I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Homo Department whether his attention has been called to the aggravated assault committed, on 13th February, on Mr. John Shilan, a miner at Ludhoe Colliery, county Durham, and attributed to those whose actions he had just previously denounced at a political meeting; and if he will take care that adequate arrangements are made to prevent the public expression of political views being attended by physical reprisals?

I have received a report on this matter, which is to the effect that Mr. Shilan complained to the police on the 13th of February—which was a moonlight night—of having been assaulted by two men, but that he was unable to give any description of his assailants. The police made full and immediate inquiry, but were unable to find any further evidence of the occurrence. Two policemen, who were in the neighbourhood at the time the assault is alleged to have been committed, heard nothing of it. I may add that, since the hon. and gallant Gentleman's question was put down, Shilan has stated to the police that the assault was not committed by any of those who attended the meeting; and the case does not appear to me to afford ground for supposing that the police arrangements of the neighbourhood are inadequate.

asked whether this man had not previously addressed political meetings in that place; whether it was not the fact that on the date referred to in the question he was in a state of intoxication, and whether the injuries alleged to be sustained were not occasioned by a fall on the ice as he was returning home.

said, he did not know the exact form of these injuries, as there was some obscurity about the matter.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War have the regulations for the direction of troops called out in case of riot been revised, in accordance with the suggestions of the Featherstone Commission?

Yes, the regulations have been revised, and the revised regulations were published in the Army Orders for March last. ["Hear, hear!"]

I beg to ask the Postmaster General what number of postmaster ships have, since 1881, been given to members of the London postal service, distinguishing those given to telegraphists, postmen, sorters, and messengers respectively?

The numbers are as follows:—Two postmasters, nine chief clerks, one superintendent, one assistant superintendent, one clerk, one inspector, one apparatus examiner, four countermen, three telegraphists, three sorters, one bagman—total 27. This number does not include transfers of postmasters from one office to another in the London Postal District.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General whether, in the event of a vacancy occurring in the postmastership of Cork, regard will be had to the claims of Irish officials to the position?

Yes, Sir.

I beg to ask the Lord Advocate whether it is intended to prosecute Monson, the late tenant of Ardlamont, for alleged frauds, in respect that he incurred liabilities to tradesmen for considerable amounts after he had been declared a bankrupt?

There is no intention to prosecute Monson in Scotland in respect of any alleged frauds, which, so far as I know, have been brought under the notice of the criminal authorities. I may, however, say that I do not know to what alleged frauds the question is particularly directed.

It is a criminal offence.

That depends on the circumstances.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General—(1) whether he is a ware that, on the delivery in this country recently of two letters written by an officer of H.M.S. Tartar, on the West Indian Station, from Jamaica, each bearing Jamaica stamps to the value of 3d., and each being under weight, the recipient, a distinguished Admiral, father of the writer, was fined 10d. on each letter, and the Jamaica stamps were obliterated and rendered useless; (2) whether, on complaint being made, the official reply (sent after 17 days delay) from the General Post Office, stated that the letters, having been posted on one of Her Majesty's ships, should have been prepaid in British postage stamps, and the General Post Office did not recognise Colonial stamps; (3) whether he is aware that British Naval Officers are generally unaware of the existence of such a rule, and that it is frequently difficult to obtain proper British Home stamps on board; and (4) whether he will direct that, in all cases where letters received in this country from officers or sailors of Her Majesty's Navy serving on stations abroad bear Colonial stamps of adequate value, no fine shall be exacted from the recipients?

The amount demanded on the delivery of each of the letters referred to was 5d., not 10d., as stated in the first paragraph of the question. The Jamacia stamps on one of the covers are not obliterated, but if those on the other cover were obliterated by mistake their value shall be made good. The answer to the second paragraph is in the affirmative. I am not aware that there is frequently difficulty in obtaining British stamps on board British men-of-war; the Queen's regulations provide that the Accountant Officer on board shall obtain a supply of postage stamps for the use of the crew. The system of exchanging direct bags between the General Post Office and British ships of war was introduced for the convenience of the officers and crews of those ships, and it was arranged that British stamps should be used. But the suggestion of the hon. Member shall receive consideration.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General whether, with a view to give further encouragement of small savings amongst the poor, and especially the children of the poor, he will provide forms to hold 24 halfpenny stamps, in addition to the forms issued for penny stamps, for investments in the Post Office Savings Bank?

The hon. Member seems to be unaware that halfpenny stamps are accepted on the slip forms referred to. It is not desirable to multiply the number of forms to be issued throughout the country, and I do not think it would be expedient to introduce a new and special form for 24 stamps.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General whether, in order to facilitate the transmission of small sums by postal order and to abolish the anomalous charges for amounts between 12s. and 15s. so transmitted, he will recommend the reduction of the fee for the issue of the 2s. and 2s. 6d. orders from 1d. to ½d.?

I regret that I cannot support the Hon. Member's suggestion. I do not think 1d. an unreasonable sum to charge for a 2s. or 2s. 6d. postal order.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War if he will state the grounds on which the Government buy cheap Foreign meat and forage for the forces in Great Britain and Ireland?

I can hardly accept as accurate the somewhat broad statement of our practice implied in my hon. and gallant Friend's question. I can only refer him to my answer to the hon. Member for Preston on the 13th ultimo as regards meat, and to my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary's answer to the hon. Member for the Wellington division of Somerset on the 7th ultimo as to forage. I would also refer to my answer to the hon. and gallant Member for West Essex on the 17th instant.

I beg to ask the Secretary for War, whether non-commissioned officers who have not completed 21 years' service, even if they have served 20 years, are subject to have their pensions reduced by 25 per cent., and in addition to have a further sum of one penny a day deducted from such pension for each year not completed; whether a private may leave the Army, after completing 18 years' service, with a deduction of only a halfpenny a day for each incompleted year; and, what is the reason for such a difference?

Non-commissioned officers who have completed 18 years' service, but have not completed 21 years, are allowed to leave the service, for their own purposes, with a pension reduced 25 per cent. They are not subject to any further deduction. Privates, after 18 years' service, are subject to a deduction of 1d. a day for every year or portion of a year short of 21 years' service. Non-commissioned officers are of great value in the Army, and there is no wish to encourage them to retire prematurely.

I beg to ask the Secretary for War whether his attention has been drawn to the deaths from sunstroke of two soldiers at Aldershot last week; whether, on Saturday 8th June, companies of regulars and volunteers had to march from Weybridge to Bisley, a distance of 12 miles, under a burning sun, in consequence of which several men were invalided; what was the extent and nature of the medical aid obtainable on the ground on the 8th June, and what, if any, provision had been made for the relief of any sufferers amongst the 700 or 800 men engaged in the firing competition on that day; and whether, in future these long marches during the heat of the day will be discontinued except in cases of necessity?

Yes, Sir, my attention has been drawn to this melancholy occurence. There was a rifle competition at Bisley on Saturday, June 8, and under the terms of the competition, competitors had to march 11 miles, but there was no compulsion to do so beyond emulation. This is not a long march, and there does not appear to be any reason to interfere with the conditions of a voluntary competition on account of this most regret-able incident. Ample medical aid was at hand, and, as a matter of fact, was afforded by the medical officer of the Guards, from the adjacent Guards camp at Pirbright. ["Hear, hear."]

asked the right hon. Gentleman whether the men were not marching in forage caps which afforded no protection against the sun.

My attention was not drawn to this fact, but the opinion among military men is that this was not an excessive march.

asked the right hon. Gentleman whether he was aware that the comrades of the deceased men had to go some distance in order to obtain medical assistance?

This was a voluntary competitive march, and, therefore, it was not to be expected that a medical man should accompany the men on the march. There was abundant medical aid available and in close proximity.

wished to call the right hon. Gentleman's attention to the advisability of giving to the soldiers a more reasonable head-gear than the absurd forage cap which they were at present.

We have taken, away from the British soldier my native Glengarry. Perhaps it is owing to that that this melancholy event occurred.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General if he will permit scientific or technical witnesses who are not members of the postal telegraph service to give evidence before the Committee to show the difference between the work done by the postal telegraph clerks and that done by the letter-sorters with whom they have been classed; and whether he will permit one or more representatives of the telegraph clerks to be present at the sittings of the Committee with power to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, and to address the Committee on the evidence laid before them; if so, if he will grant leave of absence to these persons while so engaged?

The Committee on Post Office Establishments have a discretionary power to examine any persons in the service of the Department other than those belonging to the clerical establishments of the chief offices who, the Committee may have reason to believe, have authority to make representations to them on the position and prospects of any classes of employés in the service of the Department. The Committee are also authorised to send for any persons outside the service of the Department who from their position and their experience may be able to give them information on the remuneration and circumstances of persons engaged in private employment whose position they may consider analogous to that of the employés of the Post Office. It rests with the Committee, and not with myself, to determine how far they will avail themselves of the authority. I understand that the Committee have decided to sit in public, but I presume that they will regulate their proceedings by the ordinary rules which govern the practice of such inquiries, and will retain the examination of witnesses in their own hands.

I beg to ask the Civil Lord of the Admiralty what is the reason for the delay in giving effect to the decision of the Admiralty to discontinue the practice of making Marines on embarkation pay for their white clothing.

As I stated in reply to my hon. Friend on the 23rd ultimo, the alteration required the sanction of an Order in Council, and no Council has recently been held. Arrangements will, I hope, be made so that the delay may not affect the date from which Marines will obtain the benefit of the new rule.

I beg to ask the Secretary for Scotland whether the future constitution of the office of Director of Chancery in Scotland has been under consideration for several and how many years; and, whether it is intended to take active steps in the matter at an early date?

It is the case that a Departmental Committee in 1889 recommended certain changes which would dispense with the necessity of keeping up the Chancery Office as a separate establishment. Many technical details were involved in these recommendations, and legislation would be required, which cannot be undertaken this Session. In the meantime the duties of the office are conducted by an interim director (Mr. Strettell-Miller), who has been appointed on the distinct understanding that he would have no claim to compensation in the event of the office being abolished.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if he will ascertain whether the Inspectors of Fisheries, Messrs. Cecil Roche and Hornsby, stated at a public meeting lately on the Shannon that the use of lines for the capture of eels was illegal, although a question was then before the inspectors on which no legal decision by any competent tribunal has as yet been given and, whether, considering that the decision on such a point will involve the livelihood of hundreds of fishermen who follow this mode of fishing, which has always been recognised by the Fishery Commissioners and Inspectors as not contrary to any Act of Parliament, he will give directions that the Fishery Inspectors shall not make declarations as to the state of the law until they have legal decision thereon by competent tribunals?

The Inspectors of Fisheries inform me that, having been asked on the occasion referred to, to give an opinion on the legality of the use of long lines, they simply expressed their view of the law as interpreted by them in the matter. The Inspectors did not pronounce a decision on the point, and in announcing their view of the law they acted, so I am advised, within their right. It is still open to any aggrieved person (as it was before the inquiry in question) to test the validity of the Inspectors' acts, or their pronouncements when acted upon, before the regular tribunals.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland when will the Reports of the Inspectors of Irish Fisheries for the year 1894 be presented to Parliament, having regard to the fact that the 112th Section, 5 and 6 Viet., c. 106, directs that this should be done before the end of January in each year?

The Annual Report of the Inspectors for 1894 will be presented to Parliament in the course of a few days. The work of the Department has so largely grown since the passing of the Act of 1842 that however possible it may then have been to prepare a Report within the period mentioned, it would not now be practicable to submit a Report within such a period that would be of any value.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, if his attention has been drawn to the fact that a labourer named M'Laughlin in 1893 sent in a representation to the Lisnaskea Board of Guardians for the erection of a labourer's cottage, and as yet has received no reply; if there are other labourers whose representations have not been attended to; if, in consequence of the Guardians' neglect, M'Laughlin was unable to present his case at the inquiry held by Mr. Agnew on 19th March last, when the clerk of the union admitted that M'Laughlin's case was overlooked, but would be attended to at the earliest opportunity; and if he would direct the Local Government Board inspector to make inquiry into these allegations?

The clerk of the union states that representations in favour of the labourer named in the question were laid before the Guardians in April and May 1894, but were too late to allow of the necessary 14 days' public notice being given before the date fixed for the consideration of the representations. The clerk mentioned this at the recent inquiry, but did not state that the application of M'Laughlin had been overlooked, as alleged. I believe it is the intention of the Guardians to take M'Laughlin's case into consideration when dealing with the report of the Local Government Inspector, and it will then be open to them to include cottages for M'Laughlin and the other labourers referred to.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland—(1) whether, in connection with the prosecution of certain tenants on the Massereene estate, the Irish Government are having recourse to a statute of Edward III.; and (2) will he direct that agricultural trade unionists in Ireland, who may be charged with offences similar to those alleged against the Massereene tenants, shall be tried under the ordinary law?

I replied yesterday to an inquiry similar to that contained in the first paragraph. Justices of the Peace in England and in Ireland have at all times exercised the power of requiring persons to find sureties of good behaviour when, in the exercise of their judgment, a case is made out for it in evidence. The power is founded on their commission as Justices and the statute of Edward, and it is, and has been, the ordinary law. Of course, every case of this description must depend upon its own peculiar circumstances.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, when the Report of the Congested Districts Board of Ireland for 1894 will be issued?

A Report of the Congested Districts Board for the months of January, February, and March, 1894, has already been presented to Parlialiament. The Report for the year ended March 31, 1895, is in preparation, and will be presented without any avoidable delay.

When?

I cannot say when, but I will urge the matter upon the officials of the Board.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether he will lay upon the Table of the House the Report of an inquiry ordered by him into the causes of the death of a patient named Thomas Weir, at St. Anne's Heath, Virginia Water, held by Mr. Gully, assisted by Dr. George H. Savage, in March of this year?

Yes, Sir, if the hon. Member will move for it.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War, whether he will lay upon the Table of the House the Report of Brigade Surgeon Notter, Professor of Military Hygiene at Netley, on the sanitary condition of the Barracks and water supply at Aldershot, and, if not, can a copy of the Report be had in any other way?

I shall be happy to show my hon. Friend a copy of this Report, which is not intended to be laid on the Table of the House.

asked whether there was any reason why these Reports should be made confidential?

said, it was not very confidential because he proposed to show it to his hon. Friend. It was generally the rule that Reports of this sort should be confidential.

said, he understood from the answer of the right hon. Gentleman that he could take a copy of the Report.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if there will be an opportunity within the next three weeks for a discussion on the frequent indefinite postponements of the ease of the Christian Brothers?

I do not think the House wants to discuss "frequent indefinite postponements," because there have not been frequent indefinite postponements. As to whether an opportunity of discussing the general question, to which I presume the hon. Member refers, will arise, I do not know whether the House will have time to do so within the next three weeks, but I have every reason to hope the correspondence on the subject will be at an end and that the case will be decided within that period

asked, if there was no indefinite postponement of the date, how the question was indefinitely postponed?

said, it was postponed definitely until the time arrived when an agreement should be arrived at.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether he is aware that Frank Miles, now lying under sentence of death at Norwich, was some time ago attacked by a fit which the doctor who attended him thought was sunstroke, and that, when he recovered after some hours, the doctor informed his mother that it would be dangerous to provoke him or torment him in any way; and, if so, whether he will carefully consider these facts?

The statements referred to have already been brought to my notice by my hon. Friend, the junior Member for Southampton, and they, as well as all the circumstances of the case, will receive my most careful consideration.

asked the First Commissioner of Works, when the rules under which bicycling in Hyde Park is to be allowed would be laid upon the Table of the House?

The new rules dealing with cycling in Hyde Park cannot be promulgated and laid before Parliament until after the end of 40 days from the appearance of the notice in the London Gazette— namely, until after July 21.

Will the right hon. Gentleman see if there is a special regulation as to the costume worn by female cyclists? [Laughter.]

I think the general law is sufficient.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade whether, in issuing to the railway companies of the United Kingdom the Circular of 31st August 1892 with reference to eyesight tests, there was any intention on the part of the Board of Trade to insist upon the railway companies adopting the system of tests recommended by the committee appointed by the Council of the Royal Society, or whether it was intended to draw the attention of the railway companies to those recommendations, and to leave it to their discretion either to adopt them or to continue any system of tests which, in their experience, they had found to work well and satisfactorily?

The Board of Trade have no power to insist upon the adoption by railway companies of any particular system of tests; the companies must use their discretion in the matter; the Board of Trade have, however, felt it their duty to press upon the attention of the companies the recommendations on the subject made by such an authoritative body as a committee of the Royal Society.

asked whether he was to assume that the correspondence with the railway companies satisfied the Board of Trade, although several of the companies preferred to maintain their own system of tests.

said, that without looking at the correspondence he would hardly like to say.

I beg to ask the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether the War Office has come to any decision upon the representations made to them with regard to the wages of carpenters and joiners temporarily employed at the gun wharf at Devonport; and, if so, what is the decision at which they have arrived?

The Secretary of State has, after due consideration, decided to raise the wages of the carpenters and joiners temporarily employed at the gun wharf at Devonport from 24s. to 27s. a week. This decision will take effect from the 1st June.

I beg to ask the President of the Local Government Board whether he is aware that certain assistant overseers are not on their demand notes distinguishing the rate required for the expenses of the Parish Council, but include such expenses in an item described as "other charges;" and whether he will give directions that the demand note shall in all cases show clearly and separately the rate required for the Parish Council?

The attention of the Local Government Board has been directed to this matter, and they will very shortly issue an Order prescribing the form of demand note, and requiring that the rate in the £ estimated in respect of the expenses of the Parish Council or parish meeting shall, so far as practicable, be separately shown in the demand for the rate.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty if he can give the names of the Haulbowline Inquiry Commmittee?

said, the names of the Haul-bowline Inquiry Committee would be Vice-Admiral Tracey, Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Molyneux, Mr. G. H. Stainer (Civil assistant to the Admiral Superintendent, Portsmouth), Mr. A. Wood (Engineer Assistant to the Director of Dockyards), and Mr. W. T. Green (Cork).

asked when the Committee would sit, and what were the terms of reference.

said the terms of reference had not yet been formulated, but he would carry out his promise to his hon. Friend.

I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, can he state what number of tons of gold ore were treated during the month of May at the Gwyn-fynydd mine, and what was the average yield per ton of such ore; how many tons of gold ore have been treated by the present lessees at the Clogan mine, situate in Merionethshire, and what has been the average yield per ton of such ore, and what is the total value of such gold; are royalties charged at the same rate on this mine as at the Gwynfynydd mine, and why is there not uniformity of royalties with regard to this industry; what is the total tonnage of gold ore treated on the Welsh goldfields since the hon. Member for Merthyr commenced operations; what has been the average yield of gold per ton on such fields, and what is the total value of such gold; what is the total amount of money paid to the Woods and Forests Office for royalties and fees for licences and leases during that period; and is he aware that there is a similar auriferous belt of country in the county of Carmarthen which is now being opened up, and what royalties do the Government propose to charge in Carmarthenshire?

These accounts have not yet come in and cannot be given. Since 1887 2,270 tons of ore have been treated. The average yield of gold has been 1oz. 18dwt. per ton, and the total value of the gold £15,871. The royalties charged on private lands are less than those on lands where the Crown owns all the minerals and not merely mines royal. The total tonnage of gold ore treated since 1887 is 46,795 tons; the average yield has been 11dwt.; total value, £88,566. The royalties received by the Crown have been £2,928. The sum of £2,948 has been received as dead rents where there has been no working, and £1,525 in fees. I cannot express any opinion as to the gold in Carmarthen, but the same facilities would be given there as in Merioneth.

I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, what is the date of a gold mining lease granted by the Crown to Mr. R. H. Wood, of Rugby; what is the area of land so leased, the dead rent reserved by the Crown, the term of such lease, and whether any working conditions are imposed by such lease; what other gold mining leases have been granted by the Crown to other landowners in Wales, what area do such leases in the aggregate embrace, for what periods are they granted, and what working conditions do they contain; have applications been made by various persons during the last six months for licences to work Royal mines in private lands not under lease in Merionethshire, and what is the reason the applicants have received as yet on effective replies to their applications; does the Woods and Forests Office intend to lease further areas of land to the landowners of Merionethshire without imposing working conditions whilst miners are prepared to work them, and will the Government take steps to compel all holders of existing leases to work the mines leased to them for mining purposes; and, will the Government now consider the advisability of granting small areas of land to mining prospectors for a nominal fee, so as to encourage men without capital to prospect for gold in that county, and for such purpose to appoint a resident officer in Merionethshire to lay out claims or small holdings to such prospectors?

The lease in question was granted in 1889. The dead rent is £2; the term is 31 years; there are no working covenants. There are other leases, 13 in number, to landowners, covering an area of about 25,000 acres. Some have working clauses and some have not. There are applications for licences before the Office of Woods. My hon. Friend is quite aware of the great difficulties which attend decisions on these questions. I have no hesitation in saying that, in my opinion, no mining leases ought to be granted without effectual conditions to secure the working of the minerals, so that the mining industry may be properly developed and employment found for the people in Wales. The system of granting take-notes for a year at a cost of £5, including surveyor's fee and maps, has worked well and given general satisfaction. It is not thought well to grant leases for very small areas, as the character of the gold-bearing vein is very uncertain. A special resident officer is unnecessary, as the Crown receiver is available at Harlech and the resident mine agent at Carnarvon.

asked whether the right hon. Gentleman would adopt the suggestion which had been made to have a practical man down there.

That is the very thing I desire. I have to-day seen the Commissioner of Woods on this subject, and told him that I should be very willing to assist in securing the engagement of some experienced man to investigate the whole of this subject of gold production in Wales. It is obviously of considerable importance. ("Hear, hear!")

I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer if he can give the probable date of the Committee upon the Irish Land Bill?

It will come on as soon as the Committee on the Welsh Church Rill is finished; when that will be I am not at present in a position to state accurately. [Laughter.]

I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, before coming to a decision on the question of giving a site on Westminster Palace grounds for a statue for Oliver Cromwell, he will give an opportunity to the present Parliament to express an opinion on the subject?

That question is not yet arrived at; I cannot make any engagement on the matter.

May I ask the right hon. gentleman whether he intends to make any further concessions to an anti-British and anti-Protestant party? [Cheers and Laughter.]

I think that is a question which the hon. Member will hardly expect me to answer.

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland whether a Bill had been introduced by the Lord Chancellor into the House of Lords dealing with inebriates and habitual drunkards, and whether it was because there was no necessity for the Bill in Ireland that that country was excluded from its operation.

I am aware that the Government have introduced such a Bill in the other House, from the operation of which Ireland is exempted. If hon. Members from Ireland desire, when the Bill comes down to this House, that it should he extended to Ireland, the Government will consider the matter. ["Hear, hear!"]

asked how it came about that two Government Bills dealing with the question of Temperance had been introduced this Session, and that Ireland had been deliberately excluded from them. Had there been any arrangement with anyone that this should be so? [Cheers.]

There is no arrangement with anybody.

Then why is it so?

Perhaps the hon. Member will allow me to answer that question. The Bill in reference to inebriates has been introduced in consequence of the recommendations of a Departmental Committee relating to England and to England only. Another Departmental Committee has since sat in connection with Scotland, and has made a report in reference to Scotland. The two reports are somewhat similar, and we have been able to incorporate in one Bill provisions founded upon their recommendations. No such inquiry has been made in regard to Ireland.

I give notice that unless the Bill is made to apply to Ireland I will oppose it altogether. [Cheers.]

asked whether it was not a fact that the Prisons Commission had not pointed out to the Secretary of State that it was necessary to provide a better diet for prisoners in Ireland, owing to the amount of inebriety in that country, and whether that recommendation was not then in force in Ireland.

said, the fact had not come to his knowledge. It transpired in the time of his predecessor.

asked what would be the course of business next week.

said, the business for next week would be the Welsh Church Bill, and some time or other next week they must bring on the Seal Fisheries Bill. Supply would be taken on Friday.

asked whether, at this period of the Session, public business should not be taken as soon as private business was disposed of, so that the House might not have to wait until Half-past Three o'clock?

said, he would consider the matter.

in the Chair.

Sir,—I have to make an announcement of great importance and of great interest to the Members of the Committee. I have to state that on October 1st next, a date which is regarded as marking the close of the active military year, His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge will relinquish the position which he has so long held as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. It would hardly be possible for anyone who has followed with interest the history of the Army for many years, still less would it be possible for one who has been engaged, as it has been my fortune to be engaged, with several intervals, in the actual work of the civil administration of the Army, to make this announcement without emotion. [Cheers.] His Royal Highness has been at the head of the Army for the unexampled term of 39 years. During all that time he has devoted all his energies and abilities—the whole of his life, in fact—to its service. [Cheers.] He has become identified with the Army. The Army in all its ranks has seen in him a true friend, and, as he himself, I am sure, would like to be considered, a faithful servant. [Cheers] It has recognised in him some of the most characteristic qualities of our countrymen. The Army has been, in ever-increasing degree, proud of the Duke, as he is called, and fund of the Duke [cheers]; and if the time has now come, as come sooner or later it must, when his active career shall cease, he will be followed in his retirement throughout the Army by a universal sentiment of gratitude, sympathy, and regret. [Cheers.] Happily, sir, the time has not arrived, and I trust it may be long deferred, for making a general eulogy of his Royal Highness's public career, nor should I be a fit person to make it. But perhaps the Committee will allow me, as having had a prolonged opportunity of observing the qualities which he has displayed in the discharge of his duties, to express some appreciation of one or two of the more conspicuous among his qualities. And in this I will endeavour, as well as I am able, to disengage myself from the influence of his most attractive personality, and from the power he possesses beyond most men of winning for himself the regard, I would say even the affection, of those with whom he is brought closely in contact. [Cheers.] I leave aside the question of technical attainments. I say nothing of the Duke of Cambridge's extraordinary familiarity with all the details of the military profession, and especially with the traditions, duties, practices, and requirements of our own Army—a familiarity in which, probably no officer in the service could equal him. ["Hear, hear!"] I say nothing of his industry, of the energy which he displays in an unflagging degree, even at the advanced age which he has now reached, and which can be gauged by any reader of the daily newspapers who follows his Royal Highness's engagements week after week. I wish to speak rather of other qualities which the Duke of Cambridge brings to the service of his country, and which appeal especially to us as members of Parliament. There are two qualities which, in my opinion, are the most important that any public man, and especially any public servant, can enjoy. One of them is supposed to be inborn, though I doubt it; the other is acquired. They come, in my opinion, before talent; they are better than zeal; they make genius useful; they fertilise eloquence. They are as rare as they are essential; they are constantly spoken of, but never defined. We know them by the vague titles of common sense and knowledge of the world. [Cheers.] In the exercise of these great qualities the Duke of Cambridge is a past past-master, and it is their possession that has made his influence so great. But, Sir, there is another characteristic which comes home very closely to the heart of the House of Commons. The Duke of Cambridge has been, as I have said, for 39 years the occupant of the office of Commander-in-Chief. At first his position was one of quasi independence; he was gradually brought closer to the Secretary of State, until at last he has been distinctly responsible to the Parliamentary Minister. During a great part of this time, though, happily, not of recent years, there was much room for jealousy, for difficulty, and for friction, and if this trying time has been successfully passed, it has been in a great measure because the Duke of Cambridge is a firm observer of constitutional propriety, a respecter of Parliamentary authority, and because he desires always to recognise and follow the general feeling of the country. I only now express publicly what I have often said privately, when I say that, if Providence had called the Duke of Cambridge to be sovereign ruler of some country, he would have exercised in an eminent degree all the qualities which we regard as necessary in the constitutional head of the State. I see it sometimes imputed to him, in articles on Army subjects, that he is an impediment in the way of all reform. Well, Sir, it is well known that, when, a quarter of a century ago, certain great changes were advocated, fundamentally altering our Army system, the Duke of Cambridge did not then view them with favour, because he did not anticipate a successful result from them. But when they were introduced with the approval of the opinion in the country and with the authority of Parliament, he frankly accepted them; he has never been slow to acknowledge the benefits accomplished by them; and I can say that of late years he has never shown himself unwilling to adopt such changes as were proved likely to be of advantage to the Army. If I required to quote instances of this temperament I would refer to the fact that he now makes way in order that certain changes may be introduced which Ministers have recommended to her Majesty for the benefit of the service to which he belongs. If the time has now come for the retirement of his Royal Highness, and if we are, some of us at least, looking forward to the introduction, on the occurrence of this event, of an altered, and, as we think, a more efficient machinery of administration, we can yet with perfect consistency look back with admiration and gratitude upon a long career, distinguished by such constant, zeal and devotion, and marked by a marvellous development and improvement in that Army which it has been the Duke of Cambridge's pride to command and whose interests it is his highest happiness to serve. [Cheers.] This event imposes upon Her Majesty's Government, and upon the Secretary of State for War in particular, a serious and difficult task. With common accord it is agreed that the present Commander-in-Chief cannot be succeeded by any officer with so large powers, and it is also agreed that the administration of the Army ought to be adapted to the latest ideas of efficiency. If we fail to make our method effective it will not be from lack of advice. One authority after another, one committee or commission after another, has pronounced the most confident judgment on the subject; but undoubtedly the most authoritative pronouncement has been that of the Royal Commission which sat in 1890 under the presidency of the present Duke of Devonshire. Now I have on more than one occasion within the last two or three years been interrogated as to my attitude towards this Hartington Report as it is cased, and I have always been careful to give an exceedingly cautious reply [A laugh], and this for a twofold reason—firstly, because, while I cordially concurred, as a member of the Commission, in the main lines of the report, I was a dissentient with respect to one or two of their somewhat prominent individual suggestions, which were not essential to those main lines; and, secondly, because any such academic recommendations are always to be held subject to such modifications on the part of those actually responsible for their application as may be suggested by active experience in the duties concerned. The Committee will not expect me on this occasion to enter upon the details of a scheme for the reorganisation of military administration which necessarily is not yet matured, but this I am prepared to say, that we accept and shall proceed upon the main principles of the Report of the Hartington Commission. The Report of the Commission refers to certain defects of principle, which appear to be inherent in the War Office system, and they define these to be, in the first place:—

"An excessive centralisation of responsibility in the person of the Commander-in-Chief on whom the whole executive command, administration, and supply of the Army now devolve. He is, in fact, the only officer who has any direct responsibility to the Secretary of State."

That is the first defect. Then, secondly,—

"the system cannot adequately provide for the consultative as distinguished from the executive and administrative duties of the War Department."

Now, what are the remedies proposed? The Commissioners say that—

"the principles which should be kept in view in any changes which may be decided upon are: The recognition of the responsibility to Parliament which rests on the Secretary of State; the recognition of the importance of the consultative as distinct from the administrative and executive functions of the professional advisers of the Minister; and the establishment of direct responsibility to the Minister of officers charged with certain denned duties."

These principles we adopt and will act upon. ["Hear, hear!"] We do not propose to create the new office of Chief of the Staff as described in the Report, believing such an office to be not only unnecessary, but undesirable. We maintain the appointment of General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, but his functions will be greatly modified as compared with the duties now attributed to the Commander-in-Chief, and his office will be subject to the ordinary rules affecting staff appointments, and will be tenable for the usual term of years, capable, of course, of extension, as in the case of other appointments. He will be the principal Military adviser of the Secretary of State, and he, with the other heads of the Military Departments, who will each be directly responsible to the Minister, will constitute a deliberative council, so that the Secretary of State when he gives his decisions will be guided and supported by the express opinions of all the experienced officers by whom he is surrounded. The other departments will be the Adjutant General's Department, dealing with discipline in the Army; the Quartermaster General's Department, dealing with supplies, &c.; the Department of Director of Artillery, or whatever name may be given him, dealing with materials of war; the Inspector General of Fortifications, as he is now called, dealing with works and cognate subjects. These five general officers, each directly responsible to the Secretary of State, will constitute a deliberative council of the kind to which I have referred. That is a very rough indication of the general idea; it, of course, requires careful elaboration in details. I firmly believe that when this new configuration is given to the heights of Military Administration, when a system is thus introduced less centralised and more elastic, great advantage to the Army will ensue. But I should not be honest if I did not depreciate the too sanguine view which I have seen expressed, which hails the prospect of rapid changes in the Army, and of vast economies as the consequence of a redistribution of duties among the officers of the Headquarters Staff. I trust that improved administration will follow, and this will have its due effect. But, after all, if it be the case, as I know it to be, that at this moment no patriotic man need think of the condition of our Military forces with misgiving; if we are able to discern in them a constant tendency to development in power and efficiency, if the country be year after year getting—as the phrase goes—more value for its money, the main factor towards this result is not the co-operation, however able, of half-a-dozen distinguished soldiers at headquarters. All that can be done by them is to secure full justice, freedom, and play to that moving force which will not fail us—namely, the patient and intelligent devotion to duty of all ranks within the Army itself. [Cheers.]

In the interesting speech just made the Secretary for War has hinted at changes to be made in the War Office which no doubt must in the future invite discussion, and even anxious discussion, in this House, and of which we doubtless shall hear much more before the Session is over. But the right hon. Gentleman has given us the ideas of the Government on these prospective changes in a form obviously general and vague, and until we know in more detail what precisely it is the Government propose I think I should be going beyond my functions if I attempted any criticism or discussion on these proposals. But the minds of the Committee will, I think, turn not so much to the future as to the past at the present stage of Debate. We must all feel, as the Secretary for War feels, that the severance of the long connection of the Commander-in-Chief with the Army is an event which moves us and must move the country, and which for the moment must exclude from our consideration this particular question, which cannot for very long be deferred. The Commander-in-Chief has served his Queen and country in his present capacity for nearly 40 years, and during those 40 years he has had the privilege conceded to all public men in this country of being tolerably freely criticised from time to time. But even those who have indulged in criticism will admit that the Commander-in-Chief has throughout that long period been a bright example of single-minded devotion to the service of the country in the duties entrusted to him. It has never been my good fortune to serve in an office which brought me into direct official relations with the Commander-in-Chief, but it is not necessary to have had that privilege which the right hon. Gentleman has enjoyed to be assured that the Commander-in-Chief has shown a power of continuous and strenuous work which few can imitate, and of which, perhaps, we can hardly find such another example in the public service. ["Hear, hear!"] As the result of that continuous and strenuous exertion the Commander-in-Chief has, by universal consent, a knowledge of the details of Army work, in which he probably had no rival. ["Hear, hear!"] He has always been able, in spite of the great, of the revolutionary, changes which have taken place during his term of Office, to keep abreast, and to do more than keep abreast, of each new condition of Army affairs as it has arisen. He has, as the deserved result of his public service, earned the gratitude and affection of the whole Army of which he has been the head. ["Hear, hear!"] It would ill become me, in the presence of the Gentlemen who have a far more minute knowledge of Army affairs than I can pretend to have, to go through, in any detail, the special services which the Commander-in-Chief has rendered to the Army and to the country. But I think it would not be out of place to mention two, both of which I think—one, at all events—were touched upon by the right hon. Gentleman. The first of these to which the Secretary of State did not make special illusion, was the anxious care which the Commander-in-Chief has always had of the wants and needs of the private soldier, and the minute knowledge which he has had of the condition of life in which the private soldier lives. It is in no small degree, I believe, owing to his continuous exertions that the life of a private soldier has undergone so great a change for the better in the last generation. The other point of view is one not purely military, but it is not on that account less important, or less deserving of the recognition and gratitude of this House. This point has been dealt with by the right hon. Gentleman. Everybody who has any knowledge of the subject must feel that no man has more clearly realised than the Commander-in-Chief the spirit which ought to animate the head of the A a free and constitutionally governed country. It has not always been a lesson easily learned by members of the military profession. It has been learned completely and practised without stay or hindrance through his whole career by His Royal Highness the present Commander-in-Chief; and we who are members of the Legislature, we who have had in some respects, perhaps, to come into collision from time to time in the last 30 years with some cherished military traditions, owe a double debt of gratitude to the patriotic soldier who has been at the head of the Army, and who has used the great power which his position has given him to make the reforms and alterations required by this House acceptable and palatable to those who served under him. [Cheers.] We shall, I hope and believe, always find men fitted for the service of their country in the high position of Commander-in-Chief, but we shall never find any man who will inspire greater affection in the Army which he commands or who will be animated by a higher sense of his public duty to the Queen and to Parliament. [Cheers.]

said that, as one of the old soldiers sitting in the House, he desired to thank the Secretary of State for the kind words he had used towards the Commander-in-Chief. He himself entered the Army 43 years ago, and having served continuously for that period, first in active service and later in the auxiliary forces, he could bear testimony that the announcement which had just been made would be deeply felt by all ranks of her Majesty's forces. The British soldier had for many years looked up to his Royal Highness as one of the best friends of the Army, and many of the better changes which had taken place during the past few years had been mainly attributable to the Commander-in-Chief. He would remind the Committee that during the Crimean War Ids Royal Highness led the first division, which was then, to a certain extent, the pick of the Army, and went through all the important engagements connected with the siege of Sebastopol, showing that though he was a Prince of the Royal blood he was not above taking the position offered to him and doing his duty honourably and nobly as the general commanding a provision of that force. [Hear, hear.]

said, the Leader of the Opposition, following the Secretary of State, had expressed in admirable language the feeling of the House with regard to the long service, detailed knowledge of army administration, and great popularity among the soldiers of his Royal Highness. With regard to the future, he wished, as one who had criticised the War Office on a good many former occasions, to express some satisfaction with the statement of the Secretary of State. A great deal would depend on the way in which the changes were worked out, but generally speaking, if the right hon. Gentleman's main words continued to be the expression of the opinion of the Government, they ought to be satisfactory. The right hon. Gentleman had stated that the future Commander-in-Chief, although possessed of lesser powers than the present Commander-in-Chief, would, nevertheless, be the principal military adviser of the Secretary of State for War; and though he suggested that there would be a board of five, yet the qualifications with regard to the services of the other officers were so marked, that, if the carefully-chosen words of the right hon. Gentleman were adhered to, the scheme would give general satisfaction to the House and the country. Anything like the creation of a new board with equal powers, where decisions would be arrived at by counting heads, would, of course, never give satisfaction; but, if the right hon. Gentleman adhered to the main lines of his statement, the country would have a scheme which would bring it more into line with the scientific requirements of the present day than any which it had hitherto possessed.

said, he had not referred to anything in the nature of an Executive Board. What he wished to see introduced was a consultative Council comprising these five officers. The Commander-in-Chief would be the president, but he would also have definite functions of his own apart from the other officers. Each member of this Council would have an opportunity of expressing his opinions, especially on topics which required decision and which affected more than one of the Departments. From his experience he was satisfied that that would be a most useful arrangement; but he did not contemplate anything in the nature of an Executive Board.

asked whether these great and unexpected changes were to be carried out at once, without further reference to the House of Commons. He had always thought that the great changes made by the late Mr. Stanhope were carried out on thoroughly unconstitutional principles. It seemed that that precedent was about to be followed, and that the House of Commons would have, no opportunity of discussing the proposed changes. Perhaps they could hardly press the right hon. Gentleman to tell them who the new head of the Army was to be. But the House of Commons had a right to assume the responsibility in the matter, and it was not too much to ask that it should have ample opportunity of discussing the violent changes that were to be made. As one who had served under the Duke of Cambridge, he desired to say that it was impossible to overrate the services which his Royal Highness had rendered, more particularly to the private soldier, during the long time he had been at the War Office. ["Hear, hear!"] It was, he thought, peculiar that, although the changes proposed were recommended by the Hartington and Stephen Commissions, no attempt had hitherto been made to carry them out. It was only at a moment when the country viewed the position of the Government as being critical that this change was brought forward. He did not think it was quite fair to Parliament that such a change should suddenly be sprung on the House of Commons without a word of warning and without an opportunity being afforded to collect evidence and facts which could be presented to the consideration of the House. The country would, no doubt, think that this was a species of deathbed repentance—an effort to rake up a very small amount of popularity in the country. [Cries of "Oh, oh!"]

said, he would not speak lightly of the value of the criticism made by the House of Commons on military subjects, though he did not attach the same value to that criticism on matters of military detail as appeared to be attached to it by some military Members; and he recognised the right of the House of Commons to have such a change as this submitted to its full consideration before it was finally made. He hoped, therefore, that an ample opportunity would be afforded to understand this change thoroughly before it was finally adopted in the arrangements for the Army. As a soldier of some standing and experience, he trusted that the House of Commons, in any criticism it might pass on the change, as well as on matters generally, would never forget that there must also be other essential qualifications in such an arrangement as this. Whoever the person might be who was called to such a position in the administration of the Army, he must satisfy not only the needs and the requirements of the House of Commons, but also those of the working combatant Army besides. It seemed to him that from time to time they lost sight of the necessities and the interests of the fighting soldier, and that they were inclined to be too bureaucratic, and occasionally to forget that there was a necessity behind calling for the necessity of consulting the feelings and the interests of those without whom their best arranged scheme was not worth the paper upon which it was written. [Cheers.] It was essential that respect should be paid to the traditions of the Army, and unless the new managing body observed this rule it would never be able to put an efficient Army into the field. Those were some of the dangers which he thought lurked behind the too great amatuer interference of Members of Parliament as Members of Parliament in military questions. As to his Royal Highness himself, he earnestly hoped that, whoever his successor was, he might at the end of his term of office find that he had deserved half as well of his country and of his brother soldiers as the Duke of Cambridge. [Cheers.]

said, that, in the circumstances, he would not criticise the Commander-in Chief. He did not profess to be a military expert, although he thought that in their own opinion all hon. Members were pretty good generals. [Laughter.] He thanked the right hon. Gentleman for the announcement he had made, and the Government for yielding to what he believed was the general demand of all parties in the country, without regard to politics. It had long been felt that great reforms were necessary in the management of our Army. He agreed with the last speaker that whoever was appointed to the post must have the confidence of the soldiers and officers of the Army as well as of the House of Commons. But before any final decision was arrived at he, like other hon. Members, would like to hear more about the arrangement. He believed that His Royal Highness, though called Commander-in-Chief, was never really Commander-in-Chief. He was described as "Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief; "but he was also told that it had been the custom for some years in the case of war for the Government to appoint a Commander-in-Chief in the field, who was responsible directly to the Secretary of State for War, and who had nothing to do with the so-called Commander-in-Chief. Was it the intention of the Government to continue that state of things? He thought that the right hon. Gentleman had practically followed the report of the Hartington Commission recommendations, and that he was going to carry them out except in one instance.

said, he was not so foolish as to attempt to carry out all the recommendations. He said that there were recommendations which must be considered when the time came to apply them in the light of the experience of those who had to deal with the duties concerned. All he said was that the Government followed the general principles and general lines of that Report.

understood, at all events, that one of the recommendations was not to be carried out—namely, the recommendation with regard to the Chief of the Staff. Was it the intention of the Government to make the appointment of Commander-in-Chief an ornamental one—to give it to a person who had little experience in war; or was it to be given to someone who had done real work in and for the Army? As the announcement of the Secretary of State for War had practically carried out the object he had in putting down a Notice to reduce his right hon. Friend's salary, he (Mr. Morton) should not, of course, move the Motion standing in his name.

said, he wished to address himself to the Vote now before the Committee, and to call attention to a question as to which, up to the present, the House of Commons had not obtained much satisfaction from the Secretary of State for War. It was the state of unpreparedness in respect of our small-arm ammunition. As far as he was concerned, they had been anxious that the Secretary of State should make himself responsible to the House of Commons, and should assure it that, while Parliament voted great sums of money for the public service, those sums were being administered in such a way as to give the country an efficient army. His excuse for bringing the matter forward was that it was a subject of grave anxiety to the late Government. It was brought before Mr. Stanhope, the late Secretary for War, repeatedly and strongly, by his military advisers, and it was one with which the late Government did their utmost to grapple. He was in this dilemma and difficulty—that, notwithstanding the importance of the subject, the figures with regard to our reserves of stores had been regarded as private and confidential, and, for the beat of reasons, that it was not considered consistent with public policy to make a public disclosure with regard to our reserves of supplies. He would not deviate from that position, but it placed him at a disadvantage in discussing the subject, and, if he could show a disparity between the number of rounds we possessed and the number of rifles we might have to place in the field, he should not have to ask that side of the House alone for support. He would base his case, as far as he could, upon the Army Estimates. In 1891 we were going through two processes that were always dangerous in Army matters—we were changing our rifles and adopting a different size of ammunition, and we were also changing our powder from black powder to cordite. In this condition of things the trading firms who were for the first time engaged in making up the new ammunition found it impossible to keep up the supplies, and the only place at which the Government could manufacture cordite was Waltham Abbey, where it was also being made for the first time. In 1890 and 1891 the supply received from trading firms fell short very largely of their expectations.

said, that any question relating to the manufacture of cordite ought to be discussed on Vote 9, that for warlike stores.

on the question of Order, wished to point out that it was not possible for a private Member to move an increase of Vote. This was a question of general policy, and his hon. Friend was of opinion that the authorities of the War Office had not done their duty in a very important matter of military equipment. He therefore proposed to raise the vote on the salary of the Secretary for War. In these circumstances he submitted it was hardly possible for his hon. Friend to do justice to his case upon any other item.

said, he quite saw the point, and if the Committee wished it, a general discussion could take place. Any question of general maladministration would, of course, be rightly brought forward on this vote. All he wished to say was that if the hon. Member was going into details as to the stores of ammunition, such details would be more in order on the vote for warlike stores.

said, he could not move the reduction of the vote for warlike stores, and he did not wish to do so. This was a question of general military policy, and he could bring it forward only by moving the reduction of the salary of the Secretary of State, which he proposed to do.

said the question could perhaps be raised on the salary of the Director of Artillery, by reason of the responsibility of his position.

continuing, said, that the Secretary for War had taken upon himself some responsibility for the general policy involved, not only with reference to the future, but also with regard to the past year, and it was on his salary alone that it could be properly raised. The difficulties of supply began in 1891, and the representations then made to the Secretary of State led to great efforts being made to increase the supply. The result was that the supply of ammunition at our own factories was raised to nearly treble the amount they were intended to produce, in order to meet the expected deficiency from the trade. It was intended that the supply should be increased until a reserve was provided, and he regretted that so little could then be done to make up the deficiency. In 1891–2, although the Government gave orders to manufacturers, and although they took steps to increase their own production, and for that purpose provided £375,000 in the Estimates for small-arms ammunition, the appropriation accounts showed that only £323,000 was expended. In other words, in spite of all their efforts, there was a deficiency of ten million rounds of ammunition. Thus 1892–3 was started with a deficiency above that of previous years, with new rifles actually served out to the troops of the Line and the Brigade of Guards. In 1892–3 the Government provided by the Estimates £363,000 as the largest amount they were likely to spend, and the appropriation accounts showed that they spent £372,000. In 1893–4 the present Government placed on the Estimates £370,000 as being the least sum which, in the interest of the public service, it was thought right to spend; and the appropriation accounts issued last October showed that £270,000 had been expended, leaving a surplus of £100,000, or nearly 30 per cent, of the amount of the estimate. That difference represented a deficiency of 20 million rounds of ammunition which the Government had failed to get. In 1894–5 the amount put on the Estimates was £352,000. On July 15 last year the Secretary for War said that he could not, with due regard to the interests of the public service, give any figures with regard to the reserve store of ammunition, but he added that he did not profess to regard it as satisfactory. That was a deliberate confession made by the right hon. Gentleman with figures before him that he could not make public. The deficiency was, not doubt, due to the fact that supplies could not be obtained from the trade, but in the Estimates of this year the right hon. Gentleman provided merely for annual maintenance, without making any provision for increasing the reserve, or making up the £100,000 which he had failed to secure the preceding year. What was our position with regard to rifles? The former Secretary for War-stated to the House early in 1892 that we had 300,000 magazine rifles. Now, probably, we had 500,000, but the number supplied with ammunition was practically not larger than it was three years ago. When the matter was brought before the present Secretary for War in March last, he said:—

"As to small arm ammunition the War Office, according to its competent advisers, stood well in this respect. There had been developed in this country wonderful facilities for the supply of small arm ammunition, and it was unnecessary to keep an exaggerated reserve, and the War Office was advised that it had a sufficient supply for its purpose."

He (Mr. Brodrick) did not wish to cast any doubt on the genuine nature of this advice, but he could only say the advice of the "competent advisers" of the War Office was absolutely at variance with what was given to the former Secretary for War in 1891. Without going into figures he could not show what was advised then and now, but trying the minute by the standard of public documents put forward for the guidance of the Army, what was the position with regard to the number of troops to be supplied? They had only to look at the Army List. We had at home:—Infantry of the line and foot guards, 60,000 men; Army Reserve infantry, 60,000; Militia infantry, 80,000; Volunteer infantry, 160,000; total 360,000—men absolutely serving with the colours with rifles in their hands; and abroad we had infantry of the line 21,000 men. Many opinions had been expressed as to the provision that should be made for each rifle in the hands of the troops. He would cite two as conclusive. Lord Wolseley said:—

"As a general rule, subject to such modification as the nature of the service may require, the proportion of small arm ammunition is calculated at 480 rounds per man. In my opinion there should, in action, be 200 rounds per infantry soldier either on his person or close to him."

Had we 200 rounds for each of our 360,000 infantry soldiers, or 480 rounds regarded as requisite by Lord Wolseley? [Cheers.] Let the Secretary for War try the matter, not by the opinions of the military advisers of the War Office stated over his table, but by the equipment regulations laid down for the guidance of the Army. He had consulted these, and he found they prescribed 400 rounds per man. Were there even 200 per rounds man? To supply 360,000 men with 400 rounds each, 150,000,000 rounds would be required, and that was a minimum, as it provided only for equipment and not for reserve. If there was a sudden outbreak of war, horses, transport, and even clothing could be got at a pinch, but the one thing that could not be got in a hurry was warlike stores; and he regretted that the Secretary for War, with his great knowledge of what could be done, should have used the faulty and delusive argument he used on March 15. What did the right hon. Gentleman mean by saying that in recent years there had been extraordinary facilities for the supply of small arm ammunition. Forty or 50 million rounds was the estimated consumption for the present year, therefore the manufacture of about 1,000,000 rounds per week was necessary. He asked any manufacturer in the House whether, if twice the amount of ammunition now used were required, it would not take five or six weeks to begin to deliver it, even with night shifts and extra workmen and machinery? Six weeks in these days of modern warfare might represent a whole campaign. The Austrian Campaign of 1866 was terminated within six weeks by the battle of Koniggratz; and the Franco-German War of 1870 was decided by the battle of Sedan in about the same time. Six or eight weeks would be required to get a supply of 2,000,000 rounds per week, or, with a sufficient supply of cordite, 3,000,000 rounds might be delivered. But the other day a contract for cordite was given to a firm which had not yet erected even the buildings in which to make it. If there was now a sudden outbreak of war we should have to find enough cordite to put into the cartridges, and also the facilities for manufacturing the great increase necessary. This was a serious state of things. To have practically no reserve of small arm ammunition was the height of impolicy. The right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean had said in one of his writings that the British Army was an Army to which peace was a necessity.

said, this was a quotation.

differed from the opinion expressed in the quotation. But, seeing how leisurely the supply of ammunition was, it might be supposed to be an Army to which peace was a certainty. His own opinion was worth nothing against that of the Secretary for War in his official position, for he knew the confidence which he commanded in the House. But he asked him to try this matter by the equipment regulations he had sanctioned; by the opinion of military advisers advanced in the most serious manner to his predecessor; by his own words last year, which were, after all, the deliberate judgment of a responsible Minister; and by the experience of foreign nations, who had never allowed themselves to be placed in the position in which we found ourselves. ["Hear, hear!"] He knew no task which could be more ungracious or ungrateful to himself than showing up our national deficiencies. He had not brought the subject forward without exhausting every influence he could in public and private to lay before the War Office what he believed to be the dangerous position in which we stood, He would not have brought it forward if he had not believed we were drifting into a position of grave national danger. We were spending so much money on other national objects, that a little timely exertion would enable us to put ourselves in a position of security. Believing the policy we had been following was mistaken, he felt it necessary to test the opinion of the Committee by moving to reduce the salary of the Secretary for War on item A by £100, [Cheers.]

said the hon. Gentleman had spoken of his distaste for the task he had performed. With his long experience the hon. Gentleman would admit that it was extremely difficult to follow him without disclosing figures which were confidential. He could only repeat the assurance given by the Secretary for War that in estimating the quantities of small-arm ammunition the War Office had been advised by the Director of Artillery, whose conclusion had been accepted and confirmed by the Adjutant-General, and the War Office was in a position to say in regard to the necessities of the year and the reserves at home and abroad, that they were satisfactory. It was perfectly true that the amount asked for this year for cordite was much less than last year, but that was due to the fact that, owing to improvements in the method of manufacture and to other causes, the cost of its manufacture had diminished the cost of cordite to an astonishing degree.

asked what the cost of the powder was.

said, he could not answer that question at that moment. The supply of the cordite had been seriously interrupted last year owing to the unfortunate accident that had happened at Waltham, which had delayed the manufacture for a considerable time. He, however, was glad to say the factory at Waltham had been reconstructed, and that a considerable amount of the explosive was being turned out there. By improvements in the system of manufacture they were now able to turn out 1,000 tons of cordite in the same lime that they formerly made only 400 tons. It had been determined to erect a duplicate nitro-glycerine factory, which would enable the manufacture to go on, even in the case of untoward accidents occurring. By employing additional hands in cases of emergency the Department was of opinion that they could in a few days so enormously increase the output as to enable them to meet any conceivable demand. He was also glad to say that at last the Government had obtained the assistance of the trade in the manufacture of cordite. They had given out contracts to two manufacturers, who had each undertaken to supply five millions of small-arms ammunition, and 200 tons of cordite within the current year. In these circumstances he could assure the hon. Gentleman opposite that there was no danger of our falling short in our supply of our small-arms ammunition. ["Hear, hear!"]

said, that his hon. Friend near him brought a very heavy indictment against the Government in respect of this new powder. He could hardly believe that the country would view with satisfaction the explanation which had just been given to the Committee by the hon Gentleman the Financial Secretary to the War Department. He did not understand the hon. Gentleman to say that we had an adequate reserve of this cordite ammunition, because, according to the speech of the hon. Gentleman, we had absolutely no reserve of it. ["Hear, hear."] The hon. Gentleman had been compelled to take refuge in general and vague language. The hum. Gentleman asked the Committee to be content with his assurance that the military advisers of the War Department were of opinion that our reserve of cordite powder was sufficient for our requirements. The hon. Gentleman, however, informed them that the Government were going to obtain the powder from private manufacturers at a cheaper rate than they had been able to produce it themselves, and this admission alone was sufficient to show that the Government were doubtful as to the keeping properties of cordite and were afraid of keeping too large a store of it in reserve for fear that it should deteriorate. An ample reserve of ammunition was absolutely necessary in these days, when no nation waited whilst their antagonists got ready for war. ["Hear, hear!"] In order to be sufficiently prepared for emergencies we ought to have a reserve of at least 500 rounds per man. Seeing that the private firms referred to by the hon. Gentleman had only just begun the manufacture of this new powder, we could not expect any very largo output of it from them. He trusted that before this debate, was finished they would have some statement from the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War.

said, that he thought that the hon. and gallant Gentleman who had last spoken had been somewhat unfair to the Department over which he had the honour to preside in reference to this subject. Did hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite wish him to give them figures in relation to this question which had never been given before, and which, he thought upon the whole, it was most undesirable to give to the world? He would not refer to what had been done in relation to this question by his predecessors in office, because he did not think that the public service would be benefited by recriminations between the two sides of the House, and because he objected to tu quoque arguments. All that he could say was that he was advised by his responsible advisers, as the right hon. Gentleman had been a few years ago, and that he acted upon that advice. He had shown the figures which he held in his hand to the Adjutant-General yesterday, who had assured him that in the matter of reserve small-arm ammunition we occupied a perfectly sound position. It must be remembered that only a small proportion of our total production of cordite was required for our small-arm ammunition. With regard to the supply of cordite, he stated that the proportion used was only 50 tons for small arms out of 1,000 tons required for the general service of the Army. It had usually been, the case, certainly according to his experience, that when the responsible Minister stated on the authority of his responsible military advisers that the supply of ammunition was sufficient, the statement was accepted.

said, he had no doubt there was not a single button missing in the British Army; that was also the official statement which was made before the French war. He believed the country would never have a sufficient supply of stores until they had some standard fixed, and some guarantee that that standard should be rigidly adhered to. His right hon. Friend had spoken about Party recriminations, but he thought one Party was no better than the other in regard to this.

That is my point.

said, he desired to go beyond Party reciminations. The evidence given before the Stephen Commission was that Party Leaders for their own purposes did in times of stress, when they wanted to economise, cut down the supply of stores very much. Lord Wolseley had said most distinctly that this country, within his own knowledge, had often been placed in considerable danger because the supply of stores had been cut down. There was practically nothing else that could be cut down on these Army Estimates. They ought to have a much better guarantee that the country had an adequate supply of warlike stores in hand. The recommendation of the Committee had been that there should be an independent authority to see that the standard which should be fixed was kept. He did not say that the standard need necessarily be made public, though he believed much of the talk of the danger of making it public was all nonsense. He ventured to say that in foreign war offices it was known what our stores were. When by going to the Appropriation Accounts they were able, no doubt a year late, to get the money value of these stores, what could be the objection to stating what the actual amount was. What were, the reasons given them for the depletion of the stores this year?

said, there was no truth in that allegation.

said, that on the contrary, the Government were reducing the Vote for this year, and were making no estimate for reserves. The reason that the Financial Secretary had given for the smaller Vote this year was a totally different one from that given in the Estimates themselves. It was that we were producing cordite so much more cheaply; to his mind that was a very suspicious statement. They had no statement yet from the Front Bench that even their own equipment regulations had been carried out. The reason in the Estimates was partly that they had accumulated a stock of rifles, and also that they were not manufacturing rifles so rapidly. There was not a round of cordite ammunition amongst the militia, the yeomanry, or the volunteers. He was afraid there was another reason—the difficulty of supply. For cordite there were only two sources of supply, Waltham Factory, and Kynoch Factory in Ireland. In Waltham Factory there had been explosion after explosion during the last two years, and an explosion might occur which would make it impossible to manufacture cordite there for four or even six months; buildings were being put up in the same dangerous condition as they were before the last explosion. He hardly thought that Ireland was the very best place that could be chosen for the manufacture of cordite.

Why?

said, there were such persons in Ireland as Fenians, and he thought Ireland a most unfortunate place to have chosen for a special manufacture of this kind. There was no security whatever for an adequate supply of cordite to our Army, especially as the whole supply of cordite to our Indian troops fell upon this country. In the old days means of supply were open to us, even from our enemies, that were now no longer available, and therefore we had to face this difficulty—that not only had we fewer sources of regular supply, but we were deprived of sources on which, to some extent, we could formerly rely. His hon. Friend had made out a good case, and yet had not received any answer from the Government. The War Office had their equipment regulations, and those regulations provided that there should be a certain amount of reserve ammunition in hand. Could the Government assure the Committee that those regulations were carried out?

said, the hon Member for Preston (Mr. Hanbury) had introduced a new and very irritating feature into the Debate. Upwards of £20,000,000 were spent in England every year for the manufacture and purchase of warlike stores and armaments, but very little indeed in Ireland. As to the manufacture of cordite ammunition in Ireland, it might have been begun there, but to a very insignificant extent, and yet the hon. Member for Preston would urge the Government to stamp out its manufacture altogether in Ireland. If they were going to shut out the manufacture of warlike stores entirely from Ireland, why on earth should she pay anything towards them?

said, what he stated was that the only source of private supply was in Ireland, and that there should be other sources elsewhere.

continuing, said, that on the main question he wished to state that although he was an Irishman he desired to see a proper supply of ammunition in reserve in the United Kingdom. The prevailing anxiety in this matter was owing, to a great extent, to the fact that ordinary Members of Parliament, and the public through them, could get little or no information from the authorities. The Financial Secretary of the late Government said two or three years ago that the ammunition was expended as fast as it was manufactured, and that there was a comparatively small supply. He said also, and the Secretary of State for War agreed with him, that hitherto they had relied upon the State supply which could not overtake the demand, but that they hoped in future the trade would assist in the supply. The War Office now went on another tack. They took up the position that it was not for the interests of the State that full information on those matters of ammunition should be published. That was a matter of opinion, but if the Secretary for War could only state that there was enough ammunition in the country, it would be to some extent satisfactory. It was the secrecy observed by the Department, and the knowledge of certain facts by the public, that created uneasiness. There was no harm in having plenty of ammunition, and the Department ought to set about its manufacture as hard as possible. The Adjutant General would incur very serious responsibility if, in case of emergency, it were found that the country was short of ammunition, and he urged that the letter or Report of the Adjutant General ought to be read out to the Committee stating that there was sufficient ammunition to meet any contingencies of the country. The question of cordite ammunition was a very difficult and intricate one. The cordite powder we manufactured was different from that manufactured by other countries, and it was different from every other powder, He very much doubted whether we had a good supply. The powder was suspected of not having good keeping qualities, and perhaps that might be one of the reasons why a large reserve of it was not maintained. It was suspected of other bad qualities, among which were change of velocity and, what was very serious, injury to the rifle after a certain number of rounds. However, in any case, it was a very serious thing for any nation to be short of small arm ammunition, and he was sure the country generally would not rest satisfied until some definite and reassuring information had been given to it by the responsible authorities as to the supply of ammunition in reserve.

said, there was not a single Member of the Committee who would not gladly accept the assurances of the Minister for War if he felt he could do so. But facts had been given in the Debate which rendered it impossible for any man to accept those assurances and to go home without misgiving in his mind. Two of those facts had been adduced by his hon. Friend the Member for Guildford, and the third was adduced by the Financial Secretary to the War Office, and that third fact supplied the only missing link to the chain of arguments brought forward by his hon. Friend—arguments which were absolutely convincing in spite of the assurances of the Minister for War. His hon. Friend directed attention to the fact, that, during the first year the Government held Office, they spent on small arm ammunition £100,000 less than they felt it their duty to ask for, in view of the enormous deficiency in the reserve of ammunition. The second fact was, that in the second year of their Office Her Majesty's Ministers admitted that they were not satisfied with that reserve, and the Minister for War declared only in July last that he would not be satisfied with the supply of small arm ammunition at that time. But his hon. Friend could not tell whether the Government had or had not, made up any lee way during last year. All they had to go upon was the sum in the Estimates for which the Government asked, and the Members did not know whether that money had been expended or not. But the Financial Secretary to the War Office told them that owing to the explosion at Waltham last year the Government had again failed in the second year of office in expending the money on this ammunition which they thought it was their duty to ask for. Therefore they had it that when the Government came into office they found that there was not an adequate reserve of small arm ammunition; that in the first year of office they failed to spend £100,000 to remedy the deficiency; and that in the second year they were again prevented from remedying the deficiency owing to the explosion at Waltham Abbey, and were dissatisfied with the then existing state of things. But the Minister for War now came down to the House and told them that the Government were perfectly satisfied.

said he understood that the Financial Secretary spoke on the authority of the Adjutant-General.

said the Adjutant-General was not responsible to that House but the Minister for War was. If they were overwhelmed by some national disaster, and it was due to any extent to neglect in the supply of ammunition, the Adjutant-General might not be shot, but the Minister for War would be held responsible for betraying the country, and every Member of the Committee who, if he entertained misgivings on the, matter, did not endeavour to bring the Minister to a sense of responsibility would also be responsible to the country for not having done his duty The Committee could not treat this matter in a leisurely and dilettanti spirit. If for two years running Her Majesty's Government had failed to make good an admitted deficiency in the reserve of small arm ammunition, the Committee must know how and by what miracle the Government had made up the deficiency during the few months of the present year. What facts had the Government brought forward to induce the Committee to believe that this miracle had been accomplished? The Secretary for War said we could now look to the trade for a portion of the necessary supply—that private manufactories could now turn out this small arm ammunition, and that the Government would no longer be entirely dependent on the State factories. The Financial Secretary, only on the very day of the Estimates, told the Committee that he had then learned that cordite had actually been introduced, and could be supplied by private contractors. From the tone in which the hon. Member spoke, the hon. Gentleman might have been supposed to be referring to the introduction of a new gas, or something of the kind.

explained that he had said that one of the contractors had completed their factory machinery and were in a position to supply cordite immediately.

said, that was the second string to the bow of the Government, and apparently it only came into operation on the day of the Estimates, and then only on an insignificant scale. In view of those facts, and in view of the serious qualifications expressed by the Secretary for War in his statement, he contended that the Committee were justified in urging again and again this question on the Government, and in demanding an answer to it—had the troops with rifles the number of rounds reserved—namely, 480 per man, which the highest military authorities had laid down were necessary to provide against any sudden emergency?

said, that in response to the appeal made to him by hon. Members opposite, he would endeavour to give a somewhat more definite statement than he had done, and in doing so, he did not think he should infringe the rule, he had laid down for himself. Hon. Members had spoken of the reserve of ammunition as being deficient. But the position was this, and he hoped his statement would be regarded as satisfactory. Instead of being depleted, there was a reserve of ammunition which had been steadily increasing. It was better this year than last, better last year than it had been the year before, and would be considerably better at the end of the financial year than it was now. It was the practice of certain Army newspapers to sneer at everything connected with the administration of the Army, and they often declared that, notwithstanding all the money lavished on the Army, the Government could barely turn out a single army corps. As a matter of fact they could mobilize three army corps, amounting to 110,000 men. Things had very much improved during the past two or three years, and a great deal had been done in developing our resources. Besides the three army corps of 110,000 men there was a large force for the defence of certain places in case of invasion, numbering about 110,000, and a force, of 170,000 men for garrison purposes. That was a large number of men, and we had sufficient ammunition for the whole of them. [Col. NOLAN: "White powder ammunition."] Well, some of the force were Volunteers, and it would be no advantage to have the new ammunition for them, because at present their rifles were the Martini-Henry, and of course it was necessary that they should have the ammunition suited to their weapons. In a few years it might be necessary to provide them with the new ammunition for other rifles. This then was their position—that they had the regulation amount of ammunition for the number of men he had stated. An hon. Member opposite shook his head, but he could assure the hon. Member that he had the facts before him, and that they were as he had stated. Under those circumstances, though he had laid no particular figures before the Committee, he thought he had given enough information to relieve the great tension of anxiety which, after all, seemed to be strongest in the minds of certain hon. Members who had in their constituencies either a Government or a private factory which was capable of producing small arm ammunition. He hoped the other Members of the Committee who took an independent view of the question would regard the statement he had made as reassuring.

said the quantity of ammunition he had mentioned did not include that for the annual course.

said that the right hon. Gentleman would doubtless acquit him of having a manufactory of cordite in his constituency; nor was there such a manufactory in the constituency of the hon. Member for Dover, and he was not aware that there was one in that which the hon. Member for Preston represented. So that there was very little ground for the sneers which the right hon. Gentleman levelled in the latter part of his speech at those who had taken part in the discussion. He did not often intervene in an Army debate, but he rose to speak on this occasion because his hon. Friend near him (the Member for Guildford) had shown him confidential figures which he had gathered in his former experience at the War Office, figures which he could not use in that House, but which showed that it was absolutely impossible that there should be at present in store a quantity of small arm ammunition equal to the regulation amount of 480 cartridges per man. On the question of secrecy he did not wish to press the Government to give, without consideration, facts winch, he admitted, it might be unwise to publish. But, at the same time, the discussion had shown that little was gained by hiding facts, which embarrassed nobody but the critics of the Government, and, least of all, foreign nations. We made public property of the number of men, the number of ships, the amount of equipment and clothing, and the number of rifles we had, and why a line should be drawn by the War Office against publishing the number of cartridges we had passed his comprehension altogether. He thought the right hon. Gentleman might on this occasion very properly break through the traditions of the War Office in regard to this secrecy—traditions which he did not invent and for which he was not responsible—and give the Committee some, further information. By doing so he would tend to quiet men's minds and at the same time put the Committee in possession of facts which were necessary to enable them to criticise the acts of the Government. He had no desire that it should be thought he was casting any discredit on the right hon. Gentleman or on his Office when he said that he entertained some suspicion with regard to facts which were concealed from Parliamentary criticism, and not less so in regard to this very question of Military stores. His noble Friend at his side, who was the late First Lord of the Admiralty, had told him that when the Naval manœuvres first began it was found that the deficiency in ammunition for the Fleet was of the most startling character, and would have been of the most dangerous character in the event of war breaking out. At that time the War Office was responsible for providing the Fleet with ammunition. Soon after that time changes were effected, and the Navy then became responsible for the supply of its own ammunition. Since that time it had been found necessary by the Navy to enormously increase the quantity of ammunition which had been previously regarded as an ample supply for our ships. That fact, however, was now a matter of past history, and might be stated openly without giving much information to foreign powers, but it was a fact which was calculated to fill them with a certain distrust, and to make them extremely anxious to have full information as to the present condition of things. And his anxiety had not been diminished by the figures given by the Financial Secretary. This was a financial question, and hon. Members were bound to criticise the Government with regard to it more even than with regard to a question of general policy. One of the arguments of the Financial Secretary was that cordite could now be produced at 2s. lb. instead of 4s. 6d. lb. as before, the result of that cheapness being that though the sum taken in the Estimates for small arm ammunition was less than that which was taken last year, yet a great deal more ammunition could be obtained for the, amount. They had been told that only 50 tons of cordite were required last year for small arm ammunition. Now the saving of 2s. 6d. a lb. on 50 tons of cordite would amount to £14,000, so they were told that a saving of £14,000 on an Estimate of £300,000 would produce such a material change in the supply of small arm ammunition that the item in the present Estimate would give them a much larger supply than the amounts in the Estimates of former years. It would, no doubt, be said in reply to the arguments that had been urged on the Government to give further information, that the right hon. Gentleman, the Secretary for War, had already given the Committee an explicit assurance, upon his responsibility, that that there was unquestionably sufficient small arm ammunition at present in reserve to allow 480 cartridges per man for a force of 390,000 men. That assurance was undoubtedly of a satisfactory character.

said, he stated that there was small-arm ammunition according to the equipment Regulations for the several forces for 400 rounds per man—that was, for the Regulars in the three Army corps. For the others the amount was less—he meant by the equipment Regulations.

said, he was not aware that the Regulations drew a distinction between the Army corps and the other forces; but, of course, he would accept the statement made. He assumed that the right hon. Gentleman meant that there were 400 suitable cartridges per man for the 110,000 men in the three Army corps. His hon. Friend near him (the hon. Member for Guildford) knew what was the quantity of small arm ammunition in existence when he left Office, and he also knew the amount which had been taken each year since by the Government for small-arm ammunition; and from the figures he confessed it was absolutely impossible to find out how the Government obtained the quantity of ammunition they now said they had. They did not spend last year the amount they took in the Estimates, in the final appropriation accounts they had not been able to spend it. How, under the circumstances, having only this Vote of less than £300,000, not merely to supply the annual waste of forty or fifty millions of cartridges which takes place every year in the ordinary process of military manœuvres, but to make the enormous addition indicated, was a matter that really required explanation. This was ground upon which Members were bound to offer criticism, for this was a financial question. How could the financial question be explained, that with the estimates diminished rather than increased during the three years the Government had held office, the amount of the reserves had been augmented and to an enormous extent? He hoped the Government would, not merely in the interest of military administration, but in the interest of financial administration, explain this paradox. Some explanation was due and ought to be given before the Committee passed from this subject.

said, he believed he was the first Member who had risen who had any kind of connection through his constituency with the manufacture of cordite. He did not think the cordite was actually manufactured in Birmingham, but the firm of Kynoch & Co., whose headquarters were at Aston, a suburb of Birmingham, were cordite manufacturers, and therefore he had the legitimate interest in the matter which, as representing his constituents he might be expected to have. In the first place, he wanted to ask a question of the Secretary for War, who, he understood, did not go so far as to say that the present situation was entirely satisfactory. He imagined the right hon. Gentleman would not commit himself to any such statement, or that he would hesitate to admit that he would like to see the reserve material increased. He understood the Secretary for War looked for that to take place through Kynoch and Co., and by means of the factory established at Arklow in Ireland. But what orders had the right hon. Gentleman given to Kynoch and Co.? There could not be any objection to stating that. What was the extent of the orders given to Kynoch and Co.? and what had that firm undertaken to deliver?

said, Kynoch and Co. had accepted a contract to deliver 400 tons of cordite within two years, and they had also undertaken to deliver five millions of cordite cartridges in this year, and five millions in the year following, as an experimental supply.

said, he had some suspicion of what the answer would be. Did not this show the grotesque absurdity of the statement, made in order to allay the anxiety of the Committee? It appeared that this great source of supply, which was to afford relief from all anxiety, was only to produce five millions of cartridges this year, or less than 5 per cent. on our present supply during the present year, and only ten millions in the course of two years! It was perfectly evident that, supposing our present condition was unsatisfactory, it would not be made more satisfactory by the knowledge of what Kynoch and Co. could do under existing circumstances. Then he had another question to ask. The Secretary for War said he was prepared to give an assurance that the supply was satisfactory, having regard to the number of men. It was a very curious commentary on the policy of secrecy that the Secretary for War had now put the Committee in possession of the whole information asked for, and foreign nations would have the advantage of knowing, by making a simple sum in arithmetic, from the figures supplied by the right hon. Gentleman, the exact amount of ammunition we have in reserve. The Secretary for War had told the Committee he could mobilise three army corps of 110,000 men. The regulation ammunition was 400 per man, and he said we had a sufficient supply. Multiplying 110,000 by 400——

Take off the artillery, call it 90,000.

said he would adopt that figure. Multiplying 90,000 by 400 the result was 36 millions of cartridges. But then they were told by the Secretary for War that there were 170,000 Volunteers. How many should be taken off for them? Assuming the same amount of ammunition was required for them, that gave 68 millions. Adding the 68 and 36 millions the total was 104 millions of cartridges. That was the simple calculation he made as he listened to the Secretary for War, and therefore he might take it as agreed that we had a reserve of, roughly speaking, 100 millions of cartridges. He asked the Committee if that was the case, was it a satisfactory position for us to be in? He had been told, but of course he had not access to authentic information that when the Japanese went into the recent war with a regular army about the size of ours, and not having the volunteers we have to provide for, they had 700,000,000 of small-arms ammunition. Surely, if it was thought necessary or desirable that Japan should have 700,000,000 of small arms ammunition, it appeared perfectly clear that we, with 100,000,000 millions of cartridges, were altogether behind the mark?

said, the case was really stronger than that which had been just before the Committee, for it was only in 1894–95 or last year that the Secretary for War gave an assurance that the condition of the reserve ammunition was unsatisfactory, and to change that unsatisfactory condition of things the expenditure in the intervening period could be traced. It had not been sufficient to produce the change from an unsatisfactory to a satisfactory condition, not sufficient even to create any reliable store. The Committee were in possession of the absolute facts. On the authority of the Secretary for War it was stated a year ago that the position was most satisfactory, and since then money had not been spent to bring up the position to what it should be, and yet the Committee were now asked to believe that the situation was eminently satisfactory. The Committee had heard of differences in the military equipment of one part of the forces and another, but all Her Majesty's forces should be so equipped that when called into the field they would have an ample supply. Could it be supposed that when the Regulars, Militia and Volunteers were called into the field there would be any ridiculous distinction in the amount of cartridges necessary for one part of the force as compared with another? Every fighting man would want his full amount of ammunition. The Financial Secretary talked of 5,000,000 cartridges in twelve months. Why that would be only sufficient for skirmishes during twelve hours. What was required was that our whole force should be able to depend on being able to fight at full strength at short notice. He could not conceal from himself that the position in which we stood at this moment was absolutely perilous. The Committee ought to be assured that there was in this country an ample supply of reserve amunition for all possible purposes. A very short time, he was informed, sufficed to deteriorate this powder, and it would be found that if they used ammunition issued two or three years ago at anything like long ranges, the accuracy of the rifle would lie absolutely upset. There could be no doubt that those who were going to vote for the amendment would be voting in the true interests of the country.

said that what had happened that night had happened frequently on several occasions, namely, that the responsible Minister had risen and assured the Committee on the responsibility of professional advices that certain things were satisfactory, and yet that the Committee had cast doubt, not on the good faith of the right hon. Gentleman, but on the accuracy of his reply. That disclosed a most unsatisfactory state of affairs, which called most loudly for some rearrangement of our system. He suspected that the explanation would be found in the fact that the professional advisers were not called upon to hold themselves personally responsible for the advice that they gave. He, however rather doubted the wisdom of making public the amount of these supplies of amunition. He did not believe foreign countries knew all about the reserve we had in store, and it certainly would not be wise that the reserve of ammunition in all our forts and fortresses should be disclosed. He wished to ask a question in relation to the sister service. He believed that, although the Admiralty had to supply their own ammunition, they got it from the War Department, and he wanted to know whether the War Department was able to supply the Admiralty with all the cordite they required.

wished to know what was the state of the ammunition reserve for sending abroad—was there in England a reserve for sending out to fortresses like Gibraltar and Malta; and also whether there was in England any reserve for military purposes in India. They had had no explanation from the right hon. gentleman either as to the great fortresses or as to India, and they ought to know whether the supply of which he had spoken was entirely independent of what was for the troops in these fortresses and in our great dependency.

said, the one unmistakable fact in the discussion was that the War Minister knew that we had not sufficient reserves of ammunition. If we had the right hon. Gentleman would be quite ready to tell the world what it was, for the knowledge that we had enough would have a pacifying effect on those who might otherwise be disposed to test the point. Who would hold, in these days of the magazine rifle, that a supply of 480 rounds per man was sufficient? It must be at least 500 rounds, and even that only amounted to a supply for five days' fighting. Was the right hon. Gentleman content to leave the country in that position? But granting that 500 rounds were sufficient, there were 390,000 men, and, therefore, the minimum required was 195 millions of cartridges. The right hon. Gentleman said he had enough. Well, had he got 195 millions of cartridges? He admitted that he had not. He had only enough cordite for 110,000 men—about one-fourth of what he ought to have. What was the reason of this extraordinary state of things? Clearly that the right hon. Gentleman had not been able to get his cordite manufactured. He would advise the right hon. Gentleman to make a clean breast of his difficulty rather than to hide his head, ostrich-like, in the sand. Foreign Powers knew quite well what our reserves were; and the House must conclude from the right hon. Gentleman's hesitation that they were not what they ought to be.

said, he had not understood that the demand had been made with all the responsibility attaching to it from the front Opposition Bench for the actual figures. But he might go so far as to say that the figures quoted by the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Brodrick) were not only maintained but exceeded in the returns which he had before him, and which he should be happy to submit to the hon. Member for his own satisfaction. [Cheers.] But the apprehensions that had been expressed had turned so much upon the question of cordite, and their powers of obtaining it, that he would repeat and amplify what he had said before on the subject. He was perfectly prepared to make a clean breast of the whole subject, and to say that, so far as the information which reached the War Office went, they had no reason to apprehend that either by storing, by keeping, or by changing the temperature from that of Canada to that of India, cordite would suffer in the way suggested. The most careful trials had shown that in ever respect it was as durable, as reliable, and as perfectly satisfactory an ammunition as powder had ever been proved to be. In fact, it was notorious that powder did suffer by being kept in store, and had sometimes to be recalled and replaced by other powder of more recent manufacture. So far as he was aware, no such experience had yet been realised with regard to cordite in any part of the world. At the present moment the factory at Waltham was capable of and was really producing 600 tons a year; and in several weeks recently they had been producing at the rate of 1,000 tons a year. Of that large quantity 50 tons only were required for small arm ammunition for the Army. India would take about 100 tons, and the balance would be required for the large guns in the land service and for the Navy, which was now making very large demands upon them. As to the supply from the trade, he said that there were two contractors who had undertaken to deliver in the course of the year 400 tons in addition to the Government's supply of 600 tons. They had in reserve another manufacturer who was very anxious to come to the service of the Department, and to undertake to supply almost an unlimited quantity. He was speaking now of the great firm of Nobel, which was producing cordite, and was prepared to do so to order, while also producing it for other customers in different parts of the world. He was justified in saying, therefore, that in face of the demands for all possible purposes, including naval requirements and the wants of India, the Government possessed ample, facilities for production. With regard to the danger in the manufacture of cordite, he said that there was less danger than in the manufacture of powder. He noticed that an incident a few weeks ago was heralded in an alarming way in the newspapers as "Another Explosion at Waltham." It could scarcely be called an explosion. It was the firing of a small lump of cordite in the midst of a mass, and when it came to be examined it was found that the only place affected by the explosion was limited to a small particle, the whole of the mass being undisturbed. [Colonel LOCKWOOD: "That is the finished article."] He was speaking of the paste. The production of nitro-glycerine required very great care, and in the reconstruction of the factory at Waltham great care had been taken. So prudent were they that this material was used up as quickly as it was made, and the Government hoped that they were guarding against any accident. But in order to be perfectly sure in regard to the future supply, the Secretary of State for War, with the approval of the Treasury, had sanctioned the construction of a duplicate factory for nitroglycerine which would be placed beyond the range of danger to inhabited dwellings. Even at the time when the Government works were in ruin the Department was able to obtain a supply of cordite paste from the trade so as to satisfy all demands. He hoped that what he had said would satisfy hon. Members that, with regard to cordite and the powers of obtaining it, the Government were in a satisfactory position. They had secured the assistance of two firms, one of them the National Explosives Company, who had satisfied the Department of their capacity to supply what they required. If it were found that they were able to produce more than the quantity confided to them, and if the Government required their aid, there would be no difficulty in getting their co-operation; but the Government had still another source of production enabling them to add 50 per cent. easily to the productive powers he had indicated. The right hon. Member for West Birmingham spoke slightingly of the 5,000,000 cordite cartridges which were to be supplied during the current year by a Birmingham firm; but he thought that this was a very fair experiment to make. He could assure the hon. Member for Preston that the Government had more offers from private manufacturers for the supply of cordite than they had deemed it expedient to accept. The Department had considered it to be prudent to limit themselves to large firms, because they were familiar with the charges and complaints made by capitalists who were encouraged to put down plant in order to meet Government requirements. He trusted, therefore, it would be accepted by the Committee that the alarmist views expressed were altogether baseless. The figures he had before him showed that the aggregate reserve of small-arm ammunition at home, abroad, in the course of production in their own factories, and the supply of the trade far exceeded the figures which had been quoted by the hon. Member, and indicated that the supply was ample.

said, the impression which the Debate had left on his mind did not at all correspond with the concluding observations of the hon. Gentleman. He approached the subject with an open mind, and he was only too anxious that the Government should make a statement and reassure the country with the object of removing doubt. He regretted to say that this was not the result which had been produced. On the contrary, he had come to the conclusion that using the word "reserves" in its ordinary sense the country had no reserve at all. [Cheers.] He understood that the regulation for the equipment was 400 rounds per man; but if the country were engaged in hostilities it would be bound beyond that equipment to have large stores of a real reserve of ammunition which could be brought into play as occasion might arise, and of that reserve the Committee had heard very little. No answer had been made to the statement that, looking to the conditions of modern warfare, 400 rounds per man was a very small amount, and might be shot away in a short time. time. The Secretary of State for War took 180,000 men, and for this number he said that he had a minimum equipment of 400 rounds; but this was only one-fifth of the total fighting force of the country. [Cheers] It appeared to him, therefore, that the stock was extremely low. The Secretary of State for War had not yet explained the discrepancy between the view he took a year ago, when he admitted that the stock was unsatisfactory, and the state of things now, which he had described as quite satisfactory, and which the Financial Secretary considered to be even more satisfactory than the right hon. Gentlemen himself. The last speaker relied mainly on the powers of production, but the time in which the combinations of modern warfare developed was so short that he deprecated relying on those powers of production except to a slight extent. [Cheers.] Looking at the danger attending the manufacture of this compound, what would become of the country if one of those manufactories on which they relied for production was to meet with some accident during the few weeks in war time when its services were most needed? [Cheers.] Whatever the result of the vote, he thought that his hon. Friend had rendered a service to the country by calling attention to the subject. ["Hear, hear!"] Whereupon Motion made, and Question put, "That Item A be reduced by £100, in respect of the salary of the Secretary of State."

(rising immediately) said, I beg to propose that you report progress, and ask leave to sit again.

I wish to ask what the Government propose to do. Do they intend to do any further business tonight?

Yes; there are Bills on the Paper that I think are not very contentious Bills. I do not know whether the next Order, the Fisheries Acts Amendment Bill, is contentious. ["Most contentious" from the Opposition Benches.] Well, then there is the Naval Works Bill. I do not know whether there is any reason why the Naval Works Bill should not be taken.

So far as I know, there is no reason why the Naval Works Bill should not be taken.

I do not gather that the issue at stake here is in the ordinary sense anything of the nature of a Party controversy. There are three or four Members who object to the Bill. Those who object to it are really very few, and I, therefore, hope the Second Reading will be allowed to be taken.

In regard to this Bill, the House is in the same curious position——

We will postpone the Bill.

said, he had to propose to leave out of the schedule "£1,920,000," the amount put down for Dover Harbour. He said it was proposed to spend close upon £2,000,000 in building a very large harbour on the open sea at Dover. Two reasons were assigned for the making of the harbour First of all it was suggested it would be a good harbour of refuge for vessels going up and down the Channel. He denied that there was any need whatever to make a harbour of refuge, properly so-called, at Dover. The configuration of the land at or about Dover was such that there was ample refuge without the works proposed. He was far from saying it would not be well to have a harbour of refuge on the Channel, but not at Dover. If such a harbour must be constructed, it should be at Dungeness, or at or about Beachy Head, and at Dungeness for choice. He was very doubtful they could make a harbour at all as set forth in the plans at Dover. It had already been found that at Dover they could not keep the silt away; in fact, he was informed by the most competent authorities that the landing places there had already silted up eight and ten feet, and such a harbour at Dover as was proposed would necessitate an annual expenditure of probably £50,000 or £100,000 in dredging. In the second place, he did not believe the harbour as proposed could be made and permanently kept open. They might make a new point of land; he doubted a permanent deep harbour without inordinate dredging. At Alderney a similar undertaking had been begun 40 or 50 years ago, and was to cost £620,000. At the end of 20 years it was found to have cost £1,300,000, and they had to spend another £20,000 in getting rid of it. The Government estimated that the proposed Dover harbour would cost £2,000,000; but he said it would probably cost £4,000,000, and he estimated that the charge for dredging would be so enormous that if it were capitalised it would probably amount to another £4,000,000. But he now came to the most serious consideration. This proposed harbour was to be treated as a station for the British Fleet. Did that mean in time of peace or in time of war? In time of peace we did not require a refuge at Dover owing to the stations at Chatham, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, and other places. Dover, therefore, was to be made a station for the Fleet in time of war, and the reason given was that in time of war the Downs would be the place for the Fleet to lie. He entirely denied that we ought to have any Fleet at all either in the Downs or at or near Dover in time of war. In time of war the Fleet should be either at sea moving about, or else far away from all torpedo attack—up the river at Chatham, or in Hamoaze, or such sheltered spots. The present Board of Admiralty was not the first to consider what strategic position we should require in time of war, but no previous Board had proposed a harbour at Dover. He contended that at such time we had no business to have a Fleet at Dover, but he admitted, nay, he strongly asserted, that we should have, not only at Dover, but along our southern coast, torpedo boats and torpedo-boat catchers. But there was ample accommodation for such craft at Dover now without the expenditure of £2,000,000 or £2. He had consulted some distinguished Admirals and most distinguished Captains of ships—he would not give their names, because if he did they would be put on the black-list of the Admiralty—and they were all of the opinion that it would be nothing more than madness to put in time of war a Fleet in such a position as Dover on the open sea. There was a notion that in the event of a threatened invasion a naval force at Dover was necessary. It was never by means of such a force that invasion had been defeated. Since 1690 no less than nine concerted and arranged attempts had been made to invade this country. France had always been concerned in these attempts, and sometimes Holland and Spain as well. Four of them were abandoned in consequence of the arrangements made to resist them. The attempt of 1690 was defeated by watching Toulon and by the battle which ensued at Beachy Head. That was the nearest point at which a battle had been fought to prevent invasion; and it was rendered necessary because the fleet had not the power of keeping the sea which it now had. The modern view was to watch Brest and Toulon, and that was the view of Lord St. Vincent, one of the greatest and almost the last naval strategist which this country possessed. In 1759 a tremendous invasion was prevented by a battle off Cape St. Vincent; and in 1797 another battle off Cape St. Vincent had the same result. It was not at Dover that our naval defence lay. In the last and greatest attempt at invasion, made by Napoleon in 1803–1805, when he had 200,000 men massed on the French coast, the British fleet was not kept at Dover. The main body were watching Brest and Toulon, and was occupied in what always had been, and always must be, the principal task—the preventing of the junction of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic fleets of the enemy. If the enemy could be prevented from getting the command of the Channel, he could not land a single soldier on our shores. These considerations disposed of the idea of making this harbour at Dover. He was not against spending money on making stations for the Navy. If the Government had proposed to spend half-a-million on a station at the Scilly Isles—where a station would be most advantageous, and of immense strategic importance—he would have supported the proposal. Such a station, 100 miles from Brest on one side, and from Cape Clear on the other, would command the routes which commerce must take going up either channel. With respect to north Europe, the navy was provided with an adequate repairing station at Chatham; and Dover would never be a repairing station. At Plymouth again, there was excellent provision for a fleet. These strategic doctrines were not his own invention. He had learnt them from Lord Torrington—who, though defeated in battle, was strategically successful—and from Lord St. Vincent, one of the greatest of our naval captains. Lord St. Vincent took the greatest interest in the establishment of a station at the Scilly Isles; and he it was who recommended the breakwater at Plymouth. He would never allow his ships to go even as far as Portsmouth, much less Dover, but kept them at Torbay to mask the enemy's port, Brest. This project of a station at Dover must have arisen from some strange fancy of a Member of the present Admiralty Board. If it were necessary now, it was equally necessary 40 years ago, though this was the first time the proposal had ever been made, and the only authority cited in its favour was that of one admiral. Against that authority he placed that of the two admirals and the captains whom he had quoted. He did not believe that the harbour could be kept up, if it were made, on account of the silting-up caused by the cross-tides, and, at any rate, the work of maintenance would cost appalling sums. It would do immense injury to the fleet, because it would be encouraged to box itself up, where it would be exposed to bombardment without the chance of reply. At low water the fleet would have 20 feet of masonry between itself and the enemy. Until absolute command of the sea was obtained by the enemy, torpedo boats would be sufficient to repel any possible attacks, which would be those of torpedo boats. Of course he knew the difficulties of the Government, and they must have been subjected to considerable pressure to make them bring forward this proposal. He had made these criticisms in no Party spirit, but in the best interests of the Navy, because he believed that the Government were making a most serious mistake. This matter of the silting-up and the action of the cross-tides was a very special subject, and he did not think that the ordinary Engineer was competent to advise upon it. To build such a harbour at such a place was a serious mistake from a national point of view. He wished to see the Navy furnished with the means which it required, and not encouraged to put itself into a false position; and, therefore, he moved the reduction standing in his name.

seconded the Amendment.

said, that the Amendment was directed against one of the most popular proposals in the Bill. The hon. Member had quoted the opinion of Naval Officers whose names he had not given. The Admiralty had acted on the unanimous opinion of their naval and expert advisers. They were of opinion that one of the most important and useful provisions in this Bill was the proposal to make a harbour at Dover, at which the fleet could lie. He would not follow the hon. Gentleman into the questions of strategy with which he had interested the House. One point on which he cordially agreed with the hon. Member, as, indeed, every naval authority would, was that it was the business of the British fleet to fight off the coasts of the enemy. There was no idea now, any more than there was before, that we should treat the Navy as a purely defensive force, and it was not in the least with any idea of that kind that it was proposed by the Admiralty to construct a great harbour at Dover. Three great features of this Bill were the closing of the harbour of Gibraltar, the closing of the harbour of Portland, and the formation of this harbour at Dover. What was the reason why it was more necessary now than it had been in the past to close these harbours? As the hon. Gentleman well knew, it was the opinion of great naval authorities that fleets could no longer resort to open anchorages. Although they were carrying on war on an enemy's coast, it was necessary that ships should from time to time come to the coast of England. In times past they anchored in the Downs and in Torbay, but these anchorages were no longer available when they were exposed to torpedo attack; and on that ground the Admiralty were advised that it was necessary to have closed harbours. The hon. Member seemed to have overlooked the fact that there were powerful land defences at Dover, and that was one of the great advantages Dover offered to ships temporarily lying within the harbour over other points where such defences did not exist. The question of harbours of refuge had been thoroughly investigated by a Committee in 1884, which fully examined the advantages offered by Dungeness, and reported strongly in favour of Dover. As to the silting up, the Admiralty would not rest content with the evidence which was given before that Committee, but they would have the matter investigated independently, and consider any plans by which the danger of silting up can be guarded against with the knowledge that is now available. It had often been suggested that we should utilise the Scilly Islands; but the advice on which the Admiralty was bound to act was not in favour of placing a harbour there, and it was in favour of having one at Dover. The hon. Member asked what good end it would serve with Chatham and the Medway on the one side and Portsmouth on the other. The Admiralty was advised that, as there was no possibility now of anchoring with safety in the Downs in time of war, it was necessary that there should be some point between the Thames and Portsmouth to which ships could resort. He asked the Committee not to be led away into attempting to investigate for itself this exceedingly difficult question as to the best point at which to place the harbour demanded by the modern wants of the British Navy, but to accept the opinion by which the Admiralty was guided, which was that of the best naval experts, to approve a proposal which was popular throughout the Navy, and support the Government in placing a much-needed harbour at Dover.

said that, having made his protest, he was bound, after the explanation of the Secretary to the Admiralty, to ask leave to withdraw his Amendment.

said, he had an Amendment with regard to Gibraltar, which was to substitute "docks" for "dock," so as to make it clear that more than one dock was contemplated. He understood the Government was inclined to meet him half way, and, therefore, need not urge the importance of foreseeing the necessity of erecting more than one dock at Gibraltar, which we had fixed upon as our great place in the Mediterranean. He moved to insert after "dock" the words "or docks."

in seconding the Amendment, said he was glad the hon. Member had moderated his requirements, and equally pleased that the Government saw their way to accept the Amendment. On the part of the commercial community there was a general opinion that, not only for strategic, but also for mercantile and refitting purposes, additional docks should be provided. He congratulated the hon. Member on his success in getting the Government to agree with him.

said, the Amendment would increase the power of the Government to plan the first dock in such a way that others could be added, and he, therefore, accepted the Amendment.

said, he was opposed to this expenditure of money on Gibraltar. Ireland was a large island, but there did not happen to be a single penny of this money to be spent in Ireland. It was only natural, therefore, that he should look with distaste on this Bill, which seemed to him to shut Ireland out from its connection with the greatness of the Empire. He had not found a single private Member who had measured the distances on a large map as he had done. [Mr. ROBERTSON said he had done so.] Of course, the Secretary to the Admiralty had done so. The value of Gibraltar as a defensive port had much changed. The strategic position of Gibraltar was not, in the slightest degree, improved by modern invention; in fact, the increase in the range of modern artillery had been to make it a most insecure place. When we put docks anywhere else, as at Chatham or Portsmouth, we put them if we could, five or six miles behind our guns, but at Gibraltar we could not put them anywhere else. Other nations preferred to have their dockyards ten miles behind their guns. Therefore, he did not think Gibraltar was a good place for building a series of docks at. Everyone had hitherto assumed Gibraltar to be impregnable, and it was, in an ordinary way; but modern artillery would throw a shell of a thousand pounds weight on to the deck of a man-of-war in a dock at Gibraltar, and he did not think that even the Inflexible would stand a shell of that character on her decks every second of time. He was afraid the proposed extension of docks at Gibraltar would excite the jealousy of Spain. Anyone who knew Gibraltar would admit that it could be pounded by land batteries on the Spanish coast.

protested against the attempt of his hon. and gallant Friend to minimise the value of Gibraltar to the British Empire. Next to the Cape of Good Hope it was our most important strategical position. In time of naval warfare, our ironclads would be unable to reach repairing places at home and Gibraltar was necessary as a repairing station. That was the grand and fundamental reason for more docks. The hon. Member for Galway thought there would be a difficulty in protecting the docks when made. But did anyone doubt that the military and naval authorities would be able to place an ample number of guns to protect it? If they atttempted to pound Gibraltar, England could pound Spain. He hoped the Government would persevere in what they proposed, for they were thoroughly in the right. They were taking power to have several docks instead of one, and he hoped they would exercise that power for the safety and security of our naval position throughout the world.

did not think that if Spain were to annoy us at Gibraltar, we could pound the whole of Spain. He did not wish to minimise the importance of Gibraltar as a British naval station, but he did not think it was exactly the most advantageous station we could have. There were better points on the opposite coast of Morocco which might be available. It was possible that at some future time Spain might re-occupy Gibraltar, and by a businesslike arrangement with the Spaniards we might, in that event, recover what we were now expending in dock construction. It was quite true, as the hon Member for Galway said, that feeling might be aroused in Spain by the sight of extensive additional fortifications or works to be constructed at Gibraltar, and in view of possible international complications he, himself, would rather have the Spaniards as friends than, foes. Spain might not be powerful from a military point of view, but a feeble opponent in our rear might become an important factor in an international struggle. On the question of general policy, if we could secure the lasting friendship of Spain, then obtain a better position for naval docks, and by a businesslike arrangement recover the sums we were expending at Gibraltar, in the event of the Spaniards re-occupying it, that would be a good day's work.

said, this was the chief enacting clause of the Bill, and, as a Member of the Committee on whose recommendations the Bill was based, he felt bound to express the disappointment he felt at the character of the Bill itself, and the terms of this particular clause. The whole history of the Bill had been disappointing, because in Committee the Members felt themselves limited by the restricted reference, and many subjects which called for investigation they were unable to deal with. He hoped that at an early date another Committee would consider several matters absent from the Bill. The Bill failed to meet many material points in the Committee's recommendations, and though he should support the measure, he felt bound to express doubt whether it would be productive of that good the Committee hoped would result from their deliberations. In many points it fell short of what the result should have been. The present law gave power to the Secretary for War to call out the Volunteers in the case of an apprehended or actual invasion. The Committee recommended that the position of the Volunteers should be assimilated to the conditions with reference to the mobilisation of the Militia, that was to say, in cases of imminent national danger, a wider term which it was felt would cover the terms of their Report. The Committee were practically unanimous that national interests might be seriously imperilled, though the position fell short of actual or apprehended invasion. It might be desirable that certain exposed forts should be manned by Volunteers, Artillery, or corps enrolled for coast or submarine defence might be called out at an earlier stage. The Committee were of opinion that the Acts under which Army Reserve men were called out and the Militia embodied in case of imminent national danger, or great emergency might be adopted, and the Committee also suggested that the Secretary of State should be empowered to call out and accept the services of portions of corps. But the Bill was framed in such a manner that the conditional power given to call out parts of corps was applied to the whole of the corps as well as to the parts, and, as the Bill stood, Volunteers could only be called out in case of imminent national danger if they offered their services for the purpose. This amounted to re-volunteering, the necessity for which was not obvious. The Bill practically consisted of only two clauses, and there was nothing in. it upon several points of vital importance which the Committee discussed, and upon which they made recommendations. There was no word as to the consolidation of the law, as to the subjection of Volunteers to military law. The law on the subject was very indefinite. The liability of Volunteers to military law appeared to depend upon whether they happened to be brigaded with the regular forces. In this there was no logical distinction, because it might happen that of two corps in immediate vicinity one might be subject to military discipline, because they were brigaded with a small detachment of regulars, while in the next field a corps might be under no such obligations because they were a brigade consisting of Volunteers only. This was an anomaly that should not exist. The pains and penalties of military law are great: they involved submission to trial by court martial, to the penalties of imprisonment and other severe proceedings, and it was on mature consideration the Committee recommended that Volunteers should be subject to military law only while on actual military service. There was nothing in the Bill as to the acquisition of land for military purposes, or as to loans for barracks and ranges, for which officers have now often to incur great pecuniary and other obligations. There was nothing about exemption from jury service. While the extensions of the service were accepted there was nothing of the consideration laid down that exemption from service on a jury should be conceded, on the principle that service rendered to the State in the one direction should excuse service in the other. He hoped the time would come when these matters would be extended, and he supported the Bill with some reluctance, for he felt it would not be of the advantage the Committee hoped for.

said, he was not a Member of the Committee, and therefore could not speak with the authority of the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down; but he certainly differed from him in his opinion as to the desirability of giving the Bill a more compulsory character.

said, he had quoted the recommendations of the Committee.

said, the hon. Member regretted that the recommendations of the Committee had not been followed; but it would be remembered that in 1888 the late Government brought forward their National Defence Bill, which contained a clause in this direction, that volunteers should be called out in time of emergency, and be subject to military law. But there was considerable opposition to that clause offered by volunteers, and a very distinguished officer, Colonel Scoby, of the 1st Hereford R.V., showed, in a letter to the Volunteer Service Gazette, that it would seriously detract from the popularity of the force. He felt the Government had acted wisely in submitting the Bill in its present form, and he should have great pleasure in supporting it.

congratulated the Financial Secretary on the Bill, and would gladly give it what assistance he could. The Institute of Commanding Officers of Volunteers was a large and influential body connected with the force, and only a few days ago the Council had the Bill under consideration, and empowered him to say that the Bill had their approval, and they hoped that every Member of the House interested in the force would assist in passing it into law. He regretted that the Bill did not carry out all the recommendations of the Committee, but he hoped that at some future date the Military Authorities would see their way to take up the other important points advocated in the Report of the Committee.

said, it was very gratifying to know that their Bill had received the assent of the Volunteers throughout the country, and he was particularly gratified to hear the statement of the hon. Baronet opposite. He was sorry to hear that there had been opposition to the Bill in a certain quarter, but he was perfectly satisfied that it arose from some misapprehension of the proposals before the House. He was really surprised at the overwhelming evidence presented to the Committee of the desire not only on the part of the commanding officers, but also on the part of the rank and file of the Volunteer force throughout the country to take a more responsible part in the general defence of the country, and of their willingness to take their part in any movement of danger, and to subject themselves to military discipline. The Secretary of State, after consulting his advisers, and especially those responsible for the administration of the Reserve Forces, came to the conclusion, that it would be inexpedient to render the Volunteers liable to be called upon except in the most urgent circumstances. The Committee agreed with remarkable unanimity that the phrase "actual military service" referred to an invasion of the United Kingdom, and there was no kind of objection on the part of the Government to carrying out that part of the recommendation of the Committee. It appeared very important to the Government that they should preserve the voluntary character of the Volunteer Force, and that the conditions under which they could be required to render military service should be somewhat restricted. But they proposed that the Secretary of State should be empowered to accept service on the part of individuals or any specified parts of a corps in case of imminent national danger or emergency. He was very grateful to the hon. Member for Islington for having called attention to the other recommendations of the Committee with regard to the willingness of the volunteers to subject themselves to military law in circumstances other than those in which they could now be called upon; but in connexion with that he would call the hon. Gentleman's attention to the concluding sentence of the report. With regard to the desirability of granting loans to volunteer corps for the purpose of erecting drill halls, he was advised that it would be quite possible—and, so far as the War Office was concerned, there would be no objection—that applications from volunteer corps might be entertained in cases in which they had acquired land for the purpose of a drill hall. Personally he hoped that none of the recommendations of the Committee would be lost sight of and he joined with those who regarded this Bill merely as an instalment.

said that, speaking as a Volunteer of 30 years' standing at least, the remarks of his hon. Friend would be very pleasing to those who took an interest in the Volunteer force. The corps to which he belonged had in contemplation the erection of a drill-hall, but the difficulty they had was as to satisfying the conditions on which a public loan could be obtained. He took it that that matter would now be set at rest, and that they would be able to carry out their building operations. He was glad to hear his hon. Friend speak of this Bill as an instalment of what was required to make the Volunteer force efficient. The disposition that existed in the force to fit themselves, as far as possible, for the duties which might devolve upon them had not been overrated. He had had experience, first of all, in the Inns of Court, and afterwards in a country corps, and he had found the tone and feeling thoroughly genuine through out the latter corps. There were other matters which had a very important bearing on the efficiency of the Volunteer force, and he did hope that the time might soon come when, as regarded the important matter of weapons, the Volunteer would be put on a par with the regular forces of the country. That was certainly one of the elements of efficiency; and further, until something more was done to provide the Volunteers with accessible ranges, all would not have been done which they had a right to expect.

said, it appeared to him desirable from many points of view that the Volunteer Force should co-operate with and add to the strength of the Regular Army when their services were required. The Militia, in which he had the honour to serve, had always in times of emergency responded to the request, when they were asked to go on active service. But the Militia was, after all, more or less of a paid service; and considering the vast armaments of Europe it was desirable for this country to go a step further and, if possible, to make use of the Volunteer Service in times of national danger. This Bill had the approval of the Volunteers themselves, and ought to meet with the support of all patriotic Englishmen. Some years ago, before Lord Cardwell brought in his Bill, he wrote a pamphlet in which he ventured to say that the great desideratum was that the Regular Army, the Militia, and the Volunteers should, as far as possible, be brought into unison. He then pointed out the importance of an adequate reserve, and he believed the Government, in bringing in a Bill to provide that the Volunteers might be called on to serve in time of danger with the general Forces, had done a very valuable thing for the country. When they saw the immense forces of France and Russia they could not ignore the fact that it was desirable to the 200,000 Volunteers who had done so much good work in the past should in time of war be at the service of their country and their Queen.

asked to be allowed to take the third reading now.

said he would venture to offer one more remonstrance to the Government on the course they were taking in regard to this Bill. It was a non-contentious measure, and an unexpected opportunity having arisen, it might be disposed of in Committee of the whole House.

said he made the motion in good faith; a similar motion having been made the other night by the Secretary to the Treasury, There was no unwillingness on the part of the Government to proceed with the Bill in Committee of the whole House,

said the Bill was drawn in a very unfortunate fashion, It was really impossible for anyone reading Clause 2 to arrive, without continual references to the original Act, at the intention of the Clause.

said that was an objection that was always taken to modern drafting, In the old days, when it was easier to pass Bills through the House, there was no objection to put pages of the existing Act to which you desire to refer into the Bill itself. But in those days it would be utterly impossible to get any Bill at all through if they took that course, and it would be quite impossible to incorporate in the Bill the enactments to which Clause 2 referred.

asked for an explanation of the measure.

It is a Consolidation Bill simply.

What is it about?

said, that the hon. Member would see; it was about the House Tax. [Laughter] A Consolidation Bill was a most useful form of legislation.

asked who was the Minister in charge of the Bill?

I am.

asked how many house taxes there were to be consolidated? [Laughter]

said, that there was only one tax, but a great many Acts relating to it. [''Hear, hear!" and laughter.]

asked what course the Government proposed to take with reference to this Bill after the Second Reading.

said, that there were certain points which ought to be considered and dealt with in connection with this Bill. It was very important that there should be a, definition of an "inhabited house" for taxation purposes. At present, if any persons lived in a corner of a large building, which was otherwise unoccupied at night, it was liable to inhabited house duty. There was a case of a large swimming bath attached to a club house, in one corner of which the teacher of natation lived. This was held to be an inhabited house, and duty was exacted. That this should be possible was in his opinion unfair. The same unfairness existed in the case of banks and warehouses which the owners did not like to leave unprotected at night. If anyone above the position of a caretaker lived in any part of the building the whole of it became liable to the duty. He trusted that in Committee some Amendment would be accepted by the Government which would prevent the continuance of this hardship.

observed that to amend the Bill in the way suggested by the hon. Member would not be within the power of the Committee to which the Bill was to be referred, as it was a consolidated measure only.

explained that in drafting this Bill every endeavour had been made to exclude any amendment of the law. The measure consolidated eight Acts and portions of five other Acts. The Government would not be disposed to proceed with the Bill if advantage were to be taken of it to amend the existing law. The sole object of this Consolidation Bill was to minister to the convenience of the public. It was proposed to refer the Bill to the Statute Law Revision Committee.

said, that he had always contended that the assessment for house duty was wrong, being upon the gross value instead of the rate able value. He hoped that nothing would be done to prevent the consideration of this question in Committee on the Bill. Though the consolidation of laws might sometimes be a good thing, the consolidation of bad laws might be a waste of time.

said, there were various Amendments which ought to be considered, and, therefore, he suggested, that the Bill should be sent to the Standing Committee on Law, which had nothing more to do. While having no objection to consolidation, he thought the opportunity should be taken to make Amendments in the incidence of the tax felt as a grievance. He moved that the Bill be referred to the Standing Committee on Law.

seconded, in order that they should not be shut out from the opportunity to consider questions which were believed to be important.

said, there appeared to be a misapprehension as to the effect of the proposal of the Government. Consolidation Bills were usually sent before the Joint Committee, whose function was to see that they were purely Consolidation Bills and nothing else. It was not a substitute for the Committee Stage in the House itself.