I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether he can now state how many of the 60 directorships and trusteeships of public companies recently held by 24 Members of Her Majesty's Government have been resigned by their holders, and how many are still retained by them?

I have no information at my disposal which will enable me to answer my hon. Friend, nor do I know that any estimate could be arrived at unless I sent round a series of questions to my colleagues. [Laughter.]

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, whether he will state what is the number of plaints issued last year in the Carnarvon County Court in actions against defendants residing in the parishes of Llanllyfni, Llandwrog, and Clynnog, and from the Portmadoc Court, in actions against defendants residing at Dolbenmaen.

The numbers in question are:—Llanllyfni, 237; Llandwrog, 219; Clynneg, 30; Dolbenmaen, 3. By the last named the hon. Member is understood to mean the ancient and smaller area so designated.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been called to a case brought before the Board under the conciliation clause, s. 31 of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888, and lodged with the Board as long ago as the 23rd of April last, in which a trader complained that the Great Western and London and South Western Railway Companies were unduly prejudicing him in respect to certain rates charged by them, and in which those Companies have hitherto neglected to reply to the communications of the Board of Trade; whether there are any circumstances justifying the delay in this case; whether there have been other cases under the Conciliation Clause of undue delay on the part of Railway Companies in replying to communications of the Board; and whether he intends to take any step with the view of securing more prompt attention on the part of Railway Companies to the communications of the Board of Trade in such cases?

Yes, Sir, I am aware of the facts of this case, and can only say that the Board of Trade have frequently pressed the Great Western and the London and South Western Railway Companies for a reply to the complaint. The Great Western Railway are principally interested, and I understand that the delay is caused by certain correspondence which has been passing between that Company and the Corporation of Weymouth. The Board of Trade have sometimes difficulty in obtaining such prompt replies to complaints under Section 31 as they could desire, but the Board cannot generally attribute this to an intention on the part of the Companies to delay the proceedings. From the nature of the complaint, involving in many cases several Companies and a large number of rates, the correspondence must be lengthy, particularly as between the Companies who desire to consult together and act in accord. I can only assure my hon. Friend that the Board of Trade will carefully watch the progress of the cases, and press the Companies for prompt replies.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War, whether his attention has been drawn to the fact that on 25th September, 1859, John Hynes enlisted in the 67th Regiment of Infantry, and whilst serving took part in the military operations in the south of China, being present with his regiment at five engagements, in the last of which he was wounded, and his eyesight almost entirely destroyed, in consequence of which, after a service of 9 years and 210 days, he was discharged on a pension of 6d. a day; will he inquire on what grounds, after the lapse of two years and three months, this pension was suddenly stopped, and no further pension since paid to him; and, whether the Secretary of State for War will consider the advisability of restoring this man's pension as a reward for his good conduct and bravery?

John Hynes was discharged from the 67th Foot in 1869, after less than 10 years' service, in consequence of defective vision, which the medical authorities certified to have been a natural defect existing prior to enlistment. He had never been wounded, and was not in possession of any medal or clasp. The Commissioners of Chelsea Hospital granted him a pension of 6d. a day for 27 months; and in 1871 they refused an application for its renewal. Hynes' service does not entitle him to any further pension.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War, whether his attention has been called to the case of Alexander Nelson, formerly a soldier in the 75th Regiment, who took his discharge in China in 1881, under a Royal Warrant granting him a free discharge and a deferred pension after 55 years of age, and has since been deprived of the pension on the plea that there was a mistake in the wording of the Royal Warrant; and whether, if these facts prove to be so, he will give instructions that faith be kept with this soldier by granting him the deferred pension to which he is justly entitled, and of which he has been admittedly deprived by the error of some War Office official, for which he is in no way responsible?

Alexander Nelson was discharged from the 75th Foot on the 2nd September, 1871 (not 1881 as in the question), with a total service of 12 years and 53 days on his limited engagement. He is not entitled to a deferred pension, as the Royal Warrant requires a minimum service of 14 years. There was no mistake in the Royal Warrant; and the Commissioners of Chelsea Hospital have no power to grant Nelson a deferred pension.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War, whether his attention has been called to the case of William Brennan, of Heyside, in the Parliamentary borough of Oldham, who was awarded a war medal for services rendered in 1878, 1879, and 1880, in the Afghan Campaign, and who was tried by court-martial at York in May last, and sentenced to ten days' imprisonment with hard labour for absence from training of the 4th battalion of the West Yorkshire Regiment of Militia; and whether he will cause inquiries to be made with a view to removing the stigma of desertion from Brennan's name, and to grant him such further satisfaction as the facts may justify, and, with a view to the adoption of some new method by which the Militia may be called up for training, if the existing method should prove on inquiry to be insufficient or unsatisfactory?

The Secretary of State's attention has been drawn to the case of William Brennan. He was tried and convicted of the minor offence of absence without leave, and no stigma of desertion attaches to him. The usual notice of training was sent to Brennan's address by post, and was not returned through the Post Office, but Brennan states that he did not receive it. In addition, the usual notices required by Regulation were posted throughout the county or area to which his battalion belonged, and the Militia Act of 1882 provides that such publication shall be sufficient "notwithstanding that a copy of such notice is not served" upon the militiaman. Even if it be assumed that he did not wilfully absent himself, as he was convicted by a competent tribunal, and has no stigma attaching to him, the Secretary of State does not see what further satisfaction can be given to him. The Secretary of State will consider whether any improvement can be effected in the mode of calling up the militia for training.

On behalf of the hon. Member for the Southern Division of Cork County Mr. E. Barry, I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, as representing the Postmaster General, whether he can explain why Clonakilty does not enjoy the same mail advantages as the other towns in South and West Cork; and what steps, if any, will be taken to place Clonakilty on a level with the neighbouring towns in the matter of postal accommodation?

The Postmaster General regrets that it is not practicable to improve the present postal service of Clonakilty. It is on a branch line of railway, and has a good night mail service by car to and from Bandon, and a day mail service by railway.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury whether he can state, in regard to the extra men employed by Her Majesty's Customs in Liverpool, what is the average pay earned per day at the present time, and what are the average hours per day of employment per man; what is the longest period of consecutive hours on which an extra man has been employed on duty in the port of Liverpool during the present year, and what wages did he earn for the task; and whether he has had any specific grievances of these extra men brought to his notice; and, if so, will they be carefully considered?

The average pay earned per day by the extra Officers of Customs at Liverpool, in a recent and fairly representative week, was 2s. l0d. per day including overtime, or 2s. 6d. per day excluding overtime, and the average hours of employment per man per day for the same period were 7¼ hours with overtime, or 6½ hours without overtime. The longest period of consecutive hours on which an extra officer has been employed on duty in the port of Liverpool during the present year is reported to have occurred on the 13th-14th June, on which days, from entirely exceptional circumstances, a consecutive attendance of 32 hours was given by one man—the total wages earned, inclusive of overtime, for this prolonged attendance being returned at 16s. 8d. He was in charge of a lighter which ought to have sailed from Liverpool at 5 p.m., but was detained there by the merchants till four the next morning. His duty during the night would not have been such as to prevent his getting a night's rest. Measures have been taken, however, for preventing the recurrence of similar lengthened attendances. The specific grievances of these extra officers have recently been under the consideration of the Board of Customs, but they have not made them the subject of representations to the Treasury.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade whether it has been brought to his notice that lock-keepers on the Forth and Clyde Canal, running partly through Stirlingshire, and belonging to a railway company, have a single working shift extending from 5 a.m. to 10 p.m., with no set time for meals, and have the further possibility of disturbed duty during the remaining hours of the night; and whether the Board of Trade possesses any power to see that these hours of labour are reduced; and, if so, whether he will take steps in that direction?

No, Sir, the Board of Trade cannot interfere with the hours of labour of these men.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies, whether, during the time he has held office, his attention has been called to the conditions under which a monopoly of the India rubber trade in a large district of the Protectorate of Lagos has been granted to the firm of Messrs. Swanzy; and, if so, would he state what these conditions are?

said, I have heard that such a monopoly has been granted for a limited number of years by one of the Native Chiefs in the Protectorate but I have no official information on the subject, and have not heard what are the conditions of this concession. I am informed, however, by Mr. Swanzy that the statement that the indiarubber is paid for by liquor has no foundation.

Is the right hon. gentleman aware that the indiarubber is paid for in bills of exchange and not in cash?

No, Sir, I am assured by Mr. Swanzy it is paid for in cash.

The right hon. Gentleman says the monopoly is granted by one of the Native Chiefs of the Protectorate. Does it come before the Government of the Protectorate?

No.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the attention of Her Majesty's Government has recently been called to the questions arising out of the collision, in 1875, between the British s.s. City of Mecca and the Portuguese s.s. Insulano; and whether protection can be given to Messrs. George Smith & Sons, of Glasgow (the owners of the City of Mecca), against the extortions to which they are, even now, subjected if their vessels, or vessels with which they are in any way connected, or are supposed to be connected, touch at Portuguese or French ports?

Yes, Sir, my attention has been called to the case in question. I have made careful inquiry into it, and have seen some of the persons concerned. Her Majesty's Government have frequently expressed their strong dissent from the judgments of the Portuguese Law Courts; but, in view of the fact that the appeal to the highest Tribunal in that country has been unsuccessful, and of the failure of all diplomatic representations, they can see no grounds for hoping that further steps would have the desired effect. Concerning the case of Messrs. George Smith's vessels in French ports, the judgment of the Portuguese Courts was upheld upon examination both as to law and fact by the Court at Rouen, and the judgment of the latter was re-affirmed by the French Court of Cassation. Under these circumstances, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that diplomatic representation would be of no avail.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War, whether, under the proposed new Warrant for the reorganisation of the Ordnance Store Department, those officers who have completed, or are just completing ten years' service, will be allowed to continue in the Department; and, if so, whether under the terms of the Warrant of 1880, if the prospects of promotion under the new scheme are bad, any brevets will be given; and, when is the Warrant likely to be promulgated; if not for some time, can any announcement be made which will tend to relieve the uncertainty under which the unfortunate officers of this Department have been living for some months?

Those officers who have completed ten years' service in the Ordnance Store Department, and those also who may complete ten years before the new Warrant shall be promulgated, and may be selected for permanent retention, will remain under the terms of the Royal Warrant of 1880. It is not anticipated that promotion will be affected. The details of the Warrant are still under consideration, and I cannot yet say when it will be issued. It has already been stated that the necessary changes will be carried out with every consideration for the claims of existing officers.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies, whether he will add to the information furnished to the hon. Member for Canterbury with respect to the Salary of the Governor of South Australia, a statement showing the terms on which the Crown Lands of the Colony were handed over to the Colonial Government, and the revenue at present derived from the said lands?

When the Colony assumed complete responsibility for its administration and government it was at the same time granted complete control over all the sources of revenue, which would include the Crown lands. The land revenue for 1892–3, the latest available, was, exclusive of land sales, about £175,000. The sales represented £53,000 more.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Agriculture, whether the continuation of Parliamentary Paper, C. 6,144, showing the number of allotments and small holdings in the year 1890, is in progress, and when it is likely to be completed?

A sum of £3,000 has been provided in the Estimates for the current year for the purposes of the Return to which my hon. Friend refers, and the necessary information is now in process of collection. I am afraid it is too early for me to lame a date for the completion of the work, which is one of considerable magnitude, but I shall be glad to do whatever is in my power to expedite its issue.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade, whether he will communicate with the Caledonian Railway Company, as owners of the Forth and Clyde Canal, with reference to the Bonnybridge pend or tunnel under that canal, which is not only unsuitable for the traffic which it has to bear but is dangerous to public safety; and, whether he will press the Company to remedy the existing defects in order to satisfy the requirements of the locality?

The Board of Trade have already been in communication with the Caledonian Railway Company on the subject, but without success. I will see, however, if anything can be done to bring about an arrangement between that Company and the Stirling County Council.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether Her Majesty's Government have any reliable information, official or non-official, as to the present position of the French and Belgian forces with regard to the Upper Nile waterway?

No, Sir, we have no reliable information.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether Sir F. Fryer, Chief Commissioner of Burmah, formally promised the Shan chiefs assembled at Mong Sing in May last, that the district of Khiang Kheng was British territory, and would always remain so; and, whether Her Majesty's Government intend to adhere to that pledge?

At a Durbar held by the Chief Commissioner of Burmah at Taunggyi (not Mong Sing, as stated by the hon. Member), the head-quarters of the Southern Shan States, on the 7th May, 1895, Sir F. Fryer said:—

"It had been our intention to give Keng Cheng to Siam, but the arrangement was never completed, and Keng Cheng, like Keng Tung, remains an integral part of the British Empire."

With regard to the hon. Member's further inquiry, I would invite attention to the announcement made by the Prime Minister in the House of Lords on the 30th of August.

I would ask the hon. Gentleman, the Under Secretary, whether the Papers he has quoted from will be presented to the House; and, if not, whether he will lay them on the Table?

I have quoted from no Papers. I have quoted from a speech made by the Commissioner of Burmah. The question whether that speech will be laid on the Table or not is a matter for the consideration of the Department of the Secretary of State for India.

Will the right hon. Gentleman be good enough to state whether the place where the meeting was held is in the State of Keng Cheng? I do not understand the speech of the Prime Minister, so far as I remember it, to directly endorse the view put forward by the Chief Commissioner of Burmah, and I would like to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether the speech did contain an assurance equivalent to that given to these chiefs by the Chief Commissioner of Burmah?

As regards Taunggyi, it is not in Keng Cheng, either on this or the other side of the Mekong. With regard to the speech of Lord Salisbury, I am afraid I can add nothing to its interpretation, which, I think, will be sufficiently clear to everybody.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether Her Majesty's Government have yet received an authoritative report of the proceedings connected with the execution of the English trader Stokes on the Upper Congo; what was the nature of the charges against Stokes; whether he was tried by a court-martial upon which two Belgian commissioned officers declined to serve, their places being supplied by noncommissioned officers; and, whether a Belgian officer present protested against the execution of Stokes, and declined to go further with Major Lothaire's expedition?

The documents, which are of a somewhat voluminous nature, were only received yesterday. Until they have been thoroughly examined, it is impossible to give an answer to the three last paragraphs of the hon. Member's Question.

Can the hon. Member hold out any hope of giving the House any information on these points before its rising this week?

I am afraid it may be difficult to do so. It will take some little time to examine the papers and put them into print. Probably they must go to the Secretary of State, who is abroad, before I can make any announcement upon them.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade, whether he can explain why, in the Report presented to this House of the Departmental Committee to inquire into the Joint Stock Companies Acts, the evidence of some witnesses is given and that of others omitted; and, whether there is any, and, if so, what objection to laying upon the Table the minutes of the proceedings and of the evidence of all the witnesses examined, who, according to the Report, were not a large number?

The Appendix to the Report contains all evidence taken by the Committee. It is not proposed to lay on the Table the minutes of proceedings, as this is not usual in the case of Departmental Committees. Moreover, the discussions of the Committee were, to a large extent, of an informal character.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War, whether it is the fact that a surgeon-major general is now performing, in addition to his own duties, the duties also of the senior War Office Clerk at the medical division of the War Office while the latter is on leave of absence; whether an officer of major general's rank has ever, in any other branch of the War Office, performed the duties of a War Office Clerk; and, why the next senior clerk at the medical division is not, as is always the custom, nominated for the duties of the official in higher rank of his own service absent on leave?

The senior Civil Service clerk of the Army Medical Department was recently obliged, on medical grounds, to take short leave of absence, and during the few days he was absent, one of the Medical Staff exercised a general supervision over the duties performed by the subordinate clerks. The next senior clerk who ordinarily would have taken over the duty was, at the time, on the sick list, and about to retire from the service. It is impossible to say whether such conditions ever occurred before, but the mode of meeting the difficulty on this occasion was considered to best meet the requirements of the service under very exceptional conditions.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, as representing the Postmaster General, what is now delaying the building of the new post office at Portadown; whether the Crown are under rent for building site of same for the past couple of years, and that promises have been repeatedly made, in reply to previous questions on the subject by the Members for North Armagh and South Tyrone and others, that building would have commenced long ago; why were the builders' tenders of 1st August rejected, and fresh tenders invited for the 28th instant, which will curtail the dimensions of the structure; and, can the Board of Works be empowered to select a builder from the specifications tendered for on 1st August, and the building of a much-required office commenced at once?

The building of the new post office at Portadown will be proceeded with as soon as a tender for the work has been accepted; and that, it is hoped, will be towards the end of the present month. The tenders already received were all too high, and it is not desirable to adopt any of them as suggested. Rent has, of course, been paid for the site since it passed to the Post Office, more than a year ago; but the amount (£20 a year) is trifling.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade, whether, in view of the courage and judgment recently exhibited by Captain Sharp, in charge of the s.s. Seaford, when in collision with the French s.s. Lyon, he can, on behalf of the Board of Trade, give some special recognition, by issuing a gold medal as a "Mercantile Marine Medal," to be awarded to marine officers who distinguish themselves on special emergencies, such as in the case of Captain Sharp?

As an Official Inquiry has been ordered into the circumstances of the collision to which the hon. Member refers, it would, I think, be premature for me to consider the grant of any reward in connection with the case until after the result of that Inquiry is known. I may say, however, that, although Captain Sharp's conduct after the collision was highly praiseworthy, as undoubtedly was the conduct of the crew, and especially of the men who, at great risk to themselves, closed the bulk head doors of the Seaford, the case is not quite of the class for which rewards are usually given.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War, if the unsuitability of the Rossmore site for a Rifle Range consists in a slight natural surface-depression of the ground, which might be remedied by a comparatively small outlay of money; and, if the Military Authorities will, before finally deciding against the adoption of this site for a Range, take into consideration the advantages possessed by Monaghan both as to its situation and climate?

Reference to Ireland is necessary as to these details, but full consideration will be given to the advantages of Monaghan before any change is made.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, with regard to the fact that, in reply to a memorial forwarded in December last by the Ridley clerks of the Second Division, the Treasury urge that, in addition to the present amount of annual leave granted to these clerks, they are absent from their official duties on Christmas Day, Good Friday, the Queen's birthday, the four Bank Holidays, and half-days on alternate Saturdays, and 52 Sundays, will he state whether these are exceptional advantages enjoyed by this particular body only, or whether they are general to the whole Service?

The additional holidays referred to in the question are not exceptional advantages of the Second Division, but are enjoyed by many other classes of the Civil Service, if the state of public business permits.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury—(1) whether a large proportion of the Ridley Clerks of the Second Division commenced their official career as boy clerks under the Playfair Regulation; (2) whether the Treasury offered special facilities to these boy clerks in the examination for the Second Division, and thereby recognised their claim to promotion to that grade; and (3) whether those Ridley Clerks, who entered as boy clerks with a view to obtaining these special facilities, and thereby entering the Second Division at an initial salary of £95 per annum, have been prejudiced by subsequent alterations in the regulations?

The answer to the first paragraph is in the affirmative. As regards the second paragraph, the Treasury have offered special facilities to boy clerks in the examination for the Second Division by reserving a certain number of vacancies to be competed for by them, but they do not recognise any claim on their part to promotion to that grade. Ridley Clerks who passed from being boy clerks into the Second Division receive a lower initial salary than under the old Play fair scale, but, taking their service as a whole, their position is very greatly improved by the change.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—(1) whether his attention has been called to the difficulties which shippers of goods to America experience in satisfying the Customs authorities at New York of the true value of the same; and, (2) whether he will cause inquiries to be made with a view to ascertain why goods shipped to New York by Messrs. Henry Kay and Co., of Middleton, Lancashire, on the 5th of December, 1894, and 23rd January, 1895, were confiscated and sold?

Cases of the nature of those mentioned in the first paragraph of the question have been brought to the notice of the Secretary of State. If Messrs. Kay and Co. have any information to give to the Foreign Office, in addition to that which has been privately furnished me by the hon. Member, I shall be glad to receive it, and inquiries will at once be made.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether Her Majesty's Government have received any communication from the Turkish Government relative to the project of a new organisation for the provinces in Asia Minor inhabited by Armenians, suggested by Russia, France, and England, in the joint note of 11th May last; whether that project has received any official support from Germany, Austria, or Italy; whether Her Majesty's Government propose to consult with the Governments of Germany, Austria, and Italy, or to arrive at any concert with those Governments before taking further proceedings in the matter; whether they are now able either to lay any Papers upon the Table of this House, or to give information as to the present condition and prospects of the negotiations; and, whether they will undertake that no action beyond diplomatic representations or negotiations will be taken by themselves without Parliament being previously informed of the grounds on which such action is based?

Several communications have been received from the Turkish Government, the general purport of which has been correctly stated in the Press. They cannot unfortunately be considered as satisfactory. The project has not received official support from the three Powers mentioned, but it is believed that they are in sympathy with it and that they have unofficially advised the Porte to give it favourable consideration. Her Majesty's Government are not in a position to make any declaration as to the course which they may find it necessary to pursue, nor to give any undertaking of the character indicated in the concluding paragraph of the Question. Concerning Papers, I will answer in reply to a question lower down on the Paper.

asked the right hon. Gentleman whether he could say on what ground Her Majesty's Government based their belief that Germany, Austria, and Italy were in sympathy with the project?

said he would not have made the statement if he had not had information on which he could rely.

will the right hon. Gentleman lay the information on the table?

No, Sir, certainly not.

asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether the attention of Her Majesty's Government had been called to the statement of the Russian newspaper Novosti that the time had arrived for the three Powers intervening on behalf of the Armenians to supplement their representations to the Porte by a united naval demonstration at the Dardanelles; and, whether Her Majesty's Government had any intention of making or taking part in any such demonstration?

The paper in question has no official character, and the attention of Her Majesty's Government had not been called to the statement referred to. No proposals of such a character have been made; but it would not be desirable in the public interest to make any announcement as to the course which may eventually be taken.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether the attention of Her Majesty's Government has been called to the statement of the Russian newspaper Novastie that the time has arrived for the three Powers intervening on behalf of the Armenians to supplement their representations to the Porte by a United Naval Demonstration at the Dardanelles; and, whether Her Majesty's Government have any intention of making or taking part in any such demonstration?

The paper in question has no official character, and the attention of Her Majesty's Government had not been called to the statement referred to. No proposals of such a character have been made. But it would not be desirable in the public interest to make any announcement as to the course which may eventually be taken.

On behalf of the hon. Member for Northampton East, Mr. F. A. Channing, I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether Her Majesty's Government have received confirmation of the reported threatening attitude of Turkish troops in the neighbourhood of Erzinghian, in Armenia, and of acts of violence by those troops and, whether steps have been taken by representations to the Porte or by other means, to prevent the outrages and possible massacres apprehended by the Christian population?

Since the reply given to the hon. Member's question or the 29th ult., a telegram on the subject has been received from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. He reports, from information obtained through Her Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum, that about the 12th of August a Turkish Lieutenant Colonel was attacked and robbed near Kermakh, by unknown brigands, and that a sergeant of his escort was killed. The crime was attributed by the Turkish Authorities to Armenians, and they had despatched a large military force in pursuit, who were said to be plundering villages and monasteries, and committing various outrages. Several Armenians had been arrested in Erzinghian, and the leading members of the community there had appealed for protection to the Armenian Archbishop at Erzeroum. Her Majesty's Ambassador at once made representations to the Turkish Government, and has been informed by the Grand Vizier that orders have been telegraphed to Erzinghian for the release of the Armenians arrested on account of the incident.

On behalf of the hon. Member for Northampton East, I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether the alleged difficulties in carrying out the distribution of the relief funds raised in England to meet the necessities of the distressed population of the Sassoun district have been overcome by the representations made to the Porte; and, whether any further steps will be taken to expedite the distribution of the relief at the earliest moment?

The latest reports received from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople show that no difficulties are now being raised with regard to the distribution of relief in the Sassoun district, and that Mr. Hampson, British Vice-Consul at Moush, is acting in concert with the Turkish authorities. No requests or suggestions have been received from Mr. Hampson as to any further steps that can be taken in the matter.

In the absence of Mr. C. E. Schwann, Manchester, N., I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether, in view of the Report of the Turkish Commissioners who conducted the late inquiry into the massacres of last autumn in the Sassoun district of Armenia being published, Her Majesty's Government will publish the notes made and Reports handed in by the British representative who attended the sittings and examined witnesses both before and outside that Commission?

Her Majesty's Government are cousulting the other Governments whose Delegates attended the Commission as to the publication of their joint Report. Subject to this assent being given, the Report in question will be presented at the earliest possible date.

inquired if the right hon. Gentleman proposed to publish the joint Report of May 11, and if he would now reply to the question, whether Her Majesty's Government proposed to consult the Governments of Germany, Austria, and Italy before taking further action?

said, that he had already replied to the last question. He was not in a position to give a promise as to the publication of the Report.

Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether the Government propose to consult the Governments of Germany, Austria, and Italy?

I thought I had made it clear that Her Majesty's Government must have been in consultation with the other Governments, or else I could not have given my answer.

In consultation, but not in concert.

On behalf of the hon. Member for Waterford, Mr. John Redmond, I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade, whether he is aware that the employés of the Waterford and Limerick Railway are obliged to work over the statutable hours; and, whether he will institute an inquiry into the matter?

There are no statutable hours, but if the hon. Member is in a position to make a complaint in writing on behalf of the men, indicating the hours which are deemed to be excessive, I will cause inquiry to be made under the Railway Regulation Act, 1893.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether Charles Franklin, aged 18, who was undergoing a term of two months' hard labour for having stolen a watch and chain, hanged himself in his cell at Wandsworth, on the 30th August, by means of a handkerchief attached to the crank wheel; whether a similar case had occurred at Lewes Gaol; whether, on the inquest on Charles Franklin, the jury had recommended the removal from the cells of these labour machines; and, whether, in view of such recommendation, and the report of the Departmental Committee on Prisons, 1895, which recommended that mechanical labour should wherever practicable be discontinued, he will take steps to cause to be removed from cells those labour machines which have been described as unproductive, serving no useful purpose, and demoralising as well as dangerous?

The suicide of Charles Franklin in Wandsworth Gaol was carried out by means of a bandage removed from an injured hand and fastened to the handle of the crank. No occurrence of the kind can be traced as having taken place in Lewes prison since it was taken over by the Government. The jury expressed the opinion that no blame attached to any of the prison officials, but that these labour machines should be removed from the cells. The recommendation of the Prisons Committee was, that unproductive labour should, wherever practicable, be discontinued, and the Prisons Commissioners have had under their most careful consideration the question of substituting productive labour for these machines. Their suggestions will receive my immediate attention.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he will print and circulate the Report of Sir William Mark by and Sir William Pollock on the Trinidad Judicial Inquiry Commission, 1892, which was laid upon the Table of this House in April, 1893?

When the Report was laid on the Table the Under Secretary of State said that it was undesirable to incur the expense of printing so bulky a document, extending to more than 800 pages. There seems to be no reason for departing from that decision.

did not think there was any copy of the document obtainable in the Library. Under these circumstances, could he have access to a copy?

said he would take care the hon. Gentleman was able to see the document.

I beg to ask the Lord Advocate, will he explain why it was that, in the case of William Agnew, shoemaker, Glasgow, who was tried for murder at Glasgow on the 29th ultimo, and acquitted, the Crown refused permission to medical men, appointed by the prisoner, to be present at the post mortem examination of the deceased.?

This step was taken by my predecessor in office. I am informed, on inquiry, that Crown Counsel saw no reason in this particular case for consenting to the presence of two additional medical men.

Then, I beg to give notice that on the Second Reading of the Appropriation Bill I will call attention to the matter.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, when will the Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committee on the Unemployed be printed and circulated?

The Minutes of Evidence are quite ready for circulation, but the printers are waiting for two Appendix Papers, one from the Local Government Board, the other from Sir Henry C. Bannerman's secretary. The Minutes will be circulated directly these two Papers arrive; but, if it was thought desirable to circulate the Minutes at once, and to issue the two Appendices as a Supplement, this could be easily done.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether he will consider the propriety of taking steps to cause a public inquiry to be held into the case of Mrs. Maybrick, such inquiry to be presided over by a Judge of the High Court, and conducted under judicial forms.

As I have already stated, I am about to give full and impartial consideration to the case of Mrs. Maybrick; but I have no power to order such an inquiry as is suggested.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland—(1) whether his attention has been called to the eviction of an old man, named Feargus Loughlin, living at a place called Stralongford, near Mohill, in the county Leitrim; (2) is he aware that a number of policemen stood by protecting the sheriff and emergency-men in levelling, not alone the cabin, but the pigstye; and (3) will he see that the Royal Irish Constabulary are not used for protecting men engaged in the demolition of property?

I am informed that this man was evicted on August 14 for non-payment of rent, and that the sub-sheriff, who carried out the eviction, was protected by a party of six policemen. I am also informed that there is no foundation for the allegation in the second paragraph of the question. The rule guiding the constabulary in such cases was stated by my predecessor on January 12, 1894, when he pointed out that when the landlord, or his representative, on the completion of an eviction, proceeds to burn or level a dwelling-house, the constabulary are instructed to withdraw from the scene and to refuse protection to persons engaged in such demolition; but that if a serious breach of the peace be anticipated, it is the duty of the constabulary to have patrols in the vicinity to prevent any violence or outrage, though not for any other purpose. This is the rule that has been pursued for many years, and which will continue to be acted upon. The police state that they afforded no protection in the present instance when the premises were being demolished, and that, in accordance with the usual practice, they withdrew immediately after the eviction had been carried out.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade, whether his attention has been drawn to the accident at Croydon, to a train belonging to the London and Brighton Railway Company; and, whether he has any powers which would enable him to insist upon the improvement of this Company's railway carriages, with a view to the safety and less violent shaking than is now the lot of their passengers?

I am afraid I cannot do more than order an inquiry into the causes of the accident, and this has been done. The Board of Trade have no such powers as those suggested in the question.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India, whether he will lay upon the Table of the House a copy of the original orders pursuant to which what is known as exchange compensation allowance has been granted to Indian officers, civil and military; whether he will lay upon the Table of the House a statement of all sums disbursed and estimated under the head up to the present time; whether he is aware that such disbursements and estimates have been made avowedly for expenditure in England; and, whether the cost of them will be borne in whole or in part by the British Treasury?

The original orders, which were contained in a published Resolution of the Government of India, dated the 18th of August, 1893, will be given if the hon. Member will move for them. I may refer to page 216 of the Finance Accounts for 1893–4, and paragraphs 108 and 145 of the Financial Statement for 1895–6, both of which are on the Table of the House. The allowance is not given "avowedly for expenditure in England," but to enable officers to meet such expenditure if they think fit. No part of the cost will be borne by the British Treasury.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether the British subject, Mr. William Henry Rickard, who was sentenced by the Hawaiian Government to 35 years' imprisonment with hard labour and a fine of 10,000 dollars, for having as was alleged been concerned in a Royalist rebellion in favour of the deposed Queen, has received any reduction of the sentence; and, if not, whether the Government are taking steps with the object of prevailing upon the Hawaiian Government to grant some mitigation of the sentence?

The sentence of 35 years' imprisonment passed upon Rickard was, on the 4th of July last, reduced to 20 years. It has been ascertained, however, that Rickard had, prior to the insurrection, divested himself of his British nationality, and Her Majesty's Government have therefore no locus standi for interfering on his behalf.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury, whether he can give any information as to what form the further investigation will take into the various proposals for making batter provision for the aged poor; and, if by a form other than a Committee of this House, whether the investigation will be commenced before the beginning of next Session?

I cannot give any final statement on this subject to the hon. Gentleman, but I can tell him that the Inquiry will not be by a Committee of this House, but it will probably be departmental. If it is, I trust it may be in work before the next Session of Parliament.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury, whether he will undertake that the House shall have an opportunity in the next Session of Parliament of considering the Bill, which has just been withdrawn, for ensuring that the Scheme for the Berriew School shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament in the manner prescribed by law?

I have only to repeat what I said last night—namely, that it is the intention of the Government to reintroduce this Bill next Session.

hoped it would content the hon. Member if he assured him that his predecessor in office had commenced, and he himself was carrying forward an inquiry into the expediency of introducing any modification into the long-established practice of the Crown Office in such a case as that which the hon. Member had brought before the House. He said that without pronouncing one way or other as to the expediency of changing the practice of many successive Lord Advocates in Scotland. The Crown Office, represented in this House by the Lord Advocate, had always held that it was within their discretion in each particular case to allow the presence of outside medical men at the autopsy. The latter could on application obtain an investigation for themselves, but to allow outside medical men to be present as a right at a post-mortem examination by the doctors selected on behalf of the Crown was a matter which raised very difficult issues and was not to be decided off-hand. It would amount to a vital change in the practice which had hitherto obtained. That, however, was one of the things which was being investigated. He did not think the hon. Member was accurate in saying that the medical profession in Glasgow were unanimous on the subject; on the contrary, he was aware, from his own examination of the documents in the case, that certain members of that profession did not take the view indicated. He hoped the hon. Member would rest satisfied in the meantime with the assurance he had given.

called the attention of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the character of the inquiry which he proposed to make into the maltreatment of the Woodbush tribes in the Transvaal. This question had excited very great interest throughout South Africa, and he himself had not the slightest doubt that ample proof would be forthcoming of the accuracy of the statements in regard to those atrocities which had been made in this country and in the independent press of South Africa. A great proportion of the press and almost all the agencies for news in South Africa were in certain hands. They were either in the hands of the ruling clique of the Transvaal, which was, of course, directed by President Kruger, or they were in those of one or two great millionaires, who lived partly in this country and partly in South Africa. The consequence was, that very little accurate information came to this country by telegraph. He should not have referred to this subject to-day, but for ridiculous misstatements which had lately appeared in the Boer organs, notably in the South African Telegraph, as to his own action and that of others who took an interest in the well-being of the native races. Statements coming from those interested sources, either from President Kruger or from gentlemen anxious to stand well with the Kruger clique in order to obtain great concessions from them, did not deserve the credit either of this House or the country. The information, however, which had come to hand from private sources of the most reliable nature, of the barbarous maltreatment inflicted upon large masses of native races by the Boer authorities, military and civil, was too strong to be resisted. It was overwhelming. He had in his own possession letter upon letter written by gentlemen of good position in South Africa, who guaranteed the truth of what they had written, who had seen these things with their own eyes, who had seen these unfortunate native tribes attacked without provocation and because they resented unjust exactions, who had seen the survivors driven hundreds of miles across a bleak country without proper food or protection under the whip of what were practically their slave-drivers, who had seen women falling and dying under the trials and exposure of the route, children—

Order, order! I am afraid the present remarks of the hon. Member are not relevant to the Appropriation Bill.

We have always hitherto been allowed to debate subjects on the Appropriation Bill which might have been discussed in Supply.

I was not objecting to the hon. Member discussing the conduct of the Colonial Office with respect to these transactions; what I do object to is the hon. Member going into a detailed description of the conduct of the Boers towards native tribes.

said, this was a very important matter, in which the honour of England was concerned; he had introduced the subject by referring to the inquiry that the Colonial Secretary had promised; but as the Speaker objected, he would not go further into these details. With regard to the investigation which the Secretary of State had promised to make into the truth of these statements, he would press on the right hon. Gentleman very strongly the importance of the investigation being of a thorough and independent character. It could not be said that our representatives in South Africa had of late given that full information to the Home Government which he ventured to think was desirable. He would not say where the fault lay, but even the right hon. Gentleman was obliged to tell him, in answer to a question about the very important petition signed by over 30,000 non-Boer residents in the Transvaal asking for constitutional rights, that he had no official information regarding it. Similar answers with regard to important interests of British subjects resident in the Transvaal had been given by the late Government. The first duty of their representative in the Transvaal should be to send home official information on such a grave matter. This investigation, if it was to be real, must be very carefully conducted, and it must be conducted by representatives of the Queen who were above suspicion, and who would visit the scenes of these atrocious events. They must obtain evidence from the witnesses direct, and promise them safeguards in return; otherwise, he feared, the investigation would prove abortive. He did not press the point which he raised in his question that day with regard to the pledge of Sir F. Fryer to the native chiefs of the Shan States. There was no doubt that Sir F. Fryer, the British Chief Commissioner in Burmah, speaking with the authority a gentleman in his position would speak, promised these Shan chiefs that their country should be British and should always remain British.

I must intervene to remind the hon. Member that he gave an incorrect version in his question of the words used by Sir F. Fryer. I quoted the correct words, which do not justify the interpretation put upon them by my hon. Friend.

said, he was quite willing to accept the words given by the right hon. Gentleman. He quoted from the only source open to him, namely, an important article in the Times. The words quoted by the right hon. Gentleman—viz., that were "an integral part of the British Empire"—were, however, strong enough to prove that a distinct guarantee was given of the maintenance of British rule over these Shan tribes. He was aware this was a very difficult and delicate question, and it was quite evident from the reply of the right hon. Gentleman that he was not anxious to go into it at this moment. He could only express a hope that this case would not be added to the painfully long list of British pledges to native races which had been broken within the last few years. Another question to which he wished to refer was the killing of three gallant British officers and a considerable number of British native troops at Weima, or Warina, in West Africa. Several questions had been asked in the House during the last 18 months with regard to this very serious and unfortunate event. He would not say anything upon the question that could, he hoped, give offence to the great nation whose forces were responsible for the attack on the British troops; but, in his opinion, from the very first, a most unfortunate line was taken by the Foreign Office with regard to this matter. It was said that this affair was to be a portion of the general settlement in Africa. Such an event as that could not in propriety be made a portion of a general settlement. It was an act which required immediate attention and an immediate explanation. There was little doubt that Weima was regarded by the Foreign Office as within British territory before this unhappy attack was made. The late Government on many occasions retreated, in a very ignominious way, before the same Great Power that was responsible for this attack—with regard to Siam, Sierra Leone, the Anglo-Congo Convention, Madagascar, the Upper Nile Waterway, and other points. But of all the abandonments of which they had been guilty, the abandonment of this Weima incident was the most deplorable. He was not blaming the present Under Secretary. He recognised that the whole affair occurred under the preceding Government; and that the present Government could not justly be held responsible. But the right hon. Gentleman had just repeated the official answer that it would be necessary to send a large expedition to ascertain the exact geographical position of Weima. He ventured to think there was no real doubt about that, but that a navigating lieutenant, even of the merchant service, would in the course of a very few days settle the position of Weima, and that he would not require a large escort to do this. He wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman now whether Her Majesty's Government proposed to take any steps to obtain some explanation of this very grave event, or whether it was intended to allow the matter to drift on from month to month, and perhaps from year to year, without any satisfactory explanation being given.

said, he could not allow the Appriation Bill to pass without expressing some disappointment on the part of those who looked to the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs to inaugurate a new era in foreign policy. They expected many things of him. They had a perfect Foreign Minister, and in the right hon. Gentleman they had looked for a pluperfect Under Secretary. He had been everywhere; knew everything. He had read every book; he had re-written most of them and abstracted the rest; and, consequently, they did expect many things from him. They thought of him in the words of Shakspere:—

"Turn him to any cause of policy,

The gordian knot of it he will unloose,

Familiar as his garter."

But when they came to the House and humbly asked him to untie the knot in the form of a question, when they asked him for a little information, they could not get any at all. He was worse, and that was saying a good deal, than the last Under Secretary of State. There were extremely important matters being carried on, as to which this House was entitled to some information. Take the case of Turkey. He wanted to know whether Her Majesty's Government were agreed, not merely with France and Russia, but with the other three Powers who were signatories to the treaty under which the action was being taken. He had asked, on more than one occasion, whether the Government had consulted or concerted with Austria, Germany, and Italy; and, if they had been consulted, he wished to know what answer had been returned. Was it not the fact that they had been consistently and persistently snubbed by those Powers in the suicidal course they were now taking with regard to Turkey, and which was calculated to throw down one of the main barriers of their Indian Empire. They had a right to some answer to this question. The Joint Note of the 11th of May had been given to the Press, but it had not been laid on the Table of the House as, he submitted, it ought to have been. The House of Commons ought not to be left to the Press, either English or foreign, to gain its information about foreign affairs. Hon. Members ought not to be treated as they had been by the right hon. Gentleman. Either the whole information should be given or he should withhold it all. They should either know the whole facts and the whole of the negotiations, or the Under Secretary should have entrenched himself in the old position of the Foreign Office of giving them nothing. The attitude which had been taken up by the Under Secretary towards Members of that House, and towards the country was one that he could not persistently maintain to the end. The country would expect to have information as to their foreign affairs, and he warned the right hon. Gentleman that next Session a good many Members of the House would not be content to take answers which were no answers, but were puttings-off, and with the suppression of important Papers on the policy which was to be carried into effect by the Government.

Probably it will be for the convenience of the House that I should reply to the matter raised by my hon. Friend (Sir E. Ashmead-Bartlett) which concerns my Department, before the Under Secretary for State answers the hon. Member who has just paid to him a compliment, not only high in itself, but particularly gratifying, coming as it does from one who is undoubtedly the most encyclopædic Member of this House. Turning to my hon. Friend, I admit I cannot quite understand what object he has in view in raising again the question of the alleged ill-treatment by the Boer Government of certain natives. What are the facts of the case? My hon. Friend on many occasions has made most serious, grave, and important charges of inhumanity and cruelty against the Boer Government, and has said that when I came into office I had proof of these charges.

No. The right hon. Gentleman has misunderstood me. I said he now has strong evidence of them.

The hon. Gentleman said, in the course of his speech, that he was convinced that I must have proof of these allegations. I wish to say that that is undoubtedly not the case. I have absolutely no proof at all, but, at the same time, the allegations in themselves were so serious that I at once promised my hon. Friend that I would make the best, and most complete and impartial inquiry it was possible under the circumstances. But the circumstances are not so easy, because my hon. Friend made these accusations either upon the testimony of the natives or of persons who refuse to allow their names to be used. It is excessively difficult to make anything like an efficient inquiry when the witnesses will not come forward; and, therefore, it will not be in my power to make the kind of inquiry I should like to have done in regard to this matter. So far as it is in my power to settle the question once for all, I shall be prepared to do so. But my hon. Friend will not be satisfied with any inquiry which does not prove the Boers to be guilty. He has asked for an impartial inquiry, but it is perfectly evident that he thinks that the persons who are to conduct this inquiry are prejudiced. He rejects altogether as evidence in this matter the testimony of our present officials, both in the Transvaal and in Cape Colony. I have to inform him that since I have been in office I have seen absolutely no cause whatever to doubt the trustworthiness of these British officials.

I cannot allow a statement of that sort to pass. I did not say that I denied the trustworthiness of our officials, but I said they must be rather slow in sending information home, because Ministers have on several occasions stated in this House that information had not been received on important questions connected with the Transvaal. I must remind the right hon. Gentleman that I have not said one-half with regard to our officials what he himself said with regard to Sir Hercules Robinson last Session. [Opposition cheers.]

That is a statement that ought not to have been made. But I am happy to give an absolute denial to the imputation contained in it. I said nothing last Session—I refer the House to the report of my speech in "Hansard"—which in the least degree reflected upon the character, the ability, the impartiality, or the judicial trustworthiness of Sir Hercules Robinson. I criticised, it is true, the conduct of the late Government in sending out Sir Hercules Robinson to the Cape under circumstances which are within the recollection of the House. But I carefully avoided and specially guarded myself against saying one single word which threw the slightest doubt on the high capacity or personal honour of Sir Hercules Robinson himself. So much for the interruption. When the hon. Gentleman goes on to say that he did not make any imputations against British officials in the Transvaal, let me remind the House that he accused them of withholding information, and he seemed to suggest, because I said the other day that I had no official information about a matter which was within common knowledge—namely, that an independent State had refused to alter its constitution at the request of a certain number of petitioners—because I had no official knowledge of that, which I did not require, that therefore the officials failed to keep me informed as to the very serious circumstances which the hon. Member alleges to have taken place in regard to the treatment of the natives. I give my hon. friend the assurance which he asks. I will endeavour to carry out an impartial inquiry into this matter, and I really think my hon. friend might wait until that inquiry has been completed and the result of it known, before again repeating in this House ex parte accusations which he has so constantly made and which up to the present time have not been proved. [Cheers.]

I will answer quite briefly the questions contained in the speeches of my two hon. Friends. The hon. Member for Sheffield has used very strong language, and has once at least employed the word "deplorable." I think in the few remarks I have to make I shall show that neither the conduct of the late Government nor the conduct of the present Government deserve that imputation. The hon. Member spoke with great confidence of the exact geographical position of Weima, the place where this unfortunate incident occurred. He said that Weima was in territory officially regarded as British, in territory which cannot on any authentic grounds be denied to be British. That statement does not in the least degree tally with the information in the possession of the Foreign Office. The exact geographical locality of Weima is wholly undetermined. It is either in British territory or it is in Liberian territory; it is a matter in all probability of a few hundred yards in either direction. He says there being this uncertainty any navigating lieutenant with proper instruments could set it right at once. That is not the case. A number of expert engineer officers have at different times been to Weima, but through their having no fixed point from which to calculate it has been found impossible to arrive at any scientific calculation as to the position of Weima. There being this uncertainty as to the exact locality of the place, my hon. Friend asks what were the French doing there? The French have a treaty with the Liberian Government which gives their officers the right to cross the frontier on to Liberian territory in pursuit of fugitives or other persons in the course of warlike operations. There is not a shadow of a doubt that this unfortunate act on the part of the young French officer who lost his life was a perfectly bonâ fide act, taken in what he believed to be the exercise of French rights, on a territory the exact locality of which has never been determined, and which he believed to be within the boundaries where he had a right to go. Then occurred the melancholy incident in which lives on both sides were lost. It is perfectly true that the matter was regarded both by the late Government and by the present Government as one of sufficient importance to justify them in bringing it up in any discussion of African questions at large with the French Government. But, looking to the great uncertainty as to the position of the place, and the difficulty of sending out any expedition to obtain more adequate information, the hon. Member is not entitled to use the word "deplorable" in reference to the conduct either of the late Government or of the present Government. With regard to the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for King's Lynn, I must express my thanks to him for the high compliment that he has paid me. It is, indeed, surprising to me to learn that an hon. Gentleman of his discrimination could expect from the introduction of any individual into a subordinate office the inauguration of an entirely new era in foreign policy. I am sorry I am the person fated to disappoint his expectations in that respect, but, inasmuch as he has made me for the first time in this House the victim of a Shakespearian quotation, I think I may find some consolation in that. My hon. Friend's desire for information is so ravenous, increasing instead of diminishing as the Session approaches its close, that no amount of official indiscretion on my part could possibly satisfy him; and in the future I must hold myself open to the particular criticism he has brought against me this afternoon. My hon. Friend asks whether we are, in respect of Armenian matters, in agreement with the three other great Powers besides France and Russia, with whom we have consistently acted, and he went on to say that we had been snubbed by them Now, I stated in some remarks I had to make earlier in the Session that the co-operation with France and Russia, for which there were many grounds of justification, was a legacy to the present Government inherited from their predecessors, and one, therefore, which they felt bound to maintain. As regards action with the other three Powers, there has never at any moment been any lack of sympathy with them. We have reason to believe that the other three Powers are entirely in accord with the action we have taken. We have had no indication whatever of an opposite state of feeling at any time since the Armenian movement began. Then my hon. Friend goes on to complain of the note of May 11, and here again he paid me a compliment which I do not deserve, because he said it was in part my production. At that time I was an obscure Member of Her Majesty's Opposition, and the late Government did not pay me the compliment of asking my views on the Note they addressed to the Porte. For that Note, therefore, I have no official responsibility. As to the question of its publication, it must be obvious to my hon. Friend that while these negotiations are still proceeding it would be impossible to publish papers relating to them, or, if papers were published, to publish papers relating to one part of the proceedings alone. In reference to my replies to questions, the hon. Member has stated that I was quoting from a document in one case and not in another. He was mistaken. In the case in which he objected to my replies I was reading out to him the substance of a telegraphic answer which had been received from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. If he is anxious to see it I will give him the telegram itself. As regards the general charge which has been brought by my hon. Friend against me—dissatisfaction with the amount of information I have hitherto been able to give—he assures me that that dissatisfaction is not only entertained and vigorously expressed by himself, but also by his colleagues on these Benches and by hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House. I do not for a moment believe that that is the case—[Cheers]—and, until I have some further evidence than the utterances of the hon. Member I shall continue the course I have already pursued. [Cheers.]

desired to thank the Board of Agriculture for acceding to his request to send a Commissioner to examine and report on the distressed condition of East Anglia. During the 10 years he had been in the House he had frequently played the part of the importunate widow, but hitherto he had always been met with platonic sympathy and a blank determination on the part of the Government to do nothing. He did not know what the Minister of Agriculture would do for the agricultural interest during the Recess, but he ventured to direct the right hon. Gentleman's attention to the questions of local taxation and the tithe-rent charge. Since the Budget of 1894 realty and personalty were both in the same boat with regard to Imperial taxation, and therefore the one ought not to pay three times more than the other to local taxation. With regard to the tithe-rent charge, it would be easy for the Government—as they did under the Ashbourne Act in Ireland—to lend money to enable the charge to be paid off within a given period.

, interrupting, said: I rise to order, Sir. I observe an hon. Member below the Gangway reading his correspondence in the House. I desire to ask whether such a proceeding is in order?

It is against the Rules of the House to bring private correspondence into the House, and read it there.

continuing, proceeded to read from the Dispatch as follows:—

"We have lately had occasion to consider further the question of our future policy in Gilghit and the surrounding States and the strength at which it would be necessary to maintain the British Agency in order to carry out that policy effectively. The proposals of Colonel Durand and the Resident in Kashmir on those points have been before us for some months, and we have had the advantage of discussing them with Colonel Durand. The conclusion to which we have come is that it will not be necessary to make any increase in the number of troops in the Gilghit Agency, either British or Kashmir. We have relieved the 200 Goorkhas by 205 Sikhs, and we have sent up a small detachment of sappers, but, on the other hand, we have withdrawn the mountain guns sent up last year."

I quote that as showing that the Government of India—that was at the time when Lord Lansdowne was Viceroy—were of opinion that the object was to watch any proceedings on the Hindu-Kush. The difficulty of supplying the troops at Gilghit was so great that it was necessary to keep the force down to the lowest possible point. The Government of India also proposed an increase of two additional political officers, an addition to the number of military officers, and, no doubt, although it does not appear, I think, in these extracts, one was placed at Chitral. It was our duty, it was stated, to avoid as far as possible from entangling themselves in the disputes of the natives. The Secretary of State approved of this proposal; but there is a letter addressed by the Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Kashmir which, I think, more fully explains the policy of the Government than that developed in their Dispatch. That Dispatch is as follows:—

"I am directed to address you on the subject of our future policy in Gilghit and the surrounding States. You were informed that the Government of India had no intention of pushing the project for the construction of a road through the territory occupied by the Indus Valley tribes. It was also pointed out to you that no action should be taken likely to lead to a collision with the Chilasi tribes, and that their headmen should be treated in a conciliatory manner. It will be your duty to inform the British Agent in Gilghit of the instructions you have thus received, and to impress upon him and the officers of the Agency the necessity of acting strictly in accordance with them. The Government of India have now had under their consideration the strength of the force which should be maintained for the future in the neighbourhood of Gilghit. The force in question is obviously intended for a twofold purpose. It is intended, in the first place, as an obstacle in the way of a Russian advance against Gilghit through the passes of the Hindu-Kush; and, in the second, to watch the tribesmen of Hunza and Nagar and the adjoining States. In regard to the second object, it is to be hoped that the effect produced upon the surrounding tribes by the successful operations against Hunza and Nagar will for some time to come render them unlikely to cause trouble. I am to impress upon you strongly that it is the desire of the Government of India that the officers of the Agency should carefully avoid any action which might have the effect of bringing about hostilities. Their efforts should, on the contrary, be directed to endeavouring, by means of conciliatory measures, to establish the most amicable relations with the tribes. Apart from the political objections which the Government of India entertain to a policy which might have the effect of involving us in further military operations on this part of the frontier, numerous proofs have lately been afforded of the costliness of maintaining a large force in the neighbourhood of Gilghit. It will, moreover, be obvious to you that, upon general grounds, there are serious objections to keeping considerable portions of the native army in so distant and isolated a position Under these circumstances, and assuming that the policy which has thus been laid down will be rigorously adhered to, the Government of India see no occasion for adding to the strength of the Gilghit garrison. Considering the great difficulty of transporting supplies across the passes by which Gilghit is divided from Kashmir, there would be obviously great advantages in fixing the strength of the garrison at a number which the country itself would be able to support. That number would, it is understood, not exceed about 1,600 men. Upon this point and upon the distribution of the troops in the neighbourhood of Gilghit and throughout the line of communication no decision will be come to until Colonel Durand's arrival in Simla. The Governor General in Council gathers from your telegram of the 18th inst. that you and Colonel Durand are both of opinion that the garrison of Gilghit itself might be safely reduced to the strength of one regiment and a battery, the remainder of the Imperial Service Troops being stationed along the line between Bunji and Astor. I may observe that the Government of India, while admitting that it will always be necessary to maintain a small body of British troops as an escort to the Resident, are not without hope that it may eventually be found possible to hold Gilghit with a force consisting mainly of local levies raised from amongst the neighbouring tribes, and entirely dependent upon local supplies. In this view it is desirable that the utmost encouragement should be given to the spread of cultivation in the neighbourhood. The Government of India are satisfied that the re-establishment of the Gilghit Agency was undoubtedly necessary, and that the operations against Hunza and Nagar were inevitable. Now that those have been brought to a successful conclusion, it is hoped that it may in the future be found possible to secure the passes and to maintain peace in the Dard States without adding materially to the burdens of the Empire."

That brings us down to the summer of 1892. In August, 1892, the Mehtar died, after a rule of something like 30 years. He was a man of great ability and firmness, and after his death there followed what our officer described as a period of "dynastic murders and civil war." The eldest son was 31 and the second 24. The latter, Afzal-ul-Mulk, succeeded, and the elder, Nizam-ul-Mulk, fled to British protection at Gilghit. Afzal murdered all his brothers he could get hold of. The Government of India at once acknowledged the man in possession, and he at once asked for a British officer to be sent to him at Chitral. Immediately before this the uncle, brother of the old Mehtar, made a sudden descent in the night, slaughtered Afzal, and took possession of the throne. He ruled about two months. Nizam, then at Gilghit, had no doubt of the support of the British Resident. I am not justified in saying that he was encouraged, but he was permitted to advance into the territory of Chitral, and he became Mehtar. I regret the interference of the British Agent in the internal affairs of Chitral. He had been expressly prohibited from doing so, but the Government of India, after further investigation, came to the conclusion that under the circumstances his action was justifiable, and approved of what he had done. Up to three years ago there was no Resident in Chitral; therefore we are perfectly free from complications in considering this question. The Agent appointed was Dr. Robertson, and in a Dispatch dated April 3, 1893, he said that "the atmosphere was one of conspiracy and intrigue." The Government never intended that his mission should be more than temporary, and considered that after he had recognised the new Mehtar it was undesirable that he should remain any longer in Chitral. Dr. Robertson left, but he deemed it desirable to leave Captain Younghusband and Lieutenant Gurdon behind him. In June, 1893, he presented a very interesting Report, which showed what was his opinion then. I thank the Government for giving us that Dispatch, but we have not got Sir George Robertson's Report in 1895. ["Hear, hear!"] It is much more important to be in possession of his views in 1895 than in 1893, particularly as the Government attached importance to Dr. Robertson's views in 1893. When he arrived at Chitral, he says:—

"Instead of finding ourselves in the position of envoys sent to congratulate and form an alliance with a young prince flushed with recent triumphs over rebellious subjects and powerful outside foes, we found ourselves called upon to firmly establish on his throne, and infuse with hope and virile energy, an unnerved, terror-stricken chief, who was conscious that he ruled on the merest sufferance a thoroughly disaffected people, whose abstention from further outbreaks of violence was entirely due to a doubt and fear lest the Government of India might have the will and also the power to avenge any injury to its nominee. That under such peculiar circumstances any permanence can be expected for the work already successfully accomplished would be unreasonable, unless the same plans which have worked so well in the immediate past be steadily persevered with in the immediate future. Military force other than that which the Mehtar himself can organise and direct it would be impolitic to use in Chitral, even if it were possible to employ it at such an enormous distance from its base of reinforcements and supplies in Kashmir or India. The upper classes have to be won over and conciliated by friendly overtures, apparently emanating from men absolutely secure and confident in their strength and position, while at the same time the imagination of the Adamzadas must be acted upon by the spectacle of their ruler being securely protected from all outside enemies and gradually making himself feared and respected by the firmness, combined with justice, of his rule, and by the display of the wealth and resources he possesses as the subsidised ally of his acknowledged suzerain, his Highness the Maharajah of Kashmir. That there are many difficulties in the way of carrying out such a line of policy it would be idle to deny, but there are also two factors, the value of which cannot be over-estimated, as favouring influences in any attempts we may make to mould the Chitralis to our interest, especially if these favouring influences be employed discreetly and with dexterity. They are, first, the absence of any real fanatical feeling in Chitral; and, secondly, the extreme impressionability of the people. The absence of all sentiments of religious intolerance in Chitral amounts to a national peculiarity. The impressionability of Chitralis, again, is something extraordinary. It undoubtedly makes them terribly fickle. But fickleness tells both ways. If you cannot rely upon unswerving supporters in changeable people, you can at least be happy in the thought that they can rarely become inveterate opponents. When great impressionability is combined with extreme cupidity, for which Chitralis are also remarkable, the power of influencing them lies with the man of most tactful speech, especially if he also possesses the longest purse. Polite attentions, complimentary speeches, have a great, if ephemeral, effect on most Chitralis. When accompanied by a small douceur they not unfrequently have the effect of starting the recipient to his feet with his eyes dimmed by grateful tears, his mouth full of fervid protestations of devotion. It is true his gratitude rapidly cools, but it can be excited again as often as is desirable by a re-employment of the means described. It follows, therefore, that a political officer in Chitral has a wonderful power always at hand of influencing for a time all those brought into direct contact with him. All manner of apparently determined enemies of the Mehtar, Adamzadas, Moghli Pirs, Sayads, as well as intriguers of other classes, succumbed at once to the not very subtle influences employed against them, while, as soon as it became generally known that I preferred expressions of loyalty to their Mehtar to hearing speeches of personal devotion to myself, the alteration I desired was made almost invariably."

I think the Chitralis have something in common with western races when pleasant speeches are accompanied by long purses. Sir George Robertson adds that—

"An Englishman now may travel anywhere throughout the length and breadth of Chitral without the slightest fear. He would be welcomed everywhere. The mission returned with no escort, unless Mr. Bruce's four Gurkhas may be so denominated. There were no sentries at night, no suspicion of danger at any time. A district in the heart of British India could not appear more peaceful and quiet. Such is the result of merely five months' work in the country."

This was written in June, 1893, and it only shows how men may be deceived. In 18 months all was altered. The Indian Government, however, came to the conclusion that Captain. Younghusband should remain for the present, though not at the capital. Colonel Durand proposed to make his quarters at Mastuj, 63 miles away. That Dispatch was replied to by Lord Kimberley, and Lord Kimberley's Dispatch again is not given in full; but I am able to supply a very serious omission in it out of the Blue-Book itself. Lord Kimberley, after referring to Dr. Robertson's Report and to the Dispatch of the Government of India, says:—

"I observe that, in your opinion, the maintenance of an English officer as Political Agent in Chitral renders necessary the retention of strong posts along the line of the Gilghit and Ghizr rivers, and it is partly on this account and partly to paralyse any hostile action of the tribes having relations with the Gilghit Agency that your Excellency's Government desires the permanent addition of a Bengal infantry battalion to the garrison of the Gilghit Agency. But in determining our future policy towards Chitral a wider view must he taken, and the question must be looked at with reference to the general aspect of affairs in that region, which may in a short time be considerably changed."

That was what Lord Kimberley wrote. But it would be altogether an unintelligible sentence where he speaks of "the general aspect of affairs" if, in the editing of these Dispatches, they had not edited other letters which contained the pith of that portion of Lord Kimberley's Dispatch. The Secretary to the Government of India, writing to the Resident in Kashmir, stated what was the general aspect of affairs in that region which Lord Kimberley thought might be changed, and which would seriously affect the whole question. He says:—

"When a review of the position on this frontier was placed before the Secretary of State for India nearly a year ago, Lord Kimberley sanctioned the retention of Captain Younghusband in Chitral as a temporary measure only, and pointed to three possible contingencies which would materially affect the general aspect of affairs in that region. Those contingencies were (1) the abandonment by the Ameer of all idea of bringing Chitral under his control; (2) the successful conclusion of the negotiations with Russia for the determination of boundaries in the Pamir tract; and (3) the mitigation, through the mediation of our frontier officers, of the irritation and suspicion of the frontier tribes."

The Ameer, at the close of 1893, bound himself not to interfere with Chitral by the Agreement concluded with Sir Mortimer Durand. In June, 1894, the Government of India appear to have addressed the Resident in Kashmir, pointing out to him that the first of the conditions to which Lord Kimberley had attached importance had been attained by the Durand Agreement; that there were indications that a Pamir settlement might before long be arrived at; and that the attitude of the tribes was fairly satisfactory.

"In these circumstances, you were informed that, if no new complications arose, the political officer in Chitral should be withdrawn when the winter was over."

At the time of that letter—in June—the Pamir Agreement was still unsigned; there was still suspicion among the tribes; and the Government of India came to the conclusion that—

"For another year our position in and towards Chitral must remain upon the present footing. It appears that Colonel Bruce and Captain Younghusband advocate a policy of activity and extension which is not in accord with the views of the Government of India."

This is not from London; this letter is written from Calcutta to the Resident in Kashmir, and expresses the view of the Government of India. The Dispatch continues:—

"I am to request that this policy may be impressed on the British Agent, and that he may be clearly informed that it is not intended to maintain permanently a resident officer in Chitral. It will suffice to retain the unquestioned right of sending a political officer into Chitral at all times."

That Dispatch was submitted to me—I had then succeeded to office—and I then stated, on August 3, 1894:—

"The reasons which induced Lord Kimberley to declare that it would be 'premature to decide now on the permanent political and military arrangements for this frontier' are still of weight. It is true that the Ameer of Afghanistan no longer advances any claims to exercise control in the affairs of Chitral, but the settlement of the frontier on the south-west and south of Chitral may still lead to troublesome complications; while on the north the question of the line delimitating the Russian boundary in the regions of the Upper Oxus is still unsettled. It was perhaps premature, in these circumstances, to raise the question of withdrawing Captain Younghusband from Chitral, and I fully concur in your decision that the moment for effecting what would certainly be regarded as a final withdrawal is inopportune, and, while adhering to Lord Kimberley's view that the present arrangements can only be regarded as temporary, I am no more prepared than Lord Kimberley was last year to formulate a definite policy (whether of abandoning or continuing those arrangements) within the fixed period such as is indicated."

In other words, the view that Lord Kimberley, the Government of India, and that I myself ventured to take was that, so long as the boundary of the Ameer was unfixed and the boundary with Russia unsettled, it was wise and prudent to make no change in the position of the resident officer at Chitral, but that when those questions were settled—and the House knows they have been now settled for a considerable time—he should be withdrawn. I now come to another extraordinary illustration of the editing of these papers. In the Dispatch from the Government of India, to which my Dispatch was a reply, there is not a word about the road to Peshawar. But in my reply this passage is given:—

"I approve also of your decided rejection of the proposals for establishing a political officer and an escort in Yasin and for opening up the road between Peshawar and Chitral."

The House will see from that, that it had been proposed to the Government of India to make this road, that they declined to make it, and that the late Government concurred with them in their opinion. That brings us down to the end of 1894. In 1895, on January 1, the Nizam-ul-Mulk was murdered by a follower of his brother, Amir-ul-Mulk. I am not going to trouble the House with the history of that occurrence, but my own opinion is that the whole of those transactions formed part of one conspiracy between Umra Khan, Sher Afzal, and Amir-ul-Mulk. Lieutenant Gurdon was in Chitral when the murder took place with eight or ten Sikhs. Dr. Robertson was at once sent to Chitral to report on the situation, where he arrived on February 1, and then commenced the difficulties of the situation. The Government of India very soon advised us at home of the serious position of affairs, and our Government felt that their first duty was to rescue Dr. Robertson. I did not hesitate myself; on March 8, I received for the first time an official intimation that Robertson was in danger in Chitral, and and on the same day I telegraphed:—

"I am prepared to approve such action for securing safety of Robertson and party as you may deem necessary."

In other words, the Government of India had a free hand in order to rescue Robertson. ["Hear, hear!"] The House remembers what took place—the prompt action of the Government of India, the magnificent preparations of Sir Robert Low, and the wonderful mobilisation of that force of men in less than three weeks. On March 14 the Government issued a Proclamation to all the people of Swat, the people in Bajaur who did not side with Umra Khan, and all other persons concerned, which, after stating that Umra Khan had invaded the district and had had warning that he was to retire from the district by April 1, and if he did not the Government would send a force into Chitral to the rescue of Robertson, proceeded:—

"The sole object of the Government of India is to put an end to the present and prevent any future unlawful aggression on Chitral territory, and as soon as this object has been attained the force will be withdrawn. The Government of India have no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which Umra Khan's misconduct may now force them to pass, or of interfering with the independence of the tribes, and they will scrupulously avoid any acts of hostility towards the tribesmen so long as they on their part refrain from attacking or impeding in any way the march of the troops."

Within a fortnight of the receipt of the telegram announcing that Proclamation I telegraphed:—

"As soon as present trouble is over, policy with regard to Chitral and neighbourhood will have to be fully and carefully considered in light of recent events. Meantime our hands should be kept perfectly free. I hope, therefore, that you will take care that nothing is said or done to commit Government either way with regard to making new roads or retention of posts now occupied, or occupation of new posts."

The House will remember the brilliant advance that was made, the brilliant relief from Gilghit under Colonel Kelly, and the successful termination on about April 18 or 20, when the siege was raised and Robertson relieved. On April 26, I addressed a Dispatch to the Government of India on the whole question of future policy. I said:—

"Since that Dispatch was written the protracted discussion as to the limit of Russian influence in the region of the Upper Oxus has been brought to a close, and an agreement has been arrived at by which the southern boundary of Russia's possessions in these regions will be the Panja and the Pamir rivers, and a line drawn eastward from Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier. The effect of this will be, while bringing her in one direction within a very short distance of the Chitral frontier, to maintain in the other an intervening belt of country between her southern outposts and the eastern end of the Hindu-kush. Moreover, the demarcation of the Afghan boundary under the Durand Agreement, in which the Ameer undertakes to abstain from interference in Chitral and the transfer to Afghanistan of the whole of the Kafir country up to Chitral, introduces a new element into the problem. The delimitation of these boundaries would, apart from recent events in Chitral, have introduced changes indicating that the e had arrived for some general survey of the existing situation, in order that the policy which had been provisionally adopted might now be settled on some permanent basis; but these events themselves have brought into strong relief the risk involved in maintaining a British officer in Chitral under existing conditions, a risk not unforeseen by your predecessor, but one which, owing to the peculiar combination of a popular claimant to the Chitral throne with the Pathan invaders, has taken a more acute form than was probably present to the minds of the Marquess of Lansdowne and his advisers. On the one hand, it has been made clear that, so long as a British Agent and his escort in Chitral can be supported only from Gilghit, he may for months be cut off from any support at all, and at best can only be supplied from a small and inaccessible frontier station by means of a road 200 miles in length, and of the worst possible description for military purposes; while to maintain a garrison at Gilghit, adequate for such military responsibilities as the existing combination has thrown upon you, would involve an intolerable financial burden, both upon the Kashmir Government and on your own. On the other hand, the shorter and more direct line of communication between Peshawar and Chitral involves the gravest responsibilities, both military and financial. The establishment and maintenance of this line of communication has been recognised as an important element in the policy of your Government in Chitral, but it was at first hoped that, by the influence of Umra Khan, an arrangement might be come to with the Pathan tribes, through whose territory the route runs, for effecting this object. As it became clear that the assistance of Umra Khan was not likely to be obtained, the project was laid by; but it has always been urged by the local authorities as essential to the security of the agency at Chitral. The Question whether such a road running 150 miles through the territory of the Pathan tribes, notorious for their fanaticism and hostility to foreigners, can be maintained at all without constant military pressure, or even military occupation, is one which is open to discussion; but in any case it is certain that it cannot be maintained without heavy expenditure from year to year, and it is possible that if maintained by arrangement with the tribes it might at the most critical time be closed against us, and the whole work of opening it up by military force would in that case have to be undertaken again from the beginning."

I then asked the Government of India for their views, and on May 8, 1895, they sent their views to me. In fact, this is the last Dispatch we had from the Government of India on this question. I need not go through that Dispatch in detail. The Government of India attaches enormous importance to maintaining our position in Chitral, because of the risk of foreign occupation if it were abandoned, and they maintained that it would be unjustifiable to ignore our pledges to preserve the suzerainty of Kashmir. I am not aware that anything has transpired in Chitral to jeopardise the suzerainty of Kashmir. But when the Indian Government came to the means by which their policy is to be carried out, then their Dispatch becomes very misty. They say:—

"What must be faced is a consideration of the means whereby we can maintain a sufficient military occupation of the Chitral valley. The length of time occupied and the difficulty incurred in sending troops and supplies by way of Kashmir and Gilghit, and the expense of doing so, are so great that some of us would prefer to abandon all attempt to occupy Chitral rather than try to hold it by so precarious a thread. The alternative is to establish communication from the Peshawar border. The expense of doing so may be prohibitive."

They then set out other objections, and say that the course which they recommend may involve the Government in an expense which the finances of India can ill afford, and in an increase of responsibilities with the tribes on our northwest frontier, which we would fain avoid. It may be possible to lessen these objections." And they concluded by saying that, at all events, the interests involved were so large that they considered it their plain duty to lay before me the conclusions at which, after full consideration, they had arrived. That is the history down to the date of the last Dispatch which I received from the Government of India. Before considering the question of future policy, I think there is one point upon which we are all agreed, and that is if a British officer with an escort is to be maintained at Chitral, it will be impossible to secure his safety so long as he relies alone upon Gilghit for his transport and his supplies. Gilghit is itself an outpost cut off for half the year. From there to Chitral is 225 miles, the road being across a pass 12,000ft. high and running through that dangerous defile in which Captain Rose and his party were destroyed. If Chitral is to be held by British troops, it can only be by opening up and maintaining a road from Peshawar, through Dir, to Swat. I say that because it is impossible to separate the policy of retaining Chitral from that of making and maintaining this road. If we are committed to the establishment of a permanent garrison in Chitral, we are committed to the maintaining of this road, and that means the occupation of the State of Chitral and the country lying between the frontier and Chitral. So far as the military aspect of the matter is concerned, the question is simply this: Is the fortification of Chitral a strategic necessity for the adequate defence of the Indian frontier in the event of an attack upon its north-west? The natural fortification of that district is the vast range of the Hindu-kush, which is so picturesquely and forcibly described by the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Curzon). He says:—

"The Indian Empire is girdled not merely with one or two ranges of great height and corresponding difficulty, but, so to speak, with an armoured belt-plate wedged upon plates of the most prodigious snow and ice mountains to be found upon the face of the earth. This mountain belt is in some cases over 200 miles in thickness, and not until its successive palisades have, one after another, been pierced or broken down, does the invasion of India enter into the domain of possibility."

But, Sir, no Government can act upon geographical possibilities or upon an opinion which it has formed upon them. This was a purely military question, and I, as Secretary of State for India, was incapable of deciding such a question. My colleagues were under the same incapacity, and the present Government must be guided also by military considerations and also by military experts. The House is aware that there is a very considerable difference of opinion upon this question. The House is aware, from publication in the Times newspaper, that Lord Roberts, an authority for whom I entertain very great respect, entertains one opinion; we know from the Dispatch of the Government of India that the two eminent soldiers who advise that Government—Sir George White and Sir Henry Brackenbury—also agree in that view; and if I understand the view put forward by them, it is that Chitral is of the greatest strategical importance, so far as the passes of the Hindu-kush are concerned; that the invasion of India from the north-west could be attempted through those passes, and that Chitral, being a weak Power, would fall under the power of its strongest neighbour. But, Sir, the British Government and the Government of India at home have also military advisers. They have as a military adviser that distinguished Field-Marshal who commanded the Indian army for a considerable number of years, and who served for upwards of 40 years in India, and whom Lord Rosebery described as the highest living Indian military authority—I mean Sir Donald Stewart. As the House knows, Sir Neville Chamberlain, Sir John Adye, Sir Charles Gough, and Lord Chelmsford, all of whom have served in India, entertain opinions differing from those of Lord Roberts. But the late Government went further, and availed themselves of the best military advice that they could command. The advice thus given is not part of the papers which have been published, and it would not be right to quote that advice or to give names. But this I may say, that, so far as our military policy was settled, it was guided and settled, so far as military considerations were involved, by and upon the advice of the most eminent military authorities of the day. I sum up their opinions, so far as the result which they produced upon my mind and the minds of my colleagues, to this effect: That the gigantic natural geographical defences of the north-west frontier render the advance of an invading army practically impossible; that, having regard to these and other considerations, our position is at the present moment practically impregnable; that Chitral is not a place of considerable importance as a base for military reserves, and that it is not useful as a base for military operations, defensive or offensive; that to lock up troops in Chitral or in the Chitral Valley would be a military blunder; and that the construction of a military road-to Chitral would, in the event of hostilities, be an advantage to an invading force and a disadvantage to a defending force. The late Government also came to the conclusion that Gilghit was sufficient, as a point of observation, and that to leave our main line of defence and to establish outposts and form depôts of supplies in distant mountain deserts would weaken the strength of our position. [Cheers.] There were other considerations of a detailed and technical character brought before them, which convinced the late Government that, looking at the question solely from a military point of view, they would not be justified in adopting the proposals of the Indian Government. But the late Government had also to consider the political, administrative, and financial questions affecting the occupation of Chitral, accompanied by the occupation of a military road. The length of the road proposed to be occupied is 180 miles, or the distance from London to Manchester. The Malakand Pass is over 4,000 feet high, and there is the Lowarai Pass 11,000 feet high. The road, if made, will have to be garrisoned, and there must be cantonments, forts, and bridges, while tunnels will have to be made for the protection of the road from the snows of winter. In fact, the road would be a peninsula between two large tracts of territory extending on the one side to the Afghan frontier, and on the other to the present frontier of Kashmir. The late Government were advised by experts that the formation of such a road meant the practical subjection of the tribes, and the annexation of the country between Peshawar and Chitral. A military road in that district means a military police to deal with offenders, and we cannot hold the country with our troops unless we are prepared to carry on the civil administration. Sir N. Chamberlain says:

"If we remain in Chitral, Bajaur, and Surat, the tribesmen will only be kept quiet by our retaining, at a great annual cost, a sufficient force in the valleys to overawe them. To make a military road, and to expect to keep it open without coming into collision with the tribesmen, is to my mind devoid of reasoning."

Only 36 miles of this road will be in Chitral territory, and the rest will have to be constructed through a country inhabited by hostile tribes, who are distinguished by the fierceness of their fanaticism, their love of independence, and their fear of annexation. We have no more right in the district than we should have in Switzerland. Lord Roberts has stated that the whole fighting force of these tribesmen is about 200,000 men. Have the Government asked themselves whether it would not be better to have these tribes as independent allies, who would form another line of defence, rather than to have them as revengeful foes? [Cheers.] When we have conquered them we shall have created a permanent source of discontent and danger, and they will seriously weaken our power to resist the attack of any hostile force. The practical question, which will sooner or later have to be determined by this House, is, whether we are going to extend the frontier of India by at least 200 or 250 miles on the western side, in order to cover a large tract of country from which we can derive no possible advantage, and from which we can obtain no possible revenue, and in which we may be constantly embroiled with independent tribesmen, patriotically defending their native soil? [Cheers.] Sir J. Lyall, the late Governor of the Punjab, who knows something about the country in question, said that he was informed that the initial cost of making such a road, and guarding it during construction, would be no less than half-a-million sterling, and that it would take three years to construct. Sir J. Lyall further stated that the tribes would certainly not assent to the making of such a road, and that, therefore, unless there was a military occupation of a line 180 miles long, it would be impossible to construct the road. According to the present computation, 5,000 or even 10,000 men would have to be interned in almost inaccessible districts, to whom supplies must be carried by pack animals, under enormous difficulties and at great cost. I am aware that the Government of India have said that they are not going to increase the Indian Army, but in that case the present Indian Army must be too large. ["Hear, hear!"] I do not believe that that Army is too large, and, therefore, I hold that to lock up any part of it in a place from which it cannot be withdrawn if troubles arise would be most unwise. ["Hear, hear!"] There then remains what I may call the moral question to be determined. The Government of India, by their Proclamation, declared that they had no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which our troops might pass. When that Proclamation was issued, there were two witnesses that I may quote as to the impression that it conveyed. In the first place, The Times' Correspondent said:—

"A Proclamation has been issued to the Yusufzai and other clans affected that we do not intend to annex any territory, but merely to compel Umra Khan to evacuate Chitral."

But a more important testimony with reference to the meaning of that declaration of the Indian Government was given by the present Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who wrote as follows with regard to it:—

"I see that the Indian Government say that as soon as they have attained their object in Chitral the British force will be withdrawn, and that there is no intention of occupying the intervening territory. Of course, that may be technically true—no one wants to add to our responsibilities, which are already sufficiently heavy; but if this Proclamation means, as it may undoubtedly be interpreted to mean, that, having opened up the essential and inevitable route to Chitral, we are going to allow it again to be closed, it will be difficult to find words to describe the melancholy fatuity of such a course."

["Hear, hear!"]

said the sentence in his letter in the Times was based on an imperfect telegraphic summary of the Viceroy's Proclamation in that paper. He presumed that was correct, but when they read the Proclamation itself they found it contained a distinct limitation, in the first sentence of the Proclamation, to the people of Swat and Bajaur. [Ministerial cheers.]

It is addressed to Swat and Bajaur and to any other persons concerned. [Opposition cheers.] I am talking about the people of Swat and Bajaur, of their thousands and tens of thousands of inhabitants. What did the Government of India mean by it? Let me turn to their Dispatch of April 26th, page 39:—

"At the same meeting a Proclamation was issued to the people of Swat and others beyond the Peshawar frontier, announcing the intention and object of the government, assuring them that we did not intend to permanently occupy any territory through which the force might pass, or interfere with the independence of the tribes, and promising friendly treatment to all who did not oppose the march of the troops.

That was how the Government of India interpreted their own Proclamation. In the interpretation of human affairs you not only deal with men's words but actions. How did they interpret by their actions?

"Major Deane at once commenced negotiations with the Swatis and other tribes concerned, and explained the situation to them. The assistant to the British Agent at Gilghit, having reported that all the men of Tangir and Darel had been recalled to their homes, which possibly indicated some excitement there, he was authorised to explain to the people the purport of the Proclamation issued to the Swatis and the Bajauris."

Practically, the Government of India prevented opposition on the faith of this Proclamation, and the noble Lord, in his own Dispatch of the 16th of last month, recapitulating the whole case, says:—

"It is probable that this Proclamation was not without effect, at all events on the tribes in immediate contact with us."

The native tribes did not combine against us. What was our danger? It was a holy war of religious fanaticism aroused, and the whole case proves there was no combination against us among the tribes, because they believed in British honour—[Cheers]—and that the British Government would fulfil that to which they were pledged. You talk of "prestige!" That word has been used frequently with reference to the advance on the north-western frontier. It was a word with which we were familiar in the great Debate on the evacuation of Kandahar in this House 15 years ago. We were told our prestige required that we should not abandon the position we had acquired by splendid daring and splendid endurance. Loss of prestige! Do you think these tribes do not understand and do not appreciate the brilliancy of the attack and the defence? But they will understand if you recede from your word, after you were allowed to pass over these terrific passes unopposed on the faith of the Proclamation. The prestige and honour of the British name will be still greater if we have the courage to keep our word. [Cheers.]

Do I understand the right hon. Gentleman to say that Lord Elgin cannot be trusted to keep his word? [Cheers.]

The noble Lord will be quite at liberty to reply when I have finished. I have said nothing reflecting on Lord Elgin. But I say that if the British or Indian Government annex any portion of the territory through which they passed last March, April, or May, that Government, whether Indian or British, will have broken its faith with the tribes to whom the Proclamation was issued. My right hon. Friend the Member for the Forest of Dean says his conscience was satisfied when he knew that the Indian Government unanimously recommended this policy of annexation. I am old enough a Mem- of the House to remember the speech the right hon. Baronet made on the evacuation of Kandahar, and the Indian Government unanimously objected. [Sir CHARLES DILKE: "No, no!"] I beg my right hon. Friend's pardon, but I say they did. [Laughter.]

No, no. It was four to three. I will read the names presently. ["Hear, hear!"]

The majority of the Indian Government.

You said unanimously.

I say that the majority of the Indian Government of 1879–80 were against the evacuation of Kandahar. The right hon. Baronet spoke in this House in favour of the evacuation of Kandahar, and the Duke of Devonshire (then the Marquess of Hartington) dealt, name by name, with the Members of the Indian Government, and denied the proposition then attempted to be laid down by the Tory Party that we were bound by the action of the Indian Government.

Sir Donald Stewart and the present Lord Cromer.

That can be settled hereafter. At all events, the right hon. Baronet did not feel bound in 1881 by the opinion of the Indian Government with reference, to the evacuation of Kandahar. But why does he not ask the opinion of the great Indian officials and the Governor of the Punjab, who is no mean authority on the question? We know what the opinion of Sir James Lyall and other preceding Governors of the Punjab was. What is the opinion of the present Governor of the Punjab—a man who, perhaps, is the greatest authority in that district, who knows the country and is responsible for the peace of the frontier? What has been the advice of Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick on the evacuation of Kandahar? I am sorry to weary the House—[Cries of "No!"]—with this long defence of the policy of the late Government, but I have said enough, and I will not repeat myself. Under all these circumstances the late Government came to the conclusion that we could not accept the proposition of the Indian Government. We came to the conclusion that we could not, on military, political, administrative, or financial grounds, and above all in the teeth of our own Proclamation, advise the taking of any step which would mean the annexation of the Chitral valley and the countries of the tribes. What has been the policy of our successors? The noble Lord immediately on accepting office very properly stated that the present Government would reconsider the question, and on August 1 he asked whether there was no further information as to the possibility of arranging with the tribes for the road between Peshawar and Chitral and the strength of the garrison there. The only information the noble Lord has received is contained in a telegram dated August 4, which says:—

"The Conimander-in-Chief has been consulted on points in your telegram. First, we have avoided open negotiations with the tribes. The reports received from Low and Define warrant the confident expectation that a peaceful arrangement for the road can be made."

[Cheers.] I am quite willing to wait and see what the peaceful arrangements were, and our judgment should be reserved until we know whether these arrangements have been successful. But they have not been successful to the present time. I have worked out what the force proposed would be, and I make out there would be about 5,145 soldiers. Taking the present strength of the regiment (and from that the pioneer regiment at Gilghit, which is to be withdrawn, would have to be deducted), the number of soldiers would be between 4,000 and 5,000. The Secretary of State, having received this information, wrote an able Dispatch dated August 16, and in that he reviews the whole situation from the commencement. In reference to the question of cost, he says:—

"Time evidently was necessary for the investigation and decision of the question of cost."

He calls attention to the views expressed by Lord Kimberley and myself as to keeping control over the external affairs of Chitral. Lord Kimberley has been somewhat misunderstood on that point, for keeping control over the external affairs of Chitral does not imply annexation or possession of the State. We have absolute control over the external affairs of Afghanistan at this moment. Then towards the end of his Dispatch the noble Lord sums up the position. He says:—

"It was apparent from your letter of May 8 that your Government was not without apprehension that the task of opening up this road might, if it were to necessitate the military coercion of the tribes and the interference with their independence, be one of such great cost and involving such embarrassing complications as to render it of doubtful expediency; but in your opinion this question, both in its financial and political aspects, depended on the attitude which might be assumed by the tribes, and you indicated that, if amicable relations could be secured and they could be persuaded to become responsible for the safety of the road, the cost need not be prohibitive."

The noble Lord quotes their allegation "that peaceful arrangements can be made," and adds:—

"The information now conveyed materially alters the position. It removes, if your officers have rightly estimated the conditions, the doubt which was felt as to the possibility of opening up the road by peaceful means and maintaining it without an intolerable burden of expenditure being imposed on the Indian revenues."

I am bound to say the noble Lord is perfectly consistent in his telegrams an his Dispatch. He says that he gave a strict caution as to keeping the conditions of the Proclamation. The noble Lord guards himself by four "ifs." He says—If the cost is not prohibitive, if you can effect a peaceful arrangement with the tribes, if it is necessary to maintain a permanent force on the Malakand, and if the terms of the Proclamation are rigidly adhered to, then the noble Lord will sanction the proposal of the Government of India. I submit that until these "ifs" are solved he cannot tell what is to be done, and I go further and say we cannot press him. He has had no answer to that Dispatch, and until he is in a position to tell the House what the occupation will cost, what the attitude of the tribes is, whether they will recognise a new arrangement, and whether the arrangement will be in harmony with the Proclamation, no intelligible decision as to their policy can be taken by the Government. A few months at this season of the year will not affect their policy. In a question of this magnitude we can afford to wait. I do not ask the House to pronounce a judgment now; I reserve my right to do so hereafter. It has been my duty to explain and defend the policy which the late Government thought it wise to adopt after ascertaining the views of those best qualified to advise them, and that has been the main object of my speech. In conclusion, I say that the policy I have endeavoured to defend is no new policy. One of the greatest Viceroys who ever ruled over India—Lord Lawrence—in the memorable Dispatch with which he closed his administration, laid down the lines which should guide the action of the Government of India with respect to its North-west frontier. I will quote the last three paragraphs of that Dispatch:—

"We think it impolitic and unwise to decrease any of the difficulties which would be entailed on Russia if that Power seriously thought of invading India, as we should certainly decrease them if we left our own frontier and met her half-way in a difficult country, and, possibly, in the midst of a hostile or exasperated population. We foresee no limits to the expenditure which such a move might require, and we protest against the necessity of having to impose additional taxation on the people of India, who are unwilling, as it is, to bear such pressure for measures which they can both understand and appreciate. And we think that the objects which we have at heart, in common with all interested in India, may be attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness on our frontier, and by giving all our care and expending all our resources for the attainment of practical and sound ends over which we can exercise an effective and immediate control. Should a foreign Power, such as Russia, ever seriously think of invading India from without, or, what is more probable, of stirring up the elements of disaffection or anarchy within it, our true policy, our strongest security would then, we conceive, be found to lie in previous abstinence from entanglements at either Kabul, Kandahar, or any similar outpost; in full reliance on a compact, highly equipped, and disciplined army stationed within our own territories, or on our own border; in the contentment, if not in the attachment, of the masses; in the sense of security of title and possession, with which our whole policy is gradually imbuing the minds of the principal chiefs and the native aristocracy; in the construction of material works within British India, which enhance the comfort of the people while they add to our political and military strength; in husbanding our finances and consolidating and multiplying our resources; in quiet preparation for all contingencies, which no Indian statesman should disregard; and in a trust in the rectitude and honesty of our intentions, coupled with the avoidance of all sources of complaint which either invite foreign aggression, or stir up restless spirits to domestic revolt."

The history of the last 20 years has afforded many startling illustrations of the wisdom of that policy and, I may add, of the folly of departing from it. That policy has been stamped with the approval of a large majority of the great soldiers and great civilians who have made our Eastern Empire a priceless boon to the people of India, and the noblest dependency of the British Crown. It is on behalf of that policy I venture, at this, almost the last hour of the Session, and in this exhausted House, to enter my humble protest against embarking on an enterprise which may be, and which in this case I conscientiously believe will be, a standing menace and a constant danger to the security and prosperity of the Indian Empire. [Cheers.]

said, he rose to move the Resolution which stood on the Paper in his name:—

"That this House views with apprehension the continual increase in the burdens of Indian taxpayers, caused by the annexation or military occupation of large areas of unproductive territory on the land frontier of British India,"

Instead of concluding with a Motion, the right hon. Gentleman (Sir H. Fowler) seemed, he thought, to acquiesce in the present policy of Her Majesty's Government, and throughout he appeared to be really conscious of the fatal weakness of his own case. Obliged by the financial necessities of India to impose obnoxious duties, he flung the money away in the invasion of Chitral, and he was the first to invade the territory of the tribes. Surely nothing could be more immoral than his conduct in sanctioning invasion and then trying to wash his hands of responsibility in the face of the General Election. He said the right hon. Gentleman, with unusual boldness, had come forward to defend his own policy, and he ought to have concluded with a Motion, but instead of doing so, he seemed to acquiesce in the policy of the present Government, and by his action he seemed to show that he was really conscious of the weakness of his own case. They admired the right hon. Gentleman as a high-minded statesman, but his career at the India Office was peculiarly unfortunate. The right hon. Gentleman was obliged by the financial necessities of India to impose obnoxious duties, and the money so raised he flung away on the invasion of Chitral. The right hon. Gentleman was very indignant at the idea that the present Government should invade the territory of the Swati, and said we had no right to be there: but it was he who first invaded that territory; it was with his sanction that enormous forces advanced to invade it. The right hon. Gentleman had said a good deal about the opinion of Sir Donald Stewart and others; but did Sir Donald Stewart give his sanction to the invasion, to the opening up by violent means of the road from Peshawar to Chitral? The right hon. Gentleman did all the mischief, and now he said it was immoral to invade the territory of the tribes. All along he had told them the policy of the Government of India was to throw this road open. When he made no objection to the crossing of the frontier by an army much larger than that with which Lord Roberts marched from Kabul to Kandahar, he must have been aware that the passage of the army would excite the hostility of the people of the country. While he only made some slight inquiry as to the object of concentrating this large force, he must have known of the vehement criticism to which the action of the Government of India was exposed in India itself. Many persons habitually favourable to the action of the Government of India took strong objection to the mobilisation of this vast force for the relief of the beleaguered garrison of Chitral. When the Government of India persevered the right hon. Gentleman said, "Go on," and took on himself the responsibility of the invasion of the country and of slaughtering hundreds of patriots in the Malakand Pass. Surely nothing could be more immoral, according to his own standard of morality, than the conduct of the right hon. Gentleman, after he had been a party to all this, in view of the General Election, to try to wash his hands of the responsibility he had incurred and to throw upon the new Government the duty of settling this difficult question. In a telegram of March 18th the Viceroy said:—

"We are agreed that the military occupation of Chitral, supported by a road to the Peshawar border, is a matter of the first importance."

The right hon. Gentleman made a temporising reply to that, and then came the further urgent message from the Viceroy of the 25th of April:—

"Narrative of events indicates withdrawal under present circumstances impossible, and would leave country to complete anarchy, and would render a settlement more difficult. In our opinion, we must also keep open the road from Peshawar for some time, probably three or four months at least, whatever the ultimate decision may be."

The right hon. Gentleman replied to that:—

"Pending the final decision of Her Majesty's Government, I do not object to the temporary arrangements which you consider necessary."

By that telegram the right hon. Gentleman did everything he was bound to do at that time. There was no necessity for the great hurry he showed afterwards to come to a definite decision about what should be done at Chitral. The temporary arrangements which the Viceroy said were necessary would have lasted for some months. The Viceroy had said that he had created a state of anarchy in the country, and it was therefore impossible to evacuate it at that time. Within a few weeks the Government was tottering to its fall, and the right hon. Gentleman evidently dreaded going to the country without trying to wash his hands of the blood-guiltiness falling upon those who were responsible for the invasion of Chitral. He (Mr. Maclean) acquiesced in the decision of the Government to retain Chitral, because he thought they were bound to accept the statement of the Government of India that it would be impossible to evacuate the country; and he accepted the decision with the more pleasure, because the noble Lord in his Dispatch pressed for estimates of the exact cost. He had properly guarded himself from taking any hasty action whatever, in regard to the opening or permanent occupation of this road by British troops; and he hoped that the noble Lord would get trustworthy estimates from the Government of India. A Government which at the end of March could calmly put down £150,000 as the probable cost of the Chitral expedition could not be trusted to give satisfactory estimates unless closely pressed. He also hoped that this was the last of the annexations on the British frontier which would be sanctioned by this or any other Government. The Royal Engineers in India were a most indefatigable body of men, and directly they had gained possession of and fortified one pass, they found another by which a few stray Cossacks might find their way to British India. Some of them would never be satisfied until Her Majesty's Government had hermetically sealed every mule-track across the immense region of mountain ranges extending from Quetta to the Pamirs. [Laughter.] Then the adventurous traveller came upon the scene, like his right hon. Friend the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who unfortunately was prevented from making any more voyages at present. [Laughter.] These travellers seemed to think that wherever they had once set foot, the British flag ought to wave for ever afterwards. [Laughter.] Unless strong pressure were put on the Government of India there would be someone proposing to occupy the territory along the other side of the river, and the road leading from the Hindu-Kush to Jellalabad, and the hospitable columns of The Times would be full of eloquent declamation about the noble mission of Great Britain in bringing every barbarian nation under its rule. ["Hear, hear!" and laughter.] It might be a noble mission, but it could not be called a very self-sacrificing one, when it was done at the expense of the Indian taxpayer. If this country desired more responsibility in these directions, let her take it at her own risk and cost. Her conduct was of a piece with that of the Government in connection with the Shahzada, who received a generous invitation to become the guest of the British nation at the expense of the mild Hindu. [Laughter.] If any one looked at the map of India now, and compared it with what it was 20 years ago, beyond the Indus on one side and the Ganges on the other, they would find that an immense empire had been added to our dominions. Beyond these rivers we had almost as much territory as between them; and nearly all of it had been acquired within the last 20 years. It stretched over a frontier several thousand miles in extent; if Afghanistan, which had been brought within our sphere of influence were included, the responsibility on the shoulders of the Indian taxpayer would appear appalling. For it was India who paid the whole cost of all these expeditions; and the worst of these annexations was that they had been wholly unproductive. Even the kingdom of Burma, which was flourishing when we took it over, cost India a million a year—not a very creditable thing to the present generation of Indian officials. Most of the other annexations not only paid nothing at all, but were very largely subsidised by the Indian Government. India now subsidised all Central Asia from the Indus to the Oxus. The Government either enlisted men of these border tribes in our army and continually increased their pay, or else paid them blackmail to keep the peace. ["Hear, hear!"] The Government of India was becoming more and more dependent on these border tribes for the security of the Empire, although many of them could not be trusted in an emergency. All the taxes were paid by the industrious traders and merchants of the plains; and nearly the whole of the revenue was spent away from them. Of the 50 millions of revenue, fully one-half went to England, and a very large proportion of the remainder was spent upon troops and expeditions on the frontier, so that the money did not go back to the people who paid the taxes at all. ["Hear, hear!"] This showed the fallacy of such calculations as were given in the explanatory statement issued this year by the late Secretary of State for India. The right hon. Gentlemen there spoke of the small burden of taxation in India. It might appear small, but there was this difference between the taxation in England, and that in India. The former was all spent within the limits of the country to stimulate trade and industry, but as regards India it was almost to the extent of three-fourths of the whole spent out of the country in which it was raised. This was because, in England, the Treasury was supreme over all Departments, while in India the Treasury was practically helpless. The Government of India was really a military despotism, and the Treasury had only one member on the Council. All the other members might be trusted to act together on questions of Imperial policy. There was no representative of the trade and industry, the culture and intelligence of the country; the members lived for the greater part of the year away in the hills at Simla, and were utterly out of touch with public opinion. They were like the Olympian deities, of whom Tennyson wrote:

"There they live and lie reclined,. "On the hills like gods together, cureless of mankind."

The possession of India had been of inestimable advantage to us; but how long should we retain India if we did not maintain sound finance there, and see that the people were lightly taxed. The right hon. Gentleman the late Secretary of State for India, several times in his speech, made allusion to the agreement made with Russia for the delimitation of territory at the Pamirs. That was signed in March last; it had certainly been concluded before operations in Chitral were sanctioned by the right hon. Gentleman, and that alone should have restrained him from taking the action which he had taken. That agreement with Russia altered the whole political situation in India. This policy of occupying the mountain passes was a Chinese wall policy; it was not the policy meant by Lord Beaconsfield when he sanctioned the "scientific frontier." Then the intention was to push forward to Kandahar, which would have been on the flank of anyone advancing on the principal road to India. But now the policy was not one of pushing forward at all. We were going to lie in wait behind these passes, until the Russians advanced to our frontier. Every military man of repute knew that if ever a Russian invasion of India were to be attempted—and he thought such an event very improbable now—our troops would be obliged to advance to Kandahar or Cabul to meet them; and if we were defeated there, what would be the use of our fortified passes? The enemy would then pour like a torrent into the plains of India, and we should be driven to make a last stand behind the Indies for our Empire in the East. That was a sufficient condemnation of the policy which was now being pursued. But our apprehension in regard to the policy of Russia was removed now that we were going to have the whole frontier fixed from Herat up to the crest of the Pamirs. That would be a blessing to everyone in Central Asia. All the disputes in the past had been occasioned by the acts of frontier officers naturally desirous of distinguishing themselves, who had gone into territories that had not been marked out as belonging to any Power, and so had brought about conflicts which were very much to be regretted. It was to be hoped that that would never again happen after the new arrangement with Russia in regard to the frontier. Our real defence in future would be that, when once the line was fixed, Russia would know that to cross it meant war. Lord Roberts made one sensible remark in a letter to The Times. He said that Russia had made no attempt to violate the frontier since it was fixed from near Herat to the Oxus, because she knew that if she did so it would mean war with England, and this would be true as regards the whole line of frontier, now that it was completed to the Pamirs. Lord Beaconsfield, in the same spirit, speaking of the evacuation of Kandahar, ridiculed the idea entertained by some fussy people that the possession of one place or another was essential to the security of our Indian Dominion. He said: "The key of India is not Herat or Kandahar. The key of India is London. The majesty and sovereignty, the public spirit, and vigour of our Parliament; the ingenuity and determination of our people—these are the keys of India." He thought that was a profoundly true sentiment. He considered that we might at least lay aside our misgivings as to a Russian invasion of India. He believed Russia would respect our boundaries, and he hoped that, instead of continuing barren conflicts with her, we should enter into an understanding with her for the good of the whole; population of Central Asia. Look at what was within our reach if we were to come to a good understanding with Russia. Why should Afghanistan be kept isolated from the commercial world? We had filled the purse; we had pampered the pride of the Ameer by the extravagant honours we had paid to his son; we had guaranteed his dominion, and we had got nothing from him in return. Why should not the Ameer open his country to trade and commerce? Why should we not join hands with Russia, and bring Afghanistan into the commercial world? It would be an immense boon to India, a great advantage to England, and a benefit to the whole world, to connect the Russian and Indian Railway systems by the construction of a few hundred miles through Afghanistan, and so to complete an overland line to India and introduce railways into the vast regions of Central Asia, which in almost recent times contained populous flourishing empires where stagnation now existed. The record of the past 30 years had been the opening up of Africa. He hoped the next 30 years would see the renaissance of Asia, and would see those vast regions recalled to civilisation. What he asked was, that in order that England might fill an important part in the future of Asia, she should do the work that now lay at her hand. He begged to move his Motion.

in a maiden speech, seconded the Motion. He said he did so unhesitatingly, because the burden on the Indian taxpayer had grown in recent years to an enormous extent. But he should disclaim any connection between the Motion and recent events in Chitral. The word "annexation" had been used in connection with Chitral in the course of the Debate; and it was well to point out that it was not very applicable. It was only recently that Sir George Robertson put upon the throne of Chitral its own proper Mehtar, which showed that Chitral was not completely annexed, in the same sense as Burmah was annexed. But, at the same time, it could not be denied that recent events in Chitral, the glorious achievements of our Army, British and Indian, and the prudent resolution of the Government to retain its hold on Chitral, were capable of being read by ambitious military officers in a somewhat different light from that in which they were regarded on the floor of the House of Commons. Many of the difficulties of the Government of India could be traced to this cause. Ambitious officers had before now embroiled themselves in matters which had made it impossible for the Government to escape being brought into conflict with tribes on the frontier. In order, therefore, that the resolution of the Government to retain Chitral, and the approval of the feats of our Army in that region, might not mislead such officers to follow the same course in the future, and also for the reason that there might not be aroused in India an apprehension that the policy of the present Government was annexation, and that they were determined to advance the frontier of India to the furthest limits, and thereby make the burden of the taxpayer so intolerable that India would be plunged into bankruptcy, he begged to second the Motion.

The Motion which my hon. Friends have proposed and seconded is so intimately connected with questions relating to Chitral, that upon it I am able to reply to the speech which the right hon. Gentleman has just made. We all welcome back to the House the hon. Member for Cardiff. He always speaks with authority on Indian questions, and, although I cannot agree with all he has said, everything he says is worth listening to. ["Hear, hear!"] I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for North-East Bethnal Green upon the speech he has just made. He has behind him a record of long and useful public service, and I feel confident both sides of the House will always listen with attention when he speaks on any question connected with our Indian Empire. I now turn to the speech of my predecessor in office. He spoke with great vigour and at very great length. For an hour he made an elaborate historical analysis of the reasons which led us to Chitral. He then proceeded for another hour to attack in the most violent terms, from financial, military, moral, and political points of view, the decision at which we have recently arrived; and, having occupied so much of the time of the House in this denunciation, he concluded by observing that the House was not in possession of sufficient information to enable it to form a judgment. ["Hear, hear!" and a laugh.] I listened with great regret to the right hon. Gentleman's speech. These frontier questions are very difficult, whether you go back or go forward. The right hon. Gentleman quoted many authorities, but the one authority he did not quote was the Indian Government. [cheers.] Not once, from beginning to end of his speech, did he allude to the Indian Government, except for the purpose of denouncing it. Our machinery for governing India is of a very complicated and delicate character; and the Secretary of State incurs a grave responsibility if he imposes a policy on the Indian Government contrary to their wishes, and insists upon their trying to carry that policy out through an instrumentality which they consider obsolete and ineffective. It appears that anybody in the street who gave the right hon. Gentleman any information of the most extravagant kind, whether it was political, financial, or moral, was at once accepted by him as an authority, and the statements made to him were publicly paraded in the House of Commons as reasons why we should refuse the proposal of the Indian Government. "But if," said the right hon. Gentleman, "I am wrong, I shall be very glad." Now, there is risk, and there always will be risk, attending our Empire in India, and we must face that risk. ["Hear, hear!"] What we have to consider is, whether the decision at which we arrived is a right one. I accept the right hon. Gentleman's account of the position which Chitral occupies in connection with the North-West frontier of India and Kashmir; but there is just one point I should like to bring home to the House of Commons. Chitral is at the extreme end of the territory over which Kashmir claims suzerainty; and, up to the present moment, access to that State has been over some of the most difficult mountain-passes in the world. But the difficulty of communication is not all; there is a great length of communication. If anybody will look at the map, he will find I that one has to traverse almost a complete circle when going from British India before he arrives at Chitral, and the distance which has to be covered is something like 600 miles, whereas the route from Peshawar is only 180 miles. The important question at present is whether a new road shall be made direct from Peshawar. In dealing with frontier questions it is impossible to lay down one general principle which, under all conditions, must govern our conduct. The right hon. Gentleman quoted the opinion of Lord Lawrence. I speak with the utmost respect of that great man. When these frontier questions began to be discussed, in Lord Northbrook's Viceroyalty, I was Under Secretary for India, and I well remember there were then two schools contending against each other, one led by Sir Bartle Frere, Commissioner of Sind, and the other by Lord Lawrence. Their views were diametrically opposed. Sir Bartle Frere believed that a forward movement was the right movement; he advised advance, and every single advance made from Sind has been attended with good results. Lord Lawrence, as Commissioner of the Punjab, had to deal with a different and more difficult country, and said, "Stay where you are." He was right as regards his own frontier. But every case of this kind which comes up for decision we must look at on its merits. The great mass of the more modern school, with regard to frontier questions, are upon this side of the House, and those of the old-fashioned view sit opposite. We know that at the India Office and amongst retired officers the old-fashioned view prevails; but in India—and it is there where most responsibility rests—opinion is almost invariably opposed to it. The complaint I make against Her Majesty's late advisers is that from the first they made up their minds to get out of Chitral. They forced the Indian Government to send them their policy before they had sufficient information to support it, and they then pounced upon their lack of information to upset the policy associated with it. The right hon. Gentleman complains very much of the editing of this Blue-book, and seems to think I have struck out of it papers or minutes which ought to have been given. He must recollect that this correspondence all comes from the Secret Department of the India Office. I have not had one single extract or line of the Dispatches struck, out except in the public interest. These are most confidential documents, and it is impossible to publish them in their entirety. But in every single case where there has been any excision of any kind the fact is noted. The right hon. Gentleman thinks I should produce some Minutes of Sir Donald Stewart. Sir Donald Stewart is the ex-Commander-in-Chief, and if I were to publish his, Minutes, I must publish the Minutes of the present Commander-in-Chief and Sir-Henry Brackenbury. The result would be we should publish to the whole world an elaborate analysis of the strong and weak parts of our military system. If the suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman were acted upon, we might just as well at once dissolve the Secret Committee of the India Office. Let us see what happened. The right hon. Gentleman spent a great deal of time in trying to show that the assent which he and his predecessor, Lord Kimberley, gave to the policy of the Indian Government in Chitral was of a tentative nature. [Sir H. FOWLER: "Temporary."] Well, temporary. As stated in a Dispatch of his, there were three objects in view. The first was to control the external affairs of Chitral in a direction friendly to our interests; the second was to secure an effective guardianship over its northern passes; the third was to keep watch over what goes on beyond those passes. These were the objects of the policy of successive Governments, both at home and in India. When Dr. Robertson was caught at Chitral, in pursuance of this accepted policy, the right hon. Gentleman very properly ordered a large force to his relief, and I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman that it is a matter of national congratulation that such heroic tenacity was shown by the troops, and that the siege was raised with such dash and daring. [cheers.] Chitral was relieved on April 20. What correspondence took place between the Secretary of State and the Indian Government? On March 30 the Secretary of State telegraphed to the Viceroy, impressing upon him the necessity of doing nothing which in any way could commit him to any future policy. He said:—

"As soon as present trouble is over, policy with regard to Chitral and neighbourhood will have to be fully and carefully reconsidered in light of recent events. Meantime, our hands should be kept perfectly free. I hope, therefore, that yon will take care that nothing is said or done to commit Government either way, with regard to making new roads, or retention of posts now occupied, or occupation of new posts."

Later on he telegraphed again. He asked for further information, and the Viceroy very properly replied:—

"We have discussed Chitral policy, with reference to your telegram of March 30. Until we have ascertained what has happened in Chitral since Robertson was shut up we cannot arrive at a final conclusion as to policy."

That was a very natural conclusion. The Secretary of State telegraphed to the Viceroy on April 19, pressing him again for further information. That was the day before the siege was raised. The Viceroy replied:—

"Our views as to the importance of Chitral are expressed in our telegram of 18th, but without entering into negotiations with tribes I cannot answer as to cost of road from Peshawar, or extent of political difficulties."

On the 25th the Secretary of State pressed the Viceroy to send his policy, and the Viceroy replied:—

"Narrative of events indicates withdrawal under present circumstances impossible, as it would leave country to complete anarchy and would render a settlement more difficult. In our opinion we must also keep open the road from Peshawar for some time, probably three or four months at least, whatever the ultimate decision may be."

On May 8 the Indian Government, in response to the instructions received from the Secretary of State, wrote at length their views. Chitral had only just been relieved, and I doubt whether they had had any direct personal communication with any officials there, so that they were very much in the dark as to what the consequences of their policy might be, but they were absolutely unanimous in recommending the retention of Chitral. [Cheers.] Indian Finance has passed through a very severe ordeal, and yet the Indian Finance Minister, who is an exceptionally strong Minister, signed that Dispatch. The Indian Government were compelled to represent their views before they had definite information, but they warned the Secretary of State that it was possible the expenditure might be very great. They say:—

"What must be faced is a consideration of the means whereby we can maintain a sufficient military occupation of the Chitral Valley. The length of time occupied, and the difficulty incurred in sending troops and supplies by way of Kashmir and Gilghit, and the expense of doing so are so great, that some of us would prefer to abandon all attempts to occupy Chitral rather than try to hold it by so precarious a thread. The alternative is to establish communication from the Peshawar border. The expense of doing so may be prohibitive."

They go on to say:—"We are not convinced, however, that these difficulties will occur." In the same Dispatch they state that this proposal may involve a heavy increase of expenditure, but that it may be possible to lessen these objections. It is clear to anybody who reads the Dispatch by the light of recent telegrams that this was a preliminary statement of policy extracted from the Indian Government by the orders of the Secretary of State. But Her Majesty's then Government immediately pounced upon this, and, after a very few days' consideration, sent a peremptory order to the Indian Government to reverse this policy, and then they added:—

"As regards Chitral State they request that, in view of the decisions above stated, you will telegraph what are the arrangements which you would recommend for the future."

On June 22 these alternative arrangements which the Home Government directed the Indian Government to send arrived, and on that day the late Ministry resigned. They never considered the alternative proposals in any shape or form, and I contend it is ridiculous for any Government, or any body of responsible men, to pretend that they have settled a difficult question by vetoing the only workmanlike proposal put forward without ever considering the alternatives. [Cheers.] Under these circumstances, we had to reconsider the position. I agree entirely with the right hon. Gentleman that financial considerations are of the utmost importance at the present moment. I go so far as to say that, in my judgment, and I dare say the hon. Member for Cardiff will agree with me, no external policy, however bold, and no frontier performances however heroic, can compensate for the permanent annual deficiency in the Indian Exchequer. I believe that the constantly increasing taxation is a serious danger to the stability of the Indian Government, and, therefore, I looked with great apprehension on the words that the Indian Government used in which they admitted that their proposals might be prohibitive by reason of the expenditure involved. I consequently endeavoured to see whether it was possible in any way to gain time, in order to hit upon any compromise or do something which would prevent us arriving at an irrevocable decision to retire from Chitral and not make the road. The House will see that whatever decision was arrived at, would be more or less binding for years to come. It was difficult to retire from Chitral, although we had only been connected with it for some three years; and if we had decided to remain there we should have to do so for a long time to come. On the other hand, if we retired and did not make this road we should possibly never get so favourable an opportunity again of constructing this line of communication, and our retirement would probably be final. Looking to the issues raised and the grave consideration attached to them, it was essential we should have time. Her Majesty's late advisers also spoke of the unanimous decision of the Cabinet. The word "unanimous" is a new epithet in connection with Cabinet decisions, and I think it is an unfortunate one, because if you state the occasions on which the Cabinet is unanimous you are bound to state those on which the Cabinet is not unanimous. My impression is that the late Prime Minister on more than one occasion, alluded to the unanimity of the late Cabinet. I suppose because, it was so remarkable an event in their career that it was necessary to mention it. [Langhter.] Time, therefore, was a very essential consideration. In the Cabinet to which I have the honour to belong there are no fewer than three ex-Secretaries of State for India, and we have the advantage of the presence of Lord Lansdowne, the late Viceroy, who, I should say, is the highest living authority in this country on questions of this kind. He has visited Kashmir, is conversant with every detail of this policy, and he was of great assistance to me in examining it. I wonder if the late Government at all realise what the evacuation of Chitral would have meant? In the first place, it is perfectly clear if we abandoned Chitral we should in all probability be obliged to abandon Gilghit. Gilghit is most expensive, since, as the valley in which it is situated cannot sustain the garrison, the cost of bringing supplies from Kashmir is very heavy. If we abandoned Chitral the cost of maintaining Gilghit would be the same as before, although our main object in maintaining it would have gone. The difficulties did not end there. The right hon. Gentleman described the condition of Chitral before we went there as one of dynastic murder and civil war. That would be the condition, of Chitral if we left. ["Hear, hear!"] He laid stress on the fact that we had arrived at an arrangement with the Russian Government by which the frontier had been delimited between ourselves and that Power. I look upon that delimitation from a different point of view to the right hon. Gentleman. I believe that, wherever these frontier arrangements are made, they can only be satisfactorily maintained on the distinct understanding that within each area allotted to the respective Powers, each Power will do its utmost to prevent anarchy, disorder, and disturbance. If anarchy and disorder commence on one side of the frontier they are, not, unlikely to extend to the other side. Nobody can deny that if we had left Chitral we should have lighted a fire there which would be unlimited in the extent of the area over which it might spread. The mere fact of our retiring before the face of the whole world and admitting that we were unable to perform the duties we had practically undertaken would have been an invitation to the neighbouring Power to step in and perform the duties we had abandoned. ["Hear, hear!"] Take an ordinary case in life. If one of the occupiers of two neighbouring houses chooses to go away and leave a fire smouldering which may burn down the premises of his neighbour, that neighbour has a right to come in and extinguish the fire which is the source of danger. Therefore, if we had abandoned Chitral with a certain knowledge of the disturbances which our retirement would cause, we should have been doing our very best to upset the frontier arrangement which had been arrived at. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman on one point only. I do not think Chitral is of so great strategical importance as some eminent military men consider. I admit that the honours on that point must be divided. I think that considerations of a moral rather than a strategical character force us to remain. I agree that, where you have a great area to defend and only a limited number of troops to protect your frontier, it is unwise to lock up your men in out-of-the-way places. Mobility and concentration are the two great ideas which should be aimed at. The right hon. Gentleman seems to think that our occupation of Chitral would necessitate an enormous strain upon our military resources. The curious thing is that, whilst the right hon. Gentleman complains of the want of information, one of the cardinal and vital pieces of information, the telegram of the Indian Government on this point, is the one which he shirks. It is very easy to exaggerate the dangers attending any course. The right hon. Gentleman seems to think there will be a large number of troops required at Chitral. But the Indian Government point out that they require no addition to the Indian Army, and show that there will be practically no troops in the intervening districts. In the same way the right hon. Gentleman seemed to think that the occupation of Chitral would necessitate enormous financial outlay. Somebody told Sir Alfred Lyall it would cost half-a-million to make the road, and the right hon. Gentleman flourishes half-a-million before the House. The difference between the actual facts and the excited imagination of the right hon. Gentleman is shown by a telegram which has just arrived, stating that the total amount would be 20 lakhs of rupees, or, turned into sterling, £13,000, of which one-fifth would go to permanent works. I cannot help thinking that the late Government were so anxious to get out of Chitral that they did not want to be accurately informed on these points.

Surely your figure is wrong.

What did I say?

You said £13,000.

Oh! it should be £130,000. ["Oh!"] There is an enormous disproportion between this figure and the half-million estimate of the right hon. Gentleman, which was for making the road alone, whereas of the £130,000 one-fifth is for a permanent buildings. The most serious part of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman was his indictment of the Indian Government with reference to the Proclamation. I cannot understand how anybody holding the views of the right hon. Gentleman can be content with simply making a speech and moving no Resolution. ["Hear, hear!"] If Lord Elgin cannot interpret his own Proclamation, if he is going dishonourably to break the terms of it, he is unfit to be, Viceroy of India. [Cheers.] I do not think it fair to come forward and talk about honourable adherence to engagements, and not put your charge in such definite shape that the Viceroy can meet it. ["Hear, hear!"] Lord Elgin framed that Proclamation and the Indian Government have interpreted it, and from first to last they have contended that it is no obstacle whatever to the course they propose. [Cheers.] Then the right hon. Gentleman, not content with exaggerating the cost of the road, says that the whole country through which the road passes must be annexed and subjugated to English rule; and he assumes that this will be done at the point of the bayonet, contrary to the wishes of the tribes. The truth rather is that the tribes are ready to fall in with the arrangements proposed. They are glad to get the money, and my belief is that the fruit of the expedition will be to induce the people to adopt more regular habits. I could not help smiling when I heard the right hon. Gentleman denounce the construction of roads. Why, 150 years ago he would have used exactly the same arguments against opening up the Highlands. [Laughter.] The position was exactly the same, and if every successive Parliament had taken the view he now advocates the Highlands would have been to this day an isolated and inaccessible part of the United Kingdom. I believe this road, if the negotiations are properly conducted, will place our relations with the tribes on a better footing than before. Now, I think I have answered the main points of the right hon. Gentleman's indictment. I have shown that he has enormously overrated the calls upon our resources which the occupation of Chitral will entail; and I have shown that he has systematically disregarded the advice of the Indian Government in this matter. I should like to add just one word on the right hon. Gentleman's references to economy. In my judgment, economy does not consist merely in stopping useless expenditure, but it consists also in getting a good return for expenditure already sanctioned and incurred. The right hon. Gentleman was forced to sanction this expedition to Chitral. The valour, determination, and endurance of our soldiers accomplished great feats, and have immensely raised our prestige in that country. Why then throw away all the fruits of the expedition. ["Hear, hear!"] It seems just as much the act of a spendthrift to throw away the legitimate consequences of a very large and necessary expenditure as to incur wholly useless and unnecessary expenditure. ["Hear, hear!"] But whilst I approve strongly of the proposals of the Indian Government, I have no desire whatever to embark on a frontier policy of enterprise, or of annexing all those territories to which the hon. Member for Cardiff alluded. On the contrary, I believe we have now arrived at a settlement of our Indian frontier difficulties. We have, I think, by the arrangements sanctioned, utilised the results of the Chitral expedition, and my one wish now is, looking to the condition of Indian finance, to associate with the satisfactory settlement of those frontier questions a period of quietude and economy. [Cheers.]

My right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, in his powerful speech, had two objects in his plan. First of all, he had to establish that the policy which the late Government pursued was one which, in the circumstances under which they were placed, and with the information in their possession, was a sound and wise policy. I believe his speech established that proposition beyond dispute. They had to come to a determination and that determination was come to on the information furnished to them by the Indian Government in their Dispatch of May 8. I do not understand what the noble lord means by the charge that we rather forced the Indian Government to give an opinion upon this subject. Why, the Indian Government, after the success of the expedition to Chitral, had to consider what was next to be done, and they laid their views before the Government at home in the Dispatch mentioned. Of course there was a question of finance. Everybody knows that in those short weeks there was an expenditure of something like one-and-a-half millions of money, and that every week meant an expenditure of thousands and tens of thousands; and in the present condition of Indian finance it was of the first importance that the Government at home should determine whether or not they were going to continue that expenditure. Therefore it was the duty of the Government of India immediately to report, and it was the duty of the Government at home, without any unnecessary delay, to come to a determination upon such report. If they determined that the expenditure should not continue upon that scale, it was their duty at the earliest moment to inform the Indian Government of their decision. Therefore I must say I entirely dissent from the tone of the observations of the noble Lord, in which he seems to assume that the late Government unduly pressed the Government of India in the matter. Now, my right hon. Friend has already laid before the House what was the character of the Report of the Government of India. I at once accept the proposition that the question of this road is really the deciding question. Therefore the argument does not depend upon the policy of making this road. The Government of India, on May 8, told us they were perfectly conscious that the course they recommended might involve the Government in an expense which the finances of India could ill afford. They were perfectly conscious of that. The noble Lord, on the other hand, enters upon this expenditure with a light heart, and that is because he has a peculiar measure of the value of a lakh of rupees. I do not wonder that he thinks the road a very cheap undertaking. We, on the other hand, being under the impression that a lakh at par is £10,000, were not able to understand how 20 lakhs of rupees amount only to £13,000. There are many county councils in England which would be extremely glad to make a road of 180 miles for £13,000. I know that in the county in which I reside roads cost more per mile than the roads over those great passes, according to the estimate of the Secretary of State, who is so careful about financial waste. Such, then, was the plan which was laid before the late Government by the Government of India. Taking that into account, and all the political considerations to which my right hon. Friend has referred, the late Government thought they were not justified in countenancing or authorising the plan proposed by the Government of India. It is a remarkable fact that when this question first arose under the present Government the Leader of the House stated that new information had come to the present Government which had altered the whole position from that in which the late Government found themselves. Well, that is an indication that he thought the decision which the late Government arrived at on the information in their possession had not been altogether a wrong one, and he laid as the foundation of his case for altering that policy the subsequent information received. Now, what I desire to do is to examine what that subsequent information was and how it has really altered the situation. The question is, as I said before, was this road, and is this road, a thing which ought to be made with a view to the occupation of Chitral? It is said that it is a very serious thing to come into conflict with the Government of India upon a subject of that kind. Yes, but English Governments have come into conflict with Indian Governments before now—["Hear, hear!"]—as, for example, on the question of Kandahar. No one who heard it at the time will have forgotten the great speech made by Lord Hartington defending the evacuation of Kandahar against the opinion of the Government of India; and is there any man connected with the Government of India now who regrets that decision? ["Hear, hear!"] Would it have been a wise thing in reference to our subsequent Afghan policy to have maintained the occupation of Kandahar? The opinion of every man connected with Government in England and in India is that the evacuation of Kandahar was a wise and judicious policy. But let us consider the circumstances which Her Majesty's present advisers consider have altered the situation. They telegraphed to the Government of India to give them information as to what they thought could be done in reference to this road, which they regard as the critical part of the question, and they received an answer, I think on August 3, in a Dispatch to which the noble Lord refers, and of which he complains that my right hon. Friend did not read it at length. It is not necessary to read it at length, because the whole of this information, which the noble Lord says changed the policy of the Government, is entirely hypothesis and surmise. The Government of India, wished to enter into negotiations with the tribes in reference to the road, and my right hon. Friend did not object to that, and gave the Government of India leave to enter into negotiations. But there have been no negotiations; all that is said is that the tribes have been "sounded." I think that is the expression, or, at all events, that is all that has taken place, and it is surmised that the tribes may be friendly in regard to this road. Now, two or three year's ago such an opinion would have been expressed in regard to Umra Khan; but what happened? There were wars of succession such as made up so much of the history of Eastern States, and tribes which are friendly to-day become our enemies to-morrow. The extraordinary fickleness of these people is admitted by Dr. Robertson. Therefore, the mere surmise that probably the tribes, or a set of tribes, may be friendly is most unsafe ground to go upon. It is a very curious thing, now that it is assumed that these tribes are friendly, that I read yesterday in the Times a telegram as to the attitude of these tribes at this time. It is dated Laram, and is headed, "The Retention of Chitral." It speaks of the withdrawal of a part of the force from Chitral. It says the garrison of Chitral, consisting of the 3rd Goorkhas, the 25th Punjab Infantry, and so forth, and that the 3rd Brigade under General Gatacre is beginning to withdraw; and then it proceeds:—

"It is apparent that a withdrawal of 10,000 men in the face of tribes who, though at present peaceful, would spring; to arms on the smallest pretext, is a problem of no little difficulty, and one which requires great skill, patience, and adroit manœuvre."

Therefore, at the present time, when the tribes are under the influence of our victories, and while there is a great body of our troops there, the withdrawal of 10,000 troops from the midst of these tribes is beset with danger. They are peaceful to-day, but they may be our enemies to-morrow. Through this country you propose to make a road of 180 miles, and by this means you rely on a peaceful occupation. Then the telegram proceeds:—

"The evacuation of the Jandol Valley was most skilfully accomplished without a shot being fired, and the successful carrying out of that difficult operation gives reasonable hope that the withdrawal from the line of the Panjkora river will be equally successful."

This shows that no reliance can possibly be placed on the permanent peaceableness of these tribes. My right hon. Friend has said, and it seems to me to stand to reason, that, if you are to rely on these peaceable tribes for your road, if the tribes cease to be peaceable you will have to subdue them by force and so occupy your road. Now, the noble Lord in his Dispatch uses these words:—

"It was apparent from your letter of May 8 that your Government was not without apprehension that the task of opening up this road might, if it were to necessitate the military coercion of the tribes and the interference with their independence, be one of such great cost and involving such embarrassing complications as to render it of doubtful expediency; but in your opinion this question, both in its financial and political aspects, depended on the attitude which might be assumed by the tribes, and you indicated that if amicable arrangements could be secured and they could be persuaded to become responsible for the safety of the road, the cost need not be prohibitive."

What, then, is the condition of the occupation of Chitral? That the tribes become guarantee for the security of the road. But how can you rely on these tribes? The noble Lord continues:—

"But your information is still incomplete as to the exact cost of the scheme, and I felt some doubts as to the absolute necessity of permanently maintaining regular troops on the Malakand Pass, and as to whether the tribes would see in this an infringement of the Proclamation."

The Government of India sent proposals that, in addition to the tribes, there should be quartered on the road three regiments and a battery, and, of course, the tribes would see an infringement of the Proclamation in the quartering of these troops in their midst. The noble Lord, then, was perfectly right in telling the Government of India he had doubts on the point. But how is this road going to be kept? By native levies? If the road is attacked you must defend it, and this road of 180 miles is in charge of native levies and of tribes not to be depended upon from month to month, or, indeed, from day to day. If the tribes do not choose to defend the road, and regard it as a menace to their independence, what becomes of your Proclamation? This is where the moral consideration to which my right hon. Friend referred comes in with enormous force; it deprives you of the power of really defending the road on which the occupation of Chitral must depend, because you cannot use force to defend the road, having given an undertaking. So then you go to the expense of making a road and have no security for the safety of it when made. Chitral, then, will be held under a sort of tenancy at will, a tenancy dependent on the will of the tribes along the road. I cannot conceive a more insecure tenancy. Where in any other part of the frontier do you hold a road on such terms? But this is what you declare in your Proclamation, and that, I suppose, is what the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs meant in his allusion, for he must have seen that the use of the road depends on the good-will of wild and fickle tribes, and there is no security of occupation. Then the noble Lord says:—

"The Government of India say it will cost nothing, that it will lead to no increase of the Indian Army."

Has the Government of India never been mistaken on that subject before? Did they not give assurances that the expedition to Afghanistan was to cost one and a-half millions? It cost, I believe, 22 millions. I have never known a single case in which the Estimates made by the Indian Government have not been proved to be greatly and disastrously below the mark. I was glad to hear the noble Lord express his strong sense of the impolicy of loading India with additional expenditure. I was very glad to hear him say that the discontent which might be produced in India' by additional taxation would be a far greater danger to India herself than any she has to fear from attacks upon her frontier by foreign nations. The great thing you have to fear is that you shall create discontent among the people of India. As long as you have the people of India your friends, satisfied with the justice and policy of your rule, your Empire there will be safe. You may rely on your Army, which has shown upon a recent occasion its vigour, its valour, and its indomitable pluck. [Cheers.] But if you have that Army on the frontier of a people which you are oppressing by taxation which they are unable to bear, you will have behind you and upon your communications a far greater peril than any which you apprehend and for which you are making advances of this character. I read in this Dispatch that the noble Lord is not satisfied with the information he has yet received. He charges us with making up our minds upon information that was incomplete. Well, he cannot have made up his mind, for in the very last paragraph he says the information is still incomplete. How, then, can he have made up his mind as to the course we are pursuing in the circumstances? It is quite plain that he has not accepted the plan laid before him by the Government of India. I do hope that before the country is finally committed to a course which I believe will be highly injurious to the finances of India, and, so far from giving strength to your frontier defence, will only weaken it, the Government at home will require much fuller information as to the cost of this expedition and as to the situation in which we stand with reference to these tribes. It is upon our situation in reference to these tribes that the matter must be judged, and I do hope that before the country is committed to a policy of this gravity, we may have much more satisfactory information than any which the Government is thinking of acting upon, and upon which, as it appears to me from the Dispatch of the noble Lord himself, he has not finally made up his mind.

said, he should not have risen to address the House had it not been for the direct allusion to himself in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman who brought the subject before the House. He might express his regret that there should not have been a Motion made. The right hon. Gentleman had put a Motion on the Paper and so excluded other Motions, and then did not move it. He thought that was to be regretted so far as the course of public debate was concerned. The hon. Member for Cardiff and his Seconder seemed to him to have placed their Motion on the Paper for the purpose of preventing some other subject corning on. Indeed the Seconder actually spoke against the terms of the Motion itself so far as he understood them. The hon. Member for Bethnal Green said that he was in favour of the annexation of Chitral; but on the merits of this case he held diametrically opposite views to the proposer of the Motion. He should not have alluded to these two hon. Members or their speeches but for the fact that the hon. Member for Cardiff had introduced into the Debate statements which showed so imperfect an acquaintance with the whole subject that he was afraid he had misled the House of Commons. The hon. Gentleman repeatedly alluded to the fortification of the passes leading into India as the particular policy he condemned. There was not a single one of these passes fortified with the exception of the Khyber Pass, which was only fortified against infantry. He thought his right hon. Friend had enormously exaggerated the difficulty and danger of making roads between the political and administrative frontier of India. It was quite possible that the road now in question might be a difficult road to make and hold; but it was equally possible that that might not be the case. Roads had been made outside the frontier of India over hundreds of miles of territory, and the making of them had been absolutely justified by what had followed. He did not wish to express any confident opinion upon the policy of holding this country; all that he wished to argue was that with regard to the road as it stood, it was quite possible, without any actual war or any great military cantonment, to keep it open, for the natives might be willing to do so for their own sake. The position of the Government was that the road was to be held by tribal levies without anything being done to infringe the Proclamation. His right hon. Friend had referred to the frontier of India, and he condemned in strong language indeed going beyond the frontier; and he used the term annexation, which was also employed by the hon. Member for Cardiff. His right hon. Friend, in giving the history of Chitral, showed that long ago it came under British influence. When in 1881 it was proposed to withdraw the Agency, doubt was expressed as to whether it was safe, but it was laid down that the withdrawal made no change in the policy with regard to Chitral. They had admitted that Chitral became a feudatory State, and they had given money help. Mr. Gladstone's first Government in 1880 endorsed that view. In 1892 the Member for Wolverhampton and the Leader of the Opposition agreed to increase our Chitral subsidy; all through, down to the recent action of the late Government, successive Governments invariably followed the opinion of the Government of India. They never attempted to over-rule it. Then there came a very sudden change, and it was upon that that he justified the interruption which he had made. The late Government acted very rapidly upon the Dispatch of the 9th of May. They must have received it during the Whitsuntide holidays, and then, after a few days, on the 13th June, they reversed the unanimous opinion of the Government of India—the first time that that opinion had been departed from in such questions. The right hon. Gentleman had taken the opinion of these great military authorities no doubt, for there was on the other side the opinion of Sir Donald Stewart. He asked the attention of the House to the very sharp point of controversy between himself and the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton. What was the principle at issue when they reversed or accepted the opinion of the Government of India? The Duke of Argyll in his famous Dispatch—twice laid on the Table of the House—had always been taken as a masterpiece on that subject. It expressed the constitutional view on this question. The Dispatch laid it down:

"Such powers of control as are claimed for the Secretary of State must be used with great deliberation, and on the rarest occasions."

The Duke was then in Mr. Gladstone's Administration. These words were taken note of by the Government of India, and accepted. What he wanted to know was whether this principle was applied in the Chitral case. He had not forgotten the Kandahar case, but in that case the Government of India were not unanimous. There were two questions there. There was the question whether we should hold Kandahar and the Pishin Valley, or whether we should hold the Pishin Valley without Kandahar. They had had three Members of the Council in India with the month at question: the Viceroy, the Military Member of the Council, and the Finance Member of the Council, such weighty names that they finally very largely overcame the opposition towards them. The Finance Member at that time was Major Baring.

said, the Finance Member of Council was Sir John Strachey.

said, at the time he spoke of, Major Baring, now Lord Cromer, was the Finance Member. Those were very weighty names, and they had against them other very weighty names. But what did they do? They argued with them for months and months, and finally yielded to them on the Pishin portion of the case, and by doing that they carried a not very unwilling dissent from those Members of the Council who had been opposed to them with regard to Kandahar. For two years they agreed to stay temporarily in Pishin, and then ended by staying there altogether. That was what he called "great deliberation," a deliberation which had been entirely lacking on the present occasion. He was one of those who believed that it was not by over-ruling the Government of India from time to time upon some question of frontier policy, but by considering larger changes of policy, that they should be able to bring the finances of India into order. The hon. Member for Cardiff thought that annexations were the main cause of the difficulties of Indian finance; there were others who ascribed them to the complications with silver which had arisen in modern times. The hon. Member for Bethnal Green appeared to share the views of the Government with regard to this particular annexation, as he called it. He, himself, should not call it by that name, but, at all events, there was, common to the Mover and Seconder of this Resolution, and common also to a larger number of Members of that House, a very uneasy feeling in regard to the condition of Indian affairs. He believed there was much to be done in the way of civil economy and civil reform in India, but, apart from that question, he contended they would never deal adequately with this question of military expenditure of India until they radically revised the whole of their military system. They had an expensive system of white army, and they would have to alter it into a cheaper system of white army before they could make both ends meet.

regretted that the Papers relating to Chitral had not been published earlier. The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton complained that the Blue-book did not contain all the necessary Papers, but the late Government had had it in their power to publish all the Papers and Documents at an earlier stage, and that he thought would have been a right and proper course to take. If the case had been put before the public the late Government would have received a great deal of support in the decision at which they ultimately arrived. As regarded that decision, he entirely concurred in the views that the late Government took. He thanked the right hon. Gentleman for the way in which he had sought to raise this question from one of mere temporary expediency, or money consideration, to a higher level. He should be prepared to vote with his hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff upon the Amendment, because it covered the ground occupied by the Chitral question, as well as many other similar questions. The hon. Member for Bethnal Green should, he suggested, have seconded the Amendment of the hon. Member for Cardiff, but he regretted that the hon. Member's reasons were, if he might say so, opposed to the whole educated opinion of India. He was sorry that Mr. Naoroji had not been returned to the House, as he could speak more authoritatively on behalf of the Indian people. He thought that in that discussion the opinion of the people of India was a very important one. He thought the public opinion of this country would insist that the question should be looked at from a broader and higher point of view, and that they would have to consider that these aggressions upon our weaker neighbours in India—this forward policy as it was called—was right and just. We had no quarrel with these people, and we had no right to deprive them of their land and liberty. He thought that a black man was as much entitled to his life, liberty and property as a white man. To the ordinary man, the terms of our Proclamation to the Chitralis conveyed the idea that we only intended to enter that country for the purpose of relieving Dr. Robertson, and that we would not interfere with the independence and liberty of any of the tribes there. He did not care who were the people who upheld the present action, for he said that, primarily, Ministers were the responsible people, and that they must take the responsibility, and they could not put it off on Lord Elgin or anyone else. Then, as regarded the grounds upon which the present forward movement had been justified, the Leader of the House placed it on two main grounds. One was the question of prestige; he said that if we abandoned any territories that we had once occupied, we should strike a blow at our prestige. He thought that his right hon. Friend the Member for East Wolverhampton (Sir Henry Fowler) very rightly objected to that word as being a governing rule for our action. What did the word "prestige" mean? Dr. Johnson had said that it was the Latin for "lie." In a dictionary which he had consulted, he found the first meaning to be "illusion," that meant self-deception; and the next meaning given was "imposture," that meant the deceiving of others. He left the Government to choose which of the two meanings they would adopt. The second reason given by the Leader of the House, was that, from a financial point of view, it would cost us little or nothing and that it would not be expensive, and he said that he had had assurances from the Government of India that the expenditure would not be very large. This information which had now justified the change of policy turned out to be simply a statement of the political officers, to the effect that the tribes would agree to having this road pass through their territories. He did not think that anyone who had studied these matters would be impressed with the correctness of the information obtained by the political officers on the frontier. Really, by far the best way of getting reliable information was the old method of placing a native Agent in these border places. He was a Mahommedan, generally of priestly position. He could mingle with the people and could give exact information upon all border questions, without raising the same suspicion or prejudice that a European officer raised; and he was able to live there without creating disturbances or rivalries among the different claimants for the Throne, or those who advocated different policies. The native Agents did not get us into these difficulties that Dr. Robertson did in the case of Chitral. Anybody reading the Blue-book would see what a humiliating position we were placed in through the interference of the British officer, who carried with him all the authority of the British Government. As regarded the cost, the Estimates were very unsatisfactory, and this had been the case in the Afghan War of 1877 and the Abyssinian War. It was remarkable that we should be regretting the policy started by Lord Lytton in 1878, which had brought us so much disaster, loss, and disgrace. Lord Lawrence's policy, on the other hand, was based on experience and common sense. He said that Nature had given us a strong rampart of rock, and mountains, and torrents, and that we should maintain those natural boundaries. Nature had also provided volunteers to man those ramparts in the native tribes, who hated foreign interference of any kind. It was just the same as if a farmer had a thick, thorny hedge round his orchard. He would be very foolish if he were to remove those thorns and briars, and still more foolish if he were to spend his substance in cutting a hole through that hedge and let the thieves through to steal his fruit. If we made this road fit for artillery, though he was not an alarmist, he must say that we were just paving the way for a Russian invasion. That meant more common sense, and that was the view which Lord Roberts held in 1880, when he was responsible for the defence of India. The noble Lord then held that, the longer and more difficult the road along which an enemy must approach through the mountain passes was, the better it would be for the defence, and that, so far from shortening such a road by a single mile or rendering it easier, he would prefer to lengthen the road and to increase the difficulties of it. That was the opinion of Lord Roberts at that time, and the noble Lord had not written or said anything since that detracted in any way from the force of that statement. The noble Lord had certainly written a letter to The Times in which he said that the defence of such a road would depend very much upon the friendly feeling of the natives to our Government. Was it not a curious thing that we should go among these tribes and, by robbing them of the independence which they valued so highly, make them our enemies? A gentleman who was well acquainted with the state of feeling that existed among the mountain tribes on our Indian frontier had said that they always regarded the first invaders as their enemies, and the second invaders as their deliverers. The proper course for us to take in the matter was to leave the native tribes alone, and to persuade them that we did not want their country because we did not think it worth taking, and then they would regard us as their best friends, and if any pressure were put upon them by either Russia or the Ameer, they would at once throw themselves into our arms. That was the policy that had been pursued by Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook, and it was only set aside by Lord Lytton. They ought to return to the well-tried system, which had been found both effective and economical. By pursuing an opposite policy we should suffer from loss of prestige, we should meet with great financial difficulties, and we should cause great dissatisfaction among the people of India. As regarded the financial question involved in the imposition of the Indian Cotton Import Duties, he hoped that the hon. Members from Lancashire would carefully examine into the matter, because, if a policy of annexation were to be pursued, those duties would have to be raised from five to ten per cent. Such a policy was unjust, because under it the tribes would be deprived of their lands and liberties. Moreover, to follow such a policy would be an act of bad faith, because all those people thoroughly understood that we only intended to occupy their country until our immediate purpose was fulfilled. Such a policy would be ruinous both politically and financially, while the people of India would see money spent in a needless way, and would see no hope of ever getting the taxation which pressed so heavily upon the poor of the country lightened, or applied to those purposes of improvement and advancement which we were so anxious to see carried into effect. He, therefore, fully approved of the policy of the late Government in reference to this question. He believed that the policy which was good then was good now, and that so far from any change in the circumstances of India having occurred which would make the policy less successful, everything tended to show that it would be more effective than ever. The fact that the boundaries of India had been delimited on the frontiers of Russia and of the Ameer's country, ought to induce us to return to the good, old, and humane policy which had given India a full treasury, and friendly neighbours on the frontiers, and a contented people at home.

said, that having been a member of the Government of India at the time when the Gilghit Agency was re-established in 1889, he hoped that the House would permit him to make some observations. The right hon. Gentleman the late Secretary for India had said that in going to Chitral we were going beyond the boundaries of India; but the right hon. Gentleman appeared to forget that there was not only a British India, but the India of which Her Majesty was Empress and over which she exercised political control, and that Chitral was certainly within the sphere of her dominions. That was clearly shown by the definition of India in the Interpretation Act of 1889. The Government of India had merely discharged an imperative duty in relieving the British officers who were being besieged in Chitral, and that duty having been discharged, the only question now before the House was as to what was to be done with Chitral. It might be perfectly true that the result of our agreement with Russia as to the delimitation of the Pamir frontier would render it improbable that Russia will give us any trouble in that quarter of the globe, but we must not overlook the fact that no longer ago than 1878 Russia had set troops in motion by the Pamir route with the avowed intention of stirring up the tribes of the Hindu-Kush so as to cause trouble on the Peshawar border. The march of these troops was only stopped by the Treaty of Berlin. What had happened before might happen again. It therefore appeared to him that the Indian Government were perfectly right in taking steps to secure our frontier in that direction. He submitted that we had good reasons for retaining our hold on Chitral. It had been assumed that the Indian Government intended to annex Chitral; but so far as he could gather it had never entered into the minds of any one connected with the Government of India to annex that country. It seemed to be thought there could not be a military occupation, temporary or permanent, in any part of India unless there was annexation. There were military occupations in various parts of the country, but the native chiefs did not consider themselves annexed because there was a British force cantoned in their territory. It was said we were going to force on the tribes a mountain road to Chitral. The correspondence contained no evidence of any such intention; on the contrary, it appeared that there was every probability of a peaceful arrangement for the road being made. Experience showed that the tribes might be trusted as guarantors for the security of such roads. In Belu-chistan there was not only a road, but a railroad, under the protection of the tribes through which it passed. On the acts he failed to see what objection there could be to the course the Government proposed to pursue. It was unfortunate that the question of Chitral should have been mixed up with the wider question raised by the hon. Member for Cardiff. In the last Parliament they had sad experiences of the result of academic Resolutions passed by the House, such as those on the system of examinations for the Indian Civil Service and the opium traffic. The latter resulted in the appointment of a Commission which entirely destroyed the case of the anti-opiumists. He hoped the House would not accept the Resolution of the hon. Member for Cardiff. So far as its principle went there was no great objection to it, but he feared it would cause embarrassment in time to come. [Cheers.]

I will not attempt to make another speech, but there are one or two personal explanations due to myself and the Government of India which I wish to make to prevent misconception. The right hon. Member for the Forest of Dean complained of the want of deliberation that the late Government appeared to have shown in coming to a decision on the question. He seemed to be under the impression that the Dispatch sent on May 8 and received towards the end of the month, was answered offhand on June 13 by telegram. No one knows better than the right hon. Baronet that a large number of communications are being constantly received in London from India. On April 18 I was perfectly aware what the policy of the Government of India was. On May 9—the day after the Dispatch—I received a private telegram telling me what the effect of the Dispatch was. On May 27, the Government of India pressed me to indicate what the Cabinet intended to do, and on June 5 for the decision of the Cabinet; and whether our decision is right or wrong, no Government ever made a more careful examination of the Papers before giving a decision than the late Government, whose decision I sent by telegram. If we had not left office I should have sent a Dispatch in a few days fully explaining the question. Another misconception I am perhaps to blame for. The noble Lord opposite thinks I have cast a reflection on the Government of India with reference to the Proclamation. I can assure him and the House that it was not my intention to do so. What I did was what the noble Lord said in his telegram of August 9:—"Do nothing to infringe the terms of the Proclamation," and at the conclusion of the last Dispatch he cautioned the Government to strictly keep to the conditions of the Proclamation. I am satisfied that Lord Elgin and his colleagues had no intention to violate the terms of the Proclamation. The Indian Government believe—I do not agree with them, but I will not trouble the House with the reasons why—that peaceful arrangements can be made for the construction of this road. If they are made, of course there will be no violation of the terms of the Proclamation. The argument I submitted was that it was impossible to make the road by means of peaceful arrangements, and to make it without them would be annexation; but that was a question of argument, and it was not one of imputation upon Lord Elgin, for whom I have profound respect, and I hope that he and his Government will believe I had no intention to cast the slightest reflection on their good faith. I will not pursue the little personal conflict I had with my right hon. Friend the Member for the Forest of Dean. He and I were speaking of two different times. I spoke of one part of the transaction and he of another. There is no doubt that in the Debate to which I referred Mr. Gibson, now Lord Ashbourne, twitted my right hon. Friend with not having told the House what the opinion of the Government was, and asserted that, with the solitary exception of Major Baring, the Indian Government opposed the evacuation of Kandahar, and Lord Hartington stated at that time that Sir Donald Stewart also opposed that policy. That is a trivial matter, but, whether our position is right or wrong, I should like, in justice to my colleagues and myself, to repudiate the suggestion that it was arrived at without full consideration or in a hurried manner. The consideration of the question was going on for several weeks, and we did not arrive at our decision without the most anxious care.

said, he was sorry to have to raise, at such a late period of the Session, and in such a small house, the question of the Import Duties on Indian Cotton, which was a question of the greatest importance to a large number of people in this country. If there was anything more patent than another in the late appeal to the Constituencies, it was the stern resolve of the people of Lancashire that this matter should not be allowed to sleep, but that it should be pressed again and again on the attention of Parliament if necessary. It would be remembered that, much to the surprise of the House of Commons, and certainly very much to the surprise of the Members for Lancashire, in the beginning of last year, it was announced that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wolverhampton, then Secretary for India, had yielded—he would not say to his better judgment—but to the representations made by the Indian Government, and decided, without carrying with him the sympathies of his colleagues in the Cabinet, to impose Import Duties on cotton sent to India. Unfortunately, owing to the Rules of the House, the representatives of those whose interests were affected had little or no opportunity of discussing the question until it was almost, to use the words of the right hon. Gentleman, "a closed question;" and the present Lord James, then the representative of an important Lancashire Constituency, had, on the 21st February, to move the adjournment of the House in order to call attention to it. An important and interesting Debate followed. He ventured to say that the arguments against the imposition of the Duties were not exhausted in that Debate, and that the eloquence and the admirable flights of patriotism in which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wolverhampton indulged, did not deal with the commercial aspects of the question. The Motion against the Duties was rejected, much to the disappointment of those who hoped the House of Commons would take a reasonable view of the matter. On May 27th following the Debate, a deputation from those interested in the cotton trade waited on the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wolverhampton, and laid before the right hon. Gentleman, as he himself would admit, the objections to the Duties with great force and detail. Before the right hon. Gentleman could give his reply to the representatives of the deputation a General Election took place, a new Government came into office, and, much to his satisfaction and to the satisfaction of every Member for Lancashire, the noble Lord the Member for Ealing was appointed Secretary for India, because, on this question, the views of the noble Lord had been consistent and straightforward since 1876. The right hon. Gentleman has declared that the Import Duties on cotton goods was unjust to the consumers of India as well as to the producers of India; and that there was little or no hope of the countervailing Excess Duties fulfilling the purposes for which they were intended. Other Members of the present Government also spoke in the Debate of February 21st. The right hon Gentleman the Member for Preston, whom he was glad to see in his present position as Secretary to the Treasury, then used the argument that while self-governing Colonies, if they liked, might adopt the mistaken policy of imposing Import Duties, in the case of India, for whose finances this country was responsible, for the Indian Government to adopt a protective policy was inimical to the best interests of the people of India. He (Mr. Stanhope) maintained that we ought to adopt and maintain in India the policy we have adopted and maintained at home—namely, that while there might be Import Duties for Revenue purposes upon spirits, tobacco, wines, and other such articles, an article of vital necessity to the people of India like cotton—which was used in enormous quantities by the people of India, and was practically their only attire—should be left absolutely free. Unfortunately that view did not prevail with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wolverhampton. The right hon. Gentleman accepted the view of the Government of India that the Import Duties should be imposed on the understanding that there was an absolutely countervailing Excess Duty. He maintained that that Excess Duty was not absolutely countervailing. In the first place, it gave to the native manufacturers of India an absolute monopoly over all the lower qualities of cotton cloth. All kinds under 20 counts being absolutely free, the native manufacturers had an absolute monopoly in that production, and they were able to embark their capital with the knowledge that that monopoly could not be attacked under the present arrangements. But it was said by the Government of India that all counts under 20 were practically already a monopoly of the Indian manufacturers, and that Lancashire was unable to compete with them. That was a mistake. In an able pamphlet drawn up by Mr. Whittaker on behalf of the Joint Employers and Workers Committee, it was pointed out with great force that the low prices, and possibly lower prices of American cotton, made it possible for Lancashire to compete even in these lower counts, and that Lancashire, with the energy she generally shows in such matters, would probably embark on such competition, were it not that the present countervailing Cotton Duty practically created a monopoly for the Indian manufacturer. The next point was that there should be on the one hand a 5 per cent, ad valorem Duty on imported cloth, and, on the other hand, there should only be a 5 per cent. Duty on the yarn in India. It had been pointed out that the yarn was the only cost in the cloth. No doubt it formed, by far, the greater portion of the cost. Let them assume that the yarn was 70 per cent, of the actual cost of the cloth. That meant that the manufacturer in India practically only paid 70 per cent. of the Duty paid by his competitor in Lancashire. It was argued that they had to pay more for machinery and coal, and that, consequently, they ought to enjoy the advantage. But, on the other hand, the manufacturers in India had an enormous market for free labour, and they had not got Factory Bills, which, though he entirely approved of them, impeded the free working of the manufacturer. On these grounds the countervailing duty was not and would not be effective for the purpose which it was intended to serve. It was true that the Secretary of State had received representations sent by the Joint Committee, and that he proposed to await the answer of the Indian Government before giving a decisive reply; but from one quarter at all events he had already had his reply. In the Times a few days ago there was a significant telegram which was a quotation from the Pioneer—one of the leading Anglo-Indian papers. These are the words:—

"We are not concerned to claim undiluted unselfishness for Calcutta and Bombay, but we know a good deal more about the depth and strength of the agitation over the cotton duties than Lord George Hamilton, and if he imagines that it was the work merely of local coteries of interested merchants, he is totally and lamentably mistaken. Lord George, moreover, has apparently yet to learn the rudimentary lesson that, where questions of Indian finance are concerned, even the shrieking units of society in the Europeanised communities of Bombay and Calcutta have a far better claim to be heard than the shrieking units of Manchester and Oldham. It is a mere waste of power to ask the Government of India to draw up a fresh minute on this subject. Their views have been given in the fullest and clearest manner possible, and it would be wiser for Lord Salisbury's Ministry to make up their minds at once that the cotton duties must remain."

If that was the view of Anglo-India, he was at one with that newspaper in saying that any representation we might make, by deputation or otherwise, might be ineffectual for achieving the object in view. It seemed to him that this question had yet to be fought out again and again, perhaps, in the House of Commons. It would have to be constantly debated and pressed on the attention of the House on every convenient occasion. Lancashire had been called selfish and greedy in respect of this agitation. Lancashire was nothing of the sort. Lancashire had a right to have its voice on trade questions that affected its interest so deeply. Lancashire raised this question in the interest of commercial freedom. It regarded import duties as restraints of trade, and it regarded these duties in particular as crippling a great industry. He hoped that in time Members of the Government might be inclined to take a more favourable view of the matter. He was aware that in this Government, as in all Governments, there were some skeletons in the cupboard. There was, for instance, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for St. George's, Hanover Square, who, in the Debate of the 21st February, did not share the view of the noble Lord, and who made a speech of the character which he did with such adroitness and skill—a speech of a character that might be called sitting on the fence in this matter. However, he hoped the Secretary of State and the Government would understand that in raising this question the opponents of the duty were only keeping the question alive, that they meant to keep the question alive, and they meant on every convenient occasion to push the matter to a division, and to show that in this question of trade, which had so much to do with the success of the Unionist Party at the General Election—that in the question of trade, at all events, there was some interest to be shown by the Unionist Party, that they would be expected to redeem their pledges upon it. He had occasion, in the course of the Election, to traverse Lancashire from end to end, and he averred that there was no place in Lancashire, county or borough, the walls of which were not plastered with enormous bills calling on the electors to vote for So-and-so and the repeal of the cotton duties. [A cry of "No."] He was sorry the hon. Member who cried "No," and who represented a seaside constituency, had not a few factory operatives in his constituency to awaken his conscience in the matter. He believed that Lancashire Members opposite, returned as they were very largely in consequence of the views they held on this matter, would assist him in keeping the Government up to the level, and in ensuring that the Government should not yield to the interested clique in India who were at the bottom of this agitation. It was said the agitation in India was purely and solely in the interest of the people of India. Towards the end of last Parliament a Report was sent containing the views of the various Chambers of Commerce in India upon the subject. The Upper India Chamber of Commerce at Cawnpore said:—

"Apart from the inconsistency and invidiousness of the Bill in excluding cotton goods when practically everything else consumed by the community is taxed, a further cogent argument lies in the fact that most of the articles liable to duty under the new Schedule form necessities of life to the classes who already suffer most from low exchange, and who bear the burden of the income tax and the direct and other cesses imposed by the Provincial Government. If, however, cotton goods are freed, the symmetry of the tax is at once destroyed, for these are the only commodities of foreign production used by the masses, and thus a very large section of the population would escape from contributing to the needs of the State."

That was to say, the argument on behalf of these duties was that they would fall upon the poorer classes of India, and that it was they who should be taxed to supply the needs of the Exchequer. Then there was the Calcutta Trades Association, which, first of all, proposed the early abolition of the income tax, and then proceeded warmly to back up the cotton duties. With regard to the income tax, this Association said:—

"Pressing as it does chiefly upon Anglo-Indians, its retention is a perfection of cruelty."

Another Chamber of Commerce advocated the cotton duties solely to relieve the official classes from the payment of Indian taxes. Next there were the mill companies, such as the Egerton Mills Company. This is what a Mr. Gilbert, said:—

"It is a far cry from Bombay to Calcutta, and it seems to me Bombay is being sacrificed At present we cannot work at a profit. The Government of India had far better say the Bombay mills should be dismantled and be honest. At present our mill interest has completely gone to ruin."

From a careful analysis of ten of the largest cotton mills in India, he found that between the beginning of April of last year and the beginning of June of this year, the share capital of these companies had appreciated no less than 46 per cent. He did not know why the commercial community should at once have so hurriedly given an increased value of 46 per cent, to their shares if they did not believe that there was going to be established practically protection in the interests of the Indian millowner. Upon this subject at all events the Secretary of India was absolutely sound. He said on the 21st February of this year that—

"He agreed they should listen sympathetically to the voice of India, but if they wanted to hear the view of India, Bombay and Calcutta were not the places to hear it. Those European cities did not represent India, and the peculiarity of modern India was that certain sections of those two capitals having adopted Western ideas, had developed with singular skill the methods of agitation. The result was there was no country in the world where the shrinking units of society could make themselves so well heard, and where the millions were so quiescent as in India."

It was because the millions of India were quiescent that so many of these questions were maltreated in that House. It was because we allowed the Government of India to embark in costly frontier policy, and to spend millions on extravagant military administration, that there was a deficit in the Indian Budget. He denied that this agitation was purely and solely in the interests of the people of India. These duties were not in the interests of India, and certainly they were not in the interest of England. The interest of both these countries was in the most complete commercial freedom, and the exchange of their commodities freely, openly, and without restraint. So long as the House of Commons continued, he would not say for interested motives, but under the claim of a forced patriotism, to insist on the imposition of duties inimical to that great principle, so long would he and his friends raise their voices against them, until this grievous injustice was removed.

desired, as a cotton spinner and manufacturer himself, to press home upon the House the all-importance of this subject, for it was a matter the weight and gravity of which could not possibly be exaggerated for the people of Lancashire. He did not abate by one jot or tittle the views he enunciated when this question was last before the House; rather he affirmed them with even more vigour and earnestness than ever. He entirely agreed with the views of the hon. Member for Burnley. There was no doubt whatever that in Lancashire this question of the imposition of Import Duties on cotton goods had a great effect in deciding the course of the elections in that country. It was, in fact, a bread-and-butter question for Lancashire. He should like cursorily to run over one or two of the arguments he advanced in the former Debate, He contended that there was protection in the way those duties were levied at the present time. Up to 20's there was absolute protection for the Indian spinner and manufacturer. In many quarters it was supposed that we did not, in this country, ever spin or manufacture goods out of 20's or under; but that opinion was entirely fallacious. At the present time there were in Lancashire three millons of spindles, producing annually 250 million pounds weight of yarn of 20's and under, and this must be compared with the number of spindles in India, producing 274 million pounds weight of yarn, or 10 per cent. over what we produced in this country. At the present time yarn was being shipped to India in 20's and under, capable of manufacturing 25 millions of yards of cloths. It was impossible, therefore, to deny that for 20's and under the duties now imposed were absolutely protective. Over 20's there was partial protection, the duty being levied on the full value of any cloth imported into India, whereas on native yarns it was only levied on 60 per cent. of the total value of the cloth. These were plain figures which could not be denied. A good deal of use had been made of the stores argument, that there was 85 per cent. duty paid by the Indian manufacturer on stores imported. That was an argument in which there was absolutely nothing. Apart from coal and oil, both of which were produced in India, the stores necessary in the manufacture of cloth were in India very small indeed. The fact that they had cotton at their own doors, wages very much lower, no cost of freight in bringing American cotton to this country and then taking it out to India, and likewise no Factory Acts—if cotton manufacturers could claim any rectification of the duty on the stores question, tenfold could Lancashire claim rectification in consequence of the heavy burdens under which their trade was carried on. This duty amounted to 5 per cent. on the turnover, and, as those acquainted with weaving concerns would know, this was sometimes three or four times the amount of the capital. The duty amounted to an impost of 15 or 20 per cent. against the English manufacturer. A good deal had been made of the fact that a great part of the Indian productions were of yarns of 20's or under, while the English imports were of over 20. It was agreed that it was impossible there could be competition between yarns counting under 20 and yarns over 20. But again he declared this to be a fallacious argument. He could understand that a trade in boots could not compete with a trade in hats, but he could not understand the argument that low-priced boots could not compete with high-priced boots. Neither could he understand the rationale of the contention that, because cloth of a coarser texture was woven in India it did not compete with the sale of finer English imports. As well say that, because New Zealand mutton was coarser and cheaper than the home production, it did not compete with English meat. It did compete with the English produce, and the latter would suffer much more if it had to bear an impost of 5 per cent. There was fierce competition between England and India in cotton manufactures, and while the trade at home was practically stagnant and flagging, in India the cotton industry was developing and progressive. Since these duties were imposed the shares in Indian mills had sprung up to the amount of Rx. 1,600,000 and he learnt from a director of two Indian companies that they were paying the one 12 and the other 22 per cent. on the capital. It was a monstrous injustice that a flagging training industry at home should be taxed to make good a deficiency which appeared in the finances of a country where a thriving trade was carried on scot free. The state of affairs in Lancashire had not improved since this subject was last debated in the House. There was the same stoppage of machinery, the same number, if not more, of operatives vainly seeking employment, and the prospect was equally black if not blacker than it was then. On this ground he, Unionist Member as he was, did not hesitate to record his opinion, and if this question came up on a Vote of confidence, and an all-important issue depended on the Vote of one Member, he should Vote against any Government, Unionist or Liberal, that had for its policy the maintenance of these duties. He believed that the maintenance of these duties struck at the root of the prosperity of the county in which he was engaged, and, sitting as he did for a commercial constituency, and believing that to this constituency this trade matter was of the primest importance, he would not hesitate to take the action he had described. He regretted that there was not a trade party in the House that would give precedence to trade above all other questions, defending them against the assaults of either party. Lancashire Members, however, were not wholly unreasonable. They recognised that the noble Lord had been in office only a few weeks, and that it was his bounden duty to hold the scales equally between contending interests. They did not expect the noble Lord to perform miracles on behalf of Lancashire, and he had the right to claim time for consideration. They recognised that the task of abolishing these duties was infinitely greater than that of preventing their imposition in the first instance. The noble Lord was in a very different position. He might issue his fiat and abolish the duties, and then he would disorder the finances of India, or he might allow them to remain a crying injustice to this country. There were two initial steps the noble Lord might take. Initial steps only he called them because Lancashire would never be contented until the total abolition of these duties was obtained. But two steps the noble Lord might take to remove the sting from the present position of affairs. The first would be to treat India and Lancashire exactly alike. There was reason in the claim that Lancashire and India should be put on the same footing. This might be done by putting a duty of 5 per cent. on all yarns imported into or manufactured in India, and on all cloth imported into India, the latter to be taxed on the yarn and not the manufactured article. Such a duty would not disorganise the finances of India, but would bring grist into the Indian mill. The second course which had been suggested by some of his friends was that the Indian Government should take a step Lord Beaconsfield's Government took 20 years ago, when all goods manufactured of yarns under 30'swereexempted from duty. Failing the adoption of the first expedient, which he preferred, the noble Lord might adopt the second. He would not enter into the question of the loss of revenue to India which the abolition of the duties might involve, for that was dealt fully with when the subject was last before the House, when it was pointed out that there were taxes in England which were not raised in India. It was said that the difficulty was a monetary one, arising out of the depreciation of silver, which the marvellously increasing supply of gold would make only temporary in its duration, and it was also suggested that the difficulty might be got over by the Indian Government resorting to the expedient of borrowing. Lancashire, as a community, had a greater stake in the well-being and welfare of India than any other community in Great Britain, and they would be attempting a suicidal policy were they to advocate any policy that would seriously hurt India. They asked the Government to be impartial, and, in the laudable desire not to render injustice to India, to take very great care they did not render injustice to this country. He hoped the Government would soon find a via media in this matter, as he believed they would endeavour to do once they fully appreciated the facts which Lancashire Members had laid before the House.

believed that the import duties had had a very good educational effect upon the people of this country, and especially of Lancashire. Lancashire people were beginning to see that the question of exchange was not the only, or even the greatest cause of the deficit in the Indian Revenue. They were beginning to see that the Indian Empire was administered in an extravagant manner; and that this country did not bear her proper share of the Civil and Military charges. But, above and beyond all, it was, in his opinion and the opinion of Lancashire, this everlasting policy of the extension of Empire that had brought about the deficit in the Indian Revenue. He admitted that this policy had to some extent been sanctioned by the country at the last General Election, for hon. Members opposite were never tired of enlarging upon the merits of the extension of our Empire and the trade that followed our flag. If, however, the country wished this heroic policy, the country as a whole should pay for it, and the burden should not be cast upon either the poor consumer of India or upon the depressed cotton industry of Lancashire. The hon. Member for Hampshire (Mr. Jeffreys), speaking at the commencement of this Session on agricultural depression, talked of relieving the local burdens on agricultural land to the extent of three millions per annum. In Lancashire they wanted no subsidy and no charity; they merely wanted justice. They said that as neither the consumer in India nor the people engaged in the cotton trade in Lancashire were responsible for the ever-increasing expenditure, so neither the producer in Lancashire or the consumer in India should be called upon to make up the deficit in the Indian Revenue.

said, that when the Indian Tariff Act was passed, imposing duties upon goods imported into India, cotton goods were expressly excluded from the operation of the measure, because it was recognised that there had grown up in India a great and increasing cotton industry, which, if duties were imposed on cotton goods of home manufacture, would be protected against the competition of Lancashire. When recently the Indian Government proposed to include cotton goods within the operation of the Tariff Act, the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, then Secretary for India, laid down the principle, which has been repeatedly affirmed by this House, that, in connection with Indian Import Duties there must be no protection. In his Dispatch of 13th of December to the Indian Government he said:—

"It will be understood that Her Majesty's Government are precluded by the pledges quoted from sanctioning the imposition of Import Duties on cotton goods unless under such conditions as will ensure beyond question that the duties thus imposed will have no protective effect."

Acting in accordance with those instructions the Government of India devised a scheme of excise duties for the purpose of eliminating the element of protection from the import duties, and the Home Government, misguided by the information which they received, believed that the element of protection had been eliminated and sanctioned the imposition of the cotton duties. He proposed to take first dyed yarns and dyed and printed cloth, as showing in the most direct and aggravated form how serious an amount of protection was still caused by the Indian Import Duties. One special item of information supplied to the Government at home was that there was no competition between India and Lancashire in coarse yarns, viz., 20's and under, because the Lancashire yarns had been driven out of the market by the native manufactures. The Secretary for India, on February 21st, stated clearly that the Lancashire trade in coarse yarns had decreased until it had nearly reached vanishing point. But six days afterwards a deputation representing the dyers of the west of Scotland waited upon the right hon. Member and convinced him that, instead of there being no competition in coarse yarns between Lancashire and India, the Scotch dyers were importing such goods into British Burmah to a large extent. The result of these representations was that an Order in Council was passed reducing the duty on coarse dyed yarns going into British Burmah from 5 per cent. to ½ per cent. He would ask the Secretary of State for India why even this ½ per cent, duty was allowed to remain on those coarse yarns. A clear case of protection having been proved, the duty ought to have been removed altogether. Why, again, was not a rebate granted to the Scotch dyers, who had had to pay the 5 per cent, duty, as is done every other day to the Indian manufacturers in the case of yarns exported to China and elsewhere? He found that a general impression existed that the injustice to the dyers was removed almost completely with the exception of this ½ per cent., but he wished to point out that it was only on a very small part of their production that the injustice was removed. A very large percentage, no less than nine-tenths of their production, was still affected by a 5 per cent, duty, which acted almost entirely as protection to the Indian competitors. He would give two instances to prove this. The other portion of their trade with Burmah consisted principally of 24's. The Bombay dyers—quite as much an alien race to the Burmese as the British—could send dyed 24's to Burmah, paying 5 per cent, on only 7 annas per pound, whilst the British dyer paid on 15 annas, being over 100 per cent. more. Take the other case. The British dyer imported a bale of 400 1bs. grey 40's from Lancashire, for which he paid duty on a value of only about £11. When the same yarn was dyed here and sent to Bombay, it paid duty on about double that amount; and when it was woven into cloth on this side, dyed and printed, the duty was trebled, quadrupled, and in some cases even quintupled (as compared with their Indian competitors), according to the labour bestowed upon it. This duty was principally on British labour. These two instances showed, in a very clear and accentuated form, the truth of some of the leading objections put forward by the Lancashire manufacturers, in their admirable memorial to the Secretary for India, viz. :—

"(1.) That the Excise Duty secures an immunity from competition in the Indian markets by England in counts 20's and below."

He had already proved that there was still a considerable trade. With American cotton at 3d. per 1b., it would be a large trade if left duty free.

"(2.) That the Import Duty imposed on goods exported from this country, made from 20's and below, without any countervailing Excise Duty being imposed on goods made from similar counts in India, is absolutely protective in its character."

Indian manufacturers were taxed only on spinning costs; British on both spinning and weaving.

"(3.) That the 5 per cent. Import Duty charged on the ad valorem value of our manufactured goods is not completely countervailed by the fl per cent. Excise Duty charged on the yarn value of goods made in India from counts above 20's, and that, so far as any portion of the value of these goods is not chargeable with Excise Duty, the Import Duty becomes protective to that extent."

That this was the case he thought he had completely proved, in dealing with dyed and printed yarns and cloths.

"(4.) That the exemption from Excise Duty of yarns 20's and below will encourage the manufacture of duty-free cloths, as such exemption enables the Indian manufacturer to avoid the Excise Duty altogether, by substituting in the manufacture of cloth non-excisable yarns for excisable yarns."

There could be no stronger confirmation of this objection than the fact that, when yarns and goods of no higher numbers than 30's were admitted into India duty free, the exports of yarn above 32's fell from 26¼ per cent. to 18¼ per cent. of our total exports in five years ending 1883, and when the duty was repealed, they advanced again to 27 per cent. in the five years ending 1893.

"(5.) That it is impossible to place a dividing line between the manufacturers of Lancashire and India, whereby a duty levied on one, unless completely countervailed, will not afford a protective incidence to one to the consequent injury of the other."

This would be clearly seen from the previous arguments.

"(6.) That the imposition of these duties has inflicted serious injury to our trade, and will continue to do so unless completely countervailed."

He thought that strong evidence of the protective character of these Indian Cotton Duties was to be found in the first place, in the falling-off in British manufactures since the duties were imposed. In the five months which had elapsed since the duties were imposed, there had been a falling-off in British manufactures of something like 267,000,000 yards, or 25 per cent. But even a stronger illustration was to be found in the enormous increase in the value of Indian mill stocks. The Indian mill stocks had increased by Rx. 1,600,000, which was Rx. 250,000 more than the whole of the cotton duties would provide. He thought it had been proved that there was a very strong protective element in these duties, and therefore it was right that the attention of Her Majesty's Government and of the Government of India should be called to the question. They had now in this country a Government which sympathised with the manufacturers and, he hoped that they would be impressed by the strong case that had been made out in their behalf. They were glad to know that the Secretary for India shared the feelings of his Chief in this matter. He thought it was much more necessary to direct the attention of the Indian Government to the real state of the case, as he believed a great deal of their information had been derived from ex parte statements. India might say she had as much right to protect her manufactures by Import Duties as any of our colonies. He hoped the day was not far distant when, by a wise federal system, the trade between the mother country and her colonies would be as free as the winds of heaven. But India was in a different position. India had been called into existence by an enormous expenditure of British blood and treasure. India could not exist for a day if British influence were withdrawn. Lord Roberts once asked a distinguished native what he thought would be the effect of the withdrawal of the British army from India, and the reply was that it would have the same effect as the opening of the doors of a menagarie—there would be indiscriminate carnage. India must learn that, under these circumstances, she would not be allowed to close her doors against the manufactures of this country. India might say that her financial position was such that it was imperatively necessary that those duties should be imposed, but Lord Kimberley and his successor did not admit that the finances of India were in an unsatisfactory state; and it is doubted whether any European State could show that its finances were in a more satisfactory state than those of India. India might say that she had no other source from which to raise her revenue. The Hon. W. R. Macdonell, on 27th February last, said:—

"There is no other civilised country in the world in which the public burdens are so light as in India."

And in this most lightly-burdened of all countries the wealthy native classes are pre-eminently the most lightly taxed of all. India may say that after all a 5 per cent. duty is but a light tax on a wealthy country like this; but it would enable the Indian manufacturer to work at a profit of 2½ per cent., whilst his British competitor is working at a loss of 2½per cent. Finally, India might say that the imposition of these duties was sanctioned by a large majority of the House of Commons. Several causes contributed to that decision, apart from the merits of the question. But the principal reason why there was such a large majority was, because the Indian Secretary had affirmed that the element of protection had been entirely eliminated from these duties. But he had shewn that a large amount of direct protection still existed, and also an enormous amount of indirect protection. It was quite evident that the information which overlooked such an important fact as an existing competition of this country with India in coarse yarns had, to the extent of two million pounds, entirely overlooked the more abstruse questions of indirect protection of which the people of Lancashire so justly complained. He thought if the question had come before even the late House of Commons clearly and distinctly on its merits, there would not have been a majority in favour of the Indian Import Duties. But the present House of Commons was of a very different description; the vast majority of the Members from Lancashire and the districts surrounding had been returned pledged to oppose the cotton duties. It was true that a great many of these had the disadvantage of being new Members, a disadvantage of which some hon. Friends on the opposite Benches had not failed frequently to remind them. But he might hint to these Gentlemen that they had now quite sufficiently impressed them with the enormous superiority which attached to themselves from the fact of their being old Members. But even the new Members from Lancashire possessed a practical knowledge of this difficult question of the Indian Import Duties which was not exceeded by that of the oldest Members of the House, and they would be prepared to give a steady and most influential vote in favour of Free Trade. Not only in Lancashire, but in the West of Scotland also, there had been a change in the representation, which had been to a certain extent influenced by this question. He thought he might say that he represented a very large section of the commercial community of Glasgow, and, in conjunction with one of the largest East Indian Merchants, Mr. Donald Graham, who had had great experience in India, he had carried a motion unanimously in the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce for the entire repeal of all the Import Duties. He believed that a measure for their entire repeal would be supported in the House, not only by the Members from Lancashire and the surrounding districts, but by those who were in favour of Free Trade, and those who took an interest in the condition of the unemployed, as well as by the public opinion in the country. There had been great education of public opinion since the time of the last Debate on the subject, principally at the time of the General Election, and the people of the country now saw that Lancashire, instead of being actuated by a spirit of greed, wished only to have fair play. It was now recognised that owing to the imposition of these duties, that part of the country had been passing through the gravest crisis in the history of her trade since the great cotton famine, and, that the masters and men had borne this infliction with that great heroism which had characterised them at the time of their still greater distress. The Indian Government should take early steps, in conjunction with the Home Government, to abolish these duties. If they were not abolished, as he hoped they would be, during the Recess, he believed that, when Parliament met again, motions would be brought forward for their abolition, and that both sides of the House would combine in seeing that all these duties were swept away.

I think it will be agreeable to the majority of the House that I should reply to the points which have been thus far raised in the discussion. An abstract discussion such as this should not be unduly pressed. Most of the preceding speakers have alluded to a speech I made in February last on the question of the imposition of these cotton duties. I did not make that speech with a view to the elections or to the interests of any section of the community. I spoke of the agitation and disturbance which had been caused by the cotton duties which were in existence some years ago. I believe that I am the only person in the House who has an official experience of what those duties meant. When I spoke in February, I endeavoured to do so from a high national, Imperial standpoint. The views which I then expressed I still hold. I had learnt them, when I was at the India Office in 1874, from men like the present Prime Minister, then Secretary of State for India, from Sir Henry Maine, from Sir Louis Mallet, and from others, and, knowing what they thought, I spoke with reluctance and with some trepidation on this question. I think that of all questions which the House of Commons has had to deal with in my experience none requires more delicate handling and none contains more germs of danger. The moment these cotton duties are imposed you array at once the great industries of this country one against another. You have in Lancashire the largest population of any county in the United Kingdom, and they are practically united on this one point, that they consider the cotton duties imposed in India as unjust in principle and injurious to their interests, and, unfortunately, that great cotton industry is not in a flourishing condition. Both masters and mill hands believe that their difficulty and misfortune are in some way connected with these cotton duties. On the other hand, you have in India a most powerful and increasing industry, united together by sentiment and race, who are strongly in favour of these duties. They have control of the English and native Press; and thus, by the very fact of imposing these duties, you have that which every politician would try to avoid; you bring two distant points of the Empire into direct collision one with the other. As these rival interests grow and develop, so does the bitterness and intensity of the controversy between them increase. That is a serious position, and when I spoke in February, I spoke entirely from that point of view, and from that point of view alone. I felt at the time that nothing but extreme financial exigency could justify the re-imposition of those cotton duties. But my predecessor persuaded the House that such financial exigencies did exist, and, whatever they were, the military operations since sanctioned have widened the margin between Income and Expenditure for this year. To-morrow I think I shall be able to show my hon. Friends that there are fallacies in their arguments so far as the control over Expenditure now exercised by the Indian Government and recourse to new taxation are concerned. The Indian Government are not extravagant; on the contrary, no other country in the world is so economically managed. But it is easy to understand that, no matter how ably and how well the Indian Government may perform their work, they have the greatest difficulty in making both ends meet. Year by year the loss on transmitting funds to meet their gold obligations has so increased that this year it shows no less than 27 per cent. of their total net available income. The hon. Member for Burnley, by his Motion, has invited the Indian Government to pledge itself to the early repeal of the Import Duties upon goods, but, speaking as Secretary for India, I am bound to see fair play between the contending parties, and to see that justice is done, having regard to the present conditions of Indian finance. Under present conditions it would be impossible in any way to pledge myself, but, even if it were within the bounds of possibility, I doubt whether it would be a proper course to pursue. If I were now to pledge myself to adopt the course suggested by the Motion it would naturally render every subsequent act of mine open to suspicion in India: I should be making promises which I might not afterwards be able to perform. ["Hear, hear!"] The old duties on cotton were imposed originally subject to no conditions as to protection: but after they had been in operation some time they were objected to on the ground that they were protective, and Resolutions were passed by successive Parliaments protesting against the policy of protective duties in India, and finally they were removed. The right hon. Gentleman, when the duties were re-imposed last year, undertook, if any duties were imposed which were protective, to submit them to the House of Commons before he assented to them. He was attacked, and it was alleged that he had not complied with his promise. But I think his defence was adequate and straightforward—that the duties he sanctioned were found to be not protective, and that he would prevent them from being protective in their effect. The pledge given by the right hon. Gentleman in connection with the duties was agreed to by the Indian Government, and since those duties have been in operation a deputation waited on my predecessor which pointed out that in Burmah certain yarns from Scotland undoubtedly competed with local yarns protected by the duty. The right hon. Gentleman wrote to the Indian Government and they at once repealed the duties and reduced them from 5 to ½ per cent. The only reason that the ½ per cent. remains is that by Executive action the Indian Government cannot repeal duties imposed by legislation. Since then—on May 27th last—the right hon. Gentleman received a deputation of Lancashire and Scotch mill-owners, who put some important points before him. At the close of his interview with the deputation, he said:—

"Now the point is, is that Excise Duty countervailing in the true sense of the word, or is it not? They say it is not only countervailing, but it is so excessively countervailing that you have inflicted—'you' being, as somebody called me, 'the Secretary of State for Lancashire,' not for India—'you have inflicted a great injury upon us.' You gentlemen come here to-day and you say, 'On the contrary, we dissent from that in toto; you have imposed an Excise Duty which is not a countervailing Excise Duty, but omit a great many points and which exposes us to an unfair competition.' Now, then, what I ask you gentlemen is to send me an argument based upon that, and upon nothing else. Let us have no other issues; that is the issue at stake. I promise you that that shall be not only considered here, but shall be sent to India, and we shall then know what they have got to say to it."

That was the position of affairs. A change of Government took place. The memorial which the right hon. Gentleman asked them to send him was sent to me, and it has been sent to the Indian Government. Now, to the position hitherto maintained by those responsible for the Government of India, that the duties are not to be protective, I adhere. It seems to me that from the time the re-imposition of the duties was contemplated there has been a common understanding to which, with the exception of a Member here and a Member there, the whole House are more or less a party, on that side (the Opposition side) as well as this. I will put myself into communication with the Indian Government, and I will do all in my power to eliminate anything savouring of protection from the duties. In the Debate that has taken place hon. Members have spoken with the greatest moderation. Whether you agreed with Lancashire, or with Indian millowners, hon. Members had all spoken with the moderation becoming the treatment of a grave and serious question. Nothing more illustrates the difficulty of the situation than the fact stated by the right hon. Gentleman last year, that he had done his best to be just to both sides and he had been equally abused by both sides. It is clear what my attitude is. If trade does revive, and if the Indian revenues permit these duties to be dispensed with, we shall be able once more to leave the English millowners and the Indian millowners in a natural and healthy condition of unbiassed competition in regard to the supply of cotton goods to the people of India.

, in addressing the House for the first time, said, there were in Lancashire large mills well equipped with machinery actually closed, and others in which looms were standing idle. For a long time capital had been gradually dwindling away, and at last it had come to be felt that this question of the Indian Import Duties, small as it might appear to be, might be the means of ruining one of the greatest industries in the country. He had listened with satisfaction to what had fallen from the Secretary of State for India, and Lancashire Members would feel that the raising of the question would encourage operatives and employers to struggle on till these duties could be dealt with. He congratulated the Secretary for India on the happier position in which he had placed the question of the duties. He did not know whether the noble Lord had seen a speech recently delivered by the President of the Bombay Millowners' Association, one of the bodies whose previous arguments were placed before the late Secretary for India when he decided the course to be taken. The President of that Association said:—

"I think it would be sound policy for the Government of India to remove the slightest shred of complaint by notifying that all 20^s yarn and under, and cloth made from 20^s yarn and under, imported from Great Britain, should be duty free. A simple notification, as has been done with Glasgow dyed yarn imported into Rangoon, would be sufficient. If there is no import of goods made from 20^s yarn, then there can be no loss of revenue. If, on the other hand, there is a limited quantity of such goods imported, it is only just, however small the quantity, that they should come in duty free. My own impression is that no goods made of 20^s yarn and under are imported, and certainly no 20^s yarn. As your chairman, I would like it to go forth that while we, in common with other citizens, supported the reimposition of the Import Duties for purposes of revenue, we are as much opposed to Protection in any form as the most ardent Free Trader in England."

After such an expression of opinion, it could no longer be said that Lancashire was pursuing a selfish policy. It was not a Lancashire policy, but it was one by which both England and India would be benefited, and a part of the policy promised by the present Government, and which he now asked should be carried out, as it affected the commercial industries of the country. The policy on which the Government came into office was a policy of advancing the national prosperity of the country; of opening new markets; of increasing the field of employment. Lancashire, therefore, made no selfish appeal in her own interest. What she asked for was that the Government should carry out the policy on which they came into office; and it would be a national calamity for the country if one of its chief industries, like the cotton industry of Lancashire, were destroyed.

, in a maiden speech, said he was afraid the statement of the noble Lord, the Secretary for India, would be read with some disappointment in Lancashire. No Member of the House was suffering as he was suffering in his trade relations owing to those Import Duties, but he did not plead for himself; he pleaded on behalf of the 400 workpeople in his employment, who since the imposition of those duties had not had two consecutive weeks' full work, with the result that they had to endure much suffering and want, and this was a case illustrative of many other firms in Lancashire. It was said that it was not the manufacturer in Lancashire, but the consumer in India who would pay this duty. He declared without fear of contradiction that it was the Lancashire manufacturers who would pay the duty, and who would have to continue to pay it so long as the native manufacturers enjoyed their present favoured position as compared with their competitors in England. Lancashire did not desire to be selfish in this matter. If it were proved that owing to the financial difficulties in India this course was inevitable they would acquiesce; but they asked that they should be put on an equality with India. and that if they were to make this sacrifice they should be assured that it was not for the benefit of manufacturers in India, but for our mighty Empire as a whole. [Cheers.]

said, that as it was too late for his noble Friend the Secretary for India, to make his financial statement, he moved to report progress. The statement would be made by his noble Friend at Twelve o'clock to-morrow.