said he had always been a consistent supporter of the Government, and it was with great regret that he felt it his duty to oppose their proposals with regard to the Brigade of Guards. He desired to assure the House most emphatically that the officers and men of the Guards had no objection to foreign service as foreign service. [Cheers.] That was sufficiently proved by the large number of officers and men who always volunteered for active service. When, recently, a detachment of men was required for service in Ashanti the whole of one battalion of the Guards came and volunteered. [Cheers.] The Guards objected to the scheme of the Government on one ground only—that of efficiency. The first difficulty he would deal with was that of recruiting. It would not be a case of raising two battalions, but nearly three. There were to be two new battalions of a strength each of 744 rank and file, and there were in addition the extra men for the Brigade at Gibraltar, which would total up to three battalions. The establishment of the Guards now was 5,208 rank and file, and to keep that establishment going the number of recruits raised each year, taking the average of the last five years, had been 1,361. The future establishment would be 7,227 rank and file, and, on the basis of the average of the recruits for the last five years, the number required annually for the Guards would be nearly 1,900 men. Even if he look the figures for 1896, when the number of recruits was 1,250, the future number required under this scheme would be 1,730 annually. There were three ways of getting the recruits. The first was to raise the pay, which the Government did not desire to do. The second was to issue an order that every man enlisted for general service who was 5ft. 8½in. in height could be transferred to the Guards. That would be most unjust to the Line regiments, would meet with strong opposition from the officers commanding Line regiments, and would accentuate, possibly, any jealousy which might now exist between the Line and the Guards. There was only, therefore, one way of raising the increased number of 480 a year, and that was by permanently lowering the standard of the Guards. If they once permanently lowered the standard of the Guards they would undeniably lower their efficiency. Recruiting depended very much upon trade. When trade was good recruiting was slack, and when trade was slack recruiting was brisk, it had been necessary frequently when trade was good to temporarily reduce the standard so as to get the number of men required. But if they permanently reduced the standard they left themselves no margin whatever for good trade and a slack time in recruiting. He would like to point out that the standard was now lowered. In 1890, out of 1,250 recruits no less than one-third were what were called specially enlisted men—that was, men below the standard, whom it was hoped by good I feeding and good treatment might at some I period or other grow up to the standard. [Laughter.] At this very moment they were drawing to the extent of one-third on the class for which they depended for the increased number of men. What was the inevitable result? The battalions must be kept up to the very greatest strength of 921 rank and file, but if recruiting fell off every battalion at home would have to be depleted till it was much below the establishment, or else would have to take men far below the present guardsmen in physique and efficiency. He proposed to deal with the question of the efficiency of the Guards under this scheme in times of peace and war. Suppose the system in full swing in time of peace, and they had a regiment composed of three battalions—A, B, C. The A battalion was at Gibraltar with a strength of 921; and B and C at home with a strength of 744 rank and file. A battalion came home in duo course, and B battalion had to go out. Before B battalion could start a certain number of time-expired men, a certain number of sick, who could not be removed, and a certain number of bandsmen would have to be left behind. Thus B battalion, of a total strength of 744, would have to leave behind something like 220 men, therefore, to make up the strength of 921 rank and file B battalion required 397 men. He begged to point out that these men must come from the C battalion, and not, as Lord Lansdowne stated, from A and G. In other words there was only one battalion to draw upon and not two. Why? They could not come from the A battalion which was returning from Gibraltar, for two very good reasons. In the first place there would be a number of time-expired men the moment the battalion came home. These men would be discharged or transferred to the Reserves, and the A battalion would at once come below its strength. Another reason was this. Supposing that an order was issued that the A battalion was to leave behind at Gibraltar 200 men to reinforce the B battalion what was the result? Say these men remained enlisted for three years. They had already spent 18 months at Gibraltar, a place where, as everybody knew, a soldier could not be properly trained. Did the Government propose to give them 18 months more at Gibraltar, and make them even more inefficient than they were? If so, these men at the end of the three years could come home, be transferred to the Reserves, could serve nine years in the Reserves, and if they chose to do so could then serve four more, so that for thirteen years they would be drawing the money of the taxpayers after only three years' training at Gibraltar. Take the case of Battalion G Battalion, C had, say, to hand over to Battalion B, 397, or in round figures 400 men, and Battalion C received from B, 220 men—time-expired, sick, and recruits. That reduced the strength of C at once to 564 men, many of whom were recruits. What would be the first result? It would be that the duties in London would be so absolutely heavy as to become intolerable slavery. Was it likely service in the Guards would remain popular when the men had less than three nights a week in bed? Lord Lansdowne said in the House of Lords that this was a loan. In 1882 and 1885 brigades of Guards went abroad on active service, and in both years received drafts. But it was a very different thing to give a draft in time of emergency and make these loans a permanent, system. It had only been done twice in 30 years. The official idea of a battalion was rather curious. It seemed to be thought it consisted of a certain number of officers and men who might not know each other, but all were the same scarlet coats and regimentals. No idea can be more erroneous. The Commander-in-Chief acknowledged that the Guards were more efficient, than the Line regiments. The reason for this was that while men in the Line regiments were constantly being transferred to regiments abroad Guardsmen, except in cases of rare emergency, served in one battalion during the whole of three, five, or seven years of their service, and officers and men became well known to each other. But if, every 18 months, one-third to one-half of the men of a battalion were to be transferred from one battalion to another the Brigade of Guards must soon lose its efficiency. ["Hear, hear!"] This frequency of transfer would lead to the non-commissioned officers refusing to re-engage to complete their 21 years' service. They would join the Auxiliary forces, and officers in the Guards would lose the service of men to whom they owed much. If a European war broke out we should have three battalions of Guards at Gibraltar. They would, for months, have had no military training, and not one man could be removed until relieved from homo. Our Navy would be looking after the enemy's fleet, and it would be impossible to find ships of war to escort troops from Gibraltar. Even if they could be relieved a not unimportant, fortress would be left to be defended by troops absolutely ignorant of defending our position at Gibraltar. Now, we had four battalions of Guards ready for active service, and behind them an ample reserve which they were told drew their pay with commendable zeal and punctuality from the Post Office four times a year. [Laughter.] Under the scheme we should have three battalions at Gibraltar who had had no military training while there, and could not be moved, and three battalions composed chiefly of Reserves at homo who had chiefly distinguished themselves by the regularity with which they had drawn their pay. The Commander-in-Chief called the scheme of the Government the greatest, step in advance that the Army had taken for years. It reminded himself of the balance step without gaining ground. [Laughter and "Hear, hear!"] There were two questions he would like to ask the Secretary for War. The first was whether the scheme before the House was the scheme originally proposed by the Army Board, or did they propose a much larger, wider, and more efficient scheme of which he believed the House and the country would gladly approve? Or did the Army Board, in default of their scheme being accepted, accept this from the Government on the ground that half a loaf was better than no bread? It was only fair to the Army Board that these questions should be answered, and it was not fair that the responsibility for the present scheme should be fixed on the Army Board when it really rested on the Government. He wished to ask the Under Secretary who were the authorities connected with the Brigade of Guards whom Lord Lansdowne had consulted? Who were the Guards' Committee? He owned he felt considerable alarm at the idea of some secret body which officers who had been in the Brigade for many years had never heard of, and he pictured to himself a secret society, with masonic signs perhaps, going to the Secretary of State for War in the middle of the night and revealing all sorts of secrets. [Laughter.] He thought, however, that he could track them to their lair—[laughter]—they consisted of the three honorary colonels of the Guards, and the commanding officer of the Brigade—His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught, General Sir Frederick Stephenson, and Lord Methuen. He had nothing whatever to say against those Gentlemen, but two of them had had no regimental experience of the Guards, although they were looked on with general esteem and affection. He would not say one word against Lord Methuen, who was a thorough good soldier—["hear, hear!"]—but he had done less than ten years' regimental duty. Were those the people to go to for information as to the views of the Guards? Why did not the Government go to those officers who were responsible for the recruiting and drill of their regiments—ho meant the lieutenant-colonels in command? Was not their opinion worth having? If it was not, why were they given these commands, and why were they not got rid of? He feared they were not consulted lest they should prophesy not good but evil of this scheme. They were told that this was only an experiment, and Lord Lansdowne had said that, if these changes resulted otherwise than was expected, the Government would certainly consider themselves bound to reconsider the matter. No one doubted for a moment the sincerity of Lord Lansdowne, but he could not give a pledge that would be binding upon his successors or upon the military advisers of future Secretaries of State, and he himself protested in the strongest way against experiments of this kind being made with the only troops at home who were highly efficient. The Commander-in-Chief had said that the Brigade of Guards were never more efficient than they were now. To what was that due? It was due to the unflagging zeal and energy and enthusiasm of all ranks, but especially to the officers and non-commissioned officers of Brigade. They were asked to apply" to that magnificent force a modified form of a scheme which had already" ruined the rest of the Army—["hear, hear!"]—and he earnestly pressed the Government to consider the matter further before they committed themselves to a scheme so crude, so dangerous, and so destructive to the efficiency of the Brigade of Guards.

said he should like to explode two misconceptions which were rather widely prevalent. It was considered by some that they who opposed this particular section of the Government scheme were opposing the general proposals of the Government. That was not so in the least. ["Hear, hear!"] They were strong and hearty supporters of the Government as regarded the whole of the scheme with the exception of this one point. They deemed it their duty to point out the manifest defects in the scheme. They were supposed also to be opposed to this scheme because they wished to bolster up and support certain imaginary privileges belonging to the Guards. But the only privilege they wished to see maintained was that of being ready to go immediately on war service, if the need arose, without any preliminary or delay in putting them on board ship. He was ready to accept the Government proposal provided that when war was declared the battalions of the Guards should be the first to move forward to the seat of war. He would accept it, however, with four essential postulates—(1) that nothing they did should interfere with the spirit that animated the Brigade of Guards at present; (2) that the step taken did not interfere with the class and stamp of recruits who now came into the Brigade—["hear, hear!"]—(3) that they should be most careful to secure absolute efficiency for the battalions in Gibraltar or any other foreign station; and (1) that they guaranteed the absolute efficiency also of that portion of the Brigade which remained at home, and undertook to see that that portion was not one whit less ready to embark for foreign service than was the Brigade as now constituted. If the Government could not show that under their scheme they could put on board ship at Portsmouth a Brigade as efficient, and in as short a time as at present, they would have broken faith with them, and, on their own showing, would have to cancel and reconstruct their scheme. The Guards to a certain extent merged their regimental in their Brigade feeling, and service-in the Brigade created a feeling of loyalty and devotion. Those who said "We do not want the swagger of the Guards," did not remember that this swagger might be an exceedingly valuable article on the battle-field. He asserted that it was a mistaken and misguided idea, to think that they would obtain for the Guards recruits of the same stamp and quality as at present if the enthusiasm which at present prevailed among them died out. He wished to refer to another point of intense importance. They knew that their brethren in Line regiments thought, no hardship greater than that which occasionally extracted an additional year of service out of them beyong that, for which they had enlisted, because they happened to be in India. They would have to be most careful that in any arrangement that was now being made, they did not bring the same rather sharp practice to bear. Once the idea got abroad that while they nominally enlisted men for three years they intended to extract four years' service out of them, they would find that recruiting would dwindle even more rapidly than under other circumstances. Passing to the important point of efficiency, he said it was acknowledged on all hands that the Guards were efficient now. He need not point out that it might make the whole difference in a campaign, whether they were able to seize rapidly and immediately on some point of vantage, or whether they had to hesitate while they created a corps good enough to seize that point. The force at present might not be very large, but as far as it went it was thoroughly good. They had also the certainty of that strong self-reliance which animated all the battalions as they were now constituted. But if this scheme was carried out they would strike at the root of that feeling and destroy the thread of confidence that ran from, the colonel down to the young man in the ranks. He was not quite sure that enough stress had been laid on the miserable condition in which the battalion at home would be after the first time of relief—that was when two out of the three battalions had done or were doing their turn of foreign service. He hoped the Under Secretary would not seek to put the House off with general assertions in reference to that matter, but would give a clear and explicit statement of the view of the War Office on the point. The present Commander in Chief, Lord Wolseley, had laid down as a paramount importance for the training of the Army, that every individual man of every single company should be trained from first to last under the immediate supervision of those non-commissioned officers and officers who would go with him into the field. Yet by this scheme they would absolutely destroy the possibility of any continuity in such training. They used the men as though they were shuttlecocks, and battledoored them about from one officer to another, from one company to another, and from one battalion to another, until it would be absolutely impossible for any large number of men in any battalion to maintain that sort of feeling towards those who had to lead it, which in the opinion of the Commander in Chief was inseparable from an efficient and trustworthy Army. If there was one point which could be compared with the necessity of this constant touch it was that the men should be well trained in musketry and in firing drill of all sorts. By the proposed change they would secure, that, supposing the battalion from Gibraltar had to be moved at the end of six months to face a European foe, they would conduct into the field men who had hardly learned what it was to go through two courses of musketry, whose discipline would not have been created by sufficiency of manœuvres or of company training, men who had not been made efficient riflemen by practice at the target, or with the weapon on which they would have to depend. He thought he had shown conclusively that under the scheme, as it stood, efficiency at Gibraltar could not be really and thoroughly maintained. As to the question of efficiency at home, the effect of the scheme had been pretty well demonstrated by the figures that had been given. The Under Secretary would no doubt say they relied on the expert advice of the highest military authorities—Lord Wolseley, Sir Redvers Butler, and Sir Evelyn Wood. He allowed that in that trio they had three out of the four best officers in the Army, and that they were entitled to attach very great weight to the opinions of these three officers. But would the right hon. Gentleman venture to say that this was a scheme which, in the opinion of these three officers, was sufficient to bring the Army into the state in which they would like to see it? He felt pretty certain that if he was in their position he would say: "I must do the best I can. Here I have one Government after another starving and ill-treating the Army. Here I have one miserable dole after another offered. I must make the best of it; I must get as much as I can." He could understand these officers saving: "This may lead to better things in the future; at all events we get something we want; "and he could imagine them reasoning thus: "This experiment will fall utterly and hopelessly to the ground after it has been tried, and then we shall have secured an addition to the Brigade of Guards which is not likely to be dispersed again. We shall, at all events, he on stronger ground for the future in demanding other additions to the Army, which, in our opinion, are vitally necessary to make the Army efficient and real." Supposing the result of this scheme was that in future they should find this addition to the Brigade of Guards made it into a division with one brigade constantly at Aldershot, and constantly in a state of immediate readiness for service, he could understand that that would not be an unpleasing possibility to these military experts, who would think that a step in the direction of greater efficiency had been permanently taken. Lord Methuen was referred to as one of the authorities whose opinion had bolstered up the Government in taking this step. He had no access to the private communications that might have passed between the noble Lord and those whom he was said to have advised, but he listened to every word of the noble Lord's speech in the House of Lords, and could say that it was an absolute condemnation of the scheme. He said:—

"The whole pith and essence of this scheme of yours depended on your not tearing out the vitals of the battalions at home in order to give life and substance to the battalions abroad."

He could not but regret that no alternative Measure could be tried. Was it impossible to carry out the object in view by some scheme in the direction of longer service—providing they could maintain recruiting under longer service—or by substituting for the system of deferred pay, which many of them thought mistaken and unwise, a differential scale, under which men could get increased pay according to the length of service. Those were experiments in which the Government would have been supported experiments which they might have made without rousing any of the grave anticipations and fears which they had roused in military minds by their present suggestions. This was no Guards' question; it was not a question in which the Guards were fighting for their own hands alone. There was not a distinguished soldier in the House, no matter to what branch of the Service he belonged, who would not re-echo and emphasise every word, or, at any rate, the spirit of what he had said. If the Government were to poll the Army through they would not find any practical men who had not seen the hollowness and misfortune of the present proposal. He had another reason for trusting that the Government would listen to the moderate request now made. Many of the hon. Members who agreed with him were strong and consistent supporters of the Government, and they did not wish to see the Government embark on an experiment which was foredoomed to failure. They preferred to see the failure. If he might venture to whisper in the ear of the Government—[laughter; the hon. and gallant Gentlelman having spoken throughout in a loud tone]—he would say, "Don't take of another scheme and fail." They preferred to see the Government's experiments successes. Considering their opportunities, the Government might have had rather more emphatically the courage of their opinions. With the expansion of the Empire, it was absolutely necessary there should be expansion of the Army. Would it not, therefore, have been bolder and more genuine for the Government to have come to the country and said:—

"We have increased responsibility, we have increased places of danger, and we call upon the country to provide the means adequate to defend those spots of danger, and to carry out that responsibility"?

They wanted an increase of 11 battalions. Conjure as they liked, they could not, by adding three battalions, get the fighting strength of 11 battalions. He had heard it said the Government had some hope that the course of events would enable them to bring home two battalions from Africa. The recent speeches of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Prime Minister, and the Colonial Secretary—which he had heard with delight—certainly did not point in the direction of the withdrawal of any troops from Africa. Would it not have been far wiser and more courageous to have faced the real necessity than to have put the present petty and inconsiderable scheme before the country? He asked the authorities—not in the name of the Guards, but on the broad ground that by the present proposal they would decrease the efficiency of the Army—to reconsider the matter in the direction of, at all events, maintaining that amount of efficiency which there was at present.

who was received with cheers, said: My hon. and gallant Friend who has just sat down began his speech by telling us that the House was not to suppose that because he found himself unable to join the Government in this particular Measure he was, therefore, in any way opposed to their general Army programme. Now, I can go further than that towards meeting him. I perfectly recognise the feelings which have animated hon. and gallant Members behind me who have spoken so strongly on behalf of that part of the Army with which they have been associated, but I can assure them that the Government have proposed these additions, not merely from the consideration of the Army at large, but from the consideration also of the efficiency of the Brigade of Guards. I perfectly recognise the right of my hon. and gallant Friend who introduced this subject to raise the question of the efficiency of the Guards as affected by this scheme. It is a question on which I have the less difficulty in meeting him, because the scheme has been already considered from that standpoint by the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State. A first and main object of this scheme is to improve the existing military organisation of the Brigade of Guards. We wish to improve that organisation, not merely in reference to great European wars, but also in respect to small wars, and, in order to make that good, let me ask the House to consider for a moment what is the present organisation of the Brigade of Guards. It is well known to nearly every Member of the House that there are three regiments with seven battalions, one regiment with throe battalions, and two regiments with two battalions each. That makes an organisation which does not specially commend itself to any military system. If it is better for a regiment to have three battalions than to have two, or vice versa, obviously the Guards' organisation is not in itself ideal, and my hon. and gallant Friend who spoke with such force to-night, the Member for West Somerset, himself admitted that when he said we had at present through the Guards, with their reservists, the power to send, out of seven battalions, only four battalions in case of a European war. The amount that we can send from the Guards is smaller proportionally that we can send from any other regiments in the Army. [Sir A. ACLAND-HOOD: "I said without reservists."] I think he said four battalions with reservists, and then proceeded to discuss the subject afterwards on the system of three battalions without reservists.

I said four battalions, with reservists behind them to fill up casualties in the field.

My hon. and gallant Friend has now made his meaning plain, but I am afraid if I were to dissect that figure I should have to show, on the authority of the Adjutant General that, even including a fair proportion of reservists, it would be impossible with the present Guards' organisation to send more than four battalions out of the country at the same time. That in itself is a serious matter, and I think that the House will agree that if you are to have a corps d'élite at all—and we attach the greatest importance to the influence of a corps d'élite on the Army—that body of troops ought to bear some proportion to the size of the Army you can send abroad. Now, the four battalions of Guards is in itself a very small proportion, and it is a strong desire of the Commander-in-Chief that in case of war it should be possible, as it ought to be possible, to send abroad, not four battalions, but six battalions of Guards, so that you might employ a whole division of Guards in support of the two army corps, or in the two army corps, which this country can provide. Therefore, as the first point in the organisation of the Guards, we take as a cardinal condition of the efficiency of those regiments that we should be able to increase the strength at which they would go abroad by one-half. Then we come to the question of small wars. Again, I think my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Somerset admitted a good deal more in his speech than he himself is aware of. There is a general belief in the country that every battalion of Guards is at this moment lit to go abroad in its present condition. That is not the case. I am very sorry to dispel the belief that prevails, because any belief in Army efficiency on the part of the public is very useful at the present moment when that belief is not too liberally bestowed. [A laugh.] But my hon. and gallant Friend alluded to the campaigns of 1882 and 1885, and I see around me more than one officer who took part in those campaigns in the ranks of the Guards. What were we able to do for the small war in 1882 by the seven battalions of Guards? The best we were a able to do was this. Out of the seven battalions we were able to send three abroad. At what strength were we able to send them? We could not send them at the full strength of 1,000 men, at which battalions should be sent on foreign service, but we sent them at the following strength:—The 2nd Battalion of Grenadier Guards, 761 strong; 2nd Battalion of Coldstream Guards, 760; 1st Battalion of Scots Guards, 764. How were these battalions made up? They were made up by draining in the most remorseless manner the other battalions at home. [Hon. MEMBERS: "No, no!" and laughter.] Allow me. The 2nd Battalion of Coldstream Guards had in its ranks 217 men out of 760 belonging to the 1st Battalion. The 1st Battalion of the Scots Guards had in its ranks 213 of the 2nd Battalion which was left at home. The 2nd Battalion of the Grenadier Guards had in its ranks 250 men furnished by the 1st and 3rd Battalions.

Will the right hon. Gentleman give the corresponding figures for the Line battalions?

I am not on that point, and I am afraid I cannot do that now.

What was the average service of these men? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware it was over five years?

I cannot tell the average service, but I believe the men were over 20 years of age, and that over one year's service was the test.

Was the average live years' service?

I am very glad if the average was five years' service, but that was not the test applied, as the Adjutant General informs me. The question was that the Guards should provide as full a brigade as could be provided, and in doing so—I do not say it by way of reproach—["Hear, hear!"]—I am only speaking of the system as we found it—the military authorities were compelled to take the numbers I have given from I the battalions remaining behind. What was the experience of the Suakin expedition in 1885? In respect of that I should like to tell the House at once that I have reason to think that in the figures I have to give are included the men who served in the Camel Corps on the Nile. The 3rd Battalion of the Grenadier Guards had 804 men, and of these 346, or nearly one-half, were provided by the 1st and 2nd Battalions. The 1st Battalion of the Coldstream Guards took 808 men to Egypt; of these 290 were taken from the 2nd Battalion. The 2nd Battalion of the Scots Guards took 812 men, and of these 360 men were from the 1st Battalion. These figures speak for themselves. They prove beyond doubt that, if for a small war you require to send a brigade of Guards at this moment, the best you can do is to send three battalions out of the seven at a strength 200 below the fighting strength of a battalion; and you can only arrive at that strength by deducting from 200 to 300 men from the battalions at home, whoso efficiency is thereby seriously impaired. My first point is, therefore, that by placing three battalions at Gibraltar on a high establishment, we shall mitigate that evil. We shall, as far as these battalions are concerned, have a nucleus in the case of a small war from which we may hope to get a brigade of Guards of fairly high strength without, unduly depleting the battalions at home. All my hon. and gallant Friends have urged that the battalions at Gibraltar will be inefficient because they cannot be trained—[cheers]—and that the battalions at home will become inefficient because they will be so depleted and will to a large extent consist of recruits. It has been boldly asserted over and over again by officers who have served there, that a regiment on a Mediterranean station is quite unfit to take the field. Let me investigate these facts, if they are facts—not on my own authority, but on the information drawn from the men who have the best right to advise us on these matters. In the first place, although the whole of this discussion has had reference to Gibraltar, it must be remembered that the Secretary of State the other night, in the House of Lords, spoke of the Mediterranean and, although I am quite ready to discuss this question from the point of view of Gibraltar alone, it must not be supposed that I am tying the Government down to Gibraltar as the only station to which the Guards may be sent. As to the service of the men in the Guards, the majority of them are not three-years men. Two-thirds of them are on seven years' engagements. But what is the position as to training at Gibraltar? I dare say that most of my hon. and gallant Friends have been there, and I candidly admit that I have not. Really, from the picture given, the House would assume that there was no place for drill, target practice, or manœuvres, and that nothing but sentry-go and such like duties was attempted. ["Hear, hear!"] I have had the advantage of seeing maps of Gibraltar and of having them expounded to me by officers who have served there many years. They inform me that there is ample room for all the ordinary company and battalion drill. As to target practice, there is target practice at 800 yards; and a young soldier trained to shoot up to 800 yards cannot be said to lose the whole of his military training. It has been stated that there is no field-firing at Gibraltar. It is not the fact. The Quartermaster-General informs me that there are ranges properly laid out for field-firing, with targets for shooting down hill—which is the best practice for young soldiers—up to 1,400 and 1,800 yards. I am told that there are no manœuvres. Has it been the practice of the Guards to go to manœuvres every year? I have taken down the occasions during the last three years on which battalions of the Guards have attended manœuvres. In 1894 four battalions of the Guards joined the field column at Aldershot. In 1895 three battalions went to the manœvres in the New Forest, and in 1896 three battalions attended the small manœuvres at Aldershot. Therefore it follows that three battalions of Guards went to manœuvres twice in three years and missed one year, while four battalions went once in three years and missed two years. Will anyone tell me that it is not a strained view of the situation as to Gibraltar to say that a battalion going there for one year will lose the efficiency which it had gained in the preceding two years, because of the loss of manœuvres for that one year—manœuvres which it might not have attended had it been in England? I must say that, speaking as we are of some of the choicest troops in the Army, that is a strange and unwarrantable conclusion. As to efficiency for war after a period of service in the Mediterranean, it appears from statistics, which I gave in reply to a question this afternoon, that there is less sickness, less invaliding, and less death at Gibraltar than at home stations, taking them all round. As to the fitness of those battalions for war, I would appeal to the evidence given by the Adjutant-General before the Wantage Committee six or seven years ago, without any reference to this scheme. He was asked, "On what regiments would you rely for active service to go first into the field?" He said, "The battalions on the Mediterranean stations are those best suited both by their character and geographical position to be the first employed for the purpose of an expeditionary force." The last 11 battalions that have served on those stations have served there on an average three years each—a much longer period than is proposed for the Guards.

Does that opinion of the Adjutant-General refer to soldiers of three years' service or longer?

They are men recruited, no doubt, for seven years—["hear, hear!"]—but they were also men who had spent three or four years at Gibraltar, and who, if the argument of the hon. and gallant Member for Somerset held good, being largely drafted from the Home Battalion, had not the advantage of knowing their officers. We propose in the allotment of drafts to the various battalions to avoid that difficulty. I wish to make it perfectly clear that if the results of the Gibraltar training had been such as my hon. and gallant Friends imagine, there are no two men who would have been more adverse to proposing such a station for the Guards than the Adjutant-General and the Commander-in-Chief. The next point of hon. Gentlemen is that the battalions at home become inefficient from depletion. What are the facts? A Line battalion goes abroad for 15 or 10 years. During the whole of that time 720 men in the battalion at home have to find drafts for the 1,000 nun abroad—that is, to keep 280 men abroad above the strength of the home battalion. The Guards are going out for one year, or little more; therefore there would be, taking the establishments as they now stand, 744 men. on the establishment at home, and abroad 920; and the difference between these two is only 180. To make that up you have two battalions to draw from instead of one. Therefore, at the worst, the drain on the home battalions ought not to be more than one-third of that on the Line battalions at home. I cannot follow my hon. and gallant Friend through all his figures for this reason, that his assumption is fundamentally different from the assumption made at the War Office. Nearly a month ago, if not more, the authorities at the War Office put themselves into touch with the officers commanding the various regiments of the Guards in order to obtain from them what, in their opinion, were the difficulties that were required to be met in the working out of the scheme. These opinions are being most carefully considered at the present moment with the view—which I hope will be successful—of meeting the objections made by the officers commanding these regiments, lint every figure upon which my hon. and gallant Friend has gone has been based on the assumption that in a certain October or April we are suddenly to raise the battalion's home strength of 741 to the Gibraltar strength of 921. That, we think, would be a very crude way of going to work. ["Hear, hear!"] We have no idea that it would be desirable to face the obvious difficulties of transferring men of the Guards by any such rapid change as would be involved in that proposal. ["Hear, hear!"] Our suggestion and the lines on which we are working are these. When a battalion goes to Gibraltar on full strength in a certain October, we shall bring the next battalion which goes out 12 or 18 months later up to an intermediate strength between the strength of the home battalion and the strength of the Gibraltar battalion. There will then be only half the difference between 744 and 921 to make up. We propose to give the Guards what they have never had hitherto, a depot—that is, a depôt outside the strength of the regiment. ["Hear, hear!"] At present, if a man is measured for the Guards and is passed by the doctor he is immediately held to be on the strength of the regiment. We propose to have a depôt in the case of the Line regiments, which will enable us to keep a pool of recruits from which we can gradually strengthen the battalion which stands next for foreign service.["Hear, hear!"] Beyond that there was pressed on the War Office by the Wantage Committee and by some colonels who had been consulted that it would not only be a great advantage to the Guards themselves, but a great advantage to the Reserve, if a certain number of the very large force of Reservists who belong to the Guards were encouraged to serve rather longer in that force. ["Hear, hear!"], At the present time, a man, when he conies to three years, has to say down whether he will serve for seven years: and if he does not he goes to the Reserve for nine years, a process which does not tend to his more effective training. We think it probable that, either by allowing men who have gone from the battalion to come back, if of good character and accepted by the colonel, or by allowing men to serve for an additional number of years, if unwilling to serve for the full term, we shall obtain for service in the Mediterranean a number of trained men who will have given one or two years' more service in the ranks and less in the Reserve. ["Hear, hear!"] That will at least give a stimulus to recruiting. A man who enlists in the Guards will know that from the day he leaves the regiment he is free at any time, if he fails in obtaining employment, and if his conduct is good, to return to the colours and serve another portion of his time. [Cheers.] We look to that and to a considerable rise in the establishment of the battalion next for service and to the depôt to relieve us from the difficulties to which hon. Gentlemen behind have referred. I have been asked to state whether, having enlisted men for three years with the right to keep them on a fourth year if they are on service abroad, we shall take advantage of it by sending these men to Gibraltar towards the end of the third year, and detain them for a fourth on the plea that they are serving abroad. We do not intend to do that. ["Hear, hear!"] It would be, if not an actual breach of faith, a straining of the relations, at all events, with the men who had already joined. ["Hear, hear!"] We propose to rely on the fact—on which we think we have every reason to expect we can rely—that a very considerable number of Volunteers would be ready to complete their services abroad, and come home with the regiment, which gives them a very much better chance of employment. ["Hear, hear!"] The case of the married non-commissioned officers has been referred to. I can promise that their case will be carefully considered. ["Hear, hear!"] We know very well that they are an immense stay and backbone to the regiment—[cheers]—and in carrying out our proposals it is our desire, as much as any military man in the House, to keep all the battalions in an efficient condition by giving a careful consideration to the position of the married non-commissioned officers. ["Hear, hear!"] I can only say, speaking generally, that, although, to adopt the phrase used by the Secretary of State for War in another place, we cannot admit the battalions of the same regiment are actually to be kept in "water-tight compartments," we fully recognise the undesirability from a military standpoint of constant transfers of men and officers from one battalion to another; and consequently, without giving absolute figures, which must be, to some extent, problematical, we can assure the House of Commons that the principle and substratum of the whole scheme is to preserve the individuality of battalions and to secure that if we have to send battalions to Gibraltar, there should still be two efficient battalions at home. ["Hear, hear!"] We come next to the very important question of recruiting. My hon. and gallant Friend has said that we cannot possibly get the recruits we want for the Guards without greatly lowering the standard of height. In touching the recruiting for the Guards we are touching, not the weakest, but the strongest point in our recruiting system. If you look to the Line, it is an extraordinary thing that the recruiting for the line under a voluntary system has been for many years as consistently good as it has been, seeing that our Line standard is higher than the standard in any foreign country. ["Hear, hear!"] But, at the same time, evidence is not wanting that if we were to strain the recruiting for the Line we would have either to lower the standard or to increase the attraction of the service. In the course of the last nine years we have had to take under the standard a certain number of special enlistments; although, as the late Secretary for State will bear me out, we have succeeded in turning those men into excellent soldiers after a year's training. But we cannot strain the recruiting of the Line too far. In 1889, we took 4,200 men, specially enlisted under the standard; in 1890, 7,900; in 1891, 11,600; in 1892,12,100; in 1893, 7,700; in 1894, 8,400; in 1895, 5,700; and in 1896, 5,000. Therefore, the House will see that for the last five years there has been a progressive improvement. Now, what has been the experience in the Guards? Fifteen years ago the standard for the Guards was 5ft. 7in. That was the standard when the Guards accomplished some of their best deeds abroad—["hear, hear!"]—und it is a higher standard than the standard of the Guards of any foreign Power. In 1882 the standard was still 5ft. 7in. During the last 15 years it has been gradually raised to 5ft. 9in., at which figure it stood for four years up to two months ago. Consequently there has been such an increase in the supply of recruits for the Guards over the demand that we have been able to raise the standard by two inches during the last 15 years. The Adjutant-General says on that point:—

"The average annual number of recruits taken for the Foot Guards during the last four years has been 1,142. We estimate that after the two new battalions are raised and the three foreign battalions raised to the foreign establishment, and the extra men so raised kept up, we shall, during a period of eight years from the commencement, have required 4,867 more recruits than are now considered necessary to keep up the existing seven battalions. Our average annual requirements during eight years will, therefore, be 1,142 plus 608, or 1,750 recruits per year for the Guards. Now, in 1883, with the standard at 5ft. 7in., we raised 1,727 recruits; in 1884, with 5ft, 7in., 1,712 recruits; in 1887, with 5ft, 8in., 1,266 recruits; in 1891, with 5ft. 8in., 1,604 recruits; and in 1892, with 5ft. 8in., 1,832 recruits. In 1891 and 1892 men under 20 years of age were taken at 5ft. 8in. In September 1892, the standard was raised to 5ft, 8in. for all; in October 1892, to 5ft, 8½in.; and in December. 1892, to 5ft. 9in., at which it remained till January 1897. These figures seem to justify our belief that we shall raise and keep up the extra men for the Guards without au undue reduction of standard."

Of course, in the matter of recruiting it is impossible to dogmatise. It all depends on the state of trade. ["Hear, hear!"] To-morrow 100 men may come in, and for a fortnight after we may not get a single man. But it will be said, all this depends on the popularity of the service, and your proposals will decrease the popularity of recruiting in the Guards. Well, I should like to read to the House the views of the Recruiting Department on this point, The report from the recruiting officer says:—

"With regard to recruiting for the Guards it appears that a large proportion of men from London or its immediate neighbourhood have a preference for other corps. These men have been frequently questioned as to why they prefer other corps, and the usual answer is desire for change; either a wish for foreign service or a desire to see the world, places where the conditions of life are very different to what they are in England, and places where they may hope to earn war medals."

The report further stated that

"about half the men, more or less, who are of the Guards' standard and come up to enlist do not take the Guards because they want to see foreign service."

That is not an opinion written to order or asked for, but the opinion volunteered before oven the question was raised, and I think we have a right to hope that the popularity of recruiting will not be reduced, but may be stimulated, by the prospect of some foreign service, especially in the face of figures showing that for some time past we have been raising the standard and that we do not require a larger number of recruits than we have been able to raise during some past years. ["Hear, hear!"] I have, I fear, burdened the House with many details—[cheers] but I have been anxious to show to those who disagree with our proposals that, at all events, these proposals have not been lightly taken up, but that the whole matter, with many criticisms offered, has been fully considered by the Government. ["Hear, hear!"] Now, having said so much about the efficiency of the Guards, I will refer to the manner in which the Government proposal will affect the efficiency of the Line. We have had 141 Line battalions forced to perform a great deal more work than it was ever the intention of Parliament that they should be called upon to do. The principle laid down at the time of short service was that there should be a battalion at home for every battalion sent abroad. But since 1874 there has not been a single year in which that intention has been realised—["hear, hear!"]—and the consequence has been that the drafts to maintain that principle have been an immense strain on the efficiency of the regiments at home. Every man and officer in the Line at present has to do from 12 to 15 months' service abroad out of every 24 months he serves the Queen. That enormous strain is one which was never contemplated in our Army system. The question we have to face is, how is that strain to be relieved.' ["Hear, hear!"] The hon. and gallant Member for Shropshire (Colonel Kenyon-Slaney) said the proposal of the Government was a miserable dole. But this so-called dole involves an addition of nearly 8,000 men to the Army at an ultimate cost of £450,000 a year. ["Hear, hear!"]

This particular scheme?

No, not this particular scheme. My hon. and gallant Friend was speaking of the whole Government proposal as a miserable dole, and he argued that it was desirable to add 11 battalions to the Army. ["Hear, hear!"] Now, by sending out three Guards' battalions we are avoiding the necessity of raising six new Line battalions, and by doing that we avoid the necessity of raising and of expending £200,000 a year permanently, making our.£450,000 up to £650,000. We also avoid the initial expenditure which would raise our requirements for military works from £5,500,000 to £6,000,000. That is not all, because you could not be sure of getting the number of Line recruits you want unless you grant an increase of pay. If you gave 3d. a day extra pay I do not think that that would have the least effect on recruiting, and yet 3d. a day would add nearly a million sterling to the annual Estimates. Therefore, you are asking us to embark in a very dangerous and difficult operation if you call upon us to substitute for our present proposal the much greater proposal which finds so much force in, the minds of my hon. and gallant Friends. I have been asked to say whether the present scheme is the scheme of the Army Board or of the Government. The sending of the three battalions abroad has unquestionably been commended to the Secretary of State by the Commander-in-Chief and by the Army Board, and the Commander-in-Chief considers that the scheme will tend to the military efficiency of the Guards. ["Hear, hear!"] The question of what addition should be made to the Army was one which the. Commander-in-Chief and the Army Board had to consider in relation to the number of regiments that the Government, deemed it necessary at a given time to keep abroad. The Cabinet must be masters of the situation. They have the key of matters abroad by which they can decide what force may be needed; at all events, what operations it may be necessary to carry out. ["Hear, hear!"] In the present year the Government have accepted from the Army Board and from the Commander-in-Chief the suggestion that an equivalent number of battalions should be kept at home to those which are to be kept abroad. Therefore, the scheme is a military proposal and not merely a Government proposal. ["Hear, hear!"] Let the House consider how we are placed. We have to decide how to meet this difficulty. We have on the one hand a proposal to send the Guards to the Mediterranean, and on the other hand Ave have a proposal that we should make a large addition to the Army at a great cost, which would become an enormous cost, if we found we could not get the men under the present regulations without increasing the pay. But having got the men we should only have, according to the Adjutant General, troops outside the organisation of our Army Corps, and maintained merely to keep up foreign relief. There is a third course, that of leaving matters alone, but I do not think the House would take this third course, as it would, in the opinion of every military authority in the country, result in the inefficiency, through overstraining, of certain Line battalions. ["Hear, hear!"] We have adopted the first alternative. We have taken the advice of those who will have to work the system, and who will be responsible for carrying it out. If Ave adopted the second we should be taking the advice of men who certainly have a right to speak on the matter, but who, after all, are not responsible for finding a remedy for the difficulty we have to provide against. ["Hear, hear!"] I must say here that I cannot help feeling impressed by the fact that a feeling has been experienced that this scheme has been adopted hastily, in order to meet a recognised and a difficult problem, but at the risk of spoiling what is almost best in our military organisation. This is not the first time the scheme has been brought forward. It was first proposed by the Duke of Cambridge, the late Commander-in-Chief, who desired to add battalions to the Guards and to send Guard Battalions to the Mediterranean. I am sure that the House will agree that there is no man in this country who is less willing to suggest a change for the sake of change than the late Commander-in-Chief. ["Hear, hear!"and laughter.] The scheme was not carried out by the Governmen of that Jay because an increase in the Army was not decided upon. It was proposed again in 1891 by Lord Wantage's Committee. Lord Wantage was himself a distinguished Guardsman; he served in peace and war with the Guards, and while with them won the Victoria Cross at Inkermann—[cheers]—and as to this proposal he had the support not only of General Fielding, himself a Guardsman, who was then Inspector General of recruiting, and therefore conversant with the whole question, but of all the four selected colonels of Line regiments, every one of whom must have been cognisant of the conditions of Mediterranena service. ["Hear, hear!"] It was again, proposed by the military authorities in the present year. Complaint has been made that the officers who are themselves commanding the Brigade of Guards have not been consulted in this matter, and it has been asked, why did we go to the Duke of Cambridge, the Duke of Conuaught, and Sir P. Stephenson? Reference was made to them only because, by the Queen's regulations, these three officers are, as I understand, the officers specially charged with considering any proposal out of the ordinary' routine which may affect the Brigade of Guards. Lord Wolseley has also been cited. May I read the opinion of Lord Wolseley'.' ["Hear, hear!"] He has, unfortunately, been prevented by illness from attending in the House of Lords, where he would have desired to express his views, but he wrote me this under date of yesterday and authorised me to read it to Parliament:—

"Gibraltar always was a popular station with the Army, and I believe that an experience of foreign service will be beneficial to the Brigade of Guards. Nothing has reached me which makes me think that it will be otherwise than popular with the men. Bearing in mind the condition of Line battalions that have spent several years in the Mediterranean, I see no reason to fear that the tour of service proposed will impair the efficiency of the Brigade. On the other hand, as a matter of military organisation, by a careful arrangement of the recruiting as between the battalions, we shall insure six battalions of Guards being fit for service in case of a big war, instead of four as at present, which will be a great improvement upon our existing organisation."

That is Lord Wolseley's opinion. [Cheers.] I have said so much as to what soldiers feel that I should like to say a word as to what civilians feel on this subject. I know how little the opinion of any civilian is worth on a military question, but this is not merely a question of military organisation. It is to some extent a question of military sentiment, and in a sentiment which concerns the Guards civilians have as much right to share as military men. I say this—that there is not a man on this Bench who would have raised one finger in this work if he had believed he was doing anything to impair the efficiency of the Brigade of Guards. ["Hear, hear!"] I know I can say for Lord Lansdowne and for myself that there are no men in this country" who are more conscious than we are of the services which the Guards have rendered to the country in the past, and, whether they have been called upon to serve in the Peninsula or the Crimea, of the devoted manner in which they had performed every duty? which the country has laid upon them. [Cheers.] But we have in this matter, when every patriotic sentiment and every military instinct urges us to consider the efficiency of the Brigade of Guards, also to consider the responsibility which we owe to the Army. We are working a difficult system—" hear, hear!"]—a system which is necessarily complicated by all the various needs of the Empire at home and abroad, and we have adopted the course now before us as being, upon the whole, the best military solution of a most difficult military problem. We have against us the suggestion that we should, at a moment when every nation in Europe is spending every farthing it can scrape together for the most effective national defence, spend a large sum of money in raising more Line battalions to do that which, it is represented to us, with increased efficiency can be done by the Guards. My hon. and gallant Friend who moved the Motion asked that we would give this matter further serious consideration. I can assure him that nothing shall be wanting on our part of close scrutiny to see that nothing in the course of the changes occurs to impair either the character or the status, the physique or the efficiency' of the Guards regiments. [Cheers.] Un the other hand, I urge the House not to stand between the Government and a proposal which will add 2,000 choice troops to the British Army, and will give to the Guards, as well as to the Army, that which in the opinion of our highest military advisers is the best military organisation for the country. [Cheers.]

I am sure there will only be one opinion in the House—that the right hon. Gentleman has laid before us the case for this particular proposal of the Government with very great ability and clearness. ["Hear, hear!"] But there were two qualities in his observations which, I think, were conspicuous above all others. He was courageous and he was sedative—[laughter and cheers]—two qualities which were very much required at the moment he rose. [Laughter.] I think there was, in particular, considerable necessity for the latter quality. We had a series of speeches from hon. and gallant officers opposite which rose in crescendo scale until they culminated in the remarks of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Shropshire. [Laughter.] I was sometimes on the point of appealing to Mr. Speaker as to whether an hon. Member was justified in using language of menace to another Member within the walls of this House. [Laughter.] He spoke, it is true, as he told us, in a whisper—[loud laughter]—but it is well for the equanimity of the right hon. Gentleman opposite that he was not siting on this side of the House. If he had seen my hon. and gallant Friend as well as heard him, I am afraid his equanimity would have been disturbed. [Laughter.] But besides being sedative, the right hon. Gentleman was courageous, and this again was wanted. We have had a report in the newspapers, emanating, I presume, from those purlieus of the Press where there is so much more intimate knowledge of our motives and intentions than we ourselves possess, that the Government intended to treat any action contrary to this proposal of theirs as a want of confidence. The fault up to that point I had to find with the Government was that they exhibited a want of confidence in themselves and in their proposal. ["Hear, hear!"] The right hon. Gentleman has supplied that lack by making a bold and clear and well-reasoned and well-considered defence of what they propose. The Secretary of State for War, on the other hand, having arranged apparently an artificial opportunity for making a statement on this subject in another place, and thereby anticipating, I think, the action of this House and almost the right of this House—["hear, hear!"]—in a way which I think we ought, at all events, to comment upon if we do not protest against it, delivered a speech and explained these proposals as being of a hypothetical, tentative character, and spoke in a tone which was apologetic and almost penitential. That is not the way in which the confidence of the country will be gained for a considerable change of this nature. ["Hear, hear!"] Therefore I am very glad that now we have from the right hon. Gentleman a fuller and more perfect explanation. The right hon. Gentleman has, however, put it on somewhat different grounds than those on which it was put in the House of Lords. The right hon. Gentleman, though he referred at the end of his speech to the necessity of dealing with the evils arising from the inequality of the regiments at home and abroad, founded, I think I am right in saying, the case for the proposal on the interest of the Brigade of Guards itself—that it was a desirable thing in itself, and then he proceeded to bring in Gibraltar and the other considerations as secondary matters, although important in themselves. That rather takes us by surprise, because we had not been led to regard the proposal from that point of view. It is not a matter on which I should like to give any strong opinion. My tendency is certainly to the belief that in all cases efficiency is increased by having at least three battalions en cadre helping each other. On the merits of the proposal, apart altogether from this question of equalising battalions, we are to have 2,000 men added to the British infantry. The question I think will arise first of all whether that is in itself necessary, because, if I am not wrong, we have added 20,000 within the last 20 years to the strength of the British infantry; and, secondly, the next point is whether any such addition of infantry is required for the duties of the Army. Ought it to be given to the Guards, or would it not be better to give it to some of the regiments of the Line? I think it is a matter certainly worthy of consideration whether this is the best form and whether there is the most urgent necessity for this increase of the infantry force. As to the Guards themselves, I think they have every reason to feel proud of and satisfied with the manner in which their ease has been put before the House. [Cheers.] I say that for this reason. The Guards have indiscreet and foolish friends, in the Press and elsewhere, who on an occasion such as this raise the question of privilege and the question of breach of faith as to service and the questions of the irksome duties of garrison life. None of those questions have been raised on their behalf by any officer who has served with them—["Hear, hear!"]—and I feel perfectly sure that no such considerations would be urged by anyone of any rank connected with the Guards. ["Hear, hear!"] Their whole history goes to disprove the probability of any such line being taken, because they have always been ready, as has been said to-day, to thrust themselves forward into any difficult or unpleasant position in order to save possibly some of their comrades in the Army. [Cheers.] At the same time I do not enter into the technical arguments that were urged by many hon. and gallant Gentlemen. With some things that they said I could largely sympathise. There were others which I think were a little overstrained, but they were all arguments based on the real necessity of the efficiency of the Brigade. It does appear to me that the Guards are not likely to suffer, but rather to gain, from a certain share in foreign service. We have had some experience of it. Everyone knows the high pitch of efficiency to which the Brigade of Guards has risen at the present moment. The energy and the zeal of the officers, and the devotion, of the men—who can say how much that is due to the experience they had in Egypt and in the Soudan, by being taken out of the ordinary routine of their home duties and employed on work of that kind, even where that work is not that of actual warfare? I remember two or three years ago, when I had some small responsibility in the matter, we were hard pressed for a battalion, and it was almost arranged that a battalion of the Guards should be sent to Egypt, or sent in the first place to Gibraltar, with a view to their being moved afterwards; but that was a very different thing—it would have been giving them the benefit and variety of a little foreign service; that was a very different thing from the proposal now before us, which, in the crude form first presented—though considerably modified now—meant the relegation in perpetuity of three battalions of the Guards to fortress duty at Gibraltar. Now, I am not going to depreciate Gibraltar or say a word that might hurt the feelings of anyone interested in that place. It may be the most healthful and pleasant place a battalion could be stationed at; but at the same time anyone can see that a regiment stationed there does not obtain the same variety of experience and instruction that the Guards obtain even at home. I confess I regard with great—I will not say an absolute or insuperable objection—but certainly with great dislike the idea, as I have said, of constituting Gibraltar a Guards' station, with three battalions of Guards always there, and I think it would be very injurious probably in its effects to the discipline and efficiency of what may well be said to be among the most efficient part of the Army. Therefore I should hope that there will not be on the part of the Government any absolute committal of themselves to that destination of the Guards. The right hon. Gentleman has raised, not probably a new question, but he has adopted a new way of looking at the question—namely, with the addition of three battalions, a desirable thing. At the same time it is all in the future; there is very little provision for it.

It will be provided for as we get recruits.

Quite so, but I do not know whether this will be proceeded with as rapidly as possible with a view to secure two battalions as soon as possible, or whether it will be proceeded with by a tentative process; we certainly gathered from a statement made in another place that the process would be exceedingly tentative. I do not know in these circumstances that I can add anything to what has already been said. The right hon. Gentleman has made out a strong case from his point of view, and the hon. and gallant Gentleman who spoke on behalf of the Guards has made what in many respects was a well-founded protest against what we believe to be the intentions of the Government, and we are in the position that we cannot divide and by actual vote express our opinion, and therefore it will be convenient to many Members not to commit themselves too hard on one side or the other. But I trust, and many Members will agree with me, especially after the exhibition on Monday and to-day of the sentiments of Guards officers towards the Brigade and their devotion to its interests, with their willingness to listen to anything which is likely, in the opinion of high authorities, to benefit those interests—after that, I say, I hope that we shall have some certainty that the views of those who represent the Guards will be considered to some extent, and if, on full consideration, it appears to the Government, as it appears to some of us, that to carry out the original proposal would be detrimental to the Guards, it will not be persevered in.

The right hon. Gentleman in the closing' sentences of his brief speech indicated his view that Members of the House had better be cautious before committing themselves to one side or the other on this controverted question, and I am bound to say I never heard a speaker more carefully carry out in his own conduct the advice he gave. ["Hear, hear!"] I. declare that, after listening to the right hon. Gentleman with all the attention I invariably give to his speeches, I have not the slightest idea whether he approves or disapproves of the policy so ably expounded by my right hon. Friend near me. ["Hear, hear!"] Indeed, I should almost conjecture that the right, hon. Gentleman had come to the House prepared with a speech which after my right hon. Friend's remarks he did not think it expedient, to deliver—that he found the enemy too strongly posted, and was not prepared to bring up his forces in the way of serious attack. ["Hear, hear!"] The right, hon. Gentleman, under these circumstances, took refuge in the ancient Parliamentary manœuvre of trying to draw a distinction between the utterances of the Government in this. House and the utterances of the Government in another place, between the view of the Secretary of State expressed in the House of Lords and the view expressed by the Under Secretary in the House of Commons, and he went the length, I think, of describing the difference between the statements as amounting to a change of front.

No, I did not say a change of front. I said totally different reasons were given, as has happened once or twice before in statements from, the present Government.

To those who do not come down with a speech cut and dried it must necessarily occur that, the arguments they may think it expedient to put forward on any occasion of this kind are determined by the nature of the attack. Lord Lansdowne was the first to open the scheme, and did not and could not foresee the extent and nature of the criticisms that would be offered against it. In consequence of that he dwelt more upon one than upon another aspect of the question, and in explaining the views of the Government doubtless he did not insist to the same length as my hon. Friend on certain points on which subsequent, experience has shown the strongest, feeling is entertained by those who have expressed and have a right to express the feeling of the Brigade of Guards in a matter so nearly affecting their interests. When the right hon. Gentleman said the Secretary of State wanted confidence, and expressed no belief in his own scheme I directly traverse that statement. ["Hear, hear!"] Not a word can be extracted from the noble Lord's speech which is fairly open to that interpretation. The noble Lord did say that if the design was found to have different consequences to those he anticipated, of course, a change of policy would have to occur. Did he express any anticipation that, evil results would be experienced?

Yes.

Quote the sentence. ["Hear, hear!"] I do not press the right hon. Gentleman. He is not bound to have the noble Lord's speech with him, nor am I justified in requiring corroboration of every word said; but this I can say—that after reading that speech I derive from it a very different impression, and I have had the opportunity, which the right, hon. Gentleman does not, possess, of a great deal of personal conversation with the noble Lord, and I can in the most explicit terms contradict, the impression which the right hon. Gentleman has himself derived from the speech and has sought to convey to the House. The explanations given by the Secretary of Slate and the Under Secretary are consistent with each other in the positive statements they contain, and the general impression they were intended to convey as to the future of the scheme now initiated. I do not think it is necessary, after what has not fallen from the right hon. Gentleman and what has fallen from my right hon. Friend, that, I should occupy the time of the House in going over again the ground so ably traversed by the Under Secretary. A more able, vigorous, temperate, and lucid defence of Government policy was never delivered at this box by any Minister of this or previous Governments. ["Hear!"] He traversed the whole ground and proved to every man who listened to him how carefully the subject had been thought out, and it would be mere impertinence on my part if I pretended to the House that I could add to the weight and value of what my right hon. Friend has said. Before I sit down it is only necessary for me to say that I appreciate the spirit which has been shown by those Gentlemen who, having themselves served in the Brigade of Guards, have a special right to take up the defence of the interests of the Brigade in this House. Neither I nor my colleagues complain of the line they have taken. If regimental officers cease to have pride in the history of their regiment, and to interest themselves in its present condition and future prospects, it will be a had day for the Army. The course they have pursued is one that requires no apology, however much Ave may have felt that the criticisms directed against us were criticisms necessarily delivered under this disadvantage, that they could not be fully acquainted with the whole view of the Government in regard to this matter. Let me simply summarise what my right hon. Friend has said. We not only do not desire to do anything that may lead to the injury of the Guards, we desire to do everything to improve their position and importance. We do not desire to make the home battalions weaker than the home battalions are at present; on the contrary, we believe the strength of these battalions will be greater than at present. In addition to these home battalions thus increased in strength we give to the Guards three battalions, all of higher strength than the Guards have ever had before. All this we mean to do without, interfering with that traditional character which has marked out the Guards as a special branch of the Army. If our anticipations are fulfilled, as I doubt not they will be, I am sure my hon. and gallant, Friends will agree that the Government instead of injuring the Guards have done them good service. If, on the other hand, our confident anticipations prove to be ill-founded, then, of course, the Government will be obliged to retrace the step they have taken. If that be to regard this as an experiment, then an experiment I admit it is, as everything in the nature of a change must be an experiment, but it is an experiment of which we do not doubt the results, results beneficial to the Guards and to the whole Army. The right hon. Gentleman complained I hat my right hon. Friend did not dwell at greater length on the question of the inequality between the home and foreign battalions, and he contrasted his speech in this particular with the speech of Lord Lansdowne. My right hon. Friend said quite enough on that subject to indicate how important in the view of our military advisers it is to diminish as far as possible that inequality. If you want your Army to be efficient you ought not to throw this undue burden upon the foreign battalions alone. That being so, would appeal to my hon. and gallant Friends behind me, and the House at large, to support the Government in the only practicable method of really dealing with this difficulty. ["Hear, hear!"] The Under Secretary has shown that if you take the only other solution—that of raising six new battalions of the line—you would be met by two difficulties, each of a formidable character. You would be met with the recruiting difficulty, which might be great in the new battalions for the Guards, but which would be still greater in an attempt to raise six battalions of the Line. You would also be met by the financial difficulty, which is, indeed, not present to the mind of many irresponsible military advisers of the Government, but which, I am sure, will have due weight with all my hon. and gallant Friends behind me. ["Hear, hear!"] They know already that impatience is constantly expressed at the immense cost of the British Army. ["Hear, hear!"] They know that in the country at large the expenditure on the Army is not of so popular a character as expenditure upon the Navy—["hear, hear!"]—and they also know that we are at this moment, and under this scheme, actually proposing a considerable permanent addition to the Army Estimates. I would put it to all those who, like my hon. and gallant Friends, are interested in the efficiency and in the reform of the Army, whether it would not be very bad policy on our part if we were to ask for a scheme which would impose a far heavier charge upon the taxpayers than the one which we are actually proposing? I am convinced that it would not be to the interest of the Army as a whole—even apart from the difficulty of recruiting and the financial difficulty I have referred to, and which was developed by my hon. Friend—and that alone would be enough in my opinion to serve as a real reason why we should adopt the more economical rather than the more costly scheme. These are the broad grounds upon which I think we are justified in asking the supporters of the Government to back us up, not on party grounds, and in asking the House at large to support us in carrying out what we believe to be a real step in Army reform. [Cheers.] There are no greater enemies to Army reform, in my judgment, than those extreme Army reformers like the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Forest of Dean, who sneer at every change that is made, and are content with nothing but advocating revolutionary schemes by which the whole existing Army system would be upset. [Cheers.] Those who ask for so much never end. The only true friends of reform are the moderate reformers, and it is because this is a moderate and practical reform—a reform within the financial capacities of the State, a reform which will not bring behind it a public reaction against Army expenditure, but which will carry out a great improvement in our Army organisation—that I appeal both to the ordinary supporters of the Government and the House at large, and not least and not last, and not with the less confidence, to my hon. and gallant Friends who have, in this Debate, shown so much ability, and have with such justifiable warmth defended the interest of that great brigade of which they have been members. [Cheers.]

thought the Under Secretary and the First Lord of the Treasury had done no more than justice to the hon. and gallant officers who had spoken in the interests of the brigade in stating that in their opposition to the scheme of the Government they had been actuated by no selfish considerations. ["Hear, hear!"] He did not think that those who had objected to the proposals in connection with the Brigade of Guards would have had their objections altogether removed by what had been said by the Under Secretary. They would still, doubt whether the efficiency of the Guards would be affected by stationing certain battalions in the Mediterranean with the inevitable drafts which would have to be made from one battalion to another, and the consequent disturbance of the military training of the men. It would also be very unfortunate if the conditions and standard of the brigade which had kept so high, should manifestly fall off. He was bound to say he thought those who had been connected with the Brigade of Guards would recognise that the Under Secretary of State had shown that very grave consideration had been given to the objections expressed in the interests of the Guards, and there had been certain modifications of the scheme as it was originally understood. His right hon. Friend had stated that there would be a depôt for the service of the battalions maintained at home so as to act as a feeder. That was an important point which had often been recommended by more than one officer, so that other battalions might not be unduly drawn upon. He also approved of giving to men who would naturally pass into the Reserves, inducements to remain longer with their regiments so as to strengthen the battalions. He was thankful that this modification, which had often been suggested by every branch of the Army and resisted by the military authorities, was to be introduced into the general system of short service and the Reserves, and would be brought into force to obviate from the Guards the mischiefs which it was feared would be caused by the scheme of the Government as at first indicated. He felt sure that the statement of the First Lord of the Treasury would give satisfaction. He had renewed the assurances of the Secretary for War, and had not diminished the effect of anything his colleague had said. If the scheme as regarded the Guards did not work well it was to be reconsidered. His right hon. Friend did not merely not say things he did not mean, but he found he generally meant more than he said, and he was sure he would carry out all he had promised. The Government that had done so much for the Army as well as the Navy would do something more than was proposed. Our military weakness was known to all the world. Only a few days ago an eminent Frenchman told him he wondered we did not increase our military forces. It was said that the Army had been increased in recent years by 20,000 men.

Infantry.

did not think we had added a single column or battalion to the Army during the last 20 years. With the enormous increase of territory we had brought under British sway and in the present state of political trouble and unrest in the world, it was very necessary our military should be increased that we need not be afraid of our enemies, and the safety of the country might be assured. The way in which the Government had met the objections that had been raised would, he hoped, induce hon. Friends who had been connected with the Brigade of Guards not to offer any further opposition to the scheme. Without an efficient Army our diplomacy could hardly be successful. We could not obtain the respect and attention which such a Power as Great Britain ought to obtain in the world, and, above all, if unwelcome war should come we should not be able to meet it fairly. ["Hear, hear!"]

said that the Brigade of Guards, unlike other regiments which had left one station for a foreign war and returned to another, had, by their duties about the Sovereign, been localised in London. They had returned to London with untarnished colours from their engagements, small and great. ["Hear, hear!"] The strongest sympathy existed between the London population and the Brigade of Guards, and he believed that on an emergency it would be possible, on the training basis of the Brigade of Guards, to raise rapidly a largo and admirable force. On public occasions of great assemblies of people in London the Guards were accepted by the people in the remarkable way in which they accepted the police. That tended to the preservation of order without the exercise of force. If they failed to recruit either their men or their officers as they were then recruited, the Guards would not fulfil their duties in war and peace as they then did. He was satisfied with the assurance of the first Lord of the Treasury that the new scheme would not be persevered in if it were found not to work well. ["Hear, hear!"]

repeated the inquiries he made last June as to whether anything had been done by the War Office to remedy the grievances of the Army Medical Department and attract candidates for appointment under it, who were lamentably deficient in number. There were 60 vacant appointments and only 25 or 30 candidates for them. With the prospective increase in the Army still more appointments would be available. The competition between the young men to obtain commissions in the Army was eager, and it was formerly so to obtain Army Medical appointments. The Army Medical Staff was much undermanned, and civilians had to be appointed at many military stations to fill up the gaps. It had been proposed to lower the standard of the examinations and to give the "chronics" a chance of allowing those to enter who had been three times "plucked." He hoped this would not be the case. Field-Marshal Lord Roberts said the Army needed as doctors the best medical schools could turn out. But, under the circumstances indicated, there seemed little chance at present of that ideal being realised.

in the absence of the Under Secretary for War, replied that the grievances of the Army Medical Department had been carefully considered in detail by the Secretary of State. The representations made had commended themselves to him, but he himself was not in a position to say at present that any distinct or specific step would be taken to remedy what was complained of. He suggested that the subject might be raised on the Estimates when the Under Secretary for War was in his place.

I rise to move that a number of land forces not exceeding 158,774 be granted to Her Majesty for the service of the Army during the ensuing year. During the two nights of discussion to which we have listened respecting the proposals which I am now about to lay before the House, it is a memorable fact that every speech or suggestion from every quarter has, so far as I am aware, been directed to a criticism of the smallness of the proposals which we submit. This is an experience as unprecedented as it is pleasurable. And it is the more remarkable because in a time of peace we are asking for the largest number of men which has ever been voted since 1815, except in one year of the Crimean war. We are moving Parliament to allow us to raise three new British battalions, two colonial battalions, one battery field artillery, and 3,500 garrison artillery. We have been asked repeatedly why we did not ask for six more battalions, and have been assured that if we had put a bold face on it we should have got the money. Well, that is a great inducement to a War Minister. It is more, it is a great temptation. If we have resisted it, it is not in the least from a want of keenness for national defence. To have 10,000 surplus men at Aldershot fit to go anywhere and fit to do anything, without calling out reserves or manipulating battalions, would be an ideal condition of affairs, and would be the greatest relief to the mind of a War Minister. Some of our friends have said to me, and much has been said in the Press to a similar effect in the last few days, "You are neglecting your opportunities; ask for all you can get; you will never get such a chance again." That advice, seductive as it is, however, carries with it its own refutation. It means this—that the country will ask and Parliament will vote for large additions, but by the time the Bill comes in the hot fit will be over, and the reckoning will then come, as it has come often before. It is worth asking hon. Members to notice what have been these spurts and set-backs in the last 50 years, and how often this see-saw has occurred. In 1847 our military strength had sunk to a condition of perilous weakness. Lord Palmerston said in that year, "We have some 50,000 or 60,000 men on paper in the United Kingdom, including depôtes, skeleton battalions, recruits just raised, and invalids about to be discharged. We could not out of this motley mass collect an army of 20,000 cither in England or Ireland. We cannot increase our Regular Army to the requisite amount, because it would be too expensive to do so." This was the policy which led to the disastrous condition of the Army in the early part of the Crimean war. Every Englishman knows how our Army by its bravery compensated for the national neglect. In 1856 Parliament voted 246,000 troops, but on the declaration of peace, and even after the early indications of the Sepoy mutiny had taken place, Parliament reduced the forces in 1857 from 236,000 to 126,000, or little more than half those voted in the previous year. In 1864 Lord Palmerston, in the temporary access of fervour on behalf of national defence which then seized the country, added 6,000 men to the establishment, but two years afterwards this excess was rectified by reducing two companies from each battalion in the Army. In 1870 Lord Card well carried this further by reducing the Army to 113,000 men, besides reducing stores and material, and within a year the panic caused by the Franco-German war involved us in a hasty increase of 20,000 troops, with all the accompaniments of panic expenditure. Eight years later, in 1880–81, despite the fact that we were at war in Afghanistan and had difficulties in South Africa, the Army was reduced again by 4,000 men. Thus the see-saw system was carried on with admirable regularity, but to the great disadvantage of the service, there having been five separate changes of policy between 185G and 1886. It has been carried on despite the fact that our possessions, and therefore our responsibilities have been steadily increasing, and that foreign nations one and all have been doubling and trebling their armaments during the same period, and it has had the worst possible effect on our Army organisation and on our national defence. ["Hear, hear!"] In the last ten years, I am glad to say, there has been a progressive increase, and with the measures now proposed the Army will be 10,000 stronger than it was in 1887, besides having 40,000 more men in the Army Reserve. And be it remembered that these increases have been accompanied by a rigid overhaul of every branch of our equipment for war; so that, even if the Secretary of State and the Army Board are not asking for the full numbers for which use could be found, a deliberate defined policy has been pursued. I told the Committee last year that we could not shrink from asking for what we thought absolutely necessary for the Army as for the Navy. I submit that we have had the courage of our opinions. We have not yet been in office 20 months. During that period we have proposed to the House on Army services alone a loan of £5,500,000; we have asked for an increase of close upon 8,000 men to the Army, which will cost us when complete, £600,000 a year; we have by Supplementary Estimates given the Volunteers £250,000, and spent large sums to equip the infantry with ammunition and the artillery with guns. By these means we propose to provide a sister battalion at home for every battalion which it is intended to keep permanently abroad. If we have gone no further, it is, as I have shown above, because, if we asked for anything which is not essential, we know by experience it will not be permanent. We have, moreover, in the matter of men, asked for as many as we believe we can recruit at this time on existing terms. If we raise questions which will cause a general reconsideration of the pay of the Army, we must be prepared to show not merely that the occasion justifies the sacrifice, but that it is a sacrifice which the country is prepared to maintain. ["Hear, hear."] I look upon permanence as being the basis on which the Army system should be dealt with if it is truly and usefully to look after the needs of the country. ["Hear, hear!"] Now some criticisms have been expended in this and in preceding years on the gross total of the Estimates, and the heavy dead weight of non-effective pay which we have to carry. And first let me assure the Committee that, considerable as are the increases in expenditure for which it has become our duty to ask Parliament, we have not lost sight of economy in our pursuit of efficiency. Last year I endeavoured to present to the House some comparison between our expenditure and that of foreign countries and the results achieved, and, taking army corps against army corps, the comparison, making due allowance for the cost of a conscript as against a voluntary soldier, worked out not unfavourably. But I then pointed out that while we have a short-service Army under pay stronger by nearly 100,000 men than the long-service Army which preceded it, we are still cumbered with all the pensions of the long-service Army, and that we have to meet a scale of pensions and retiring allowances to officers granted in 1877 and 1881 in pursuance of the recommendations of Lord Penzance's Commission, which were calculated on an excessive scale, but on which we are bound to keep faith with the officers concerned. ["Hear, hear!"] What this burden is I can best make clear to the Committee by reading the successive columns of one hem alone. The retired pay of regimental officers in 1887 was £567,000; in 1888, £623,000; in 1889, £651,000; in 1890, £694,000; in 1891, £726,000; in 1892, £760,000; in 1893, £794,000; in 1894, £821,000; in 1895, £857,000; and in 1896, £886,000. Thus we have a rise of 56 per cent. in ten years—a rise which would have been far higher but for the continuous efforts made since 1886 to check it. ["Hear, hear!"] That is an item over which we have no control except in the way which I will explain to the Committee—namely, by raising the age of compulsory retirement for captains to 45 from the absurdly low age of 40, at which it stood in 1886, when nearly half the officers of the Army were compulsorily cast at that age; by raising the colonels' retirement age from 55 to 57; by decreasing the general officers' list, and by denying the privileges of retirement in certain rants to officers who had not yet reached those ranks, or to officers who had not then entered the Army. By these means a decisive check has been put, or will be put as warrants take effect, to this great burden. ["Hear, hear. "] It is due to these efforts that the total vote for non-effective pay of officers has only increased £83,500 in the last ten years, and has now, I hope, practically reached its maximum. ["Hear, hear!"] But meantime the nation has annually to bear a charge of £3,000,000, over which we have no control, and to which I may here observe that, in my experience of the War Office, which is now of ton years' standing, with one small exception, the only addition which has been made is the compassionate allowances, granted, with the full assent of this House, to Indian Mutiny and Crimean veterans, which have cost us £30,500 a year—an expenditure which will, we believe, be satisfactory to the House—[cheers]—and which we look upon as one of the most justifiable items of expenditure to which a nation can be asked to contribute. [Cheers.] We have, therefore, to look for our economies to the effective services, and of this item of £15,000,000, large as it looks, when pay and similar obligatory charges are deducted, we have only £5,336,400 to play upon. It is on the heads of warlike stores, transport, clothing, and miscellaneous charges that we have to concentrate our attention and although I am far from saying that fresh economies may not yet be introduced in every department, yet our contracts are constantly and scrupulously overhauled, our prices for all necessaries are the lowest obtainable, and the output of our factories constitutes the cheapest, and, I may add, the most rapid and punctually delivered supply of the Army. ["Hear, hear!"] If the amount that we can give for our money does not, as we know is the case, satisfy all our critics, it is not for want of energy at headquarters. ["Hear, hear!"] Leaving now this question of economy, upon which I have dwelt merely for the purpose of satisfying the Committee that we have not had it out of our sight, I would observe that the past year has been one of exceptional activity in the War Department. Early in the year we dealt promptly, and, I hope, to the satisfaction of Parliament, with the pressing needs of the field artillery in respect of the guns, of the infantry in regard to ammunition, and of the Volunteers in respect of capitation grant. ["Hear, hear!"] But beyond the provision of an increase to the Army and of the military works which have been already explained to Parliament, the military authorities have brought before the Secretary of State proposals for the reorganisation of the cavalry—[cheers]—and of reconsidering to some extent the service of officers in the different branches of the artillery. The organisation of our cavalry has for a long time given disssatisfaction. Hitherto we have had what one General called no organisation at all in the cavalry. It may be described as an organisation of separate units, none of which, excluding those in India, are in themselves large enough for independent action, and none of which have behind them any arrangement to prepare them for such action, while it may be said that there is absolutely no existing organisation for the use of cavalry in war. Convenience has laid down the establishment of cavalry regiments in India, and similarly convenience has prescribed the establishment for the cavalry regiments at home as best calculated to provide for the preparation of each regiment in turn for its Indian tour. Before proceeding to detail the present proposals, it must be stated that some years ago the cavalry were divided for this purpose into four corps—viz., Household Cavalry, three regiments; Dragoons, ten regiments; Lancers, five regiments; and Hussars, 13 regiments. In the following proposals it is proposed to maintain these four corps, and the corps of Household Cavalry may be dismissed from further consideration, as it is not proposed to interfere with the Household Cavalry. For active service the cavalry will be organised in divisions; each division will be composed of two brigades; each brigade will be composed of three regiments; each regiment will be composed of three squadrons. The squadron on service is to have 120 sabres, the regiment 378 sabres, the brigade 1,134 sabres, and the division 2,268 sabres, not including officers and staff, Besides this force, each army corps will have one regiment for divisional purposes, and one squadron for headquarters duties. Turning now to the organisation of the units composing this force, we have already, as stated, three corps. The corps of Dragoons, ten regiments, will remain as they are. The corps of Lancers, five regiments, will be made into six regiments by the 21st Hussars being converted into a Lancer regiment, to which it is understood that there would be no objection as the regiment was originally a Lancer regiment. The corps of Hussars will then consist of 12 regiments. Each corps, except the Dragoons, will, it is observed, be divided by three. We have 28 regiments in all, of which nine are permanently in India and two do not go to India. Both of these latter are Dragoon regiments, and it is proposed that they should in future take alternate turns with each other on the Indian roster. The effect of this will be to reduce the number of Dragoon regiments taking turns on the Indian roster to nine, the regiments in each corps then admitting of being divided into groups of three, each group having one regiment in India, one regiment at homo on a high strength ready to go abroad, and one regiment on a lower strength. ["Hear, hear!"] The effect of this arrangement as compared with the present establishments will appear from the following figures:—The number of regiments on the new higher establishment will be eight, as compared with six on the old. Each regiment on the new higher establishment will have 26 officers, as against 24 on the old; 108 noncommissioned officers, as against 102; 560 privates, as against 504; and 433 horses, as against 410. Comparing the new and the old lower establishments, the number of regiments on the new lower establishment will be nine, as against II; each regiment having 23 officers, as against 24; 93 non-commissioned officers, as against 100; 460 privates, as against 390; and 343 horses, as against 313. It will be observed from these tables that the regiments on the higher establishment, will be at a higher strength than those of the present higher establishment, and the regiments on the lower establishment at a higher strength than those of the present lower establishment, and I would beg the Committee to note that the essence of the scheme is that the First Cavalry Division and divisional cavalry regiment will at all times be ready for active service, requiring no men or horses to complete numbers. ["Hear, hear!"] The other advantages claimed for the scheme are that the regiments on the lower establishment in the Second Division can at any time be made up to war strength by men and horses from the reserve, who would be lit for the ranks by the time the division could embark; that squadron officers in peace time will be trained to lead squadrons on war strength; that cavalry drafts for India will be composed of trained soldiers; that young horses will be saved from hard work to a far greater extent than can be done in squadrons on the present strength; and that senior officers will be accustomed to lead cavalry brigades—in fact, that they will learn in peace time those duties that may devolve on them in time of war, if only the House by passing the Military Works Bill will enable us to hold such manœuvres as will enable us to exercise the cavalry. ["Hear, hear!"] But certain changes are necessarily involved by the scheme, and they are as follows:—Certain changes in the foreign service roster, so as to insure the proportion of representative regiments of each corps being at homo at the same time; the abolition of the Canterbury depot, which will cease to train recruits for India, but will remain the headquarters of the cavalry riding establishment and the administrative centre for all matters connected with cavalry reserves; and great simplification of uniform. It is proposed that all regiments should keep their present full dress, but that the undress of the regiments of each corps should be assimilated. Let me make it perfectly clear that there is no intention to do away with the identity and historic associations of the present regiments. ["Hear, hear!"] We are well aware of the importance attached to these distinctions, and Lord Lansdowne believes that in sanctioning this scheme as the most effective organisation for the cavalry both in peace and war, he has fully safeguarded the regiments in these respects. Although: the purchase of 432 additional horses has been met by savings in the current year, there will be some initial cost in the scheme, but there will be a small annual saving arising out of other economics which it enables us to, effect, while we have a satisfactory increase in the strength of the regiments.

How will the saving be made?

There are rather less non-commissioned officers of cavalry, and the depôt at Canterbury will not be so expensive as it is at present, and there is a slight change in the number of officers which, with the saving in pensions, will more than compensate for the expenditure on extra horses. Now, with regard to the artillery. Measures are in contemplation to divide the service of officers in the artillery between the garrison and mounted branches. That has been for a long time the subject of serious consideration. Some years ago a step was taken in this direction by posting officers to field or garrison artillery and treating horse artillery service as a sort of staff appointment. It was then held that the passing of officers from the mounted branch to the garrison artillery from time to time, though they had less knowledge of big guns than might be desirable, imparted life and smartness to the garrison artillery. But, despite this advantage, if it were one, it is clear that the great divergence in the nature of the two services makes the continuance of the system impossible. ["Hear, hear!"] A long course of garrison artillery makes a man unfit for the horse artillery service, while horse artillerymen come to garrison duties with all the mechanism of big guns to learn. The Commander-in-Chief states that the difference between the mounted branches of the artillery and the garrison artillery is as great now as between cavalry and infantry. It has, therefore, been determined, with due regard to existing rights and qualifications, to separate artillery officers into two lists for mounted and garrison artillery respectively. Lord Lansdowne has appointed a committee to inquire into the subject of different claims, and every effort will be made to continue the same rate of promotion and to give weight to any claims which may be put forward by those who prefer the mounted service; and I think the change will commend itself to all critics as giving us a system more applicable to modern artillery. Another thorny subject which we have had to deal with has been the condition of the medical department. For some time past, as the Committee is aware, we have had difficulty in procuring sufficient candidates for the Army Medical Department. Many reasons have been adduced for this, among which may be mentioned the question of rank and social condition, the examinations which were held to be conducted under less favourable circumstances for candidates from Irish and Scotch medical schools than for those attending London schools, the rate of pay in India, and the prolonged terms of foreign service. Lord Lansdowne has given the most careful personal attention to all these questions. He has received various deputations, and has spared no pains to get to the root of the difficulty. His conclusion is that as regards the examinations, while every consideration should be given to eminent members of the Scotch and Irish medical schools in filling vacancies on the examination board, the board should be constituted solely with reference to the professional eminence of its members—["hear, hear!"]—without regard to the mere fact of their coming from one part or another of the United Kingdom. The falling off of Irish candidates, not being more than on a par with the falling off of other candidates, has no special significance or importance. Lord Lansdowne has also reviewed the whole circumstances attending the present titles of medical officers, a question which appears to be closely bound up with their complaints of a lack of social consideration. The truth appears to be this. When the system of attaching medical officers to regiments was abandoned, on grounds which at the time were certainly deemed to be sufficient, for the system of appointing them to stations, medical officers lost their special and close personal contact with their regimental brother officers. Attempts have been made to give them a better position—first, by ranking them with combatant, officers on the recommendation of Sir Andrew Clarke as representing the schools, and then by conceding composite medical and military titles carrying with them substantive rank in their own department. These concessions, though welcomed at the time by the profession, have not altogether acted as was desired. Lord Lansdowne is anxious that every consideration should be shown to the officers of this most valuable and distinguished department. ["Hear, hear!"] He has, after communication with the India Office, been able to secure to the medical officer an increase of pay in India, and the Indian tour will be decreased from six years to five. ["Hear, hear!"] Assistance will also be given to form medical messes at the large stations, quarters will be offered in barracks where possible, and opportunities to study on return from foreign service will be given. But none of the proposals which have been submitted to the Secretary of State for giving new forms of Army rank to the medical staff appear to him desirable for adoption. He does not believe that by such titles the medical department will obtain the status to which their talents and professional acquirements entitle them, and anxious though the War Office is to meet the medical profession on all points, this is not one of those on which further action appears to be desirable. As regards the conditions of our forces, so much has been said in the Debates before the Speaker left the chair on the condition of the Line and the state of recruiting that I do not propose to touch upon these subjects further now. But the present Estimates, apart from the increases of establishment which have been fully explained, contain no very striking features, except that we have been able to make various provisions which, will act directly on the comfort of the private soldier. The Quartermaster General (Sir Evelyn Wood), who has been um emitting in his efforts in this direction, has succeeded in making arrangements with the railway companies which will enable us in future to send troops between England and Ireland and otherwise in the United Kingdom by the shortest and most comfortable route, and thus to abandon the long sea passage by coasting steamer. ["Hear, hear!"] We have also arranged to give the soldier on discharge or on transfer to Army Reserve free conveyance to his selected place of residence in the United Kingdom—["hear, hear!"]—which is often further from his place of discharge than his place of attestation to which we are bound to return him. Despite these concessions, by a most careful economy in conveyance of stores, etc., Sir Evelyn Wood shows us a reduction on the Vote apart from special services on manœuvres. The Vote was, £329,000 in 1895–96,. £309,000 in I896–97, and £281,000 in the present year. This is, I think, peculiarly satisfactory. ["Hear, hear!"] For some time past, we have also been considering the soldier's bread, the flour for which has earned an unenviable title as "red dog," a name which perhaps more than the quality has caused objection at some stations. [Laughter.] The white Hour which it is proposed to substitute will cost us £8,000 a year, but, considering that this is a subject on which the soldier is specially particular, we think the change is due to him. ["Hear, hear!"] Our attention has also, been drawn to the prickliness of the flannel shirt supplied to the Army—due to the less careful dressing to which inferior flannels are subjected. I myself made an experiment with the flannel, and I confess I was not impressed with the comfort which it afforded. [Laughter.] All men's skins are not equally susceptible, but that by no means relieves those who are sensitive, and we have taken £4,000 to provide a better quality of flannel. ["Hear, hear!"] Finally there is the question of boots. ["Hear, hear!"] Everyone admits that the soldier's boot is durable, but its want of flexibility often causes discomfort. To a certain extent this is due to the preference of many men for a boot too small for them—preferable perhaps for walking out on Sundays, but unsuited to a long march. We have, I believe—and all classes bore witness to it in the Ashanti expedition—as good a band-made field-boot as can be made. The only difficulty is we cannot obtain it. The trade do not, supply it in sufficient quantities. Boots, however, are unremittingly being tried to improve on the present boot, and I shall be glad if any hon. Member who has an interest in the subject will look in at Pimlico and see the varied assortment which there are under experiment. The question is not one of price, it is the difficulty of obtaining a flexible and at the same time sufficiently durable machine-made boot, ["Hear, hear!"] As regards the Militia and Auxiliary forces, a great change has been made this year by fixing the period of commands for Militia, and Volunteer officers at five and four years respectively, with power of renewal. The object of this change is not to end the career of any really competent officer before he retires by age, but to secure a reconsideration of competence at stated periods—a procedure which it is believed will commend itself to all who have the interests of the service at heart. Seventeen battalions of the Militia were brigaded this year at Aldershot, and their work at the small manœuvres carried on there earned the warm commendation of the Commander-in-Chief. In his force, as in the Volunteer force, the dearth of officers is a serious drawback. The Volunteers, thanks in some degree to the grant voted by the House last year, have reduced their deficiency by 200 officers during the year, and it is hoped further progress will be made in this direction in the coming year. As regards the Militia, a variety of expedients have been suggested for filling up vacancies in the force. These have been under Lord Lansdownc's careful consideration, and I hope that before the Militia Vote comes on I may be able to make a statement on this subject. It seems clear that as the best organisation for the Militia is to have two classes of officers—first, county men, who enter with the intention of rising in the regiment; and, secondly, officers who hope through the Militia, to get commissions in the Line, or having served in the Line are willing to give a turn of service in the higher ranks of the county Militia. As regards the latter class, it is a question worth considering whether any Line officer taking retired pay might not under certain conditions (laid down before he entered the service) be liable to service in the Militia as he is now to recall to the Line in case of war. This and other similar questions are under consideration. I may add that it is intended again this year to train a considerable number of Militia battalions with the Line. Incidentally, I may mention that the issue of canvas shoes to the Militia last year, which was made as an experiment, has given so much comfort to the men that it is proposed to extend it. ["Hear, hear!"] Hitherto the Militiaman has only had one pair of boots to wear during the month of his training. We found the issue of canvas shoes gave so much comfort and was so favourably reported on by the commanding officers that we have provided money to give every Militiaman this advantage. We also propose to complete the issue of helmets to the Militia, except in the case of those wearing a special headgear. Some criticisms have been passed on us in recent Debates for not giving further attention to the development of the artillery. I do not think we are open to this criticism. Last year we took measures which added 81 pieces of field and horse artillery to our equipment. We have now 45 batteries of six guns each, or 270 field guns, with 10 reserve guns; 10 batteries, or 60 horse artillery guns, with six reserve guns—the complete equipment and reserve of three army corps. Beyond this, in case of invasion, we have 188 field guns in the hands of the Volunteers and 204 guns of position which the military authorities assure us are a most valuable item in our defence. It is not pretended that guns horsed and manned by Volunteers are at this moment equal to the Royal Artillery, but the military view is that they are better manned and better horsed than the American guns were at the beginning of their war, or the French guns in the army of the Loire in 1871, and when we reckon up our artillery we may well afford them the credit they deserve. ["Hear, hear!"] This year we hope to complete the ammunition columns for the horse and field artillery, and to commence the formation of a modern siege train, of which 24 pieces are allowed for in the Estimates of 1897–8. We also have taken a considerable sum for quick-firing guns in connection with the defence of harbours against torpedo boats, the necessity for which was explained on the Military Works Bill, and the works for which are included in that measure. The Militia, including Militia Artillery, have been already armed with the 303 rifle, and it is proposed within the next financial year to complete the re-arming of the whole of the Engineer and Rifle Volunteers. In connection with this I may perhaps mention that the provision of small arm ammunition to complete the equipment of all descriptions of troops has now been accomplished, and that the three trade firms are now sending in regular supplies of this ammunition. There are many other subjects in connection with the progress of the Army on which I would gladly touch; but this Session has already been fertile of Army discussion, and will probably be more fertile still. What I have desired to show the Committee is that progress has been made in every department of the service. We are often accused of taking too optimistic ii view of Army affairs. But I would ask whether there is not another side to the question, and whether possibly we in England who are so determined to see into every detail of our Army organisation do not sometimes take too black a view of the progress we have made. My right hon. Friend who spoke earlier in the evening used words of a Frenchman, to the effect that we are insensible to the demands of our Army. I remember a quotation from another Frenchman, the sense of which is that John Bull gives credit to all the world except his own soldier.

My Frenchman said that he wondered when we were covering the whole world red that we laid not thought it necessary to increase our Army. [Laughter.]

I think, on the whole, my Frenchman made the observation most pertinent to our Debates. [Laughter.] I am the last man to stand hero and say we are getting all we should like, or making all the progress we might make, that our system is absolutely perfect, or that we could not by any means make further progress. I believe that every year we are obtaining fresh light, that every change brings to us fresh organisation, decentralisation of stores, and responsibility, while doing away with the old system of red tape by which everything was discussed in the War Office affecting the remotest parts of the globe. All that we believe to be good, but at the same time let us not ignore the progress that has been ma le, the condition of our troops and the number of the Reserve, that the services for which we have to provide have been reviewed by successive Cabinets, and that latterly the stores and equipments have been provided, and the Army thus placed on a workable basis. Knowing what we intend to do, having regard to the National Defence which we must make in ease of invasion, and the number of troops to be sent abroad, I think I may say that all these are items of progress, showing that there is a sound principle prevailing at headquarters, one not averse from criticism, but which represents the Army in a fair and patriotic light and not in that which may seem most favourable to the country. [Cheers.]

referred to the Militia, and said that, though the helmets had been mentioned, nothing had been said about the caps. He hoped that no more black powder would be supplied. Something ought to be clone to improve the condition of the non-commissioned officers in the Militia so as to get a supply of better men. He advocated that the Militia should he enlisted for foreign service in case of war.

was pleased to hear that the War Office authorities were giving attention to those small material things which contributed so much to make the life of the soldier more pleasant. As put from the Chair the Vote was for 163,569 men; but this was a very limited Vote, because on the Army Estimates there were, exclusive of men in India, 645,000 men; and there-fore it was obvious that in taking the Vote for the smaller number of men the Committee vas only taking the Vote for the Regular Service. What did the right hon. Gentleman mean when he said that the ammunition equipment was now complete for all arms of the Service? Was it meant that the ammunition equipment would be equal to the demands made upon it in lime of war: and was the ammunition estimated by the number of men and arms represented on these Estimates?

said it was according to the equipment laid down for the Army, Militia, and Volunteers.

Is there any spare ammunition to meet those demands that must come from all parts of the Empire?

There are certain ammunition stores in other parts of the Empire for those demands.

asked whether an assurance could be given that if war broke out the demand by the colonial forces could be supplied. On the last two occasions when there was a panic demands came from all quarters of the Empire for ammunition and equipment, and we were unable to supply them. It was necessary to extend our views in this matter, and to be ready to supply arms and ammunition beyond the forces of the United Kingdom. He did not clearly understand whether the artillery was going to be divided into distinct and separate corps—whether three or two corps were to be constituted.

said there would be a corps of mounted artillery and a corps of garrison artillery. The officers would be separate.

thought that the fact of allocating a large body of artillery officers to a duty that was purely sedentary, with no chance of any active service, would have some effect on the class of officers obtained in the future. He was glad to hear the intention of the Government with regard to officering the Militia. It was a wise step, and he hoped that before long the Government would harden their hearts and approach the Militia question in a bold spirit. He thought it was to be regretted that the Militia had for so many years been treated with apathetic neglect. The full advantage which we could reap from the Militia had not been grasped by the War authorities, and his belief was, that the Volunteer Force, which was not created by any stroke of military policy, but by a spontaneous movement of the nation, had enabled the War authorities to do what could not be done before—namely, to release the Militia from purely local service in the United Kingdom. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would be able to assure the Committee that the Government were considering that matter, because, after all, it was at the root of the solution of the question which had been the difficulty with us all along ever since the introduction of the short service system. The interesting sketch of the right hon. Gentleman of what had happened since 1847 was, as they all knew, quite true; but his contention was that it was because we had not had a consistent military policy. ["Hear, hear!"] That was at the root of our military weakness. On the whole, he thought many of the matters to which the right hon. Gentleman had alluded would give great satisfaction to the Army, and none would give greater satisfaction than the efforts which had evidently been made to improve the position and comfort of the private soldier.

referring to the reply of the Under Secretary to the complaint that the spokesmen of the War Office were too optimistic, said that he and those who agreed with him had always distinguished between their general views as to the system on which alone, as they thought, the Army could be put on a permanently satisfactory footing, and the particular schemes which the Government brought forward and which were consistent with their policy, that was to say, they always tried to give a perfectly fair and impartial consideration to the detailed proposals of successive Governments, even though those were proposals to make the present system work, and he should do so on the present occasion. He congratulated the right hon. Gentleman on the clearness of his military expositions, and agreed that many of the proposals made to-night—given the existing system—wore excellent, and said they would have his warmest, support. He felt most strongly that we had not a field artillery which was equal to the needs of the Empire, and believed the Government would be driven to increase that branch of the Service in future years. He was not prepared to say that it was impossible to create a Volunteer field artillery. The Swiss had been extraordinarily successful with their field artillery upon a training shorter than that which we gave to the Militia Artillery, and that showed what could be done; but for himself he believed that if a proper artillery was to be created for Volunteers it would have to be upon some mixed system, partly professional and partly volunteer. There was the remarkable fact that while there had been an enormous increase of military expenditure we had greatly diminished the field artillery in the last 10 or 20 years, and even the increase made this year would leave us infinitely below the figure reached years ago. What would be the additional cost of the proposals?

The total cost will be £450,000 a year, becoming complete in the fourth year.

added that this, taken in connection with the Military Works Bill, would mean a considerable increase on the Army Estimates of the future: and of course it emphasised what he had formerly said as to the small return we got for the expense. On the return of the CHAIRMAN of WATS and MEANS, after the usual interval,

said that he most heartily supported any proposals which had for their object the increasing of the defensive forces of the country, or the increasing of their efficiency, and it was rather as to the omissions of the Government that he desired to say a few words. He held that the Government had very properly asked for a large sum of money in order to permanently increase the establishment of the Army, but he dissented from the policy of the War Office under which the Army would be centralised three, four, or possibly five large camps. It appeared to him that great danger to the country might arise through the adoption of such a policy. What, for instance, would be the effect of such a policy on recruiting and the number of recruits? Hitherto, fortunately, we had been able to do without conscription, and he was sure every Englishman believed that so long as proper facilities were afforded for recruiting there would never be any necessity for recourse to that system. He felt, however, that if we withdrew our soldiers from the large centres of population we should at once remove a large incentive to recruiting. Nothing could have a more advantageous effect upon the whole military system of this country than that the troops should be quartered at the large centres of population, and that the people in those centres should from time to time see the troops in their midst. The Under Secretary of State for War would bear him out when he said that the Guards, for example, were not recruited from London but from the provinces. That surely ought to be an additional reason why all the incentives to recruiting should be continually maintained in the provinces. He fully recognised the necessity of brigading regiments together, in order that they might be properly trained, but it was a self-evident proposition that the troops must be enlisted before they could be trained. He feared that if the taxpayers' wishes were entirely disregarded we should soon find the present system inadequate and have to devise sonic other, possibly the one suggested by the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean. It was questionable whether, from a public point of view, it was good policy that the troops should be moved into large camps. Nothing could be more necessary than that adequate protection should be afforded our population. No one held a higher opinion of the police forces of the country than he, but he, nevertheless, felt that those forces were not sufficiently strong in numbers to put down a serious riot in any of the large centres of population, and that, therefore, it was necessary troops should be near at hand. The War Office would say that the facilities of transport were now so great that it was easy to move troops from one place to another. It seemed to him, the Department were so imbued with the idea of centralisation that they often overlooked even the most necessary precautions for the safety of large centres of population. Take the case of his own constituency, Manchester. In July last the War Office suddenly removed the troops from Manchester, in view, he supposed, of the proposed centralisation. The troops were withdrawn without any intimation of any kind or description being given to the local authorities. A magazine of powder was left entirely unprotected, and the officer commanding the troops telegraphed to the Chief Constable asking him to protect the barracks. Surely that was no part of the duty of the police. It might be necessary that troops should be moved into camp for training purposes. The training season was the spring and summer months, and he put it to the Government whether for the autumn and early winter the troops could not be brought back to the large centres of population. He hoped that in the interest of recruiting and the safety of our large towns and cities the Government would reconsider their present policy.

said that, while he should like to have some further explanation as to the alternative schemes which had been mentioned, he desired to state that he approved the proposals of the Government as far as they went, and believed they would be welcomed as a step to the good by all men who were concerned in the welfare of the Army. As a cavalry man he of course felt peculiar interest, in that arm of the service, and he regarded the changes proposed as a substantial improvement. He had had experience of the error and inconvenience of weak squadrons, and he was glad to learn that now three squadrons would be kept up to their strength in each regiment. One point to which he wished to refer was that last year the Under Secretary for War stated that it was to be the policy of the War Office to decentralise the department as much as possible, so as to lighten, it of certain duties and give to the general officers commanding districts more scope and independence of action. This change was recognised at the time as a wise one; but, so far as he knew, there were only two matters in regard to which officers commanding districts had been given a free hand, the disposal of lunatics, and the appointment of civilian chaplains. [Laughter.] He should like to ask the Under Secretary for War whether in the ensuing year any change—any kind of decentralisation, would be carried out with regard to the stores of clothing? The stores being now mostly kept at Pimlico, great difficulty would certainly be experienced in a time of stress to get the clothing shipped off or distributed as required. ["Hear, hear!"] He was very glad to sec that the Government had recognised the valuable services of the Yeomanry, and that an additional sum of £3,000 was to be granted to them this year. ["Hear, hear!"]

said he welcomed the scheme of organisation now proposed by the Government as an advance in the right direction, and he believed it was of a character which would lend itself to that greater scheme of organisation of the Army at large, which must come sooner or later. ["Hear, hear!"] He understood the cavalry scheme was to be one of divisions, brigades, and regiments. The divisions would probably be only on paper at first. What they had really to do with were the brigades, each of which was to be composed, he understood, of three regiments. Now what he wished to know was to what extent, if any, this scheme of organisation would interfere with the regimental system? Were there to be three squadrons forming the entire regiment, or were there to be three squadrons as a regiment working with the brigade, and one in depôt? If there was to be also a squadron in depôt he should be in entire agreement with the right hon. Gentleman. What he wanted really to get at was how the strength of the three squadrons in trained men and horses, was to be kept up? If it was to be done by denuding other regiments it would be introducing a bad system into the cavalry service; but if it was intended to keep up the strength of the squadrons entirely from the depôt squadron, the scheme, he was confident, would prove to be an excellent one. He did not see how this could be effected through the depôt at Canterbury. He would also ask the right hon. Gentleman whether, while making the proposed changes of organisation, he could not deal with the discrepancy that at present existed between, the number of horses and men in a cavalry regiment. It was constantly thrown in the teeth of the cavalry corps, for instance, that while they had got 200 men they had only 100 horses. Where were the men without horses? Why, filling the places of officers' servants, clerks on the staff, and so forth, and yet these men, who were without horses, were counted on the strength of the regiment as efficient cavalry soldiers. ["Hear, hear!"] Could not the authorities consider some scheme by which Reserve men might be employed in those places, so that the strength of the cavalry should be regarded only as the number of men who had horses, and were available at any time to ride them? ["Hear, hear!"] It was not fair to the cavalry regiments that they be pointed at in the House and in the country as having so many men and only so many horses. ["Hear, hear!"] In Germany, France, and other foreign countries, a squadron was accounted to be, say, 120 horses and 120 men; as many men as formed the corps so many horses. Why could we not adopt a similar system. If some such suggestion were carried out it would enable all the men of the regiment to be actively utilised, and give employment to the He-serve men, and at the same time overcome one of the difficulties applying to the reservists. ["Hear, hear!"] Something had been said about the uniform to be worn by the new brigades. He regretted that the undress uniform was to be the same. What was called the undress unifrom was that which was worn in barracks, but what was wanted was a really serviceable working dress, and he would ask the right hon. Gentleman whether such a dress might not be provided for the purposes of manœuvres, drills, and general work. In foreign countries this was done. In Russia the Guard had a magnificent full dress, but when they went on service they were as plain a dress as any man of the Line. The only difference there was between the Garde Corps and the Line Corps was that there was a small piece of lace on the collar. He would ask the right hon. Gentleman whether something of this kind could not be devised now when this new departure Was being made. He knew one great difficulty was the head-dress, but he did not see why there should not be a really serviceable working headdress. He would press this on the right hon. Gentleman's attention, because it was a time when those changes could be made, and he thought made in a way which would be very acceptable to the Army. The right hon. Gentleman referred to the Medical Department, and he was sorry to hear him say that it was impossible to return to the regimental system. He thought the system of changing doctors so frequently was a bad one, and he did not see why the men in their regiments could not be treated in the same way as civilians were treated. He noticed from the right hon. Gentleman's statement that the time of the doctors in India was going to be lessened. That would increase the rapidity with which the doctors would move from this country to India, and increase the evil of which he complained. The difficulty arose chiefly, if not wholly, from this Indian rota. He would ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he could not modify to a certain extent the medical department, and as they had got a Brigade of Guards, whether he could not put a brigade or regimental surgeon to this new cavalry organisation. He was sure it would be good for the men, and would give them confidence in the organisation of the Army, and make it easier to get recruits. The hon. Member for North West Manchester, in referring to the question of barracks, had no doubt touched upon a point which is a very great difficulty with any future scheme of re-organisation. One system which obtained in Austria was worth consideration—that was that when a great city like Manchester wanted a regiment quartered there, it built its own barracks, and he believed that a great city like Manchester would be willing to do that. ["Hear, hear!"] He knew the danger of it, because it gave the city a hold upon the Army organisation; but still it was worth consideration. As he understood the hon. Member for Manchester, his proposal, or idea, was that the barracks should be in these great cities, and the troops should be quartered there during the winter, but that they should go to these great camps in the summer time. He hoped that the right hon. Gentleman who had planned out so excellent a thing as Salisbury Plain for the Army, would insist upon that being simply a camp of exercise, and that there should be no permanent camp there. He thanked the right hon. Gentleman for this much larger scheme of cavalry organisation, than he thought the country had ever known, and he thanked him especially for saying that it was the intention of the Government in no way to interfere with the regimental system, which, he believed, had carried them through all the great days of warfare. That was why he had always distrusted this system of linked battalions.

said he was sorry to see that the Secretary of State for War proposed to raise three new battalions. To his idea they had too many battalions already. Their infantry were split up into too many units, and that was the great cause why they were not efficient. The Government's proposal, if carried out, would only increase the existing evil. Under their present system their infantry were filtered away in 141 battalions. His impression was that every foreign battalion should be 1,200 strong, and every home battalion 1,200 strong. If they had 1,200 men for the home battalion, it might be accounted for in this way; 1,000 men on the active home battalion and 200 extra for the drafts. He believed that in that way they would get their home battalions and their foreign battalions efficient. But of course it must be acknowledged that that scheme would mean an increase to the Army of 20,000 men. He need not tell them that that, would never be voted by this House; but it seemed to him that very much the same object might be effected by reducing the number of battalions by one-third, and aggregating them together in three linked battalions instead of two linked battalions. He wished to see the foreign battalions 1,200 strong, because if there were only to be 50 abroad it would be necessary to maintain the same number of men in those 50 battalions as had been hitherto maintained in 76 battalions. He thought that when they came to consider this they would find that without any increase of cost to the country, and without any augmentation of men, they would have an army which would consist of 50 home battalions of 1,200 strong, fighting strength 1,000, and 50 foreign battalions of 1,200 strong. That would give the foreign battalions about the same number of fighting men as they had at present. This idea of linked battalions was not new, but as Mr. Childers destroyed all the old traditions of names and numbers, he did not see why they should not bring it up still further so as to give three battalions to each link. He would not go at length into the scheme; he put it forward merely as a sketch, and the details might be worked out. The fault of our present system was not want of numbers in the infantry, but the weakness that arose from breaking it up into too large a number of units. He was quite aware that many of his hon. and gallant Friends did not approve of this, but went in for augmentation, saying, "Give us more men." He, however, did not think that the country would give more men, and that it would be better to set aside vain hopes never likely to be realised, and come at once to some practical scheme that might be worked out with the approval of the country. It was an old-fashioned idea to keep up a number of skeleton battalions, for it was said it was easier to bring these up to strength than create a new regiment. This was all very well a hundred years ago, but now wars were conducted with such rapidity that no battalion was of any use unless ready at a moment's notice. Lastly, he had a few words to say in reference to the Brigade of Guards. He was sorry to see the augmentation in the number of battalions. He did not sec why four battalions at homo should not be sufficient for three battalions abroad, as was found to be the case with Line regiments. He protested strongly and emphatically to raising any new battalions whatever which were not to take a fair share of foreign service in the colonies and in India.

thought it would be convenient if he now dealt with one or two minor points raised in the course of the discussion. The first of these was in relation to horse and field artillery, and he stated how matters stood. There were 45 field batteries, each consisting of six guns; there were 10 batteries of horse artillery, consisting of 60 guns, making 330 altogether, and there were 40 field guns and six horse artillery guns in reserve, making a total of 376 guns. By far the greater portion of the batteries were fully equipped and in readiness for service, and in the Estimates there was provided a further sum to complete the whole of them. When this was done it would be seen that in respect of proportion of guns to per thousand of troops we stood in nearly as favourable a position as foreign countries, assuming, as he did, that the class of guns we had in our Army are as good as the weapons foreign armies possess. It was, perhaps, unadvisable to carry things further at the present moment than they were carried in the Estimates, for this reason, that before very long there would probably be invented and perfected a quick-firing horse and field gun. When this new gun was perfected, clearly our forces would have to be armed with it as quickly as possible; and with this probability in view the Secretary of State had rightly decided not to carry matters further than the Estimates proposed. There was a complaint from the hon. Member for Manchester that two regiments had been: moved from Manchester suddenly and without due notice or consultation with the local authorities. He did not know: what local authorities ought to have been; consulted, unless possibly the Board of Guardians. [Laughter.] These things, of course, were in the hands of the military authorities; and he was not prepared to accept the theory that those I who paid for the troops ought to command them. [Laughter.]

I did not say so.

understood his hon. Friend to say they should have a voice in moving the troops from place to place.

No; I did not say anything of the sort.

would not press the matter. In this particular instance there was very sufficient reason for removal—the barracks were in a very unsanitary condition. The hon. Member for St. Pancras had called attention to two matters to which the Secretary of State attached great importance. One of these was in reference to some proposal to change the numbers of cavalry regiments. He did not know whether any such proposal had been made, but he could give his hon. Friend an assurance that it would not be accepted; the numbers of cavalry regiments would remain precisely as they were. The other matter was the decentralisation of clothing supplies, and on that he assured his hon. Friend that matters were making satisfactory progress. But this was not a thing to be entered upon lightly and indifferently—it was like marriage in that respect—and it was very costly. It would involve an outlay probably from first to last of £200,000; certainly of over £150,000. But a start had been made, experiments had been sanctioned and were being tried. It had been found that in a considerable number of centres in various districts—at any rate in the headquarters of the districts—very little alteration and fitting would enable clothing to be stored. These alterations would be very quickly taken in hand and completed. In other cases there would have to be heavy outlay to supply satisfactory accommodation, and the work must take some considerable time. The matter certainly would not be lost sight of. The question had been raised as to the cost of the Army proposals which his right hon. Friend had submitted to the Committee. His right hon. Friend had stated the cost as £450,000. This sum embraced every item of charge which the increase proposed by the Government would give rise to during the next few years.

said there were some of the proposals for augmentation of the Army in the Estimates which all would approve of, and rejoice in. The first of these was the the addition of a battalion to the West India Regiment, a force which deserved every possible encouragement and exhibition of gratitude that could be shown. He believed that the additional battalion would give greater facilities for changing the quarters of the force, and he only wished it were possible to introduce into their course of service the occupation of some quarters not altogether tropical. He was aware this was a matter of difficulty, and that it had been contemplated more than once; but if it could be effected without injury to the susceptibilities in any direction it would be an exceedingly desirable thing to station the regiment sometimes in a locality not open to the evil of tropical life. Then he came to the addition of the Cameron Highlanders, and observed that no explanation had been given as to the mode in which the battalion was to be recruited. He knew there was a general impression in the minds of people, especially of residents within the sound of Bow Bells, that everybody in Scotland were a kilt. He saw in one of the Christmas numbers of the illustrated papers an elaborate and very entertaining pictorial version of the well-known ballad of "The Laird o' Cockpen," and he was extremely amused to find that, though the locale of the ballad was in the Lothians, all the little boys on the roadside, as the Laird of Cockpen rode along to visit his ladylove, were beautiful kilts of the Stuart tartan pattern. [Laughter.] He did not know anyone within striking distance of Cockpen who ever saw a kilt in his life. [Laughter.] Being unable to maintain one battalion of Cameron Highlanders, they were to have a new battalion created. He was full of faith, and he should be glad to believe almost everything the right hon. Gentleman who represented the War Office should tell them. He should be pleased to know where in Scotland the Scotchmen and Highlanders were to be found who were to fill that second battalion of Cameron Highlanders. The present battalion in the main part was recruited in Glasgow; but Glasgow was drawn upon by all the other kilted regiments, and he believed all the people who could either have a "Mac" before their name or could speak Gaelic had been exhausted long ago. [Laughter and "Hear, hear!"] Then the artillery was to be considerably increased, and so far as that was necessary for the working of the defences of the coaling stations there was no objection. But there was an objection in one sense. Although he knew the fixed and regulated opinion on the other side, he should have thought it would be very much better if the Navy would undertake the defence of the coaling stations. ["Hear, hear!"] He did not want to hamper the Admiral on the station with the cares of defending the particular coaling; stations, but surely, if in a place like St. Helena a few marines were stationed, they could move as any ship passed. If it was an unhealthy climate or an unpleasant station, they could be relieved and removed so easily by the Navy, whereas what was more detrimental to a company of infantry or a few artillery as those they were now invited to vote, than to be stationed for two or three years permanently in such a locale as that? He knew that places like Sierra Leone, St. Helena, and other coaling stations must be defended, but he could not help thinking common sense required that it should be the Navy that should be responsible for the defence of these places, and not the Army. ["Hear, hear!"] He applied the same principle to such larger places as Malta and Gibraltar. What could be more extraordinary than that they should coop up in those two garrisons at the present moment ten of the best battalions of their mobile force? He said the other night they were deteriorating under their eyes from day to day. They were not deteriorating, it might be, but they were not improving. Negatively, if not positively, they were deteriorating, and therefore he should have hoped, now that they had a strong Committee of the Cabinet established to look into these matters, they would seriously consider whether the naval view was really to prevail to the extent that it did at present, and whether they might not see some marine forces employed on a larger scale than now for the defence of these fortresses, thereby releasing a number of their mobile battalions, which would then have all the benefit of the Salisbury Plain manœuvring ground of the right hon. Gentleman, and all the other blessings of boots and flannel shirts which he was anxious to bestow upon them in this country. ["Hear, hear!" and laughter.] These things concerned both the Army and Navy. Each had its prejudices, which sometimes ripened into being superstitions, and he was at present attacking what he believed to be a naval superstition. He hoped it was not too late to attack that superstition with some effect, and then the whole question of the unequal distribution of battalions would solve itself. The hon. Member for Hampshire, td whom he always listened with great respect in these matters, had said one thing which rather astonished him—namely, that he opposed the increase of the battalions of infantry because he said he was in favour of larger cadres and fewer of them. He agreed with the hon. Member, but, whenever any proposal had been made to deal in a logical and common-sense way with the infantry or cavalry, there had always been this tremendous outcry as to the traditions of the regiments, their numbers, and associations. The Under Secretary for War made an announcement as to the reorganisation of cavalry. He would prefer to sec the details in print before examining them, but be might say it seemed to be a step in the right direction. The right hon. Gentleman was advised in the matter by authorities beyond doubt the most capable he could have. He himself was very glad that this matter, which had hung in the wind for a great many years, was at last being dealt with by the military authorities. The right hon. Gentleman stated—and every one was glad to hear it—that he had been able to provide something for additional comforts for the men. He could not help wondering, as he was speaking, and the Secretary for the Treasury was sitting in an attitude of admiration of his discourse—[laughter]—whether anything was to be done towards the more frequent washing of the sheets and blankets of soldiers. [Laughter and "Hear, hear!"] He hoped that now the Under Secretary was a little nearer the Throne than in the times when he seemed to be the reservoir of personal complaints of soldiers throughout the country, he would quietly and without public display—[laughter]—see that these sheets and blankets were more frequently washed. [Renewed laughter.] The Under Secretary at the close of his speech spoke of being an optimist. He himself was an optimist and gloried in being one. ["Hear, hear!"] What was an optimist? He understood him to be a man who preferred to look on the bright side of things, and to contemplate the good things that had been done rather than those that had been left undone. The Under Secretary for War was perfectly right. He and himself and others outside the House, who had really been inside the War Office and knew how the administration of the Army went on, without claiming any great credit for themselves had this advantage over many people who spoke with considerable confidence in the matter—that, whereas they spoke with experience of the defects of the system, they themselves spoke with experience of the advantages of the system—[cheers]—and the impossibility of the alternative system which might be proposed. Therefore, if the right hon. Gentleman and himself spoke as if everything was for the best in the best of all possible worlds, it only meant that from their knowledge they believed that the best was being done just now under the conditions imposed upon them with the means which the country supplied. [Cheers.]

complained of the want of employment amongst discharged soldiers. It was stated public? in evidence before the Wantage Commission that out of the total of the Army Reserve 20,000 men were believed to be out of employment. From inquiries he had since made he found that, in the Field Lane Refuge, of 1,150 destitute persons 179 were discharged soldiers. Returns from provincial workhouses told a similar tale. He believed that the poor future of the soldier after serving in the Army deterred the best class of recruits from enlisting. ["Hear, hear!"] Reference had been made to the Royal Marines relieving Line battalions. The Royal Marines consisted of 15,000 men, and had one general officer on active service, which consisted in sitting on a stool in Pall Mall. The Marines as a body of troops were unrivalled, and it was lamentable that they should not offer them a greater objective of ambition. He hoped the reforms that had been suggested in the Debate would be carried into effect. There should be some authoritative agreement as to the length of service. Persons regarded as "authoritative" differed on the subject, giving the periods at three, six, seven, eight, and twelve years. Now? they were told they were to discard all these, to have four years and a "go-as-you-please" term of service after that. It was an example of having "authorities" eternally quoted against you. It was only when there was a movement taken up on a large scale, a large demand made, and a large appeal made to public opinion that any changes worth thinking about at all were made. He persisted in his view that until some very radical reforms were introduced into our military system the House would not get away from the perpetual recurrence of Debates such as had occurred that night. No one after hearing the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, the Under Secretary, could get away from the fact that what he had told the Committee was not the view of the military authorities, it was but a maimed and stunted account of their view. It was the habitual mistake of the War Office that they did not take the country into their confidence. The Navy had at least compelled the Naval authorities to tell the House what they really wanted. The House had never refused to vote supplies when a responsible Minister told the House of Commons what he wanted. It was not quite fair to come and put before the House a state of things which was not the view of the military authorities. He did not believe that the House would ever refuse to meet an appeal for military necessities. Until such a full statement was made upon Army matters as had been made in regard to the Navy this unsatisfactory state of things would continue; and he would, at any rate, do what he could to discredit the present method of stating the needs of the Army. The regiments were inefficient, and, known to be inefficient, and until a clean breast was made and some confidence given to the House he should continue to press for a complete and searching reform.

said he had listened with deep interest to the Debate which had taken place. [A laugh.] They had heard a great deal about the Guards. He did not know much about them himself, but he was surprised that hon. Gentlemen who, he had no doubt, had plenty of military courage had not the courage to go to a Division. [Laughter and an HON. MEMBER: "We could not."] Hon. Gentlemen took care to raise the question when they knew they could not divide. He knew that game. [Laughter.] If they had gone to a division he should have voted with them so as to encourage the spirit of independence he would like to see grow up on the other side of the House. Although hon. Gentlemen who spoke on behalf of the Guards represented a very important factor in this matter, he represented a far larger body of men than they. He represented the British taxpayer—["hear, hear!"]—who was obliged to pay for all this increase in expenditure and who, when he got the opportunity, loudly protested against it. It was all the more necessary for Members of the House of Commons to look closely into these Estimates, because he remembered that Lord Beacons field said that the heads of the two spending departments ought to be in the House of Commons and that unless they were, Members of that House could not exercise due control over them. Had hon. Gentlemen taken into consideration the fact that taking things all round, this permanent increase in the expenses of the country would amount to about £800,000 per annum? Yet not one word of protest had been raised against it. Of late years the Navy had been very largely increased because Ministers had said that it was absolutely necessary to have a Navy stronger than the navies of any two other countries. At the same time the House was told that England was not a military nation, but that she must rule the sea; and he said to himself, "Now, if we spend all this on the Navy it has this advantage, that we shall not have to spend more on the Army." He was, therefore, surprised to read a speech of the Commander-in-Chief in which he actually gave as a reason why more money should be spent on the Army that we had already spent so much on the Navy. There was a sort of competition between the naval and military authorities and if the House of Commons did not put its foot down, the people would be eaten out of house and home. ["Hear, hear!"] The proposal was to increase the infantry and artillery. He would have thought it more desirable to increase the artillery than the infantry, and if it had been proposed to increase the artillery alone he should have suggested that it might be done by decreasing the infantry. The plea put forward was that there were not sufficient men for foreign service. The question was, could the difficulty be met not by increasing the number of soldiers but by reducing, without any harm to the Empire, those places abroad where soldiers were sent. ["Hear, hear!"] Perhaps the Guards rather than go to Gibraltar would agree that we should give up Gibraltar. [Laughter.] But he thought it was far more important that a reduction should be made in Egypt. As far as he could gather he believed we had now 4,200 men in Egypt. He was not going to repeat the various protests he had made on political grounds to our occupation of Egypt, but would look at the matter from a military point of view. The importance of Egypt from a military point of view was due to the fact that the Suez Canal, which was the means of communication between our Indian and home possessions, ran through Egyptian territory. He admitted that if that canal fell into the hands of some foreign Power in time of war it would be a most serious matter to us. In time of peace it was very obvious that we gained nothing by this garrison being in Egypt. Nothing prevented our commerce or our troops going through on equal terms with that of other nations. As to the case of war, he would assume for the sake of argument that we were at war with France and Russia. It was not necessary, however, that we should occupy Egypt in order to stop other Powers with whom we might be at war from passing by the Suez Canal to India and the East. So long as we held the command of the sea we could always prevent a fleet passing that way, and if we were at war with other Powers we should not attempt to convoy our merchandise or send our troops by way of the Suez Canal. Mr. Childers had told him that when he was Minister of War there was an important Departmental Conference between the naval and military authorities at which it was decided that in case of war between naval Powers it would be impossible to send our troops under convoy through the Suez Canal. Everybody knew that in case of war they would be obliged to allow neutrals to pass through the Canal, and if any neutral could be induced to blow up his ship in the Canal, it would block the Canal for two or three weeks. Some tacticians were of opinion that in the case of such a war it would be wise for us to evacuate the Mediterranean and concentrate our forces nearer home; if we did so it was obvious that we must either increase our garrison in Egypt or withdraw it. If we increased it he did not even then see how we should be able to prevent an army approaching Egypt by land through Syria. Moreover, in such a case, if we increased the force in Egypt, we should have to draw soldiers from India or from the British Isles, which would put us in an utterly false strategical position, as these places would require troops. In a Dispatch written by M. Waddington to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and dated November 3rd, 1886, M. Waddington quoted words which Lord Salisbury had used, to the effect that they were greatly mistaken who thought that we wanted to remain indefinitely in Egypt, and that we sought the means honestly to withdraw the troops which we had there, and which would be more useful in India. He (Mr. Labouchere) very often agreed I with Lord Salisbury. [Laughter.] At the time of the Treaty called the Drummond-Wolff Convention, Sir Henry Drunmond-Wolff wrote a Dispatch to Lord Salisbury in which he said that the diain on the military and financial resources of England rendered it most desirable that our troops should as soon as possible be taken from a position if so delicate a character, which in time of war might be a weak point. Lord Salisbury, writing in reply, said that he assented entirely to Sir H. Drummond-Wolff's views. Then the First Lord of the Treasury had said:—

"We are pledged before Europe not to occupy Egypt permanently. We do not look upon the occupation of Egypt as strengthening the position of this country."

In 1891 Mr. Gladstone said that our occupation of Egypt was an embarrassment and weakness, and in 1892 Lord Kimberley declared that the long continuance of the occupation would be fraught with great disadvantage to our country. Thus the Prime Minister and other prominent statesmen had stated that from a military point of view our retention of this garrison in Egypt was not advantageous. It might be said that Egypt paid for the troops. Well, Egypt paid a portion of the cost, no doubt, but nothing like the whole amount. It should be remembered that no gain accrued from taking men from labour and putting them into the Army, for a country depended largely for its prosperity upon the number of labouring men which it had. He protested against this system of hiring out mercenaries to a foreign Power. Surely no one would say that we ought to increase our Army simply to benefit Egypt. Very possibly the Egyptians were badly governed before our occupation, and if we withdrew their future system of government would very likely not be as good as the present.

The hon. Member is trenching upon political subjects. He must confine himself to the military portion.

moved:

"That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 154,574, all ranks, be maintained for the said Service."

He said that he had only incidentally interpolated the remarks for which the Chairman had called him to order. Our occupation of Egypt was stated to be only temporary, and for tins temporary occupation they were asked to increase the Army. Could anyone point to any single occasion when, after having increased the numbers of our Army in time of peace, we had reduced it to the former numerical state? Once the numbers of the Army were increased, they were never reduced. Practically the Committee were now asked to burden the Budget for all time with this addition of £800,000 per annum. He was not prepared to consent to in-crease the Army for these wild schemes of occupation, schemes said to be temporary, but which would be converted into permanent ones if that should be possible. He concluded by moving the Amendment standing in his name.

seconded the Amendment. When he first entered the House some 17 years ago, there was in it a body of Members who were known as the party of economy, and whenever a Government proposed any increase in the taxation of the country it was always subjected by that party to searching criticism and a good deal of opposition. It might be that the opposition of those gentlemen to increases of expenditure was too general; nevertheless, in his opinion the condition of things which then prevailed was much more wholesome than the state of things now, when hon. Members like the hon. Member for Belfast, who used to be looked upon as a Radical, and would possibly so describe himself still, attacked the Government with the greatest ferocity because they had not proposed Army Estimates equivalent in amount to the monstrously extravagant additional expenditure on the Navy. In the last few years millions had been added to the permanent expenditure of the country, and that had been done without vigorous protest except from one or two quarters. The hon. Member for Northampton was perfectly justified in his assumption that the proposed addition to the Army was directly connected with the occupation of Egypt. Seven or eight years ago the present Commander-in-Chief declared that in consequence of that occupation and the strain that it put upon the British Army, it would be necessary to increase the military forces by 10,000 men, and that increase was made. It was not sufficient, however, and now they were called upon to sanction a further increase of upwards of 7,000 men. Those of them who heard the extraordinary speech delivered by the Chancellor of the Exchequer last week could not do otherwise than believe that the present increase was only the beginning of a long career of extravagance. This increase was plainly to a considerable extent dependent upon the necessity of a prolonged occupation of Egypt. They knew from the Chancellor of the Exchequer that the requirements in connection with the occupation of Egypt would grow enormously in the next few years, and they would, therefore, if they voted this increase now, be called upon in all probability to vote further and greater increases in the next few years, in order to develop and consolidate the British Empire in the Soudan. This country was now in a period of profound peace, the most unbroken during the century, and yet we had settled down to an 8d. Income Tax without hope of any diminution. Indeed, he doubted whether in view of the further demands that would be made on the Treasury, an, 8d. Income Tax would be sufficient. The present period of unparalleled prosperity—in England at all events—might come to an end, and if it was followed by a period of depression similar to that which existed in 1893 and 1894, it would be necessary in order to maintain the present burden to increase the Income Tax by 1d. or 2d. He thought the country was entitled to know what value it was getting for all this expenditure. While they were called upon to vote immense sums for the British Army and the Britsh Navy, and for the re-conquest of the Soudan, they saw, nearer home, scandalous and monstrous and unheard of proceedings in the Island of Crete, within sight of British ships, and within the reach of British arms, and yet not a single soldier or sailor was moved to put a stop to that state of things. It was monstrous that they should be asked to increase the naval and military forces of the country, and yet that nothing should be done to end the outrages which were disgracing Christendom and humanity in the Turkish Empire. The Under Secretary had expressed the hope that the Military Works Bill and the Military Lands Bill would be allowed to pass quickly. For his part he would resist these measures to the utmost of his ability. It appeared to him that the British taxpayer was suffering from a temporary ht of insanity with regard to the expenditure of money. England was enormously wealthy, and an 8d. Income Tax was an inconvenience and an uncomfortable thing even for her, but she was dragging in her wake in this monstrous enterprise a poor country which would be swamped, and founder under the burden which would be placed upon her. It was their duty, even if the expenditure was justified, from an Imperial point of view which he did not believe, to take into consideration, to take into account the circumstances of a poor country which had not shared to the extent of a single Cd. in the prosperity and wealth and trading expansion of England, but which, on the contrary, was plunged into a condition of profund depression. Therefore, from the Irish standpoint, as well as from the view of the hon. Member for Northampton, which he shared, he objected to this expenditure.

The hon. Gentleman who moved this reduction did it avowedly on the ground that the occupation of Egypt, which requires the services of 4,200 British troops, would not be expedient in the interests of the British Empire; and he divided his speech in making out this contention into two heads—one devoted to the Canal and the other devoted to Egypt itself. He said the Canal was of no strategic or commercial importance to us that we should require this expenditure, and that we should gain nothing from the occupation of Egypt, even apart from the Canal. He produced in defence of both propositions a long catena of eminent military and political authorities to support his views.

All our best generals. [Laughter]

All our best politicians and all our best generals. [Laughter.] There was one authority he did not quote. I do not know whether I ought to describe him as one of our best generals or one of out best politicians, but his opinion is couched in these words:—

"He considered it absolutely necessary to maintain supreme and paramount influence over the Canal, and it was impossible to maintain that influence unless we also had paramount influence in Cairo and the valley of the Nile. He did not know that there was anyone more strongly opposed to our intervention in Egypt than he was, but, speaking in a general sense, he really believed this intervention was absolutely necessary if England was to remain the great Empire that she was."

That represents the earlier phase of the hon. Gentleman's opinions. [Laughter.] That was the hon. Member's earlier manner—[laughter]—but whether he spoke as the best of our politicians or the best of our generals I know not. In any case he must admit that there has been a period when people of intelligence took a different view from that which the hon. Member now takes. [Laughter and cheers.] In truth, I rather think if I were to go into the question of the utility of the occupation of Egypt to the British Empire on the present Vote you, Sir, would call me to order and would restrict me to the question of whether the 4,200 men should or should not be kept on the Establishment. Let me point out, therefore, that we really could not assent to the hon. Member's Motion if we are to remain in Egypt; if we regard our duties apart from our interests as requiring us to be in Egypt this force must be there; and, therefore, there is no military question involved at the present time. Even the hon. Member would not say that we ought to disband these 4,200 men and maintain the occupation of Egypt. It would be impossible for me, however, without transgressing the rules of order, to go into the reason which makes it absolutely necessary that these men should be kept on the Establishment. But though I cannot go into the merits of the question, I may conciliate the hon. Member, not, perhaps, in his capacity as politician or as general, but in his capacity as economist, for these 4,200 men which I think he has described as costing a million of money—

NO, no; the figure he quoted was £800,000. But the Government were asking for 7,400 men, and he took the sum at £100 per soldier, adding the charge for generals and so on. [Laughter.]

Then it is not our Estimate the hon. Member wants to reduce; it is the Egyptian Estimate, a subject which is hardly in order on the present occasion. Egypt pays the greater part of the cost of the English occupation; broadly speaking, it pays for these troops.

admitted that Egypt paid a considerable amount, but he could not suppose that any Gentleman on that side of the House would take that point because that was really hiring out our soldiers as mercenaries for foreign States.

All the additional cost falls on Egypt except a trifling sum. That being so, I do not think the hon. Member need be perturbed over this Vote. If we are to keep Egypt, and as long as we keep it, men must be there and paid for. The hon. Member will admit that this is not the occasion on which to discuss the Vote on the occupation of Egypt. The success of the hon. Member's Motion would only prevent us from continuing our present Egyptian policy; and therefore I submit that the only way in which the House can be legitimately asked to come to a decision on the point is on a Resolution openly and plainly stating that the English occupation of Egypt ought forthwith to come to an end. [Cheers.] When the hon. Member chooses to bring forward that Motion we shall be prepared to discuss it in all its bearings, but until that moment arrives I submit to the Committee that it is not for our advantage, and does not conduce to legitimate discussion in Committee of Supply, that we should, on an absolutely irrelevant issue, be asked to decide a question not merely of English or Imperial policy, but a question in which the whole of Europe is concerned as well as ourselves. I trust, in these circumstances, the Committee will speedily come to a decision on the point, and it will not consent to follow the hon. Member in the course which he has asked it to pursue. [Cheers.]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give us a day to discuss the occupation of Egypt?

If a Vote of Censure is brought forward by the proper authorities—[cheers]—I shall gladly do so.

wished to remind the Government that in regard to the Army they were responsible to the nation, not only for its efficiency but also for the welfare of the men who composed it. He was sorry to miss from the right hon. Gentleman's statement any reference to the character of the men in the Army. Unless the nation could be convinced that men left the Army better than they entered it, the class of recruits which it was desirable they should obtain would not be secured, nor would they get the results for which they hoped. The popular prejudice against the Army found expression in the exaggerated language sometimes heard. He had been told of parents who said that they would rather follow a son's body to the grave than that he should join the Army. The nation had confidence in the management of the Navy, but not of the Army. At the present time large numbers of immature boys were decoyed into the Army, and in many cases their lives were practically ruined. That was a condition of affairs to which the attention of the nation should be aroused.

thought that two divisions of cavalry—not one, as was proposed in the Government's scheme—should be kept up at full strength. The enormous difference between the strength of our cavalry and the strength of the cavalry of both France and Germany, was most apparent in the matter of horses. In France there were 601 horses to the regiment, in Germany 612, and England only 433. We had very nearly as many men in a cavalry regiment as France or Russia, but, as compared with those countries, each of our regiments was deficient in 200 horses. Where were those horses to come from in time of war? Were they to be obtained from the omnibus companies or the tramway companies, or pressed from the hunting stables? [Laughter.] But those horses were no more to be compared to the horses which the French and German cavalry rode than a cab horse was to be compared to an elephant. [Laughter.] He did not believe at all in a reserve of horses. What we had to do was to find out what cavalry we needed and keep it up to its full strength in time of peace. ["Hear, hear!"] He was glad that in the proposed reorganisation it was not intended to touch the regimental associations of the Army. When he was at Constantinople at a time that our relations with Russia were rather strained, General Skobeleff said to him in a friendly way,

"Your Army has one great advantage over ours. Our army is composed of enormous masses of men, but your Army has the advantage of regimental divisions, and you should never allow it to be interfered with."

["Hear, hear!"] He earnestly hoped, indeed, that that great institution of the Army would never be touched.

said there was a very distinct understanding, if not a pledge, before the last Government went out of office, that a regiment would be stationed at Fort George. He thoroughly agreed with what had been said on the Opposition side of the House with regard to the extravagant expenditure on the Army, but he thought that as long as money was being spent the Scottish people were entitled to a fair share of it. [A laugh.] The Scottish people contributed their share towards that expenditure, and the least they could ask was that a due proportion of the regiments at home should he quartered in Scotland. He had considerable doubt as to the good that would result either to the district of Fort George or to a regiment from being quartered there, but the people of that locality were so misguided as to believe that it would be a considerable advantage both to themselves and a regiment to have one there, and therefore in the interest of the people he hoped the Under Secretary for War would be able to relieve the anxiety on that point by sending a regiment to Fort George. With regard to the raising of another battalion of Cameron Highlanders, he was sure the War Office authorities were under a very great misapprehension if they imagined that they were going to get recruits from the Highlands for this second battalion. There was a very popular tradition that more Highlanders did not enlist in the Army because of certain treatment meted out to them at the beginning of the century. [Ironical laughter.] But after examination he had discovered that the disinclination arose from an entirely different cause. Anyone who studied the history of the Highland regiments would have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that a Highlander was never a man who hired himself out for the purpose of killing. Highland regiments had, with credit to themselves and glory to England, gone to all parts of the world and made empire, but those regiments were raised for a particular object, and having served that object the men considered their functions were at an end. He therefore ventured to say the right hon. Gentleman would find great difficulty in finding recruits from the Highlands for the second battalion of the Cameron Highlanders. If England wished to fight battles abroad she would have to find men to do so outside of Scotland. Scotland had quite sufficient to do at home. [Ironical cheers.]

protested against any further Votes being taken that night. It was altogether unusual to take more than the first Vote which involved a large sum on the same night. There were many hon. Members who were interested in the following Votes, and who might be absent in the belief that this invariable practice would be followed on the present occasion. ["Hear, hear!"] They had already allowed one Vote—the Medical Vote—to pass, but he hoped no further Vote would be taken.

said he entirely agreed with the right hon. Gentleman, and he had no desire whatever to press on Votes which might be unexpected. Under those circumstances he would not go on with any further Votes, and would move "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again." ["Hear, hear!"]

asked for some explanation of the Bill on the ground that sufficient opportunity had not been given for considering it.

said the Bill was simplicity itself. In 1887 an Amendment Act to the then Trusts Acts was passed, learned Member knew, such reductions of rent to tenants, for as the hon. and learned Member knew such reductions could not be given under the Common Law in Scotland. Unfortunately the Amendment Act was so worded as to limit the powers of trustees to granting reductions on agricultural rents only. But there were many cases other than those applying to agriculture in which deserving tenants were entitled to reduction of rent—the cases of mineral tenants for instance. ["Hear, hear!"] This Bill was intended to enable reductions to be made on mineral rents as well as on agricultural rents.

said it was very unfortunate that year after year it should be necessary to bring in Bills to amend previous Amendment Bills. He had no objection to the present Bill, and he did not intend to oppose the Second Reading, but he wished to strongly complain that reasonable time and opportunity had not been given to hon. Members for the perusal or consideration of the Measure. On the previous night the Second Reading of the Bill was moved, even before it was printed. It had, however, since been printed, and hon. Members from Scotland had had, therefore, the opportunity of seeing it, and though, as he had said, he should offer no objection to the Bill, yet he wished to impress on the Government that reasonable time and opportunity must in future be given to hon. Members to peruse and consider Bills before they were proceeded with. ["Hear, hear!"] That had certainly not been the case in the present instance, and he hoped the protest which had been made would be regarded by the Government as a warning. Bill Read a Second time, and committed for Monday next.

expressed the hope that the House would assent to the Second Reading of the Measure. The Bill, he said, was simple in its terms, and its object was to provide pensions for County Surveyors in Ireland.

said that so far from the Bill being simple or acceptable in its terms, it really violated all accepted notions of propriety and justice. [Laughter.] The second clause of the Bill is framed to enable the Grand Jury of a county to award a pension to any county surveyor who might be serving in that county at the time when he retired, and it gives them the power to direct that the amount of that pension should be payable not only from the county cess of the county in which the surveyor was serving at the time of retirement, but also from the cess of those counties in which he had previously served. He thought that was a most unwise and unjust provision. ["Hear, hear!"]

said he was extremely sorry to have misled the House, but the hon. Member for Fermanagh assured him that he had seen the Attorney General for Ireland, and had introduced an Amendment to the Bill as originally drafted, which, he told him, had received the sanction of the right hon. and learned Gentleman. He was extremely sorry to have misled the House, but under the circumstances he hoped the House would acquit him. [Cheers.]

I suggest that, in the circumstances, the Debate should be adjourned.

hoped the hon. Member would withdraw this objectionable Bill. If the Debate was adjourned encouragement would only be given to a group of mischievous Bills of a similar character, which it was the intention of Members on both sides of the House to bring in for the superannuation of everybody except the ratepayers, who provided the money. He trusted the House would reject the Bill.

On the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Attorney General for Ireland, I would ask permission to withdraw the Bill.

Do I understand the hon. Member desires to withdraw the Bill?

Yes, Sir.

said the Bill was intended to carry out the recommendations of the Select Committee, which sat upon this question. This Bill had also been—

Order!, order! I understand that the hon. Member gave instructions at the Table that this Bill should be postponed to a particular date.

If it did not come up on an earlier occasion. [Laughter.]

said that the hon. Member having given instructions at the Table that the Bill was to be put down for a particular date, he was not in a position to move now, because other hon. Members might have been misled. ["Hear, hear!"]