said it would be in the recollection of the Committee that when the Vote was last before the House the First Lord of the Admiralty refrained from dealing with many questions that had been raised respecting the personnel of the Navy. To one question he wished to recur. He alluded to the demand made for the telegraphic instructions sent by the Admiralty to the Admirals in Cretan waters, and to the reasons given by the First Lord of the Treasury for refusing to produce those Instructions.

said the matter did not arise on this Vote.

said he was not going to discuss it. He proposed to refer to it because they were dealing with the salaries of the Admirals, and he thought it would be relevant to ask for the Instructions given to the Admirals in Cretan waters.

said the Admirals simply carried out the instructions of the Admiralty, and the Admiralty were responsible for the issue of instructions, and, therefore, any criticisms—[Mr. ROBERTSON: "No," and cheers]—must be made upon the salary of the First Lord of the Admiralty, by whom the instructions were issued.

said that when he said "No," he did not mean to contradict the Chairman, but merely to suggest that he had not perhaps correctly apprehended his point. He did not propose to criticise the instructions to the Admirals, but merely to protest against the alleged rule of the Service that the instructions to the Admirals on active service could not be disclosed.

That would not arise upon this Vote, for obviously the Admirals who carry out the instructions are not responsible.

said that he would postpone what he had to say until the Admiralty Vote was reached. There was only one other question to which he would refer—that of the conduct of one of the Admirals; and he deprecated any attempt to make the officers or men of the Navy responsible for the policy they were carrying out, either by insinuation, accusation, or defence. Therefore, it was only right anything tending to impute, conduct not in accordance with the regulations of the Admiralty to any one of its officers should be brought to the notice of the Admiralty, and that they should have an opportunity of making such explanations as were possible. He wished to refer to a telegram in The Times of March 11, purporting to be from its correspondent in Canea, and the substance of which was this. He said:

"I have seen Admiral Harris, who has made a statement to me regarding an official visit paid by him to certain persons described as insurgent chiefs."

The Admiral told how the insurgent chiefs received what were called the autonomy proposals, and the Chiefs told him they never received the Proclamation of the Powers forbidding them to attack the towns, and never heard of the orders issued by the Admiralty to send doctors after the bombardment. The Admiral concluded by saying that these two Notes had been by him intrusted to the Greek Admiral, and his conclusion was that the Greek Admiral had failed to notify these facts to the insurgent Chiefs. The point to which he desired chiefly to call attention was this. The telegram concluded as follows:—"The Admiral particularly said that he, wished this to be communicated to The Times." He wished to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, if this telegram were true, the conduct imputed to the Admiral was consistent with the regulations of the Admiralty, and in particular with Regulation 682, which was made by the Admiralty for the conduct of all persons in the Fleet, from the highest to the lowest:—

"All persons belonging to the Fleet are forbidden to write for any newspaper on subjects connected with the Naval Service, or to publish, or cause to be published, directly or indirectly, in a newspaper or other periodical, any matter or thing relating to the public service."

He believed this to be an operative regulation at the present moment. He submitted that if the statement in The Times were true, the action of the Admiral in sending a message to a newspaper in this country, through its correspondent, was inconsistent with that regulation, the wholesome character of which the House would admit. He asked whether the attention of the First Lord of the Admiralty had been called to this, and whether he had made any inquiry regarding it?

said the message must have been sent on the Admiral's personal responsibility. Some time ago he complained of the fact—which he believed to be a fact, judging by the accounts of eye-witnesses—that during the recent bombardment shells were dropped into the garden of a convent and some women were killed. He brought the matter before the House at the time, but the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, from the lofty eminence on which he posed, treated with supreme and absolute contempt all information given by newspaper correspondents, but unfortunate individuals who had not access to the telegrams received by the Foreign Office, except such as the Under Secretary read to them, must base some reliance on newspaper correspondents, especially when the correspondents of different newspapers concurred. When the correspondents of such newspapers as The Times, Standard, Daily News and Daily Chronicle substantially agreed in their statements, they could not expect the ordinary Members of that House to treat such statements with absolute contempt. Had the Admiral or the Foreign Office inquired whether it was a fact that without notice a number of shells were fired from a British vessel into the garden of a convent, and whether any women in that convent were injured or killed? He thought they were entitled to ask whether Admiral Harris did take what would be considered by the Admiralty to be satisfactory steps to assure himself that those upon whom he opened fire had adequate warning. He did not think that a message sent to the Greek Commander was sufficient notice.

hoped the First Lord of the Admiralty would not accept the version given by the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down as representing the real facts. He very adroitly sailed near the wind, and did not state that the correspondents of The Times, Standard, Daily News and Daily Chronicle had asserted this fact.

said he relied on The Times chiefly.

asked if the hon. Gentleman said that there was a unanimity of opinion among these correspondents?

said he took the statement from The Times, and he believed the Standard and Daily News bore out the statement.

said that no correspondent, as a matter of fact, could have been on the spot at the time, and the statement must therefore have rested very much on hearsay. ["Hear, hear!"] There was no such consensus of opinion as to the bombardment of this convent as was supposed. He believed this convent was a very strong building, and was occupied by the insurgents for defensive purposes. He understood that one woman was wounded. An attempt had been made to represent our Admiral as not having taken sufficient pains to inform the insurgents of his proposed bombardment. It must be recollected that all the Admirals had been in constant and friendly intercourse with the Greek Commander. The Greek Commander was in communication with the insurgents, and it was exceedingly natural that the British Admiral should communicate with the insurgents, who were of a wild and ferocious character, through the Greek Commander. They heard from all the correspondents that there was a most deplorable lack of interpreters. Much of the mischief that had happened was caused through this, and he trusted the Government would see that the difficulty was removed as soon as possible.

thought the hon. Gentleman opposite had put a strained interpretation on the regulation which he had referred to. This was not a question of disclosing information about the public service. He took it that our Admiral spoke on behalf of the other Admirals associated with him, and probably he sent this infortion, by their desire, to correct the statements which had been sent not only to this country but to Europe. The hon. Gentleman, he was sure, would admit that The Times was the foremost journal in the world for conveying public information, not only to this, but to any other part of the world. He should have thought The Times would be received as the first organ of public opinion in all parts of the world, and, therefore, he thought the Admiral, instead of being blamed, was to be commended for his action. If the hon. Gentleman went so far as to say that when local correspondents were attached to fleets they were not to get information, that raised the whole question of the system by which special correspondents were so attached. It was public opinion that required this source of information. The Army as well as the Navy would no doubt be happy enough to do without correspondents, but as long as correspondents were approaching an Admiral in command of a squadron for information, he would be more than human if he did not endeavour to correct some false information, which all the Admirals must have felt very keenly.

I think the hon. and gallant Member has stated the case of Admiral Harris extremely well. I do not think Admiral Harris has done anything whatever against the spirit of the regulation to which the hon. and learned Gentleman referred. This is not information containing secrets of the service, and there is nothing in his action which at all contravenes that question of discipline which, I believe, is at the bottom of the regulation. If the Admiral were to be censured for sending this particular telegram, the whole question of furnishing information to war correspondents would have to be reconsidered. I am sure some hon. Members on the opposite side of the House will feel that it must have been extremely galling for the Admirals to have seen all the strictures cast upon them without being able to say one single word in their defence. [Cheers.] Accordingly, I should certainly not feel it my duty in any way to reprove Admiral Harris for the action which he took. [Cheers.] The hon. Member for East Mayo asks me what were the facts of the case referred to by him, and he again asserts that it was a convent that was fired upon.

said he did not know the facts; he had only said what was reported in the chief newspapers.

I do not know whether the hon. Member is aware that the place fired at by the Admirals was the headquarters of the insurgents. If, therefore, they fired at a convent it was because the insurgents had established themselves in a convent, and had raised their flag at that point. The British Admiral states that it was a homestead with stone walls round it. It was a strong place, and it was there that the insurgents flew their flag. With regard to the question of notice, it seems to me to have been as proper a precaution as could possibly be taken by the Admiral to communicate with the Greek Commodore, and for him to communicate with the insurgents. ["Hear, hear!"] The hon. Member knows the Admirals state that these notices were given, and I do really not see why the word of the Admirals in this respect should not be taken against any anonymous evidence. ["Hear, hear!"] The important question of interpreters has been raised. No doubt it would have been better if the ships had had a proper supply of interpreters, but hon. Members will, I think, see that there would be some difficulty in providing interpreters. A famous case was lately before the House in which the question of an impartial interpreter played a considerable part. It may have been that any Greeks or Turks taken as interpreters would be likely to be open to suspicion, and of course that is a very important point. It is very desirable that all ships of war should be furnished, as far as possible, with men capable of speaking various languages; it is a matter which has occupied my attention, and I am not surprised that attention should have been called to it. [Cheers.]

said he was surprised that the First Lord of the Admiralty should say that Admiral Harris had acted in accordance with the spirit of the regulations.

What I said was that he had not acted contrary to the spirit of the regulations.

replied that if Admiral Harris had not acted contrary to the spirit of the regulations, he must have acted in accordance with it. ["Hear, hear!"] It came to the same thing. The Question was whether or not the Greek Commodore had communicated certain facts as to whether the International Fleet would fire on the insurgents or not. Admiral Harris appeared to have considered that the Greek Commodore had not communicated with the insurgents; and he then calmly made an accusation of bad faith against the Commodore. But the Admiral did not write home to his own Government on the subject, and thus enable the Greek Commodore to reply; but he sent for the correspondent of The Times newspaper, and put into his hands this accusation against the Commodore, and asked him to send it to his newspaper. Nothing more objectionable, unfair, or contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Admiralty regulations could be conceived. [Cheers.] It now appeared that Admiral Harris in making this accusation against the Greek Commodore was absolutely wrong, and that the Greek Commodore did, as a matter of fact, communicate with the insurgents. Therefore it was obviously a case in which the Admiral, who had violated the regulations, ought to be blamed. Then as to the point in regard to the firing, the complaint was not that the Admiral had fired on a convent, but that he had fired at all. He did not say that Admiral Harris should be turned out of the Service, but he thought the First Lord of the Admiralty should inform the Admiral that when he had an accusation to make against a fellow Admiral, he would do well to forward the accusation home to his Government, instead of sending for The Times Correspondent and, without communicating with the Greek Commodore, have the accusation published to the world at large.

said be did not think the hon. Member for Northampton was correct in stating that Admiral Harris had accused the Greek Commodore of not having transmitted the message to the insurgents. All that Admiral Harris had said was that certain chiefs who had been interviewed stated they had not got the message. He did not suppose that Admiral Harris had any intention of accusing the Greek Commodore of having betrayed the trust reposed in him, and whether the Admiral was technically right in having communicated with the correspondent of The Times he did not profess to say, but he joined his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for East-bourne in defending the Admiral for the action he had taken, considering the provocation he had received. [Cheers.]

said there were two points in dispute. The first was—did Admiral Harris violate the Admiralty regulations in communicating with the newspaper correspondents; and, secondly were sufficient precautions taken before the order to fire on the insurgents was issued? In regard to the first point, this was not a case of the Admiral having offered or sent fresh information to a particular newspaper—for the explanation appeared in all the London daily papers the same morning; but it was a case t he Admiral taking the quickest possible way of making his position and the position of his brother Admirals clear to the world in regard to a certain false report which had been circulated against them—[Ministerial cheers]—and, taking that view of the matter, he should be very sorry if the result of the Debate should be to make it more difficult for newspaper correspondents to obtain information front naval and military sources during the grave crisis through which Europe was now passing. ["Hear, hear!"] In regard to the second point, he was not convinced that Admiral Harris had taken the necessary precautions before the order to fire was given. Admiral Harris admitted that he was now convinced that the insurgents had not received the message sent to them by the combined Fleet, and before giving the order to fire he ought to have satisfied himself that those on whom he was about to open fire were aware of what was required of them.

said he did not make any accusation against Admiral Harris. All he desired was information. He had hoped that the First Lord of the Admiralty would have been able to say that the telegram was incorrect. But it now appeared that the telegram was correct, and that the Admiral had sent the message to The Times.

I am sorry if I conveyed that impression. I am absolutely ignorant about this telegram to The Times, and whether the communication was made or not.

said that was the whole point. His complaint was not that The Times or any other newspaper should have obtained its information in this way, but that Admiral Harris should have expressed the wish, as the telegram said, that this information should be sent to The Times. Such action appeared to hint to be entirely inconsistent with the regulations; and he therefore sincerely hoped that there was some mistake, and that no such message had been sent by Admiral Harris. But there was one thing the House should take a note of, and that was the way in which the First Lord of the Admiralty appeared to be inclined to fritter away the most prominent, wholesome, and universal of the regulations of the Service. [Ministerial cries of "No, no!" and Opposition cheers.] If the plain words of the Admiralty regulations forbidding any person in the Fleet to publish or cause to be published, directly or indirectly, any matter relating to the public service, were to be treated in this way, it would be bad for the Service and bad for the House. ["Hear, hear!"] The First Lord of the Admiralty had said that Admiral Harris had acted under extreme provocation. Surely that was no excuse for any officer for violating—as he believed, or as he hoped, Admiral Harris dill not violate—the perfectly clear regulations of the Service. The consideration that newspaper correspondents would not find their enterprise as easy as they did now was not one which ought to weigh with the Admiralty or the House. The regulation was clear and specific, and he, for one, would not believe, without further information, that Admiral Harris did communicate this message, in the way described in the telegram, to a newspaper correspondent.

said that hon. Gentlemen opposite seemed to have misapprehended one fact. Commodore Reineck declared that he did deliver the message to the insurgents; but Admiral Harris's assertion was that he gave two notes to the Greek Commodore which were not delivered to the insurgents. As to Admiral Harris's communication to a newspaper correspondent, there was a broad distinction to be drawn between the use which Admiral Harris made of the correspondent—for he must assume that the telegram to The Times was true—and the suborning of a correspondent to write up a particular officer and particular views. The former act was in the public interest; the latter, though it was often done by naval officers, was most obnoxious. ["Hear, hear!"] A certain discretion should be allowed to an Admiral as to the manner of communicating news to the public. As to the Admiralty regulation against any officer writing or publishing any matter connected with the public service, that regulation was carried out in a most partial and mischievous manner. ["Hear, hear!"] It was notoriously not always enforced. Officers were every day writing to the newspapers; and officers and officials of the Admiralty as well were constantly writing to the Press anonymously to write up particular projects. On the other hand, the Admiralty would sometimes forbid an officer to publish articles of the utmost public importance. He had called attention to the case of a naval officer who was forbidden to read a paper before the Royal United Service Institution on the strategic interests of England in the Mediterranean. If the regulations were to be enforced against the smaller people, officials and officers should be forbidden to write to the papers anonymously. ["Hear, hear!"]

said that he did not complain of the statement of Admiral Harris. But when a question was asked as to this bombardment—an event which shocked the public opinion of the country—it was stated that Admiral Harris had given ample warning to the insurgents. That information remained unchallenged for a fortnight, until there appeared in The Times this telegram—as to the authenticity of which he had no doubt—stating that the Admirals had learnt in an interview with the insurgent chiefs that their warning had never been received by the latter. Before Admiral Harris fired on the insurgents he ought to have satisfied himself personally, without the intermediary of the Greek Commodore, that the insurgents were warned. Commodore Reineck was not acting with the allies, and had been treated by them with every sign of hostility and want of confidence. ["Hear, hear!"] But, on his own statement, Admiral Harris did not satisfy himself, but trusted to the action of the Greek Commodore. [Cheers.] It was his business to satisfy himself. [Cries of "Oh," and "How?"] By the same means that he afterwards took to communicate with the insurgents. [Cheers.] He might have met the insurgent chiefs on the shore before the bombardment just as well as after. Admiral Harris made a communication to The Times Correspondent at Canea shifting all the blame on to the Greek Commodore, who by this time had gone back to Athens. Commodore Reineck then called on The Times' Correspondent in Athens, and submitted to that Gentleman the documents on which he founded his contradiction of the Admiral's statement, and the Correspondent telegraphed to The Times that he had examined the documents and was satisfied that Commodore Reineck had done his best to warn the insurgents. The facts were these. The Greek Commodore sent on to the insurgents the Admiral's warning. The insurgents sent back a remonstrance stating that they were only on the defensive, and that the Bashi-Bazouks were the aggressors; but this did not reach the Admirals in time to stop the bombardment, and accordingly the insurgents were fired on while they were under the impression that they were still in negotiation with the Admirals. Because the British Admiral was in such a hurry, and sent his message in such a roundabout way, he opened fire on men who had no reasonable ground to expect the attack. ["Hear, hear!"]

said that he had never listened to a more extraordinary line of argument. [Cheers.] How was Admiral Harris to satisfy himself personally that the insurgents had received his warning?

By sending one of his own officers. [Cheers.]

said that in that case the hon. Member would have at once asked whether the officer understood Greek. [Cheers.] The Admiral gave two written notes to the Greek Commodore.

Why did he not send the British Consul? [Cheers.]

said that Sir A. Biliotti had performed, at great personal risk, an act of the greatest gallantry, for which he had been sneered at by the hon. Gentleman. [Cheers.] Sir.A. Biliotti's time was fully and nobly occupied, and it was most unreasonable to expect him to be employed in delivering these notes. But Admiral Harris did commit one slight indiscretion. He ignored what he should have known on high authority—that the Cretan chiefs might not always be persons whose word could be closely relied on. [Cheers, cries of "Oh," and an HON. MEMBER, The devil quoting Scripture," followed by laughter.] Mr. James Lowther went on to say that there was one thing which had come out clearly in the Debate. As the First Lord had told them, the "women and children" argument, which raiders were very fond of, was untrue in this case, as it was in another with which the House was familiar. [Irish cheers.] It was plain that word was conveyed to the insurgents, and, under these circumstances, the House might be perfectly well satisfied that the British Admiral had faithfully discharged his duty.

thought Admiral Harris might very well exclaim, in Shakespearian phrase, "Save me from my friends." The right hon. Gentleman had not followed the sequence of events at all. There was no desire on that side of the House to be severe, let alone unjust, to Admiral Harris, but they were determined to probe to the bottom a matter which concerned the lives of Christians who were struggling to free themselves from abominable tyranny. Of course Admiral Harris would naturally be indignant that a false construction should be put upon his conduct; but were they to have no regard for the feelings of the Greek Commodore and the Cretans because they were Greeks? Commodore Reineck, in the most categorical and clear manner, to the satisfaction of The Times' Correspondent, and not by verbal expressions but by the strength of documents sent by the insurgent chiefs, had proved first of all that he had conveyed the message of Admiral Harris and the other Admirals. [Cries of "No!"] He conveyed, at all events, the Warning.

What he did not do was to convey the Notes. He might have conveyed his own view, which might have been a very different view from that of the Notes.

retorted that if the Commodore conveyed the substance of the communications no one could say that he had not conveyed the warning. They were entitled to assume that he knew the contents. These unfortunate insurgents were entitled to be heard just as much as the Turks were. He believed Commodore Reineck had been most unfairly treated, but it was most desirable that the facts should come out, and if the statements which had been referred to were made by the insurgent chiefs, and were conveyed by the Greek Commodore to the Admirals of the allied Fleet, it was their duty to have satisfied themselves whether those statements were true or untrue.

pointed out that the hon. Member for East Mayo had cast a greater aspersion upon Commodore, Reineck than Admiral Harris or anyone else. The hon. Member asked, Why did not Admiral Harris take steps to ascertain whether the message was delivered? For his own part he had been under the impression that if a brother officer and colleague and gentleman undertook to deliver a message, it would be delivered. ["Hear, hear!"] Evidently the hon. Member was under a different impression, and was of opinion that the British Admiral ought to have taken steps beforehand to ascertain that his Greek colleague would do what he had promised.

thought it unfortunate that hon. Gentlemen opposite, in discussing this matter, should find it necessary to cast strong imputations upon everything connected with the Greek people and the Greek race. ["No!"] The Member for Sheffield had suggested as clearly as anybody could, without saying it directly, that Commodore Reineck had been guilty of mendacity, and the right hon. Member for Thanet had cast reflections on the character of the whole Greek people. [HON. MEMBERS: "No; Cretans."] Were not the Cretans Greeks? Did they not speak the Greek language?

Does not the hon. Member speak the English language? [Laughter.]

was glad to take as a compliment the suggestion that he, an Irishman, was able to speak the English language. Undoubtedly the Cretans were of Greek race. The complaint he had to make of the First Lord of the Admiralty was this. The correspondent of The Times in Athens, having been shown all the documents in the business, had expressed his strong conviction that Commodore Reineck had vindicated his own good faith. In face of that, would it not have been a courteous and almost necessary act on the part of the right hon. Gentleman representing the Admiralty to have also stated that in his opinion Commodore Reineck had vindicated himself and his nation from what, after all, was a very serious, and, if true, a very foul charge? Some complaint had been made of the action of the Admiral in communicating with The Times' correspondent. His hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy, who was a journalist, had naturally great sympathy for anything which extended the facilities of journalists. So had he. He did not blame the special correspondent for getting information either from the naval or the military commander. That was his business; if he did not do so, he would have rather a rainy day when he came back to his newspaper. With regard to Admiral Harris, no doubt, he was smarting under what was a serious charge, and felt bound to vindicate himself. He did not blame him for that. Were there not other channels and organs by which commanding officers could indicate the character of their defence except the newspapers of the country? There was, for example, the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Foreign Office. If Admiral Harris felt aggrieved his business was not to go to a newspaper correspondent, but to telegraph to the First Lord of the Admiralty and then to let the right hon. Gentleman make the statement. He thought that Admiral Harris had gone against the spirit of the orders under which he acted. His communication was to a large extent an intervention in what at the moment was a very fierce political question—namely, the responsibility of this country and the responsibility of the Greeks. That was a question in which naval and military offi- cers should mix as little as possible, and Admiral Harris had adopted the wrong way of defending himself.

said that as so much depended on the wording of this telegram, he asked permission to read it. The hon. Member for Northampton repeatedly said that Admiral Harris sent for The Times Correspondent. That was not borne out by the telegram, which said:—

"I have seen Rear-Admiral Harris at Suda. He says that, having been assured that the combat yesterday was provoked by the Bashi-Bazouks, he wished to confer with the insurgents. With the French and Italian Admirals he landed at Akrotiri this afternoon, saw six of the chiefs, and discussed the autonomy proposal, which was favourably received. In the course of the discussion he unexpectedly elicited the fact that the chiefs never received the proclamation of the Powers forbidding them to attack the towns, and never heard of the Admiral's offer to send doctors after the bombardment. Both these Notes were intrusted to the Greek Commodore Reineck, the Admiral trusting to his brother naval officer to communicate them to the insurgents. The Admirals were all convinced that the Akrotiri insurgents were not communicated with on these occasions. Doctors are to go to Akrotiri to-morrow. The Admiral particularly said that he wished this to be communicated to The Times."

A more extraordinary and monstrous idea of the duties of commanding officers than that apparently held by the hon. Member for East Mayo it would be impossible to imagine. According to the hon. Member the commanding officer had personally to satisfy himself—["No, no"]—that the insurgents had full notice. These insurgents had previously fired on the officers who had tried to communicate with them, and to suppose that the Admiral should land and go up two or three miles from the town to a high position in order to communicate with wild insurgents was ridiculous. It was equally absurd to say that he should send his flag-lieutenant or one of his officers when he had one of the most natural means of communication at his hand in the person of the Greek Commodore, whom he knew well and whom he naturally trusted. Hon. Gentlemen were placed in a most ridiculous dilemma, because if the insurgents were communicated with, as they said, then the whole charge against Admiral Harris fell to the ground. If they were not communicated with, the responsibility clearly rested on the Greek Commodore, who undertook the duty of communicating with them. A very un- just attack had been made on Admiral Harris on this occasion, as on previous occasions; and when hon. Gentlemen found fault with the Admiral for communicating the information to a newspaper correspondent who visited him, let them remember the attacks they made night after night, not on the Government, but on the Admiral, for bombarding the Akrotiri heights. ["Hear, hear!"]

moved to reduce the Vote by £279,545, in order to call attention to the great increase in this Vote as compared with past years. Ten years ago the amount of this Vote was £3,000,000, and it had gradually grown by £300,000 a year until the present amount of 4¾ millions had been reached. The £3,000,000 in 1888–89 provided for 62,000 men, while the asked for last year provided for 93,000 men; therefore in the ten years there was an increase of 60 per cent. in the amount of the money and 50 per cent. in the number of the men. Those were very grave figures. For the last ten years we had been steadily strengthening the Navy, and he thought they might at least stop for a few years instead of going forward at the rapid pace shown in this Vote. The Vote this year was the largest increase that had taken place in any year except 1893–94, and it was the amount of one particular Vote that ought to arrest the attention of the Committee. A very grave policy was involved in this, because the increase in money and men had not been defended. He had paid the greatest attention to the two former Debates, and beyond the information given in the Paper which had been distributed, the Committee was furnished with no reason why this Vote should be enlarged. In the Paper it was shown that the officers, seamen, and engine room artificers were to be increased, and that there should be 2,000 stokers added to the Navy. That seemed to him to be an extraordinary proposal. Some interesting figures had been quoted by the hon. Member for King's Lynn, and he thought that we could very easily provide for the necessities in reference to the number of stokers that might be required without having this burden thrown permanently on the country.

said that the House had already decided to increase the number of men employed in the Navy. It was open to the hon. Member to move that their pay should be reduced; otherwise he did not see how he could cut down the Vote by three-quarters of a million without reducing the number of men.

had noticed that the maximum number sanctioned by the House hail not been fully taken advantage of. He wanted to keep down expenditure, and he thought that the amount voted last year was sufficiently large for the purpose; he therefore objected to the increase. He did not think that there was anything in the condition of affairs which could justify such an increase as this.

again pointed out that the House had already decided to increase the number of men. If the hon. Member could show that the same number of men could be maintained out of the reduced sum he was entitled to do so; but the general question could not be raised a second time.

said that, broadly speaking he objected to this increase, believing that it would lead to further expenditure later on; hence his Motion to reduce the amount. He was strongly of opinion that the burdens thrown on the people by this constant increase in the expenditure of the Navy were greater than they had experience of in time of peace; and he did not think that they should be increased in the rapid way which had been shown during the last ten years.

said he rose out of courtesy to the hon. Member, but, as had been pointed out by the Chairman, the House had already decided to make this increase in the number of men, and thus the Admiralty now asked that the necessary pay should be provided. The only effect of the Motion of the hon. Member would be to indicate to the Admiralty that a reduction should be made; and he trusted that the hon. Member would withdraw his Motion or proceed at once to a division.

said there had been nothing this year in the nature of an ordinary statement as to the Navy. The First Lord referred them to a printed statement, but that did not give the information which his hon. Friend wanted, and which he thought he had a right to ask. He said that, although he did not agree with his hon. Friend. The taxpayer had a right to know, whether he took his hon. Friend's view of the matter or not. They had, he repeated, no statement this year, and if they did not get it on the Navy Estimates they should expect front the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the Budget a much fuller statement as to the Army and the Navy. His hon. Friend, he must say, had had no proper opportunity of raising this question of general expenditure on the Navy. As for himself, through the courtesy of the Admiralty, he had been able to work out, a statement for himself. He thought he had a knowledge of what had been spent this year, and also some idea of what would be spent next year. He found that it was very difficult, however, to arrive at the information.

said the right hon. Gentleman had said that the usual statement had not been made this year. Last year he followed the usual course, which he did not follow this year. The right hon. Gentleman gave notice of a Motion, which really covered the whole subject of the naval policy, as to men and shipbuilding. He was obliged to follow him. If the right hon. Gentleman had not made that Motion he should have made his statement in the usual way; but in his reply to the right hon. Gentleman he went fully into the whole subject. After that he did not think it necessary to make any general statement. Next year he would undertake to make the usual statement, hoping that the right hon. Gentleman would not intervene with a Motion.

said the point to which he referred—and he was not blaming the right hon. Gentleman as to the men and shipbuilding—was the question of expenditure. His hon. Friend had wished to take objection to the expenditure, and he had no opportunity of doing so. More and more money was being taken, but the total amount of the expenditure was not shown. It was clearly their duty to see what was the amount of expenditure. Up to the present they had had no opportunity of discussing that point.

said at the time the point was raised before, the accounts were not complete. He promised that either on the Loan Bill or on some other occasion a full statement would be made as to the cost of the Navy.

asked leave to withdraw his Amendment, after thanking Sir C. Dilke for the lucid way in which he had placed the matter before the Committee.

said that on the point of the training of men he would quote from a remarkable article in The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, contributed by Captain Baron Von. Lüttwitz, of the German Grand General staff. He said,

"Our Navy must be so strong that, after the withdrawal of the cruisers sent to watch foreign coasts, it can successfully cope with the English squadrons which may be in home waters."

He said, further, that in long periods of peace they were apt to exaggerate the importance of numbers; it was the spirit that inspired armies or a fleet. It was useless to have a large number of men on the Vote and large amounts for their pay unless they secured that the men were adequately trained. With regard to the item for certain officers at Jamaica, he utterly condemned the dockyards and hospital there. The hospital should be abolished as utterly useless. Ample notice should, of course, be given. He would appeal to the right hon. Gentleman to give hint some assurance that both the dockyard and the hospital would be abolished.

said he wished to call attention to the case of chief and petty officers in the Navy and their complaints and grievances, which had been before the Admiralty for at least l2 years. When the present Secretary for India was First Lord of the Admiralty he gave an assurance to the then Members for the constituency he now represented that these matters should be favourably considered. The Admiralty he had the honour to support gave the same assurance, and yet the claims of this large body of men still remained neglected. It was very remarkable that, while for the corresponding ranks in the Army and Marines pecuniary advantages were easily obtained, the Navy seemed to have been very badly treated in that particular. Probably that was accounted for by the fact that the Army and Marines had been so largely represented in the House. He hoped the First Lord would give an assurance that he would rearrange the whole scale under which chief and petty officers were employed. All they asked for was 1s. 2d. per day for each year of a second period of service, and that chief petty officers should be placed on a higher scale of pension than the first-class petty officer.

The question of pensions should be raised when the Pensions Vote comes on.

said there was another matter which caused a very great grievance in connection with the marking of parchments. A man might have served 19 years, during which his marks had been "very good," but for his last year he only got a "good" mark. The penalty for that was that his pension was reduced to 8d. a day. He hoped the First Lord would look into that matter and devise some remedy for it. ["Hear, hear!"] If these grievances were remedied, it would add largely to the popularity of the service, and would induce men who now refused to enter for a second period to remain in the service. That, he would point out, would be an absolute saving to the Government, seeing that it cost £200 to train a man. Moreover, the men who re-entered formed a steady, reliable body of men, and the loss by the withdrawal of trained men could not be over-estimated. ["Hear, hear!"] He would also ask the right hon. Gentleman to give some attention to the case of the stokers. The difficulty of obtaining men in this capacity arose from the fact that they were not Offered sufficiently good wages. All the stokers asked for was to be put on the same footing as other men. They asked that, on re-entering for a second period of service, 2d. a day should be given to them as it was given to men of the seamen class, and leading stokers asked for the a day after four years which petty officers received. He knew the enormous difficulty the Admiralty had with the stoker class, and he was sure that many of the obstacles in the way of their reentering would be removed by a slight addition to their pay. ["Hear, hear!"]

said that the grievances to which the hon. Member had alluded had been fully considered by previous Boards of Admiralty. He could not say that he thought that to put the petty officers on an equality with what were called the corresponding ranks in the Army and Marines would really be to their interest. The opinion he had formed coincided with that formed by previous Boards. The hon. Member had referred to the assessing of character on parchment certificates. That might occur in regard to any rating in the Navy, and he could not give him an assurance that any alteration would be made in the direction he desired. It would be very difficult to make a distinction in the case of one particular rating, and it would certainly not be conducive to the maintenance of discipline or beneficial to the men themselves. ["Hear, hear!"] There was no doubt that the increasing number of men who left the Navy with a certificate of the highest class was due to the fact that the regulations with regard to this matter were extremely strict. With regard to re-engagement, the hon. Gentleman seemed to think that the figures upon that point were not favourable, but he would point out that of every 100 seamen win, completed their first engagement, 55 per cent. re-engaged at once, and 12 per cent. after more or less short periods on shore, and the Admiralty had no doubt that the percentage would increase year by year. As to the supply of stokers, he could assure the hon. Gentleman that there was no difficulty whatever in obtaining an ample supply of men who in every way satisfied the conditions laid down, and the figures with regard to the re-entry of stokers were even more favourable than those with regard to seamen. Of every 100 stokers who completed their first period of service, 72 per cent. re-engaged at once and 72 per cent after a short period on shore. Therefore there was no reason why the Admiralty should invite the country to go to any further expense, as the pay of the stokers seemed quite sufficient to attract the requisite class of men. ["Hear, hear!"]

said that he wished to call attention to the order issued last year by the Commander-in-Chief at Devonport, with reference to the question of seamen wearing plain clothes on shore. In a communication which he had sent to the First Lord he pointed out that the order did not apply in the case of Portsmouth, and that when an attempt was made some twenty years ago to enforce an order of the kind, so much dissatisfaction was rightly expressed by the local tradesmen that the Admiralty allowed the order to lapse without officially withdrawing it. At Devonport the order had been allowed to lapse until the arrival of the new Commander-in-Chief, and its enforcement affected a large body of traders in the place, who, until then, had had the advantage of supplying the, men with plain clothes. The wish of the men to wear plain clothes on shore was not due to their being in any way ashamed of their uniform. They were, on the contrary, proud of it; but the conditions of life in port were such that the very best men found it desirable to wear plain clothes on land. The petty officers in harbour vessels, doing port duties, resided on shore, and naturally, when they went home, many of them liked to take a share in local affairs, and the wearing of plain clothes then resolved itself into a question of comfort and convenience. In the West of England nonconformity was very strong, and a large number of petty officers took leading parts in religious work, and it seemed to them that uniform was rather out of place in church or chapel, when the man wearing it was taking an active part in the service. Officers were subject to the same regulations as applied to the men, but in the officers' case the regulations were not enforced with rigidity. The same liberty ought to be extended to a seaman, who lived perhaps for three years at a home port, and who went on shore to his home night after night. Many men at Devonport who objected to the rigid enforcement of the order had shifted their quarters, so as to be outside the area patrolled by the naval patrol. There was another matter relating to the question of clothing which he wished to bring forward. Hitherto, chief petty officers and other ratings who wore the blue cloth had been allowed, on promotion, to get their outfits from their own outfitters, but recently an order had been issued that these men on joining or on promotion must procure their uniforms from the Government contractor. That had affected seriously the traders of Devonport, among whom the orders for these uniforms used to be distributed. The enforcement of the new order by the Admiralty meant a displacement of trade amounting to £15,000, and the loss of employment by a large number of men. It was his opinion that petty officers and others ought to be allowed to obtain their uniforms from whatever outfitters they preferred. The outfitters were quite willing to conform to any standard which, the Admiralty might lay down, and there ought to be no difficulty about securing uniformity of uniform. The new order appeared to him to amount in its results to an infringement of the Truck Act. Considering the great amount of dissatisfaction that was created by this order among the local trading community, he thought the Admiralty might well be lenient in their application of it. Such leniency would not be followed by any harmful results.

said that he could not admit that tradesmen in dockyard towns had any right to interfere in the smallest degree in questions which were matters of discipline. ["Hear, hear!"] The prosperity of these towns, he knew, depended largely on the expenditure in the dockyards, but when it was gravely suggested that such a question as whether plain clothes should be worn by seamen on shore ought to be decided by the local outfitters he thought the line must be drawn. ["Hear, hear!"] He knew that there was considerable agitation on this subject in dockyard towns—an agitation raised by the outfitters. Not long ago a deputation from a dockyard town proposed to wait upon him for the purpose of convincing him that bluejackets ought to wear plain clothes more than they did for the benefit of the townspeople. He refused to receive the deputation, not from want of courtesy, but because he did not think that the local authorities of the dockyard towns had any locus standi in the matter. It was not for them to decide how often and on what occasions bluejackets should wear uniform. According to what he had heard, when young sailors received their pay, outfitters rushed at them and tried to persuade them to wear private clothes. That was not a practice which he cared to encourage. Captains of ships had drawn his attention to this practice, and there was nothing improbable in the allegation, for as these towns were so anxious for custom it would be very unlike tradesmen not to take the first opportunity of getting hold of those who were likely to become good customers. The very importance that was attached to the question in dockyard towns showed how interested the townspeople were in promoting a custom which the Admiralty certainly did not wish to promote. It had been suggested that it was out of place for men in the Navy to appear in a Sunday school, or church, or chapel, in uniform. The present system was not worked harshly, but generously, and it was the opinion of the Admiralty, as, indeed, of all naval men, that it was to the interest of the service generally that uniform should be worn in the dockyard towns, and they were not prepared to depart in any way from that general position. ["Hear, hear!"] Every facility was given where it was necessary or clear that an advantage would arise from the wearing of plain clothes for this to be done, but the Admiralty did not wish to depart front the present practice, nor could he hold out any hope to the hon. Member that they would do so. The system of supplying the cloth for the uniforms from one Department insured that the same quality should be provided for all the Men, and prevented that diversity of pattern which was frequent before the existing arrangement was entered into. Formerly, when the men purchased their uniforms privately it was found that they were not quite right, and the defect had to be corrected at their own expense, or they had to purchase new uniforms. If it were shown that the uniforms now supplied to the men were of an inferior quality, that they had to pay More for them, or that there was any drawback which weighed heavily upon those who took their uniforms in this way from the Government stores, he would give the matter his best consideration. It was necessary that the men who entered the Navy should get their first uniform supplied from the Government stores, but inquiries should be made as to whether the men who re-entered were compelled to follow the same course.

whilst agreeing that a certain amount of laxity should be given in certain instances, considered that, in dockyard towns, it was extremely important that the men, unless there was grave and good reason against it, should go ashore wearing their uniform. He did not believe they were ashamed of their uniforms, but that, on the contrary, they were extremely proud of them. Again, it was an advantage that the naval uniform should be seen on shore. It was so little known that, when an officer came to London, people would fancy he was a railway servant, or something of that sort, and ask him what time the next train went to Exeter. [Laughter.] It was unfortunate that the naval uniform should be so little known, and inasmuch as the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Kearley), who represented the cause of the vendors of" reach-me-downs," had no further argument than want of comfort to advance, he really thought his case fell to the ground.

thought that with regard to the wearing of plain clothing, the same latitude should be extended to the ordinary seamen as was extended to the officers. It was quite natural that a seaman should desire to be relieved from the necessity of wearing uniform when he was attending divine service. He thought the hon. Member for Devonport had made out a good case for re-instituting the system by which, for a considerable period, men of all classes in the Navy were allowed to appear in plain clothes.

drew attention to the Lewes Prison, and asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether it was not the fact that a large number of seamen were sent there before their cases were adjudicated upon by Courts Martial? He was quite certain there was an abuse there, and he called attention to it, with a view to securing a remedy.

promised that inquiry should be made into the matter.

drew attention to the system of Naval Courts Martial. Up to 1881, the system of Courts Martial in the Army prevented any ordinary procedure being adopted such as existed in other courts of judicature, and a prisoner was obliged to have his questions written down, and they could only be addressed to the witnesses by and through the Court. This resulted in the destruction of many advantages to be derived from a verbal examination, and an examination on the spot. That system was entirely altered for the Army, and in 1893 a procedure was adopted which was the same as that now ordinarily followed in the ordinary courts of law. That was to say, the solicitor, or counsel, or friend of the prisoner bad the right of appearing for him and of conducting the examination in the usual way. But whilst that was the reformed system now applicable to Military Courts Martial, the present system of procedure in Naval Courts Martial was fixed by the Naval Discipline Act of 1866; and the Admiralty Instructions of 1893, framed under this old statute, followed much the same system as that followed in the old Courts of Chancery. Written interrogatories were administered, and the answer to each interrogatory was written down. In the Courts of Chancery this procedure was abolished many years ago and in the Naval Courts Martial alone was the system perpetuated under the Act of 1866. The procedure in Military Courts Martial should be adapted to the Courts of other arms of the Service. Besides this, whilst Military Courts Martial could adjourn, the statute of 1866 prevented the Naval Courts Martial adjourning. Naval Courts Martial often had to adjourn from day to day for the attendance of witnesses whose evidence was deemed desirable; but, owing to the power to adjourn being prohibited by statute, the Court had to go through the farce of meeting daily in the interim till the final date when the business could be disposed of. This wasted the time of the members of the Court and involved expense. He trusted that the procedure in Naval and Military Courts Martial would be made alike.

said that the procedure which had been followed so long had worked extremely well, and miscarriages of justice had been extremely rare. But he would look into the matter.

said he wished to complain of the disqualification of Royal Marine officers from sitting on. Naval Courts Martial when afloat. When the late Sir John Pope Hennessey brought the matter forward on the Army Annual Bill in 1891, the then First Lord of the Admiralty gave a definite promise that he would move an Amendment to the Naval Discipline Act giving Royal Marine officers a privilege which they enjoyed on shore. The First Lord said:—

"A good many naval officers objected to the proposed change. I personally cannot see why the change should not be made, and I will undertake to consider the matter, and propose an Amendment to the Naval Discipline Act this Session or next to carry it out."

He trusted the present First Lord would carry out the pledge of his predecessor.

said that as he read the "pledge," it merely was to consider the matter. Naval officers raised considerable objections, both from technical and disciplinary points of view, to the proposed change. He would consider the matter, but he could not definitely pledge himself to accede to the request of the hon. Member.

asked if the First Lord of the Admiralty could enlighten the Committee as to the progress made in training the Reserve. It was stated that in the increased amount of the Vote provision had been made for the increased attendance at drill apart from embarkation on board ships. The present drill in the batteries did not afford sufficient training for the men. The First Lord had taken credit for improving the batteries, but they were still, in the Opinion of those who had visited them, far from giving a satisfactory training in gunnery and discipline. Some improved guns had been put into them, but they were not of the most modern description. He should also be glad to hear what steps had been taken to improve the system of six months' training, which had seemed hitherto to be rather a failure.

also asked for information as to the guns which had been supplied to the batteries. There had been certain improvements, but he was afraid they were slight. To train the men with old-fashioned guns was of very little use. Training men for ship service in a battery ashore had serious disadvantages, as all sorts of assumptions had to be made. The men ought to be trained in a ship, or hulk, and he hoped the right hon. Gentleman was preparing to abolish entirely the present system of training in batteries in favour of ships. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would be able to give them some further information as to the prospects of the exceedingly interesting and serious experiment he was about to make of embarking second class men on board district ships for six months' training. Perhaps this was an attempt to substitute drill in ships for drill in batteries ashore, but in many cases there were no district ships, and it would be rather inconvenient if the men had to go a long distance for their training. The difficulty about reserve men was not that they were badly trained, but that it was very hard to get them to submit to the necessary restraint of naval discipline. In the naval service one man had to do one thing, and another man another, whereas it was different in the merchant service and in fishing vessels. Another point was that these men, when taken on board ship, were commonly put to the meanest and lowest jobs, and this discouraged them. He hoped the Admiralty would make this six months attractive to the men, and bring down the pension from the age of 60 to 50.

said that with regard to batteries being fitted with modern guns, a number of batteries had had an addition made to their armaments during 1896–97. They were doing their best, and they thoroughly appreciated the great importance of having these modern guns. He was afraid it would be a long time before they should go as far as to do away with the batteries altogether. There were two different lines of policy which might be adopted—one would be to do away with the batteries and only employ district ships for training the men and the other would be to employ district ships where possible while keeping up the supply of guns and so forth in the batteries. He placed the ships in the first rank, and these armament batteries in the second rank, but the Committee would see that they had certainly not neglected the case of these batteries, and had made it part of their duty to improve the drill wherever possible. In the scheme of mobilisation the newest ships would have the fewest Reserves, and as they got to the older ships they would increase the proportion of the number of Reserve men. The older ships, of course, were not fitted with such modern guns, and, therefore, if the Reserves were trained to use such guns as were in the older ships, it must not be thought that their work was thrown away. They would naturally all be trained as far as possible with modern guns. He begged the Committee would consider in all these matters how difficult it was to make rapid and proportionate progress in every direction proposed. Of the new scheme in regard to the Naval Reserve, he could not give final and absolute particulars, but he could give a sketch of the plan they were working out with all the attention they could bestow upon it. He hoped very shortly it would be in active operation. The cardinal points were to secure six months' training if it could possibly be done, and to do away with the old distinctions between first and second class, and establish a system of promotion from one class to the other. They based their hopes of success on two points—the promotion from the second class to the first class, dependent upon the six months' training, and on the pension. It was thought that the pension which was proposed would be one of the chief attractions which would induce the men to go for the six months' training. He had again been reassured that it was expected that the present second class men would avail themselves to a great extent of this offer. Of course only experience could show what the result would be, but those who were in touch with the whole of our Service were extremely hopeful that the attraction held out in the scheme would be sufficient for their purpose. He rather thought that the number of Reserves who might be expected to come forward had been underestimated, and the Committee would agree that if, besides the hold the Admiralty now had over them, they could have the additional hold of the advantages that would be forfeited if they did not appear, then there was considerable security for their appearance at periods of emergency. It had not been thought necessary to propose a larger increase until they had had some experience of how the experiment of sea-training resulted. With experience they could with some approach to certainty say to what extent the Reserves should be increased. He would not say the point at which they should stop, but first let them be content with the present proposal until the result of the experiment was known. It would be better to have 25,000, of whom 20,000 had been to sea for six months, than a larger number untrained. ["Hear!"] He could not guarantee the success of the scheme, but he would be disappointed if it did not succeed. The Admiralty had taken all reasonable means to secure a successful result to their experiments, but could not guarantee success. For the 600 Reserve men who would be afloat at one time the best arrangements that were possible would be made. It was not easy at first sight to see how the distribution could be arranged. Of course the training must be on ships not engaged on distant cruises, for the term of training was only six months, but the Admiralty officials were carefully considering how the six months would be best employed. So far as he could he had given the outlines of the proposal, and was ready to answer any further questions, admitting the value of a full discussion upon it.

said he had listened with great interest to the right hon. Gentleman's statement of the scheme proposed in regard to the Reserves. The amount of money for the Reserves, £249,900, was far too small, and the increase was not enough to call forth adequate Reserves for the Fleet. He turned to the pages of the Estimates relating to the Reserves. He was told the other day that the Admiralty were getting plenty of engineers and artificers for the Navy, and that there was an ample reserve, but he found that the reserve of engineers was as last year, 300; no increase at all. The amount of money for lieutenants and sub-lieutenants was only increased by £500, but there were no additions to engineers. Why had not the First Lord made arrangements for increasing the reserve of engineers? He was told the other day of some 98 torpedo boats rusting in various yards at home and abroad; could they be manned should they be required? Why should these remain useless in basins and creeks? Why should not a scheme be formulated for the training of engineers for the Reserve, and one of these torpedo boats be stationed at every port and at the mouth of every river round our coasts for the training of engineer reserves? Why should not a torpedo boat be stationed at Sunderland and on the Tyne for such training purposes? Ho had repeatedly urged the training of engineers for the Reserve, but his words had been very lightly treated by the Admiralty. As he read in the Portsmouth correspondence, the steam reserve was terribly short of officers and men. There were not enough to keep ships moderately efficient, and when the Mars completed her trials at the end of the week and the Powerful went for her gun trails there would not be enough men for both ships at once.

said the hon. Member was not referring to the Naval Reserve?

said he was speaking of the reserve of engineers, but he would not proceed if it was a painful subject to the right hon. Gentleman.

said he did not know whether the hon. Member meant the Naval Reserve; the Portsmouth correspondent was alluding to the active list of the steam reserve and dockyard reserve.

said if that was the condition of the active list, where were the reserve engineers? There were 300 down in the Estimates but no more. Was it not an extraordinary state of affairs that, with an expenditure of 22 millions, there should be no reserve of engineers? It was all very well to say you could get 25,000 reserve men, but where were the firemen and engineers? What would be the use of bluejackets if there were no firemen and engineers? He would like to see in the Estimates provision made for engineers and firemen to man every ship in case of need. If the Reserve ships were mobilised, were there engineers to put on board of them? No; for there were but 300 engineers in the Reserve. The right hon. Gentleman would be well advised if he had put down double the amount of money and made it half a million for the Reserves. What availed it to put on board the Reserve ships bluejackets and men to work the guns, if there were not men below to work the heart and life of the ship in the engine room? At every port there should be a torpedo boat, and every encouragement should be given to young men to join the engineer reserve. He had little doubt that apprentices and young men would join, he could himself induce a score of such to join. Put down half a million or more for Reserves, and let the country have the satisfaction of knowing that for every ship afloat there were the men to man her at any moment when required.

said the practical knowledge and experience of the hon. Member who had just spoken entitled his observations on engineering subjects to careful consideration. Whether correctly or not he did not know, but it was reported at the time of the late naval manœuvres that so short were the Admiralty of engineers that they even had to withdraw a few from the Royal yacht. At the moment we had in the Reserves between 23,000 and 24,000 men. That was an absolutely insufficient number in the event of war. It had been calculated that in the first six or eight months of a naval war we would lose from 20 to 25 per cent. of the men in the Fleet. How could those losses be replaced? Where would we get engineers to replace the engineers of the first line? He contended that the Naval Reserve should be not 23,000 men, its present strength, but at least 50,000 or 60,000 men. A very large percentage of the men who left the Army after five or six years' service went into the Reserve, and the State paid a large sum to maintain them. But nothing of that kind was done in the Navy. When the men left the Fleet, after 10 or 21 years' service, no effort was made, as in the Army, to retain them in the Reserve. He would suggest that in order to bring the Reserve up to the proper strength, a bonus should be given, not only to the sailors who served in the Mercantile Marine, but to the shipowners, to retain in their service men who would be available for the Reserve; and also that inducements should be held out by the offer of bounties to the fishermen and others connected with the sea in our colonies to serve in the Fleet in case of emergency. In that way the colonies would be knit together with the Mother Country in a grand Imperial system for the defence of the Empire. He also thought the number of training ships should be increased. There were parts of the kingdom from which, if there were only training ships there, a large number of boys could be obtained for the Navy. He admitted that the Admiralty had taken a step or two in the right direction, but, in his opinion it was a monstrous thing that we, who were able to build ships year after year faster than any other nation, should not have sufficient men to man them in times of difficulty and danger. He ventured to think that the House would most willingly vote a million of money for a sufficient Reserve, and thus show to foreign countries that if our first line of defence should unfortunately be defeated, we would have sufficient men and sufficient ships to retrieve the disaster.

considered that the scheme which had been presented to the Committee by the First Lord of the Admiralty was a good step in the direction of obtaining a really efficient Reserve; and he had no doubt that under it the Admiralty would be able to obtain as many men as they desired. In certain batteries there were men who looked upon the Reserve as a gigantic system of outdoor relief. That feeling did not prevail in the South of England, but he knew it existed in the North of Scotland. In 1886, when there was an impression that this country would be engaged in a naval war, he had had the honour of commanding a large battery of Reserve men, among whom there was a very strong feeling in favour of volunteering. He desired to join in the appeal of his hon. Friend the Member for King's Lynn to the First Lord of the Admiralty to lower the age at which men in the Naval Reserve became entitled to a pension. For men who followed the hard life of the sea 60 years was a very high age for a pension, and he believed that if the age were lowered to 50 years the Admiralty would get a much better class of men.

expressed the opinion that the scheme propounded by the First Lord of the Admiralty was doomed to failure at the outset. Before entering on the new departure, the Admiralty ought to have initiated some system under which the existing Reserve could be reorganised and made more efficient. A great deal had been said in and out, of the House with regard to the efficiency of their Naval Reserves. It had been alleged that, in the event of war, their Naval Reserves would not come forward for the purpose either of serving or of replacing that waste which must naturally occur during war. As against those allegations he would like to mention the Report of the Departmental Committee, presided over by the late Admiral Tryon, which sat for the purpose of inquiring into the then existing organisation of the Reserve. One point of the inquiry was to ascertain whether the men would or would not come forward in the event of an emergency. In accordance with the evidence, and the facts and figures placed before the Committee, they found that, out of a Reserve of something like 20,000 men, there came up for drill in the year 1891 no fewer than 18,800 men, nearly half of them belonging to the seafaring class. It was also found that out of those 18,800 men, 16,000 of them were employed in the home or coasting trade, and 2,500 only were engaged in the long voyage trade. This was disproof of the allegation that, in the event of an emergency, the Reserves would not be available. He held that the Naval Reserve proper ought to be raised to the numbers in accordance with the Act of 1859, namely, 30,000 men. In his opinion, the Admiralty were not utilising the material they had at hand, and which they could utilise at a very small expense. They were not utilising the material they had at hand in connection with their seamen and fishermen. He held, therefore, that it was the bounden duty of the Admiralty at once to increase the Reserve under a system which could be extended, and not to enter upon this Utopian scheme of creating a new reserve by enrolling a number of men for six months, because he felt bound to say that the scheme was doomed to be unsuccessful, as men would not leave good employment for six months, which, when finished, might leave them iii the same predicament as the men of the Army Reserves—namely, swelling the ranks of the unskilled unemployed. He held that, in addition to the resources ill this kingdom, there were other resources out of which reserves might be raised which had never yet been tapped. There were, for instance, 70,000 men and boys engaged in seafaring life, in the coasting and fishing trades of Newfoundland. They ought to enlist a large number of men in their Naval Reserve in connection with their colonies, who, in the event of war, would be invaluable in replacing the waste and in supplying any less which might occur in connection with the men on board the Fleet on the North American station. He was glad to hear from the First Lord that their obsolete batteries were at last to be done away with and re-armed, but he held that the whole of the men in connection with the Naval Reserve should as far as possible be sent on board and be made familiar with the working of the ships on which they alight one day have to fight. All classes of ships should be sent to the several Reserve Districts, and the men trained on board at sea, without, however, interfering materially with their shore employment.

said that the Admiralty, having left the old groove, would no doubt take this matter in hand with the greatest zeal and enthusiasm, and he was quite ready to believe that his right hon. Friend and those who advised him had turned the information at their disposal to the best account on this occasion. He should have thought that there was further room for further consideration as to whether 60 was not somewhat too old for a pension, but that seemed to be regarded as a proper age by a considerable number of persons, and he had no very strong views on the subject himself. He was disposed, looking far ahead, to rely much more upon a real Reserve than a good many Gentlemen who addressed that House and many Gentlemen who had had official connection with the Admiralty. He quite agreed with the First Lord that they could not expect this country to keep on the active list a larger number of seamen than what they now understood as a liberal allowance—at this moment, he supposed, something like 100,000 men. But he thought they would have, in the future, to rely much more upon a highly-trained Reserve. He was inclined to think that the sound policy would be to affiliate to their existing system a system of short service. He thought it was very doubtful indeed whether six months' training would be sufficient to make the men efficient for the purpose. He doubted whether anything under two or three years would really make a Reserve such as they understood by a Reserve when they spoke of it in connection with the Army. The Admiralty could not easily have taken a step of this kind all at once. He congratulated the First Lord on what he had done, and, if it were successful, it would effect a great improvement, because there was no doubt whatever that the Reserve to-day was completely unsatisfactory. Whatever the willingness and zeal of the men, the training had hitherto been so insufficient that in case of war a small number of Reserve men would have had to be scattered among a large number of trained men. The suggestion that engineers and firemen should be trained on torpedo boats stationed at various ports was well worthy of consideration. The engineers front the merchant service could no doubt do useful service on the large men of war, but the engines and boilers of torpedo boats and destroyers would be wholly unfamiliar to them. They were of quite a different type.

said that if the fresh departure made this year were judiciously carried out it would be of the utmost value to the service. It was most important that the Reserve men should receive a training in the home ports, where they could become acquainted with the construction and repair of machinery, and where they could be sent out on the various vessels making the trials. The experience of the new type boilers and engines running at the highest pressure which they would thus get, was something which no six months at sea would supply.

asked how it came that 300 boys were included in the Reserve. Boys should be trained for the Navy, not for the Reserve. Of the 1,400 officers on the Reserve establishment this year, he believed that nearly all were employed on ocean going steamers. In this duty, they simply went to and fro over one route. Now the Navy, in time of war, would have a great deal of coast duty to do, and men who knew every headland, harbour, current and tide, would be most useful in such work. There were hundreds of men in Canada—the masters of steamers on the coasting trade—who would be most valuable in the Reserve. Why did not the Admiralty avail themselves of such men? Last week he had been reported to say that there were from 4,000 to 5,000 deep- sea fishermen in Canada. Those figures related to the number in his own constituency; the number in all Canada was 71,000.

called the attention of the Admiralty to the large number of "readymade men" that were available for the Navy on the River Thames, at the port of London. There were between 10,000 and 12,000 watermen and lightermen exclusively employed on the Thames, and able and willing to serve their country. At a large meeting, held about a year ago, more than 1,000 of the men volunteered to give their services to the country as Reservists, if the Government would only grant them the same facilities as their fellows enjoyed at other ports in the country. These men would be most valuable, for, in case of war, the enemy would certainly make straight for London.

said that the "ready-made men" in his hon. Friend's constituency were essentially river men, and had not the preliminary sea-training which men in the Reserve possessed. He did not think his hon. Friend's constituency was in danger of invasion; but he would rather offer his hon. Friend to a foreign foe than increase the expenditure on the Reserve to include the men his hon. Friend had mentioned. As to the sources suggested by the hon. and gallant Member for Pembroke, that opened large Imperial questions which had not been contemplated by the Admiralty in this connection. The Admiralty had taken a new departure and proposed to offer facilities to a proportion of engineer officers in the Naval Reserve to attend for a three months' training at one of the ports this year. If this step were a success, the Admiralty would no doubt follow it up. They were quite conscious of the benefits which would be derived from a large number of engineer officers coming forward for this training. The hon. Member for Gateshead had said the Admiralty had torpedo-boats in various ports but could not man them. There was no foundation for that assumption. The manning or such boats was provided for among the Active Service men voted in the Estimates, and it was not the intention of the Board of Admiralty that engineer officers in the Naval Reserve should serve on torpedo-boats or torpedo-boat destroyers. In time of war vessels of this class would be manned exclusively by engineer officers engine room artificers and stokers of the Royal Navy. The only other point he had to notice was that raised by the hon. Member for St. Pancras. It was not the fact that during the recent manœuvres engineer officers had to be withdrawn from the Royal Yacht because they were required for other ships.

asked why the Admiralty had not more than 300 reserve engineers.

thought he had made that plain. They did not require any more. According to their calculations they had sufficient engineer officers in the Royal Navy to man the Fleet. They had 300 in the Naval Reserve who might become available in the event of waste of war, but they were not required for mobilisation.

said he had shown conclusively that they could not man the Fleet at present; 300 reserve engineers were not reserve at all for the Navy of Great Britain. Instead of a paltry £250,000 being taken for the reserve, they ought to take half-a-million sterling, and instead of having 300 reserve engineers, they should have something like 3,000. The Admiralty would not give young engineers encouragement to join the service. Three or four years ago he undertook to get 50 reserve engineers if the country would only give them a retaining fee of £10 or £15 a year and allow them to wear a jacket with brass buttons. Hundreds were to be got at every engineering port if proper encouragement were given.

remarked that about ten years ago the Ordnance Department was placed under the the Admiralty, and Parliament was informed that the conduct of that Department would be handed over to naval officers. Although ten years had elapsed, not a naval officer was employed on the work. Was there any chance of gunnery officers or officers thoroughly qualified being intrusted with those duties?

said that the future of the Naval Ordnance Department had not yet been definitely settled. It was still under consideration whether it was advisable, or possible, in all cases to substitute naval officers for the present officers, who were drawn from the Army. He could not give his hon. and gallant Friend any definite information now.

asked whether anything was being done to improve the cruisers on the Australian station.

said it was proposed to gradually substitute other ships for those now employed on the station. The same course was being followed in other cases. ["Hear, hear!"]