I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War whether his attention has been drawn to an article which appeared in the Railway Review, under date 24th December, 1897, in which an appeal, signed by G. Lloyd, Captain and Adjutant, Recruiting Officer, is made to the Army Reserve men in the Wrexham district (North Wales) to act as pickets for the protection of the railway company's property, and with a view of preventing intimidation of those members of the railway staff who wish to continue their duties in the event of a railway strike taking place which at that time was threatened; and whether it is legal for a Captain in the Army to interfere in a dispute of this character, and, if it is not, whether he will cause an inquiry into the conduct of this officer?

Without expressing an opinion as to the legality of Captain Lloyd's proceeding, I may soy that the Commander-in-Chief, on 21st January, expressed his disapproval of the action of Captain Lloyd, as well as of that of a superior officer who sanctioned his action.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that the tenants on the Clonlost Estate of Mr. Palmer, in the county of Westmeath, signed agreements to purchase their holdings from the Land Judge nearly two years ago, and that, nevertheless, the sale has not yet been carried out; and, if so, what is the cause of the delay in completing the sale?

There are not, at present, any proceedings pending for the sale of this estate, either in the Land Judges' Court or before the Irish Land Commission.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland what are the numbers, according to the various religious denominations, of examiners and centre superintendents in connection with the Intermediate Education Board, Ireland, for the past year, whether, in consideration of the great number of pupils sent forward for examination by the Methodist College, Belfast, the Wesley College, Dublin, and other Methodist schools, he will consider the desirability of securing to the Methodists a greater number of the said appointments during the coming year; and whether the present Government intend soon to alter or enlarge the constitution of the Intermediate Board, so as to give thereon the Methodist Church at least one representative?

I am informed by the Assistant Commissioners of the Board of Intermediate Education that in the cases of examiners and centre superintendents it is the practice of the Board to appoint, as far as practicable, equal numbers of Roman Catholics and Protestants. The total number of examiners in 1897 was 75, of whom 37 were Roman Catholics, 33 Episcopalians, and five Presbyterians. In the case of Centre Superintendents for 1897, 134 Roman Catholics were appointed, and 133 Protestants, of whom 76 were Episcopalians, 50 Presbyterians, and seven Methodists. The suggestion of my hon. Friend in favour of the appointment of a Methodist representative on the Board will be noted by the Lord Lieutenant for consideration on the occurrence of a vacancy thereon, but the limit placed on the number of members of the Board may make the suggestion difficult to carry out, and I am afraid I cannot promise legislation on the subject.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War, if it is proposed before long to relieve the Royal Welsh Fusiliers sent to Crete at a few hours' notice last spring; if huts have now been provided for them; if the difficulties of obtaining drinking water have been overcome; and if officers and men have been granted field allowances in consideration of the irksome character of their duties, and the expenses to which all ranks are put as part of an international force?

As at present arranged, the Royal Welsh Fusiliers now in Crete will be relieved in the course of a few months, but, of course, all such arrangements are liable to change if circumstances require it. Huts for the troops were sent out towards the end of last year, but it is believed there have been difficulties as to their erection. Meantime, the provisional arrangements for winter quarters are understood to have been very successful. The tents have been provided with puddled floors and wooden sides. The men have also been supplied with beds. The Navy supply condensed water, as to which no complaint has been made. The officers have field allowance. The Warrant Officers also have field allowance if under canvas. Officers and men have rations on the field service scale.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any steps have yet been taken to appoint a Commercial Secretary to our Embassy in Japan, in accordance with the recommendation of Mr. Brennan in his recent Report; and, if not, whether, in view of the great and growing Foreign trade of Japan, the Government intend to make such an appointment?

It is not proposed to make such an appointment at present, as it is thought better to wait and see the result of the similar appointment quite recently made in China.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War whether he can lay upon the Table any information supplementary to the Return issued last Session showing the number of discharged soldiers chargeable to the poor rate?

Later returns showing the number of soldiers chargeable on a day in December have been called for from the several localities, but all have not yet come in. When the whole are received and tabulated the Secretary of State will consider whether he can lay the Return on the Table.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he is able to give any information with reference to the outrages stated to have been committed in the vilayet of Kossovo, and enumerated in the memorandum presented by M. Marcoff, the Bulgarian Agent, to the Porte on the 31st January; and whether a representative of the British Embassy at Constantinople will be instructed to proceed to the spot as soon as possible in order to investigate the matter, either alone or in conjunction with the representatives of other Embassies?

A member of Her Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople has been at Uskub for the last 10 days, and it appears from his telegraphic reports that there is primâ facie considerable foundation for the statements made in the memorandum presented by M. Marcoff to the Porte. A Commission of Inquiry has been sent by the Sultan to Northern Macedonia, with large powers to investigate the charges of violence which have been brought against the Turkish authorities, and its proceedings will be duly reported upon to Her Majesty's Government.

I beg to ask the Financial Secretary to the War Office when the Report of the Committee appointed to consider the question of the Decentralisation of the Army Clothing Department may be expected; and whether the organisation of the clerical staff of, and the claims to promotion of the Second Division clerks employed in, the office of the Director of Army Clothing have been dealt with by that Committee?

The Departmental Committee on the Decentralisation of the Army Clothing Department has not yet reported, and, as the subject involves an immense amount of detail I cannot say when it will report. Meanwhile, the decentralisation has commenced, but at present it is impossible to determine what staff will be required for the Office at Pimlico when decentralisation has been completed.

I beg to ask the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, whether there is any intention upon the part of the Admiralty of placing the unskilled labourers employed at the Royal Victualling Yard, Deptford, upon the increased rate of wages recently granted to the unskilled labourers employed under the War Office at Woolwich?

The matter is under consideration, and I can make no statement until the Estimates are before the House.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been called to the want of proper precautions for the protection of life at the level-crossing at Drumleigh, on the Bantry Extension Railway; whether he is aware that a cow has recently been killed at said crossing, and the train narrowly escaped being thrown off the track, and that the life of the boy who was driving the cow was endangered; and what action the Board of Trade propose to take with regard to this crossing?

I am informed that the crossing in question is a private-farm crossing, and in that case the Board have no power with regard to it. The company state that the owner of the cow killed is responsible for keeping the gates shut when trains are approaching and for taking all precautions.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether the out-door relief given and the moneys chargeable under the proposed Bill for the relief of distress in Ireland is to be an electoral division charge until the sums reach the maximum for indoor relief in the electoral division where such relief is given?

The outdoor relief given while the Local Government Board Order is in operation is to be charged in the same manner as indoor relief. That is to say, if the rate for relief on any electoral division exceeds the average rate over all the divisions by 50 per cent. the excess is charged to the Union at large.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, whether he can now state approximately when the agricultural holdings on the White estate, Bantry, will be disposed of?

I am informed by the Registrar of the Land Judge's Court that it would be impossible to state, even approximately, when this estate will be dealt with under the 40th Section of the Act of 1896.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India whether Dum-dum or explosive bullets have been employed against Her Majesty's troops in the North-West Frontier campaign; whether the use of such missiles is opposed to the canons of International Law; and whether the Government are taking any steps to trace the source of supply of such bullets if they have been used in the campaign as stated?

The so-called Dum-Dum bullets, which are not explosive bullets, have been used against the troops in the recent Frontier campaigns, and are probably part of a large quantity of ammunition captured from a convoy by the Afridis at the advance on Maidan. The use of these bullets is not opposed to any international law or to the customs of war.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the Government are making or intend to make any inquiry into the alleged supply of guns by Birmingham gunmakers to the hostile tribes of the North-West Frontier of India?

Her Majesty's Government are conducting an inquiry into the entire question of the illicit importation of arms into Persia.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War, whether he can inform the House of the opinion of the Canadian Government on the proposal which was referred to it by Her Majesty's Government as to opening Canada for a territorial recruiting area; and whether steps have been taken to further the proposal of creating regimental districts in several greater Colonies of the Empire?

The opinion of the Canadian Government on this subject has not been communicated to Her Majesty's Government. I am not aware of any proposal to create regimental districts in any other Colony.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India whether his attention has been drawn to a statement to the effect that Damodar Chapekar, now under sentence of death for the Poona murders, declared on his trial that a police superintendent had promised him a sum of 20,000 rupees and employment for his brother in the police; and whether any information upon this matter has been received from the Indian Government; and if not, whether an inquiry will be made to ascertain if such a declaration was made at any time by the condemned man?

I have received no information from the Government of India as to the trial of Damodar Chapekar, but I have seen a newspaper report of it, from which I gather that he did make the statement referred to in the question. I also gather that no credit was attached to it; and, as at present advised, I see no reason for making any especial inquiry on the subject.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, whether he will state the number of sittings which the Chief Land Commission held outside of Dublin during the year 1897, and at how many of these sitting's Mr. Commissioner O'Brien sat as a member of the Court?

There were 23 sittings to hear appeals by the Chief Commissioners held outside Dublin during the year 1897. Pursuant to arrangements made by the Land Commission with regard to the distribution of the business of the Department between the Commissioners, the Judicial Commissioner and Mr. Commissioner Fitzgerald are members of the Court at all sittings for rehearings and fair rent appeals. The other three Commissioners attend such sittings practically in turn. At seven of these sittings Mr. Commissioner O'Brien sat as a member of the Court.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, (1) what is the gross amount of the grants of public money made by grand juries in Ireland to the Shannon Development Company; what were the conditions under which these grants were made; how far have these conditions been fulfilled by the company; (2) whether the grand juries have any power to enforce alleged agreements with railway companies; (3) whether he can say who were accountable for the alleged mismanagement of last summer's tourist traffic on the Shannon, for the promotion of which the grants referred to were made; and (4) will the Government sea that these moneys are made use of only for the purpose of developing the passenger and other traffic on the Shannon?

The gross amount of the grants made by grand juries to the Shannon Development Company is £11,900, made up of two annual contributions of £100 each for seven years, and six annual grants of £250 each for the same period. The conditions under which these grants were made are set out in the several presentments. The Board of Works have certified that the conditions as regards the agreement with them have been fulfilled, but it rests with the county authorities to say if the obligations imposed by the presentments have been carried out. On this latter point I have no information, nor have I any knowledge of the alleged agreements referred to in the fourth paragraph. As regards the fifth paragraph, there may have been unavoidable irregularities incidental to the opening up of the new service, but none sufficient to justify the withholding of the certificates by the Board of Works. The formal agreement between the Development Company and the Board contains provisions for the application of any moneys received from the counties to the purposes of the service during the period named in the agreement.

I beg to ask the Lord Advocate whether he is aware that the Moray Firth Fisheries' Association have recently subscribed to charter a steamer to patrol the Moray Firth for the detection and prevention of breaches of the law by trawlers; and whether it is proper that the maintenance of the public law should be left thus to private enterprise?

The fact stated in the first part of the hon. Member's question is, I understand, accurate, but so far as I know she has failed to detect any British trawler fishing within the prescribed area. I cannot admit the assumption conveyed in the last part of the question.

I beg to ask the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether £1,000 was recently expended in the Royal Laboratory upon an attempt to produce a new type of machine gun which resulted in failure; if he can state who it was who authorised this expenditure in a factory which has no experience in the manufacture of machine guns or work of a similar nature; and if the experiment was conducted at the Royal Laboratory because the Enfield factory has been for more than two years without any professional head qualified to superintend the manufacture of a new weapon?

About £1,000 was expended out of moneys voted for the purposes of experiment in an attempt to produce at the Royal Laboratory a new machinegun. The gun was not a failure, but it was abandoned because a still more promising weapon was invented by a private firm. The gun in question was devised by a member of the mechanical staff of the Royal Laboratory, and its manufacture in that factory was sanctioned, as I think rightly, by my predecessor, the hon. Member for Hanley, in order that its inventor might superintend the process. The Royal Laboratory has, perhaps, unrivalled experience as respects this class of gun, and there was no vacancy in the office of Superintendent at Enfield when the experimental manufacture of this gun commenced in 1894.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War whether the attention of the Military authorities has been directed to allegations recently made, as to the existence of a traffic for what is practically the sale of Volunteer commissions, conferring on the purchaser the right, if he chooses to exercise it, of assuming honorary military rank; whether any specific instance of this practice has recently been brought to his notice in connection with one of the Metropolitan Volunteer Corps; whether the officers chiefly concerned in the alleged transaction have been called upon to furnish explanations; and whether the name of any person proved to have obtained a commission in the manner referred to will be removed from the Army List, a notification of the circumstance being duly made in the London Gazette?

The Secretary of State's attention has been called to the specific case referred to in the Question, and he has directed that the appointment to an honorary Colonelcy in the Volunteers be cancelled. Inquiry will also be made in regard to other Officers concerned in the transaction.

I beg to ask the Financial Secretary to the War Office for what reason, and on whose recommendation, Mr. Donaldson has been appointed to the post of Deputy Director General of Ordnance Factories; whether he is aware that of late years a largo number of Officers of the Army and Navy have been selected to fill the most important posts as directors and superintendents of great manufacturing establishments, and have shown themselves eminently qualified for the work entrusted to them; and whether, among the 6,000 officers serving in the Army, it was impossible to find one officer competent to occupy the post of Deputy Director General of Ordnance Stores; and if any such officer could be found, why he was not appointed in preference to a civilian, who is unacquainted with the management of an ordnance factory, and has no knowledge, either theoretical or practical, of military stores?

The appointment of Mr. Donaldson, as I have already stated in answer to a Question, was made in pursuance of one of the recommendations of Lord Morley's Committee. Mr. Donaldson had high testimonials, and the necessary experience in the management of a factory. It is well known that retired Officers of the Army become directors of manufacturing companies, but they are not, except in very rare cases, entrusted with the management and control of the works. The Ordnance Stores are under military control.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what information he has in reference to the distress reported to prevail amongst the peasantry of Crete; whether a large body of peasants, numbering about 500, have been at Paleocastro for some time in a state of semi-starvation waiting in hopes of getting away to Greece; and whether the admirals are taking any steps to secure that relief is sent to those districts where the people are in want of food?

Sir Herbert Chermside reported on the 11th instant that over 700 Christians were on the seashore, a few miles west of Candia, in a destitute condition, and that they wished to embark for Greece. Relief was distributed to them by the British and Russian Authorities. In addition to the sum of £400 which has already been contributed by Her Majesty's Government for general relief purposes, a further sum of £300 has been granted for this emergency, to be administered by Sir H. Chermside in conjunction with the British Naval Authorities.

I beg to ask whether the right hon. Gentleman has any information with reference to the reports as to great distress prevailing in the interior of the island?

Speaking from memory, I do not think we have any such information.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether Her Majesty's Government will communicate to the House the text of the written pledge given by the Czar's Government as to free, or open, ports in Northern China?

The pledge given by the Russian Government was shown in writing to the Permanent Under Secretary of State, who took note of it. It was to the following effect. Count Mouravieff expressed great surprise at the agitation which appeared to prevail in England, both in the Press and in official circles, on the subject of recent events in China, where English and Russian interests cannot be seriously antagonistic. Count Mouravieff observed that various English statesmen of position had recognised, as perfectly natural, that Russia should wish to have an outlet for her commerce on the coasts of the North Pacific. Any such port would be open to the ships of all the Great Powers, like other ports on the Chinese mainland. It would be open to the commerce of all the world, and England, whose trade interests were so important in those regions would share in the advantage.

I wish to ask my right hon. Friend whether there was any pledge that, in the event of the territory behind that port being occupied by the Russian Power, British and other goods would be allowed free access to it?

I think that is a Question of which my hon. Friend should give notice.

I will give notice.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: (1) with regard to the cession of Soudanese territory to Abyssinia, whether, in 1884, the Egyptian Government protested against the abandonment of the Soudan, which was forced upon Egypt by the then British Government; (2) whether the Egyptian Government has always maintained its claim to the whole of the territory evacuated by, or lost to, Egypt under the compulsion of the British Government in 1884; (3) whether the Sultan, who is sovereign of the whole of Egyptian territory, has ever recognised that abandonment of the Soudan; and (4) whether the Egyptian Government is, at the present time, reclaiming and re-occupying Soudanese territory, which was evacuated in 1884–5?

I think my hon. Friend, in the first part of the Question, has confounded the facts with regard to two distinct territories and groups of events. There has been no cession of Soudanese territory to Abyssinia. The Frontier districts of Somaliland which are affected by the recent Treaty with Abyssinia were never a part of the Soudan. The Egyptian Government themselves proposed the abandonment of Harrar, and consented to the abandonment of the Coast in 1884. As regards the Soudan, the answer to the first two Questions of my hon. Friend is in the affirmative, to the third in the negative, and to the fourth in the affirmative.

Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us whether there is any official map giving the delimitation of the Soudan?

I do not know, but I will inquire.

Will my right hon. Friend reconsider the answer he gave not long ago as to the desirability of publishing the existing Treaties in regard to these districts, accompanied by maps. The right hon. Gentleman referred us to a large and an expensive book, but could not the Government publish a Blue Book on the subject?

It is a little difficult for me to answer the Question, because I am not quite certain to what Treaties my hon. Friend refers. I was asked a question the other day about Treaties concerning the West Coast of Africa and the Niger, and I answered that they were to be found in "Hertslet's Map of Africa by Treaty."

I beg to ask the Vice-President of the Committee of Council on Education whether, in September last, on the post of chief attendant in the National Library, Dublin, becoming vacant, Mr. T. H. Evans, who was appointed to the post by the Trustees, was strongly recommended for the maximum rate of pay, the recommendation being supported by the Director and Librarian of the National Library; whether, after seven months' delay, a letter was received from the Science and Art Department, stating that Mr. Evans would have to proceed to the maximum salary by the usual yearly increment, and, about six weeks later, another letter was sent by the Department stating that the increase was made through error, and requested Mr. Evans to refund the money paid; and whether steps will be taken to refund to Mr. Evans the money accruing to his post since his appointment by the Trustees in September last?

The recommendation of the Trustees of the National Library, Dublin, was received on October 14th. In November, the Department stated that Mr. Evans must proceed by the usual yearly increment. In December, the Trustees were informed that, according to Treasury regulations, the Department had exceeded its power, and could not sanction the increase. Mr. Evans has been overpaid to the amount of 12s. 3d. I understand he has been told that this sum will have to be refunded, but I do not think this will be necessary.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can state if difficult questions of International Law have arisen through the action of the Government in closing Scottish ports to the landing of fish caught by foreign trawlers in protected areas; and, if not, what is the nature of the difficulty anticipated should English ports be so closed; and if there is any difference between the two cases; and, if so, what is this difference?

My attention has not so far been called to the difficulties alluded to in the first part of the hon. Member's Question, and, as it is not proposed to close English ports, there does not seem to be a necessity for expressing an opinion at present as to any such that might arise in the event of that step being taken.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade whether he has received a memorial on behalf of the clerical staff of the Irish Board of Lights in favour of assimilating their salaries with those of the Trinity House; and whether he will favourably consider their request?

I have received from the Irish Lights Commissioners an application for the sanction of the Board of Trade to the salaries of certain clerks in their service being assimilated to the salaries of clerks in the service of the Trinity House. The application, which was only received on the 19th instant, is now under consideration, and I hope to be able to give the decision of the Board in a few days.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War whether he can tell the House what is the present numerical strength of the 1st Dragoon Guards quartered at Colchester; what is the number of horses belonging to the regiment; and whether detachments from infantry regiments have been detailed to groom these horses under supervision of cavalry non-commissioned officers?

The present strength of the 1st Dragoon Guards is 440 noncommissioned officers and men; and 337 horses belong to the regiment. No Infantry soldiers have been detailed for the purpose of grooming horses, but detachments from three Infantry battalions have been attached for training in the duties of regimental transport. As part of this training, grooming and other duties connected with horses naturally come in. The opportunity of the winter is taken for this purpose, as many of the Cavalry soldiers are on furlough, and the horses are available for training the Infantry.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if his attention has been drawn to a resolution of the Castlebar Board of Guardians, passed at their meeting on the 12th inst., in which they declare that exceptional distress prevails in several districts in the Union; and whether he will take steps to urge upon the Local Government Board the necessity of affording immediate relief to the districts affected?

I have received a copy of the resolution referred to. The restrictions upon the giving of outdoor relief in the Castlebar Union were relaxed on the 19th January. Upon the information at present before me, there appears to be no distress in the Union of such character or amount as to lead me to the opinion that the Poor Law will be unable to meet any demands for relief without laying an exceptional burden on the ratepayers. Should, however, the necessity arise, the Guardians will be given an opportunity of adopting the Government proposals.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War whether steps are to be taken at once to drain and level the waste land at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, so as to make it suitable as additional recreation ground for the use of the Cadets; and whether the Board of Visitors has for many years urged that this should be done even before the present large increase was made to the number of Cadets being trained at the Academy?

Money for carrying out this service is included in the Army Estimates for the ensuing year.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the Sultan has ordered the creation of additional regiments of Kurdish irregular cavalry—a force whose excesses have been in the past a source of grave evils?

It was decided in 1892 to raise the total number of Auxiliary Cavalry regiments to 100. There are now 59 regiments of Hamidieh Cavalry, and one more was recently reported to be in course of formation. It appears that the total number will be eventually brought up to 100 in accordance with the decision of 1892. These would not all be Kurdish regiments, the intention being to extend the organisation to other tribes.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs why the telegram, from the British Ambassador at Paris, detailing the conversation between M. Hanotaux and himself with reference to the relations of France and Great Britain in Western Africa, which was read by the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary without any previous interrogation in the other House of Parliament was not communicated to the House of Commons, although a question was asked there on the subject; and whether he will take the necessary steps to secure that the House of Commons when in Session may at the earliest moment be placed in possession of intelligence with reference to Foreign Affairs which the Government may think it expedient to make public?

The omission of a statement to the House was due to the fact that on Tuesday afternoon Lord Salisbury's train did not arrive in time for me to obtain his sanction to my making a statement. Hearing of the anxiety expressed on the subject, Lord Salisbury shortly afterwards made a statement in another place, which it was my intention to repeat here on the motion for adjournment, but the House, in its eagerness for a holiday, unfortunately deprived me of the opportunity.

On the whole, I accept that.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, (1) in the Convention between Great Britain and France, of 5th August 1890, recognising the sphere of influence of France up to a line from Say on the Niger to Baruwa on Lake Chad, drawn in such a manner as to comprise in the sphere of action of the Niger Company all that fairly belongs to the Kingdom of Sokoto, it was stipulated that this line was to be determined by Commissioners to be appointed; whether any such Commissioners have been appointed since the Convention; and, if so, whether they have made any progress towards determining the line in question; and (2) if no such Commissioners have been appointed, whether he can state the cause of the delay in their appointment?

The answer to the first question is in the affirmative, and to the second in the negative. The necessity for local delimitation owing to the relative position and distance of the two Powers on either side of the Say-Baruwa line has not hitherto been of an urgent nature, but when the Paris Conferences are over the matter will, doubtless, engage the attention of the two Governments.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who is to pay the expenses of the Indian troops sent from Bombay to Mombasa for service in Uganda?

The Imperial Government will bear all charges.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War if any plans have yet been prepared for the defence of Cardiff, which is the chief port of supply for the coal used in the Navy, but which now lies open and unprotected against the raids of hostile cruisers and torpedo boats; and, if so, whether any sum is included in the Estimates for carrying out such plans.

Plans for the de fence of Cardiff have been prepared; but at present all funds available for fortifications are required for the more urgent defences of naval bases and military ports. On the other hand, it is not the case that the port of Cardiff lies open and unprotected. It is covered by the batteries which protect the British Channel and by mine fields.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War whether, when a soldier applies after a lengthened term of service for a free discharge, his application, according to the Regulations, must lie upon the orderly room table for a period of 30 days, and the applicant be brought up three times during that period and asked whether he still desires to be discharged.

The 30 days referred to is stated in the Queen's Regulations to be for the purpose of enabling the soldier to reconsider his request if he desires to do so; but the commanding officer is empowered to shorten the period or to omit it altogether if he consider it for the interest of the soldier to do so. There is no regulation requiring the soldier to be brought up three times during the period.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether an invitation has yet been addressed to this country to attend the Brussels Sugar Bounties Conference; and how soon the Conference is expected to meet.

An invitation has been received from Great Britain to be represented at the Brussels Sugar Bounties Conference. The exact time of meeting is not yet fixed.

The Bill I propose to lay on the Table of the House is substantially identical with that which I presented last year, when there was, unfortunately, no time to press it to a Second Reading. Before I ask the House to take the Second Reading of the Bill, I will lay on the table of the House the rules which it is proposed to make under the Bill, should it become an Act, so that the House will be in full possession of what, I may say, will practically be a new prison Code.

said: I call attention to the first item in this Vote—£6,000 for telegrams. That is £6,000 in addition to the £17,000 already voted for this service of telegrams. Generally, Sir, I lay down this as a settled principle, that the Vote for the whole service of the year should be provided for in the estimates for the year, and that this should not be supplemented by other estimates unless subsequently to the original estimate being presented some new and unexpected emergency has arisen. I am commenting on the sum of £6,000 Supplementary Estimate for Telegrams, in addition to the £17,000. I lay down this proposition, that the estimates given for the service of the year should be sufficient for the service of the year, and this House should not be called upon to vote any supplementary estimates unless it can be shown that, after the original estimates were presented, some contingency has arisen which renders them inevitable. No such contingency has been shown to have arisen. We are told that this extra sum has been rendered necessary by the state of affairs abroad. The state of affairs abroad has not materially changed since the Estimates for last year were presented and passed. All the matters in China, in Tunis, in Madagascar, were foreseen, and could have been dealt with at the time the estimates were presented. Again, there are matters in India which, perhaps, may be considered to be new, and matters in Africa, but the Indian Government have to do with the former, and the Colonial Office with the latter. This is not the first time that this extremely bad practice on the part of the Foreign Office has come to the knowledge of this House. Year by year there has been a demand for an additional sum for telegrams, and not for a moderate sum either. Having had £17,000 granted, the Foreign Office comes now with a demand for another £6,000; that is to say, more than one-third of the original estimate has been added to it. If you were to deal with the whole of the Supplementary Estimates in this way, the Supplementary Estimates would amount to £30,000,000 or more. I think, however, that it is incumbent upon some hon. Member of this House, who takes an interest in the regularity of finance, to protest against this practice. I cannot help suspecting that this has something to do with the largeness of the surplus. ["No."] I am glad to hear that that is so. I am bound to say that this is an important matter. If the Foreign Secretary can show that the means were not at hand when the estimates were presented for estimating the additional sum demanded, if he can show that there has been an emergency of unexpected change which justifies the additional vote, then the case falls to the ground. I hope that the Foreign Office will take means to inform itself of its liabilities, and that it will in future take a larger sum for the telegrams, and will not bring us face to face with the necessity for voting so large an additional sum as £6,000.

I think I can satisfy the hon. Gentleman on the grounds of the principle he has laid down himself. That principle is, that no extra sum shall be asked for by the Foreign Office, unless we can satisfactorily demonstrate to the House that some new and special emergency has arisen. He says we are not in a position to state that now, and that, therefore, there are no good grounds for asking the sum of £6,000. But has not the situation changed a great deal since last year? Is it true that the situation in China, at the time the estimates were framed, had assumed anything like the importance it has now? The Chinese problem and the financial questions that have arisen are responsible for a great part of this increase. As much as £6,000 will be required for telegrams to and from Pekin during the last year. I trust this explanation will satisfy the hon. Gentleman.

I do not complain of the money spent in sending the telegrams. What I complain of is, that my right hon. Friend has not obtained sufficient information by means of these telegrams. I would suggest that he should send one or two more telegrams to find out the position the Russians now exactly occupy in Manchuria.

I do think it is a little late in the day to ask us now to agree to a Mission to inquire into the habits of the seals. Had the Mission been one, for instance, for practical sailors to see how the regulations made in consequence of the Paris Award were working, and whether they inflicted—as I know they do inflict—enormous hardship upon Her Majesty's subjects in the Canadian Dominion, I for one would have found no reason to complain. Several years have been spent and whole reams of paper have been printed in describing the habits of the fur seal from the natural history point of view. It is absurd to send out the Mission when we have professors like Professor Darey Thompson, and men of that sort, and it is the more absurd, considering that we have been treated with great roughness by the United States. I must say I was horrified to find that the only thing the Mission did was to capture a young seal and shut it up in a box to see how long it could live. It is very sad to know that we should send out a Mission, and that one of its first acts should be to perpetrate this harm upon an unoffending animal. It may be that the right hon. Gentleman can show that we have had some permanent information as to the habits of these animals, but I cannot see how it is possible that it should be so. The whole history of this is founded on the allegation that these animals were on the point of starvation, which this Mission has disproved. I cannot see why any mission of this sort was required, and I hope we shall have an explanation which will satisfy us.

AS the House knows, there are certain regulations for the control of the seal fisheries in the North Seas which were laid down by the Paris Award of 1893. Those regulations came into force in the following year, 1894, and they come up for revision under the Paris Award at the end of the fishing season in the present year, 1898. The United States Government have in the interval constantly urged on Her Majesty's Government that we should undertake at an earlier date the revision of the regulations, and that in the interim special regulations should be made for stopping pelagic sealing because, as they allege, there is danger of complete extermination of the seals. To these representations the Government have always replied that the question of amending the regulations must rest upon the evidence of experts as to the exact state of the fisheries before the termination of the original period, and therefore we suggested an inquiry by experts into the state of the seals upon the Russian and American islands. The experts' first report was presented to the House in 1896, and they found that there was no fear of the extermination of the seals, but that some modification of the regulations would be necessary at the end of five years. Representations for an immediate suspension of pelagic sealing were then received from the American Government. It was felt, however, by the British Government that a longer period of observation than a few months was necessary before the regulations under the Award could be revised and before we could take the matter in hand, and we asked the American Government to allow experts to pay another visit to the islands last year. The report of this second mission has also been laid before this House, and it shows that there has been a considerable decrease of seals since 1896. My hon. Friend is not quite right in saying that it was the duty of the experts to examine into the habits of the seals. That was not their object at all. They were not deputed to inquire into the nature and habits of the seals, because these were perfectly well known. The inquiry was as to the number of the seals. Well, Sir, they have conducted this second inquiry, and have provided us with the information; which is requisite for the revision of the regulations when the time comes, and which, I hope, will enable us to arrive at an agreement in the matter.

I want the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to answer a question in reference to one item—that of the British Guiana boundary question. When is this question likely to go to arbitration? What is the Commission engaged in doing—whether the matter is likely to be soon settled? I think every Member of this House will rejoice that this question, which threatened very serious consequences, is now in a fair way to be settled in a peaceful manner.

I rise simply in consequence of the remarks made by the hon. Member for King's Lynn, who thinks, evidently, that on this subject he can attack Professor Thompson without attacking the United States. He declared that this country had been badly treated by the United States, but I think the United States has been badly treated by this country. The United States carried out the conditions imposed upon them by both Governments, that they were to control the seas properly, whereas England did not. Consequently, I think the hon. Member is wrong. Therefore I think it is the United States Government that has been badly treated.

I did not know my hon. Friend was going to ask that question, or I should have been prepared for it. As regards the British Guiana Boundary Commission, the money asked for—£6,000—is required to cover the expense entailed in making inquiries, translations, and so on, by those who have been responsible for preparing our case. Our case is now complete. The fifth arbitrator has been appointed; but, as anyone acquainted with the practice of arbitration must know, a very considerable amount of time must be spent in delivering statements and replies and counter statements and counter replies. We are desirous of pushing matters forward, but I should only be deluding the House if I led the House to think that they would only occupy a short space of time.

I move a reduction of £100 in the item which concerns the recent mission to Abyssinia. The amiable giants who composed this mission to the Emperor Menelik, have brought back a Treaty with which the Government are perfectly satisfied; but I confess that my own opinion is a very different one, and one which concurs with that of persons who know the country and have been there, and are well acquainted with it. Several questions have been put to the House with regard to matters which are not in the Treaty, but I will deal with them after I come to deal with what the Treaty actually is. The very astute Prince who has made himself "the conquering Lion of Judah," has in this Treaty received an accession of territory, which I ventured yesterday to describe as 15,000 square miles, or a third or a fourth of the Somaliland Protectorate. The Under Secretary of State said at the time that he had not the figures with him, but that my figures were not accurate. I remember he told us in the course of the present Session that an account which I ventured to give of certain proceedings in Madagascar was one of which he could not admit the accuracy. In the same way his reply yesterday was that they were not well founded. He was wrong in his evident belief that a map accompanied the Treaty. There was no map laid before Parliament, but I have had the opportunity of seeing an official map showing the cession which has been concluded. I have, with two of the highest authorities, gone into the subject, and both of them made it out to be 15,000 miles. I was wrong in suggesting that it was one-third or a fourth of the Protectorate, but it is a fifth. The total amount is about 15,000 square miles. There are provisions in this Treaty against ill-treatment—as far as provisions can be enforced—of persons who, for a good many years, have enjoyed, not only British protection, but a considerable amount of British rule. That stipulation is to the effect that they are not to be losers by the transfer. After talking about the advantages of British rule, as some Members of this House have done, it does seem rather startling that such a power as Abyssinia can secure the rights of these people for the future. There was, some years ago, an unfortunate cession of territory, which had never been ours, but which, in some respects, answers to this case. I mean the case of Kafristan, and the Ameer of Afghanistan. We all know that in that case it had not been anticipated that those persons would be offered the alternative of death or conversion to a religion which was not their own. I am very much afraid that the facts I have to bring forward will show that these people have been virtually British subjects, and have enjoyed a certain amount of absolute British rule. The facts I shall lay before the House will, I think, show that there is reason to believe in this case also the people may be offered the alternative of death or the adoption of a religion of which they do not approve. The Abyssinians are now in the habit of converting people by force, and they carry on this practice at the present time. Apart from this stipulation to protect British subjects, which, I fear, we have no power to enforce the observance of in the future, by this cession of the back of the Somaliland Protectorate, we cut ourselves off from a country, in one sense, which is likely to assume considerable importance very soon, under circumstances which I will describe. Our Somaliland Protectorate, although in the Eastern half of Africa, does not face the east at all. It faces towards the north-west, and the strip we have given—this 15,000 square miles which we have given to Menelik—brings Abyssinia right across this as a sort of bar on the south side of our Protectorate. Now, Sir, when I asked the other day what was going to be the future, and what was the present extent of the Italian sphere of influence, the Under Secretary replied that it was a matter for Italian negotiation; but I think I shall be able to show that it concerns ourselves, and does not concern Italy at all; in fact, the Abyssinians have been all the time that this has been supposed to be an Italian sphere of influence in occupation of almost the whole of that sphere. Now, Sir, so far as the rest of it goes, we have not improved our position by bringing Abyssinia right across from the north. The country faces the north-west. It is turned round, and thus the strip goes across the southern part and forms a bar. Now, immediately south of the Italian sphere comes the British sphere of influence, connected with the British East Africa Protectorate, and it is with that I wish mainly to deal to-night. Let me only say upon the other side that we have got from the Emperor Menelik the assurance that he will not allow arms to be supplied to the Mahdists, who have always been his enemies. Well, Sir, the Mahdists have always been, his enemies, because he has been in the habit of baptizing these strict Mahomedans by force. Of course, they are his enemies, but that he has any intention, or has shown the slightest sign of joining us, or taking any part as an ally with us, I must most positively deny. What is much more important than what is in this Treaty is what is not in the Treaty, relating to this territory which may become so important to us in the future; and the reason why I trouble the House with these observations, and bring the matter before it at all, is that in the enormous territory which lies behind there are great dangers, and there is every prospect, and, indeed, every probability, that if we do not try to regulate the boundaries, we shall soon be face to face with exactly the same kind of difficulty, in an aggravated form, as occurs in West Africa.. When this Mission was sent with great pomp and circumstance to this Prince, who is very powerful in his dominions, we naturally expected that some attempt would be made, and possibly some attempt was made, to deal with these important questions to which I allude. I will try to describe what they are. When this Mission went to the Court of Abyssinia, Count Leontieff the Russian and M. Lagarde the French diplomatist had already concluded written engagements with Abyssinia. We are not acquainted with the terms of those arrangements, and only learn the general effect of them from Mr. Thomson, a French Deputy with an English name, who is the reporter of the Foreign Office Budget, and has described them in his report on the French Foreign Office. He alludes to them as being very highly satisfactory to the French, but there is no description of their actual contents, so that, we are left to mere surmise. From the speeches of unauthorised Deputies in the French Chamber, we gather what their sense may be; but there are certain documents, to which I do not wish to attach too much importance, which have been published in Paris, which are of a very startling character. I mean, for example, the alleged charter granted by the Emperor Menelik to the so-called Franco-Russian Company, in which Prince Henri of Orleans and a Russian adventurer were the principal persons concerned. It purports to be a charter giving to these gentlemen the government of an enormous country down to the second degree of north latitude, which is almost entirely over the region composed of the British sphere of influence. A portion is Italian, but the great bulk of it is British territory, and certainly, if this Treaty has been made with Abyssinia, it is of the first importance that some attempt should be made to regulate the boundaries and to provide for the future in this direction. Now, Sir, there is a Native question also to be considered apart from the Treaty itself. In this 15,000 square miles handed over to French rule or Abyssinian rule, we had disarmed the Natives, and yet we hand these people over to a kingdom armed to the teeth in recent times. We all know that 120,000 stand of the best arms are in the hands of the Abyssinians at the present time, and this Treaty gives them power to have as many arms as they please, so that there can be no doubt that we are handing over an entirely unarmed Native population to a people armed to the teeth, who are likely to overcome them, whatever resistance they may make. And there is much danger that a Native question lies behind in the vast territory which is not subject to this Treaty, and which would not be subject to any arrangement of this kind. From the recent information laid before the House you will find that the territory which has been ceded in this Treaty includes the trade routes, and the routes which Mr. Cavendish followed on a former occasion, and is about to follow again, where there is the great Borani tribe alluded to by Mr. Cavendish, who are among the tribes probably most friendly to this country, and who are being raided at this time by Abyssinian troops. Surely this was the first place to which the attention of our Mission ought to have been called; but it seems to me that the facts relating to the British Protectorate were ignored, as well as our duty towards the Native races. I have here a report of the lecture delivered to the Geographical Society by Mr. Cavendish. It has not yet appeared in print, but I have a proof of the lecture here, that I should like, with the leave of the House, to quote a few sentences from the report with regard to this portion of the British East Africa Protectorate, which the Abyssinians are raiding now. The Under Secretary has been questioned by several of my hon. Friends, one of whom knows the country himself, and is the only Member of this House who has been in those parts. In his reply, the Under Secretary said that these important matters "remained for future discussion" and were "left for subsequent settlement." My point is that these questions ought to be settled now, because they are threatening as to the future. The annual report for British East Africa shows that the rich and friendly Boranis were being raided within the sphere included in the unorganised districts of the Protectorate. Mr. Cavendish says he found Abyssinian parties "looting all the villages" and "driving off the live stock," and that was on the direct route which Mr. Cavendish is about to follow again through the Rudolph depression towards the Nile. He says the Natives mistook him "for an Abyssinian force," and added: "they have been so badly treated by the Abyssinians that the mere mention of such a force is enough to make them desert their villages and disappear." "The Borani-Gallas treated us in the most friendly manner, pressing every kind of present upon us, and we had the greatest difficulty in making them accept a return present. We found these people, undoubtedly, the most friendly Natives whom we met during the whole expedition; they besought us to stay with them, and when we refused to do so, they begged us to lay a petition before, the great chiefs of the English, begging them to extend that protection to them which they had afforded to Somaliland. One of the chiefs said, 'The Somalis are happy, and we want to be under your chiefs.' Well, just at that time, the great chiefs of the English nation were concluding a treaty with the Abyssinians, who were raiding these people who were actually under our Protectorate. Mr. Cavendish goes on to say—

"They brought us numbers of people who had been horribly mutilated by the Abyssinians. The Boran King, hearing that Englishmen were in the country, sent his son 100 miles to us with a present of 30 oxen and the best pony we saw in Africa. The son refused to take the present we wished to send to the King. The Borans were the most industrious, thriving, and richest race we encountered. In spite of the fact that these people are nominally under British protection, and carry on a trade in rubber, fibre, rope, honey, gum, and ivory, the Abyssinians levy tribute to the extent of half every caravan that leaves the country."

I should like to add a word or two to the remarks made by the right hon. Baronet. I think the right hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs has scarcely recognised the position in regard to the British Protectorate. If, as the right hon. Baronet has described, all the territory formerly occupied by us has been ceded to Abyssinia, and if we are to recognise their claims to the south as well as to the west of the Frontier, then I think the position is very serious, as this would cut us off from our British East Africa Protectorate permanently. Something has been said in the Press with regard to the nature of the country which has been ceded, and which we have practically abandoned. It has been stated in the public Press that this country which we have abandoned is practically worthless, and our concessions are of no material value, and do not prejudice our interests there; that with this territory we have purchased real advantages in the Nile Valley, and in regard to trade. I do not pretend to know what the area of the abandoned territory is. I have crossed it on two or three occasions. I have traversed it from east to west, as well as from north to south. This territory is important to us because across it you have all the most important trade routes, the keeping open of which depends upon the access to the water places on those routes which were formerly in our possession. Those we have now ceded to the Abyssinians, or abandoned, and we have therefore handed over the key to those routes in case of any difficulty with the Abyssinians. With regard to what we have gained by this treaty, I do not pretend to know what the value of the friendship of Menelik in the Nile Valley will amount to. I am not certain that he is able to prevent the passing of arms to the Mahdists in the Nile Valley. It appears to me that the treaty is all "Give," on our part, and very little "Take." But I will say it is the first attempt to come to a proper understanding with Menelik, and it is better than nothing at all. I congratulate the Government on at last sending a representative to Abyssinia, and upon the choice they have made. Lieutenant Harrington, who will be our representative, is a man who we can be confident will preserve what British influence there is in Abyssinia, and will increase it. I hope great things from his presence at the Court of Menelik. I should like to say I think the whole question with regard to the cession of our territory and the abandonment of our Protectorate is a theoretical one with regard to its effect on Native opinion there. It should be remembered that during the Italian and Abyssinian war, that our attitude was something more than an attitude of benevolence towards the Italians. It was known that we had given the Italians facilities in Somaliland and elsewhere with regard to their warlike operations. It was known throughout that part of Africa that our sympathies had been with the Italians with regard to their conduct in Abyssinia. When they were defeated at Adowa, we suffered in our prestige ultimately, because we were also associated with the Italian policy. It was known that the Italians had been allowed to purchase their camels in Somaliland, and it was known that if it had not been for representations that were made to the Government greater facilities would have been given them. After the Italians had abandoned all pretence to a Protectorate over Southern Africa, after they had been defeated, we also go to Menelik, and are despoiled of part of our Protectorate. It may be rather a theoretical view to take, and crediting the Natives with more intelligence than seems probable, but I assure the Committee that is the general effect of our attitude towards Abyssinia. I think the whole question as to the treatment of the large regions between the British Somali Protectorate and our British East African possessions is a very difficult one when we do not know whether the Italians claim it as part of their sphere, whether the Abyssinians claim it as part of their Ethiopian Empire, or whether we intend to maintain our influence in that country. I assure the hon. Gentleman we have a very far-reaching influence throughout these regions. I do not know whether it was with the acquiescence of the Italians, or their tacit acquiescence, but we did to a certain extent administer the country within the Italian sphere. Certainly, the tribes on the far side of Abyssinia constantly referred their disputes to Berbera, and I believe Italy acquiesced in the settlement of those disputes. There were very few tribes on the south of British Somaliland who did not always urge the representatives that when they returned to the Coast they would beg their Chief or Sultan to take them into the Protectorate that they might enjoy the advantages which the British Somali tribes enjoy. It is a most unfortunate thing that in this treaty we give every facility for the arming of the Abyssinians, and we have done nothing to put the Somalis in a position to protect themselves. I am altogether of opinion that we have promoted a wise policy in forbidding the importation of arms with regard to the Somali tribes, and the French are bound as we are not to admit arms to the natives, but we have no power, so far as I can see, to prevent Abyssinian raids. I know very well myself what the Somali suffer at the hands of the Abyssinian raiders. I cannot describe the country as occupied by Abyssinians, for they do not occupy it; they simply raid it, and exact large levies from the Somali people in the shape of cattle and sheep. The people of that country have long looked to us to help them against the descents of the Abyssinians, and the Abyssinians have on no occasion, so far as I am aware, claimed that territory as part of their Ethiopian Empire until, I think, 1891. It is difficult to know who is going, in future, to be recognised as the master of it. If it is the Abyssinians, I trust we shall use all our influence at the Court of Menelik to protect the Somali. If it is the Italians, I hope they will make their occupation effective, so as to protect their trade. It is a mistake to think the country is worthless. It has a large population, and their requirements, though simple, are numerous. Before I sit down I should like to say I quite agree "with the opinion of Mr. Percy Aylmer, who may be described as an expert, who was one of the first men to reach the interior of Somaliland, and who has been there lately, who also knows a good deal about the Abyssinian boundaries, and who may be regarded as an unprejudiced and impartial observer. That gentleman, in a letter, expressed the opinion that, with regard to Article 6 of the Treaty, the Abyssinians would have observed that, without any concessions being made on our part, and that a great injustice had been done to the Somalis. Now, I support the reduction moved by the right hon. Baronet, because I do hope that an opportunity will be given to the House for a debate on this Treaty, and that the right hon. Gentleman will be able to clear up some of the points to which the right hon. Baronet has attended, and be able to tell us what is the exact position with regard to the undefined territory between the new boundary and the boundary of the East African Protectorate.

I do not think that the correspondent of the hon. Member need regret that he is not a Member of this House, for he has certainly succeeded in putting before us, in very forcible language, his views upon the subject through the medium of the hon. Member who has just given both pleasure and information to the House; though he did not as it seemed to me, agree with the right hon. Baronet who initiated this discussion in the very severe and sweeping denunciation which he passed on everything, I think, without exception in this Abyssinian Treaty. I will follow his own order, and will take in the first place that which is in the Treaty and then that which is not. The first point on which the Treaty has been attacked is in reference to the rectification of the Frontier of the Somali Coast Protectorate. Now, the Frontier of our Protectorate which has existed up to the present time is one which was fixed by us with the Italian Government by Protocol, in May 1894; but that Frontier had never been communicated to or recognised by the Emperor of Abyssinia; and, indeed, the account of it given by the right hon. Baronet does not tally with the facts as reported to us. One might imagine, from the speech of the right hon Baronet, that there were a number of tribes inhabiting the Frontier in settled and peaceful conditions, and accepting the British Protectorate; but that is not so at all. Upon this Frontier a number of these tribes, although within our boundaries, as defined by Treaty, have for some time practically been under Abyssinian control. They have been constantly raided by the Abyssinians, and, I am sorry to say, our resources have not been equal to securing them the protection which their presence within the British boundary entitled them to receive. When Mr. Rodd approached King Menelik, and commenced to discuss the matter, he found that the King complained also of the pushing forward of the triangle of British territory in close proximity to Harrar. Now, we have had the opinion of the hon. Member opposite, who is an expert, but I think he will admit that Captain Swayne, an officer who has spent many years in the Somali Protectorate, is also an expert, whose opinion is worthy of consideration in the matter. It was the opinion of Captain Swayne that the request made by Menelik with regard to the rectification of the Frontier might be granted. Now, what is the nature of this concession? The right hon. Baronet says it amounts to 15,000 square miles, and I am unable to accept or disprove that statement. He further says that it is one-fifth of the entire Protectorate. I do not believe that to be the case. That is a point, however, which we can determine, and which I can bring before the hon. Baronet more clearly when we are able, as I hope we may be, to lay a map before the House, showing the whole Frontier; but, surely, a more important thing than the actual square mileage of the district under discussion is the nature of it. Mr. Rodd reported to us that this territory was sparsely populated, that it was not under permanent occupation at all, and that it merely consisted of temporary grazing grounds visited by a certain number of Native tribes at certain seasons of the year. All that our Envoy was, therefore, concerned to do in satisfying the desires of King Menelik as to this strip, was to secure that no tribe should lose its right of frequenting any grounds that it had been in the habit of visiting, and if hon. Members will look at page 7 of the Treaty, they will find that it is stipulated that the tribes occupying either side of the line shall be at liberty to graze on grounds on the other side of the line, and that during their migrations they shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial authority. Free access to the wells is equally reserved to the tribes on either side of the line. That was one stipulation which it was necessary to secure in their interest. The other was to secure guarantees from Menelik that these tribes should not suffer from the transfer of authority. And that object we endeavoured to secure by a provision on page 4 of the printed Treaty, containing an assurance given by King Menelik that any Somalis who may become subjects of the Ethiopian Empire shall be well treated, and be orderly governed. That is the account so far as I am able to give it, and that is the whole of the information in our possession with regard to this so-called cession of Swayne territory. I venture to submit that Captain Swayne and Mr. Rodd were quite right in thinking it was a small price to pay for the determination of a fixed Frontier, about which there cannot be any dispute in the future between the Abyssinians and ourselves, and for the cessation of the Abyssinian raids which have rendered the country so unhappy in the past. While I am on this point I may inform the Committee that in the negotiations undertaken by the French Representative at the Abyssinian Court for the delimitation of their Somali Frontier, France has submitted to a very much more considerable reduction and restriction than we have done. Now, the right hon. Baronet proceeded to give his version of the Treaty, and he said that all we had got in return for this cession of territory was an assurance that King Menelik would regard the Mahdists as enemies of his Empire. That is not all that we have got. We have also got an engagement from King Menelik that he will do all in his power to prevent the passage through his dominions of arms and ammunition to the Mahdists, which, I think, is an engagement of very considerable value. Now, the right hon. Baronet said that the Mahdists always have been, and must always be, the enemies of Abyssinia through the conditions of their life and religion—but I do not know whether the hon. Baronet is aware that there have been constant communications between the Mahdists and King Menelik. Applications had been made to King Menelik by the Mahdists for assistance long before this event, and this assurance from King Menelik as to the Mahdists is one for which we must be grateful. The right hon. Baronet also omitted to refer to the Article under which we have secured most-favoured-nation rights in Abyssinia, which must be regarded as a distinct feather in the cap of the envoys who negotiated the Treaty. I could not help thinking, when the right hon. Baronet attacked this Treaty, that his ideas of compromise were that we are to get everything and to give nothing. But people in different positions take different views. It is very easy for anyone in opposition to get up and to pick any Treaty to pieces, and to prove that on the two sides the balance is against his own country; but when one is engaged himself in making the Treaty one has different views which, perhaps, upon the whole, are rather more just. That remark of mine must not be looked upon as a rebuke, but rather as a criticism, which more especially applies to that part of his speech in which the right hon. Baronet attacked us, not for our sins of commission, but those of omission. He seemed to argue that more ought to have been got, and, in particular, that some agreement should have been arrived at with reference to the boundaries of the British Protectorate in the far interior of East Africa. But, Sir, what is the information with regard to those regions upon which the right hon. Baronet has relied? It is based, as he has told us, upon the report of a lecture recently delivered by Mr. Cavendish, who has been travelling in these countries, and which is not yet in print; and upon statements in the recent report upon the East African Protectorate by Sir Arthur Hardinge. Neither of these statements had appeared, or were available, to Mr. Rodd when he went up to Addis Abbaba; and to contend that he should have made an agreement as regards the British Frontier in the Interior, when neither he nor anyone else at that time was in possession of the information requisite for doing so, is surely absurd. The right hon. Baronet, from his great experience, will know that there is nothing more dangerous than to settle questions relating to Frontiers when you are in complete ignorance of the local conditions of the country. We have too often suffered from boundary Treaties which have been made in similar ignorance in the past. I hope that the statement I have made is satisfactory; but I may add that, in the very countries abroad—I do not think I need specify them—where it might have been expected that this Treaty would have been depreciated, there has been a chorus of praise as to what has been described as a triumph for British diplomacy.

The speeches of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen who have taken part in this Debate to-night have been full of special knowledge, and I am sure that the House has listened to them with pleasure.

"I beg to call attention to the fact that there are not 40 Members present." Notice taken that 40 Members were not present, the CHAIRMAN counted out the House, and 40 Members being in their places:

As I was saying, the speeches with which this Debate was initiated have proved full of interest. The right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean always speaks on these subjects with very great force, and what he says is deserving of the great attention which is shown to those who combine intellect with industry. The hon. Gentleman who followed him, the hon. Member for the Cleveland Division, spoke with even greater knowledge, for I believe he is the only Member of this House who has had an opportunity of visiting these places. The Abyssinian Question is a very difficult one, for while it seems very hard to declare that, on the face of it, the Government do not appear to have accomplished much, yet it would, perhaps, be unjust to deny that they have done as much as was possible of accomplishment at the time. This case of Abyssinia is a striking illustration of the evils of neglect and delay in dealing with these foreign difficulties. For the last five years—ever since the fatal change of policy in 1893—this country has suffered in every quarter of the globe from what appears to be a rooted system of indifference, neglect, and procrastination with regard to dangers that threaten it from abroad. My reason for starting this proposition is that, until it is realised by the Government and the country that these misfortunes do not come upon us by haphazard, or by accident, but are the result of rooted errors in British policy, we shall have no improvement in a policy which leads to these retreats, reverses, and disasters abroad. The causes of these rooted errors are twofold: first, they arise from neglect and delay in dealing with questions which seem a little awkward, and which are put off in the hope that they will disappear, instead of which they become ten times more difficult; and, secondly, there is the alienation of the old allies of this country. It is not fair to charge the responsibility for this upon one Government more than another.

Order, order! The hon. Member is now dealing with general principles of policy.

Of course, Sir, after your remark, I will not go further into that question, and I only referred to it because it is impossible to deal with any one of these difficulties, or to suggest a remedy, unless the cause of the trouble is removed. Our difficulties in Abyssinia are part of the great scheme of Russo-French encroachment which began in 1893. When the right hon. Baronet attacked the present Government he was practically obliged as more or less a Party man, to pass over what happened under the previous Government. The difficulty really began in 1892–93, when the Foreign Office was represented in this House by the hon. Baronet now sitting alone on the Front Bench (Sir E. Grey). It began when Colonel Leontieff was first sent to Abyssinia. I, at that time, endeavoured to call attention to the danger which threatened our interests there. I ventured to ask a question on the subject, but I obtained no support, although if the right hon. Baronet had seen, as we did then, the result might have been different. But the right hon. Baronet simply told us, in airy and indifferent tones, that the Russian Mission was simply a scientific and geographical one. What actually occurred? Colonel Leontieff was away many years, and in that period he reorganised the Abyssinian Army, which was soon armed with French rifles. The movement was aimed, not so much against the Italians as against us; its real object was to embarrass us on the Upper Nile. It was part of a great Russian-Franco scheme of encroachment which has since developed itself in China, and, indeed, in every quarter of the globe. This recent cession of territory and the Treaty we have been discussing to-night can only be judged by results. There is a distinct conflict of opinion between the right hon. Baronet and the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs as to the precise effect of this cession of territory upon our Treaty rights, and upon our communications from Somaliland with the interior portion of these regions, and in that conflict of opinion I am not able to decide between the two right hon. Gentlemen. We have one thing, however, to bear in mind, and that is that the tribes look to us for protection. We have prevented those tribes from being armed, and they are, consequently, open to attack from tribes which, although nominally Christian, are really most cruel and savage. They are practically semi-savages. We have heard of the troubles in Bulgaria, but if hon. Gentlemen will read the reports of massacres and outrages committed by the Abyssinians on the unfortunate Somalis they will see that the crimes said to have been committed by the Turks in Bulgaria are trifling in their nature when compared with those committed against the Somalis. I do trust that the Government will take special measures to protect these unfortunate Somalis. The inhabitants of the territories to the west and south-west of Abyssinia are well armed, and mostly well mounted, and they are constantly making raids on the Somali villages, killing the men, carrying off the women, and desolating the whole country. The Government would do well to look after the interests of these unfortunate victims. My opinion was that a certain amount of unpopularity would attach to the occupation of this country. I do not lay so much stress as the Under Secretary for War on the value of this declaration as against the Mahdists. We know that the most desperate antagonism has existed between the Dervishes and the Abyssinians for many years. I trust it will prove, however, that the pledge of King Menelik will be observed. There is one very interesting point which the right hon. Baronet referred to more than once, but which the Under Secretary has not touched upon at all, and that is the alleged cession by the King of Abyssinia of an immense tract of territory southwest of his dominions, and which is said to extend to within two degrees of the equator. This territory is said to have been ceded by Menelik to Russia and France—to have been granted in a charter to that Colonial adventurer, Leon-tieff, and to Prince Henri of Orleans, who is no friend of British interests. If these two persons, who are most pronounced and active enemies of England and of British interests, possess this charter giving them rights over, a vast territory, the greater portion of which lies within the acknowledged British sphere of influence, it is a very serious fact.

It is very easy to ask what is that concession worth, but that is not the question we have to consider. We have seen these encroachments going on in every quarter of the globe—in Siam, in West Africa, in the Transvaal, and in China, and this affords a striking illustration of the way in which our enemies go to work. The great danger the Government has to guard against is the neglect of these apparently trifling matters, and I do say that this is a point upon which our Government should obtain the clearest information, and the most definite assurances from the French Government, for the time may soon come when, if this charter has really been granted, it may prove a source of danger to British interests. Indeed, we know, from statements by means of the French Colonial party, and from declarations by the French Government, that they consider that they, possess arrangements with Abyssinia which cannot but prove very satisfactory from their point of view. As I said before, it is very difficult to assert that our Government have not done their best under the circumstances. The late Government neglected the beginnings of this difficulty; they passed them over and concealed them from the public. Then, for some period, the present Government followed the same course and pursued the same policy. They did so for a year, or a year and a half, but at last they woke up in the matter, and sent a Mission to Abyssinia. Mr. Rodd did the best he could for us. In view of the enormous influence which the French and the Russians had obtained there, and of many other circumstances which I need not refer to, I think it is pretty clear that Mr. Rodd did his best to produce some sort of peaceful arrangement between this country and Abyssinia. We, naturally, do not like the position in which these unfortunate Somalis are placed, exposed as they are to the raids of enemies cruel and savage to a greater or less degree; we do not like the fact that great districts in the North-East Soudan are exposed still to the raids of the Abyssinians; these are disagreeable and perhaps humiliating facts, but it would be very unfair to blame Mr. Rodd for them. He had everything against him, for he was sent there very late, and, under the circumstances, I do not think he could have concluded a more satisfactory Treaty with regard to the danger to Abyssinian attack or encroachment upon what we consider to be our district. I think the right hon. Gentleman gave a most effective answer. He suggested, or rather stated, that Major Macdonald had been despatched to look after this important region, and to forestall any Abyssinian attack. That, of course, is a very important fact, but it is a great misfortune that the expedition has been almost broken up and destroyed by the mutiny of some Soudanese troops in Uganda, which was never for one moment anticipated. Still, we know that every effort is being made to repair the disaster, and that troops are being hurried up to undo the result of the Soudanese result.

The topic which the hon. Member is now discussing is very remote from the Question before the Committee.

I have to beg your pardon, Sir, but perhaps you did not catch the statement of the Under Secretary that Major Macdonald's expedition was sent in order to look after these territories.

I caught the expression, and was aware of it, but the hon. Member is not entitled to discuss the revolt of the Soudanese in Uganda, although reference to it is admissible.

I did not intend to discuss that. I will only conclude by repeating what I said at the beginning—that if difficulties like this with Abyssinia are to be avoided, and if British policy and British control are to be established successfully, the only way to secure that end is to revert to the old alliances and arrangements, and then we shall be enabled to hold our own against the attacks of foreign Powers.

The hon. Member who has just sat down has devoted most of his speech to criticisms, most of which were directed not against me personally, but against the Government of which I was a subordinate Member. I have so often spoken in this House when I have had the blame of the hon. Member for Sheffield directed entirely against the side of the House on which I sat, that I cannot help feeling rather relieved at his criticism on this occasion of hon. Gentlemen opposite.

It was because they followed your policy. Whatever policy was pursued was pursued in common by both Parties.

The hon. Member says that it was pursued in common by both Parties, and I gather that he is not satisfied with the policy. There are some considerations which I think do modify some of the criticisms which have been passed on this Treaty. At the same time, I cannot say I regard it as entirely satisfactory. But I won't detain the Committee very long, because I am not in a position of an expert who would do what I should like to see done if possible—reconcile the conflicts of opinion as between Gentlemen on this side of the House and Gentlemen on the opposite side. The question of importance seems to be as to the tribes which by this Treaty have been transferred to the Government of Abyssinia, who in previous years have been living under the protection of the British Crown. There is great conflict of opinion on that point, but I gather that there must be some tribes who are being transferred from the protection of British authority to Abyssinian authority, according to the note at the top of page 4 of the Treaty under which His Majesty the Emperor Menelik binds himself as to the Somalis particularly. He promised they should be well treated. Unless a transfer has taken place I do not see why that question should be put and answered. What is their treatment likely to be? I cannot suppose that in a question of this kind any mere verbal provision would be likely to have very much effect unless a careful eye is kept on it. And I think it is most likely to be the case. Some of the Natives have been transferred to the British protection, and those in authority should, at any rate, report carefully what their treatment is, and, if need be, it should receive the most urgent attention of the Government. Now, as to the other Natives who have been under the Italian sphere, one argument has been raised in this Debate, that Natives living under the Italian sphere will find their position very much worse, that they will in future be recognised as being under the Abyssinian rule in a way that they have not been before. As regards Natives who have been under the Italian sphere, I think these will find that there is a sensible change for the worse in their condition. I gather that the Italian influence in some parts of this sphere has been somewhat remote, and that many Natives in the Italian sphere have relied rather on British influence, or on their neighbourhood to British influence, than on the active interference of Italian officers. But, Sir, if they were in the Italian sphere of influence, and if the Italians were no longer going to give them their protection, we have been spared the responsibility of this. As regards the Italian sphere, I can only suppose we have done nothing under the Treaty which can be a matter of complaint by the Italian Government itself. We have no direct assurance to that effect—perhaps it is impossible it could be given—but the right hon. Member for the Forest of Dean did make a point—viz., that we had introduced a bar of territory ceded to Abyssinia which had been previously recognised as an Italian protectorate. But, however, the question is really one for the Italian Government, and if they have no objection to what the Britsh Government has done, then I cannot see how any objection can be taken, as regards the Italian sphere, to the provisions of this Treaty. But there is one reservation on this point, and it is as regards the clause touching the importation of arms. In Article 5 it says that the importation of arms into Ethiopia through the territory of Her Britannic Majesty is authorised. Now, Sir, would the Somalia have the same facilities for obtaining arms as has been granted to the Abyssinians. It has been stated that there are Natives, weaker tribes, on the borders of Abyssinia, who are continually subject to raids from the Abyssinians. Now, Sir, this Treaty puts us in the position of being bound to facilitate, or, any rate, permit, the transit of firearms into Abyssinia, which, I suppose, we should be bound to prevent in the case of tribes who are liable to incursions from Abyssinia. That is an extremely unpleasant position, and I suppose the best defence that can be made for this provision is that if the Abyssinians do not get a full supply of firearms in that way, they could obtain it easily in another way. That certainly is an element which very much qualifies the satisfaction one feels in reading the provisions of this Treaty. Now, Sir, the Treaty has been criticised on a ground which is not connected with the welfare of the Natives but which is connected with the future of the British possession in Africa generally, and that is, that under this Treaty we are cutting off the Somaliland protectorate from access to the British sphere of influence in East Africa further inland. Now, Sir, I do not attach much importance to that objection. I am quite at one with my hon. Friend the Member for Cleveland, who has stated with, I think, unique advantage that there are important trade routes of which we shall lose the control under the provisions of this Treaty. He said, I think, from the wells which were necessary for trade routes, that two of those wells had passed from British control. That may be so, but even if we had retained those wells, what should we have obtained? If we are going to regard this Somali Protectorate as valuable because it would afford access to the British sphere of influence in East Africa, then I think it ought to be our policy to occupy and develop the whole of these routes. We have been promoting means of access to these parts of Africa from different quarters. Advance has been made up the Valley of the Nile, and a railway has been begun from the coast to Uganda. It is possible that through Somaliland there may be another means of access to these trades routes, but we could only have made use of them if we had been prepared for a great territorial expansion until we had occupied and developed the whole length of these routes till they joined our East African sphere of influence. That, Sir, it seems to me, would be a tremendous operation—a tremendous addition to our responsibilities in Africa. I think it would have been beyond our strength, to say nothing of further political complications, to have seized upon these other trade routes, and, at the same time, to have endeavoured to have developed them. In developing those routes we never contemplated joining this Protectorate to our British East African possessions. Therefore, I think, it is better that we should recognise facts rather than leave the question open to further difficulties. There is one thing lacking in this Treaty which the Member for the Forest of Dean pointed out. In making a Treaty of this kind it would have been most valuable if there could have been some recognition of our sphere of influence in British East Africa. The right hon. Gentleman said it would have been impossible to obtain this boundary because there was not enough influence, but that sphere of influence has been recognised before by other Powers in British East Africa, and I do not see why that same recognition might not have been obtained from Menelik in this instance. I quite admit that the actual definition of the boundary might have been impossible for lack of information, but we do not find that a lack of information has been a bar in other cases to the recognition of our sphere of influence, a recognition which has already been given to other Powers, and which, I think, might have been asked for or negotiated for this country. Of course, the right hon. Gentleman can speak with fuller knowledge on the subject, but I say that it would have been a great acquisition to the value of the Treaty if such a recognition could have been obtained, more especially in view of the statement that a charter has been given by Menelik himself, which apparently authorises certain persons to penetrate well into the British sphere of influence. I do not know whether that is true or whether the right hon. Gentleman opposite is in a position to make any statement on that point; but, at any rate, in discussing this Treaty I cannot help feeling that it is a serious drawback to the satisfaction with which we should like to regard any Treaty with this country that it has left an open question future difficulties in what is, perhaps, the most important matter of all that will have to be dealt with in the future. Now, Sir, I should like to have it stated what the real reason is for the making of this Treaty. I do not suppose that the real reason was the readjustment of the boundary, and I do not think the Treaty can be fairly judged by merely reading the actual provisions. I think the real justification of the Treaty must lie not in the mere balance of advantages to be found in these separate articles, but in reasons of policy and State, which cannot, perhaps, be fully explained to the House. I do think, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cleveland has said, that it is important that Menelik should be recognised, but I would rather this Treaty should have been made than no Treaty at all. The question of this part of Africa is an important question, and it may be a very critical question in the future. Abyssinia is undoubtedly a great factor in that part of Africa, and must be a great factor in any future settlement; and I think the real justification of this Treaty is to be found in the fact that as other nations have entered into relations with Menelik, and have had an understanding with him, it became vital that we should also have an understanding to recognise him, and under this Treaty we have recognised his authority. Possibly there is an understanding not defined which may have an influence extending beyond the mere provisions of the Treaty. On the ground that I am not in a position to judge of the merits as fully as those who have the full official information, I think the Committee may accept the Vote for this Treaty, and on those grounds I certainly shall not oppose it.

The right hon. Gentleman has covered the ground pretty fully as to some considerations directed against this Treaty. Certainly, the points which he has chiefly touched were points which were not answered in the first instance by the right hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I propose to direct attention to another matter which the right hon. Gentleman did not answer, and that is the question of the cession of Somaliland territory to Menelik. Now the Under Secretary used these words: he said that the territory was surrendered because it was raided territory, which had been raided by the Abyssinians, and a little further on he referred to the cession as "the so-called cession." The case made out by the right hon. Gentleman, as I understand him, is this: that, although we have this Treaty with Italy recognising a certain line of demarcation between our sphere of influence and the Italian sphere of influence, yet Menelik, the Abyssinian Emperor, has never recognised our Treaty, and that our claim to the territory—so called—ceded has not been recognised by the Abyssinians. In making that statement he appears to have ignored altogether the terms of the particular: Treaty which he was defending in this Committee. I find that the Emperor Menelik himself speaks of the territory as something we have a right to cede. He gives us his assurance that those subjects who hereafter become his subjects under the new boundary arrangements shall be well treated. This territory is inhabited by tribes who have formerly accepted and enjoyed British protection in the British Protectorate, and there is further in this Treaty itself definite allegation that this territory was in the British sphere of influence and Protectorate, and there is a general acceptance of that view by Menelik himself.

I think the hon. Gentleman is confusing the two parts of the arrangement. The tribes there referred to are the tribes who had been under British protection.

There is no distinction about the particular tribes. Clearly, the words I am referring to referred to the whole of the tribes. Now, Sir, the Committee will remember that the Under Secretary in his observations rather appealed to us to make the best of the Treaty, and take it as it is; but we cannot forget that this last of a series of "graceful concessions" was re commended to us, earlier in the Session, as a triumph. We know now that the right hon. Gentleman defends him self upon the ground that our power in that part of the world was insufficient to enable us to get better terms. I will appeal to him, and to the Government of which he is a Member, when he makes this confession of our inability to properly look after the protectorates and spheres of influence which we take upon ourselves in Africa—I will appeal to him to remember this confession when he is extending the sphere of British influence into the heart of the Soudan. The very same difficulties which the Government have found in Abyssinia they will find there. Before I conclude let me remind the Committee that the concessions which we have obtained under this Treaty are only concessions which might be called mutual. We have got nothing except the trade concessions, and every concession that we have received is a concession of a mutual nature—we give something corresponding directly to what we receive. There are only two unilateral concessions, and in both cases they are made by us. One is the surrender of territory, and the other is the cession to which the hon. Baronet referred, and as to which no reference has been made by the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs—the cession to Menelik of the right to import as much arms as he pleases.

I think, if there is no strong reason to the contrary, if the right hon. Gentleman can answer the question asked, with reference to this agreement, it will certainly help to clear up the matter. It is clear as to the relation, and the agreement made with Italy in 1894, by which we gave a line separating our protectorate. Anyone who reads the whole treaty will clearly see that it is a question of the continued recognition by us of the Italian Protectorate to the south of the Italian sphere of influence, and to the south of our Protectorate; and that is where, in the second paragraph, they establish on each side a dividing line. The previous part contained a recognition by Menelik of the boundary of our Protectorate, but its provision with regard to the tribes recognises the other side of that line, and the question is: what has become of our obligation towards Italy? I think we may consider that Italy is out of the matter altogether; that we have neglected or contemned the rights which, in 1894, we acknowledged to belong to her. And what is the position that Her Majesty's Government have taken up with regard to Italy? They have consented to this abandonment to us of a right which we formerly recognised in them; or, if not, what is the meaning of the arrangement? Upon the main issues raised by the hon. Baronet I agree. Although I am far from thinking, as was well pointed out by the Member for Keighley, the treatment is in many respects very disappointing, and not certainly what we should have expected; there may be reasons why it has been thought desirable that the House should not be informed upon this question, and, therefore, I shall, for that reason, not join in any opposition to this Vote.

I beg to ask whether Mr. Curzon can inform the Committee concerning the terms of the Charter alleged to have been agreed upon between the Emperor Menelik and Prince Henry of Orleans? I think it is important that we should hear from the Government, before coming to a decision on this Vote, the exact position in which we stand with regard to the Charter. It has been constantly referred to in the French Press and in the French Chamber, and there seems to be no specific ground for the Charter entered into. I do think, before coming to a vote on this subject, we should hear what the views of Her Majesty's Government are upon that concession.

In reply to the last question, I can only say that we know nothing of this Charter, except what has appeared in the papers. In reply to the right hon. Gentleman opposite, the terms of our arrangement with Menelik were communicated to the Italian Government, and they raised no objection.

I think it will be in the recollection of the House that the other day the First Lord of the Treasury promised that an explanation should be given to us—I do not know whether he meant by the Colonial Secretary or the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. But I certainly think we ought to have some sort of explanation, in order that we may fairly consider what are the reasons given in favour of it.

The Vote, as it stands on the paper, explains itself; it is explained on the paper.

I beg the right hon. Gentleman's pardon; the right hon. Gentleman contradicts me. The First Lord of the Treasury gave a distinct pledge that the information should be laid before the House.

My right hon. Friend has promised that when the Vote comes before the House he himself will be able to defend it. So he is. But before he can defend the Vote it must first be challenged. I saw, with some surprise, that the hon. Member for Northampton, as well as another hon. Member, has given notice of a Motion to reduce the Vote, and I am here to listen to any objections that they may offer in that case. In the meantime, I may say that these Colonies on the West Coast of Africa are being extended by way of protectorates and spheres of influence into the interior, and the Government wish proper notice to be provided.

The right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury undertook to "explain" the Vote. I cannot say that the explanation of the right hon. Gentleman can be said, in any sense of the word, to be an explanation. Under these circumstances, I am obliged to take these statements that I read in the newspapers. I am one of those who are not very much in favour of Colonial expansion in South Africa, but I fully admit there are exceptional circumstances in regard to the coast. On the Bight of Benin a number of countries claim a large amount of Hinterland, and as they do not allow free trade in their Hinterland it is most desirable that we, having the coast, should have a fair proportion of the Hinterland, in order that we may be able to trade with the natives for our benefit, if not for theirs. I doubt whether it has been a wise policy to establish a Protectorate over the kingdom of Sokoto. I don't believe in these Protectorates. I don't believe the game is worth the candle. We have, in many parts of the world, a vast number of races subject to our rule; I think I am not wrong in saying that there are nearly 400 million persons subject to our rule. In Africa the objection is stronger than anywhere else, because, as a matter of positive fact, the African will never work for himself or others unless he is made to do so. We then found that we had assumed very great responsibility in Africa when we took under our Protectorate a large portion of the country; for instance, with regard to slavery or serfdom. Either you have slavery among the Africans themselves—as is the case in Pemba and Uganda at the present moment—or where there is not slavery among the Africans themselves, we established, as in Rhodesia, or tried to establish, a species of serfdom to make them work for us, which is only slavery under another name. In this case there, is the further objection that the portion taken over is in the hands of the Niger Company, a chartered company, and we know perfectly well that these chartered companies are apt to get into quarrels with their neighbours and to pursue an agressive policy, and when they get into a mess they are apt to call upon us, at considerable liability to ourselves, to come to their aid. It is somewhat remarkable that the right hon. Gentleman should be anxious to take over the vast territories in Africa, considering he has asked us to give some dole to the West Indian Colonies, which have so long been in our possession, and yet, though the majority are of the black race, they have paid us so badly that we have to come to their aid to save them from absolute ruin. I put aside, however, the general question of expansion in Africa. The great country of Sokoto is brought under our Protectorate. We have a great Hinterland there; but the great question of interest is not in regard to the tribes, but in regard to France. The matter at issue is a comparatively small strip of country. There is a Commission sitting at the present moment in Paris discussing this question. As I understand it, the question is whether there have been prior treaties or not, and the whole thing is in a perfect tangle. We have gone there, or we have sent persons there, to make treaties with divers chiefs. The French, also, have made treaties with divers chiefs. I myself do not attach much importance to these treaties. Generally speaking, somebody goes to a village, and gets hold of the headman, and asks him whether he will receive French or English assistance. He is given a bottle of gin, or something of that sort, and he is at once asked what he owns. He says he owns the whole country. Then the French go to the country and meet the savage or black man, and they go through the same thing. The chiefs will sell it to a dozen persons, and the whole thing is an absurdity. The question of title cannot arise upon such vague powers. I know perfectly well that it is sometimes urged that we ought to have the Hinterland behind our own territories. I am rather of that opinion myself, but we are precluded from using this argument, because we have laid hold of a considerable portion of the Hinterland between the French, colony of Dahomey and the German colony of Togoland. It is an unfortunate thing that, while this disturbance has arisen between the French and the English, the right hon. Gentleman should be the Secretary of State for the Colonies. I have the greatest admiration for the right hon. Gentleman as a speaker. I have often heard him make the best case out of the worst materials. I do not know a better speaker in this House; but there my admiration begins and ends. During the vacation the right hon. Gentleman went about the country as a sort of Ajax defying the lightning, talking a vast amount of Bobadil trash. The right hon. Gentleman laid down many grand theories as to the expansion of the Empire. I think the right hon. Gentleman will not deny that he did hold language which laid down that the British Empire must exist by expansion, and that we must go on and expand. In one of the right hon. Gentleman's speeches which I read, he said that he dreamed of an Empire so vast, that it could not be dreamed of by any other person.

I never said anything of the kind. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman cares to be accurate.

If it be a matter of choice, I always prefer to be accurate. At any rate, it was something about dreams. Now, the right hon. Gentleman, I admit, is in a somewhat difficult position. The right hon. Gentleman is a Unionist—a Liberal Unionist—and the right hon. Gentleman is a Member of a Conservative Government. I can perfectly understand that the right hon. Gentleman has a legitimate ambition to be the head of the Party opposite.

I rise to order, Sir. I was rather severely treated just now, and I wish to know whether this elaborate discussion is à propos of the question before the Committee?

On the point of order, Sir, I was giving some of the reasons why I am unfortunately unable to vote in favour of this money, and one of the reasons is that the right hon. Gentleman is the Colonial Secretary. It is all very well for Gentlemen to cry "Oh!"

I must remind the hon. Member that in dealing with Supplementary Estimates the rule of the House is very strict. Only those matters which appear in the Estimates are open to discussion, and I must, therefore, ask the hon. Member to deal a little more closely with the subject.

Anyhow, the right hon. Gentleman has adopted a policy of expansion in Africa, and in the West of Africa he has practically defied France. I say the right hon. Gentleman had defied France. There does not seem to be unity of views among the Government. I judge that that is so from the utterances of Lord Salisbury, who is at the head of the Government, and I judge that also from the utterances of the Press, because the Press have continually contrasted Lord Salisbury with the Colonial Secretary. The Press seem to prefer the right hon. Gentleman; they may be right or wrong, but they seem to prefer the Colonial Secretary to Lord Salisbury. Now, last week we had a singular instance of this. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Colonies came down to the House on Friday and read two dispatches which he had received from Africa. One of these dispatches stated that they had claimed a place called Wa, behind the Gold Coast, where the French had raised their flag, and that, in another place on the right bank of the Niger—that is to say in the disputed territory—a body of Hausa troops, commanded by an English officer, were in possession.

No, Sir, the right hon. Gentleman is lamentably inaccurate, and as he is now raising questions which have some international interest, I venture to tell him that he is wholly wrong in everything he has hitherto said.

There was a dispute with regard to flags and possessions between the French and the English, one in this town of Wa, which was behind our Gold Coast Colony, and the other in a village on the right side of the Niger, in the territory which is disputed between us and France. I think that is perfectly correct, and I have no doubt that these disputes very frequently take place. You have in these places no clearly defined lines of delimitation between them. Behind the Gold Coast you have no clear definition of what is ours and what is French by treaty. You are actually discussing in Paris now what is the line of delimitation respecting the right bank of the Niger. Therefore, it can hardly be said that either Party ought to be blamed for what took place. It is a necessary consequence of sending troops about there—a lamentable consequence, no doubt, but one which has taken place again and again under similar circumstances. Well, on Monday the right hon. Gentleman came down to the House with a further dispatch, stating that the French had invaded the empire of Sokoto, which was stated to be undoubtedly ours. The right hon. Gentleman used the word "invasion" in regard to this matter, and undoubtedly great attention was paid to his statements, because I saw in the paper that a panic took place in the City at once upon those statements. Now, this was while negotiations were going on. It is remarkable that these incidents do occur before a Vote for additional troops is asked for, but I should certainly have thought that in order to keep up a friendly feeling with France pending the negotiations, it would have been better for the right hon. Gentleman not to accentuate, as he did, those particular telegrams. Fortunately, Lord Salisbury saved the situation. Lord Salisbury had already dealt with the speeches of the right hon. Gentleman during the Vacation in the excellent speech which he himself made upon the Address—a speech which my right hon. Friend the Member for Monmouthshire rightly said ought to be written over the doors of the Primrose League, and, he might have added, ought to be written over the doors of the Colonial Office. Lord Salisbury, when he heard of this incident, at once telegraphed to instruct Sir Edward Monson to ask for some explanation from M. Hanotaux, whose reply was to the effect that he did not believe any Frenchmen had invaded Sokoto, but that if any were there they were there against the wishes of the French Government, and he would recall them. But at the present moment we are asked to vote a large sum of money to increase the forces at the command of the right hon. Gentleman in these colonies. We hear, as a matter of fact, that there are already forces there—nominally, it is true, a police force, but, nevertheless, what I should look on as something of a military force. Then we see in the newspapers that a large number of officers are being sent out there from day to day for the purpose of enlisting men; and I am surprised to hear that the proposed force is to be entirely under the control of the Secretary for the Colonies. The First Lord of the Treasury was asked to-day under whose direction it would be, and he said it would be under the direction of the Secretary of State. I asked who the Secretary of State was, because really I was under the impression that he meant the Secretary for War, and I was informed that it was the right hon. Gentleman the Colonial Secretary. The last information we have been vouchsafed is that Imperial troops have been ordered to go to the front. Whether they are to go to the front or not I do not know, but I hope the right hon. Gentleman will be good enough to tell us. Now, what is all this collection of troops in this place for? It is true that we have taken this empire of Sokoto, or, rather, the Niger Company have taken it for us, under somewhat peculiar circumstances. It is placed under our Protectorate, but the whole circumstances are decidedly vague. Sokoto is surrounded by States which, the Emperor claims, are feudatory to him, but this they deny. However that may be, we know perfectly well that these forces of ours will probably be used to join in the different quarrels that may take place in this territory, which has practically become ours; but I cannot help thinking that another object in sending troops so openly to these colonies is to weigh upon France—to convince her that we are really serious, and that we are not going to let what we consider our rights be interfered with. Well, I say it is a great mistake to do this at the very time when you are in negotiation with a foreign country. Take a parallel case in Europe. Say there was a dispute between France and Germany; well, the sending out of an army would, to say the least of it, not be conducive to peace. I must say, with all my admiration for the ability of the Colonial Secretary, that I regard the right hon. Gentleman as a very dangerous man, and I am therefore not inclined to entrust him with these vast powers or with the money which he desires. We hear a good deal at the present day about markets, especially in China; and I should say that our trade with one province in China is worth what we could obtain by getting hold of the whole of Africa I am not in favour of yielding what is ours, and I trust the Commission which is sitting in Paris will come to some rational arrangement. I think there should be some clear and specific arrangement as to the Hinterland belonging to us and that which belongs to France, but, if we cannot agree as to it, why did we not go to arbitration1? I find, by the way, that these colonies obtain their revenues in the main by a tax upon drink, and if you are able to run a, whole Government upon a tax on drink it is very clear that a large amount of it is imported, and is drunk by the inhabitants of the country. I vote against this increase of our forces on the clear ground that I do not believe in increasing our forces in this district at the present moment, since I do not think it will tend to aid in keeping the peace between France and England, a matter of very much more importance to us than a few miles of territory in the centre of Africa.

Since this Estimate is not asked for to cover the cost of arming and maintaining the troops which we keep in the Niger territory, I must take it that it is for raising a different force from that which we maintain at the present moment. We gather also that this force is to be under the control not of the local Government upon the spot, but of the Colonial Office at home. It is described, by the way, as the West African Frontier Force, and if that be so I am entitled to assume that it is not a police but a military force, since it is presumably a force for the protection of the Frontier. The reason why I have put down an Amendment for the reduction of the Vote by £100,000 is, first, because of the refusal of the Government to give us that information for which I think the House was entitled to ask before it was called on to vote for a sum of money apart from the ordinary Supplementary Estimates. This is, as it seems to me, the initiation of an entirely new policy, and it certainly would appear that the House is entitled to, at least, as much information as was given in the case of the Venezuela Frontier dispute. When an hon. Member asked the Government the other day for Papers giving the history of the transactions which have led up to the present dangerous situation of things the answer given was that, the matter being under negotiation with the French Government, it was not in the public interest to give the information requested. It appears to me a strange thing how it can be maintained by the Government that it was in the public interest to give the information which would enable the House to approach the consideration of the question with full knowledge in the case of the Venezuela dispute, which was just as dangerous a dispute as this, and is against the public interest to deny similar information in the present case. However, both sides of the House, being anxious not to exacerbate the situation supposed to exist between this country and France, acquiesced in the refusal of the Government to give this information, and then what occurred? An unprecedented series of events took place. The Government, having refused to give information extending over the last few years and leading up to the present condition of things, suddenly certain telegrams were read out in this House—telegrams of the most exciting and dangerous kind, which went round the whole of the country, and, indeed, of Europe, and inspired in the whole Press of Great Britain a series of articles of the most offensive and aggressive character against the Republic of France. Now, I should like to know why it was against the public interest to deny to the House, before this Vote was presented to the Committee, full information which would have enabled it to approach the matter in a reasoning spirit, and why it was for the public interest to read out, as they came, telegrams which were calculated to create a panic on the Stock Exchange and to lead people to believe that we were on the verge of a war with France? No one can deny that these telegrams have excited—and, I think, reasonably excited—a very dangerous feeling in France. Throughout this controversy the tone of the French Press has been characterised by very much greater forbearance and dignity than the British Press has shown, and until these telegrams were read the French Press was almost silent as to the condition of things in West Africa, being content to leave the matter in the hands of the Joint Commission. Hon. Members opposite have said that the French Press was silent, because France was going on. That is your way of stating the case, but there are always two sides to a case, and I have heard the same thing said with regard to England. The Débats says—

"France is obliged to take these precautions because of the constant forward movement of England in these regions."

I have no doubt that the House will be grateful to the hon. Gentleman who has just spoken for the efforts he has made to avoid a conflict between this country and France; but though in strength of language he has quite exceeded the hon. Member for Northampton, I do not think his arguments were much better. The hon. Member for Northampton did not rise even to the height of vituperation, and when he did have something of a case, he did not know how to deal with it, and has left me to say that there is something to be said as to this matter of the Frontier. But what there is to be said is not to be said against the Colonial Secretary, who is driven at last, at the eleventh hour, to take certain steps for maintaining the rights of England. It is, perhaps, desirable that the Committee should remember what took place in Madagascar. Surely it is necessary that some stand should at last be taken, and it is the duty of the right hon. Gentleman to take the steps which he is able to take. If there is a case against anyone, it is against the Foreign Office, not the Colonial Office. From 1890 up to the present day this Frontier question has been allowed to remain undecided so far as the Western and Northern boundaries of the Niger Protectorate are concerned, and no effort even seems to have been made to define it. The suggested Northern line, clearly, could not define itself, because it did not follow any parallel; but no effort has been made, either by the right hon. Baronet opposite or by any other Government, to send out delimitation Commissioners. Again, the Frontier to the West remains unfixed to this day. Under these circumstances, I think collisions and disputes and misunderstandings were almost inevitable, and I hope we shall have some explanation of the fact that no effort has been made during these eight years to settle the Frontiers on the West and North, which settlement would, in all probability, have prevented these misunderstandings. Having said that, I am bound to add that there is no man in this House who would regret more than I should anything which would tend to bring France and England into anything approaching war, because I believe it is in a good understanding between England and France that the best hope for the destinies of Europe is based. I, therefore, should regret most profoundly anything which would lead to a war between the two countries; but I am perfectly convinced that England's game is not to retreat whenever France advances, but to show occasionally what is called a stiff upper lip—to say—

"When we can fairly concede we will, but when we have reached a point where concession is impossible you must excuse us."

I do not propose to detain the House at any length. I think the House will realise that it would have been imprudent on my part to have defended this Vote until I knew exactly on what grounds I was to be attacked. It will be seen that no good would have been done had I attempted to anticipate the line of argument of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Northampton and the hon. Gentleman who sits behind him. To my mind the greater part of the speeches of the hon. Gentlemen appeared to be absolutely irrelevant to the case at issue. But, as the hon. Gentleman the Member for Mayo says, this is in a sense a new proposal—the development and military defence of the West African Colonies—and, therefore, no doubt the House is entitled to claim some explanation of the lines upon which we are proceeding. But the greater parts of the speeches of the two hon. Gentlemen have been taken up with an endeavour to bring into this matter something else which has nothing whatever to do with it—namely, the differences of opinion which have arisen between ourselves and a great friendly Power. The time will come, no doubt, when it will be possible for the Government, and when the Government will be delighted to give the fullest possible information in regard to those differences; but that time has not come at the present moment, and I think that if the hon. Gentleman who have spoken really desired to prevent any exacerbation of feeling between two great nations, they have been particularly unfortunate in the method they have taken to secure that result. The hon. Member for Mayo complains that we have refused to produce papers, while, as he said, we have produced inflammatory telegrams. We did not produce those telegrams. The hon. Gentleman appears to think that we have, in some way or other, manufactured the telegrams. As a matter of fact the news contained in the telegrams was public news, which either had already been, or was about to be, published in every newspaper in the country; and, that being the case, I took the course usually taken under such circumstances and gave the House, in the baldest possible way, without criticism or comment, the exact facts, so far as they were known to me. Beyond that I did not go, and to have refused to go so far would have been altogether improper in anyone holding my position. If any hon. Member says that we ought to have gone beyond that and produced papers, that hon. Member has, I imagine, given only a very casual attention to this very important matter. If he had given it proper attention, he would have known that the papers, if ever they are produced, will, of course, contain a full account of all the negotiations, and these negotiations, which have been proceeding for a very considerable period, which have been continued from time to time, and which were renewed in October of last year and have continued down to the present time, have been undertaken with the French Government with the distinct understanding with that Government, pending the negotiations, that nothing whatever should be printed or published with regard to them. The desire of the Government would naturally be to place everything at the disposal of the House, but it is not possible for the Government to keep faith with the French Government and publish anything in regard to these negotiations. Are we, under those circumstances, to be called upon to go into these matters which have been referred to with so little knowledge by the hon. Member for Northampton? Is it expected of me that I am now to lay before the House of Commons the British case as opposed to the case which may be put forward by the French Government? Sir, it is perfectly absurd. The negotiations are still going on. We have reason to hope that they may result in a friendly and satisfactory settlement, and until these negotiations come to an end we shall not be in a position to give the House further information with regard to their progress. But as regards the remarks of my hon. Friend behind me, the Member for Lynn Regis, I am afraid that I cannot congratulate him on having shown more knowledge of the facts of the case than the hon. Gentleman opposite, because it seems to me that my hon. Friend is under the impression that the whole difficulty has arisen from the non-delimitation of the Saye-Barruwa line. On the contrary, no difficulty has arisen from that cause. The general trend of the Saye-Barruwa line is recognised by all parties; the exact curve of the line has to be determined in accordance with the ultimate delimitation of the northern part of the boundary of Sokoto. But there has not been, up to the present time, any approach to the northern boundary of Sokoto by France from the north, neither has there been any approach to it from the south by us. Under those circumstances, both the Great Powers being a considerable distance from this line, which has not hitherto been delimited, no difference has arisen, and there is no prospect at the present time of any difference arising. The differences have arisen, not on the delimitation of the Saye-Barruwa line, but on the delimitation on the west of the Niger, and I do not think our earlier delimitation of the Saye-Barruwa line would in the least have relieved us of the difficulties in which we now find ourselves.

May I explain to the right hon. Gentleman that I pointed out that not only was the Saye-Barruwa line not delimited, but the Western Frontier had also been left un-delimited.

Well, Sir, the negotiations which we are now carrying on have for their object, among other things, to determine the boundaries between the possessions of the two countries to the west of the Niger. That, then, is all I have to say. I regret as much as anyone that it is so little, but it is all I can say about the burning question of differences which have arisen between ourselves and the French Government, but which have nothing whatever to do with the proposal which is now before the House, which is independent of that altogether, which was provided for and put forward before these later negotiations took place, and which would have been pressed on the House whether the negotiations came to a satisfactory or unsatisfactory issue. The fact is, that the circumstances with regard to these West African Colonies have most materially changed in the course of the last few years. If I am not wearying the House, I will very briefly recount the recent history of these Colonies. The whole thing is most interesting, if we had time to go into the history. The House must know that for a very considerable period these Colonies were valued by this country, and similar possessions by other countries, chiefly because the stations which were formed along the coast were convenient stations for carrying on the slave trade. Slaves were brought down from the interior and from these stations were distributed to America and other parts of the world. When the slave trade was abolished entirely the apparent value of these possessions seemed almost to have disappeared, and although they were carried on a considerable time afterwards, it was more because they then became stations from which the slave trade could be opposed than from any particular profit, or expected profit, to this country. In the year 1865 a Committee of this House actually advised that we should reduce, and even, if possible, altogether get rid of, our responsibilities in this neighbourhood, and that, if we were to retain any position at all on the West Coast of Africa, it should be confined to Sierra Leone, which was thought to be of importance as a naval station. The decision of that House of Commons' Committee, which was a very strong Committee, consisting of both Parties, at the time, shows how little it is possible to predict the future of these undeveloped countries. Up to that time these possessions on the West Coast of Africa had been rightly denominated "West Coast" Possessions. They were purely and simply coast possessions. No attempt had been made to penetrate into the interior, and, as late as 1874, the position of things still continued. So little did people understand that there was a large and fruitful country in the interior, that practically the whole of it was at our disposal—practically the whole of it, from the Gambia to the Cameroons, might have been taken by Great Britain, and no other country would have said us nay. That, however, was not our view. There was a considerable party in the country at that time who shared the views now held by the hon. Member for Northampton, against the expansion of our Empire. Rightly or wrongly, those opportunities were lost sight of, and it was not till ten years later—in 1884—that we found ourselves confronted with a newly-born ambition on the part of other Great Powers, which threatened our Colonies in that part of the world—threatened, I do not mean to say the Colonies actually in our possession, but their possible future extension. We found the Colony of the Gambia, which I look upon as having been at one time the most promising of these Colonies, and the Colony of Sierra Leone had been hemmed in, and there was a probability that in the case of the Gold Coast that would be also hemmed in by the territories of other countries which, from the moment they were placed under the flag of those countries, would be absolutely closed to British trade. That is an important element in the whole of this argument. If other countries had adopted the policy we have adopted with regard to these and other Colonies, I do not say that it might not still have been our policy, as it was in 1865, to have allowed to these other Powers the gratification of their territorial ambition, and to have satisfied ourselves with the possibility of extending our trade. But under existing circumstances every inch of territory placed under a foreign flag is closed, and apparently closed for ever, to the introduction of British trade. In these circumstances it became necessary in 1885 to come to some arrangement, because disputes and differences appeared to be likely to arise, and accordingly a Conference was called at Berlin in order (as has been well said) to establish the rules of the game. It was quite clear that if there was to be this prosecution of rival claims in Africa, a general agreement between the competing Powers must be come to. Events, however, move with such rapidity that what was settled in 1885 has already become antiquated. What that Conference did then was not enough for the future. They settled matters of great importance, and they laid down certain conditions, as, for instance, that coast positions could only be properly held against rival claims if they were accompanied by effective occupation. They laid down also the freedom of navigation of the great continental rivers, and they also determined certain broad lines of demarcation between possessions as far as up to that time they had been established. But very much was still left undone, and in the course of the next ten years—that is to say, the last ten years with which we have been dealing—there has been a most remarkable and extraordinary display of enterprise on the part of our competitors. Up to the present time the policy of this country with regard to these extensions has been altogether different to the policy of foreign countries. Our policy has been to establish, if we could, a sphere of influence generally of a very moderate character in proportion to the vast territories with which we were dealing—to establish a sphere of influence in the Hinterland of the Colonies, not to occupy it, but to leave it afterwards for gradual development, the idea being that the enterprise of commerce and the gradual spread of civilisation would result ultimately in bringing these territories under sufficient and satisfactory control. On the other hand, any attempt prematurely to occupy them by a military force would not only be very expensive, but would also tend to bring us into conflict with the Natives, and cause much bloodshed and slaughter, which we would gladly avoid. Accordingly, our Colonies have been self-supporting, and no demand has been made on Imperial funds for the Gold Coast or the Gambia, or for Sierra Leone—none is likely to be made for Gambia or Sierra Leone. The history of these Colonies has been written. We have allowed them to be shut in, and it is absolutely impossible to contemplate any future extension. I confess that, whatever may have been the opinion of those who dealt with them at the time, I cannot doubt that everyone will say that it is a most lamentable fact that in the case of these two Colonies we allowed ourselves to be anticipated in the way that has actually taken place. We do not intend that the history of the Gambia and Sierra Leone shall be repeated on the Gold Coast. As I said, these Colonies have up to the present been self-supporting, and their extensions have been measured by their revenue. Considering that they are even now little more than settlements on the coast, they have been extraordinarily prosperous. At the present moment the trade with West Africa is very considerable. Every year they take from us two millions sterling of British and Irish produce. Independently of those goods which pass in transit from foreign countries, the actual trade with this country, which employs British and Irish artisans, already amounts to two millions a year, and it is capable of indefinite extension. A force of military police has been established, and gradually these forces have been pushing their way into the interior; and if we had been alone in this matter—if we had had no foreign competitors to deal with—I have no doubt that this progress into the interior would have continued to be very gradual, and would have been conducted at the expense of the Colony and without any demand upon Imperial funds. But we have not been let alone; the policy of our competitors has been wholly different. Germany and France—especially France—have been carrying out during the last three years military expeditions at enormous cost, and have been spreading all over the Hinterland, to a part of which, at any rate, we consider we have a most undoubted right. I confess I cannot look at this action on the part of France without admiration. Granting their point of view, I have nothing but praise for the enterprise, for the devotion, for the courage, and for the persistency of aim which has been shown by French policy with regard to this great question, and the result has been that, whatever may be the ultimate decision on the matters of difference which have arisen, in any case France will have carved out for herself an enormous Empire in Africa, from which I have no doubt she will derive in the future well-deserved profit and advantage. But if this extension which France has undertaken were to be allowed to go on without any corresponding extension on our part, the result would be that the Colonies of the Gold Coast and Lagos would be strangled in the same way as the Colonies of the Gambia and Sierra Leone have already been strangled. An hon. Member said we were acting in regard to the Hinterland of the French Colonies in the same way as they were acting in regard to the Hinterland of ours. This is absolutely inaccurate. To my knowledge, we are not at present in any way on the Hinterland of any of these French Colonies—on what may be called the geographical and legitimate Hinterland of these Colonies. They, on the other hand, taking the same definition, are on what may be called the geographical and legitimate Hinterland of ours, and it is against this that naturally we are seeking to protest. Therefore, under the circumstances which I have detailed to the House, without abandoning our old policy, which is the policy of cautious and gradual expansion, we are obliged to develop it somewhat. We are obliged to go forward more quickly than we should have done if we alone had interests there. We have proceeded by steps. In the first instance, what we did was to send agents into our Hinterland—not that of the French or the Germans—in order to make Treaties with the Native Chiefs, which, we thought, would secure us against any foreign competition. If that policy had succeeded we might have continued as before to hold these Colonies as claims pegged out for futurity, but to refrain from developing them until the resources at the disposal of the Colonies enabled us to do so without any demand on the taxpayers of this country. But, Sir, we have found that that was not sufficient security; we have found that, in spite of these Treaties, which have been, of course, communicated to our allies and the friendly nations on our borders, France and Germany thought these facts did not preclude them, under International arrangements, from coming into our borders and endeavouring to make Treaties which, though they were subsequent to ours, nevertheless, were set up against us. At the same time, great expeditions had been sent out from the French Colonies on the North, from the French Colony of the Ivory Coast on the West, and from Dahomey on the South, and these expeditions have spread out like a fan all over these territories; so that if we had remained as the hon. Gentleman wished us to do, and had taken no action on our own part, the whole of these prospective advantages, which we are anxious to secure for our successors, would have been taken from us. Sir, that is a position which, with our present knowledge, it is absolutely impossible that we should accept; and, accordingly, we have thought it necessary to raise what has been called a Frontier force. The present forces on the Gold Coast and Lagos are almost entirely required for the mere policing of the coast districts, and if we are to occupy, as evidently it is necessary that we should occupy, these territories over which we have assumed a protectorate, we must have a force capable of that duty. Accordingly, it has been decided to create and establish such a force, which, on the Lagos side, will be under the command of Colonel Lugard. That force is now rapidly being recruited, and it is for its officering that the drafts to which the hon. Member has referred have taken place. But, as I have said, the creation of that force was necessary, and will be necessary whether the differences with the French are arranged satisfactorily or not; because, if we are to assume these responsibilities, hon. Gentlemen will bear in mind that our obligations are reciprocal. When we make a Treaty with a Native State, we accord it our protection. At the same time we are bound as a civilised Power to accompany that with certain conditions. We expect, for instance, that the practice of slave raiding, and the observance of these fetish superstitions, which has caused so much bloodshed in Africa, and which—slave-raiding especially—has desolated the country, and has destroyed for centuries the possibilities of trade—we expect that these practices wall be given up. In return, we have to guarantee the security and the order and peace of these districts if they are threatened from outside. We do not intend to interfere with Native customs where they are not of the barbarous character of those to which I have referred, but we are bound to preserve peace and order as between the different tribes. Under these circumstances, therefore, for the proper government and control of the country over which we have assumed a protectorate, and for the proper performance of the obligations which we have entered, it is absolutely necessary that we should have the moderate force for which we are now asking, and for which this vote is proposed to-day. I believe that this force, besides being, as I have said, a necessity and an advantage to the district, will also prove, in the long run, to be a most economical force. It is impossible, in dealing with these Native territories, that we can always avoid difficulties, and expeditions, from time to time, probably, will have to take place, especially if we are going to interfere with the customs of the Natives themselves. But what happens now? Whenever an expedition is required, it is necessary to go outside for a military force; we have to go to the West India regiments—a most admirable military force, but, as they are not Natives of the country, they require, in the way of transport and other particulars, very much more expense than anything that would be required for a purely Native force. If the West India regiments are insufficient, we have to go, as we have had to go in the case of the last as of the first Ashante war, to British soldiers, and although they are most satisfactory, no doubt, so far as their military value is concerned, yet I do think that it is cruel and wrong if it can be avoided, to expose British soldiers to the terrors of the malarious climate of that country. Now, if this force of which I have been speaking is established, and if it answers the expectations we have formed with regard to it, we believe we shall be able, in the future, in carrying out whatever expeditions may be necessary, to dispense altogether with the employment of British forces, and, probably, to a large extent, if not altogether, with the employment of the West India regiments. Now, Sir, I think I have said all I need say in support of the policy of Her Majesty's Government in reference to the difficulties which have arisen on the Frontier between ourselves and the French. I cannot help thinking that the opposition to this vote on the part of the hon. Gentlemen opposite, is motived by another cause. It was not so much to show that we were wrong in any differences we may have with the French; it was not so much to put on record, that opposition to all expansion of the Empire, which it is quite unnecessary for the hon. Member for Northampton to advertise, as we have long recognised his consistency in that respect; but it was to show that there was a serious difference within the ranks of the Government—that there was a policy of Lord Salisbury which is different from the policy of the Colonial Secretary, and possibly another policy different from either. I need not say that if this were a matter of merely domestic interest, I should not think it necessary to allude to that, or to utter a single syllable upon it. But, Sir, circumstances have arisen which, whatever we may think about them, are at all events, circumstances of considerable gravity, and it is above all necessary that there should be no misunderstanding abroad as to our position. Therefore, I venture to say that in regard to the whole of this policy, from the beginning to the end, there is one policy of the Government only. The Cabinet is absolutely united—and, I believe, that in this they have the whole country behind them—in the determination that while they will exhibit the most conciliatory disposition in dealing with disputed matters, and will be ready even to make concessions of what they think to be their rights, in order to secure the friendship of the great nation with which they desire to remain in cordial unity; on the other hand, they will not allow the important interests of this country to be sacrificed.

The right hon. Gentleman has given an interesting resumé of a very large and important question, and I do not think he has said anything which can be fairly construed as likely to prejudice the peaceful solution of this question. Nobody can have been at the Foreign Office and have been cognisant of what has passed between the two Governments most concerned in this question within the last few years without being deeply impressed with the importance of the point which we have now reached. You have only to look at the sub-head of the Vote, on page 12, which is to cover the initial cost of raising, arming, and maintaining a force to be at present employed in the Niger territory. It is there that the chief difficulty has arisen. I will not travel over the whole of the ground, or attempt to do so, but what has been the history of the last few years? They have been years of pressure—years during which other countries, and ourselves, too, have been obliged to go at a faster pace than we desired. I think it would have been better to have proceeded more gradually, and it might have been possible to do so if what the right hon. Gentleman has properly called the rules of the game, had been understood in the same sense by all those who were interested in the question. Take the Hinterland doctrine. The Hinterland doctrine was understood by us, at any rate, to provide a certain sphere behind our own recognised and occupied possessions, in which there need be no haste, because, so far as other countries were concerned, it would be looked upon as a natural sphere, in which our right of action was recognised if at any time we chose to exercise it. But there was more than that. There was the doctrine of treaties made with native chiefs within, that Hinterland, which was supposed doubly to secure our rights. Had those "rules of the game" been understood by everybody in the same sense, I think it would have been much better for all; responsibility would not have been extended so fast, and dangers would not have been incurred. But that has not been the sense in which those rules have been interpreted. They have been called into question. There has not been that general consent which we expected to the principle that questions of dispute should be settled solely on those lines, and a remarkable activity has been shown by small expeditions traversing large tracts of country. That, I think, has not been without its effect on the Natives themselves. It has produced among them a feeling of unrest, and, apart altogether from our difficulties with the French, the number of small expeditions, whether British or French, which have gone at a great pace over large tracts of country, have produced that amount of unrest in the Native mind, which has, I think, in some cases, already led to troubles, and which may possibly lead to more in the future, and which makes it absolutely necessary for us to have a larger force to protect our own interests; I do not mean against any European Power, but against possible Native disturbances. If that is so, I think it is absolutely necessary that we should support this Vote, if only on that ground. Then there was a further ground alluded to by the hon. Member for Northampton. He said he took this as intended to convince others that we were in earnest on this question. Sir, I hope that this Vote is not needed to convince others of that; it is the consequence of our being in earnest. I sincerely hope, as the right hon. Gentleman said to-night, that the solution of this question will be the natural outcome of friendly negotiations, and I see no reason why it should not be so, and we certainly hope that the Government will be conciliatory and patient in the conduct of these negotiations; but we know that they have no choice but to be firm. And it is because I feel that the worst public service which anyone could render at the present time would be, either by speech or vote, to give an impression in any quarter that public opinion in this country was not united, and not firm, that I think we ought to support this Vote.

I have listened to the speeches on this Vote tonight with a certain amount of pain. Although I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton on a great many subjects I differ with him in his notions of expansion—I mean by that Imperial expansion. I hold it to be the fundamental principle of national existence in any country to expand. That country, or nation, that cannot expand is moribund. I plead guilty during the Recess to attacking the Government on many platforms for a spiritless foreign policy, and there are many Liberals who agree with me in condemning them for not adopting a more spirited policy in the questions that have arisen with regard to Tunis, Siam, Madagascar, and China. I condemned them, and I should do it again; and now that we come to this West African business, what is the question? I want the House to bear in mind this. Of all the countries in the world, to my way of thinking, that have claims on that coast, there is none that will stand equal to Britain. What has it cost Britain? When we put down the slave trade, we had cruisers there for a long time, we spent hundreds and thousands of pounds, and many gallant lives of sailors and soldiers, in the course of those operations. Yet what do we find? If you look at the map, you will see that we are hemmed in completely. All the way down to Senegal, and the other reaches of the Niger, is now practically French territory, and we are hemmed right in. Where are your markets now? I do not want the right hon. Gentleman to go to war. I hope, and believe, that he will be able to settle this amicably, the Government succeeded in settling the questions of delimitation at Herat and Penjdeh, but we know that there is a syndicate of empires, or countries, all working against Great Britain at the present time. There is no disguising the fact that at every quarter of the globe we are being attacked, and what will be the result? It is all very well to say, do not expand, but let me ask this: Suppose you had withdrawn your troops from this portion of West Africa, what would have been said in this House? Why, the very Gentlemen who now complain would have been the first to denounce the Government for that. If that is so, what is our duty to-day? Our duty to-day is—at least I think so—to have our Frontier police, and look after the interest of the Natives in a quiet way; we should have our own markets, and we should on no account allow ourselves to be surrounded with France on the other side, and Germany on the other. Therefore, when I look at the whole question, I look at it from a national point of view—not from a parochial point of view. We are a commercial nation. Cripple our commerce, and we are done. It is the duty of our statesmen to ensure that our commercial position is unimpaired. Without our commerce, we must decay. The moment our commerce is weakened or destroyed, that will be the beginning of the decadence of the Empire of Britain. Therefore, if the hon. Member for Northampton moves a reduction of this Vote I shall certainly vote with the Government.

We have heard a great deal to-night about French interests and English interests, but we have heard nothing about the interests of the inhabitants of this part of Africa. Nobody has ventured to say a word in support of the interests of these dark people of this African continent. I want to know when the inhabitants of these regions invited either England or France to steal their country and rob them of their liberties. No such petition from these people has been presented to this House, and I am sure I am stating what is true when I declare that you have gone to these parts of Africa despite the protests of these people, whom you declare you want to civilise. The coming expedition is not the only one that has been sent to Africa by the Colonial Secretary. There was the expedition sent out to arrest King Prempeh. As the right hon. Gentleman the Colonial Secretary has boasted to-night, like my hon. Friend who has just sat down, of the benefits conferred upon these people by being brought under English rule, or within the English sphere of influence, let me for a few moments quote the opinion of a man on the spot, an Englishman, who has the courage to write and denounce the work done by this expedition. This is what he writes in the Lagos Weekly Record. He is speaking of the conduct of Governor Maxwell in requiring the King to pay the cost of the expedition, and the unpaid balance of the indemnity due for the Ashanti War of 1876, and this writer says—

"On King Prempeh intimating that it was beyond his power to pay such a large sum of money down at once, and requesting that time should be allowed him to do so, he was answered by being promptly put under arrest with a number of his family, including both males and females. There was no justification for such treatment of the King, and the action of Governor Maxwell—in the absence of any malfeasance on the part of the King, or menace on the part of his people—was an outrage upon civilisation and the bonâ fides of H.M. Government. But this gross violation of the rules and principles governing civilised methods appears to have been but the preliminary or prelude to more flagitious acts of Vandalism, inspired by a spirit of excessive cupidity, which seems to have seized upon every one connected with the expedition. We are informed, upon very reliable authority, that while the King was tendering his submission, and before he had finished doing so, his house, and even other royal residences had been invaded by avaricious officers on the hunt for treasure. And here followed a general system of looting, spoliation, and desecration, more worthy of a ferocious and barbarous people, than of the subjects of a civilised and Christian Government."

"They would seem to get on well without any regular laws, and to live out their span in comparative quiet. No country presents such a field to a philosopher as this country does, with its dense population, quite innocent of the least civilisation. I should say they are singularly free from vice. Their wars are generally very harmless affairs, and seldom cause bloodshed."

I beg to propose a reduction of the Vote by £130,000.