Sir, I rise to move that this Bill be read a second time upon this day six months. The object of this Bill is to consolidate and convert the capital of the Gas Light and Coke Company, and if this were the only proposal, I should regard it very much in the light of a matter affecting the shareholders alone, and not affecting the public position. But what I object to in this Bill is the watering of the stock, and if the House will kindly grant me just a few minutes I will state, as briefly as possible, what are my objections to the Bill. In the first place, the House will see that this is not a small Bill, but that the interests affected are very enormous. When I say that the stock which it is proposed to convert by this Bill amounts in the aggregate to close upon £12,000,000 sterling in nominal value, the House will see that, as I have said, it is not a small matter with which it is called upon to deal. It will, however, be convenient if, in explaining the effect of this Bill, I confine my attention to the ordinary stock of the company, which amounts to upwards of £6,000,000. It is not necessary that I should go further back in the history of the company than to the Act of 1876. By that Act, a Parliamentary bargain was made between the company on the one hand, and the consumers on the other. The relation which was to exist between the dividends which were to be paid and the prices which were to be charged for the gas was regulated by what is known as the sliding scale; that is to say, there was to be a 10 per cent. dividend on the ordinary stock, because I believe the dividend then payable was taken as the standard of dividend, and the then price of gas—3s. 9d. per 1,000 feet—was taken as the standard price of gas, and it was stipulated that for every penny charged in any year in diminution or in excess of the standard price, the standard rate of dividend should be reduced or increased for that year by one quarter per cent. Further, by that Act the interests of the public were protected by what is called the "auction clause"; that is to say, it was stipulated that any stock thereafter issued should be submitted to auction at the best price that the market could afford, so that the permanent advantage should not go to the shareholders, but that it should be appropriated to the purposes of the undertaking, and in this way accrue indirectly for the benefit of the consumers. Now, Sir, I say that the principle of the auction clause was to support and strengthen the sliding scale, and that the general effect of this clause was to provide that the shareholders should not from 1876 always receive any additional advantage without some corresponding advantage accruing to the consumer. Under the settlement of 1876, both the shareholders and the consumers have benefited. The price of gas offered by the company is now 2s. 10d. per 1,000 feet, and the dividend on the ordinary stock is 12¾ per cent. But the company is not satisfied. The company say—and I desire to put their case as fairly as possible—that £100 worth of stock nominal, with a dividend of 12¾ per cent., which runs up the Stock Exchange price to something between £200 and £300, is not so saleable as £100 worth of stock, with a 4 per cent. dividend, and commanding a premium of, perhaps, £15 or £20. And so the company bring forward this Bill, in which they ask the House to allow them to convert their ordinary stock, with a standard rate of dividend of 10 per cent., into a stock two and a half times in nominal amount greater, but having a standard rate of dividend of only 4 per cent. Now this conversion, as I will presently show, will bestow great advantage upon the company, but the effect upon the community will be very mischievous. In the first place, the effect of the Bill will be to conceal from the eye of the public the real state of facts in relation to the company. The company is now paying 12¾ per cent. upon its ordinary stock, but if this Bill passes it will then only pay about 5 per cent. Now, I submit that it is contrary to public policy that the company, having statutory powers and dealing under those statutory powers in a monopoly, should seem to be paying only 5 per cent., when, indeed, and in faith, it is paying a dividend of 12¾ per cent. This is my first objection. My second objection is that it is proposed by this Bill to rip up the Parliamentary bargain made in 1876 between this company and the consumers in London, and to do that in the interests of one of two parties only—namely, the company. It makes a present to the shareholders in this company in the shape of an enormous addition to the Stock Exchange value of the undertaking, whereas there is nothing in the nature of any particular advantage accruing to the consumer. I understand that it will be said that there is some advantage to the consumer in this way, that he will receive a compensation through the operation of the auction clause upon that portion of the authorised capital of the undertaking which remains as yet unissued. But, Mr. Speaker, I think it is sufficent to knock the bottom out of that argument to merely state what the amount of the unissued capital really is. The total existing stocks are very nearly twelve million pounds, and the only portion which remains unissued amounts to £175,000. That, of course, is a mere bagatelle, and it is obvious that, while the company receives an enormous advantage, the advantage to the consumer through the operation of the auction clause on the unissued capital—namely, £175,000—is absolutely inappreciable. In the third place, I object to the Bill because the public will be prejudiced by its effect if at any future time the public should propose to acquire the property of the company. It is admitted that the effect of this Bill will be to increase the Stock Exchange value of the undertaking. The degree of enhancement of value is, of course, a matter of dispute. Indeed, it is denied that the precise amount of the enhancement of value can possibly be fairly stated; but no one can seriously deny that the enhancement of value must be very considerable, and will probably be enormous. We are not without precedent to guide us in this matter. In the case of the South Metropolitan Gas Company, where the stock was treated in a similar manner in 1896, under circumstances to which I will in a moment refer, the Chairman of the company estimated the probable increase of Stock Exchange value at £90,000, the Controller of the London County Council put the figure at £250,000; but they were both wrong, for, in fact, the enhancement of value has proved to be the enormous sum of £900,000. Now, I believe it will be argued on the other side that the enhancement of the Stock Exchange value of the undertaking will not affect the price to be paid in the event of purchase by the public. I anticipate that that will be said on the other side. It will be said, I presume, that the arbitrator will estimate the price not upon the Stock Exchange value, but upon the basis of divisible property. But I will leave that argument to be judged by the candour and common sense of the House, and for this reason that I think it will be difficult to persuade hon. Members that the market is not a possible basis that a company may put before an arbitrator. We must remember that an arbitrator does not give his reasons. We cannot possibly understand or know what motives are operating at the back of the mind of the arbitrator. But I do say there is a risk—I will not put it stronger than that—a very serious risk, which I think no man would willingly incur in the case of his own private concerns, that the Stock Exchange value will have no inconsiderable influence in the primary deductions of the arbitrator. Now a word with regard to precedents. I understand that my hon. Friends who oppose me will rely upon precedents, and I should like to say just a word with reference to them. There are I believe, four or five legitimate precedents in favour of the course which the promoters of the Bill desire to take. But all these precedents, with one exception to which I will refer, were agreed Bills; that is to say, the local authority which was entitled to oppose the Bill considered that in one shape or another it had received a quid pro quo. The one exceptional case is the case of the South Metropolitan Gas Company's Bill, and that Bill, Mr. Speaker, had a very significant history. The Bill was originally introduced in 1895, and it was referred to a Committee, and that Committee threw out the Bill, and made a lengthy report. The Committee considered that the subject of the conversion of stock was of so far-reaching and important a character that it ought to be dealt with by a Committee especially appointed to consider it, the same as was done in the case of the water companies, and the Chairman of that Committee, at any rate, does not sit on this side of the House. The South Metropolitan Gas Bill, having been thrown out by a Committee in 1895, was re-introduced in 1896. It was referred to another Committee, and it passed into law. In the first place, in regard to the Bill, it may perhaps be worth while to mention that there were some provisions in it which seemed to have influenced some members of the County Council in its favour, and may possibly have obtained the support of some Members of our own Committee. These provisions were those relating to giving to the employees of that company some representation in the management of the company. But I do not rely very much upon that. I have, I think, a much stronger ground when I say that this House is no more to be influenced by the decision of one Committee than it is by the decision of the other Committee, and, as it is quite clear that the Committees differed, this is not a question which can be determined by the taking and considering of evidence. It is distinctly a question of policy, and I say that, if it were referred to two different Committees of this House, those Committees would arrive at exactly opposite conclusions. It is, indeed, precisely one of those matters which the House ought to decide for itself, and it is upon the merits of the Bill that the issue is now raised without any reference to what has gone before. Lastly, Mr. Speaker, what is the feeling of the local authorities, whose duty it is to protect the public in this matter? That, I think, is a very important thing for the House to consider. The London County Council, the Holborn Board of Works, the Islington Vestry—which is, I believe, the largest in London—and other local bodies, have passed resolutions hostile to this Bill. The action of the London County Council is particularly significant. It was not treated there in any way as a Party question. Leading members of the Moderate Party denounced this Bill in language even more vigorous than that which was used by my Progressive friends; and as a matter of fact, the London County Council was nearly absolutely unanimous—indeed, quite unanimous for all practical purposes, for the voting was: For the Resolution against the Bill 101, in favour of the Bill 4; and I am told that of the four in its favour two were tellers, so that you have the London County Council substantially unanimous against this Bill. I think, Sir, that this is not exactly the time when this company is entitled to come to this House, and ask for indulgences. The company has just given notice to raise the price of gas per thousand feet from 2s. 10s. to 3s. It is freely said by the local bodies to whom I have referred that this state of things is due to bad management and over-capitalisation. It may possibly be said on the other side that raising the price of gas will not, under the sliding scale, benefit the shareholders in the company. I would like to say one word about that. No doubt, the effect of a rise of 2d. in the price of gas per thousand feet will necessitate the reduction of the dividends by one-half per cent., but there can be no doubt that the object of the company in making the rise in price is to prevent a still heavier fall, which would happen unless they were able to put their hands in the pockets of the consumers, and take out this additional twopence. Sir, I have endeavoured to put this case fairly before the House. I have not intentionally omitted anything which would apply either in favour of the Bill on the one hand or against it on the other. I think I have stated as concisely as I can the serious objections which the representative authorities of London have to this Bill, and ask the House to reject this Bill. There is no urgency for it. It is only at the very best a financial juggle. Let the House throw out the Bill this year and leave the Company free to satisfy the representative authorities of London, so that new arrangements, if necessary, can be made. But that new arrangement should be one which would be equitable to both sides of the bargain, which was made in 1876.

formally seconded the Amendment.

Mr. Speaker, the hon. Member who has just sat down has advanced us a reason for asking this House to reject the Bill, the statement that the consumer will gain no benefit, and that any public body who may desire to purchase this Company will lose should this Bill become law. Now, the hon. Member says that the value of the Stock Exchange price will be increased, and that, no doubt, is true. But I venture to say that that will be equally a benefit to the consumer as it will be to the Company; and, in any case, I think that the increase in value cannot be held to affect the question of purchase by a local authority. I do not believe that any water-works or gas company has ever been purchased upon the basis of the Stock Exchange value. I believe that every such undertaking has always been bought upon revenue and not upon the capital. It would be a very unfortunate thing if the capital value was introduced into a purchase of this kind, because there would be nothing to prevent a number of persons combining to enhance the price upon the Stock Exchange, whereas it is a very difficult thing to attempt to tamper with the dividend, which can always be easily ascertained, while the actual price on the Stock Exchange is a thing that can be arranged by people buying and selling. Then the hon. Member says he would not object to the Bill provided it were only for the purpose of consolidating the Preference Debenture Stock. He objects only because the Ordinary Stock is going to be divided. I may point out that if he only objects to one clause, he might let the Bill go to a Committee, and allow the matter to be threshed out there. I object myself to one of the clauses—the 13th Clause—but I do not purpose to ask the House to reject the Bill on that ground. Now, as regards the watering of stock, the stock is increased, but at the same time the dividends are equally diminished, and, therefore, it is not a question of watering stock; it is simply a question of amount, because the dividend is reduced at the same time. The shareholders will gain nothing whatever by this Bill, beyond, perhaps, an increased value on the Stock Exchange; but the consumer will gain in this way, that, if it is necessary to raise more capital, it will be able to be raised on better terms if this Bill is passed.

The unissued capital is only £175,000.

But there is nothing to prevent the Company from coming to Parliament for powers to raise more capital. I would say that every large railway company has come to Parliament and consolidated their Preference and Debenture Stock, because they found the Company was much the better for doing so, and that they were able to borrow money on better terms. The same thing applies here, and I maintain that what tends to the benefit of the shareholder tends also to the benefit of the consumer. The hon. Member has alluded to the objection of the County Council, but I think that that objection arose from the fact that the Bill really was not quite understood. I confess that it does seem to me to be rather a large Bill, but, as a matter of fact, there is little in it at all. It will not in any way hurt the consumer, and it will not in any way benefit the shareholder, except by slightly enhancing the price of the Stock in the market; but it must benefit the consumer, because it will enable the Company to raise money on better terms. I hope that the House will, at any rate, let the Bill go before a Committee.

The arguments, Sir, we have heard on the other side are well-known, old friends, having been brought to the notice of this House, and also used in Committees upstairs, not merely four or five times, but not less than 10 times, in the presence of representatives of 10 large towns, including the Metropolis. This matter is really res judicatur, and I think that the time of the House ought not to be taken up with the reiteration of arguments upon matters which have already been decided. The argument as to the South Metropolitan Gas Company's Bill a year ago is the very argument raised before the Committee by one of the most distinguished counsel at the Parliamentary Bar—Mr. Worsley Taylor—that if the Committee passed a Bill with this principle in it, it would be a precedent to follow. And, notwithstanding that, the Committee passed it, and this House endorsed it, and I submit, therefore, that the thing has not been passed, as the hon. Member said, without consideration, but that it is a thing which, has been adjudicated upon after argument. Now I will draw attention to another inaccuracy, not, of course, intentional, which was put before the House. The hon. Member said that every £100 worth of Stock which carries a dividend of 10 per cent., but which is really 12¾ per cent., is proposed to be watered—be calls it so; I call it sub-divided into two certificates, each carrying four per cent., and I always learned that two-and-a-half times four amounted to 10, and therefore the Company and the public are not paying one penny more. But the hon. Member put it to the House that this £250, which is to be what he called a "financial juggle," and a "watering of stock," is not more than, as he would have us believe, but a great deal less than the present price in the market at which this stock can be sold. The present price of a £100 stock is about £320—I am told it is £280, but, at all events, it is considerably more than £250. This cannot be said to be a juggle nor that the Stock Exchange has deliberately put the price of Stock at such a rate that they can get a great deal more than this so-called juggled amount of £250. Now, the argument of my hon. Friend opposite was that people would be mystified, and that the real price of Stock would be concealed, when they came to the local authority or the local authority went to them and wanted to buy them, and that so much more would have to be paid because the price of stock had been raised in the market. But suppose that were so, I do not see that that is an argument against the Bill. It ought to be competent for every joint stock company, well managed as this undoubtedly is, so to manage their entirely domestic affairs as they please so long as the interests of the public are not affected; and I submit that the interests of the public are not affected in this case. Besides the argument which has been put before the House, and which I will not repeat, there is this to be said. We wall take a case. Supposing that the division of the stock were coupled with the unification which is a very important part of this Bill—and the more the people see of unification the better they will understand it—there is a larger market, and where there is a larger number of buyers and seller—it must surely be better for everyone concerned. But supposing the price of stock, instead of being £280, was by this arrangement made £300, and after that the public authorities wanted to buy it. It would naturally be valued according to what the Stock Exchange showed. But the market price of a thing is operated upon by a variety of circumstances, and a hundred different things affect, and tell upon it. But no reasonable local authority in discussing the amount they should pay for a thing of this kind would go into the extrinsic, but the intrinsic, value of it. What would they look at? Why, the return they would get per annum on the amount of public money they would invest. I maintain that if they did their duty they would disregard any question of extrinsic market price. The hon. Member cited the case of the South Metropolitan Gas Company, but that is another inaccuracy. He said that in the case of this company the enhancement in value was put down by them at about £90,000, and by the officer of the London County Council at £250,000. I maintain that it has arisen from a great many other causes, for money has gone down in value. Another point which the hon. Member raised was this: that they were putting up the price of gas. If ever any gas company could be said to be doing a good thing for themselves and a bad thing for the public by raising the price of gas, they have only to consider what the sliding scale is. If they put up the price of gas, down goes the dividend. The question of putting up the price of gas is determined by many other considerations relating to the finances of the company, and the cost of the production of gas. I make these observations impartially, as I have no interest whatever in the matter myself, and I hope the Bill will pass.

I have listened to the speeches of hon. Members opposite, but I do not think they have made out a sufficient case that this Bill should go to a Committee, because it seems to me that any portion of a Parliamentary bargain on the part of a monopoly like this ought not in any sense to be permitted to be departed from, unless there are very strong reasons for it. The only argument urged by my hon. Friend opposite, and by my hon. Friend who has just spoken, was that the price of the gas stock would be increased. My hon. Friend who has just spoken said that, in his opinion, the price of the stock might be increased in the market if this Bill was carried through. My hon. Friend cast considerable doubt upon the question as to whether the intrinsic value of the stock would be increased in the market if this Bill were passed, and that was the only argument that I heard him urge. I think the House ought to hesitate before they pass this Bill. As representing the consumers and the ratepayers, we want to know what is the possible advantage to the consumer if this Bill is passed. I do not see in any remote degree whatsoever what the consumers' advantage would be by the passing of this Bill. My hon. Friend opposite said that if this Bill was passed—and it is stated in the memoranda—it would increase the value of the stock, and that, therefore, if the Company wanted to raise further capital they would be able to obtain that capital at a lower rate of interest, and it would be a disadvantage to the consumer. With regard to the increase, I think the figures stated by my hon. Friend behind me are quite conclusive, because we know that, with the increase in the use of electricity throughout London, it is not likely that the gas companies will be able to extend their operations, and it is not at least likely that they will have to come to this House for any extension of powers. They have already spent something like £12,000,000, and their unspent capital is about £175,000. I therefore oppose this Bill on the ground that when you have a company of this sort representing a monopoly in certain parts of London, when that company has obtained these powers which enable them to pay an enormous dividend of 12¾ per cent on the present price of gas, I do not think that this House ought to allow a bargain of that description merely in order to increase the market value of this particular company's stock. As regards the question of purchase, I do not think that there is any time in which the local authority would be likely to purchase, or any likelihood of their doing so, in view of the development of electric lighting. The only precedent we have in London of the taking over of one of these monopolies is the case of a water company; and, upon the question as to whether it was advantageous, it was distinctly based on the market value of the stock. I think the argument of the gentleman opposite that the market price would not affect the purchase is really the stumbling-block, for I think it would be one of the elements in the question of purchase. I do not wish to dispute that, because, as far as my recollection goes, it was founded upon the market price at the moment. I do not think the local authority would like to purchase. There was one point in connection with the speech of the hon. Member who spoke last, in which he said that we ought to allow this Bill to go through, because other gas companies in other towns have been enabled to carry out practically the same proposal. I think my hon. Friend behind me pointed out a conclusive answer to that, namely, that in all these other cases it has been a question in which there has been an agreement between the gas company and the local authority, and there has in every case been some quid pro quo on the part of the consumers. It is because the consumer obtains no advantage, and because the local authority has not been consulted, that I am opposed to it. If the gas company would come to some agreement of the nature I have alluded to, then I would certainly not oppose this Bill, but so long as they have not even endeavoured to come to any such arrrangement with the consumers and the ratepayers I think the House should reject the Bill on this principle.

I wish to remind the House that this Bill was discussed by the late London County Council, which consisted of about one-half of Moderates and the other half Progressives, and only two members of the Moderate Party were found to be in favour of it. More than 100 members of the Council condemned it, and the Council decided to oppose it. I would also call the attention of the House to the fact that no explanation is given or offered of the action of the company in raising the price of gas, and the House can form its own judgment as to the object of that move, and as to whether due consideration has been paid to the consumers, or whether the raising of the price of gas is intended to prepare the way for the equalisation of dividends on the increased stock. To pass this Bill would be to establish a very mischievous precedent in the case of other companies supplying gas or water. For my own part, the mere fact that no explanation has been given as to the raising of the price of the gas itself will induce me to oppose the Second Reading.

I support this Bill because its effect is practically nothing more nor less than a consolidation of the capital. That principle has been applied in the past by this House dozens of times in connection with railway companies and with regard to the South Metropolitan Gas Company, and I think if the same privilege of dealing with their own affairs in this case were refused it would be most unjust. I have heard an allusion made to the question of the advance in the price of gas. Well, that is simply an advance in connection with the arrangement made by the sliding scale, and when the price goes up there is a reduced dividend. That sliding scale since it has been introduced has been of immense value to the consumers of gas in the City of London. I can quite understand all consumers finding fault with the price of gas going up. So long as we do not purchase, we are, glad to see the price as low as possible. Well, we in the North of England would like to see the price of coal higher in London instead of lower, and we should like to have a much higher price for coal, even at the expense of the consumers of gas. With regard to the advantage given to the consumer by this Bill, I am bound to admit that it is a very trifling one, but it is also a trifling advantage that the company gets. You must understand that every penny of capital that has been raised for many years under the auction laws—that is, if they, wanted to raise £10,000 of capital, it is put in the auction room, and commands the full market price. The result is that, although my right hon. Friend said that the gas companies are paying something like 12¾ per cent. interest, as a matter of fact they are only getting that on practically one-third of each £100 of stock, for every purchaser of stock for many years has had to pay about £250 for each £100. I think it will be much simpler, and it will be an advantage not, only to the company but to the consumer, to have the capital consolidated in this company, as it has been in other companies, and on these grounds I support this Bill.

I am glad that this question has been approached on both sides without any feeling. There are, however, many points that can only be justly considered by a Committee of this House. It seems to me impossible for Members sitting as we do here to realise the operation of the sliding scale or to discuss the dividends of gas companies and the rise and fall in the price of gas; nor is it easy for us to understand—although Gentlemen opposite have explained it very clearly to us. Inasmuch as the whole policy for a quarter of a century is involved in the opposition to this Bill, I hope it will be referred to the Committee.

I wish to point out that the reason why the London County Council opposed this Bill was that there were certain clauses in it with which they did not agree, and to support a Bill you have to support it in all its clauses. This is a Bill which ought to go before the Committee upstairs to be dealt with, for there are clauses in it which will come out very different. With regard to the question of floating this Stock, I am one of those who believe that it is better for the shares of these large Companies to be as small as possible, and not in the large Stock that they now are. This Bill, with certain alterations which can be made upstairs, is a most vital Measure. As I said before, it was rejected by the London County Council, not because of Party considerations, by the Party with which I am connected, but because there were certain clauses which we could not accept.

(Camber-not going in imitate what has taken place on the Front Benches opposite. Evidently, the Government see certain difficulties in their way, and they leave the matter to hon. Members opposite. It seems to me that this Bill is a sort of conspiracy between the producers of coal and the sellers of gas to exploit the people of London. I do not think the Company is so popular at this moment that this House should favourably receive this proposal. The hon. Member for St. George's-in-the-East suggested that the Company had given no reason for the rise in the price of gas. But the case is worse than this; they say that it is because cause of the high rates charged by the rating authority that they have raised the price. You are told that it is purely a question of the sliding scale, but the price to the consumer does not go down so much as the profit to the seller goes up. No addition has been made to the moderate argument of the Member for Peckham, who put the merits of the Bill very low. Promoters of Private Bills should not treat this House as if it were a Committee of the Stock Exchange. It cannot understand the precise merits of this question of consolidated Stock. Bills should only be brought in here when promoters want to get leave to do some work. I think, considering the unpopularity of the Company at present, it would be very injudicious for the House to pass the Second Reading of this Bill.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War whether, having regard to the fact that the Reserves are never called up for training, and consequently not fit for the first line in war, arrangements can be made to enable a limited number so volunteering to keep up their Military and musketry training with volunteer corps, as supernumeraries to the establishment, the Government either defraying the cost of their uniform, or giving £1 a year towards it if they were certified as having attended not less than twelve drills and fired their class?

It is not admitted that men who have had seven years with the Colours are not fit to take their places in the first line, when mobilised. The Secretary of State has, however, under consideration the subject of training those men whose service in the Reserve exceeds five years.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty whether there are any vessels in the "A" Division of the Fleet Reserve whose main armament is composed of muzzle-loading guns; and, if so, how many vessels; and whether he can inform the House if there are any vessels in the fleets of European Powers armed with muzzle-loading guns; and, if so, how many vessels and to what fleets do they belong?

There are 10 ships in the "A" Division of the Fleet Reserve whose main armament consists of muzzle-loading guns. There are some vessels similarly armed in European navies, but the noble Lord may assume these are not ships of any importance, with perhaps one exception.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been called to the case of John E. Tanner, a British subject, mate of the British schooner Ida, of Halifax, Nova Scotia, who is stated to have been forcibly taken off his vessel by an armed boat's crew from the Spanish warship Criolla, on the 5th May, 1897, at Vajardo, Porto Rico, on a charge of having injured a lighterman named Manuel Santana, and to have been then detained without any trial or examination until the 2nd July, when he was set at liberty; and if his attention has been called to it, and the matter has been investigated, and the facts are as stated, whether any claim has been made on the Spanish Government for compensation for this wrongful treatment; and whether Messrs. George Mitchell and Son, the owners of the schooner Ida, have submitted a claim for expenses incurred in endeavouring to obtain the release of said John Tanner, also for detention of their vessel at Vajardo for 17 days, and for damages for loss of market through detention of vessel; and, if so, whether a settlement of these claims is being pressed for by Her Majesty's Government?

This case has been brought to the notice of the Foreign Office. Her Majesty's Consul at Porto Rico was instructed to make inquiry into the circumstances, and directed to render such assistance as he properly could. The Consul's dispatch received in reply shows that the facts are generally as stated in the Question. He also reported that he had taken measures to secure proper treatment for Tanner while in prison, and had made repeated endeavours to have the trial brought on as soon as possible. He finally obtained Tanner's provisional release on himself depositing a guarantee for the sum of £50. There were, however, certain discrepancies between the Consul's account and that contained in a statutory declaration made by the Master of the Ida, and the former was instructed to report further on these points. To that instruction no reply has yet been received. Messrs. George Mitchell and Son have submitted a claim, but pending the arrival of an answer, it has not yet been put forward.

When is an answer likely to be obtained?

That really depends on the post.

Not on the Consul?

Well, on both.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the 4-inch and 6-inch breech-loading guns supplied to the Dœdalus, Royal Naval Reserve drill ship at Bristol in September, 1895, and January, 1896, respectively, are still lying on her main deck unmounted, as was the case on 22nd September, 1897, when a Member of this House visited the ship; and whether any other of the drill ships are in the same unsatisfactory condition in respect of facilities for instructing the seamen of the Royal Naval Reserve in the working of such guns?

The guns specified in the Question are now mounted. Some delay was occasioned by the fact that it was contemplated to relieve the Dœdalus by a modern cruiser, but this has not yet been carried out. All the guns belonging to other drill ships are mounted.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the men who recently so violently assaulted and robbed our Vice-Consul, C. J. Cooke, Esq., outside Sebastopol were Russian seamen wearing the uniform of the Imperial Navy; whether the offenders have been arrested, and whether any representation has been made to the Russian authorities upon the subject; and whether the Russian servant of the Vice-Consul, who was also grievously hurt in defending his master on the occasion, will be suitably rewarded for his gallant conduct?

The men who committed the assault on Vice-Consul Cooke were, as stated, seamen of the Russian Imperial Navy, and were at the time in uniform. The local authorities at once effected the arrest of the culprits, who will be tried before a Court Martial. Her Majesty's Ambassador has received from the Russian Government an expression of sincere regret for this assault upon a British Consular Officer. The case of the Russian servant must depend upon any recommendations that may be made by Her Majesty's Consul.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland (1) whether his attention has been called to the fact that the teachers in the Dee Street National School, Belfast, have not received any salary for the three quarters ending 31st December, 1897, although the work of the school has been carried on as usual; (2) what is the reason of the withholding of the salaries; (3) and when will the teachers be paid.

The facts are as stated in the first paragraph. The difficulty in this case arises out of a question concerning the managership of the school, and the head inspector of the National Board of Education, who recently held an inquiry into the whole matter, has made to the Board a report which will be under consideration at their meeting on Tuesday next, when the question of the staff to be recognised and paid will be determined.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, as representing the Postmaster General, will he explain why the details of the regulations governing sick leave in the Post Office, which have recently been revised, have been withheld from the staff; whether an absence on sick leave of 18 days in two years brings an officer within the operations of the pension regulations; and whether he can see his way to publish to the staff the regulations now in force?

The regulations regarding sick leave in the staff of the Post Office have been communicated by Circular from time to time to the Surveyors and Heads of Departments, and there is no desire that they should be withheld from the staff. In consequence of the excessive sick absence in some branches of the Service, to which the attention of the Postmaster General was recently directed by the Treasury, the Postmaster General decided that when an officer was absent in two consecutive years for more than the average sick absence of the whole staff, or of the staff of the office in which he was serving (whichever was the highest), the Medical Officer should be asked to state whether in his opinion there was any reason why the officer concerned was not likely to render regular and useful service to the Department in the future. There is no desire, however, on the part of the Postmaster General to refuse sick absence in any case where the circumstances require it, or to call on any officer to take his pension whose health enables him to discharge the duties of his office.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty, what is the answer to the complaint of the Comptroller and Auditor General, dated 6th January, 1898, as to six destroyers on which £191,000 had been spent before 31st March, 1897, and which, though ordered early in 1894, had not been delivered in January, 1898?

Of the six destroyers specified, the Zebra has been delivered since the date named in the Question, having finally fulfilled the conditions of the contract as regards speed, etc. No penalty will be inflicted. Repeated trials showed that the large locomotive boilers in the Fervent and Zephyr would not develop the necessary power to attain the contract speed. Fresh arrangements have been entered into with the contractors to remove these boilers and instal approved water-tube boilers. This work is now in hand. The Conflict, Teazer, and Wizard have been delayed by difficulties in obtaining the contract speed, and by accidents which occurred on the steam trial. No instalment beyond the 8th, which has been earned on each of the vessels, has been paid. The question of waiving or inflicting penalties does not arise until the vessels are satisfactorily completed and delivered.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War if it is the case that some of the European and Native troops have not yet received their medals for the Chitral Campaign which took place three years ago; and, if not, what is the reason of the delay in issuing them; and, whether a special medal will be issued to the troops which took part in the recent campaigns on the North-West Frontier in place of the clasp to the medal granted to those troops who were engaged in the former Frontier wars?

My hon. Friend will allow me to reply to this Question. The medals for the Chitral Campaign were issued in the first half of last year. If my hon. Friend will inform me of any cases in which the medals have not yet been received, I will cause inquiry to be made as to the delay. Nothing, as yet, has been decided as to the issue of a medal for the recent campaigns in India.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade whether the Register of Patent Agent Rules, made by the Board of Trade in 1889, are general rules, under the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Acts, 1883 to 1888; and, if so, were they repealed on the 31st March, 1890, by the then President of the Board of Trade; and, has the Register of Patent Agent Rules, 1889, been laid before Parliament since 31st March, 1890, or in any way made effective since that date; and, if so, how?

The Rules referred to are General Rules, and they have not been repealed. They were amended by the Rules of 1891, which were presented to Parliament.

In putting this Question to the President of the Board of Trade, I venture to say that the House is pleased to see the right hon. Gentleman in his place again. I beg to ask him whether he will state the amounts of the existing balance standing in the accounts kept by the Board of Trade with respect to Colonial and foreign lights, the sums payable on accounts of money secured on the Colonial dues, and the amount of the contribution by Her Majesty's Government in respect of the lighthouse at Cape Spartel, Morocco?

I thank the hon. Member for his kind remark. In reply to the Question on the Paper, I have to say that the only lighthouses abroad, on account of which balances are held by the Board of Trade, are those known as the Basses and Minicoy Lights. The balances held on account of these lights on the 31st March, 1897, as shown in the Account presented to the House of Commons, on the 16th ultimo (No. 66), were as follows:—Consols, 2¾ per cent., £20,000 stock; Consols, 2½ per cent., £22,529 stock; cash, £4,044 stock. There is no outstanding debt or loan chargeable on this fund. Her Majesty's Government contribute the equivalent of 1,500 francs (about £60) annually towards the maintenance of Cape Spartel Lighthouse.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade whether the Governments of France, Russia, Germany, Italy, and Portugal maintain the lighting of their respective coasts out of the Imperial funds; and if he can state what European countries make a charge on merchant shipping for lights, with the amount of charge in each case?

The Board of Trade have no recent information as to the funds out of which the cost of the lighting of the coasts of European countries is defrayed. From a Report of the United States Commissioners for the year 1885 it appeared that at that time tonnage dues were levied in nearly all countries, and that these dues, though not called light dues, were applied to the maintenance of lights as well as to other Purposes. The Board of Trade have no information as to the amount of charges made by particular countries.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, as representing the Postmaster General, what steps, if any, have been taken to meet the requisition which was sent last year from the inhabitants of Johnstown, county Kilkenny, requesting that the mails which arrive at Kilkenny at 9.15 a.m. might be delivered in that district at 1 p.m. instead of 6 p.m., which takes place at present; and for what reasons the mails which arrive in Kilkenny at 9.15 a.m. are allowed to remain there till 3 p.m.?

No definite steps have yet been taken to meet the request of the inhabitants of Johnstown. That request refers to the second mail (the day mail) from Dublin. The letters for Johnstown by that mail are conveyed by a car working from Urlingford viâ Johnstown to Kilkenny in the morning, and back to Urlingford by the same road in the evening; and as the car, which is run chiefly for passenger purposes, only leaves Kilkenny on its return journey at 3 p.m., it has hitherto been impossible to despatch the mails from Kilkenny before that hour as the correspondence is not sufficient to justify the establishment of a car for the mails alone. The Postmaster General, however, has not lost sight of the case, and he may yet be able to effect some improvement.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that a Local Government Board Inspector has ordered the dismissal of the assistant relieving officer for the Clifden Union on the grounds that he allowed a certain number of men to receive employment on the labour test relief works, while such men were the owners of some live stock and such small property as boats, &c.; and whether it is a necessary condition that recipients of such relief must be absolutely destitute of all goods and chattels before they obtain relief?

The Local Government Board have recently required a temporary relieving officer in the Clifden Union to resign that position on the grounds of inefficiency. This officer was an old man in bad health, and, evidently, physically unequal to his duties. He failed to enter on his relief lists the names of the persons on the relief works, and, owing either to his want of knowledge of his duties or to his inability to make sufficient inquiries, he was in the habit of certifying persons to be destitute who were earning money, and were possessed of means, and who were not proper cases to be supported by the ratepayers. The special relief measures this year are intended for the occupiers of small holdings, who, owing to the failure of the potato crop, might, if not relieved on the works, have to come into the workhouse; but, beyond submitting this general condition for the guidance of Boards of Guardians, the Local Government Board do not limit their discretion as to the eligibility of individual applicants for relief.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if he is aware that on the 5th of January the Local Government Board Inspector assisted at the election of two hospital assistant nurses for the Clifden Workhouse, and that he recommended the election of two resident paupers, although he was informed by the clerk of the union at the time that neither of them could read or write; and whether the Local Government Board has sanctioned the appointment of these illiterate nurses?

The paid attendants referred to are not employed in nursing the sick, but on work of a menial character such as scrubbing and keeping the wards tidy. Both of these persons were recommended for the position by the medical officer of the workhouse, and the Local Government Board, who have sanctioned their employment, do not consider it indispensable that persons engaged in the capacity mentioned should be able to read and write. The duties of nurse at the workhouse are performed by a trained official.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if he is aware that, out of the ten magistrates entitled to adjudicate in the Clones, county Monaghan, petty sessions district, two only are Catholics, and whether two Protestant magistrates have been recently appointed, one of whom has neither residence nor property of any kind in the district, and lives in an adjoining county; and if steps will be taken to remedy the disparity between Protestant and Catholic magistrates in this petty sessions district, where Catholics are largely in the majority over all other denominations?

I understand that three of the magistrates in the Clones Petty Sessions district are Roman Catholics. The two gentlemen recently appointed to the Commission of the Peace in the county are, I believe, Protestants, and one of them is not actually resident in the county, although he appears to live very near the border of the county. The Lieutenant of the county is always ready to consider the names of any gentleman recommended to him for appointment to the Commission, whether Roman Catholics or Protestants.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury when the Land Tax Commissioners' Names Bill will be introduced; whether a memorandum will be issued to Members explaining the steps to be taken by them for the purpose of inserting additional names at the Public Bill Office; and whether the Bill will be drafted in such a form as to admit of an amendment being moved in Committee with the object of abolishing the property qualification of Land Tax Commissioners?

The Bill will be introduced before Easter. A circular is being issued to the clerks to the Commissioners of Land Tax instructing them as to the steps to be taken for preparing a list of additional names. The clerks will in due course transmit their lists to the Members of Parliament for the county, division, or place in which the proposed new Commissioners reside, with a request that if the Members do not disapprove of the names they will sign and deliver such lists at the Public Bill Office. Other copies of this circular will be sent to the clerks for transmission to the Members concerned. The Bill will be drawn in the usual form.

Will the lists handed in previously stand good?

Yes, so far as the names are not disapproved.

I did not quite catch the answer to the third paragraph. Was it in the negative?

I do not propose introduce the Bill in a form which will admit of more amendment that I can help.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether Her Majesty's Government have preferred upon the Turkish Government a specific claim, in the name and on behalf of the Armenian Relief Committee, for the sum of £500 which was stolen from Yussuf Yunan at Sairt, and has formed the subject of consular inquiry?

Without some direct evidence or tangible proof of connivance in the crime on the part of any Turkish official, Her Majesty's Government would not be justified in preferring a specific claim against the Porte. No such proof has been forthcoming, and Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Bitlis reported on 25th November that, with regard to the occurrence itself and the behaviour of the local officials, no negligence could, in his opinion, be justly imputed either to the police or the judicial authorities.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, as representing the Postmaster General, whether he can proceed at once with the building of the new post office at Bury, Lancashire, as grave dissatisfaction is being expressed with the present arrangements?

The plans of the new post office at Bury were received from the Office of Works a few days ago, and are now under consideration. No reason is seen why the new building should not be begun shortly.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Agriculture Whether the Board of Agriculture can now say how much longer the muzzling order is likely to continue in force in the counties of Worcester, Warwick, and Stafford; and whether he is aware that resolutions asking for the withdrawal of the order have been passed by the county councils of all these counties?

It is not possible for me as yet to fix any date for the withdrawal of the muzzling orders in force in the counties named, but my hon. Friend may be sure that I shill be glad to take this step at the earliest possible moment at which I can do so without endangering the success of our operations for the extirpation of rabies. The reply to the second inquiry is in the affirmative.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India whether any agreement has been entered into with the French Government for the reopening of the immigration of Indian Coolies into Réunion; whether it provides for the residence in Réunion of a British protector of immigrants; and whether he will lay a copy of the Agreement with the French Government upon the Table?

A convention for the reopening of Indian immigration into Réunion has been signed, but is not yet ratified. It does not provide for the residence of a British protector in Réunion. There, as elsewhere, the protector will be an officer of the Colonial Government, but under the convention his position will be greatly improved. The immigrants can also invoke the assistance of the British Consul. As soon as the convention is ratified, it will be laid on the Table of the House.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India, whether from 1875 to 1891 majors of Royal Artillery holding appointments in the Ordnance Department in India, and not in receipt of consolidated salaries, were not allowed to receive the regimental pay and allowances of their rank in addition to staff pay, whereas all officers of the Royal Artillery serving in the Indian Ordnance Department, other than majors and officers receiving consolidated salaries, have received regimental pay in addition to staff salaries since the Department was started, and what was the reason, if any, for this discrimination against the majors; whether all officers serving in the Indian Ordnance Department, majors not excepted, were obliged to subscribe to the Royal Artillery regimental band at Woolwich, and whether they would have been obliged to do so by the Regulations had the Indian Ordnance Department not been considered a department connected with the regiment; whether in 1891 the Secretary of State sanctioned a regulation which, from 1st July in that year, placed majors of the Royal Artillery in the Indian Ordnance Department on the same footing as lieutenant-colonels, captains, and subalterns by sanctioning payment to them of the regimental pay and allowances of their rank in addition to staff pay, and whether any compensation was afforded to officers who had been serving in that Department previous to 1st July, 1891, and had been under the circumstances stated deprived of the privilege enjoyed by lieutenant-colonels, captains, and subalterns in the same service of the regimental pay and allowances of their rank; with respect to the case of Lieutenant-Colonel and Colonel Vincent Carne Fisher of the Royal Bengal Artillery, who has appealed to the Secretary of State to recoup him the amount of which he was deprived by the fact that, from the 1st May, 1880, when he was promoted to the rank of major Royal Artillery while serving in the Ordnance Department, he was not paid the regimental pay of that rank in addition to staff salary, but only Staff Corps pay plus staff salary, though he was during the same period obliged to contribute to the Woolwich band fund as serving in a department connected with the regiment and in which the other officers were receiving regimental pay, will he state whether this claim was reported on by the Commander-in-Chief of Madras as worthy of consideration; and, whether his claim has been rejected; if so, whether the decision will be reconsidered?

The facts are as stated in the first part of my hon. Friend's Question. The grounds for restricting majors of Artillery in the Indian Ordnance Department to the Staff Corps pay of that rank were, that the grade of major was reintroduced into the Royal Artillery for reasons connected with the command of batteries, and that these reasons were not applicable to the Ordnance Department, in which, except in the highest position, the actual rank of the officer was unimportant, while there never had been any question as to the adequacy of the pay for the duties to be performed. In 1891, on the representations of the Government of India, that this rule was, in their opinion, justly looked on as a grievance by the officers of the Ordnance Department, the Secretary of State modified the previous decision, and allowed these officers the regimental pay of their rank in addition to staff pay. In 1892 Colonel Fisher applied for the difference between regimental and Staff Corps pay for the period he served in the Ordnance Department as a major from May, 1880, to December, 1888. His claim was considered by the Commander-in-Chief, Madras, worthy of consideration, but was rejected by the Government of India as inadmissible, the decision of 1891 not having retrospective effect. In 1893 Colonel Fisher sent to the Secretary of State a memorial on the same subject, which was not supported by the Government of India, and was rejected by my predecessor. I see no valid reason for reconsidering that decision.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India if he can give any further explanation than is contained in the Blue Book of the reasons why the Khyber Rifles at Lundi Kotal last August were, in a manner described by Lord Roberts as quite incomprehensible, deprived of the support of their British officer at the time when it was most needed?

As I stated the other day, the military authorities on the spot decided that troops from Peshawar could not be sent up the Khyber Pass, and Sir R. Udny, with this knowledge, recalled Captain Barton from Lundi Kotal, in the belief that the Khyber Rifles were not sufficiently strong or reliable to repel an attack, if made in force, upon them, and that Captain Barton's presence at Lundi Kotal would precipitate and aggravate the contemplated attack.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether the Russian Chargé d'Affaires has lodged a formal protest against the Anglo-German Loan, and demanded compensation for his Government; and, if so, what the compensation demanded is; what the conditions are under which the Trans-Manchurian Railway is to be constructed; whether any boundaries have been assigned to the area described in the arrangements made between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of China as the Yangtsze Valley; and, if not, in what manner it is to be distinguished from the other portion of the Chinese Empire; and, whether Her Majesty's Government has undertaken, or proposes undertaking, any obligation on the part of this country in connection with the said arrangements?

We have received no information of any formal protest against the Loan to China arranged by the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank acting for itself and a syndicate of German Bankers. The conditions of the Agreement between the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank relative to the construction and maintenance of the Manchurian Railway were published in the Russian Official Gazette of December 11th and 23rd, 1896. I am afraid they are too long, occupying as they do some pages of print, to be stated in reply to a question, but I shall be very glad to show a copy to any hon. Member who desires to see them. The undertaking of the Chinese Government applies to the Yangtsze region—i.e., to the territory of the provinces adjoining the Yangtsze river. The Chinese Government having given the assurance in question, Her Majesty's Government will naturally hold them responsible for its observance.

Will the right hon. Gentleman have any objection to laying the conditions of Agreement on the Table of the House?

I do not know that there would be any advantage in doing so, but I am quite prepared to consider the matter.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, is he aware that, at Monaghan Assizes last week, a reassessment of nearly £2,000 was ordered to cover the defalcations of a collector who appropriated the money to his own use; how would cesspayers in England be treated in similar circumstances; and, will he provide a safeguard in the Local Government Bill against the recurrence of such a case, by making it compulsory on County and Urban Councils to have the security for collectors of a guarantee society in addition to solvent personal sureties?

I am informed that a sum of £2,613, being the amount of the defalcations of two Barony cess collectors, was represented at the county at large at the recent Monaghan Assizes. The grand jury brought the matter before the Judge of Assize, who, after argument, fiated the presentment. I have no information as to the second paragraph, and with regard to the inquiry in the third paragraph, I would refer the hon. Member to the provisions of Section 55, Sub-Section 3, of the Local Government Bill.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, as representing the Postmaster General, how many rural messengers are attached to the Smithborough, County Monaghan, sub-postal district; how many of these have been appointed, and by whom, within the past six months; and how many of them are Roman Catholics?

There is only one established postman connected with the Smithborough sub-office—viz., the Monagran to Smithborough postman—and he was appointed as long ago as 1882. There are no means of ascertaining without a reference to Ireland, which would take time, how many auxiliary postmen may have been appointed within the last six months, as the selection of these is entrusted to the District Surveyor, and no record of them is kept at headquarters. The Postmaster General has no knowledge as to how many are Roman Catholics, and he does not consider it desirable to inquire.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade whether Her Majesty's Government will provide a steam launch or other steam boat for the use of the North Eastern Fisheries Board, as has been done in the case of the Scotch Fisheries Board?

Her Majesty's Government are not in a position to do so. The Committee of the North Eastern Sea Fisheries District is a Joint Committee of several County and Borough Councils; and, as such, the expenses it may incur are payable by those Councils. The expenses of the Fishery Board for Scotland are paid by the Exchequer, and the cases are, consequently, not analogous.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that great dissatisfaction is felt by the County Councils and ratepayers in the area of contribution at the amount of the levy for this Board? Will he undertake to give his consideration to the subject?

I do not suppose that any one ever pays taxes quite willingly. I am afraid I cannot interfere in this case, as what is done is in accordance with the law as it stands.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War whether Colour-Sergeant Walker, of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, who was kept a prisoner by the Afridis for six weeks, was tried by court martial on his return to his regiment for being absent without leave; and whether he was ordered to lose his pay for the time he was away?

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War whether his attention has been called to the statement that Colour-Sergeant Walker, of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, who was recently captured, and during six weeks held prisoner, by the Afridis, has been tried by court martial on a charge of having been absent without leave, and, though acquitted, has been ordered to lose his pay for the time of his enforced absence; and whether the facts are as stated; if so, whether the Secretary of State will take steps to secure to Colour-Sergeant Walker the restoration of his pay?

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War whether Colour-Sergeant Walker, of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, who was kept prisoner by the Afridis for six weeks, was tried by court martial on rejoining his regiment for being absent without leave, and ordered to lose his pay during the period of his absence; and whether such loss of pay will be refunded to him?

No report on this subject has been received from India. I may, however, say that the inquiry held was only that which, under the Queen's regulations for the Army, is held on every returned prisoner of war; and, under the warrant, a man is not entitled to pay for the period of his absence as a prisoner of war. If, however, the result of the inquiry is satisfactory, the pay is restored by the Secretary of State.

On behalf of the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere), I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether Manchuria is an integral part of China, or whether it is a separate territory under the rule of the Emperor of China?

Manchuria is not one of the 18 Provinces of China proper, but is certainly an integral part of the Emperor's dominions.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Agriculture whether the latest official information the Board possesses as to the acreage and yield of hops in the United States is derived from the Census Bulletin, published in Washington on 12th November, 1891; and whether, in view of the importance that English hop growers attach to having the latest intelligence on questions of this kind, he will take steps to obtain, either from official or from some other reliable sources, the most recent available information as to the state of American hop cultivation?

On inquiry of the United States Department of Agriculture earlier in the year, we were informed by the Government Statistician that no more recent official information exists with regard to the acreage and yield of hops than that to which my hon. and gallant Friend refers. The officer in question was, however, good enough to supply a memorandum which contains estimates from unofficial sources as to the acreage and yield in California, Washington, and Oregon, and we propose to make this information public in the Journal of the Board of Agriculture for the present month.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the Government are prepared to consider the propriety of availing themselves of the Calliope Dry Dock accommodation now in existence at Auckland, New Zealand, especially in view of the fact that the present available docking and repairing accommodation for the Australian fleet is situated 1,200 miles westerly therefrom; whether they have valuable land adjoining the dock, where economical buildings could be erected and machinery supplied for undertaking repairs to Her Majesty's ships in cases of emergency; and whether the Government would be willing to make a complete statement upon the subject when the Works Vote No. 10 comes before the House, or when Vote 8 for supply of yard machinery comes up for consideration?

The Question is now under consideration. I will communicate with the hon. Member when a decision is reached.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether Her Majesty's Government have confirmation of the statements which have been reported from Pekin: that Russia has demanded the cession of Port Arthur and Talienwan; that Russia has demanded the right to make a railway across Manchuria to Mukden and Port Arthur, with power to send Russian troops to the railway stations on this line; that Russia is actively opposing the conclusion of the Anglo-German loan to China; that Russia has demanded the dismissal of British engineers on Chinese railways; and that Russia has obtained from Korea the cession of Deer Island, opposite Fusam?

Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg has been informed by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Russia is negotiating with China for the lease for a certain number of years of Port Arthur and Talienwan, as well as for the construction of a railway to Talienwan or Port Arthur on the same conditions as the Manchurian railway; the Russian Government have made no demand for sovereign rights over those ports, nor have they threatened to send troops into Manchuria. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs further stated that Talienwan, if leased to Russia, would be opened to foreign trade like other Chinese ports. Her Majesty's Minister at Pekin has confirmed the existence of these negotiations, but he states that there is no indication of anything in the shape of an ultimatum; neither, so far as he is aware, has any time limit been given for a reply, as represented in the Press. We have no information to the effect that the Russian Government are opposing the loan to China concluded by the Anglo-German Banks, which, I understand, is on the point of being issued. Her Majesty's Minister at Pekin reported in October last, that endeavours had been made by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires to obtain the removal of Mr. Kinder, the chief engineer on the Northern line from Tientsin to Kirin, on the ground of a promise by the Chinese Government that, if this line were extended, they would, in the first instance, address themselves to Russian engineers and Russian capital. Sir C. Macdonald obtained a promise from the Tsung-li-Yamen that Mr. Kinder should not be removed. We have received no information confirming the alleged cession of Deer Island to Russia.

Can the right hon. Gentleman state with regard to the railway, as to which he answered in a previous Question, whether the existing agreement contains the right to send Russian troops to the stations along the line?

NO, Sir, it does not contain any such stipulation. The only provisions in the agreement about the Manchurian railway relating to the safeguarding of the line are as follows: The Chinese Government undertakes to adopt measures for securing the safety of the railway and its employees against extraneous attacks; and the preservation of order on the lands assigned to the railway is entrusted to police agents, appointed by the Company, who are empowered to frame regulations for that purpose.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, whether he is aware that, in the case of the late suicide in Derry Prison, the doctor of the accused wrote to Sir William Millar, medical superintendent of the prison, stating that the prisoner had been for some time previous predisposed to melancholia, and requesting that he should be given active employment and allowed the use of tobacco; and, if he can explain why, under the circumstances, the request was not complied with?

Sir William Millar received from the private medical attendant on the prisoner referred to a letter simply stating that the prisoner had been used to an open-air life, and that he smoked. He made no mention of the prisoner being predisposed to melancholia, nor did he allude to his mental state, but only asked the prison doctor to see whether a moderate use of tobacco would help to keep the prisoner in health. His health being perfectly good, the prison doctor did not consider it necessary to give him tobacco.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies, whether he can state the total number of British Civil officials in Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast respectively; how many deaths occurred amongst them in each Colony in 1896 and in 1897, to the date of the latest available information; and, whether he will consider the possibility of establishing 12 months as the maximum period of service required before leave can be claimed?

The number of British Civil officials in the two Colonies is about 30 and 125 respectively, and the number of deaths among them was in 1896 five and 14, and in 1897 two and five. A comparison based upon a longer period appears, however, to show that the Gold Coast is more unhealthy than Sierra Leone. As regards the third Question I must refer the hon. Member to the answers already given on the same subject on March 12th and July 22nd, 1897.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury whether the rule that any portion of an unexpended grant remaining in the hands of the accounting officer on the 31st March is returnable to the Exchequer is based upon statutory provision; and, if not, upon what is it based; and, whether the exception to the above ride in the case of the particular forms of grants called grants-in-aid is permitted by statutory authority?

Under Section 24 of the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, 1866, the only sums chargeable against grants are those which have actually come in course of payment during the year to which the grants relate. The accounting officer of the Department to which the grant is made must produce to the Comptroller and Auditor General vouchers or proofs of payment to show that the money expended by him has been applied to the purpose for which it was intended to provide. Any portion of the grant, in respect of which such vouchers are not forthcoming, remains in the hands of the accounting officer at the end of the financial year, and, his authority to expend it having expired, it must be surrendered to the Exchequer. There is no difference in this respect between an ordinary grant and a grant-in-aid. In both cases any money remaining in the hands of the accounting officer at the end of the year must be surrendered. The expenditure by the grantee must, however, be distinguished from the expenditure or payment to him by the accounting officer. Payment by the accounting officer to the grantee is the only payment for which vouchers are required to be produced to the Comptroller and Auditor General. But, in practice, the Treasury, under powers conferred on it by Section 33 of the Exchequer and Audit Act, requires the Comptroller and Auditor General to follow up the expenditure in detail by the grantee in all cases where the contrary is not stated on the face of the Estimate. This does not, however, mean that the expenditure by the grantee should necessarily take place during the financial year.

He is required to follow up the sum?

Yes, he follows it up to see that it is expended.

Does not the Comptroller and Auditor General take an entirely different view from that held by the Treasury?

No, Sir.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether the Local Government Board in Ireland are cognisant of the many irregularities disclosed in the accounts of the Macroom Union, from which it appears that rates were returned as irrecoverable that were actually paid; that houses were returned as vacant that were occupied and for which the rates were paid; that there is £280 of seed rate not accounted for, some of which has been collected; and that a sum of £188 is found to be not accounted for; whether he is also aware that a considerable amount of arrears at the end of each financial year are returned as collectable, but are not collected; and, if an inquiry has been or will be instituted by the Local Government Board authorities in Ireland?

The Local Government Board have been in communication with the Guardians of the Macroom Union in reference to certain irregularities in the accounts of one of the poor-rate collectors. The Board, having regard to the facts disclosed at the last audit of the union accounts, requested the Guardians to call upon this rate collector to tender his resignation; but subsequently, in deference to the unanimously expressed wish of the Guardians, they stated they would not insist upon his resignation on the present occasion, though, in the event of the recurrence of similar irregularities on his part, they would remove him by sealed order.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if his attention has been called to the threatened famine in the Ballyvourney district, and, whether, in connection with the great distress prevalent in this and the contingent Kilnamartyra and Clondrohid districts, he could consider whether some public work or works could be undertaken, such as a light railway to Ballyvourney, and afford immediate relief?

Upon the information at present before me I have no reason to believe that there is any abnormal destitution among any portion of the people in the districts referred to, or any destitution of such character and extent as cannot be dealt with by the Guardians out of the rates of the Union. In this connection, I may point out that there is a considerable decrease in the numbers now in receipt of outdoor relief as compared with the corresponding period of last year.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if he can say in how many instances an acre of land has been granted to a labourer under the Labourers Act since the passing of that Act; and whether he will give the result in the four provinces of Ireland?

Since the passing of the Labourers Act of 1892, which extended the maximum garden allotment from one-half to a statute acre, orders have been made authorising the erection of 1,097 cottages with acre allotments. Of these 607 are in Leinster, 475 in Munster, 13 in Connaught, and 2 in Ulster. During the same period orders have been made sanctioning the taking of an additional half-acre in the case of 363 cottages which had already been built—namely, 316 in Munster, 45 in Leinster, and 2 in Connaught.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies, whether any reliable survey and soundings have been taken on the River Niger between Lokoja and Liaba; and, if so, when; and if a report of same can be laid on the Table of the House?

This information for which the hon. Member asks is not in the possession of Her Majesty's Government.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade whether any communications have, as suggested by the Select Committee of the House of Commons appointed to inquire into the administration of the Royal National Lifeboat Institution, passed between the Board of Trade and the Committee of Management of the Institution and the Committee of Lloyd's relative to property salvage services rendered by the crews of the Institution's lifeboats; and, if so, whether he can state the result of such communications?

Yes, Sir. In consequence of the suggestion made by the Select Committee, conferences have been held at the Board of Trade between representatives of the Board, the Royal National Lifeboat Institution, and the Committee of Lloyd's. At the invitation of the Board of Trade the President of the Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice was also kind enough to attend these conferences. After having fully considered the representations made at these Conferences, the Board of Trade have addressed a letter to the Committee of the Royal National Lifeboat Institution, stating that they find themselves unable to make any suggestion to the Committee.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, has he seen a copy of a resolution, passed by the Grand Jury of the county Monaghan, requesting the Government to take over the Irish Lunatic Asylums in the way they have taken over the prisons, and maintain them at the public cost as an Imperial charge; and, will he give this matter his favourable consideration?

I have received a copy of the resolution in question. The proposals of the Government with regard to Lunatic Asylums are embodied in the Local Government Bill for Ireland, and I can hold out no hope that the entire cost of the maintenance of these institutions will be borne out of Imperial funds.

I beg to ask the Financial Secretary to the War Office, why the recommendation made in the Report of Lord Morley's Committee, to the effect that the Head of the Ordnance Factories should be a military man, serving under a military chief at the War Office, has never been carried out; and why, in direct opposition to the recommendation in the Report, a civilian has been appointed to the post of Deputy Superintendent of the Ordnance Factories?

The first recommendation of Lord Morley's Committee was that a Superintendent of the Ordnance Factories should be appointed. The late Secretary of State, Mr. Stanhope, in appointing Dr. Anderson, did not, for reasons which he gave to the House at the time, accept the view of the majority of the Committee that the Superintendent should be a military man, but chose one whom he thought to be the best available candidate—and experience has fully justified the selection made. The second recommendation of the Committee was that, subordinate to the Superintendent, a chief mechanical engineer should be appointed, under whom the three separate branches of the factory might be amalgamated. This recommendation has been followed in the appointment of Mr. Donaldson.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland (1) whether the amount of relief given under the present scheme in the county of Mayo by the Boards of Guardians practically amounts to under 2d. a day per head for the individuals relieved; (2) and whether, in this relief, the head of the family is compelled to do work which is only imposed on able-bodied men in England who are known to be capable of earning their living if they would do so?

The maximum amount of outdoor relief authorised to be given by Boards of Guardians to persons engaged on the works organised as labour tests is six shillings a week, and this would work out at the figure stated in the first paragraph, on the assumption that a family represented on the works by one of its members consists of five persons. The current rate of wages for labourers in the distressed districts in ordinary years would be about seven shillings a week. In order to secure that only those who are actually in need of relief are afforded it at the expense of the Government and ratepayers, a task of work is required for one member of every family in all cases in which the Guardians wish to obtain the Government contribution. The relief afforded to these people in return for their labour is not intended to represent the wages which might be earned by an able-bodied man working on his own account, but is only supposed to enable him to procure the necessaries of life for himself and those dependent upon him, and thus prevent the family from coming into the workhouse. The granting of the relief is not contingent on everyone performing a task of work which would be done by an able-bodied man, and no one is taxed above his physical ability.

Will the right hon. Gentleman say if, in the case of a family in which there is no able bodied man or woman, whether old or young are compelled to do the work?

Yes, Sir, one member of the family is always called on to do it.

I think that that is most scandalous.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, as representing the Postmaster General, if he can see his way to have a special mail bag made up of all letters posted in London before 4.30 for Belfast forwarded by the Euston express train leaving at 5.30, arriving in Liverpool in time to catch the steamer leaving for Belfast at 10.30, and arriving there at 6 o'clock a.m. Sunday morning, when letters could be sorted and ready for delivery to callers at post office between the hours of 8 to 10 o'clock a.m.?

A bag for Belfast is already forwarded by the train leaving Euston at 5.30 p.m. on Saturday, as on every other week-day, for transmission to Belfast by the steamer viâ Fleetwood, which is due at Belfast about 6 a.m. The letters arriving on Sunday morning are delivered to callers at the Post Office between the hours of 8 a.m. and 10 a.m. The Liverpool steamer, which is not used by the Post Office, is not due at Belfast until 8.30 a.m.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been drawn to the finding and recommendation of a coroner's jury, who sat in the case of the death of a platelayer named Thomas Clarke, who died in the service of the London and North Western Railway Company whilst engaged in watching a landslip near Twyford Mill, namely, that the death was caused by exposure, and recommended the railway company should pay greater regard to the men employed on night duty especially during severe winter; whether he has noticed the death of five workmen on the Mallaig and Inverary Railway recently from exposure; and if he will use his influence with the railway companies concerned, and other railway companies, to protect the lives of their employees when working in winter in exposed positions?

The London and North Western Railway Company inform me that the man in question was on duty temporarily as night watchman, and that some time during the night he was seized with illness, and was discovered by the ganger in the morning. A conveyance was procured as quickly as possible, and the man was taken home, but died. A hut was provided for him, and he was supplied with a bucket suitable for a fire, plenty of fuel, and an overcoat. I have also received a letter from the Secretary to the West Highland Railway Company, which I shall be happy to show the hon. Member. I gather that when the men, who are contractors' servants, on leaving their work require refreshment, they have to go some miles to obtain it, which results in exposure to the weather. The contractors have, however, now opened a canteen at the works, where refreshments can be obtained. I will cause a copy of the hon. Member's Question and the reply to be furnished to the Railway Association.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if he will state the total amount of poor rate and the total amount of county cess paid out of agricultural land in Ireland in the year 1896–7?

The estimated total amount levied on account of local rates on agricultural land in Ireland during the "standard" year 1896–7 was in respect of poor rate about £615,000, and in respect of county cess about £924,000. The hon. Member must understand that these are merely approximate figures.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lientenant of Ireland if he can state the average annual value per acre of agricultural land in Ireland, the average amount of rate in the pound on such land, and what is the proportion of the proposed new grant of £730,000 that will be distributed to holdings of over £15 per year annual rental?

According to the Census Return the total area of agricultural land in Ireland outside the towns is approximately 18,536,000 acres, and the rateable value of land, deducting the towns, is £8,932,000. On these figures the rateable valuation per acre works out to nine shillings and sixpence. The average rate in the pound is approximately three shillings and fivepence. I have no means of giving the information as regards the allocation of the agricultural grant to holdings rented at over £15 per year.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether his attention has been called to the congestion of traffic, caused in the streets of London by the large number of omnibuses plying in the daytime, and to the inconvenience caused by the lack of omnibuses at night-time, and more particularly after midnight; whether there is any limit to the number of omnibuses that may be licensed to ply in the daytime; and whether any conditions are made as to the hours during which such omnibuses shall ply; and, if not, whether he will consider the advisability of making regulations with a view to providing for a reasonable number of omnibuses to ply regularly for the convenience of theatre-goers and others after midnight?

My attention has been called to the congestion of the traffic caused in certain streets by the large number of omnibuses plying in those streets, and the matter is now under my consideration. There is no power to limit the number which ply. As regards the other part of the hon. Member's Question, my information is that very few omnibuses are withdrawn from the streets until quite late; but, however, that may be, I should not feel justified in imposing conditions as to the hours during which omnibuses are to ply.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War, whether any Reserve men, offering themselves for re-engagement, have been rejected as medically unfit; and, whether such men will be deprived of their Reserve pay, or whether men who have been certified as unfit to serve in a battalion at home during peace time will be retained on the strength of the Reserve and receive pay as qualified for active service in the event of war?

The returns of men rejected have not yet been received. Each, case will be considered on its merits.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War whether Reservists may re-engage at any period of their Reserve service, or only during the first year after leaving the Colours?

The only restriction as to service is that the Reservist must still have two years to serve.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War whether his attention has been called to telegraphic reports as to alleged communications on the Cuban Question between the British Ambassador at Washington and the United States Government; and whether there is any truth in those reports?

There is no truth in the reports. No communications on the Cuban Question have passed between the British and United States Governments.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War, as it appears from the Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War relating to the Army Estimates, 1898–9, that the total number of recruits raised during 1897 for the regular Army was 35,015, and as it appears from the Return presented to the House on the 28th February that 28,903 men under one year's service were serving on the 1st January, 1898, if he can state the causes that have led to the disappearance of over 6,000 men who enlisted in 1897 and were not serving on 1st January, 1898?

The number of soldiers of less than one year's service on the 1st January given in the Return quoted was 29,657, and not 28,903 as stated. Of the 35,015 enlisted during 1897, 1,293 were recruits for Colonial Corps, who were not included in the 29,657. All the returns as to the other casualties have not been received, but it is estimated that 3,150 left within three months of enlistment by purchase of discharge, discharged as unfit, etc., and that 915 deserted. This accounts for the difference between the totals.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War whether, although vacancies in the list of major-generals in the Royal Artillery occurred by the retirement of Major-General Caldicott on 1st October, 1897, and the death of Major-General Yeatman-Biggs on the 4th January, 1898, yet during the intervening months no appointment has been made; and inasmuch as by Royal Warrant, Section 47, V., it is laid down that while supernumerary major-generals exist, only every second vacancy is to be absorbed, why in the cases referred to the warrant is not carried into effect?

Several points as to the promotion to the rank of major-general had to be considered before the promotion could be approved. These having been disposed of, the promotion will be shortly gazetted.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade if he can ascertain whether the position of book-keeper in the Stores of the Commissioners of Irish Lights at Kingstown is now vacant, but under the provisions and, if so, do the Commissioners of Irish Lights intend to fill the vacancy by open competitive Civil Service examination; and, if not, will they state the nature of their objection to the open competition, and describe the method of appointment which they propose to adopt; and, will he, in the event of the Irish Lights Commissioners proposing to adopt their usual system of limited competition for clerical appointments, recommend to them the desirability of nominating such a large minimum number of candidates as will ensure the appointment of a thoroughly qualified officer to fill the vacancy?

I understand that the position of book-keeper in the Stores of the Commissioners of Irish Lights at Kingstown is now vacant or about to become vacant; of the Order in Council the Board of Trade have no power to interfere with the discretion of the Commissioners with regard to the vacancy.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War whether the attention of Her Majesty's Government has been called to a description by the Daily News correspondent of the tents provided for the British regiments in the Soudan as ragged and wholly unsuitable for the climate; and whether suitable tents will be provided?

No complaint has been received as to the tents issued to the British regiments in the Soudan. They are of the Indian pattern, obtained direct from Bombay, and are considered suitable for a hot climate.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, as representing the Postmaster General, whether his attention has been called to the hardships often incurred by sub-postmasters and sub-postmistresses in consequence of the charge made upon them for the removal or alterations of telegraph wires owing to change of residence; and, whether anything can be done to remedy this grievance?

Attention was called to this matter, in which my hon. Friend has taken so much interest, at the Conference which certain officers of the Post Office had with the Postmaster General and myself in August last, and instructions have been given that the cost of the removal or alteration of telegraph wires owing to a change of residence is to be borne by the Department in every case in which there is not some good and special reason for charging it to the sub-postmaster, such, for instance, as a vexatious and capricious removal occurring immediately after one already carried out at the expense of the Department. The new rule is to take effect as from the 1st April last.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland has he seen a resolution passed by the Clones Town Commissioners asking that the Local Government Bill should contain a provision to reform the constitution of the Irish Salmon Fishery Boards at present possessing an undue proportion of ex-officio members; also asking that the Royal Irish Constabulary be required to patrol all breeding streams during the close season; and can he give any assurance that these suggestions shall have attention?

Representations have been made to the effect stated in the Question, but I can only repeat what I have already stated, that the matter would appear to be one proper to be discussed when the Local Government Bill is under consideration by the House, and that I am not prepared, at present, to make any statement upon it.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if licensing magistrates have powers under the existing law to prevent licence-holders serving children under thirteen years of age with intoxicating liquors for consumption off the premises?

There is no statutory provision expressly giving justices the power to prevent such serving; but it is, of course, open to them, when the question of the grant or renewal of a licence is before them, to consider any abuses which are likely to result in connection with the serving of children under 13.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for War whether he can give some financial assistance to Volunteer rifle battalions anxious to provide themselves with a Maxim gun?

Several Volunteer corps have provided themselves with machine guns; but it has not been thought necessary to give financial assistance for this special purpose.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India whether he would grant, as an unopposed Return, a copy of the regulations relating to the manufacture and sale of opium in India as set forth on to-day's Paper?

I shall be glad to lay on the Table such Papers as are in my possession if the hon. Baronet will confer with me as to the form of the Return.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury if the Council of Defence ever meet; if so, whether he can inform the House of the date of its last meeting?

In answer to my noble Friend I have to say that the Committee to which he refers is a Committee of the Cabinet, and it is not usual, and it would not, I think, be convenient, to give statistics as to the meetings of either the Cabinet or its Committees.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether the Government can see their way to recommend the establishment of a Royal Residence in Ireland?

Before the right hon. Gentleman answers, I should like to ask him whether he is aware that the Irish people have not the slightest desire for a Royal residence in that country; and whether, under these circumstances, he can see his way to recommend the Government to set aside for the relief of the starving poor in the west of Ireland—

Order, order!

I am not at all aware of the fact alluded to by the hon. Gentleman opposite; but, as far as the Question on the Paper is concerned, I think my noble Friend will see that this is a matter which concerns the domestic arrangements of the Royal Family, and can hardly be said to come within the sphere of the Government.

Hear, hear! We shall hear no more of it.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether his attention has been called to the fact that the expenses to be incurred under the Workmen's Compensation Act are set down in the Estimate under two different heads—namely, the Home Office (Class 2, page 89) and the Registry of Friendly Societies (Class 2, page 139); and whether he will consider the advisability of placing both Votes under one head, and making one Minister responsible for the whole administration of the Act?

The course adopted is, I understand, that which has universally been pursued on the Estimates when money has to be spent by two public Departments. I think my hon. Friend will see that it would be quite impossible to make any Minister responsible for the expenditure of any Department not under his control.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether it has been brought to his notice that, in connection with the reports of Debates usually furnished to Members, the custom of supplying the replies given by Ministers to Members' Questions has been discontinued this Session owing to the fact that the cost to the contractor for postage amounts to about £2 per week, and that, according to the conditions of his contract, he is not bound to supply answers to Questions; and whether he will take steps to have the practice formerly in vogue reverted to, as Members are thereby saved considerable labour and inconvenience when replying to communications from their constituents?

I am informed that the contractor, though not bound by his contract, has expressed his willingness to meet what appears to be the commonly expressed wish of the House by supplying hon. Gentlemen with copies of Questions and answers as well.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty if any decision has yet been come to as to granting a pension to the widow of Chief Officer Emery, of Haddock's Station, Fairlight, who died through over-exertion in the course of his duty?

I am glad to be able to inform my hon. Friend that a pension has been awarded.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India a Question, of which I have given him private notice—namely, whether he can give the House any recent information as to the recent disturbances in the city of Bombay?

I desire to ask the noble Lord whether he can give any explanation of his statement in the House on Tuesday that any statement that there was exceptional agitation amongst the Mahomedan population in Bombay was false?

I do not think the hon. Gentleman opposite is quite accurate in his statement of what I said. I was asked by a friend of his, with scarcely any notice, if I had any confirmation of certain rumours in the newspapers, and I replied that I had telegraphed to the Governor of Bombay, and that I had received no reply. He further asked me if I could make any statement as to the state of things in Bombay, and I told him that the latest telegram which I had—which was some days old—from the Governor of Bombay was to the effect that rumours of unrest among the Mahomedans should not be credited. In reply to the question of my right hon. Friend—and perhaps the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Montrose will allow me to answer his Question at the same time—I have to say that I have only received two telegrams from the Governor of Bombay in connection with the riots. They both came yesterday, and they are no doubt waiting until the close of to-day to report the condition of Bombay as it now is. The telegrams do not give any fresh information, but they may interest the House, as they confirm what has appeared in the public Press. The first telegram is as follows—

"From Governor, Bombay, 9th March, 1898. No disturbance till to-day. Have just heard serious riot took place this morning in Bombay city on account of attempted removal of plague patient to hospital. Four men killed, three very seriously injured; three police officers injured, one very seriously. Mr. Dastur, a Parsee, one of the Presidency magistrates, injured. Riot over for the present. Military sent for."

This is the second telegram—

"From Governor, Bombay, 9th March, 1898. In continuation of my telegram. Commissioner of Police is now with me. He says there was an additional outbreak in adjoining part of town. Two rioters killed by fire. Promiscuous rioting in several streets; two British soldiers were killed, and another seriously injured; five more European police officers injured; several private Europeans were attacked and injured. No rioting since about 4 p.m. Principal streets and hospitals guarded by European and native troops. Rioting commenced in quarter inhabited by Julais, a sect of fanatical Mahomedans. Have asked the general officer commanding Poona for some cavalry."

There is no official information beyond these telegrams. Investigation into the causes of a widespread disturbance in a large city like Bombay must necessarily take some time, but I am in daily communication with the Governor, and shall no doubt receive further information either this evening or to-morrow. I am confident that the disturbance is not the result of any excessive or unnecessary severity in the regulations or in their administration, and I feel sure that when order is restored—as is probably already the case—the work of combating the plague will proceed, every endeavour being made to give no avoidable offence to the customs or beliefs of the people, and to induce native gentlemen of position and influence to co-operate with the Government in the performance of this humanitarian duty.

Will the noble Lord give the House any information he receives before the adjournment.

Certainly, Sir.

I beg to ask the noble Lord if he was aware that he was reported as follows:—"On Tuesday, in the House of Commons, Lord George Hamilton read a telegram"—

Order, order! It is irregular for the hon. Member to refer without notice to an answer given to a question on a previous day.

Then I shall put it down for to-morrow.

Is the noble Lord in a position to state how many persons have been arrested in Bombay?

No, Sir; I have given the House all the information I have received.

I rise to ask this House to grant a colossal sum for the Navy Estimates. That sum is £23,780,000. But that does not represent the total projected expenditure on Naval services. To that must be added £1,775,000 which will be spent under the Naval Works Act. Thus the total sum which we have to administer will amount to £25,555,000. The House will, I hope, appreciate the sense of responsibility under which I propose these Estimates at this time. I have no doubt of the readiness of this House to grant these sums. In fact, if I have any doubt it is whether in some quarters they will think that I have not asked enough. But, however that may be, this is the sum which the representatives of the taxpayers of this country are asked to grant, and the taxpayers of the country are entitled to know that they have full value for their money. I trust the Board of Admiralty may be able to give such an account, in the Debates which are going to take place, of the present position of the Navy as may satisfy the public that we are doing our very best. On this occasion I propose rather, if I may say so, to speak to the House in general and to the public in general than to those experts and specialists who take a particular interest in the items of our programme They will have an opportunity of administering, in due time, their able and searching interrogations, and I shall be prepared to go into any detail they may wish. To-night I would rather give a broader and more general view of the situation as revealed by these Estimates. I wish, if possible, to avoid what is called official optimism. We are sometimes decoyed into optimism by the extravagance of the pessimists. But I am anxious to place the truth before the House. I think the truth, though still revealing a situation in which nothing is perfect, shows, at all events, that great progress has been made. I wish to remind the House once more that we are in a transitional state, and many of the deficiencies—the admitted deficiencies—of the Navy are due to this transitional condition. This transitional condition is accompanied by a series of improvements which we are anxious to introduce even while we are expanding, and if we have to increase the number of our ships, the number of men, the size of our dockyards, and the manufacture of our guns, and if we are at the same time to improve the guns, to improve the ships, and to carry out reforms in almost every branch, the task, as the House will acknowledge, becomes still more complicated. The very improvements that we are making seem to throw all that has been done before into the shade. New guns have been introduced. We have so large a fleet that the introduction of new guns, if they are to be introduced everywhere, is an operation of time, and so it happens that, while we are furnishing our new vessels with new and more powerful guns, vessels which a few years ago were considered excellently armed are now considered to be armed obsoletely, or, as an hon. Friend of mine expressed it, are armed with nothing more than old ironmongery. We are going forward in every branch. I can illustrate the difficulties of this expansion by our dockyards. We have to refit and repair in proportion to the number of ships in commission, so that there may easily be a congestion, not only in our dockyards at home, but sometimes also in our dockyards abroad. Take the case of the Mediterranean. In that squadron we have now 40 ships of all kinds. A very few years ago we had 20 ships. But the dockyards must rise to the occasion, and, if possible, deal with the repairs, those constant repairs, of these 40 ships, which hon. Members know must inevitably occur in the case of every fleet. We cannot fit out or commission more ships than the dockyards can deal with. Consequently, as I said, during this process of expansion we must be prepared to find imperfections in many directions. Many Members of the House will remember the splendid display in July last, when they saw a magnificent gathering of British ships. At the Admiralty we were not dazzled by that display. We did not think that it meant that we had done enough. It did not seem to us to mean that we had reached a state of perfection. It was great, but we want to do more. It was satisfactory, but it did not reach the ideal standard, if ever that standard could be reached, which every Board of Admiralty desires to reach. To show the enormous advance that has been made, and the immense increase of that which we have to administer, let us for one moment give a glimpse into a rather distant past. In the year 1872 I stood at this Table as First Lord of the Admiralty, and I then proposed Estimates of which the total was £9,500,000. To-day I ask for over £23,000,000. At that time I asked for 61,000 men and boys. To-day I ask for 106,000. I asked them for money to commission 124 fighting ships. To-day we ask for money which will commission 258 fighting ships. I admit the contrast covers a long interval, but, after all, it is no longer than the administrative phase in the life of a Member of Parliament. Let me take a much shorter period. Let us take a glance at how matters stood only ten years ago. Then we had 139 fighting ships in commission, with 24,800 men. To-day we have 258 fighting ships in commission, with 50,300 men. That is to say, we have in commission ships holding twice the number of crews which we had only ten years ago. Where are they? Those who are with me know precisely where those ships are, but it will be interesting to the general public to hear how our ships are distributed. In the first place, there is the Channel Squadron, more powerful than any Channel Squadron we ever before had in commission; and that Channel Squadron is not confined to that area which its name would seem to imply. The Channel Squadron was a few days ago off the western shores of the Mediterranean and we have in the Mediterranean itself a number of ships. The Channel Squadron has an offensive, as well as a defensive, intention in time of war; and the closer defence of our shores and the seas around these islands in time of war will be intrusted to reserve ships which are now kept in commission; therefore it must not be supposed that the Channel Squadron is simply a squadron which operates in the Channel. Then we have the Mediterranean Squadron, of which I need say no more; a squadron on the North American Station, on the South American Station, on the Western shores of the American Continent, and in all these regions we alone, with the exception of France, which keeps a small squadron for the protection of the Newfoundland fisheries—we alone have squadrons where other nations have isolated ships. I do not include, of course, those nations who have their homes on the American continent. Then we have the Australian Squadron, the East India Squadron, the Cape Squadron, the China Squadron, and, let me remind the House, that with the exception of the Channel Squadron all these squadrons remained at their stations when that great naval mobilisation took place last year; the ships which took part in that mobilisation were those which remained over after the squadrons were left at their various stations. Then we have another resource. A system baa been introduced, and I think it is a good system, that when we have to reinforce or relieve our foreign squadrons we do not send out crews in freight ships or troop ships; we send out a fully-commissioned, fully-manned man-of-war, so that at all times, besides our squadrons at the stations, we have traversing the seas a certain number of ships in commission ready for war if war should arise at any time. I will illustrate this by reference to what happened recently, though there was no war, and I hope there will be no war. The Edgar was going out carrying relief crews for the China Squadron. It was thought desirable that that vessel should remain on the China Station, and that ship remained at the station in the natural course of administration to reinforce the China Squadron. Another instance was that of the Orlando; she was coming home from Australia and was detained at Singapore, and if need arose this was a further strengthening of the squadron. I mention this to show how we stand as regards our squadrons, and how ships from the East India Squadron, from Australia, and the Pacific can, if necessary, be called upon to strengthen our squadron in the Far East and in the China Seas. I think I need not say that I have by no means exhausted the enumeration of the ships afloat that we have to administer. We have training ships and surveying ships, and ships of other classes, and demands are made upon the Admiralty from all quarters. Australia is clamouring for a survey of her coasts in every direction, and we do what we can; but our surveying ships must be limited in number, because we cannot spare more than a certain number of officers competent to deal with that duty. We are anxious to keep up with the demands of our fellow-subjects, but they are numerous, and we are not always able to comply with their desires. Both England, Scotland, and Ireland have recently urged us to undertake the duty in connection with protecting fisheries against trawling around the shores of these islands. I have spoken of the general distribution of our squadrons. We have reinforced the China Squadron. I have told the House one means by which that squadron has been reinforced by the Edgar and the Orlando. We have also sent two ships from the Mediterranean, the Bar-fleur and the Victorious, and I am able to say that these two ships will be replaced in the Mediterranean by the Illustrious and the Hannibal, which will be ready in a few weeks. All this has been done quietly and unostentatiously. We prefer to celebrate the home-coming of ships rather than their send-off. But I can speak, however, of one gallant send off, and that was the start of the Bar-fleur. This ship had been in commission three years, and was due to come home; the crew were to be relieved in the ordinary course by the crew going out. The captain of the ship, officers, and men petitioned that they should be left with their ship, and amid ringing cheers, forgetting their long absence from home, forgetting they had been away three years, and forgetting their desire to return, asked to be allowed another spell of duty on foreign service. That is the kind of start I think that British opinion appreciates and prefers. I trust, and I believe I judge the Navy aright, that the men are not yet infected with the ostentatious sensationalism which is becoming somewhat the fashion of modern times, but prefer the quieter, simpler traditions of the service. Now, as regards the Victorious. She passed through the Suez Carnal with perfect ease and safety, and, as I think has been stated at this Table before, the accident that unfortunately happened to her had absolutely nothing to do with the passage through the Suez Canal. "But how was it," it may be asked, "we were never told before that ships of the Victorious class could pass the Canal? Well, I do not think it is necessary for the Admiralty to speak in advance of all its resources. We knew that we had nine ships of a class that could pass through the Suez Canal, but we did not announce this from the house-tops. We were told we could send no assistance, that we were left with the Renown as the only ship that could pass through the Canal, and a question, put by an hon. Member of this House surely must have been prompted by a practical joker, "Why not send a ship of the Canopus class?" when it must have been perfectly well known that no ships of this class are completed. We have ships which can pass through the Canal; and I say now, with an emphasis I hope the House will pardon, I hope we shall never be pushed by questions in the direction of saying prematurely what we can do, where we shall send our ships, what stations we shall reinforce, or how we shall distribute our ships. If times should grow darker than now they are, if timidity is shown in this or that direction, and we are pressed to say, "Will you defend this point or that point, will you strengthen this squadron?"—then I hope we shall have such confidence given to us by the House of Commons and the public that we shall be allowed to hold our peace and steadily do our duty. To my references to these general considerations I may be permitted to add one more general observation. It is, I know, sometimes considered that we act without system at the Admiralty, that we have no system in our combinations, in the number of our ships of different classes that we construct, and that we have no strategic plans if war should break out. I do not know on what facts such a view is founded, except the fact that we do not much report upon our schemes, or talk about the system we are adopting; and, there, again, I hope it may not be necessary for us to do so. But I can assure the House, standing here as Minister, that the distribution of our cruisers is very carefully considered as regards every trade route and every route by which our food supplies arrive. There is no haphazard in the number and class of cruisers we build, and we modify our plans as we observe new elements coming forward in the situation we have to deal with. The charge is that we have no system. We have our system, and work upon it, though, let me assure the House, there is no tendency to official optimism. Every day new factors enter into our strategic considerations. The balance of power varies; navies vary in the rate of increase; new fleets are created. For instance, the Japanese fleet is a new factor in strategic considerations, and there are naval developments by Germany and other nations. All these matters must continually modify our plans, and we do not wish simply to say, "We must ask the House of Commons for a few more ships in order to satisfy the public demand," without knowing at the time why we ask for them and what we have in view in making the demand. I would now submit to the House some points connected with the personnel of the Navy. As the House will have seen from my statement, there is an increase of 6,340 men of various ratings. We asked for a similar number last year, and it was granted, and I am glad to be able to assure the House, as it will see from the statements before it, that we had no difficulty whatever in securing the 6,300 men that we asked for. There is a constant misapprehension upon this point, which it is very difficult to eradicate, and that is that we cannot get enough, boys to be trained into seamen. That is an entire mistake. As a matter of fact, we have offers from various localities, saying, if we would only send a ship to such and such a port, they would find us as many recruits as we require. Not only can we get sufficient boys, to fill the gaps that we desire, but we have enough to enable us to pick and choose and to eliminate those whom it is undesirable to have or who are below the standard. I do not think we take more than one boy out of eight of those who present themselves; therefore, we have no difficulty whatever about finding boys. We ask for an increase of 6,300, but that is not the whole amount we have to find in the course of the year, because, besides that number, we have to supply others to provide for the waste, which is about 10,000 on our 100,000 men, or about 10 per cent., so that we have to find as many as 15,000 or 16,000 entries in the course of the year. In the course of last year we not only raised 6,000 men, but we raised 6,000 men and boys besides the numbers necessary to provide for the waste of the year. When we increase the Navy in this way we do not, of course, in the first month or two recruit the whole. It would be most injudicious to do so. There are some persons who will say, "You want more men, why not take them all at the same time?" But if we did so we should not be able to keep up the standard; we should disorganise the general recruiting service; and those connected with the Army as well as the Navy know that a regular system of recruiting is infinitely better than spasmodic recruiting. You are better able by degrees to secure the men whom you want, and that is the only reasonable way to distribute the recruiting, both for boys and marines, over the whole of the year. I may say, in passing, that we have the same system on the Northampton, under which recruits of somewhat older age than those who go into the ordinary training ships are engaged round our coasts, and it has been very successful, and the boys are well reported of in all the squadrons in which they are serving. One new additional training ship has been established—namely, the Black Prince. She is perfectly fitted up for her duty of training boys at Queenstown. Hon. Members will see in the statement which I have circulated that we have appointed a Recruiting Committee, and that Committee is doing good work. What we are anxious to do is to spread recruiting all round the coasts and all over the country, not to take too many men from one locality, but to open up the whole country for our recruiting purposes; and it is with that intent we are endeavouring to improve our recruiting system. As regards stokers, I may say that our recruiting has been improved very much during the last few months. The paucity of men, naturally, constantly forms a prominent part of the debate as to the condition of the Navy, as will be seen from my statements. When, on the occasion of the Jubilee, we had all those ships mobilised, some 37,000 men were manning that mobilised fleet. Those ships were all fully manned—manned like ships commissioned for war. But, nevertheless, it was said in a leading organ of public opinion it was well known that these ships were undermanned to the extent of 30 or 40 per cent. Such a statement ought never to have been made; it was absolutely untrue. They were not undermanned at all. Well, it, was because of that statement, that two statements were made, which I may perperhaps notice. One came from France, and it was this—

"That so difficult had it been to man the ships during the Jubilee manœuvres that I had gone down personally 19 times to Portsmouth in order to hasten the manning of the ships."

Another statement, which came from Germany, was that we had 20,000 foreigners in the British Navy, and that if these foreigners were withdrawn we should be unable to send our ships properly to sea. There are a few foreigners in the Navy, apart from the Maltese and Kroomen, but they are mainly confined to bandsmen and domestics of various classes and so on. Possibly in consequence of that statement, I had a letter from a gentleman in high office in one of the Colonies, who wrote that, as we had so many foreigners in the Navy, it would be wise on our part to attempt to recruit in the district in which he was. I have thought it right to call the attention of the House to these exaggerations to show that if by stamping on the ground I could at once produce another 10,000 fully-trained men, although I should rejoice to have them, I should not know where to put them. We cannot, and we will not, enter more men or boys than we can properly train, administer, house, and send to sea. We have gone forward steadily every year, and this year another 6,300 is required. We have proceeded systematically upon these lines, and we do hope that the House and the public will not hurry us into any measures which would give us only the numbers without having the trained and efficient numbers. As my hon. Friend behind me intends to raise the question of training, I will not say more on the subject of our personnel except this—no doubt we are short of officers, but I would point out to those who object to the changes we are making in the Britannia that, under the present system, we shall turn out 60 more officers every year than we turned out before. If they were of a worse quality the increased number would not be an entire advantage; but as we shall be able, we believe, to turn out 180 cadets as good as the 120 turned out before, everybody will admit that the 60 additional officers thus supplied every year is a great advantage and an important step, looking to the acknowledged paucity of officers. I now come to the question of the Naval Reserve, and I will confine what I have to say to a very few words on that point. The House may remember that we made a change last year in a direction which was approved of, I think, by almost everyone who took part in the discussion, but it was doubted whether it would succeed. That change was that in future we would only have in our Reserve men who would submit to six months' training on board a man-of-war. Well, I admit the experiment was one with reference to which doubt could be entertained whether the men would submit to six months' training. Of course, this was done partly in order to secure the fishermen around our coasts. It was thought they were a strong body of men, who could be induced to join the Reserve, but it was felt they must have some training on a man-of-war. That was the reason we imposed these conditions. For the first few months, I admit, I was exceedingly anxious with reference to the result of this experiment. The men came forward slowly. I inquired the reasons, and I found they were based on human nature. They said we had fixed the age rather too high; that fishermen married young, and would not leave their wives for so long a spell as six months. They also said they did not like the dress on board men-of-war; that they were accustomed to comforters and clothes which protected all their limbs, and that the attractive costume of the British bluejacket would not agree with fishermen. There were other reasons of that kind. Under the advice of the Registrar-General of Seamen, we reduced the age by one year, and the effect was almost instantaneous. Men who would not come because they were older would come when we took them before their affections had been engaged. Now, we have 600 good volunteers for this service, and I hope it will be a success. I will now call the attention of the House to the matériel of the Navy. In regard to shipbuilding, my statement shows in some detail the way in which labour strikes have disappointed our hopes. It is a deplorable circumstance. The House will be able to understand the intense anxiety with which we watched the strike week after week. There is one postponement, however, which is chronicled which was not due to the labour war, but to another circumstance. This is a somewhat more technical point than those which I have dealt with. You will observe that before the commencement of the battleships of the Formidable class, and the commencement of the four ships of the Crescent class—armoured cruisers—which the House allowed me to order in July last, there has been considerable delay. Yes, there has been delay, and we deplore it, and I am not at all sure that the right hon. Gentleman cannot but admit that there were some grounds for it. The principal cause of the delay in preparing the designs of the Formidable class and the cruisers of the Cressy class was due to the experiments necessary to develop the designs of the new 12in., 6in., and 9.2in. guns. These guns being of greater weight, longer, and giving a much higher velocity than the previous patterns of guns, required stronger mountings, and involved increase of weight in many directions, so that the design of the ship could not be completed until the design of the guns and their mountings had been approved. You may lay it down generally that armament dominates design, it affects the stability of the ship, it affects the dimensions, the displacement, the space of ammunition—it affects the ship in every direction. These new guns were much more powerful than the guns which we had before in our ships, and the Ordnance Committee had to make out the details, the guns had to be tried, and various processes had to be undertaken. We were in this dilemma: Should we wait a few weeks, or a month or two if necessary, until we had secured the best guns, or should we immediately put in hand the ships with a certainty that when they were completed it might be said we had floated our newest and largest ships with guns which were already superseded? I felt it was a very difficult question to decide, but it was the full and unanimous opinion of my colleagues and advisers that it would be unwise to proceed at once with the construction of these ships until we had got the designs for the guns completed. To have commenced the ships earlier would have involved accepting the old pattern of gun, and, therefore, it was well worth while to sacrifice the few weeks which were necessary to obtain the new design. For my part, I am perfectly convinced that we followed the right course. However that deals only with a portion of our programme, that portion which involved the commencement of these ships; but the real delay—the terible delay—has been the delay in the ships under construction, and the ships that were in dockyards for various reasons, but mainly the ships under contract. There are two aspects from which this has to be considered—the retarded completion of the ships and the effect upon finance. Of course, the whole finance of the firms has been disarranged, but the completion of the ships to us is the more important point. We have been thrown back—and I ask the House to realise this—a whole seven months in our construction of men-of-war. I am glad to say now that the men are working with a will. I understand, from all quarters, they have gone back to their work, and that work has been resumed with a good spirit on both sides, and it is hoped that now, with renewed energies they will be able to push on with the orders they have in hand, and to retrieve, to a certain extent, the arrears. It is a serious thing to disarrange the construction of a man-of-war. In my statement I gave the particulars as to each ship, but I will now give the House the general result of the postponement, irrespective of some of the details in the dockyards. The ships which would have been on the sea, and many of them in commission to-day but for the strike, are as follows:—one first-class battleship, three first-class cruisers, two second-class cruisers, and six third-class cruisers, in all 12 vessels, the latest and best examples of their classes in the Royal Navy. Besides, this squadron, it is practically certain that, instead of 25 30-knot destroyers having been completed by the end of the present financial year, 45 vessels of that class would have been ready for service. Well, now, I know the view which has been taken by an hon. and learned Gentleman opposite. He considers that if the Government had intervened by enforcing penalties on all the firms who were in arrear, we might have averted some of the worst effects of the strike.

I have never expressed any opinion of that kind.

I am delighted to hear it. I thought, from questions which the hon. and learned Member put in me, and the statement that he was going to call attention to the subject of the exaction of penalties on the Estimates—I thought, and still think, on the whole, that the hon. and learned Member was in favour of that course.

I do not wish to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman, but I was simply asking for information. It depends on the information I receive whether I shall take that course.

I can conceive no more reasonable course; the hon. and learned Member is absolutely reasonable. But I am sorry that the paper which supports the hon. and learned Gentleman generally has made a violent attack on me, I am told, for this very reason. They say they hold me responsible for a portion of the results of the labour war, because we did not interfere by enforcing penalties. I quite understand that the hon. and learned Member would have a natural reluctance to introduce this point, because to enforce the penalties as suggested would have been an illegal step, as the decisions of the Courts have gone. As I understand those decisions, we should have had no right to enforce those penalties, and I indicated in the reply I gave that it would be, under any circumstances, an extremely difficult thing to exact penalties where a shipbuilding firm had not delivered in time, when the delay was caused by another firm—where there had been partly a lock-out and partly a strike—not delivering machinery in time. To penalise a firm in that way, or to take any course of that kind, would have outraged the sense of equity of the whole House. But I am glad to say that, while there has been postponement in every direction, it does not follow that the ships will be behind their contract times in all cases, because contractors often put in a date in order to secure themselves, with the full intention, and often with the full capacity, to deliver ships before the contract dates. That, of course, gives a certain margin, and although the ships will not be delivered as it was expected, nevertheless, they may, in many cases, I hope, be delivered within the contract dates. The sum which has not been spent in consequence of the delay is £2,270,000. I will not say that that sum has been entirely unspent, because a certain portion of it has been utilised. For instance, we have anticipated some of the demands for 1898–99 as regards armaments by granting a considerable sum out of this unspent money, we have hastened on repairs to a certain extent, and dealt with some of the expenses connected with the greater mobilisation of ships, the greater number of ships in commission, and the greater consumption of coal in the financial year. But, generally speaking, we have short-spent on new construction £2,270,000. Well, of that the instalments are all disarranged. We have not been able to get on with certain ships because the armour was not delivered and because the gun mountings were not delivered. Now, let the House thoroughly understand the situation. It may be asked why we have not spent more, and why we have not put it all on the coming year. That is a point I shall be able to explain in a very few words. When once a contract is fixed, the function of the Admiralty is simply to pay the instalments as the work proceeds; therefore, on ships under contract we cannot increase or decrease our expenditure if we wish to do so. So much is due to the contractors as they can earn, but not more. For such ships, therefore, we do not ask more than the proposed instalments to be earned in the year; that was the basis on which we framed the Estimates. Well, now, I wish the House to understand this, that the liability for ships under construction, without laying down a single new ship, on April 1st, including arrears of £1,400,000, is a sum between £7,000,000 and £7,100,000. If we carry on work in the dockyards, as we intend to do, these are the liabilities in which there is really no elasticity whatever. As regards the dockyards, I omitted to make this statement: we cannot largely increase the expenditure in our dockyards profitably, even if we wish to do so. We intend to keep up the strength of our workmen in the dockyards precisely as it stands now. We have kept the dockyards at full power during the whole of the year. If men were taken on for an emergency and subsequently discharged there would be discontent, and one of the charms of the Government service in the dockyards is its continuity. The contentment thus produced can only be secured by our not being tempted at any particular moment largely to increase the numbers at the yards, or to reduce them at other times. Therefore, I look upon work in the dockyards as rather a fixed quantity during this period of expansion of the Navy, and the elasticity, when it is desired, can only take place in laying down more ships to be built under contract. That brings me now to the point of the new ships we propose to lay down in the present year. Let me remind the House how we shall stand on April 1st, not only as regards finances, but as regards ships under construction. We shall have nine first-class battleships, 12 first-class cruisers, six second-class cruisers, 10 third-class cruisers, two sloops, four gunboats, and 41 torpedo boat destroyers. That will be the programme inherited by 1898–99 from 1897–98. That is the gigantic work on which the contractors and dockyards will be engaged. I cannot set down the value of these ships at a lower figure than £23,000,000 sterling. I am told that our programme for this year is a modest one, but that programme has to be grafted on to this other programme, which has to be carried out with all the energy which the contractors can put into the work and all the energy which the dockyards can put into it. I must say here, in regard to the dockyards, that while there has been local trouble here and there, generally, during this trying year, the temper of the men in the dockyards has been admirable and the work they have performed has been excellent. There has been splendid emulation between the different dockyards as to the speed and excellence with which they have produced their work. Well, then, these ships of which I have spoken hitherto are already under contract, or building in the dockyards. As regards our new programme, it is three battleships, four armoured cruisers, and four sloops. I offer the House no justification whatever for asking to be allowed to commence these ships. If I am challenged in regard to them I expect that it will be from a small section on the other side of the House, while there will be many speakers prepared to state why it is necessary that we should build those ships. I ought to add that this is not the whole programme really for 1898–99, because the House will remember that there were four armoured cruisers authorised in July last, in anticipation of the programme of 1898–99, so that we really have eight armoured cruisers and four sloops which belong to the new programme. And now as regards battleships. We have considered that three is the proper number of battleships to propose for the Navy, after a careful study of what has been done by others. We wish to maintain the standard at which we have been trying to arrive for so long, and we wish to exceed that standard if it were possible. But at present the general tendency in shipbuilding of some of our rivals—I do not know by what other name to call them, and I certainly do not call them foes—for power on the sea has been transferred rather to cruisers than to battleships, and it is to cruisers accordingly that we are directing our main attention. With reference to the battleships, and the cruisers which are to be commenced in the course of this year, I must ask once more for the indulgence of the House in requesting them to allow me to put off any statement as to their nature to the very latest date possible in the course of this Session. If they are not to be begun early in the financial year is it wise for us to state precisely the style of ship we intend to build? One thing I will say, and that is that I am afraid they will be very costly ships, but they will also be very powerful ships. We secure much advantage by the commencement of ships by other Powers in ascertaining precisely the class of ship—its speed, shape, and armament—which we may possibly have to meet, but I am unwilling to give them a corresponding advantage so long as the House of Commons will trust us to put off to a later period of the Session—if necessary to when Vote 8 is taken—the discussion of the description and speed of these special ships which we propose to build. We have received so much courtesy at the hands of right hon. Gentlemen opposite in this respect that I hope they will give me that confidence again. One word, and an important one, upon the reasons why it would not be possible, why we could not with advantage lay down more ships in the course of the coming financial year. I am now addressing myself to those who think we are not doing enough. I would point out that it is no good to lay down ships, and no one will dispute it, I am sure, unless you can calculate that the material for them will be delivered pari passu with the labour on them. For instance, it would be unwise to check their progress for want of armour. Rapid construction is economical; but to begin ships and not to be able to finish them—taking the men off and putting them on other work until you get the armour—is a process which we cannot really recommend. Now let the House remember that formidable list of ships I have just mentioned. There are nine battleships, and of the 12 first-class cruisers four are armoured ships, so that we have 13 armoured ships requiring armour in the course of the coming year; and we do not think that we could rely on such an output of armour as would justify us in hastening the construction of armoured ships early in the coming financial year. The output of armour has been thrown back partly owing to the labour difficulty to which I have already referred, but it has also been thrown back by the introduction of new processes of manufacture by which better results can be obtained, but which have required a rearrangement of machinery. It has been suggested that we should ourselves construct works where armour could be manufactured, but I do not think the House generally would be inclined to encourage us in such a task. We have, indeed, enough upon our hands, and our establishments are large enough without undertaking new great Government works of this kind. It is a safe rule to lay down, that if you can fairly secure the article to be manufactured by private enterprise it is unwise to check the development of the enterprise by the Government undertaking the work themselves. At all events, it would be a long and costly process, and I do not think it would be wise to undertake it. Well, then, we have got, as I have said before, a liability already of £7,000,000 on April 1st irrespective of any new ship, and now we have the additional liability pulaced upon us of laying down three battleships, four cruisers, and some small ships. I do not wish to mortgage 1899–1900 further than it is mortgaged by this programme, but rather to keep it for the House of Commons, and the Admiralty, to judge in about a year's time how we can best utilise any further resources we can rely on in 1899–1900. This is an argument which runs side by side with what I have already stated, that we should not inform our foreign friends of the course we intend taking. I desire to reserve to the Admiralty the liberty, so that when we come to the end of 1898–99 we may not find that we have incurred such liabilities in that year that if we want one description of vessel more than another we are hampered by the previous liabilities we have incurred. For instance, it might be thought necessary to lay down another large ironclad, which would influence the Vote for the year to the extent of £500,000, but when the time came we might find it desirable to spend the money on cruisers, and therefore from that point of view I only now propose this modest programme. I will not say what this modest programme will cost, because that would give too much of a clue to the class of cruiser we intend to build. I have stated that they will be powerful cruisers, and they will be adapted to those special circumstances which last year and this year have revealed themselves in different parts of the world. I must thank the House for the attention with which they have listened to me so far. There is one great department of activity which I have not yet touched upon, the main exposition of which I will leave to my hon. Friend the Civil Lord of the Admiralty; that is the action which we have taken under the Works Act of last Session. We have been much disappointed in the progress of the works; we have been disappointed at Hong Kong, where we have not been able to get hold of the land; we have been disappointed at Gibraltar; and we have been disappointed in the extension works in several other localities. I do not say that the unspent amount of money is an exact criterion of the work that is not done, because it depends frequently upon the capital and resources of the contractor. If the contractor can go on for some time without asking for instalments, work may be done which represents money, but money which has been earned but which has not been asked for until a later day. We have not got the money entirely in our hands. But I will admit fully that we have been disappointed. We have had many disappointments. I have sometimes heard it said: Are the Admiralty aware that the works at Gibraltar are not making sufficient progress; or are they aware that no steps have yet been taken in such and such a direction? Yes, we are aware; and who so much as we are likely to deplore these delays? Who so much as we are likely to be mortified with the arrangements that have been made and which cannot be carried out? And who so much as we can deplore the fierce struggle and between capital and labour, which has deprived us of ships by which we had hoped to reinforce squadrons, and bring them up to their strength? We may be criticised for these delays, but it is we who suffer from them most; and as for my Naval and professional colleagues, who are criticised, and naturally criticised too, I ask the House to remember their position. They work on unostentatiously, quietly, and loyally; they are not cheered by any demonstrations of popular audiences. They may not take pen in hand in order to explain, contradict, or refute. They must bear chilling criticisms in silence, but they have this comfort, that they see, notwithstanding all the imperfections with which any great administration such as ours must necessarily be charged—they have, at all events, the comfort of seeing the fleet expanding from year to year, and from month to month. The fleet has been expanding, the personnel has been expanding; our guns have been improved, and there have been improvements in every direction, and for the organisation of all these, they deserve the chief credit at the hands of the nation. Yes, Mr. Speaker, expansion and improvement are going on, and though it is difficult for them to keep step through the labyrinth of difficulties, they are pressing forward. The Admiralty can do much, but it cannot do all. The State can do much, but it cannot do all, even if a generous House of Commons and a generous public consent to continue to place such colossal sums at our disposal. We require the steady co-operation of other interests. We require the steady co-operation also of those who represent the maritime interests of this country. We require, too, the steady co-operation of the manufacturing centres. If in those centres which have been the pride and strength of the country; those engineering and manufacturing centres which have been so famous for their work—if there the furnaces are extinguished; if there the men are standing out, or are locked out—I do not care how it may be, for we have no politics at the Admiralty, and we know nothing of trades unionism, and we only want to see the work of the country properly done; if the sons of our seamen take less and less to the sea; if, from some false idea of economy, or from the imposition of impossible conditions on the other side, British sailors are being ousted by foreigners from British ships then I say God help this country. It is not only with respect to our men-of-war, and not only with respect to the crews of our ships when war is likely to break out that "England expects every man to do his duty." There are other classes to which we may appeal, and there are other services which the nation has got a right to command; and if once more peace and harmony should reign in those great centres of industry, and if the maritime instincts of this nation which calls itself the mistress of the sea should re-assert themselves, and show again an increasing number of British seamen in the British mercantile marine, then, with the splendid spirit of the personnel of the Navy, and with the generosity of the taxpayers of the country, the nation may look forward with ever-increasing confidence to this prospect, that if there be peace, which God grant, it may be peace shrined in honour; and if there be war, which God forbid, it may be war crowned with victory.

I rise to call attention to the country's deficiency in ships and men, and to move—

"That this House desires to see a fuller provision for manning the fleet."

I do not think the right hon Gentleman has upon this occasion indulged in any official optimism. The story that he told us is not one, I think, calculated to make us feel very satisfied with the strength of our Navy at the present time. He has told us that we have got fewer ships than we ought to have if it had been possible to carry out our programme. He has told us that though there has been a great deal of activity in the naval works in different parts of the world, at Hong Kong and Gibraltar, yet that the work is behindhand, and he has told us that he would desire to have spent more of the money voted, if we possibly could have, for the Navy. It seems to me that altogether it would need somebody with a light heart to have dealt with any official optimism in regard to the statements the right hon. Gentleman has made in the House. Mr. Speaker, I do not want to attempt to make any Party attack of any kind on the Admiralty or the right hon. Gentleman. I regard the question of Imperial defence as of such transcendent importance that it ought to be altogether outside of the circle of Party politics, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will not think that in anything I am going to say I am endeavouring to make any Party points against the Navy. Now, Mr. Speaker, to one who, like myself, is not an expert in Navy matters, it is necessary to go to the Admiralty returns and to the various information that has been given in this House by the First Lord of the Admiralty and other Naval experts, in order that we may be able to judge what the standard of efficiency of our Navy should be in regard to the other navies of the world. I have endeavoured to do this, and I find that there is one standard that has been accepted by the leaders of both political parties in this House as the irreducible minimum which this country should have. Lord George Hamilton, in introducing the Defences Act in 1889, said—

"I think I am correct in saying that that idea" (the idea underlying all Naval Minister's and Prime Ministers' speeches) "has been that our establishment should be on such a scale that it should be at least equal to the naval strength of any two other countries. For the purpose of meeting unexpected blows we should have a considerable margin of reserve."

Then Lord Brassey, in the Naval Annual for 1889, said—

"Our standard of strength in battleships should be twice that of France."

Now I think that is the admitted standard, and it is common ground with both sides of the House that the irreducible minimum from which this country should not, under any circumstances, fall is supremacy over the next two strongest navies in the world combined. Now, Mr. Speaker, I do not wish at the moment to argue whether this is a satisfactory standard to set up or not. But taking this standard, which is admitted by both sides of the House I believe, I shall be able to show that our Navy is weaker now, compared with the next two strongest navies of the world, than it was in 1889, than it was in 1894, and than we were last year; and that it will be still weaker on the completion of our present naval programme of 1899 and the following year. And yet the right hon. Gentleman tells us that we have made great progress. He tells us that the improvements of the last few years have put all other improvements of the past absolutely in the shade. I think it can be proved—and the figures of the Admiralty prove it—that, in regard in France and Russia—the next two strongest naval Powers—figures show our improvements are more imaginary than real, and that no really satisfactory progress in regard to the strength of our Navy has been made. The Return of 1889 gives our strength in armoured ships, and it also sets out what the standard of strength for this country should be. For the purposes of the comparison that I am now going to make, I only intend to take first and second class battleships. These will be our first line of defence, and on our great battleships we shall have to depend principally in the event of a possible combination between any two Continental nations. In 1889 we had battleships completed, 32; France and Russia had 21. In 1894 we had 31; France and Russia, 26. In 1897 we had 35; France and Russia, 33. In 1899 we should have 46; and France and Russia, 45. So, taking the Admiralty's own Standard and their own figures that they have put before the House, we are considerably less strong in battleships now than we were 10 years ago in relation to France and Russia. We have increased our battleships by a total of 14 in that period, and they have increased theirs by a total of 24. Of course, this is making an allowance for ships that have been removed to lower classes, and for ineffective ships that have been struck off the list. In all, since 1889 we have built 29 battleships, all first-class. France and Russia 23 first class, 7 second, and 13 third—in all 43. So far as numbers are concerned, it seems to me that we are drifting into a very serious position, and that we are not going forward in the right direction, as the First Lord of the Admiralty told us a few moments ago. But these figures do not represent how bad the case really is, for we shall not have reached these figures in 1899. The delay that has been caused by the strike during the past year in our building programme puts us seriously behind. According to the First Lord's memoranda, and according to the calculations of the Admiralty made last year, if this country were to be considered safe at the present time we ought to have spent nearly £2,500,000 on new construction more than we have done, and we are that much behind in our programme; and of the battleships, four of which the First Lord of the Admiralty promised should be completed last year by the time he next made his statement on the Estimates, only one has been completed. I know he told us that two others, the Illustrious and the Hannibal, will very soon be launched, but they have been delayed, and the six ships of the Canopus class, the First Lord told us, were seven months behind. Altogether, the delays of last year means that we have lost 12 months in our construction programme, and we shall be 12 months behind for the next few years. The only vessel upon which there seems to have been any real progress made during the past year is the Royal yacht, and that vessel seems to be nearly completed. In 1899, according to the First Lord of the Admiralty's statement of what we were really doing, it seems to me that we shall be six battleships short, representing a tonnage of 77,000 and 91 guns. If we had to go to war with any combination of the great Continental Powers, it seems to me that our position would be a very serious one. Now, it has been urged in this House that we can build our ships so very much faster than France and Russia that it did not very much matter if we got slightly behind in any one year, but that argument has ceased to have the same weight now that it used to have, seeing that France is now building almost, if not quite, as fast as we are. The Jéna was launched six months after she was commenced, and some other French vessels have been launched in eight months, so that the great advantage that we had over others in the past, when France was building very slowly and we were building comparatively fast, has vanished, for the French are now building, as I said before, almost as fast, if not quite as fast, as we are. It is the case that our ships are very much larger than the ships of France and Russia, or of any other Power, and in that way we may be said to possess an advantage; but it is more an apparent advantage than a real advantage, because our ships have to carry much more coals on account of the distant stations in which they have to serve, that the size does not generally represent stronger armament, but only additional coal carrying power; and, therefore, they would not be stronger than foreign ships of 4,000 or 5,000 tons less when it came to the time of battle. Then there is another serious defect in respect of eight of the vessels which, in the Admiralty Return, are reckoned as effective second-class battleships. Eight of these are still armed with muzzle-loading guns. Now, does the First Lord of the Admiralty propose to re-arm these vessels? It is a most important point, but he told us nothing whatever about it to-night. Is it possible to re-arm them? It has been said that in the Alexandra and the Rupert the funnel casing comes up through the battery, so that it would be impossible to re-arm them with modern breech-loading guns. In another two, the turrets are so constructed that the cost would be so vast if they were to be re-armed, that it would be almost cheaper to build new ships. But, however that may be, I maintain that the Admiralty are not justified in counting these amongst their effective ships—amongst the ships that would be capable of meeting the ships of a foreign Power, armed with breech-loading guns. The First Lord of the Admiralty said, a few years ago, that we ought to trust in Providence in this respect. Mr. Speaker, I am inclined to think that Providence would not be likely to help us in battle if our ships were armed with muzzle-loading guns against the ships of an enemy armed with breech-loading guns. Up to the present, in numbers, in strength, and in armaments I do not think we have that superiority to any other two Powers in the world. It has always been maintained as the irreducible minimum that this country ought to have a Navy sufficiently strong to deal with the combined navies of any two other Powers. But this is not the standard that has been considered necessary by experienced naval experts. After the Naval Manœuvres of 1888, a Committee of three Admirals was appointed to inquire into what standard this country ought to have, and they told us it would not be possible to blockade the enemy's ships, as it will be necessary for us to do if ever we are going to war with a combination of Continental Powers, with less than a proportion of five English vessels to three foreign ones. That standard has never been either accepted or given up by the Admiralty. If the Admiralty do not accept the standard, will they give us the reasons for not accepting it, and the reasons why they think that the standard set up by these three Admirals was too high a standard for this country to attain to? On one occasion the Government gave us a standard that they thought was a sufficient standard for this country. It was the standard set up in the Return of 1889. The present Secretary of State for India, who was then First Lord of the Admiralty, told us that the standard that this country should aim at is the standard of six English vessels to five, in first-class battleships, over possible opponents, and 4¼ to 2 in second-class battleships. We are not only below this standard set up as the standard that we ought to attain to by the First Lord of the Admiralty in the late Conservative Government, and a Member for the present Government, but we are below the standard of the three Admirals, and we are below the irreducible minimum that has been accepted by all parties; and, therefore, I cannot say that the Estimates and statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty are in any way satisfactory. But in all these standards it has always been contemplated that if we ever went to war it would be against a combination of two Powers. But, in considering our Naval Estimates, it seems to me that with our great commerce and our dependence on our Navy, we ought to consider the possibility of a still stronger combination being ranged against us. I think we have been able to realise during the last three weeks, when we have been hearing of wars and rumours of wars on every hand, that there is a possibility of a still stronger combination than the two strongest Powers that could be brought against us. In every part of the world there is a possibility of complications arising with three great foreign Powers—we have difficulties in West Africa with France and Germany, we have difficulties in Northern China with Russia, and at any time we may be called upon by the combination of these three Powers to evacuate Egypt; and it seems to me that we should be prepared to meet that combination. We have adopted what the Colonial Secretary called a policy of "splendid isolation"—a policy of disregarding alliances—and with that policy I, for myself, entirely agree, for I believe that when the time of danger came you could not depend upon your allies; but if we adopt that policy—if that is the settled policy of this country—we must be provided against every eventuality. We cannot at present consider we are safe if we are called upon to meet a combination of three Powers. We cannot afford to take any risks, and I believe that an all-powerful Navy—a Navy that would be capable of crushing any possible combination that can be brought against us—would be to the best interests not of war but of peace. The present Secretary of State for India, when, as First Lord of the Admiralty, he introduced his Naval Defence Act in 1889, told us of the enormous responsibility that our Navy would have cast upon it in time of war. The First Lord of the Admiralty has repeated that remark as to our responsibility. He has told us of the great mass of shipping and trade that our Navy would have to protect, and that a war between England and a combination of the great Continental Powers would be a war of limited liability on their part, but of unlimited liability on ours, because they could attack our Colonies and could crush us in every other part of Commons should very carefully paramount importance that the House of Commons should very carefully criticise the programme which the First Lord of the Admiralty has laid before us to-day, then, I believe, it will come to the conclusion that it is not sufficient to meet the requirements of the case. France and Russia this year are expending seven millions of money on new construction, and that is a larger expenditure than, I believe, has been known before. We read to-day in the papers that an additional ten millions has just been taken for the Navy of Russia. The First Lord of the Admiralty told us a year ago that there was a balance of power between the fleets of Europe, and that any extraordinary expenditure on the part of other Powers should mean an equivalent expenditure on our part. I do not think the First Lord of the Admiralty's estimates carry out his own idea as to this. We have this extraordinary expenditure on the part of other countries, and we have no extraordinary expenditure on our part to meet it. The First Lord of the Admiralty told us that it is impossible for him to finish the ships. I would, therefore, urge upon him the necessity of, as far as possible, pushing forward this extra building of ships to meet that, on the part of other naval Powers that may be against us. Also, at the same time, I would ask him to make provision for getting extra armour plates, and extra materials, to build these ships, if we are to be able to meet the difficulty I have mentioned as regards the large amount of money that is being expended by Continental Powers on their navies. During the last 30 years we have spent on new construction about £86,000,000, or an average of £2,800,000 a year, but we have no settled policy in our building expenditure. It varies between £800,000 and £7,000,000. France, on the other hand, in pursuance of a settled policy, has been gradually increasing her expenditure from year to year—an average of about £1,600,000 a year—and Russia has been doing exactly the same thing. There has been a steady rise in the expenditure on new construction of each of these Powers, but, again and again, when the First Lords of the Admiralty have come down to the House of Lords, they have assured us that they were perfectly certain that the Navy was as strong as need be; that there was no need for any new expenditure. The next year they came down and told us that the state of the Navy was unsatisfactory, and that, therefore, they needed much larger Votes of money. They have preserved no settled fixed policy with regard to this matter. In 1893, the right hon. Gentleman for West Monmouth told us that the Navy was in a perfectly satisfactory state. The next year we had an enormous expenditure on new armaments. In 1888 we were told that the Navy was in a satisfactory state, and that was followed by the Naval Defence Act of 1889. I have no wish to ask the House to believe, and I do not believe myself, that these statements were made in bad faith at the time, but, I say, they do show that we have in the Navy no settled building policy. These statements show that these Estimates rise and fall, and that, from year to year, the Admiralty do not look forward to what may be necessary to keep up the proper standard of strength. I would ask the First Lord of the Admiralty for a statement of the requisite number of ships in each class that it is necessary for us to have, so as to be able to meet any likely combination that may be brought against us; and I would ask him if he could give that in a Report to the House every year. I would like to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty a question with regard to our cruisers. There have been remarks made lately that the Powerful and Terrible have been unsatisfactory vessels. I have heard one statement that the engines were too heavy for the ships. It seems that there must be something seriously wrong during the time that the Powerful was going out to China. I would like, also, to ask the First Lord if he would give us a statement of how long it would take to send the A Division to sea; could it be done in 24 hours? Then, with re-regard to the manning of the Fleet, if I had heard the First Lord of the Admiralty's speech before putting the Resolution which I have put upon the paper, I should have moved an Amendment relating to ships as well as men, for it seems to me that in the First Lord's present statement we are more deficient in ships than we are with men, but, although his statement is fairly satisfactory in regard to men, I do not think it is altogether a satisfactory statement. He told us that, when the number of men was 106,000, it would be unwise to go beyond that in time of peace; but the First Lord, in his speech last year, told us that, when he built new vessels, new vessels meant more seamen, more marines, more of every kind of men. Therefore, if the First Lord has now come to his limit in men, and he still keeps to the statement he made the year before, he must also mean that he has come to the end of his programme, as far as building ships is concerned. There would be an enormous call on our men in the first few months of a war; it seems to me that there is no provision to meet such a strain. With the present Reserve, I do not suppose, in the first six weeks of a war, the First Lord of the Admiralty could rely on getting more than 10,000 to 15,000 men. It is in the first six weeks of a war that it would be necessary to man every cruiser to defend our trade routes. I would ask the First Lord of the Admiralty if he would lay a statement before the House of the number of men required to man every ship, and every class of ship, in the Navy? I think it would be satisfactory to have such a statement. We could then judge for ourselves whether the number of men now asked for is sufficient for all requirements. I do not think that the First Lord of the Admiralty's explanation in regard to the boys of the Navy was very satisfactory. He told us that he could get any number of boys for the Navy at the present time. Yet from his speech it seems that he had not got the number of boys that he was voted by the House last year. This does not seem to me to be a very satisfactory state of things. Altogether, I think that the programme now laid before us for new construction shows a very great weakness in ships. It shows, I think, we have fallen lamentably away from the standard of size which the House has given its assent to in the past. I therefore beg to move the Resolution standing in my name.

Mr. Speaker, I do not believe that at any time in the history of this country it has been more important that we should have undoubted command of the sea. I have never heard a more frank or honest speech with regard to naval affairs, either in this House or outside, than that of the First Lord; but so far as new construction is concerned, it is a heart-breaking speech. I should like to say a few words with regard to the remarks of the First Lord as to the delay in carrying out the proposals made last year, and also as to the small number of ships proposed to be built this year. I should like it to be distinctly understood that I do not blame the authorities in any way whatever for the circumstances which have occurred, but I ask the House to consider whether the authorities are doing all they can under the circumstances with regard to increasing the Fleet. I consider the statement of the First Lord with regard to construction not only serious, but positively alarming, considering the preparations that are going on in other countries. The point I should like to urge is this: The First Lord tells us that he has spent £2,270,000 less for construction than he anticipated last year. What is the position? It is this, that the Government of the day, the Admiralty, and the Cabinet considered the expenditure of that money last year necessary to put our defences in proper order up to now. Therefore, we are that much short of what we ought to be at the present moment. This is a very serious question. I do not agree with the First Lord—but after his explanation it is rather difficult for me to make my point clear—that £1,400,000 is enough to add to this year's Estimate in order to make up that great deficiency in the construction of ships which are to defend our Empire in the event of war. In other words, we are going to take three years to make up this deficit, instead of doing, as I hold we should do, our level best to add it to this year's Estimates, and try to lay down or buy ships in order to fill up the Navy. There is another point. Last year the First Lord, in his speech on introducing the Estimates, declared—and it was very much taken notice of in the Press, and delighted all those people who looked to defence—that if other nations did increase their shipbuilding and their naval defences in any way, he should be prepared to come to this House and ask for more money. He did more than that, for, when other nations did show signs of increasing their forces at sea, he came to this House and asked for another £500,000, which shows that he himself thought at the time that that sum was necessary in order to keep pace with what other nations were doing. I maintain that at this moment we are not building up to our complete capacity. I have not been able yet to go through all the slips in the dockyards and all the slips in the contract yards, but the First Lord himself has acknowledged that the only elasticity that he has is in the private yards; and I believe myself that, looking to the gravity of the case, as I do, I think that we ought to get hold of every slip that we can in order to lay down ships at once to meet the needs that were regarded as absolutely necessary this time last year. I would point to another thing. I think it is most necessary that we should re-arm those vessels which are at present useless—there are 13 of them—and if they were re-armed, they would be most excellent vessels. Some years ago, I, myself, made a proposal to the Government when I was Captain of a Dockyard Reserve that we should re-arm these. I estimated that the cost would be about £1,300,000—and I do not think that it would amount to more—to substitute breech-loading guns of modern make for the useless ones that are at present mounted on these vessels. I think that under the circumstances which have arisen, and which can in no way be said to be the fault of the Government, any system of re-arming these vessels which can be done quickly should be taken into the consideration of the House. With regard to this question, we may be told that we could deal with that later, and that the issue of a war would be in favour of that country which had the greatest number of vessels to put to sea, and we shall then find that these vessels would be useful. I utterly deny that. These ships are at the present time armed with only muzzle-loading guns, and in addition to this they have neither the range nor the speed of more modern ships—that is to say that when they are out in blue water the modern ship can pick the position of advantage, because she has the speed, and she can always hit one of those ships armed with muzzle-loading guns, although the muzzle-loading gun ship cannot hit her. In their present condition, Sir, I say that these ships should be at once scratched off the effective list, as by their being allowed to remain there the public is deluded. While they are armed with muzzle-loading guns, as at present, the Government have no right to put them on the list of effective vessels, and I think that now is the time, when we are so backward in construction, that we should take this matter up. Then there is another question. I think, as the First Lord has got all this money, let it be spent. Why should we not buy all the ships that are at present being built in this country for foreign Powers? I believe we have a perfect right to do this. I know that we bought the Belleisle, the Orion, the Neptune, all of which were being built for Turkey, and the Superb, which was building for Brazil. I think it was in 1878, but, at any rate, we did buy those ships when there was just such an emergency as at present exists. There was no war, but there were rumours of war with Russia, and the Government of the day spent 4½ millions in buying those vessels. Sir, there are ships now on the stocks, and others that are being finished for foreign countries in many of our contractors' yards, and I think that it would be a very wise thing for the Government to immediately purchase all these vessels, As I said before, we are over £2,000,000 behind in our construction for last year. There is another point as to the increase of the Fleet. Owing to circumstances which have occurred recently, it is imperative that the Fleet should be largely increased. I will give my reasons for this statement. We have neglected for years a most important point, and that is the fact of our having adequate naval bases. If we do not have those bases, we must largely increase the Fleet. Batoum and Biserta were taken as naval bases, and we have taken nothing as a counterpoise. We have had a great deal of agitation and writing in the Press, and this and other things have induced the Government to at last put Gibraltar into something like an adequate state of defence. If it is necessary to put Gibraltar into a state of defence now, it was necessary several years ago to do so, and although a great deal has been done in this direction, much remains to be accomplished. I say that under the circumstances of the case they ought to have taken Alexandria. I believe we could have done it without any war at all, and made a naval base there. If we do not have naval bases we must have the fleet largely increased, because the ultimate issue of a campaign will rest with a fleet which can most quickly repair itself. You have now steel ships. The steel ships of the present day are not like the ships of the day when I went to sea. They are not self-supporting. In former days you would have on board spare spars and canvas to make new sails; but in these days you must go to her naval base to put her right and replenish her stores. How do we stand now? We have no naval base there. We have got Hong Kong, which is not as suitable as it ought to be as a naval base. My point is this, that the Government are not doing enough. Supposing they were going to have trouble with China, or there was anything looming on the horizon, what are we sending all those ships for? If there should be trouble there, how are we situated? Hong Kong is 960 miles from Chusan, and 1,500 miles from the theatre of war. I do not believe in the principle of "wait and wait and see what other people are going to do." Russia is perfectly right to go in Port Arthur, and say that "she is going to winter there." I should say her winter will last about 100 years. Let our First Lord of the Admiralty say that we were going to winter at Chusan in the same way. There is nothing of a threatening character in all this. It is simply looking after our trade and commerce. My point is this, that with the addition to the Fleet which the First Lord has sanctioned it is not big enough owing in our not having a naval base. I do hope that the Government will not go on with this waiting policy. I am as certain possible that Kiaou Chau will, in a in a short time, be fitted up as a proper naval base. In the course of a private conversation—I cannot say who told me—I was informed that an Admiral told the Government—

"As for Chusan, don't bother your head about it; we can always take it if we go to war."

That Admiral, if he said such a thing, ought to be tried before a court martial for being a fool. What you want is a naval base for stores, reserve of ammunition, and repair of our ships, and everything we want to enable the Fleet to go out again as soon as it could and fight an action. The idea of taking Chusan if we went to war is so ridiculous that I will not trouble the House any more with it. The reasons why I hold that further steps ought to be taken are: First, that we are 2¼ millions behind what the Cabinet of the day thought absolutely necessary for our safety last year; secondly, that when you have a want of properly equipped naval bases throughout the world you must have a larger Fleet in those waters if you have no place for repairing; and, thirdly, because we are not building ships as quickly as we ought to do in relation to the shipbuilding of other Powers. In the old days, if there was any likelihood of increased estimates for armaments abroad, we could always beat foreign Powers in the rapidity of construction. I observe, however, that both France and Russia are able very nearly to construct as quickly as we can. That is a most serious thing when you come to consider that, we are two millions behind what we ought to be. There was the Gaulois, for instance, which was laid down in January, 1896, and was launched in October, 1896. It used to take them two years to construct a ship. It is a very serious thing for us to reflect that they can now be ready as quickly as we. Another ship in France was laid down in January, 1897, and launched in July, 1897, and a third was laid down in March, 1897, and launched in October, 1897. This, I repeat, is serious when you come to think of the enormous advantage over foreign nations we once possessed by reason of our rapidity of construction. On the question of the proportion between our navy and those of other Powers, which the hon. Member opposite has brought before the House, I do hope we shall stick to that proportion of three to two which was laid down by three of our most celebrated Admirals. Take the total of ships launched in the last ten years. The British nation has launched 22 ships of 300,000 tons, Whilst France and Russia have launched 29 ships of 273,000 tons. Therefore, the proportion of three to two has not been kept up at all, and I should like very much to see it kept up. When that proportion was agreed to by this House, I thought it was a very wise proposal. I agree with the hon. Member opposite in saying that the proportion has certainly not been adhered to of late years. The First Lord of the Admiralty made some comparisons which were very interesting, but which were of no use at all unless he put them beside other comparisons. It is true that at one time we asked for £1,000,000, and now we are asking for £23,000,000. That is a great increase, certainly, but he ought to have told us something also about the increase in the exports and imports. Ministers say, "Look at what we are doing now compared with what we were doing some years ago." I do not care if you treble your Navy. The point is, Are you doing enough to meet the needs of the defences of this great Empire? The First Lord has said that some of the critics of the Admiralty had made grave remarks about the system. I am afraid I must plead guilty to that; certainly, I have been severe on the system of the Admiralty. What I have always complained about with regard to the Admiralty is that they had no plan of campaign, and no system laid down as to what they would do if war were suddenly declared. Until last year there could have been no plan of campaign; they never, for instance, thought of fortifying their bases in the narrow seas—they never thought of Gibraltar. Now, such things are being done. They are fortifying their naval bases, they are putting reserves of ammunition into the different stations, and they are building ships to maintain the same rates of speed, and whose gearing is interchangeable. That shows we are at last beginning to have a system in the administration of the Admiralty; but when the First Lord says that distinguished Admirals in the Admiralty have no right of reply, have no right to say, "We do not agree with you for such and such a reason," I would point out to him that it would be impossible for any First Lord or any Government to propose these large sums of money necessary to keep our defences in order unless the people who settle the question know the reason why. Those of us who are critics have never in any way tried to throw discredit on the authorities, but merely have sought to strengthen their hands in the only way possible, for the only chance you have of getting the attention of the people is by pitching into the authorities. The First Lord said very wisely that he had no place to put the men. That is one of the things we have complained of for so many years. The Hartington Commission had clearly shown that our want of business-like arrangement at the War Office and the Admiralty put us in this position, that we were invariably making out our requirements before we made out our establishments. The First Lord's proposal was most business-like. He said he could only join a certain number in the year; he did not think he could train more. That is a most important point, for I do not think that we ought to join men in a hurry, unless we have places in which to train them. We ought to look after our establishments before making up our requirements. There is another point about the Reserves. The First Lord made a speech the other day in which he said he was perfectly satisfied with the number of the Reserves and the training of the Reserves. A few of us took exception to that. Some of us said very distinctly that we did not think they were sufficient in numbers, and that the men were being joined on a wrong principle. Since that the Admiralty have altered the system of training and of joining, as well as the class of men they were joining, and though we cannot say it is a success, yet those of us who are critics are willing to wait to see what the result is. I believe it will be very beneficial to our service, and that it will ultimately succeed. But I would like the First Lord in his reply, or the hon. Gentleman below me, to tell me, and tell the House, what they consider the number of the Reserve now completing ought to be. The First Lord said he was going to put off the building of the ships in order to see what other nations were going to do. I do not agree with that policy, considering that our Fleet is not up to the strength it ought to be. I hope the First Lord will reconsider that and build the ships as quickly as he can. I know the men can be got afterwards. There is the bottom of the ship to be laid down, and the other parts to be brought from different parts of the country to make it complete—the boilers, engines, guns, ammunition, and armour, all of which take a great deal of preparation and consideration before the ship is built. I have heard the First Lord say that he did not think it would be wise to increase the guns and armour. Over and over again we have seen good and very valuable men-of-war hung up because the plates and guns were not ready, and I think the Government should take it into their heads to see if they cannot increase the existing plant. I know when I was in Chatham we were hung up over and over again in the dockyard because the plates made at Sheffield, although very good, did not come to hand. Well, Sir, the other points which have been mentioned by the First Lord of the Admiralty I prefer to take up on the Vote, because I think the House will prefer that rather than that I should make a long speech now. The Reserves and the personnel would come before it on that Vote. But I cannot but record my opinion, as a very drastic critic, that I do think the Admiralty are doing the best under the circumstances, with the exception of this question of construction, and I do hope that in this Debate there will be a general feeling in the House that some greater part of this debt of £2,270,000 should be paid off than is at present, because my point is this: that if the Government thought this time last year that the Navy was unequal to our needs, and that it required strengthening, then at the present time we must be in a very serious state. Things did not look half so black then as they do now. The proposals for more shipbuilding for other countries were not then determined, and certainly were in no way accepted by those Governments. But they are now accepted by those Governments, and, having regard to the fact that we have done nothing respecting a naval basis in the Far East, I consider it absolutely imperative that we should take action in the matter. I do not want to adopt an aggressive attitude, but I think we must make China an offer to buy Chusan there, or do what Russia is doing, and go and winter there. I have the honour, Sir, to second the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Speaker, I have listened with very great pleasure to the speech which has been made by the First Lord of the Admiralty, and all that speech to me was very inspiring, especially when it came to the peroration. There were, however, some points in that speech which, I think, want a little elucidation in regard to what he so forcibly put—namely, the delay in building the vessels. The hon. and gallant Member who spoke last alluded to the short expenditure of £2,270,000 this year.

Order, order! The hon. Member must confine his remarks to the Amendment which is now before the House, and which deals simply with the question of manning.

Mr. Speaker, I was just quoting the hon. Member's words on the dockyards.

We have nothing to do with that question now. The hon. Member must confine himself to the question of manning.

Well, Mr. Speaker, I am not very well acquainted with the procedure of this matter, but I was coming to the point as to how the Government failed to spend the money on account of the loss of labour. Could I follow the hon. and gallant Member in the observations that he made in seconding the Amendment?

Not unless the observations were addressed to the question of manning, which, to some slight extent, they were.

Sir, I fear I labour under the difficulty that the mover and seconder of the Amendment have not addressed themselves to it, but have dealt with entirely different subjects, and did not speak of it. Sir, I presume, nevertheless, that they will vote for that Resolution, although they used no arguments at all in support of it. But, although I propose to vote against the Amendment, I propose to speak to it. Sir, in the remarks which I wish to make—and they shall be as brief as I can possibly make them—I am sure I need not say that I am prompted by no animosity to the First Lord of the Admiralty or to Her Majesty's Government, but only by a desire to support some of the suggestions which I wish to see adopted. Still less let it be supposed that I intend to make any reflection upon the First Lord in his official capacity, because, Sir, I feel grateful—and I think the whole House feels grateful—to the First Lord for the manner in which he has conducted the administration of his Department. He has succeeded; others have equally taken credit; and it is worthy of remark that it has rarely, if ever, been found possible to pass anything like a vote of censure on the First Lord. Chancellors of the Exchequer are denounced as extortionate, on the one hand, and spendthrifts on the other; Foreign Ministers are derided for their weakness and indecision; and even Colonial Secretaries are brought in question; but rarely, indeed, is the First Lord of the Admiralty challenged. That I attribute to the very practical manner in which the work is conducted at the Admiralty, to the sound traditions of the Service, and to the experienced staff of naval officers and experts by whom he is assisted. Now, Sir, I hope I shall not be taken to task or be held to be presumptuous because I criticise the Admiralty, for the Admiralty, good as it is, is not all perfection in knowledge and wisdom. It was the case that, not longer ago than 1835, Lord Melville—then, I believe, the First Lord—wrote a solemn Admiralty minute, stating that the Admiralty felt it their duty to use every effort that they were capable of to resist the introduction of steam into the Navy, because, he said, it would be a fatal blow against the supremacy of England. Therefore I hope that in any suggestions that may be made the Admiralty will not despise this House, or even me, the humblest Member of it. Now, I have no new suggestions to propose; all I ask is that we may revert to what I hold to be the old traditions where they have been departed from. They were sound; they were based upon practical training, and they were based upon an almost equal contempt for pure abstract science and book-work. While the French were safe in port, learning high mathematics and ballistics, our men at sea were learning to handle ships and fire guns so as to hit a mark. Now, Sir, comparisons made between ships and ships, ton for ton, are very misleading, but still more misleading, in my opinion, is the comparison made between men and men in mere numbers, because, unless the training of these men is taken into account, such comparisons would be entirely useless. This matter of training seems to me not only of first importance, but of growing importance. In the old days the mercantile marine trained the men for the Navy, and the men you induced, or pressed, were as good as your own for all purposes, and some far better. The modern man-of-war, however, is so full of delicate machinery, her weapons are of such a complicated and ever-varying character, and the whole conditions of her life are so involved that it is absolutely necessary to have special men, specially trained in a way that can be only carried out by the Navy itself. And the greater the improvements, the more complicated the mechanism, the more it will become necessary that the men should have the Navy's special training, and no other. Now, this is no new doctrine, but I do think it is somewhat overlooked. To the public a ship is a ship, a man is a man, and I cannot help thinking that there is a temptation to the First Lord, seeing the view the public take, to say, "I will give you so many ships and so many men," and so to take a large proportion of money and apply it for those purposes, rather than for more training. The First Lord has said that he does not look only to numbers. But I am afraid, Sir, he does to too great an extent. Take the age at which boys are received in training-ships. Under the ordinary system boys are received in training-ships between the ages of 15 and 16½, and you have never had a lack of boys. Their 20 months' training is now reduced to 16. This is too short. Then, to send a boy to a training brig for six weeks is an absurdly short time. It ought to be at least 13 weeks. There are too few training-ships, too few training brigs, and the training squadron is too small. I would strongly urge the First Lord to increase his training ships, so as to give the boys the full amount of training, to abandon the mischievous innovation of the Northampton, and to increase his training brigs and the training squadron. I am very pleased to notice a paragraph in the report which indicates that certain reforms are to be effected in regard to captains of guns, and captains of turrets. Upon the captain of the turret the whole fate of a vessel may in a moment depend. In an action the fate of the vessel may hang for the moment upon his nerves and his eye, and the way in which he fights his guns. How have you treated the captains of the turret? You have modified the examination for becoming a captain of the turret, and so far so good; but once made, it is assumed he is made for ever, which is a great mistake. Nothing is more delicate than the duty he undertakes, and a man may lose his nerve and eye to a certain extent, and a man who is a good captain of a gun or turret yesterday becomes a bad or, at least, an indifferent one to-day. What I have always suggested is, that there should be more practice, with the Morris tube, if you like. You might make the man fire four or five shots with a Morris tube, and then you might see whether he keeps his eye and nerve, and if you saw he was fit to do his duty, instead of paying him the miserable 2d. or 3d. a day, I would suggest that the amount should be multiplied by 10; but I would make it depend upon his retaining those qualities which it is necessary he should have. Now I come to the worst part of my indictment, and where I do think the First Lord has gone seriously astray, and that is the age of entry for training for our officers. Of course, I recognise, and it is only fair to remember, that we are in a period of transition with regard to the training of our young officers. Now we want more officers than we should require to supply under normal conditions. I believe during the wars of Napoleon we had 3,000 lieutenants; we are very far short of that number now. We are very short of the number that we want to command our vessels. There is another extremely important matter: it must be remembered that officers, by winch I mean finished officers, have in these days to bear a very great strain when they have to take their stand upon the bridge and fight their guns. That strain is so great that it is certain older officers will not be able to stand it. The men must be younger. Now let us see what, I regret to say, is the alteration made with regard to the training of our officers. I will not deal with the substitution of the college ashore for the ship afloat, although I do very much regret not teaching the boys on a ship for the first 18 months, and letting them acquire a knowledge of ship and boat life at a very early stage of their career. Now, under the old regulations, those which are at present in force, the age at which cadets are accepted is from 13½ to 14½, or an average of 14 years. Now, that is full high, and I would rather it should be from 12½ to 13½, or an average of 13. Who does not remember Byron's lines—

"Full well the docile crew

The skilful urchin guides"?

Yes, but it is because he is a skilful urchin taken young that when he grows up he becomes a good officer. I remember that story of a skilful urchin—Peyton, I think, was his name—who was told to take the Pride of the Mediterranean over to Gibraltar, and he did it, and having done so, he also brought her over to England. A boy who could do that at 11 years of age is likely to make a first-class officer. Well, the age used to be 13½ to 14½, and now the First Lord has altered it to 14½ to 15½; so that instead of being brought in to the Navy at the age of 14, as they used to be, the average now is 15; so that you have so much more time lost between the time the boy enters and the time he becomes a lieutenant. You have not only reduced the usual time of his training from his entry, but you have done worse—you have lost an enormous amount of the time which you allowed him to be trained in the Britannia. In the olden times he passed in the Britannia 104 weeks; under the new system he is to pass 65 weeks, and when the holidays and examinations are deducted from that, you will find that a boy sent into the Britannia fresh from the shore, and never, perhaps, having seen the sea, has only 48 weeks of instruction in the Britannia before he is sent to sea. The results are perfectly ludicrous in certain cases. Then as to the instruction; take French, for instance; that is no longer a compulsory subject for passing in, but it is compulsory if passing out, and if the boy does not acquire a certain amount of French in the Britannia he is sent away. Now, what opportunity has he for learning French at all?—the whole course is only 14 lessons. Well, French in 14 lessons! These boys are subjected to a course which is an absolute farce. In the case of French it cannot be more than a sham and a cram. I understand, and I hope and believe I am right in so doing, that this course of training, which is now 18 months, is to be extended to two years. But that is a point about which I particularly want to ask the right hon. Gentleman. How is he going to do it, if he is going to do it? Is he going to do it by sending the boys in younger, or by sending them in older? If he is going to do the latter, he will send them to sea later than they go at present, and involve them in a further loss of time before they can become lieutenants. We see these alterations are being made, and we know that this last one has been made especially to please the masters of public schools, and it is hoped that we may get boys from the public schools. We know the old story that the Battle of Waterloo was won on the Eton playing fields. But Trafalgar was not; it was won by men like Peyton, who led their men to the assault at the age of 16; that was how that was done. By getting boys taught young and trained into good naval officers. Now, I do not believe you would get boys from the public schools, and if you did get them they are not the boys you want. They are boys who would have acquired public school habits, and being used to all the luxuries of public school life, they would not be likely to be easily content, and to settle down, as would a boy of 13, to merely a chest and a hammock, to become a lieutenant. Now, what I respectfully submit is, that the age should be lowered again to 12½ to 13½, giving the average of 13, and then in two years you would get the full course in the Britannia, and you would get more adequate time at Greenwich and at Portsmouth, as to which I must again strongly complain. These two splendid training establishments are being absolutely wasted. In consequence of the time which the officer is allowed to spend, and can spend, in these establishments, he is not able to be properly instructed in the various subjects with which they deal, but is superficially varnished over with them by a system of cramming. And the percentage of officers who go away with anything more than the merest smattering of what is supposed to be taught to them either at Greenwich, where theory is taught, or Portsmouth, where practice is taught, is very small indeed. Why, at Portsmouth you are expected to learn six new gun drills a day, all with different guns! It is extremely advisable to lengthen the course of training, and I suggest that the right hon. Gentleman could do that by lowering the age of entry by a couple of years. Now, I wish to say one word with regard to the Naval Reserve. It now consists of 22,000 seamen, and the fishermen and boys bring up the total strength to 25,000. I think it should be increased to at least 30,000, or possibly 40,000. There are many people who think it should go as high as 60,000 or 70,000. I confess it seems to me that we should be very chary of importing too large a proportion of Reserve men in to such a highly special body as the Navy. The main part of the men on board our ships must be specialists, and should only be diluted to a very small extent with Reserve men. There is no difficulty in increasing the number. As to the Engineers, with regard to the training and the promotion, I have nothing but praise for the course taken by the right hon. Gentleman, but there he has taken the step which I suggest should be taken in the case of our officers; he has reduced the age of entry from 19 to 18, and I trust he will have compassion for the officers, and adopt that step with them. With regard to the Naval Reserve in the British possessions abroad, there is an enormous advantage in having Reserve men in those places. In certain stipulated places there should be permanent stations, which would give this advantage: that instead of having to send out crews from home, you can make up your number of men from there, if necessary, in time of war. I need not point out what an enormous advantage it would be for a commodore of a squadron to find a number of trained men whom he could take on board at once, instead of waiting for them from home. Now, I just want to quote a few figures upon this subject, which might prove valuable for this purpose. The number of men employed in various vessels of the Mercantile Marine is 84,000, but that does not take into account the fishermen, who are estimated at another 70,000, and I find, by reference to Mr. Wilson's book on Newfoundland, that the Newfoundland fishermen are 55,000. Those figures, added together, give a total of 210,000. Now, that is a large fund to draw from for special purposes; and what I submit is, that at certain selected places, well spread about, such as Sydney, the Cape of Good Hope, Halifax, and Esquimalt, and other places where there are large naval stations, there should be large Naval Reserve establishments started, where men should be allowed to join for training. There would, I believe, be no difficulty in getting the men, and the right hon. Gentleman would have the advantage of having ready-trained men in various portions of the globe in case of emergency. I have made this suggestion in a practical spirit, and in no spirit of animosity towards the Admiralty, but rather with a view of co-operating with them in an humble way. We are on the verge—if not actually in—of some of the most troublous times we have ever had in our history. The old laws of the world have neither been improved nor changed; bird eats bird, and fish eats fish, and there is not a blade of grass that grows which has not to displace something else and fight for its life. It is still the law of the world, and, as we won our position, so we shall have to keep it, by hard blows. Out of the present situation, involved and complicated as it may seem, we shall come somehow, I hope, by the efforts of diplomacy and the skill of our Ministers; but I am sure, if it must be so, we shall come out of it by fighting. However it may be, it does behove us to gird our loins and make as perfect as we can our naval power, on which alone we can rely. The very essence of the naval power lies in the men. The importance of ships and guns lies in the men you put behind them, and the experience of the men depends upon the training you put into them, and it is for that reason I ventured to bring the suggestions that I have made before the House.

I wish to point out that compared with the numbers asked for in Vote A of last year, there still appears to be 1,398 men deficient. We voted 100,050, and there have been entered, according to the latest returns dated the 1st February, 98,652 men; and the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty has stated that the exact number voted will be "practically obtained" by the 1st April. I do not quite understand what those words "practically obtained" mean. I rather suspect that by the words "practically obtained" we are to understand that the number will not be secured.

They will be actually obtained.

I am given to understand that the men will be obtained. On the face of it this appears to be very satisfactory, and it will impress the country favourably that the Navy is being efficiently manned. But that is not the case; and a large percentage of this deficit, although the number appears to be small, represents one of a most serious character, because it is mainly made up of a particular class of ratings—namely, skilled ratings, which cannot be obtained, and the want of which has already seriously impaired the fighting strength and the value of our ships. Last year I called attention, Mr. Speaker, to the same deficiency, and the First Lord gave an answer which appeared to have some merit about it. He said last year there was some difficulty in entering the skilled ratings, owing to the general revival of the shipbuilding trade throughout the country. This year that does not appear, because the great strike, or lock-out, not only threw out of employment the engineers, but necessitated a large number of other skilled ratings being thrown out of employment also. And, consequently, these men being out of employment, if the conditions offered by the Admiralty were suitable, they would have been glad enough to have accepted naval service. But what are the facts? Why, there have practically been no entries in spite of the special efforts made by the Admiralty, who had had to send about the country, not only to their own naval yards, but to private shipbuilding yards, a Committee of Inquiry to endeavour to find out how it is that there is such an extraordinary deficiency in these skilled ratings. The amount of deficiency in skilled artisan ratings is simply alarming. I addressed, about a fortnight ago, a question to my hon. Friend the Civil Lord of the Admiralty asking what had been the outcome of the inquiry, and, also, what was the deficiency of the complement in shipwrighting and certain other skilled trades which are largely employed. He told me that the shortage in shipwrighting ratings amounted to 72. Well, I do not think that disclosure of the facts was intended to mislead me, but I know that officials, when replying to questions, are not always to be taken seriously. But he knows, as well as I do, and as well as anybody does, what are ratings which shipwrighting includes. Well, now, Sir, I shall disprove his figures by simply giving figures with which I am perfectly acquainted and prepared to vouch for in my own constituency. Now there is a shortage in Devonport alone of shipwrights and carpenters' crew of 71 men. Nevertheless, my hon. Friend opposite tells us that the total throughout the country is only 72. There is also a shortage of blacksmiths' mates of 23, of engine-room artificers 35, and of coopers find other skilled ratings, 27, making a total deficiency in Devonport alone amounting to 156. That, I am told, is practically the same everywhere; and it is estimated, from information I have received, that there are certainly at least 500 of these skilled ratings wanted at the present moment. Well now, that, of course, is serious, because these men are skilled mechanics. As was pointed out by some of the speakers, the Navy to-day is a very different thing to what it was in the old days of practically wood and canvas. It is a highly technical instrument, is a ship of war, full of the most complicated machinery, and liable to break down at any moment, and unless skilled workmen are there to take it in hand the ship may become simply ineffective. The efforts made by the Admiralty to meet this difficulty have had a most evil effect. Of course, the sending of this Committee of Inquiry about the country no doubt was intended to solve the difficulty, but I may say here, in passing, that, strangely enough, that Committee of Inquiry avoided seeking information from the very people that might have given it to them—that is, the interested trades about the country. They carefully avoided like poison, as it were, asking information from these trades, either in the private yards or in the Government yards, from which the actual information might have been acquired. They preferred to go to official channels, and the result is they have obtained nothing that is of any service to them. The efforts the Government have been making have resulted in a very dangerous procedure being adopted. In the first place, they have reduced their old standard with regard to skilled ratings, and last year they issued an order—I think it was in September—not only to cut down the quantity of the complements of our ships, but, at the same time, they also reduced the quality. I have figures to prove this fact. I take what is considered generally the best class of battleship of the moment—that is, the Royal Sovereign class. Under the old scheme there were allowed for shipwright ratings four leading shipwrights, four shipwrights, one leading carpenters' crew, and two carpenters' crew, making a total of 11 efficient men. Under the new scheme, the battleships of the Royal Sovereign type will now carry three leading shipwrights, two shipwrights, two leading carpenters' crew, and three carpenters' crew, making a total of 10. The percentage of skilled men was higher than the percentage of skilled men under the amended scheme. And I say that this reduction is a great danger. Beyond that, the Admiralty have recently issued an order to the Commanders-in-Chief of the various home ports—and, from what I hear, the ports abroad also—that they are not to be particular in the test that they apply to mechanics who seek to come in to fill these ratings. The result can be seen by comparing the test that applied before this recent order was issued with the new test that is now sufficient to pass a man in. Under the old test, a man who wished to go in the Navy as a shipwright had to pass an examination in practical shipwrighting in both wood and iron. For the test of wood he would probably be called upon to mould and fix a timber to the ship, or to fit a plank to the ship's side. The test for iron work would be probably to shape and fit an angle-iron frame into a ship, or to put an iron plate in the side of a ship. That was a high test, and only skilled men who had served a seven years' apprenticeship would stand the faintest possibility of passing such a test. Now, what is the meaning of the test approved by the Admiralty order within the last few months? What is the test? A man wishing to be taken into the service as a shipwright has simply to demonstrate that he is able to use the adze and the axe. And with what result? Why, that a mere handyman from a remote country place, who would not stand the faintest possibility of being considered a carpenter or a skilled mechanic in civil employment, that man presents himself and becomes a skilled rating in the Navy. Well, I say, Mr. Speaker, this constitutes a very grave danger, more especially when we remember the reductions which have been made in the last four or five years, the outcome of the recommendations of the Manning Committee. Complements have been very much reduced, and the Member for Lewisham has protested over and over again against the sweating down in the engine-room staff. I think I have demonstrated amply and clearly that this sweating has been carried on in connection with the other skilled ratings. The effect will be, in my judgment, most disastrous in the case of war. You are aware that you have never faced the difficulty, and you are simply treating it as a passing one. I see this year you are endeavouring to meet the difficulty by offering extension pay of sixpence a day to men who would be entitled to retire at the end of their pension period to induce them to remain on. I am perfectly sure that the men who are serving now will not supply your deficiency by reason of any such expedient as that. The only remedy, if you want to get skilled mechanics into your Navy, will be to have a free and liberal pick from all parts of the country, and you will only get that by giving them better pay and better status. Just consider the position of these skilled ratings in the Navy as compared with their treatment on shore in the Civil employment of the Government. We all know there are Government schools at the various ports, and they are excellent schools. Civil Service examinations are held every year, and those who come out highest in the competition have the opportunity offered them to choose whether they will go into your civil employment as shipwrights or fitters' apprentices. Well, I merely mention that to prove the value that is put upon these trades by the Government themselves in their civil employment, But when one of these fitter apprentices has served his time in a naval establishment, when he is entitled and elects to go to sea, he starts at five shillings and sixpence a day. The shipwright apprentice, to whom you give the opportunity of selecting what he would become, whether a fitter or a shipwright, when he goes to sea he does so as a leading seaman, and he gets four shillings as against the other man's five shillings and sixpence. But not only is there a disparity in the pay—I am not suggesting the engine-room artificers get too much, on the contrary, I think they ought to get more—but the inferior rating which the shipwright holds also carries with it many menial duties, which no skilled workman should be asked to submit to. He is bound to take his share in the cooking of the mess and in the scrubbing of the decks. When he goes out of the dockyard, instead of marching out on the same terms as his former confrère, with proper leave, he is marched out under the control of the ship's corporal. This is the reason of all the difficulty. The skilled men will not throw up their good appointments on shore, where they can get six shillings a day, to go to sea and rough it and get two shillings a day less, besides unfair treatment. Mr. Speaker, this applies very much to other trades. To a lesser or greater extent it applies to blacksmiths, painters, coopers, and so on. These men request that they should have some respect paid to their position as mechanics. Well, now there is one statement that I want to refer to that appeared in the First Lord of the Admiralty's speech. It pointed out that last year, for mobilisation, there were 165 vessels mobilised, and that the number of men on these vessels was 36,619, and here the First Lord of the Admiralty stated that the whole of these ships went to sea practically—that ominous word "practically," which we are given to understand means actually—fully-manned, and that the deficiencies were slight. Considering these ships, mobilised with only one-third of the skilled ratings laid down under your own scheme—and even to get to this one-third of your mobilisation complement you had to drain every ship in the harbours of all the ports—I think, Mr. Speaker, that we are really entitled to ask for a definite statement from the First Lord of the Admiralty as to whether we have a sufficiency of artisan ratings to mobilise our Fleet with a full complement in the time of war. Of course, these deficiencies may pass muster in time of ordinary manœuvres, but it would not be tolerated in time of war. The deficiency of skilled ratings cannot be denied, and we should have some assurance from the First Lord, now that he has the evidence before him, that he will take steps to bring forward some reform that will cause this deficiency to be set right upon the earliest possible occasion.

I am sure we all thank the right hon. Gentleman for the very able statement in which he has placed the Estimates for the coming year before the House. I have heard many statements from the First Lord of the Admiralty, and I remember them some 20 years ago, but the statement this evening far exceeds any of the statements which he made so far back as that. In dealing with the question of manning I would like to point out to the House that by looking back to the period of the Naval scare in 1884 we have increased the Vote to the permanent men during the last 12 years to nearly double. My contention is, that this increase of men has been almost entirely on the part of continuous men, and successive Governments have neglected to deal with the question of the Naval Reserves. It is quite true that the present First Lord of the Admiralty has made an attempt with regard to this new department, that is, he has enrolled men for the purpose of serving as such on men-of-war. This system, I ventured to state when the First Lord brought it before the House, I thought would be a failure. I think it has been a failure in procuring men for this six months' service who are able seamen of the class you anticipate. The First Lord has been compelled to reduce the age to 18, so that the so-called men are not men, but boys. With regard to this question, were the boys trained, in the first instance, for anything in the shape of seafaring life?

Yes.

I am very glad to hear it; but what I am anxious to see this evening the First Lord turn his attention to is that any future increases in the effective forces shall not be so much on the part of continuous men and permanent men, but to increase the Reserve, for 500 is a very small proportion. The reason why the Reserve ought to be increased is, in the first instance, that there is not at present any provision for waste. The right hon. Gentleman told us this evening that the annual amount of waste was 10 per cent. Well, if the annual amount during a period of peace be 10 per cent., what will the amount of waste be in the event of war? During the past 12 yeans the number of continuous men has been increased from 59,000 to over 106,000. It is all very well to increase the number of continuous men, and, as the right hon. Gentleman stated this evening, he has no room even for the number now proposed for the ships that are coming forward. This increase in the permanent men means an enormous augmentation in the annual cost to the country. In the year 1885 the cost of the permanent men was a little over £4,000,000. The Vote now asked for is increased to £7,000,000, an increase of £3,000,000 directly; but we have, in taking comparative cost into account, to allow for future contingent pensions. The £7,000,000 does not represent the actual amount which is to be provided, for the Contingent Pension Fund means an additional £1,500,000. Thus the Admiralty are asking for eight and a half millions annually. Now, I hold this, that with the increase in ships we never intended that these ships should be maintained and kept on a war footing. I believe the intention of Parliament was to maintain a powerful reserve. I feel bound to say this, that the Admiralty do not look sufficiently to the necessity for increasing the Reserves. My proposition with regard to the Reserves is this: the first-class Reserve should be increased to 25,000, the second-class also to 25,000, and the third-class or stokers to 10,000. That is, you ought to have in connection with the Reserve 60,000 men in all. The question may probably be asked, Where are the men to come from? I will endeavour to show hon. Members. A Departmental Committee was appointed in the year 1891 to inquire into this question of the Naval Reserve. One point submitted to that Committee was as to the source from which the Reserves were to come. The other point referred to that Committee was as to the use to which the Reserves should be put in times of peace and also in war time. With regard to the source from which Reserves could be obtained, according to the evidence laid before the Committee, we had something like 40,000 men in connection with the mercantile marine of the right age who could be enrolled in the first-class Reserve. Down to the present time the number the Admiralty has enrolled is 10,600 men. Another source of supply which was alluded to is as to men connected with the fisheries. We were informed by the Committee that in connection with the fishing industry of the country we have 70,000 who are wholly, and 46,000 who are partially, so engaged, making altogether 116,000 men who are available in connection with the second-class Reserve. Of these 116,000, all that the Admiralty has enrolled down to the present moment is 10,800. Then, with regard to the supply of firemen in connection with the mercantile marine, out of 60,000 men, down in the present time all that has been done is to enrol 1,700, and we are now proposing to increase the number by 1,800 this year, thus bringing up the number to 3,500. In addition to this, according to the statistics of men who have paid considerable attention to this question, we find that, beyond these numbers, we have something like 150,000 men engaged in a semi-seafaring life, all of whom are available for enrolment in the Naval Reserve. Sir, there is yet another source. Out of the whole of those men who enrol themselves in the Navy, a very large proportion never enrol again—I believe, something like 50 per cent. fail to enrol themselves for a second period. What I should like to point out to the right hon. Gentleman is this: that some system or scheme ought to be devised under which those men could be retained for the Reserve. The late Admiral Hornby—than whom there was no higher authority—held that a Reserve of this kind was absolutely necessary. Then, as several hon. Members have pointed out, there are other sources from which the Reserve may be recruited. The hon. Member for Lynn told the House this evening that there are 55,000 fishermen and men connected with the fishing industry in Newfoundland. In these we possess some of the hardiest fighting material to be met with in any part of the world. Not only have we a large reserve of strength in Newfoundland, but we have also another large reserve in connection with Canada, which has something like 50,000 men also engaged in the fisheries, and the men in connection with that industry are the men we want to fill our Reserve. The man who is trained on a fishing vessel is almost as capable a man as one who is trained on a warship. Now, there is some objection made with regard to the constitution of the Reserve. It is held by some that the period of drill is too short. If we can judge from the reports as to the manner in which Naval Reserve men conducted themselves when placed on board men-of-war, we find that those men emulated their shipmates in the endeavour to perform their duties loyally and well. There is a paragraph in the Report of the Manœuvres testifying as to that. Admiral Lord Waller Kerr told me two years ago that the men we had as Naval Reserves under him in the Manœuvres had performed their duty in the most brilliant and admirable manner. He said perfectly truly that you cannot expect them to be as smart as those who have been in the Navy for several years, because that is impossible, but considering the shortness of the period during which they were under training, the men performed their work even better than they could have been expected to do. The fault is in the system. I hold that the system of drill and education adopted by the Admiralty for years and years past with regard to the training of the Reserves is nothing less than a disgrace. What do we find with respect to the system of education? Why, down to very recently, the whole of the ships on board of which these men have been trained and the whole of the guns mounted in the battery have been obsolete. Last year the right hon. Gentleman promised that there should be a change in the system of drill. I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman how many batteries—I think there are 27—of the Naval Reserve are mounted with modern guns?

The whole of the 27.

I am glad to hear it, and I must congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on his having made such a necessary change. There are one or two other points to which I should like to call the attention of the First Lord. First with regard to pensions. There is a great amount of dissatisfaction about pensions in the Reserve. With regard to the age at which a man becomes entitled to a pension—in the Navy a man is entitled to a pension at 55, but in the Reserve 60 is the pension age—I say that the age ought to be reduced from 60 to 55. I would ask how many men in the Reserve are now receiving a pension, because very few of them ever reach the age of 60 years? Hence I think the Admiralty might very well reduce the age. Then again I hold that the second-class Reserve men should also have a pension, in order to induce men of the fisherman class to join. The pension in their case should not be less than £10 a year. Another grievance is as to the kit. Of the men who would have to serve on a man-of-war in an emergency, the Reserve men would only receive £3 10s. each. The cost of a kit is £10 a man. Now the meaning of this is that the first-class Reserve man would have to work 84 days and the second-class man 104 days for nothing. That is a real grievance, which I think the Admiralty would do wisely in remedying at once. I think it ought to be altered, in justice to these men and their wives and families.

As some hours have already been devoted to this question, I will not detain the House long, but perhaps I may be permitted to say a few words. In common with everyone interested in the subject, I was extremely pleased that the right hon. Gentleman took up the question of the Reserves last year. I should like to point out that the real question of a Naval Reserve has yet to be grappled with; as yet, the fringe of it has barely been properly touched upon. The question is surely one of vast importance, and I trust that my right hon. Friend, who takes such a great interest in the profession over which he presides, will do well still more to add to his already great distinction by initiating a policy by means of which we shall see a really adequate Reserve established. After all, it will be a great and noble ideal to place before the country, that every man shall be trained in some way or other to use modern weapons in defence of his country whenever called upon. I am persuaded that under modern conditions of social life, whether it be for the Army or the Navy, we must ultimately depend upon a very large Reserve. I am entirely in agreement with my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for York that we cannot expect the country in times of peace to undertake the burden of maintaining a much larger active list than we now have; but we must bear in mind that there is still the necessity of our having the means to enable us to expand our fleet on an emergency. We can only do this by means of a large Reserve. What particular course should be taken with this object I will not discuss now. I have recommended for the last few years—and I know that the hon. Members for York and the Forest of Dean are with me in this—that the experiment of short, instead of long, service on training ships should be tried. My hon. Friend has not got practical experience of these matters, and I should like to tell him the result, at any rate, of my experience as to training ships, both for boys and for officers. I was delighted when the predecessor of the right hon. Gentleman instituted the system of trying to get boys at a later age and training them for a shorter period. I hope that system will be extended and developed. I can assure my right hon. Friend—and I do not think there is any man who has a professional and intimate knowledge of the question who will deny it—that a long period of training in the training ships is a mistake and time thrown away. It is far better to have simply a short period just to accustom the lads to ship life and then to let them pass into the regular Service. That has been my experience, whether for officers or men, and nothing disappointed me more when I was serving than the sad and melancholy want of knowledge, energy, and activity which the youngsters coming from the training-ships showed when they entered the general Service. So far from recommending my right hon. Friend at the head of the Admiralty to accept the view of my hon. Friend the Member for King's Lynn, I can assure him I at least would support the direction which his policy has taken of recent years—namely, that of raising the age and keeping them a shorter time in the training ships. These are the only two questions upon which I wish to address the House. The second one upon which I have spoken is not, in my opinion, of vast importance; the policy is settled. The other one—the question of the Reserves—is of huge importance: the policy is not settled; the policy has not yet been grappled with. It has yet got to be faced; and I do hope my right hon. Friend, who takes so keen and lively an interest in the great profession over which he presides with such great distinction, will add a further distinction to his term of office by initiating a policy which will establish a truly adequate Reserve.

Mr. Speaker, I have a very few words I wish to address to the House on the question of the Royal Naval Reserve. It was my honour and pleasure to address this House on a similar subject last year, and I do not find in the Naval Estimates this year that there has been any appreciable increase in the Royal Naval Reserve. I find only an increase of 600 men. When we consider that we spend annually on the Army Reserve nearly two millions of money, and that we only spend £257,000 on the Naval Reserve, I think it is very disproportionate. There is only an increase of £7,000 since last year. I am told by my hon. and gallant Friend on my left that further inducements have been given to fishermen, and that a large number of them are at present joining the Naval Reserve. But our Naval Reserve compares very unfavourably with that of foreign countries. In France, I understand, they could, if necessity arose, have an effective Reserve of 50,000 or 60,000 men at practically a minute's notice. On the other hand, we have only a Reserve of 25,000 men. We have, I know, a long service system, and France has, comparatively speaking, a short service system, but I find that we have 6,000 trained sailors leaving the Fleet annually, of whom 1,300 or so—or about one-fourth—join the Reserve. Is there no system that can be devised to induce more men than these to join the Reserve, as these men are all competent and well-trained sailors, and would be very useful in an emergency? We know the terrible casualties that would occur if the English Fleet went into action, even if we were victorious, as I trust we should be, and I cannot help saying that it would be a wise scheme of the Government to adopt the suggestion I threw out last year. Why could we not have some reserve of sailors in Canada? There are 50,000 or 60,000 fishermen there, and, if we stationed a training-ship or two in Canadian waters, we could, I think, establish a strong Naval Reserve there of, say, 5,000 or 10,000 men, for an emergency. You could do the same in Australia and the other Colonies. When I was in Hong Kong I went on board our ships, and on the flagships of various other countries, and I found that, if we had a naval engagement outside Hong Kong, we should have no reserve of sailors to fill up casualties. They would have to be brought out from England. We can build ships, but what we require is a reserve of men to man them in time of need and replace the casualties of war. Nelson's victories, and Collingwood's, I read, were won, not by the ships, but by the skill and courage of the officers and men. We have now 106,000 men in the First Line, and I venture to believe that some scheme could be devised whereby we could get another 100,000 in the Reserve, instead of merely 25,000 as at present. Knowing the great danger we are in, and knowing that we may be involved in a war at any moment, we should see that we have an effective Naval Reserve. We hope the war clouds may pass away; still, who can say what the future may bring? I do not think I can conclude better than by quoting the words of Tennyson—

"We have sailed wherever ships can sail,

We have ruled o'er many a mighty State;

Pray God our greatness may not fail,

Thro' craven fear of being great."

Mr. Speaker, before I address myself to the interesting and important subject of shipbuilding, I propose to say a few words on some questions which I certainly will not call minor questions, because I think no questions are of greater interest or of greater importance than those which affect the threshold of the naval profession and the early training of both officers and men. And it is on these that I propose to detain the House for a few moments. I will not follow several of my hon. Friends on this side of the House, and on the opposite side, in the remarks they have made on the subject of manning. I think it will be far more satisfactory that these remarks should be answered by the responsible officials, who will be able to give the best information. But I think I may congratulate the Government upon the success which has attended the efforts year after year of the Admiralty to obtain the increased number of men winch has been rendered necessary by the increase in the number of ships that have been built. I have not now access to the same sources of information which were open to me some little while ago, and I am not perfectly certain as to whether the scientific proportion between the Reserves, and the number on the roll of active service, is being satisfactorily attained off not. Whereas, in the last Estimates which were presented to Parliament, a very considerable addition was proposed to the Reserve, and considerable reforms introduced in the whole system of the Royal Naval Reserve, I do not perceive in these Estimates any very considerable step in the direction of further augmenting the Royal Naval Reserve. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman has further steps in contemplation. I do not wish to be misunderstood. I am perfectly well aware that in time of war it would not be desirable to have more than a certain and limited proportion of Reserve men on Her Majesty's ships for war purposes, but at the same time we must remember that all the Reserves will not be available. We must not be so sanguine as to suppose that they will, and it may be necessary further to augment the Royal Naval Reserve. I do not know how far the investigations of the Manning Committee have been carried on under the present administration.

Regularly.

I am glad to hear that they have been regularly carried on. I do not think the right hon. Gentleman will contradict me when I say that the large additions which have been proposed to the Navy in his time will necessitate a very considerable increase in the number of men beyond the number which was contemplated when his predecessor was in office;. I have estimated, with as much care as I could, the number of men who will be required for the ships, which the right hon. Gentleman proposes to add, or has already added, to the Navy, and I have found that many thousands of men will have to be added to the number which was previously contemplated. That, of course, is liable to a deduction on account of the fact that there are always ships, from year to year, which are becoming more or less obsolete, and less and less fit to be commissioned in time of war; but, at the same time, the total number for which provision has to be made, is largely increased, and I should like to have an assurance that a due proportion is being observed between the Royal Naval Reserve and the total number engaged for active service. It is, of course, a great satisfaction to members of the late Board to learn from the right hon. Gentleman how very successful the Northampton, and the ships associated with the Northampton have been in enlisting older boys for the Navy. I entirely dissociate myself from the criticisms of the hon. Member for King's Lynn. If that hon. Gentleman's plan were adopted we should simply have to draw boys from one particular stratum—from one particular age—and the result would inevitably be to lower the standard. The Northampton and her consorts have been singularly successful in enlisting a very satisfactory class of boys, and the reports of the captains upon those boys, from the very commencement of the system, have been extremely satisfactory. I hear with great pleasure that they continue to be satisfactory, and that these boys turn out excellent seamen. I have said before in this House, in speaking on this subject, and I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will agree with me, that very great credit is due to the first captain of the Northampton for his share in the excellent training of these boys; and I think good judgment was shown in the selection of the captain, for his influence on the boys, the enthusiasm which he threw into the new system of enlistment, the immense trouble he took about it, and altogether the qualities which he brought to bear on this new experiment have, in a large measure, brought about the great success of that experiment. There is a point in the statement of the right hon. Gentleman to which I should like to call attention. I see that the right hon. Gentleman proposes to move the Agincourt from Chatham to Portland. It may seem a small change, but I hear of it with the very greatest pleasure and satisfaction. One of the unfortunate results of having to add such a very large number of boys from year to year to Her Majesty's Navy is, that after they have received the training to be obtained on the training-ships, for which the hon. Gentleman opposite has such a strong preference, after they have received that training, and after a great deal of trouble and money has been bestowed upon them, and they have been trained up in the way in which they should go, they are relegated to harbour and depôt ships, and a very great deal of good is liable to be undone thereby, especially if these ships are in the harbour of a dockyard town. I venture to express the hope that special attention will be given to finding healthy and useful occupations for these boys and to getting them to sea as often as possible, and to drafting them soon into seagoing ships. It is one of the unfortunate consequences of having to provide, in case of war, a larger navy that we can keep in commission in time of peace, that so many men and boys have to be kept in barracks and stationary ships. I rejoice to think that a step is being taken in the right direction, and I hope it will be followed up. With regard to the Naval cadets, everything I hear confirms me in the opinion I have previously laid before the House, and now express again, the opinion that a mistake, from many points of view, has been made in raising the age. It is desirable to catch these fellows young. The boys who are most satisfactory on the Britannia are those who have not been sent to crammers, and it would therefore be very much better that they should come early to the Britannia. I trust that the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty, and others who have got a voice in this matter, will keep their minds open and will not, because they have been led to consent to this experiment of raising the age in the Britannia, regard the matter as settled once and for all. If they find the change is not attended by the excellent results they anticipate, I hope they will have the courage to change their minds and revert to the system which, after all, has produced officers of whom this House and the country may well be proud, and upon whom we now rely, if, unfortunately, we should be engaged in war, to command the men we enrol for Her Majesty's service. And I have no doubt that, if we revert to the system which prevailed before the raising of the age, it will continue to produce excellent officers. The question of the further training of young officers is being inquired into by the Committee over which Admiral Tracey presides, and, perhaps, the right hon. Gentleman will inform the House what stage that inquiry has reached, and how soon we may hope to have the results. I have so far been dealing with the training of boys and Naval cadets. I wish now to say a word with respect to the Marines. On the fifth page of the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty there is an announcement to the effect that—

"Towards the end of last year the large accumulation of recruits at the Walmer Training Depôt absorbed the whole of the accommodation there, and it became necessary, without stopping recruiting, to lessen the flow of men in that direction. This was done by forwarding recruits for the Artillery to the division at Eastney, and removing from Walmer the men of that branch, already in training there, to complete their course at their own headquarters."

I know, Sir, that when the Board with which I was connected had rapidly to increase the Marines, we had to resort to exactly the same expedient, but it is a very unsatisfactory expedient. Walmer is a very satisfactory place for the training of the young; Marine; it is a place where he is exposed to remarkably few temptations, and the training system has been attended with exceedingly good results. At Eastney, and the other Marine Divisions, the conditions are not so satisfactory, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty will face the necessity of providing more accommodation at Walmer. At the same time, I cannot help thinking that, by the aid of the compulsory powers for acquiring land embodied in the first Naval Works Act, great improvements might be made at Walmer which would tend to the efficiency of the Marines and of the system of training recruits. I pass now to the subject in which the House is naturally most interested, and I confess that, although I came down to the House intending to say a good deal about the delay and disappointment in the shipbuilding programme announced last Session, the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty, by the frankness of his admissions, both in his statement and in his speech to-day, and also by the frankness with which he has apologised and expressed his deep regrets at the delay, has disarmed me so that I shall not go into detail so much as I had intended. But delay is written large over all the Estimates which have been presented to the House. The expenditure on new construction alone is less by the enormous sum of £2,270,000 than the Estimates which were presented to Parliament and the grants which Parliament made for what was regarded as necessary for construction. The House must remember that the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty took the exceptional course of coming down to Parliament in July and asking for a Supplementary Estimate of £500,000, £400,000 of which was to be spent on new construction. There are three causes and three categories of failure to spend the money voted by Parliament. First of all there is the engineers' dispute. I do not propose to say anything on that point because I know there are Members who will deal with that subject, and will discuss the attitude of the Government towards the parties in the dispute and the responsibility of the Admiralty for the delay in the building of these ships. There is a second cause of delay which she right hon. Gentleman included in his statement, and which he has again placed before the House in his speech—I mean the delay due to the retarded designs of several ships. These ships were not proceeded with in consequence of the delay in experiments with new guns. I think the House will be of opinion that it was quite essential that the newest guns should be put into the newest ships, and I can quite understand that the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty was right in delaying the ships when he found it was impossible to send out the designs to the contractors without arming them with old guns rather than with new ones. What I cannot understand, however, is why the right hon. Gentleman was without that information in July; nor how he did not then understand that there must be delay in producing the designs when the type of gun was not settled. I trust some further information will be given on that subject. In his speech to-day the right hon. Gentleman spoke of the delay as due mainly to the contract ships, but an examination of the figures shows that that is not the case.

The delay on the Ocean, the Canopus, and the Goliath was caused by the contractors not having furnished stern-posts and other parts of the ship.

I quite understand that, but I think the right hon. Gentleman unintentionally misled the House into thinking that the delay was mainly in the contract ships, and that there had not been as great delay in the dockyard ships. But, Sir, I find that there has been greater delay with the six dockyard battleships than upon the contract ships. The delay upon the contract battleships is represented by a nett short expenditure of £214,000 as against £482,000 on the dockyard ships. I do not wish to labour that point, but I think it is necessary the House should be put in possession of the facts, and should know that, as a rule, dockyard ships are quite as dependent on the performance of contract as are contract ships. The third category of delay is to be found in the short expenditure on naval works. Rather less than a million has been expended on the Naval works under the Act, whereas the Estimate for the year was no less than £2,700,000. We know the very serious nature of the delays at Gibraltar as to the dockyard, and the new docks, and in the extension works at Hong Kong, owing in large part to the difficulty of obtaining War Office land. I think the right hon. Gentleman will agree with me that it will be necessary that we should be furnished at an early date with a detailed account.