complained of the want of system and lack of geographical knowledge displayed by the Local Government Board for Ireland in the framing of some of their Provisional Orders in connection with the relations between county councils and urban district councils. In the present Bill the urban district councils of Dundalk, Sligo, and Tralee were made to contribute towards the salaries of the county surveyor and the secretary to the county council, whereas the urban district council of Enniskillen was exempted from such contribution. These councils had their own surveyors and clerks, who performed within their own districts the duties which were carried out in the county by the county officials. He could not, therefore, see why this contribution should be enforced. There was a point of principle involved in this matter, and if the promoters of the Bill considered that principle a correct one, it should be applied as far as possible in all cases.

speaking as Chairman of the Committee which had had under consideration the Bill before the House, said that only one part of the measure—that dealing with the borough of Dundalk—was opposed in Committee. So far as Dundalk was concerned, the Committee heard all parties, and had reported the result of their deliberations to the House.

did not agree with the view that the urban district councils should not contribute towards these salaries, because some of the county officials certainly did discharge duties in connection with the urban districts. The Bill should be allowed to pass, as it merely enforced the uniform practice which had been adopted for some time past.

said the slightest consideration of the question would have led the hon. Member to see that absolute uniformity in this matter was altogether impossible. Under the Local Government Act the Local Government Board, if the local authorities applied to them, were bound to adjust the financial relations between urban or rural district councils and county councils, and until the burdens were uniform the adjustments could not be uniform. In some cases the county surveyor discharged much more important duties for the urban district than in others. If the county court house and other public buildings were within a particular urban district, and the urban district council had the use of those buildings, it was quite obvious that the county official who had charge of them and looked after the maintenance and repairs discharged duties in which the urban district council was directly interested, and in regard to which it was right and just that it should contribute to the official's salary. The secretary to the county council also discharged duties in which the urban district council were concerned. In the case of Dundalk the urban district council was made to contribute to the salaries of both the county surveyor and the county secretary; in the case of Enniskillen, a contribution was made only to the salary of the county surveyor; while in the case of Tralee again, the urban district council had to contribute to the salaries of both officers. These conclusions had been arrived at by the Local Government Board after due consideration of the respective burdens and liabilities of the particular councils. It was perfectly impossible to have one uniform system to apply to all cases, because the circumstances varied. He hoped the Bill would be allowed to pass, as the Orders could not be modified, and the only result of the opposition, if successful, would be to prevent the carrying out of the object of the Orders.

asked on what grounds Enniskillen should be expected to pay any part of the salary of the county surveyor. The urban district council had its own surveyor, whom they paid for doing their work, entirely independently of the county council; therefore it ought not to be called upon to pay for the services of the county surveyor, who never did a pennyworth of work for the district from one year's end to another. The same remark applied in practically the same degree to the county council secretary. His objection was rather that Enniskillen did not get enough out of the transaction in connection with this readjustment of rates. The urban district council paid £600 or £700 per annum for main roads and so on, but they had also at the same time to pay for the making of their own roads, many of which were main roads equally with the others. In fact, Enniskillen considered that it had been treated exceedingly unfairly, but it was willing to accept the arrangement.

objected to the Local Government Board promoting Bills which gave to particular townships exemptions which were denied to other townships. There was already quite enough confusion with regard to the Orders made by the Local Government Board, and the right hon. Gentleman must be aware that the Orders issued by the Board in connection with the urban and rural district councils had led to the greatest possible amount of confusion.

could not agree with the claim of Enniskillen to this special exemption. Part of the county surveyor's duty was to attend to the county buildings, the court houses, and so on, and surely the rich merchants of the towns ought to contribute towards the salaries of such officials. He was not in favour of the burden being shifted from the shopkeeper to the tenant-farmer, as the former were well able to pay for their own roads, and to contribute towards the expenses of county management.

admitted that the hon. Member for South Fermanagh was a thoroughly good representative of his district, but, at the same time, such towns as Enniskillen would be in a sorry plight were it not for the support of the country districts. When, therefore, it came to the paltry question of contributing to the salary of the county surveyor, such towns must take a very narrow view of the matter if they begrudged having to bear their share.

said he was a member of the Enniskillen Rural District Council, but he certainly protested against the preferential treatment which had been accorded to Enniskillen in this case. The present arrangement was very unfair.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes, 178; Noes, 70. (Division List No. 313.)

Bill read the third time and passed.

Colwyn Bay and Colwyn Urban District Gas Bill

Petersfield and Selsey Gas Bill

Lords Amendments considered, and agreed to.

FAVERSHAM WATER BILL [Lords]

As amended, considered; an Amendment made; Bill to be read the third time.

DOVER HARBOUR BILL [Lords]

HARROGATE CORPORATION BILL [Lords]

HARROGATE WATER BILL [Lords]

RIPON CORPORATION BILL [Lords].

STRATTON AND BUDE IMPROVEMENT BILL [Lords].

Read a second time, and committed.

^* said he rose for the purpose of calling attention to the state of the fleet in the Mediterranean. He was aware that by the rules of the House and the limits of the Chairman's discretion he was precluded from referring to certain matters germane to the subject which he wished to bring before the Committee. It seemed to him that that was the best occasion upon which, he could bring up the matter. It had recently become inevitable that a debate upon it must take place, and within the last few days it was manifest that public interest had been aroused to such a point that some discussion must take place in that House. It became a question as to how best that could be done. He knew there was a feeling in some quarters that it could be best done by moving the adjournment of the House; but it seemed to him, for several reasons, that that was an undesirable course. In the first place, he knew that a debate on the motion for the adjournment of the House was apt to become rather heated and of an acrimonious nature; and, in the second place, there was great risk and probability that a motion of that kind would come from some avowed opponent of the Government, and, if so, the matter would at once degenerate into a question of party conflict. It was most desirable that they should avoid that. In the third place, such a motion might have raised issues which might have been injurious both to the Government and to the country, and although it would not be unpleasant to certain sections of the House if they were disagreeable to the Government, it would be extremely repugnant to patriotic Members of the House that a debate should arise which would be injurious to the interests of the country. If the Committee would allow him one word of personal explanation, he should like to point out that he had no motive whatever in the direction of stifling discussion. He had the honour to represent Portsmouth. He might be an extremely stupid person, but he was not stupid enough to desire to do anything which would preclude discussion of a matter of that importance, seeing that a great number of his constituents were naval men, and were not likely to appreciate an attempt to protect Government from discussion, and that a large number of his constituents were men employed in the dockyard. If he consulted his own personal interests only, it would serve him best to urge the Government to continue to increase their supply of materials of all kinds in the dockyards in such a manner and to such an extent that the dockyards would be full of employment between now and the General Election. He at once repudiated that he had any desire to stifle discussion. What he was doing was to bring forward in no hostile spirit an inquiry for information and explanation. He was asking the representative of the Admiralty to make such a statement as would, as far as possible, satisfy their minds as to recent allegations which had been put forward, and to allay as quickly as possible and as much as possible the idea that there was any cause for the agitation or alarm which might be disturbing the public mind. The other day he had read a paper in the National Review as to the state of the fleet in the Mediterranean.

^* , on a point of order, asked whether the question of the Mediterranean Fleet, so far as ships were concerned, was not a question that could be discussed on the Shipbuilding Vote. He wanted to know exactly where the Committee was. In 1899, when this question was raised, the Chairman had ruled that on the Vote for the First Lord of the Admiralty's salary no question could be raised which could be dealt with under a particular Vote. He wished to ask whether this question, which his hon. friend proposed to raise, should not be brought up on the Shipbuilding Vote.

^* : My difficulty is that I have not yet heard what the hon. Member is going to say. If he is going to say that there are not enough ships in His Majesty's Navy, and that the shipbuilding programme ought to be enlarged, that would not be in order on this Vote; but if the hon. Member is going to say that the strength of the Mediterranean Fleet is not sufficient at the present time, and ought to be reinforced by bringing squadrons from other parts of the world, that is a question clearly of policy, and may be discussed under this Vote.

^* said he could assure the hon. and gallant Gentleman that it was a question of policy and not a question of shipbuilding which he was thinking of. His point was this, that supposing he had an opportunity of raising all the issues raised in that article to which he had referred, what would be the result? The next morning every Chancellory in Europe and every General Staff would be in possession of this country's secrets. All that foreign countries would have to do would be to get a file of The Times , and there would be little left to be communicated to them. It was not necessary to demand of the Government such far-reaching information as a full debate like that would naturally involve. It was the right and duty of every patriotic man to keep a watchful eye on public affairs in all parts of the world, and he was sure the Secretary to the Admiralty would not resent the spirit in which he ventured to bring up the question, and he hoped that the Committee would have a full statement from the Secretary to the Admiralty which would be satisfactory. The most patriotic man in the world, with the best of intentions, might act on impulse, and he did not think the country would derive any benefit from a patriot in a panic. He protested against undue demands on the Government in matters like this. He did not profess to speak as a naval expert, and he did not know whether he would be in order in making a retrospect of our position in the Mediterranean. He did not wish, however, to get away from the point which led him to bring this question before the House—namely, the state of our fleet in the Mediterranean. He held no brief for the Admiralty. It was his intention to try and elicit from them some statement showing that they were carefully watching the interests they all had at heart. In this world, in public matters as in private, they must trust somebody. In this case whom did they trust? In the first place, they had a distinguished admiral in command of the Fleet who enjoyed the thorough confidence of the British public. In the second place, they had the admiral second in command, who was well known and popular in this country. He believed he was trusted, and he thought he might safely say that, knowing him as they did, the noble Lord the second in command was not likely to carry the principle of silence and the repression of the truth to any undue extent. Then they had the Board of Admiralty, including the Naval Lords. He had not yet heard any adverse criticism of them. And then they had the Government. They had these four powers to fall back upon, and until they learnt that these authorities were unable to agree, and until they learnt that any section of them were dissatisfied, it was premature for them to declare that the case was bad. The country would take care that no admiral who threw up his command because of what he regarded as an unsatisfactory state of things would suffer in his professional career or in the public estimation. He desired to speak with the fullest gravity upon the subject, knowing as he did the serious position, and how seriously it was taken in the country. His position was that he did not take it for granted that the Government had failed, and he did not desire to associate himself with any attack upon the Government until they had some reasonable grounds for believing that the time for such an attack had come. If the Government neglected any warning, if they were wilfully blind to facts, and as a result were to put the country in peril which might end in disaster, then they would rightly earn undying execration, and those who supported them would remember their conduct with undying shame. He hesitated to charge the Government with such neglect, and he asked the Secretary to the Admiralty now to give the House such information as would convince them that they were doing everything that was humanly possible to safeguard the interests of the country. In anticipation of such a statement he would not move his motion, which was to reduce the salary of the First Lord of the Admiralty by £100.

^* said that he was glad that the hon. Member had not moved the reduction of the Vote, because it left it open to some hon. Member whose heart was more in the matter to do so. The hon. Gentleman's speech had hardly justified the motion he had placed on the Paper, and the hon. Gentleman had evidently seen that himself. The hon. Member for Chester, or some other hon. Member, was likely to make a similar motion, and he rose at that moment because he would rather speak before any motion was made. As had been shown by the question of the hon. and gallant Member for Yarmouth and the ruling of the Chairman, they could not discuss anything arising out of the shipbuilding; or armaments Votes, although every one of these subjects was a ground for an attack upon the Government. There were, however, a few matters which grew out of the speech of the hon. Gentleman which were deserving of the attention of the Committee from the point of view of those who, like himself, were not the opponents, but rather the supporters of the Admiralty. The hon. Member for Portsmouth had told the Committee that a motion for the adjournment of the House, which he took steps to prevent, would not have been the best occasion—to use his own words—for discussing the peculiar position of the Mediterranean Fleet. But if it was necessary to discuss that, it could only be done upon some such motion. It could not be discussed on any of these particular Votes, and therefore the hon. Gentleman's motion burked debate and prevented a general discussion. He wished to speak with all possible courtesy; but, although the hon. Gentleman said that that would not have been the best possible occasion for discussing the whole question, it would have been the only occasion to do so. A very large portion of the question could be discussed on the Shipbuilding Vote, but the matter as a whole could not be discussed on that Vote.

Then as to giving information to foreign Governments, he knew something of that matter. He himself had been frequently asked, and had acceded to requests, in a previous Parliament—he was not referring to the present representative of the Admiralty—not to raise certain subjects, but he had always been able to point out to the Admiralty that the facts to which he desired to call attention were perfectly well known to foreign Governments. There was an amusing example of that the other day. A question was put down with notice which arose out of letters and articles which had been published about the Mediterranean Fleet. That question was not asked, and he had no doubt it was not asked because it was held to refer to secrets which ought not to be brought to the knowledge of foreign Powers. A precisely similar question of his, a few years ago, was not asked, although he showed the Admiralty that all the facts were to be found in the accounts of the Ordnance Factory Department, which were known to every foreign Power, though the House of Commons was too apt to forget them. Secrecy could not be observed in such matters. Any hon. Member who was interested in shipbuilding and naval construction could, by looking through the Italian Annual, or the French Annual, or Jane's book, or Lord Brassey's Annual, know all the essential facts. France, which was supposed to be a naval rival, and had a magnificent fleet, standing next to that of England, made no such attempt at concealment, and they had with reference to the French Navy the very facts which the hon. Gen- tleman deprecated discussing. The hon. Member for Portsmouth alluded to the recent agitation, to which he appeared to attach some importance. He said it had caused doubt in the public mind, and that it was necessary that that doubt should be removed, although the Government would have difficulty in doing that to-day on account of the rules of order. Personally, he was a little inclined to take the view that that particular agitation was not, perhaps, thoroughly well founded, but he was most strongly of opinion that there were grounds for anxiety in the public mind, as they would be able to prove on the shipbuilding and some of the other Votes. He therefore did not take the view which many hon. Members on his own side took, and which he was sure would be expressed in the course of the debate, that the agitation was mischievous, because he believed it would have the effect of directing the public mind to the particular points which were most deserving of the attention of the country; and although a specific statement might be fairly satisfactorily met by a specific answer, yet the shipbuilding proposals would be clearer to the country after that agitation than before it. The hon. Member opposite invited a statement from the Admiralty to allay the agitation, and in connection with it he alluded to something which had reached him with regard to the opinion of the admiral in command of the Mediterranean Fleet, and notably of the opinion of the second in command.

^* said that he said nothing at all about the opinion of the admiral in command.

^* said it was not material to his point, but he understood the hon. Member before he referred to the second in command to allude to the admiral in command. Of course they all knew that, although in theory a general or an admiral in high command did not express his views, still, unfortunately perhaps, the rule was more honoured in the breach than in the observance. There had been some remarkable cases in connection with the war in South Africa. It was no secret that not only the admiral second in command, but all the officers of the Mediterranean Fleet, from the admiral in command down to the officer of the lowest rank, were distressed at the pre- sent time with regard to certain points which had been raised in the course of the recent agitation. Of that there could be no doubt. The Government themselves admitted the other day the shortness of the Mediterranean Fleet in destroyers, clearly showing that the admiral in command had reported to that effect, and that the Admiralty were trying to meet his views. The hon. Member spoke of the possibility of some of these distinguished officers being led to take an extreme course, and he asked whether there were any grounds for an attack on the Government. The ground for attack on the Government, which, however, they could not discuss on that Vote or on any other Vote, as the hon. and gallant Member for Yarmouth well knew, was the policy of the Government, which included large expenditure on defensive military forces at home. Every officer in the Fleet held and freely expressed the opinion that money was being sacrificed at home on military expenditure which could not be spent in the present state of the public finances except at the expense of the Fleet. He entirely associated himself with that opinion. It was not, however, an Admiralty question. It was very difficult for the Admiralty to make their views prevail in the Cabinet. Even the late First Lord of the Admiralty, who was a very strong First Lord, and who expressed in debate his opinion of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet with a freedom which left nothing to be desired, did not always get his own way in the Cabinet. The real ground for attack on the Government was their defensive policy as a whole; but that subject, which was of stupendous importance, and which was perhaps the most important subject on which the House of Commons could spend its time, could not be discussed to-day. On the Shipbuilding Vote on Friday, however, they would be able to discuss a material part of that subject, though not with the fulness and freedom which the House of Commons and the country desired. He earnestly hoped that on Friday they would discuss the general question of shipbuilding, and not spend their time on some particular detail. It was not the fault of the Government, it was not the fault of anyone, that on the last occasion when the Shipbuilding Vote was dis- cussed they did not have a general statement. He knew there were reasons for not giving the statement, and the whole evening was spent in discussing a very interesting motion in reference to the Royal yacht, which did to some extent concern the stability of ships in the Navy, but still it was a detail, and he hoped that a similar discussion would not recur on Friday. On the question of the statement on the Shipbuilding Vote, they were told it was to be made in the House of Lords to-morrow. He did not know whether that was a fixed engagement or not. Of course the House of Commons, and especially the Committee of Supply, was jealous of information being first given in another place. He believed it was not in the power of the Government on the last occasion when the Shipbuilding Vote came on to make the full statement that was generally made in reference to construction, so far as new facts had arisen since the February or March discussion. He believed the Government were not then ready, but they were ready now, and he could not but think that it would be better that that statement should be made in the House of Commons on Friday in the manner uniformly observed during the tenure of office of the late First Lord of the Admiralty.

That is the usual practice, and it will be adhered to in this case. The statement will be freshly made in this House.

^* said the hon. Member for Portsmouth did not specify the particular points on which he desired the Government to allay his alarm. It was, of course, difficult to do so, as a discussion of them would not be order, and he did not know whether even a mere catalogue of the points would be in order. A statement had been made by the Government themselves with reference to the shortness of the Mediterranean Fleet in destroyers, which no doubt the Government were trying to meet. The question of progress with regard to destroyers and cruisers as compared with that of other Powers would, of course, be in order on Friday next. Another question which would be in order on Friday was the question of fleet auxiliaries. It had been suggested that the Government should purchase fleet auxiliaries ready made, but his own opinion was that they would have to be built. The fighting capacity of our ships as compared with foreign ships in ammunition hoists and other matters of that kind would also be in order on Friday, but many other matters to which at least equal importance was attached would not be in order, but would be in order on the Ordnance Vote, such as armour-piercing projectiles, black powder, and so forth. What was in order to-day was the distribution of the Fleet. With reference to that, he had no doubt that the Admiralty would repeat what had often been alleged by Mr. Goschen when he was at the Admiralty, that the Mediterranean Fleet could not be treated by itself, and that the Channel Fleet could be considered as part of it. That brought up the question, which could only be effectually discussed on the Shipbuilding Vote, as to the adequacy of the Navy. They had been told by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in a famous speech that they would have to add 50 per cent. to the Naval Estimates unless they were allied with some military Power, but the right hon. Gentleman made another speech in which he advocated isolation without any entangling alliances whatever. That pointed to an increase in the standard of the Fleet, but that increase was absolutely impossible as long as the present military expenditure on defensive forces at home continued. The two policies were inconsistent, and the country would be alarmed at the amount of taxation and expenditure that would be involved; and they would continue to potter on as at present, spending a certain amount on the Army and the Navy without any general consideration of the questions which lay at the root of the matter. The Government had stated that they were going to increase the number of destroyers in the Mediterranean as soon as possible. He should like the Secretary to the Admiralty to state whether it was contemplated to increase the force of destroyers in the Mediterranean by withdrawals from home or other stations, or whether they proposed an increase in the whole force of destroyers. On the Shipbuilding Vote they would be able to show how little progress we had made as compared with other Powers in the building of destroyers. He did not know whether the Admiralty were in a position to supply the destroyers or cruisers required. As regards destroyers, he believed it was a matter of building; as regards cruisers, a matter of withdrawals. We had not made satisfactory progress in this matter; we had not quite held our own in recent years. Mr. (now Lord) Goschen, in 1897, made a speech in which he drew a most favourable picture of our position. He related at length the superiority of our own ships, class by class, as compared with the ships of foreign Powers, and showed that, putting the Mediterranean and Channel Fleets together, we had a fleet at that time which could not be rivalled by any Powers—certainly not by any possible combination of two Powers. He was bound to say, however, that what was true in 1897 could no longer be alleged in regard to our present position in the Mediterranean. That was ground for alarm. He was one of those who believed that the question of the command of the sea could not be considered in relation to one particular sea, but must be considered as a whole. The country did not realise, as did the naval authorities, that the command of the sea depended on our entire strength rather than on our strength at a particular spot. This was largely a question to be raised on the Shipbuilding Vote, and on Friday they would probably have a more useful discussion. The real question of policy now before them was whether our present standard was sufficient, and whether it was possible to improve that standard without trenching upon the vast and, he thought, useless expenditure upon defensive military forces.

said his hon. friend the Secretary to the Admiralty had formerly stated that nothing was ever got out of the Admiralty without an agitation. In this case he welcomed the agitation as to the position of our Mediterranean Fleet, because behind that question was the far greater one of the relative positions of the Navy and Army in the defence of the country. That was the point now being discussed by the whole country. He had two questions on matters of policy which he wished to address to the Secretary to the Admiralty. The first, which had been alluded to by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Forest of Dean, was as to the strength of the Mediterranean Fleet at the present moment. He wished to know whether, under present circumstances, and considering that we had always put before us the possibility of having to face a combination of France and Russia; considering, too, that Russia at the present time had control of the Dardanelles, and had a considerable fleet in the Black Sea, numbering, he believed, ten battleships; considering, further, that France had a large fleet at Toulon, numbering, he believed, twelve or fourteen battleships, the Admiralty were of opinion that our Fleet in the Mediterranean, numbering some ten battleships, one of which was always on the repairing list, was sufficient to face a possible combination of twenty battleships? However efficient, splendidly manned, and magnificently officered were our ships—and they never were better officered and manned—he believed they were being asked to do an absolute impossibility. And if in the event of war we abandoned the Mediterranean, we might save the situation, but we should lose prestige to a certain extent. Was it the intention of the Admiralty to keep our Mediterranean Fleet so far inferior to the combined fleets of two other Powers? It was said that the Channel Squadron ought also to be included, but it would take that squadron a certain time, say three days, to get down to the Mediterranean. Were we prepared to give our adversaries three days' start? War was often sudden and accidental; if not, it was the result of long and steady preparation, and when that was the case the opportunity was generally well chosen. His hon. friend appeared to think that the interest in this question was of recent growth. That was not so. A leading article appeared in The Times of January 22 last, from which he would quote the following passage:—

"For months past we have been insisting that our war fleets are not adequately prepared and equipped for war. The facts speak for themselves. For a considerable period during the past year the complement of cruisers attached to the Mediterranean Fleet, never adequate at the best of times, was reduced to an inadequacy positively perilous, while the Channel Squadron was for a time entirely deprived of cruisers."

These facts had thus been in men's minds for a long time, and it was a realisation of them that induced him in a recent holiday in the Mediterranean to pay a visit to the fleet with a view to gaining some practical knowledge. He wished to ask whether the Mediterranean Fleet and the Channel Fleet were prepared and equipped for war, and if not whether it was the policy of the Admiralty to keep them in a condition of unpreparedness and without proper equipment. They knew that in one respect the Mediterranean Fleet was not properly equipped, they were not adequately provided with destroyers. He wished to know whether the Mediterranean Fleet at present was equipped with an adequate number of cruisers for the discharge of war duties. He was told the right proportion was five cruisers to three battleships. That might possibly be too low a proportion, but still it was the proportion, and he would again ask whether in the opinion of the Admiralty the Mediterranean Fleet was properly equipped with cruisers. The next point upon which he desired information was whether the Mediterranean Fleet was properly equipped with auxiliary ships.

said he objected very strongly to their trenching upon a discussion which could properly arise on another Vote. He submitted that the only point they would properly discuss with regard to the Mediterranean Fleet was whether or not the Admiralty were prepared to reinforce it by withdrawing ships from other stations, and whether the ships, already there were in a fit condition for war. The question of auxiliary ships arose on Section 3.

asked whether it was not in order upon this Vote to deal generally with every matter relating to the efficiency or inefficiency of the fleet.

^* : I do not think it would be convenient, or in point of fact possible, to discuss this Vote in the manner which the hon. Gentleman suggests. As soon as you begin to discuss the efficiency or the inefficiency of the Fleet, you must mention the particulars in which the Fleet is efficient or otherwise; and directly you mention the particular item you mention an item which is specially provided for in a particular Vote. With regard to the point put by the right hon. Gentleman, I am not myself able to say. I do not know whether the Admiralty have these auxiliary ships with which they could supply the Mediterranean Fleet without building or purchasing them. If it is necessary to build them, then it must come under the Shipbuilding Vote.

on a point of order, said that the allegation of the hon. Gentleman was that the Mediterranean Fleet was not adequately supplied with auxiliary ships. Was it not possible to discuss on the Shipbuilding Vote the past and present want of auxiliaries? Would it not be proper to discuss this as an exercise of the discretion of the Admiralty?

^* : With regard to the Shipbuilding Vote, hon. Members are not only entitled to discuss the future, but the failures in the past.

said the point which he wished to bring to the attention of the Committee was that the Mediterranean Fleet at the present time was not given all the auxiliary vessels necessary to make it an efficient fighting force in time of war. What he desired to know was whether it was intended to keep the fleet in that condition, or to add such auxiliary vessels to it as were necessary to make it an efficient fighting force. That fleet was, in the opinion of those well qualified to judge, not equipped with the various auxiliaries to make it an efficient fighting unit fit for war. A high authority, Sir H. Hopkins, in the Naval Annual for the present year, laid stress upon this as of paramount importance, He understood that some thing like thirty auxiliary vessels were required to make the fleet effective, and he wished to know whether the Government intended to make it effective. Another point which he desired to draw attention to was the fact, which no one could get away from, that the captains of cruisers could not learn scouting by instinct, and that they must be systematically drilled in order to learn their business. That was not his opinion—he knew nothing more of the subject than what he had read in the works of our great naval experts; it was the opinion of the great naval experts who attended the last naval manœuvres; that was the lesson which they had learnt The Boer war had taught us the value of scouting. He submitted that these were points which the Committee had a right to have explained. He had put before the Committee certain questions, fair questions, which the country was anxious to have answered. These were questions, in which the nation was vitally interested, and in order that the hon. Gentleman might have an opportunity of giving a clear answer to them he formally moved the reduction of Item A by £100.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Item A (Salaries) be reduced by £100, in respect of the Salary of the First Lord of the Admiralty.'—( Mr. Yerburgh. )

said he was not sorry the Government had taken an unusual course in setting down the Vote for this day, because it would bring to a head an agitation which had continued for some time in the country—an agitation which he did not hesitate to characterise as mischievous, and the real character of which imperatively demanded the consideration of the House. The agitation was a newspaper agitation. It took some courage to protest against the influence of the press, but its power, which had been growing in the country and the House, ought to be diminished. He was not surprised that the press, which had presumed to dictate to a particular party what its policy should be, should not hesitate to take command of the Channel Fleet, and to wrest from the control of the Admiralty the business which the Admiralty alone was qualified to conduct. But the more serious character of this journalistic agitation was the fact that the press had not hesitated to bring into the discussion the names of the highest naval authorities concerned in this question. He thought they were entitled in the course of the debate to have some statement from the representative of the Admiralty on this point. The other day a letter appeared in the newspapers from Lord Charles Beresford relating to this very matter. Was that letter published with his authority? The hon. Gentleman representing the Admiralty said it was not. Yet a week or ten days had elapsed since that letter was published, and it had not been disavowed by Lord Charles Beresford. He did not hesitate to say that if he authorised the publication of that letter he committed a breach of discipline which deserved the severe censure of the House, and proved his unfitness for serious responsibility of any kind. But to him (Mr. Robertson) it was more alarming that it had been indicated that the line taken by Lord Charles Beresford had the support of a more important person still—namely, Admiral Fisher, Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet. For his part he could not believe, knowing him as he did, that Sir John Fisher would take a line of action so inconsistent with his duty. They had learned to-day that the avowed origin of the agitation was the Navy League. The Navy League had done no good whatever in the course of its existence. It was the Navy League who told them that the Board of Admiralty was a legal fiction; which clearly proved that the Navy League did not know what the Board of Admiralty was or what a legal fiction was. The Navy League acted in that spirit, and from time to time renewed this agitation.

was sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but he reminded him that he had quoted from an article which appeared in The Times on 22nd January last. He might look on The Times as leading the agitation.

said he was aware that The Times had expressed that view, but the Navy League and Mr. Arnold White were the sources of the present movement. The Navy League in a memorandum published in The Times a week ago went into specific details he would not quote now, and since then an article by Mr. Arnold White had appeared in the National Review; and the hon. Member could perhaps explain how it was that the memorandum of the Navy League was corroborated in so great a manner by the article of Mr. Arnold White. It was astounding that, literatim et verbatim , the statements of the Navy League were contained in Mr. Arnold White's article. Who was the author? Was it Mr. Arnold White? He professed to speak on his own responsibility, but the Navy League made these statements as if they were founded on independent information.

pointed out that Mr. Arnold White was a member of the executive committee of the Navy League, and therefore any memorandum issued by the League would naturally go before him.

I did not know that Mr. Arnold White was a member of the Navy League. But here comes the most serious point in this matter. Mr. Arnold White has been spending some time as the guest of one of the officers of the Mediterranean Fleet. He comes back to this country, and a day or two ago this gentleman—who appears to be a journalist, judging by his style—says— represented as saying through this gentleman is that there is a deficiency in all classes of vessels in the Mediterranean Fleet, from battleships down to torpedo-boat destroyers, and that—

Now let me point out to the Committee what all this comes to. There are two separate sets of questions involved in these attacks. One touches the general principles governing the distribution of the fleet, and it appears to me, from what I have read in the organs of this agitation, that the conception on which the agitation is founded is this, namely, that wherever, in time of peace, there is a fragment of the fleet of any other Power, you must have in the immediate neighbourhood an equivalent, or more than an equivalent, portion of the British Fleet. I have for many years sat at the feet of the hon. and gallant Member for Great Yarmouth in matters of this sort, and I would ask him, if he speaks in this debate, to deal with that point, because it appears to me that the fundamental assumption upon which the whole of this agitation is based is the negation of all the ascertained principles of naval strategy. It appears to me to ignore these two essential things—the unity of the British Fleet and the unity of the ocean. There is only one fleet; there is only one ocean. The idea of separating the navies of the world in time of peace, and saying that wherever you may see ships, not of an enemy, but of a friend, you must have in close proximity thereto ships in equal or greater number!

The second of the matters involved in these attacks is the question of accessories, including gyroscopes. I should be the last to speak disrespectfully of the gyroscope, but on the whole question of accessories I confess I do not see how it can profitably be discussed on this Vote. The provision of accessories belongs to Votes other than that now before the Committee. If there is any want in the Mediterranean Fleet or any other portion of the Navy in this respect, we are entitled to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty to give the matter his full consideration, as I am sure he will. I therefore do not see that there is much to be gained from this somewhat irregular debate, beyond the exposure of the mischievous and hollow character of a great deal of the agitation.

But there are two general points involved about which I should like to say a word before I sit down. There is the question of administration. The motion which has been made to-day, the speeches which have been delivered, and the articles which have been written outside, do touch a most important question relating to the control of this House over Departments, especially the Admiralty. I am one of those who think that this House is gradually losing its proper control over Departments. I bitterly and deeply regret that, in spite of repeated Reports from the Public Accounts Committee raising questions of maladministration, nothing beyond the Report of the Committee takes place. We are denied all opportunity of inquiring further into the matter and of fixing the responsibility upon those who are really guilty. I am all for increasing the control of this House over the Departments, but I am also of opinion that beyond assenting, as it must assent, to the proposals made by the Department in general terms, it can do little more than attempt to ascertain whether the proposals have been carried into effect. Any attempt on the part of Members of this House to give a line of direction to a body such as the Admiralty appears to me to be utterly futile. The Admiralty is there for the express purpose of deciding, with full knowledge, such questions as those which are raised to-day. How can any of us accept the responsibility of dictating, to those who must consider these matters with more information than we can provide, the line of conduct they ought to pursue? Above all, on the supreme question of the distribution of the British Fleet, for us here and now to take upon ourselves to dictate the constitution of any portion of the Fleet appears to me to be an utter absurdity, and, as far as I am concerned, although inviting party advantages have been suggested as arising out of this debate, I decline to look at any party advantages which involve such a complete reversal of proper departmental responsibility.

The other general question is a financial one. I agree with what has been said on this point. You cannot go on spending money on the Army as you are doing if you intend to make such demands as are really being made to-day. The ultimate, if not the direct, effect of this demand would be not merely the strengthening of the Mediterranean Fleet, but an increase of all the Navy Estimates. Apart from Army questions, is this a time when any Government can, unless as the result of direct necessity, ask us to expend any more even on the Mediterranean Fleet? I am not going into that matter now, but I should like to take this opportunity of making a correction as to our present expenditure. On the last occasion when these matters were discussed I showed that, taking the expenditure as a test of the performance of our duty, there had been a gradual predominance on the part of this country as against not only any other two Powers, but against three. Neglecting the two Powers standard, which I for one have never admitted as the limit, I showed that we had been gradually forging ahead of Germany, Russia, or France. I had not the figures on that occasion, but I have them now, and I find that the combined French, German, and Russian estimates for the present year amount to just about the total of our own naval expenditure, including the expenditure on naval works. Our expenditure, including that on naval works, will this year be about £22,000,000, while the total expenditure of France, Germany, and Russia will be about £32,600,000.

Are those the final figures?

Yes; they have no Naval Works Bill I understand.

But are there not supplementary Budgets?

The figures are given as the Naval Estimates for 1901, and the Supplementary Budget is often smaller than the original. At all events, they show a considerable increase on the previous year, which is fully met by the increase in our own expenditure. I mention that only to enforce my statement that this is not a time when any Government can come to this House and ask for a further increase in this enormous expenditure on the Navy. If there is a necessity for it we must know it. No such necessity has yet, in my opinion, been proved, and I do not see that the result of this debate will be to further the cause of those who are merely clamouring for the expenditure of more money. As I have had somewhat of a feud with the Navy League, Mr. Arnold White, and the agitators who have been engaged in promoting this scare, I should like to sit down with a word of peace, and that is that I do entirely concur with them as to the supreme unwisdom of wasting money—or I will not say "wasting," but of spending money to the amount we are now spending on the Army, so long as a single want of the Navy remains unsupplied. My position in the matter has throughout been that we ought to have a fixed sum per annum as the limit of our total naval and military expenditure; that we should deduct from that sum all that, is wanted for the Navy, and that only the balance should go to the Army. That being so, I think I have no alternative, much as I regret it, but to give the first vote I have given in this Parliament in support of His Majesty's Government on this Vote.

said that to his mind the procedure of this House rendered it impossible to deal with the main question which underlay the reasons for the reduction which had been moved. It was quite obvious that the reasons for the subject coming before the House at all was the appearance of articles in magazines and in the daily press. He wished to enter his very humble, but very earnest, protest against this House taking to itself the function of dealing with the distribution of the naval forces of this country, for he thought that was entirely beyond its power and capacity. If they analysed the speeches which had been delivered, it would be found that the reduction in the Vote had been moved because certain newspapers, certain magazines, and certain gentlemen considered the Mediterranean Fleet too weak. Putting aside the difficulties of procedure his objection had been very fully stated by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Forest of Dean, who had laid it down very clearly that they could not discuss the relative strength of any particular Fleet, and, as the late Civil Lord of the Admiralty pointed out, the question of the relative strength in any particular sea was a question of the whole naval power of one country against the whole naval power of another. He could not but view with alarm the tendency of imagining that a few weeks or a few days with the Mediterranean Fleet made anybody competent to determine all the great issues involved in the disposition of the naval forces. What did it mean? It meant one of two things. It meant either that the Admiralty and the Naval Lords did not know their business and that they had to go to the man in the street to be taught it, or it meant that they had not ships enough. The real question was the relative standard by which they were to regulate necessary relative power. That was a question, however, which they could not raise on this Vote. They could not raise the question of whether the two-Power scale was sufficient for their requirements. That was the standard by which they regulated their naval expenditure, and this House and the country had come to the conclusion that if Great Britain had a Fleet equal to that of any two foreign Powers she would have reached a fair margin of safety. That was a doctrine against which he had from the very first protested. It was a doctrine which was unscientific, unreal, and utterly unsound. What they had done was this. They had accepted this standard both in the House and the country, and, under those circumstances, the real question was that if hon. Members thought that the Fleet was not strong enough, their aim and efforts should be directed against adhering longer to this two-Power standard, for, if not, they would have to be satisfied with the power that had been given to them by that standard. Therefore the issue now before them was simply the distribution of the power which they had attained under that standard. Was this House going to take upon itself the responsibility of regulating the distribution of the ships? He distinctly protested against any attempt on the part of the House of Commons to interfere with so important a question, with which it was utterly incompetent to deal. He congratulated the hon. Member for Chester upon having put the case of the papers and the magazines in the way he had done. The hon. Member had stated that Russia had so many ships in the Black Sea, and that Russia had practically the control of the Dardanelles. He had pointed out that France had a large fleet at Toulon, numbering between twelve and fourteen battleships, and that the British fleet in the Mediterranean only numbered some ten battleships. The hon. Member adds the French and the Russian ships together and he asked the House to make a certain alteration in the redistribution of the ships upon those facts. He had also reminded them that, although the Channel Fleet was practically part of the Mediterranean Fleet, it would take the Channel Squadron three days to get to the Mediterranean, and this would give their adversaries three days start. He wished to ask the hon. Member for Chester if he had taken into consideration the political and other difficulties in the way of effecting a combination between the Russian fleet in the Black Sea and the French fleet in the Mediterranean?

I have.

^* said if the hon. Member had taken into consideration those difficulties, all he could say was that the hon. Member's estimate did not agree with his own. When he made the definite assertion that Russia controlled the Dardanelles—and if she did not his whole contention fell to pieces—he was assuming more than he could possibly prove. This was not merely a question of a combination between France and Russia, but it was a question which concerned all the Powers which possessed sea ports on the Mediterranean. If they took up the question of the Russian fleet passing through the Dardanelles into the Greek Archipelago that would involve a strategical matter which the House of Commons was not competent to discuss. Supposing the House of Commons took upon itself the duty of laying down for the Admiralty where the ships ought to be placed, and what was to be the relative strength of the forces. Supposing his hon. friend who had raised this debate was able to persuade the House that he and his supporters were right, and supposing the House immediately went to a division and decided in favour of the principle that the Mediterranean Fleet ought to be increased upon the figures given by his hon. friend the Member for Chester. The Admiralty would then proceed to apply that mandate given by the House, and they would send more ships to the Mediterranean. It seemed to be entirely forgotten that the Admiralty must take those ships from somewhere else. Unless the House first settled the question of the standard to be maintained it meant that they were going to take ships from some other places, and send them to the Mediterranean. Supposing that his hon. friend convinced the House that he was right and the Admiralty were wrong, that he knew everything and the Admiralty knew nothing, and that to carry out his hon. friend's policy, the Admiralty took ships from somewhere else? Suppose, for instance, that to accomplish this the Admiralty took some ships from the Channel Squadron and sent them to the Mediterranean. Of course, the papers and the magazines would applaud this. But, supposing that next day France chose to shift some of her warships from the Mediterranean into the English Channel, what would his hon. friend say then? The House would immediately have another debate, and they would be asked to discuss the weakness of the Channel Fleet. It was an impossible, extremely pernicious, and dangerous thing for the House of Commons to attempt to deal with strategic problems, because every one of them had been fully and thoroughly discussed subject to the means which were at the disposal of the Admiralty, and he did not think that in this matter the Admiralty could do better than they were doing at present. But they had to consider something more than the Mediterranean Fleet. They had to consider also the question of the standard adopted, which he had from his place in the House and out of it always repudiated as a standard which was not scientific, and which could not be accepted as a real solution of what our naval power should be. He entered his protest once more against the two-Power standard, and he also further protested against the Government in any way giving information or being influenced by speeches in this House upon questions concerning the distribution of His Majesty's Navy. He cordially endorsed what had been said upon the general question by his right hon. friend the Member for the Forest of Dean. The whole case came back to this—that the procedure of the House of Commons prevented them from discussing the real question which ought to be settled, and which never had been settled—apportionment of expenditure, naval and military. He noticed that hon. Members cheered when expenditure was proposed upon the Army auxiliaries, but he believed that if hon. Members had abstained from supporting the Government proposals for spending money on the Auxiliary forces, they would have done more in the interests of the Mediterranean Fleet and the real naval defence of the Empire than by making speeches in this House, or writing sensational articles about the condition of the fleet in the Mediterranean.

Hon. Members could not even discuss the relative strength of the Mediterranean Fleet and be in order, and they could not discuss the question of the apportionment of our expenditure between the Army and the Navy, owing to the procedure of that House. Until the House realised that this was a complex Empire, and that no part of our expenditure could be indefinitely exaggerated—until they had laid down the principle that our first business was the defence of the sea, and that everything must be in relation to that broad fact, we should go on spending year by year money here and money there, without ever reaching a solution of the question at all. This agitation, he was afraid, might do more harm than good. It might mislead the public as to the attitude of the Admiralty on these questions. The Admiralty had to administer and regulate the force which the House gave it. The House asked them to produce a force equal to that of any two Powers. Those who thought the Government were not doing their duty had only one thing to do, and that was to show that the Admiralty was not producing with the money given what was necessary to the maintenance of that standard. That was the whole problem, and he thought that in that sense the agitation, if it awakened the country, the Government, and the House to consider its naval position, and reconsider the standard, would have done some good. If, however, the agitation were to encourage the idea that the House was competent on a Wednesday afternoon to decide questions of naval strategy and determine the relative interests of the Empire, this agitation would have done a great deal of harm. He hoped the Government and the representative of the Admiralty would put their foot firmly down against the attempt of the House of Commons to influence in any way the judgment of the Admiralty in the strategical distribution of ships.

I know there are some other hon. Members who wish to address the Committee, but I think it would be convenient if I said something now, because perhaps it would suit the purposes of those who desire to consider these questions if we could go on to the other Votes which are on the Paper and specifically deal with some of the matters in which I know hon. Members are interested, but which, by your ruling, Sir, we are now precluded from discussing. It has been said by the hon. and gallant Member who has just sat down that the whole of this debate is to a certain extent illusory, and that it is crippled by circumstances over which we have no control. I can honestly say, if that is the case, and to a certain extent it is the case, I regret it. I am quite well aware that there are in this House many hon. Members who take a real and profound interest in naval matters, and there can be no doubt that the country is deeply interested in the Navy. My view is that it would have been desirable that there should be an uninterrupted discussion on a matter that does undoubtedly interest the House and the country. I cannot disguise from myself the fact that circumstances over which I have no control have so limited the time at the disposal of the House that it is not possible, without grave interference with public business, to make these ideal opportunities, which some of us. I among the number, would desire. But I wish the Committee to understand that as far as I represent the Admiralty—and I believe I represent the view of the Admiralty correctly in this matter—they desire nothing better, when there is a bona fide wish to discuss great matters connected with the welfare of the Navy, than that a full opportunity should be given to the House of Commons for that very legitimate form of discussion.

It appears that the discussion is destined to be distributed, I will not say squandered, over a variety of Votes; and I am compelled, as hon. Members who have preceded me have been compelled, to confine myself strictly to that portion of the large sums with which we deal, which alone is within the limits of order at the present time. I do not underrate for one moment the value of expressions of outside opinion. I think that there are Members of this House who would think that I was adopting a pose which would not be legitimate if I were to suggest that there is not and never can be any valuable expression of public opinion destined for the guidance of public Departments. I believe there are instances where those expressions of opinion have had some weight. There are actually cases which could be quoted in which even the best of Departments have learned something from outside opinion. If I were to suggest that that were not so, I think I should be occupying a position which the Committee would regard as untenable and ludicrous. I do not desire to attempt to censure or even to deprecate the fullest expression either in the press or anywhere else of the opinion of our countrymen upon this great question of the Navy. But when I say that, I must add something. In the first place, I think it will be obvious that there are subjects which, though they may be profitably dealt with in the way I have suggested, cannot be equally profitably dealt with by those who are charged to express the views of the Board of Admiralty in this House. It is impossible, as my hon. and gallant friend the Member for Yarmouth pointed out just now, and as was pointed out by the late Civil Lord, to discuss matters involving grave political and diplomatic considerations with the same freedom on the floor of this House as they are discussed in other places and with other methods of communication. Although I am not prepared to deny the value of this stimulus to a public Department, I think that that stimulus becomes less valuable when it has been made quite clear that the department to which it is proposed to apply it is fully conscious of the duty which it is required to perform, and is most anxious to perform it, and that it has by its action given evidence which cannot be challenged that it is performing its duty to the best of its ability.

It is my task, if I can achieve it in this House, to demonstrate that the Board of Admiralty is fully alive to its duties with regard to the Navy, that it has given evidence, which no one can controvert, of its intention to perform in the future those duties, and of its efficient performance of them in the past. I think, if I can establish that I shall carry the Committee with me in the view that, having shown ourselves efficient in the matters which can be frankly and fairly discussed here, they should give us credit for showing an equal desire and an equal capacity in those matters which, in my opinion, cannot be satisfactorily discussed here. It has been pointed out that the members of the Board of Admiralty have recently paid a visit to the Mediterranean. It has been suggested that new light has been let in by that visit, and that great vistas of information have been opened out to the members of the Board of Admiralty which, up to that date, were entirely closed to them. I do not think that is a correct description of the situation. I had at a late period the great advantage of following in the footsteps of the members of the Board of Admiralty, and of receiving, I believe, the same help and information which was accorded to them. I do not deny that there is an enormous advantage in these direct communications between officers who are charged with the responsible duty of commanding our fleets and the members of the Board of Admiralty. On the contrary, I say they are of the highest possible advantage both to the officers commanding our fleets and those who are charged with the administration of the Admiralty. But I should be saying what I know to be untrue if I were to say that, to any large extent, new ground was broken, or that information was conveyed to the members of the Board of Admiralty of which they were quite unaware before. It would seem almost superfluous to make a statement of that kind, if the contrary suggestion had not already been made in the course of this discussion. Everything that has been said by the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Fleet in the Mediterranean has been brought officially to the notice of the Board of Admiralty; and I can truly say that those representations have received the fullest possible weight, as they ought to do coming from two officers so distinguished and so experienced as those two officers are.

But when I come to the further question as to whether we in this House are well advised in taking sides on what are supposed to be the different views which might conceivably be entertained by any set of officers in His Majesty's Navy, we are on very unsafe ground indeed. I believe, on the contrary, it will be found that everything that has been done by the officers and by the admirals in the Mediterranean has been done in accordance with the regular and proper official practice of the Service, and that those representations are receiving the consideration of the Admiralty. But we are now asked especially to consider the question of the Mediterranean and of the Mediterranean Fleet. The hon. Member said with truth; that you cannot possibly consider the question of the Mediterranean or of the Mediterranean Fleet apart from the consideration of the whole Fleet and the distribution of the whole Fleet. I am asked to make some statement with regard to the distribution of the Fleet, and I am challenged as a matter of duty to make that statement to this Committee. Equally as a matter of duty I decline to make that statement. I believe I should be right in doing all that is consistent with my duty and consistent with the instructions of the Board of Admiralty in informing the House of Commons as to what generally is the policy of the Admiralty with regard to the distribution, not only of the Mediterranean Fleet, but of the Fleet generally. But if it is supposed that I am to come here and, in response to the requests that are made to me, give detailed particulars of the policy which in the present and the future may commend itself to the Board of Admiralty with regard to the detailed distribution of the ships—that, I think, is founded entirely on a misconception. I think, if I ask hon. Members to support me in the view which I think it is my duty to take, I shall have their almost unanimous support.

I should like to say, in the first place, that whatever may be the wisdom or unwisdom of the present distribution of the Fleet, one thing is obvious. You cannot reinforce one station without taking ships from another, and in saying that I include the ships in reserve. I would commend that observation to the attention of hon. Members who are ready to urge that large additions should be made to a particular section of the Fleet. It is the duty of the Board of Admiralty to regard, not only the interests of a particular station, but the interests of all stations, and it is the privilege of the Admiralty to become possessed of the information which enables them to form a just and adequate opinion of the needs of the whole Navy throughout the world. If you add to one station you must deplete another, and although the Mediterranean is important there is another station which is even more important, and that is the home station itself. The home station is the origin of all our naval power, and as long as there is any doubt whether the home station is capable of supplying all the demands which may be made upon it, it would be idle to suppose that we should be prepared to deplete it for any service however important. I would remind the Committee that, though the number of ships is large, it is limited, and that of late there have been very special demands made on the resources of the Admiralty on account of disturbances which have taken place in various quarters of the world. We have at present no less than five battleships in Chinese waters. We have a considerable force detached in connection with the South African operations, and there are other ships detached for special purposes. When you reflect on that, and recollect also that what is left behind is not only the force which is destined for the immediate defence of our coasts, but also to supply the whole of the material which is required for mobilisation in the event of war, you will realise what is the problem placed before the Board of Admiralty. We are bound to keep at home not only the ships necessary for the defence of the channel, but also the ships necessary as reinforcements for our stations in time of war; and, what is much more important, we are bound to keep at home a sufficient number of men to give the necessary nucleus for the mobilised ships when the reserves may be called out. In addition to that, there is always a large reduction in the personnel of the navy in the shape of men who are undergoing instruction in the various courses at Portsmouth and Devonport, which it would be exceedingly unwise to forego except under very great necessity.

I lay down, then, this proposition that, in order to reinforce any other station you must take away ships practically from the home station. I think it must be entirely a matter for the judgment of the Admiralty when and to what extent, if it becomes desirable at all to reinforce any station, you should deplete the home station for that purpose. The statement that has been made is of a very general character. In the first place, it is said that the distribution of the whole Fleet is faulty, inasmuch as it does not assign a larger number of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers to the Mediterranean station. It is alleged, not that the number of ships at the disposal of the Admiralty is inadequate, but that they are so distributed as to make the fleet on the Mediterranean station undesirably weak. The second matter charged is one I cannot deal with now, though it is important and ought to be dealt with. It is that the ships which are at present in the Mediterranean are not sufficiently equipped to enable them in the event of war to be effective. I hope, when the opportunity arises, to make a statement which I think will be satisfactory to the House in regard to that matter.

Finally, it is alleged that the Admiralty are either not aware of, or not awake to, the serious nature of the situation which exists, and that though they have been warned they are not prepared to take steps to remove the danger which is alleged to exist. On that last point I have already said something. With regard to the first point as to the actual fleet in the Mediterranean, I propose to say only a few words. It is proposed, when and as the number of battleships at home is increased by the addition of new ships, to make certain additions to the battleships on the Mediterranean station. That addition will be largely in the direction of improving the quality of the ships. The new ships are necessarily of a better quality, we all anticipate, than the old ships, and as those new ships become available they will be sent to the Mediterranean to take the place of the ships of an older date. It is also in contemplation, when the full needs of the Navy at home and throughout the world are satisfied, to make actual additions to the strength of the fleet in the matter of battleships.

With regard to the question of cruisers, I think I can be more explicit. There has been, undoubtedly owing to the reason to which I have referred, a withdrawal from the Mediterranean Fleet of cruisers which are appropriated to it, and which ought to be appropriated to it. It is the opinion of the Board of Admiralty that the standard of cruisers in the Mediterranean is not that which is generally recognised as requiring to be maintained in respect of so large and important a fleet. It has been suggested that the cruisers might with advantage be reinforced from the vessels already at the disposal of the Admiralty. That is not a question which I desire to discuss at length. I would only point out that cruisers, to be of value, must possess certain fighting qualities, and it will probably be in the recollection of the Committee that we are on the eve of adding to our available Fleet a number of cruisers of a quality very far in advance of that of any existing cruisers in the matter of their fighting efficiency; and when those ships are added to the effective list of the Navy it will be, I hope, possible to make additions to the Mediterranean Fleet in the matter of its cruisers, which will add substantially to the strength of that fleet.

With regard to the question of the destroyers, I have already in answer to a question said something with regard to the policy of the Admiralty in that matter. I say "policy" deliberately, because I desire the Committee to understand most clearly that neither in the matter of battleships, nor of cruisers, nor of destroyers, is there any change in the avowed policy which the Admiralty have been carrying out. A few years ago the Mediterranean Fleet was without any destroyers at all, but from that date the Admiralty has consistently followed the policy of adding with such ability as it could to the squadron of effective destroyers in the Mediterranean. That is no new policy. It is a policy which found favour when it first became necessary, and which has been followed consistently ever since. The number of destroyers is increasing and there will no doubt be at the disposal of the Admiralty, after having satisfied all the more pressing needs, if more pressing needs there be, available destroyers which can be sent, and which will be sent, to the Mediterranean. I hope I have made clear with regard to the main contention raised in this Committee that there is no substantial difference, unless it be a matter of degree, between the Board of Admiralty and those who allege that it has failed in its duty. I allege, on the contrary, that it has not failed in its duty, that it is alive to its duty in all those matters which have been brought up as new discoveries, and that it is, as far as lies in its power, doing everything which the country demands.

I have been asked some specific questions by my hon. friend the Member for Chester. I have been asked whether the Mediterranean Fleet is completely equipped for war. There is no fleet existing in this country or in any other country which contains in every ship of it every invention which the ingenuity of man up to the latest date has produced. The British Fleet is no exception to the rule, but I will say that the British Fleet has been equipped more perfectly and with greater celerity, considering its numbers, than any other fleet, and when we come to discuss this question freely I think I shall be able to reassure my hon. friend and to prove to this Committee that everything that can be done is being done, and that the Mediterranean Fleet, in so far as it can be equipped with the latest appliances, has been equipped, and that on the very first day when its complete equipment can be achieved it will be achieved. The essence of this accusation is that there has been a demand made by experts and professionals with regard to the equipment of our ships, and that that demand has been neglected or has not been met by the Admiralty. That is a contention which I must emphatically contest. On the contrary, I shall prove to demonstration that the very moment that a demand has been made for an addition to the effective equipment of our Fleet, whether it be in the Mediterranean or elsewhere, that demand has been attended to by the Board of Admiralty, that they have taken the necessary steps by referring that demand to their expert advisers, whom they have requested to inform them of the mechanical means by which that demand can be met, and that as soon as the expert advisers have informed the Admiralty that they have completed the plans for the appliances demanded, not an hour has been lost by the Board of Admiralty in supplying, with the greatest rapidity which the manufacturing establishments at our disposal will allow, the whole of the articles which we have received scientific warrant to proceed with. I cannot carry this matter further now, but I will undertake to say that there has been no negligence in supplying all these necessary and important adjuncts to our Fleet, and if there is a need still unfulfilled and which is not in the course of fulfilment, I shall rely confidently upon the House to give the Admiralty the means of fulfilling any need which is proved to exist.

My hon. friend also asked me whether the standard of cruisers in the Mediterranean Fleet was adequate in the opinion of the Admiralty, and whether it was proposed to raise the number of cruisers in the Mediterranean. I think I have given him an answer which, though it may not commend itself entirely to him, will, I hope, be satisfactory to the members of the Committee with regard to the intentions of the Admiralty in this respect.

My hon. friend also raised a question with regard to the auxiliary vessels in the Mediterranean. There again I regret I am not able to follow what would have been the natural sequence of this debate but for our rules of order, and to give the details which I think he is justified in asking for with regard to these cruisers. These auxiliary vessels, therefore, will be necessary in the time of war; but what astonished me was that the hon. Gentleman should give the Admiralty credit for no prescience in the matter. If he had done us the favour to look at the Estimates, he would have seen that we have taken steps to fulfil some of the desires which he entertains, and that considerable sums of money are taken for these purposes. When I have the opportunity I think I shall be able to point out that we go even further than already indicated, and that every step has been taken to provide for contingencies. I do not agree that some thirty or forty auxiliaries ought to be maintained in the Mediterranean in the time of peace. That, I think, is a demand which goes far beyond the necessities of the situation. It would be impossible to maintain the ships or to find the docks or the crews for them, nor could I recommend to the Admiralty the expenditure of the money necessary to maintain them. There are some works which are better not maintained in peace time, and I say that with some diffidence, because I am one of those who believe that very little will be done in time of war that might have been done in time of peace. There are some exceptions, however, to that rule, and I believe a portion of these auxiliary ships will come under this description. With regard to the others, I think I shall be able to satisfy the Committee that without exception the Admiralty are taking steps to provide for these additions to the Mediterranean Fleet. We have already made some provision in the matter, and we hope shortly to provide a repairing and depot ship for the destroyers. We have made enormous advances in the coaling facilities, and we have, by an act of generosity which I believe the country will duly appreciate, been enabled to endow the Mediterranean Fleet with a hospital ship. We have already also in the Estimates made provision for the equipment of a number of additional ships for hospital purposes in the event of war. We believe from our experience that even in war time there will be no difficulty with the preparations which we have made in equipping hospital ships in sufficient time. I hope I have succeeded in convincing the Committee that the Admiralty is alert on all these questions, and does not require any stimulus, though it is not reluctant to receive that. If I believed that these matters were being neglected, I should not be here; but that is not the case. The hon. Member for Dundee, the late Civil Lord, has spoken of other matters—of the vast expenditure upon the other branch of our defensive forces. That is a matter on which I am neither permitted nor competent to enter; it is a matter of policy, and must be decided by the House. But, so far as my duty of ascertaining and presenting to the House the views of the Board of Admiralty is concerned, I think I am charged with a sufficient answer to the hon. Gentleman.

asked the hon. Gentleman not to overlook the question whether the captains of these cruisers were given opportunities of systematic and thorough training in their responsible duties.

I am not aware that the captains of our cruisers are denied an opportunity of systematic and thorough training. On the contrary, I believe that the opportunities are constant; that they are afforded when manœuvres are going on or not going on. It is a mistake to suppose that it is necessary to have an entire mobilised force on a war footing to enable officers to acquire knowledge of their responsibilities. I admit that if the number of cruisers were larger exercises could be conducted on a larger scale and made more profitable, but I do not admit that there are officers, either in the Mediterranean or anywhere else, who are now denied the opportunities in the matter referred to. In conclusion, I will only say that the Admiralty are awake to their duties, and I hope I have made it clear that they do not require a stimulus, but if the House or any Member can point out a clear deficiency it shall be supplied, and the Admiralty will rely upon the House to give effect to their words in Committee of Supply.

^* said that the hon. Gentleman the late Secretary to the Admiralty asserted that this was a newspaper agitation, but as one who had in the past given the best years of his life to journalism he would go a step further and say that under the circumstances in which we lived every great agitation was almost necessarily a newspaper agitation. He did not know how they could get any of their ideas carried out into law without newspaper agitation. He did not know how far his friend Mr. Arnold White had been responsible for this newspaper agitation, which apparently dated back a considerable time; but, so far as that gentleman was responsible, he congratulated him on his share in bringing about this debate. He had not risen, however, with the intention of making these semi-personal remarks, but to direct attention to one point which had not yet been mentioned by any Member who had preceded him. It was a small point, but one on which the alarm which was felt in regard to the state of the Mediterranean squadron found its genesis. It was this. The Empire was defended by two sister Services, which were officially represented by two great Departments. One of these Departments had recently been put to a very severe and, perfectly naturally, an unexpected strain. That Department had fallen lamentably and disastrously short of what was expected of it. The question which the country was concerned with at this moment was whether the sister Department would fare any better in time of war and could better bear a sudden strain. The hon. Member for Dundee said that the Admiralty was there for the express purpose of looking after the defence of the Empire.

said he spoke of the distribution of the Fleet, and that was a tactical matter.

^* said that that was one of the most important points connected with the defence of the Empire. The Admiralty existed for that express purpose, but, he asked, did not the War Office exist for the express purpose of looking after the defence of the Empire, but with the result they all knew. There had been no adequate plan of campaign in South Africa, no maps, no sufficient reserve of ammunition, even after stripping the country of the Volunteer service ammunition. They had sent out rifles wrongly sighted, and they had no big mobile guns. In fact, from almost every point of view, the War Office had been found wanting. In regard to the sister service, the views of Lord Charles Beresford were well known. Whether that gallant officer was right or wrong, it would be presumptuous for him to express an opinion. Whether it was right that his letter should have been published he would not say; but, at any rate, the noble Lord the second in command of the Mediterranean Fleet was very well capable of looking after himself in that matter. But it was known to at least two Gentlemen present in this debate that his superior officer—he did not say shared Lord Charles Beresford's view, but at any rate felt great anxiety in regard to the condition of the Mediterranean Fleet. It had also been pointed out by hon. Members who were technically able to deal with the details of the Navy far beyond his competence that we lacked torpedo destroyers and cruisers in the Mediterranean Fleet, that we lacked armoured shells, that we lacked smokeless powder, black powder being still used; and that our Secret Service was not what it ought to be. These were things they knew in regard to our Mediterranean Fleet, and, judging by the example of the War Office, that was alone sufficient to justify them in expressing their anxiety, either on the floor of the House or through the despised medium of the press, and in making their alarm public. The efficiency of the Mediterranean squadron depended on the efficiency of His Majesty's Government; and the efficiency of His Majesty's Government had become gravely suspect by the breakdown of the War Office. Therefore he hoped some kind of assurance would be given by the members of the Government responsible for the Navy that we did not stand under the shadow of so great a possible calamity as had happened in connection with the War Office. For his part—and he said it with great reluctance—he could not say that the speech of the Secretary to the Admiralty—who, he might remark in passing, and he hoped the hon. Gentleman Would not resent the remark, owed perhaps his position, and certainly much of his great reputation, to this despised method of newspaper agitation—had entirely dissipated these alarms.

said that he congratulated the Secretary to the Admiralty on the most skilful defence which he had ever had the honour of hearing in this House. He had followed very closely the statement made by the hon. Gentleman, but he had not been convinced that the Admiralty had made the necessary preparations for the defence of our position in the Mediterranean. He ventured to think that Mr. Goschen himself could not have more successfully sheltered himself against the accusations made in regard to the failures of the Admiralty on the plea of the necessity for official secrecy. His hon. friend had said that he ought not to give the details of the distribution of the Fleet, but, as had been pointed out by the hon. and gallant Member for Yarmouth, that was only a part of the question. The real question was whether or not the Navy was strong enough as a whole. Every admission made by his hon. friend as to the possibility of strengthening one squadron at the expense of another was an admission that the Navy was not I strong enough in comparison with the fleets of foreign Powers. As one who had watched the trend of the public mind in regard to naval affairs for many years, he ventured to say that never since 1888, when the Naval Defence Act was passed, had there been more general alarm and suspicion as to the comparative inadequacy of the Navy than at the present time. It was believed, from the private letter of Lord Charles Beresford, and from the official reports communicated to the Admiralty, that the fleet in the Mediterranean was not sufficiently strong in many important respects. His hon. friend the Secretary to the Admiralty, although questioned in the ordinary forms of the House, did not, and perhaps could not, deny that such reports existed, and certainly that day he had not given an assurance that the Admiral in Command in the Mediterranean had not reported that the fleet there was insufficient; and as long as his hon. friend was silent in regard to that allegation, the country and the Committee were justified in thinking that such a report was in the archives of the Admiralty. This country had made enormous sacrifices in the past for the purpose of maintaining our naval supremacy. Gibraltar, Malta, and Egypt were all held at enor- mous sacrifices made in the past, and for a definite object—namely, the security of the highway to the East. It would be reasonable for the country to lie under the belief that at the present time, under present circumstances of the development of foreign navies, there existed in the mind of the noble Lord, who was once a Member of this House, and whose outspoken candour was well appreciated, an opinion that there existed a deficiency us regarded the protective power of our leet in the Mediterranean. It was in that sea that the first shock of battle would be felt. They had heard that day a good deal as to the Channel Fleet, but the Channel Fleet would have, in the event of war, its own duty to perform. It would have the duty of blockading the northern ports of Europe, to prevent the escape of privateers and cruisers to prey upon our commerce. We could not spare a single vessel of that fleet for the purpose of strengthening the Mediterranean Fleet. If that were so—and the facts were as well known to the administrations of the navies of foreign countries as to the Admiralty—some further provision ought to be made to place the Empire in a position of security. The only persons who were interested in a true comparison between our Fleet and those of foreign nations were the citizens of this country, and he contended that there was no danger in a full and free discussion of this question. It would educate the public mind, and assist the Admiralty in doing what they ought to do, so as to make the condition of the Fleet as safe as it was possible to be.

The policy of muddling through had been possible with our land forces, but it would not serve with our naval defence. We could improvise an Imperial Yeomanry, for we had only to sit a Britisher on a horse and put a rifle in his hand, and he would meet the best; but we could not improvise a battleship or trained seamen. These must be provided for beforehand. It was the duty of the country and of this House to see that the Admiralty and the Executive Government—without distinction of party—did their duty for the protection of the country. The Leader of the House, in a recent brilliant speech, condemned what he described as the extreme naval school. With great respect to the right hon. Gentleman, he ventured to say that it was impossible for the inhabitants of this sea-girt isle to be "extreme" on naval affairs or any question affecting the paramount efficiency of the Navy. He feared that there was a suspicion already in the public mind that we were sacrificing the efficiency of the Navy to the chimerical idea of our becoming a great military Power. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had told the House that our normal expenditure had greatly increased, and was likely to increase still further. He had told the House also that our power of bearing increased taxation was not greatly expansive, and, further, that a period of bad trade was coming. Such statements by members of the Government created an uneasy feeling that the spending of thirty millions of money on the Army might, perhaps, mean some shrinkage of necessary expenditure on the Navy. Yet, what was the Army in comparison with the Navy for the defence of the country? When we spoke of the Navy as the first line of defence, we altogether fell short of a reasonable description. We should rather speak of the Navy as the only line of defence, because if the Navy broke down the Army would be powerless, and the six army corps at Colchester, Aldershot, or wherever else they might be stationed, would be absolutely paralysed.

^* : The hon. Member is now discussing a matter which is outside the Vote for the salary of the First Lord of the Admiralty.

said that perhaps he had gone beyond the line laid down by the Chairman, but he hoped he would not offend again. He would invite the Leader of the House to consider whether the standard of the comparative power of the British Navy, which was established twelve years ago, was now a sufficiently high standard. The standard was that the Navy of this country should be equal to the navies of any two Powers that might be brought against it in combination. That was a standard which he ventured to urge had now become obsolete. He would remind the Committee of the origin of that standard.

^* : I think that matter would be more properly discussed on the Shipbuilding Vote.

said he did not wish in the least degree to traverse the ruling of the Chairman, but he would respectfully submit that the Navy as a whole—the comparative number of ships, and everything that went to make up naval equipment—was surely a matter of general policy which would come under the purview of the First Lord of the Admiralty. He would submit that, with great respect, as a point of order.

^* : I have already ruled that any question of general policy which can be raised on any other Vote cannot be now discussed. Clearly the sufficiency of the Navy comes under the Shipbuilding Vote.

said of course he would bow to the ruling of the Chair. Before sitting down he would wish to refer to the question of the auxiliaries. A suggestion was made that the Mediterranean Fleet was not sufficiently supplied with auxiliaries, and, speaking with some knowledge of the matter, he felt it was only right to say that in his opinion the Mediterranean Fleet was insufficiently provided in that respect. As to whether auxiliaries should be built or purchased, he differed altogether from the suggestion of the previous speaker. He believed that there were in the mercantile marine a number of vessels which should be purchased at once as a matter of policy and added to the Mediterranean Fleet, in obedience to the strong desire of the gallant officers in command of that fleet. The limitations of the debate pressed very heavily on him and on previous speakers, and he would conclude by expressing a wish that the new First Lord of the Admiralty and the new Secretary to the Admiralty might, as he believed was their earnest and strong desire, be strengthened by the debate, and by the public agitation on which it rested. The First Lord of the Admiralty was a thoughtful and energetic man, and the Secretary to the Admiralty was an enthusiastic and well-informed statesman. He believed that, notwithstanding skilful official denials, the Admiralty realised that they should have more provision and more assistance from the national Exchequer for the purpose of supporting the Navy. He earnestly hoped that they would make sure that they did get at least their full share of the supplies that might be allocated when the Cabinet dealt with the question of defence as a whole. He was glad there had been no suggestion of party or of antagonism to the Government introduced into the debate. That was the right spirit, and was the spirit which should always animate naval debates. If the Committee kept to it, the country would support them in a demand that the Navy should be rendered strong enough. England's safety lay in the strength of her Navy, and its weakness would change the map of Europe.

said the debate had been certainly interesting, and had also been somewhat unusual. It was initiated by a supporter of His Majesty's Government, who had previously put down a motion in order to prevent discussion, and it was turned by his hon. friend the Member for Chester into an occasion for making a demand for the remedy of what his hon. friend believed to be deficiencies in the Mediterranean Fleet. Further, the most amazing defence of the Government came from the hon. Gentleman opposite, the late Civil Lord of the Admiralty, who made a most tremendous onslaught upon the mischievous character of newspaper agitation and the indiscipline of Lord Charles Beresford. The speech of the hon. Member in which he defended the abstract Admiralty was in very marked contrast to the speech of the present Secretary to the Admiralty. The present Secretary to the Admiralty had shown on this occasion the candour and outspoken frankness with which they had always been accustomed to associate him. What was his answer? The hon. Member for Chester stated that the Mediterranean Fleet was deficient in cruisers, deficient in battleships, and deficient in destroyers and auxiliaries. The answer of his hon. friend was an admission of the whole case, for he told the Committee that it was proposed to make an addition to the battleships, first of all in point of quality, and then in point of quantity; he added that the strength of the cruisers now in the Mediterranean was not such as should be maintained, and that more cruisers were to be sent out; and he also stated, in respect to destroyers, that the standard was not what it should be and that more destroyers would be sent out. He had absolutely corroborated his hon. friend the Member for Chester in the case he made out, and he thought, therefore, they might congratulate themselves upon the fact that the debate had taken place at all, As to the question of the distribution of the Fleet, no doubt that must rest with the Admiralty. No doubt the Admiralty would always be prepared to say that their distribution of the Fleet was absolutely perfect, and they were also equally prepared to deny any information at all as to what that distribution was.

He wished to touch upon a question which still apparently remained open in some minds, in spite of the frankness of the answer of the Secretary to the Admiralty, and that was the present inadequacy of the Mediterranean Fleet to perform its duties. It should be remembered that the allegations made did not rest merely on the assertion of his hon. friend the Member for Chester. They rested on the assertions of the admiral second in command of that Fleet, contained in a letter, in which he stated that he had addressed representations to the Admiralty. If the newspaper agitation complained of were vague, uncalled for, and mischievous, as the late Civil Lord .of the Admiralty said, the answer of the Admiralty would have been perfectly simple. They could have placed before the Committee a few reassuring extracts from the letters of Lord Charles Beresford, and probably a few more reassuring extracts from the letters of Sir John Fisher, which would have convinced the Committee that the Mediterranean Fleet was at the present moment as strong as it need be. But that had not been done. They had had a frank avowal from the Treasury Bench—more frank than he had often heard from that Bench, and he congratulated the Secretary to the Admiralty on having made it—that that Fleet did require all those things which had been pointed out during the debate. For his part he was perfectly content to let the matter remain there. He recognised the difficulty in which the Admiralty had been with regard to the Mediterranean Fleet. Very considerable calls had been made upon them from other places, notably China; and they were forced to deplete the Mediterranean Fleet of cruisers, though that would not apply to destroyers. He was, however, content to leave the matter in the hands of the Admiralty, which had so active and frank and candid a Secretary as his hon. friend, and he did so with especial confidence in consequence of what had taken place in the debate, and with the assurance that the debate would act as a spur to the Admiralty to supply the wants of the Mediterranean Fleet.

There was one consideration in regard to that Fleet which he would ask permission to point out. That was that the Mediterranean Fleet was of far greater relative importance now, and its duties were of far more onerous a character now, than in times past. In the first place, we had taken the responsibility for the occupation and defence of Egypt. The British garrison in Egypt was extremely small, so small that it would be quite incapable of defending the country against a land attack without the co-operation of the British Fleet. Inasmuch as we had to look after Alexandria, as well as Malta and Gibraltar and the whole of the Mediterranean, the effect was, so to speak, to dilute the Fleet and to divide it in fact into two. Up to a short time ago it was a principle at the Admiralty that there should always be a squadron of the Fleet east of Cape Matapan; but whether that was so or not now he did not know. It was manifest, however, that it was necessary to divide the Fleet in two, instead of having it one single Fleet. That was one reason which made the Mediterranean Fleet more important than ever it was before. There was another reason. They had so alienated Turkey—the necessary ally of England, as he believed—and alienated her, not as a matter of policy, but in consequence, he was afraid, of political discourtesy towards people in high positions in that country, that she was no longer moved by the determination and desire to keep the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles closed to any enemies of England. He was speaking of what he knew. He knew the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and they were armed very strongly against any Power desiring to enter, but they were not armed at all against any Power desiring to leave, the Black Sea. The effect, of that was that in case of a war in which England was engaged with a Mediterranean Power, the Dardanelles, with or without the consent of Turkey, would be open to the exit from the Black Sea of that formidable fleet I which Russia had long been building up there. There was another reason why the Mediterranean Fleet had become more important than it used to be, and why it was more necessary that it should now be in greater strength than it was ever before. Bizerta, on the coast of Africa, would in the case of war, he believed, weaken rather than strengthen the French Fleet by adding to its lines of communication. But Bizerta was of Very great and growing importance as a torpedo station, and as a station for torpedo boats and destroyers, which gave added significance to that part of his hon. friend's case in which he stated that it was in destroyers that the Mediterranean Fleet was at the present moment weakest. If war were unfortunately to break out now or in a few weeks between England and a Mediterranean Power, Bizerta would be doubled in importance, and in its effective capacity, in consequence of the want of destroyers and torpedo boats in our Mediterranean Fleet. Spain had also been alienated, not as a matter of policy, but in consequence of imprudent action, and extremely imprudent utterances. He was glad to believe that he had been in some measure the agent for producing a better feeling towards England on the part of that ancient Power. The right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury shook his head. He was afraid the right hon. Gentleman did not read the Standard newspaper, for if he did he would have seen a declaration yesterday that Spain had now come to the conclusion, after considering certain recent debates in the House of Commons, that it was her interest to turn from all other Powers and to seek friendship with England. Consequently he claimed to have some share in bringing that about. If hon. Members would read the Spanish newspapers they perhaps would agree with him.

He thought that the debate had been a very improving one. He himself was extremely pleased to have heard the declaration of the Secretary to the Admiralty. He did not think that the authors of the agitation were in any way open to the tremendously passionate and vindictive onslaught made upon them by the hon. Gentleman the late Civil Lord of the Admiralty. His belief was that they had rendered a public service. It was absurd to say that you must never say anything unpleasant to a Government. On the contrary, it was the most unpleasant things that were most profitable, and it was the Government you love that you chasten. For his part he congratulated the Government on having in the present Secretary to the Admiralty an hon. Gentleman who was prepared to consider the ideas and listen to the suggestions addressed to him. He thought the debate had been very instructive and very profitable, and he could not join in the protest addressed to those who had initiated it.

said he should like to know whether the Committee was debarred from discussing. Vote 12. He asked the question because he wished to make some remarks about the constructors to the Admiralty.

^* : The motion for the reduction of the First Lord's salary must be disposed of first.

said he desired briefly to refer to what he regarded as the very high handed action of the Admiralty at Berehaven. A project was on foot of very great importance for the construction of a pier at Berehaven, but, if his information were correct, the Admiralty were raising objections on the ground that it would interfere with their naval station at Bantry Bay. It was a subject not only of local, but of national importance. It was clear that unless steps were taken to improve the service between America and Ireland, they would not be able to retain the postal service to and from the United States very long. Steps were being taken to build a fleet of steamers in America, which would call at Berehaven, thereby shortening the passage to four and a half days. The action of the Admiralty in preventing the building of the pier, and also the possibility of great commercial advantage to the south of Ireland, was a matter of such importance that he was entitled to bring it forward. He merely wished to point out that the action of the Admiralty, if they persisted in retaining possession of one of the most important naval stations in the whole of the United Kingdom for their own purposes, would hamper the new spirit of progress which was so evident in many parts of Ireland.

said, as the representative of the district concerned, he joined with his hon. friend in protesting against what he considered the monstrous action of the First Lord of the Admiralty in preventing the construction of the pier. He was one of the deputation which waited on the First Lord in order to ascertain what objecttion the Admiralty had to the construction of the pier, and he was amazed to find that the answer that was given was that they required the whole of the harbour at Berehaven as a naval harbour. Such a thing would not be tolerated in England. The Admiralty had not got complete possession of any harbour in Great Britain, but he supposed that it was in accordance with the usual policy of the Government to treat the demands of the Irish people with contempt, that such action was taken in Ireland. A company had been formed to construct the pier, and to build in connection with it two lines of railway, one to Bantry and the other to Kenmare, and the expenditure in that district, which was a congested district, would be about £700,000. The Admiralty was pursuing a dog-in-the-manger policy. They would not permit this work to be carried out, and they were not prepared to do anything themselves. He hoped the Secretary to the Admiralty would be able to inform the Committee that the matter would be further inquired into. He could assure the hon. Gentleman that if the present objection were not withdrawn there would be very strong protests from all parts of Ireland, because the question was not only a local, but a national one. The project had been approved by the county councils of Cork and Kerry, and the people expected that a large sum would be expended in that district, and that the Government would not prevent others from doing good.

said that he desired to call attention to a matter of some importance to his constituents. He did not think that sufficient was done by the Admiralty to popularise the Navy in the manufacturing districts of the North. The ignorance among the masses of the people as to how to get into the Navy was amazing. They had no means of getting to know, and consequently the Navy lost the advantage of drawing on a supply of most useful sailors.

^* : That question will more properly arise on the Vote for the men.

said he also wished to mention the difficulty of entering the Navy to be an officer.

^* : That will also arise upon the Vote for officers and men.

said it was a matter of the personal intervention of the First Lord of the Admiralty, and therefore he ventured to suggest that it would come under the Vote for the First Lord's salary. A nomination had to be obtained from the First Lord or someone connected with him, and if that nomination were refused the matter was at an end.

^* : I think this is part of the general system of recruiting officers for the Navy, and will arise on the Vote for officers and men.

said he would defer his remarks.

said he had listened with very great pleasure to the debate, and was very pleased to hear the statement that was made by the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty. He took it that the question before the House was: "Is our fleet in the Mediterranean sufficient?" What were the facts? A great many of our battleships there were practically obsolete. Take the "Royal Sovereign" class as an example. A great many were armed with muzzle-loading guns.

No.

Yes, and they fire black powder! Unquestionably the fleet was too weak for the work entrusted to it. The hon. Gentleman had never told them how many screw colliers there were with the Mediterranean Fleet. If they were at war how were they going to coal the fleet? At present they could not coal the vessels without running them either to Malta or Gibraltar, and the coaling stations at both those places were unprotected. Why did not the hon. Gentleman tell them he was going to provide distilling ships, so that the fleet might have fresh water? Again there was only one hospital ship attached to that fleet, and there should be more. If they wanted to maintain their supremacy at sea they must have the necessary equipment. They would never be able to safeguard their interests in the Mediterranean in war time with their present fleet; it was far too weak, and our cruisers were far too slow. If we were at war with a first-class Power the whole of the Admiralty administration would break down in the same way as our Army system had broken down under the strain of the South African War. It was no use the representatives of the Admiralty telling them that they were safe. Their safety was only to be found in being ready, in having a fully-equipped Fleet, fitted with all the appliances that science gave them. Everything connected with the Navy must be efficient; it ought to be the finest and first navy in the world. The story told them that day by the Secretary to the Admiralty was a pitiful expression of weakness, and he was sorry that the Continental Powers should hear it. He hoped, however, that the Board of Admiralty would rise to the occasion. Let the hon. Gentleman come down to the House with an additional Estimate to build more battleships and torpedo-boats, and thus make the Fleet what it should be—a credit to Great Britain.

As I have been questioned in regard to Berehaven Harbour, I may explain the circumstances in connection with this matter. This question was brought before the notice of my noble friend the First Lord of the Admiralty only a few days ago by a deputation, and the First Lord then stated that he would make all necessary inquiries, so as to ascertain whether the objection that the Admiralty had taken to this project could be removed. My noble friend has not yet been able to come to a conclusion, and clearly it would be premature to make a further statement until he has done so. I would like to point out that the hon. Member for West Cork was incorrect in stating that the Admiralty do not take full possession of naval harbours in England. The contrary is the fact. The whole of the traffic at Porstmouth and Plymouth is absolutely regulated by and at the discretion of the Admiralty, and no merchant ship is allowed there except by permission of the Admiralty. Berehaven is a naval harbour, and the Admiralty is absolutely entitled to regulate or exclude mercantile shipping. This harbour has been used for a long time for the service of the Fleet, and it is necessary for the Admiralty to take the ordinary steps. I admit that a strong case has been made out, and it is essential that the commercial element should be encouraged in this and every other port. We have, however, undertaken to see whether effect can be given to the representations which have been made, and I can assure hon. Gentlemen that every allowance will be made which can be made consistently with the service of the fleets.

I will not attempt to follow the remarks of the hon. Member for Gateshead, because I understand that it has been ruled that the details of the composition of the Mediterranean Fleet should be discussed when we come to the appropriate Vote. As I have said, I believe, in spite of the jeremiad of the hon. Member, that I can make a statement which will be considered satisfactory by the House. If I do not do so, I will invite the hon. Member to repeat his recrimination.

A question has been raised with regard to the Channel Fleet, and I think I ought to say that the view expressed by the hon. Member for the Shipley Division of Yorkshire as being the accepted view of all parties is not that entertained by the Admiralty. The view has already been expressed by Mr. Goschen in this House that under certain circumstances the Channel Fleet must be regarded as an integral part of the Mediterranean Fleet, and the picture which the hon. Member drew of the Channel Fleet exclusively occupying itself with operations at the mouth of the Channel is not one which is recognised as a true picture by the Board of Admiralty. So far from that being the case, I think hon. Members will be glad to know that, in order to procure unity of action between these two great departments of our Fleet, the Mediterranean and Channel fleets, it is the intention of the Admiralty to resume a custom which, I believe, is a very good one, and to allow these two fleets to manœuvre in company under the command of the senior officer of the two fleets. I believe this is a very desirable step—it will produce harmony, and it is almost absolutely essential as a preparation for war.

said that on the west coast of Ireland they had good harbours, but unfortunately they were idle. There was one—Berehaven—which could be used to the great advantage of the commercial development of that part of the country. A railway might be constructed and £700,000 or more expended very advantageously, but the Government would do nothing. It preferred to claim the sole use of the harbour for naval purposes. Could the hon. Gentleman quote any instance where similar action was taken in England? He could not, he was sure, and he would appeal to the Government not to pursue a policy which prevented the establishment in the proximity of these Irish harbours of works which would give employment to large numbers of persons. Let them abandon their dog-in-the-manger policy. There was another matter he desired to bring forward. People living on the western seaboard were much interested, naturally, in the fishing industry; indeed, without the fisheries many of them would find it difficult to live. They had time after time asked that these fisheries should be protected against the raids of foreign trawlers. True some steps had been taken in that direction by the Government in the last year or two, but the vessels employed for the purpose were not fitted to cope with the energy of these trawlers. Only two vessels had been told off for the protection of the whole of the coast there, but their speed was less than that of the steam trawlers which they were sent to look after. He had repeatedly asked questions on this matter.

submitted that this question ought to be raised on another Vote.

claimed that he was fully entitled on the Admiralty Vote to discuss this question. Irishmen had exactly the same right as Scotchmen to have their fisheries protected, and in view of the fact that they had to con- tribute towards the cost of the Navy and supplied so many of its sailors, he trusted that the Admiralty would more effectually protect their fisheries.

thought the right hon. Gentleman the member for South Antrim, who was formerly at the Admiralty, and who he regretted was not still there, was in error in supposing they were not in order in raising the question of the protection of the Irish fisheries on that Vote. Members representing Irish seaboard constituencies were constantly getting complaints that in the matter of protection for their fisheries the Irish people did not get fair treatment in proportion to the amount they contributed to naval expenditure. It was not the fault especially of the present Government, successive Administrations had shown equal neglect of Irish claims in this respect. Several questions had been addressed that year to the Secretary to the Admiralty upon the question, and a number of cruisers had as a result been put on to patrol Irish waters, but it was well known that they were insufficient in number and too slow for the duty. Meanwhile the work of destroying the Irish fisheries was proceeding.

When this matter was discussed on a previous occasion I asked for particulars of any single case of dereliction of duty, and undertook to see that it was not repeated. No communication on the subject, however, has been made to me.

said he had no information that would warrant him in alleging any neglect of duty. Probably the officers on the ships there did what they could, but his point was that the number of ships was insufficient for the patrolling of the Irish coast. Wexford fishermen had bitterly complained to him of the depredations of foreign trawlers, and it was a notorious fact that these foreign steam trawlers were constantly raiding the fishing grounds. He appealed to the Admiralty to put on more efficient ships, and a greater number of them. This appeal should have the sympathy of every representative of a seaboard constituency and particularly when it was remembered that none of the expenditure of thirty-two millions by the Navy provided any employment in Ireland. He would make an appeal to some of the hon. Members opposite—who probably hated and detested everything he himself did—to support this reasonable demand he was now making on the Admiralty. Then he came to the question of Berehaven Harbour. He utterly denied that there was any exact similarity between the treatment meted out to English harbours and that of which complaint was being made in regard to Berehaven. Surely it would be possible so to arrange the mercantile traffic as not to interfere with naval needs? It was not necessary that the Navy should have the whole of the harbour. Such action would not be tolerated in connection with an English harbour. Before he sat down he would like to ask if he were at liberty now to discuss the treatment of Roman Catholic chaplains in the Navy.

^* : That cannot be done at present. We must first dispose of the motion for the reduction of the salary of the First Lord.

^* said that for three years he had been protesting against the manner in which the Wexford fisheries were being raided by steam trawlers. For a long time he was told that no vessel was available for their protection, but now one had been procured by the Irish Board of Agriculture for the purpose, and it had already made several seizures. Unfortunately, the delinquents were only fined £5, and that was not sufficient to act as a deterrent. He heartily endorsed the appeal for further protective measures.

said he desired to make an appeal on behalf of the North of Scotland fisheries.

^* : There is a separate Vote for the protection of the fisheries of Scotland.

I rose to ask for another cruiser for this purpose.

^* : The hon. Gentleman would be out of order in doing so now. He can do so at the proper time.

thought the proper time was upon the Vote for the salary of the First Lord of the Admiralty, and for that reason he believed he was quite in order in calling attention to this matter. But he had another question to ask, Would the Admiralty place another training ship on the coast of the North of Scotland?

thought it would be more convenient to discuss the matter under the Vote for Training Ships.

said that, as the representative of the Admiralty had practically admitted the whole case he had ventured to put before the Committee on the first point to which he called attention, and on the second had promised to deal with it on another occasion, he would withdraw his motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Original Question again proposed.

^* said the matters on which he proposed to address the Committee had not been instigated by any newspaper or other publication. There was an item in the Estimates of £15,600 for the salaries of the Controller of the Navy and designing officers, including the Director of Naval Construction and his assistants. In a recent debate on the designing of His Majesty's ships it was alleged by the representative of the Government that the matter was sufficiently disposed of by the circumstances that one officer of the Controller's Department, Sir William White, had taken the whole responsibility upon himself. Many hon. Members were anxious to know whether that responsibility was a personal or vicarious one, and that point was never made clear, and some hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House who tried to force the matter and give some effect to the doctrine of official responsibility were none too well considered by the Government. But Vice-Admiral FitzGerald on 20th June took upon himself to write to The Times , manifestly in consequence of the debate, a letter in which he spoke of the responsibility in the matter of the Director of Naval Construction as being analogous to that of the colonel of a regiment, the manager of a business firm, or any other chief who, though nominally responsible for all that goes on, "must, and does to a large extent, hang by the necks of his subordinates." But that House, in view of the story of the royal yacht, had received no satisfaction of any kind, and was left in this positions that when a great catastrophe happened—for it was nothing else, in view of the discredit brought upon British naval construction by an incident of that kind—instead of a statement by the Admiralty setting forth how the accident happened, who was really responsible for the miscalculation of the cost, how it came about, what steps had been taken to prevent a repetition of the occurrence, whether she would be safe and satisfactory for the King's service—though questions were asked on all these points, none of them were answered. Anxiety was now felt as to other ships of the Navy, and the Admiralty had done nothing to dispel that anxiety. The letter of Vice-Admiral FitzGerald in The Times threw a side light on the official sense of responsibility. No attack was made in the debate on Sir W. White's professional character. The strongest remark was that of the hon. Member for Chester-le-Street, who said that in the case of a private firm the responsibility would have been traced to some individual, and he would have been dismissed. But Vice-Admiral Fitzgerald complained of attacks made in the House on Sir William White, and said they could only be "the outcome of jealousy and malevolence, or gross ignorance" on the part of "self-constituted critics," and he likened hon. Members of the House who discussed the matter to "a pack of snarling critics" at the heels of Sir William White, "striving to blacken his professional reputation, whereas to black his boots would be a distinguished honour for most of them." He would attach no value to such words, were it not for the negligence of the House in performing its duty in connection with the Navy of the country. The House should take a more active concern in the administration of the Navy than it did, and insist upon having a committee to deal with Admiralty expenditure, concerning which it might put such questions as it pleased so as to give the House and the country some guarantee that we were not liable, in the principal ships of the Navy, to great errors and catastrophes. Suppose this Vice-Admiral of whom he had spoken hoisted his flag and were sent away to a foreign station to conduct affairs of his country, and, either by his own act or that of the officers under him. lost his squadron. Could he turn round when spoken to and say, "I take the whole responsibility upon myself. I do so handsomely and every one who criticises me does what is wrong, and I shall declare they are not fit to blacken my boots"? This would be throwing over everything like responsibility. He wished to know why the First Lord of the Treasury, to whom they looked for the protection of their Parliamentary rights, did not give them, in regard to the Royal yacht, some information to show on whom the responsibility really rested. He was very much averse to granting these salaries when they were told that no one was responsible in matters of this kind, which were most damaging to the public credit. He did not wish to say anything which would reflect on Sir William White; and because he took great pains the other night to go into this matter with perfect fairness and much consideration to Sir William White, he felt entitled to defend other Members of the House who had actually been attacked and traduced by a Vice-admiral in the Navy. He should look with anxious eyes when that gentleman was allowed to hoist his flag, because he had shown them what his idea of responsibility was and how he would exercise the high functions of an admiral in charge of His Majesty's ships. But his object was to produce some effect, if he could, upon the minds of the hon. Members of that House as to their duties. He was unaware of the extent of Sir William White's responsibility, but his suspicion was that he was about as responsible as any high officer who had to trust to his subordinates. But, this accident having happened, it was the duty of the Admiralty to explain the nature of the miscalculation, to take the House into their confidence, and to let them know the truth of the matter. That would have given the House some opportunity of placing their trust in the Admiralty in the future. The course pursued by the Admiralty was calculated to cast grave doubt on the future of His Majesty's ships. Nobody in that House knew anything about the ships, except their general features, and there might be grave miscalculations in their design and nobody in that House was allowed to know anything about it. He believed that hon. Members on both sides would like to see the House properly advised and responsible for these grave matters, and would like to see some change in the existing state of things. He would not move any reduction of the Vote.

said that in naval matters Irish Members naturally took very little interest. No doubt to Great Britain and the colonies the Navy was a great advantage for the protection of trade, but Ireland had few industries to be protected and was therefore very little interested. When they asked for justice at the hands of the Government in this matter, however, they were met with a curt refusal to listen to their claims. Ireland paid much more than her proportion for the upkeep of the Navy, and as that was so he submitted that the Navy ought to do for Ireland as much as it did for Scotland and Wales in the way of fisheries protection. Over and over again the question had been raised and nothing had been done, and he would remind the Committee that the pledge given by the First Lord of the Treasury in 1899 in regard to this matter had never been carried out. He thought the Government should make some endeavour to carry out the pledges they gave to the House. This matter might appear to be a very small one to hon. Members living in a country having large industries, but to Ireland, which had no industries of any importance, it was another matter altogether. Ireland had, he thought, been very badly treated in this matter, and it was their duty to protest in every way. He also protested against the way in which the Catholic sailors of the Fleet were treated in the Service. Ireland expected when Roman Catholics entered the Navy that the Admiralty would see that their religious susceptibilities were hot outraged in the way they had been. He regretted that there were so many Irishmen in the Navy and Army.

^* : Order, order! The hon. Gentleman is not in order in discussing that matter upon this Vote.

On a point of order. Is it not in order to discuss this matter by moving a reduction of the salaries of the chaplains of the Fleet?

^* : Certainly not. If the hon. Gentleman has any objection to make with regard to the individual he can do so.

I have, Sir.

It being half-past Five of the clock, the Chairman left the Chair to make his Report to the House.

Committee report Progress; to sit again upon Friday.

Ways and Means [2nd July]

Resolution reported, "That an additional stamp duty of sixpence shall be charged, on and after the 15th day of July, on every policy of sea insurance made for time containing a continuation clause, and that if the risk covered by the continuation clause attaches and a new policy is not issued covering the risk, the continuation clause shall be liable to stamp duty as a separate policy."

Resolution agreed to.

objected to further proceeding.

said he understood that the Amendment had been accepted by the promoters, and under the circumstances he hoped that the right hon. Gentleman would not stop the progress of the Bill.

said he had no desire to stop the Bill, but certain matters had been submitted to the law officers of the Crown, and certain advice had been given which necessitated this matter being postponed for a short time.

in asking that the Bill be put down for Thursday, reminded the right hon. Gentleman the Solicitor General that the Amendments were made by the Lord Chancellor.

Objection, being taken to further proceeding, the Chairman left the Chair to make his Report to the House.

Committee report Progress; to sit again to-morrow.

reported from the Committee of Selection. That they had discharged the following Members from the Standing Committee on Trade (including Agriculture and Fishing), Shipping, and Manufactures:—Mr. Griffith-Boscawen and Sir William Hornby; and had appointed in substitution: Mr. Pierpoint and Mr. Mitchell.

further reported from the Committee of Selection: That they had discharged the following Member from the Standing Committee on Law and Courts of Justice, and Legal Procedure:—Captain Norton; and had appointed in substitution: Mr. Samuel Young.

further reported from the Committee of Selection: That they had discharged the following Members from the Standing Committee on Law and Courts of Justice, and Legal Procedure:—Mr. James Heath and Mr. Graham; and had appointed in substitution: Mr. Galloway and Mr. Flower.

Reports to lie upon the Table.

MANCHESTER CORPORATION BILL [Lords]

Reported, with Amendments; Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.

Local Government Provisional Order (Port) Bill

Reported, with Amendments [Provisional Order confirmed]; Report to lie upon the Table.

Bill, as amended, to be considered tomorrow.

Naval Works Provisional Order Bill

Reported, without Amendment [Provisional Order confirmed]; Report to lie upon the Table.

Bill to be read the third time Tomorrow.

SOUTH WESTERN AND ISLE OF WIGHT JUNCTION RAILWAY BILL [Lords]

HANDSWORTH URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL BILL [Lords]

CHESTER CORPORATION TRAMWAYS BILL [Lords]

Reported, with Amendments; Reports to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.

COUNTY COUNCILS (BYELAWS) BILL [Lords]

Read the first time; to be read a second time upon Monday next, and to be printed. [Bill 250.]

Public Petitions Committee

Eighth Report brought up, and read to lie upon the Table, and to be printed;

LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 7) BILL

Reported, with Amendments [Provisional Orders confirmed]; Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.

Bill, as amended, to be considered to-morrow.

Business of the House

On the motion for adjournment—

replying to Mr. Channing (Northa-mptonshire, E.), said that the first Order to-morrow would be the recommittal of the Finance Bill, in order to insert the clause carrying out the resolution in Ways and Means just reported to the House. The second Order would be the Loan Bill.

Adjourned at twenty minutes before Six of the clock.