I do not think, Sir, it will be necessary for me to waste many words either in justifying the general practice, now extending over more than two centuries, by which this House has rewarded those who either by sea or by land have upheld the honour and glory of this country, or in justifying the particular application of that general practice in the case of Lord Roberts. In truth it is consonant with the feeling of national gratitude that we should take these occasions, as we have constantly done, to mark our sense of the great services which from time to time have been rendered to us by our generals and by our admirals. Marlborough, Hawke, Rodney, St. Vincent, Collingwood, Nelson, Wellington, to come down to no later period, are names that at once suggest themselves among those who have earned the gratitude of the country, and among those to whom the country has not proved itself ungrateful. And besides this catalogue of names, which are on the lips of every Englishman, and which are enshrined in the hearts of all those to whom the glories of our country are dear, there are a large multitude of men distinguished in their own time who have rendered great services by sea or by land, who have held brilliant commands and won brilliant actions, whose names are now better known to the students of military history as well as to the general public. It is a long and illustrious list; and I think when we have added, as I doubt not we shall add, this afternoon, the name of Lord Roberts to that list, we shall have done something to augment the glorious character of that which is already so glorious.

The events on which we base this claim of Lord Roberts to national gratitude are so fresh in the memory of the. country and of the House, that it is not necessary for me to do more than briefly recapitulate the leading incidents of that brilliant six months which made so great a change in the aspect of affairs in South Africa. I remember well the series of disastrous incidents which immediately preceded Lord Roberts's appointment as Commander-in-Chief in South Africa. It was on the 10th of December we heard the news of the Stormberg reverse. On the 11th we heard the news of the Magersfontein reverse. On Friday, this 15th, we heard the news of the Colenso reverse. That disastrous news was, I remember, brought to us late on the Friday night, with the melancholy intelligence that we had lost in killed and wounded over 1,100 men, and among them that gallant officer Lord Roberts's only son, too soon taken from the active service of his country. The very next day, on Saturday, the 16th, we sent for Lord Roberts; on the following Saturday he was on the high seas, and three weeks afterwards, on the 10th of January, he had arrived at Cape Town. What was the situation when Lord Roberts arrived at Cape Town? Three English generals were apparently helpless in face of the armed positions occupied by the Boers. Three towns on English soil were beleaguered by hostile forces. Three great reverses had befallen three English generals. About 11,000 of the best troops of this country were entangled in Ladysmith; and the number of troops on the high seas destined to reinforce our arms was at that moment not of such magnitude, measured by mere numbers, as promised any great change in the military situation. And if any touch was required to complete the gloomy picture which I have been endeavouring to paint, it is that up to that date every single engagement had been fought on British soil, and not a single British soldier had as yet crossed the frontiers of the invading States. The Cape Dutch, or some of them, in certain districts, were, to say the least, restless. The native difficulty, always present in South Africa, had to be taken into account; for, loyal as the natives had proved themselves to British rule, in mere self-defence, and for mere purposes of self-protection, it was impossible to expect that they should remain loyal to that rule if and when it became plain that the British flag was no longer to be a protection to those who owned allegiance to it. The problem with which Lord Roberts had to deal was not, of course, a simple military problem of conflict between bodies of men equally matched in numbers and in situation. He had to deal with difficulties greater than those of mere numbers. He had to deal with a country which, from the military point of view, may be described in regard to a large part of the area as practically a desert; because it does not contain, and never has contained, the supplies necessary to support an army, which, therefore, has to be fed entirely from the base. The character of the country thus presented difficulties not unknown in the history of warfare, and the character of a country has over and over again proved disastrous to the most courageous, disciplined, and best led troops. But in this case it had this further difficulty—that, while it did not contain the supplies necessary for the maintenance of an invading host, it was covered by positions of great natural strength, which lent themselves to the peculiar tactics of an enemy whose mobility, ability of covering long distances, and power of employing the rifle have made him in his own country one of the most formidable foes with which any organised force has ever had to deal. The great space to be covered, the great difficulties of supply, the great distance from the base, the unequalled mobility of the enemy, and the character of the country—.these were the difficulties which Lord Roberts would have had under any circumstances to face, and which any general might have been proud successfully to overcome. In addition to all these difficulties, Lord Roberts had to see to the relief of Kimberley, of Ladysmith, and of Mafeking, well knowing that the fall, at all events of the first two of these places, would prove a most disastrous blow to British prestige in South Africa.

Now, Sir, what was the course which Lord Roberts, under these circumstances, adopted? I suppose that any strategist among us would have suggested, and probably rightly suggested, that the proper course to pursue was to drive a wedge in between the eastern force beleaguering Ladysmith and the western force besieging Kimberley, to threaten Bloemfontein and the communications of the Boer generals, and by so doing to compel the relief by indirect means of the two imperilled garrisons. That, undoubtedly, was the proper strategy, and it was the strategy adopted by Lord Roberts. But, had he adopted it in the simple form of attempting to go up the central railway towards Bloemfontein, the inevitable result would have been that he would have found the enemy astride the railway in position after position, and while, no doubt, Lord Roberts would have been able eventually to overcome those difficulties, the length of time, not to speak of the loss of men, which such a course would have entailed would have seriously imperiled—to put it no higher—the safety of the army at Ladysmith and of the garrison at Kimberley. Lord Roberts adopted a bolder, more difficult, more original, and more successful form of strategy. With the utmost secrecy, and at the same time with the utmost expedition, he accumulated a force, with the necessary supplies, on the Modder River. He determined to abandon the line of railway altogether; and, braving the difficulties necessarily involved in crossing, with a large army, barren and inhospitable regions, where food and water were alike difficult of acquisition, to march between General Cronje and the force on the east, and by that strategic operation to compel the relief both of Ladysmith and of Kimberley. It was a bold move, and might have failed. For, after all, the position of a force having to depend entirely upon ox-wagons for transport, and surrounded or opposed to an enemy so mobile, and having such knowledge of the country and such special means of information, must inevitably carry with it hazards and dangers. Had Lord Roberts failed, had he been compelled to retreat, while the retreat might have been, and I doubt not would have been, a brilliant military feat of arms, as some of the greatest feats of arms by some of the greatest generals the world has seen have been in the nature of a retreat, it would undoubtedly have marked a most disastrous turning point in the South African drama.

I will not remind the House of the great success which crowned this master-movement, or the surrender of General Cronje; and the other battles that took place at that period, with the final march to Bloemfontein, are all fresh in the memory of the House. But if people want to realise how great were the services rendered by Lord Roberts to his country at that critical time in our history, let them put themselves for a moment in the position of one of the enemy's generals, let us say, on the 10th of February, a month after Lord Roberts had landed at Cape Town. I think any Boer general would then have said he held all the cards in his hand. The Boer forces occupied defensive positions from which it was almost impossible to turn them. General Buller to the south of the Tugela, General White in Ladysmith, were caught in toils from which it seemed hardly possible that any skill or any bravery could extricate them. The fall of Kimberley seemed a matter of days, or, at all events, of weeks. Under those circumstances it could not but be that the Boer generals would feel that they could withstand any advance which it was in Lord Roberts's power to make until they had inflicted upon British arms a disaster which I am glad to think this country has been spared. That would have been the conjecture—by no means an over-sanguine one—of the Boer generals on the 10th of February. In three weeks or less that dream was shattered, and the whole plan of the enemy had been destroyed. Kimberley was relieved, Ladysmith was relieved, General Cronje had surrendered. The British force had driven itself like a wedge between the eastern and western forces of the enemy, and for the first time since the beginning of the war British soldiers had successfully invaded those who had begun by invading them, and the tide of battle was thrown back never, I think, to return. It will be remembered that if anything could have added to the difficulties of Lord Roberts, it was that this brilliant operation had, partly through a military accident, to be conducted on very short supplies of food, and that the men engaged in this historic enterprise—an heroic enterprise carried to a successful conclusion—were men fighting upon half or upon quarter rations, fighting cheerfully as well as fighting courageously.

After Bloemfontein I shall not pursue in detail the further military operations conducted under Lord Roberts's guidance. They were of a different character, but they were not less successful. He himself advanced with a considerable army towards Pretoria, while the two wings of the force under his command, to the west and to the east, extended from end to end a distance of not less than 400 miles. A great operation, admirably conducted. The only incident to which I need refer in connection with the occupation of Pretoria was that at the end Lord Roberts, with the intuition of. genius, saw that to hesitate before occupying Pretoria would entail| probably a long siege of that place, and all. the delays consequent upon such operations, and all the risks in other parts of. the country which it might bring in its train, and he pressed forward on a three days march with only three and a half days provisions for his troops, knowing, that he had not the wherewithal, had he been checked in his progress, to feed the forces under his command. Even in looking back upon it, it seems a great risk to take. What must have been the cheerful courage of the man who, knowing the dangers he was running, knowing also the incomparable advantages of success, if he succeeded, was ready to. dare his fortunes on a throw? Those are the men of whom this country may well be proud; those are the men whom this country honours itself in rewarding

I do not think any human being will deny that the services which I have briefly and most imperfectly endeavoured to sketch are well worthy of national, gratitude. I will not ask whether. Lord Roberts saved South Africa. That is a question which cannot be answered. I for my own part will never put a limit to the recuperative power of this country. I will never ask whether, had it not been for Nelson, we should now be a French, province; whether but for Wellington Spain and the Continent would have remained under the heel of a Napoleonic dynasty. These questions may be asked, but no one is audacious enough to answer them. But this we may say, that, had it not been for Lord Roberts, had it not been for the scheme which he contrived, had it not been for the courage, the foresight, the promptitude, and the rapidity with which that scheme was carried out—had he shown less ingenuity, less secrecy, less strategic ability, less of that rapid intuition which enables a general to seize the moment—then, Sir, I think Kimberley would have fallen; I think Mafeking would have fallen; I think 11,000 British troops would have been starved into surrender at Ladysmith. I think the timid in South Africa would have joined the enemy; I think the disloyal in South Africa would have found the courage to throw in their lot with the enemies of 'their Sovereign. I know not what the consequences of that would have been. I do not know with what eyes foreign nations would have looked upon us. I do not know what price we should have had to pay for national humiliation and loss of prestige. We might have recovered it. I believe we should have recovered. But at the cost of what national exhaustion, at the cost of what national sacrifice! Overcoming difficulties how great; dealing with obstacles apparently how! From all that we have been saved by the genius of the man whom I now ask the House of Commons to reward. And surely, as we ask our soldiers to fight our battles without mixing themselves up with those political considerations with which we have to deal, without judging of the rights or the wrongs, the justices or the injustices, the expediencies or the inexpediencies of the course which they are asked to pursue—surely, as we make this demand upon them, we may on this occasion forget those differences of opinion with regard to South Africa which have so long divided us and have produced such bitter conflicts within these walls, and all join unanimously without question. I have suggested the generous course. It is for. Gentlemen to decide how far they should follow it. That, at all events, is the course I earnestly recommend to the House as most consistent with our honour, the honour of the country, and with the gratitude which we owe to one of the greatest of its servants.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum, riot exceeding £100,000, be granted to His Majesty, to be issued to Field Marshal Earl Roberts of Kandahar, K.G., K.P., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., V.C., Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's Forces, in recognition of his eminent services during the war in South Africa."

Sir, the proposal which the right hon. Gentleman has submitted to the Committee is the natural sequel of the action taken by the House of Commons during the last two years in voting Supplies for this war. The Committee, I am sure, will gladly join in expressing its warmest admiration of Lord Roberts, of his character and his career, and its high appreciation of his great services during this war. At a moment of great difficulty he assumed the supreme command in South Africa. I will not add anything to the elaborate account which the right hon. Gentleman has given of the history and strategy of the campaign. But undoubtedly if we were delivered from the difficulty in which we then found ourselves it is in a very large measure due, not only to Lord Roberts's direction of affairs, but also to that spirit which throughout his military service he has always been able to evoke, perhaps in a degree exceeding that of any other soldier in the Army, or in the part of the Army under his command. And I think that we must not forget the circumstances in which Lord Roberts went to South Africa and undertook this great task. The word "sacrifice" is not one to be used when we are speaking of a soldier, and no one is more saturated with the qualities of a soldier than Lord Roberts, because a soldier goes where his duty calls him at the word of command, without any afterthought or consideration of himself. But Lord Roberts was an old man; and he was at that moment suffering under one of the most terrible blows that can fall upon anyone in the loss of a gallant son who gave his life on the field of battle. Therefore, although as I say the word "sacrifice" does not enter into the considerations of any soldier, we may at least find something in it to add to our gratitude. Lord Roberta deserves our warmest recognition, and such full reward as precedent seems to prescribe. I have no doubt, therefore, that the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman will be accepted by the Committee. The only observation that I imagine may be made is this, that the war is not over, and that action of this sort ought to be postponed until that consummation is attained. But I would point out at least that Lord Roberts's part in the war is over; and it is, no doubt, on that view that the Government have acted in making this proposal. I have nothing more to say except to express the certainty that the country will retain the fullest sense of the gratitude which it owes to Lord Roberts; and. that that feeling will be existent amongst our successors in all the ages to come.

Sir, I am a countryman of Lord Roberts, and when I heard the First Lord of the Treasury describe in powerful language the gravity of the crisis in which this Empire was involved when Lord Roberts was summoned to the assistance of the Government, I could not help thinking it a remarkable fact that, for a second time in the century, when the fortunes of your Empire were at their lowest ebb, you had to come to Ireland for a general for your forces. It would have naturally been expected that for the benches around me, crowded as they are by representatives of the countrymen of Lord Roberts, this occasion would be one of pride and gratification. I think it is a circumstance well worthy of the consideration of English statesmen that no such feeling exists amongst us on these benches, and that we, who are the countrymen of Lord Roberts, can have no share or part in the eulogies which have been poured out on him by British statesmen, and that we can have no share or part in granting him the reward which this House is asked to vote to him. Sir, before I state the grounds for this condition of feeling— and in this matter I speak for all the Nationalist representatives—may I be permitted to remonstrate against the language used by the First Lord of the Treasury in describing this achievement of Lord Roberts? I must confess I listened to him with amazement, and for some moments I felt a doubt creeping into my mind as to whether the right hon. Gentleman was not speaking ironically, and poking fun at Lord Roberts. The right hon. Gentleman recited to the House a long catalogue of the names of men who, whatever we may think of their character or achievements, will go down through the stream of history as men illustrious in the art of war, and great saviours of their country in time of trial. The right hon. Gentleman referred in succession to the Duke of Marlborough, Lord Nelson, Lord St. Vincent, and he stopped at the Duke of Wellington. Then he said that to that list the House would add fresh lustre by voting this grant of £100,000 to Lord Roberts. Ah! to what depth has the British Empire sunk. The Duke of Marlborough, when this Empire was small and insignificant, smashed the power of the greatest military monarch Europe ever saw by the force of his genius alone. Lord Nelson swept the navies of the nations from the seas, and established for a hundred years the supremacy of the British flag throughout the oceans of the world. Lord Wellington, with a small force of English troops,, stood against Europe in arms, and by the magnificence of his military genius defeated the greatest commander the world has ever seen. And now we are told that the deeds of these men will gain lustre from the fact that 250,000 British troops, under Lord Roberts and others, have been able to hold their own against 15,000 Boers.

Sir, while the First Lord, reviewing the campaign from the point of view of the military expert, described in glowing, language the tremendous achievements of Lord Roberts, I thought he was a little hard on General Buller and his men, for, after all, when the true story of the war comes to be told it will have to be admitted that General Buller did the bulk of the hard fighting; and I go further and say that in this connection even the unfortunate Lord Methuen seemed to be forgotten. At Magersfontein Lord Methuen had 12,000 British troops, against Cronje; while at Paardeberg, against the same gallant Boer general, Lord Roberts had 40,000 men; and yet we are told that it was the genius of Lord Roberts alone, with his 40,000 men, that, enabled him to do what Lord Methuen failed to do with 12,000. Be that as it may, history will say that all the heroism was on the side of Cronje, who, cooped up with 4,000 men in the river-bed at Paardeberg, hurled defiance for weeks at an army of 40,000 British troops, though 100 guns were all the time raining death and destruction on his wretched camp. That small body of Boers in the first battle of Paardeberg hurled back your forces in the most ignominious defeat they suffered throughout the whole of the campaign, and 1,100 English soldiers were left dead or wounded around Cronje's camp. We are asked now to accept the battle of Paardeberg and the ultimate surrender of Cronje and his 4,000 farmers as deeds worthy to be placed beside Wellington's operations on the lines of Torres Vedras, or Nelson's achievements at the battle of the Nile. That, Sir, I regard as one of the most striking symptoms I have yet seen of the degeneration worked in the public mind by the spirit of the new Imperialism.

I oppose this grant on behalf of Lord Roberts's countrymen. [HON. MEMBERS: No, no.] Yes; on behalf of Lord Roberts's countrymen I oppose it. If you doubt that we speak their sentiments in the matter, come to Ireland, and try the issue before our people. We speak also for the many families of the men who have been shamefully ignored— the men who fought at Pieter's Hill and are still fighting—the men from Dublin, Cork, and Tipperary who charged at Talana and are still in the field enduring the hardships of war, while your City Imperial Volunteers, at 5s. a day, go out to make a show, and come home to parade the streets of London as the great heroes of the campaign. Sir, the grounds upon which I oppose this grant are five: First, because Lord Roberts has conducted the war with the greatest inhumanity, and has in the course of the war committed repeated and gross violations of the well-recognised rules which now guide the warfare of civilised nations; secondly, because Lord Roberts has not dealt honestly with the public of this country or with Parliament in the information which he has given as to the nature of his operations; thirdly, because, from the military standpoint, his conduct of the war has not been a success, and the condition of things in South Africa at the present moment is a proof of this proposition; fourthly, I oppose the grant because from the political standpoint, and having regard to the future settlement of South Africa, his policy and conduct of the war has been a dismal and hideous failure; fifthly, I oppose the grant because on more than one occasion Lord Roberts forgot his duty as a military general and commander, and blossomed out in the most odious of all characters—a military politician. Dealing with the first of these objections, it may be urged, and no doubt will be urged, by some that it is an invidious thing to criticise the conduct of a general in the field who has been sent out to fight for his country. Sir, I do not admit that, I think it is the duty of a constitutionally governed country, in which the representatives of the people are supreme, that they should make it their business to see that military men do not overstep the proper limits of their authority and that they conduct the military operations in accordance with the rules of humanity and civilisation. If I were doubtful as to the propriety of embarking on this line of criticism, I have a good example to point to, for I am treading in the steps of the Colonial Secretary in so doing. Sir., this is not the first time that Lord Roberts has been denounced for sinning against the rules of civilised war. In the Afghan War, in 1879, Lord Roberts was in command, and, after declaring the Afghans to be rebels, he treated them as such and hanged them in great numbers. A violent protest was raised in this country against such conduct, and who, above all others, denounced Lord Roberts? Why, Sir, it was the present Colonial Secretary; but in those days he was in good company. In the protest he signed on that occasion against the inhumanity of Lord Roberts the Colonial Secretary was joined by the Archbishop of Canterbury.

I could go over a very wide field in criticising Lord Roberts's conduct of the war, but I confine myself to the specific points in regard to which there can be no manner of doubt as to his responsibility. The first of these is the practice of farm-burning. It was Lord Roberts who deliberately instituted this practice as the means of bringing the war to an end. The farm burning was commenced under his direction, and the great majority of farms which were burned in South Africa were burned while Lord Roberts was still in Pretoria as Commander-in-Chief. Sir, if I had no other ground on which to oppose this Vote, I would be justified in opposing it on that ground alone. As practised under Lord Roberts's directions, farm burning in South Africa was a barbarous method, directly at variance with all the accepted principles of civilised warfare. Lord Roberts in June of last year issued a proclamation in which he stated that small parties of raiders had recently been doing wanton damage and had been destroying railway bridges and culverts, which could not be done without the connivance of the principal civil residents, and that therefore they would be held responsible for property injured in the manner specified, that the houses in the vicinity of the place where the damage was done would be burned, and that the principal civil residents would be made prisoners of war. That policy was challenged in the House of Commons in December last, when news, in spite of the official censorship, began to leak out, and the Government, through the mouth of the Colonial Secretary, told us that no farms were burned except as a punishment for specific acts of treachery, and the Colonial Secretary said he had telegraphed to Lord Kitchener, who wired back that that statement was correct. Now, Sir, it turns out that the statement was absolutely false. Out of the six hundred odd farms that were burned there are only one hundred and seventy, according to the Government Return, in which it is officially claimed that the farms were burned because of acts of treachery. I do not rely merely on the statement of the Colonial Secretary, for evidently, in view of the debate which had taken place on the subject in the House of Commons, Lord Roberts was called on for a full statement of all the facts connected with the farm burning, and in the statement he furnished to the Premier of Cape Colony it was said that he found it necessary to burn the farms as a punitive measure because of interference with the railway and telegraph lines, and that the question of ascertaining which of the inhabitants were regarded as accessories was left to the decision of the commanding officers. Sir, I say that statement was meant to convey, and did convey, and can bear no other interpretation than that throughout the whole of their campaign the burning of farms was confined to cases where, after investigation by the commanding officers on the spot, the occupants of the farms were convicted either of tearing up the railway lines or of being concerned in some alleged act of treachery. After a prolonged debate in the House, we obtained at last from the Governmment the official documents relating to this practice, and, taking the evidence these documents afford us, it is clear there is not a word of truth in the statement of Lord Roberts in his proclamation or in the statement put into the mouth of the Colonial Secretary. I take the official Returns, and what do I find? In the majority of cases the reasons for the burning of farms, are stated to be, not acts of treachery, but the following, "Owner on commando," "husband on commando"; and very often the reason is stated in general terms to be for the purpose of laying waste the country. I need not labour this point. It is quite clear, as proved by Government evidence, that the statement which Lord Roberts made in order, if possible, to allay the public feeling aroused by his policy of farm-burning was false, and therefore, Sir, I say that the contention I make is perfectly justified—namely, that Lord Roberts has not dealt honestly with the public in the nature of the information he gave to Parliament as regards the conduct of his operations in South Africa. Why, Sir, in not one-fifth of the farms ordered to be burned was the burning carried out for the reason Lord Roberts alleged, and in one case, that of Potgeiter, the reason is stated to be that he "was in arms against us." It is not surprising, I say, that no one on the opposite side has had the courage to defend such barbarous conduct.

I have stated to the Committee, as my third reason for opposing this grant, that the military policy of Lord Roberts has been a failure. The First Lord of the Treasury has eloquently described the state of affairs that confronted the Commander-in-Chief when he first went out to South Africa, and he stopped his description at the occupation of Pretoria. But, Sir, the world has not ceased rolling round since then. Pretoria was occupied in June, that is more than thirteen months ago, and in claiming this recognition for the services of Lord Roberts we must consider not only the position of affairs when Pretoria was occupied, but also what the position is to-day in South Africa, and what the position might have been if the war were stopped at an earlier date. Sir, when Pretoria was occupied the war had cost this country sixty or seventy millions sterling, and about ten thousand lives. Since Lord Roberts has left South Africa, and for electioneering purposes announced that the war was over, the cost to the country has been another sixty or seventy millions and an equally large loss of life. Where are we to-day? If there is one thing more evident than another from the results of this war it is that the farm-burning and general policy of devastation have been responsible for the prolongation of the war. Even Lord Milner, whom we have to accept as the repository of all wisdom, sorrowfully admits that the period of six months after Lord Roberts left was a period of retrogression, and that at the end of it things were in a worse state than when Pretoria was occupied. To what does Lord Milner attribute this state of affairs? To nothing else than to the utter disappointment of all the hopes that were based on the policy of devastation. When you failed to crush the Boers in the field you turned your weapons against the women and children, and closing the channels of information and steeling your hearts against the cry of conscience you had to recourse to your infamous policy of farm-burning. You are trying to do in South Africa what the Duke of Alva did in the Netherlands. His policy did not succeed; nor will yours. All the calculations of your statesmen, all the genius of your military officers have been put to nought by the simplicity and bravery of the gallant Boers fighting for their homes and country. I noticed in the gloomy picture drawn by the First Lord of the Treasury regarding the position of affairs in Cape Colony when Lord Roberts went out that the Dutch were at the point of extreme restlessness. Will anyone say now that the Dutch in the Cape are less restless? After almost two years of war nearly one-half of the colony is in the hands of the rebels, and still they are progressing, and you are not able to put them down. Will anyone say that the condition of the Cape is better now than it was two years ago? You know perfectly well that it is not. I base my statement on the Standard, The Times , and the Daily Mail newspapers. It is an admitted fact that the condition of the Cape to-day is worse from the military point of view than it was at any time during the war, and it is worse as the direct result of your policy of farm-burning and devastation. Therefore I say that from the military point of view the policy of Lord Roberts has been a failure.

Turning to the political question, what are we to say of his policy from the point of view of the future settlement? Why, Sir, until Lord Roberts let loose the dogs of war on the homes of the Free State and Transvaal burghers undoubtedly there was a hope that South Africa could be saved to the British Crown. There is none now. These people and their children's children will hate you with the hatred characteristic of the whole history of the Dutch race. The Dutch people are not a people to tamely accept servitude, and you by your infamous policy have burned into their minds the conviction—which all the Lord Milners you ever may send to South Africa cannot eradicate—that the object of this war is to put the Dutch under the iron heel of the Anglo-Saxon. In their view that is the object of the war, and you, with your land settlements, your plantations of Ulster, and your confiscations of property in the Transvaal and the Free State have rooted that conviction deeply in their minds. On the day this policy of devastation, of farm-burning, was inaugurated the fate of South Africa was sealed—perhaps happily for South Africa, but not in the direction in which Imperialists in this country desire. It has been held from the days of the earliest governors, including Sir G. Gray, another great countryman of ours, who would have settled South Africa if you had allowed him, that the root fact in the situation was and is the loyalty of the Dutch population of South Africa. Well, what has become of that sentiment? It has been uprooted and destroyed by Lord Roberts and his policy of pillage, and, therefore, from the point of view of the future settlement of South Africa, the policy of Lord Roberts has been a dismal and disastrous failure. Now I come to the last point in the indictment against him—namely, that he has forgotten his duty as a soldier and become a politician. It has been the habit from time to time of illustrious soldiers to forget that they are not Napoleons, or even the servants of some great hereditary and absolute monarchs. They fail to remember that they are but the servants of a great democratic nation. The soldier who serves this country is bound to accept that situation, although it may not be one that is satisfactory to his sense of his own importance. Yet he does not always do it. We have examples of that. We remember that silly and absurd speech of Lord Wolseley in 1879, when he declared that no Government in this country—Radical, Conservative, or Liberal—would ever allow the Dutch in South Africa to get back the Transvaal or the Orange Free State, because the people of England would not tolerate it; and then, within twelve months from that time, we had the Convention of London signed. I mention that, not for the purpose of entering into debate as to whether that was a good policy or not, but because I think it is a striking illustration of the absurdity of a soldier undertaking the position of a diplomat and high potentate, and telling the world and the people of South Africa what the British people will or will not tolerate. Lord Wolseley was simply made a fool of; but Lord Roberts has adopted a still more disastrous course. He delivered at the Cape a speech which, I think, was one of the most improper ever delivered under similar circumstances by a general in command of troops. He said ploughed—ploughed by the sword and the torch. It is ready for the seed which has been sown, and you and the children who come after you will reap such harvests as may be expected from a soil so ploughed.

said the speech to which they had just listened was another illustration of how general views about the origin and cause of the war must colour the judgment on every detail. He had listened to the speech with regret. But he did not presume to condemn or criticise it. His hon. friend came of a race which in the past had suffered bitter things at the hands of the English nation. He came to the subject with memories of injustice in days gone by which had coloured his point of view. The iron had entered deeply into his soul, and if he spoke out he would not have hesitated to tell the House that his sympathy in the struggle in South Africa was really with the foemen of the British nation.

That is not my sentiment in this matter. My sympathies are with the people who are defending their liberties.

said he did not mean any injustice to his hon. friend. What he meant was that his hon. friend took a strong view that the British race was in the wrong. He could understand the attitude of his hon. friend, but regretted it; because the effect of such views as his hon. friend's being expressed with such strength was that when the people of this country were asked to consider the grievances of Ireland, their views were necessarily coloured, and they were less inclined to do justice to a strong case. It would be difficult to obtain sympathy from a people with whom the hon. Member had had no sympathy in what might have been a life-and-death struggle. Those feelings did not colour his own views; he realised the depth of the grievance of the hon. Member, but he felt that this was a matter on which no one could be allowed to deflect his own judgment out of sympathy. It was not an Irish question, but a question of the British nation on which members of the House of Commons were bound above all things to act on their sense of the obligations of nationality. The crisis through which the country had passed was so great that he could not take any other course than that of altogether dissociating. himself from his hon. friend, with whom on other occasions he had often felt deep sympathy. The hon. Member had put forward a case against Lord Roberts under five heads, which in substance came to this—that the war had been conducted by him with inhumanity, with great tactical blunders, and also with an infusion of political motives and sentiments. He would not on that occasion enter into the discussion of those matters; they had been before the House and the country for a long time. His hon. friend held one view very strongly; he held another, diametrically opposed to his hon. friend's, equally strongly. While he held that all war was a curse, he also held that this particular war had been conducted in the main, notwithstanding incidental mistakes, with a humanity and a desire for mercy which marked it out from the other wars which the history of this country recorded. If the policy of farm-burning was a mistake, it was not entered into with any sinister motive, but in the firm belief that it was best calculated to bring the war to a conclusion. It may have been a blunder, but it was a blunder committed from good motives. Why were he and many others ready enthusiastically to support this grant to the Commander-in-Chief in the late war? [Nationalist cries of "Late war?"] It was a war which was not yet ended, he admitted, but it was a war in which the present stage was emphatically distinguished from the former stages. Its present chapter was as completely dissevered from preceding chapters as it could possibly be. The warfare now was of a guerilla character, more in the nature of a police undertaking than a campaign. Serious and costly it might be, but still it was totally different from what we meant by war in South Africa six months ago. He, for his part, supported this grant on this ground more than on any other—that Lord Roberts was the man who came forward in the hour of the nation's need. When things looked black, when there had not been sufficient foresight, when the Government was not ready to deliver the country, Lord Roberts with his genius came to the rescue and effected a diversion. He once more gave confidence to the British people in their ability to carry out the task which they had set themselves; and that service was marked, though imperfectly marked, by the grant which the House of Commons was to make on the recommendation of the Sovereign. The matter could not have been put better than by the Leader of the Opposition, who said that this grant was the necessary and logical outcome of the granting of Supplies for the campaign. The hon. Member for East Mayo and his friends did not support the grant of those Supplies, and they therefore stood in a different position. Those who supported the granting of Supplies must as a necessary and logical consequence support this grant wholeheartedly and unanimously, as recognising the debt that was owed to the man who had brought the great stage of this war to a successful conclusion at a time when it was in dark circumstances, and when it looked as if the issue might have been different. The question was one on which the national sense was deeply touched. There might be greater obligations than those of nationality. But those who sat in the House of Commons, and who had undertaken to represent the country and to deal with its affairs were deeply committed to the obligations of nationality; and if they failed to respond to the real sense of the nation, they would be failing in their duty. They would have so failed if they did not on this occasion give their cordial assent and support to the proposition which had been placed before the Committee.

remarked that no attempt had been made to controvert any of the five main charges brought by his hon. friend against Lord Roberts, especially with regard to the inhuman methods and barbarous system on which the war had been conducted since he took it in hand. It was admitted by Lord Roberts himself, in his correspondence with Commandants Botha and De Wet, that the charges were well founded. War had, in fact, been waged on women and children, and he would like to know how Lord Roberts could possibly justify the Proclamation of September, 1900, which directed the destruction of farms and the complete clearing of supplies in large districts whenever an attempt was made to derail a train or to cut the wires. He submitted that it was a most atrocious order, and he was tempted to ask if it was a legitimate military operation. The farm burning was responsible for the deep feeling of hatred and desperation which now animated the Boers in the field; it was also responsible for the untold miseries and long-drawn-out sufferings of the people in the concentration camps. Lord Roberts had laid it down that if the Boer troops cut the line of railway or the telegraph wires his forces were justified in burning farms near the scene of the operation, and in destroying all empty buildings within a radius of ten miles. The policy which, it was stated, had justified Lord Roberts and the British Army in South Africa would have justified Alva in most of the proceedings carried out by him two hundred and fifty years ago. General Buller received similar instructions, but it was remarkable that the period of farm burning in South Africa synchronised with Lord Roberts's arrival and departure. They were entitled to ask did the Government still approve of farm burning and the destruction of property all over the country, where trains are derailed or telegraph wires cut. Were they legitimate operations, or were they not? Then Lord Roberts stated that because the commandoes had been broken up into smaller bands they were irregular guerillas. If that were a justification, it would have justified the French troops had they regarded the British troops as guerillas in the early stages of the war in Spain. No such claim could, however, be maintained. As his hon. friend had pointed out, after the policy of farm burning was commenced the war, which up to then had been conducted in a civilised manner in the main, was afterwards carried on in a spirit of tenfold desperation. Louis Botha's farm was destroyed. Was that because, to use the language in the Return which had been furnished to Parliament he was "absent on commando"? Was it justifiable, because the British troops were fighting men far removed from the centres of civilisation, that war should also be carried on against women and children? Humanity cried out against such a policy. That policy was sought to be justified by reference to the American Civil War, and it was stated that farm burning was carried on during Sherman's celebrated march. That was not quoting history correctly. Sherman, in order to destroy supplies on which the Confederate troops were drawing very largely, ordered that barns and outhouses containing supplies should be destroyed, but that the farmhouses, furniture, and property should not be interfered with. That was a very different matter. No doubt the British soldiers carried out their wretched work with as much tenderness and kindness as possible. But could anyone read unmoved of whole families being turned out on the veldt because the male members were fighting in the war, of furniture being ruthlessly destroyed, of little household objects being scattered, of the homes of the people being burned, and of helpless women and children being swept into concentration camps where disease was prevalent? That lesson would ever remain. Young boys growing up to manhood would, as the Dutch, from which they sprung, did, vow an eternal vow never to submit. Those boys would grow up with a bitter hatred against British rule, and the British flag under which those atrocities had been perpetrated. It was an unprofitable speculation to discuss the "might-have-beens" of history, and he would not therefore enter into the question whether the Boers after a time might not have accepted the condition of things and might not have settled down under the British flag in some kind of modified contentment. But the policy by which it was sought to bring the war to a speedy conclusion had not only lengthened the war, with all its accompanying horrors and hardships, but had rendered future content in the country impossible, and the seeds of deep racial hatred had been planted in the breasts of a people who were naturally brave.

said he desired, as an Irish Nationalist, to protest against the proposal to vote such a large sum as £100,000 to Lord Roberts. He regarded it as little better than a fraudulent proposal, because the country had not got value for the money it was asked to pay, and, therefore, to a certain extent, in his opinion, the motion was a fraud on the taxpayers. He particularly desired to oppose the Vote, because it had been said by the Leader of the House that they were adding fresh lustre to the King's Arms by putting another name on the roll of fame, and the right hon. Gentleman joined the names of Roberts with the names of Wellington and Nelson. No doubt that was part of the political game which was being played in the country for a considerable time, with a view to spreading the Jingo spirit of Imperialism over England. It was commenced in 1897, when contingents were brought from all parts of the world to take part in the Jubilee procession to show how wide the Empire was. There were hon. Members on both sides who realised deep down in their hearts that that Imperialism was a huge sham and a fraud, and that no Minister, however powerful, would dare to impose £1,000 of taxation on the colonies. If. that were attempted there would be another Boston Harbour incident. The grant before the Committee was a comparatively small one, having regard to the huge sums of money with which they were accustomed to deal. He remembered one occasion when twenty-five millions was voted in less than a minute, and only last night a sum of two millions of money was voted just as if it had only been a few pounds. He protested against that method of plunging the country day after day deeper and deeper into debt. He protested against it, not from the point of view of the interests to the Empire, with which he was not concerned, but because one-eleventh of every £1 of taxation had to be borne by the impoverished people of Ireland. From that point of view he resented and resisted, the granting of that money to Lord Roberts. Lord Roberts had not earned the money. His mission to South Africa was a dismal failure, and the message that he sent that the war was over had been proved by sixteen months, of determined fighting to be far from the truth. It was said that, as Irishmen, they should be proud of Lord Roberts. He did not regard Lord Roberts as an Irishman at all; he was an Anglo-Irishman, and his family had been connected with the Government ever since they came to Ireland. In the early days of the English occupation in Ireland, Englishmen were said to be Hiberniores Hibernis ipsis , but Lord Roberts might be said to be Angliores Anglis ipsis . Lord Roberts and his family had been identified with the effort to uphold the accursed Union which was ruining Ireland, and, therefore, it was no reproach to Irishmen that they opposed the grant, even though Lord Roberts was regarded as an Irishman. But even if he were more Irish than the Irish themselves they would oppose the grant, because he had been engaged in an unholy war, because he had issued an infamous order that farm-buildings should be burned, and because he had driven to destitution, misery, and death women and children whose only crime was—a noble one in his opinion— that their fathers and brothers were fighting for their country. Music-hall songs and the jingo writings of the Daily Mail helped to return the Unionists to power, but now the Government and the Daily Mail were in hand-grips, and he hoped they would continue. There was an old saying in Ireland that when rogues fell out honest men came by their own. He did not believe that the sentiment of the country which had been referred to existed. Let the Committee compare what occurred during the Crimean War, and what was now occurring in South Africa. The men who at first dared to oppose the Crimean War were hounded down, but later any man who supported it dared not appear before the people. That would happen also in connection with the inglorious and infamous war in South Africa, and when the Government had failed to root out national sentiment in South Africa, the reaction would set in and the people would realise that they had been engaged in a game of the most costly description, the only result of which had been to bring dishonour on the arms of England and to impose enormous burdens of taxation on a people already seriously handicapped in the race for the commercial supremacy of the world. No more inopportune time than the present could have been chosen by the Government to bring forward their motion. No intimation had been given to the House of Commons at any stage of the session that such a grant was intended, until last week, when it was casually mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House. Almost from the first day of the session they had been engaged in voting supplies for the war, and the Government were acting injudiciously and improperly towards the taxpayers in piling up taxation in such a manner, which should have to be repaid in the long run by the people. The party system in England was a very unfortunate one. A Government engaged in piling up taxation might by a turn of the wheel get out of office and their successors would then have to find the means to meet the liabilities which had been incurred. He did not admire the conduct of the Liberal party in connection with the war. If they had taken a bold, manly attitude towards it, their position would be infinitely better in the country. When the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Monmouthshire was Chancellor of the Exchequer he put the finances of the country on a sound commercial basis and left a surplus.

^* : The hon. Member is getting a long way from the resolution now before the Committee.

said that it was a question of finance, and the means by which the grant would be provided should be taken into consideration. He would not pursue the argument further except to say that the Government were absolutely reckless as to the amount of taxation they imposed. From that point of view he was entitled to protest against the manner in which the Government had dissipated the large surplus they found on entering office. If the present extravagant course of conduct was pursued, the finances of the country would be in even a worse plight than they were at present. With reference to the motion, he believed Lord Roberts's conduct of the war was a dismal failure, and that it would be more just to the taxpayers if, instead of voting him £100,000, the Government looked out for another general to prepare for any great emergency that might arise. If England were engaged in war with a Continental Power, where would she find any man among all her generals to take the place of Wellington? There was not such a man. In his opinion the vast majority of the British generals were not fit to command a corporal's guard. The only man-who really deserved any credit was a Roscommon man, named French, who seemed to display all the military ability shown in the war. That being the position, it was merely carrying on a game of Imperialist bluff to try and delude the people of England that Lord Roberts was a great general, and that he led the nation out of terrible difficulties into Comparative peace and success. That was all humbug. He therefore supported strongly the motion for the rejection of the Vote—all the more as no more discreditable episode had ever occurred in the history of England than the destruction of farmhouses in South Africa. When England wanted to destroy a nation, she burnt Mown the dwellings of the people, exiled the women and children, and gave them no chance of obtaining the ordinary means of subsistence. That was the game tried by Mountjoy three hundred years ago in Ireland, when he left the whole of Munster a field if human bones. The Irish people were not exterminated by that terrible scourge, and he believed also that the Government would not be able to exterminate the Dutch people in South Africa.

^* said he had hoped to have heard a more vigorous protest from the Opposition benches against this proposal, but in the absence of that protest he felt bound to state his own objections to this proposal. He dissociated himself from expressions of indifference to the welfare of the Empire from Members below the gangway; he cared a great deal for the honour and welfare of the Empire, and, because he cared, he protested against what was done in the name of the Empire, by Lord Roberts. He also dissociated himself from the remarks of the hon. and learned Member for Haddington, that this was not a question of right or wrong as of nationality. There could be no more immoral doctrine than that we must stand up for our country, right or wrong. He did not intend to spend much time in discussing the point whether this Vote ought to have been brought forward before the war was over; neither did he propose to discuss it from the point of view of giving money to those who already possessed wealth, while the wives and children of the men who were fighting, and the widows and orphans of those who had fallen, were very poorly provided for. It seemed to him that the generosity of the Government would have been much better if it had been shown towards the wives and children of the soldiers. What he desired to deal with was the extraordinary proclamation issued by Lord Roberts in South Africa. He agreed with much that had been said on this subject by the hon. Member for East Mayo. He protested against the populations of these two States in South Africa (after they had been annexed on paper) being treated as rebels. That kind of thing was unheard of in civilised warfare. With regard to farm-burning and the laying waste of the country, that was a point upon which he felt most strongly of all, because such proceedings were contrary to the laws of war. The destruction of a railway was a perfectly legitimate operation in time of war, and in Lord Wolseley's "Soldier's Pocket Book" would be found elaborate details for the carrying out of such an operation. Yet Lord Roberts gave orders that wherever the railway was damaged the district within a ten-mile radius was to be devastated, and the nearest homestead was to be burnt. This practically meant that a homestead was to be destroyed because the owner was not able to prevent a few men from making a night attack upon the railway. To devastate some 300 square miles, or, roughly speaking, 200,000 acres of land, as a reprisal, seemed to him to be downright and absolute barbarism. In conclusion, he wished to say that during the fifteen years he had been a Member of the House of Commons he did not know that he had ever given a vote with less hesitation than the vote he was about to give against this proposal.

said that the First Lord of the Treasury had stated that during the past two centuries there had been frequent precedents for grants of this kind being made to military commanders. It did not follow, however, that it was desirable that the House should follow those precedents. He had not been a Member of the House of Commons for two centuries, but if he had, he should have opposed every one of them. During the time he had been a Member of Parliament several grants had been made to military generals, and he had invariably opposed them. He had not taken into consideration whether any great deed of war had been performed. He had never yet been able to understand why in the world they should give these large sums to military men who did their duty efficiently. Why should they not also give grants to civilians who did something for the benefit of their country? Why, for instance, should they not give a grant to the hon Member for Haddington? The hon. Member for Haddington had just spoken in favour of this grant, and he had frequently made speeches which were very valuable to his country, and yet no hon. Member of this House got up to move that the hon. Member for Haddington should be given a large sum of money for his great services to his country. There were distinguished men in civil life, eminent statesmen, inventors, authors, and many others who had done more good for mankind than any military men could ever do, and why should the latter be selected for special reward? There were more reasons against this course being taken than for it.

Take the case of a general who wished to distinguish himself. They had some thirty generals, and perhaps one would be as good as the other. One would be selected to take charge of a certain campaign, and the fact of him being selected made him exceedingly fortunate, because he would get all the glory. He got, in fact, more than the glory, for he got the cash as well. Besides this, a general who distinguished himself as the head of one of these wars always got an exceedingly good billet afterwards. He was not going to question whether a general received too much money or not, but a certain gratuity was always given to those who took part in a war. A unit went to the soldier, and this was gradually increased through the ranks up to the officers and the Commander-in-Chief. That seemed to him to be quite a reasonable thing. Lord Roberts received this, as well as the others, and he received more in proportion, for he would get some £2,000 by this general grant.

Lord Roberts came home and he became Commander-in-Chief, and his salary as Commander-in-Chief was increased from £4,500 to £5,000 per annum. Therefore, he thought it was a great mistake to say that military services were very poorly paid. In the lower ranks of the military services they were very poorly paid, but the man who commanded one of these expeditions successfully always got one of these great prizes. He could perfectly understand that when a great war like the Napoleonic war was finished, after a fight like the Battle of Waterloo, a large sum of money would be voted to the Commander-in-Chief. That, however, was no exception to the general rule, but it was no precedent why the present Commander-in-Chief should be given such a large sum as this. He was not going to go into the question, whether this war was right or wrong, but he thought that the First Lord of the Treasury had spoken in somewhat exaggerated terms of the services which. Lord Roberts had performed in connection with this war. The First Lord of the Treasury stated that, owing to the follies and stupidities of his own Government, they had almost lost South Africa when Lord Roberts was sent out there. The right hon. Gentleman had indicated that Lord Roberts proved himself to be such a military genius that he had saved this country from the loss of South Africa by a war which was brought about by the present Government and. the Colonial Secretary. That was hardly a correct statement of the facts. God forbid that he should attempt to. follow the First Lord of the Treasury in, an essay upon strategy. He knew as little about strategy as it appeared to him the First Lord of the Treasury knew,, judging from the speech which the right hon. Gentleman had delivered. When Lord Roberts was sent out Sir Redvers Buller was relieving Ladysmith, and the mess we had got into was owing to the Government from the beginning insist- ing upon Natal being defended from the Boers, and on Kimberley being protected because Mr. Rhodes was there. But General Buller had not the whole of his army with him, and it was only when Lord Roberts, with a large force at his disposal, arrived that he was enabled to force his way to Pretoria. Lord Roberts did all this, but then he had the soldiers to do it. As the Emperor Napoleon once said Providence was usually on the side of the biggest battalions, and if they had on one side 50,000 trained soldiers and on the other side a quantity of armed peasants, amounting to about 40,000, defending their own country, it was evident that they ought to be able to push forward to their capital.

While he did not complain in the least of Lord Roberts, he yet thought that he had shown himself to be a very poor political guide. When Lord Roberts reached Pretoria he thought that the Boer resistance would collapse, and he announced that the war was over. He had evidently forgotten that he had to deal with a whole nation in arms against England. Lord Roberts announced that the war was over, and he had no doubt that Lord Roberts believed what he said. He did not believe for a moment that he intended to deceive the public. It was very unfortunate, however, that he did send that information home the very day after the dissolution had been announced, and, whether Lord Roberts was right or wrong, unquestionably he did a very great electoral service to the Conservative party. Hon. Gentlemen opposite would be ready to admit that they went to the country upon the statement that the war was over, and they were returned to this House. The election was fought on a false issue, and now they had the political misfortune of having a Conservative majority instead of what there ought to have been, according to the normal state of things, a strong Radical majority. But the war was not over even at the present moment. The hon. Member for Haddington had said that in a certain way the war was over. He presumed that the Boers had a right to defend themselves as best they could, and the hon. Member might describe their conduct just as he liked. They had been spending £1,500,000 per week ever since Lord Roberts pro- nounced that the war was over, and, whatever the hon. Member for Haddington might call the operations which were now going on, he thought that every practical man would say that the war was not over, although the conditions had changed.

If the Government had intended to make a grant to Lord Roberts before the war was over, why did they not propose it when he first came home? Suddenly, at the end of the session, while the war was still going on, the Government sprang upon the House a large Vote for Lord Roberts, which, if it was necessary at all, ought to have been moved for when Lord Roberts came home. At the same time, as a little incidental thing, the Government have introduced a Supplementary Vote of £6,000,000 for the war. He thought Lord Roberts had been treated very unfairly in this matter, for when he came home he deprecated all honours shown to him on the ground that the war was still going on, and because he thought those honours should not be heaped upon any individual while the war was going on. He honoured Lord Roberts for that statement, but, if he wanted no honours, surely he did not wish to take this money until the war was over. Lord Roberts had never asked them to do this, and he was sure that he thoroughly deprecated the proposal which had been made by His Majesty's Government. They had read in the newspapers the statement that Lord Roberts should be given a large sum of money because he had been made an Earl. Lord Roberts was already a baronet when he was raised to the peerage, and he did not know that there was any distinction between an earl and a baronet in regard to the question of spending money. It was not the noblemen who spent the most money, for the greatest spendthrifts were generally South African millionaires, and if they wished their nobility to compete with these gentlemen they would have to give them, not £100,000, but £200,000 or £300,000 per annum. There was no difference between an earl and a baronet so far as spending money was concerned, and therefore Lord Roberts did not require any extra money in order to maintain his dignity as an earl. They granted this hereditary title to Lord Roberts, and they gave him a large sum of money in order to provide for those who might succeed him. After a sovereign had given a title to a man, was it not absurd to say that they should also maintain his dependants as persons living upon the taxation of this country?

He also complained that the Vote which was now proposed was most excessive. What did the Duke of Wellington get when he finished his great war? He got £200,000. Surely they were not going to say that if the Duke of Wellington got £200,000 for the battle of Waterloo, they were justified in giving £100,000 to Lord Roberts for this wretched little war in South Africa, for no one could compare that great war with the present struggle against the Boers. Lord Wolseley got for Tel-el-Kebir between £30,000 and £40,000. Lord Kitchener got £30,000 after the Soudan War was over, and Lord Roberts got £12,000 after his campaign in Afghanistan was concluded. What did General Moltke, who was at the head of the Prussian Army, receive? General Moltke only got £40,000, a sum which was not charged on the German taxpayer, but paid out of the loot obtained from the French. He suggested that the Government ought to give Lord Roberts some shares in some of the rotten South African mines. The cost of these operations in South Africa was entirely out of proportion to the magnitude and importance of the war itself. It was not a great war. and they could gain no great national glory by it. The individual soldier had shown his valour, but. when they talked of gaining great military and national glory there seemed to him to be a great want of proportion between the combatants which was entirely overlooked. This mighty Empire was fighting a nation of farmers, and, although English soldiers might manœuvre better than the Boers, history would say that the national glory of this war was on the side of the Boers, and not on our own side.

Hon. Gentlemen opposite seemed to have a perfect mania for spending money. They thought it was a grand thing to have a big Budget. They spoke of the war in South Africa as a great war. Their newspapers said, "See what a rich country we are! We have spent £200, 000, 000 upon this war. What a brave race we are!" If they took what the newspapers said—and the Government was very much under the influence of the Daily Mail and other newspapers —they would see that the party opposite were always very glad to get a reason for spending a little more money. Let them consider what the grants made to generals had already been. Let them consider the grants made after the campaigns in Egpyt and the Soudan, and the grant made to Lord Roberts himself after his campaign in Afghanistan. He should have thought that if this grant had been £30,000 or £40,000 it would have been a far more reasonable proposal. He had no objection to large sums being voted for the soldiers themselves and for the widows and orphans of those who had fallen, and in his opinion it was more desirable the House should distribute money among those unfortunate people who were without the comforts and even the necessaries of life than that they should heap huge sums upon particular individuals. This Government was ready to give a large sum of money to Lord Roberts, while at the same time they stinted the amount of money given to the families of those who had lost their lives or to the families of those who had been disabled during the war.

He had made no attack upon Lord Roberts personally, for he believed him to be a kindly and a brave man. He thought, however, that he had been carried away by his desire to finish this war too quickly, and this ambition had led him into committing acts which he believed were contrary to the usages of war. He would mention one question as a case in point. It was by the order of Lord Roberts that the women and children in the refugee camps received half rations if their husbands or fathers were engaged in hostilities against this country. No one could justify that order, and when the news that it was being enforced came over to England after attention had been called to it in this House the order was withdrawn. He had no doubt that Lord Roberts was a most gallant soldier, but he voted against this grant on the general ground that it was a bad and invidious system to give large sums of money to military men and not to give it to civilians who had distinguished themselves equally. He did not think that this war was so important, from a military standpoint, that it justified them in giving a large sum of money to the Commander-in-Chief, however well he may have behaved in this matter. He entirely agreed with his leader—[Ministerial cries of "Which?"]—he answered to the name of Campbell-Bannerman. He agreed with his leader in thinking that it was most extraordinary that the Government should not have waited until the end of the war before proposing this grant.

said he did not object to His Majesty bestowing any mark of favour he pleased upon Lord Roberts at his own expense, but this was a motion to dip the national hand into the pockets of the taxpayers to the extent of £100,000. He thought they were entitled to ask for what reason this special sum of money was being bestowed upon the Commander-in-Chief. Like the hon. Member who had just sat down, he agreed that this sum was out of proportion to the sums granted to other military commanders for military services. Certain men in the nation chose the Army as a profession, and on rising to the rank of a general they were entitled to receive a certain salary for the performance of their duty. He understood that previous to the outbreak of this war Lord Roberts's salary was £4,000 a year. Most of the time that Lord Roberts and other generals were receiving this salary, fortunately for the nation, they were practically unemployed. When war broke out they were called upon to perform the duties for which they were paid, whether during peace or war, and it seemed monstrous that in addition to their salaries large sums should be voted to them by way of gratuity at the end of the war. The distinction made between the general in command and the soldiers in the field was one which required more than passing attention. The right hon. Gentleman, in referring to the campaign, spoke with justifiable pride about the men who had served their country at a time of great need, and who had fought most of the time upon half rations. Thousands of those poor men had come home wounded, and hundreds of them would return no more. What did the Government propose to do for these men and those dependent upon them? [Nationalist cries of "The workhouse."] Those wounded men went out to South Africa healthy and strong, and served their country faithfully and courageously, and yet to-day they were dependent upon the charity of others, and in some cases upon the public rates, for the means of keeping life within them. Cases of this kind ought to have a prior claim to any proposals to honour the Commander-in-Chief.

There was another class of case which also deserved prior consideration. His Majesty the King was recently bestowing medals upon those who had returned from South Africa, and some eighty or ninety of those who had fought their way through the campaign refused to receive their medals at the King's hand simply because they could not get their wages out of the Government. The promises made to those men had not been kept. There was another question upon which he thought they were entitled to have a direct answer. He wished to know if Lord Roberts had been consulted in reference to this grant. When he came home Lord Roberts refused to accept private hospitality, while the war was going on, and what reason had they now to believe that he was willing to accept this national mark of appreciation of his services while the war was as far from being over as it was at the period when he refused this private hospitality.

He now proposed to give some reasons in detail why the House should refuse to vote the sum which it had been asked to vote. The First Lord of the Treasury had drawn a comparison between Lord Roberts and the great generals who had gone before him, and he finished up by alluding to the Duke of Wellington. The right hon. Gentleman also added that Lord Roberts's career would add lustre to the great record of those generals who had gone before him. He had taken the trouble to refer to Hansard upon this subject, and he found that, at the end of the last campaign conducted by the Duke of Wellington, Mr. Benjamin Disraeli, speaking upon the grant made to the Duke of Wellington, said that that could be said of the Duke of Wellington which could be said of no other general, namely, that he captured 3,000 cannon from the enemy, and never lost a single gun. Mr. Disraeli also said that the greatness of the exploits of the Duke of Wellington were even surpassed by other difficulties which he had to encounter, for he had to encounter a feeble Government and a factious Opposition. It was for such services as those that the Duke of Wellington was voted £200,000. He did not want to pose as an authority on military strategy, but he knew that it was an accepted fact among the military authorities of practically all countries, and by many military authorities at home, that the military plan of Lord Roberts in South Africa was a failure, and was responsible for the long-drawn-out continuance of the war. The truth was that Lord Roberts was more concerned with theatrical displays than with solid, substantial work. Lord Roberts rushed on to Pretoria without securing the country as he went along, and that fact alone had been largely responsible for the continuance of the war. Lord Roberts also misread the situation in South Africa, and did not understand the character of the people opposed to him, and these two errors had cost the country more than it would be able to pay for generations.

There was another aspect of the question for which Lord Roberts was primarily responsible, and which should not be passed over—the proclamation issued by Lord Roberts that the war was over, that all who were found in arms in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State would be treated as rebels, and the farm-burning and the inhuman treatment of women and children which followed were contrary to the rules of warfare laid down at the recent Hague Convention, which were accepted by this country, and placed a stain upon the annals of the British Army. When Lord Roberts declared the Free Staters and the Transvaalers rebels, simply because they were defending their own country, he was acting directly contrary to the Hague Convention. Besides this, he also complained of the great destruction of private property which had taken place in South Africa. The terms of the Hague Convention were as clear and explicit upon this point as language could possibly make them. It was laid down clearly that property was to be respected and that private property was not to be taken, unless a receipt was given in exchange. It was also laid down by the Hague Convention that people were not to be punished collectively for the acts of individuals, which they had no power to hinder, and that no pressure should be put upon the citizens of conquered territory to accept the oath of allegiance, and that no proclamation should be effective until the occupation of the territory had been effected. In all those particulars and respects Lord Roberts by his conduct of the campaign was guilty of violating the terms of the Hague Convention. He issued his proclamation before he was in possession of the country. He gave orders that people were to be turned out of their homes, and he threatened that the property of those in the field should be confiscated unless they surrendered and took the oath of allegiance.

Lord Roberts endeavoured to induce those brave men to act the part of cowards by deserting, for he offered them special terms both for themselves and their families if they would surrender. Fearing that this bribe might fail, Lord Roberts inflicted additional hardships upon the women and children of those in the field. It seemed to him to be the most scandalous incident in the whole campaign when Lord Roberts, over his own signature at Pretoria, informed the Boers that the women and children who had been left behind by them in towns occupied by the British forces would be sent on to the Boer commandoes still in the field. It was quite bad enough to destroy their homes without threatening to send the women and children adrift. Amongst those poor women was the aged and dying wife of President Kruger. It was for acts of this kind that the Government proposed to place an honour upon the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army. To make war upon women and children was quite bad enough, but to make war upon an aged lady, whom Lord Roberts knew was stricken by disease, and was. in consequence, unable to accompany her husband to Europe, was a deed for which there was no excuse. He opposed this grant because he believed it was wrong in principle, because it had not been earned by the recipient, and because it was opposed to the opinion of the mass of the I people. He did not believe that there was a constituency in England, much less Scotland and Wales, where the granting of this Vote would be endorsed by a popular vote. The Government and the newspapers were trying to bluff the nation into believing that this was a right thing to do, and speakers upon public platforms were putting forward as an excuse for supporting this Vote the fact that such grants had been made before. At a time when taxation was going up by leaps and bounds he did not believe that any man would be taken in by the argument that this House was justified in voting this large sum to Lord Roberts. He believed that this Vote was entirely wrong in principle, and that the nation would not endorse it. This grant had not been earned by the recipient, and he should divide the House against this motion. He was certain that if the matter could be tested by public opinion the nation would endorse with practical unanimity the attitude of opposition which he and other Members adopted to it.

said that anyone who had listened to the noble and sympathetic speech just delivered by the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydvil must admit that he had expressed the sentiment of a man of the people. He had no hesitation in declaring that this war had been conducted by Lord Roberts with the maximum of cruelty and the minimum of humanity. His hon. friend the Member for East Mayo had not unnaturally spoken in indignant terms of the horrible hypocrisy of Lord Roberts's speech in Cape Town in December last, when he simply took a page from the history of Oliver Cromwell and gave it to the people in South Africa. He had listened to the speech of the First Lord of the Treasury with very great interest and pleasure, but he could not help thinking that the right hon. Gentleman had been skating on very thin ice. Nobody was able with greater success to trade on the ignorance of his fellow-creatures than the first Lord of the Treasury. He had told the House that they would make this grant to Lord Roberts and sink all mere political considerations. He thought the Financial Secretary to the War Office gave the right hon. Gentleman a few tips in the course of his speech. The right hon. Gentleman had drawn a glowing picture of this victorious warrior, and no historian had ever written such a glowing picture of the Balaclava charge as that which had been drawn by the right hon. Gentleman upon the Front Bench to-day concerning the deeds of Lord Roberts. Lord Roberts was at the head of 250,000 trained soldiers, and all he had done was to unsuccessfully endeavour to suppress two small communities whose joint population was not so great as the population of West Ham or of the county and the city of Dublin put together. The Boers had actually captured more British soldiers than the whole total of their own force in the field, and had they possessed anything like equal numbers in South Africa, the Boers would have driven the British Army into the sea.

It had been said that Lord Roberts had been brought before them simply as a military man. He had no unkindly feeling for the soldier who did his duty, but he did dislike the soldier-politician, and his charge was that Lord Roberts from first to last throughout the campaign had been a soldier-politician, and a jingo soldier-politician. On the eve of his departure for South Africa he issued a manifesto to the Americans by way of furthering the great Anglo-Saxon alliance. That was the act of a politician. Lord Roberts went out to South Africa with two proclamations in his pocket. He had power to annex those two countries just at the psychological and what moment did he choose? He chose the fourth of July as the day on which to issue his proclamation of annexation, and he made much of the fact that the surrender of Cronje took place on the anniversary of Majuba. Since that time the Boers had furnished them with quite twenty Majuba Hills. Moreover, Lord Roberts refused leave to an hon. Member of the House to visit the hospitals at Bloemfontein, because he knew that any disclosures might prejudice the result of the General Election; he unduly applauded the men of the City Imperial Volunteer Regiment, who had returned home, while the working soldier was still fighting at a shilling a day and starving into the bargain, and throughout he was only thinking of highly placed individuals, whom he pushed in every way, at the expense of the working officer and soldier. Lord Roberts's conduct of this campaign had been most properly denounced by the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydvil as one in which every advantage had been given to the wealthier classes as against the poorer. Lord Roberts throughout the campaign only thought of the highly placed individuals Who was the man who raised the British flag at Pretoria? It was the Duke of Westminster. Another noble Lord raised the flag at Bloemfontein. How did they treat the Volunteers and the Imperial Yeomanry who were in danger of being deprived of their means of livelihood, because they were kept in South Africa longer than the period for which they contracted, while the dukes and lords were allowed to go to and fro just as they pleased. He asked the First Lord of the Treasury some time ago if he would give the House some of the correspondence which passed between the Cabinet and Lord Roberts with reference to the precise day on which the war ought to be over, for the purposes of the General Election. The right hon. Gentleman assumed his most virtuous tone and said he would not give him any information. He had, however, endeavoured to get that information. For four weeks before the General Election the oracles were dumb, the press censors not allowing one item of news of importance to come from South Africa, because it would not serve the purpose of the Government. But Lord Roberts's own despatches, recently published, were interesting as showing what was going on when the General Election was on the tapis . During the four weeks preceding the General Election, no news was given to the country with respect to the captures made by the Boers in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, and until Lady brand had been relieved there was not a single notice that the place had been besieged. Rustenburg had also been besieged. He was glad that the press censor was present in the House, and he would correct him if he was wrong. There was one surrender which was never allowed to be officially announced, and. again, a battle in which twenty-six lives were lost, no news of which was given to the country at the time. That would not have suited the purpose of the heroes who were going into Parliament at the Election. It was a curious thing that Lord Roberts knocked down generals just in the same way as a child would knock down ninepins. Whenever anything went wrong down went a general. There were ever so many people who came under the lash of Lord Roberts's highly judicial tone —a Daniel come to judgment, with a jingo tail behind him. Sir Redvers Buller, Sir Charles Warren, Sir William Gatacre, and Sir Henry Colvile had fallen under the lash of Lord Roberts. They were not in favour with the gold millionaires whose finances were involved in this war. Lord Methuen, the hero of Graspan, Modder River, Belmont, and Magersfontein, was still in South Africa. Was Lord Methuen still there because he was an original shareholder in the Rhodes company, or because he was a society peer?

^* : What has that got to do with the Vote?

said he would show that. He was impeaching Lord Roberts's fairness and discretion. [Ministerial cries of "Order," "Withdraw," "Cowardly," "Name," and "Divide"; and Nationalist cries of "Shut up," and "Bullies."] When he made that observation in reference to Lord Roberts he was thinking of letters which he had in his possession from heartbroken parents whose children were destroyed by the blundering at Magersfontein. Methuen's despatches in reference to Magersfontein were never published. With regard to the policy of farm-burning, the hon. Member said that what had been done was scarcely paralleled in the blood-stained annals of Turkey One farm had not been mentioned, and that was the farm of the gallant De Wet. He was glad that Lord Roberts was the man who burned the farms. If it had been Lord Kitchener, he thought that general would have burned De Wet's family too. Referring to the military government of Johannesburg, the hon. Member asked how Lord Roberts acted in that matter. There was scarcely a position in Johannesburg which had not been given to mine-agents or people in some way connected with the mines. There was a horrible and odious incident for which Lord Roberts was directly responsible—the so called trial of Cordua, and his execution, which was a foul act. Lord Roberts was in Pretoria in August last year, and there were a considerable number of Dutch there who had taken the oath of allegiance. But what occurred? It was almost inconceivable except that they knew similar things had been done in Ireland. The Government sent a half-Greek, half-Spaniard to induce these men to break the oath of allegiance, and the boy Cordua was seduced by this man. It only reminded Irishmen of the acts of the Government thirty years ago, when spies were employed to capture Fenians by going to Catholic chapels. [Cries of "Divide," and a Nationalist Member, "They're afraid of the truth."] The press censors prevented news coming from South Africa on the pretext that they were afraid it would reach the enemy, hut it was the enemy in this country they were afraid of. He had asked questions again and again about what was going on in South Africa, but he had sometimes been unable to elicit the information he desired. Colonel Kekewich, the gallant commander at Kimberley, was constantly obstructed by Mr. Rhodes during the siege. When General French relieved Kimberley, Rhodes ordered Kekewich out of his room, and yet Rhodes was praised. Were the Government afraid of Rhodes? Why was it that Lord Roberts took no notice of that? When he asked a question on the subject he was told that Lord Roberts had his own motives for this. What were these motives? Now that they were to give him £100,000, they ought to know the faith that was in Lord Roberts. Did hon. Gentlemen know that the war would have ended as far back as June, 1900, but for Lord Roberts? Very important and interesting despatches had been published. Sir R. Buller recommended that there should be an armistice, and that the Boers should have some little terms of independence. But Lord Roberts insisted on unconditional surrender (cheers). Hon. Gentlemen who were cheering should remember that two or three of their colleagues had lost their eldest sons in the war since the policy of unconditional surrender was announced. That was over eight months ago, and since then 124 officers and 1,450 men had been killed in action. The war was said to be over in September last— nearly a year ago, but it was still going on. The Commander-in-Chief, having the instincts of a gentleman, refused a complimentary sword six weeks ago because the war was not yet over, and he did not wish any public acknowledgment until it was fully accomplished. The hon. Member had never lost an opportunity of denouncing this war and all its ways. He had not made a speech on the subject since the closing day of last Parliament. Since then he had been at the gates of death, but he thanked God he was able once more to denounce this abominable and organised iniquity.

said that in opposing this Vote he had no intention whatever of taking the course adopted by previous speakers, of indulging in a series of diatribes against Lord Roberts. He had no hesitation in accepting without serious comment the eloquent tribute which had been paid to him in regard to the conduct of the war by the First Lord of the Treasury. But many hon. Members on the Opposition side of the House objected to the grant on grounds apart from any criticism of Lord Roberts's conduct of the war. It was a painful thing for him to come and oppose any honour that could be conferred on Lord Roberts, but—

"Peace hath her victories, No less renowned than War";

and he thought the First Lord had neglected an opportunity he had when, he did not allude to the great services Lord Roberts had rendered to the Army in times of peace, and especially in the matter of temperance. Lord Roberts had bestowed much care on the material interests of the private soldier in connection with improving the condition of barracks. The improved discipline and efficiency of the Army was a consequence of the encouragement he had given to movements of that kind. There was only one blot on Lord Roberts's administration in India, and that was in regard to cantonment prostitution; but he would not enter into that subject at present. They objected to the grant on account of the excessive and disproportionate amount asked for in respect of the services he had rendered in South Africa. If they compared it with previous grants it would be seen that the amount was excessive, and in proposing such a large sum the Government were establishing a dangerous precedent. Let it be compared with what had been paid to Lord Roberts for more distinguished services. He conducted a brilliant campaign and led a brilliant march in Afghanistan, but for his services there was only voted £12,500. The Egyptian campaign was as great as what was involved in Lord Roberts's services in South Africa, bat for these services Lord Wolseley only received a grant of £30,000 or £40,000, and Sir Beauchamp Seymour received only £20,000. There was no greater justification for the proposed Vote of £100,000 to Lord Roberts than for those votes. He objected to separate treatment of one particular branch of the public service. The Civil Service had its records of achievements which would compare with any that any general ever secured. If the great Civil Service was prepared to do its work and carry on its great enterprises without looking to these monetary rewards, coupled with honours, he thought the military service might do the same thing. Lord Roberts as Commander-in-Chief received £5,000 a year, the same salary as the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Treasury; in fact, it was the top salary paid for official services. A Vote of £100,000 out of the taxpayers' money in addition to various honours was an outrage on the sense of the House. It was in accord with the general extravagance of the present Government. It was time the Government got out of the extravagant frame of mind they had got into in consequence of the war. For these and other raesons he should oppose this Vote, and in doing so he believed he should be voicing the views of many hon. Members around him.

My hon. friend who has just sat down said that £5,000 a year was the largest salary paid in the Civil Service, but I think he must have omitted to notice on the Treasury Bench a gentleman who receives about £20,000 a year for the great services he renders. [An HON. MEMBER: Not in salary.] Yes, it is largely salary; at any rate, the salary is more than £5,000. I have not risen to comment on the financial aspect of the question, but to state in a few words the one reason which will guide me in the vote I am about to give. I speak simply for myself, and anybody else who may care to agree with me. I share to the full the sentiments expressed on this side of the House below the gangway in objecting altogether to these grants on principle. I have never during the fifteen or sixteen years I have been in Parliament voted for any special grant for any special services. I believe it has been laid down by the Admiralty that special rewards for special services are contrary to the best interests of the service. I share in the general objection to grants of this kind, but a special reason animates me in this case. I am not going to deal with the war, the conduct of the war, or the policy that led to the war. I take no notice of any of these matters, but there is one point which has not yet been noticed, and I think it deserves the attention of those who represent the Government in regard to this Vote. Let me recall to the House what happened at the beginning of this session and the session before last. Eighteen months ago the war in South Africa appeared to be in a dangerous position, and public opinion was rising against those who were supposed to be responsible for its mismanagement. It was rising in particular against the generals who were conducting the war. The press, which had been most anxious in promoting the policy of the war, was loudest in denouncing the generals, the War Office, and the Government. Things were so critical at the beginning of the session before last that I think it was a matter of prudence and necessity for the Government to do what it did. It came down to this House and promised an inquiry into the whole conduct of the war. That inquiry has been promised again and again, and no member of the Government has ever in his place or outside the House repudiated that promise. I do not suppose that the right hon. Gentleman opposite would seek to repudiate it now. We want to know whether the Government still adhere to the promise that the whole conduct of this campaign is to be the subject of an impartial, de lib rate, and complete inquiry? If that is the policy of the Government, and I do not see how they can declare any other, how can they ask us now, before the inquiry has taken place, to pass judgment upon one portion of that inquiry by voting the sum we are asked to vote for Lord Roberts? The conduct of the war includes the conduct of the general in complete command of the troops. Therefore I say if the Government adhere to the pledge they gave and repeated so often, the proposal they now make is premature. Prematureness has marked the whole conduct of the Government in reference to this unhappy campaign. The return of Lord Roberts was premature, and I venture to think that the General Election was premature. The peerage to Sir Alfred Milner was premature. Why should he or anyone else in the civil or military service be rewarded before the war is over, before the House or the country have the means of pronouncing judgment on the campaign? If the First Lord adheres to the pledge that there shall be a full and complete inquiry, I protest that the fact that this inquiry has not taken place, apart from all the other general grounds I have mentioned, would be for me a reason not only sufficient, but obligatory, to go into the lobby against this Vote.

said he would not be doing justice to his constituency if he did not oppose this grant. He came from a city which would go down in history as an example of English treachery and bad faith. He had no hesitation in calling the enormous sum they were asked to vote to Lord Roberts "blood money." It was money granted as the price of the blood shed and the misery entailed in South Africa during this nefarious and unjust war. When the impartial history of this war came to be written, it would bring the blush of shame to the cheek of every honest English gentleman. The great majority of the Irish nation had denounced this war from beginning to end. The Government had plunged into this war in the most reckless and cruel manner. They were asked to vote this great sum of money to Lord Roberts. Why should not the private soldiers who fought the battles be better provided for? Why was the money due to them withheld, and why had the maimed and wounded in some cases to go into the workhouse, when it was proposed to grant so much to one man? The Nationalist Members had no desire to come to this House at all. They wished to be allowed to carry on their own business in Ireland, and the sooner the British Members came to realise that the better. They were not sent to this House for any other purpose than to fight, and they would do so as long as they were here.

^* pointed out that the hon. Member's remarks were not relevant to the question before the Committee.

said he was wandering away from the subject with a purpose. He had got out all he wanted to say on that subject. He had raised his voice against this grant, and, please God, he would give his vote against it.

said he was a countryman of Lord Roberts, but he felt that he would be false to the opinions he held and in his duty to those who had elected him if he did not associate himself in every particular with the views of his hon. friend the Member for East Mayo. The Nationalist members knew well that the views they held with regard to the conduct of the war were not the views of the majority of the members of this House, and they were likewise aware that the views they enunciated with regard to Lord Roberts were distasteful to a large extent to many members, but they were sent to the House to speak the opinions of those who elected them. The horrors of this war had been brought home in a dismal way to the mansion of the rich and the hut or cabin of the poor, and Ireland was no exception in that respect. While he said those people had his condolence, with respect to his own country he said— although it might appear unnatural to some people—he could not have that regard for them that he had for Englishmen because he thought it was a humiliating sight to see his fellow countrymen doing the bailiff's work for England in destroying the homes of people in South Africa. Roughly speaking, the people of this country had pronounced in favour of the war and in favour of the methods with which it had been pursued, and the Nationalists regarded with admiration the courage of the small minority in this country who had protested against the war and the methods used by Lord Roberts and although they had been subjected to intimidation, which had been encouraged in high quarters, they had held their own, and the people to whom they appealed had in most cases honoured them by returning them to this House. From the commencement of the war those whom the Nationalists represented had raised their voices against it and against the methods with which it had been pursued. He ventured to say that Lord Roberts had not added to his reputation by the conduct of the war in South Africa. He went to the war with something like 250,000 men at his disposal, and if he had found it necessary to ask for more he would have had more. [Cheers.] Quite so, but whom had he against him? He had against him something like 25,000, or 30,000 at the most, of untrained farmers. The way in which these men had fought and had wolloped the British on many occasions was not very much to the credit of Lord Roberts. He would read an extract confirming what he had been saying. On 20th February last a letter was published in The Times dated Pretoria, 21st January, which said—

Lord Roberts had spoken as if it was an unpardonable crime that the railways should have been blown up. But nothing was more justifiable according to the laws of war than the blowing up of railways where it was desirable to cut off the supplies of the enemy. The Boers were perfectly justified in their action, but Lord Roberts was not justified in his action. By what right or title did he call these men, bravely fighting for their homes, "rebels"? That was only a manœuvre to justify their being dealt with as rebels. They were rebels in no sense of the word; and to call them rebels would not redound to the credit of Lord Roberts; they were a brave and chivalrous race, true champions in defence of their hearths and homes. He would like to say candidly that he wished he could speak more favourably of a fellow-countryman.

He was something of a sentimentalist in regard to his country. For his own part he liked to see the success of anything Irish, even of an Irish horse, or an Irish dog. He remembered well when Master McGrath won the Waterloo Cup how they all rejoiced. He wished, therefore, that he could congratulate his fellow-countrymen; but as an Irishman representing Waterford, where Lord Roberts's family had lived for generations, he felt he would be false to his own convictions if he did not protest with voice and vote against this grant to Lord Roberts. He maintained that future generations, looking with a dispassionate eye on the proceedings in South Africa, would say that Lord Roberts had not acted with generosity towards the brave Boers—a handful of unarmed peasants. [Cries of "Oh, oh," and laughter.] The verdict of history would be that these were brave, unarmed men, and not the miserable caricatures to be found in the music-halls and theatres. Hon. Members opposite could not belittle these brave men without belittling themselves. They ought to praise the valour which the Boers had shown on many a hard-fought field.

said that while the hon. Member for Waterford argued that he was speaking with regard to Lord Roberts as representing his constituents, he as representing his own English constituency held that that constituency entertained absolutely contrary views in regard to the Com- mander-in-Chief. He had every intention of supporting the Vote, and he was only too glad to know that on this occasion he should be following the Leader of the Opposition, who had in the debate expressed his approval of the grant to Lord Roberts. He felt confident that that decision of his leader would give the greatest satisfaction to the great majority of the Liberal party in the country. He regretted that one hon. Member sitting on the Front Opposition Bench had thought it right to say that he was going to vote against the grant because the Government had refused an inquiry. That was not the question before the House. The question was whether the House was prepared to refuse to recognise the services of Lord Roberts to this country; and that was the only question on which he was going to vote. As to the merits of the war, and as to the details of the conduct of the war generally, he held himself perfectly free to criticise the Government at the proper moment. The question was, did they believe or not that Lord Roberts had served his country well in this war?

If for no other reason, he would have risen from these benches to show that there were some Radicals who had not the slightest sympathy with the statement of the hon. Member for South Donegal that Lord Roberts had conducted the war with the maximum of cruelty and the minimum of humanity. He repudiated the suggestion that Lord Roberts had carried on the war with the maximum of cruelty and the minimum of humanity. They had been told that Lord Roberts had lent himself to electioneering tactics. He regretted that such a mean suggestion had been put forward from any section of this House. He had not the slightest doubt that during the election certain Conservative candidates had in the most unjustifiable way tried to exploit Lord Roberts. They tried to hoodwink the electors by alleging that in voting against Conservative candidates they would be voting against Lord Roberts, and against our generals and our soldiers. Some of them, he regretted to say, sat on the Front Treasury Bench at the present moment; but the great majority of Conservative candidates did not stoop to that mean and contemptible way of getting votes. Many of them, indeed, repudiated the suggestion in their own districts, and fought the election perfectly fairly. It was very unfortunate to mix up the Army with politics in this country, and we had always hitherto kept the Army entirely aloof from politics. He was perfectly certain that Lord Roberts had never lent himself in any way to play the part of a party politician in this matter. It had been said that this war was not an important war from the military point of view. He was not speaking there as a soldier, but as a civilian, and he held that this was a most important war from the point of view of our nation and our great Empire. From the way that the colonies had rallied to us in every part of the world, we saw that they understood that we were not only fighting for South Africa, but for the Empire. He believed himself that the great majority of the electors of this country looked upon this war as a question of the Empire, and were ready to put their country before party considerations.

said he wished to say a few words in order to explain that his opposition to this Vote did not arise in the slightest degree from the very strong views he entertained as to the justice and expediency of the war. He believed that the soldiers had absolutely nothing to do with the justice or injustice of the war in which they might be engaged. It was their duty, as Lord Tennyson had said, "not to reason why," but to do their duty or die. But it was the duty of members of the House to learn the reason why; and if he abstained from supporting this Vote to Lord Roberts it was not on account of the views he held as to the justice of the war. He associated himself with a number of speakers on that side of the House who objected very strongly to these military Votes as distinct from similar Votes which would not be granted for civil services. He would not go so far as to say that under no circumstances would a Vote of this kind be justifiable, but he thought it should only be granted in a very rare and exceptional case. In this generation, within the last thirty or forty years, we had made these Votes of little value by continually passing them on the most trivial and unexceptional occasions. He had voted against the grants to Lord Wolseley for the Ashantee War and to Lord Kitchener for the Soudan War, in which the ordinary military operations ought to have presented no difficulties whatever to civilised and highly disciplined troops as against half-civilised and badly-armed native levies.

This war certainly could not be said to be a small war. It might be said that it was a war against undisciplined men, in our sense of the term; but these men were certainly not wanting in military capacity, while their bravery was unquestioned. This war was a great war, but its greatness was due entirely to the extraordinary military capacity and almost superhuman bravery shown by these two small nations, whose adult male inhabitants capable of bearing arms did not amount to over 30,000 or 40,000, but who had to attack and meet from first to last ten times their numbers, and who were still carrying on the war in a way that had nonplussed our ablest generals. He said it was a great war, but the greatness was on the part of the Boers. [Cries of "Oh, oh."] Who would say that there had been any greatness or any military capacity displayed on the other side, when they had 250,000 disciplined English troops opposed to 20,000 Boers? But there were other considerations in this matter, which, even if the war had been conducted between equal numbers of Boers and English, would make it impossible for him to support this Vote.

To justify such a grant as was now proposed to the Committee, the war should not only be a great one, but the services rendered by the recipient ought to be conspicuously great, and show conspicuous and exceptional ability. He ventured to say that no one would assert that the services rendered by Lord Roberts were conspicuous or brilliant. They had not been even decently successful—to say nothing of brilliancy or signal success. He doubted whether there was a military man living in the country who did not regard the military reputation of Lord Roberts as having been lowered rather than increased by this war. [Cries of "Oh, oh."] His firm belief was that that was the impression of the Army, and that Lord Roberts's reputation as a military commander stood higher before the war than now. He was, with other hon. Members, quite willing to disclaim any knowledge of military strategy; but it was not necessary for a man to have military knowledge to judge of the results of military strategy. A man might see when a thing had come to an end without having been able to take part in it himself, and they could say whether the strategy of any great general had been fully successful or not. The admissions of Lord Roberts himself proved that his strategy had not been successful. When Lord Roberts said twelve months ago that the war was over, that proved that it ought to have been over, and when Lord Milner months ago said that the position in South Africa had retrograded rather than advanced during the previous six months, it proved that Lord Roberts's strategy had been a complete failure. [Cries of "Oh, oh."] Well, but what was the result? Was the war over when Lord Roberts alleged that it was over? However, he did not want to elaborate that point any further.

After all, the strongest grounds he had for opposition to this Vote was the methods by which this war had been carried on by Lord Roberts. He maintained that these methods were not creditable to Lord Roberts, and were totally opposed to the traditions of the British Army. [Cries of "Oh, oh!"] Did hon. Members say that it was according to the traditions of the British Army to destroy villages and burn farms? He would quote an authority greater than Lord Roberts himself. He had got the life of Lord Clyde, by General Shadwell, and in vol. I. page 241, it was stated— wards Lord Clyde, Sir Charles Napier said— of Lord Roberts had surpassed that of Wellington or Napoleon he would have declined to vote a single shilling to him, because he had disgraced British troops and British traditions by resorting to practices of this kind. [Cries of "Oh, oh!"] This policy had not only been cruel and barbarous, but it had not had the miserable merit of success. It was admitted that it had not only been a military error but that it had infuriated the Boers and infused new courage and determination into them. The failure of the peace negotiations was due to this more than to any other course. Having annexed the country we should have to govern the people, and how would that task be facilitated? By the enormities which had been perpetrated? Those who held opinions such as his were told that when they denounced these atrocities they were charging the British soldier with barbarous conduct. He did not believe the British soldier to be immaculate—it would be, absurd to expect any army to consist of men who were perfect—but, making that allowance, he believed that there had never been a war in which the combatant soldier had acquitted himself with less brutality. The evidence of the Dutch women and people testified to that. Letters from privates, corporals, and sergeants showed that they deplored the work—some of them called it the beastly work—which they had been called upon to perform. There was no charge against the private soldier. That charge was against the military authorities, the generals in command, and the authorities in this country who sanctioned the atrocities. He looked with horror to the result in the immediate future. It seemed to him that there was a great danger of famine arising in that country within a short time. The natural products of the country had been entirely destroyed, and it was as much as the railway could do in time of peace to supplement the natural supplies for the support of the civil population; while there were now, in addition, the army of 250,000 troops. It should be remembered that the entire provender for the whole community had to be purchased in England or elsewhere, and transported to South Africa. Not only were the railways unequal for the transport, but the harbours on the sea-board were in- sufficient to receive and discharge all this food.

^* : Order, order! The hon. Gentleman is travelling far beyond the Vote.

said that that was the result of the policy of denudation which had been inaugurated by Lord Roberts. However, he did not wish to continue the argument, because he knew that apprehensions about the future and evil prophecies were of very little value in this House or anywhere else.

I do not think it necessary to reply to the charges made against Lord Roberts: I think they fall by their own weight. Every aspect of this question—at any rate, every aspect hostile to the Vote—has now been developed at great length and with great elaboration, and I venture to press the Committee now to come to a decision.

said he agreed with the hon. Member for the Eifion Division that the military services of Lord Roberts did not call for this vast sum. The First Lord of the Treasury had said that Wellington and Lord Roberts were about equal in attainments. To a certain extent he agreed with that. He had been reading Lord Wolseley's "Life of Wellington," in which he dealt with the Waterloo campaign, and the inference he drew from that was that Wellington won the battle of Waterloo by the greatest fluke in history.

rose in his place, and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put."

Question put, "That the Question be now put."

The Committee divided:—Ayes, 257; Noes, 108. (Division List No. 381.)

Question put accordingly.

The Committee divided:—Ayes, 281; Noes, 73. (Division List No. 382.)

Resolution to be reported to-morrow; Committee to sit again upon Friday.

said he desired to move a reduction of this Vote, which had in creased with horrible and alarming rapidity during the last few years. The programme of the Navy League, an association founded some years ago, appeared to be to carry on an agitation for the purpose of increasing without limit the Votes in Supply for the Navy. Three years since he had ventured to express the opinion that if £8,000,000 or £10,000,000 were added to the amount voted to the Navy it would not have the slightest effect in removing the fears of those gentlemen that sufficient money had not been spent for shipbuilding in this country. All that he prophesied had occurred. They had gone from one increase to another, and this year the claims exceeded in intensity those which had occurred in previous years. While he quite understood that from the English point of view there was a good deal more to be said for expenditure on the Navy than for the extravagant expenditure on the Army, he thought the time had come for the Imperialists of the House to bring forward some comprehensive scheme which would throw a portion of this intolerable burden upon the colonies and tbe other portions of the Empire who shared the protection afforded by the Navy. It was a monstrous thing that Ireland, which derived least benefit from the money spent upon the Navy, should be compelled to contribute her full proportion, whilst wealthy and progressive countries like Australia, Canada, and New Zealand should be let off scot free. The time had certainly come when those who held that Great Britain must have a fleet as large as the combined fleets of Russia, France, and Germany were bound to bring forward a scheme providing that all the colonies should contribute their share of the cost according to their trade. He begged to move that the Vote be reduced by £1,000,000.

Amendment proposed—

"To leave out '£5,306,500,' and insert '£4,306,500' instead thereof."—( Mr. Dillon. )

Question proposed, "That' £5,306,500' stand part of the Resolution."

, in supporting the reduction, said he thought before the House was tasked to vote an additional £5,000,000 for shipbuilding the repre- sentative of the Admiralty should give some explanation with regard to the £4,500,000 obtained by Lord Goschen, when First Lord of the Admiralty, and still unexpended. That it had not been expended he believed was due to the unbusinesslike procedure of the Admiralty. Foreign Governments could come to this country and get their ships built to time, but directly money was granted to the Admiralty matters were so bungled that they could never get their ships built to time. England looked to the Navy to save her from the defects of her military machine. The Admiralty had lately gone in for submarine boats. Having heard of what the French were doing with submarines, the British Admiralty had gone to New York and bought a boat from an Irishman named Holland, and it was a curious thing that the Admiralty should have been compelled to go to an old Fenian, as Holland was, to assist them in this matter. The British fleet was deficient in numbers and inefficient in quality in every part of the Empire, as was shown by the articles written by Mr. Arnold White. In Australian waters the Russian fleet was sufficient to mop up the old tubs which England had got there. In Chinese waters Japan was able to do the same. In North American waters there was the same state of things; whilst in the Mediterranean waters the British fleet was outclassed at every point. In those waters there were ten British ships confronted by fourteen French ships of the same class, whilst Russia had a ship in the Levant. Now the House was asked to vote more money for shipbuilding. What had become of the £4,500,000 which Lord Goschen had obtained? The House had had no sufficient guarantee from the Admiralty that the money had been properly applied, and would not be justified in voting the sum now asked for. The hon. Member for Gateshead had shown how deficient was the fleet in the matter of boilers; he had proved that the boilers used in the Navy were useless for the purpose. It was true that they were French boilers, and the question would be asked, no doubt, how it was that a boiler found to be so superior in the French Navy was so useless in the British Navy; but the explanation was that the English were so stupid that they could not manage, these boilers. The natural result would be that in time of war British vessels would be outclassed. The Secretary to the Admiralty had not yet communicated to the House the result of the theatrical race between a ship with the Belleville boilers and one with the old cylindrical boiler; but the fact that the French could get better results out of this boiler than the English went to prove that there must be something deficient in the men who worked these boilers in British ships. Hon. Members smiled, but he remembered the smile which went round when he pointed out some defects at the outbreak of the war in South Africa. The French had given up defensive for offensive tactics, whereas British ships were kept most of their time in harbour, and never had a chance to go to sea in rough weather and—

^* : Order, order! The hon. Member is not in order in discussing that matter.

said he objected to the Vote because so much of the money would fall upon Ireland. The fleet was an insurance for sea traffic. Ireland had no sea traffic—they had not a one-thousandth part of the sea traffic of Great Britain, and it was monstrous that they should be asked to contribute one-twelfth of this expenditure when they got no value for their contribution. On the other hand, the great colonies over sea had a much larger sea traffic than Ireland, and did not contribute one penny. He thought the House was entitled to demand an explanation under the circumstances why Ireland should be asked to pay one-twelfth of this expenditure and the colonies nothing.

entirely agreed that Ireland had not so much commerce as the colonies, and that while Ireland was called upon to pay an enormous contribution the colonies, with the exception of Cape Colony, paid nothing. They had heard of great schemes for the federation of the Empire, but he thought the Government should submit in a definite form to the colonies the question of whether or not they were prepared to bear their share of the expenditure on the Navy. When it was first proposed to increase the Navy the reason given was that we had a small Army, and as it was undesirable to increase the Army we ought to increase the Navy, and that a strong Navy would save expenditure upon the Army. He believed the statements then made and voted for the increase, but what had happened since?

^* : Order, order! The discussion as to whether money should be spent on the Army or the Navy is not material to this Vote.

said we were told first that we ought to have a Navy equal to the combined fleets of two great Powers, but it seemed we were now to go beyond that; it had been conclusively proved that we were not trying to equal the navies of two Great Powers, we were attempting to have one-third of the entire naval force of the world. The members of the Navy League were never satisfied. There ought to be some check put upon this reckless expenditure; it was simply a ridiculous game of "beggar my neighbour," which might beggar us as well as other countries. We ought to attempt to convince the world that we did not wish to dominate the sea.

^* : Order, order! That is not material to this Vote, but would rather come in on the Vote for the Foreign Secretary's salary.

quite agreed, but was afraid the right hon. Gentleman was not in the House. This Vote included money expended on the repair of the royal yacht. That vessel was supposed to cost £300,000, which was in all conscience sufficient for the purpose, but when the ship was built by a wonderful naval authority it would not stand upright. The ship, which was to cost £300,000, had, through the stupidity of the Admiralty, cost £500,000, and if the same principle was adopted all along the line it would be found that we were spending £2,000,000 more on every £3,000,000 than we ought to spend. He hoped the Secretary to the Treasury would keep his eye upon these matters, and see that the new ships which were to be built were built a little better than the royal yacht had been.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes, 229; Noes, 56. (Division List No. 383.)

Resolution agreed to.

said that this resolution had been passed through the House with indecent haste. It had been introduced in the small hours of the morning, and the House had been expected to commit itself to a serious policy involving a great charge to the taxpayers of this country, without knowing in the least what they were doing. This policy was a grave departure, involving grave obligations that would be drawn in its train, of an unrealised and uncertain character. The least the Government might have done, had they any regard to the precedents of the House, would have been to put down a resolution of this character at u reasonable hour, and that the Secretary to the Treasury should have made some statement. The hon. Member for South Belfast said not a word until the Vote was blocked. The original endeavour of the Government was to get this Vote passed through Committee sub silentio between the hours of one and two in the morning, a procedure entirely without precedent. It was quite true that the Secretary to the Treasury got up and made a statement, but he gave no particulars of the grounds upon which the Government recommended this policy to the House. The hon. Gentleman intimated merely that this was a formal preliminary stage, and that by passing the resolution the Committee did not commit itself to anything, that the Bill would then be introduced, and the House would be free to discuss the Bill, and to come to a decision upon it. The debate then took an extraordinary development. The hon. Member for the City of Waterford pointed out that there was no urgency; that it was a matter talked of in connection with vague Imperialistic schemes for the consolidation of the Empire. All these things had been spoken of, and speeches made indicating various proposals, and this proposal among the rest had been adopted, but the House had no idea that they were in any way tied to this proposal, and the hon. Member for Water-ford pointed out that there was no urgency. It was therefore unparalleled that in a session like this, when it was all but impossible to drive the business of the Government through the House of Commons at a reasonable time, that a proposal like this should be sprung upon the House. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer made the most extraordinary statement he ever heard. While a few minutes before the Committee had been invited to pas; the resolution upon the specific assurance that their hands would be perfectly free the right hon. Gentleman got up and explained that the House of Commons was no longer free in the matter; that a contract having been entered into the money would have to be raised. It was perfectly monstrous; the whole thing had been settled by the Colonial Secretary behind the House of Commons, and they had to pass the Bill whether they liked it or not, and the Government having a majority, they would no doubt pass the Bill.

But in that case he would make a proposal to the Government. As he understood that the Government were prepared to sit on indefinitely, a Committee should be appointed, and should immediately withdraw from the House and see if there was sufficient food in the precincts, as he did not apprehend that the Government had any desire to starve out the men who were commandeered for this discussion as they were attempting to starve out the Boers. What was the proposition before the House? The words of the resolution entirely bore out what he had stated on the previous evening. The proposition was to lay the whole of this obligation on the Consolidated Fund of this country; £2,000,000 were to be raised, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer was to have power forthwith to raise this money. He had been told that that was not the case, and that the colonies had arranged to raise thirteen-eighteenths. It was perfectly frue that the colonies had agreed to pass Bills pledging themselves to pay thirteen-eighteenths of any loss there might be on the working capital, but the whole of the risk was fixed upon the taxpayer of this country, and if there was any dispute the outlay of all this money would fall upon the taxpayer. The whole £2,000,000 was charged on the Consolidated Fund, which would be responsible for it.

There was another aspect which had not been touched upon at all. Surely it could not be that the Government had undertaken to lay a cable between Vancouver and Sydney—a cable which would, immediately it was laid, come into competition with the cable companies—without having an understanding with those companies. Were the Government going to enter into competition with the great cable companies without any exchange of opinion with them? He could hardly believe it, and the cable companies were not so dead to their own interests as to allow a great competing line like this to be laid down by the people of this country without considering the effect it would have upon them. What were the communications which had taken place? What were the understandings that had been arrived at? Was there any arrangement as to a fixed minimum charge? What was the principle upon which these cables were to be worked? He did not pretend to have any violent interest in this matter, but he thought it would be an extraordinary proceeding in any Bill the House would sanction that where there was a great enterprise in which an enormous sum was invested, and which had been worked for years, the taxpayers of this country should be pledged to a great competing line without any arrangement being made with the shareholders of that great enterprise. That was an aspect of the question which ought to be considered. There was another aspect which had been alluded to on the previous evening. This was not a question like that of the Uganda Railway, a railway through a savage country; this was a question involving great political principles, one, which might have great consequences in the future, and involving also an awful additional expenditure. Once this principle was accepted, and there was an all-British cable, as it was called, running from Vancouver to Australia, then in the same way a cable to South. Africa and a cable to China, and, in fact, cables in all directions all over the world, would be required, all under the control of the Government. Was that the decisicn that the House was required to come to to-day, without any reference to the burden which might be put upon the country in the future? Why should the taxpayers, overburdened as they were by the crushing weight of the present expenditure, subsidise these lines? Why were they to subsidise a cable between two great progressive and wealthy British colonies which did not approach within 8,000 miles of this country? If Canada and Australia required a cable to be laid between those two countries they should be able to find the capital themselves, without coming to the unfortunate taxpayers of this country. He thought they were entitled to demand from the Government some statement of the grounds on which they asked the taxpayers for this subsidy.

thought it would have been more convenient, and in accordance with the usual practice of the House, for hon. Members to have the Bill in their hands prior to entering into a discussion on it. The hon. Member had asked for a statement as to what was proposed, but he would venture to reply that the one he made in the early hours of that morning was sufficient to show the nature of the Government proposals. There was not a shadow of foundation for the suggestion of the hon. Gentleman that there were agreements between the Government and the existing telegraph companies in connection with this matter which had not been disclosed. The hon. Gentleman spoke as if everyone had been taken by surprise by this proposal. It was made as long ago as the Colonial Conference of 1887, it was repeated at the conference of 1894, and a Committee which inquired into the matter presented a Report to the House in January, 1900, in favour of the proposal. He was a little surprised at the tenderness for vested interests displayed by the hon. Gentleman, who seemed to think it unfair that the Government should assist in the construction of a cable which might in some measure compete with lines constructed by private enterprise. If the hon. Member would turn to the Blue-book he would find a letter from 'the Colonial Office which fully answered that contention. The Government did not think that the laying of the proposed cable would injure existing companies. It was their hope and belief that the traffic passing over it would be to a large extent new traffic created by the increased facilities given, and not traffic won away from other lines. The House had never laid down the principle that the fact of one great company having a monopoly was sufficient to prevent the Government of this country or the governments of the colonies, if they thought fit, either subsidising or carrying out a competing enterprise; indeed, all the legislation by Parliament in regard to municipal undertakings was directly contrary to any such principle. The hon. Gentleman had complained that the Government was taking upon itself the whole burden.

The whole liability.

, con tinuing, said the fact was that His Ma jesty's Government had undertaken to raise the money required, because it would not be an economical arrangement that each of the Governments concerned should separately raise its share; but the colonial Legislatures had passed legislation accepting their share of responsibility for the interest and sinking fund and for any extra cost there might be above the receipts in the early years of the working of the cable. The hon Gentleman had suggested that thi country had no necessity for a cable of this kind. He could not agree with him; on the contrary, he would have said that the fact that these great colonies were so deeply interested in it was sufficient to give this country an interest in it, and the Government could not and would not lightly refuse their co-operation in a great Imperial undertaking when it was asked for by those self-governing colonies. It was also of great advantage to this country that there should be an alternative line to those which already existed to Australasia, by which messages could be sent without touching foreign territory. This cable would secure that, and we should be able to send messages over a line which nowhere touched on a foreign land. That was no light object to attain. It had been no small gain from the commercial point of view, because as soon as it was known that this arrangement had been made, the existing companies made reductions in their rates. which they had not seen their way to do before. This considerable decrease of the tariff, stimulating as it did communication between ourselves and the colonies, was a matter of the first consequence to this country. Because of the strategic importance of the cable in time of war, because of its commercial importance in times of peace, and because, too, of the deep interest felt in it by the Governments of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, His Majesty's Government had entered into an agreement with the colonies to bear their part in this great Imperial undertaking, and he was quite certain that the House would give its ready assent to the proposal. Until the, Bill was in the hands of hon. Members he did not think he need say more as to the details of the scheme.

^* did not think that this was a proper time to ask the taxpayers of this country to subsidise an undertaking of this character. The Government might well have waited another year or two, and have paid a little more attention to the recommendations of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his last Budget speech, that they should attempt to study economy. They had better have attempted to deal with the question of Old-Age Pensions, especially in view of the fact that it was proposed to raise the necessary funds for this scheme by terminable annuities, to be created at the very moment when Consols were down to 91 ½. A more inauspicious moment could not have been chosen. He would like to know whether the colonies would pay a share of the loss if one were incurred?

Yes, if the cable does not pay, the colonial Governments, under their agreement, will make up a certain proportion of the loss.

^* said they might fail to pay. They knew from experience how colonial Governments were apt to fall into arrears with their payments, and he must repeat that it was most unfortunate that the British Government should undertake this responsibility at the time we were incurring an enormous war expenditure.

rose in his place, and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put."

Question put, "That the Question be now put."

The House divided:—Ayes. 166; Noes, 71.—(Division List No. 385.)

Question put accordingly,

The House divided:—Ayes, 180', Noes 55. (Division List No. 386)

Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Mr. Secretary Chamberlain.