I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies if a copy of the recent correspondence between the British and Dutch Governments respecting peace has been sent to the Boer Generals in South Africa; and, if so, is he in a position to state to the House the nature of any communication that may have been received from the Boers in response.

As has been already stated by the First Lord of the Treasury in answer to a Question on the 6th of February, Lord Kitchener has been asked by Telegraph to communicate the correspondence to the Boer leaders. There has not been time for a reply, if any is made, to be received.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he has received the verdict of the court martial in the case of General Kritzinger; and, if not, whether he will give instructions that it shall be communicated to him so soon as delivered; and, whether he will undertake that it shall be made public as soon as received.

No, Sir, the trial of Commandant Kritzinger is not yet over. Lord Kitchener will communicate the result with his decision by telegraph, and I will see that it is published without delay.

My Question is whether the verdict will be communicated to the right hon. Gentleman as soon as it is delivered, and before it goes to Lord Kitchener for confirmation.

It is not usual to communicate anything to the public until after the decision of the general officer, nor is the verdict published until it has been first considered and then confirmed by the General officer.

Will the verdict not be known at all in South Africa before it is communicated to the right hon. Gentleman?

No, Sir. I presume it will not be known. Such verdicts are not necessarily published until after they are communicated properly in the ordinary course.

In the event of the verdict being one of capital punishment, will the sentence be carried out before it is communicated to this House?

You are not responsible for it!

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he will now lay upon the Table of the House the message from General Kritzinger to Lord Kitchener relating to the shooting of natives as spies; and whether the terms of this message are the same as those contained in the proclamation by General Kritzinger o 13th July, 1901, published on page 137 of the South African Blue Book of January, 1902.

The communication was made to General French. The purport of it was communicated to the War Office, but we have not an actual copy of the message.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he has now any information as to the case of Mr. C. J. Lotter, a Member of the Cape Parliament, who, together with his son and manager, was arrested on or about 24th January, 1901, by the military in the Uitenhage district of the Cape Colony, and was committed for trial only on 8th January, 1902. Can he state by whose authority, and on what ground has he been kept in prison for fifty weeks without trial, what is the charge against him, and what is the tribunal before which he is now to be tried.

Mr. Lotter was arrested on the 22nd January, 1901, on a charge of high treason. He was sent to Uitenhage on 30th January, and released on bail on 27th February. The case was then dealt with by the civil authorities under Special Treason Act, and he was formally committed to trial by a magistrate on the 7th January, 1902. It was notorious that he bad been very active in his district in fomenting sedition, and he was detained in consequence. The Attorney General found that the legal evidence available against Lotter was not strong enough to secure conviction, and consequently he was not prosecuted.

Has he been released?

I assume so.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he has now any information as to the case of Mr. Alheit, the minister of the Dutch Reformed Church at Ceres, in the Cape Colony, who was arrested there by the military on or about the 27th August, 1901, taken to Malmesbury, and there imprisoned; whether he has ever been charged with any offence, and if so, with what; whether he has ever been tried, and if so, by what Court, and with what result, or whether he is still in gaol; and can he explain why this minister was not tried at Malmesbury on or about the 27th September last, by the judge who sat in that circuit town at that date as the Judge of Assize.

Mr. Alheit was arrested at Ceres on 27th August, 1901, arrived in Malmesbury on the 28th, and remained in gaol until released on parole on the 25th October. Affidavits had been entered against him for using treasonable language, and his influence had been used in favour of the enemy. The general officer commanding at the Cape, on a review of the whole evidence in October, deckled that the circumstances did not necessitate his further detention.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he will state the number of non-combatant Boers compelled by the British Authorities to travel upon trains for the purpose of protecting those trains from attack by the Boer forces, and how many of such non-combatants have been killed, and how many wounded. Whether there is any precedent for such a practice, except in the instance of the Franco-Prussian War; whether, in November and December, 1901, Boers were compelled to accompany trains between Pretoria and Pietersberg; whether, on or about the 5th December, 1901, about 35 Boers at Pretoria were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to accompany trains. Whether he is aware that it is stated in the Manual of Military Law, published by the War Office in 1899, that the general population of the enemy's country who form no part of the armed forces cannot justly be exposed, so long as they abstain from acts of hostility, to any description of violence; and whether that statement is still considered as binding upon the Military Authorities in South Africa.

As regards the first and second paragraphs I have no information, except as regards the question of precedent: it is recorded that the practice has been adopted in other civilised warfare. As regards the last paragraph, I am aware that it is so stated, but if the hon. Member will be good enough to look at the footnote to the first page of Chapter XIV., "The customs of War," he will find that this chapter has no official authority, and "expresses only the opinions of the compiler as drawn from the authorities cited."

I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman what are the other cases in which this practice has been adopted by other civilised countries?

There are so many susceptibilities on this matter that I think I should not be well advised in mentioning the cases.

Will the right hon. Gentleman ascertain whether it is a fact that the non-combatant Boers were compelled to travel in those trains in October and December?

No Sir. If it was thought necessary to put non-combatant Boers on the trains for the protection of those travelling on them, that would be in the discretion of the General Officer Commanding in South Africa.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that the men of the 3rd Battalion of the Suffolk Regiment were summarily dismissed after being summoned for embodiment at Bury St. Edmund's on Monday, 17th instant; and whether, in view of the loss sustained by the men giving up their various employments to join the regiment, any pay or other compensation will be granted to them.

The embodiment of this battalion on the 17th instant was temporarily cancelled owing to representations of the Mayor of Colchester that the smallpox would be imported into the town from the place of assembly. The military authorities thought it well to consult the General Officer commanding at Colchester, and after consideration it was decided to embody the battalion on the 24th instant, Instructions have been given that any soldier who can satisfy the commanding officer at Bury that he had given up his employment is to be paid his pay, ration, messing and lodging allowances for the week, while the families of those who, in addition, had broken up their homes, are also to receive separation allowance.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether the periodic Returns furnished to the War Office from the various military commands have been suspended since 1899; whether it is from these Returns that the Preliminary Return of the British Army and the General Annual Return are compiled; for what reason have these two Returns been withheld from the House since 1899, thus leaving Parliament so long without information as to the effect of operations in South Africa, on the state and condition of the military forces of the Crown stationed elsewhere.

I fully explained to my hon. and gallant friend last May that, as the units in South Africa were unable to furnish the usual elaborate Returns while the war lasted, it would not be possible to publish any Preliminary or General Annual Return until the war is over.

Is my right hon. friend not prepared to answer my question about His Majesty's forces in other parts than South Africa?

I do not think any partial statement would be of much value.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether his attention has been called to a notice issued at the Brennan Torpedo Factory, Chatham, stating that employees will be required to notify to the office whether and within what dates they and their families have been vaccinated, and that it might be necessary to take steps to prevent the possibility of the disease being introduced into the factory through persons who have not taken the precaution of vaccination or re-vaccination. Will he explain under what authority re-vaccination is required; how recent a re-vaccination is requ red; and whether those who refuse to notify to the office will be dismissed.

The notice was issued in order to obtain information for guidance in the event of the epidemic becoming so serious in the neighbourhood of the Factory as to require special consideration. It referred to the desirability of re-vaccination, but does not enforce it. Non-compliance with the notice will not involve dismissal, but I must reserve complete freedom to the War Office to issue any regulation which may be thought necessary to prevent smallpox being introduced into the Factories.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether the evidence of Colonel Stevenson (late Inspector of Remounts, South Africa) will be taken on the inquiry into the Remount Department.

I am afraid I cannot undertake to answer Questions as to the procedure which the Court of Inquiry may adopt.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether, when the Yeomanry at Aldershot were sent out for a mounted field day in the Long Valley on the 13th ultimo, he can say how many of them had had only ten days instruction in riding; and can he state how many casualties occurred. The hon. Member explained he should have substituted two days for ten in the question.

The exercise referred to was to give instruction in the general principles of outpost work in the field; there was no fast work, and no more was imposed upon the men than they have been doing daily over the same ground in the ordinary course of their training. Between fifty and sixty men had not received more than 10 days instruction in riding, but no men were taken out whom the Commanding Officers did not consider fitted for the work. Two casualties occurred, one to a sergeant, who is an experienced rider, and whose horse slipped up and fell with him, and one to a man who had more than 10 days instruction in riding, and whose horse bolted in the barracks before starting for the field.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War if he can state what number of men have been discharged or suspended from employment without offence on their part at Woolwich Arsenal since November last; whether further discharges are contemplated, and what is the cause of the reduction; whether the stores are yet replenished; and whether work formerly done at Woolwich has been sent to King's Norton and other places; and, if so, can he explain why.

634 men have been discharged, and more discharges are contemplated. These are due to a reduction of demands on the Factories. The stores have, to a great extent, been replenished. During the pressure of the War, and owing to the increased requirements of the service, the making up of cartridges was given to the trade; the Arsenal was, at the same time, fully employed at this work.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty if he can state the indicated horse power of H.M.S. "Condor," and the ratings of the engine-room staff; and whether there is official information showing that there was any defect, either in the engine-room equipment, or in the engine-room staff, at the time the vessel last sailed from port.

The I.H.P. of H.M.S. "Condor" was 1,400. Her engine-room complement was composed of:—1 artificer engineer, 1 chief engine-room artificer, 2 engine-room artificers, 3 chief stokers, 3 leading stokers, and 16 stokers; or a total of 26. No information has been received at the Admiralty as to there being any defect, either in the engine-room equipment, or in the engine-room staff, at the time the vessel last sailed from port.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can state what is the present position of the Newchwang Railway and the Tientsin Siding Disputes; whether, as regards the latter, a large proportion of the land now included in the Russian Concession was, before the grant of the Concession, already the property of various British firms, among them Jardine, Matheson and Co., William Forbes and Co., and John Swire and Sons; what is the date of the latest communications which have passed between His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government in reference to the position at Newchwang; whether Papers concerning these matters can be laid before Parliament previously to the passing of the Foreign Office Vote.

The Russian Government have stated that the Shanhaikwan-Newchwang Railway will be restored to the Chinese Administration on repayment of the expenditure incurred on the Peking-Shanhaikwan Newchwang Line, and on the re-establishment of a normal state of affairs. As regards the Tientsin Siding disputes, His Majesty's Government have proposed to the Russian. Government the appointment of a Commissioner on either side to inquire and report on the conflicting claims to the land in dispute, and if thereupon the British and Russian Ministers should be unable to agree, the reference of the points of difference to arbitration. The Russian Government are in communication with the Russian Minister at Peking, on the subject of this proposal. With regard to the third part of the right hon. Baronet's Question, some of the land included in the Russian Concession is the property of British subjects, but His Majesty's Minister at Peking has been officially assured by the Russian Minister thatthe Russian Government have no idea of obliging foreign owners to have their property included in the Russian Concession. Negotiations as to Newchwang are still proceeding. I am afraid I can make no promise at present as to Papers on this subject.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can state after what delay will the promise of the Russian Government to evacuate Manchuria become operative.

I have nothing to add to the statement which I made on the 3rd instant, in reply to the hon. Member.†

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the attention of His Majesty's Government has been drawn to the deportation of Marshal Fuad Pasha by the Sultan of Turkey; whether he is aware that this is the same officer who saved the Armenians and Europeans on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus from possible massacre; and whether he is in a position to give the House any further information in the matter.

We have been informed that Marshal Fuad Pasha, who holds a distinguished position in the personal suite of the Sultan, was recently arrested, and sent to Syria in one of the Sultan's yachts. It is true that during the disturbances at Constantinople he took effective measures for the preservation of public order in the district for which he was responsible.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether his attention has been called to the application by William Gwilliam for a certificate of exemption from vaccination at the Leamington Borough Police Court on 3rd February, and to the refusal by the Magistrate's Clerk to return to the applicant the birth certificate of his child, upon the ground that such certificates were filed by him as evidence; and will he state whether the Magistrate's Clerk is empowered to retain a certificate under such circumstances.

Yes, Sir, and I am in communication with the clerk on the subject. For the moment I cannot say more than that, as at present advised, I

†See preceding volume, p.178.

do not see what power he has to retain the certificate.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, is he aware that, from time to time, attacks of destructive character have been made by boys on the Roman Catholic Church, known as St. George's Cathedral, abutting on the Westminster Bridge Road and Lambeth Road; that, on one occasion, a window, one of Pugin's earliest paintings, was broken through, and later on other windows, although wire-protected; and, seeing that the clergyman in charge some time since communicated on the subject with the Chief Commissioner of Police with little result, and that when some of the delinquents were brought before the Magistrates charged with the breaking into the schools attached, they were dismissed with a caution, will he take measures to prevent a repetition of the acts complained of.

It does not appear that the police have received any complaints of windows having been broken since 1899, nor are they aware that the window particularly referred to has been broken. It is exceedingly difficult for them to prevent a certain amount of damage being done in places where there are a large number of children about, or to treat the children who do such damage as criminals.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that no such damage occurs to Protestant Churches in Catholic Ireland?

Has the right hon. Gentleman seen the letter in The Times from Canon Keating full of complaints on this matter?

I have seen it.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade if the petition of sixty-three fisherman from the parish of Evie, Orkney, protesting against the grant of the rights and interests of the Crown in the Foreshore of Eynhallow Island to the proprietor of the island has been received, and if the same will receive due consideration.

Yes, Sir, the petition referred to by my hon. friend has been received, and will be duly considered by the Board of Trade.

I beg to ask the President of the Local Government Board whether he is aware that a resident of Rugby, while ill with smallpox in one of the hospital ships under the control of the Metropolitan Asylums Board was visited on 1st February by his mother and sister; that he died the next day, and that the mother has since been attacked with smallpox at Rugby, and is now in the smallpox hospital at Rugby; and whether any, and, if so, what, precautions are taken by the Metropolitan Asylums Board to prevent the spread of infection by visitors to patients.

I am aware of the facts referred to by the hon. Member. As regards the concluding part of the Question, I am informed that the following are the chief precautions taken by direction of the managers of the Metropolitan Asylum District to minimise the risk of infection being spread by persons visiting patients at their Smallpox Hospitals—

"The visitors on their arrival are invited to partake of a light meal in order that they may be physically better able to resist infection; they are then seen by a Medical Officer who enquires into their condition as to vaccination, and if necessary, urges upon them the advisability of immediate re-vaccination. Before entering the wards the visitors are dressed in overalls and caps, and whilst in the wards they are, on no account allowed to touch, or in any way handle, their relatives, or the beds on which patients are lying. After a brief stay in the wards (some minutes only) the visitors are taken to a dressing-room where the overalls and caps are removed, and they themselves undergo a thorough washing of the hands and face before leaving the hospital premises. The fact of every visit is communicated by letter to the Medical Officer of Health in whose district the visitor resides, whether that visitor has been recently re-vaccinated or otherwise."

In the case referred to in the Question, the two visitors refused to be re-vaccinated at the time of their visit to the ships.

I beg to ask the Secretary of the Local Government Board, whether in this session the Government will bring in a measure enabling the local authority to enforce isolation upon persons known to have been in contact with others suffering from smallpox, and to provide reasonable compensation to such persons.

The answer to the Question must be in the negative. I may state, however, that I propose to issue a circular in the course of a day or two, as regards the isolation of persons brought into contact with smallpox, based on the views held by the medical advisers of the Department.

Is it possible to meet the case of persons who lose their wages? Very often such persons would be quite willing to submit to isolation if some provision was made for them.

Does the hon. Member mean, can we sanction payment of their wages out of the rates?

Yes.

I do not think so. I do not think it would be desirable that district authorities, whether boards of guardians or municipal councils, should pay wages out of the rates. Detention need only be for a very short time. At present the local authorities can provide for the maintenance of people isolated, but to go further and pay their wages would be a serious step.

Whilst maintenance has been undertaken by some local authorities, others have refused to undertake it, under the impression that they have no power to assume the liability.

I think where local authorities have not acted it has been from a misapprehension, which has I believe, now been removed. I am not aware of any case now in which a local authority refuses to act.

Is there any power to prevent people from visiting patients?

The Metropolitan Asylum managers have absolute powers. I am informed that they only sanction visits to patients who are believed to be dying. It is thought by the managers that it would be extremely difficult to refuse admission to relatives of patients whose death is imminent.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, whether he is aware that an inquiry concerning the scheme of labourers' cottages to be erected in the Dunloe Electoral Division of the Killarney Rural District was held on 8th July, 1901; and can he state why the result of the inquiry has not yet been communicated to the Council.

The Inspector's report was received on the 6th January, and the result of the inquiry has been communicated to the Council.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, whether he is aware that the resident magistrate, presiding at the Sneem Petty Sessions in November, 1901, refused to grant a gun licence to Thomas Sheehan, of Tahilla, who is a harbour constable and relieving officer; and can he state on what grounds the refusal was based.

The question of the issue of a licence to keep firearms is one for the consideration of the resident magistrate, as licensing officer of the district. This case has been referred to the resident magistrate for such further consideration and action as he may think fit.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he will explain why the Commissioner of Valuation, on being asked by the Kerry County Council to revalue the Limerick and Kerry Railway, did not communicate his refusal to the council for over twelve months after the request was made; whether he is aware that the Kerry Council protested against this refusal, and believed that their protest was being considered; and as by the failure of the Commissioner to reply they were prevented from lodging an appeal in time, and in view of the charges borne by the county for railways, whether he will direct the Commissioner to comply with the demand of the Council.

It is not the fact that the Council was prevented from appealing against the decision of the Commissioners of Valuation. On the contrary, it was open to the Council to appeal upon receipt of the Valuation Lists, which showed that a revaluation of the Railway was not contemplated. With respect to the concluding part of the Question, I am afraid I cannot supplement my replies to the two Questions the hon. Member has already put to me on the subject.

Is it not the fact that the Commissioner did not communicate his refusal to the Council for over twelve months?

Probably the hon. Member is aware that the Commissioner has had a great deal of work to do recently. But the Council had warning on which they could have acted, as there is a statutory right of appeal. I am afraid there is no remedy other than the one I have suggested.

But cannot the valuer reconsider the case, seeing that the Kerry County Council cannot influence the other rating authorities?

There is no power to value the line separately.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, as representing the Postmaster General, if his attention has been directed to the fact that an officer on the establishment of the Clones Post Office, who was absent on sick leave from the 24th to the 31st December, 1901, has had his application for payment of the medical expenses incurred refused; and seeing that, at the time of his illness, this officer was entitled to free medical attendance, as the number of officers on the establishment justified the appointment of a medical officer, and that, in consequence of representations, an official medical attendant has since been granted, will the Postmaster General grant payment of the expenses incurred for which application has been repeatedly made.

The privilege of free medical attendance to Post Office servants is granted only at offices at which the Department has an appointed medical officer. The sick absence of Mr. Wilson, the officer referred to in the Hon. Member's Question, occurred in December, 1900, and not 1901. At the former date there was no medical officer appointed at Clones and Mr. Wilson was not entitled to free medical attendance. His medical expenses cannot therefore be paid by the Department.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, as representing the Postmaster General, whether the Controller of the Dublin Sorting Office has as yet made good to the revenue any, and, if so, how much, of the £1,600 defalcations which occurred under his control, and which he was informed by the Postmaster General he was liable to be called upon to pay; if not, under what circumstances has he been freed from his liability; whether his attention has been directed to the fact that this official, before his promotion to the controllership, and when chief clerk to the late controller, was responsible for checking the accounts of the defaulting officer; and whether, during the investigation following the disclosures, the falsification was found to have been practised during the period for which he, when chief clerk, was responsible, although he vouched as correct fictitious entries in the accounts of the defaulting officer.

The Postmaster General is aware of all the circumstances under which an Assistant Superintendent in the Dublin Sorting Office was found to have embezzled a large sum of money, and those Officers whose neglect of duty facilitated the fraud were severely punished. The Superintendent and Chief Clerk who were responsible for checking the accounts of the dishonest officer were reduced in rank and salary, and disciplinary notice was taken of the neglect of other officers concerned. The Controller of the Sorting Office was not proved to have contributed to the fraud by any personal negligence; but as he has a general responsibility for the money dealt with in the office, he was called upon to make good £10 of the loss as a mark of the Postmaster General's disapproval of the lax system which was found to prevail there.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, as representing the Postmaster General, whether steps have been taken to remedy the irregularities in the Irish mail service, by the Larne and Stranrear route, so far as the city of Londonderry and the north-west of Ulster is concerned; and whether he has any objection to a Return being furnished, showing the number of occasions on which the service has failed to catch the Londonderry train connection at Ballymena, specifying the cause of such delay in each case.

The service to Ireland by the Larne and Stranraer route has recently been irregular owing in some measure to the severity of the weather. In some cases, however, delay has occurred which cannot thus be accounted for, and the attention of the Companies concerned has been drawn to the matter. A Return of the failures of connection at Ballymena has been called for, and the hon. Member shall be informed of the result as soon as possible.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, as representing the Postmaster General, whether he can state the cause of the delay in the establishment of a trunk telephone between Belfast and Londonderry, and whether steps will be taken by the Post Office authorities to compel the Telephone Company to construct forthwith the said trunk line asked for by the public bodies interested in these districts.

Inquiry has been made on several occasions as to the possibility of providing a Post Office trunk telephone line between Belfast and Londonderry. There is, however, no means of doing this without incurring an expenditure altogether out of proportion to the probable amount of traffic on the line. If a local guarantee were given at the usual rate of £5 per mile, a line would be provided by the Postmaster General. No trunk lines have been or can be provided by the National Telephone Company since the purchase of the Company s then existing trunk lines by the Post Office in 1896.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if he has any information as to any arrangements for reinstatement having been conic to between a landlord at Ballynanty Bruff, County Limerick, and the evicted tenants on the Cullawn property; is the management of the estate vested in the Land Judges Court; and have any negotiations been opened for the sale of this estate.

Three ex-tenants on this property have been reinstated in their former holdings by the landlord. The estate is not in the Land Judges Court and negotiations for its sale are not pending.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that in the Fifth Improvement Scheme under the Labourers Ac s in the Cork Rural District Council, an application was received from Timothy Sexton for a cottage and plot on the farm of Alexander Ferguson in the electoral division of Lehenagh; whether, seeing that this holding over 400 acres in extent contains no labourers' dwellings with plots attached, he will explain why was the application of Timothy Sexton refused; and, seeing that his present abode has been condemned by the Medical Officer of Health, and that he has his parents dependent on him, will the Local Government Board reconsider their decision and sanction this cottage for Sexton.

The application was rejected because no evidence was produced in support of the assertion that the existing house accommodation for labourers in the district was insufficient. Nor was the certificate of a Medical Officer of Health produced to show that the existing house of the applicant was unfit for habitation. The holding of Mr. Ferguson contains four cottages.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the inspector gave as his reason for refusing to sanction the scheme that Sexton was an unmarried man?

I have given the hon. Member all the information I have received.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary for Ireland, as representing the Board of Agriculture, whether the Board will consider the advisability of providing farmers who may require them with hand separators on easy terms, with the view of encouraging the making of first-class butter in the farmers' homes.

If any local authority or association of farmers approach the Department with a practical scheme for facilitating farmers in the acquisition of hand separators, such scheme will be duly considered.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether instructions have been issued to the Royal Irish Constabulary, directing them to furnish beforehand, if so requested, to the solicitors who represent county or rural district councils, a statement of the evidence to which they can depose at the hearing of claims for alleged malicious injuries.

In every case in which a claim is made for compensation for an injury alleged to be malicious, the police have, since October last, received instructions to forward to the Secretary to the District or County Council concerned, as well as to the applicant, a short statement of the occurrence. This statement is to be a record of the facts apparent on the scene when visited, and is not to embody any inferences drawn from, or suspicions excited by, such apparent facts.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if lie will give effect to his promise, made last session of Parliament on behalf of the Irish Local Government Board, that when vacancies occurred amongst consulting sanitary officers, superintendent officers of health would be appointed.

The statement made by me last session was, that the provision in the Board's Sanitary Order of May, 1900, with respect to the appointment of a Medical Superintendent Officer of Health had not been acted upon in any case, and that the opportunity to act upon it would only arise as vacancies occur in the office of Consulting Sanitary Officer. The Board is prepared in all cases where such vacancies may arise, to sanction the appointment of Medical Superintendent Officers of Health.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that, on the evening of the 6th instant, after the declaration of the result of the East Down Election, a farmer, named John Burns, living in Woodgrange, Downpatrick Police District, when lighting a bonfire on his own lands was molested by a party of men belonging to the Local Orange Lodge, who endeavoured to extinguish the fire and insulted John Burns and his wife, whilst some of the party fired shots from revolvers over John Burns' house; will he state what proceedings, if any, have been instituted by the police for the prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators of this action, who are well-known; and what precautions have been taken to ensure the protection of John Burns and his wife from further molestation.

This incident has been exaggerated. A few boys, whose ages range from ten to seventeen, attempted to extinguish the bonfire. Mrs. Burns alleges that one of them used abusive language towards her at a distance of 150 yards. Mr. Burns was not molested in any way. He stated to the police that he had done a silly thing in lighting the bonfire. He desires that no further notice should be taken of the affair. There is no evidence that shots were fired. No proceedings are called for on the part of the police, as suggested, and no special precautions are necessary for the protection of Mr. Burns, who is popular with his Protestant neighbours.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether his attention has been directed to the fact that at last Petty Sessions at Ballyshannon, in the County of Donegal, on the 13th instant, District Inspector O'Connor, Royal Irish Constabulary, refused to carry out the order of the magistrates to remove certain constables he had placed at the entrance to the magistrates' room in the courthouse, and also to obey other directions of the Court; is he aware that the same inspector on former occasions showed a reluctance in obeying similar directions; has he received a representation on this subject by the magistrates, and, if so, what action has he taken; and, in view of the fact that this inspector's conduct was censured by Mr. Justice Kenny at last Lifford Summer Assizes, and of the effect of such conduct on the proceedings of the Court, whether it is intended to retain this inspector in the constabulary force in Co. Donegal; and, if so, will assurances be given to the justices that their directions will be carried out.

The Inspector General has received a communication from the magistrates on this subject, and inquiry is now being made into the matter. I am informed it is not the fact that Mr. Justice Kenny censured this District Inspector, as alleged.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury if he can now give any information as to the constitution of the proposed Committee on Private Bill Procedure, and whether he will be able to nominate it at an early date.

In answer to my hon. friend I have to say that I do not think any final steps should be taken until the House has sanctioned those Rules of Procedure which suggest, in part, the necessity for the appointment of this Committee. But I hope there will be no long delay, both in passing the Rules and in appointing the Committee.

reported from the Committee of Selection. That they had selected Mr. Emmott to be a Member of the Parliamentary Panel of Members of this House to act as Commissioners in pursuance of the provisions of The Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1899, in the place of Mr. Charming. Report to lie upon the Table.

The task of presenting the Navy Estimates to the House is rendered easier, and, at the same time, in a sense more difficult, by the circumstance that a great deal of their interest and value has already been made public through the full Statement of the First Lord.† But I think it is due to the House of Commons, and I think they will expect it, that there should also be some statement in this House when so large a sum of money is asked for as is asked for in these Estimates; and I hope I may be able to make that statement without going too closely over the ground that has been traversed by the First Lord of the Admiralty. The first point to which I should like to draw attention is the absolute amount of the sum which is asked from the House of Commons. The total amount of the Estimates is £31,255,000. I observe that in some quarters there seems to have been an anticipation that there might be a reduction in comparison with last year. I think it hardly conceivable that such a proposition could have commended itself to those who are responsible for the administration of the Navy. I am aware that the Navy has not occupied in the public view, during the past year, a very prominent place; but I believe that in the mind of every thinking man it bas occupied a very important place indeed, and those who remember the words of a great naval writer will have pictured to themselves the power which has been exercised all over the world by those great silent ships at a time when the danger to this country has been considerable, and when the sister service has been engaged in a difficult and prolonged conflict 7,000 miles away from these shores. Sir, I think this is the last moment which would have been considered suitable by any thinking man for a reduction in the Navy Estimates. The apparent increase amounts to £380,000; but I should like to point out to the House that that does not represent the whole of the increase available for the service of the Navy. And I think it is desirable to point this out because, undoubtedly, there are new services which in themselves involve a considerable expenditure of money, and which, if they were to be carried out without any increase corresponding to them in amount, must involve a diminution of the sum available for what I may call the effective service of the Navy—the personnel and construction. There has been an increase on the net Estimate of £380,000; but those who have studied the figures may have observed that there is also a reduction on Vote 9 which is the Vote for guns and ammunition, amounting to £563,000. I shall be able to explain to the House at a later period that the reduction in no way involves a diminution of the supply of all that is necessary for the service of the Fleet in respect of its ordnance, but that the reduction of £563,000 is a reduction of what may be called capital expenditure which was necessary last year and is no longer necessary this year. If, therefore, we add this £563,000 to the increase of £380,000 to which I have referred, we shall have a considerable addition to that sum; and though I do not know whether it is strictly permissible for me to speak on an estimate which has not yet been brought before the House, I would remind the House that in the Supplementary Estimates which it has been found necessary to submit there is an item of £191,000 in Vote which is a most effective expenditure, because it is all to be translated, and is being translated, into additional ships and additional appliances for the service of ships for the purposes of war. There- fore, if we take these three sums of £380,000, £563,000, and £191,000, we get what I take to be the net effective disposable increase for the Navy—£1,134,000 this year alone. I do not want to detain the House too long, and I particularly want to avoid, if I can, one or two subjects which I know to be controversial. These subjects will be raised at the proper time by hon. Members who have made a special study of the points which they will present to the House, and I should unendurably prolong the remarks which I wish to address to the House if I attempted to approach those subjects now. I want to confine myself as far as I can to a succinct and specific statement of the general points which I believe will be of interest and importance to the House in view of the fact that we are called upon to vote £31,000,000 sterling for the Navy.

Mr. Speaker, in rising to move the Resolution standing in my name, I do not intend to take up much of the time of the House in re-stating the arguments in favour of the Motion. This question has been so often debated in tins House that it would be impossible, even for one with greater experience than myself, to add anything new to the debate. The grievances of the Roman Catholics in the Navy are twofold. First, the question of proper facilities to enable Catholic sailors in the Navy to practise their religion, and, secondly, the question of putting Roman Catholic chaplains on terms of equality with their Protestant brothers. In the Navy it is estimated that there are between 12,000 and 15,000 Roman Catholics, and not one Roman Catholic chaplain is to be found aboard the warships. In this respect we consider our claims to be just and reason- able. It has never been suggested from these Benches that the Navy should appoint a Roman. Catholic chaplain for each ship, but what we do advocate is the appointment of one Roman Catholic chaplain to every squadron. If that was done, it would meet the difficulty and remove that part of the grievance. I cannot understand how the Government can allow such a small matter of this kind to interfere—as it undoubtedly does interfere —with recruiting for the Navy; and when on this question, allow me to refer to a meeting of the Archbishops and Bishops of Ireland, held at Maynooth in June last year, presided over by His Eminence Cardinal Logue. With your permission, Mr. Speaker, I will read a copy of the Resolution come to:—

"We have frequently urged His Majesty's Government to make adequate provisions for the spiritual needs of Catholic sailors in the Royal Navy, and not with standing the repeated promises to do so, such adequate provisions have not been made. We now deem it our duty to advise Catholic parents not to allow their children to join His Majesty's ships until suitable arrangements shall be made to minister to the spiritual wants of the Catholic seamen in the Fleet.

Mr. Speaker, in rising to second the Motion of my hon. friend, I do so with full knowledge of the gravity of the question, affecting as it does the spiritual welfare of a large number of men who have joined your Naval Service and who are of the Roman Catholic faith, and affecting also the number and standing of the Roman Catholic clergymen who have to minister to the spiritual wants of those men. This is not a question that is being brought before this House for the first time; no, Sir, this is a question that has been brought before this House time and time again within the past twenty-six years, and the justice of which has never been questioned. No member of the Government representing the Admiralty has ever denied the justice and moderation of the demand made by the Irish Members for the necessity of a change in the method of dealing with the spiritual necessities of Roman Catholics in the Navy. In this connection let me read the Minute of the Admiralty, dated. June 1878:—

"My Lords direct that when a large number of ships forming a squadron aresen to on any, service that would keep them for a considerable time away from a port where the services of a Roman Catholic priest would be available, arrangements are to be made for one to accompany the squadron."

I also think that the views put forward by the Roman Catholic Hierarchy of Ireland are both just and reasonable, and that the Admiralty would have been well advised if they had adopted their views. The Secretary to the Admiralty referred in his speech a few minutes since to a falling off in recruiting for the Royal Naval Reserve, I am of opinion that it is I due to this cause. I grant at once that the spiritual position of Roman Catholics in the Navy is much better now than it was some thirty or forty years ago, but this is a progressive age, and the Admiralty must progress, no matter how slowly, with the rest of the Departments of the Government. I approach this question, not from the point of view of an Irish Nationalist, but from the point of view of a Roman Catholic whose only desire is that his co-Religionists should be placed on a footing of equality, as far as it is reasonable, with the members of other religious denominations in the naval service. I quite agree with this inference in the speech delivered last year by I the Secretary of the Admiralty when he said that it may not be permissible to allow men ashore on Sunday for divine service or otherwise during the manœuvres, as, perhaps, the enemy's fleet might heave in sight during the time the men were ashore. But, surely, I Sir, that is an argument in favour of having a Roman Catholic chaplin attached to the squadron, as, if the men were at divine service on board one of the ships, and such an event were to take place, the men would be speedily sent on board of their respeetive ships, and so be prepared to meet the enemy. Might I he permitted to adduce another argument in our favour, by alluding to the conduct of Irish Catholic soldiers on the field of battle. I don't care under what flag they may have fought—I have never heard that they fought with less dash because they had attended to their religious duties before the battle. Might I also be permitted, Sir, to refer to the prisons of this country, and in doing so to confine my remarks to Roman Catholic prisoners, whether innocent or guilty, who are confined in them. Those prisoners, as any time they may require it, can have the services of a Roman Catholic priest. Surely, what you do for your soldiers, and even for your prisoners, you ought not deny to those in your Naval Service. We trust that the days of bigotry are past; we know that bigotry and intolerance go hand in hand, and surely in this enlightened age the Lords of the Admiralty will not feel themselves bound by the prejudice of their predecessors of generations long gone by, but will approach this question in the broadminded spirit of the age in which we live, and grant our very modest request. If the Secretary to the Admiralty can give us an assurance that a Roman Catholic chaplain will be attached to each squadron, and that such chaplains shall he placed on a footing of equality as regards pay and position with the other chaplains in your Naval Service, we shall be content. But if he tries to put us off by vague promises which are not intended to be kept either in the spirit or the letter, then I make bold to tell him that he has not heard the last of it, and that this question will be brought forward again and again until the just demands which we now make are conceded. I beg, Sir, to second the Motion. Amendment proposed—

"To leave out from the word 'That' to the end of the Question, in order to add the words, 'in the opinion of this House, Roman Catholic Chaplains in His Majesty's Navy should he placed upon the same footing as regards rank and pay as Chaplains in His Majesty's Arm.'"—(Mr. William M'Killop.)

Question proposed—

"That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

I should like to say a word in support of the Motion which has been moved in such very fair and moderate terms. I frankly admit that it is a very difficult question, and further, that Catholics who are most interested in the settlement of it have not always met the Admiralty in the manner in which they should in this matter. I have been conscious for some years past that though we have always approached the Admiralty on the question, we have not always assisted the Admiralty by suggesting measures which would be applicable to, the officers and men of the Navy. Further than that, when the Admiralty have accepted our suggestions, we have not assisted them to carry the suggestions out as we ought to have done. At the same time, it must be universally admitted that the condition of Roman Catholics serving in of the Navy is not satisfactory. We have complaints from various quarters, and I venture to think that the true solution of this problem is, that a properly accredited chaplain should be attached to each fleet—not definitely to a particular ship, but to be left on shore, with means of transport to be allowed to him whenever the fleet left its station. With regard to the spiritual needs of Roman Catholic sailors in home ports, they should be provided for by a local clergyman. I am sure the hon. Gentleman will give his sympathetic consideration to this question, and I hope that when we come together on these Estimates next year, we shall find that a satisfactory solution has been arrived at.

said that the demand now made was the demand made twenty-five or thirty years ago, when a promise was obtained from the then Government that Catholic chaplains in reasonable numbers in proportion to the Catholic sailors in the Navy should be placed on the same footing as to rank and pay as the Protestant chaplains. That demand, made some years ago with regard to the Army, was after some controversy granted, and as a matter of fact Catholic chaplains in the Army now had the same rank and pay as the chaplains of the Established Church. On what ground was the same equality as was freely granted in the Army denied to the Catholic priests of the Navy? This was by no means a new question. It was raised many years ago. Of the 10,000 or 12,000 Catholics in the Navy probably nineteen out of every twenty were Irish. On March 15th, 1878, twenty-four years ago, when Mr. W. H. Smith was First Lord of the Admiralty this question was raised in the House. Mr. Smith was always extremely sympathetic on questions affecting Catholics in the Army and Navy, and in reply to the hon. and learned Member for County Louth, Mr. A. M. Sullivan, who then brought the matter forward, he said—

"It will be the duty of the Admiralty to endeavour to make such provision while attaching a Roman Catholic clergyman to a fleet of say five or six large ships, operating at a distance from its base, and from any port, in order that in case of illness or sudden emergency, or imminent danger, he might be at hand to afford the consolations of religion which might be required. I cannot hold out any expectation of being able to provide an additional chaplain to any one ship; but I will do everything I can to bring within the reach of Roman Catholic sailors the ministrations of their priests." [(3) Debates, ccxxxviii., 1,417.]

That was a specific pledge without reservation or qualification, given twenty-four years ago, and that pledge remained to this day unredeemed. In 1888, ten years later, in a letter addressed by the Admiralty to the Catholic Association of this country, of which the Duke of Norfolk was President, this statement of Mr. Smith was recognised as a pledge—

"My Lords are prepared to carry out, as far as possible, the undertaking entered into in June, 1878, as to sending a Roman Catholic chaplain with any squadron of ships despatched on service which would keep them a considerable time away from a port where the services of a Roman Catholic priest are available."

The Minute, dated June 10th, 1878, quoted by the Mover of the Resolution was as follows—

"My Lords direct that when a large number of ships forming a squadron are sent out on any service which may keep them a considerable time away from a port where the services of a Roman Catholic priest are available, arrangements should be made for one to accompany the squadron."

Nothing, however, was done, and the Question was allowed to slumber until 1896, when it was again brought forward on the Navy Estimates. Mr Goschen's reply on that occasion was—

"He promised the hon. Gentleman that he would inquire into the matter in order to see that no undertaking given by any of his predecessors in office was left unfulfilled, and to make it clear to Roman Catholic sailors that it was no feeling of religious intolerance which barred their claims to the ministrations of their own priests."

But the pledge, even though thus repeated, was still unredeemed. That was a most extraordinary record, and he was curious to know what defence the present representative of the Admiralty would make. He was perfectly aware that, subsequent to the debate of 1896, a series of communications passed between the English Catholic Hierarchy and the Admiralty, and considerable modifications were made. But what Irish Catholics complained of was that, after all these specific pledges, their original demand had never been granted, and the reason for refusing it had never been frankly stated. Even in the case of the chaplains at Portsmouth and Chatham, who were now, he believed, called Chaplains of the Navy, they were not on the same footing as Protestant chaplains. That was the first particular in which the pledge had been broken. The second was that, owing to sonic Bidden and obscure obstruction, which he had never been able to understand, the specific pledge that a Catholic chaplain would be attached to any fleet of five or more large ships operating at a distance from its base had never been carried out. That was a great breach of faith, and the House was entitled to know the ground on which it had been committed. He would give the House one or two particulars of the present condition of things. In the outports there were chaplains, or gentlemen called chaplains. What was the situation? Protestant chaplains commenced at a salary of £219, and could rise to £400 per annum. In addition, they were often Naval Instructors, and a Naval Instructor commenced at £18 5s., and got up to £109. But a Catholic chaplain commenced at £175, and could not rise above £200 after five years. Therefore, roughly speaking, even in these outports on the coast of England, the Catholic chaplains had about one-half the salary of the Protestant Chaplains. As to rank, he had never he able to get from the Government a statement as to why Catholic chaplains did not enjoy the same rank as Protestant chaplains. Evasive answers were always given. In the Army a Catholic priest enjoyed the same rank as a Protestant minister; why could he not do so in the Navy? This was not a small matter. Catholic sailors felt humiliated when they saw their priest placed on a lower level than the minister of any other religion. The Admiralty had no right to take these men's services; to accept the risk of their lives; and then to inflict this humiliation upon them. It was a mark and sign of inferiority, and regarded from that point of view it was a matter of immense importance. The question of rank was also of importance as regarded the facilities which the ministers enjoyed in the discharge of their duties. Therefore he claimed, first of all, that all the chaplains, wherever situated, should not be bogus or sham chaplains, but chaplains in every respect on the same footing as any other minister of religion who served in the Navy; in other words, that the system adopted in the Army should be extended to the Navy in this respect. Secondly, he claimed that the pledge given and repeated so often on behalf of the Government should now be definitely carried into effect, viz., that wherever there was a squadron of five or more large ships there should be attached to that squadron a Catholic chaplain of full standing, with the same rank and privileges as Protestant chaplains. They had been met by the statement that so strange was the construction of a man-of-war that when they had got one chaplain on board they could not even squeeze in another. All they asked was that when a squadron went far away from its base and was not going to visit a port for some time they should find room for a Catholic chaplain. When ships were manœuvring or cruising in the neighbourhood of a port arrangements should be made for the services of a Roman Catholic chaplain, and that was not an unreasonable demand to make. At least they were entitled to ask that the pledge given to them on this matter some 30 years ago should now be honestly carried out. When he brought this question forward in 1896 he drew the attention of the Admiralty to the fact that sonic of the men who were first killed during the bombardment of Alexandria and whose names appeared in the casualty list were Irishmen, and yet there was no Catholic priest near at the time. Consequently they were hurled into eternity under circumstances which were very painful to Irish Catholics. When a fleet was going on a cruise or going into action it ought to be an established principle that there ought to be a Roman Catholic chaplain on some of the ships. He would assure the Secretary to the Admiralty that this subject would be raised in the House of Commons upon every possible occasion until something was done. It was not creditable that after the Admiralty had given a distinct pledge upon this matter that they should seek to evade its fulfilment. The tea Mr. W. H. Smith once said in the House of Commons that they might take it for granted that there was no feeling of religious bigotry or prejudice in this matter, but, nevertheless, he was inclined to believe that there was at the back of this refusal to grant what was demanded some bigotry and dislike of the Catholic religion amongst the officers of His Majesty's Government. He could not imagine any other ground for the obstinate refusal of the Government of a demand which would only involve at the outside the expenditure of about £2,000 a year. Therefore it could not be contended that it was refused on the ground of expense. There must be some other reason, and he was afraid it was because of the old bitterness in the Navy against Catholics. They might shut the door of the Navy to Irish Catholics if they liked, and put up a notice at all the recruiting stations, "No Irish need apply," and if they did that he would undertake never to trouble them on the. Navy Estimates. They accepted these Catholics in the Navy, and the Government were compelled to admit that they certainly were not the worst fighters they had. Therefore they had no right to inflict upon them this double insult and injury, which was keenly felt by them, for it was acknowledged that sailors were much more religious men than soldiers. Therefore they were inflicting a real substantial injury by denying them the opportunity of religious ministrations, which were not only desired by them, but which any Government responsible for the conduct of the Navy ought to see that they had, for they could not possibly have a better guarantee for the good conduct of the men. In conclusion he said that by the present system they inflicted upon Catholics in the Navy a stigma of inferiority, because they felt it not only to be an injustice, but an insult, that the ministers of their religion should be placed on an inferior plane to the ministers of any other religion.

The hon. Member for East Mayo and my hon. and gallant friend the Member for Chichester have both referred to the pledges which have been previously given to this House. I wish to say that I am undoubtedly responsible for pledges, which may have been given many years ago, but I am more fully cognisant of those which I myself have given. I think, however, that hon. Members are under a misapprehension in regard to, those pledges. The undertaking which I myself gave on this matter was that, when large squadrons of ships were detached from their stations for any length of time in circumstances which would preclude Roman Catholic sailors from receiving the ministrations of their religion, a Roman Catholic chaplain should accompany those ships. That is the pledge which I gave, and I think hon. Members will agree that my pledge has been carried out. What was promised has been done on the two occasions on which those conditions were fulfilled—namely, when ships were detached from the Mediterranean fleet to take part in the manœuvres, and when a squadron was detached for warlike operations in China. On both those occasions special arrangements were made, in pursuance of my pledge, that a Roman Catholic chaplain should accompany the Fleet. The hon. and gallant Member for Chichester said that lie also desires that there should be a Roman Catholic chaplain at the great stations at which the Fleet calls who might minister to the requirements of Roman Catholic sailors. That, I may remind the House, is already the practice. It is the case not only at Malta and at Portsmouth, but there are at present no less than 154 stations where Roman Catholic priests are paid wholly or in part for the purpose of ministering, when required; to Roman Catholics in the Navy. The hon. Member for Limerick and the hon. Member for North Sligo both called attention to the fact that there were occasions when the men's lives were in peril; when it was particularly essential that they should have the ministrations of priests belonging to their own faith. The hon. Member for East Mayo has also alluded to something which occurred during the bombardment of Alexandria. I may say that some time ago Lord Goschen gave an assurance, and I myself have repeated it, that, whene vr a hospital ship accompanies a Fleet engaged in warlike operations, a Roman Catholic chaplain should embark on board that ship. I do want to make it quite clear that there has been no breach whatever of that pledge. I may also say that I do not think it is desirable that the Admiralty should alter the present arrangements in regard to ships which are constantly entering ports. No case has ever been brought to my notice where a sailor has been deprived of the ministration of his own religion at the time of his death when serving in the Navy. I would remind hon. Members opposite that it is not a question of economy at all.

The right hon. Gentleman has omitted the question of the rank of Roman Catholic chaplains.

With regard to the question of rank, no chaplain has any rank at all. The chaplains who go afloat—and the chaplains of the Established Church minister to over 80 per cent. of the Navy—do have a commission on the ground that they are liable to be moved, and often are moved, by the orders of the Admiralty, to any part of the world. That is not the case with the Roman Catholic chaplains who minister to Roman Catholics in the Navy in such places as Portsmouth, where they remain permanently in port. I wish to point out, however, that when these Roman Catholic chaplains go on board ship, they receive the same consideration accommodation, and deference as the chaplains of any other denomination, and beyond that I do not think I can go. With regard to the question of pay I do not think I can, without notice, discuss adequately any special cases which hon. Members have brought forward. I may say that there have been many mprovements in the rates of pay, and if any hon. Member opposite desires to bring any specific case to the notice of the Admiralty, in which he thinks the services of a Roman Catholic chaplain are not adequately remunerated, I can assure the House that any representations of that kind will receive very careful consideration by the Admiralty.

said he wished to remind the hon. Gentleman that in June last year he brought before him the case of a Catholic sailor, serving on board the "Diadem," who met with an accident at four p.m. and lived until 6.30 suffering great agony. The ship was at Berehaven, but none of the officers on board took the slightest notice of the dying man, and he was allowed to die without the last rites of his Church. When the inquest was held one of the jurors asked why a boat was not sent off to bring the Catholic clergyman, and the reply of the officer was that if their own Church of England chaplain ha d been on board the sailor would have had his services if he required them. That showed the sympathy the officers had with the Catholic sailors.

I stated at the time why the Roman Catholic chaplain was not sent for.

said he asked the hon. Gentleman at the time whether the statement he had mentioned was made by the officer in open court, and the reply was that no such statement was made at all. The hon. Gentleman stated that the Catholic chaplain was not sent for because the doctor did not consider that the man would collapse so soon. The officer who made that statement to his superior had a great amount of hardihood. Those who were present in court heard the statement that if the Church of England chaplain had been on board the man would have had his services. It was owing to the bigotry of the officers that chaplains were not attached to the fleet. He could give the House some idea of the insolent and tyrannical manner in which Catholic sailors were treated on board His Majesty's vessels. The "Collingwood" was stationed in Bantry Bay, and the commander who was on board a few years ago—he was brother to the private secretary of Her late Majesty—had a favourite name for the Catholic sailors. He called them Irish pigs. That was an example of the tyrannical, bigoted, and ill-conditioned treatment they received.

I would remind the hon. Member that this Amendment has nothing to do with rudeness or persecution by officers. The only question with which the House is dealing is "that, in the opinion of this House, Roman Catholic chaplains in His Majesty's Navy should be placed upon the same footing as regards rank and pay as chaplains in His Majesty's Army."

said he would not go further into that matter. There was a total disregard of the spiritual wants of Catholics on board the ships, and there was a great deal of bigotry and intolerance shown towards them. Promises similar to those which the hon. Gentleman had given now had been made before. He dared say that after this debate was over there would be nothing done in the direction they desired. He had no desire to see Catholic sailors entering the Navy, but when they did go to serve His Majesty he thought there ought to be some attention paid to their wants, both spiritual and temporal. He hoped the hon. Gentleman would use his influence with the Admiralty to do something to remedy the grievance of Irish Catholic sailors.

said he had had the honour to serve as one of the surgeons in the Navy, and he was conscious of the fact that there was a great want of Catholic chaplains. He was very glad, indeed, to hear the remarks of the Secretary to the Admiralty in regard to the improvement that was taking place in supplying the wants of the Navy so far as Roman Catholic Chaplains were concerned. He felt quite certain that the words which shad fallen from the hon. Gentleman would be received in Ireland with a great deal of satisfaction. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Main Question again proposed.

In moving the Amendment standing on the Paper in my name, I desire to say for myself that I dissociate myself from any spirit of hostility to the Navy. There is no man in this House who has greater admiration for that great service than I have, but I desire to draw the attention of the House to an important question in connection with it. That is the question of cost and the burden which it brings on the inhabitants of the nation. I adopt the old standard as to the amount we ought to, spend on the Navy. The old standard was that we should spend as much on our Navy as any other two Powers, spend on their fleets.

The standard was that our Fleet should be equal to, those of any two Powers.

Well, I think I state it fairly when I say that the old standard was that our Navy should be as strong as those of any other two Powers. I think the best way to secure that would be to spend as much upon our Navy as any other two Powers spend upon theirs. I find that we have departed from that old standard, and that we have not established any other standard which has been accepted by this House and the nation. The total amount asked for in the present Estiinates is £31,250,000, showing an increase of £380,000 on the Estimates of last year. In comparison with the increases of previous years this growth, is moderate, but it cannot be looked at apart from what has been done in the immediately preceding years. To this, however, must be added an expenditure of about £3,000,000 on naval works. This great sum has also grown up recently, so that the total expenditure for the coming year with which we have to deal is £34,250,000. Let us compare this expenditure with what it was eight years since. In February 1894, the Navy Estimates were only £14,000,000 odd, so that in this short period they have grown from this modest figure to the huge amount which I have mentioned. It will be said that this figure of 1894 was totally inadequate. It was the largest amount that had ever been spent in one year up to that time, and when we look back on the eight years preceding 1894, we find that the estimates had increased more than in any previous period of the same length. For 20 years before 1885 the naval expenditure had not exceeded £10,000,000 odds, but in that year the first of the five great steps upward was taken by Lord Northbrook, who increased them by 1·5 millions. In 1888 the Hamilton programme added another £2,250,000 per annum, and from that year till 1894 the total expenditure rested at the amount I have mentioned. In the spring of 1894 the third great step was taken in the Spencer programme which added £3,000,000 to the outlay, raising it to some £18,000,000, and the House was induced to adopt that Estimate by the statement that it would "Make a full and adequate provision for the requirements of the Navy." After the election of 1895 Lord Goschen became responsible, and in the five years during which he was at the Admiralty £9,000,000 odd were added to the annual bill. In the first year for which Lord Selborne was responsible, the total was increased by £3,000,000, and thus in the five steps I have named, during the short period of 16 years, this branch of the national expenditure increased from £10,000,000 to £34,000,000. The House may well ask what reasons have been submitted to the country for this great increase in one arm only of the national defence. The first reason was that other Powers were making preparations. We had our attention directed to the great efforts France was alleged to be putting forward. I cannot go into past years, but we have had a paper distributed in regard to the preparations of other Powers. It is in a convenient form, and ought to be very useful to us in the present discussion. We find that, so far as France is concerned, the total expenditure is £12,000,000 odd per annum. France makes the largest preparations of any naval Power on the Continent of Europe. So far as I know there is no disposition on the part of France to greatly increase these preparations. Next to France the largest expenditure on the Continent is that of Russia, which amounts to 8·7 millions; next we have Germany with 7·4 millions, and then Italy with 4,000,000, so that it will will be seen that our Estimates of this year are greater than those of the four largest European Powers. No doubt, recently, the United States have come into the field, and their expenditure in the last year that is given amounts to 13·3 millions, but this is a quite new figure, and two remarks may be made with regard to it. First, that it will take America some time to get a navy constructed that would compare with those of the great European Powers, and there is no certainty that she would pursue such a policy, and, secondly, we might reasonably expect from her more friendly dispositions toward ourselves. If, however, we include America, our expenditure this year is as great as that of any three Powers, so that so far as the question of the outlay of other Powers is concerned there is nothing in the facts to justify the great figures which have been reached. Then the second argument that has been used in defence of the outlay is that the commerce of the country is insufficiently protected, and that nothing would tend more towards its development than increased naval expenditure. We are also able now to look at this argument. The expenditure has gone on for 16 years on the scale I have mentioned, and the figures I have quoted show that it is three times as great as it was at the beginning of that period. How about Commerce? No doubt this, too, has shown some increase, but it is of a modest character. It must also be borne in mind that the population of the country has considerably increased, and this must be taken into account in making any comparison. The total imports and exports per head of the population in 1885 were £17 16s. 9d., in 1901 they were £21, so that this is an increase of about 20 per cent. against 230 per cent. in the cost of the Navy. I have looked back through the naval and commercial statistics to see whether we might find a period of 16 years during which the expenditure on the Navy diminished, and I find that this was the case between 1857 and 1873. Between these two periods, the cost of the Navy declined nearly four millions, yet the total of the imports and exports expanded from £11 17s. to £21 4s. 9d. per head, and this total of the year 1873 has not been exceeded in any year since that time. I think these figures are a remarkable comment on the argument that increased naval expenditure assists commerce. They show that the tendency is exactly in the other direction, and probably nothing could be done at this moment that would so much assist the commerce of the country as to reduce the outlay, both in this and in other respects, with a view of lightening the burdens of the people. The prosperity of commerce depends on the abundance of free capital, and there is nothing which tends so much to interfere with this as sudden and large increases of the taxation of the country, which have all to be met by immediate cash payments. The realities of the position may be brought home to the House when I say that when within the last six years the national expenditure has been doubled, or to use in this wider sphere the formula we have been using for some time about the war, it has increased from a rough average of 2,000,000 a week in 1896 to an average of 4,000,000 a week at the present time. The great bulk of this increased expenditure has been in the additional cost of the Navy and Army. If we take the Estimates that have been laid before the House for the coming year, the sum asked for these two Services amounts to no less than,£2 10s. per head of the population. We will better realise the weight of this rapidly-growing burden for warlike preparations if we contrast it with what other nations have to bear. The cost per head of population in Russia is 5s. 9d., in America 6s., in Germany 13s. 7d., in France 19s. 6d. against £2 10s. in the United Kingdom. These are the nations with which we have to compete.

I do not think the hon. Member is in order in discussing the total expenditure for war preparations in different countries.

I accept your ruling, Mr. Speaker, but, I wanted to make good, if I could, that these great and growing Estimates are throwing an undue burden on our population. I ask House whether I have not said enough to satisfy hon. Members that, so far as commerce is concerned, there is no certainty that this rapid and spasmodic increase of expenditure is of any use to the country but the contrary. But apart from the burdens of the taxpayer, a great objection to this policy is that it is calculated to create a feeling of alarm abroad. Can we blame the Continental Powers if they want to know the reason why we persist in making such extra- ordinary preparations? No adequate reason has ever been alleged for them. There is nothing to make us think that agression against us is intended in any part of the Empire. Would it be any cause for surprise if this huge expenditure should prove to be largely the cause of the ill-feeling against us which has grown in recent years among foreign Powers? If so, then we must recognise that the pursuit of this policy is calculated to promote the dangers which it is designed to avert. Sir, I appeal to the Government to consider the matter from a somewhat new standpoint. Is it too much to ask that 34,000,000 a year should not he stereotyped as a reasonable sum to be spent on one of the Services. The longer such figures continue the more difficult it will be to alter them, yet it must be recognised that it is quite impossible for us to go on at the same rate as we have been doing during the past eight years. If we do so, in eight years more we would be spending 80,000,000, and in 16 years we would be spending 160,000,000. Of course it seems incredible to us that any such progress can be fairly anticipated, but eight years ago who would have conceived that we would have reached such figures as we are discussing today? The strongest argument against the present huge figures is that their maintenance seriously threatens the efficiency of the Navy. Public attention is now devoted so much to the Army that the Admiralty during these important years has almost escaped any serious criticism. Yet the efforts of one or two Members of this House, and a few sad disasters which have recently occurred, are well calculated to make us ask whether this branch of national defence is in any better condition than the other. From the statement of the First Lord I see that the wrecks of the "Viper" and the "Cobra" have put a stop to the turbine system of machinery, and another sentence reads—"that the Board have often been urged to build large numbers of destroyers at the same time," but this advice he does not believe to be sound for two reasons. First, because the type is in process of rapid evolution, and, secondly, because it is a short-lived type. Yet we turn from this severe criticism on this class of vessel and find that no less than 22 of them were completed and carried into the Fleet Reserve in the present year, and ten more are contemplated in the Estimates for the coming year. Surely this is extravagant procedure with a type of vessels which the First Lord himself admits to be unsatisfactory. The question of boilers has been constantly brought before the House by my hon. friend the Member for Gateshead, and I think I correctly represent the general feeling which his efforts have produced when I say that no one is satisfied that the great question he has raised has been effectively solved. The present Estimates provide for 122,000 men against 61,500 which were provided for in 1885. It is useless to hope that the larger number can be of such good material as the smaller number, the population of the country is not sufficient to furnish them I am glad to see that the royal yacht is classed amongst the ships that have now been passed into the reserve. The mistakes and difficulties experienced in her construction have been very disquieting. The First Lord's statement is very inadequate in the slight attention which it draws to the naval disasters, casualties, and accidents of the year. It is almost impossible to worm information on this point out of the Admiralty. On the 31st of January I wrote to the Financial Secretary, asking for some particulars, but I have got, practically, no satisfaction. This secrecy, quite as much as the painful calamities, the occurrence of which cannot be concealed, have suggested to the country that we have not secured efficiency by our great outlay. As to the remarks of the hon. Member for Great Yarmouth in regard to the Colonies, it is impossible to deal with this subject without thinking of the nature of the duties which the Navy has to perform. It is only on the ground of the extension of the Empire, with its great new fields of wealth and commerce, that any outlay like the present can be justified. But the question may be asked—if our rich Colonies lead to the increase of the Navy, should not the inhabitants contribute something adequate towards the cost I Another section of the Return which I have already quoted gives the facts with regard to this matter. From it we see that Canada, Newfoundland, and Natal make no contribution whatever towards the cost of the Navy, except in the case of Natal there is a small contribution of coal. From the Australian Colonies and New Zealand a small contribution amounting to £126,000 is received, but in return for this, I understand that there is an obligation that a considerable fleet shall be maintained in Australasian waters, so that the amount paid is far from meeting the expenses incurred in that particular service. A fleet is also necessary for Canada, yet no contribution whatever is received. The Return gives the aggregate imports and exports by sea of these great Colonies, and this figure amounts to £256,000,000, or considerably more than one-fourth of that of the United Kingdom, and yet their total contribution for naval defence is £156,000 against our £34,000,000. So far as I can gather from the Return, the full cost incurred in India is paid by that country, and considering the contrast which its sufferings present to the prosperity of the other parts of the Empire, there is food for reflection in this fact. I am glad to see by the statement of the First Lord that some negotiations with regard to the Australasian Colonies are to take place this year. Should they not be opened up also with Natal, the Cape, and other places? The need is pressing, and until a far more adequate contribution is received, it is not too much to say that an undue burden rests on the people of the United Kingdom. It is impossible to refrain from contrasting these meagre contributions from our richer Colonies with the heavy impost that is levied on Ireland. The total of her exports and imports is concealed, but it is safe to say that they do not amount to half as much as those of the Dominion of Canada and Newfoundland, which pay nothing, nor as much as New South Wales alone amongst the Australian colonies. Yet Ireland will pay this year something approaching to £3,000,000, and no small part of the discontent and suffering in that country may directly be traced to this intolerable addition to the burdens which have already been declared far too heavy. Has not the time come when it would be desirable to find some definite standard in accordance with which our Naval Estimates might be increased or diminished? Would not the same proportion of increase as takes place in population or trade be a reasonable standard to adopt? Neither of these has increased more than 20 per cent. during the last sixteen years, and this must be compared with an increase of 230 per cent. in the naval expenditure. The naval expenditure is the greatest that has ever been proposed, and it has grown up with extraordinary rapidity in recent years. Heavy obligations have to be met for other requirements of the nation. There is nothing in our relations with other countries to justify the action we are taking, and when we look at our great dependencies we find that they are making a totally inadequate contribution towards the outlay which is largely incurred on their behalf. Amendment proposed,

"To leave out from the word 'That,' to the end of the Question, in order to add the words. 'The growing expenditure on the naval defences of the Empire imposes under the existing conditions an undue burden on the taxpayers of the United Kingdom.'"— (Mr. Louah.)

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

said that in common with other Members of the House, he had felt extremely gratified at the able, clear, and business-like speech, in which the hon. Gentleman had brought forward the proposals of his department. The Secretary to the Admiralty was never optimistic, but on this occasion he had a great deal to congratulate himself upon. In everything he said he was amply justified. There were several most encouraging statements in the statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, perhaps the most encouraging of which was in the opening paragraph, in which he recognised the claims of the younger men in the Service to promotion to higher ranks. In every other Navy in the world youth was coming more to the front, and in our Navy that matter ought not to be neglected. On the question of additional ships, he had nothing to say, but when he came to the addition of the personnel that was a different matter. We were notoriously short of stokers, and if hon. Members looked at Page 10 of the First Lord's statement, they would find that even now the stokers employed in cleaning and attending ships in the Reserve were being taken away and put on board ships and steamers on active service, and their places being filled with civilians. It was no doubt a wise proceeding, but it pointed the moral that we were very short of officers, and that the engineering side had never been efficiently treated by the Court of Admiralty.

Order, order! I would remind the hon. Member that any observations he desires to make on the personnel would be more in order on the general discussion which will follow. This Amendment does not refer to the personnel of the Navy; it simply raises the question whether an undue burden is placed on the taxpayers.

But it tends to show that there is not an undue burden, because there are not enough persons to do the work. But as your ruling is against me, Sir, I prefer to wait until the general discussion.

said it was idle to pretend that the question raised by the Amendment was one on which they all agreed either on one side of the House or on the other. There were the gravest differences of opinion between the hon. Gentleman the Member for West Islington, and himself and many others who sat with him, and very grave difference of opinion among hon. Members on the other side with regard to the programme of construction and with regard to the standard the hon. Gentleman wished to see adopted. This was the one question on which they might avoid anything like party recrimination. The matter was of the deepest interest to everyone present, and ought to be discussed without reference to any party. In regard to the contribution from the colonies, he submitted that it was a question which they could not discuss with prudence or much advantage. No one could deny that the fact that the great Colonies either did not contribute or contributed very little was a matter which was to be borne in mind; but although everyone agreed that a strong case might be made out by Great Britain why a contribution should be made, an equally strong case against it might be made by the Colonies, and it would be extremely dangerous if we were to attempt to impose our will upon them. By so doing we should only cause resistance in the minds of their statesmen. The only way to deal with that matter was to point out our case. The hon. Member had complained of spasmodic increases which he thought had taken place in the expenditure of this country. In the present Estimates there was practically no increase and a great diminution of the new programme. The increase as to new construction was an increase which must go on to some extent for some years, but the general effect of the Estimates looking towards the distant future was a decrease rather than an increase. The proposal to regulate expenditure on the Navy by a rule-of-three proportion to population wealth or commerce must always be fallacious. The only test was safety, in an Empire situated like ours. The hon. Gentleman had made a curious admission; in the beginning of his speech he had said he was prepared to accept what he called the old standard, that was to say the standard of equality, laid down by the authorities of 1888, with the fleets of the two next Powers. Sometimes they were told superiority and sometimes equality; a very great difference because superiority might mean bare superiority or sufficient superiority which in the minds of the Naval authorities was a very different thing. The hon. Gentleman had then proceeded to mistake the old standard, because he had stated that he was prepared to support a Navy as large as that of France and Russia who were not at the present time the two next great naval Powers. But in the standard of equality or superiority to the two next Powers, as laid down in 1888, there was nothing about equality of expenditure, which obviously could not be observed. Our long service system was infinitely more costly and we paid more to all ranks. There were facts which told both ways. Personally lie had never been committed to the old standard, in fact, he had always been against it. The hon. Member he thought had also mis-stated the expenditure of this country at the present time. He had several times said that to the expenditure in the Estimates had to be added a sum of £3,000,000 for works. He would like to know what that "expenditure for works" was obtained from.

said that in the previous year the House had voted £6,000,000 in the Naval Works Bill, which the House was told would be expended in two years.

said it was apparently a guess on the part of the hon. Member. He imagined that the expenditure this year would be very far short of £3,000,000, but no one could tell for a long time, in fact, until the bills came in. But, putting all that on one side, the speech of the hon. Member for West Islington had for its main burden the very dangerous doctrine of retrenchment apart from efficiency. That was not a Liberal doctrine, and it was open to the objection that those who clamoured for retrenchment at one time demanded all sorts of changes involving great expenditure at another time. The hon. Member had failed to point out extravagance or to suggest in what direction economy could be effected.

I pointed to the boilers and destroyers.

said the difficulty with regard to the boilers was a difficulty with which all the other Powers were equally afflicted, it was not peculiar to ourselves, the particular class of boiler to which the hon. Member so strongly objected was largely used in foreign fleets. It was largely a question of training the men to work these boilers, and that in itself was largely a question of expense; but though it was a question of expense now it would be far cheaper in the long run if these men were trained. Then the hon. Member advocated economy with regard to the building of destroyers, did he mean to suggest that he would build no more destroyers because one or two had been lost.

said that twenty-two of these unsatisfactory destroyers were put into the Fleet last year, and twelve more were to be added this year. He suggested that experiments should be made more economically.

said that there were very strong reasons for supposing that our building of destroyers had been altogether short of our requirements. Our average output had been ten destroyers a year for many years past. It was true that twenty destroyers had been passed into the fleet this year, but one must not look at the number passed into the fleet, but rather the number constructed in a year, and the average number for many years had been ten, and that had been so insufficient that when the Admiral in command of the Mediterranean Fleet had to ask for more and said that he wanted them soon, they could not be supplied at once. The Admiralty promised to increase the destroyers in his fleet by a large number, but it was some months before they were largely increased, and even now they were insufficient. If the hon. Member wished the House to support his Motion he must show the House that there had been extravagance in the Navy, or, if he could not do that, he must show where it was, either in matériel or in personnel, that we could reduce the expenditure. It was no use coming to the House with a general grumble against expenditure without being able to point out to the House where extravagance was or where great reductions might be made. The hon. Member said that he accepted the old standard, but he would find if he accepted that standard that it would and ought to involve the country in a steadily increasing charge. It was impossible to keep the Fleet in the same condition in which it was at the time the old standard of 1888 was made without looking forward to a steady and constant increase in the personnel. When they turned to construction, he for one differed quite as strongly from the Government as the hon. Member for West Islington, but he differed in exactly the opposite direction. The hon. Member found fault and complained that the building programme was too large. He (Sir Charles Dilke) complained and found fault with it because in his opinion it was wholely and grotesquely insufficient for the necessities of the case. It was inconsistent with the standard which the hon. Gentleman accepted, but which he never had accepted and never would accept, of "equality with the next two Powers" and he was strongly of opinion that any reduction would not be attended with safety to the country. The hon. Member for West Islington had alluded to France and Russia; he apparently saw no reason for Germany being considered by the Admiralty in their preparations; he had only the old France and Russia standard in view. But, of all the possible two-Power combinations, a combination of those two particular Powers, there being no allies on either side, was the most unlikely. It was impossible to keep out of view, in considering the naval programme from year to year, a more distant future. Ships could not be built in a hurry. The country would have to go into a naval war with its programme of four or five years before. Ships were not being built more ripidly now than formerly, and the First Lord of the Admiralty stated the reasons in Parliament last year. It seemed to be supposed in recent debates that the country would be blockaded, and that in six months, while the blockade was on, ships could be built which would conquer the blockading fleet and raise the siege. The whole thing was an absolute delusion. While at one time it seemed as though ships could be built in two years, the more usual period now was four years. The ships now taking the water and being commissioned were the ships of the 1897 programmes, ships which were "built in a hurry," being, as Mr. Goschen stated in February and July of that year, vitally necessary for the safety of the country. Many of the ships of the 1897 programme were not yet in commission: that would show how long it took to finish ships. Therefore it was necessary to remember that the country would go into a naval war with ships according to the programme of four or five years before war was declared. Mr. Goschen was a careful First Lord of the Admiralty; he felt the responsibility of his statements to the House, and was most anxious to avoid the use of language which could in any way irritate feeling abroad. Yet Mr. Goschen, in his programme year after year, alluded not to France and Russia alone, but to the necessity of maintaining—not at the present moment, but for the permanent safety of the country—a fleet which would cause not two, but three Powers to pause before they attacked us. To his mind it was infinitely more important to the country that its expenditure should be shaped not towards meeting a sudden attack by two Powers—which was not going to occur—but towards meeting, not immediately, but in time to come, the possibility of an eventual joining together of three Powers, one of which was very rapidly building a magnificent fleet. From that point of view the programme of the Government this year was a beggarly programme. A great many ships were now taking the water and being commissioned, but the Secretary to the Admiralty said nothing whatever about the programme of next year and the future new construction. That great three-volume novel of the First Lord of the Admiralty—the statement ac companying the Estimates—which every year became more and more bulky, and more and more "pappy" and vague, said nothing, as Mr. Goschen used to do, as to the reason which had animated the Government in the preparation of a particular programme. Probably the hon. Member for West Islington thought the standard of the present programme too large; he himself thought it too small. It was a programme which would fail in the future to keep tip even the limited standard, to which personally he objected. It consisted of two battleships and two armoured cruisers only. The Admiralty had got into the unfortunate habit of putting off the commencement of the new construction, as it was called, for a very long time; and that habit was an extremely bad one. The ships that would be begun in March of this year were the ships of the programme of February of last year. Ships were begun thirteen months after they were announced to the House. The effect on the money was very strange. The Government would involve the House in no additional cost as regarded this year if they increased their programme. Their programme of construction this year was a programme of completion of ships nearly finished. If they had a larger programme of new construction for the future, it would mean, under the present system, ships to be begun thirteen months hence. But the Government had not announced such a programme. It was not the financial necessities of the year that had prevented them doing so. It was not the strength of the country during the next four or five years which would be affected by their not having done so. What would be affected was the strength of the country after five years hence; and he confessed that so far from supporting his hon. friend, he should be prepared to go into the lobby against the Government in the opposite direction—for not having looked sufficiently ahead or contemplated what was to happen to their country in the future. The House could not discuss this matter of Naval expenditure without considering one fact which the Speaker would probably feel was sufficiently in order to be referred to. The hon. Member had spoken of England being in opposition to two other Powers.

said he mentioned two Powers.

said the hon. Member spoke repeatedly of "the standard." When that standard was last defended in the House, Mr. Goschen again and again said England would not fight alone, alluding to an understanding between this country and Italy as regarded an alliance between the Italian fleet and our own. Mr. Goschen consequently defended the two-Power standard by the consideration of the assistance of the Italian fleet and the even greater assistance of the Italian ports. But the Notes exchanged in 1888, which formed a virtual alliance between England and Italy, had been replaced by something entirely different. There could be no doubt that the recent arrangement between France and Italy made the neutrality of Italy in a contest the best this country could hope for. The present, therefore, was not a moment in which to propose to cut down the expenditure on the Navy. The hon. Member the Secretary to the Admiralty had asked the House to remember that stimulus was not needed by that Department. That was almost the phrase to which the hon. Gentleman objected when Mr. Goschen said they must not spur the willing horse. Mr. Goschen was a willing horse, and the Secretary to the Admiralty probably sympathised with those who were pressing him to remember the necessities of five years hence. That was the view the hon. Gentleman had always held, and he was not one to change his views. But while stimulus was not needed by the Admiralty, protection was. The Admiralty needed to be protected against even its own colleagues in the Government, and the temptation to cut down estimates. When the expenditure on the Army and the general expenditure of the country was as large as at present, the temptation to cut down estimates was very great, and the Admiralty, so far from needing to be protected by the hon. Member for West Islington in the one direction, rather required to be protected by the House of Commons and the country in the opposite direction. The Admiralty needed support in the keeping up, at a time when it was difficult and politically dangerous, of that permanent view of the naval requirements of the country. It was not the expenditure of this year, next year, or the year after next, that was in question; it was the standard of four or five years hence, and from that time forward. In the present condition of Europe and of the world generally, it would be madness on the part of the country to listen to the suggestion of the hon. Member for West Islington; if the Government was to be blamed at all, it ought rather to be for the smallness of its programme of new construction.

said he would willingly have left the Motion and the speech of the hon. Member for West Islington to he dealt with by the right hon. Baronet who had just spoken, were it not that he believed that every Member who was in favour of maintaining the efficiency of the naval service of the country, and of supporting the estimates that would attain that end, ought to do what in him lay to defend that service and the expenditure upon it. The hon. Member appeared to have moved his Amendment and delivered his speech without any matured judgment as to the tests to be applied to naval expenditure, or the problems the naval administration of the country had to meet. The hon. Member was prepared to support the two-Power standard, but he at once showed that he did not realise the expenditure that that standard involved, by saying that the naval expenditure of this country ought not to be greater than that of any two other Powers. It would be evident to anybody who understood the Estimates of this or any other country in regard to new construction, that if the expenditure of this country was to be confined to equalling that of any two countries in Europe, England would fall far behind the two-Power standard. He would admit at once that the expenditure in. the Navy Estimates for the current year was equal to the expenditure of three other European Powers. In fact, it was £2,000,000 more than the joint naval. budgets of Italy, France, and Germany. But if the hon. Member examined the progress of new construction in those countries, he would see that that additional £2,000,000 was necessary to enable this country to keep abreast of either two of those three countries. On, this question of naval expenditure, a most interesting and exhaustive Memorandum had been placed before the French Chamber by M. Lockroy, whose name was familiar to everybody interested in naval matters. In that Memorandum the naval expenditure, not only of France, but of Germany, Italy, and this country, was closely examined, and the conclusion arrived at was one that would be extremely satisfactory to all Members of the House, whose principal object it ought to be to attempt to decide whether or not the country was getting full value for the money voted for the naval service. He would call attention to one or two points made by M. Lockroy, which he hoped would convince the hon. Member for West Islington that the arguments on which he had based his speech were. not tenable if he accepted the two-Power standard, and, at the same time, proposed to reduce the naval expenditure of the country. M. Lockroy had pointed out in this analysis that we were not by any means the first Power in the proportion of the Navy Estimates devoted to new construction. New construction was the most important element which this House had to consider. He might say in passing that this question of new construction entirely disposed of one of the main arguments upon which the hon. Member founded his speech. He held up to the admiration of the House a period which had long since passed by, and which he (Mr. Macartney) hoped would never return, when the naval expenditure, instead of increasing, gradually diminished, a diminution which went on to such an extent that the naval strength of this country was far below that which was required to defend the ever-increasing commerce and wealth of the British Empire. The fact that the expenditure of the United Kingdom upon the defences of the country had been allowed year after year to diminish, was one of the main reasons why, at the present moment, and for the last few years, the expenditure on new construction, and almost everything else connected with the maintenance of the Navy, had been of such large proportions. If, in past years, Parliament and the country had been prepared to support the maintenance of the Navy in an efficient state, the naval budget would not, in contrast with the budget of ten years ago, have doubled itself. He would now return to the question of the expenditure upon new construction as contrasted with the relative expenditure of their three European competitors. According to M. Lockroy's analysis, the proportion of our Navy Estimates devoted to new construction was about 30 per cent., whereas France was devoting 37 per cent., and Germany 51 per cent. of their naval budgets. The hon. Member opposite must recollect that in order to keep pace with the fleets which Germany and France were keeping up, it was absolutely necessary that the total sum which was devoted to their Estimates should reach not only a proportion equivalent to the total budget of those two ountries, but it should at the present moment exceed the total budget of three European countries. Neither France, nor Italy, nor Germany had to meet in their Naval administration the multifarious duties and innumerable problems which had to be met for keeping the Navy of this country in a state of efficiency, and it was absolutely impossible to arrive at a correct judgment of their expenditure if they merely looked at the totals of certain figures without attempting to solve the problems beneath those figures, and consider what our Navy had to do in contradistinction to the navies of other Powers. The Mentor-andum in the Report which M. Lockroy laid before the French Chamber brought out, to the great advantage of the naval administration of this country, the economy with which the Estimates voted by that House were applied to the strengthening and the administration of the Navy, and his figures were so remarkable that, in view of the charges of extravagance and inefficiency made by the hon. Member for West Islington against the Admiralty—charges which, he thought, were wholly without foundation—he hoped the House would permit him to quote them. M. Lockroy pointed out that, whereas the establishment charges of the Italian administration amounted to 26 per cent. of the total naval budget, and of the French administration to 33 per cent., the establishment charges of the administration of this country amounted I to only 21½ per cent. The only European country in which the establishment charges were lower than our own, was Germany, and those were 13½ per cent.; but in comparing the charges of Germany with our own, it was necessary to recollect what were the naval establishments that Germany had to maintain, and also the comparative date of their creation. Everybody would admit that where a country had got to deal, as the United Kingdom had got to deal, with a navy reaching back for centuries, with naval establishments created many years ago, which were, no doubt, suitable and adapted to the circumstances of the Navy at that time, the establishment expenses must be considerably larger than those of the absolutely modern naval establishments which had recently been set on foot by foreign countries, and in which those who created them were able to take advantage of the most modern appliances, and all those circumstances which the advantage of science and naval strategy showed would be the dominating influences in connection with naval administration. Therefore, Germany had the great advantage, in the first place, that its Fleet was a new creation, that its dockyards were practically modern as compared with those of the United Kingdom, and that all the circumstances which concerned the life of the Fleet, and the administration of dockyards were fully developed. Consequently this country would be put to considerable expense adopting alterations to dockyards such as the Mediterranean dockyards, which were created years ago, and which, if they had to be established now, would probably be established upon a somewhat different basis. But apart from that altogether, if this consideration were borne in mind, it would be found that the 13½ per cent. of Germany was not so very much, if it was at all, less than the 21½ per cent, of this country, because Germany had only three establishments, as against our six establishments in the United Kingdom alone, not to speak of the very large establishments in the Mediterranean and in other portions of the Empire. On this question of expenditure and of the value which we were getting for the money voted for naval purposes, the criticisms of one of the most acute naval experts in Europe, made after close examination of our estimates, and contrasted with his own, show that the naval administration of the United Kingdom was of a most economical description, and gave far the best results so far as the application of the money voted by the House to the necessity and efficiency of the Fleet was concerned. M. Lockroy, in summing up the matter generally, stated that this country, in the cost of direction, the cost of administration, and policing of our great naval establishments, was immeasurably superior to any other country in Europe, and that the cost was far lower than that of France. The hon. Member who brought this Motion before the House had dwelt upon the argument that in his opinion, the large expenditure which Parliament had granted, and which the country had approved, had led to a lack of efficiency in the Fleet. He thought that was a charge which ought not to have been made, even inside the walls of the House of Commons, without some far more substantial backing and foundation than anything which the hon. Member had laid before the House. The hon. Member had alluded, in a casual sort of manner, to the accidents which had taken place to sonic of the destroyers, but he must be as much aware as any other Member of the House that accidents of this description were common to the Navies of every country in the world, and were by no means confined to the Navy of this country. Accidents of this kind happened in the very best mercantile lines, not only of this country, but of every country in the world, and he thought it was scarcely fair of the right hon. Gentleman to come down to the House and make those charges when the slightest examination of the evidence given in the course of the inquiries held concerning those accidents would have shown him that, in the opinion of those best entitled to form a judgment, the officers in command in every case were absolutely free from any fault of seamanship or anything else for which they were held responsible. He did not know that it was worth pursuing any further the argument which the hon. Member put before the House, because he could not believe for a moment that, in any quarter of the House, the hon. Member would find any support for the views he had expressed in regard to those accidents. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Forest of Dean said that it was highly desirable that this question should be raised without any Party feeling, but he did not think that any Party spirit had ever been introduced into the discussions on the Navy Estimates. He thought the hon. Member opposite had destroyed his own case by admitting that he was prepared to support the two-Power standard, and unless he was prepared to come down to tins House and show that the money now asked for by, the Government was something largely in excess of what was necessary to maintain the two-Power standard, he had no right to ask for any diminution in the Navy Estimates, or to bring a charge of extravagance or undue expenditure against those responsible for bringing the Estimates before Parliament. The right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean had expressed deep regret at the fact that his hon. friend had not asked for more money.

My complaint was that the new programme was too small. That does not affect the amount asked for this year, but it may involve more being asked for next year. It does not affect it much this year.

said it was true that the programme did not show a larger number of ships, but he did not know that this was a convenient moment to discuss whether or not the two-Power standard was being maintained. The right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean had always seemed to him to want more than was required by the two-Power standard. He himself believed in the two-Power standard with a margin. He did not mean a three-Power standard, or a two and a half Power standard. What the margin was, Lord Goschen or Lord Selborne had laid down in another place. From such information as he possessed as an unofficial Member, he did not believe that at the present time the relative position of this country to any other two European Powers had gone back. He fancied we were in a better position, taking the two-Power standard, than we were a year ago or six months ago. He thought it was most satisfactory to see, from the statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty and the detailed Return which his hon. friend had laid before the House, that the shipbuilding resources of this country had completely recovered their full capacity. There had been signs for a considerable time past that we were approaching the period when, both in armour and in everything necessary for the equipment of private yards for naval work, we should be able to utilise to the fullest possible degree the productive powers of this country. He trusted that the hon. Gentleman opposite, before he again attempted to criticise the naval expendi- ture of this country, would devote some time to the consideration of the problems which this country had to meet in naval construction, and of the duties which the Government had to perform. That knowledge could not be arrived at by merely adding up rows of figures and comparing the budgets of other countries with the naval budget of this country; it involved a full and careful analysis of the duties which each of these respective countries had to carry out.

This is a question of very great importance, of far greater importance than a superficial spectator might suppose, looking at the state of these Benches and comparing it with their condition last night, when we were discussing such questions as whether we should meet on Wednesdays or Fridays for private Members' business, whether our sittings should begin at two o'clock or three o'clock, and whether we should adjourn for an hour for dinner or stay within the precincts of the House. I shall therefore make no apology to the House if I venture to offer one or two general considerations which appear to me to be absolutely fatal to the proposition which my hon. friend asks the House to adopt in his Amendment. In one respect, I quite agree with my hon. friend. I hope I am as much alive as he is to the danger due to the fact that in many directions the national expenditure is imposing a dangerous and undue burden upon the shoulders of the taxpayers—that, to use an old phrase, it has increased, and is increasing, and in some directions, at any rate, ought to be diminished. For my part, I think there are two branches of national expenditure in the diminution of which I see no prospect, and for the diminution of which I have no desire. One is the money we spend on national education, the other is the money we spend on our Fleet. I quite agree that, as regards naval expenditure, it is the duty of this House to scrutinize it with the most careful watchfulness. We ought to see that we get full value for every pound, and, if possible, for every penny, we spend. We ought to take all the precautions this House can take, or induce the Executive to take, to avoid improvident contracts, to use the best possible material, to employ the most skilful labour, and to secure the most watchful and the most competent supervision. But, when you have done that, it appears to me that the large question of policy which the House has to consider is the question, What are the needs of the Empire, and how are they to be met? Not, I agree with my hon. friend, by jerky, occasional, spasmodic efforts, but by a constant and continuous policy. What are the considerations to which we ought to look? I cannot in the least degree think this is a matter to be decided by arithmetic. It is not even the number of your population, it is not even the value of your commerce, which you have mainly to consider, but the risks to which the one and the other are exposed. How do we stand in that respect as compared with the halcyon years to which my hon. friend has referred, when the expenditure of the Navy was infinitely less than it is at the present moment? I agree that the wealth of the people has increased, the population has increased, commerce has increased, but the risks to which we as an Empire are exposed have increased in a much greater proportion. How do we stand? We have during that period very largely added to the actual territorial extent of the Empire for which we are responsible; there are an infinitely greater number of points which need protection, which in time of war would have to be protected, and for the protection of which your Navy is your only efficient instrument, than was the case in any previous period of our history. That is one new direction in which the call for additional naval force has made itself felt; but there is another still more important, and that is the one pointed out by the right hon. Gentleman below the gangway and other speakers—namely, the growth of the naval power of other nations. In the days to which my hon. friend has referred, there were for all practical purposes not more than two naval Powers in the world, certainly not more than two naval Powers which could for a moment be compared. [AN HON. MEMBER: "Turkey."] I make my hon. friend a present of Turkey. I say that in the days to which he has referred the possible naval competitors of this country were, as compared with the state of things that exists at the present day, not worthy of mention at all. France was, for all intents and purposes, the only serious naval Power then in existence. What is the state of affairs to-day? The French Navy, as the right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken has pointed out, has increased. —I do not think it is an exaggeration to say—by leaps and bounds. You have seen the Russian Navy brought into existence you have seen the Italian Navy, which, although it has not grown so rapidly as others, is still a formidable item in the naval forces of the world you have seen the German Navy, —which did not exist at all—become as it is to-day a most formidable element, when you are adding up the offensive and aggressive forces to which—it may never happen, but it is the duty of the Admiralty to make the forecast—we may possibly be exposed. Go further, both to the East and West. In the case of our kinsmen across the Atlantic, in the United States, there is now growing up one of the largest and best equipped Navies in the world; and at the very opposite point of the compass our new allies, as I suppose we must call them under the recent Agreement, the Japanese, are themselves constructing a powerful Navy. It is impossible to ignore these facts when we arc taking into account what preparation the Admiralty ought to make to meet the dangers to which we are exposed. If there be an actual increase in the territories to be defended, and the number of antagonists we may be called upon to meet—I do not profess to be an expert, and I do not wish to dogmatise—I think that what is called the two-Power standard represents the minimum of safety. I am not an expert, and I do not venture to enter into the question either from an abstract point of view or as regards the actual composition of the existing navies of the world, but. I say the two-Power standard is, at any rate, the minimum to which we ought to conform. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Antrim used a phrase which may be current on the other side of St. George's Channel, when he said that we ought to have the two - Power standard "with a margin." That is an elastic expression, which does not seem to accord with the ordinary ideas of mensuration or mathematical precision. I do not suppose anyone would say that the two-Power standard is anything more than rough rule of thumb. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Forest of Dean thinks that margin is not sufficient. It must vary from time to time according to the exigencies of the case and the altered circumstances of the world, but so long as we are satisfied that the programme of the Admiralty does not exceed that standard, then, given the safeguards to which I referred in the earlier part of my remarks, there is no ground for this House to complain on the assumption that it is imposing an undue burden on the taxpayers of the country. It is far the best form of insurance. This country expends thirty odd millions in connection with the Navy, which is a large sum, I know. I look upon it simply as a premium we pay to insure the ultimate safety, not only of our commerce, but the safety of our shores and the very existence of our population in the face of dangers which we all hope may be remote, but against which it is our business to guard.

I shall not attempt to reply at any great length to the hon. Member for West Islington, because I think it will be admitted that I have been discharged from that task by the speakers who, followed him. The most convenient course will be to come to a decision at once on the Amendment proposed by the hon. Member. I think the most important matter calling for notice was, the observation of the hon. Member twitting me for not supplying information. He has asked me to secure certain information for him. The information which has been asked is of a very complicated character, and the Admiralty have been engaged in collecting it since the request for it was made. I feel it to be my duty, where I can do so, to furnish hon. Members with any information which it is in my power to obtain. With regard to the matter of the hon. Member's speech. I have nothing to say which has not already been well said by other speakers. I hope that my right hon. friend the Member for the Forest of Dean will allow me to postpone the answer I have to make to his speech until later. (7.45.) Question put. House divided:—Ayes, 129; Noes, 54. (Division List, No. 42.)

When one is speaking on the Navy Estimates, the temptation to consider, in a manner more or less discursive, the statement made by the First Lord of the Admiralty, is very great; but, as many Members speaking are bound to hold the same opinion and make the same remarks, as far as I am concerned, I will save the time of the House as much as possible by going directly to the subject in which I am more immediately interested. I would like, however, to bear tribute to the intensely interesting nature of this year's statement. It is put in a businesslike fashion, laying no claim to anything beyond an honest attempt on the part of the First Lord and his assistants to do their best; but it has several most encouraging features, and one or two which require criticism. The personnel is really being treated for the first time, as far as the higher grades are concerned, with anything like openness, and the evident desire of the First Lord to give us the advantage of younger men in the higher grades, must raise him considerably in the estimation of those who have the efficiency of the Navy at heart. But it is when we come to the additional numbers that the First Lord and I part company very decidedly. There we see that 1,900 executive ratings are to be appointed, and only 1,150 engine room ratings, of whom 1,000 are to be stokers. It is notorious that we are short of stokers. It is admitted in this very statement, for if hon. Members will kindly look at page 10, they will find that the stokers who are engaged cleaning and attending ships being brought forward for commission are now to be pressed into active service, and civilians employed. I do not grumble at that, but it is a sign of the times. We who are more or less interested in the efficiency of the Navy on its engineering side, feel that this is one of the subjects which is never treated with openness by the Board of Admiralty, which is entirely composed on its Naval side of executive officers, few of whom have a proper appreciation of the preponderating importance of the engineering branch. 1,000 stokers in proportion to 1,500 seamen is, to my mind, simply ridiculous, while 150 artificers is evidently inadequate, if we look at the number of engineer officers. My position is very considerably strengthened by the revelations made on page 12 as to the number of firemen borne on the Royal Naval Reserve—something like 3,700, as against seamen, about the same date, 21,000, whereas the proportions on board a man-of-war are very much more nearly one third stokers to seamen. That the Reserve is causing anxiety to the Admiralty, is shown by the appointment of the Committee under the presidency of the hon. Baronet the Member for Berwick. In it we will have every confidence. The decision of the Admiralty to abandon the ships fitted with yards as training vessels is, in, my opinion, a wise one; but on page 6 a remark occurs, that the training of the seamen should therefore be directed towards a knowledge of the structure and machinery of a modern man-of-war, and capacity and handiness to deal with and repair it. Does this mean that the deficiency of stokers and engineer ratings is to be made up by pressing into theservice of repairs of machinery the blue-jacket? The amount expended in new construction is eminently satisfactory. We have now apparently got a grip of the situation, and are able to spend money economically and sufficiently, as we have not been able to do since the year of the great strike. It appears to me, however, looking at some of the dates given for completion of the ships, that the First Lord is not yet in a position to give us assurances of speedy construction, such as we are becoming accustomed to in Germany and the United States. If we take such a vessel as the "Monmouth," which has now been some months launched, it is certainly not reassuring to find that she is not expected to be passed into the Fleet Reserve until 1903–4. This appears to me to be far from a remarkable rate of progression. Does the Secretary to the Admiralty consider it satisfactory that on page 10 we should find that the total number of Royal Naval Reserves trained during the manœuvres in 1901 on 162 ships was 34 officers, 231 seamen, and 83 fireman, or a total of 34 officers and 314 men. The establishment of Royal Naval Reserve Executive Officers is satisfactory, but surely the Secretary to the Admiralty does not pretend for one moment that the establishment of Engineer Officers, viz., 400, can be held to be at all satisfactory. How much less the question of the stokers. One unsatisfactory feature of the First Lord of the Admiralty's statement is the fact that sufficient importance does not appear to me to be attached to the question of the supply and treatment of the officers belonging to the Engineer branch of the Royal Navy. The Board of Admiralty, on which there is not one single engineer, stand on this question in antagonism to every trained engineer in the country, and have never given satisfaction to the claims of their own engineers. It is satisfactory to know that some very highly placed officers in the Navy have recognised the mistakes made by the Board of Admiralty. We have had in the past several sympathetic Admirals, but the Board qua Board appears to be unable or unwilling to appreciate the seriousness of the situation. To go into details would only weary the House, and I hope they will take it from me that the statements I am making, although not supported by detailed figures, are absolutely reliable. My allegations are as follows—that the supply of the Engineering Ratings is totally inadequate to the requirements. There are neither enough officers, enough artificers, nor enough stokers. The reserves, both of officers and stokers, are ridiculously inadequate, as I have already pointed out. The inducements offered for the recruiting of this service are not sufficient to attract men of the proper stamp, and expedients tending to lower the entire service have in despair been from to time adopted. The engineering equipment of His Majesty's ships is, in comparison with a mail ship of anything like the same power, far too low. It may be argued that His Majesty's ships get along with the crews they have and carry out thir annual stram trials, and I admit that this is in some cases—I am afraid not all—true. But if we compare what is a fairer thing—the probable conditions in war—with the conditions in peace, the House will see how the matter stands. Supposing we take a ship like the "Repulse," "Resolution," or "Royal Sovereign," or some of this class, or first-class cruisers like the "Good Hope," "Powerful," or "Terrible" we will find that the engineering staff consists probably of a fleet engineer, of something like forty-five or forty-six years of age, of a senior engineer of six and a half years service, and probably other three or four of what can only be termed youngsters—good boys perhaps, but still youngsters, without experience. In other words, there are practically only two men on a vessel of that description at all corresponding with what we count certificated engineers in the mercantile marine. A vessel of the description, we will say, of the "Royal Sovereign" on squadron service will probably for six months of her time be doing nothing, lying at anchor. For other five months she may be cruising—it is not likely, but she may be cruising—at a speed of probably from ten to twelve knots; and for a few days at a time she may run anything from half power to three quarters, perhaps occasionally full power. Her staff will certainly be overworked, but they will manage to get through. But compare a war service, where not only will they be constantly on the look out, practically constantly under steam or with banked fires, sometimes in action, where serious casualties may happen in the engineering ranks, and always under the highest possible pressure of anxiety. Allow, for example, that anything happens to a mail ship's chief engineer of the size of the "Campania," there are at least seven or eight men under him, each one of whom is perfectly capable, owing to Ids experience, of taking charge of the machinery. Under the fleet engineer on a first class cruiser or a battleship, as a rule, there is one man, and he has no more than at the outside six years service. Sir, we know the trouble that exists now with our modern machinery. We know the complication and the anxiety. We know that in peace time practically the Engineering Department has all the anxiety, and that in war time it certainly has as much anxiety and less chance than the Deck Department; and yet the most moderate reforms asked for are denied. I admit that since the advent of the noble Lord we have had some improvements. We have had the artificer engineer class developed, and the numbers increased from 150 to 400. The acting time counts; eight years service is sufficient, and the age of twenty-nine is allowed instead of thirty-five. But artificers are still underpaid, and their pensions are still inadequate. It must be remembered that they are very largely married men, whose pay does not go a long way in keeping a house on shore, as well as their own expenses at sea. It is to these men apparently that the Government intends to look to fill up the shortages that we are getting accustomed to in our engineering ranks. We know that they are going, to a dangerous extent, in depriving vessels of considerable size—for example, the unfortunate "Condor" of the advantage of a commissioned officer in the Engineer Department. If the Government are determined to take this line, then they can easily reduce the engineers in number and largely increase the warrant officers, but they roust be prepared for a very different recognition of the engineering staff, who will then become a select branch, who must be most highly trained, most highly paid, and most adequately recognised—somewhat as the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors is at the present moment. If, on the other hand, the Government are determined to keep the engineers on their present footing, they will then have to get more. Let us consider what would be the result of mobilisation, say, of the first-class reserve, or, as I understand it is called, the A Reserve. There are practically no Royal Naval engineers available for duty without withdrawing from other important employments or from other ships, and even then there would not be anything like sufficient to man more than a very few of the ships. The shortage of stokers is numbered by thousands, and all we have to meet this is the Royal Naval Reserve of engineers of 400 officers and 3,000, or 4,000 at the outside, reserve of stokers scattered all over the world. Sir, the Board of Admiralty are no doubt highly scientific, technical, sensible men, but they all belong to the military side, and they appear to be unable to fathom the intricacies of this engineering question. The Royal Naval engineers' claims are disregarded, they are made to feel themselves, though not by their brother executive officers, inferior in every way. The marvel to me is that they have done as well as they have done. We speak of them not being military. I wonder if the House realises that of the bluejackets who walked into Ladysmith, fought the guns there, and were shut up there, no less than fifty were stokers, and there are other instances of distinguished service being rendered by the engineers. Sir, the Board of Admiralty must alter conditions, and the sooner they begin the operation the easier it will be. I lay before the House what I am convinced will be an adequate expression of the confidence of the country in the engineers and of recognition of their work, and if the Admiralty cannot see their way to grant this then I do not think engineers can be blamed for refusing to join the Service. In rank there should be a Royal Naval Engineering Corps formed. The Admiralty refuse to concede to them a military grade. There is therefore no reason for refusing a separate Corps, There are Royal Marines; we have a Royal Army Medical Corps and we have the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors. We must have a corps of Royal Naval Engineers, and corresponding rank should be given, only in a few cases on hoard ship exceeding the rank of Commander, which will be borne by the chief engineer of the ship. If you had a separate Corps of Royal Naval Engineers there would be no stagnation in promotion, as it would then be as with lieutenants after eight years service, who get rank and pay. The pay of the engineers is not a thing they are inclined to stickle at, although it is considered, alongside of such non-combatant branches as the Paymaster and the Doctor, too small. Still it is the junior ranks that most require augmentation, and a very little, I believe, would satisfy the assistant engineers and the engineers. At the present moment it is not possible for them to maintain themselves creditably. Engineers are much wanted for filling up the gaps of age between say a Fleet Engineer of forty-five and his next in charge of twenty-six or twenty-seven. At present an engineer with eight years service must be a chief in independent charges. Small disciplinary control ought undoubtedly to be given to the engineer. They wish no powers of vindictive punishment. That is the cloud which has always been cast around this item of their requirements by the Board of Admiralty. Shut up as they are down below, they must have the respect of their men, and everybody knows, who knows anything about a ship, to what an extent rank carries weight. It is a microcosm of a society, and should be treated as such. This is already granted to Marine Officers on board ship, and the engineers ask nothing more than to be allowed to do what the Marine Officer does. Let the House fancy that if the chief engineer, for some small breach of discipline, makes a man do some dirty work, such as cleaning the bilges, or something like that, instead of some tidier job, he is liable on complaint by the man to have his orders cancelled by the Captain, as it pertains to punishment. The last item refers to the youth of what ought to be the Corps of Royal Naval Engineers. Even at Keyham College, when the young fellows are entering upon their career, there are strict lines of difference drawn as compared with the "Britannia." Things that are done for the Cadet Officers in the way of amusements and expenses for their social life are denied to Keyham. There is also a lack of supreme authority at the Engineering College. No better illustration of the disparity of the treatment in the two institutions could be given that the fact that at Keyham the cost to the country per head is only about a quarter of what it is in the "Britannia." Now, Sir, the last thing I would like to do is to weary the House. It is very difficult to make one's contention good in a complicated case like this without going into it at great length. I hope, Sir, I have not erred in that respect. To administrators like the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary, and the Civil Lord, I hope I can confidently appeal to act in this matter as men patriotically inclined, who do not desire to see the Navy suffer in any way whatever; as men of business, who recognise that an important branch of their department is suffering, and is liable to become more or less inefficient through lack of numbers. I know they are actuated by the highest good of the Navy, and I hope I may with con fide n leave this case in their hands for suitable adjustment. (8.15.)

said he felt that the House would be indulgent to anyone who represented a constituency like Portsmouth for intruding, even at some length, on the attention of the House. Anybody representing such a constituency was necessarily charged with interests of no small importance. By the courtesy of the First Lord of the Admiralty a convenient system had been adopted by which hon. Members were able to meet him privately and lay before him a large number of matters which could be better discussed by a private deputation than by debates in this House. He referred to such questions as those affecting chief warrant officers and petty officers, the different ratings in the Navy, and all questions affecting the dockyards which could be better laid before the proper authorities in the manner he had indicated. Therefore he would eliminate from his remarks at the outset those issues which he would have an opportunity of devoting himself to elsewhere. It had been his experience that if one endeavoured to take a generous view of the work of the Admiralty and the prospects of the Navy, one was apt to be accused of a servile obedience to the Government. In spite of that he desired to point out features which were matters of congratulation to the Admiralty in their conduct of the Navy. The right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean had alluded to the long time still taken to build a ship in this country. That was true, but we should not forget that it took other countries quite as long, if not longer. For the purposes of a comparison he would take a French and English battleship and a French and English cruiser. The French battleship "Republique" was laid down in the year 1901, and was to be commissioned in the year 1905, and consequently took four years to build. The English battleship "Formidable" was laid down in March 1898, and commissioned in October 1901, the time taken for building being three years seven months. The French cruisers "Jules Ferry" and "Leon Gambetta "were laid down in June 1900, and were to be commissioned at the end of 1903, and took three and a half years to construct. The English cruiser "Cressy "was laid down in 1898, and commissioned in October 1901, and took three years to construct. Therefore the comparisons of these ships, which were much of the same tonnage and class, were by no means unfavourable, and the facts he had quoted showed that England was able to turn out her ships more rapidly than France. According to the French official document, the "Charlemagne," which was to have been completed in October 1897, was not completed till the year 1899. The "Henry IV.," which was estimated to have been completed in July 1900, had not yet got her engines on board, and the "Montealm," which should have been ready in the year 1901, was not yet finished, and already 2,225,000 francs had been spent on her in excess of the original estimate. Therefore, with regard to the criticisms which have been made in regard to their shipbuilding, they did not need to be at all disheartened in view of the comparisons he had made. They often heard complaints of the unbusinesslike manner in which proposals were brought before them, and of the manner in which they were explained to the House. That, however, was a grievance which was not exclusively their own. It was a grievance which they could read in the French Official Report on the Budget, where it was stated that although the date given on which the cruiser "Gloire" was to be completed, was August 1902, it would not be completed, according to another official document, until April 1903. In the same way the "Carabine" was promised for September 1902 in one, and the middle of 1903 in the other. Therefore, even if they sometimes thought that their shipbuilding was not carried on as expeditiously as they wished, and even if the Admiralty were inclined to be obscure in regard to the information which they gave to the House, he thought they could afford to put those objections on one side to a very great extent, because the official documents of other countries showed that foreign Admiralties were afflicted in a similar manner, and even went far beyond any grievance which had been brought forward in this House. He desired to say a word or two about the cruisers which were provided for in the Memorandum of the first Lord. Anybody who looked for the moment into the state of the Navy and interested himself in naval affairs must be convinced of the paramount importance of keeping up our standard of cruisers. Wars of the future would be racing, wars, and speed would become one of the most important elements in naval operations, and whatever happened this country must never allow itself to fall back in the establishment of modern cruisers. When he talked like that it was only right that he should fortify his opinion; it was necessary that he should not give what he had just said as an obiter dictum, and he ought to establish his proposition by giving some well-recognised authority. He would, therefore, quote the words of Laird Clowes who said—

"A large, fast, and well-armoured cruiser, mounting numerous protected guns of medium calibre, but having neither very thick armour nor very heavy gulls, would be a match for the largest and most costly battleship now afloat."

He desired to associate himself with those who thought that they could not have too many cruisers mounting numerous protected guns of medium calibre, for these, at all events would be an acquisition to their naval strength which they could not afford to neglect. He agreed with the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean, who had expressed surprise that only two cruisers had been provided for in the Memorandum laid before the House. It was not easy to understand at any moment to what state of perfection the different navies of the world had arrived. It was not easy to collect information as to what would be the state of things at the end of the next few years. But he desired, in regard to the Navy, to associate himself with those who firmly believed that this country could not have too many cruisers, an d it would be most disastrous to their prospects in the future if they were to allow any proposals put before them to pass which failed to provide an adequate number of cruisers. There was one matter upon which he desired to congratulate the Admiralty. The cruiser class, which last year appeared to take the fancy of the authority, contained only 6-in. guns, and that seemed to be a serious defect. He found that the French cruiser "Gloire" had 7·6-in. guns, and the corresponding German cruisers had 8·2-in. guns. The French cruiser "Montcalm," and those, of a similar class, had 7-G-in. guns, while the Russian cruisers now being built had 8.7-in. guns, and the German cruisers now under construction would have 9.4-in, guns. It therefore seemed a great pity that our cruisers should not have bigger guns than 6-in. guns. Consequently, he read with great satisfaction the statement in the Memorandum of the First Lord of the Admiralty that the new cruisers were to be armed with 7½-in. guns, a change which he thought would commend itself to the judgment of the country. It was very difficult to say where the line should be drawn in this matter. Of course there must be a medium somewhere. They had it on the best authority as a fair estimate that sixty-six new cruisers were required. He was not prepared, nor did he think anyone would be prepared, to ask the Admiralty to provide that number. However, he did ask for more cruisers so that the Navy would, be able to cope with any emergency in the event of war. Nelson in the old days asked for more frigates. A British Admiral should never be placed in the position of saying that he had been starved for cruisers in the ultimate emergency of war. The hon. Member for West Islington, who moved an Amendment earlier in the evening advocated a reduction in the establishment of destroyers, and appeared to intimate that destroyers were a useless class of ship. He himself took an entirely different view, not only was the destroyer essential to our safety, but we must demand from it the utmost that had ever been demanded, and far more than was demanded in many quarters. He read with very much surprise the evidence given by Mr. Parsons at the enquiry in the disaster to the "Cobra." He said—

"These destroyers were very lightly built. He believed they were originally intended to be fine weather vessels."

It appeared to the hon. Member, even as a layman, that such a proposition was impossible. In this view he was fortified by the authority of an article he read recently in the Contemporary Review, in which the writer said that Navies could not be run on lines to please nervous, well-meaning shore folks, and used the words "Damn danger." While he apologised for the force of the language quoted, he took it that that was a sailor-like and common-sense expression of opinion. The country that knew the capabilities of its destroyers from tests made in time of peace held a very good card in its hand. If we were going to have destroyers in time of war it would be necessary to use them in foul weather, and though he deplored a disaster like that to the "Cobra," he thought the Navy must be asked to undertake these risks. He believed they would not ask that of the Navy in vain. He wished to call the attention of the House to an important matter in connection with this point. Supposing a sailor was killed in warlike operations, his widow received a pension from the Government; so with regard to the soldiers; but supposing a sailor lost his 1ife, as in the case of the "Cobra," his widow depended upon the Greenwich Old Age Pension Fund. He thought it was not too much to ask in such cases that the country and not the pension fund should be called upon to provide for the widow. From the year 1865 to 1895 the Government paid only one hundred pounds as rent for Greenwich Hospital, but since then £6,500 a year had been paid. From 1869 to 1893 Government appropriated £16,000 from the funds of the Greenwich Hospital and in 1893 they refunded that £16,000. Thus a very large sum of money every year was withheld during that period from the funds of the Hospital, a sum which might now be available for the pension of the old sailors who were entitled to it and whose claims the government admitted were valid but could not be met because the money was insufficient. He came into touch with a good many men of the lower deck, men who as a class were not grumblers, and he found that in the matter of food they chiefly wanted change in the quantity. The recommendations of the Committee on Navy Rations would not be introduced until 1903. He urged the Admiralty to increase the amount of food given to the sailor. For 100 years the seamen had had no meal between 4 p.m. and 6 a.m. Whatever else they might require must be got from the canteen. He did not think it would be asking the country very much to ask it to provide the seamen with something in the shape of a supper, which would be considered in accordance with the standard of living nowadays, not luxurious or extravagant, but within the bounds of reason, and proper for those who were manning our ships. He must now say a friendly word for the Marines on whose behalf he asked that the Department would grant the desire Marines had often expressed when trouble arose that they should be tried by court martial at sea. He did not see why the wish of the Marines could not be met in that respect. There was one little matter which might not sound very heroic, but which he ventured to press, and that was that our war ships should be warmed. That was no original suggestion of his own. The other day he was at Portsmouth, where he saw a Japanese battleship, and it was warmed throughout by means of hot water pipes. No one would accuse our new allies of being an effete or an effeminate race. Russ an war ships were also heated in the same way, so that there was no difficulty in the matter, and we ought to make the lives of our seamen compatible, as far as possible, with the standard of comfort which obtained everywhere else. He had to express great satisfaction and pleasure on learning from the Estimates that one of the new battleships was to be built at Portsmouth. Personally he threw out the hope that it would be as near as possible to the "Formidable" class, which he believed was the best battleship we were building now, and a type we might continue, with the greatest confidence, to build. He had another suggestion to offer, and that was that it should be named the "Portsmouth." We must on no account fall back in our building programme, and he wished that more cruisers of the "Drake" and "Good Hope" class should be put into the water. So far as human ingenuity could contrive, and human foresight could anticipate, nothing should be left undone to perfect our Naval equipment and develop and complete our Naval resources. He would adopt the sentiment of the Poet Burns, who once said—

"He will liquidate your debts And lessen all your charges, But, God's sake, let no saving fit Abridge your bonny barges Nor boats this day."

said he wished to say a few words upon this Vote. In the first place he wished to offer his very sincere congratulations to the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty for his lucid and workmanlike statement he had given to the House in introducing the vote. To his way of thinking, and without at all desiring to flatter the hon. Gentleman, this was the best exposition of the Navy Votes which had ever been brought before the House in his experience. The value of a war ship in those days depended entirely upon two factors. First, there was the offensive power of the vessel; and next, her steaming power. The combination of these two factors being obtained in a ship, made that ship a true, fighting machine. He would deal first with the offensive power of some of the vessels which had been built under the last programme, and some which were included in the admirable statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty. It must be in the recollection of the House that last year in the discussion on the Navy Estimates he drew attention to the fact that we were building valuable vessels, costing hundreds of thousands of pounds meant to protect our Empire, and to be our first line of defence, but that they were miserably under-gunned. He was happy to see from the statement issued by the First Lord, that the Admiralty had since come to the same conclusion. They were now altering the "Powerful" and the "Arrogant" classes, and putting into them more guns, and making them better fighting machines in proportion to their dimensions. It might startle the House to know what those vessels really were. He would take the "Cressy" class. That vessel, which was much lauded as a first-class cruiser, was of 12,000 tons displacement, yet what was its offensive power in an engagement either for the protection of our commerce or in attacking an enemy? She could only fire 1,960 lbs. weight of shot in one discharge of her guns. By way of comparison he would take another vessel, one of the new Japanese cruisers—the "Asama," built at Elswick, and designed by the new chief constructor of the Navy—a very clever man in every respect. The "Asama" was of 9,750 tons displacement, a far smaller boat than the "Cressy." Now, if the "Asama" went into an engagement with the "Cressy" she would just blow her out of the water, because she could fire 2,240 lbs. of shot in one discharge. Again, the "Asama" could steam 21 knots pet hour with 150 lbs. pressure of steam in cylindrical boilers, while the "Cressy" could not approach that speed with her water - tube boilers. He could give any number of cases more. The facts were admitted by the Admiralty themselves, because they were taking out the 4¿7 inch. guns and replacing them with 6 inch. guns; and no doubt they would do that also with the "Terrible," if she were able to steam home. The question might be asked why it was that those vessels were not designed properly at first? It was admitted by the Admiralty that they were badly designed, and under-gunned. He did not call that designing at all. It was bungling with the ships, and tinkering with the nation's money. He would give his view as to why it was that those vessels were so light in their offensive power. He held, rightly or wrongly, that the dominant idea which had obtained for a long time in the Construction Department of the Admiralty was to build vessels of a high speed. Now, they could not get high speed without fine lines; and the natural sequence of fine lines was that such a ship could not carry heavy guns without rolling. That was to say, if heavy guns were put on board she could not top the waves in a heavy sea. There was an article in The Times the other day, and it would startle the House to know that that Journal, which was generally in favour of the Government, said—

"The ships of the Mediterranean Fleet during the past few months have been under- going a thorough experimental series of exercises in target practice, both with their main and intermediate armament. The analysis points to a marked divergence in accuracy between the results attained from the moving and vibrating platform of a warship, pulsating from her engines and heaving from wave motion, and that estimated theoretically in the win factories, and practically reached on the solid platform of the shore range. The divergence between results in these diverse circumstances is marked at all ranges, but the difference of result is specially unsatisfactory at any range beyond a sea mile."

That was to say, they could not be sure of their aim on account of these vessels rolling when there was any sea on. He had been talking to a gunnery lieutenant the other day, who told him that he could not, with a three-feet sea on, hit a target once out of sixty times. Such, he held, was the true condition of our war ships at the present moment. How could the greatest offensive power be obtained in an engagement when the ships were designed on terribly fine lines, and had light guns on board? What he had spoken about last year had been amply verified, and it was well known at the Admiralty that such was the case. The cruisers were under-gunned, and had not a stable platform when the least sea was on. They were in every sense of the term fine weather ships. They would do very well for sailing on the Serpentine or on a big pond, but when at sea their power as effective fighting machines practically vanished. Where, then, was the safety of the Empire or of British commerce when only defended by such ships. He honestly said that the offensive power of the vessels in the Navy was of minor quantity as compared with the vessels of other navies; and, as the hon. Member for Portsmouth had said, they were worked with smaller guns than French and other warships. He came to the next quality which should be possessed by a warship, and that was steaming power. A warship, even if weak, provided she was well-engined and could keep her steam up, could generally get away from an enemy in the event of an engagement. That was a factor which could not be overlooked in designing a. warship, and for many years he had been directing attention to what he considered, eight years ago, the great mistake that was made by the Admiralty officials in putting into vessels steam generators which had never been tried, and of which they had had no experience whatever, and putting them into vessels which cost millions of pounds. Every word of what he had said had been verified; so much so, that Lord Goschen when First Lord of the Admiralty appointed a Committee, and that Committee's Report verified his statements. He was sorry he was at a disadvantage in not having also the Report of the Boiler Committee on the "Minerva" and "Hyacinth" tests. The House had not got that report, and it was not fair that it had pot been presented.

I endeavoured to keep my pledge, but the Report could not be printed in time. I regret the delay as much as the hon. Member.

said he was fully aware of the hon. Gentleman's desire to have the Navy what it should be. He knew what the hon. Gentleman's sentiments were; and he fully appreciated that the delay was not his fault. The Admiralty officials had put into magnificent vessels costing millions, boilers they had never tried and knew nothing about. Indeed, they were not boilers at all in the true sense. They were steam generators. What had happened? Oh, such a sorrowful picture! Go to Devonport, and what would they find? A crowd of cripples. At Portsmouth, a crowd of cripples, and the same at Chatham; the "Europa," the "Hermes," the "Diadem," the "Spartiate," the "Powerful," the "Vengeance," and many others. Absolutely there was no single vessel, and he was speaking advisedly, and he hoped correctly, that these boilers had been put into that could do her designed rate of speed; and when they attempted to do it they came to grief, and would continue to come to grief. The dockyards would soon be nothing less than repairing shops for vessels lying in them. It is all very well to say that we could not get the men to work the boilers. That was nonsense. There were as good men in England and Scotland as there were on the Continent. We were a race of engineers; but how could a man get steam out of a thing in which the natural principle was nullified by the design? It was not a question of men at all. He wished the House to realise how the system affected the Navy Votes. The repairs to the "Terrible" was given as £8,674. He should like to know what shipping company would stand that The "Diadem," which was only built in 1898, had down against her for repairs £24,289; the "Pelorus" £23,540, although only four years old, and the "Porcupine" £19,439, all within the space of three and a half years. He could not find the repairs to the "Europa," the "Hermes," and the "Furious" in the Votes, but it would startle the House to know where the money went. It was all very well for the Admiralty to say that they wanted £31,000,000; they would get it with the greatest of pleasure. He himself believed with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Forest of Dean that it was not enough, but where did the money go? He would tell the House. One-fifteenth of the total amount went in repairs. A sum of £2,195,528 went in repairs, or what was commonly known as reconstruction, whatever that meant, repairs and alterations if any steam shipping company in the world spent a fifteenth of its capital on repairs it would be bankrupt in six months. What did that mean? Did it mean that the vessels of the Navy were right and strong? No. It meant that they were absolutely wrong and unfit for their work, or else they would not be in the dockyards so often as they were. Take the case of the "Spartiate." The original estimate for that vessel was £518,623. What did she cost beyond that? Her total cost was £636,141, an excess of £127,518. In that one vessel alone the original estimate was exceeded by nearly £120,000. The House would see it was not a question of voting the money but of efficiency. When one-fifteenth of the total had to be spent in repairs, there must be something wrong. What was it? He attributed the whole of that excessive expenditure on repairs to nothing else than the great blunder made in putting steam generators into the ships eight or nine years ago. How were they to-day? In the very lucid and clear statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty he found that the battleship "Queen" and the first-class cruiser "Cornwall" were to be fitted with Babcock and Wilcox boilers; that the "Hermes"—the celebrated "Hermes" —which had to be towed into Bermuda was going to have Babcox and Wilcox boilers; that the "Challenger" would also be fitted with them, and that two of the "King Edward VII." class were also to have them. There were six or eight vessels going to be saddled with Babcockand Wilcox boilers. What was the history of those boilers? He warned the Admiralty again that they were making a plunge which they would regret, and that they were spending the money of the nation in a way they would regret. A Departmental Paper issued by the Board of Trade in connection with a Babcock and Wilcox recent boiler explosion explained exactly what took place. That Report said—

"Considerable trouble has been caused by the tubes in these boilers blistering and bulging, this having taken place during the three years that the boilers have been at work. "There is greater danger from temporary shortness of water in boilers of this description than is generally supposed."

And the head engineer of the Board of Trade said-

"It should also be remembered in dealing with boilers of this type that an amount of deposit, local or otherwise, in the tubes, which would be comparatively harmless at ordinary rates of evaporation, becomes a grave source of danger when the boilers are unduly forced, as they appear to have been in this case."

It was impossible not to force the boilers when fighting a ship; no water-tube boiler can stand forcing. That is the fault of all these boilers. There was a ship built at Sunderland into which the Government were now putting the same type of boilers which had to be taken out of her. Upon what grounds of practical experience were they fitting these boilers into brand new ships? Why were hundreds of thousands of pounds to be squandered by putting these boilers into ships without there being a proper trial of them—a lengthened trial at sea under high pressure and designed power and speed? What did the Boiler Committee say in their Report of water-tube boilers? They recommended them, provided a satisfactory type were adopted. Was the Babcock and Wilcox a satisfactory type? When the Belleville boiler came out, and scientific papers were written on it by Admiralty Officials, he warned the Government they would fail, and as surely as they had failed with the Belleville boiler, they would fail again with the boiler they now proposed to adopt. The Report of the Boiler Committee was a sensible Report, and he did not quarrel with it. But where was a suitable, type, and why should the Government plunge again, and put these boilers into six or eight new battleships and cruisers when they had no evidence as to whether they were suitable or not? But if they had no evidence that the Babcock and Wilcox was a satisfactory type, they had evidence that the old cylindrical boiler was satisfactory. They had the evidence of the "Isis" and the "Dido." Those boats were ordered out to China during the disturbances and they steamed away at between fifteen and twenty knots, without a hitch, right out to China to do their work. Against that, let the Government take the "Glory," a modern, up-to-date Belleville water-tube hollered battleship. She should be called H.M.S. "Ichabod." She took fifty-seven clays to go to China. Why did she take so long Simply because she could not get along any faster. He felt very strongly this plunging again by the Admiralty officials. What fault had they to find with the cylindrical boilers? None. The fact was that the Government were ashamed of the failure they made when they first put water tube boilers into our ships; they were ashamed to admit they had made a mistake, their only desire was to get out of admitting it, and the result had been that they had run all over the Continent in order to find a suitable type, and our ships were simply being experimented with. How could we expect to avoid disaster? How could we expect anything from a ship which could not depend upon her engines I What was the use of the best ship to the best admiral if he could not depend upon her engines? The true value of a ship lay in its capacity to safely give steam to its captain when he required it. He had warned the Government before, and he warned them again. He cared not who their advisors were, the Admiralty were wrong, and would come to grief once more if they persisted in this course—putting into ships a thing the very principle of which was scientifically wrong—which burnt more coal and employed more risen. He saw the nice, gentle way in which they were going to get out of the difficulty. They were going, to put in three-fifths Babcock and boilers, and two-fifths cylindrical boilers. This was Horse and Hen engineering. If they were right about water-tube boilers, they ought riot to put in cylindrical boilers at all, but if water-tube boilers were wrong, they ought to put in cylindrical boilers alone. He entered his protest again against the blunder the Admiralty were committing.

said he had been in hopes that this discussion would have been taken in Committee, because he perceived a difficulty in the way of the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty in, replying to the various speeches made; but, as it appeared that that was not to be the order of the day, he wanted to take, as briefly as he could, a part in this discussion. The hon. Member who had just sat down always commanded the-attention and sympathy of the House. His patriotism and earnestness all admired, and in what he had said years ago, in conjunction with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Forest of Dean and the hon. Gentleman now the Secretary to the Admiralty, with regard to the armament of ships, he had the satisfaction of saying to-day, "I told you so." Too much stress must not be laid upon cost of repairs. It was in the nature of progress and experiment, and in those experiments a large sum of money must be expended in repairing damage, and this was the general policy entered into and set forth in the First Lord's Memorandum With regard to the Secretary to the Admiralty's speech, he congratulated his hon. friend on the clearness and frankness of his statement, which had surprised none of those who had watched his career in and out of the House. The-First Lord's statement conveyed, to his mind at least, a rather new departure. It was marked by a spirit of broader policy than they had had before, but its value lay snore in promises than in anything else, and they had to wait and see how far those promises were fulfilled by performance. The difficulties were great, and too much should not be expected. Butin that Memorandum there was one alteration, in one branch of our Naval policy, to which his hon. friend had not referred. The Admiralty, for the first time, acknowledged the complaint with regard to administrative congestion. That was important, because the first thing that improved a position was to acknowledge the fault. There was an acknowledgment of congestion, and an indication that the Admiralty were engaged in some technical remedies with regard to the Controller's Department. But he would point out that when a statesman was put at the head of the Admiralty, he had to learn the Naval problem from the Naval Lords, and his conviction was that these Naval Lords, instead of performing these duties as they should, were being turned into superior routine clerks. These gentlemen acknowledged when they left their positions that they had not time to consider the bigger questions of Naval policy. That was very serious for the country and for the Navy, and he hoped the First Lord would not stop at having made this acknowledgment in his statement, but would prove that he had realised the danger by providing some remedy for this defect. Everybody outside the Department could make suggestions, though without a knowledge of the internal working of the Department those suggestions might not be of much value. He considered, however, that a Naval Lord should have a post-captain to whom he could depute some of the routine work under his supervision, and then he himself would be free to attend to those larger questions of naval policy. But whatever else happened at the Admiralty, there was one principle that must never be given up—that of interchange from the Admiralty Board to the sea, and from the sea to the Admiralty Board. The next point referred to in the Memorandum was that of personnel. Many questions in that connection it would not now be necessary to discuss, because one of the most important, that of the Reserve, had been referred to a very strong Committee. One point, however, was admitted. The age of superior officers was a very important question. It was necessary to have an adequate number of sufficiently young, trained executive officers. What was really wanted was not so much tinkering with the present system of executive officers, as an enlarged view of the whole position of the Navy. Greater outlets for the naval service and larger opportunities of employment within it were required. In tins connection, he was glad to see—for the first time for many years—a distinguished Admiral had been sent to hold an important position in Australia. As everybody who had studied the history of the question knew, for long after the Napoleonic wars there was hardly a Government position near the sea board of any colony in which there was not a naval officer available for naval service. The real difficulty of the age question could be overcome only by an enlarged view of the whole situation. It was a curious fact that in the different branches of the Navy a very large proportion of the officers on board ship, with their staffs, were not naval officers at all. It was too large a question to be dealt with in that debate, and he would merely repeat that better outlets would have to be provided, so that many officers of executive rank, when they left the list temporarily, would still be associated with the sea. Before passing from the details of the personnel, he desired to know the distribution or apportionment by classes of the 266 officers and the 143 warrant officers alluded to on page 5 of the Memorandum as an increase. Then there were 400 additional men to the miscellaneous branch of the Navy. Were they to be effective fighting men? Did they belong to the engine-room staff, or the executive staff, or the civil staff, or what? A new feature was the provision of 250 additional artisans and electricians. Those men were not to be under the engineer, but the gunnery-lieutenant. It had to be remembered that the whole period and opportunities of training for a gunnery-lieutenant were between entering the "Britannia" at fourteen and a half or fifteen years of age, and about twenty-one or two, and it was necessary to take care that too much was not piled on to that young man, that in trying to make him everything, they were not spoiling him altogether, and that in creating in the Navy special classes, they did not expect too much from particular classes and too little from others. Had or had not the Admiralty made up their minds that the gunnery and torpedo ieutenants were to be highly trained scientific, hydraulic, and electrical engineers? As to the general question of the relations between the engineers and the executive branch, that was merely a repetition in another form of a question as old as the Navy itself. In the old days, generals and troops were put on board ship hastily and sent to fight the battles; the ships were merely the vehicles of military force. The troops returned, having distinguished themselves, and were rewarded, while the old sea-dogs who provided locomotion to the ships were forgotten, and, of course, they did not like it. They felt that they did the work while the others got the credit, and in the end they took their proper place as masters of the situation. The question now was the same, but in another form. Instead of the executive officer being the man who utilised the labour of the men to provide locomotion for the ship, he simply called his orders down the tube. These men below felt that they ought to be more fully recognised. It was a sentiment, of course, and in the interest of the naval service mere argument must not be pushed too far. The executive officer must, without doubt, be chief, but the Admiralty would do wisely to recognise that there was a general responsibility in all departments, and for the life of him he could not see why the engineering department should not be formed into a corps of Royal Naval Engineers and worked under much the same conditions as the Marine service. He was glad the Admiralty had accepted in full the Report and recommendations of the Victualling Committee, and it was only right to point out that an hon. and gallant colleague of his, who was no longer a Member of the House—Admiral Field—was the man to whom credit was due for having perpetually, in season and out of season, breed that question on the attention of the Admiralty. Then, he was not satisfied with the higher education of officers. Not one-fourth was being done that should be done. He looked upon it as most serious that officers, from the time they entered until they became captains, had simply to confine their attention to matters wholly connected with the inside of their ships, And were denied opportunities of studying the bigger problems of naval policy and practice, so that when the Admiralty asked for their opinion, when they attained high positions, on those problems, they were not always really sound guides. As regards construction, they were for the first time told that what was proposed to be built in the year would be built in the year. That was satisfactory, but it was a startling fact. He presumed that the explanation was that the Secretary to the Admiralty was able to say that the productive power of the country had so developed as to meet present demands. He should like to know whether it was due to the development of the productive power of the country or alteration of the Admiralty system. Was the programme of construction now regulated by that limit of, producing power That was a matter for grave consideration. If that was the limit, the first thing the Admiralty ought to do was to increase by some means the productive power of the country. He was not satisfied that, looking four or five years ahead, the present programme was what it ought to be, and he would simply content himself by ex, pressing his agreement with the remarks of the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean on that matter. There were two aspects of the policy of construction to be borne in mind; one was its relation to the power of other countries, and the other was the internal policy regulating provision and constitution of the fleet and determining the class and sort of vessels that should be built. He objected altogether to basing their policy on a sort of blind adherence to abstract comparison with the ships of other powers. In these matters they ought to lead and not follow. He had already mentioned the new class of scouts, but he wished to know whether the Admiralty were quite clear as to the direction naval policy would probably take in the near future. At present he did not think they had sufficient information about these scouts. As a great many of his remarks would have to be postponed until Mr. Speaker was out of the chair he asked his hon. friend to give them explicit and detailed information as to what sort of ship this new scout was to be and what it was expected to accomplish. He had listened earlier in the evening to the ideas put forth as to the possible standard which we ought to adopt in regard to the Fleet, but he thought they might just as well attempt to fix a standard by the number of cases of smallpox as by the standards which the hon. Member suggested. He must, however, express his agreement with some of the remarks of the Member for the Forest of Dean and press for further and detailed information, for they must all be impressed gravely with the responsibility involved in the question. Our Fleet had to cover the whole world with protection, and upon the right policy we were going to pursue depended the existence of the Empire.

said the hon. and gallant Member opposite had congratulated the Secretary to the Admiralty upon the statement he had placed before the House, alit he wished before making a few observations upon that statement to join with him in praise of the tone adopted by the hon. Member who represented the Admiralty. It used to be one of the pleasures of this House, however much they might differ on other matters from Lord Goschen, to feel that he always spoke upon Admiralty matters with his heart in his work. That pleasure had been continued in the case of the hon. Gentleman opposite, who now represented the Admiralty, for they felt that he had got his heart and faith in this matter, and they listened to his words as listening to one who might well command the attention of the House of Commons. Earlier in the debate there was a discussion which he though was well met by a justification of these Estimates. He did not wish to dwell upon a matter which belonged to another period of the discussion, but he would say that he did not think the Estimates—although they involved an increase of £1,000,000—showed an expenditure which the country could dispense with or diminish. In a very interesting discourse which was reported in The Times newspaper in May of last year, Sir Robert Giffen gave a calculation of the National income, which he placed at £1,500,000,000 sterling. Taking these Estimates at £30,000,000, that was only some 2 per cent. on the National income. If we only considered what the National income meant to us, it seemed to him that 2 per cent. was not an extravagant amount to pay as an insurance premium. Upon that income depended not only our prosperity but our very existence as a Nation and au Empire. Without that National income we should be "An over populated and discontented Island in the North Sea." Whether we took the National income at £1,500,000,000, or at the figure disclosed in the valuable Return which his bon and gallant friend got from the Board of Trade, we had much the same result. If we took those figures, the commerce of this country was something approaching £1,000,000,000 and the Estimates only amounted to some 3 per cent. on that. That was not an extravagant premium of insurance. He agreed with his right hon. friend the Member for East Fife that upon this matter of the Navy and also upon education he was not disposed to be parsimonious. He wished to make some remarks upon the increase in the Estimates. As had already been pointed out, these Estimates were about £1,000,000 in excess of the previous year, but when we considered the increase which had taken place in British Commerce and in the commerce of other nations that was by no means an unexpected result. We had seen great competing lines of mercantile ships proceeding in increasing numbers from Germany, the United States, and elsewhere, and yet our own commerce had shown no signs of diminution and we still held first position in the volume of trade sent forth. That trade had got to be protected, and in view of the increases in the Navies of the United States and Germany, England was bound to consider her position. He did riot attach undue importance to that remarkable discussion in the Reichstag the other day, when it was disclosed that the German Government would before long make further proposals for increasing their Navy. That was natural; but it was equally natural that we should think our own naval equipment required overhauling. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Antrim referred to the statement of M. Lockroy, and to the interesting criticism when 'he made on the position of the Naval Powers. The right hon. Gentleman was a student of the French Estimates, and he (the hon. Alember) was a student of that equally interesting book "The German Naval Annual." In reading that book he had been struck with the very cool-headed criticisms which it contained. For some things it praised us, and for others we were blamed. There was, however, one feature in which the British naval policy was praised, and that was our admirable system of building ships in classes, and in that respect we were singled out as preeminent among the nations. We were, however criticised for a singular want of steadiness in our shipbuilding programmes, which varied from time to time. He saw from Page 7 of the printed statement of the First Lord that the Admiralty appeared to be alive to this, and were now insisting upon steadiness in their programme of naval construction. The strength of Germany had laid in the marvellous punctuality with which her cruisers and battleships had been turned out, and he was glad to hear that in our case this year the shipbuilding programme would be a completed programme. He was glad also that the armament of the old battleships was being transformed and brought up to the modern standard. The substitution of new guns would make a great difference. It was not simply a question of the number or the calibre of their guns, but it was a question of the weight of metal which they could discharge in a given time. Efficiency in this respect involved that all the equipments and the guns of our old ships should be brought up to the modern standard, and he trusted that this re-arming of the older class of ships meant that they were all being brought up to the standard of modern times. But important as construction was, there were other matters to be considered. He felt, like his right hon. friend the Member for the Forest of Dean, that it was rather difficult to be satisfied with the shipbuilding programme which had been placed before them. It was impossible to know exactly what progress was being made relatively to other nations, for there were so many things to be taken into account. It was a most complex and difficult problem, and, satisfactory as the shipbuilding programme was in many respects, he was not disposed, without more knowledge, to burst forth into paeans of praise about the programme set forth in the First Lord's statement. We had to realise that whatever we might be deficient in, there was one thing essential, and that was that this country must, have absolute command of the seas. Command of the seas did not mean simply defence, but a defence which embraced the capacity of offence and of taking the initiative. Whether we adopted the standard of comparison with two, Powers, or whatever standard we took, that must be the consideration in the comparison, and more knowledge was required as to what the other nations were doing. They wanted a great deal more information than they had now before them to make hon. Members satisfied that we were keeping up to the old footing. As regarded the United States, he did not think that in the future England would.be able to keep up the two-Power standard. The enormous resources of the United States, together with the ingenuity and the energy of her people, had marked America out as a country likely to become a great military power. All he insisted upon was that England should not slack off in any degree, and_ should be careful to see that our best energies were devoted to maintaining what our traditions dictated. He would now deal with the question of the personnel of the Navy, and he was not sure that this question was not one of more importance than construction. The first thing that struck one in this connection was the question whether the Navy really had that amount of brain power and intelligence of the highest order which was required to control it. He was not questioning the ability of the-men who held commands in the Navy, but he did find that the work of the Board of Admiralty was increasing enormously. It was responsible, not only for matters of peace, but for matters of war. It was responsible for seeing that the. Navy, when called into action for the serious business of war, was up to the mark. But the members of the Board were overworked, and had little opportunity for elaborating the essential considerations of policy and strategy. With the Intelligence Department, which ought to be our aid, he was far from satisfied. We had only 13 intelligence officers, against 18 of Germany, and the Vote for the Department was only £10,000 a year. There were 13 military attaches against five naval attaches. Surely there ought to be a naval attaches the East, where such great naval development was taking place. He knew a little of this from the inside. Our naval attaches were among the most important people we had in connection with our naval service. We depended upon them for a great deal, he would say the bulk, of the information we got about what was going on in foreign Navies. He had seen the valuable Reports that came from these officers. He wished we had more of them. He wished there was more encouragement given to them to do their work. If military attaches were important, naval attaches were more important. There were more secrets in connection with the Navy than the Army, and yet even with the enlarged programme we were only to have five naval as against 11 military attachés It seemed to him that the point on which our naval system needed much overhauling was in this matter of intelligence. The Board of Admiralty should be enabled to delegate portions of their work. He would be glad to think that every member of the Board of Admiralty had a commander or a captain to assist him in the minor problems of his Department. There was a great deal to be done in this direction, and he thought that the writer of the remarkable series of articles that had appeared in The Times was right in insisting on the necessity of searching inquiry in this matter. He would like to see the whole constitution of the higher Departments of the naval service inquired into, and he ventured to press on the Government the desirability of searching and independent inquiry such as would be obtained by a Royal Commission. Germany had a very young and very snail Navy, but it was organised on a very modern pattern. He was especially struck with the difference between German admirals and our own. Our own admirals came into their commands to a large extent by seniority. In Germany it was quite different, and when he found that the oldest German admiral was fifty-seven and the youngest forty-nine, he was struck by the contrast between the state of things in that country and in this. Far be it from him to criticise the remarkable men who filled high commands in our Navy; but it seemed to him that we should be able to avail ourselves of the services of younger men when necessary, though he was afraid that the traditions of our Navy lent themselves but ill to having the younger men filling the high commands. Then there was a great deal too much employment on shore in the Navy, and too many officers unemployed. In the German Navy there was not a single officer unemployed. In this matter of the employment of officers, something still remained to be done if the higher grades of our personnel were to be put on a proper footing. He was glad to think that there was a real movement in favour of a naval. Volunteer force, and that this question was also receiving the attention of the Government. In the statement of Lord Selborne reference was made to the training of officers. He was not one of those who were likely to despise the advantages of high education, but he felt that there was one great fault that we in thin country were apt to commit in educational matters, that was the forcing of subjects upon people for which they had no natural aptitude. Much as he admired mathematics, it could not be denied that there were boys who had no. aptitude for that subject, and in learning it were to a great extent wasting their time. They wanted to make a first rate naval officer thoroughly at home in his ship and to take an intelligent interest in the science of seamanship. Let him specialise himself in that science as much as possible, but do not let him learn the differential calculus if he had not a turn for common addition and subtraction. Again, why should the Admiralty give 800 marks for Latin and only 400 marks for French? He should like to. see our young officers read Nauticus, the German naval manual, but he was afraid there was not much encouragement given for that at the present time. He corned the reference of the Secretary to the Admiralty to the College of Naval Strategy at Greenwich. It was an admirable institution, which had been in existence about a year. He was glad to notice that the Admiralty were recognising the private yards not only in ship, construction, but in the repank of ships. He thought it was important, not merely on account of these private yards, but because he was a great believer in their-value. In his opinion great institutions like Elswick, and Maxim, and Vickers, were part of the defences of the Empire. They should be encouraged as far as could be consistently with the service of the country. They might be our standby in time of need, and he should like to see them treated as integral parts of the defences of the country, manned as they were by men who had shown great patriotism in placing their abilities at the service of the Nation. Of course we must expect to pay a little more for the work we got done there than when we did it ourselves, but the advantage of keeping these places inure or less continuously employed and of having them as reserves seemed to him to compensate for any disadvantage. He wished the public could know a little more of what took place at the great annual manœuvres. There might be some objections to the Press being represented there, but he owned, speaking as a Member of Parliament and of the public he should like to have fuller information than reached the public on these occasions, for he could not conceive what mischief could be done by getting direct reports instead of reports at third hand. That was a matter which rested with His Majesty's Ministers; but he held the strong opinion that, as far as he could see, it would be much better in the public interest that they should have full and free information on these matters. As to the whole statement of the Secretary to the Admiralty, he agreed that, taking it in the main, it was a very satisfactory one. He was not alluding to the programme of construction. That was a thing which it was impossible for a layman to pronounce an opinion about. But he saw in that statement evidence of a desire to keep up-to-date, and make steps forward, which, if they did not go the whole way, went someway. He hoped that we should be able to continue the good tradition carried on for some years of a continuity in Naval policy. To his mind a continuity of Naval policy was hardly less important than a continuity in Foreign policy. The Navy was a great institution for peace as well as war. It was in this House that Mr. Cobden said that he would spend a hundred millions in order to have an efficient Navy. If we were to sleep in our beds in peace and comfort it was important that we should be strong on the ocean. He trusted that, so far as in him lay, he would never be a party to any sort of criticism in this House which could disturb the good tradition which had grown up within the last dozen years of a continuity of policy in this country as regarded Naval matters.

As the House is aware, when Mr. Speaker leaves the chair it will be able to continue this debate practically on the same lines. It is almost impossible for me to deal as adequately as I ought with all the subjects which have been brought forward; and if I deal briefly with the important question raised by the hon. Member for Gateshead, it is because I know that the Question must arise again on Vote 8. By that time the hon. Member will have a further document in his hands, which he will find an interesting contribution to the question when he raises it again. The right hon. Member for the Forest of Dean took the view that the Navy Estimates were not sufficient. The right hon. Gentleman speaks with so much weight and experience, that I do not like a charge of that kind to go abroad without pointing out that there is another side to his contention. The right hon. Gentleman suggested that the new programme for next year was altogether inadequate. Now, I do not take that view. In the first place, I would point out that we have now Estimates of almost unparalleled magnitude. The building estimate is now over £0,000,000 and as long as we keep it at that figure, or anything like it, the amount of work done in any one year is something gigantic. The right hon. Gentleman suggested, and the hon. Member who followed him adopted the suggestion, that in this matter the Admiralty are not provident; that though they are adding to the strength of the Fleet this year and the next year a considerable number of ships, yet they are not looking forward to the next five or six years and making provision for additions at those dates. Now, if this could he truly said, it would, indeed, he a very strong condemnation of the policy of the Admiralty. But I can assure the House that that is not the case. I will not quarrel with the right hon. Gentleman as to the matter of standard; I believe the right hon. Gentleman has always taken a rather more advanced view, and has advocated a standard of relative strength even greater than is acceptable to many Members of the House. I prefer to take the view that had been taken by the First Lord, and to say that our duty is to have a naval force which shall certainly be equal to that of two other Powers, and shall also be equal to any reasonable emergency with which we may expect to be confronted. This, of course, involves a power not only equal to, but in excess of, the standard of two Powers. But we have that matter in view, we have that ideal before us, and I can assure the House that our building programme is based upon a consideration of all the facts before us. The right hon. Gentleman spoke as if this were an extraordinarily small programme, but that, I think, is not so. In 1899 two battleships were laid down, in 1900 two battleships, in 1901 three battleships, and next year it is proposed to lay down two. That is to say that in the last two years of this period we are laying down five battleships, as against four in the previous two years. The armoured cruisers in 1899 were four, in 1900 six, in 1901 six, and in the coming year two. That is really a difference of two during the last two of these four years; but against that we have to set a much larger number of destroyers in those two years, considerable additions of submarine boats, and an increase in the new class of scouts which have been referred to. Now what would happen if we were to make large additions to the initial stages of our shipbuilding would be that we would have such an enormous excess on one or two years that the whole of the arrangements which we think are adequate for supplying us with all the ships we require within that period would be thrown out. Shipbuilding goes on in stages, and the ordinary rate of building battleships is three years. There is a small initial expenditure in the first half year, there are two very large expenditures in two following years, and the balance is expended in the last year, and if we got too many ships all coining into what we may call the fat period in one year, we should have an enormous excess of expenditure in one year, and very inadequate expenditure in the year succeeding, and so forth.

I am not asking for an excess. I am asking the Government to keep to their own standard in this programme.

We are keeping to our own standard in cruisers. In order to complete our programme it will be necessary to devote very great resources to it; and I think we should gain nothing by laying down four or five battleships at the beginning of next year. We are now building, and shall be building during the next two years, a very large number of ships. I would point out that, though we had in view, and were guided by, what other Powers are doing, there is a precedent which has been acted upon several times in this House—namely, that of introducing a Supplementary Estimate at a later date, if any unforeseen circumstances should occur to modify our view of our position in regard to other Powers. But I do not think that will be necessary. I believe it will be seen that the method of equalizing the expenditure on construction will in the long run be the wisest and most economical, and will get us the ships in full time. As to the Scouts I cannot give the exact details. They are not yet designed, but they will, no doubt, possess all those qualities which we have the right to expect from the ingenuity of the new Director of Naval Construction. I ant asked what is the object of this new class called Scouts? It is this. There are quarters of the globe in which we are compelled to act at some distance from our base, and it is found that under those circumstances it is not always easy to entrust the work, which in home waters might safely be entrusted to the ordinary destroyer, to a vessel of that type; and we believe we are justified in making the experiment of building vessels somewhat more habitable, somewhat more sea-keeping, and with somewhat heavier armament than the ordinary destroyer, which will thus be enabled to perform the work of destroyers at some distance from their base. I think I should be guilty of a dereliction of duty if I did not allude to the question of the engineers. The hon. Member for the Kilmarnock Burghs has been good enough to say that this is a matter in which he is very deeply interested. But I would like to remind the House that the difficulties submitted to our consideration with regard to this engineering question are not fully described in the speeches which we have heard, and which present a portion only of the really grave problem that confronts the Admiralty, and which, indeed, confronts every other Admiralty throughout the world. I believe that the difficulties that exist in this country are less both in quality and in degree than the difficulties which have arisen elesewhere and are perplexing the authorities of other countries. I would also like to say that, though nobody can object to this question being raised as it has been to-day, this engineer difficulty to a certain extent is not one arising directly in the Navy. It would be wrong to pretend that it has not sympathy in the Navy, but it is distinctly a matter arising outside the Navy, and that, I think, we must bear in mind. We do not find complaints from officers commanding ships of the condition of their engines, and we do not find that when a strain is put upon the engineers they have failed to respond to it. I think I am correct in saying that the discipline in the engine room is not only good, but that among all classes of men on board the ships it has been exceptionally good. I mention those two circumstances because I think it right that it should be known. It is very much to the credit of tins all-important body of men. Despite all that hon. Members have said, much of Which ought to have weight, these men have done their work admirably, and have been working their engines in a way which is immensely to the advantage of the Navy. I am quite aware that hon. Members will tell me, and tell me rightly, that I have not really approached the question which agitates their minds. The Admiralty has, as I have said, done something which will tend to improve the position of the engineers. We have added three chief inspectors of machinery and seven inspectors of machinery, and we have given a further allowance to the engineer officer of the flagship, even when there is an inspector of machinery on board. We have also increased the allowance to the officer in charge of the engines of a torpedo-boat destroyer from 2s. to 3s., and we have increased the number of artificer engineers from 133 to 200. We have also taken a step which I think is an exceedingly wise one, and one which will be appreciated—we have allowed engine-room artificers to obtain warrant rank at an earlier age than formerly. I think that is perfectly right, because, owing to these men being unable to obtain their warrants until thirty-five years of age, we were debarred from getting into that important part of a ship's crew young men, and it is most important that we should have the service of young men in the Navy. Now I come to the more serious part of tins matter, which cannot be dealt with by such measures as I have just described. Two claims have been put forward, and I think it is the duty of those who speak on behalf of the engineers to reconcile these views. There is a claim for more promotion, and a claim for an increased number of engineers. I think I can make it clear that there is no compatibility about those two propositions. I have not heard it suggested that engineers should, under any circumstances, take command of ships,and when it is remembered that there are some 400 ships in commission, and that there will be a much larger number in time of war, the House will see that the flow of promotion that goes on in proper proportion of the lower grades, as between lieutenants on the one hand and engineers on the other, is arrested when the rank of captain is reached, and that the promotion of engineers is pro tanto eliminated from the ascending scale. Until you get over this difficulty you are face to face with this fact—that the more you increase the personnnel of the engineer branch, the smaller is the chance of the promotion of engineers, and hon. Members, I think, would do wisely if they made up their minds to accept the fact that if promotion is to be accelerated to any great extent in the engineer branch, it must be by a relative reduction of the number of engineers borne, otherwise it cannot be accelerated. I think there is some misconception in regard to the question of punishment. The engineer officer stands in no different position from any other officer on board ship. The sole authority on board ship is vested in the captain of the ship. He delegates four of the thirty-one penalties he may inflict to the commander, and three to the officer of Marines. With those two exceptions there is no delegation. The officer of the watch has power, in accordance with an old naval custom, to compel a man to stand on the leeside until the watch is over, but that is a punishment which does not apply to the stokehold, nor to men who are engaged in active work. The principle affecting punishment in the Navy is that no punishment can be inflicted until twenty-four hours after the offence, and then the source of authority is the captain himself. I mention this because I believe the suggestion that some special hardship has been inflicted upon the engineers is part and parcel of a misconception. There appears to be a misconception, which I believe does not exist in the Navy, that there has been some intention to put back the engineers as compared with other officers in the Navy. That is not the fact. The position of the engineers is the result of the historical evolution of the Navy itself, and nothing else. They came into the Navy after it had been established for years, and they took up duties which were not properly understood and of which some do not thoroughly appreciate the importance even now. Their importance has grown with the increasing importance of their duties, and I should be the last to suggest that they have yet received the full recognition they are destined to receive. It is not, however, in accordance with facts to say there has been any putting back of engineers in the position they occupy. The position they occupy is one to which they have come historically, and from which they now in some respects wish to be relieved. But we are told there is a great desire on the part of bodies outside the Navy—engineering bodies—who have taken up this case to alter their position, and I should be very unwise if I said anything disrespectful of these bodies, who represent a most important class of head and hand workers in this country; but when they undertake to interfere—not using the word in any bad sense — when they undertake to advise upon the internal economy of the Navy, they must be reminded that there are other interests involved besides the interests of engineers, other officers of other branches of the service, what I may call the civil branches, to be thought of, and complicated considerations not to be hastily disposed of, which have to be dealt with. My own view is that it is a lamentable thing that engineer officers should feel impelled to look outside the Navy for their future and the fulfilment of their ambition. There is only one Trades Union that is good for the Navy, and that is the Navy itself. These men should feel they have a part in the traditions of the Navy. It is suggested that they have not yet realised this, and I think the Admiralty would be on right lines in encouraging this feeling among engineer officers, that they are a part of the Navy, and in bringing them within the scope of the traditions of the Navy, and making them feel that there is a future for them there, and that they need not look to any other source. For that reason I deprecate any suggestion that another corps should be formed; it is unnecessary. The corps of Royal Marines has a great historical existence, but I am not sure that if we had to reconstitute it now we should give it the same organisation. I think it may truly be said that among the great public services there is none more conspicuous for absence of cliqueism and unfriendliness than the Navy. There is an absence of any tendency to find fault with superiors, colleagues, or subordinates; and nothing should be done that would tend to introduce any feeling of division or segregation in the Royal Navy. I have said a great deal less than I should have liked to have said on the subject of engineers, but I feel that I must not say much more. The case has recently been put before the public in a manner which I know has been present to the mind of many Members, and though it may have been a useful contribution to the solution of the controversy, it is not the most valuable contribution that could be made. There are highly coloured statements and exaggerations in it. I find a Table set out for the information, not of people informed upon this subject, but of the general public, purporting to give the increase of horsepower in the Navy and the corresponding increase in the engineering staff, and the moral is drawn that the increase in the personnel is wholly inadequate. But is it not rather an unreasonable thing that in this connection no mention should be made of the fact that, during the time this increase had been going on, nearly 4,000 engine-room artificers have been added? It may be hat these artificers were not competent to take the place of engineers, and a great deal could be said on that point; but not to allude to the creation of this valuable class seems to me to be a misleading method of controversy, and damaging to the case it is supposed to support. I believe a great deal can and will be done by the reasonable advocacy of Members of this House, and they have urged their points of view with a moderation I am bound to acknowledge. I can give no pledges, but I must say that this subject has engaged, and is engaging, the attention of the Admiralty very closely indeed. It is most important that there should be no justification for a feeling of discontent in this branch of the Royal Navy. I do not admit that discontent exists, but I feel that if there be any organised attempt made by a body of men in this country to make a service unpopular, it will be made unpopular, and it will be our aim, if discontent exists, not only to remove every just cause of dissatisfaction, but to bring the engineer, who is an officer of enormous value to the Navy, into full community with the naval tradition. Then I come to deal with some other points raised by hon. Members. I must ask the permission of my hon. friend the Member for Gateshead to defer what I deem it my duty to say with regard to the question of boilers to a more fitting occasion—when we are discussing Vote 8. My hon. and gallant friend the Member for Great Yarmouth called attention, as he always does, to a very pregnant matter, the question of administration, and the hon. and learned Member for Hadding- tonshire devoted his remarks to the same subject. I do not know whether those hon. Members, when they advocated an addition to the naval staff of the Admiralty, were aware that there had lately been additions of that character. There has been added to the Controller's staff a post captain, who is able to give and does give very valuable assistance in the carrying out of the duties of that office, and the appointment of another very capable naval officer, whose name is well known to many Members of this House, Admiral Eardley Wilmot, in connection with the Naval Ordnance Department, will go a little way, though perhaps not far enough, to meet the desire of hon. Members that there should be a larger infusion of the naval element at the disposal of the naval Members of the Board in the carrying out of their very arduous duties. I should be untrue to the views I have so often expressed in this House if I were to pretend that there was no weight in the contentions of the hon. Member for Haddingtonshire with regard to organisation for war. But my reading of the problem is a little different from his. I do not say there is no room for improvement in the Admiralty itself though we have a Naval Intelligence Department, which has grown very rapidly of late years, and is now most valuable, though I do not pretend to say that it might not with advantage be extended. The figures which the hon. Member quoted with regard to the large personnel of the German Intelligence Department as compared with our own are suggestive. But I confess I am still unregenerate in regard to the broader aspect of this question. I cannot help feeling that there is need in this country for a more general organisation, not only of the naval or the military branch, for war, but of both services together, and of the enormous resources of the Empire for the conduct of war. I have no hesitation in saying this, because the absence of such an organisation is not, perhaps, a matter of reproach to anybody at this particular moment. If this organisation, which I fondly hope we may one day possess, were to be considered necessary, it could not be created in one year or two years, but would require a long and patient course of application of knowledge and experience before it could be of any value. We have to deal with a problem far more complicated than that of any of the Continental nations, and, though I believe in the goodwill and capacity of the chiefs of the various departments of this country, I am still of opinion that such an organisation as that which I refer to involves enormous professional study and an almost life-long devotion, which can only be given systematically by those who have the leisure and the opportunity. To that extent—and I hope I am not expressing ideas which are not shared by other Members of the House—I am in agreement with the hon. Member for Haddingtonshire. I do not know whether there are any other points of detail to which I ought to refer, but I would remind the House that if they would now allow Mr. Speaker to leave the Chair, we could practically continue this debate on Vote A on precisely the same lines as those on which it is now being conducted, and with the greater freedom which comes from discussions in Committee.

said he had attended the debates on Navy estimates for the last ten years, but he had never known the request the hon. Member had just made to be put forward after so short a discussion. There were one or two questions he desired to put to the Secretary to the Admiralty. The first was whether any good reason could be given for the recommendations of the Victualling Committee which had been accepted not being put into force at once. That Committee was appointed two years ago, and the Admirality had had over a year in which to consider its Report, but, according to the First Lord's statement, the changes were not to be introduced until next year. The excuse was that they could not be introduced simultaneously until the necessary reserve stock had been created. That was a somewhat mean excuse. The moment it was made clear that the food of the Navy was inadequate, the grievance should be remedied in the home ports at all events, although there might be some delay with regard to the far off statfons. The second question was with regard to the Naval Ordnance Department. That was now to be formed into a separate branch, and would incorporate the Naval Ordnance Store Department. Wonld the warrant officers have assigned to them the positions in that Department which had been promised to them by successive Lords of the Admiralty for many years past? With regard to accidents to torpedo boats, the hon. Gentleman had said that they should not be taken too seriously. That was a strange statement. What was it that had directed the public mind to the weakness of these destroyers? It was that last September a boat left the Tyne, and almost immediately, in not very rough weather, foundered, breaking in halves. Was that a matter not to be taken seriously?

said that he was not referring to the "Cobra," which was not built by the Government or manned by a regular crew from the Royal Navy. He was speaking of the accidents sustained by destroyers in running in and out of port.

said he was not imputing to the right hon. Gentleman the suggestion that the loss of the "Cobra" was not to be taken too seriously, but that it was the loss of the "Cobra" that drew the general attention of the public to the condition of these destroyers. The "Cobra" was taken over by the Government after repeated surveys, and within ten hours of leaving it foundered. He thought the hon. Gentleman was mistaken in saying it had not a naval crew on board; at any rate, sixty-seven sailors lost their lives. The truth was that the building of these destroyers required special skill. The Admiralty had on their list a number of men, but they had a false conception of the ability of these men to turn out destroyers of the necessary quality. The Yarrow firm had built for the Japanese Government destroyers that went straight from the Thames to Japan; those destroyers were of great speed; they met with no accidents whatever, and were running in all sorts of weather. He was afraid the fear of the Admiralty that their torpedo flotilla was not as good as it ought to be would induce them to reverse their policy and lower the speed of the boats, in order that they might be more strongly built. If that were done they would fall altogether behind the other Navies of the world. Other Navies would continue to get what we did not appear to be able to get, viz., boats of adequate stability and quality. On the question of the progress of construction, he was glad to notice there was no mention in the First Lord's statement of the engineering strike as the cause of the delay. That excuse had been worked for all it was worth. They had now to wait for the report of the Committee as to the causes of the delay, but he believed there was practical agreement on that point without waiting for that report. The First Lord himself was apparently converted to the views which had been so frequently expressed in the House, because on page 6 of his statement he said—

"It appears to me that what matters is not the date at which ships are commenced, but the date at which they are concluded and ready for commission. The hull, the engines, the armour, the guns, and the gun-mountings must be timed for delivery so that the progress of the ship to completion is never delayed."

That was the proper way to build a ship, and year after year it had been advocated in the House that all the necessary parts should be so arranged and ordered in advance that there would be no possibility of the ship being delayed in completion through the non-delivery of any part. Lord Goschen admitted that these delays were due to armour and engines being in arrear, and he thought that when this belated report came out they would not find much that they had not already anticipated as to the cause. There was a great improvement last year in the progress of construction, and as the Secretary to the Admiralty had stated with some pride this was the first time for many years that the full sum had been exhausted in the financial year. Nevertheless, it still took four years or more to build a battleship where the limit used to be a little over two years. Although it took the Admiralty between three and a half and four years to construct a battleship, there were private firms in this country who turned out ships at a much higher speed in considerably less time. He suggested that there should be a limit for the construction of a battleship of two and a half years, and that that limit should not be exceeded under any circumstances, no matter whether the construction took place in the Government yard or by contract. The hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean had already pointed out that some of those ships in the 1897 programme were still not completed or not commissioned. Notable in this respect were the "London," the "Bulwark," the "Bellerophon," and four cruisers of the "Cressy" class, one of which only was in commission. There was one cruiser which was laid down five years ago, and it was not yet in commission. Was this because the boilers had gone wrong? It was some consolation to know that in this House there was only one apologist for these delays. The Secretary to the Admiralty met them very fairly last year, and he had done the same today when he admitted that these delays were serious, and he was glad to hear that the Admiralty were going to exercise all their ingenuity to remedy this. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Antrim last year found consolation in the fact that although this country was falling behind in rapidity of construction England was ahead of all other Powers in this respect except Japan. He would remind the House that the Japanese ships were built in this country. That proved that there were private firms in this country who could produce ships in considerably less time than the Admiralty. It might be said that it was all very well to criticise, and to meet this argument he would offer some suggestions as to how construction could be hastened. In the first place it behoved the Admiralty to see that they had the most modern and most up-to-date machinery and equipments in the Royal dockyards. The right hon. Gentleman opposite claimed that the machinery was of the best character, but if he had seen some of the best dockyards in Great Britain he did not think the right hon. Gentleman would claim that this country had the most up-to-date machinery. No doubt, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was wondering when the Admiralty would be coming to him for additional money to provide new machinery and appliances for the dockyards. The Admiralty should have the courage to take out all the obsolete machinery in the Royal dockyards, which was at present occupying the place where good and modern machinery ought to be. He did not suggest that this change should be done violently or suddenly, but it should be done by degrees as part of a general scheme for the Admiralty to work out gradually until it was completed in every way. They had seen lately in the various Government departments—notably in the War Department and the Admiralty—a disposition to call in Committees to advise them when in difficulties as to how to surmount them. Committees had become almost the order of the day. They had had a Committee to instruct the Admiralty as to the cause of the failure of water-tube boilers. They had a Committee to advise the Admiralty how to surmount the arrears of shipbuilding. There had also been a Committee to advise the War Office how to reform its internal economy. Another Committee had been appointed to advise the Admiralty as to the value of the existing torpedo flotilla. He now ventured to suggest the appointment of another Committee to go into the Question of ascertaining what was required in the Government dockyards in the way of equipment, to give them what was required if construction was to increase in rapidity in order to secure the best and the most modern reforms. Such a body should be a roving Committee. It should not only inquire in this country, but it should go to the United States and to Germany, and having seen what there was to be seen there this Committee should thoroughly overhaul the dockyards, condemn everything that was obsolete, and put down new machinery. He was sure that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would be delighted to find money for that purpose. He thought that was a practical suggestion. He had now something to say about the way contract ships were being built and delivered. On page 7 of the Admiralty Report, the First Lord said that no doubt there had lately been some congestion of the work of repairs in the dockyards, and in order to affect a radical cure it had been decided to utilise also the private yards where the ships were built for the purpose of repairs. He thought that was only touching the fringe of the reform which was necessary. Why should they send the ships that were built by contract back to the private yards to be repaired What was the cause of the congestion of work in the dockyards? On page 13 of the Admiralty Report there were many paragraphs in the statement of the First Lord which pointed unmistakably to the cause of the congestion, which was mainly due to vessels being sent from the contractors to be finished in the Government dockyards. There was one of their dockyards which was so inefficiently equipped that they could not complete a ship there, and some of the ships delivered by the contractors had to be sent to Portsmouth to be completed. Could anything be more extravagant or unbusinesslike? Why should not a ship built by contract be absolutely finished by the contractor?

Because they do not make the guns.

asked who made the guns in the "Russell."

I do not say that that is impossible, but what I do say is that no time is lost because the guns are not made by the contractors. No delay is caused because the guns are fitted by our own gunnery officers at Portsmouth.

thought he could show the right hon. Gentleman that he was not right in that respect. He maintained that these ships should be completely built and equipped by the contractor. This was not the practice when contractors in this country built ships for foreign Governments, for it was made part of the contract to complete the ships; and in case a foreign Government desired to supply the guns they were sent over to the contractor's yard. When the Japanese Government bought a battleship from Armstrong's, it was delivered ready for use, completely equipped with the guns on board, and this was all done as part of the contract. If it was possible for the Japanese Government to do this, why was it impossible in the case of our own Government? This practice was leading to an enormous waste of time and money, and frequently twelve months elapsed between the deliveries of the contractors and the passing of the ship into the Fleet Reserve. He would give the right hon. Gentleman an example of this delay. He had already referred in the earlier part of his remarks to the delay in commissioning some of the ships of the "Cressy" class. About ten or twelve months ago a ship of this class was delivered, and she had not yet even done her gun trial, and she was not ready to be placed in Commission. So necessary was it that this particular ship should be got ready that he had actually been told that the Channel Squadron was waiting for this particular cruiser because the "Diadem" had broken down. He did not see why the Government should go on pursuing the policy of having these ships delivered without the guns being mounted or, at any rate, being placed on board. Even turrets had to be put in by the men in the Government dockyards. It was not only a great waste of time, but also a waste of money, because when these ships from the contractor were placed in Government dockyards, a great deal of undoing of contractors work took place. When the Admiralty received a ship from the contractor, they often began to introduce some of their modern improvements, which meant great expense in labour and material, and he did not think it led to much good. When a ship had been carefully designed he thought it was a great mistake to try and alter her, except in the very earliest stages of her construction. After a ship had been designed and commenced to build, if they began to pull her about it was sure to lead to a great deal of extravagance. All that could be obviated by so arranging matters that they would have these ships completed at the contractor's dockyards. It might be said that there was some difficulty as to supervision, but that was purely a matter of organisation. Some years ago they had a system of having a senior labour officer constantly visiting the contractor's yards, and looking after the progress that was being made with the work. For some reason or other, however, that Department was abolished, but now it had been resuscitated, and the officer at the head of this department was a gentleman who was spoken of in the highest possible terms. This officer had taken upon himself the responsibility of going round the contractors yards, in order to see that the ships were progressing satisfactorily. Surely it would be within the power of the Admiralty to extend this officer's responsibilities, and allow him to take with him an adequate staff, including an engineer, staff commander, and warrant officers, representing the gunnery and other branches. If this were done, he did not think there would be any difficulty at all. The Admiralty had already proved that there was no difficulty in this respect, because they had taken an initial step which he hoped would be followed again in the future by sending the guns of the "Russell" to the dockyard where the ship was built. He hoped that practice would be continued and instead of sending contract ships round to the Government dockyards to be completed, he hoped they would be finished off completely by the contractor. He suggested that as a cure for the delays which were constantly occurring. He wished to say a few words about the training of the personnel. One of the most satisfactory things which had been announced was the attention which was being paid to the question of training both officers and men, which was very much to the front ust now at the Admiralty. No doubt this had been pressed upon their attention by the criticisms brought forward in this House from time to time, and he thought it was opportune to make some observations upon it, more especially as the First Lord had suggested in his statement that any criticism would always be welcomed by the Admiralty. The First Lord had stated that no ships, however excellent, would effect anything in the hands of an inefficient personnel. He was glad to see that recognised, for it ought to be put in the front. He wished to refer to the criticism which had been levelled, notably within the last twelve months, at the system of training officers in general. That brought him to ask whether the training of officers, at all events of junior officers, was as efficient and thorough as it might be. He thought they would all agree that Naval men were more professional than their military colleagues. They had less temptation to escape their proper work or indulge in recreation; and, therefore, he thought naval men would welcome most cordially anything that would make their work more interesting, and give them more opportunities for thorough study in the direction of improving their scientific knowledge, and so on. Much of their work at present was not interesting and simply consisted of wasting time, and it would be a good thing if more time could be afforded to them for the study of such subjects as gunnery, torpedo navigation, and signalling, all of which were necessary qualifications to make them efficient men. As regarded the time that was wasted, let them take for example a big battleship or a cruiser. She might be in dry dock, but all the time the ship was there the Naval officers would be walking up and down the decks practically doing nothing of any importance, for their total duties consisted really in receiving senior officers when they came on board. and superintending small matters which might very well be left to the warrant officers or to the senior petty officers. Last year when the Navy Estimates were discussed one of the great reforms promised was that many of the duties now performed by military men should be eliminated, and he suggested to the Admiralty whether it was not worth their while to overhaul this sort of thing and see whethersome of the duties which werenow so wasteful of time could not be delegated in the way he had suggested either to warrant officers or to senior petty officers. In this way they would have the Naval officers perfectly free to benefit by the improved training which he was sure the Admiralty desired that the officers should have. Those who thought a great deal upon these matters suggested that the most important thing to be insisted upon was that there should be frequent practice in the handling and the manœuvring of ships. They might reply that this was being done already, but there was not enough of it being done, and if they wanted to give their officers that confidence which was necessary they should have more frequent opportunities of manœuvring with steam craft, torpedo boats, and so on. He was not suggesting that the junior officers should be entrusted with the torpedo craft, but there were other opportunities for them. His point was, that if they wished to develop in an officer, confidence, good eyes, cool judgment, and nerve; if they wanted to train him so that as he advanced to higher commands and got control of bigger vessels, he would feel at home with them, the only way to accomplish this was to ground him from the very commencement through all the various stages of training. He was informed that the Channel Squadron and Channel Fleet had sometime ago a five months cruise, and during the whole of that time the junior officers were only exercised in steam craft tactics twice. He sincerely hoped that things had improved now in that respect. Another important matter was the question of signalling, and every officer ought to be thoroughly equipped on this subject. Only those officers who were bound to know this subject had at present a complete and perfect knowledge of signalling, and consequently the majority of officers could not read naval signals with facility, because that subject was in the hands of the signalling staff. He thought the Admiralty should pay special attention to signalling, and insist that every officer should have a competent knowledge of this subject. In steam tactics, not only should the junior officers be thoroughly exercised, but they should be given the position for the time being of Captain of one of these boats, and allowed to take the responsibility. It had been suggested that in these miniature fleets they should go as Commodores. Lord Charles Beresford adopted for the very first time the exercising of his captains in taking charge of the Fleet, and that practice was quite novel, for it had never been put into operation by any Naval officer before. He thought that practice might very well be imitated by the Admiralty in other directions. Some very favourable comments had been passed on the School of Naval strategy. Some time ago the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean put a Question to Lord Goschen as to the advisability of starting this School of Naval Strategy, but his lordship then received the suggestion rather coolly. Within a year, however, of that Question being put, they found the Admiralty taking the Question up, and what he hoped for now was that the Admiralty would carry out their determination to make that school a thoroughly efficient in institution. It being Midnight, the Debate stood adjourned. Debate to be resumed on Monday next.