As an elector of the borough of Galway and the representative of a neighbouring constituency—

Order, order! This cannot be debated now. It is only a Motion for certain documents to be presented to the House as an unopposed Return. If any steps are taken on them, then will be the time to discuss the matter. This is merely an Order for certain documents to be laid so as to place the House in a position to take action.

Of course, Sir, if you rule that by no means I can say a word on this, I will sit down. My contention is that the documents asked for are incomplete, and that presented in this form they may do an injury.

It will be open to the hon. and gallant Member to move for a further Return.

On another occasion?

Yes.

Then I will ask if the Government will agree to have included in this Order copies of the certificates of the sentences passed on the rebels at Natal and the Cape, and also similar certificates from the gaolers that these rebels are kept in custody.

That clearly would be a case for a separate Return. It is an argumentative matter, not material to this particular Motion.

Then if that be your ruling, Sir, I will sit down.

Will due notice be given before the issue of the Writ is moved?

The hon. Member had better put that Question in the ordinary way.

To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he can give the House any information as to the working of the compensation scheme instituted by the master potters for injuries caused by lead, and alluded to in the arbitration on the Home Office rules; and whether His Majesty's Government have been informed by the Potters' Association of the progress of the scheme and of the extent to which masters and men have co-operated to make its advantages general. (Answered by Mr. Secretary Akers Douglas.) I am informed that seventy-two firms have joined the Potters' Assurance Association, and that three others are insured on the same lines in other ways. Most of these firms are of importance in the trade, and, as far as my information goes, the scheme appears to be working satisfactorily, with the exception that in eight factories, as I understand, the men have refused to submit to the medical examination which is an essential part of the scheme.

To ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether the Government has given its assent to any scheme whereby, either by means of taxation or otherwise, Kaffirs are to be induced, by pressure from the Executive Government of the South African Colonies, to work in mines; whether the Government has given any assistance to the mine-owners in their efforts to procure Native labour from districts either within or without the area of His Majesty's dominions; whether, in either case, the Government has imposed on mine-owners any conditions of employment; if so, what those conditions are, and if they include a minimum rate of remuneration. (Answered by Mr. A. J. Balfour.) No assent has been given by His majesty's Government to any scheme enabling the Executive Government of the South African Colonies to put pressure upon Native labour; nor has any assistance been given to the mine-owners to procure Native labour, unless the Native Regulations are to be regarded in that light. For these Regulations I may refer the hon. Member to the Parliamentary Paper, Cd. 904.

To ask the Postmaster General whether, in view of the fact that successive Post-masters General have declared that postal employees have the right to form defensive organisations, he will state if members of the Postal Telegraph Service who are also members of the Postal Telegraph Clerks' Association have the right to obtain the assistance of the officials of that Union at the time or during the progress of a case between the individual telegraphist and his superior officer, on matters affecting his emoluments or conditions of service. (Answered by Mr. Austen Chamberlain.) There is no objection to such assistance being sought, provided that official documents are not made public.

To ask the Secretary to the Board of Education whether he will consider the desirableness of replacing the recently issued Model Course of Physical Drill for Children by a course more suited to the needs of young children than the present compilation, which is prepared from the Soldiers' Drill Book. (Answered by Sir William Anson.) The Board of Education have no present intention of replacing the Model Course of Physical Training. But they are considering the desirableness of issuing a kind of introduction to the Model Course, showing the steps by which the series of exercises in it may be progressively acquired. This will greatly assist the managers of the smaller schools in introducing it. I may remind the hon. Member that though the Board strongly advocate a uniformity of system, both in the interests of the teachers (on whom falls the burden of imparting the physical training) and in those of efficient instruction, they are prepared to consider (and have in many cases approved) alternative schemes having the same scope and aim as the Model Course.

To ask the Secretary to the Board of Education whether it is the intention of the Department to issue any memorandum or instruction with regard to ex-officers and members of school boards whose services might be desired on the new education committees, but who hold contracts under local municipal authorities. (Answered by Sir William Anson.) The Board of Education does not think it necessary to draw up any memorandum or instruction on the subject of disqualification for membership of committees under Section 17 of the Education Act. The cases referred to in the Question are governed by Section 17 (5), and are not affected by Schedule II. (9).

To ask the Secretary of State for India if he will say when the Report of the Commission on Irrigation will be presented to the House. (Answered by Secretary Lord George Hamilton.) The Government of India have been asked to send home 1,500 copies of the Report of the Irrigation Commission when it is completed and printed, and copies will be distributed to hon. Members as soon as possible after arrival.

To ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that the French Government will require a stamp of 1 per cent. to be affixed to the new 2½ Consol Bonds to Bearer held in France when exchanged next April for the existing 2¾ Bonds, even when these latter already bear the full French stamp; and whether he will take steps to secure that the stamp may be transferred from the old Bonds to the new at a reduced charge, as was accorded to the French Government by the Inland Revenue in similar circumstances connected with the recent conversion of French 3½ Rentes into 3 per cent. (Answered by Mr. Ritchie.) I am in communication with the Foreign Office on this matter.

To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, seeing that the new Licensing Act which lately came into force confers no new powers on magistrates in regard to the reduction in the number of licences in their districts, will he consider the advisability of intimating the present state of the law on the subject to licensing benches throughout the country. (Answered by Mr. Secretary Akers Douglas.) Before the new Act came into force I issued circulars showing what changes it made in the law. It was clear that the powers long possessed by licensing justices in regard to the refusal to renew licences were not increased by the Act; and I do not think that there is any further communication on the matter which I can properly address to the justices at the present time.

To ask the President of the Board of Trade whether he has taken into consideration the recommendations of the Ichthyological Committee; and, if so, what steps he proposes to take to carry them into effect. (Answered by Mr. Gerald Balfour.) The Report is still under consideration.

To ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will lay upon the Table the Treaty, Agreement, or Correspondence conferring on His Majesty's Government the right to construct a railway in the South of Persia when railways are constructed in the North of Persia. (Answered by Lord Cranborne.) An assurance to this effect was given to His Majesty's Government during the reign of the late Shah and has since been confirmed. It would not be desirable to present the correspondence.

To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether any excavations are now going on upon the Hill of Tara in Ireland; whether the Hill, or part of it, is now being offered for sale; and whether His Majesty's Government, having regard to the historical and archaeological interest of the Hill of Tara, will endeavour to have it brought within the operation of the Ancient Monuments Act, or to take such other steps as may be within their power to prevent the mounds and other characteristic features of the surface from being obliterated. (Answered by Mr. Wyndham.) I am informed that excavations have not been resumed at Tara. The tenant's interest in that portion of the Hill where excavations formerly took place has recently been sold. The landlord's interest has not been sold. The monuments on the Hill are at present within the operation of the Ancient Monuments Act of 1882, to this extent, that the Commissioners of Public Works have power to proceed against any person, other than the owner, who injures or defaces the mounds. To restrain the owner, the guardianship of the mounds should be vested in the Commissioners. The owner has declined to take this step, and there is no power to compel him to do so. The Commissioners are watching this matter very closely, and will use every means in their power to strengthen the popular forces at work in order to prevent any resumption of excavation.

To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether his attention has been drawn to the cases of Messrs. Lohan, County Councillor, and Finnerty, District Councillor, who are still confined in Galway Prison; and whether in view of the fact that they were imprisoned in consequence of their endorsement of a speech delivered by the Member for East Galway who has been released, will he reconsider their case. (Answered to Mr. Wyndham.) The persons named in the Question were not imprisoned for the reasons alleged. They were convicted (and the conviction was confirmed on appeal by the Recorder of Galway) of taking part in a criminal conspiracy. Their cases are under consideration.

To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether the census printing for Ireland is now complete; and, if so, will he state what the cost of it has been. (Answered by Mr. Hayes Fisher.) The printing for the Irish census, although in an advanced stage, is not yet complete, the "Typographical Index" being still in the press. I am not, therefore, as yet in a position to state the cost.

To ask the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that men belonging to Volunteer regiments volunteered for active service in South Africa on the distinct understanding, given in Army Order 29 of 1902, Paragraph 12, that they would receive a gratuity of £5; and whether he will reconsider his decision that Army Order 87 of 1901, to which no reference was made in the Order under which the men enlisted, deprives them of the right to this gratuity; and whether he has any information as to the effect this decision has had on recruiting for the Volunteer forces. (Answered by Mr. Secretary Brodrick.) All the men who volunteered for service under Army Order 29 of 1902 were granted the war gratuity, except those who had already completed a period of service in South Africa and received a gratuity. The condition of this grant was that it should not be given twice to any individual. It is not apparent how this decision could have any effect on recruiting for the Volunteer forces; but if my hon. friend can show that there has been any breach of faith I will consider the question.

To ask the Secretary of State for War whether it is proposed to give any financial assistance to Volunteer Corps desirous of adopting the Service dress in addition to their present full dress. (Answered by Mr. Secretary Brodrick.) As the adoption of the Service dress is quite optional for the Volunteer Corps, there appears to be no sufficient reason for throwing any of the cost on the public funds.

To ask the Secretary of State for War whether the Preliminary Return of the British Army and the Annual General Return, the publications of which, since 1899, have been suspended, will not again be presented to the House; and, if so, whether he proposes, in some other form, to provide similar information necessary to enable the House to know, before discussing Army Estimates, what has been the distribution, state, and condition of the Army during the preceding year. (Answered by Mr. Secretary Brodrick.) The preliminary Return has been abolished. The general Return is being carefully compiled, but the difficulties of such compilation have proved considerable, and I fear no publication can be promised earlier than the beginning of April. The Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting, which will before long be published, will supply a considerable amount of information.

To ask the Secretary of State for War whether he will state what is the married establishment of a battalion of the garrison regiment; and, if this is greater than the married establishment of a line battalion, what additional expense will this involve. (Answered by Mr. Secretary Brodrick.) The question of fixing the married establishment of the garrison battalions is at present receiving careful consideration, and it is not possible to state the cost, but it will naturally be considerably in excess of that of a line battalion.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether he can arrange to give to the House any annual opportunity, in Supply or otherwise, of discussing such matters connected with the co-ordination of Imperial Defence as between the two Departments primarily charged with it as are not at present the subject of any Vote; for example, the dwindling of the garrison of so important a coaling station of the Fleet as Thursday Island.

We cannot, I think, question the motive of the right hon. Baronet's Question, and I have some hesitation in answering it in the affirmative. There are two reasons. First of all, there are technical difficulties in the way, for the discussion, to all intents and purposes, would be a discussion in Supply not relevant to the particular Vote; but that reason might be got over if we were quite clear as to the question of policy. But my hesitation on the question of policy arises because the right hon. Gentleman proposes, in effect, that there should be an annual debate on the strategic position of the British Empire and the various ways in which we ought to distribute our Army in view of a possible combination against us. I am not sure that a debate of that kind in the House is really very useful. It is not merely the right hon. Gentleman who will have to exercise the right of giving his views on all these rather delicate national questions, but he would force the Government to make a reply. If the reply was a complete reply, which would suit all sections of the House, the Government would be compelled, I am afraid, to go into details which I do not think it is much to our advantage that we should discuss in the House. If we, on the other hand, were to be content with a fragmentary reply, it might be urged that we were glossing over the difficulty, and I do not know that the general gain would be great. As at present advised, I am not ready to assent to the request of the right hon. Gentleman.

asked if, when the re-organisation was complete, Papers would be laid setting forth the nature of the new Committee of Defence.

Order. order.! That does not arise out of the Question.

To ask the Secretary of State for War on what grounds did Lord Kitchener base his request that 100,000 medals should be despatched to South Africa for presentation to kaffirs who were engaged in the British service during the late war; whether General Lyttelton, now Commander of the Forces in South Africa, has presented some of the medals to Kaffirs, or has directed them to be presented to Kaffirs; and, if so, how many of those medals were presented; how many Kaffirs during the late war drew pay from military funds, and for what services was that pay drawn; and, seeing that the War Office authorities gave assurances that natives took no part in the late war, will he state what was the precise character of the administrative services for which medals for the natives were requested by Lord Kitchener.

I have no detailed information to enable me, in reply to the points raised by the hon. Member, to add to the information already given to him. The services on which the natives were employed were chiefly in connection with transport and supply, with intelligence work, and hospital services.

But why were so many medals sent out?

The number of natives employed was very large.

Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will send a sample of the medals into the tea room for inspection by Members.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War what is the diminution in the strength of the Volunteer force upon 31st January, 1903 compared to 31st October, 1901; and what is the deficiency of officers at the present time.

The strength of the Volunteer force was, on the 31st October, 1901, 288,476; on 1st January, 1903, 250,990. The present deficiency of officers is 1,895. In estimating the diminution in the Volunteer force it should be remembered that the strength in 1899, and for many years previous, was only about 225,000, and that an abnormal number of enrolments took place in 1899–1900 (113,000), whose period of three years service expired in October last. A large number of Volunteers, who would have left the service in ordinary times during these three years, have also waited to take their discharge till the close of the war.

Is there any ground for the suggestion that the diminution occurred owing to the stringency of the new Regulations?

There is no doubt that stringency may have had some effect; but I am equally certain, seeing the Volunteer force was maintained before the excitement of the war at about 225,000, that ultimately the strength will revert to some such figure.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he has made inquiries with reference to the incident at Nelson's Hotel, Cape Town, on Christmas Eve, 1901, brought under his notice on the 8th August, 1902 by the hon. Member for South Donegal; and, if so, what has been the result of these inquiries, and what punishment, if any, has been inflicted on the officers concerned.

Yes, Sir, I have made full inquiries. The officers concerned were quartered in various parts of the world and had to be communicated with by letter, this not being a case in which explanations could be given by cable. The reports are as yet not all received, but the military authorities are losing no time in the investigation.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War if he will state in what capacity, whether civil or military, was he the recipient at Malta of a salute of seventeen guns; is there any precedent for the conferring of this mark of honour on any other Secretary of State for War; and on whom does the responsibility rest for its bestowal.

The Governor ordered the salute to be paid to the Secretary of State for War according to the established precedents. No other authority was needed or asked.

If the Prime Minister had gone under similar circumstances, how many guns would have been fired?

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he proposes to take any steps with reference to the unauthorised use of his name by the agents of the Rock Assurance Company as a director of that company in a trade advertisement in a newspaper at Johannesburg.

The necessary steps were taken as soon as my attention was drawn to the matter.

What action will the right hon. Gentleman take? Will he resign his directorship?

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War in what capacity, civil or military, did he hold inspections of troops and review guards of honour at Malta; and whether he is aware that Colonel Stanley, who in 1878, as Secretary of State for War, inspected troops at Malta, had served in the Grenadier Guards, of which he was a captain, and was honorary Colonel of the King's Own Royal Lancaster Regiment.

I have already told the hon. Member that the inspection was held by the Governor. I have no information as to whether Colonel Stanley inspected the troops at Malta in 1878.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty whether officers in the Navy are permitted to spend their own money on services connected with their ships.

It is the policy of the Admiralty to provide for the supply of all stores necessary for the maintenance, upkeep, and decoration of ships, and the regulations are framed with the object of giving effect to that policy. It is necessary from time to time to review the issues of stores referred to, and at the present time the question of whether the supply is in all cases adequate is under consideration. Officers are not prohibited from spending their own money on services connected with their ships, but the practice is not encouraged.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty whether the new agreement relating to the Australasian Squadron has yet been ratified by the Governments concerned.

The agreement cannot be ratified until it has been approved by the Federal Parliament of Australia and the Parliament of New Zealand, which are not yet in session.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General, as representing the Secretary of State for the Colonies, whether, in the selection of members of the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, care will be taken that the names of the gentlemen to be appointed by His Majesty's Government are submitted to and receive the approval of the Government of the Dominion of Canada.

The British members of the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal will be selected in consultation with the Dominion Government.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General, as representing the Secretary of State for the Colonies, can he state the effect of the law in the Australian Commonwealth with reference to public loans or guarantees relating to sugar manufactures or refineries, or to rebates on sugar grown within the Common wealth, and also with reference to fiscal advantages of any other kinds granted thereby to growers or manufacturers of sugar; and will he inquire as to the communication made by the Premier of New South Wales, protesting against New South Wales having to bear the cost of a rebate on sugar, and lay upon the Table the text of that communication.

The laws of Queensland and Victoria authorise the Governments of those States to make advances under clearly defined conditions to sugar manufacturers for establishing and improving sugar works. No other fiscal advantages are granted. Copies of the laws can be supplied to the hon. Member if he desires it. With regard to rebates on sugar grown within the Commonwealth, all such sugar, in the production of which only white labour is employed, is entitled to a rebate of 2s. per cwt. of the Excise duty, which is 3s. per cwt. I will inquire as to the communication made by the Premier of New South Wales, to which the hon. Member refers.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General, as representing the Secretary of State for the Colonies, whether Sir Frederick Lugard intends to send a military expedition to Sokoto before the Delimitation Commission commences its work; and whether any military operations are in progress or in contemplation in Southern Nigeria at the present time; and, if so, for what purpose.

The British Commissioners met the French Commissioners at Junju on the 6th instant, and the Commission has now probably begun its work. The questions whether the force which has occupied Kano will proceed to Sokoto, and, if so, when, depend upon the local, political, and military situation, but Sir F. Lugard has authority to send a force to Katsena, and, if necessary, to Sokoto. Beyond the patrolling of certain unsettled districts, no military operations are in progress or in contemplation in Southern Nigeria.

Has the right hon. Gentleman seen the report in the Morning Post as to certain expeditions into Southern Nigeria? Is it correct?

I can give the hon. Gentleman no information beyond that I have just read.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, have His Majesty's Government, since the signature on 5th March, 1902, of the Brussels Sugar Convention, had any correspondence with, or received any communication from, any of the signatory Powers relative to Great Britain's obligation under Article IV. to impose countervailing duties on sugar-sweetened products imported from her self-governing Colonies, when such Colonies grant direct or indirect bounties on the production or exportation of those products; if so, from what Powers have communications been received; and when does he propose to lay them upon the Table of the House, or to state the effect of such verbal communications.

I would, in the first place, refer my hon. friend to my answer on the 17th December last. On January 13th His Majesty's Government despatched a circular informing the Powers signatory to the Convention that they would not consent under any circumstances to be bound to penalise bounty fed sugar imported into the United Kingdom from any of the self-governing British Colonies, and that they were not prepared to accept any reference of this Question to the Permanent Commission. We have received official replies from the German and Austrian Governments only. The German Government differ from us and reserve their liberty of action, but consider that the difference of opinion has no practical significance. The Austrian Government have said that they pre- sume that in practice the case contemplated will not arise, but that they reserve their full liberty of action. The Dutch Government have sent no reply. The Italian Government, we understand, do not dispute our view. The Belgian Government consider the point of no practical interest. The French Government have expressed no opinion on the subject. Our ratification has been deposited on the express condition that we shall not be bound to penalise bountyfed sugar from our self-governing Colonies. We have therefore incurred no treaty obligation to do so. Papers are being prepared and will shortly be laid upon the Table.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, do the treaties still exist of 13th March, 1871, and of 30th March, 1856, whereby the Great Powers of Europe affirmed and engaged to respect the principle invariably established as the ancient rule of the Turkish Empire, in virtue of which it has at all times been prohibited for the ships of war of Foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus: have any, and, if so, how many, Russian torpedo destroyers or other ships of war recently entered and passed both those Straits, and when; were any, and, if so, what communications on the subject received by His Majesty's Government either from Russia or from Turkey before the passage of those ships; were any representations, verbal or written, made by His Majesty's Government; has any correspondence passed on the subject either before or after such passage; and, if so, when will he lay it upon the Table of the House.

The provisions of the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 relating to the Straits are still in force. His Majesty's Government have been informed that four Russian torpedoboats passed through the Straits on various dates between December 31st and January 30th last; they were to fly the commercial flag and they were not to carry cannon or war material. No communications on the subject were received by His Majesty's Govern- ment from the Governments of Russia or Turkey before the passage of the vessels. In accordance with the course pursued on previous occasions His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on January 1st addressed a Note to the Porte in which he stated that the permission granted was in contravention of existing Treaty stipulations, and pointed out that, as these stipulations were applicable to all Powers alike, His Majesty's Government must reserve to themselves the right to claim similar privileges in the future. No reply has been returned to this Note by the Turkish Government. It is not considered desirable to present Papers on the subject.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether he has any official information showing that the claims of American citizens against Venezuela are to be paid in full forthwith in gold or its equivalent, while those of British subjects will have to wait the decision of the Hague Tribunal.

Our information is to the effect that the American claims will be dealt with by the Tribunal at the Hague.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether a Commercial Treaty has been recently concluded between Persia and Russia; whether, under the provisions of that Treaty, duties so high as to be practically prohibitive have been imposed on Indian teas imported into Persia; and what steps His Majesty's Government have taken to protect British trade in Persia.

The answer to the first Question is in the affirmative. Although, as I stated last night, this Commercial Treaty is likely to affect British trade injuriously in certain respects, we have no reason to believe that it will have anything like the effects which the hon. Gentleman suggests. A large part of the Indian tea used in Persia is imported through Russia, and it is not likely that the tariff will prove to be prohibitive as regards this particular article. Great Britain is at present entitled only to "Most-Favoured-Nation" treatment in Persia, but His Majesty's Minister at Teheran has been instructed to obtain an arrangement with the Persian Government under which this country will, for the future, have a more influential voice in regard to alterations in the tariff affecting British trade. I hope shortly to be in a position to make a further statement on the subject.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any agreement or arrangements have been concluded between the Government of Cuba and of the United States regulating the conditions of commerce between the two States and the Customs duties thereon; if so, whether His Majesty's Government can state the effect of such agreement upon British commerce, and can lay upon the Table the text thereof; and have His Majesty's Government received any, and, if so, what representations on the subject form British trading interests.

A Convention between Cuba and the United States has been signed, but has not yet been ratified. It would therefore be premature to consider the question of laying it before Parliament. The Convention is a reciprocity Convention giving exclusive advantages to the trade between the two countries, and must necessarily be to some extent disadvantageous to the trade of other countries. His Majesty's Government have received representations as to the adverse effect which the Convention would produce upon British Commerce with the Island of Cuba.

Is it not the fact that this Convention places British commerce at a disadvantage of from 25 per cent. to 30 per cent. in Cuba?

I do not think so, but if the hon. Member will put down a Question I will try and get the information.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been called to the resolution which was carried at Christiania in 1901 to the effect that no trawlers should be allowed to operate in areas, such as the Moray Firth, which have been closed for scientific purposes; and will he consider the expediency of communicating with the Foreign Powers concerned, with a view to the Moray Firth, which is already closed against British trawlers, being also closed against foreign trawlers. The following Questions on the same subject also appeared on the Paper:—

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether he proposes to take diplomatic action in the direction indicated by the Reports of the Delegates from Great Britain to the International Council on Sea Fisheries in 1901 and 1902, for the purposes of protecting form foreign trawlers areas in British territorial waters, such as the Moray Firth, reserved for purposes of scientific experiment in the interest of fisheries.

I propose to answer both Questions together. I am quite aware that a resolution to the effect stated was passed at the Fishery Conference in question, but I fear that the time has not yet arrived when a proposal of the kind would meet with such general acceptance as would effectively exclude all trawlers, whatever flag they might fly, from visiting the Moray Firth. The Secretary of State is, however, now considering certain suggestions which may lead to a practical solution of the difficulties which form the chief subject of complaint.

I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, when it can be shown that small coal used in the manufacture of patent fuel contains nut coal of a value that would, if taken out, leave the remaining small of a value not exceeding 6s. per ton, the fuel is exempt from the export duty on coal; and, if so, why the duty is imposed on similar small coal when exported in an unmanufactured state.

It is not the fact that fuel is exempted from the export duty on coal if it is shown that the small coal used in its manufacture contains nut coal of a value that would, if taken out, leave the remaining small of a value not exceeding 6s. per ton. But if the nuts actually have been screened out of coal which originally exceeded 6s. per ton in value, and have been sold for a price which reduces the average value of the residue to 6s. per ton or less, rebate of duty is allowed on such residue, whether used in the manufacture of fuel which is exported, or exported separately.

I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the export duty of one shilling per ton imposed on coke practically amounts to a duty of only three-fifths of a shilling on the coal used in its manufacture; and, if so, will he state the principle upon which coal used in the manufacture of other kinds of fuel is charged the full shilling duty.

(1) By Section 3 (5) of the Finance Act, 1901, coke, culm, and cinders are included under coal, and are, therefore, charged with a duty of 1s. per ton on exportation, if exceeding 6s. a ton free on board, without any reference to quantity of coal used in their production. I cannot say whether, as implied in the Question, five tons of coal are, on the average, required to produce three tons of coke, as I am informed that the yield of coke from coal varies considerably. (2) The coal used in the manufacture of 'other kinds of fuel'—e.g,. patent fuel, is charged with duty when present in the fuel exported and exceeding 6s. a ton in fee on board value, because Section 7 of the above mentioned Act so directs. The hon. Member appears to suggest that duty ought to be charged on all the coal used in the manufacture of exported coke. I do not think this would be equitable, for the coke represents only a by-product of the coal, the remainder having been extracted as gas. Both coke and patent fuel are dutied on the quantity of the dutiable article exported, and so far on the same principle.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General if he will explain why an application for Income Tax marked O.H.M.S. is surcharged 2d. when forwarded by post to an address other than that to which it was originally directed, considering that if it had been originally sent with a penny stamp, and without the letters O.H.M.S. on the envelope, it would have been redirected and forwarded without any such surcharge.

I shall be glad if my hon. friend will send me the envelope so as to enable me to make further inquiry.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether his attention has been called to the refusal by certain petty sessional courts to renew the licences of publicans against whom no complaint had been made of misconduct; and whether it is the intention of the Government to introduce legislation which will prevent such action taking effect until the question of compensation has been dealt with by Parliament.

At the same time may I ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, having regard to the instances in the United Kingdom in which licensed victuallers who have spent considerable sums of money in the acquisition of their premises have been deprived of their licences through no fault of their own in either the conduct or management of their business, will he state whether he can see his way to introduce legislation such as will admit of compensation being granted in all cases in which the magistrates withhold the renewal of a licence on the ground that a reduction in the number of licences in the district is desirable.

Though my attention has been called to this matter I have no information as to the actual results of the present licensing sessions, but assuming that the facts are as indicated in the Questions, I must point out that it has long been clear by well-known legal decisions that the renewal of a licence may be refused for reasons other than misconduct, e.g. for the reason that the justices in their discretion do not think that the licence is required. I can give my hon. friends the numbers refused for this reason in four years since 1890 if they so desire. That discretion must of course (to use the words of the Lord Chancellor in his judgment on the case of Sharp v. Wakefield) be exercised "judicially," and what has to be done must be done "according to the rules of reason and justice and not according to private opinion. It is to be not arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular, and it must be exercised within the limit to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself." If it should appear that the justices are acting otherwise, it would certainly be a matter of gravity; but I do not think that we are yet in possession of sufficient information as to the facts to enable us to form an opinion. I will call for a full return directly the sessions are closed.

Will the right hon. Gentleman send a circular to the magistrates, setting forth the admirable opinion of the Lord Chancellor as to their duties in the matter?

Is the recent action of the magistrates in any way connected with the Licensing Act of last year?

That Act confers no new powers on justices with respect to the refusal of licences.

I suppose the right hon. Gentleman will obtain the information in sufficient time to enable appeals to be entered?

It will be given as soon as the Brewster Sessions are over.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether the action of the licensing justices throughout the country in refusing, or in declaring their intention to refuse, the renewal of licences, is in consequence of any instructions issued by Government?

No, Sir; the justices are acting in this matter, as they must do, on their own discretion; and the Government have no authority to issue instructions to them.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade, in reference to the agreement proposed to be made by them with Mr. Pierpont Morgan's Shipping Trust, now Known as the International Mercantile Marine Company, will they afford this House any opportunity of expressing an opinion on that agreement before it is finally concluded.

I must remind the hon. Member that the general lines of the agreement have been settled and accepted by both parties, and that the Government cannot treat them as open to re-consideration.

Who are the parties?

The Government on the one hand and the Atlantic Combine on the other.

Then will the House have no opportunity of considering the question?

Oh yes, when the Papers are laid on the Table.

I beg to ask the President of the Local Government Board whether his attention has been called to the fact that articles of food imported into London, and landed at the wharves on the river side, are not subject to inspection by the officers of the Port Sanitary Authority of the Port of London; and whether he will consider the advisability of issuing an order giving to the Port Sanitary Authority jurisdiction over all wharves abutting upon the Port of London, whether on the River Thames or within the area of any dock.

My attention has been called to the matter referred to, and I am now considering the issue of an Order dealing with it.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if he can state whether an inquiry has yet been held into the charge made against Sergeant Hyde of supplying false information with regard to the action of the police at Glenville, on the 23rd of November, in preventing persons attending an ordinary meeting of the United Irish League, and imprisoning those who did attend by fastening the door of the League room; whether his attention has been directed to the proceedings taken against Sergeant Hyde before the magistrates at Rathcormac on the 23rd of December and their decision; and what is the result of any inquiry made into all the circumstances of this case.

Yes, Sir. The sergeant was reduced, as a result of the inquiry held, to the rank of constable. He was fined for assault at the Petty Sessions mentioned. He has since retired from the force.

Has this man a pension for his "deserving" services?

He has a pension.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether the Land Commission considered they had sufficient security when sanctioning an advance for the purchase of Mr. John Walker's farm at Towlerton, Queen's County, by the occupier from the representatives of the late Mr. Edge; has the security depreciated since then; and, if not, will he explain on what grounds the Land Commission refuse to sanction sale of the occupiers' interest in the holding, and demand a fine of £50 from the purchaser.

I would refer the hon. Member to a reply to a Question put on this matter on the 18th December last. The application made to the Commissioners in this case was one in reference to which they exercised the discretion vested in them by Statute, upon a full knowledge of all the facts. It would be contrary to practice to discuss their decisions in the manner now suggested.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland is he aware that a man named M'Elligott from near Bawnboy, County Cavan, has been confined in Dundalk Gaol during the past nineteen months for refusing to give possession of his farm to the Irish Land Commission at £60 less than he could get from a solvent purchaser; and will the Government introduce a Bill to amend the law relating to contempt of court, in order to prevent people being confined for indefinite periods for offences of this description.

The nature of the contempt in respect of which this man was committed to prison by the Master of the Rolls, was stated in my answer to the hon. Member's similar Question of the 20th March last. The Executive has no power to interfere in such cases. The reply to the second part of the Question is in the negative.

Does the right hon. Gentleman intend to keep this man permanently in prison?

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if his attention has been drawn to the circumstances under which a recent appointment has been made to a vacancy in the position of Lecturer in Organic Chemistry at the Royal College of Science in Ireland; whether he is aware that the Assistant Secretary to the Technical Instruction Department of the Board of Agriculture conferred the position on a gentleman who only became a candidate for it at the solicitation of the Department; and will he explain why another candidate, of at least equal qualifications, who is an Irishman residing in Ireland, a Roman Catholic, and graduate and Fellow of the Royal University of Ireland, and who was, in addition, recommended by the gentleman who obtained the appointment, was passed over.

The gentleman selected for this appointment, which was made by the Department, is an Irishman. He has had considerable experience as a lecturer.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction or the Congested Districts Board propose to encourage the adoption of the Rural Libraries Act by a grant to those district councils which have already adopted, or may adopt, the Act in the future.

Both Departments afford aid to village and working-men's libraries in the purchase and selection of books. The Department of Agriculture has also at present under consideration further proposals framed with the view of promoting the adoption of the Act by rural district councils.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland when the improvement of Liscannar Harbour, as provided for in the Marine Works (Ireland) Act, is likely to be carried out.

In addition to this Question, I have received many communications from the hon. Member for West Clare, in whose constituency Liscannar is situate. The plans are now completed, and, after conferring with representatives of the County Council on the 28th inst., I trust that there may be no cause for delay.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he will give the names of the counties and districts in Ireland which still remain proclaimed under the provisions of the Criminal Law and Procedure Act.

The counties of Cavan, Clare, Cork, Galway, King's, Leitrim, Limerick, Longford, Mayo, Queen's, Roscommon, Sligo, Tipperary, Waterford, and Westmeath, and the county boroughs of Cork, Dublin, Limerick and Waterford, are still subject to the provisions of the Act in respect of special juries and changes of venue. The summary jurisdiction clause of the Act has been withdrawn from portions of ten counties and from three county boroughs, and remains in force in portions of five counties—Clare, Limerick, Roscommon, Sligo and Tipperary.

What is the reason for maintaining these proclamations?

The same as induced the original order, I presume.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that, a short time ago, a Noconformist church in Thurles, County Tipperary, was broKen into, the harmonium smashed, bibles torn up, and the whole church saturated with paraffin oil and set on fire; and if he will state how many arrests were made.

No arrests have yet been made in connection with this dastardly occurrence—none the less regrettable because it is most uncommon in Ireland.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he will print and circulate the Report of the Irish Land Conference as a Parliamentary Paper.

I propose to lay Papers on some aspects of the land purchase question, including a Report on the present condition of past purchasers. I will consider the desirability of adding this Report, although, of course, it is in no sense an official document, and indeed derives its interest from that fact.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he can state the number of county rural district and urban councillors and Poor Law guardians respectively, who have been disqualified within the past twelve months in Ireland in consequence of sentences of imprisonment with hard labour having been passed upon them under the Criminal Law and Procedure (Ireland) Act; and whether he proposes to introduce legislation to remove such disqualification.

The number of cases of the kind mentioned was fourteen. In answer to the concluding inquiry I would refer to my reply to the similar Question addressed to me on the 22nd October last.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that in Limerick on 14th January last the driver of a car refused to drive Dr. Long to attend a patient; and that he was stoned after leaving divine service on Sunday 15th instant; and will he state what steps he proposes to take in the matter.

The reply to first inquiry is in the affirmative. The police have no power to prosecute for the offence of refusing to drive a fare. With respect to the occurrence on the 15th instant, I am informed that a number of little boys were playing football, and that a stone was thrown from their direction in that of Dr. Long. He was not struck or otherwise stoned, nor do the police consider that there was any intention to strike him.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that a man named McDuff, who was convicted and fined in Belfast for keeping an illegal betting house, made application through his solicitor to have his books and papers, which were seized by the police, given back to him, which the magistrates refused; and will he explain by whose orders and on what grounds an order was sent from Dublin Castle to hand them back.

The magistrates made no order in respect to either the detention or return of these books and papers. There was no clause of forfeiture in the Statute and it would have been unjustifiable on the part of the police to have retained them. Directions for their return were consequently given.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General if he is aware that the nine clear hours at home recommended by the Tweedmouth Commission has not yet been carried into effect in Dublin; and whether, if there is no reasonable hope that it will be carried out, the Postmaster General could see his way to make some pecuniary grant to the Dublin staff in lieu thereof.

I am sorry to find that there are still eight officers in the parcel office who have not received the benefit of a clear nine hours' interval at home. I have given renewed stringent instructions on the subject.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General if he is aware that stamping is largely done by sorting clerks and telegraphists at Dublin, while in other large centres, such as Glasgow, stamping is entirely confined to postmen; and can he say whether stamping comes under the strict limit of a sorting clerk's duty, and, if not, will he see that it is done by the proper officers.

It is not correct to say that the stamping of correspondence at Dublin is largely done by sorting clerks and telegraphists. The duty is mainly performed by postmen, but three sorting clerks and telegraphists are allotted to stamp the correspondence posted by Government Departments, and junior sorting clerks and telegraphists assist in the stamping of the ordinary correspondence when there is unusual pressure of work. Such work, although assigned to postmen, when the interests of the business require it is work which is also proper to sorting clerks and telegraphists and in which they have to qualify.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General if he is aware that learners in many English post offices, such as Manchester, Leeds, and Sheffield, are paid at the rate of 8s. weekly, and on appointment get 16s. per week, and that the rates of pay throughout Ireland for persons holding the same rank are 6s. and 12s. respectively, and whether, seeing that the cost of living in the large towns in Ireland is at least as great as that in some of the English centres where the higher rate of pay is given, will he consider the advisability of granting the same wages in Ireland as he does under similar circumstances in England.

Wages of 8s. a week for learners with 16s. a week on appointment as sorting clerk and telegraphist were introduced as a temporary measure at certain English offices where a difficulty was experienced in obtaining the necessary number of candidates. The ordinary wages are found to be sufficient in Ireland to attract the required candidates; and it is not proposed to increase them.

Will the right hon. Gentleman give me a copy of these answers?

Yes; but if the hon. Gentleman when he wishes for a copy of the reply will put down his Questions as unstarred that will serve his purpose, as copies are supplied with the Parliamentary Papers.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade if he can now state what decision has been arrived at with reference to the repair of the Tory Island Cable.

I have been informed by my right hon. friend the Postmaster General that arrangements are being made by his Department for taking over the Tory Island Cable, and that it is intended to repair the cable as soon as circumstances admit.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether, in view of the desire in Ireland that the International Automobile Race should be run in that country, and considering that the local councils through whose districts the cars will speed are prepared to take every precaution for the safety of life, he will introduce a Bill to enable the competitors to hold the race in Ireland.

Before the right hon. Gentleman answers this Question, may I ask is His Majesty's Government aware that this is a rare occasion on which the whole of the Irish people are at one? Taking this fact into consideration, will His Majesty's Government give a favourable reply to the Question? (Laughter.)

I agree that my hon. and gallant friend is to-day speak- ing for the whole of Ireland. I understand that a Bill has been drafted by the hon. Member for the New Forest Division of Hants. In view of the unanimous desire of all the local bodies representing districts through which the proposed course would run, and also, I believe, of all hon. Members of Irish constituencies, I venture to express the hope that such a Bill would pass as an unopposed measure.

Will the Government make the Bill their own, and thus secure for it the advantages of such a measure?

I do not like to contemplate the possibility of other hon. Members opposing this measure when it is brought forward unanimously on the part of Ireland. I hope it will pass by consent.

But there are other Bills in front of it.

Still, I hope it will pass by consent. No one can be opposed to it.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury when the final Report of the Royal Commission on University Education in Ireland will be presented to the House.

I am informed by the Secretary of the Commission that the Report will be ready in the first week in March.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury if it is the intention of the Government to reintroduce the Marine Insurance Bill at an early date.

The Lord Chancellor hopes to reintroduce the Bill at an early date. I believe it is a measure that is much needed, and that it is practically agreed to by the important commercial interests concerned.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether steps have yet been taken to discontinue the grants hitherto made by the Commissioners of Woods and Forests to 104 denominational schools; and whether he can yet inform the House whether there is any other national Department that contributes in the same manner to denominational schools.

These grants will be continued up to the appointed day. After the appointed day, the continuation of these grants will be limited to the question of repairs; and the basis of any contribution, if contribution is to be made, is a matter which cannot yet be determined. As to the last part of the Question, I have no information about other Departments, but there would be no objection to a Return if the hon. Member will move for it.

I beg to ask the Financial Secretary to the War Office why it is that the White Paper dealing with the distribution of the six Army Corps has been sent to the newspapers and not distributed to the Members of the House.

I am afraid I cannot answer the Question, as I have been away for the last three days, and am not aware of the circumstances under which it was communicated to the newspapers.

Does this come under the Betrayal of Official Secrets Act?

said that in moving the Amendment which stood in his name, he was giving expression to the opinion entertained not only by many members of that House, but by almost everybody outside. To every one who had followed the signs of the times it could not but be apparent that the policy of the War Office would be seriously challenged; and it was only right and fitting that this strong disapproval should find utterance in the House of Commons. It was not agreeable—indeed, it was intensely disagreeable—to find oneself in opposition to a Government which one desired to support, and he wished, therefore, to make it perfectly clear that he was attacking the policy, not of the Government, but of a Department; not the administration of affairs in general, but the administration of the Army in particular; and in doing this he ran counter to no Unionist principles whatever; he claimed to be as sound and loyal a Conservative as any hon. Member who might rise in the course of that debate to defend the system. His task was not rendered easier by the fact that the head of the Department attacked was a friend of over twenty years standing, for whom he had the warmest regard, and whose excellent and admirable qualities he held in the highest esteem. But when one saw a friend embarking on a course which must lead to disaster, it was the part of a friend to give warning of the danger, and to attempt to divert him into another course, at the end of which was to be found success. He appreciated the great difficulties with which his right hon. friend had had to deal, and the zeal and energy with which he had tried to cope with them. But the measure of his difficulties had been the measure of his opportunities. No man had ever had greater opportunities, but he regretted to say that, from their point of view, those opportunities had been unhappily used or deplorably neglected; and, instead of putting the Army on a new and efficient basis, the right hon. Gentleman had produced a scheme unsound in priniciple and ruinous in practice. He would endeavour to make good his words without going into more detail than was absolutely necessary It was high time that the nation took stock of its position. They had made great efforts and great sacrifices, and they seriously needed a period of rest and recuperation. He remembered, just before the war broke out, attending a bankers' dinner at which Lord Salisbury was present, and addressed a serious warning to the nation, telling them they were in danger of doing what men of business called "trading beyond their capital"—that they were in danger of undertaking obligations they would not beable to meet, and assuming responsibilities greater than they were able to bear. If that warning was needed then, how much more was it needed now, when we had spent over £200,000,000 sterling in South Africa. The war was over, but the consequences remained, as they were unpleasantly reminded every time the tax-gatherer knocked at their doors. The taxpayer urgently required relief; but taxation could only be reduced if expenditure were reduced, and reduction of expenditure was naturally looked for where it had most largely increased, viz., on the Army. Every one would agree that if for two-thirds of the present cost the country could have a thoroughly efficient Army which would meet all the needs of the Empire, it was the duty of the Minister for War to provide such an Army. His proposition was that for twenty millions of money we could have an Army better suited than the one which now existed to meet all the needs of the Empire. Before he asked for thirty millions of money, it was the business of the Secretary of State for War to show to show that the present force was needed; that every man was absolutely necessary, and could not be dispensed with, and he had never attempted to do that. The nation wanted to know what were the needs of the Empire, and what sort of Army was required for their defence. The nation was conscious of extravagant expenditure with inadequate results, and wanted sufficient security at a reasonable cost. They wanted to know what purposes the Army was intended to serve, and how much was to be spent on it. This information had been given to the authorities at Pall Mall, or it had not. If it had, then the nation which had to pay was entitled to be informed what it had to pay for, and why it had to pay so much. If it had not, then the military authorities had been organising in a haphazard fashion for an uncertain object, and no wonder, then, that the result had been something like chaos. There had been no authoritative statement as to the views of the authorities as to the requirements from the Army except that issued by Mr. Stanhope in a Memorandum issued in the year 1891. It was a rather interesting document, but he did not propose to read it to the House. He would content himself with reading a paragraph—

"It will be distinctly understood that the employment of Army Corps in the field in any European war is sufficiently improbable to make it the primary duty of the military authorities to organise efficiently our forces for defence."

Therefore, according to that Memorandum, our primary duty was to organise our forces efficiently for the defence of the country. The outcome of that view was this scheme of six Army Corps. He thought it would be rather interesting if they could ever find out what was the genesis and conception of the Six Army Corps scheme. How was it that the Secretary for War managed to hit on this scheme? Was it adopted after long consultation with the officials at the War Office? Was it subjected to careful examination and minute criticism? Were those responsible for the efficiency of the Army called into consultation, and did they pronounce a blessing upon it? He understood nothing of the kind took place. He understood that the War Office repudiated the paternity of this scheme. They always thought it a very remark- able performance on the part of Jupiter when, after pains in the head, he produced from his brain Minerva, fully armed and equipped; but that performance sank into insignificance compared to that of the Secretary for War, who, after a few days' pains in his head, produced six Army Corps, armed and equipped, ready for everything except war. He had several objections to this Army Corps scheme. His first objection was that it was based on a wrong principle; his second was that it was not fitted for the real needs of the country; his third was that it was enormously costly; his fourth was that it did not remove the defects which the war in South Africa so clearly revealed; his fifth was that it was not adapted to the conditions of service in this country; and the sixth was that it had no real existence. He ventured to say that the defence of this country was the primary duty, first of the Navy and next of its citizens. Our history and our position alike indicated this policy to us. It was not for nothing that we were hemmed round by the inviolate sea, on which floated the most powerful Navy in the world. If our position compelled us to maintain our Navy at an overwhelming strength, it relieved us from the necessity of maintaining a large Army to guard our frontiers, for our frontiers were the sea, and these could only be properly guarded by the Navy. If the War Office contended, as he understood they did. that our Navy did not defend us efficiently, that was an argument for strengthening our Navy. not for strengthening our Army; and therefore he absolutely endorsed the words of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife, when he said that an Army organised for home defence was a costly, wasteful and foolish luxury. His right hon. friend the Secretary for War asked, if we lost temporary command of the sea, whether we should allow the country to be despoiled by our foes. This meant that we were asked to spend £30,000,000 annually because moments might occur, wnich, if they did not occur, would be absolutely thrown away. No wise nation will strain its resources, cripple its finances, and saddle itself with a huge burden of taxation merely to provide against a contingency that had not occurred for a thousand years, and which was never likely to occur again. What did the temporary loss of the command of the sea mean? It meant that either the Navy was temporarily disabled or was lured away to other parts of the globe. Did any one imagine that under these circumstances any foreign foe would dare to land a force on these shores, which might be shut up and caught like rats in a trap? It was Moltke who said that, in such a contingency, he knew of twenty ways of getting into England, but not one of getting out. We need not, he thought, be afraid of a temporary raid. We ought to rely far more than the War Office had done hitherto on the citizens of this country. We had never appealed to the people of England in the right way; and if we did not appeal to them in the right way we could not expect them to do what we wanted them to do. He believed that if appealed to in the right way we should get such a response as would astonish the gentlemen at the War Office, and would show that the people of England were not so dead to their duty and interest as these gentlemen believed. We had the raw material for the finest and cheapest citizen Army that the world had ever seen, and, properly trained and organised, they could repel with ease any temporary raid, which, indeed, would never be attempted. It was common knowledge that the Volunteer force had been discouraged by the War Office; and that men had been driven out of that force because the War Office had laid down regulations with which it was impossible for Volunteer Officers to comply. The Volunteers might not be fully trained—as he would show that the Regular Army was not properly trained; but he maintained that an imperfectly trained Volunteer was a better man for defence of the country than a citizen not trained at all. It was not only on the Volunteers that the course pursued by the War Office had had a most pernicious effect, but also on the defence forces in the Colonies. He had a letter from a General in Australia who was in a position to know, and who said that—

"The main obstacle to the organisation of the forces of the Colonies of Australia was the odium in which the War Office was held."

And here he would like to make a quotation from Lord Roberts who, in an article, said—

"What are really required for England, are two Armies—a home Army, and a foreign service Army. The former should consist, I conceive, of some sort of Militia, and this should be our reserve. The latter should always be in the most perfect state of efficiency, ready to take the field in our distant possessions upon the shortest possible notice."

A large Regular Army for home defence was not mentioned in that definition; and when the Commander-in-Chief talked of operations abroad he referred to our distant possessions. He never contemplated that our Regular Army should ever be employed on the Continent. He was not going to discuss the question of Canada. Of what use would two Army Corps be in America? If we had to contend with America, we would have to put the whole nation into the field. It might be said that a large Regular Army would be required on the Indian frontier. He knew something about our Indian frontier, and he thought that this idea of an invasion of India by Russia was a good deal of a bugbear. A Russian officer had said to him—

"In the first place, no one contemplates invading India. It is true we bring pressure upon your Indian frontier when we want to get something out of you in other parts of the world. We do not seriously contemplate the invasion of India, because, in the first place, we do not want India, and in the second place, because it would be impossible."

We knew that, armed as we were with modern weapons and smokeless powder, it would be impossible for an invading Army to get through the passes. Then we also knew that until Quetta, on whose fortification so much had been spent, was taken, it would be perfectly impossible for Russia to march on India. All that would be needed would be to strengthen the Indian garrison from home, and it would not require a great Army to do that. And here he would quote from what President Roosevelt, of the United States, had said only the other day, which exactly expresses our ideal of what the English Army ought to be—

"The [American] Army is small, and it is not desirable that it should be other than small relatively to the population, but we have a right to expect that it shall represent for its size the very highest point of efficiency in the civilised world."

Whatever else could be said about it, the great increase in the expenditure on our Army was a fact, open, gross and palpable to the eyes and pockets of all men. He maintained that the Army was not only unsuited to our needs, but enormously costly. The increase of expenditure was very great. He would take the year 1880, in which he had a particular interest because the father of the present Financial Secretary to the War Office was then Secretary for War. At that time the total expenditure on the Army was £14,980,000, and that was just after the Zulu War and the Afghan War, and shortly before and after we were ready to go to war with Russia. In the year 1899 the expenditure was £20,617,000. That was the year before the Boer War. And now the expenditure had risen to £29,310,000—an expenditure which was out of all proportion to the increase of our population and to the increase of our trade. The Government said that that increase of expenditure was inevitable. Well, let them prove it to be inevitable. We had no evidence of the fact. There was a point beyond which expenditure could not go, for the simple reason that the taxpayers of the country would rebel against it. Moreover—and he strongly urged this consideration—it might be that in indulging in this inflated expenditure we were running the risk of provoking a reaction which might lead to a dangerous parsimony. He held that the distribution of expenditure upon the Army and Navy required reconsideration, though he need not dwell on that, because it was admitted by everybody that the predominant position of the Navy must be accepted, and that the Army should be supplemental to the Navy. His contention was that for such increased expenditure no adequate result had been obtained, although glaring defects had been revealed. Would those defects be removed under the scheme of the Secretary of State for War? When he called attention to defects in the Army he must be understood as making no reflection whatever on the officers and men, who did their duty so gallantly in the field. The defects to which he referred were mainly due to three causes—the lack of foresight, the lack of organisation, and the lack of training. Nothing had been thought out before the early disasters of the war in South Africa, and no proper preparations had been made to meet what was called and "inevitable war." Recently the Prime Minister stated—and his announcement created a great deal of interest in the country—that the Council of Defence had been reconstituted. Of course the reconstitution was proof, if proof were needed, that the previous Council of Defence was a farce and a failure. Yet, they should remember that before the previous Council of Defence there was the prospect of an inevitable war which it would have been thought would have been a sufficient inducement and stimulus to bring the members of the Council together in order to deliberate and consult and prepare for the war. What assurance had the House of Commons that without any such stimulus or inducement the Council of Defence would rice to any higher conception of its duties. He sincerely hoped and believed that it would; but their good faith in the matter was of the substance of things hoped for, and based on the evidence of things unseen. He observed one deficiency in the composition of the Council. He thought that the Chancellor of the Exchequer ought to be a member of it. The members who composed it had one eye on the sea and one on shore, but they had to have their eyes constantly on the Exchequer. Therefore the Chancellor of the Exchequer ought to be a member of the Council in order to measure its schemes by the sound standard of pounds, shillings, and pence. He himself wanted to know what the Council of Defence thought of the present Army scheme, and he asked the Prime Minister if he would regard the scheme with an open mind. The Prime Minister replied that he regarded all questions with an open mind, in which he himself fully concurred. At the same time he wished to know whether his right hon. friend would regard the Army scheme in particular with an open mind, as it involved a large expenditure of money if the Army Corps were to be put on a more stable, or less unstable, foundation. Ministers would tell the House of Commons next year that the country was committed to the scheme, but they now wanted the Council of Defence to examine the scheme before the country was committed to it, and they desired an assurance from the Prime Minister that, if needs be, the six Army Corps would be thrown into the melting pot. Were the politicians on the Council to dictate to the soldiers or sailors, or were the soldiers or sailors to dictate to the politicians? If the Cabinet wanted the plans of the soldiers or the sailors they could always have them; and the fact that the plans were submitted to the Council of Defence did not add any new feature to its composition, or give any new assurance of its effective working. After all, the Council of Defence could only examine and dispose of schemes of attack and defence on the intelligence supplied to it by the Intelligence Department, and the Intelligence Department could only supply intelligence if it were properly and efficiently manned. At the present moment the Intelligence Department of the War Office was very much undermanned, and it was practically impossible for it to discharge the work committed to it. When they read an official definition of the duties to be performed by one man over countries extending almost from China to Peru, and including preparations for attack in each country, plans for the defence of the colonies, the co-ordination and distribution of the military forces of the Crown, to imagine that they could be efficiently performed by one man was to imagine an absurdity. In America, the first thing they did was to create a well - paid staff. But then America believed in brains; they in England did not believe in brains. They believed in collecting specials, flat-foots, weedy boys and a whole host of undesirables, and paying them large sums of money, while they starved the brains department. Information was the last thing the War Office wanted, and all the information that came to them was suspect, unless it was tied up with red tape, and stamped with the official seal. In fact, it might have been written over the door of the War Office, "Information not wanted here." Then, lack of organisation would exist under the new scheme no less than under the old. They had it on the highest authority that at the outbreak of the war the Army was not organised for war. That was perfectly evident, because, when the Army was called upon, not one single battalion or battery was ready to take the field. What would have happened if the Boers had pushed on in South Africa, and if no Volunteers were forthcoming, he shrank from contemplating. It would, however, have been a disaster of the first magnitude to the British Empire. The truth was that the Army was not organised, and would not be organised, for war, because the Army scheme was based on fallacy. It was entirely dependent on the exact maintenance of an equality between units at home and abroad, which was impossible. With reference to that, Lord Wolseley said:—

"The moment that basis broke down the whole system is thrown out of gear, and it becomes impossible to maintain the system or organisation which was created and based on that principle."

That was to say that when war broke out the system broke down. He would make a frank admission to the Secretary of State for War—that his Army Corps were as perfect as he doubtless would make them out to be, provided they were not asked to go anywhere or do anything. It was true that in spite of their lack of organisation they muddled through. A Minister of the Crown the other day said that it did not matter whether they muddled through as long as the British Empire came out uppermost. That was an unfortunate doctrine, and when a Minister of the Crown talked like that he was extremely ill-advised. For his part he said that the country was getting tired of a policy of mess, muddle, and make-believe. It wanted to see its work well, thoroughly and efficiently done. But it was hopeless to expect organisation in the Army until the War Office, which was the head and front of the offending, had been organised itself. Commissions sat again and again to examine into the defects of the War Office. They laid their fingers on the same defects and made pretty well the same recommendation, but the War Office went its way unheeding. If he might parody a well-known verse, he would say—

"They hear Commissions thunder past

In silent, deep disdain;

They bow their heads before the blast,

Then plunge in tape again."

They had heard a good deal about decentralisation, which was a very good thing if they could get it; but inquiries in the Army Corps districts showed that there was no more decentralisation under the new scheme than there was under the old. The War Office lay like a nightmare on the chest of the Army. A Commission had been appointed to inquire into the training of officers. He did not know whether its recommendations had been adopted; but if they had not, it was quite time they were. He did not blame the officers; it was perfectly obvious they could not train men unless they had men to train. Even from the battalions which had been referred to as "squeezed lemons" there were deductions for foreign drafts, special duties, employment in regimental workshops, etc. It was not surprising in such circumstances that there was a universal complaint that commanding officers never saw their battalions, or company officers their companies, because there were neither battalions nor companies to see. The depots were too few, and required instructors. They would have to be increased in number, and efficient instructors would have to be appointed. The men were taken away from the depots before they were properly trained; and, to quote a military officer of great experience, "to expect efficiency under such a system was to expect a miracle." Yet the nation was asked to expend £30,000,000 on expenditure from which to expect efficiency was to expect a miracle. The result of the system was that they could not carry on even a small war without calling out the Reserves to form part of the fighting line. One of the most urgent needs, as was undoubtedly and universally admitted, was that we should have a small expeditionary force that could be sent anywhere at a moment's notice, without mobilisation, and without calling Parliament together. The Army Corps system did not give this force, and could not give it so long as the system of linked battalions remained. With regard to the linked battalion system he would like to quote objections to which that was open. Lord Roberts said:—

"As a rule, the battalion in which a man first makes his home is the one he will like best to the end of his service, and constant and compulsory change, or even a liability to such change, does more to make a soldier dislike the Army and kill the esprit de corps that used to exist than anything else."

The Army Corps were founded on this very system. Coming to the Army Corps themselves, what and where were these Army Corps? They were on a large piece of paper it was true, but were they anywhere else? He remembered when the Secretary of State for War, two years ago, came down, like the poet, "with his eye in fine frenzy rolling," to give to these six "airy nothings a local habitation and a name." He did not intend to quote figures—he could quote figures to any extent—but those figures would, no doubt, be objected to by the War Office, while any figures quoted by the War Office would be objected to by their critics. All that he would say was that if anybody wanted to satisfy himself as to whether these Army Corps existed, and in what state, that person had better go to the headquarters of the Army Corps and see for himself. One industrious journalist had gone about looking for a mission Army Corps. He reminded one of those patient, persevering savants who perambulated the globe in search of the missing ling. They might find a skull and a bone or two, but they never discovered the entireman, and he predicted that a similar failure would await any one who tried to discover an entire Army Corps. Even if an entire Army Corps were found, his arguments was not affected in the least; in fact it was, if anything, strengthened, because the more complete it was, the more money it would cost. And not only must the number of men in these Army Corps be considered, but also what proportion of them were efficient soldiers. The figures of the War Office were largely open to suspicion on this point; because, though the House was told at the commencement of the war in South Africa that we had 109, 000 men, it turned out subsequently, according to the statement of the Secretary of State for War, that 92,000 of them were not fit to take the field.

That was contradicted by Lord Lansdowne, and entirely disproved.

Excuse me, I can quote Lord Lansdowne's words.

I can also quote. Lord Lansdowne denied it, and said an interpretation was put upon his wouds that they did not bear.

Of course, I know that the 92,000 were available later on, but not at that moment.

Lord Lansdowne showed that at that very moment more than half of them were available.

That is quite enough for me, Sir. Continuing, the hon. Member said he did not object to the country being divided up into six districts, nor did he object to the Army for home defence being divided into Army Corps, but he strongly objected to Army Corps, whether complete or incomplete, for the reason that they were extremely costly; the work of the staff was extremely costly, the work which was now being dome by a general at £4,000 a year being that which in the past was done by a general at £800 a year. This Army Corps system also blocked the way to Army reform; they would never get Army reform until these Army Corps were swept away, root and branch. It increased the numbers of numbers of nominal soldiers without increasing the efficiency of the fighting units, and considering the fact that our military service was totally different from any continental system, he thought there was great danger in adopting continental systems. Continental nations had to defend a compact territory, whilst we had to defend widely-scattered dominions. They trusted for their defence to an Army; we trusted for our defence to a Navy. An Army Corps in England stretches from Dover to plymouth, from the Isle of Wight to Pembrokeshire, and, spread over so wide a country, it cannot be organised, manœuvered or trained as a fighting unit. The Army Corps system on the Continent was intended to facilitate the handling of large masses of men. We were not called upon to handle such numbers, and if the House considered the nature of our requirements and the probabilities of the future, they would see that not once in 100 times would an entire Army Corps be required. A great part of these Army Corps were composed of auxiliaries, which would be withdrawn from them at once if required to serve outside this country; and even if the Army Corps were complete they could not be moved en masse to the frontiers; they would be broken up when they were put on board ship, and as each ship reached the other side the men would be marched to the front as they arrived, and an Army Corps would therefore never take the field, except in a fragmentary condition. There was only one place in which an Army Corps could be manœuvred, and that was South Africa, and if one were sent out there it might be a useful thing. If the Government sent out 20,000 men, as they proposed to do, to south Africa, they still had to keep the linked battalions at home; but if an Army Corps were sent out, and it were put on the home estabishment, they had not to provide linked battalions for it. As a matter of fact the whole thing hung upon the recruiting, and upon this he would quote what General Russell said:—

"The recruiting difficulty is at the bottom of all our Army troubles and embarrassments; it is the principal cause of our great expenditure in proportion to results as compared with foreign armies. It hampers our Army training; it impairs our efficiency; it imposes endless trammels on the hands of our officials connected with Army administration, be they military or civilian, in that it is the great difficulty we have to solve, and until solved all so-called schemes of Army reform must be in the future, as they have been in the past, snares and delusions."

The difficulty of the recruiting arose from the fact that they wanted more man than the country was willing to supply, and the War Office proposed to solve this difficulty by asking for more still. The normal amount of men available was 25,000, and when more then this number was required then the pay had to be increased, which was a good thing, and the standard had to be lowered, which was bad. He also thought that during the war the War Office lost a great opportunity. The one thing this war had shown was the value of intelligence and character and men of intelligence and character could only be attracted by improving the conditions of service and raising the pay, but we were still recruiting from the same class as before. Upon this point he would just quote the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting:—

"Besides this, the annual net desertions—it is no use blinking the fact—amount to about 2,500; and the total wastage of men per annum amounts to something like 50 per cent. of the annual contingent. Thus it is no exaggeration to say that of the 35,000 recruits who should annually arrive in fit physical condition to keep our Army up to its normal and sufficient strength, we only get about half the number of good men; the rest are mere expensive trash."

The Government were packing their Army Corps with "expensive trash," and then come down to this House and boast of their success in raising recruits. He wished to point out the dilemma in which the War Office had landed themselves. The men enlisted for three years, with power to extend their service, in which case they would receive an extra sixpence. The idea was, he supposed, to pass as many men as possible into the Reserve many men as possible into the Reserve. But they could not pass men into the Reserve and provide men for the foreign drafts at the same time. If a sufficient number of men were not induced by this extra sixpence to extend their term of service the War Office would be absolutely unable to furnish their foreign drafts and the whole system came to the ground. It was a gamble on a sixpence; the whole fate of the British Empire turned upon a sixpence. Here he would mention a quotation from an article by Lord Roberts:—

"We are sacrificing our Army to obtain a Reserve.… Any attempt to make the Foreign Service Army subservient to the Reserve must end in failure, and I confidently predict, in disgrace and disaster."

That was in 1884.

1881.

said that in any case it was repeated on Lord Roberts' authority in 1900. But he might be asked—"What is your scheme? You propose to pull down; how do you propose to build up?" He submitted that in his diagnosis of the disease he had sufficiently indicated the nature of the remedy that he would suggest. In any case, it was not his present business to propound the remedy. Once the principle was accepted, the details Would fall into their proper places. If his right hon. friend did him the honour to consult him, he would give him a broad outline of the details of his scheme, but the present was not the time or place to produce them. That scheme had been adopted after careful consideration of the circumstances, and the most severe criticism by skilled experts; its supporters did not trust to their own wisdom. He wished the question could be decided on its merits, unexposed to the undertow of Party currents. It was a national issue of the highest importance, and these were issues in which the crack of the Party whip ought not to be heard or, if heard, disregarded. No doubt the Prime Minister, in eloquent and moving terms, would make an appeal to his followers, and such was the charm the right hon. Gentleman invariably exercised, that he had no doubt that appeal would not be make in vain. He (the speaker), however, appealed not to Party, but to a principle—the principle that there were times when it was the duty of every Member of the House to let national interests over-ride Party obligations. There was not one of their trusted leaders, either past or present, who had not, at one or another period of his career, acted on that principle, and what had been right for them in the past could not be wrong for us in the present. He therefore asked the House to vote against the scheme of his right hon. friend on the following grounds: that it involved a huge expenditure without adequate result; that its cost, compared with that of the Navy, was altogether out of proportion to the national requirements from the two services; that it annually demanded a huge sum of money which ought either to be saved to the taxpayers or spent on the Navy; that its organisation was not adapted to the work it had to do, and would infallibly break down under the crucial test of war; that it did not provide an expeditionary force or a real reserve; that it was unsuited to hte protection of the Empire and was no safeguard against the invasion of this country; that it was too small to contend with the conscript armies of the Continent, and too large for expeditionary purposes in distant parts fo hte world; that it failed to remove the defects rendered apparent by the late war, and left untouched the great organisation in which those defects had their source and origin; that its numbers did not exist except on paper, and could not be obtained except at an inordinate cost; in a word, that it was unsound in principle, ruinous in practice, and ought to be swept away, abandoned, and replaced by another scheme under which the country would have a force which would meet and fulfil the requirements of the Empire, without laying too great a burden on the resources of the nation.

, in seconding the Amendment, said that Members on his side of the House fully realised the gravity of speaking and voting for this Amendment to the Address, but they were taking their present course because they believed the matter to be above and beyond all Party considerations. Their objections to the proposals of the Secretary of State were not as to details, but were fundamental, and ought not to be in any way affected by Party. He entirely dissociated himself from any personal attack upon any man, except in so far as that man was identified with the system embodying such faulty principles. The strong step of moving this Amendment, and carrying it to a division, was being taken because its supporters believed that the faulty principles to which he referred would end by landing the country in national disaster. They had not forgotten that only two and a half years ago that national disaster seemed very near, and they believed that the policy now being pursued, so far from leading towards a solution of the difficulties, was making it more likely that if troubles arose in future we should be even less prepared to meet them than in the past. As a humble student of military affairs, he supported the Amendment on four main grounds. The first was that the country was now committed to spending as much on the Army as on the Navy. In this year's Estimates the amount for the Army was slightly less than that for the Navy, but by the present scheme more would have to be spent on the Army than on the Navy.

dissented.

thought the right hon. Gentleman would find that when he had all his forces complete, the cost would amount to more than was being spent on the Navy. In declaring this to be an unsound policy, he did not quite agree with the mover of the Amendment in saying that if the Navy were supreme we required no Army at all at home. He thought that that was not a sound thesis.

I never said that.

believed it would be a disastrous day for this country if such a view obtained. He understood his hon. friend's view to be that the defence of the country must be entrusted, not to a Regular Army, paid all the year round, but to a body of citizens who received only the few shillings that they were paid during the time they were training. Of that he would speak later. The right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean had always held that the rank and file of an army could be improvised at a moment's notice. We had had good reason to know that, given the initial skill with the weapon and the necessary patriotism, an army could be improvised in two small States to overcome which required a force of 250,000 men from England. But a fleet could not possibly be improvised; it took years to build; consequently he thought the general proposition might be laid down that as long as we lived on an island, with a widely scattered Empire, whatever was spent on the Navy, far less must be spent on the Army, Therefore, as a navy could not be improvised, while an army to a large extent could be, any scheme which proposed to spend as much on the Army as on the Navy was based on a wrong principle and would have to be abandoned. His second thesis was that the Government were endeavouring to create too large a Regular Army. It was too large because it was beyond the power of our purse. Taxation has reached the limit to which it was safe to go; therefore, disagreeable though it might be, the fact had to be faced. Apart from that, the Army was beyond our needs. What were the three Army Corps for foreign service for? For three Army Corps to attack any white nation was impossible. One evident lesson of the late war was that to attack any white people in the world would require, not three, but probably thirty, Army Corps. Three Army Corps were utterly inadequate to wage war on any foreign country, and to commence a struggle on that basis would infallibly end in failure. What else could they be for? Surely not for fighting against black races? It was not suggested that to meet the Mad Mullah, or any of the black races with whom this country was occasionally brought into conflict, would require so great a force as 100,000 men. It might be said that they were to keep this country from invasion. He would lay down a cardinal principle, and once this was adopted he believed all their difficulties would vanish, and that was that the force established for the defence of this country from invasion, whether that contingency was likely or unlikely, or whether they wanted, 1,000 men or 5,000,000, was not the affair of the Regular Army, but of the citizen Army of this country. Therefore he could not see himself what these three Army Corps for foreign service were for, still less could one see what the other three Army Corps were for. There could be no doubt of the great expense they would entail. There was another reason, for holding that they were asking for too large an Army, namely, that they were asking for numbers which went beyond the limits of voluntary recruiting. It must be apparent to every one conversant with recruiting that they were not getting the class of men they desired to enlist. Of the recruits obtained those who had the necessary physique to go through the arduous training to which they were subjected, and those who had the character to resist the many temptations of the soldier, had done them yeoman service in South Africa, and this he knew well, for he had served there, side by side with them. They were now obtaining a very large number of men who would never be able to take the field. He had not been able to ascertain the precise number of men who proceeded to the late war from our home battalions, but he knew that little more than half of the full strength of the home battalions proceeded to the war in South Africa. That showed that they were keeping up a system of sham. It was no good pretending that they had a battalion when they had not got it; and they would find when war came and they had only got half of a battalion to go to the war, they would have to make some other arrangements, or else confess that they had only got the half, and not try to make out that they had got the Whole. He knew what was in the minds of many persons at the War Office and people elsewhere. They thought—and they were most patriotic persons—that if they set down this high standard of the number of troops required, and if at the same time they could, by imposing a rather rigid standard upon voluntary troops, get rid of them, that in a moment of trouble the nation would say: "We cannot get the men we require by voluntary means; let us resort to conscription." He would respectfully submit that that was the counsel of folly. To attempt to fill their foreign service Army, to garrison Madras or to fight the Mad Mullah; to allow the men to be severed altogether from their homes; and to say they were to attempt to obtain such an Army by conscription, was an attempt which was bound to fail, and it was a system which would not be accepted by any free country in the world, nor was it now accepted by any free country. He believed that the true path of safety of this country lay in every man being trained to arms, in whatever way was possible. Everyone who viewed what took place in South Africa, especially at the later stages of the war, must recognise the great danger of disregarding that first rule of national safety, the necessity of every man learning the use of his weapon, as every Englishman used to do in times gone by. Now our sense of responsibility and the need for self-sacrifice should be more than ever appreciated, but to suggest that you should fill up your foreign service Army by conscription did seem to him a counsel which was bound to end in complete failure. If they were to attempt to make an Army larger than voluntary enlistment would supply, then let them dispel altogether the idea that there was this other way to get the men. Look the facts frankly in the face, and if they had only got 10,000 men fit for service call them a Division and not an Army Corps. He believed an hon. Member of that House once described bi-metallism as a principle by which they took a shilling and called it 1s. 6d. The present principle in regard to the Army Corps seemed to be to take a Division and call it an Army Corps, and it was claimed that by this principle they were immediately multiplying their force by three. He should have thought that probably that was not the case. The third ground on which they opposed this system was that not only were they spending too much money on their Army, but they were spending it in the wrong direction, because they had not got at the root of the trouble which cost them so much during the last war. They were spending more and more money on infantry battalions, upon men they obtained with difficulty, and which they obtained only by reducing the standard. They had not increased the Army in those essential things which bitter experience in South Africa had taught them was necessary. He accepted certain items of expenditure, for no doubt there were many things in which a great advance had been made. He should imagine that in the force to which he had the honour to belong an advance had been made, although the expenditure had been great. He accepted this case because it was only a small matter, and because the provision of mounted men in a country where people had practically ceased to ride, would always be a matter of the greatest difficulty and expense. He referred to that, because it seemed to him that a greater proportion of the Regular Army should be composed of mounted men, and the greater proportion should be composed of every sort and kind of men who had had special training which could not be given on the spur of the moment. But that was not all. They all knew that the War Office had been abused unfairly. They all knew very well that everything which had been laid at its door was not true. They knew perfectly well that the individuals at the War Office were endeavouring to do their best, but they also knew that a faulty system existed there which wanted rooting out from the bottom to the top, and it was this system which prevented any man, however public spirited and determined he might be, from administering the affairs of the Army in a proper manner. A system prevailed there by which everyone meddled in everyone else's affairs, any by which officers who were specially directed to have control of certain affairs were constantly interfered with by others who had other duties to perform.

Will my hon. friend give an instance?

said he regretted that the right hon. Gentleman has asked for an instance, for he must give him a case which he was about to pass over. He was about to refer to the loss of Volunteers which had occurred in Great Britain, although they found that they did not get too many trained men for the late war. It struck them as curious that the same Minister who had been obliged to send men to South Africa who could not shoot to fight their battles should be the man who drove the few trained men they had from their ranks. He had been informed—and he awaited an explanation—of a certain Army Order which caused the bitterest offence amongst the Volunters of the country, and which was probably responsible for many resignations. The precise terms of this Order first became known to the officer principally concerned through the columns of the Press.

That is not so. That Army Order went through every channel, and had the opinion of every authority taken upon it before it got my signature.

said if the right hon. Gentleman would make inquiries he thought he would find that he was in error in stating that the officers principally concerned were fully conversant with that Order.

I do not think these allegations should be made without giving us the facts. What officer principally concerned was not aware of that Order before he saw it in the columns of the newspapers?

said he thought he had explained that. He was alluding to the Inspector General of the Auxiliary Forces at the War Office. This was what he referred to when he said that there was a principle at the War Office by which everybody meddled in everybody else's business. They knew full well there were misunderstanding, and though the Order was understood. He was perfectly certain of his facts. It was obvious that this might have been a matter in which it was the precise phraseology employed which was unknown to the responsible officer, but it so happened that this phraseology had caused the whole trouble, and might cause further trouble in the future. He would not delay the House further on the matter of the lack of responsibility which rested upon individual officers. It existed in the field in South Africa, but by degrees that vicious system was eliminated whilst the men were on active service. At the beginning of the war their system of red tape hampered their movements, but by degrees a wiser system prevailed, and people were allowed, to use a vulgar phrase, to "run their own show" and the principle of "one man, one job" was adopted. He supposed that no one in the War Office would deny that that principle did not obtain there. Various Commissions had recommended that that principle should obtain at the War Office, and this country was determined that it should prevail. He had only one more word to say, and it was, to his mind, the chief objection to the present system that was before this House. They were confusing the functions of the foreign service Army with the functions of the home service Army. What were these six Army Corps composed of? Hon. members knew that they were composed, as to three of them, partly of Regular troops and partly of Volunteers. of Volunteers. That had most far-reaching results, and he believed it would cause more trouble to us than anything else. The foreign service Army, composed of Regular troops, had produced men who did us good service in time of war; our auxiliary Army had also produced men—who had done good service in time of war. It had produced men not only from this country, but from every colony of the Empire, who had done good service, and their Regular brethren who had served with them side by side would admit that they were very similar to them in fighting capacity. The reason for this was not far to seek. It had been well pointed out that the qualities which the modern soldier required were courage, character, common-sense, and trust in his leader. They might obtain these essential qualities by different methods; one method was by taking a man when he was young, as was done in the Navy, and by training him in high ideals to withstand the awful ordeal of war. That it was an awful ordeal nobody would ever deny, because it could not be forgotten that nobody surrendered because he liked it. The auxiliary, by a totally different method, arrived at the same result, but it obviously was not an affair of whether there were to be five, or three, or two or four day's training. It was an affair of the sort of man he was, and whether he believed that his services were wanted, and whether he had the courage to offer them when the time came. But the Government were confusing two totally different things in these Army Corps. They seemed to say: "Our Regular troops need not be so rigidly disciplined as before; they can be a little bit more like the Volunteers, or the Volunteers must be made a little more like the Regulars." They were trying to convert the Volunteers into sham Regulars, and by a persistent policy of so doing they were alienating the sympathies of the Regular Army, who had reason to be annoyed that they should be placed in an Army Corps, having the same uniform and organisation with men who, though as good in time of war, yet only went to war in time of great national emergency, while the Regular soldier had to live in unhealthy countries and go to war fifty times for the auxiliary's once. See what effect it had on the auxiliary. The Volunteer was told, in the Order already referred to, that he had hitherto claimed to be taken seriously, and that, by implication, if he wanted to be taken seriously he must be something quite different from what he was before. Fresh regulations were laid down for him to make him appreciate in a greater or less degree what was required. What had been the result? They were losing the very men they wished to retain. They were losing them by laying down a hard and fast standard of a certain number of days consecutive training. They were losing the very men of the character who had succeeded in civil life, and who were, therefore, most likely to succeed in war. If they were losing these men, what had they got in their place? It might be said that, after all, we did not want all these Volunteers. In fact he had heard it stated that we did not want as many Volunteers as we had got. It was a fact that the Volunteers were slowly dwindling form lack of sympathetic treatment. There could be no denying the fact that, if men who could not shoot had been sent to fight our battles in South Africa, it was madness to lose the trained men we had. When he returned with these facts burned deep into his mind, he went to every place in the constituency which he had the honour to represent and told the people that the unprepared state of the nation might land us in disaster. He suggested that skill in the use of the weapon was what every man should endeavour to attain. In a few months from that time there were formed eight rifle clubs, with 650 men. One argument which seemed to him very strong was that, if they approached the people sympathetically, there was nothing they would not do for the country. The hon. Member instanced the life-boat service, which he described as a singularly close parallel. There were always men ready to undertake that arduous and terrible work without any inducement except a few shillings. If that service were put under the Government at Pall Mall, he did not think the men would undertake the work for £60 a year. They would, he thought, want £100 every time they went out. If this was true of the men who were engaged in that service saving life, was it not possibly true also of those who would be willing to engage in saving the country from invasion or disaster? It seemed to him that they had been for a long series of years, which had only now culminated, pursuing a policy which was bound to lead us into disaster, simply because we would not trust in the people and make it easy for them to take up the burden they were anxious to take up, and to fit themselves for whatever might be in store for them. Therefore he begged to second this Amendment. He urged hon. Members to regard this as a non-Party matter. If it were made a Party matter, it would be to him a cause of distress to vote against the Party to which he had given his support in its education policy, its South African policy, and in other ways; but still he asked the House to affirm that the Government had strayed from the straight path of national safety, that they must spend more upon the Navy, that they must reduce the Regular Army, and that in order to make the country safe they must appeal frankly to their countrymen to do their utmost to take up the burden which others had taken up. If the Government did so, he was convinced that they would not appeal to the people in vain, and that one day we should be the strongest nation in the world

said the Secretary of State for War at the present moment was perhaps a little badly treated by the House of Commons and the Press. He was going to admit that on the whole the right hon. Gentleman was an improving Secretary of State, but the improvement was sadly slow. Those who two or three years ago voted against the military scheme had no potion except to oppose it now. The real misfortune of the Secretary of State for War was that which had been told to the country by his former colleague the ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer. It was a little hard on the Secretary of State that one who had collective responsibility for this scheme, which he supported two years ago by his vote, should nevertheless have entirely confirmed what was said by the opponents of the scheme two years ago. The Chancellor of the Exchequer took the line that had been taken by the mover of the Amendment, and specifically stated that the Secretary of State had undertaken an impossible task. And in the verbatim report which appeared in the Western Daily Press—revised by the Chancellor of the Exchequer—he explained how this task was impossible. The right hon. Gentleman said:—

"He (the Secretary for War) had to try to reform the administration of the Army and primarily of the War Office, and at the same time to conduct a great war. That could not be done."

The experience of the last two years had entirely confirmed that view. He had made the admission that the Secretary for War was improving, as, for example, in adopting last year a greater elasticity in the conditions of service. Had the right hon. Gentleman not done so, where would have been his recruiting? If he was able to lay before the House an improvement in recruiting, it was due to his death-bed repentance of last year. The Secretary for War had not treated the House with fairness in regard to their knowledge of the present military position. They had not had the Preliminary Annual Return or the General Annual Return of the British Army since the year 1898, and these were the Returns on which all the official calculations were based, and, when pressed to give the House the facts before this debate, the right hon. Gentleman told them that he would give them in his speech.

I had no knowledge that this debate was coming on until last Tuesday night, and I was only asked for the White Paper dealing with the position of the Army before the Army Estimates came on on Thursday. I have made every effort to comply with the wishes of the right hon. Gentleman.

said that he and others had taken great trouble to arrive at the facts relating to the Army, but they did not know them officially. Some of the military papers had published what foreign nations called the order of battle, and others had published statements in regard to the First and Second Army Corps, and the number of men in the battalions.

I deny that they are right.

Well, they had made an estimate of the number of men at Aldershot and Salisbury Plain, but they should have had the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting, and the Annual Return of the British Army, which had not been published since 1898. They should have had a Report of what number of men were trained, and what the proportion of them who were just-joined recruits. The Secretary of State said that these six Army Corps which he put before the House were real—as real as he said two years ago, when they were spoken of as phantom or paper corps. A late Secretary of State for War, who was still living, Mr. Gathorne Hardy, put before the House a scheme of eight Army Corps in 1876, and these figured in the Army List till 1881 as the official representation of what he called a Field Army, a part from garrisons. Almost the same phrase was used by the present Secretary for War. But these eight Army Corps were removed form the Army List in 1881, and declared to be phantoms. He would like to ask the Secretary for War how could he declare that the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Army Corps were any more real than the eight Army Corps or the later six Army Corps of Mr. Hardy's scheme, which were admittedly unreal? He believed the right hon. Gentleman would probably tell the House that some of the troops intended for these Army Corps were at present in South Africa, and that they would return in May. But even after these troops returned in May these Army Corps would still be what he had said in advance, two years ago, they would be. They would be no more real now than two years ago. The new Army reformers who had taken up the running, and, representing so many men sitting on the Benches opposite, had addressed the House with so much power, had adopted the position that they desired to save money on the Army in order to spend more money on the fleet. In that position they came to the view of the old Army and Navy reformers represented by his hon. and gallant friend the Member for Great Yarmouth, who had never ceased to point out to the House that, considering the nature of our Empire, the House had spent too much money on passive defence. But when it was suggested that it was possible to save ten millions out of the Army Estimates, he had two observations to make. The one was that there was great risk that they might direct or tempt the Government to save in a wrong direction—such as in guns, armaments and stores. The other observation was that they would not be able to save that sum, or anything like it, except by revolutionary Army reform. His hon. friends opposite, perhaps, did themselves some injustice before the country in an under-statement of the cost to the British Empire of military and passive defence, on the cost of troops, and on the expenditure on the land forces as compared with the expenditure on the fleet. They had to remember the expenditure not only on the army in India, the Crown Colonies and the self-governed colonies, but the amount of the Civil Estimates under the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office for land forces. The War Office did everything they could to give colour to their view. They omitted from the figures submitted to the Colonial Conference the cost of the Indian Army and Navy—an omission so stupendous that he could not understand what defence could be offered for it. Another fact was that the War Office did not consult India on the changes they made last year, although the objections of the War Office to revolutionary Army reform had always been insisted upon, as it was, they declared, contrary to the interests of India, albeit India thought otherwise. Now, the normal peace cost from votes of Imperial defence—without any expenditure on expeditions or little wars of any kind, though such wars were always going on—was, without Supplementary Estimates, £60,845,000. There was a question whether they should or should not add the money spent from loans on military and naval works, so far as it was additional to the annuities charged. That would amount to £2,500,000 for the Army, and £1,500,000 for the Navy, or a total of £4,000,000. Add the cost of the land military forces under the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office Votes in the Civil Estimates, now increased by the creation of the 3rd battalion of the West African Frontier Force, the expenditure on land forces in Crown colonies, in self-governed Colonies, and of the Navy in India and the Colonies, apart from the small Australasian and Cape grants for the Navy, which amounted to another £3,500,000, making in all £64,500,000 or £68,500,000, according to whether they did or did not include the loan money. The normal peace expenditure in India on land forces, according to the Report of the Indian Financial Commission, at the official rate of the rupee, was £17,000,000 more, but if they took the rupee as having, as the Treasury alleged, retained its spending value in India, then the charge on India would be £25,000,000 instead of £17,000,000. They thus attained to either £81,500,000, £85,500,000, £89,500,000 or £93,500,000, according to which way they settled the doubtful points. Out of this either about £31,000,000 or about £32,000,000 would be expenditure on the Navy, and the rest on land forces. Taking the smallest figures and the lowest possible computation, we spent £31,000,000 on the naval factor, primary in Imperial defence, and £50,500,000 on land forces. Some people seemed to think that the increase of the expenditure on the Army had ceased, that the increase on the Navy Estimates was more rapid than that on the Army Estimates, because the Navy Estimates had passed the figure of the Army. But if the increase of the last three years was looked at, it would be found that it had been vastly greater on the land forces than on the fleet. In all other countries, although called military empires, and although their Navy was not the first line of defence, the increase was taking place on the fleet. The expenditure on the Army in all these great military countries was a stationary expenditure; it was on the fleets that the increase was taking place. It was only in our case, although we called ourselves an Empire of the seas, where the greatest expenditure was re- quired on the Navy, that our chief increase had been on the Army. Some people thought it was possible to obtain money from the colonies for the fleet, and that we must look forward to an expenditure we could not bear if we were not prepared to take strong measures to have contributions made up by the colonies. There was a chance of that when they expressed their readiness to do so a few years ago. But the opportunity which might then have been taken was lost and thrown away; and if there was still a chance of such a contribution being obtained on an adequate and effective scale, the way in which the Army and Navy told different stories at the Colonial Conference made it impossible of realisation. Without something like a revolutionary reform of the Army being undertaken, the present gigantic figures must be further swollen. The Army Corps scheme, as at present developed, had not had a full development. The expense would automatically increase year by year. At the present moment expense was being incurred in the conversion of the rifle, probably an unnecessary conversion; but, apart from such doubtful points of expenditure, there were points on which all men would agree that there must be a vast increase of expenditure under any scheme or in any circumstances. One had been already alluded to, namely the Intelligence Department. They had in the Military Intelligence Department twenty-three officers. The Germans had 250 officers in their Military Intelligence Departments. In the Army and Navy Intelligence Departments together—and the Navy required world-wide information—there were forty-one officers. That was a point on which expenditure would have to be increased. In the able series of articles which recently appeared in The Times—which he did not endorse in every particular, but with a great portion of which every Army reformer would agree—there was a proof of the weakness of our Intelligence Department which was the most striking he had ever read. The writer pointed out that England had an alliance with Japan. He was not concerned now to discuss the wisdom of that alliance, but they relied on Japan to supply naval and military forces in the event of operations in the extreme East. Would not any other Power which had such an alliance feel it incumbent to have a number of officers in the Japanese Army and to receive Japanese officers in its own Army, which was the only way in which friction could be avoided? Yet there were only two or three British officers employed in Japan, and the Intelligence Department was so undermanned that it was impossible that it could be adequately represented in a matter of such vital interest. Besides such matters in which an increased expenditure much be incurred, whatever scheme was adopted, there would, he thought, be some further increase in pay, as, for instance, the pay of non-commissioned officers. Then there was the question of food. The Committee which considered the food of the Navy, which was better than the food of the Army, laid down the principle that it was not good enough, and that it should be improved. If the War Office wished to attract a desirable class of recruits to the Army it would have to provide better food; and it was even more desirable to make a man comfortable in that respect than to give higher pay. It was certain that there would have to be an increased expenditure on food. Then as to horses. Everyone would admit that the Army would have to keep up a larger number of horses. Although they had been so grotesquely extravagant, they were always striving to save money in the wrong direction. For example, they went into war without quick-firing guns. His hon. friend the Member for Islington was a great economist, and took an active part on the Committee which was moved for by the hon. Member for Oldham. Sir Ralph Knox, who had so great a part in the creation of the War Office as it was, it might be remembered, told the country that he prayed for the day when mobilisation would be ordered, as then the War Office would confound its enemies and accusers. Sir Ralph Knox, replying to his hon. friend, showed that the refusal of the War Office to accept the pressure of the House of Commons in connection with quick-firing guns had been due to opposition in the War Office itself. Colonel von Lindenau said, before the Military Society at Berlin, as an explanation of the early misfortunes of England in South Africa, that—

"Great Britain discovered that the oldest weapons are the most expensive."

The whole matter had been brought home to the conscience of the nation and the House of Commons because of the increased, and rapidly increasing, cost of the present system, and also because the country and the House of Commons saw that whatever was done by individuals in gallant service in South Africa the Army did not fulfil the expectations entertained of it, and that the military system had practically broken down. The responsibility for change must rest on the Cabinet as a whole. A revolutionary reform of the Army could not be looked for to the War Office alone. If the House of Commons simply cut off the money, the War Office would not cut off expenditure in the manner desired. It was the Cabinet, as a whole, that could force the War Office into a better system. An hon. Member asked the Prime Minister the other day whether the observations of the Council of Defence—which the Prime Minister went out of his way to tell the country had been re-constituted two and a-half months ago—would be available in connection with the present year's Estimates, and whether there might be some result of the co-ordination of the two services, to which the House of Commons attached so much importance. The hon. Member and the House generally was disappointed when the right hon. Gentleman stated that the Estimates for the present year had been prepared before the re-organisation of the Council of Defence; and it would, therefore, be thirteen months before they saw on the Estimates any good results from the co-ordination of expenditure between the two services, which the House of Commons and the country so thoroughly desired. He himself was not disappointed in that part of the Prime Minister's reply in which he said that, of course, the Cabinet could not be responsible for the details of the Estimates. Of course it could not. They could not take the responsibility for the details away from the Financial Secretary to the War Office, or from the Secretary to the Admiralty; but what the Cabinet could do, and what the House of Commons expected it to do, was to lay down, as general principles, what he believed the majority of hon. Members were agreed upon; that the expenditure on the Army was only a sign of the unfitness of the system of which they complained, and that the primacy of the Navy should be secured. Departments were rather apt to shuffle off responsibility from one to the other. Some of them thought that their responsibility was actually to the House of Commons itself. Before the Hartington Commission, in 1888, Sir George Tryon said—

"The responsibility of the strength of the Navy rests with Parliament, and not with naval men."

He himself thought that the responsibility rested with the Cabinet, for it was the Cabinet alone which had full knowledge before it, and which could accept the general guidance and direction of Parliament, which Parliament would try to give it. Before the Committee on National Expenditure there were allusions to "the limit" of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which was the oldfashioned system of telling the Army and the Navy that they must not exceed a certain figure. When Mr. Smith was Secretary of State for War he said that the Chancellor of the Exchequer informed him that he would have to take off half-a-million. That was not the way in which they wanted the Cabinet to proceed in the future. The general guidance of the House of Commons had now been pretty freely expressed, and the Cabinet should show that it had some notion where it was going, and of the principles which guided it. The late Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, he was afraid, was in the old rut on this question, declared that the Army should not be allowed to go beyond £30,000,000, and that he did not see why there should be an increase in the shipbuilding Vote. He did not think that that would suit the House of Commons at all. The old revolutionary reformers and the new reformers always recognised the primacy of the Navy in Imperial defence, and held that it was what the country could afford to spend on defence, over and above that which was necessary for the Navy, that must be allotted to the Army. It was held, too, that in the Army the preference in expenditure should be given to the active, striking forces, as compared with other arms who could not go abroad. He was sure the country would never grudge expenditure on the Navy or on a small effective Army suited to the needs of India and our Empire. On these points there was, he believed, general concurrence, however Members might vote in the division, in the principles which had been put forward by the reformers in their recent speeches in the country. The War Office clung too strongly to a policy of which they had a large example in the course of the Colonial Conference, and a small example in the correspondence between the Secretary for War and the States of Jersey which was published in Jersey last Tuesday, the day on which the States met. The right hon. Gentleman told the States that unless they adopted the conscript Militia, of 1,800 men, they having offered 1,000, he should take away the garrison. The States having come over to his terms, the right hon. Gentleman wrote, under date February 13th, that the defence of Jersey would be recognised, and the present garrison would remain, conditionally on the new Militia Bill being accepted. The Secretary for War then, as in the document laid before the Colonial Conference, begged the whole question of the command of the sea. The question of invasion lay at the bottom of all the talk of conscription, and this question affected the number of Regulars at home, as it did also the linked battalion system. The linked battalion system, though beautiful in theory, had never worked in practice, and probably never would. The endeavour to have one battalion at home for every battalion abroad led to the Mediterranean being counted as being at home, and then Egypt, and now it was proposed to count South Africa. Perhaps some day India would be counted as being at home. The Secretary for War told them last year that in hit scheme he allowed for the permanens retention of twelve battalions, or 15,000 men, in South Africa; but now, in answer to a question, he said that 30,000 would remain there.

I said temporarily.

said he did not know whether the right hon. Gentleman expected to reduce the 30,000 men to twelve battalions by March; if not his scheme would be further broken into. The working of the linked battalion system reminded him of The Times average of harvests in this country; every year The Times published as statement as to how much the harvest was above or below average, and if they looked back for fifty years they would find that the harvest had always been below average. The normal year of the system never came. He had no doubt the right hon. Gentleman would be able to tell them that recruiting had improved owing to the adoption of the the three years service. But he believed a year's service for our Regulars could be worked so as further to swell our Reserves in time of war. Some were afraid that such troops would be Militia; but it must be remembered that Frederick the Great fought battles with an infantry—always recongnised as among the finest that had ever fought—the overwhelming mass of whom were Prussian Militia with one year's service. Of course, the men must be sandwiched with men of greater experience, and there must be a professional type of officer such as we could and must create Mounted troops, of course, could not be too well trained, but, as regards infantry, a great deal could be done with short service with professional officers. A book had recently been published describing the training of officers at the military college of West Point. Comparing the Sandhurst system and Sandhurst results with the West Point, the results of the Sandhurst training contrasted unfavourably with those of the West Point Academy in regard to the professional nature of the officer. Our officers were gallant, and had often redeemed what might have been great disasters in South Africa, but no man could shut his eyes to the fact that our officers were not professional in the sense that they might easily be made out of the material we had in this country. The moral of this Motion was the country wanted to get what it paid for. It was willing to pay, as it did, and enormous amount of money provided that was assured. He did not see how the words of the Amendment could be denied; they were true. He was convinced that for a remedy they must look, not to the energy or administrative ability of this or that general or statesman, but to the House of Commons, which could influence great politicians to take a vital interest in the question. He hoped the Prime Minister would rise to the height of the responsibility which the present attitude of the House of Commons threw upon him.

The right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down began his speech by referring to what appeared to him my misfortune in being made the subject of attack in many quarters on the question of the condition of the Army. If I had been free from such attacks, I should be different from every one of my predecessors, from Lord Cardwell downwards, who have ever attempted to do anything for the Army. The only possible way for a Minister standing in my place to stand absolved from severe criticism and attack is to leave things absolutely as they are, to allow the Army to drift, and to be content to leave it to those who come after him to fill up gaps which have arisen during his term of office. From the moment I took up the position in which I now am, I felt that, at whatever personal cost, that line was one which neither the duty I owed to this House nor the expectations of the country could allow a Minister to adopt at the present time. But I am fortunate in this that, at all events tonight, we are challenged by a direct vote on a direct issue of broad policy, and not one of small personal objections or of details on which so many debates in this House have proceeded — but on an issue going to the root of the matter. I say I am fortunate in that. And why? Because no two of my critics ever agree on any single proposition which is put forward in criticism before the House. My hon. friend the mover of the Amendment laid down as one of the foremost points of his argument, that with the existence of a powerful Navy we did not meed to provide specially for home defence. [Cries of "No."]

Not by a Regular Army.

He went further than that, because my hon. friend the seconder took occasion to dissent from him.

I corrected him.

All I can say is, I stand on the recollection of the House as to what my hon. friend said.

I accepted the correction.

His proposition in the first place was against the necessity of sending a Regular Army abroad; and secondly, he discussed the various positions that a regular army might occupy abroad; and then he came to another defence at home, and I imagine that he has only now joined the Member for the Isle of Wight if he says he is prepared to rely on citizen soldiers for that army. If that is his proposition, how does it square with the proposition of the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean, who, supporting the Amendment from an entirely different standpoint, said that for the defence at home he was afraid of cutting down?

No.

He was afraid the Government would cut down exactly the force it was most necessary to maintain.

No, I said there might be a danger of cutting down that which ought not to be cut down—stores, guns, and horses. I did not mean the defence at home.