To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he can state what number of employers were reported during the year 1902 by the Inspector under the Cotton Cloths Factories Act as having exceeded the nine volumes of carbonic acid (carbon dioxide) in every 10,000 volumes of air (Factory and Workshop Act, 1901, Clause 94, section 3); and whether he can state the number of prosecutions which have been instituted by the Homo Department in consequence of these reports. (Answered by Mr. Secretary Akers Douglas.) There were sixty-three cases in 1902 in which the inspector reported that an employer had exceeded the standard referred to; but in many cases the excess was found only in one part of the shed, while in other parts the proportion of carbonic acid was found to be below the prescribed limit. No proceedings wore instituted on these reports. I do not think the inspectors an; called upon to prosecute unless a contravention of the Act in this matter is continued or repeated after notice from the inspector.

To ask the Secretary of State for the Homo Department whether he can give the numbers of licences refused for reasons other than misconduct during recent years. (Answered by Mr. Secretary Akers Douglas.) Returns of the renewals of licences refused in recent years have been published for the years 1890, 1891, 1895, and 1000. It appears from these that out of the total of 186 for the year 1890, 43 renewals were refused for the solo reason that they were not required and 37 for that reason combined with others, e.g., misconduct. Of the refusals because not required, five were reversed on appeal. The corresponding figures for 1891 are: total refusals, 339; not required, 103; not required and other reasons, 53; reversals of not required, on appeal, 6. For 1895 the figures are 200, 30, 59, and 4, respectively. For 1900 the figures are 216, 77, 48, and 12.

To ask the Postmaster General whether, in view of the increase in the cost of living as well as the increase of postal and telegraphic business at Newton Abbot, he will make inquiries with the purpose of placing that town in the next class, and so increasing the possible maximum salary of the staff; and whether he will consider the advisability of raising the scales of pay in the Newton Abbot Post Office to those in existence at Barnstaple and Bridgwater. (Answered by Mr. Austen Chamberlain.) The question of the wages proper to the postmen at Newton Abbot was examined by me so recently as November last, and I explained in my reply to the right hon. Gentleman in this House on the 21st of that month that it was not considered that there are sufficient grounds for placing the postmen upon the next higher scale of wages. Their present scale is the same as that received by the postmen at Barnstaple.

To ask the Postmaster General whether he is aware that when Dublin bookmakers put their advertisements in newspapers they state that their name, with Dublin added, is a sufficient address for letters; and will he state what special arrangements or privilege are made for the delivery of such letters. (Answered by Mr. Austen Chamberlain.) No special arrangements are made for the delivery of letters so addressed.

To ask the Postmaster General, as representing the Secretary of State for the Colonies, whether he is aware that the duty on beer imported into the Transvaal is more than double the value of the article, and is a prohibitive

† See (4) Debutes, cxv., 147.

To ask the Postmaster General, as representing the Secretary of State for the Colonies, whether the blockhouses in the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies, which were taken over by Lord Milner from the War Office authorities for *50,000, have now been resold to the inhabitants of the districts; and, if so, will he state whether the re-sale has resulted in a loss; and, if so, how much. (Answered by Mr. Austen Chamberlain, for the Secretary of State for the Colonies.) I have no later information than that given to the hon. Member on the 15th December last.†

To ask the Postmaster General the approximate time which is taken in the transmission of correspondence from London to Yokohama, Shanghai, and Hong Kong respectively via United States; also the approximate time from London to Sydney via Vancouver and via San Francisco. (Answered by Mr. Austen Chamberlain.) Correspondence despatched from London via the United States reaches Yokohama in from thirty-one to thirty-three days, Shanghai in about forty days, and Hong

† See (4) Debates, cxvi., 1203.

To ask the hon. Member for North Hunts, as representing the First Commissioner of the Board of Works, when the Report of the Select Committee appointed to inquire into the Ventilation of the House of Commons building will be issued; and what stops, if any, have been taken during the recess to remove some of the insanitary conditions. (Answered by Mr. Ailwyn Fellowes.) The Select Committee found it impossible to conclude their inquiry last session, and it is proposed to ask the House to reappoint the Committee at an early date. During the recess the authorised improvements in the ventilation of the Commons Committee Rooms have been completed, and new fittings have been supplied to the sanitary offices on the ground floor terrace front, and mechanical ventilation has been introduced into them with excellent results. Other sanitary offices in the building will be dealt with in the same way as opportunities arise during recesses.

To ask the Secretary to the Treasury whether his attention has been called to the petitions presented, in the early months of 1902, from women typists employed in various Government Departments relative to the conditions of their service; will he state whether any answer has been sent to those petitions; and whether the Treasury will be able to grant the improvements in the conditions of employment which are desired by this class of public servants. (Answered by Mr. Hayes Fisher.) The Papers have only recently been laid before me. I am in communication with the various Departments concerned, and I hope that an early decision may be arrived at.

To ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer why taxpayers in Scotland are still being forced to pay income tax two or three months sooner than England, seeing that in 1901 his Department promised that both countries should be treated alike in future, and no pressure should be used in the one country which was not used in the other; will he arrange that this course shall now be followed; and will he also say the latest day on which income tax may be paid, without costs being incurred, in both countries. (Answered by Mr. Hayes Fisher.) As the facts referred to are somewhat complicated, I have caused a Memorandum to be prepared, of which I am sending a copy to the hon. Member. He is at liberty to make any use of it which he desires. He will observe that there is now no ground for the impression that Scotland is more strictly treated than England.

To ask the Secretary to the Admiralty whether he can announce the date upon which the increased pension to chief petty officers becomes operative; and how it affects men whose period of service will have ceased before the forthcoming Estimates are presented. (Answered by Mr. Amold-Forder.) The new scale of pension for chief petty officers, sanctioned by Order in Council of the 16th February last, applies to ail chief petty officers who may be pensioned on or after the 1st April, 1903. Chief petty officers discharged to pension before that date are not affected by the change.

To ask the Secretary to the Board of Education whether he is aware that the draft education scheme framed by the Committee of the Leicestershire County Council was informally submitted to the Board of Education without the authority of either the Committee or the Council, and before it had been submitted to the Council for consideration; and that, in consequence of objections raised by the Board of Education to the draft scheme, it was withdrawn and another scheme prepared for presentation to the Council; and if he will state in what particulars the scheme originally prepared was not in accordance with the requirements of the Education Act; and on what grounds the objections of the Board of Education were based. (Answered by Sir William Anson.) I have nothing to add to my answer of the 20th instant except that an Education Scheme was submitted to the Board of Education by the County Council of Leicestershire on the afternoon of that day. In my judgment no useful purpose can be served by stating in answer to Questions in this House the purport or details of the various discussions or communications, sometimes extending over some time, which take place between the Board and local authorities, or members and representatives of those authorities, while a, scheme is in course of preparation or while it is being settled for publication.

To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if he has seen the Report read by Dr. Norman Connolly at the recent meeting of the Richmond Asylum, in which reference was made to the increase in the number of cases of alcoholic lunacy committed to that institution: whether he is aware that the Richmond Asylum authorities have, since the year 1900, made several representations to the Irish Government on this matter: and whether, in view of the state of the law as regards the care of alcoholic lunatics, and considering the revenue derived by the State from the sale of intoxicating liquor, he will recommend the establishment of a State Infirmary in Ireland for the treatment of persons who have become insane from excessive indulgence in intoxicating drinks. (Answered by Mr. Wyndham.) The reply to the first and second queries is in the affirmative. The concluding part of the Question suggests an amendment and widening of the existing law which provides for the establishment of institutions for the reception of habitual drunkards under certain prescribed conditions. I cannot give an undertaking such as suggested.

To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether the Land Commission are aware that in the case of John Flynn, Rathrone, Enfield, and other tenants in the Trim district, the landlords have had their applications to have second-term judicial rents fixed transferred from the county court judge to the Sub-Commission; and whether, in order to expedite the hearing of these cases, they will direct that a Sub-Commission court be held in Trim at an early date. (Answered by Mr. Wyndham.) The originating notice of application to fix a fair rent in the case specially named in the Question was not served until the end of last October, and was transferred to the Land Commission in December. A list of cases from the Trim district is now in course of disposal. It contains, however, only such applications as were made at dates anterior to that referred to. There is no power to list cases for hearing out of their regular turn except by order of the Land Commission, which should be applied for in the usual way.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War who is responsible for the preparation and authenticity of the summary of the evidence given before the War Commission which has been supplied to the Press; whether such summaries have been revised by the witnesses; whether the evidence already given will be laid before Parliament at once, and when the taking of evidence by the Commission will be concluded.

I assume that the secretary of the Commission is the person responsible for the preparation and authenticity of the summary of the evidence. I do not know if the summaries have been revised by the witnesses. No report has been forwarded to the Government, and it may be assumed, therefore, that no Papers will be laid till the inquiry is concluded. I am not in a position to state when the inquiry will be concluded.

I wish to know whether, in accordance with invariable practice, the right hon. Gentleman has communicated to the Commission and to its secretary the fact that this question was going to be asked in the House of Commons, and what answer they had asked the right hon. Gentleman to give to it.

I am not aware that there is any precedent for Government laying such questions before the Royal Commission. If that is the case, I will certainly lay it before the Commission, but I think in that case the Question should be addressed to the First Lord of the Treasury. I have no authority over the Commission, nor had I any authority in the appointment of it.

I beg to give notice that I will repeat the Question to the First Lord, and I hope we shall get such an answer as is due to the House.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he can explain on what grounds the conclusion was arrived at that the proceedings of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the conduct of the late war should be wholly secret, having regard to the fact of his statement in the House of Commons on the 12th June, 1902,† that the question as to whether the Commission was to be an open or a secret inquiry was a question for careful consideration, and that in all probability some parts of the inquiry would be conducted in private.

When questioned on the subject of the inquiry I could only give my opinion as to the probable course which would be adopted. I have no doubt

† See (4) Debates, cix, 499.

But when the right hon. Gentleman said that the question whether the proceedings should be wholly secret was under consideration, did he mean under the consideration of the Government or of the Commission?

The Government can only appoint the Commission, which has itself to decide the course of procedure.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War if he can inform the House what inquiries into surrenders in South Africa have been reopened otherwise than by the Royal Commission, and what officers who had been cashiered or placed on half-pay have been reinstated.

Some cases have been reconsidered, but in only one case has an officer been reinstated, when it was found that the Court which tried him had been illegally constituted.

Was that the Helvetia case?

No, Sir.

But has not the officer in that case been reinstated?

That case is under consideration.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General whether, in the interests of the tenant farmers, the agricultural labourers, and the general public of great Britain and Ireland, he will take steps to secure that agricultural produce may be forwarded by parcel post at reduced rates and under special conditions.

I would refer the hon. Member to the answer which I gave on Thursday last, the 19th instant, to a similar Question put by the hon. Member for the South Molton Division of Devonshire.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General whether he is aware that a telegraphist named Mercer, of the Bristol Post Office, has applied for 160 vacant postmaster ships since 1894; whether, seeing that during these periods clerks of less service, experience, ability, and salary have been the recipients of these positions, he will make inquiry into the case.

I have no knowledge of the number of applications made by Mr. Mercer since 1894, but it is clear that he has not been considered by either my predecessors or myself the best qualified candidate for any appointment for which he has applied, and I see no reason for making special inquiry.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Agriculture whether he will state the number of cattle at the present time in the United Kingdom, and how that number compares with the same period in the year 1896.

The number of cattle in the United Kingdom (including the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands), on the 4th June, 1902, the latest date for which statistics are available, was 11,376,969. At the same period in 1896 the number returned was 10,941,655.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many aliens had to be arrested last year by the Metropolitan Police, and if his attention has been called to the representations on the subject by the Judges of the High Court of Justice, by the Recorder of London, by the Chairman of the Middlesex Sessions, and by juries, and what steps he proposes to take to save the taxpayer from the expense of maintaining these alien criminals during imprisonment.

I am aware that representations such asmy hon. and gallant friend indicates have been made. It would be a matter of extreme difficulty to give trustworthy figures in answer to this question, but I have under consideration the best way of laying the necessary information before the Royal Commission which is now inquiring into the whole question of alien immigration.

But I was given last November † the number of arrests up to October, so surely the Department has the information in hand?

My hon. friend had better put another Question.

That is my Question.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Board of Education if his Board, in approving schemes for Education Committees, will see that each scheme makes provision for the inclusion of at least two women on the Committee.

The Board of Education are advised that the Education Act only requires that a scheme should make provision for the inclusion of one woman on an Education Committee. The Board have not found any reluctance on the part of the County Councils to place women on the Education Committee, but in asking for the inclusion of more than one woman the wishes of the local authority and the needs of the area must in each case be considered.

Can the hon. Gentleman give me any information as to the number of authorities which have made such provision?

I have the information as to thirty-nine counties. In three provision is made for one woman member, in twenty-seven for two, in six for three, in two for four, and in one for five.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he can state if the Board of Agriculture for Ireland would be prepared to appoint a Departmental Commission to report upon the railway rates at present charged in Ireland, their effect upon the agriculture, trade, and industry of the country, and the steps necessary for amelioration of the present position. On 8th April, 1902†, you informed Mr. Field (Dublin, St. Patrick) that "while far from saying that such an inquiry would not be useful, you were not at present prepared to recommend it."

The Department of Agriculture is constantly investigating questions affecting railway transit and rates and obtaining information which would prove of utility should it ever be decided to appoint a Committee of Inquiry. The Department does not think, however, that the time has yet arrived for such an inquiry.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that the Belfast Corporation have adopted a resolution characterising the withdrawal of the grants-in-aid of technical instruction in Ireland as an evasion of Parliamentary responsibility, contrary to the understanding come to with local and educational authorities in Ireland, and unfair to the taxpayers of Ireland; and whether, in view of similar pronouncements by other public bodies in all parts of Ireland, he can state what action the Government propose to take.

Representations have been made to this effect. I have stated that it has been decided that the existing grants, amounting to *3,500, shall continue, but that a limit to their

† See (4) Debates, cv., 1260

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he will state the circumstances under which a gamekeeper became purchaser of a non-agricultural holding situate in a congested district near Aclare, County Sligo; whether the purchase-money, amounting to hundreds of pounds, was advanced by the Land Commission; and, if so, whether it is usual for the Land Commission to make such advances to persons in such a position, who have had no previous connection with the localities in which they purchase.

The purchaser in question was tenant of the lands purchased. The Land Commission report there were no grounds for refusing to make the loan, as the security for the advance was considered ample.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether his attention has been called to the case of John M'Elligott, a Protestant farmer from Shraugh, County Cavan, now two years in Dundalk gaol for contempt of court; and whether, after this long term of imprisonment, he can hold out any prospect of M'Elligott's speedy release.

I stated in reply to a similar question put to me yesterday that the Executive has no power to intervene in such cases. To purge his contempt the prisoner must apply to the Master of the Rolls, the committing Judge.

May I ask if this terrible abuse of power—

Order, order!

Is there any precedent in this country for a man being kept two years in prison without trial?

May I ask—

Order, order! The Question on the Paper has been fully answered.

I wish to ask if the Judge has power to inflict imprisonment for life?

That is not the Question.

May I ask whether, in view of this and similar cases, the Government will undertake to introduce legislation to prevent—

The hon. Member must give notice of that Question.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether the claim of the port of Kenmare, County Kerry, to receive assistance under the Marine Works (Ireland) Act has been favourably considered; and, if so, when will effect be given to this decision.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he can now say what works it is proposed to execute under the Marine Works Act, and especially whether he proposes to provide for the improvement of the harbour of Portnablagh and the construction of piers at Portnoo and Kincasslagh, and of a pier or boatslip at Falchorrib.

Saturday next has been fixed for a conference between myself and representatives of the Councils of Congested Districts Counties to discuss the whole question of the allocation of the funds provided by this Act. For the present, therefore, I would ask hon. Members to defer these Questions.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that during the holding of a public meeting, under the auspices of the United Irish League, at Inniscarra, County Cork, on Sunday, 1st February, a body of police was posted on the evicted farm of Mrs. O'Oallaghan, Ballyshoneen; and will he state the nature of the duty for which these constabulary were detailed.

Directions were given by Government that the meeting should not be allowed to be held on the farm in question. The police were there to give effect to these directions. The meeting was held in the vicinity.

Is it usual to plant the police on evicted farms?

It is the practice of the Irish Government to see that the police are placed where they can carry out their instructions.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that a number of betting offices and houses are being kept open daily in Armagh, Ballymoney, Cork, Coleraine, Londonderry, Limerick, Maryborough, and Waterford, and will he reconsider the advisability of taking proceedings in their cases under the Betting House Act of 1853.

Before the right hon. Gentleman answers the Question, I beg to ask him whether he is aware that the principal parties who frequent betting houses in Maryborough are officials of His Majesty's Prison—

Order, order!

Who are also disciples of Mrs. Smily's, of Birds' Nest fame, Dublin, as well as of the hon. Member himself.

Order, order! I must call attention to the fact that it is gross disorder for an hon. Member to persist in putting a Question after he has been called to order, and whilst I am standing.

The police report that, though vigilant watch has been maintained, no evidence has been obtained to show that any offices or houses have been kept open for betting in any of the places named. A prosecution was instituted for betting under an archway in Armagh, but was abortive, as the King's Bench Division decided it was not a "place" within the meaning of the statutes. In Londonderry, where a bye-law has been passed against street betting, a conviction was obtained. In Cork there have been seven successful prosecutions since 1896.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if he will state when he proposes to introduce a Bill to give effect to the recommendations of the Committee appointed in May, 1901, to inquire into the pay and pensions of the Royal; Irish Constabulary; and when he intends to give effect to that portion of the recommendations that requires no legislation.

The Estimate for the next financial year will contain provision necessary to give effect to such of the recommendations of the Committee as do not involve legislation. With respect to the question of legislation, my hon. friend will understand that in view of existing demands upon the time of the House, I cannot fix a date for the introduction of the measure he refers to.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he can explain the cause of delay in the prosecution of Thomas O'Keeffe, of Cuniglass, County Cork, for forgery and perjury, as ordered by Mr. Justice Wright in a forged will case tried before him on the 10th December last.

Mr. Justice Wright did not direct a prosecution in this matter. The case will be laid before my right hon. friend the Attorney General in a day or two. The delay, which is unavoidable, is caused by the necessity of obtaining copies of the voluminous documents in the action.

Will steps be taken to prevent this person leaving the country in the meantime?

Any precautions that are necessary will, of course, be taken.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he can state the result of his promised consideration to the matter of the allocation of the Irish Local Taxation Fund; and whether, in that consideration, he found himself able to set aside a sum for the repayment to boards of guardians of half the salaries and expenses of mid-wives employed by these boards in the various dispensary districts, on the same principle as half the salaries of medical officers is refunded.

I am not yet in a position to recommend an allocation of the unexpended balances. The proposal in the second part of the Question was duly considered when the Local Government (Ireland) Act of last session was being drafted, but the Government felt unable to make any concession in the direction suggested.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Agriculture whether it is intended to give effect to the recent recommendation of the Departmental Committee on British Forestry with reference to the acquirement by the State of areas for practical demonstration; and, if so, whether he will consult with the President of the Department of Agriculture in Ireland as to the advisability of securing in Ireland a similar area.

The evidence taken by the Forestry Committee has not yet been published, and I am therefore not at present in a position to come to any decision with regard to the proposed provision of demonstration areas. It is clear, however, that the recommendations of the Committee involve important financial considerations, which will require careful examination both at the Treasury and by the Commissioners of Woods and Forests, as well as by myself. We shall certainly consult the Irish Department of Agriculture on the subject before any action is taken.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether it is the intention of the Government to appoint a Commission to inquire into the promotion and extension of afforestation in Ireland, in view of the fact that the Commission appointed for a similar object as regards England and Wales has recently issued its Report.

Some of the recommendations in the Report of the Committee on British Forestry are applicable, in principle, to Ireland. The Irish Department is at present conducting a special survey of existing woodlands, and lands suitable for forestry operations. Such a survey is necessary to enable the Department to consider the measures to be adopted to give effect to the recommendations of the Report in question.

Is it proposed to make any provision for the preservation of existing plantations in Ireland?

I can make no announcement on the subject.

I beg, to ask the First Lord of the Treasury by which of the other four principal Secretaries of State are the duties appertaining to the headship of the Colonial Office Department, in the absence from the kingdom of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, discharged; whether there has been any departure from the position whereby in the absence of a Secretary of State the duties of the Department of State allotted to him are discharged by one of the other principal Secretaries of State; and if, during the absence of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, there has been any departure from this practice, what are the reasons on which such departure is based; and what precedents, if any, are there for the departure from such practice.

The hon. Member asks this question under the impression, apparently, that the Colonial Secretary has entirely severed connection with the office of which he is the head. That is not the case. The absence of the Colonial Secretary throws on the Under Secretary—a most competent person—a great deal of work and a certain amount of responsibility which would naturally devolve on the Secretary of State; but, of course, the Secretary of State can be communicated with by cablegram. As to the signing of documents which require to be signed by another Secretary of State, the ordinary practice is being followed.

They are signed by another Secretary of State?

Yes.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury if he will consider the desirability of appointing a Select Committee to consider the proposals for the reform of the Procedure of this House, which were placed on the Paper last session by the Government and by private Members, but were left undiscussed for want of time.

Included in the proposals which remain unfinished among the Standing Orders, I hope that there is at least one which is practically uncontroversial dealing with consolidation. But I will consider whether the remaining proposals I made last year ought, or ought not, to be sent to a committee. I should like, however, some time for reflection.

Will the right hon. Gentleman consider as to whether other proposals from unofficial Members of the House might not be dealt with by the Committee?

I think that if a committee is appointed it might as well be given plenty to do. They might have a roving commission over the Standing Orders of the House, but I do not know that these inquiries come to much. I have personally felt that as to the Rules dealing with procedure from day to day the Leader of the House knows as much as any commission or committee can teach him. Though there may be legitimate differences as to whether he is right or wrong, it is not on account of the ignorance of any proposal that the opposition to the Government in such matters arises. Therefore, though I have not the same hopes as my right hon. friend, I will consider the suggestion.

Are there not many hon. Members who object to the proposal of consolidation?

Perhaps I was wrong in saying uncontroversial, but I have gathered that the great body of opinion in the House without restriction to Party is in favour of it.

said that two years since, upon an unlucky Friday, the right hon. Gentle man the Secretary for War came down to the House of Commons to move his now famous Army Scheme in what was, by general consent, thought to beavery admirable speech. The right hon. Gentleman, if he might say so without presumption, always made a very good speech, and their experience the preceding night in no way fell short of what they were led to believe was his accustomed Parliamentary skill But he had ever noticed that the right hon. Gentleman always made a very good speech when he was in a very difficult position: the more there was to be said against the cause he was defending the better the speech he made. It would be admitted by all sections of the House that the speech he delivered on the previous day was one of the best he had ever delivered in the whole of his Parliamentary career. But there was one thing about the speech which was a fault—the right hon. Gentleman proved too much. After all, they who had friends in the Army heard what the soldiers said about the Army Corps Scheme; and they heard, too, what the officers said about the length of their commands. Was all that a mere delusion? Were all the statements in the newspapers, written with some responsibility—were the statements made by "uninstructed" persons in the country-mere delusions? Had they at that moment got what the right hon. Gentleman seemed to prove on the previous day—three real live efficient Army Corps, and were they to have in another six weeks time three more? Therighthon. Gentleman established his case in the face of much incredulity the preceding day by means of two statements which were variously put before the House. The first was the White Paper about Army Corps, which was issued in the morning, and the second was the statement in the debate about recruiting and about the general strength of the Army. He wanted to know what was the relation between the two statements. What relationship was there between the immense number of men the right hon. Gentleman said he had got and the skeletons which were produced on the White Paper? That he believed to be a valuable and useful line of inquiry. The White Paper gave a very rosy and glowing account of the Army Corps system. To judge by it one would think that the whole work had already been achieved, and that there was nothing more to do. But, unfortunately, not ten days before the White Paper was distributed another publication from the War Office came out by authority, and in regard to it he might observe that it was not produced with reference to any particular debate in the House of Commons. He alluded to the Army List, which hon. Gentlemen were, no doubt, aware contained the names and disposition of every battalion and every battery in the British Army. It was most carefully compiled and was kept up-to-date. He observed a very great discrepancy between the White Paper and the Army List. The latter bore the date 9th February; the former was issued on 22nd February. According to the White Paper out of twenty-five battalions the First Army Corps ought to have already possessed twenty-four, but when they looked in the Army List they found that it actually had only twelve battalions in the Aldershot command. Admitted that four more were out of the command there still remained a discrepancy of eight battalions. Had these arrived at Aldershot between the dates of the publication of the Army Lid and the issue of the White Paper? Really the Army Lid was very instructive, for he found further that although the First Army Corps had twenty-four battalions, the 1st Division had only one brigade, and the 3rd Division, which should have two brigades, had none at all. General Bruce Hamilton was still on leave, as he had been for more than four months, the time which had elapsed since he was appointed to the command of the 3rd Division of the First Army Corps.

He has not taken up his command; he is still on half pay, and he will not take up the command until the troops are there.

Regulars?

We expect 29,000.

said that a good deal of water had run under the bridges during the last eighteen months, during which time he did not think the War Office had done so badly. He deprecated the somewhat flamboyant speeches which had echoed in that House, and which had been promulgated in the papers. Those speeches had been most brilliant, and he wished that he could have made such speeches himself in reference to swine fever. He did not, however, think that those speeches would do much good in the direction of reforming the War Office. Perhaps the House would pardon him if he gave one or two arguments showing why he thought this Amendment was inopportune and not required at the present moment. He wished to call attention to the Militia force, for which nobody used to care a brass farthing, and which was now a sort of Cinderella to the Army. Hon. Members had called upon the War Office to abolish the Militia Reserve, and the War Office had not only done this but they were creating a real Reserve of Militia. For that he thought the War Office deserved praise. With regard to the treatment of the Royal Garrison regiment, a change in the strategical localisation of the Army had been effected, and they had found a way by which old soldiers might still remain with the Colours. With regard to recruiting, this had always been the bugbear of every Secretary of State for War, but the War Office during the last eighteen months had done a good deal towards solving the question of recruiting. Barracks in a good sanitary condition had been built all over the country, the pay of the soldiers had been raised and the terms of enlistment reduced, and that was the only way to get recruits. A great deal had been done for the private soldier, who had been better clothed, and fed, and allowed to go out in plain clothes; in fact, he had been treated more like a man than he had ever been before. In this respect he wished to produce the testimony of another authority besides the Secretary of State for War, namely, that of a distinguished soldier, General Sir William Gatacre, who said that in his district they were getting so many Army recruits that he did not know what to do with them. If the Secretary of State for War had done anything to solve the tremendous question of recruiting, then at least he deserved the thanks, and not the censure, of the House. The term "Army Corps" did not smell very sweet after Mr. Gathorne Hardy's experiment years ago. He got eight Army Corps together on paper, and they were afterwards laughed out of existence. He could not say whether Army Corps were suited for this country or not, he was an agnostic on that question. All he had to say was that the right him. Gentleman's scheme held the held and nothing else had been suggested. The hon. Member for Whitby said he did know of a scheme, but nothing would induce him to divulge it to the House. although he said that under certain circumstances he would reveal it to the Secretary of State for War. He did not see how anyone could get together six Army Corps in eighteen months. How could they get them with 40,000 of the troops in South Africa, and the rest of the Army disorganised and all to pieces, as it was now at home. They would have to wait till these Army Corps were matured, and, in his opinion, he did not think they would have to wait very long. The question of the general staff had been alluded to in connection with the National Committee of Defence. He had been told that there was a Service Members Committee, and they formulated a resolution last session which they intended to press as an Amendment to the Address calling upon the Government to take steps to see if this Committee was to be a sort of nucleus to the general staff. The Prime Minister, however, at Liverpool, spiked their guns and practically moved their Amendment himself, and now he understood they were to have something of this kind which would be made a nucleus of the grand general staff The want of such a staff accounted for all their faults in the Crimean War and during the South African campaign, and he now understood that the War Office had accepted the proposal of the first Lord of the Treasury to form such a general staff. It was suggested by Lord Hartington's Committee of 1888 that some such general staff should be formed. It was not supported on the ground that a general in the field of action would be able to know what to do without any general staff at all. Shortly after that Lord Rosebery was Prime Minister of this country. Lord Rosebery, the apostle of efficiency, tried to run the British Army on the cheap by allowing it to get short of powder. He would, with the greatest pleasure and alacrity, vote against the Amendment. He congratulated the Secretary of State for War on sticking to his guns.

Two years ago, when the right hon. Gentleman introduced the scheme of so-called Army Reform of which we have heard so much today, I felt it my duty to move an Amendment in condemnation of it, in almost the same terms as the Amendment which has now been moved to the Address, and, therefore, there can be no doubt as to the course I shall take in cordially supporting that Amendment. I ventured to say then in anticipation, what has now become apparently the deliberate opinion of a great number of hon. and gallant Members who, on that occasion, voted against me. Now, Sir, neither then nor now have I, and those who voted with me in the same Lobby, any Party taint whatever in our attitude. I have always endeavoured, through the many years in which I have been more or less connected with this Army question, to keep the subject of the Army, and of the public service generally, out of the arena of Party politics altogether, and I hope that that will not be departed from on this occasion. It is greatly to be regretted that to-day a technical interpretation of this Amendment does give that colour to it to a certain extent. It is, of course, as we all know, the theory that every Amendment to the Address must be resisted by the Government, and that, whatever be the circumstances of that Amendment, if it is accepted, that fact is regarded as being as fatal to the position of the Government as if a vote of censure had been passed on them. In passing, may I express the hope that we may find a way of getting rid of this restraint on our debates. Of recent years such inroads have been made on the opportunities of private Members bringing forward subjects of this kind, that they are driven in a heap, as it were, on to this debate on the Address, and, amid all this, we are always told, when we complain of not having sufficient opportunity, that the Address is open to us. But it is most desirable, surely, to get rid of the incubus which vitiates our debates and prevents the expression of the real genuine opinion of the House. That however, by the way. We ought to discard if we can, not political bias only, but also those prejudices and prepossessions which I am afraid beset these military questions almost more than any other. The question is so vital and so important that we ought to approach it with an open mind. I do not say for a moment, in speaking on this subject, that people should be ready to forget or to leave behind them their fixed opinions, if these opinions are based on wide views and a full knowledge of the facts; and also I would admit that with those fixed opinions we ought always to keep ourselves in active consciousness of the fact that as time goes on the circumstances upon which those opinions were formed may materially change. But, as I think all of us must know from our own experience, there are many men, military and civilian alike, who are swayed in these matters by prejudices and by partial knowledge. You may have a most distinguished officer who has served through a long career with the greatest credit, and who has had every opportunity of informing himself of military facts, and yet who has served during the whole of that time in such circumstances that he has not been induced to take a broad view of questions—such a question for' example, as Army organisation. I take, for instance, the case of an officer who has served a long life as a regimental officer. He may have excellently discharged all his duties, and yet may never have been able to look far beyond the efficiency of his own regiment and the necessities of his own duties, and may never have taken the wide view of the general situation which is necessary. Another distinguished officer may have served abroad all his days, and he may remain at the end of his service in a large degree ignorant of those difficulties, those impediments, those delicate influences which have to be taken into account in. everything which affects the recruiting and the administration of the Army. Well, I should hope that in this debate at all events we shall all of us endeavour, whether administrators, creators, or critics, to keep an open mind. The right hon. Gentleman took exception to something I said the other day of his scheme having been a panic scheme, and justified his action by stating that it was called for by the general sentiment of the House and the country. I quite agree with him that at that time there was a considerable military fever and a great deal of alarm as to our position. It is a satisfaction to me to remember that I raised my humble voice in deprecation of any such panic. It no doubt existed, and I raised my voice against it for two reasons—firstly, the action taken in a panic is seldom soundly considered and permanently successful action; and in the second place, that panic or fever might be used in order to guide us, and drive the people of this country into a conception of this as a military nation—as a nation dependent upon military power—whereas I hold that we shall go very far astray indeed in our policy in other matters besides military administration if we forget for a moment that this Empire is not a military empire, but an Empire cemented and maintained by trade and commerce, and amity and friendship amongst the different elements which compose it. As to this particular proposal, I ventured to say, as the hon. Gentleman who has just spoken has said, that we ought to wait. The right hon. Gentleman's hands were then presumably full with the war, and he ought to have waited until the lessons of the war, of which we have heard so much, were more fully mastered and seen in their proper perspective, and also until the generals, who were best able to give him advice, had returned from the scene of action. That was the reason why I spoke of the scheme having been a panic scheme. There are two principal divisions in the subject with which we are dealing. First of all, we find fault with this Army Corps scheme, and, in the second place, we wish to direct the attention of the House and the country to the larger question of military expenditure generally. On these two subjects I will venture to say a few words. I will take the technical matter first. This Army Corps Scheme had the effect, to a large extent, of dazzling the eyes of the people and of soothing the nerves of the country. But the right hon. Gentleman himself, in speaking of it, now says he was not the inventor of it. No. the name was familiar to us. In the late seventies the system of the grouping in units of Army Corps was introduced into the Army, with the effect of greatly increasing the bulk of the Army List, but with no other effect I ever knew. I always regarded with suspicion and dislike that new departure. The only thing that I could see that could be said for it was that which the right hon. Gentleman said yesterday—that it did furnish a standard up to which you might work. But it was open to great misconception, and the right hon. Gentleman has set himself to make these Army Corps real. If the right hon. Gentleman will allow me to say so, he has many good qualities. Among others he is not only intensely patriotic and intensely laborious, but he is also intensely serious, and if I may venture to point to what may be considered a defect in his character—not in his private but his public character—it will be rather surprising to him when I name it, because we are all startled when we see ourselves in the looking-glass. I mean the defect, as it appears to me, is that he has not a sufficient sense of humour. He takes too serious a view of a question. He does not allow for the play of human nature, and having these six Army Corps on paper, he immediately took them seriously and treated them CM pied de la lettre. He treated them as they were never intended to be treated, and that is the cause of all this mistake. That was before his German experience, when he saw, I presume, Army Corps in action. But I think I have traced to its proper source the origin of the mistake which the right hon. Gentleman made. Now, what is an Army Corps? An Army Corps is a collocation of military units in certain dispositions, under a certain hierarchy of military control. The right hon. Gentleman said that it was not a German institution that he had introduced into this country. I quite agree with him; but it is a continental institution. I am not aware of any other country in the world that has Army Corps on a continental scale except continental nations. It represents a formation which they find by their experience most expedient and convenient for their purpose; but there are two points which distinguish them completely from us. In the first place, they have a conterminous enemy. When they go to war they can arise and march over the frontier as they are; and, therefore, the whole Army Corps having been located in its own district moves to the frontier and passes into the enemy's country unaltered in any respect. The next difference from us is that the whole of Europe, with the exception of a very few parts, is unenclosed country, so that this body of troops with. its particular formation can be moved with the most mathematical accuracy in every direction. There are some districts, no doubt, but not numerous, between Calais and Bucharest, where the country is enclosed, but for the most part it is open country, for the simple reason that the climate does not permit of cattle remaining in the open; they are kept in houses and not like with us, in the fields, which do not need to be enclosed. And, therefore, when the crops are off the ground there is nothing to prevent the march of an Army wherever it chooses to go. With us, where is the Army Corps, qua Army Corps, capable of being used? What was the use of an Army Corps formation in South Africa? Was any part of the campaign in South Africa conducted in the formation of an Army Corps? No, Sir; because it would not have suited the situation, and the result of that consideration is that if we send an Army Corps abroad for any purpose, the first thing we have to do is to break it up and send it to the port of embarkation, and start afresh at the end of the voyage. When we turn to our own country and the question of the defence of this island, we are met with the same thing. There is not a more enclosed island in the world, and the same may be said of the island of Ireland. It is so enclosed in fact, that it is a matter of complaint that the great difficulty with us is that we cannot find room for the training in open country of our troops except in one or two districts. It is on that ground, I suppose, that the suggestion has been made that in future a large force of our troops should be maintained in South Africa. That seems to me to be one of the strangest reasons put forward for that proposal—that there should be abundant opportunity for training. I only hope, with regard to that suggestion, that a great deal of consideration will be given to the proposal before it is adopted. I will mention two circumstances which, I think, are of great weight. The first was mentioned by the Secretary of State last night, when he asked what effect this would have on recruiting in England? When a man joins the Army he does not join it for foreign service, but for a mixed home and foreign service; and if he knew that he would be taken out of the country immediately when he enlisted, or that when he was made fit as a soldier he was to go to South Africa or anywhere else, and then perhaps to be transferred from there to India, and would never, in the whole course of his service, have a chance of being in this country at all, I venture to say that it would have a. most prejudicial effect on the recruiting for the Army. There is another point urged; that South Africa is half way to everywhere—half way to India and to Hong-Kong, and to every place we can imagine where troops would be required. Yes, but the conveyance of troops across the ocean is a matter of transport, and where are the transports to be found in South Africa? Suppose you had 25,000 men in South Africa, and you wanted to use them in India, the first thing you would have to do would be to engage shipping in this country and send transports out to pick the troops up and carry them to India from South Africa. I mention the proposal by the way, because I think that although it has some attractive features in it, it is certainly one which requires most careful consideration. Now, if the Army Corps system, which the right hon. Gentleman has endeavoured to create in flesh and blood, is, as I have proved, unsuited for us in time of war, is it suited for us in time of peace? The right hon. Gentleman named a list of improvements that have been recently made in decentralisation of all kinds, of stores and duties. I did not gather that any one of these could not have been effected under the district arrangement we had before—which arrangement had the advantage of being much cheaper than that he has adopted. As to the other advantage put forward—I should have mentioned this when I was speaking of the warlike use of a Corps D'Armce —it was that the men would go into the campaign under the command of the same officers under whom they had been trained, and that every one would find himself, on his right hand and on his left, in company with a neighbour with whom he had been engaged for years. Now, that is inconsistent with the necessary constitution of our Army, where it has always been held that the battalions for home service ought to move about. It would be inconsistent, too, with the comparatively short tenure of staff appointments and the command of regiments. All these arrangements completely militate against the idea of a stereotyped machine of that sort being employed in the way I have referred to. Now, several arguments have been used which show that there are lurking in certain minds fallacies which I would have thought had been disposed of long ago. One hon. Member made light of the Reserve. He asked, "What was the use of this Reserve, because it was put in the first line at the commencement of a campaign, and therefore nothing was left behind? "He cannot but be aware that this is the use made of the Reserve by all the nations of Europe that have a Reserve. As to the system of double battalions, I shall have something to say. The hon. Member for Oldham used a phrase which has become a standard phrase, when he said that the system of double battalions has broken down. Well, to prevent misunderstanding as to the meaning of the Amendment, I must say a word or two on these elementary questions; and [think it is all the more necessary because a generation has arisen which knew not the original controversy, and a great many men who speak intelligently on this subject are not really aware of the rationale of the reasons for the system which existed and which, as the hon. Member for Oldham said, continued down to the year 1897, and did very good service for the defence of the country and the Empire. I take, to begin with, the short service in order to lead up to the other. Does the House bear in mind why this short service was introduced? It was simply because we could not get recruits in this country for long service. That can be proved from the Reports of Royal Commissions over and over again, and from the evidence given before them. It was no strange fancy of the so-called Army reformer, full of fads and fancies of his own. It was the absolute necessity of the time, that unless you took men for short service you could not get recruits for long service—I mean by long service recruits men whom we kept for their whole lives and most of whom died in our hands. If we are to have short service, then arises the difficulty of adjusting this to the duties of foreign garrisons. You must have some means of drafting sufficientment to the units abroad, and in order to accomplish that purpose you must have a certain number of regular soldiers at home. I read in the Press, and I have heard in the course of this debate, observations to the effect that we do not require any Regular troops at all at home. Now, how could your battalions in India be maintained unless you have some troops here? Then, you must have depots; but depots are most extravagant, and a most inefficient form under which you can train men to arms.

How about the Marine depots?

The Marine depots are very small things, and you can carry them on, as you used to do, with a limited number of recruits. Besides, the conditions of the Marine service are entirely different from those of the Regular Army. The Marines serve for three years on board ship and one year at home. The men of the Regular Army have to go for seven or eight years to India. There are many ways I could point out in which you could not find any analogy which could help you between the Regular Army depots in England and the depots for the Marines or the old Presidency troops. Therefore, what are you to do? You must have a certain number of them for training purposes. Why not take the benefit of them and make use of them for other purposes? The system of double battalions is no idle dream or spiteful invention of some too active-minded reformer. ft results from the necessities of the case. I confess to the House that I think it ought to have been carried further: that instead of the double battalion arrangement there ought to have been a multi-battalion system, which would have given us greater facilities. Let it be remembered that there was another memory in the minds of men in those days—the memory of the Crimea. In that war there were only certain corps which managed to maintain their efficiency throughout the whole of the war, and those were the multi-battalion corps—the Guards and the Rifle Brigade. That conveyed a great lesson, and was a strong inducement to adopt such a system as that I speak of. The average draft to foreign battalions is 180. The House can see what a hole that makes in the battalion at home; and, therefore, this system never can be popular with the officers of the home battalion, because they are always drilling, and always parting with the men as soon as they become efficient. They never have a decent force to show on parade; and so their prejudices—and I sympathise with them immensely—are against this system, and if they looked at it from the interests of themselves or their battalions they would condemn it. But, on the other hand, if you look to the interests of the Army at large, you would not take that view. It is said that this system has broken down. What do you mean by breaking down? When it was adopted there were to be seventy battalions abroad and seventy battalions at home. But that has never been realised. We have occupied Egypt, and sent troops to different places, preventing the possibility of that balance being maintained. But, as far as the balance has been maintained, the system has worked admirably. I am quite ready to agree that, if you increase your forces abroad inordinately, the confusion becomes so great that you must resort, for the purpose of the battalions abroad, to some modification of the system. Such a change of circumstances compels one to modify the strict opinion one has formed, while retaining it in principle. But it is forgotten by many that this system has worked exceedingly well, and resulted in our sending such a large force to South Africa when the war broke out.

What was the state of the battalions at home, described by Lord Wolseley as "squeezed lemons"?

That is a phrase which has stood those who attack the system in good stead. But Lord Wolseley was one of the originators of the system, and has always been a defender of it. As the question of Army organisation is condemned in the Amendment, I must disclaim any desire to include in it any general condemnation of the system which I have described. What is more pointed at is the Army Corps system which the right hon. Gentleman introduced two years ago. But now I come to the larger and more comprehensible question—that of Army expenditure. I do not like this practice of comparing the Army with the Navy expenditure. There is constant complaint that the Army has more than the Navy or the Navy more than the Army; that because the Army Estimates are larger in one year than the Navy Estimates, we ought to build one or two more ironclads to redress the balance. That is not the proper way to discuss the question. The proper way to look at this subject is to see that we should not spend a penny on the Navy that is not justified by naval wants, or a penny on the Army that is not justified by Army wants. We all believe that the Navy has the first claim, and that the wants of the Navy ought to be fully and even generously supplied. I do not know whether great additional expenditure is required; but there is always the danger in naval expenditure that the more we do in shipbuilding the more we stimulate other nations to keep pace with us. But I fully endorse the dictum that the Navy has the first claim upon us, and that it ought to be maintained in the fullest efficiency. But the fact we have to face—whether we like it or not—is that the national expenditure is increasing beyond the patience, the endurance, and almost beyond the resources of the people of this country. Why is it that those who approved by their votes the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman two years ago are now attacking it? It is nothing else than the salutary and sobering effect of the income-tax. My right hon. friend the Member for Montrose said that the tax-gatherer was the great schoolmaster, and he has been busy educating all classes in the country. The result is this change of opinion in a great body of the community. It is quite clear that the military expenditure must be reduced, or, at least, checked. But, before going further, I say again what I said last week—that the first thing we have to do is to inquire into the military requirements of the country and determine what, in present circumstances, they are. The hon. Member for Oldham has said that up to 1897 our Army was a good one and sufficient for our purposes. I have no reason to doubt it. The idea was then that we should never contemplate anything more than an expeditionary force of 70,000 or 80,000 men; and that was more than accomplished with the machinery and material that we had. The question is, What has caused since then an increased demand on the Army? If the Army were strong enough in 1897, why should it need to be stronger now? If the expenditure of £18,000,000 were sufficient in 1897, why should we now require an expenditure of £30,000,000? We want an inquiry by a competent and responsible authority, not only into the general question, but into the particulars of the question, to see precisely what we ought to provide for. I have some hope that this Cabinet Council of Defence may give an opportunity for this sort of inquiry. It ought to be a deliberate and careful inquiry, and I should not object to its being a slow inquiry, if it were adequate. But do not let me be understood as altogether appreciating the merits of the particular arrangements explained to us by the Prime Minister. I am old-fashioned in this matter, and I think it is the constitutional duty of the Executive Government to determine this question. When I read of the Government's chief professional advisers—the Commander-in-Chief, the First Sea Lord, and others being members of the Committee—and not merely having the most ample opportunities for putting their views before the Council—which, of course, is most necessary—I think that a somewhat singular situation is created. These officers have only one responsibility. The Cabinet is responsible financially, as well as administratively, but these officers have only an administrative responsibility.

The Council has no administrative responsibility.

These officers are responsible to their departments and professions for putting forward the claims of their branches of the service, but they have no responsibility for finding the money. That is the difference. I frankly say that if I were a Quartermaster General or a First Sea Lord, and were serving on that Council, I would pile up my demands in order to make myself secure; because it would be no part of my duty to find the money. That would not be done beyond conscience and reason, but it would be the tendency. When the First Lord made his statement to the House, he said with great naiveté that his proposal does not interfere with Cabinet responsibility, because all the decisions of the Council come under review by the Cabinet. Yes, Sir; but the Council are to be the Prime Minister, the Secretary for War, the Lord President, and the Colonial Secretary.

No, no; the First Lord of the Admiralty.

Yes, the First Lord of the Admiralty, but not the Chancellor of the Exchequer; but whoever they are, they are the Prime Minister and his principal colleagues: and who is to tell me that the rest of the Cabinet, who know nothing about the matter, or, at all events, have no special knowledge, are going to override a solemn resolution come to by the Prime Minister? If it has any effect at all it cannot but diminish the responsibility of the Cabinet; and. with all good-will towards a scheme of this sort within certain limits, I cannot go so far as that.

I entirely differ.

I may not understand the plan—we shall hear more about it, no doubt, by-and-bye, but as far as it has been explained it seems to me gravely open to these objections. I say we should look round and determine what it is we really require for the defence of the Empire, both naval and military. You ought to determine what is needed according to the circumstances—you cannot have finality and then to set about supplying it. Now, the right hon. Gentleman has shown no disposition during the last six or seven years to check the increase of the Army and the expenditure upon it. In seven years the Army has been increased by 54,000 men. I am quite aware of the pressure brought upon the right hon. Gentleman in the Press and in this House more than anywhere. There is nothing he has done that has not been received with cries of approbation and delight. But we must be stern in this matter, and say that he ought not to yield too readily to pressure from Members of the House of Commons. No doubt it is difficult often to resist, but the question now is, as expenditure has increased to such an extent, how can you reduce it? It is never easy to reduce the number of men. I doubt whether the right hon. Gentleman is alive to the effect of what is being done. I will give one small instance of the sort of thing I refer to. Last year the right hon. Gentleman introduced a scheme to give the soldier the option after three years of continuing his service and receiving another 6d. a day. I am favourable to short service and to elasticity in the terms of service, and so that commends itself to me. But what I do say is this, that the greatest dead-weight we have in the Army consists of the young men whom we must recruit young, but who are not fit for foreign service or service in India, The age was raised from eighteen to nineteen not many years ago, and it had immediately a most disastrous effect. The men must be taken young, and that causes a great increase of the Army at home. The right hon. Gentleman succeeds in getting his recruits easily, mainly owing to the want of employment. Now, under his new scheme, no man can go to India until he has served three years, and in that way the right hon. Gentleman has increased tin's dead-weight. At the present time a man can go to India if he has served one year and is twenty years of age; but the right hon. Gentleman will not send him there after a year's service if he can come back at the end of three years and claim his discharge. Until he makes the option he must remain at home. This new arrangement does not come into force until next year, but I should like to know whether any proper calculation has been made of the expense. The first thing to be decided is what the force of the Regular Army ought to be, and the strength of the other forces as well. There must be a mixed force for home defence; and I do not agree with the hon. Member, who contributed an excellent speech in seconding the Amendment, in the somewhat strange argument that to train Volunteers and Militiamen with Regulars, or Regulars with Volunteers and Militiamen, in some mysterious way would spoil them both. I believe that it would improve both. The whole country will insist, and the right hon. Gentleman must make up his mind to this, on a full recognition of the Militia, the Volunteers, and the Yeomanry who have played such a prominent and successful part in the recent war. They cannot now be snubbed or neglected, and they must receive the training which will make them efficient, and their place in the work of defence must be defined. But they must not be overdone or overburdened. It is obvious that an excessive annual training would have a most damaging effect on the force if it interfered in any way with civil employment; and I would venture to suggest what has always appeared to me to be the best settlement of that difficulty. It is that they should on first being enlisted be subjected to a somewhat long and severe course of training, and then a smaller and less irksome training each year afterwards will suffice. I am inclined to think that that is the solution of the difficulty. It is by developing this home force, it is by avoiding grandiose and ambitious schemes, it is by patiently considering the requirements for the defence of these islands and the Empire, and by adhering to the standard which is set up—it is thus we shall be able to provide for the security of the country and at the same time to lay no undue burden on the already over-weighted taxpayer.

Whatever we may think of the arguments of the hon. Gentlemen who put forward this Amendment, I as one of those who are standing here, so to speak, on their defence, cannot have one word to say against the way in which the prosecution have brought forward their case, and I want to admit to the fullest possible extent my knowledge that those Gentlemen who have spoken on, and who are going to support, the Motion are not animated by any animus against the Government, but are simply endeavouring to lay before the country and the House of Commons what they consider to be the requirements of the country. The right hon. Gentleman opposite and other Members have appealed to the Government to have an open mind on this question. I confess I do not quite under-stand what an open mind on such a question is; because, if I take an open mind to be the attitude assure ed by the right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken, it seems to consist in supporting all the arguments of the Government, and at the same time voting for the Amendment against them. I am willing to admit also that from these debates, as a general rule, nothing but good can come, and that reforms in general have always come from Members of this House, though they have been opposed by the Minister for War for the time being. The hon. Member—or the ex-hon. Member, for Woolwich; I hardly know when he is in the House or out of it—gave himself full credit for having secured the Council of Defence, but I think the Army reformers are too moderate. I was an Army reformer before I was in office. I think they should take all the credit they possibly can. and not credit for any particular thing. Every point in the scheme which is now cavilled at has been advocated in the strongest way by the Service Committee, and was adopted by the Secretary for War at their instigation, and after due discussion in the House. There is another thing the War Office cannot complain of, and that is the number of schemes that are invariably put before it. Everybody who has a relation, however distantly removed, who was ever in the Army, has a scheme for Army reform. It is like an infantile disease which nobody escapes, and I am bound to say I am not immune myself. I wish to speak of my own scheme for this reason: It has been alleged that there are people at the War Office in favour of conscription. On this particular point I have not only spoken, but, on one occasion, written. I wish to make my position perfectly clear. I have a scheme which does involve conscription, which I did advocate, and which I do not for one moment say that in my heart of hearts I do not, however, believe to be the right scheme. But, at the same time, I have to see things as they are, not as I would like them to be, and I have to consider that my own scheme, which consists of an adequate long service voluntary Army abroad, and an extremely short service compulsory Army at home, is impracticable, at all events at present; and, that being the case, I have to drop any idea of seeing that scheme adopted, and back up to the best of my ability any scheme which I think will adequately take its place. There is a matter from which Army reform suffers to an extraordinary extent, and that is that schemes are proposed, most carefully thought out and put into execution, but, because in the first instance they do not turn out the successes they were expected to be, there is a strong inclination on the part of the country, and sometimes of officials at the War Office, to follow the example of the children who pull up a plant and look at its roots to see whether it is growing. The consequence is that schemes which, if left would have developed, are often hurriedly east aside, and then after some years we have to return to the schemes which, if they had only been left undisturbed, would have been in working order. No alternative schemes have been put forward. The mover of the Amendment says he has one up his sleeve, while the scheme of the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight is that of an armed people—a people armed, but not organised. Surely that is a principle which would not he accepted, even by the supporters of the Amendment.

said the people of the Free State were very well organised.

I do not know whether the hon. Member has read General de Wet's book on the subject, but that does not show that the organisation or the discipline in the troops of the Orange River Colony was so extraordinarily good.

The question of organisation is the principal thing we have to discuss, because it is the Army Corps system that is attacked. My right hon. friend has stated very distinctly that he attaches absolutely no importance to the name, but that he attaches the greatest possible importance to the organisation which is being carried out under the name. I quite admit that if the organisation is to be compared with foreign organisations. Army Corps against Army Corps, the name may not be quite appropriate; but I look upon "Army Corps" as a name for an organisation in which it is our ambition to gather together such complements of troops as are held to be in the right proportions for use in the field—to bring together under one man the right number of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and to decentralise as far as possible all questions of administration and expenditure. The hon. and gallant Member for the Heywood Division of Lancashire asked whether Lord Roberts approved of this scheme. I saw Lord Roberts to-day, and he told me a fact which may be interesting to the House. In 1879, when in Afghanistan, he was sent for by Lord Lytton, the then Viceroy, to attend a conference on the re-organisation of what were then the Presidency Armies. He was asked by the Committee to draw up a scheme for them to consider. He drew up a scheme consisting of the Army Corps into which India was afterwards, under him, divided. He can, therefore, be said to be not only the sponsor of the present scheme, but the father of the Army Corps scheme which was carried out under him in India.

said he quite understood that such a scheme might be advisable for India, and that Lord Roberts might advocate it there, but the question he asked was whether Lord Roberts was in favour of an Army Corps Scheme for England, and whether he was consulted before he came back from South Africa.

Of course, there is only my word for it, but I hope the hon. Member will take it. Lord Roberts told me this morning that he fully considered the scheme before it was put into operation, and that it has his unqualified approval at the present moment. Granted that there must be some organisation and some Army, it is for us to consider what the duties of the Army are. I am perfectly ready to admit, as a general principle, that our Army must be subservient to the Navy, that our Navy is our first and principal line of defence; but still there are other duties which must fall on the Army. Our Empire is partly insular and partly continental. As far as the insular part of our possessions is concerned, there is not the slightest doubt that the principal defence must be in the Navy. But there are duties which must fall on the Army, and in regard to which the Navy must, to a certain extent, be subservient. First of all, I would put the defence of India; secondly, the defence of the coaling stations; and, thirdly, the defence of this country against any possible invasion. In regard to the defence of India, the mover of the Amendment expressed it as his opinion that it was only a bugbear.

As the opinion of experts on the frontier.

And I think he quoted as an expert a Russian General. I cannot help thinking that if the, Russian General sees those remarks in the paper he will be only too glad to cultivate the acquaintance of other Members of the House. But who are the authorities on the frontier? We can deal with them only through our responsible advisers in India; we are bound to go by what they say. Quito recently I have had an opportunity of speaking on this subject to men who, after all, are the greatest experts in the matter, and they do not look upon it as a bugbear. They look upon an attack as, at all events, something practicable, and though they have no doubt as to the result, their confidence exists only so far as this country is prepared to give them the support they require. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Northumberland spoke of South Africa, and pointed out that one of the greatest faults in the management of that campaign was that we did not have sufficient troops before the outbreak of the war. Now, Sir, I ask if it is good in that place, is it not equally good in India? Ought we not to be absolutely prepared to send troops to India before the war breaks out and not wait until after war has broken out. If hon. Members agree to that, what is the use of putting forward a proposition to send out the Militia or the Imperial Yeomanry?

Nobody ever suggested that an expeditionary force should be kept to reinforce India.

I think it is better to be prepared to put the maximum number you are asking for, and not put in a part and wait for the other half until Parliament has given you sanction. With regard to the defence of the coaling stations, that is a point upon which we shall all agree, for we all desire that those bases should be kept intact for the use of the Fleet by the Army. It has now become one of the greatest bones of contention as to whether there will be, or could be, an invasion of this country. With that point I am naturally not competent to deal. I quite admit that the onus of protecting this country from invasion must rest with our auxiliary forces, and they ought to be thoroughly organised to the best of their ability; and we ought to lose no hint as to how to resist any attack that might be made upon our shores during the temporary absence of our Navy. I come now, therefore, to the question of the number of men required for this purpose. In this matter, are we not rather fighting with one hand tied behind our backs, because nobody would wish anybody in a responsible position to deal with the actual eventualities which might arise, and at the same time stint the number of troops you would send? Therefore, a great deal of this scheme must be taken on trust. The hon. Member who moved the Amendment said that if details are given to the military authorities they ought to be given to the House of Commons. With that statement I entirely disagree.

I said that a general reason ought to be given which would satisfy the public.

But what is the general reason? I have endeavoured to say what I consider the policy is. It is to send sufficient troops to keep India, and enough to amply safeguard the whole of our coaling stations, and to rely to the greatest possible extent on our auxiliary forces in case of invasion. The question is—How many troops are required for the first two purposes which are not to be met by auxiliary forces? It is the whole question of the Regular Army that is dealt with in this Amendment, and it is a question as to how many Regular soldiers can be sent abroad, and whether they shall be sent. I know that the Defence Committee has been reconstituted. Some hon. Members have asked whether the Estimates for this scheme were submitted to the Defence Committee as well as to the Cabinet. I have the authority of my right hon. friend for stating that they were submitted to the Defence Committee before being placed before the Cabinet. These Estimates were submitted by the right hon. Gentleman to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet after full consultation with the whole of his military advisers. They went up to the Cabinet Committee to be considered as the final requirements of the War Office. The Navy Department do precisely the same thing, and, therefore, the Cabinet Committee has the two proposals before it, and is able to gauge what are the requirements of both. I do not for one moment believe that if the right hon. Gentleman comes down next year, and in the name of the Cabinet asks for a certain number of troops, and declares that he asks for them alter the advice, and at the instigation, of the Committee of Defences that he will be any more believed than he is to-day. when he says that a certain number of men are required.

I entirely agree with that.

I doubt whether the House would think any more that the number fixed upon by that Committee is the right number, and hon. Members would still reserve the opinions which they have now expressed that the number asked for is excessive. At the present moment the Secretary of State for War, who has enunciated not his own policy but the policy of the Government, tells you that the number of troops which we must be prepared to send abroad is three Army Corps. You cannot expect that the details of that number can ever possibly be given. That is impossible, and that is what I mean when I say that you must, to a certain extent, take these figures on trust, and you must believe that a responsible Minister making such a statement is doing so with a full knowledge of his responsibility, and the House should give him credit for not asking for a single man more than his military advisers and the Cabinet think are required for the necessities of the case. On the subject of numbers it may be said that we do not need to send 120,000 men abroad, and that we only need some 30,000 or 40,000. What we have to rely upon is the military experts who advise us in such matters. Hon. Members of this House have not hesitated to draw a comparison between the Intelligence Branch of our Army and that of the German Army.

said that he made rather a detailed comparison, and what he compared was the British Army and Navy Intelligence Departments with that of the German Intelligence Department.

There is one thing which has never been taken into account in estimating the strength of our Intelligence Department. The great place we want to collect all the intelligence we can is undoubtedly on the Indian frontier. [Cries of "Why?"] Hon. Members cannot have it both ways. You do not want intelligence about all the interior of foreign nations, because you say that our Army cannot be used at all in any such enterprise. In India there must always be a concentration of an enormous amount of interest which must affect at all times the strength of the Army. We have got in India an Intelligence Department which is well organised, and which naturally sends back to us matters which have been sifted and can be dealt with without practically any further inquiry. I may say that in South Africa Colonel Henderson is still employed as Intelligence Officer, and he has with him the full staff of intelligence officers which he himself considers necessary.

When the war is over there is not the same necessity to have the same staff. All of them are not therefore at the present moment employed at the War Office. The House may be perfectly certain that when Intelligence Officers are wanted those who did well in South Africa will be used on every possible occasion. I feel as strongly as anybody can feel that we should have the best Intelligence Officers we can possibly have for the whole of our requirements. But I would quote in respect to this subject some words of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition. He was referring to the General Staff, and to what has been called the thinking part of the Army. On that point he made a remark which is just as opposite today as on the day when it was made. The right hon. Gentleman said the task of Continental countries differed fundamentally from that of Great Britain; we had no designs upon, our European neighbours; Indian military policy would be settled in India; in small wars the plan of campaign must be governed by the particular circumstances, and he was at a loss to know why this larger branch was needed. I agree with him in some of the deductions he has made, though, at the same time. I entirely disagree with him in not wishing to see this particular branch increased largely—increased above what it was then, and, if necessary, above what it is now. There has appeared in The Times a series of most interesting articles. They have been directed against the War Office, and I confess today it seems to me, when the last of them has appeared, that it is almost like parting with an old friend. They are written, according to common report, by a gentleman who is a great personal friend of my own, who I know has studied the whole question of Army reform most deeply; but I must entirely disagree with him as to what, after all, is a fundamental part of his scheme, and that is the retention of the First Army Corps in South Africa. It has been pointed out by hon. Members, and by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition in particular, that it will be difficult, if we keep troops there, to secure the requisite number of recruits. Now I do not think that the question of where the recruits are coming from does influence this matter to any great extent. But I am told by those who are competent to judge that when a man has been two or three years abroad, he then feels homesickness coming over him, and he feels the time has arrived when he would like to return home. That being so, we should be asking him at the time when he is most desirous to come home from South Africa to re-engage for a period of five years. The hon. Member who moved the Amendment used an admirable phrase when dealing with the question of drafts for India. He said that we were gambling on a sixpence. I hope it is an investment and that it may not be a gamble. I understand his feelings most fully, because I appreciate the view that if by any chance there is a failure to secure the requisite number of men to complete the drafts for India, the whole of that scheme for short service must fall inevitably to the ground. Therefore I would ask Members of this House to dismiss entirely from their minds the idea that we are able at present to entertain the suggestions put forth in that article. But we shall at all events have something by which we can judge. We are at the present moment keeping in South Africa certain troops who ought to be, and I hope may be, before long on the home establishment. We are at present sending out recruits, and we shall be able to judge when the time comes for them to re-engage whether we can rely on their re-engaging in sufficient numbers. I have only one word more to say, and that is on the subject of the Volunteer force. It has been said that the Volunteer force has been slighted at the War Office, I should deeply regret such a mistake, and I should still more deeply regret that there should be any reason for the suggestion being made. I do not believe that on the part of a single man in that office is there any such intention. The new regulations have been referred to as having created some feeling. Before these regulations were put out they were thoroughly considered; but lot us grant, for the sake of argument, that they were not considered by the Volunteers. On the second Committee I served personally myself. On it there were a majority of Volunteer members, and the rules and regulations that were put out were not carried by the War Office members but by the unanimous vote of the Committee. I spoke on this matter to my hon. friend behind me, and also to the hon. and gallant member for the Kilmarnock Burghs, and they told me at the time that they saw no reason why the Volunteer force in the main should not be able to carry out these conditions. We have endeavoured to put them as low as we can, and we have endeavoured to give the Volunteers that amount of training and administration which we consider essential to enable them to comply with that part, and practically that part alone, which refers to the defence of the country in the case of possible invasion. The House tonight will have to decide between the two schemes that have been put forward. It is not only an Amendment for or against a particular Army Corps Scheme. The cleavage is very much greater and deeper than that. It is a cleavage as to whether we shall have our present comparatively large Army or whether we shall have a small Army in the future. These seem to be the two sides of the question. On our side of the question I have endeavoured to the best of my ability to state the reasons why I consider our present system must be maintained. We have, at all events, military experts on our side as to the number required. On the other side you have got the arguments, powerful as they are, of those who have moved, seconded, and supported this Amendment. The question cannot he decided by any vote the House of Commons may take today. It is for the people of the country at large, and they will have to judge, hut whether the question he submitted to the House or to the country, I feel absolute confidence as to the result.

said he found himself in some difficulty as to the course he should take in regard to this Amendment. The arguments which the noble Lord had addressed to the House were very similar to those in the speech made by the Leader of the Opposition. The noble Lord dwelt on the necessity of keeping in this country a considerable standing Army, and of course on that point he was in agreement with the Leader of the Opposition. The Amendment, as it stood on the Paper, asked for a reduction of military expenditure, and it also drew the attention of the House to the number of men now employed in the Army. He found, or at least he thought he found, a very considerable amount of reason why they should separate the one question from the other. None of the speakers who had supported the Amendment, and who referred to the increase in the Army Estimates, had taken notice of the corresponding increase both of area and population which had occurred in the British Empire since these Estimates began substantially to increase. It was not until the year 1892 or 1893 that there was any very substantial increase in the Army Estimates. Between 1887 and 1892 the Army Estimates had varied from £17,000,000 to £18,000,000. They were dropped in 1898 to £15,000,000. During that same period the British Empire was increased by no less than one-third o the present total area. It went up from 8,000,000 to 12,000,000 square miles, at which it stood at the present moment. It went up in population from about 250,000,000 to very nearly 350,000,000, and amongst the population thus added to the Empire might be found as wild, warlike, fanatical and restless tribes as could be found anywhere on the face of the earth. In this calculation he put aside the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The new territories cost considerable sums to acquire, and they must cost considerable sums to maintain. We had to police and protect them from their own internal unrest, and we had to guard them from possible external attack. Therefore it could not be said that the problem that presented itself to the War Office at the present moment was precisely in degree and character the same as the problem that presented itself before those expansions took place. In coming to a conclusion on this matter he had endeavoured as well as he could to take those considerations into account. He hoped he might be permitted to put forward one or two arguments in support of the principle he had laid down. The War Office, which in 1887 was four-twentieths of the total expenditure of the country, was now five-twentieths, in spite of the increase of the area to which he had referred. In 1887 the Admiralty expenditure was three-twentieths, and it was now five-twentieths. In 1887 the education expenditure was one-twentieth, and it was now two-twentieths. There had therefore been a corresponding increase in the other Departments of the public service. The three Departments he had named were keeping pace with the natural increase of the whole Empire. Although he must say that he regretted the present expenditure of £30,000,000 on the Army, he thought that the process of reducing that expenditure was by no means so simple or easy as some hon. Members appeared to think. The Leader of the Opposition laid down two propositions which were echoed from the Benches opposite—that you must know how many men you require, and how you are to got these men. Now, fortunately for us, practically the whole surface of the world had been absorbed by one Power or another and we were not able to add to the area of our Empire to any considerable extent. Therefore, it was to be hoped that some finality had been reached in increasing our possessions. Some of them had been profitless, a great many had been forced on us by the action of other countries, and some of them had been acquired by our own greed, but the process of absorption was complete. Therefore you could lay down some general proposition as to the number of men and the amount of money required. The military authorities had only got to decide the way in which these were to be supplied. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Forest of Dean, he knew, would like to proceed on what he called revolutionary lines. He would do away with the linked battalions and a Regular Army for home defence and constitute a special Indian Army. That was indeed revolutionary, and there was a great difference between that scheme and the proposals put before the House by the Secretary for War, which were not of so far reaching a character, but only involved what might be called alterations. He thought the right hon. Baronet would find it very difficult to satisfy any one that the system of linked battalions could be abolished. There must be some system at home for keeping up the supply of men for India, Egypt, and the colonial garrisons. It was idle to conic down to the House and propose to sweep away a system without some general idea as to what was to be suggested to take its place. They could not play with the system of the Army and go to the War Office and otter a plan in accordance with the results gained in every campaign. They had done this in 1870, and they wanted to do the same thing in 1900. They could not destroy a system because of some personal experience in a particular war. They must take the consensus; of opinion of the military authorities, and fortunately the War Office had had the assistance of the best brains in the Army during the past five years; and it was idle for hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House to say that if an easy, cheap, and practical scheme could have been evolved it ought to have been evolved before now. Putting aside the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman, and also the question of conscription, which was impossible now, whatever it might have; been in 1900, they came to the scheme of the substitution of auxiliaries for the Regular forces. The letters in The Times, to which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Berwick, referred the previous night, and which he made the basis of a simple but telling speech, laid down, first of all, that they must transfer the First Army Corps to South Africa, then that the general reliance for the defence of this country should be placed on civilian levies and on an increased Intelligence Department. He would say a few words on each of those propositions. In the first place, if they did get a better training ground in South Africa than possibly in this country, they would obtain a training ground not for infantry but for mounted troops. If a future campaign were to be fought, it would not be in a country like South Africa, but one which was broken and enclosed by ditches and fences, in which not mounted troops but infantry would be required; and, after all, the latter could be trained equally well in Scotland or Ireland as in South Africa. In the next place it was said that a Corps d'Armć e was required in South Africa. That argument might have been valid two years ago but the focus and arsenal for hostilities being gone now and the country having settled down, the numbers of troops, together with the South African Constabulary, which need be maintained for policing purposes, would not be sufficient for an Army Corps Then, in regard to the vulnerability of England and the Colonies, and the strategic advantages to be gained by sending troops to South Africa, it was admitted that South Africa was not likely to be affected, nor Australia, nor Canada. India would not be attacked by any Power except Russia, and troops could be supplied, he argued, for the defence of India as well from England as from South Africa. India had been described as impregnable, but Russia had already absorbed Northern Persia, and there was no guarantee that she would not also absorb Southern Persia. The moment the latter event took place our frontier in India, with the impregnable fortress of Quetta, would be turned. Therefore strategic mobility was not to be gained by sending an Army Corps to South Africa, The right hon. Baronet referred to the possibility of reliance for the defence of this country on civilian levies, as had been shown in the case of South Africa. Everything was now to be referred to a South African standard. But what was the cause mainly of our victory in South Africa? It was not the existence of organised levies of the people well acquainted with the country, and accustomed to an outdoor life. We succeeded in spite of the very qualities inherent in the Boers. [An HON. MEMBER: We succeeded because we were ten to one against them.] Yes, but what would have happened when they were ten to one against us, if they had been Regular troops? The Boers, in spite of their natural advantages, failed because of their want of cohesion, of their irresolution and their incapacity to strike after victory. If the Boers, being exceedingly good men, had been properly organised, led by commanders who had been trained in the real school of warfare, they would have driven us from the country before we could have sent reinforcements to South Africa. A considerable trained force was required for the protection of Gape Town and Calcutta, but what would be the effect if there was a raid on London by a continental force? There would be a general uprising of the military spirit throughout the Empire, but they could not afford to run the risk of leaving London to be defended alone by civilian levies. He would ask the House to consider the strength of the garrisons of this country. Which one of them could be weakened without seriously endangering all? Was it proposed to keep fewer troops in India than 75,000? Was it proposed to keep less than 30,000 troops in South Africa during the next seven or eight years? In Canada there were only one battalion garrison regiment, two companies of Engineers, and two companies of Royal Garrison Artillery. Could they be reduced? In Egypt there were one cavalry regiment, one Royal Artillery battery, one mountain battery and four infantry battalions. Were those garrisons in Canada and Egypt too large, and should they not be increased rather than diminished? In all the colonial stations there were only fourteen companies of Engineers, ten batteries of Field Artillery, twenty companies Royal Garrison Artillery, and eighteen battalions. That was the garrison of the Colonial Empire, and could it be reduced? Some of them were garrisons of inferior troops which the War Office would not dare to put into the field, but which might be of some service behind earthworks. There was one further point to which he wished to refer, and which had been mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Berwick. The right hon. Gentleman most reasonably and effectually argued for the increase of the Intelligence Department. Had everyone forgotten what was the fate of the Intelligence Department before the war, and of Sir John Ardagh's report which was presented to the military and civil authorities and absolutely disregarded by both? That report told the Government that they could not send infantry to South Africa without an adequate force of cavalry to guard their flanks. It told them the armaments of the Boers and their probable number. It pointed out the weakness of Ladysmith, drew attention to every single defect, and told the Government where the weakness of the British Army was, and where the weakness of the enemy. The Cabinet and the military authorities disregarded that report, and, in the face of that, what was the good of increasing the Intelligence Department. What was the good of having 500 men at the intelligence Department if the War Office and the Cabinet disregarded their advice and the knowledge they collected? What guaranteehad the House of Commons that the civil and military authorities would take notice of the recommendations and advice of the Intelligence Department? What they had to do was not to go on increasing expenditure on Army Corps, but to bring the existing departments up to date. They had got to see that the principal officials in Pall Mall made use of the information they got, and that they should take a real interest in the better administration of the Army. He hoped that nothing he had said would lead anyone to suppose that he was speaking in favour of the Six Army Corps system. It was the most portentous humbug ever laid before the House of Commons. It never had any real existence, and the holes picked in it by the hon. Member for Oldham did not need his brilliant oration, but a little industry, a little common-sense, and a little frankness from the War Office. They never did get from the War Office the same frankness they got from the Admiralty. They ought to have from the War Office an annual statement such as the Admiralty presented.

Certainly.

said the hon. Member (Mr Charles Hobhouse) had given in his very important speech the reasons why he, a member of the opposition, would vote for the Government on the present occasion. He did not know whether the House realised that the Amendment was the Amendment which was moved by the Loader of the Opposition when the scheme was affirmed; but the Leader of the Opposition did not, of course, object in the least to hon. Members on the Government side stealing his thunder. The motion was now supported on the ground of principle, but the Leader of the Opposition supported it on grounds of detail. In moving it on the 13th of May, 1901, he said that the question was a question of detail, though now some of his hon. friends on this side said it was a question of principle He was surprised that the right hon. Baronet the Member for Berwick, whose conspicuous fairness in the House was worthy of praise, stated calmly and deliberately that this particular scheme was rushed upon the House, or rather that the House had not been given time to consider it. That was not an accurate statement. The scheme was produced on the 8th of March, 1901, when the House was expected to discuss Army Estimates and the scheme, but instead it plunged immediately into a discussion of the personal grievances of generals who thought they had been hardly treated. Afterwards, several hon. Members, including the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean, brought before the Government the importance of obtaining the calm and deliberate opinion of the House of Commons on the scheme, and the Leader of the House took a most unusual course, and said that the Government would give a special opportunity for the purpose. That was in May, the scheme having been laid before the House in March. When the scheme was brought before the House some hon. Members opposed it. He opposed it tooth and nail, and said wild horses would not make him vote for it. He did not vote, for it then, and he assumed the same attitude towards it now. But it was rather a strong order, and it was inconsistent with the dignity of the House or the business aspect of this question to ask them now, on an Amendment to the Address, to deliberately upset a scheme after it had been before the House for an unusually long period, and had been discussed at great length and had been accepted. He mentioned this in order to justify his own position. He thought for the House of Commons to attempt to upset, on an Amendment to the Address, a scheme which it had deliberately adopted after being challenged by the Leader of the Opposition, after due discussion, to reject it, was not the right way to proceed. If they adopted such a course they would deserve neither the respect of this country, nor the loyalty of the Colonies, nor the respect of the foreign nations. He therefore considered it was his duty not to vote for this Amendment. It was for no Party reason that he did not support it. On questions of British security he acknowledged no Party ties, and he would never follow a Party in a question of this sort. These were not mere empty words, because, as many hon. Members were aware, he had consistently acted up to what he supposed to be his duty in these matters. With regard to the subject matter of the Amendment the right hon. Gentleman the Minister for War had been good enough to allude on the previous day to his (Sir John Colomb's) constant advocacy in this House for developing, increasing and maintaining the striking power of the Army. The right hon. Gentleman, or any other Minister, could always depend on his unhesitating and unswerving support of any policy of that sort. He saw in the speeches supporting the Resolution the dangerous idea that if we only had a Navy strong enough we needed no striking military force at all, and merely a citizen army for the defence of these islands. He protested against that doctrine, and always had, and he would warn those of his hon. friends who had suddenly come over to the "blue water school" not to carry their argument too far, but look a little further into the question. When this scheme was first propounded, the Secretary for War announced a new departure of which he cordially approved. The right hon. Gentleman put in the forefront of his scheme the necessity of the Empire possessing an adequate striking force. That had for some forty years been put in the tail of the hunt, and that was a new departure upon which he immediately congratulated the right hon. Gentleman. His ground of subsequent objection broadly was that when the scheme came to be developed he found that this scheme of an adequate striking force was only words and nothing more. His positive objection to the scheme was that it chalked up in big letters "Striking Force," and that the right hon. Gentleman ran away when he developed it. When fully developed, he found it was not a real but a sham scheme on the old hypothesis, and that the right hon. Gentleman finally mixed up in these Army Corps forces rooted to the soil of this kingdom and that free force which was the striking force—the Regular Army. It was because he was not going to support the Amendment that he wished to make it plain that he was, then and now, in vehement and violent opposition to the scheme. He hoped that was pretty clear. The only excuse for bringing this question forward in the shape of an Amendment to the Address, when the House was within measurable distance of a proper opportunity being afforded for its discussion upon the Estimates, was that by the procedure of the House when they came to consider Army policy, in going into Committee or in Committee, they were forbidden to discuss the broad principles in relation to sea-power. He had frequently been called to order for attempting to do so. That being the case, his hon. friends, had they waited for the proper opportunity, could not have made their speeches, and therefore he hoped they would not think he was criticising them unduly hardly though he said that he felt strongly that the House should not, on the occasion of an Amendment to the Address, upset an Army scheme formally approved of only a few months previously. But though this discussion was excusable on that ground, it was inexcusable on others, one of which was the deliberate adoption of the scheme by the House, and another that within the last few months a step of the greatest importance had been taken. He alluded to the Council of Defence. That was a new body the functions of which were to review and bring before the Prime Minister and his colleagues in the Cabinet, who alone must be responsible for the defence of the country, all information. It would bring the War Office, in their presence, to prove its doctrine that sea supremacy was no security; and it had this function valuable above all others, it was to keep records and preserve them. They would have in the future a record kept, and if ever the cowardice and pusillanimity of Ministers plunged this country into a chaos of danger and difficulty, the House of Commons would be able to turn up the records, and would know what Minister to hang. That was the first step towards establishing real Ministerial responsibility. This particular question, therefore, the influence of the sea power as affecting the military policy, and the question raised as to whether we should have a small, big, or no Regular Army, was a matter which he for one left with full confidence to the Council of Defence. But when Ministers were being asked by hon. Members whether the Council of Defence had considered this matter, he could only assume that hon. Members had no knowledge of what a Council of Imperial Defence really meant. How could a Council of Defence, which was only brought into existence within the last three months, and which had not formulated any machinery, be expected to plunge into this question and deal with it offhand? Its members would be unworthy of the position they held if they did anything of the sort. It was in view of the fact of this Council being appointed that he could not go with those who now wished the House of Commons to upset the deliberate decision at which it had arrived a few months ago. He would remind his hon. friends who had lately come over to the" blue-water school" that, as pointed out by Mr. Thursfield, sea power did not merely mean sea force. It meant a combination of military power and sea force, and when they spoke about sea power, they spoke not merely about ships and sailors, but about the just apportionment of the two services for the purpose of providing for national safety and of meeting our obligations to the Empire. He desired to protest against the reckless use of phrases about a "big fleet" and "a small Army." What was meant by a small Army? The measurement of the army, its strength and composition, could be determined only by the practical and real purposes for which that army was necessary. By a "small army did hon. Members mean small in proportion to the Empire's needs, or small relatively to continental armies? If the latter, he would agree with them, but if the former, he strongly disagreed with them. The real reason for the Amendment was the fear of hon. Members at having to answer to their constituents for the expenditure upon defence. That was a matter for Members to consider, but, for his part, even though it cost him his seat on the morrow, he would never vote for cutting down the necessary expenditure on defence by a single penny. Why was he in favour of the maintenance and development of a military force for striking purposes over-sea as a necessary adjunct to the Fleet? The frontier of India had been casually disposed of in a sentence, and with regard to the frontier of Canada, a right hon. Gentleman, who had held and would again hold office, had declared that in contemplating the questions of military necessity, America might be ruled out of account altogether. While expressing in the strongest possible manner his desire that the policy of this country should be so guided as to avoid all possible friction with the United States, and that the two Powers should proceed amicably hand in hand, he could not forget that that country was the arena of the bloodiest, most horrible, and revolting war of the last century, and if a people in their own territory and over their own internal quarrels could carry on such a war, it was asking too much that he should rule them out of account in such a question as this. But having thus lightly disposed of these frontiers, Members proceeded to ask: "What, then, is the use of an Army?" If a state of war prevailed, and England was supreme at sea, what did it mean "? It meant the paralysis of the enemy's fleet, that if her war vessels came out of port they would be driven in again. So long as that condition of things prevailed, the freights in British ships and British goods might be comparatively safe, but the enhancement of freights and increased cost would handicap the nation in the markets of the world. Already the margin of profit between importing raw material, manufacturing, and exporting, was so small that there was great difficulty in keeping ahead of other nations, and that margin would disappear if the condition of things he had suggested arose. What were the "blue water school" without an Army then going to do? Were they going to wait to be ruined? Did they think there would not be a furious outburst from all the manufacturing cities, demanding that such a state of things should be terminated? But how would they terminate it if they had no striking power? The matter had been dealt with entirely from the point of view of the passive defence of our own land frontiers. Purely passive defence was never successful defence. But other Powers had oversea territories. He rejoiced that America and continental Powers were pushing their interests over-sea, because, so long as England maintained her maritime supremacy, every possession over-sea of another Power was a hostage to British peace. He agreed that maritime supremacy in the hands of England was the greatest guarantee of the world's peace, but he was not so sure it was such a guarantee of peace if there was no military power immediately available behind the fleet to cause other nations to hesitate to quarrel with us. Such a position contemplated by his hon. friends would ruin our commerce and trade. The House ought not, therefore, to dismiss the question in an offhand way, by saying that because we had a big fleet a Regular Army was not required for striking over-sea. One other matter had not yet been referred to. All agreed that the real incentive to this Resolution was the question of Imperial expenditure. The House had been told that the expenditure had almost reached breaking strain, that the people could not bear it, and so forth, with that view he agreed. But what was the cause of the expenditure? The energy and enterprise of the people of these islands had created an Empire overspreading the world. Every part of the Empire was profiting by the past and present expenditure of money, men, and resources of these two islands. If we were to face the future simply as two islands with an Empire on our back, while the Empire itself did not bear its fair share of cost in discharging the duties and the responsibilities, of Empire, he admitted we could not go on. That was the real question, but everybody shirked it. People were frightened to raise the question of colonial contributions. He did not know why they should be. He was confident that if the facts were put strongly and plainly before our fellow countrymen beyond the seas they would have common sense enough to accept the facts, and do their duty like men. The sooner the outlying portions of the Empire understood that this country could not go on for ever bearing the burdens of the Empire almost alone and afford all the security they expected free of cost to them the sooner would this bugbear of expenditure be got rid of. In the case of a great war every other country would draw its resources from every corner of its territory, while we should have to rely on the resources of two islands, with merely the sympathy and loyalty of our outlying peoples, unexpressed in organised form. That was not a satisfactory position. Members must make up their minds as to what they were going to do, whether they would run away from their Imperial obligations, because their constituents did not like the expense, or whether they would face them boldly, and say to the peoples of the colonies—

"These two islands have spent their treasure, and blood in building up your Empira; you are wealthy and prospering now; is it right to expect the mother country alone to go on for ever bearing your burdens?"

said the hon. and gallant Member for Yarmouth advocated a large Army and a striking Army.

I never said a large army, but one large enough for our needs.

No, it was 12,000 above the strength.