To ask the First Lord of the Treasury if, in view of the fact that no popular boon or concession has been granted, according to ancient usage, in connection with the Delhi Durbar, His Majesty's Government will direct the Government of India to take some early opportunity to rectify this omission. (Answered by Mr. A. J. Balfour). I am not prepared to admit the validity of the principle upon which the Question of the lion. Member appears to proceed.

To ask the President of the Board of Agriculture whether he is aware that Mr. Bonn, of Mudford, Somerset, was summoned for neglecting to notify swine fever on his premises; and whether, seeing that an inspector of the Board had previously inspected the swine on such premises, and though knowing them to be infected had not so informed the owner, he will explain why the inspector did not at once inform Mr. Bown of his swine being affected, so that Mr. Bown might have notified to the police and have refrained from moving any pigs off his farm. (Answered by Mr. Hanbury.) The inspector was not in a position to state definitely that swine fever existed on the premises of Mr. Bown until a postmortem examination of viscera had taken place, but he informed the owner that he suspected the existence of the disease on his premises, and pointed out to him his obligation, in any case of suspicion, to report the case to the police. This, however, Mr. Bown did not do, and on post-mortem examination proving the existence of disease, he was summoned by the police. The obligation to report applies equally to pigs suspected of swine fever as to those which are actually affected.

To ask the Secretary to the Admiralty, will he state what the practice is with regard to the promotion of naval officers to a superior rank after service in the Royal yacht; how many officers, and of what ranks, have been promoted after such service during each of the last five years; are appointments for service in the Royal yacht made by any rule as to seniority or as to the position of those appointed in the examinations whereby the abilities of officers are tested; and, if not, by what rule are they made; and do the Admiralty propose to continue the practice of promoting over the heads of other officers those who have served in the Royal yacht. (Answered by Mr. Arnold-Forster.) It is usual for a commander to be promoted after three years service, a lieutenant after two years service, and sub-lieutenants after one season in the Royal yacht. During the last five years one lieutenant and three sub-lieutenants have been promoted in each year after service in the Royal yacht. Two commanders have also been promoted during the same period. Officers appointed to the Royal yacht are selected by His Majesty from amongst those recommended by the First Lord of the Admiralty, who takes into account their official record, their position on the list, and their war service in making his recommendations, but there is no definite rule such as is suggested in the Question. It is not in contemplation to make any change in the practice with regard to these appointments.

To ask the Secretary to the Admiralty, by whom will the nominations to compete for entrance to the "Britannia" for cadet-ships for the Executive Officers, Engineers, and Royal Marine Officers be granted under the new Admiralty Scheme. How many nominations for naval cadetships for Executive Officers alone were granted by the First Lord during the year 1902, and how many is it estimated that he will grant during the year 1903 for the whole of the three branches, viz., Executive, Engineers, and Marines. Who, under the new scheme, will decide whether, among the applicants for nomination, other things are equal, and whether preference shall or shall not be given to those among them whose parents declare that the boys aged 12 will be ready at the age of 20 to enter either of the three branches. And will the Admiralty consider whether it would not be preferable to establish a system of open competition for all the cadetships. (Answered by Mr. Arnold-Forster.) The intention is that the system under which nominations are granted for the naval cadetship examinations shall continue under the new scheme generally on the same lines as heretofore. The number of candidates who competed in the examinations for cadetships in 1902 on the nomination of the First Lord was 640 (including in this number those who competed more than once), and as far as can be foreseen at present, the number of nominations for the various examinations under both the old and new schemes during 1903 is likely to be about 750. The First Lord of the Admiralty is the ultimate authority in all matters connected with the entry of cadets. The answer to the last part of the Question is in the negative.

To ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will state the dates of the evacuation of Shanghai by the various detachments of foreign troops. (Answered by Lord Cranborne) The Japanese troops left on the 22nd November. The British troops left on the 22nd December, the French troops on the 27th December, and the Germans on the 3rd January.

To ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether the Government have received any reports of atrocities perpetrated on the natives of the Congo State by the agents of the Congo Administration; and, if so, whether any representations will be made to the Government concerned on the subject. (Answered by Lord Cranborne.) I answered a Question on Wednesday to the same effect as that put by the lion. Gentleman.† †See page 382.

To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether the Irish Government intend to take any steps, and if so what, to have Irish industries represented at the forthcoming St. Louis Exposition. (Answered by Lord Cranborne.) His Majesty's Government have received no confirmation of the report which has appeared in the newspapers on the subject.

To ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer if any further payments will be received by County Councils in respect of the residue (Beer and Spirits Duty) grant during the present financial year; if the sums received in respect of the present financial year are likely to be greater or less than those received in respect of the last financial year; and if he would consider if he could give any further information as to these receipts to the County Councils and County Borough Councils (if possible in the month of March in each year), so as to enable them to frame their educational budgets with some degree of exactitude. (Answered by Mr. Ritchie.) I understand that a further instalment of the residue grant, amounting to £150,000, will be distributed very shortly among the County Councils and County Borough Councils. I cannot at present state exactly the amount that will be distributable in respect of the present financial year, but I will endeavour to arrange with the Local Government Board and the Revenue authorities, so that the latest information as to the state of the Local Taxation Revenue from time to time may be placed at the disposal of the local authorities.

To ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will state what was the amount of preservatives, and what kinds of preservatives, were found in the samples of fresh and sterilised milk imported from abroad and examined at the Government laboratories during 1902. (Answered by Mr. Ritchie.) The samples of fresh and sterilised milk in question, with the exception of those taken from frozen milk, in which preservatives are not employed, were all examined for boric preservatives and for formalin, but in no case was either preservative detected.

To ask the Lord Advocate if local authorities in Scotland are empowered to make provision for the treatment of consumption as an infectious disease. (Answered by Mr. A. Graham Murray.) Having in view the general scope of the provisions as to infectious diseases contained in the Notification Act and the Public Health Act, the employment of public funds by the local authority in the way suggested by the hon. Member would raise a legal question affecting the ratepayers, on which, as I have no authority to determine it, I must respectfully decline to give an opinion.

To ask the Secretary to the Treasury how many of the 105 second class principal clerks of the Inland Revenue Department are receiving the maximum salary of that class, and how many of the corre- sponding grade in the outdoor service—i.e., the 234 second class supervisors—are at the maximum of that class, and how many of each grade have been receiving the maximum for a period of five years or longer, and how many of the twenty-four clerks who passed in 1900 for the position of principal clerk (second class) remain still unappointed to that position; and what steps the Board of Inland Revenue intend to take in order to enable these clerks to obtain the promotion for which they qualified in 1900 within a reasonable time. (Answered by Mr. Hayes Fisher.) Seventy-one second class principal clerks, and 107 second class supervisors, are receiving the maximum of their class. Of these, thirty-two principal clerks and thirteen supervisors have been at their maximum for five years or more. Twelve of the clerks who passed in 1900 for the position of principal clerk (second class) are still unappointed to that position. They will obtain promotion in the ordinary way as vacancies occur.

To ask the Postmaster General whether he will state when it is proposed to proceed with the erection of the post office at Lurgan. (Answered by Mr. Austen Chamberlain.) It is proposed to begin building the new post office at Lurgan next financial year, if Parliament votes the money.

To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if he will explain why extra police were drafted into the villages of Ballylaneen and Kilmacthomas, county Waterford, on the day Mr. Matthew Power was released from prison: and will he state whether the county will be charged with the cost incurred by drafting these extra men into these villages; and, if so, what will the cost be. (Answered by Mr. Wyndham.) A small force of ten men was detailed for duty on this occasion in anticipation of a disturbance of the public peace, which, happily, was not realised. Any expense that may have been incurred will be defrayed from the Constabulary Vote.

To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if he can state the number and the acreage of the estates for sale in the Land Judge's Court in Ireland on the 31st December, 1902, and the names of the owners of such estates. (Answered by Mr. Wyndham.) I am informed that the preparation of a return containing this information would, in the opinion of the Land Judge, make such demands upon the time and labour of his staff as would seriously impede the working of his Court. Under the circumstances, and at a time of pressure like the present, I am reluctant to ask the Judge to undertake the return, and regret, therefore, that I cannot consent to it. I may add, however, that among the returns which I have promised to lay before Parliament in connection with the forthcoming Land Bill is one giving full information under a number of different heads in respect of the operations of the various Land Purchase Acts. This return will show the extent to which Section 40 of the Land Act of 1896, administered by the Land Judge, has been availed of down to the end of last year.

To ask the Secretary of State for War whether, in view of the fact that the cartridge pouches and bandoliers with which the troops were equipped in South Africa were unsuitable and were the means of supplying the enemy with quantities of ammunition, it is proposed to issue serviceable leather bandoliers to soldiers and volunteers; and, if so, when these are to be provided. (Answered by Mr. Secretary Brodrick.) Trials are now proceeding of equipments with improved arrangements for carrying ammunition.

To ask the Secretary of State for War if he will state on what grounds he has decided to issue an order abolishing the use of the lance by the cavalry on active service. (Answered by Mr. Secretary Brodrick.) This is a purely military question which it is quite impracticable to discuss in the form of a reply to a Question.

To ask the Secretary of State for War can he state for the five years, 1898 to 1903, respectively, the totals for half-pay required for officers eligible for employment, specifying the percentage of those sums, also that of the Non-effective Vote to the Army Estimates for each year. (Answered by Mr. Secretary Brodrick.) The figures showing the amount of half-pay taken in Army Estimates, and the percentage to the normal Estimates, are as follows:—

To ask the Secretary of State for War under what circumstances orders have recently been issued by the Adjutant General to the 4th West Yorkshire Artillery (Volunteers) that no greater mobility than that of infantry shall be required of them, and that not more than two horses per gun shall be employed during their annual training; and whether, in view of the fact that this corps consists of four batteries equipped with field guns, and has been efficiently trained for many years past as field artillery, he will have the orders in question rescinded and give the necessary financial assistance to enable the corps to be properly horsed during its annual training. (Answered by Mr. Secretary Brodrick.) The Commander-in-Chief holds that all Artillery Volunteers, whatever armament they may now be in possession of, are not to be trained to manœuvre with cavalry, but that it will be sufficient for them to move at the same pace as infantry. As regards the allusion to the employment of two horses per gun, no such instruction has been issued.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War, whether a Military Works Bill will be introduced this session; and, if so, how much money will be borrowed under it.

It is intended to introduce a further Military Works Bill in the course of the session, but I cannot at present state the additional amount of money that will be included. It was clearly stated on the introduction of the Bill in 1901, that the amount then taken was only an instalment and represented the sum that it was anticipated could be spent prudently within the next two years.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he will state under what circumstances two drummer boys were recently flogged in the Grenadier Guards, for what offence, under whoso orders, and by what authority; what punishment has been inflicted on those responsible; and what steps have been taken to prevent the recurrence of similar practices.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kinloch, commanding the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards at the time, had given orders that boys under age in that battalion were not to be allowed to smoke. On the 28th February, 1902, a boy, who had given a great deal of trouble, was brought before an officer for smoking, and the Acting Adjutant of the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards, at the instigation of Lieutenant-Colonel Kinloch, sentenced the boy to receive eight strokes with a birch rod. The following morning, before the punishment had been inflicted, the boy broke out of barracks, went to Aldershot, where he was apprehended later on, and was sent back to the headquarters of his battalion. He was brought before Lieutenant-Colonel Kinloch, charged with desertion, and the latter, in order not to mar the boy's military career by sentencing him to imprisonment at the outset of it, ordered that he should receive sixteen strokes with a birch, and this punishment was inflicted. On the 26th March, 1902, another boy of the same battalion was caught smoking. He received six strokes with the birch, by order of Lieutenant-Colonel Kinloch. This mode of punishment is not authorised in the Army, except in prisons, and in Army schools in a restricted form. The Commander-in-Chief expressed his disapproval of Colonel Kinloch's action, which was not in accordance with the Regulations, and these practices are absolutely prohibited.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War, for what purpose regiments of cavalry will, in future, be armed with the sword as well as the carbine (or rifle), seeing that the carbine (or rifle) will henceforth be considered as the cavalry soldier's principal weapon.

The rifle will be generally used on foot, the sword when mounted.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the lance is in all respects a far more efficient weapon than the sword?

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War will he state why troops were required to be in South Africa between the 1st of January and the 1st of June, 1902, in order to secure the King's medal; and why these troops received both the King's and the Queen's medal, while others of equal, or greater, service in South Africa received only the Queen's medal.

In reply to a Question put by my honourable friend on this subject on 5th March, I gave him a clear explanation of the grant of the King's medal, to which I fear I can add nothing.† †See (4) Debates, cxviii., 1550.

When will these medals be distributed?

I am pressing the matter forward as rapidly as I can, but having regard to the enormous number of medals that had to be made, there has necessarily been delay.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies when it is proposed to put the House in possession, by Parliamentary Papers, of an accurate Report of the statements made by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and others at the various meetings and interviews held by him with the representatives of the different political parties and subjects of the Crown in the self-governing colonies and other districts of South Africa. May I say what a satisfaction it is to see the right hon. Gentleman in his place once more?

I am much obliged to the hon. Gentleman: and, with reference to his Question, I would say that I must take it as a compliment that he seems to suggest that I should publish at the public expense a new volume of my speeches—which no doubt could be quoted hereafter. Of course, I have no personal objection: but it is a matter which would require some consideration, and it would be, I believe, an unusual precedent. I am ashamed to say that I believe the total number of speeches delivered by me during my recent tour amounted to something like seventy. I had no time to read them at the time, much less to correct them, and I am afraid it would be rather difficult for me to correct them now, and that would also stand in the way of such a publication as the hon. Gentleman suggests. But possibly the best thing would be to leave the whole matter until the question is more fully discussed in the House, and if there are are any particular documents which the hon. Gentleman wishes to have published, I shall be glad to consider whether that can be done.

I thank; the right hon. Gentleman, and will adopt his suggestion. There is, perhaps, something a little unprecedented in the journey altogether—a journey in the colonies during which the right hon. Gentleman spoke on behalf of the Ministry. It is, therefore, very desirable to have an authorised version of the speeches.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether the control and treatment of the Boers who were taken prisoners in the late war, and have been deported to India. Ceylon, and Bermuda, and detained in those countries, notwithstanding the conclusion of the war and the proclamation of peace, are within the purview of the War Office and within the sphere of the Ministerial responsibility of the Secretary of State for War.

As regards the safe custody of the prisoners of war in India, Ceylon, and Bermuda, and maintaining order and discipline among them, the India Office and War Office respectively are responsible. Questions of general policy in regard to these prisoners fall within the sphere of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Who is responsible for the punishment of breaches of discipline?

No doubt it be the Secretary for War.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies under what authority, statutory or otherwise, have Boers taken prisoners in the late war, who have been deported to India, Ceylon, or Bermuda, been detained in imprisonment, and in many instances treated as common criminals, for nearly a twelvemonth after the conclusion of peace.

The prisoners of war in India, Ceylon, and Bermuda have been detained under martial law, which has been proclaimed over the area covered by the prisoners of war camps. Breaches of military discipline have been punished by the military authorities, but I have no information of any such treatment as is alleged.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies at what stations in India are Boers who have been taken prisoners in the late war imprisoned at the present time, and what are the numbers of the Boors detained at each station; by whose authority and on whose responsibility was a communication made to Boers thus imprisoned, that default in taking the oath of allegiance would prolong their stay in the hotter districts, whereas the taking by them of that oath would secure their removal to cool hill stations; and what course does the War Office intend to take with reference to these prisoners.

(1) The prisoners of war in India are at present stationed at Ahmadnagar; (2) The number of them is about 800: (3) I have no information as to any communication of the kind alleged; (4) All prisoners of war are at liberty to go where they please at their own expense, except to the new colonies. They will not be allowed to return to the new colonies at the expense of His Majesty's Government unless they take the oath or make the declaration of allegiance. It has been arranged that General Botha shall send a delegate to the prisoners to explain to them the desirability of making the declaration.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies, how many Boer prisoners of war are at present detained in Bermuda, and under what circumstances are they now detained, and when will they be sent back to South Africa?

There are at present eighty-two prisoners of war in Bermuda who have not taken the oath or made the declaration of allegiance under the terms of surrender. They will be sent back to South Africa as soon as they take the oath or make the declaration.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether any, and, if so, what, decision has been arrived at as to the amnesty of rebels in Cape Colony and Natal?

The question of amnesty has been left to the governors of the self-governing colonies, acting on the advice of their Ministers I have received the following message on the subject from the Governor of Natal, dated 12th March: "On the unanimous advice of my Ministers, and as a result of correspondence with you at Capetown and Madeira, I have exercised the prerogative of pardon in case of rebels still in gaol, twenty-three in all, and have issued a Proclamation providing for amnesty for all outstanding cases of rebellion, and for offences strictly consequent on the war. Details to follow by mail despatch."

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he will state under what authority, and on whose responsibility, the district of Vryheid, which formed part of the territories of the South African Republic, has been added to the Colony of Natal and placed within the purview of the government and constitution of Natal; and whether, having regard to the fact that the constitution of the Colony of Natal owes its origin to the Imperial Parliament, any addition to the territories endorsed by that constitution can be made without the sanction of the Imperial Parliament.

The authority was that of Letters Patent under the Great Seal dated the 29th November, 1902, passed in accordance with the provisions of the Colonial Boundaries Act 1895. Having regard to the provisions of that Act the consent of Parliament was not required.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty whether a Naval Works Bill will be introduced this session; and, if so, how much money will be borrowed under it.

A Naval Works Bill will be introduced this session. The amount to be borrowed cannot be stated until the Bill is introduced.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty why was the Memorandum, dated 16th September, 1902, concerning the entry and training of officers and men of the Royal Navy, signed by one alone of the Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral, viz., by the First Lord of the Admiralty; did all the other members of the Board of Admiralty concur in the decisions and determinations therein announced, and especially did all the Naval Lords so concur; and, in view of the fact that alterations in the King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions are usually promulgated by command of their Lordships of the Board, and by the Secretary to the Admiralty, why was the signature of the Secretary on this occasion omitted.

The Memorandum in question was signed by the First Lord in accordance with precedent, which does not require that such documents should be signed by all the; members of the Board. The answer to the second question is in the affirmative. The Board of Admiralty works, and has always worked, on the system of joint responsibility in the same manner as the Cabinet. The changes affecting officers were promulgated to the Fleet in a circular letter dated 19th December, which was signed by the Secretary as usual. The actual alterations in the King's Regulations will be embodied in the Addenda for the current year, and the usual notice will be promulgated to the Fleet in due course.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty has the Board of Admiralty made any recommendation for the sanction by an Order in Council of the alterations in rank and pay of certain naval officers and the other changes in the King's Regulations which had been decided and determined on by the Board on 16th December, 1902; and, if so, has an Order in Council been made giving such sanction, and on what date.

The changes announced in the Admiralty Memorandum, issued in December last, have not yet been embodied in an Order in Council, except as regards the pensions of chief petty officers, as the changes involved many minor alterations in the Regulations, all of which required careful consideration before receiving the authority of His Majesty in Council. Steps are being taken to carry out the required procedure before the 1st April, when the new scheme will come into operation.

May I take it that no recommendation has yet been made?

The recommendations are being drawn up.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty whether it is the intention of the naval authorities to proceed immediately with the permanent arrangements for the storage of oil fuel, for which provision is made in the Estimates for 1903–4, or to wait until a more extended experience has been obtained of the value of such fuel by trials on His Majesty's war vessels.

Arrangements are now being made for the storage of such quantities of oil fuel as are likely to be required in 1903–4, should the trials now in progress be attended with generally satisfactory results, but the question of further storage accommodation will depend on more extended experience of this description of fuel.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India whether it is proposed to abolish the lance in the Indian Cavalry.

I have not received any communication from the Indian Government to this effect.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he will state the proposed increased amount to be paid by India for the increase of Army pay sanctioned last year.

As I have before stated the Indian Government have agreed to pay the extra 2d. a day which came into operation in April last; this amounts to £215,000 a year. The apportionment of charge arising out of the extra 6d., which does not come into operation before April, 1904, has been referred to arbitration.

When will the result of the arbitration be made known? The matter has been under consideration a long time now.

The decision to refer the matter to arbitration was arrived at not long ago, but I hope the result will soon be made known.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade if he can state when he proposes to introduce the Bill with reference to the Port of London; and whether it is his intention to take the Second Reading before Easter.

I am not yet in a position to say when this Bill will be introduced, or whether the Second Reading will be taken before Easter.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade if he can state the amount of bounty given in Canada and Australia on the production or export of iron and butter respectively; to what extent bounty-fed articles, other than sugar, have been imported into the United Kingdom during recent years from British colonies and foreign countries; and if the Government propose affording protection to those engaged in agriculture and manufacture at home on lines similar to that afforded to the West Indian sugar planters.

As regards Canadian iron I must refer the hon. Member to the answer which I gave to-the hon. Member for West Islington on 4th November last.† I know of no Australian bounty on iron. As regards butter I have no knowledge of any direct bounty, but the information desired will, no doubt, be contained in the return of Colonial bounties on agricultural produce, which was promised by the Postmaster General, as representing the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in reply to a Question by the hon. Member for South Somerset on 4th December last. The Trade Accounts do not distinguish‡ between imports of bounty-fed and other articles. The answer to the last paragraph is in the negative. †See (4) Debates, cxiv., 8. ‡See (4) Debates, cxv., 1307.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade a Question, of which I have given him private notice—viz., whether, in view of the verdict and rider of the jury in the case of "Penrhyn v. Parry," he will now take steps, under the Conciliation Act, 1896, with the object of bringing the dispute to an end.

I regret that I see no reason to believe that the expression of opinion by the jury has altered the existing situation, but, of course, if at any time I have grounds for hoping that the intervention of the Board of Trade would lead to a satisfactory result, I should be happy to take action in the matter.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he can state the number of clubs registered under the Licensing Act, 1902, in England and in Wales.

No, Sir, the information is not in my possession; and I think it would be better to wait until the new Act has been in regular operation for some time.

I beg to ask the Lord Advocate whether such an interval will be fixed before the Second Reading of the Licensing (Scotland) Acts Amendment Bill as will enable Burgh and County Councils to consider and discuss the proposals; and can he state when the Second Reading is likely to be taken.

The date for the Second Reading of the Bill must depend upon the general arrangements as to public business made by my right hon. friend the Leader of the House. In any case, it is obvious that a considerable time must elapse before the Committee stage can be reached, which will leave ample time for consideration by all public bodies interested.

I beg to ask Mr. Attorney-General whether, before granting or withholding his fiat to a plaintiff in an action to protect a public right, he requires any information other than a statement of claim showing a good cause of action, failure of attempt to settle amicably, and certificate of counsel that the action is a proper one to be brought; and, if so, what further information is sought or requirement insisted on by him.

In addition to the requirements mentioned in the question, the Attorney-General must consider whether the proceedings are substantially directed towards the assertion of a public right, in the public interest. Every case is examined upon its own merits, and it is impossible to lay down any more precise rules upon the subject. If in substance the object of the proceedings is rather the assertion of private rights, the Attorney General ought not to give the use of his name to the proceedings, but to leave the applicant to his remedy by action.

I beg to ask Mr. Attorney-General whether the Crown will bear the expense of bringing Mr. Whitaker Wright to justice; and whether he will direct that the costs of the prosecution should be borne by the Crown rather than by the assets of the creditors.

As regards the first branch of the question, the Crown will bear all the expenses connected with extradition. As regards the second branch, the question of the ultimate incidence of the costs of the prosecution will receive full consideration, but it would not be proper at this stage to arrive at a decision upon it. The control of the proceedings will, of course, remain with the Official Receiver, who is prosecuting under the orders of the Court.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether the Irish Government intend to take any steps, and, if so, what, to have Irish industries represented at the forthcoming St. Louis Exposition.

Yes, Sir, the Irish Government are taking all the steps in their power to see that Ireland is properly represented, but the nature of these cannot well be stated until I know what the general arrangements are to be for the United Kingdom.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether he can now supplement the answer of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the 18th December last† by stating what arrangements have been made for British and Irish commercial displays at the coming St. Louis Exposition; and whether a Royal Commission will be appointed in connection therewith.

†See (4) Debates, cxiv.,, 1637.

A Royal Commission will be appointed to deal with the subject. Its composition has not yet been finally determined, but it will, of course, contain representatives of both British and Irish interests.

What arrangements have been made for British and Irish commercial displays?

The object of the Royal Commission is to make such arrangements. If the arrangements had already been made it would not have been necessary to hare a Royal Commission.

Seeing that other Governments have already applied for space, are we not a little late?

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that, in the first scheme made in 1899, the Roscrea Rural District Council proposed to erect a cottage for a labourer, named John Creagh, on the farm of Michael Hennesy at Barrahill, which the Local Government Board declined to sanction on the grounds that Hennesy s farm was too small, and pointed out that there appeared to be larger farms in the locality; that, although in 1902, in a second scheme, the council proposed to erect a cottage for the same labourer on one of the large farms referred to, the Local Government Board again declined to sanction the cottage, notwithstanding the inspector's unfavourable report on Creagh's present dwelling; and will he say what steps he proposes to take in the matter.

The facts are as stated. The Board's decision in the case of the second application was based on the evidence given at the local inquiry. The District Council proposes to appeal against the decision to the Privy Council.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he has recently received representations and resolutions from the different sections of political thought in the country urging the necessity for alterations in the system of Private Bill legislation; and will he state what steps he proposes to take to give effect to these representations

Yes, Sir; but I do not see my way to enlarging the legislative programme of the present session.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether his attention has been called to the fact that the Local Government Board for Ireland has instituted legal proceedings against the Lismore Board of Guardians to compel them to proceed to a new election of master of the union; and whether, in view of the fact that Mr. George M'Donald satisfied the clerk of the union in an examination as to his educational competency, and that he has acted as master temporarily and is now so acting to the satisfaction of the guardians, the Board will, before taking legal proceedings, apply the same tests as to Mr. M'Donald's fitness as have been applied within the past three years in the ease of the masters elected in any of the unions in Minister.

The reply to the first part of the Question is in the affirmative. A candidate for this position is required to give, not to the clerk of the union but to the local Government Board, satisfactory evidence of his fitness to discharge the duties of the office. Where such evidence is not forthcoming he undergoes a test examination of a very elementary character. That was the course adopted in the present case. Of the sixty-nine masters whose appointments were sanctioned in the past four years thirty-four underwent the test examination. The Lismore Guardians are not unanimous in their refusal to appoint a qualified master. If the majority consider the Board's decision wrong they will have an opportunity of showing cause against the Conditional Order for a mandamus becoming absolute.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether his attention has been directed to an encounter between a number of the Royal Irish Constabulary and some civilians near the village of Killea, in the county of Tipperary, on Sunday last; and whether, in view of the fact that, the police demand that the bands returning from a meeting in Templemore should not play when passing Thompson's dwelling at Barnane was agreed to, he will explain why District Inspector White ordered the police to use batons on the people, whereby several persons were injured.

Yes, Sir, my attention has been called to the rioting that took place on this occasion. A special inquiry is being made into the circumstances.

Will the hon. Gentleman inform the House of the result of the inquiries?

Yes, when I have received it.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that the Commission for Cork County is fixed to open on St. Patrick's Day; and whether he will take steps to secure the postponement of the opening of the assizes.

The Executive has no authority to take the action suggested. The matter is entirely one for the Judges of Assize, over whom the Government exercises no control. I may add that the Land Commissioners have arranged that no sub-Commission Courts shall sit to-morrow, and the Local Government Board has also arranged that no audits shall be held on that day. But there is no analogy between these fixtures and sittings of the Assize Courts, and any alteration in the holding, of the latter Courts, at this advanced period, would possibly be attended with difficulty and expense to jurors and suitors.

I beg to ask the Postmaster-General if he will explain on what grounds a second divison clerk has recently been promoted to the position of first class assistant superintendent in the Dublin Sorting Office; and, in view of the practice that this position should be filled by an officer drawn from the staff of the controller of the sorting office, will he say why this course was not followed in this instance; and whether the statement of the controller that there was not a man qualified for promotion in the Department had any influence in this appointment.

The promotion in question was made because there was no officer of suitable rank in the sorting office who was qualified in all respects for advancement to the position of a first class assistant superintendent.

I beg to ask the Postmaster-General whether he has received a communication from the residents of Ballinhassig, alleging that the present location of the Post Office in that district is unsuitable and inconvenient, and that the premises in which the postal business was formerly transacted are still available; if so, can he take steps to remedy this alleged grievance; and further, will ho say why a stranger, without knowledge of the people or district, has been appointed to take charge of the office.

A remonstrance against the temporary arrangement under which the business of the sub-office is carried on at the entrance to the national school is stated to have been sent to the Commissioners of National Education and a copy was sent to me. The old Post Office premises were unsuitable and the newly appointed sub-Postmistress is providing new premises of a suitable nature for the Post Office, and they will, I understand, be available very soon. She is well acquainted with the locality, having lived in Ballinhassig for a year and in the neighbourhood previously. She was the only candidate who could provide proper accommodation.

On whose recommendation was she appointed?

By me, on my own responsibility.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether the constitution and powers of the Committee of National Defence have been submitted for consideration to the War Inquiry Commission.

The answer is in the negative.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether he will consider the desirability of introducing legislation with the view of compelling all private banks to publish their balance sheets.

I do not see how you can distinguish between private banks and other private undertakings and if the accounts of the one were to be made public by law, I suppose the accounts of all private undertakings would have to be made public by law.

I wish to ask a Question with reference to the White Paper which has been issued from the War Office containing the evidence of Colonel Kinloch. That is only one paper referring to one part of a large transaction. When pressed on this subject on Wednesday evening the Secretary for War said that if forced to do so he would lay the papers on the Table.† He used the word "papers" in the plural. I have refreshed my memory by referring to The Times, and it is beyond all doubt that the reference was to documents affecting the whole inquiry. I want now to ask—Is the Speaker satisfied, first, that the rule that every document which has been referred to shall be produced, has been complied with; and, secondly, has the pledge given to the House been observed?

†See page 5002.

The question concerning a pledge said to have been given by a Minister is one with which I have nothing to do. The other question is as to whether the document which has been laid on the Table of the House satisfies the rules of debate. I have seen that document, I have considered the matter, and I think it does satisfy the rules of debate, for this reason;—the right hon. Gentleman, in addressing the House, said that Lord Roberts had dealt with Colonel Kinloch's case upon Colonel Kinloch's own evidence, and he proceeded to give what he considered to be the effect of that evidence. He was challenged as to the accuracy of the statement, and he quoted from Colonel Kinloch's evidence the statements on which he relied. I was then asked whether he was not bound to produce the whole of the document, and I said yes, subject to his stating that it was not in the public interest to do so. As regards Colonel Kinloch's evidence, the right hon. Gentleman has, in my opinion, put in all that was necessary in order to satisfy the rules of the House. The principle of the rule is that if a Minister quotes from a document, the context must be placed before the House, so as to enable the House to judge whether there is anything in the rest of the document which would modify, alter, or contradict that which was quoted. In this case the question was whether Colonel Kinloch's evidence had been rightly quoted by the right hon. Gentleman. He has produced the whole of that evidence. In so doing he has satisfied the rule. As to any promise given by a Minister, that is a matter for him and not for me.

Will the right hon. Gentleman say what business is to be taken this week.

As the House is aware, we are now approaching the end of the financial year, and the date when our financial business must close governs our procedure for the next few days. It happens that the days of the week do not fall very conveniently this year, as the House will see when I tell them that the last day upon which we can take Supply is Thursday, the 26th, because Friday is a private Members' day under the new rule, which I hope will always be observed, and the Government do not wish to interfere with private Members' business. We shall have to finish our financial business then, on the 26th, and that being our limit I do not see how we can better arrange our time than in the manner which I will now submit to the House. The Navy Estimates we propose to take to-night and to-morrow, and I think we must get Votes A and I of those Estimates to-morrow. We can then take the report of the Army and Navy-Votes on Wednesday, and Thursday will be devoted to the Vote on Account, and I may say parenthetically that I shall be glad to learn through channels what Votes it venient to set down first, so that we may utilise time to the best advantage. On Monday we take the report of the Vote on Account as the first order of the day, followed by other Supply, and hope to read the Consolidated Fund Bill a first time. The Second Reading of that Bill will be taken on Tuesday, the 24th, and the Committee stage on Wednesday, followed by the Third Reading on Thursday, the 26th, which, as I have explained to the House, is the last available day at our disposal.

When is it proposed to introduce the Irish Land Bill?

It will be seen that Wednesday, the 25th, is the day proposed under the arrangement I have suggested for taking the Committee stage of the Consolidated Fund Bill, and, as that stage is incapable of debate, if it is the wish of hon. Members opposite, I shall be glad to see the time at our disposal on that day devoted to the Land Bill.

When will the Education Bill for London be brought in?

I hope it may be introduced before Easter. But at any rate it cannot be before we have completed our financial business for the year.

asked if it was proposed to follow the precedent set on the Army Estimates, and allow a general discussion before the Minister in Charge made his statement.

I hope I am consulting the convenience of the House in following precedent by making my statement on the Motion that the Speaker do leave the Chair. I do not wish to dogmatise, but I do think it is most convenient that I should say what I have to say as to the general proposals of the Board of Admiralty, leaving particular portions of those proposals to be reviewed by lion. Members who have given notices of Amendments. I have to present to the House Navy Estimates of a magnitude, I believe, unparalleled in peace or war. I do so as the official representative of a great Department; but I do not forfeit my position as a private citizen; and as a citizen I cannot help sharing the regret, which I am sure every Member of the House must feel, that the bitter competition and rivalry among the nations continues, and makes this enormous, unproductive expenditure a necessary burden. I think we shall all agree in feeling that if the word of power could be spoken which would call a halt, and cause a discontinuance of the rivalry among the nations of Europe, we and they would benefit in the highest degree. Perhaps I have said more than I ought to say as representing the Admiralty on this subject; but I desire to make it clear to the House that which is my opinion, and I believe that of every member of the Board of Admiralty, that we take no pride in, that we profess no exultation over, the magnitude of these Estimates; and I think the depth of our feeling in the matter may be taken as the measure of our conviction, that these Estimates, large as they are, are necessary in the circumstances in which we live; and the only way in which we hope to commend them to the House of Commons is by proving, as we can, that the money voted so lavishly in the past has been satisfactorily and effectively expended for the purposes for which it was voted, and by showing that the money which may be voted will be so expended in the future. That, I think, is the only satisfactory justification we can put forward for this enormous expenditure; we must prove that it is necessary; we must show that it has been, and will be, well spent. I know that the system has not been tested. It is true, as is often said, that the expenditure and policy of the Admiralty have never been put to the test and trial of a great naval war. I am sure it is the fact that the Board of Admiralty are under no illusion as to the depth and the intensity of the responsibility that rests upon them; and I can assure the House that the spirit that prevails there is not alien to that existing in the country. They are united in the endeavour to meet future exigencies and deeply conscious of the responsibilities they have to bear. I have to call the attention of the House to the figures that make up this enormous Estimate. The total Vote shows an excess over the Vote of last year of over £3,000,000 sterling. The personnel, which is of first importance, shows an increase of 4,600 over the Vote of last year, and the Votes by which we can best measure the amount of actual addition to the strength of the Navy—Votes 8 and 9 for material, shipbuilding, guns, and gun mountings—have been increased by no less than £2,000,000 sterling, or if we add, as we ought to add, the appropriation of grants-in-aid, the gross increase is £2,271,224. Hitherto, as has been pointed out, a very small amount has been devoted to what is technically known as the "new programme" as apart from new construction, and a very small part of the cost of entirely new ships has come into the financial year. It has become the practice of successive Boards of Admiralty to defer expenditure on the new programme to a late date in the year in respect of which it is voted, and to a certain extent the amount has become illusory in respect to that particular year. I do not know that when the practice is understood much harm is done, for it is pretty clear we are voting a year in advance; but I am not sure that it is altogether an advantage that the practice should continue, and during the present year we are adding £451,430 to the Vote for the new programme, thus showing that we are taking steps to do away with the practice of making the Vote for the now programme in any particular year an illusory Vote. We are taking £1,151,430 for new programme work during the coming year, and I hope this will be the amount we shall spend.

Many hon. Members who attach importance to the ancient forms for the conduct of the business of this House must have felt regret that the hon. Gentleman should have made his statement with you, Sir, in the Chair. I had hoped, the Secretary of State for War having reverted to the old and, I think, the better practice, that the hon. Gentleman would have adopted a similar course, and allowed the Motion that you, Sir, do leave the Chair to be used for what I respectfully submit is its proper purpose, viz., the submission of grievances by hon. Members before Supply is asked for. The hon Gentleman would then have made his statement, as did the Secretary of State for War, on the Estimates themselves. I the more regret the course the hon. Gentleman has taken on this occasion, because by it he has obtained some advantage over me. He has made a speech before I begin, and he is to make another when I have finished. He has taken a sighting shot at me before I have got into action. I also feel the disadvantage under which labour on the present occasion in respect of my personal inadequacy to deal with this matter. To many Members of this House the sea is a horror, the Navy a-mystery, and the naval officer an enigma, and to attempt to solve that enigma, to explain the functions of the naval officer, how he is produced, and how dangerous is to tamper with the provisions whereby he is to be brought to a perfect state, is a task which might appal even a seaman, and which is doubly difficult to me, who am, after all, but a landsman. The sea may be a horror, but we who live in islands have to deal with it, for it is our only road, our only rampart; and f we are not its masters we must be its slaves. The first essential of this island Empire, therefore, is a strong and efficient Navy. I regret that at this very moment, when the primacy of the Navy is so loudly asserted, there is in the highest places in the country so great a distrust of it that he Secretary of State for War has invented six new Army Corps, avowedly because he cannot trust the Navy to keep the command of the seas; while the First Lord of the Treasury considers the Navy to be incapable of striking a blow or producing any effect on the enemy unless it has an expeditionary Corps to help it—all which is contradicted by history. But all agree that the Navy is the principal force on which we must rely, and, if I may quote the remarkable document I am about to criticise, "by a strange decree of fate," it is this very moment when the primacy of the Navy is first openly recognised and asserted, which has been chosen by the Admiralty for the invention of what I presume my hon. friend would call the standardisation of the naval officer, so as to secure his interchange-ability—but what I consider to be the absolute destruction of the naval officer as he now exists. I need hardly remind the House that the Navy consists, not of ships or guns—they are things of wood, iron, or steel—but mainly and primarily of the men in the ships, the men behind the guns, and, above all, of the officers over the men. Of those officers the only one to whom I attach great and primary importance is the naval officer, properly so called, the man who handles, navigates, and fights the ship, and manages the crew in the working of the ship He is the only indispensable officer in the ship. Take away the naval officer and the ship is helpless. Take away al the others—the marine, the engineer, the chaplain, the surgeon, the pay master—and the naval officer will handle and fight the ship as well as ever. It fact, he does do so, for many of those important vessels, the destroyers, with crews of from sixty to eighty men, are handled without an engineer at all, and all of them without a chaplain, surgeon, or paymaster. Therefore I say I have warrant for my assertion that the naval officer is the king-pin of the whole system. As long as he is there the ship will work, but when he is not there, or is damaged in his quality, the ship will cease to work as it should. Will the House consider for a moment the extraordinary combination which the experience of centuries has declared necessary for the making of a naval officer. He joins the Navy—he should, he must join it—young and at schoolboy age; et not as a schoolboy, but always as an officer. The boy goes to the "Britannia," and finds himself not under a schoolmaster, but under an officer. He goes to sea at the age of fourteen or fifteen, and there again he s treated as an officer, and learns him-self to be an officer by commanding men and taking responsibility at an early age. It is true that because of his youth his education is necessarily incomplete, and therefore he must have the schoolmaster to give him some instruction, which is most necessary provision. But what is the boy's life? At the age of sixteen he is in school. He hears his boat piped away, snatches his dirk and pistol and jumps into his boat, and finds himself engaged capturing a blockade runner. After this he takes off his dirk and goes back again to school. It is a combination of theoretical and practical. He sits on a form and learns, but he also stands on a deck and acts, and at this early age learns to exercise responsibility and to command men. That is the whole story. That boy at the age of twenty is probably fit to command anything. That is the training you are now going seriously to impair. I shall be told that nobody disputes the efficiency of the naval officer. Then why touch him? If it be true, as it is, that the system and the traditions of the Navy have produced the most admirable naval officer, why cannot you leave him alone? One of the suggestions is that the naval officer of the present day has lagged behind the age. It is absolutely false. There is no training which has been so unceasingly developed as that of the naval officer. In the transition from wood to iron and from iron to steel, and the transition from sails to steam hydraulics and electricity, he has kept abreast of every movement in naval science. You find him studying and practising successfully sails, steam, hydraulics, and electricity; in fact, at this moment a naval lieutenant is being relied upon to instal the system of wireless telegraphy in Somaliland. Is this the man you must abolish and replace by something else before you consider him equal to his duties? But while I magnify the naval officer proper, I do not desire to depreciate the other officers. I believe they are all good and excellent. I believe the marine and the engineer to be admirable, as they undoubtedly are. There, again, if they are admirable, why touch them? But I claim that of all of them the naval officer is preeminent and most necessary. The proposal is to standardise the naval officers and to run them all into the same mould, and the method by which it is proposed to do this is to take them all at the age of twelve and give them all the same education up to the age of twenty, and then serve them out to the various branches of the Service. I say that this is uncalled for, dangerous, and calculated not to increase but to impair the efficiency of all. It was on Christmas Eve last that the document was promulgated which I regard as the death sentence of the naval officer as he exists at present. It came as a bolt from the blue. It was wholly unexpected, and it was received by naval officers and those who had the interests of the Navy at heart in silence. The document indeed stated on page four—

"The best authorities, naval and civil, will be consulted by the Board before carrying; the plan into operation."

But on page three of the same document we had already been told that all these changes had been "determined upon," and that it had been "decided" to do the things related and proposed in the memorandum. What is the use of consultation after decision? No trace of consultation can I find in this document, nor do I find anywhere any trace of acquiescence on the part of authorities naval, military, or civil. I have seen many naval officers, and my experience is that every kind of naval officer, from the admiral down to the lieutenant—and I do not go lower than the lieutenant—is dead against this scheme. I cannot say that there are no exceptions. There is the exception of the noble Lord who was lately the Member for Woolwich, and who was accidentally prevented from slaughtering the Army scheme in the House of Commons by being appointed Commander of the Channel Fleet. This portentous document is full of tropes and figures and beautiful words and phrases—"solidarity," "homogeneity," "the decrees of fate," and "long-felt wants" are piled up together with a few asthmatic perorations, all dressed in lady's maid's English. It was just the shallow and plausible scheme to please those gentlemen who write leading articles in half-an-hour, and especially those afflicting dons who pen the solemn twaddle of The Times newspaper. It was Christmas time, and there was much to do of various kinds. Festivity and charity prevailed, and the Press accordingly hastily approved of the scheme. But when time passed by, when those who had tried to understand the Navy, when naval officers themselves came to examine the scheme, then indeed the tone changed. The Service journals soon began to show the defects of the scheme. Admirals and captains on active service have not scrupled in regard to the language in which they privately denounced it, but they dare not speak out because of Article 682 of the King's Regulations, which prevents the only persons who understand this question and know all about it from giving their opinion. And so it has been left to me, inadequately, to fill the vacancy. Now, as to the authorship of this document. Lord Goschen has thought it necessary to repudiate all credit for this scheme, and Lord Rosebery has suggested that it is the work of Admiral Fisher. Intelligent critics who have studied its style think they see in the scheme the hand of the Secretary to the Admiralty. I believe it is wholly and solely the work of the First Lord of the Admiralty, with possibly some slight literary assistance in phrasing and punctuation from the Secretary to the Admiralty. And I will tell the House why. In all great matters—and this is surely one of the greatest—it is usual for the Admiralty decrees to be promulgated and advocated by the permanent Secretary to the Admiralty, who is the sole recognised authority for communication between the Board and the outside world. But his signature is not on this document. It is moreover usual for the whole Board to sign when an order is promulgated affecting the King's Regulations; but the whole Board does not sign this document, for it is only signed by the First Lord of the Admiralty. Again, no great change in the service or the King's Regulations has ever been introduced, nor, I believe, can legally be introduced, without an Order in has Council. But in this case there has been no Order in Council. It is now avowed that although the changes are there, and partially carried out, and although your engineer admirals, and engineer captains provided for in the Estimates, yet, not only has there been no Order in Council, but it has not been thought necessary to make an application to the Sovereign for such an Order. The only reply that is given is that His Majesty will at some future time be appealed to to make that Order in Council, and that it will probably be issued on that First of April which seems the chosen day for all changes in our naval and military forces. This document is perhaps the most remarkable testimony that the country has been afforded of the preponderance in the Government of the Liberal Unionists. In every official position of trust, they occupy a much larger proportion than the Conservatives. It is perhaps natural on the same ground that in the child's Noah's Ark man was represented as so much bigger than the elephant in order to show the intellectual superiority of the human being. They do preponderate. They are almost exactly one-sixth of the whole combined Party, but of the sixty members of the Government, including those pillars of the Constitution the Lords-in-waiting, they but six. In the Cabinet, which consists of eighteen Members, they are not three but five; and in the Admiralty they not only preponderate but they are there alone, absolutely alone. The First Lord of the Admiralty is a Liberal Unionist, and the Secretary to the Admiralty is a Liberal Unionist. It is true there is the Civil Lord, who is a Tory, but what is a Civil Lord? If you look at the Order in Council you will find that the function of the Civil Lord is to assist the Secretary, and there he is on the Treasury Bench assisting him. In other Departments there is something like a division of responsibility between the Liberal Unionists and the Conservatives, but here there is not. The triumphs of Venezuela are equally shared by the Liberal Unionist Lord Lansdowne and the Tory noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but in the Admiralty Liberal Unionists claim all: and if this scheme is adopted the credit or the mischief will be due entirely and exclusively to the Liberal Unionist Party and not, thank God, to the Tory Party. In this remarkable document the Admiralty declare that they "have studied the question with prolonged and assiduous care"; that they alone "have the advantage of knowing all the conditions"; and that they have produced "a long and carefully thought out scheme the advantages of which will be inestimable and permanent!' And so throughout, in the English I have described, the praises are sung of the Board of Admiralty as it exists and of that the first First Lord who has ever-understood the real wants of the Navy and has prepared to meet them. I do not wish to be unfair to the Admiralty or the First Lord. There are some good things in this document. There is promotion to warrant officers, increase of pensions to petty officers, free kit to stokers, better pay to singlemen and increase of artificers—all most excellent things. But they have nothing whatever to do with the new scheme. They are the insidious jam which conceals the latent pill, and therefore I have nothing to do with them. It is stated that this is a long and carefully thought out whole, but some of the most important matters have not been thought out at all. Lot me cite some of them from the document itself. As to the education of the naval cadet, it says—

"Every detail connected with the education of these young officers will be carefully thought out and considered, and the best authorities, naval and civil, will be consulted by the Board of Admiralty."

Yet these details are of the essence of the whole thing and they are not yet settled. Then again—

"The sub-lieutenants of this branch (the engineer branch) are to go to the college at Keyham for a professional course, the exact duration of which will be determined with great care. The question of the rates of pay of the existing marine officers is being carefully considered. The lines on which the gunnery in torpedo schools may best be developed should now be settled."

Therefore all these things also, which are no less important, are not yet settled; and last, and greatest and most important of all—

"The Board have now under consideration a plan for the complete reorganisation of naval bands."

Well, these are all undecided points, and some of them are of considerable importance, and lying at the root of the matter to which the scheme refers. They are all being "carefully considered," "considered very carefully," "determined with great care," and so forth. This really does not come up to the praise which is bestowed upon the scheme by the Admiralty that invented it. The matter is of vital import. It is manifest that if mistakes are made in this matter they will be very serious indeed. Let the House remember that if this scheme is adopted and put into operation, the full effects of it cannot be felt for at least ten years. It will take ten years for those new young officers to come into positions of responsibility, and probably twenty years before they come into positions of great responsibility, where the difference between man and man is most felt in the Navy. If these are mistakes it will take generations to remedy the defects which have been introduced. But why this upheaval in the Navy? Is the Navy bad, and have the Boards of Admiralty been incompetent? Is the naval officer so inefficient that he must be entirely recast? The answer given in this Memorandum is entirely in the affirmative. This is nothing short of a most tremendous indictment, as I shall show the House, of every Board of Admiralty except the present one, and also of the existing naval officers. In effect this Memorandum charges that the officers are ignorant, disunited, and inefficient, that the}' have no common sentiment, that they are not abreast of progress (whatever that exactly means), and that they are unfit for their duties. As to the Boards of Admiralty, of the last fifteen years, the charge is that they have failed to recognise the changes that have occurred in the Navy, or to make the officers competent by adequate training. All these terrible things have, up to this moment, been unsuspected. Nobody would have believed them. Everybody believed quite the contrary. We believed that the Boards of Admiralty had done their duty, and that the product, which is the naval officer, was truly and completely admirable. We should probably have remained under that belief if the hour had not come and the man. Let me quote from the Memorandum—

"It is difficult to measure the change which has taken place in the last fifteen years. In that snort period the officers and men of the Navy and Marines have increased from about 60,000 to over 120,000. There are several foreign navies more powerful to-day than the British Navy was fifteen years ago, and yet the relative standard has been maintained. Of the ships which formed the effective fighting ships of the Navy fifteen years ago but few remain on the effective list now. The country can judge for itself what years of strenuous labour these have been for the Admiralty, years in which every task fullfilled was forgotten in the anxious effort to fulfil tasks which had yet to be done. Throughout this period the Board never lost sight of the most important question of all those which confronted them, the education and training of the officers and me of the Navy, and the adaptation of that education and training to the new conditions under which I he Navy has to work."

But these Boards were all failures. Lord Northbrook was a failure; Lord Ripon was a failure; the noble Lord who is now Secretary of State for India was a failure; Lord Spencer was a failure; and Lord Goschen was a most especial failure, because this very Memorandum cites his experiment with regard to the public schools which ended so disastrously. Every Board of Admiralty has essayed in vain to deal with this problem. They all tried and they all failed. They "never lost sight" of the question, but they failed to solve it. They gave "years of strenuous labour" but it effected nothing, and it is quite clear from this Memorandum that all Admiralty Boards would have continued to fail had there not in the very nick of time arisen a prophet, and the son of a prophet—aye, and the son-in-law of a prophet, and the brother-in-law of a prophet, and the cousin in-law of a prophet to show how he could succeed where so many preceding Boards of Admiralty had failed, and if this be the indictment of the Board, what is the indictment of the naval officers? I will state in the Admiralty's own words what it is—

"They [the Admiralty] have determined on changes which they are convinced are adapted to the changed conditions of the time, and will increase the efficiency and solidarity of the service."

That means that at present there is not adequate efficiency and solidarity in the service—or it means nothing. Again—

"No seaman, however practical, will be fit to rise beyond a certain rank unless he has thought out the problems of his calling as a student, and has omitted no opportunity of acquiring the knowledge that makes up the science of his profession."

That means, that at present the officers of the Navy have omitted their opportunities of acquiring a knowledge of their profession—or it means nothing.

"The strength which its unity gives to the service can hardly be overestimated, yet in respect of this very matter a strangely anomalous condition of affairs exists."

That means that there is no sufficient unity now—or it means nothing.

"Up to this point the young officers' characters have been formed in one school, and all these sub-lieutenants have received as the foundation of their professional education that common knowledge which all alike require. Henceforward their education must be differentiated to make them fit to perform those specialised duties which are the product of modern science."

Unless that means that at present the naval officer is not fit for his specialised duties, it means nothing.

"I hope that the officers both of the Navy and of the Marines will realise more and more in the future that the Royal Marines and the Royal Navy are but two great parts of the one sea service on which this country depends."

That means they have not realised yet that they are but two parts of the one service. What! Did they not realise it when side by side they marched up the hill at Graspan, and when after losing one third of their number they conquered the hill at last? This indictment is absolutely unfounded. It is a false indictment, and a cruel aspersion on the officers of the Navy to say that they are lacking in all these attributes I have set forth. At last comes this statement—

"In the old days it sufficed if a naval officer were a seaman. Now he must be a seaman, a gunner, a soldier, an engineer, and a man of science as well."

That suggests that the naval officer is not any of these. I say he is all of them. I say that he is all that already. All that relates to the science that belongs to a ship he is at present perfectly endowed with, and all acts required of him he is capable of performing. If you look at this document what it suggests is that the naval officer at the present day is an ignorant person, who has just stepped off a sailing brig and never heard anything of steam, hydraulics or electricity, and that he requires nothing less than a Militia colonel to teach him his profession. I say the contrary is true. I say that naval education has kept pace with every other kind of education. The "Britannia." the service at sea, the "Vernon," the "Excellent," and Greenwich College have provided the most practical training in the latest resources of science, and of those resources the naval officer has most fully availed himself. Steam, for the last quarter of a century, has been part of the training of the naval officer, and he has now, with the greatest success, added to that such matters as electricity and hydraulics. I can tell the House of an instance in which a naval lieutenant found the defect in the hydraulic machinery of a turret, which the engineer was incapable of finding. As a matter of fact the naval officer, by which I mean the naval officer properly so-called, is admirably equipped, so far as possible, with all the scientific knowledge that is required. He is a man you cannot better. Of course the naval officer lives away from the world, unknown; he does his work at sea, unseen and unheard of. But those who do know him know that he is a thorough man, whose soul is in his profession, and that there is none so fully fitted and equipped for his business. Take the case of the Marines. Their business is to act as soldiers. They are admirable troops. There is nothing in the Army that can touch them. I do not know why you want to revolutionise or extinguish the Marines. Nor are the Engineers less excellent. When they join from Keyham they are absolutely fitted to take up the duties for which they are required. What now are the proper duties of the engineer on board a man-of-war? He is not an engineer in the sense in which a man is whose business it is to design engines, and who requires great theoretical know- ledge and considerable imagination. The engineer on board ship has as his business to take the engine when designed, to keep it running, and to take care that it does not get out of order. The ship engineer's business is mainly a matter of handles, levers, and glass-gauges; he is not properly an engineer at all; he is an engine-driver. It is true that an engineer properly so-called—a theoretical engineer—is required for designing, but you only want a few at home: you do not want them on board ship. When a machine gets out of repair, if the repairs are slight the engineer and the artificer can do them; but if they are serious the ship has to be sent to the dockyard. Battleships are indeed boxes of complicated and delicate machinery, but it does not follow that the care of it requires any very high qualities; on the contrary, the history of engineering is—the more complicated the machine the more simple is the care of it. Take the telephone—it is complicated enough, but you can work it by your footman.

If it goes out of order?

You send it to the real, designing engineer.

At sea?

Take the case of the motor-car with its complicated machinery, driven by a chauffeur, who has never yet asked to be called an admiral. Take the railway locomotive. It is driven by the driver and is looked after by the locomotive superintendent; but neither engine-driver nor superintendent asks to be called a director. The engineering function is to drive an engine at sea, and to keep it in order; of the theoretical engineers you want very few, and they should be ashore and not on board ship. The present engineers and artificers are competent to do all that is needed there. Then why all this upheaval, why this revolution? The real reason is to be found among the engineers themselves. The Secretary of the Admiralty has almost admitted as much. In his speech to-day he admitted it. In his speech at the Fishmongers' Hall on 15th January, he said—

"If the difficulty with regard to the supply of engineers was to be solved, they must have a thorough education, and it was necessary they should undertake to give their naval officers, who showed themselves competent, the best education possible."

The reporter, perhaps, rather spoilt I the beauty of his phrasing, but it shows, at any rate, that he had an eye to the engineer. Again at Glasgow, on the 24th January, the Secretary to the Admiralty said—

"He believed, under this new proposal of the Admiralty, the time would come when they would be able to give the engineer in the Royal Navy that opportunity within the service which they were sometimes told he had lacked, and which they all felt it was most desirable he should receive."

I think, therefore, I am justified in saying that, after all, the engineer is at the bottom of the whole difficulty. And this is shown in the very last paragraph of the Memorandum, in which the Board of Admiralty say that—

"In the task of consolidating their work they rely, with supreme confidence, on the loyalty to the service of the officers of the Royal Navy and of the Royal Marines."

Why do they appeal to the loyalty of the naval officer and the Marines only, and not to the engineers? Because these are supposed to be going to reap great advantages, and not to require, therefore, an appeal to their loyalty. They have to appeal to the officers of the Royal Marines and Royal Navy because these are getting nothing, while the engineers are getting everything. What, now, are the grievances of the engineers? One is that the engineer officer cannot punish his men. No more can a torpedo lieutenant, or a gunnery lieutenant, or an officer of the watch. In each case they have to go to the captain. In the case of a torpedo-destroyer, the captain himself cannot punish the man; if the man breaks his leave in a most discreditable and scandalous manner, the captain has to keep him on board until he gets to the parent ship, and he has to send him there for judgment Nay, on shore we none of us can punish our servants; if my cook sends up a leg of mutton badly cooked, I cannot give him ten days cells; my only remedy is to go to the magistrate. Therefore the idea of an engineer not being able to punish a man is purely an imaginary grievance. Again, the social grievance has disappeared. The engineer officer takes his place in the ward-room, and is welcomed there. I have never heard of any difficulty in the ship as regards the social question. All the engineering grievances, in my belief, would easily have been solved by the simple method of an increase of pay. That was the one solution. The Vote for engineer pay amounts to £250,000 this year. Suppose you had given an increase of 10 per cent., or even of 20 per cent., it would have satisfied the engineers, and contentment at that price would have been cheaply bought, instead of which you are revolutionising the whole scheme of education. Are the engineers grateful for this boon? Not they. Listen to what G. M. Johnson, Chief Inspector of Machinery, their great spokesman, says—

"And what does the new scheme confer on the present engineers in the service? An empty title! A title shorn of all the privileges, accessories, and the authority which executive rank has hitherto conferred on its predecessors! A thing of shreds and patches—a discredited counterfeit foisted on the country. A deliberate extension of the system of veiled contempt with which the engineer has been treated by the executive class ever since they were first compelled to admit him into the ranks of the Navy as a necessary evil."

A "discreditable counterfeit." That is what your engineers call the scheme which was mainly intended to satisfy them. That is not all. It has leaked out that it is the final intention of the Admiralty to get rid of the major part of the engineers altogether and to substitute for them artificers of a lower grade. If that is so, the result of your great scheme for the benefit of the engineers is that they will have been engineered out of the Navy altogether, and the engineers will find that they have foolishly agitated to their own destruction. But there is more. Under the new scheme the engineer is to go to the "Britannia" for from four to seven years at a cost to his parents of at least £100 a year. How are the families of that excellent artisan class who have furnished so many engineers to the Navy, and still furnish them for the mercantile marine, to continue to provide them for the Navy? How are they to send their sons to a service which requires so much outlay? How can they afford to pay £100 a year for seven years or more? This scheme, when carried out, will make it absolutely impossible for persons of that kind to-send their sons into the Navy, and you will close the service of naval engineering to the class which has given the best men in the past, and which now furnishes the only engineers to the mercantile marine. I am sorry to have detained the House so long, but I feel I am doing inadequate justice to this most tremendous subject. One other point. I have already explained that the marines, the engineers and the naval officers are all to be started in the same school up to twenty years of age, and that they are then to diverge. At first, to quote the; Memorandum, we were told that "it is proposed to make the division into the various branches definite and final," but on the 25th February the First Lord made a revelation, and said—

"I have no. more doubt than that I am standing here that the scheme will work out so that all these branches of the naval service will throughout the career of the officer be interchangeable."

"Interchangeable." That is the end. It does not, indeed, include the chaplain, the surgeon, the paymaster. I do not see why it should not. If there is anything in your scheme the chaplain should fight the ship, the paymaster serve the guns, and the last consolations of religion be administered by the surgeon to the blue-jacket who has had his leg sliced oft' by the torpedo lieutenant. The scheme as it stands is no less ridiculous. It is impossible that a naval officer can go from the deck properly and adequately to take charge of the engines, and it is equally impossible for the engineer officer to go on deck and handle the ship. It is even more impossible for the marine officer to take charge of either, and the scheme is one for making every man fit to do every other man's business—which is impossible. Only one point more, and I have done. This scheme will enormously increase the patronage of the First Lord of the Admiralty. At present he gives nominations to 3,401 naval officers only; but in future he will also give nominations for 466 marines and 1,210 for engineers, or 1,676 more. This scheme, in short, will give very nearly double the number of nominations to the First Lord of the Admiralty, and so double the amount of his political patronage. Nor is that all. The scheme declares that—

"No sub-lieutenant will be compelled to join a branch for which he did not enter as a boy when applying for a nomination, but in giving nominations for competition for entrance to the 'Britannia,' preference will (other things being equal) be given to those boys whose parents or guardians declare for them that they will be ready to enter either of the three brandies of the Service."

How a parent can declare for a boy of twelve that at twenty he will be ready to enter a particular branch of the Service, only a First Lord of the Admiralty can say. But see how it will work. Two boys apply for nominations—A and B. A will not declare readiness to enter either branch, and B will. A is the son of an Earl or the grandson of a lawyer, B is the son of a Dissenting parson. Will the First Lord hold the other things to be equal in such a case? He is the judge. Will B be given a preference over A? I doubt it. It seems to mo this scheme will make a huge new engine of political influence in England which is extremely undesirable. I believe that the old system was right; that it requires no essential alteration whatever; that the new system is mischievous, and may be disastrous. The functions of the naval officer, the marine officer, and the engineer officer are diverse, and are daily becoming more diverse, and therefore their training should be diverse. There must he day by day more, and not less, specialisation, earlier and not later specialisation. But here is a scheme which generalises everybody, as though they were all to perform the same functions. The naval officer as he at present exists is admirable, but for that naval officer, who is a specialised seaman, engineer and man of science, you propose to substitute a hybrid, interchangeable popinjay, a jack-of-all-trades and master of none. I do earnestly hope that the House will not give its assent to this hasty and ill-considered scheme. Experiment, if you will, with your Army, and play what fantastic tricks you like with it. The Army is comparatively unimportant as contrasted with the Navy, but do not tamper with your naval organisation, which has grown up from the experience of centuries and has produced such admirable results as we see in the existing naval officers. I beg to move—"That the new scheme of naval training embodied in the Memorandum of the First Lord of the Admiralty, dated 16th December, 1902, is calculated, in its present form, seriously to impair the efficiency of the Navy, and that, before being carried into effect, it should be reconsidered and modified."

I should like to second the Amendment because I regard the scheme of the Admiralty as fundamentally bad. My chief objection to the scheme is directed against that part of it which relates to the early entry of the boys and to their school time, between twelve and seventeen years of age, before they go to sea. In this matter the Admiralty are not themselves experts; they are rather obtruding on the domain of experts, and therefore they cannot find fault with any criticism of their scheme. But not only are they not experts in this matter, they have a very bad record in the past, because, twenty years ago they kept a school for boys of between twelve and fourteen years of age, and it was, confessedly, an extremely bad one, and an extremely expensive one. Every boy in the school cost £308 per annum, and of that sum £98 was found by the parent and £210 a year was found out of the Consolidated Fund. The school was occasionally inspected, and the reports of the examiners were incautiously published by the Admiralty, incautiously, because some of them excited considerable discussion. Then the Admiralty refused to publish any more reports, or to let the House know what the inspectors thought the state of their school was. In those days there came into this House a rising young naval officer, Lord Ramsay, who had himself been commander of the "Britannia" for two years, and who was returned to this House as Member for the city of Liverpool. Lord Ramsay gave to the House a description of the "Britannia" which compelled the Admiralty to abandon the practice which they had then adopted of taking these little boys and schooling them in the "Britannia." Unfortunately they did not raise the age, as urged to do at the time, to seventeen, and took sort of half measures and raised it to fifteen and a half years. The whole plan, however, of taking these little boys was abandoned. Allow me to remind the House of the reasons against the plan which was deliberately abandoned twenty years ago, and to which the Admiralty have again practically reverted. The first objection is that it subjects little boys of twelve or twelve and a half years of age to competitive examination, which is one of the very worst things for young boys, and prevents their education. All competitive examinations are bad, although in some cases they may be necessary evils; but they are especially bad for small children. An appointment is given to the boy who answers the greatest number of questions put in examination, and the consequence is that for a few years he is not educated at all, but prepared for examination and taught how to answer questions. The system is a very bad stimulus to education; with these little boys it is something worse. The medical authorities are agreed that the anxiety and dread of these examinations, and the strain of them, are so great that they positively injure the intellect and leave the brain entirely depleted of its powers. In their scheme the Admiralty say that they will not make the examination very severe; but how can they make it not severe? This is a very long and carefully thought out scheme, but they have not told us how the severity of the examination is to be mitigated. In any examination the strain is very great, even if it is only in arithmetic, algebra, or an easy paper in the French language. The strain of the examination upon these little children, and their preparation for it, is enormous. In fact, so bad is the system of competitive examination for entering little boys of twelve years of age for the Navy, that the late Mr. W. H. Smith would never put a stop during his lifetime to the system of nomination, saying that it was infinitely preferable to examination. Lord Ramsay, the young naval officer to whom I have referred, said that the early entry was perhaps the most mischievous and most pernicious feature of the whole system. My second objection to entering the boys at an early age is that many of them never become naval officers. Lord Ramsay had of course similar experience in the "Britannia," and ho told the House of Commons that a very large number of the cases out of 250 boys who had entered that institution, and into which he had inquired, had consented to go to the "Britannia" in order to get away from school. That was a most brilliant idea! A very large number had also gone into the service because their parents wished it, although they had no particular taste for it, and did not think they were fitted for it. Under the new scheme the Admiralty entered boys of twelve and a half years of age who are afterwards to man the executive, the engineering, and the marine branches of the service; but a great number of these will not, when they come to years of discretion, wish to become officers at all. The Admiralty themselves see this, because they propose in their Memorandum to eliminate very freely during the course of training between twelve and seventeen years of age a great number of the boys. But what an extemely uneconomic and expensive process that is? These boys will have had spent on them a large sum of public money every year to educate them. In this long and carefully thought out scheme the Admiralty do not tell us of finance. There is no kind of estimate of the cost of providing our naval officers, but if it is like the "Britannia" of old days, it will cost the country upwards of £200 per year for every one of the boys. That is a very extravagant way of manning the Navy. But I have a very much stronger objection. As to the spoiling of a number of boys, perhaps that is a matter with which the Admiralty think they have nothing to do, but this House, which represents the interests of the country, has something to do with it. How many boys are you going to spoil for life by a proceeding of this kind in order to obtain officers? A boy twelve and a half number of naval may be entered at years of age and turned out at fifteen, and he will have lost, educationally, a great part of that time. He may not be qualified to make a good naval officer, but he may have very rare merits in another direction. The career of the boy is therefore interfered with, and may be utterly spoiled. Another objection to the scheme, which is a very strong one, is that one of the worst things that you can do with any class of boys is to separate them from the rest of the community and give them a special education apart, instead of allowing them to mix with other boys. No part of the scheme seems to me much worse than that. It is quite true that in the Navy, as well as in other professions, you have to give at a special stage special education, but everybody who knows anything about education at all, knows that specialisation should be made as late as possible, and not at twelve years of age. Until you have to separate the boys for specialisation, it is far better that they should be brought up with other boys than set apart in the manner the Admiralty propose. Again I quote the authority of Lord Ramsay, who said—

"This system of separating little boys from their fellows was destroying much originality of character, and narrowing the minds of future officers by cutting short their general education, and taking them out of the world before they had time to see anything of it."

Another naval officer, Captain Price, in one of the debates in this House, said that for the first two or three years he had been in the Navy he had learned nothing, and un-learned a great deal of what he had learned at school. I have another objection; and that is that by this scheme you are practically restricting your naval officers, engineers and marine, as well as executive officers, to the richer pails of society. It is only a rich man that can afford to send his son from the age of twelve to the age of seventeen to a school at which he has to pay at least £100 a year. We have not got the details of the financial part of the scheme before us, but I assume that parent would have to pay £100 a year, or perhaps more. In that way you will restrict all your naval officers to the richer parts of society. I dare say that the present executive officers of the Navy are practically drawn from the riche parts of society; but the engineers are drawn from the middle classes; from the young men who, born in a poor station of life, have raised themselves by attending the public elementary schools, the higher grade schools, and the technical schools in such a way that, at the age of sixteen or seventeen, they arc fitted by their own industry, and without having cost their parents one penny, to enter he Navy as engineers. You are going by this scheme to deprive those boys, some of the best boys of the country, of an honourable career hitherto open to them; and you will shut that career out from all boys whose parents cannot fiord to pay £100 a year for their education from the ago of twelve to the age of seventeen. The reasons for taking joys at this early age, which were referred to by my hon. friend the Secretary to the Admiralty, are two, which will be very much appreciated by naval men One is an historical reason. It is that history proves that boys will not take to be hardships of sea life unless they begin at an early age. The other reason is, that boys must go to sea early to learn seamanship, which can only be learned by practice, and which used to be one of the most important qualifications of a naval officer. But are you going to send, those boys to sea? If you were going to end them to sea at the age of twelve those arguments would apply; but you are going to keep them on shore, and in a school one might even say an inferior school, from the age of twelve to the age of seventeen, and then at the age of seventeen you are going to send them to sea. Why not take boys out of the schools of the country, and send them to sea at the age of seventeen. With the great enterprise there is in education in this country, and with all the additional enterprise which the Act of last year is likely to give to the local authorities, you have only to say what sort of boys you want, what qualifications you require, and the country will supply them at the age of seventeen, without any cost of trouble to the Government; the Admiralty will thus be relieved from the strain or keeping schools for little boys, and will be enabled to attend to their proper business of managing the ships of the Navy. I examined with the greatest possible interest and curiosity this Memorandum to see what the reasons were for this proposal. I do not want to attack my hon. friend or the Admiralty; but I may say that the reasons given in this document are rather, what are perhaps unjustly called, women's reasons. On page four we find the reasons, and all they say is that the change is necessary. My hon. friend has not told us why it is necessary; but he has told us that this is a long and carefully thought out scheme, which I should not have known otherwise, because it does not appear to me that many of the points have been thought out at all. It is also said that it is very important to have unity in the Navy, and that for this unity early homogeneous training is necessary. Homogeneous is a very long word, but I suppose what it means is, that we cannot have naval officers friends with one another, unless, as little boys, they have been to school together. But they would be at school together if they were taken from the ordinary schools. I cannot see in this Memorandum any reason given for reverting to the old plan which has been abandoned, and which I think it is a great pity that the Admiralty should now, without a great deal longer and more careful consideration, revive. The House will recollect that all authority, at least all Parliamentary authority, is against a system of this kind. Not only was this system condemned by Lord Ramsay and Captain Price, but also by Sir John Hay, one of the greatest authorities in his day on naval questions. Sir Edward Reed, also a considerable authority, at all events in the engineering branch of naval education, condemned it. It was condemned by Lord Knutsford, and also by Lord Goschen, when he was a Member of this House; and, although various Secretaries to the Admiralty, who had to defend the practice during the debates in this House twenty years ago, were obliged to say something in favour of the system, they very clearly showed that their sympathies were very strongly with those who attacked the proceedings of the Admiralty. Mr. Shaw Lefevre and Sir George Trevelyan sympathised with those who attacked the system, and the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, when he was Secretary to the Admiralty, was also sympathetic. Then we have another authority against it. We have the universal authority of all foreign nations. Although no doubt we are very proud of our Fleet, and do not consider that any Fleet in the world can compete with it, yet in one particular subordinate branch, which is accessory to the training and education of officers, we are not particular experts. All foreign nations, without exception, take their naval officers at about the same age that we take our Army officers, namely, at seventeen or eighteen year's of age; and as soon as they take them from the ordinary schools of the country they send them straight off to sea. I am told that our great naval rival—France—actually examined a scheme of this kind quite recently, but determined to pursue the old practice of the French Navy, namely, to take young men of general education from the ordinary schools of the country and begin their specialisation by sending them to sea at the age of seventeen or eighteen. I strongly object to the fundamental ground-work of this scheme; and I hope before it is carried out that these matters will be reconsidered. If lion. Members will turn back to the speech made in this House by Lord Ramsay—it was his maiden speech—they will find all the arguments extremely well stated. It was a speech made in 1880 and can easily be found, as Lord Ramsay did not trouble the House on a great many occasions. I strongly recommend that speech to lion. Members as containing a most excellent summary of all that is to be said for and against this particular feature of the Admiralty scheme. May I now be allowed for a moment to leave my own ground, and follow the school-boy to the ship to which he is sent as a midshipman; and want to call the attention of the House to a rather important point. No doubt at seventeen, when the officer begins his naval training, you must give him practical experience of his profession, and practical work, as well as continue his theoretical education. I am sorry to say that this carefully thought out Memorandum does not state whether that practical work is to be given on a training ship specially adapted for training our officers, or given on an ordinary man-of-war. But whichever it is, I should like to ask the Admiralty to consider whether they think the provision made in their scheme, not for practical work but for the continuation of theoretical instruction, to be at all adequate. They say that as soon as the young officer goes to a man-of-war compulsory school work is entirely to cease, and that he is to be left almost to his own devices as to his studies. "A man-of-war," said Lord Ramsay—I must apologise for quoting him so frequently but he is the great source of illumination on this subject—"is the worst place for scientific study that can be conceived." The duties of the ship are so necessary that the young officer is continually taken away from his studies, and when he gets back he cannot resume them with the same earnestness as if he had not been disturbed. He will be under no less than six separate tutors, men who have not been practically trained in the art of teaching, and who will have the supervision of his studies, without they themselves being at all qualified as experts in the art of teaching. There will be an executive officer to teach him executive duties, and an engineer officer to teach him about machinery, a gunnery officer, a marine officer, a navigating officer, and a torpedo officer. He is to be examined annually in all these subjects during this three years he is at sea; but the papers will not be set by the officers who have been teaching him, but will be sent down from the Admiralty. What will be the consequence? What in the result? Why, that this unfortunate youth during his three years at sea will be cramming for the Admiralty examinations so as to be able to pass them, and so obtain promotion. I do not think the three months at Greenwich which is to close the career of the midshipman will be at all sufficient to complete his intellectual and scientific study; and the only plan I can suggest is that these young officers should go to sea for a certain number of months, and be on shore for a certain number of months, during which time they should be engaged in serious study. You must of course combine study on shipboard with study on shore, and the only way to do that which I can suggest is to make the time at sea specific; and I am quite sure that unless some system of that kind is invented, you will find that the boy who has been to the Admiralty school from the age of twelve to that of seventeen, avid has been at sea from seventeen to twenty, with the exception of this three months spent at Greenwich, is very far inferior to the boy who has been brought up at the ordinary public school in the country, who may have learnt engineering in a secondary school, and have become a thoroughly trained engineer by the time he has reached twenty. I do not wish to say a word against the idea which appears to have prompted this scheme—the idea of making all officers brothers in the Service and giving to them a common feeling for the Navy, and preventing there being any jealousy as to any particular branch in which they may be engaged. But after all the naval profession is very complicated. You cannot bring up a man as a good marine, a good engineer, and a good executive officer. It is far too complicated for that. You must have different branches of the Service. By all means amalgamate them as much as you possibly can, and do away with jealousy as much as possible; I only say I think the wrong way to do that is to take away little boys from the other little boys in the country and segregate them in a school different to all the other schools in the country, and then to suppose they will be better men. I think if the plan is adopted it will only end in bringing misfortune on the Navy and the country. Amendment proposed—

"To leave out from the word 'That,' to the end of the Question, in order to add the words 'the new scheme of Naval Training embodied in the Memorandum of the First Lord of the Admiralty, dated 16th December, 1902, is calculated, in its present form, seriously to impair the efficiency of the Navy, and that, before being carried into effect, it should he reconsidered and modified.'" "—(Mr. Gibson Bowles.)

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

Mr. Speaker, the somewhat unusual course that has been taken to-day has at all events this advantage—it enables the House to discuss by itself the comparatively narrow but immensely important issue raised by the Amendment before it proceeds to deal with the undefined and unexplained magnitude of these colossal Estimates. I propose to follow as closely as I can the speeches made by the two hon. Members who have just spoken. I agree entirely with the point made by the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down that this is not a question in which the Admiralty are experts. This scheme strikes at the principle of competition in the public service, and it is therefore not a question for Admiralty opinion alone, or naval opinion alone, but for the people of this country and their representatives in this House. That leads me to say, it being a scheme of this character and of this magnitude that I do not understand why the Admiralty has been so evasive of Parliamentary control as it has in this matter; why it kept this back until this House had risen; and why it has entered into this scheme at this time at all? What has it done? What is the scheme of the Government? You have under the present system naval officers of three kinds; the executive, the marine, and engineer officer. The executive officer comes into the Navy by patronage at an early age from the cadet school, the "Britannia." The marine officer comes in at a later age and by open competition, and the engineer officer also comes in at a later age and by open competition, and in spite of what the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty has said, I believe there can be no doubt that this scheme has been brought about by the dissatisfaction which those classes of officers other than the executive have felt for many years. It is no use to disavow the fact that it is the dissatisfaction of the engineer and marine officers that has compelled this Admiralty, as it will compel every Admiralty, to face this question. What is the grievance of those officers? It is the position of professional inferiority in which they stand with regard to the executive officers. The engineers complain that they cannot issue orders to their inferiors and have no control over them. Neither they nor the marine officers can rise to the higher ranks, and both marine officers and the engineers suffer from a sense of social inferiority. It must be taken to be established as a fact that the repeated grievances they have made for many years undoubtedly arose from the difference of entrance into the Navy—the one by patronage and the other by competition. That difference brought about this social inferiority, and I call the House to witness that this immense experiment is due to nothing-less than the existence in the Navy of that; cursed spirit of class distinction which is the curse of the country. Now what have the Admiralty done? They have; not classed the position of the existing officers—they have, to use an old phrase, cut the Gordian knot. They have solved the question by making in future all naval officers to begin as cadets in the "Britannia" at an age of twelve and a half years, and by patronage instead of competition. They train them together for eight years, of which the first four are to be employed in giving them a general education, and the last four devoted to special education. After the eight years they are to be separated into the three classes—executive, marine, and engineer, definitely and finally, according to this scheme. That, I believe, has been mitigated by a recent announcement, but that is the embryology of a naval officer. It appears to me rather like a misapplication of a misunderstood scientific principle, but that is the scheme, and my objection to it, while not confined to the points taken by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Cambridge University, is largely founded on the reasons he has given. What I want to impress on hon. Members on this side of the House is this—the proposition now before the House is whether you are going to abolish the principle of competition; of entry by merit; whether you are going to abolish that principle in the two branches of the service in which it now exists and base the whole of your naval service on. patronage, in the first instance, and class interests and power in the second. That is the manner in which this matter has I to be considered, and to that point I shall devote what little I have to say. Competition, entrance by merit, all these things go by the board, and the only excuse, the only pretence for an excuse, is that reverted to by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Cambridge University, which is, that you cannot get a proper seaman unless you catch him young, at the age of between twelve and thirteen. In other words, you have a declaration by the Admiralty that you cannot give a boy the proper sea-character unless you begin at twelve and a half years. That is a business point for the House to consider, and it is to the consideration of this point that I desire to devote a few moments. There is not a unanimous naval opinion on this question; so far as I know it is a point on which if you had a naval opinion it might be of great value, but the question of whether it is necessary to begin young in order to become a good seaman is a question on which naval opinion differs. Anyone who has read the old debates in this House knows that no two naval men hold the same opinion on it. One of the brightest names in the annals of the British Navy is that of Lord Dundonald, but he entered the Navy at eighteen years of age, or about the period of the second stage under the new scheme. What is this sea-character which cannot be acquired unless you catch your seaman at the age of twelve and a half years? Does it apply to all seamen? Does it apply to the mercantile marine? Does it apply to all the men in the Fleet? The ordinary seaman comes in at eighteen, from which it appears that the sea-character is a thing which does not concern the ordinary seaman at all, but is special and peculiar to the officer. But supposing it to be confined to the officer, has it ever been contended to be necessary in the case of marines or engineers I Or, to adopt the argument of the hon. Member for King's Lynn, do you now, in justification of this proposal, allege that the true sea-character has never been acquired by the marine or engineer officer? I do not believe that anybody who knows the Navy would venture to take up such a position as that. These boys will not get sea-life, and how they are to get sea-character at a land college is one of the mysteries which have not been explained, either by the First Lord of the Admiralty in his Memorandum, or by the Secretary to the Admiralty in his speech to-day. Confining myself to the alleged necessity of fixing the age at twelve and a half years, I would ask what reliance can be placed on the supposed preference of a boy of that ago for a naval career? Can you trust the preference of such a lad as you would trust the deliberate preference of a young man who has been thinking about the matter for four years more, and who at the age of seventeen, after considering all possible careers, makes up his mind for the Navy? If you asked my opinion, I should say, choose the more, rather than the less matured judgment, and I regard that as one strong argument against the adoption of the earlier age. To go back to the preparatory stage, in the course you are going to give them for the first four years there will be, and cannot be anything else, but a good secondary education. You cannot give them anything more than that; you may base it largely on science—in my humble judgment all education ought to be based on science, and I approve of all the Admiralty propose as to that—but you cannot give them anything more than a secondary education. Therefore I would say, instead of taking them at twelve and a half years and condemning them, as you will be condemning them, to a naval career, fix your requirements by declaration, say that boys must know something of the principle of marine engineering and the physical sciences, and take them at the age of sixteen or seventeen when an examination can be a reality, and you may rest assured that the public school system will produce the training which will yield the results you desire. After carefully considering the whole question, I have come to the conclusion that the alleged necessity for cadets entering at this early age has not been and cannot be proved. I believe the adoption of the early age is not the consequence of any such necessity at all, but it has been favoured in order to build upon it a system of patronage and exclusive appointments. Even if it were proved to me, as it has not been, that there are advantages in the selection of the earlier age, I say that it is paying too high a price for those advantages to adopt a system which excludes from the service of the Navy 95 per cent, of the brain and muscle of the eligible candidates who might be willing to adopt a naval career. The effect of this scheme will be the complete exclusion of all but a privileged class from the Navy, which all pay for, and which belongs, not to the Admiralty or to naval officers, but to the people of the country at large. We can to some extent judge the probable effects by the results of the system in the Army. Coarser methods are there applied, but they have the same object in view. We have in the Army what are called "crack" regiments; I hope we shall never have in the Navy "crack" ships, in the fashionable sense in which the word is used. In the debate to which reference has been made, Lord Goschen spoke; he was then First Lord of the Admiralty, and this is the principle he laid down—

"That naval service must be open to all classes of the people."

Lord Gosehon has no doubt changed his opinion on many subjects, but I doubt if; he has changed it on this, and I hope that before the scheme becomes an accomplished fact the late First Lord will have something to say about the proposals of his successor. Allusion has been made to the late Member for Woolwich. Lord Charles Beresford is an excellent example of the kind of naval candidate who obtains easy admission to, and rapid promotion in, the Navy. He has been succeeded in this House by an hon. Member of a very different type, representing unknown forces, and probably, to some, unwelcome opinions. I shall look with interest to see how the successor of Lord Charles Beresford votes upon the first question submitted to him. In the name of the Crown, the Admiralty come to the hon. Member and say: "This Navy, for which we ask £36,000,000, must be supported by taxes on the bread, tea, and sugar of the people, but we state frankly to the class to which you belong, practically the whole of your constituents, that though their sons may be stokers, artificers, and perhaps warrant officers in the Navy, we are going to take care, by this new system, that it shall be impossible for them ever to become officers." That is the question placed before the hon. Member, and I have very little doubt as to how he will vote upon it. Reference has been made to certain articles in The Times newspaper. I always read the naval articles in The Times with more interest than any other part of that remarkable organ of the powerful, wealthy, and privileged classes of this country. In one of those articles a gentleman, defending the scheme, has the assurance to say that under these new proposals dukes' sons and cooks' sons will come into the Navy on equal terms. That is what men who have not examined the scheme say. But while I am supporting his Motion, I do not take the same view of other parts of the scheme as the hon. Member for King's Lynn. I do not believe that the grievances of the engineers are of such a character that they can be bought off by a payment of money; that things are as they ought to be, and that all you have to do to satisfy the engineers is to add 10 per cent, or 20 per cent, to their salaries. Therefore, though I have attacked the scheme on the grounds that I have mentioned, it must not be sup- posed that I concur with the hon. Member opposite in what has been the main body of his criticism. I agree rather with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Cambridge University, that, while the exclusion of competition and the establishment of patronage is the one big thing concerning the scheme upon which the House has to pass judgment, there are other questions, also difficult, involving other considerations. What is to be the effect of this scheme on the Navy as a whole; and, in particular, what are the prospects of what is called the "interchangeability" of officers? On that point I should like to have naval opinion. On a question of that sort, naval opinion would be most important if we could only get it; but we have not got it, and I am afraid there will be some difficulty in getting it. The question of interchangeability is manifestly a difficult one, and there are two questions I should like to ask. You are going to make the marine executive and the engineers all one. After what has been said, I think some statement ought to be made on the question of the status of the marines. If you are going to mix the officers up, I suppose there will be a certain fusion in the lower ranks also, and I should like to hear what the hon. Gentleman has to say on the question of whether it is at all necessary to keep up the separate organisation of the marines on board ship.

Order, order! That question does not now arise.

The suggestion was to make them all one, and I suggested as a deduction from that that some explanation might be necessary why they do not go further and abolish the distinction altogether as far as the marines are concerned.

That question does not arise. It may be somewhat remotely connected, with the subject of the Amendment, but it cannot be discussed.

It would be necessary to know what are the special functions of this special class. But there is another question. There will be grave difficulties in the transition period between the officers of the old system and the officers of the new system. There must be friction of some sort between the officers and engineers of the old and new system. All these things want considering. The main question, however, which the House has to consider to-day is the one with which I began, namely, are we, for the sake of an unproved advantage and an unprovable advantage, and for the sake of bringing officers into the Navy at an age far lower than usual, to establish a system which removes them, so far as the officers are concerned, entirely from the main bulk, which destroys competition, which will have an evil effect, and which will produce no advantage to the country or to the Navy. I agree with the Amendment to this extent, that in destroying the principle of public competition, and in establishing the principle of favouritism and exclusiveness, the Admiralty has gone too far; the Government ought never to have taken up this scheme or proceeded with it without the assent of Parliament, and I declare my confirmed and determined opposition to that part of the scheme to which I have referred.

It was obvious during the earlier part of this debate that the support that Government might get for this scheme from their own followers would be a divided support. It is pretty obvious that upon this side of the House also there is a good deal of division of opinion. My hon. and learned friend who has just sat down has made a powerful speech about the scheme, and he has done great public service by calling attention to one matter connected with it, and that is the large extent to which patronage is put at the disposition of the naval authorities. That is an important point, no doubt, but I have been deeply moved by different considerations connected with this scheme, turning on another point which seems to be equally vital, I agree with my hon. and learned friend that it is a question of balancing difficulty against difficulty, and that the burden is upon those who say the change must be made. The point I have in my mind is one which leads me to think very strongly that this scheme is a very good one and goes to the root of the matter. The complaint, as my hon. and learned friend has put it, against this scheme is that it should be deemed necessary to bring officers into the Navy at an earlier age than is at present the case, and he argues that there is no reason why these officers should not be rendered fit for the Navy at a later stage in life. But, Sir, if there is one thing about which there has been strong feeling of late, and one topic upon which there has been more agreement than upon any other, it is the unfortunate fact that most of our Admirals are comparatively old men. The conditions of the service which control the promotion of officers in our Navy are such as to give high rank at a far later ft age than ought to be the ease if you are to get complete efficiency. The ages of the admirals in the German Navy are on an average some ten years less than those of our own admirals. Now, Sir, I am not saying that we have not had some magnificent service from elderly men in our Navy, and I hope that we shall continue to have such magnificent service in the future. I do,, however, say that it is a bad thing, when everything depends upon quickness and daring, upon judgment and courage, and upon those qualities which you do not often find in men who have passed the prime of life—I do say that it is a misfortune that we should have a system which of necessity compels these admirals to be kept back from exercising their supreme functions until a stage has been reached when they are past the prime of life. On that ground alone I should say it was a material advantage to reduce the age at which officers should be able to join the Navy.

The German age is not an earlier age.

No, but the German admiral age is much earlier. I am aware that the German naval cadets enter later, because they have to go through the secondary school system, but I was under the impression that our Navy was a model, and that we meant to be very much ahead of Germany as far as the quality of our officers is concerned. I do not think anybody can form a just judgment of the scheme without looking at what the problem is which the Admiralty has to solve. I agree with my hon. and learned friend that there has been great dissatisfaction on the part of the engineer branch of the Service, but that is not the only matter, nor is it the most serious one. As time has gone on, the work of the average naval officer, whether he be an executive officer or an engineer, has gradually become of a more and more technical character, demanding more and more complete training, and calling for a combination not only of various qualities, but of kinds of knowledge which cannot be got unless the education is of a very much more thorough character than it was in the good old times. Two qualities have been called for. The hon. Member for King's Lynn, in the fine old crusted speech in which he complained of the influence of the Liberal Unionists, desires us to go back to a former state of things, to those old traditions about our midshipmen who used to command cutlers at a very early age, and did so very efficiently, with a plenitude of language which usually belongs to a much later stage in life. No doubt that sort of sea quality is very valuable, but, on the other hand, you are now calling for increased scientific knowledge, increased training, and better education for young officers. How are you to combine those qualities? It is for the want of the combination that the existing system has broken down. The average boy who comes from the public schools has not been properly trained when he arrives at fifteen or sixteen years of age, and he has not got that kind of quality which the old midship man used to get. The kind of training which the young officer has to go through does not make up for the deficiences which the school training necessarily has. We have now passed away from the kind of education afforded by masts and yard-arms, which made a seaman of a young officer very fast, and we have got back to a condition of things in which scientific knowledge is most important, and which must yet be acquired in a sea atmosphere. Now the Admiralty are face to face with this problem. The battleship, the cruiser, the torpedo destroyer, or whatever it is you are dealing with, is getting more and more of a scientific instrument, and is getting to be a vessel in which every part is co-ordinated, and in which no man can command the whole unless he has a knowledge of every part. The executive officer must to some extent be an engineer. I disagree with the hon. Member for King's Lynn that a man can separate the two capacities, or be a good controller of machinery, without knowing in detail how to deal with it. Your executive officer must have some knowledge of engineering if he is to be really first rate on board a battleship or cruiser. Your Marine officer and others a re, on the other hand, at present cut oft altogether from the kind of naval surroundings which they ought to have if they are to be brought into relation with other duties. The purpose of the Admiralty in this scheme is, if possible, to provide a type of naval officer who will have all this kind of knowledge when he begins his career, and then, and not till then, will they allow him to differentiate. I see no difficulty in a man of nineteen or twenty having sufficient knowledge of engineering to be an expert in the art of understanding and controlling the ship's engines, and see no difficulty in such an expert also having the general knowledge which an executive officer ought to have. Let anybody interested in these things watch the young officers who are being trained to work the torpedoes at Portsmouth on board the "Vernon" Whether it be torpedo work, or wireless telegraphy, or any other technical subject taught on the training ships, you will see at every turn the necessity which is growing for the naval officer understanding every branch of the science which is necessary for the handling of a ship. Whether you are dealing with gunnery, torpedoes, the engines, or the electricity which is the motive power right through the ship, or with the liquid air which is likely to be of such importance in the future on board our warships, all these things require scientific knowledge, which must be possessed by every kind of officer. That is the problem the Admiralty have to face. I dissent from the view that this is a problem which has arisen merely out of the discontent of the engineer officer. I feel that it is due to the growth of our time and the great change that has come over the tremendous instruments of war which science has made necessary if we are to hold our own in the competition of the world. The problem which the Admiralty has had to face is to provide a system under which officers can begin earlier to acquire their knowledge. The situation was—that the public school had made the endeavour to furnish young men who would come up at the end of their secondary education and compete for entry into a short service. That has been found to be insufficient, and accordingly the Admiralty have formed the design of reverting to a different kind of training, under which the officers begin at an early age in order to produce this interchangeable and highly trained kind of officer. This is no new idea, because this kind of officer exists already in the United States, where he had been a great success. I must say that I was strongly impressed by the opinion of certain of the naval authorities of the United States, who gave nothing but praise to this scheme so far as in operation across the Atlantic. But how are you going to produce this kind of man unless you give him longer training than three or four years? You must take him at an early age. If you are to begin at the first four years of his professional life, between twelve and twelve and a half years of age, you must begin by instilling into him something of seamanship. It is said that these four years are to be passed at a college on land. I am not sure if I have read the scheme in the same way as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Cambridge University—there is to be a naval college, but there is to be training in marine appliances and ship appliances.

Marine engines.

I believe there will be war ships provided for giving instruction; there is to be a ship in which these boys will be trained, and in which they will be in contact with naval officers through that period of their career. I do not interpret the scheme in the restricted sense in which the right hon. Gentleman interprets it, and it turns out that my interpretation is the right one, for I see nodded assent from those gentlemen on the other side of the House who are responsible for the scheme. The idea is to bring the boy into a naval atmosphere and give him there the beginnings of a first-rate secondary education. He will begin at twelve, when his primary education is done. The secondary education adopted for naval purposes is one which he may make use of for other purposes if he fails in the examination, or for any other reason does not qualify for the Service. You are going, as I read the new scheme, really to start a very good new school. The right hon. Gentleman referred to the failure of an attempt of this nature on board the "Britannia." That, I think, is probably very true. It is a quarter of a century since that time, and we come to this matter now with superior wisdom. I trust it is within the capacity of the Admiralty nowadays to organise a good secondary school of this special type, because, if not, then I should begin to doubt their efficiency for Admiralty purposes in which, up to the present time, I have been very much disposed to believe. I think it is possible to start a first-rate school of this kind. It entirely depends on whom you get to manage it. Our naval people have proved themselves, in other spheres, sufficiently handy and adaptable to make me, believe that they are sufficiently handy and adaptable to bring themselves into line with educational experts in this matter. Then, after these four years, it is alleged against the scheme that it is by no means certain that there will be any real good training on board ship. There, again, the Admiralty Memorandum is somewhat sketchy, but I find nothing to exclude the notion that every encouragement will be given to the young cadet getting into the second stage on board ship so that he may thoroughly apply himself to the study of his profession. It is not going to be a continuation school. The Admiralty in that matter have left themselves a good deal of elasticity, and it will be their duty to lee that the course of training for the four years is carried out in a more specialised naval form in the next three years. If that is not done, it will be the duty of this House to call them to account, and some of us who are interested in this matter will follow it with a great deal of attention. There you have seven years of what ought to be, if the general principles which are laid down in this Paper are carried out, first-rate secondary education specialised as such education ought to be specialised in the view to the subsequent career of the officer. The science that is taught in the ordinary public school is taught generally without specialisation, whereas here you have a class of school which is designed to produce a particular kind of mind in the trained officer. I welcome that on educational grounds. What is it that we have been complaining of in this country except the deficiency of specialised secondary schools? The Tight hon. Gentleman the Member for Cambridge University has been the keenest critic of the absence of the provision of specialised secondary schools, and he has told us over and over again that we stopped short at the end of elementary education.

I never advocated specialisation at so early an age as twelve.

The point of the age is another matter; but the right hon. Gentleman knows that in the German secondary schools he admires so much the specialisation begins with the cleverer boys at this age. You are adopting that age which has been adopted in Scotland, and certainly ought to be adopted in England, as the time for beginning secondary education. I say that as the officer is to be a high scientific person in future, he must be trained in that fashion if you are to do any good. I am glad in the interest of education in this country that the Admiralty, which seems to be an enterprising body, is giving the whole cause of education a lift by teaching how to organise a specialised kind of schools. I now come to the most formidable point made against the scheme. My hon. and learned friend the Member for Dundee has touched upon a point which I do think involves a disagreeable element, the predominance of the nomination system. I am glad to see that effect is given to my first conclusion that you must begin at this early age if you are to do the work thoroughly, although we may agree or disagree as to the methods. I have given the reasons which convey to my mind strong conviction on the subject. But if you are to begin at so early an age as twelve you cannot have competitive examinations. I think they are ridiculous at that time. I think my hon. friend took that view. What he says is that you have not proved your case for the earlier age. If it were possible to get this training begun at sixteen or eighteen, certainly put it in the form of competition, as we put as many other matters in that form when entering the public service as possible, but if you cannot defer it without sacrificing efficiency, then I think we should be wrong if we sacrificed the Navy to the principle of competition.

This scheme contemplates competition.

The system, as I understand the Memorandum, is this—the First Lord will nominate, and there will be a certain number of nominations by persons connected with the Navy. There will be slightly more candidates than there are vacancies to fill.

The scheme says that the present system is to go on, and there will be competition. The present system is to nominate three times the number for which there are vacancies, and the selection is by competitive examination.

That is an entire misapprehension. There is no intention of following the old system of nominating largely in excess of the vacancies.

May I call attention to one clause in this Memorandum?

I think this is rather an irregular discussion.

I certainly do not read the new scheme as contemplating the nomination of three times the number that are wanted. I read it to mean that you are to nominate a certain number, and then, having regard to the number you are able to employ, you would be able by examination from time to time—the scheme does not go into details—to knock off those who are insufficiently equipped or objectionable on other grounds. We have got exactly that system in every public school. You have an examination by which boys go from form to form. And the examination test is not a perfect one. I am glad to see that in the United States there is rapidly growing a demand for higher and more searching educational tests. I am bound to say that this scheme is rather sketchy, and I shall be glad to hear what the details consist of. The knocking off of those who are not wanted for the second part of the course of training involves, of course, an invidious duty on the part of the naval authorities, and I should like to have an assurance that this, as well as the initial nomination, will be done in the most public possible way—that the lists of those who applied for nomination, as well as of those who have gone in for examination, will be published, and that the lists of those who have gained will also be published. If it is impossible to make everything public, at least let what is done be done, as far as possible, in the light of day. Let us take every security that there shall not be any jobbery connected with it. With the present First Lord of the Admiralty, and with Lord Spencer, who held that office in the late Government, I should not have the smallest fear of favouritism, but one never knows whether, from this side of the House or the other, there may not come somebody not so distinguished as a purist as these two men, and I wish to take guarantees that we shall be able to bring criticism to bear if we think there has been any case of undue favouritism. I should like a democratic profession in the sense that it should be open to everyone, but I am not prepared to sacrifice anything in the Navy to competitive examination. Therefore the difficulty will have to be got over in another way. I hope we will have guarantees now, or at a later stage, as to the fashion in which we are to have these nominations. I have taken part in this debate, and support the scheme from two points of view. First, because the Navy has got to become more and more effective in that kind of organisation for which we claim predominance, of which we are proud, and in which we desire to be an example to the rest of the world. Secondly, because in this scheme there is an educational lesson to the rest of the nation engaged in other pursuits. On these two grounds, speaking for myself and reserving the liberty to criticise the details, some of which we do not know, I am, for my part, prepared to give my approval to the scheme.

The mover of the Amendment based his attack on the fact that candidates were to enter at a later age than hitherto, whereas the seconder and others have based their views on entirely contradictory grounds, viz., that candidates will enter the Navy at a very much later stage, and it is not necessary that a sea-going officer should enter young. I venture to think that the matter could not remain where it was, and that the great upheaval that has arisen from the Memorandum of the First Lord of the Admiralty was absolutely inevitable. What was the condition of things before? It was that the engineer force of the Navy had become more and more important; the work of the officers in the engineering branch had become baulked because of the paucity of candidates, and of the difficulty of replacing the natural wastage of engineering officers. That difficulty could not have been overcome by merely increasing the pay of engineer officers. They have as much esprit de corps as any other officers in the Fleet, and they desire that their position should be recognised, and that the important duties which they perform—the fact that they have the responsible discipline of over one-third of the ship's company—should be made clear, and their position improved accordingly. I heard with great regret the statements of the hon Member for King's Lynn. They were not worthy of any one of real understanding of Naval affairs and real experience of the requirements of His Majesty's Fleet. It is not a question of mere monopolies; it is not a question alone of the management of one-third of the ships' companies; nor is it a question alone of discipline or the starting or stopping of an engine to order, but at the moment of difficulty, at the time of the breakdown of machinery, of the inevitable accident which must occur in times of peace, and are certain to occur in times of war—what are the attainments of the men you require? You must have them able to restore that machinery to its working condition, and to put right that which has gone wrong. The life of the engine-driver on land, with a skilled engineer who supervises him, has no relation whatever to the life of the engineer at sea. The latter has to depend upon his own resources, and he may be hundreds of miles away from those who have superior knowledge and responsibilities. Therefore, you must have in your naval engineer, knowledge, culture, and scientific skill, equal in most respects to the higher class engineer on land. Such are absolute necessities to one rising to the highest position in the Navy. The difficulty I have in supporting this scheme is some doubt as to whether the age that is proposed, of, I think, nineteen or twenty years, for the young aspirant to engineering to commence his workshop experience is early enough. The lion. Member for Gateshead, who thoroughly understands the question of engineers, will no doubt agree with me that a lad cannot too early commence his workshop practice, and if that is obtained at too late a period of life, the young engineer will not acquire that knowledge which is essential for the proper discharge of his duties later on in life. Whether the suggestion that the period at which the aspirant shall go to the workshop may be accelerated commends itself to the Secretary to the Admiralty, and those whom he so well represents, I cannot say, but I think, if it be possible to arrange the workshop practice to commence at an earlier age in the engineering branch, that it will make for more practical knowledge and greater efficiency of the engineers m the future. Something has been said of the non-democratic character of this scheme. I believe you will find that it will produce a class of officers in the Navy which will correspond very largely, both socially and n other respects, with the Royal Engineers in the Army. It is well known that sons of parents of moderate means may take up positions in the Royal Engineers and live on their own pay. I believe that military hon. Gentlemen, familiar with Army affairs, will bear me out in saying that the only corps in the Army in which an officer can live on his pay is the Royal Engineers. I believe, in like manner, you will find a class of officers will grow up in the Royal Navy who will be of that class. For that reason I think it will be found necessary and desirable that the higher rate of pay shall be given to all correspondingly of equal rank.

Order, order! The hon. Member is now going into a topic outside the Amendment which deals with the training of officers. He is going into the general position of certain officers in the Service.

Then, Sir, I will not go into the question of pay. It was said by the right hon. Gentleman below me that you cannot combine in your officers the executive, the marine, and the engineering branches. But it is the very essence of the scheme that at nineteen or twenty years of age you specialise. You make your aspirant select either the executive branch, the marine branch, or the engineering branch. From nineteen or twenty years his education is limited, so far as speciality is concerned, to one or other of these branches. Then there is the question of competition. According to the scheme, it is understood by those who have carefully read the Memorandum that the system of competition is continued. It exists in the first stage, and it certainly exists towards the secondary stage, when the decision of the aspirant as to which line of the Navy he will enter has to be taken. As I read the Memorandum, the choice will be given by the Admiralty Board on the basis of confidential reports and the results of competition. Now, I challenge with absolute certainty the allegation of the hon. Member for Dundee that the humbler classes will be shut out from the officers of the Navy. The Secretary to the Admiralty told us in his speech to-day that sixty warrant officers would commission rank.

I was referring to those who began their naval career as officers, not to those who rose.

I quite agree; but there are to-day, and will continue under this scheme, two means by which it is possible to rise to become Admiral of the Fleet. One through the midshipman, or by whatever way it is the custom, by the old or new schemes, for young lads entering the Navy with a view to being trained as officers, and the other, by which men of the lower deck, rising from the position of warrant officers, may attain. And just as that possibility exists to-day, as shown by those sixty promotions, so I believe it will continue under the new scheme. I have no hesitation in supporting this new scheme from the point of view of the engineers. I believe the existing engineers accept it as a reasonable and proper solution of the question, and I regard it as a wise and beneficial reform.

The hon. Member for Shipley has pointed out to us the many qualifications required and desired in an effective engineer officer; but he has failed to show in any way why students who are going to follow that branch of the profession should be called upon to come to a naval school at twelve years of age. Although I think there is much in the scheme that is good, my first and great objection to it is that raised by the right hon. the Member for Cambridge University, viz., the cutting off of young children of twelve years of age from their natural home life that is open to an ordinary boy, and the loss of which is so thoroughly disastrous. The plea of the Admiralty is that they want to get something by better training than they have now; but the very worst way of securing that is by appealing to the old traditions of the sea, which are that you can only get efficiency by catching the officer young. I believe that the open door at the age of seventeen would be far more conducive to the best brains coming to the Navy, when the competitive system of examination could be applied with beneficial results and without injury. All medical authority points to the fact that any attempt to compel young children to undergo competitive examinations is positively hurtful to their future prospects and career. If we are going to take into the future nursery of the Navy, as raw material, a collection of young children, who are not to be subject practically to any test when they come in, but who are to be subsequently liable to the mortification—in which their parents would share—of being weeded out, I doubt very much whether many parents would assent to send their children under these conditions. It is very easy to tell us that it would only be the elimination of the unfit, but when children return to their home associations thus weeded out, they would suffer from the stigma of dismissal. The fact is that by taking the children too young it is impossible to test their merits, and thus many who under other conditions who choose this career are destined to lie lost to the service. I have another objection to this early entry, which could be better met by an open competition at seventeen years of age, arid that is, that the latter system would save the country from undertaking the responsibilities of their scholastic education, and also from the considerable expense necessarily involved. The number of students in the "Britannia" is at present about 280; but it is estimated that under the new scheme they would be 480; and taking the cost to the State as £125 per annum for each student, these additional numbers alone would mean an additional cost to the State of about £25,000 a year. If the entry were made at seventeen years of age there would be a much wider and superior selection, provided the Admiralty let it be known what class of education would be required at that age. Then at the age of seventeen the constitution, character, and capacity of the youths would be known, which could not possibly be the case with boys of twelve. The hon. and learned Member for Haddington appealed to the great advantages of the children being educated in a naval atmosphere, but I do not think they could be satisfactorily educated, and at the same time pick up as he suggests a secondary education on board a cruiser—even if they had the capacity. They would require the whole of the four years to be devoted exclusively to education. The Admiralty seemed to have made up their mind very suddenly to a particular class of reform, as affecting all entries irrespective of cadets, and when once they seized hold of it they would never let it go. Not only are the Admiralty about to train all their officers from these young children, but they are also determined to train all their artisan ratings from boys, and will not in future apply to the open market. Already they have started building up their naval shipwright ratings from young boys whom they have taken in to train; they are now going to train engine-room artificers from boys also; and very soon the outside skilled working man, or the young apprentice trained outside, will no longer be asked to come into the Navy, which will cease to offer him any career whatever. I think myself that that is dangerous. I think that the outside supply should always be kept going, as certainly the engineer establishments of the country have many advantages over the establishments controlled by the Admiralty, in this respect, that the equipment outside is very much better than the equipment it present possessed by Government establishments, although, no doubt, it is undergoing much improvement. There are a few question I should like to ask. As regards the Royal Marines, I am glad that they are no longer to be treated, as the Secretary to the Admiralty once expressed it, as the fifth wheel of the coach, but are to have in future a definite recognition. I wish to ask whether they are to have a direct representation on the Board of Admiralty. Nobody emphasised the necessity for that more strongly than the Secretary to the Admiralty when he was in a position of greater freedom and less responsibility. I also want to ask, and this is a matter I have raised many times in this House, whether marine officers are to be allowed to sit-on courts-martial when afloat. There, again, I could quote some very pungent language of the Secretary to the Admiralty when he was sitting below the Gangway only three years ago. Now that changes are going to be brought about, and that the status of the Royal Marines is to be improved, I wish to ask whether these two very important matters are going to be considered. I would also wish to know what is to be the concession as regards the rates of pay of Marine officers.

The hon. Gentleman is now going beyond the question raised by the Amendment.

With all respect, Sir, I submit that this is part and parcel of the scheme as adumbrated in the Memorandum of the First Lord of the Admiralty.

The Amendment refers only to the scheme of naval training embodied in the Memorandum. It does not refer to everything in the Memorandum.

On a point of order, Sir, I would submit that under this new-scheme the position of Marines will be altogether different; and that these are questions which affect the future status-of the Marines.

The hon. Gentleman cannot proceed with that matter now.

In conclusion, I should like to explain that if I have to give a vote, I shall give it against I he Government, not because I disagree with the entire scheme, but solely on the ground that I object to the early-age of entry. My vote must be understood to mean that and nothing more. I am very glad to see that concessions are to be made to the warrant officers, for which some of us have worked hard during the last ten years. The very-first speech I made in this House was to bring forward that particular grievance, which was embodied in what was called "The Warrant Officers' Earnest Appeal." I am certain that it is a good thing to give these sixty commissions to warrant officers, and to advance them to the position of lieutenants. It is not, of course, substantive rank. I am myself in favour of the democratic ideal that every position, from the lowest to the highest, should be open. I am afraid we shall have to wait many years for that, but we are thankful for small concessions as they come along. Another old grievance aired in this House by myself and others, is to be remedied by the concession to the chief petty officers. It only shows that the matters which we have brought forward have had a general element of justice connected with them, as is evidenced by the fact that in course of time they have been conceded, although they may have been originally discounted. The only other remark I desire to make has reference to the transition stage The men trained under the new scheme will not really take charge of our Fleet for at least a quarter of a century. That is to say, the cadets entering to-day will not be captains for twenty-five years, so that there will be a long interregnum. Therefore, the Admiralty will be well advised to build as much of the new as they can to the old; so that there may be at the right moment a fusion between those serving under the old conditions and those who will be overlapping them, as it were, under the new conditions. It will be interesting to learn from the hon. Gentleman the system by which it is proposed to blend the old system into the new. There are difficulties, no doubt, in this transition stage; but if we are to have a successful scientific Navy, it is urgently necessary to bring this new system of training to bear on the old. Putting aside the strong objections I have to the early age of entry, I wish the Admiralty well; and I have no desire myself to be an opponent of the scheme, except as regards that part of it.

I venture to interrupt at this stage, because I think that inasmuch as there may be many other points cropping up, it will be convenient to deal with them as we go along. I venture to think that generally speaking the discussion has been moderate, helpful, and useful. But I do not know that I can apply these words to the speech of the lion. Member for King's Lynn in moving the Amendment. The speech was a disappointment to me, and gained nothing in my opinion from the personal discourtesies which it contained. There was nothing in that speech which minimised the value of one new scheme for the teaching of officers. My hon. friend asked what had made the necessity of the scheme so suddenly apparent to the Admiralty. I should have thought the answer to that was plain enough. This year coincides with the conclusion of one distinct epoch of our naval system—the epoch which witnessed the change from masts and sails to steam; and I should think that that in itself is sufficient proof that the time has come for the adoption of different methods of teaching. If I may say so, I think it is almost childish for my hon. friend to suggest that the decision of the present Beard of Admiralty to institute an alteration in the system of teaching is a reproach upon former Boards for not having made the change. My hon. friend spoke of Boards of Admiralty of fifteen and sixteen years ago, and suggested that because they did not do what we are doing we condemn them as inefficient and incompetent. But the whole process of the Admiralty is one of evolution, and must always be one of evolution; and if every change that is made in our naval system implies the condemnation of the Boards that had gone before, little will ever be done for the advantage of the Fleet. I agree with my hon. friend in one matter of which he spoke, the position of what he calls our engine-drivers on board ship, though I do not agree with all he says. The scheme does not propose, as my hon. friend has suggested, that every officer in the engineering branch of the service should be a highly qualified engineer. I agree it is not necessary, and it is just because of that that this scheme of training proposes to give a scientific education to a small number of engineer officers. We believe that in a great scientific service like the Navy there is ample room, and must always be ample room, and need for engineers of the highest scientific attainments, but we do not propose that the superintendent of every engine-room shall necessarily be a man possessed of these high qualifications. Coming to the point which my right lion, friend emphasised with so much force, and which was taken up by my hon. friend opposite, I can assure my hon. friend the Member for Dundee that the arguments ho has advanced against the lowering of the age of entrance for officers have been fully considered and discussed by the Board of Admiralty. When forming its conclusions let me remind the House what the points are. In the first place there is the suggestion that you ought not to take the boys so young—what my right hon. friend calls little boys—and he adduces the arguments of the late Lord Ramsay in support of that contention. But it is not really a question between the ages of twelve and a half years on the one hand, and fourteen and a half years on the other. The point is whether in the Navy you are going to take boys young or old educationally? I hope no one is going to contend that the system Lord Ramsay suggested—

He advocated the age of seventeen.

I think he was a member of the Board which suggested that the age of fourteen and a half should be adopted on board the "Britannia," and it was hoped at the time the age of fourteen and a half years was adopted that the Navy would get the best boys the public schools could produce. But we have not got the best out of the public schools, for the boys are taken away just as they are beginning to obtain the real value of the training in public schools. I do not think anybody is going to dispute the failure of the system of taking boys at fourteen and a half, and, therefore, you have got to decide whether you will make the age of entry eighteen, as my hon. friend opposite suggests, or twelve as we suggest.

I meant the second stage.

That is sixteen. I think there you would be breaking right into the middle of their public school career. At the age of sixteen he would be just in the middle of his public school career. I can see arguments in favour of entering at eighteen years of age, but I cannot see any in favour of entering at sixteen. But my right hon. friend said why segregate them? Why are you going to give them scholastic education on a ship? There will be no similarity between the Naval College at Osborne, as we intend to establish it, and the "Britannia" as my right hon. friend describes it. The "Britannia" is a school where the course is about eighteen months, and consists of four terms, and where the scholastic subjects are principally taught. There will be two cruisers attached to the College at Osborne, and both at the Naval College at Osborne and on the "Britannia" these boys will receive just that training which will be of most value to young naval officers. There will be machines and appliances for instructing the boys, as far as boys of that age can be instructed, and they can be taught a great deal, in the use of tools and mechanical appliances. They will have their steam launch in which they will go to sea; they will also be taught languages and such other knowledge as is being imparted on the "Britannia." The course will be a three or four years' course, and we shall make it, as we believe, a thoroughly sound and organised training which will be of value to every boy who goes through it. Although we propose to impose practically only a qualifying examination for entering, we desire to introduce much more severe and serious examinations at various stages in the boy's career. An hon. Member opposite said he did not believe that public opinion would tolerate or concede the introduction of the new principle of allowing boys to be eliminated after they had once entered. But it is not a new principle. It exists at Woolwich, where, as far as I know, it has never been cavilled at, and it exists, in fact, on the "Britannia." But if it be regarded as in any sense invidious at the present time, it will cease to be so when it is understood that it is to be applied as a regular principle after examinations at certain fixed intervals. If it happens that a boy is found not to be physically or mentally capable, or not to have the necessary taste for the service, and is compelled to leave the "Britannia" at any point, he will at any rate be able to prosecute his studies in a public or private school, or in any other direction, with an amount of knowledge and training that he would hardly obtain at equal cost or with equal facilities in any other institution in the United Kingdom. It has been said that you might take these boys from any public school, secondary school, or board school. I will not say a word against what those schools might give; perhaps I am rather sceptical about the knowledge imparted in public schools at the present time. What I will say is that, take the best of them or take the worst of them, I am confident that for naval purposes not one of them can give in two years the amount of knowledge of the kind we require that we should be able to give in one year under our new scheme. I will deal with one other important question—that of nomination. I do not complain at all of the introduction of that question. On the contrary, I think it would have been a very grave mistake if the debate had been allowed to close without that subject being brought up. It is a very serious thing indeed that for any reason, however good, we should limit in any way the avenues to one of the great public services. But I ask the House whether they do not think the reasons we are able to adduce are good? My hon. friend said that this was an undemocratic arrangement. I object to accepting that as a conclusive argument, though I know he regards the circumstance of any institution being democratic as per se a recommendation. But I agree with him that it is desirable as far as possible to get the whole sweep of national life into any great national concern, but the moment you depart from the principle of open competition you must come to some system of this kind. This is nothing new. For many a year we have obtained I our naval officers by this principle of I nomination. That is no argument in itself, but I ask the House to consider whether we have been well or ill served? Is it true to say that wealth dominates the selections for the Navy, that wealth has acquired an undue influence in the ships, and that only the wealthy have got on in the Navy? I believe that the answer to every one of those points is in the negative. I can bear testimony to the fact that, I do not say the poorest of the poor, but that many men and women who are really poor, have sent their sons into the Navy to the great advantage of the State and of the Service. A point may be made in respect of the fact that we are eliminating the sources of entry through the Royal Marines and the Engineers. I do not know whether hon. Members are aware how very slight is the real difference between the cost of the engineering education in the Navy and that of a cadet in the executive line. There is a difference of £35 a year, but, as the "Britannia" course lasts only four terms, while the course at Keyham lasts five years, it is not possible by taking, the figures for one year to make a comparison between the two. I think it will be found that the difference is very slight indeed. My hon. friend says that this is an undemocratic proceeding, but if that be so I think I have already shown that it is a proceeding which has received the sanction of innumerable Parliaments, and, what is more important, it has received the imprimatur of national approval and the approval of the naval service. If the system is anti-democratic, why is it not scouted and abandoned by She countries professing to be ultra-democratic? With a single exception every navy has found it necessary to exercise some sort of control over the appointment of naval officers. In France, where there is open competition, the result is that they were recently twenty short of the number of officers required, and had to nominate subordinate officers to fill up the vacancies. Is entry into the United States Navy governed by competition? Not at all. How is it fixed? The United States Navy is officered by nomination. And who nominates? Perhaps it will be said by the hon. Member that the system there is better than our own and gives a better choice. We trust the nominations, for good or for evil, to the Board of Admiralty, which is responsible for the welfare of the Navy. In the United States the nominations are entrusted to individual Members of Congress. My view is that nothing at all would be gained for the Navy if every single Member of this House were given a nomination and was bound to attach it to one particular county in the United Kingdom. I mention this not as deriding the United States system, with which I had nothing to do, but as showing that it is not easy to modify the system of nomination. It will have to be accepted in the future as in the past, unless some much stronger reason for its abandonment is shown, as the inevitable consequence of the relinquishment of competition in the earliest stage of the officer's career. My hon. friend the Member for the Shipley Division was in some doubt as to whether the instruction we are giving is sufficient.

Will the hon. Gentleman tell us whether the scheme generally will be the same as before.

There will be nomination of a sufficient number of candidates for the vacancies, with an addition which will cover waste through failure to pass the medical examination, through failure to qualify, and through cadets proving unsuitable afterwards. I am conscious of the gaps in the syllabus of educational training of which we have been reminded to-day, but I will undertake to say that hon. Members, when they have heard my explanation, will agree that we have been wise in leaving these blank spaces. Everything that it was essential to decide we have decided; but in this matter we have felt it necessary to carry public opinion with us, or perhaps I should say instructed, educated and professional opinion with us—in all stages. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Cambridge said it was a very serious thing to allow these young officers to go to sea for three years without making proper provision for carrying on their instruction at sea, and I agree with him that this is a very important matter; but I do not think the right hon. Gentleman, if he were to peruse the reports of the results of education at sea, would be very anxious to see the present system prolonged, and the question is not whether we are abandoning anything of very great value, but whether we may not. substitute something better. For the last six months we have been trying experiments in this respect with a training ship, H.M.S. "Isis." A decision on the questions as the carrying on of instruction in a training ship is awaiting the result of more extended experience of the trial now being made with such a ship. Another reason we have not been hasty in formulating some of these proposals with regard to some branches of this curriculum, is that we have been most anxious to submit the whole of the educational direction of this new scheme to a thoroughly competent person. We have felt that it is important that the head of the intellectual part of the Navy should be as competent and conspicuous a person as the head of the department responsible for material construction, and with that view we have approached, and happily approached, a very eminent and distinguished man, and have secured the services of Professor Ewing as Director of Naval Education as a successor to Dr. Niven on his retirement. Those who are acquainted with the scientific world and with the work Professor Ewing has been doing, with the position he holds in the Royal Society, and the position he occupies in the estimation of all men connected not merely with abstract science, but with applied science and mechanics in this country, will consider that we have been fortunate in obtaining the services of one whose work at the University of Cambridge, and whose high place in the esteem of all men for his scientific attainments, prove his knowledge to be, indeed, exceptional. I do not think I need follow my hon, friend the Member for Devonport into the question of the Marines, because I venture to think it is not quite within the four corners of the Amendment. If I can answer any questions at a later stage I shall be glad to do so. I have devoted myself to the points which have been raised. The Admiralty, for the reasons I have endeavoured to explain, has elected for the earlier age. In regard to the question of nomination I think the Admiralty must be tried and tested by the work done. I think it is most important that they should have in mind what I know is in the mind of the hon. Member opposite, and that is the necessity of so exercising their powers that no members of the community who are reasonably likely to be serviceable in this great profession shall be prevented from entering it, but I am not prepared on behalf of the Admiralty, in view of the circumstances of the case or the experience of the past, to abandon the principle of nomination.

I have attended very closely to all that has been said on this most important subject, and I have heard nothing at all which shakes the two cardinal grounds on which I oppose the scheme of the Government in regard to the training of officers for the Navy. The first of these is the point which has been explained to the House by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Cambridge University, who, like myself, remembers all the debates and discussions which took place some years ago on this subject, when he was not the representative in this House of a learned body but of a dockyard constituency. I have an objection to taking these boys at so early an age as twelve and a half, making a separate class of them, and endeavouring to inspire them with what is called a sea-character. I have heard nothing to bring home to me the belief that the particular treatment to which they will be subjected by being kept in a college on shore will give them that sea-character; but whether it does so or not, going back to those debates to which I have referred, when we had present in this House several distinguished admirals, I remember that, while there was some difference of opinion among them, I think the predominant feeling was that no prejudice was likely to result to the Navy from future officers being entered at a much more advanced time of life than twelve or fifteen years of age. Putting the question of the early age of cadets aside, I come to another matter which is still more potent in determining my vote on this occasion, and that is the exclusiveness, which is necessarily characteristic, of this scheme. It is almost grotesquely ironical to think that there having been great complaints made—and I believe just complaints—of the treatment, by individuals in the Service, of engineer officers who are now important far beyond what they were some years ago—when there have been complaints that they, from social reasons undoubtedly, for I think it cannot be denied, they were subjected to a manner of treatment which was not likely to conduce to their comfort and therefore not likely to bring the proper sort of men into the service—you should adopt a scheme for getting over that difficulty by means of the extermination of that class of officer altogether, because hitherto engineers have been taken as a rule from the less wealthy and the less leisured classes in, the community. It is not a question of the difference between the very rich and the working man, or the man who lives on a daily wage. The proportion of the population of this country with an income of over £1,000 a year is very small, and the whole of the different strata of society below some figure of that sort are practically excluded by this scheme. Now I think that is a most undesirable state of things, a state of things which would condemn any scheme you might propose. My hon. friends on both sides of the House have talked of the evils of competition' for boys, and, on the other hand, have declaimed against the system of nomination. I am certainly not in favour of nomination, and, above all, I hope we shall never come to the method referred to by the Secretary to the Admiralty, which he says prevails in the United States Navy. That would be the worst of all. It is not a question of nomination, or of open competition even; it is a question of expense, because a boy is taken at twelve and a half years of age for this long period of educative process for the Navy. We have no statement of estimate, that I am aware of, of what will be the expense of that. There will be, no doubt, heavy expense borne by the public, though part of it undoubtedly will fall upon the parents of the boys themselves; and although the lion. Gentleman has just said that the expense of the "Britannia" is not so severe at present, compared with the engineering college, as people might imagine, lie is going to prolong the course by a period of four or five years, and the whole of that time the pocket of the parents of the boy has to furnish a large portion at all events of the expense. Therefore I regard that as practically prohibitive in respect of 80 or 90 per cent. of the population of the country. That is not a state of things to be contemplated for a moment. It is a systematic specialised education, but in this Paper it is all professed to be given in addition to the ordinary education. Do not let us be misled by the idea of public schools. The whole of the population are not in a position to send their children to great public schools. They get their education nearer home, and perhaps in a more efficient way, and certainly at less expense. I do not see any advantage whatever in the proposals

The Motion which I put upon the Paper, and which I should have been glad to move if there had been an opportunity of doing so, was couched in language used by the late Chancellor of the Exchequer in September last in an important speech which he made at Bristol. In the course of that speech Sir Michael Hicks-Beach said that, having regard to the expenditure during the last seven years on the Navy, he saw no need for the large expenditure for construction this year. That was advice given to the Government by a great authority, the late Chancellor of the Exchequer, advice to which the Government might well defer, and the Estimates which we are considering to-night are the reply to that advice. Those Estimates are £34,500,000 against £31,000,000 last year. The Estimates this year are the largest that have ever been presented to the country. For years past we have been increasing the Navy, but never were there such rapid strides as during the last six years. Every year there has been an increase; in 1898 the increase was 1·8 millions, in 1899 2·5 millions, in 1900 2·2 millions, in 1901 2·1 millions. In 1902 there was practically no increase, but this year the increase is 3·2 millions, so that the reply of the Government to the advice given by the late Chancellor of the Exchequer is the largest increase they have ever made. This is another illustration of what I might almost call the defiant attitude of the Government with regard to the advice of its friends, and the feeling of the country. At the present moment the country is in need of a little rest and economy after the great efforts which it has been making, but the Government, instead of giving it that rest and economy, cast about to discover what heavy burden they could put upon it. The only standpoint from which T desire to look at this question is the stand point of economy. I consider, looking at all the circumstances of the nation, that it is not fair on the part of the Government to ask the country to make this great sacrifice on their invitation. On one or two things we are agreed. One is that we must have a strong Navy. I believe everybody both inside and outside this House is agreed upon that, but that agreement does not carry us very far. We may all agree that the Navy must be very strong when making speeches outside with regard to it, but when we come to this House and attack this problem it becomes a question of figures, and we must discuss how much we can afford to pay. It is my right hon. friend who represents the Forest of Dean who, amongst others, has urged on the Government to make a heavy expenditure for the Navy. My right hon. friend made a very interesting speech on this matter last week, when he said he would vote for this increase with the greatest possible pleasure, and would vote also for those larger Estimates to which he looked forward in the future. But there must be a point, Mr. Speaker, at which this miserable struggle will have to stop, and as we are the leaders in this matter—as we are the great spending Power—I say it is for us to try and discover some point at which this strife with other nations may be brought to an end. The hon. Gentleman who has charge of the Estimates said he looked forward to the time when somebody on the Continent I would speak the word which would stop this vast expenditure. Who can speak that word so well as we? We have a most magnificent Navy and are the strong Power in this matter, but the Government has shown no disposition of that kind, and so this extraordinary situation has arisen. Now on this situation I wish to make three remarks. First of all, the Government has departed entirely from the two-Power standard which, has been the traditional policy of this country for many years. The meaning of that standard is that we should build as much as, and make as much naval preparation as, the two strongest Powers may, and if we make that much preparation that argument implies that there it should stop. There has never been a discussion in this House upon that question, and it is time, if that standard is to be departed from, that the question should be discussed and decided. We are departing entirely from the two-Power standard now. I try to look at this matter in the best way possible and with the best authorities I can get, and I find from the Naval Annual this year that we have 226 effective fighting ships, as compared with France with ninety-five, Germany with sixty-five, the United States of America with sixty-two, Russia with sixty-four, Italy with thirty-seven, and Japan with thirty-two. Those are the whole of the great naval Powers, and upon the strength of those ships the House will see that we have been maintaining the two-Power standard, and rather more, because if the House will add these figures together they will see that our Fleet is as large as the joint Fleets of any three Powers. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will say that we must have regard to what other nations are doing at the present moment, so I have taken pains to ascertain the total naval expenditure of the three great Powers, France, Russia, and Germany, as compared with our expenditure. Our Estimates last year for naval expenditure were £31,255,000, those of France £12,271,000, Russia £10,341,000, and Germany £10,454,000. So that, ac cording to this test also, we are spending practically as much as these three great Powers against whom we are building. In now construction last year we spent 9·1 millions, France spent 4·4 millions, Russia 3·0 millions, and Germany 5·6 millions. So that again last year we were spending as much as any three Powers. In the face of these circumstances, what need is there for this greatly increasing expenditure? I think there is no reason. All these Powers are friendly Powers, and the disposition of the Government, and the House, and the country should be to retain and increase the friendly relations which exist between us. In France there has been a great change in the policy as regards this country. Monsieur Jaurès, the Socialist leader, at the recent elections became President of one of the high offices of the Chamber; the language of France towards us has been of the most peaceful character, and I certainly think that we should respond to this new friendly spirit. We ought to respect this friendly feeling; but when France holds out the olive branch to us, these arrangements we are making seem to me to be shaking our fist in her face in a very unneighbourly fashion. The hon. Member told us that the Mediterranean Squadron was being increased; but is not the Mediterranean a sea in which France must have profound interests I Then why should we not consult the wishes and feelings of our great and friendly neighbours, and not keep on adding in this unpleasant way. Looking at the state of France, I say there is no reason for this constant addition. It is impossible in this regard not to say a word with regard to Germany. In the King's Speech Germany was called our ally, and there are the deepest ties between Germany and this country. Then why not cultivate these friendly relations so far as the Navy is concerned? Some friends of mine attended a meeting held in Westminster some time ago, the object of which was to agitate for the strengthening of the North Sea Fleet. Such an agitation appeared to me to be merely raised to irritate a great and powerful ally. Now they tell us that although they have not got their squadron, they are perfectly satisfied because the Government are going to have a Naval Station on the North Sea. We are taking every step we can that may possibly irritate these Powers, and that is a most foolish thing for this country to do. We should cultivate friendly relations with them. Now, with regard to Russia, I see no ground for that distrust of Russia. I have travelled over a great part of that country, and I find that she has a great land problem to occupy her for some time to come. I will say nothing about the United States, because I do not think any one will suggest that we are going to build up this immense fleet against anything the United States may do. I have quoted enough to justify me in saying that up to the present moment we maintain fully the strength of the Fleet according to the two-Power standard, and if we are prepared to face the Fleets which any of the two Powers can send against us, we are as safe now as we have been in the past. I would suggest that the Government, rather than spend this vast sum in building ships, might approach these countries and negotiate with a view to economy. Why, then, cannot we, who derive so much more advantage than France or Germany, do something to secure a peaceful solution of this great difficulty? In the speech of the late Chancellor of the Exchequer, to which I have alluded, he deals with this point and gives advice, which, coming from his lips, comes with far higher authority than from any one else. He says—

"The safety of the country depended on our policy with regard to other nations; we should carry out the Golden Rule of doing to others as we should wish them to do to us. Whilst keeping our powder dry, let us be careful to avoid provocation, whether by word or action, and let us estimate at their true value, which was nothing, the vapourings of the sensational Press, whether at home or abroad.

I commend those words to the Government as a solution of this great difficulty and avoiding this great expense. Large as these Estimates are they do not contemplate efficiency. They involve larger Estimates in the immediate future. If any one examines them they will find these Estimates open up a vista of extravagance such as this country never contemplated. Take Vote A. I am familiar, I am sorry to say, with the Estimates of the last forty years, and I find an established principle is laid down with regard to Vote A, which is that it shall be roughly one third of the whole of the Naval Estimates. In the year 1892 it was 34 per cent, of the whole, and in 1896 it was about 36 per cent., but this year it is no less than 51 per cent. £17,500,000 of the Estimates is devoted to this purpose of building new ships. Now we are going to construct a Naval base in Scotland, and when we have carried out that we cannot help seeing that that new expense opens up a vista of expense from which the country might well shrink before it is too late. The hon. Member deals with another matter. He has given me the Return of casualties which I asked for, and in thanking him for that I would ask whether it is not possible to grant the other Returns I desired. We have only received the Return of casualties for 1901, and what do we find? We had at sea in 1901 200 ships, and the casualties amounted to 43 per cent.; we had twenty-six collisions, of which eleven were between our own vessels. That seems to me to prove that we have too many ships in these narrow seas, where they have not room to manœuvre, and where manœuvres cannot be carried out with success. In that year we lost 102 lives, and the total losses amounted to one second-class cruiser, a torpedo boat destroyer, two coast guard cruisers, and a vast amount was expended on repairs. The last remark I wish to make in regard to the Estimates is, that they give no sense of security in the Navy. That is a point which the House might well consider. We have for ten years been urged by many hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House, as well as by hon. Gentlemen opposite, to pursue this furious and extravagant naval expenditure. The Estimates have gradually grown up during the past ten years from something like £14,500,000, which they stood at in 1893, to £34,000,000 this year, but does anybody feel that we are secure? Has the nation a more restful feeling with all this expenditure? On the contrary, the nation gets more and more distrustful as the expenditure goes on, and we have not reached any harbour of safety. Some people say that this naval expenditure is an insurance of our commerce. I have already pointed out that we had twenty years of experience of the Navy during which we made no increase. It was between 1863 and 1883 that our commerce increased from £13 per head of the population to £21; but in the last twenty years we have raised our naval expenditure from £12,000,000 to £34,000,000, and our commerce has only increased £1 per head. These remarkable statistics prove that this huge expenditure has not facilitated or given any security to commerce, but on the contrary, that it strikes a blow at and puts difficulties in the way of commerce.

It is now a good many years ago, at least six or seven, since I told the House that the naval expenditure would increase greatly every year. My reasons for doing so at that time were satisfactory to myself, although perhaps not obvious to my listeners. However, we are face to face with an expenditure of £34,000,000, and it will be my duty to-night to show how that expenditure is increased up to that amount. Before doing so, I would like to glance at the Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty concerning the Navy Estimates for 1903–4. One half of that Statement is hope, the other half despair! I will not deal with the administration of the Navy, or the personnel, but with the construction, reconstruction and repairs, which will in a few minutes lead me on to show why and how this extra amount of money is wanted this year. Perhaps at the risk of being considered a little irregular, I will take the points as they come up in the pages of the First Lord's Statement. I take first the clause where it is said—

"Owing to the great pressure of work in the dockyards, it has been decided to allow the contractors who are building the ships to complete them in all respects ready for commission, by which means all the shipbuilding films who-construct war vessels will gain further experience, and be better prepared to undertake naval work."

And again, it is said that—

"The policy of relieving the congestion of repairs in the dockyards by sending ships to be repaired by the private firms which built them, has been largely followed."

Now, here are two statements made by the First Lord of the Admiralty, and he has given no reason whatever as to what has occasioned this great pressure of work in the dockyards, or the congestion of repairs in the dockyards. Immediately before these clauses we get a statement of re-construction, as announced in the First Lord's Statement of last year. He says that the Admiralty has completed the re-construction of—

"Battleships ('Royal Sovereign' Class)—'Empress of India,' 'Resolution,' 'Revenge,' 'Royal Oak.' First-class Cruiser—'Powerful.' Second-class Cruisers ('Talbot' Class)—'Doris,' 'Venus,' 'Dido,' 'Isis.' In hand (Battleships)—'Barfleur,' 'Centurion.' First-class Cruiser—'Terrible'."

Now I hold that this is a statement of the facts which are not put down here in such a way that any Member of the House can understand what they mean. Here is the first class cruiser "Powerful," a brand-new boat that cost the country £1,400,000, and now she is reconstructed. Then there is the first-class cruiser "Terrible," which cost the country the same amount of money, and she is being reconstructed, as are also the brand new battleships "Barfleur," and "Centurion." I have said that this statement is hardly correct; I do not want to use a stronger term. The First Lord says—

"I have never attempted to minimise the difficulties which have been caused to the Fleet by the adoption of Belleville boilers; these difficulties were due partly to the faulty manufacture of the first series of such boilers, partly to the great increase of pressure, and partly to the initial want of training of the personnel in their management."

I deny that. These boilers were built under Government inspection by Admiralty inspectors who were paid big salaries. I say that they were good jobs, and were considered good jobs, and lauded in the papers, which sang of these mighty cruisers and what they were going to do. Here again is a statement which I say is not correct—

"As each of the earlier Belleville boiler ships conies in for refit on the termination of her commission she is being placed in thorough repair and made absolutely efficient for service/'

I deny that. They are not absolutely efficient for service. There is not one of them which has been repaired that can steam what she could steam when new. Then the statement goes on—

"Owing to the experience gained no further difficulties ought to occur with these ships."

Indeed, no further difficulties! The "Russell," the "Canopus," the "Glory," "Ocean" and others could not do their work, and, forsooth, it is written in this paper that "No further difficulties ought to occur with these ships." Then the statement goes on—

"Although the Board agree with the Boiler Committee in considering other types of water-tube boilers to be much preferable, they also share the Committee's view that to replace these boilers by others in the ships which already have them would be an unjustifiable, because an unnecessary, expense."

I deny that phrase; I say that a seeming prodigality in that case would be economy in the end. You cannot keep down your Estimates every year by having such repairs arising out of this factor alone. We are told it would be unjustifiable. Is it unjustifiable to make an efficient warship? What is a warship for if not efficient? The cry of efficiency has risen like a storm from the Admiralty, and yet the First Lord comes here and hands us a Statement that it would be unjustifiable to-make these ships fit to fight! I think such a Statement is unworthy of the Board of Admiralty, and ought not to have been issued to the House of Commons. Again the First Lord says—

"I warned Parliament that the cost of repairs for the boilers of the earlier ships fitted with the water-tube boilers would prove to be very heavy."

Oh yes! it was very easy to warn Parliament when the ships were broken own by the dozen; but the First Lord should have taken the warning given ten years ago, and he would have had less Estimates to-day. How amusing it is to me to see the phraseology of this statement—

"At the same time I pointed out that the history of the experience of the use of any new invention generally proceeded on similar lines."

Why, whoever advised the First Lord to use such phraseology did not know his business! The water-tube boiler is not a new invention; it never was an invention; it is a contrivance. It has been before the engineering world for over a hundred years, and, forsooth, to call it an invention is playing with words. I have known the water-tube system for fifty years, and call it nothing but a contrivance. Then the First Lord says—

"In my opinion, the water-tube boiler has come to stay."

Well, if that is his view, it is probable that it has come to ruin his Fleet, and increase his Naval Estimates year by year. "The water-tube be her has come to stay! "Why, the new Admiralty Yacht, the "Enchantress," now building at Belfast, is to be fitted with Scotch boilers! Are the Lords of the Admiralty afraid to trust themselves with water-tube boilers? If water-tube boilers are good enough for men-of-war, surely they are good enough for the Admiralty yacht.

"For ways that are dark, and for tricks that are vain,

The Admiralty Lords are peculiar."

Now I come to another phase of this wonderful production, and my comments thereon will tend to cast light on the great amount of money required for what I call Admiralty follies. The First Lord says—

"The trials of the 'London,' 'Venerable,' and 'Russell,' as well as those of the 'Duncan' and 'Exmouth,' were carried out with successful results. The speeds obtained on trial were slightly in excess of the estimated speeds as designed."

I deny that; they were not carried out to a successful result. The "Russell" tried to do it three or four times but could not. Then again it is said—

"That the 'Montagu's' trials are not jet complete."

This Grand new ship, which cost £1,250,000, came round from Birkenhead to do a trial, and ought to have been able to get up steam and go outside fit to fight an enemy. But what happened? The boilers could not hold water! I see she is crawling outside just now, after lying in port for six or eight months. I come now to the heading "Submarines," where it is said that—

"At the commencement of the year there were live vessels of the 'Holland' type under construction, and they have all been delivered."

And they are going to lay down nine or ten others. On February last I said in this House: Why could not this great and glorious Admiralty of ours give any encouragement to British engineers in designing sub-marine boats? They had sent instead over to America, bought their drawings, and put the construction of these sub-marines into the hands of Maxim, Vickers & Company, under the superintendence of a Yankee. And with what result? They could not trust them, because they did not know the moment they were going to have an explosion. There had been explosions, and the men blown through the manhole, while the crew were nearly asphyxiated by the gasoline. Yet the Admiralty are going blindly ordering more submarine boats when they have I had no experience of those already built. I would ask those at the Admiralty responsible for this to go down in a submarine boat under the water, and not sit complacently in the Admiralty Office. They would then get some knowledge of submarine requirements. Apart from patriotic principles, I am sure that if the Admiralty go on ordering more foreign boats of which they have had no experience they are bound to come to grief with great loss of life. Now, as to the re-boilered ships. The "Hermes" came to grief before she got to the West Indies. The boilers burned out, and her men were in danger of their lives, and almost in a state of mutiny. She was sent to Belfast for repair, and is now being fitted with Babcock and Wilcox boilers. I ask, partly with regret, and partly with sorrow, what experience has the Admiralty got of the Babcock and Wilcox boilers? None whatever. This is another American contrivance, not British, and that is how the money goes. There is no mystery about the increase of expenditure when we find in the "List of repairs" no fewer than seventeen boats not yet three years old. I do not believe a single one of them has done a twelve months steaming. What are we coming to? I may be wrong, but I see before me an array of broken-down vessels that cannot be trusted to steam full power without coming to grief, and which would in an engagement be assuredly sunk because they could not be manœuvred by the admirals or captains either full speed or slow. What is the reason? I will show the Secretary to the Amiralty what is the reason why you cannot steam your ships at full speed. The reason is in a nutshell. You cannot synchronise your feeding, firing and steaming. You never will get them to synchronise with water-tube boilers, because you have too little margin of safety. The scientific aspect of the question therefore hangs on three points, namely, feeding, firing, and steaming, and these must all synchronise or they are bound to come to grief. I wish to direct the attention of the House just for a moment to this peculiar fact. A Return was asked for by Lord Charles Beresford of casualties in regard to marine boilers extending over five years in the mercantile marine. I have here a copy of the Return, and I would like to give some of the figures. The total number of Scotch boilers in use through-out Great Britain is given at 22,000, while the total number of water-tube boilers is placed at 58. Of the 58, 11 gave out and failed, and that reduces the number to 47, and yet in the face of that practical fact the Admiralty are retaining Babcock and Wilcox boilers for ships costing £1,500,000. Whoever heard of such blindness? The numbers of persons killed and injured per thousand in the ships using Scotch boilers is 4·32 casualties, 1·36 persons killed, and 1·5 injured. In boilers of the water-tube modern type the figures are 120·6 casualties per 1,000, 86·2 killed, and 103·4 injured. On the face of that Return, issued by a Government Department, you are still putting into your valuable vessels boilers which at the present time are endangering hundreds of lives. Again, how do these boilers compare with regard to cost? I am going to show how you are mounting up your millions every year. With the old type of Scotch boiler vessels of the "Majestic" class, after five years and five months of working, cost £2,319, but vessels of the "Diadem" class, which is the new modern ship costing £1,000,000, and is only two years old, cost £9,048. Take the "Powerful" class, which after three years and seven months of water tube-boilers cost £16,184, and compare it with a similar class fitted with Scotch boilers, which for a similar period cost only £1,823. What does that tell this House and the country. There is a voice in these figures that ought to re-echo throughout the country. In two years and three months there was £194,000 spent on twenty-nine ships fitted with water-tube boilers, or an average of £6,700 per ship. With Scotch boilers over fifty ships in four years and eight months cost £101,420, or about £2,000 per ship, showing that your water-tube boiler ship is running up your bill very heavily. I must complain bitterly of the way these Estimates are got up, for the items are not put down on business lines. Every ship ought to have attached in the Estimates the original cost and the cost of repairs every year. Under Sub-head D I find recon- struction, repairs and alterations for 1903–4 represents £3,156,008. Last year it was £2,195,528. That shows you have a repairing increase of £1,065,663. But that is not all we have paid for, there is still the material and other things which are not shown in these Estimates in a businesslike way. We are now brought face to face with this fact, that we have from sixty to eighty vessels fitted with water-tube boilers, every one of which you cannot trust. What is the Admiralty doing? When vessels require new boilers they are still putting in water-tube boilers. Are you going to have your warships useless, and what can your ships depend upon if they cannot steam properly? I would have stood up here and defended the clearing out of the whole of these water-tube boilers and the putting in of the same boilers in all your ships as you have put into the "Enchantress." Instead of putting in a mixture of water-tube and cylindrical boilers in your ships, I would have put in all cylindrical boilers, and made the ships safe for the men. Water-tube boilers burn twice the quantity of coal, and you require more men. You require more artificers, and consequently not only is the cost increased but also the pay. But these figures will rise even more than that, because as these boats are tested they are bound to go into the hospital for repairs, and you will never really get to the bottom of the expense. I am sorry that I have spoken so long, but this is a matter in which I have always taken great interest. No one would be more ready to defend the Admiralty when they are pursuing a sane and safe course than I should be. No one would be more ready to defend the Admiralty if they were getting one pound's worth for every pound spent. But when I see the ships absolutely being turned to no ships at all, that is no fighting ships, would I be doing my duty if I did not speak my mind and express my convictions in this House? Take as an example the case of your "Good Hope," the vessel that was to indicate 30,000 horse-power, and steam twenty-three knots. She has recently been to the Cape, but I would like to know if she can steam twenty-three knots to-day. She cannot do it, for she would be sure to come to grief, and she would be lying a cripple before long. She is almost one now. The Admiralty are not spending the nation's money upon ships, but upon repairs; and, although millons of money have been spent in this way, the vessels have done no real genuine ocean steaming work, and so far as their fighting qualities go they are a disgrace to the Admiralty.