inquired if a general discussion would be allowed on the Vote.

I think the practice has been to allow a general discussion on Vote A and Vote 1, and it is by arrangement only that such discussions are allowed on other Votes. I, therefore, think that in this case a general discussion will be permissible.

said that in continuation of the protest he made on Vote A he intended to move a reduction of the present Vote, which was the first in which they were confronted with a large increase of money for naval expenditure. He thought he was justified from the point of view of the Irish taxpayers in making a practical protest by moving a reduction.

On a point of order I wish to move an Amendment, and I should like to know if a reduction moved by the hon. Gentleman for East Clare will have the effect of excluding me from an opportunity of drawing attention to an earlier item in the Vote?

If a reduction is moved of the whole sum it will not be possible then to move a reduction of an item.

Would it be possible for the Government to put the closure on the Motion, and thus deprive hon. Members of an opportunity of discussing details of the Vote?

Certainly.

said he had no desire to prevent hon. Gentlemen above the Gangway indulging in any criticisms they might deem necessary in regard to the policy of the Government, and, therefore, he would content himself with moving a reduction of Item A by the sum of £281,692. He thought it was most unjust and unfair from the point of view of the Irish taxpayer that, without any reference whatever to the capacity of Ireland to meet these great increases of expenditure, these additions to the Estimates should be put down. He did not complain in the slightest degree of the Secretary to the Treasury or of the officials in charge of the Admiralty making what arrangements they considered to be necessary for the efficiency of the Fleet as far as England was concerned, and he held that an Irish Member had very little right in that House to object to any expenditure—naval or otherwise—of the money of the British taxpayer. The Government was entitled to do exactly as it liked with its own taxation. They could increase the Navy Estimates and the Army Estimates year by year if they chose, but the Irish taxpayers objected—and it was an objection against which no reasonable argument could be advanced—that it was unfair to insist on their paying whether their country was prosperous or not. They ought not to be called upon, whether they liked or not, to pay their share of any increased expenditure which might be deemed necessary by the British Government. That raised at once the whole question of Ireland's position towards Great Britain under the Act of Union, which abolished the Irish Parliament. They were told at the time of the Union that the amalgamation of the Irish and British Legislatures would have most beneficial results so far as Ireland was concerned; they were told that under the Union they would enjoy benefits and advantages which they could never obtain under an Irish Parliament. But those who opposed the Union very wisely predicted that that result very likely would not be achieved, but that, on the contrary, the result of the union of the Irish and British Parliaments would be that Ireland, from a financial point of view, would suffer considerably. He ventured to assert most respectfully that no Member on either side of the House could deny that the effect of the Union down to the present day had been that the Irish taxpayer had been called upon to spend enormous sums for purposes which would never have arisen at all had Ireland remained a self-governing country with a Parliament of her own—had been called upon to spend enormous sums of money for purposes which had been brought about owing to the action of England and Scotland, and through no fault of the Irish people themselves. He knew he was bound to confine himself to the Navy Estimates on that particular occasion; otherwise, he thought he would have been able to trace, year by year, during the last century, action on the part of successive Governments which had entailed the expenditure of enormous sums by Ireland owing to the arrangements under the Union from which Ireland had derived no benefit whatever. He would not refer, even briefly, to the South African War which had just been concluded. It was, however, a notorious fact that Ireland had no interest in that war, that the Irish people were passionately opposed to it, and whether they were right or wrong in the estimation o Englishmen, the fact remained that the voices and the votes of Ireland in that House were raised in opposition to it, and that they disclaimed all participation in it. Yet the Irish people had been called upon to pay a very large and unfair proportion of the 250,000,000 or so of money which the war had cost the taxpayers of these countries. These Naval Estimates were simply a continuation of the old policy towards Ireland of making Irish people share an increased expenditure whether they desired to do so or not, and his object in rising that day was to ask—though he supposed it would be perfectly futile for him to do so—that in the future some arrangement might be made, while the present system of Irish Government lasted, whereby increased expenditure which was initiated by England alone should be borne by England alone, and that the Irish taxpayers should be relieved from this enormous tax upon their slender resources. He knew perfectly well that a great many Members would come at once to the conclusion that in objecting to the increase of those Estimates he, and those of his colleagues who joined him in the objection, were simply actuated by the motive of delaying the transaction of business. There were, he believed, some Members who went so far as to say that their object was simply to waste the time of Parliament. Well, they had to put up with those misrepresentations, and he said there, as sincerely and truly as ever any man had made a declaration in that House, that he was objecting to that increase because he believed it was monstrously unjust and unfair to ask Irish taxpayers for an increase of even one shilling of money under the Vote. He would ask the Secretary to the Treasury if he could tell him how much of that money would—directly or indirectly—benefit the Irish people. The number of Irishmen in the Fleet was extremely small, and, as regarded the cost of the Coast Guard Service, that service was, in Ireland, also a comparatively small one. It would, therefore, be impossible to suggest that Ireland participated to any extent in the benefit of the expenditure of this money. An increase was apparent in all the Votes contained in the Estimates, and in connection with everyone of them he ventured to assert that the Irish people got no return whatever for the expenditure. It was perfectly futile for the Secretary to the Treasury or any other hon. Member representing the Government to tell him that they had in return for that great expenditure the satisfaction of knowing that they were protected and safeguarded all round their coasts by the British Fleet. He did not know whether this country was in danger or not; he did not know whether the standard set up—the two-Power standard which had been set up for our Fleet to render it able to cope with the fleets of any other two nations in the world—was justified by circumstances or not. This country might be in danger, and it might be considered necessary to spend even more money than it was now proposed to spend for its protection; but, however that might be, no one could seriously urge that it was necessary for the welfare and security of Ireland, with its population of 4,500,000, to spend year after year increasingly large sums of money for the upkeep of the greatest and largest Fleet in the world. They in Ireland were in no danger; their foreign trade had unfortunately almost vanished. A hundred years ago there was a considerable trade throughout Ireland, but one of the results of the destruction of the separate Irish Government had undoubtedly been the disappearance of the foreign trade of Ireland, and it was, therefore, absurd to say that any theory of national security or well-being could justify a demand on the Irish people to spend millions of their money for a Fleet from which they derived absolutely no advantage whatever. He said seriously it would only be fair and reasonable to arrive at some arrangement in regard to Ireland whereby, if it were necessary that they should pay some share of the cost, the amount should be fixed and not exceeded year after year. That was done in the case of the Colonies, and he would ask the Secretary to the Treasury, without going into details, to say whether, supposing our naval expenditure continued growing year by year, the demand upon the Colonies would increase in proportion. They knew very well that it would not; that a sum had been fixed to cover a certain period of years, and that whether the expenditure on the British Navy was larger or smaller that given sum only would have to be paid. The ease of Ireland, however, was quite different from that of the Colonies. The Irish people were poorer, their resources were much slighter in every way than the resources of the Colonies. They certainly were not so wealthy, and it was, therefore, most unnecessary to call upon them to pay this enormously huge sum of money, increasing as it was, year by year. The whole position of Ireland in reference to Great Britain in this matter was most unjust and unfair, and he would go even further and would say that, in his opinion, it was a downright mean thing for a great and wealthy Government like the present one to insist upon the Irish people, whose poverty was perfectly well known, sharing to the fullest extent the burden of this expenditure. He might cite another point. Some years ago a Royal Commission sat to consider the relative positions of Ireland and Great Britain in the matter of taxation, and it was on record that that Commission reported that the Irish people were contributing several millions a year more than they ought in fairness to pay for national purposes. That could not be gainsaid in any way, and yet the demands upon the Irish taxpayer were being increased year after year. The Irish people found the greatest possible difficulty in providing for themselves the ordinary necessaries of life, and yet, without the slightest reference to their deplorable condition, the representatives of the wealthy English nation came there and without any hesitation insisted that they should consent to the increased naval expenditure. The Irish people had no sympathy whatever with this braggart policy which had been adopted by the present Government, the result of which they saw in the expenditure of those enormous sums of money. If the Government considered these things were necessary, if they considered that the wealth of the country should be sunk in shipbuilding and gunmaking, it was their business, and no one had any right to interfere with their opinion or their decision to spend their own money as lavishly and as generously as they chose upon their Fleet. They might make that Fleet four times its present size, they might fill their dockyards with work and employ thousands more men than they did at the present day; but they had no right to ask the people of Ireland, who were not threatened by any danger from any Power in the wide world, to keep pace with them in that expenditure, which was creating alarm by reason of its very magnitude. He had asked a Question of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that day with a view to securing a Return which would give in a handy and intelligible form information showing to the taxpayer of this country, and of Ireland as well, what had been the growth of naval expenditure during the last twenty years. This year there was a further increase, next year there would be another, and doubtless in the year following the same thing would happen, and so the thing would go on until there was as much spent on the Army and Navy as was at present spent on all the Departments put together. That was the road so ruin. One day there would be a rude awakening, and the masses of the people would see that national safety did not exist in this rivalry between nations as to expenditure. Personally he did not care if it did lead England to disaster, as in many ways she deserved it. She could make her Navy as large as she liked, but she ought to do it with her own money, and not force Ireland to pay whether she liked it or not. As an illustration of the manner in which Ireland was treated he instanced the Coastguards. He had no objection to Coastguards as such; they were picturesque-looking individuals, and with their flags and guns they served to break the monotony of the coast. But so far as Ireland was concerned far too much money was spent on the service. What was the use of the expenditure? When had the Irish coast been attacked? When had these men made any practical return for the money expended on them? The days of smuggling had long gone by, and the Coastguards apparently had nothing to do except to fire big guns at nothing at all in the sea. Along the Irish coasts there existed some of the poorest and most miserable populations in the whole world; the people were huddled together without sufficient land to live upon and with their fisheries undeveloped. Side by side with these poverty stricken people would be found a Coastguard station, the cost of whose upkeep, if spent in improving harbours or buying boats, might greatly relieve the lot of these poor people. The contrast was really too great. He could not expect English Members, who probably represented constituencies in which there was no real poverty, to enter into his view on this matter, but if they came from districts in Ireland they would readily agree that there was much to complain of in the enormous expenditure from which the Irish people derived no benefit whatever. He was perfectly aware that no attention whatever would be paid to anything Irish representatives might say. It was true that they did not share the Englishman's enthusiasm for the Navy and the Empire. As a matter of fact, many of their constituents had never even seen a man-of-war, and they could not be said to be unreasonable in objecting to enormous increases in the Votes from which they would derive no practical benefit whatever. A system by which Ireland made a reasonable fixed payment might work, but the present system under which she had to pay more and more every year simply perpetuated illfeeling, dissatisfaction, and disloyalty. It was well known that Ireland had no sympathy with the policy which necessitated the expenditure of £42,000,000 on the Navy and £25,000,000 or £30,000,000 on the Army; she was outside it in every way except that she was compelled to bear her full share of the cost; but as long as that position continued there would remain to her representatives the consolation, poor though it might be, of protesting vigorously and repeatedly against an impost which was unfair and mean to the last degree. He begged to move.

, who was very indistinctly heard, referred to the method by which the Admiralty now selected the young officers for the Navy. He heartily supported the principle of the scheme. Without committing himself to every detail, he believed the plan adopted was an admirable one, and he hoped it would be successful. There were two methods of selecting officers—that adopted by the Admiralty of taking the boys at a very early age, and becoming responsible for their entire education, and the system adopted by all other civilised nations of taking the young officer at seventeen or eighteen years of age from the ordinary civil population and then beginning special training. The system of the Admiralty was not necessarily to be condemned because it was unique. He believed the British naval officer, all round, to be the best in the world, but whether that was in consequence or in spite of the method of training was a point upon which differences of opinion might exist. One of the chief disadvantages of the present system was that the young boys were deprived of the immense advantage of being brought up, and educated amongst the ordinary youth of the country. They had not got the ideas which they would get in association with other boys, and that was no doubt a very great disadvantage. Another disadvantage was that when a boy was twelve years of age, it was difficult to say whether he would make a good naval officer or not. Again they could not tell when he arrived at the age of seventeen or eighteen years whether he might not have developed an earnest desire for some other profession. It was a great misfortune for a grown-up young man to be obliged to follow a profession to which he had not a natural bent. Having made their choice he thought the Admiralty were carrying it out in the best way they could, and he cordially wished their plan success. He hoped they would never send these young boys to anything approaching a competitive examination, for it did them a most pernicious injury to cram them. If the system adopted was to be given a fair chance they must make up their minds not to have a competitive examination. He also wished to point out that to test the success of the scheme would require a considerable number of years. His hon. friend behind him seemed to think that the scheme had succeeded already. He agreed that it would not be difficult to get a great number of boys to join the Navy, but it would be at least twenty or thirty years before they could tell whether the naval officer produced by this sort of training would be an improvement. One objection he had always made was that the plan of taking boys at twelve years of age had been tried and been found wanting. The plan of taking them at seventeen or eighteen years of age had not been tried, but he did not think the age of fifteen or sixteen years as an alternative was a satisfactory compromise. With regard to school management, when the Admiralty undertook to manage a school they should be very careful to see that it was really a good one. If public schools were never going to be better than they were now, then the Admiralty would be right in saying that they must have a school of their own. He was not sure that the Admiralty would be able to maintain the school as well as the public schools were now maintained. He would suggest that the Admiralty should have this school examined by the Department of the Board of Education, and that the reports of that inspection and examination should from time to time be laid on the Table of the House. He thought that would be a safeguard for the Admiralty itself, and a guarantee that the large amount of money asked for would be usefully and properly expended. Instead of taking a much larger number of boys at the age of eighteen it might be better to have some system by which the wastage could be supplied from the outside. That had been done in former days in the Admiralty, and in that way they had a great check upon the efficiency of the system. Those were points which he desired to urge upon the Government last year, but he did not get the opportunity. He wished the Admiralty to consider this as a matter of education, and not as a matter of naval policy, and if they did he thought it possible that some system of the kind might improve and assist the plan which the Admiralty had adopted and in the carrying out of which he had no desire to do anything hut give them the most cordial support.

said there could be no doubt that expenditure upon the present scale of the Navy Estimates pressed very hardly upon this country as well as upon Ireland. Knowing as he did the importance of having a sufficiently strong Navy, he had never found any difficulty in supporting the Navy Estimates, and, despite their growth, which had been almost alarmingly rapid, he should not oppose any part of the expenditure upon the Navy which was now being asked for. Years ago he said in this House that he thought the expenditure upon the Navy would ultimately rise to £40,000,000, but he did not think it would have arrived so soon. With regard to the information upon which they granted the money that was asked for, he thought that information was in some respects somewhat slender. It was, indeed, almost impossible that it should be otherwise, because they all knew that there were items in naval expenditure as in other Departments which could not well be discussed in public. They took a very serious responsibility upon themselves in voting an expenditure which increased at so rapid a rate unless they were certain that means could not be devised by which the House could be more fully taken into the confidence of the Admiralty. They could not consider the Navy Estimates without bearing in mind what was being spent annually upon naval works. The naval works at Rosyth would cost over £5,000,000. He gave that as an example of the expenditure they were asked to sanction without having any real knowledge of what it was for. If one had to defend that expenditure in the country it could be justified fully only upon the ground that it was necessary to have properly equipped dockyards situated in the cheapest centre of production. In order to continue this great annual outlay upon the Navy it was necessary that the Government should take the country along with them as well as the House of Commons. It was stated by Lord Goschen in introducing the Navy Estimates in 1899 that a Supplementary Estimate was needed because a large sum had been taken from a special fund in Russia for Navy purposes. It might not be always possible to give the grounds for which money was asked for the Navy. What he felt in regard to the Vote for new construction was that sufficient cause had not been made out for raising it to the figure at which it stood. It might not be possible to do that in public. The consideration which he wished specially to put before the hon. Gentleman was one which had been already referred to, and that was whether it would not be possible to appoint a Committee of the House with power to sit in secret session, as the Foreign Relations Committee did in America, and whether fuller information could not be imparted to those Members of the House who were most qualified, irrespective of Party, to serve on such a Committee. He believed if the Navy Estimates had the support of a Committee of that kind there would be much less disposition, either in the House or the country, to cavil at the details of this great expenditure with which the country was burdened. He would always be, as he had always been, in favour of voting the fullest provision for the requirements of the Fleet, and he submitted the suggestion as to whether it was not possible to take the House of Commons more into the confidence of the Admiralty, hoping that it might be seriously considered. He believed the suggestion could be worked out without any great difficulty.

said he knew some of the hardships involved in the new principle of entering boys at twelve years of age, because it shut out those of a class who, prior to the introduction of the new scheme, had an opportunity of entering the Navy. That would apply to the engineer class of officers most particularly. He did not in the least suggest snobbery, but there could be no doubt that little opportunity would be given to certain people to gain admittance in future to the higher ranks of the Navy. He did not suppose in these democratic days anyone would attempt to argue that all the best brain was reserved for a few. In the United States and other countries very many of the best men came from the most humble beginnings. He thought it would be shutting out a great element of strength to absolutely close the doors to some of those who had had an opportunity hitherto of access. He desired to raise a question affecting training. They were told by the Secretary to the Admiralty that the training of the Navy in the future was bound to be scientific, mainly concerning gunnery and the care of machinery, and that all boys as soon as they went into training ships would have their attention directed to those matters. It occurred to him that there would be a great need in future for schoolmasters to prepare the minds of the lads for the higher examinations they would have to pass at a later period for the posts of petty and warrant officers, and so on. Of course in the old days the seamanship instructor was a great man on the ship, when promotion was dependent almost entirely on good seamanship. That had entirely disappeared and a new state of affairs bad come into existence, and a scientific knowledge would be needed even among the lower deck to enable them to make that scientific progression expected of them in gunnery, torpedo work, signalling, and so on. At the present moment he understood that no schoolmaster was carried on any ship afloat. He would suggest that the Admiralty should consider the desirability of introducing into all sea-going ships carrying, say, a crew of 200 or more, a schoolmaster, who should be carefully selected. He wished to ask the hon. Gentleman a Question in regard to a matter which was referred to in the First Lord's Statement. He referred to the assimilation of the scale of the Marines to the scale approved for the Army both with regard to pay and allowances. Would that assimilation be extended to separation money? Now there was an undertaking on the part of the Admiralty to equalize the condition of the Marine with that of the soldier because it was held to be practically impossible to have different rates of pay prevailing for these services. What he wanted to know was whether the Admiralty was acting actually on an equality basis if they ignored the claims of the Marine to the separation money which the soldier who was married received when abroad. This was a matter of considerable interest to many, and he hoped the hon. Gentleman would be able to give some satisfaction upon it.

said the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Cambridge University spoke with authority on all matters relating to education. Whether boys were to take their place in the services or in the ordinary walks of life, any opinion which the right hon. Gentleman gave on then-education deserved attention. He had had experience in his own family of various methods of naval education. One of his boysentered the Navy some ten years ago, and had had a successful career. A second boy who afterwards entered some four or five years later had also been successful. He had a third boy who would soon apply for entrance. His opinion was that the most recent innovation was one which was likely to have considerable advantages in the matter of education, and in the future of the Navy. He did not agree with the right hon. Gentleman that it would be wise to leave the education of officers to the age of eighteen, because the earlier they had the environment round the young life the more likely were they to develop their predilection in favour of the career they were going to take. It was possible for the boys themselves, after running through the earlier period of training, if found by the parents to be unfit for the career, or if the boys expressed a definite distaste for it to be withdrawn from the service. He had found in his own experience that it was of the greatest possible advantage to give boys an early naval environment. The fate of the country might depend on the natural inclination of officers for their work and their scientific training, and, if their selection was left to a later period of life, valuable time for training would be wasted which the most recent change in regard to entrance would enable them to improve. It must not be forgotten that under the new system youngsters did not make a selection of the particular branch of the service to which they eventually attached themselves till a later period. They were now to be put through the same curriculum and training up to a certain period, and afterwards it was determined by selection, merit, or efficiency which branch they should enter. He thought this was a considerable gain under the new system. The natural bent was given full play, and that was also a great advantage over the old system. He would take this opportunity of asking the Civil Lord for information on some of the figures in the Estimates. He looked with regret on the fact that we had not provided for an equal number of boys under training who were eventually to become our seamen, as was the case last year. The number had been decreased from 6,200 to 5,000, though there was a provision for 360 boys under training of the artificer class which did not appear last year. There was an increase in the amount of prizes given for shooting, which was a step in the right direction. Our seamen gunners ought to be encouraged more than in the past to acquire the art of good shooting; and money prizes acted as a great incentive to this as well as mere kudos winning. The hon. Member for Clare spoke of the Coastguard gunnery practice as "firing at nothing at all," but was the hon. Member himself not really firing at "nothing at all" in the speech he had just made?

said he was firing at the hon. Gentleman; and he did not know whether that was firing at nothing at all.

said the hon. Member for Clare might have been firing at the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, but at any rate he could not believe that the hon. Gentleman was firing at him. If so he paid him a very great compliment. The hon. Member had complained that during the autumn manœuvres the Fleet had not made its base in different parts of Ireland, but one portion of the torpedo destroyer fleet had its base at Kingstown and in Dublin harbour; and another portion of the Home Fleet had its base at Bantry Bay, so that the hon. Member would see that Ireland was not altogether neglected. He was quite sure that if the hon. Member would continue to press the matter upon the Civil Lord, it might be arranged that all future naval engagements should take place round the coast of Ireland.

said that the discussion of the past two days had amply justified the few observations he had made on the subject of finance when he seconded the Resolution then before the House, and endeavoured to impress on the Committee that the present provision of naval force far exceeded the two-Power standard. That contention had been supported by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on both sides of House and emphasised by the right hon. Member for West Bristol. There was no doubt that the general result of the discussion was that the Committee was impressed with the view that at the present moment we had a more than sufficient naval force for any probable eventuality in any naval war in which we might be engaged. He had endeavoured to bring that to the test of any reasonable interpretation of the two-Power standard, and he believed he had shown that we were able to meet any such contingency in any part of the world. While there was in many quarters of the House a disinclination to propose specific decreases either of expenditure, shipbuilding, or men, there was a widespread desire, which came out very clearly in the course of the debate, that a stop should be put to the increases that were now going on, more particularly when hon. Members became aware of the fact that within the four corners of the Estimates there was involved not merely the voting of the specific sums included in the Estimates as initial expenditure, but large increases in future years. He thought the Committee should get some assurance from the Government on this point. We were constantly getting committed to small sums of initial expenditure, like £5,000, £10,000, or £20,000, which might result in an additional expenditure of millions. There was the case of the two dockyards, which would involve, when they were completed, an annual charge of hundreds of thousands of pounds being placed on the Estimates. We could not but fail to recognise that the present times were not only critical but transitional. Critical because of the naval war in the Far East; but surely we might draw the conclusion that being in a position of great naval superiority—and acknowledged to be so—we could fairly offer to hold our hand and rest in peace. Still more was that argument good if we looked at these as transitional times in regard to naval warfare and naval defence. Many disputable points in regard to naval warfare were being put to the test and it would be only prudent to hold our hands, ii possible, with a view to profit by the experience and lessons to be drawn from the war in the Far East. There had been no answer to the contention of the hon. Member for Dewsbury and the right hon. Member for Forest of Dean in regard to the expenditure on battleships. The Admiralty were taking the initial steps which would involve an expenditure of £4,000,000 or £5,000,000 on a type of battleship which they themselves acknowledged was not the best available type.

said that these ships had been laid down some six weeks ago, and it was not possible to alter them now.

said that the Admiralty might have begun to lay down these ships six weeks ago, but that only shifted the responsibility further back and did not affect his argument. There was another point which he wished to put forcibly to the Admiralty which showed still more the un wisdom of the present expenditure of the Department; and that was, that in all probability the plans for the new and improved type of battleship would be ready in the autumn of this year. If the new type was more powerful than the present and was likely to be adopted not only by ourselves but by foreign Powers, it would have been wisdom, from a financial point of view, for the Admiralty to hold their hands so as to have these new vessels of the best possible improved type. Another point on which the Committee should have some information was the distribution of the Fleet at the present moment. It appeared to him somewhat strange that there should be the enormous naval force there was in certain seas compared with that we held at home. There were squadrons in parts of the world where no other nation had any naval force whatever. Taking the numbers from the Navy List we had thirty-eight vessels on the China Station; in the Mediterranean we had no less than fifty-one vessels of all sorts and kinds. We had been increasing our naval forces in the Mediterranean out of all proportion to any increase going on in the French Navy, which was our most formidable rival in those waters. We had in that sea nearly double the number of vessels contained in the combined Channel and Cruiser Squadrons. That distribution appeared to be somewhat strange, because the naval strength of the country ought to be retained principally in home waters. Then the South Atlantic Squadron, with alternate headquarters at Gibraltar and Sierra Leone, had been constituted. No explanation of that had been given, although it was stated yesterday that that squadron was looked upon with a certain amount of doubt and wonder by many naval authorities. As regarded the East Indian and Pacific Squadrons, they were quite small, but he thought they could be reduced even below their present limits, as no other Power, with the exception of America, had ships in that part of the world. He thought some explanation should be given of the changes that had taken place.

said that with reference to the distribution of the naval forces of the country, he thought the hon. Gentleman who had just spoken had lost sight of the fact that they could not divide the sea. While he admitted the gravity of the naval expenditure, it appeared to him to be absolutely unavoidable. He agreed in going as far as was necessary and no further; but they would all admit that the naval expenditure had reached a point at which it became very serious. They had, however, to remember that the Empire was a sea Empire and that there was no comparison possible between it and any other Empire in the world. The national expenditure both in ships and in personnel, would continue to increase whatever they did. His own view—and he held it more strongly the older he became—was that the Empire would have to wake up to its responsibilities and share this burden. In talking about naval expenditure they should not forget the broad fact that this was a sea Empire or nothing, and that if it was a sea Empire all parts should assist in preserving it. As an illustration of that argument, he saw on page 11 of the Estimates a charge for twenty-five Royal Navy Reserve Officers allotted to Naval Reserves in Australasia. The revenue of Australasia was greater than the revenue of Japan, and they all knew what Japan was doing. Why should Australasia escape her duties and liabilities in connection with the Navy? He admitted that naval expenditure would continue to increase; but he looked to a better co-operative system between all parts of the Empire to provide the necessary expenditure. There were those who said that the naval forces of the country were now powerful enough, and that there was no need to do any more. He did not think that they could stop. They could stop doing what was unnecessary; but they could not stop doing what was necessary. Suppose it was found that the number of British ships exceeded the ships of a combination of Powers by ten or twelve. Was this country going to stop and wait until the others came up to it? If it did, then when the other countries reached equality they would have ships of a superior kind to ours, which would be out of date, because every ship was an improvement on another ship. What was necessary was to take a reasonable view, to examine expenditure and see that nothing that was not required was asked for. He did not think there was anything to complain of in the Estimates. During the last fifteen or sixteen years the Admiralty had been conducted in a businesslike way; but the more criticism there was in this House of a really reasonable character the more the Admiralty would look into matters. There was, he thought, one branch of expenditure which showed a tendency towards exaggeration. He thought there was danger in imagining that this Empire demanded a very great naval personnel, and he thought he saw a tendency on the part of the Admiralty in that direction. He protested against that. The real truth was that the Navy was so entirely different from the Army that no analogy as regarded personnel could be drawn between them. In contemplating a reserve for the Army it was necessary to calculate on something that could not be estimated. In a land war it was not the enemy they had most to fear but disease. Disease could not be helped, but it might be mitigated. That was not the case in the Navy. The sanitary condition of the Fleet did not change when it passed from a state of peace to a state of war. All the conditions that prevailed in peace remained in war; and it was, therefore, obvious that it was very much easier to arrive at the standard of what the personnel of the Fleet should be than in the case of the Army. He mentioned that because he thought the general trend of policy was to exaggerate the proportions of a reserve personnel required. They knew exactly the number of warships fit for service and they knew the number of men required to man them. There would be no wastage through disease, but only the number actually killed or wounded. The conditions of modern warfare had greatly changed. In the old days a ship might become a slaughter-house and still survive, but that was not the case now. Did not the present war emphasise that very point? The naval reserve was there, but the ships were wanting. He would therefore ask the Secretary to the Admiralty to consider whether he was not going a little too far as regarded personnel. He would conclude where he began. He thought it was the true policy to speak out plainly in regard to the duties and obligations of the outside Empire, in order that all citizens of the Empire should agree to share the burden of the Fleet, without which the Empire could not exist. The present arrangement was not right and should not continue. The increasing expenditure might weigh down the popularity of the Navy, and then there would be a reaction which would drag down the Navy to a low standard, which would be as bad for the Colonies as for this country.

said he thought it might be convenient if he now answered the Questions which had been put, and if necessary he would answer further Questions later. With reference to the point mentioned by his right hon. friend the Member for Cambridge University—who approached the subject with great knowledge, and whose remarks deserved to be received with great respect—with regard to the early age at which boys were admitted to the Navy, his right hon. friend said that the early age had been already tried and had been found wanting. That was certainly true, but he thought that the conditions under which it had been tried were sufficient to account for its failure. The present system had very few features in common with the old system, under which boys wore put on board ship under conditions not suitable to children of their tender age, and under conditions of education generally which applied to the Navy of that day, but which no longer applied. The conditions now ensured at Osborne were such that the boys would in every respect, both physical and educational, have at least as great advantages as in any private or public school in the country. As to the suggestion that the Admiralty ought to seek advice on educational matters, he would say that the first thing they did with regard both to Osborne and to the general scheme of naval education was to go to the University of Cambridge, which his right hon. friend represented, and to secure one of its most distinguished sons, Professor Ewing. Not only had they thus secured the highest and best advice on educational subjects, but through Professor Ewing they were kept in the closest personal touch with all the greatest educational authorities in the country. The suggestion that it would be an advantage if the inspection of Osborne was carried out under the auspices of the Board of Education was a new one to which he would not like to give a reply for, or against, off-hand, but he would undertake that it should receive the fullest consideration. With regard to the wastage, the Admiralty did not contemplate any appreciable wastage right up to, or nearly up to, the age of eighteen. They contemplated a considerable wastage up to the end of the first year at Osborne, by which time they expected to be able to eliminate nearly all who did not show sufficient qualifications to make them desirable naval officers. There was one very forcible consideration, not educational but naval, which weighed against any proposal to fill up from outside sources. The First Lord of the Admiralty had recently stated that the sea was one and the Navy was one, and that unity of the Empire was a most important feature which they could not afford in any way to injure. Unless it was absolutely necessary they should jealously guard against any action which would introduce division or section into any class of the Navy. It was originally considered whether there should be two rival schools, one at Osborne and another at Dartmouth, or whether the boys should all go to one school. The idea of having two schools was very attractive in many respects, but the Admiralty came to the conclusion that the principle of the unity of the Navy was of such importance that they could not afford to disregard it. The hon. Member for Leith had complained that the Committee did not get sufficient information on, certain points. The Admiralty were anxious to give all the information possible, but purely on financial grounds it was not always desirable to say too much, because there were such things as countries building and providing against one another, and if they said too much about what they were going to do and exactly how and why they were going to do it, it was not at all unlikely that other people would do the same thing and thus cause us further expenditure. With regard to Rosyth the Admiralty had given practically all the information in their possession. No great naval establishment could be designed or even considered until after the most careful examination of the site had been carried out and the Admiralty experts had made their report. The Admiralty had not yet received the report; in fact, the detailed examination was still going on; when the examination had been completed, and the particulars were before the Admiralty, the Government proposals would be prepared and laid before Parliament with the least possible delay.

said he mentioned Rosyth merely as an example. His point was that, much as the Committee would always value expert opinion, it could not wholly relinquish its responsibility with regard to public expenditure. In some respects he was afraid the Committee leaned too much on expert opinion and too little on its own judgment.

said he did not for a moment suggest that the Admiralty had any right to act on the advice of their experts without submitting their proposals to the House, but simply that they could not submit their proposals until they had considered the result of their experts' investigations. As to the suggested Estimates Committee, the Prime Minister had really answered that point. The hon. Member for Devonport had raised a very legitimate question as to the field of selection for cadetships, and it might be a satisfaction to him to know that on the last entry three sons of engineer officers in the Navy had actually obtained nomination. There would be no narrowing of the ground for nom nation by the First Lord; that would b e done only by the committee of selection, which consisted of naval officers and civilians skilled in education. A further question raised by the hon. Member was with regard to separation money for the Marines. Considerable advantages had been given to the Marines to correspond to 1 the increased pay of the Army. The Admiralty had the fullest sympathy on general, grounds with the suggestion that this separation or lodging money should be granted, but the conditions practically precluded it from being done. The money was really given not as a separation allowance to the wives and children, but as a lodging allowance to the men themselves, because accommodation was not provided for them in barracks. On board ship lodging was provided; consequently the Marine was not entitled to the allowance when afloat. Moreover, the Marines, when on shore, were under the Army Act, under which the system of lodging allowances obtained on the ground he had stated; but when the Marines were on board ship they were under the Naval Discipline Act, which recognised no such system. Therefore, to give a separation allowance to Marines afloat would raise the much larger question of whether it would not necessarily have to be given also to all seamen of the Navy. On the grounds of policy such an allowance could not very well be made. With regard to carrying a schoolmaster on every ship, that would be a very large departure, and one which was not likely to commend itself to the Navy. Every boy who went through the curriculum of a training ship ought to have the necessary instruction in stoke-hold and mechanician's duties, and in gunnery, but it did not follow that that instruction would best be given by schoolmasters. The question raised by the hon. Member for East Perth had already been fully discussed. While there was considerable force in the argument that a new ship should not be laid down when there was a prospect of better designs being produced within a short time, it should be borne in mind that if that practice was adopted they would never lay down any ships at all, because they were always at work trying to improve designs. There was no method by which ships could be laid down with certainty except that of determining to lay them down at a certain time to the best designs then available. If Noah had proceeded on the principle suggested by the hon. Member, the ark would not have been completed yet. The matter had been fully considered, and the balance of advantage had appeared to lie in laying down the ships at once.

said that both sides were agreed that the Estimates were enormous; the difference between them was that they on the Opposition side held it to be the duty of this country, as the supreme Naval Power in the world, to take the initiative in trying to bring to an end this ruinous naval competition. The Prime Minister had refused to take the initiative and they contended that he was wrong. The right hon. Gentleman had stated that it was not for him to take the initiative, but that was a perfectly monstrous proposition coming from a Government which was responsible for one of the greatest wars of aggression that the century had known. It was said that ours was only a defensive policy, but France said the same thing. The hon. Gentleman opposite had said we had no motive for a Navy except to defend ourselves. He was glad that the Liberal Party had pledged itself to the proposition that it was the duty of this country to take the initiative and declare that this policy was ruining the country, and they ought to sit down with other countries in order to see if some means could not be invented to bring their system of Navy expenditure to an end. The hon. and gallant Member for Yarmouth said he had never clamoured for expenditure upon the Navy, although he was afraid that these Estimates must grow larger on account of the automatic increases. The Secretary to the Admiralty had somewhat misstated his position, which was that when the Shipbuilding Vote was normal it amounted to one-third of the whole Navy Estimates, but the Shipbuilding Vote would grow. He would go back to the time when it was stationary, and then it would be found that for a series of years the Shipbuilding Vote was about one-third. If that view was correct the Estimates they were passing to-day would involve Navy Estimates amounting to £50,000,000 in a comparatively short period of years. He desired to express his disappointment that the Prime Minister could not see his way to go beyond the non possumus attitude he had taken up. The Member for Perthshire had introduced a new and a dangerous doctrine, for he understood that he challenged the present distribution of the Fleet. He had never hesitated to challenge the authority of the Admiralty on many points but there were things as to which in his humble judgment the Admiralty's authority was pontifical, and for them to say in this House that the Admiralty ought to have a larger or a smaller number of ships in the Mediterranean or anywhere else was a position that he could not take up for a moment. He said that because they had the whole thing discussed at the time when the hon. Member for Perthshire was not a Member of the House, when the Mediterranean scare took place, and when the demand was made by the Navy League and its supporters in the Press that we should have a larger squadron in the Mediterranean. The decision of the House of Commons on that matter was that the whole responsibility must lie with the Board of Admiralty. On the question of education he was sorry that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Berwickshire chose to castigate him yesterday for some views ho had expressed. He did not object to this modified "Britannia" scheme of education, and he had no objection to the curriculum or the mode of selection of the boys, which was rather more competitive than the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Cambridge seemed to think. They were classified, upon an interview, after making them read and write and testing them in various ways. His objection was that naval opinion was not unanimous by any means upon the question of the early versus the later age. As to the early age his objection was on behalf of the Navy and on behalf of the people who supported it. The system of selecting boys at the age of twelve and keeping them in an expensive school, to which not 5 per cent. of the parents of this country could afford to send their children, meant the shutting out of 95 per cent. of the boys of the country, which was a wrong to the Navy, a wrong to the boys of this country, and a wrong to their parents. That was the result of the system, and he greatly preferred the system which had been adopted in the United States which took the boys at a later age, paid the whole of their expenses out of the public funds, and the parents were not allowed to spend a dollar for the support of their children. He preferred the Admiralty mode of selection, but at the age of sixteen or eighteen years there was not the least objection to competition. His objection to the naval education system was that it was not possible for these boys to enter the Navy as officers. He held that the Navy or the country would never be justly treated until at every step of his career the naval officer was paid by the State a sum sufficient to meet his expenses and from the earliest day he should be self-supporting. He wished to know what was the present rule of the Admiralty with regard, not to wages or salaries, but the extraordinary expenses which naval officers had been allowed and encouraged to make. The practice of permitting naval officers to spend out of their own money on the service of the ship to which they belonged was what they called "painting the ship." That was a gross flagrant and scandalous abuse if it existed at all, because it was most unfair to the poorer men. Last year he was told that the practice was permitted, but not encouraged. He contended that it ought neither to be permitted or encouraged, because it was absolutely wrong. There was one particular class of officer who he believed considered that he had suffered a great deal from this system and its results. In times past it had been believed that this system of allowing officers to pay for "painting the ship" was a mode of giving a preference to the rich. He wanted to know whether the Admiralty had stopped; this practice altogether, and he hoped they would let it be known that it would not be permitted, and that officers would not be allowed to expend any of their own money on the public service. They were spending £42,000,000 on the Navy, and were they going to be mean enough to ask a single naval officer to spend a single penny? He wished also to know whether there was any justification or foundation for the complaint that certain kinds of naval officers had not fared so well as others in the matter of promotion. He knew that was a delicate subject, but that was what had been stated, and he could refer to statements made upon it in public journals. There was the specialised officer and the non-specialised. The complaint had been made to him that the non-specialised officer, who was usually the richest officer, fared better in promotion than the others, and that of the others the navigating officer, who as a rule was the poorest officer, fared worst of all. He had seen a table of information which supported this complaint, and he thought it right to bring the matter to the attention of the Admiralty in the hope that the hon. Gentleman would give a frank statement upon it, and that if there was anything unusual or abnormal he would see that it was either corrected or sufficiently explained.

said the hon. Gentleman opposite had made a complaint which was not new when he said that the promotion of the specialised officer was as a rule less rapid than that of the non-specialised officer. He did not think that was the case. If there was any complaint, the hon. Gentleman would find it was that the specialised officer obtained more rapid promotion than the non-specialised officer. The hon. Gentleman made a complaint that the officers of a man - of -war had to spend a certain portion of their substance in ornamenting and painting the ship. No doubt the grievance did exist, and it was entirely due to the niggardliness of the Admiralty. But there were means of escape even from that. There was a means which was extremely popular throughout the service, namely, the method of getting the supply from the dockyard itself. He had heard of an officer who said his only complaint in regard to the men on board his ship was that there was not a competent thief amongst them. In regard to cadets, the hon. Gentleman had complained that the system excluded boys who would make very good naval officers. Any boy would make a good officer when put into the Navy. It was the Navy that made the officer and not the officer the Navy. He did not think the suggestion of the hon. Member for Devonport in regard to appointing schoolmasters to go on board the ships was a wise one. He did not think there was anything comparable to the education a boy got in the Navy between the ages of thirteen and twenty. He attributed that largely to the absence of the schoolmaster. The naval officer gave the boy that practical education which he rejoiced to possess himself. If they said they would take a large number of boys at thirteen, and charge the parents nothing for their education, the result would undoubtedly be to get a large number sent into the Navy for the sole purpose of getting education. Having got their education at the expense of the State, a large number would resign. He thought that would be quite a sufficient objection to changing a system which had worked very well. They were told that the bluejackets were to have no training whatever in masts and yards. He presumed that the whole idea of sail was to be eliminated from the life of the sailor. It was perfectly true that he would get a certain amount of boating, but experience in boating would not enable him to put a ship about. There might be a war in which it would be absolutely necessary to take possession of a considerable fleet of sailing ships. The number of sailing ships was considerably larger than the number of steamships. What a nice position it would be if they had not a man who could take charge of one of these sailing vessels and put her about! He suggested that one ship might be kept where the handling of masts and yards would be taught, so as to have a certain number of men who would be sailors as well as seamen. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol had suggested that the time had arrived when the Navy should be treated as the Army, and that naval men should be put under a system of short service of two, three, or four years, and then drafted into a Reserve. He hoped the Admiralty would not entertain any notion of that kind. It might be excellent for the Army to have short service—he could not offer an opinion on that—but it was not suitable for the Navy. The artificial conditions of life in the Navy required that men should enter the service young and be brought into such a condition of mind that they freely accepted life on board ship. He trusted his hon. friend would give, on behalf of the Admiralty, an assurance that they were not prepared to plunge into a system of short service with the large Reserve suggested. He was in favour of a very considerable increase in the Naval Reserve drawn from the merchant service. The Naval Reserve at present numbered about 26,000. It might be increased to 30,000, 40,000, or even 50,000. The Naval Reserves, as they existed now, were not really reserve men. They were really an infusion of an active element if we mobilised the Navy. Therefore he hoped that something more would be done than was proposed at present. He most sincerely regretted the existence of the Naval Volunteers. He thought they never could be of any use. The arguments by which he supported the Royal Naval Reserve were the same factors as those by which he condemned the Naval Volunteers. The Admiralty had recently built barracks at Portsmouth to accommodate 6,000 men. Admiral Fisher, who had introduced an enormous number of improvements in regard to the Navy, had for the first time issued a rule which enabled men to leave the barracks at night. That was absolutely the right system. What was the result. Out of the 4,000 who had beds in the barracks not one-third remained in the barracks. That showed the popularity of the new rule, and also that the barracks were built four times as large as they need be. In regard to the masts of the ships, he asked whether the Admiralty had considered the extreme danger of the present heavy masts. The ordinary error in shooting was a vertical error. A shot was fired either too high or too low. The result of that was, as experience had shown, that the tops of the masts of the battleships in action suffered more than any other part. If these heavy armoured masts did get struck by projectiles, the result would be that they would come down and jam the turrets, or put out of action some of the guns. He earnestly impressed on his hon. friend to consider whether these heavy masts could not be absolutely done away with. Of course it might be said that masts were necessary for hoisting out boats, but that could be provided for by derricks. He trusted his hon. friend would forgive him for bringing this consideration before him, but it was not without importance. In conclusion he wished to make a few remarks on the general question. The hon. and gallant Member for Yarmouth had asked why the Colonies should not make a further contribution towards the cost of the Navy. At present the Colonies subscribed not one-hundredth part of the total cost of the Navy. As a matter of fact they subscribed only £300,000 in all.

said that India paid £100,000.

said that India paid £100,000; but that was not a voluntary contribution. England exacted it just as she required a contribution from India of £1,500,000 for our Army. But the Colonies, from whom we could not exact or require these contributions, and which they must give voluntarily if at all, had at this moment practically withheld all assistance to the expenditure on the Navy, on which their existence depended. On the other hand, they wanted commercial preferences, were determined to maintain their political independence, and equally determined not to contribute to the Navy, by which alone their independence could be maintained. Whatever was to be done for the Navy must be done for it by ourselves alone. That made it so important that we should see to it that we were not exceeding the real needs of the Empire. Ho himself had put the point, which had been enforced by the hon. Member for Exeter, and still more powerfully enforced by the right hon. Member for West Bristol, and which had not yet been answered—that the present Construction Estimate was not a two-Power but a three-Power Estimate, judged by expenditure, which was a fair test. The very simple Question put the day before, he repeated now, and hoped the Committee would get a satisfactory answer, it was—What was it that had caused the Government to depart from the two-Power standard to the extent of doubling their naval requirements? It might be that there was an answer to that Question; that the hon. Gentleman would be able to say that he knew the answer but could not give it because of the exigencies of the public service. But he did think that if the time had arrived when there should be a three-Power standard the matter should be dealt with by Parliament. If the hon. Gentleman disputed the figures, he invited him to explain how it was that we got less value for the money we spent on our Navy than the three largest naval Powers in Europe.

said he wanted to ask if the hon. Gentleman was in a position to assure the Committee or guarantee that, although he refused information to the Committee, other people, as he described them—presumably other naval Powers—were not as well acquainted with the policy and plans of the Admiralty as he was himself. The neglect of other Government Departments in allowing official information to leak out during the past few years, had rather destroyed, at any rate had shaken, confidence that the Admiralty, any more than their other Departments, was able to keep their secret plans and designs from other people. That was very important, especially when this enormous and alarming growth of expenditure on the Navy was contemplated. The Committee should have, as far as possible, a full, complete, and unreserved statement that the money they were now asked to provide would not be exceeded in next year's Estimates. He wished to refer to the question of the education of our ordinary seamen. During the last fifteen years he had signed vast numbers of papers for boys who were entering the Navy—sons of agricultural labourers, fishermen, and tradesmen who loved the sea and naturally wanted to join the Navy—and two-thirds of these boys were certainly far below the standard of education to which they should have attained to make them efficient under the new system of naval service. Everybody knew that the work of ordinary seamen in the Navy was approaching year by year more nearly to that of a mechanic. It required high intelligence. He did not know anything about the possibility of carrying schoolmasters at sea, but this he did know, that for better effective service in the Navy a vast number of boys who had passed through his hands, should have some months, at any rate, of good training under a highly capable instructor or schoolmaster. That was a matter worthy of serious consideration by the Admiralty. He joined the hon. Member for King's Lynn in the regret that the teaching of sailoring work to the men of the Navy had been abandoned. He meant the manipulation of sails and yards, the bending of sails, and the management generally of sailing vessels. It would be a great misfortune to the nation if, in time of war, mercantile vessels were captured and fifty men could not be mustered capable of re-rigging them and repairing the damage caused by the capturing gunboats, and sailing them into port. A short time, therefore, should be devoted to imparting to the boys proficiency in the manipulation of sailing vessels, and certainly under no circumstances should it be abandoned altogether.

They are trained to manipulate sailing boats.

said he was bound to say that he feared the capacity of "Jack Tar" in the management of small boats left much to be desired. He did not know whether it was the fault of the men or of the boats, but there were large numbers of fighting men on board ship who found the greatest difficulty in getting a boat through the surf on the sea-coast, even when that was not heavy. There had been some sad and disastrous experiences of late in that respect; and that looked bad for our naval reputation. If the hon. Gentleman would make inquiry into this question he would find he was perfectly justified in making that statement.

said that the discussion, two nights ago, on the question of contributions by the Colonies to the cost of the Navy had, he was glad to recognise, already borne good fruit. The hon. and gallant Member for Yarmouth, who had as Imperial a soul as any Member of the House, and who knew better than most the needs of the Navy, opened his speech by advocating that the Colonies should subscribe towards the legitimate cost of the Navy. He was amazed that Englishmen and Scotsmen in the House who regarded a strong Navy as a matter of vital importance, did not take more pains in pointing out to the Colonies their duty in this matter of contributing to the expenditure on the Navy. It was, therefore, to the financial aspect of the question that he would address himself. He did not imagine that anything he could say or anything Irishmen could say would induce the Admiralty to make any reduction in the Votes. Anything he could plead with reference to the poverty of Ireland would not induce the hon. Gentleman to make any change; but the Irish Members were, nevertheless, bound to do their duty to their constituents, to whom the Navy was of no use. He would only refer to the Colonies, because if the Colonies contributed to the Navy the Irish taxpayers would be relieved to a certain interest. He saw that out of a total of £6,000,000 sterling, which they were now asked to vote, the Colonies contributed only £76,000. Would any hon. Member say that that was a fair contribution from the great Colonies over the sea. It was said the other day that if the Suez Canal were blocked, vessels to the Cape, India, and Australia, would pass down the West Coast of Africa at the rate of one an hour. All that great carrying trade was secured by the Navy; without it the Colonies could not exist, and yet they only contributed £76,000 out of £6,000,000. It would be more worthy of the pride and honour of this country to refuse such a paltry and mean contribution. The Australian Commonwealth and New Zealand contributed £58,000. In connection with that, he should like to ask whether, in consideration of that insignificant contribution, the Australian Commonwealth had not made a bargain with the Admiralty that two out of the eight ships on the Station should be manned by Australians and New Zealanders, who were to be paid, not at the ordinary naval rate, but at special rates approximating more to colonial wages. A great part of the £58,000 would in that way go into the pockets of colonists. Was it not also a fact that the Australian Squadron was, in consideration of the contribution, to be kept up to eight cruisers, which were to be employed exclusively in the protection of the fisheries, and which were not to leave Australian waters. As regarded the distribution of the Fleet, he was an unsophisticated amateur; but it did seem to him that to keep eight cruisers on the Australian Station was a waste of money. He did not think that in the event of war France, Germany, Russia, or the United States would attack Australia. Why, therefore, keep eight cruisers on the Station? The taxpayer was a long-suffering individual. But this bargain with the Commonwealth ought to be the last straw. He also wished to ask whether any representation had been made by the Admiralty or any other Department to Canada pointing out the benefit she derived from the protection of the Fleet on the Bermuda Station and the North Pacific Fleet, and whether she would make any contribution to the up-keep of those fleets. He understood such a communication had been sent; and he wished to know what answer had been received. He was amazed that such a prosperous colony as Canada had not contributed to the Navy. There was a misprint in the Estimates the other day, and he wondeed whether the omission of Canada from the contributions was also accidental. He could not believe that Canada would be so mean and paltry as not to contribute to the Navy, to which Ireland, without any sea-borne trade, contributed between three and four millions sterling. It might be that Canada was looking forward to amalgamation with the United States. He himself believed that that would ultimately happen, and that might be the reason why Canada had not contributed to the Navy. He was in a state of wonderment as to how the country would be able to meet those constantly increasing Estimates. With the construction account increasing all other accounts would also increase; and in three or four years the House would be asked for £10,000,000 more. As regarded the details of the Estimates no adequate explanation had yet been given; and he hoped it would be forthcoming. He intended to support the Amendment of his hon. friend the Member for East Clare. Even from an English standpoint the Navy ought not to exceed the two-Power standard; but now it was being arranged on a three-Power basis.

said that as representing a constituency in which a large number of dockyard employees lived, he desired to thank the Admiralty for laying down the new battleship at Devonport instead of having it built by contract, as was originally intended. That was of considerable value to the men; and the avoidance of change in the personnel of the dockyards was, he thought, very desirable. While he recognised the importance of keeping in touch with private shipbuilding yards, both as regarded construction and repairs, he wished to emphasise the importance of keeping the dockyards fully employed on construction and repairs. The dockyards were fitted with the most efficient appliances; and the work could be done better in them than in private yards, The Estimates had reached an alarming figure; but it should be remembered that in time of war the food supply of the country depended on the Navy. He thought it was of the first importance that the country should have a thoroughly strong and efficient Navy. Irish Members seemed to think that Ireland had a special grievance in regard to their contribution towards the maintenance of the Navy. They apparently had forgotten that last year this House was engaged in dealing with the land question and in effecting arrangements which would probably be more beneficial to the people than any legislation in reference to agrarian questions in any other country in the world. That was an evidence that this House was not less careful of the interests of Ireland than of those of any other part of the United Kingdom.

remarked that Parliament had not given a single penny to Ireland. It had simply made arrangements for a loan which was likely to turn out very good business for the Treasury.

This matter is quite irrelevant to the subject under discussion.

earnestly hoped the Admiralty would continue their scheme for providing a strong Naval Reserve. The movement of the population from the country districts into the towns was such that, at no distant date, it would be extremely difficult to get strong lads for the Navy; hence it was desirable that the Admiralty should secure the services of men in case of need by getting them into the Reserve after they had passed through the Navy. He was fully confident that the Admiralty were doing their best to secure a fully efficient Navy, and as long as his constituents were satisfied that all economy consistent with efficiency was practised, they would not object to finding their share of the money. He strongly supported the view that it was only reasonable that the Colonies, who derived so much advantage from the Fleet, should contribute much more largely to its cost. They had given such full evidence of their loyalty and patriotism that he was confident that, if it was pointed out to them how altogether inadequate was their present contribution, they would at once see the desirability and justice of increasing it.

desired to dissociate himself from the easy acquiescence of hon. Members on the Government side of the House with the enormous figures of the present Estimates, and with the fact that the present constructional programme pointed to an expenditure of £50,000,000 per annum in the course of two or three years. As, in addition, the works provided for under Naval Works Acts amounted to two or three millions a year, there was an admitted prospect of a permanent annual outlay of from £55,000,000 to £60,000,000. The Prime Minister had very properly pointed out that expenditure was dependent on policy, but it was really futile to fix a two-Power or a three-Power limit to naval expenditure until the Government had carried out the same clear idea as to what really was the policy to be pursued. The Government assigned to the Navy three different kinds of duties, and the question was whether some of them were not of the nature of impossibilities. The first was the defence of these shores. With that object all would agree. The second idea was that all our sea-borne commerce in every quarter of the globe should receive equal protection as well as our colonial and other possessions. Was not that really attempting the impossible? It was that that rendered the present rate of expenditure almost insupportable. The Estimates this year represented £1 per head of the population, with a prospect of their increasing to 25s. per head, or about one-fifth of the sum spent per head on food. According to the Blue-book recently issued by the Board of Trade, this country had about 7,000,000 tons of steam-driven, and about 1,500,000 tons of wind-driven ships, so that an expenditure of £42,000,000 represented £5 a ton on all the shipping of the country. Moreover, it represented 16s. per ton on all the shipping cleared in this country, and it amounted to 50 per cent. on the total freight earnings in the year. These facts gave rise to the question whether we had not reached the point where the premium of insurance was in excess of the risk, whether it was not time to reconsider the general lines of the policy to be pursued, and whether by having a large Fleet in being around these shores we were not more securely protecting our sea-going shipping than by spreading cruisers all over the world. In view of the greater mobility of cruises and battleships now as compared with the beginning of the last century, the wisdom of maintaining various stations all over the globe was open to question. Might it not be well to have only one central station—the British Isles—with coaling stations dotted about in all quarters. Under such a system the Admiralty would be able to make much greater use of a Naval Reserve scheme. It would decrease the active list, increase the use of the Reserves, and diminish the total cost of manning the Navy. With regard to the question of recruiting in Scotland, he thought he was right in saying that there were only 300 or 400 men drawn, not from the fishing villages, but from Glasgow, Leith, Edinburgh, and other manufacturing towns. He urged upon the Admiralty the necessity of doing something to improve recruiting in Scotland, because if they did not get a fair proportion from Scotland they failed to have in the Navy a microcosm of the nation. He would not detain the House by outlining any method, but he had suggested more than once that it might be possible to have one or two Scotch ships officered by Scotchmen, and in other ways specially identified with Scotland. He understood that Australia and New Zealand had two ships set apart for their own recruits, and surely what was possible there was possible in Scotland. His opinion was that it ought to be possible for a young man to enter the Army or the Navy just as easily as it was for him to join any of the learned professions. He hoped that in the future "painting the ship" would be absolutely prohibited and arrangements made by which an officer could live upon his pay without assistance from his parents. Nothing was said in the First Lord's Statement about the scheme of retirement, and he wished to impress upon the Admiralty the desirability of knowing and seeing clearly what object the Navy was to serve. Were they to undertake the' impossible duty of providing a defence all over the world for every ship which sailed under the British flag? It was time to bring to an end this enormous expenditure on the Navy. The insurance premium had become greater than the risk. In his opinion it would be better to take the risk, and to be content with a small, well-equipped Navy in the home waters ready to go anywhere it might be required.

said the Prime Minister stated yesterday that he adhered to the view of the two-Power standard, and the right hon. Gentleman further stated that this principle had never been exceeded, and was not exceeded in the present Estimates. Was this in consonance with the facts and figures? He hoped the Committee would receive from the Secretary to the Admiralty a clearer and more detailed statement than had yet been given of the co-relation between the principle and the practice of the Government with regard to the Navy. The principle that the Navy must be kept up to the two-Power standard was accepted on all sides. But, while the total expenditure on the Navy was £42,000,000 the expenditure needed by the two-Power standard did not exceed £24,000,000 in the case of Continental nations, or £27,000,000 if America were included. He hoped it was not in contemplation to advance to a three-Power standard.

said that in the answer given by the Secretary to the Admiralty there was not a word in reply to the very able and eloquent speech made by the hon. Member for East Clare. He was quite sure that it was not the hon. Member's intention to overlook that speech, and, when he came to reply, he hoped he would deal with the points raised by the hon. Member for East Clare as well as by the hon. Member for Kilkenny. He was surprised at the remarks of hon. Gentlemen opposite with regard to the Colonies not contributing more towards the Navy. His colleagues' position was perfectly correct when they took exception to the fact that the Colonies were not called upon to contribute to the Navy, whereas Ireland was obliged to contribute £2,000,000 a year. What right had hon. Gentleman representing English constituencies to ask Canada to make a contribution towards the Navy? The hon. Member for King's Lynn and the hon. Baronet the Member for Yarmouth had made a desperate onslaught upon the Colonies because in some instances they did not contribute enough, and in others they did not contribute at ail. What had this country given Canada that she should be called upon to contribute to the Navy. This very Vote which they were about to pass was for His Majesty's Fleet. It had been asserted in this discussion that the object for which the Navy existed was to defend our trade and commerce on the seas. Did Canadian vessels carry that trade and commerce? No, the trade and commerce between this country and Canada and the Colonies was carried in English vessels, and therefore the Navy existed to defend our own trade and commerce and not the trade of Canada. He had read in the papers that Canada was raising an Army of 100,000 men which they would be able to bring up to a fighting force of 200,000. The Canadian Government spent money on the construction of ships to defend their own fisheries, and therefore they had their own little navy, which was a matter of importance to them. Therefore he did not think hon. Gentlemen opposite had anything to complain of in regard to Canada for she had rendered this country greater services than England had rendered to her. Canada in the moment of trouble came to the rescue of this country and now England was showing her gratitude by treating Canada with absolute scorn. Hon. Gentlemen opposite thought Irishmen ought to rejoice because certain vessels belonging to the Fleet had visited certain ports and harbours in Ireland, and that in consequence they should not take exception to the increased expenditure found in every page of these Estimates. They had always striven hard from the Irish Benches to make their position perfectly clear in regard to this expenditure, which was that the Navy was of no use to Ireland because Ireland had no commerce, for Irish trade had been destroyed by this country. That was why they could not joyfully vote such large sums towards the Navy, and that was why they protested against contributing a considerable proportion towards these Estimates, because the money was taken from a country which was absolutely incapable of bearing the burden put upon it. That was the position taken up by the hon. Member for East Clare. A Royal Commission had revealed that Ireland was taxed £3,000,000 too much. ["Oh, oh!"] He knew perfectly well that criticisms of that kind were not agreeable to hon. Gentlemen opposite, but Irishmen had a duty to perform. They often spoke of equality of treatment and it was frequently stated that Ireland got an equal share in everything. Ireland was represented in that House by eighty Members but three Members on the Treasury Bench could defeat the whole of the Irish representatives, for they had only to call in to their assistance those who cared nothing for Ireland. Even if they were Englishmen they would object to this expenditure and ask where was all this going to end? Years ago they were told that they had almost reached the extreme end of the Estimates, but since that time the amount had more than doubled. Ireland was taxed for the maintenance of the Navy in which they had no interest. What was the answer they got when they asked for a contribution towards technical education? They were told that they must vote this increase for the Navy and at the same time Ireland was refused a small amount towards education. As an Irish Member he felt it was his duty to enter a protest against expenditure which brought no benefit to Ireland, and he was quite confident that those who represented Ireland did not share in the joy of hon. Members opposite in regard to the magnificence and strength of the British Navy.

said the hon. Member for Dundee had asked what steps had been taken to reduce the expenditure of naval officers upon their ships. On principle every one would agree that no inducements of any kind ought to be offered to naval officers to spend money out of their own pockets on the public service. The Admiralty were not prepared absolutely to forbid a sailor to spend money on his ship, which he regarded in a sense as his child, but they had largely increased the allowance for paint and brass-work. The question of naval bands had also been dealt with, and to a large extent the necessity for officers to contribute to their upkeep had been removed. With regard to promotion, he thought what had been said by the hon. Member for King's Lynn absolved him from the necessity of saying much on that point in reply to the hon. Member for Dundee. He could assure the hon. Member for Dundee that no advantage was given either to specialised officers or to what were called watch-keeping officers The Board of Promotion considered these matters solely from the point of view of personal merit, and of advantage to the service. On the point of the proportion which the reserves should bear to the total personnel of the Navy, the Admiralty took their stand on the admirable Report of the Committee presided over by the right hon. Member for Berwick, and held that the total Reserve available on mobilisation should be 50 per cent. The Admiralty had endorsed and accepted the recommendations of the Committee to which he had referred with regard to short service. He thought his hon. friend the Member for King's Lynn was in error in supposing that the system of allowing men to go out of barracks at night had been first introduced by the Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth. It was one which had been in force for a long time. The naval barracks had been designed to hold a certain number of men, giving the full cubic space which was necessary. It was recognised that the only time the barracks would be crowded would be in time of mobilisation, when it might be necessary, for a short period, to use the whole of the space available. That contingency had been arranged for by providing double the number of hammock fittings normally required. On mobilisation the naval barracks at Portsmouth would contain close on 6,000 men and officers, and in normal times about 4,000. The hon. Member for Leicester had raised a point in regard to the leakage of information from the Admiralty. He could tell the hon. Member that the subject had quite recently been engaging the most careful attention of the Board, but, from the nature of the case, to state any precautions which they were taking would render them valueless. As to the education of boys entering the Navy, he reminded the Committee that during the period they were in the training ship the boys received the careful attention of schoolmasters, and everything was done that could be done to improve their reducation. On the question of masts and yards, it must be of advantage to every man who went to sea to have a knowledge of masts and yards; but many factors had to be considered. They could not put a quart into a pint pot, and they must teach men all they could, within a given period, of what was most necessary. It would be impossible to maintain the instruction in masts and yards except at the expense of something else more necessary; but it should be remembered that in a mobilised fleet there would always be a certain number of naval reserve men who were merchant sailors and had the training the hon. Member for King's Lynn suggested.

I suggested that one training ship might be retained for instruction in masts and yards.

said that point would certainly be borne in mind and considered, but he could not say more than that at the present time. With regard to the complaint of the hon. Member for Banff as to vessels for training purposes, there was a considerable number on the coasts.

said the point was that these vessels seldom visited the remote parts of the coast.

said he was afraid that what the hon. Member called the remote parts of the coast were places where there were shallow waters, and where it might not be safe for the vessels to go. As to the cost of the new scheme for the retirement of officers to permit of promotion, it would be about £25,000 a year. The hon. Member for Kilkenny asked some very detailed Questions. He hoped the hon. Member would excuse him if he said that he did not think they were Questions in which he took a very great personal interest. He was afraid that he should be wearying the House unduly if he were to go into all the matters raised by the hon. Member. He was anxious to meet the wishes of hon. Members from Ireland as fully as possible, and if it was their wish that he should read out the detailed explanations he was prepared to do it. He understood, however, from the hon. Member's countenance that he was absolved from doing that.

said not at all. The hon. Member must not read any absolution from his countenance at all. He presumed the hon. Member wanted to get his Vote, to-night, before dinner, and if that was the case the hon. Gentleman ought to answer one or two Questions; or kindly send the replies. There was one question which the hon. Member for Kilkenny asked in which he and many other people on his side of the House were interested, for their attention had been called to it. Was it a fact that the men on board the ships of the Australian Station were to get a special rate of pay arranged by the Commonwealth Government in accordance with the standard rate of wages prevailing in Australia? That was the first Question. Here was another one. Was it a fact that arrangements had been made that some of these ships in the new Australian Squadron should be manned exclusively by Australians? These were Questions which he ventured to say were quite as important and well worthy of being answered as many of the Questions that had been answered.

hoped that the hon. Member would recognise the necessity of making inquiries on the points raised yesterday afternoon in reference to the Irish fisheries. It was a very serious question for fishermen along the coast of Kerry, that great ravages were made by trawlers for the simple reason that there were no gunboats to protect the fisheries. If the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty would do something in that matter he would promise him that, so far as he was concerned, he would not have the same difficulty in the. future as he had had in the past couple of days in getting his Estimates through.

said that the hon. Member for East Clare had asked two Questions. These Questions he had noted and was about to answer. With regard to the pay of the men of the Australian Contingent, he had to state that those men would receive the rate of pay given to men in the Royal Navy, and over and above that rate they would receive at the end of their period of service a colonial addition. The answer to the Question as to the ships, was that there were three ships to be used as training ships and these would be manned by Australian crews. In making this arrangement, however, the Admiralty did not consider that they were granting any favour, as it was desirable that as large a number as possible in the Australian Colonies should be trained for this service. He had given very careful attention to the question of the fisheries, but he wished to say at once on behalf of the Admiralty that the Admiralty would on no account whatever hand over any ships or men of the Navy to any other jurisdiction whether it was to local authority or anyone else.

We only want the use of them where necessary.

said what the Admiralty desired was that the ships which were on the coast of Ireland, or of the United Kingdom, should give every assistance to the local authority to carry out the Fisheries Regulations, whether inside or outside the 3-mile limit. The Admiral Commanding Coastguard and Reserves was now engaged on an inquiry into this matter. There were on the coast of Ireland two torpedo gunboats and three steam Coastguard cruisers. All the Coastguards were under the control of the Admiral Commanding, and so far as Ireland was concerned, the Rear Admiral at Queenstown was to act as his deputy, and he would be available for any representations that might be made to him upon the subject. He would visit the Irish Coastguard stations from time to time, and the Coastguards would be instructed to give every assistance in their power in carrying out the