House Of Commons
Monday, 8th August, 1904.
The House met at Two of the Clock.
Unopposed Private Bill Business
London County Council (Tramways and Improvements) Bill; Rotherham Corporation Bill; Selby Urban District Council Bill; Swindon Corporation Bill. Lords Amendments considered, and agreed to.
Barry Railway (Steam Vessels) Bill [Lords]; De Trafford Estate Bill [Lords]; Newcastle and Gateshead Water Bill [Lords]. Read the third time, and passed, with Amendments.
Belfast and North East Ireland Electricity and Power-Gas Bill [Lords]. As amended, considered. Ordered, That Standing Orders 223 and 243 be suspended, and that the Bill be now read the third time.—( Mr. Caldwell.)
Bill accordingly read the third time, and passed, with Amendments.
Belfast Corporation Tramways Bill [Lords]. As amended, considered. Ordered, That Standing Orders Nos. 223 and 243 be suspended, and that the Bill
be now read the third time.—( Mr. Caldwell.)
Bill accordingly read the third time, and passed, with Amendments.
Neath, Pontardawe, and Brynaman Railway Bill [Lords]. As amended, considered. An Amendment made. Ordered, That Standing Orders 223 and 243 be suspended, and that the Bill be now read the third time.—( Mr. Caldwell.)
Bill accordingly read the third time, and passed, with Amendments.
Aberdeen City Improvements Order Confirmation Bill [Lords]. Read the third time, and passed, without Amendment.
Message From The Lords
That they have agreed to—Newburgh and North Fife Railway (Extension of Time) Order Confirmation Bill; Kirkcaldy Corporation Order Confirmation Bill; Electric Lighting Provisional Orders (No 8) Bill, without Amendment.
Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway (Steam Vessels) Bill; London County Council (General Powers) Bill; Loch Leven Water Power Bill; Leyton Urban District Council Bill, with Amendments.
Amendment to—Gas and Water Orders Confirmation Bill [Lords]; Glasgow Corporation (Tramways, etc.) Order Confirmation Bill [Lords], without Amendment.
Amendments to—Great Yarmouth Corporation Bill [Lords]; King's College Hospital Bill [Lords]; Leeds Corporation (Waterworks) Railway Bill [Lords]; Manchester Corporation Tramways Bill [Lords]; Manchester Ship Canal Bill [Lords]; North Wales Electric Power Bill [Lords]; West Riding Tramways Bill [Lords]; Ilford Urban District Council Bill [Lords]; Newcastle-upon-Tyne Corporation Bill [Lords], without Amendment.
That they have passed a Bill, intituled, "An Act to confirm a Provisional Order, under The Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1899, relating to Ayr Corporation Tramways." [Ayr Corporation Tramways Order Confirmation Bill [Lords.]
Returns, Reports, Etc
Royal Commissions
Return presented, relative thereto [Address 28th April; Mr. John Edward Ellis]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 315.]
Queen's College (Belfast)
Copy presented, of Annual Report of the President for 1903–4 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
Marriages, Births, And Deaths (Ireland)
Copy presented, of fortieth detailed Annual Report of the Registrar-General of Marriages, Births, and Deaths in Ireland, 1903 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
Queen's College (Galway)
Copy presented, of Report of the President for the Session 1903–4 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
Secondary Education (Scotland)
Copy presented, of Report for the year 1904 by Sir Henry Craik, K.C.B. [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
Medical Officers Of Health For Counties
Return presented, relative thereto [ordered 18th May; Mr. Frederick Wilson]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 316.]
Sandgate Homes (Pauper Inmates Chargeable To Metropolitan Unions)
Return presented, relative thereto [ordered 27th June; Sir Edward Sassoon]; to lie upon the Table.
East India (Railways)
Copy presented, of Administration Report on the Railways in India for the year 1903, by C. W. Hodson, esquire, M. Inst.C.E., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Public Works Department, Railways [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
Post Office
Copy presented, of Fiftieth Report of the Postmaster-General [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
Customs
Copy presented, of Forty-eigh h Report of the Commissioners of Customs for the year ended 31st March, 1904 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
Inland Revenue
Copy presented, of Forty-seventh Report of the Commissioners, for the year ended 31st March, 1904 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
Public Works (Ireland)
Copy presented of Seventy-second Annual Report of the Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland, with Appendices, for the year ending 31st March, 1904 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
Taxes And Imposts
Return presented, relative thereto [ordered 3rd May; Mr. Goddard]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 317.]
Government Departments (Contracts)
Return presented, relative thereto [ordered 28th July; Sir Howard Vincent]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 318.]
Superannuation Act, 1887
Copy presented, of Return for the year ended 31st March, 1904, of the Army and Navy Officers permitted, under Rule 2 of the Regulations drawn up under Section 6 of the Act, to hold Civil Employment of profit under Public Departments [by Act]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 319.]
Trade Reports (Annual Series)
Copies presented, of Diplomatic and Consular Reports, Annual Series, Nos. 3248 and 3249 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
Navy (Health)
Copy presented, of Statistical Report of the Health of the Navy for the year 1903 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 320.]
Naval Prize Money
Account presented, showing the Receipt and Expenditure of Naval Prize, Bounty, Salvage and other moneys between the 1st April, 1903, and 31st March, 1904 [by Act]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 321.]
Naval Savings Banks
Account presented, of deposits in Naval Sayings Banks, and the payments thereof, and the interest thereon, etc., during the financial year 1902–3 [by Act]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 322.]
Paper Laid Upon The Table By The Clerk Of The House
County Courts Act, 1888, and Supreme Court of Judicature (Officers) Act, 1879. Copy of Order made by the Lord Chancellor, dated 27th July, 1904, directing that the Registrar of the County Court of Staffordshire, held at West Bromwich, shall not practice as a solicitor, and that Section 20 of The Supreme Court of Judicature (Officers) Act, 1879, shall not apply to the office of Registrar of the said County Court [by Act].
Questions And Answers Circulated With The Votes
Ballinrobe And Claremorris Light Railway
To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that the barony of Kilmaine, county Mayo, has given a perpetual guarantee of six pence in the pound to th Ballinrobe and Claremorris Light Railway; if so, will he say whether the Ballinrobe District Council, within which the barony is situated, is empowered to elect three directors to act on the board of management; and, if not, with whom does the right of election or nomination rest. (Answered by Mr. Victor Cavendish.) No, Sir. The guarantee of the barony of Kilmaine and part of the barony of Carra, under the Ballinrobe and Claremorris Light Railway Order, 1890, is a maximum of 5 per cent. per annum on the paid up capital of the company; but the baronies are recouped by the Treasury to the extent of one-half of the amounts paid under the guarantee, not exceeding a sum equal to interest at the rate of 2 per cent. per annum. The balance of profit over the working expenses is credited to the undertaking before the guarantee is calculated. The Order above referred to provides that the barony of Kilmaine may, by resolution at presentment sessions, elect three directors on the board, which is to consist of not more than seven directors. It appears that there are only four ordinary directors on the board at present. The business of presentment sessions was transferred by the Local Government Act of 1898 to rural district councils. It is open to the councils of the districts in which this guaranteeing area is situated to make application to the Local Government Board for an Order providing for the representation of the guaranteeing area on the board of management of the railway.
Foreign Seamen On British Ships—Numbers Engaged At Shields, Cardiff, And Antwerp
To ask the President of the Board of Trade if he can state how many sailors and firemen were engaged at the ports of North and South Shields from Monday, 18th July, until Saturday. 23rd July, inclusive; and the number of British nationality and the number of foreigners.
To ask the President of the Board of Trade if he can state how many sailors and firemen were engaged on British ships at the port of Cardiff from Monday, 18th July, until Saturday, 23rd July, inclusive; and how many were British and how many were foreigners. (Answered by Mr. Gerald Balfour.) In the period stated 194 sailors and firemen were engaged at South Shields; of these 130 were of British and sixty-four of foreign nationality. At North Shields fifty-three sailors and firemen were engaged during the same period; of these forty-three were of British and ten of foreign nationality. The engagements at Cardiff with regard to which my hon. and gallant friend also inquires were as follows in the period named:—337 sailors and firemen, of these 170 were of British and 167 of foreign nationality.
To ask the President of the Board of Trade if he can state how many sailors and firemen were engaged on British ships at the Port of Antwerp (Belgium) from the 5th to 11th June, inclusive; how many of these were British and how many were foreigners; and whether the foreign seamen were all able to produce certificates of discharge. (Answered by Mr. Gerald Balfour.) In the period stated, ten British vessels opened agreements and engaged crews at Antwerp. For these, 129 sailors and firemen were engaged; fourteen British and 115 of foreign nationality; ninety-seven
| Countries. | Duty on imported wheat per quater. | Average price of wheat per quater. | Basis and date of price. | Approximate percentage of imported wheat in total supply (five years 1899–1903. | ||
| s. | d. | s. | d. | |||
| United Kingdom | Nil | 28 | 0 | Gazette average price of English wheat (last week in July) | 77½ | |
| 29 | 0 | Average declared value of imported wheat (July) | ||||
| Germany | 7 | 7 | 37 | 9 | Berlin official market price 29th July | 34 |
| France | 12 | 2¾ | 36 | 6 | Paris official price 30th July | 2* |
| Italy | 13 | 0½ | (Cannot yet to be given for the end of July) | 18 | ||
*Average of four years 1899–1902 | ||||||
of the latter produced continuous certificates of discharge. Four other British vessels during the period named engaged twenty-three sailors and firemen at Antwerp. Of these, two were British and the remainder foreign. As they did not open fresh agreements when engaging these sailors and firemen, I have no records from which I can say how many produced continuous discharge books.
Prices Of And Duty On Wheat In United Kingdom, Germany, France, And Italy
To ask the President of the Board of Trade what were the average prices of wheat per imperial quarter in the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy, respectively, at the end of July, 1904; what were the duties on imported wheat per imperial quarter in each of these countries at that time; what were the approximate percentages of imported wheat in the total wheat supply of each of these countries; and whether the average prices include both the imported and the home-grown wheat. (Answered by Mr. Gerald Balfour.) The official sources from which the above foreign prices are taken do not state whether imported wheat is included or not.
Electric Lighting Provisional Orders Granted To Local Authorities And Others
To ask the President of the Board of Trade if he will state how many Provisional Orders for electric lighting have been granted to local authorities and to others, respectively, during the five years ending 31st December, 1903; what was the average length of time granted by the Board of Trade for completion of the works; under how many of these Orders have works been begun; what is the nominal capital of the Companies or others applying for these Orders; in how many of the nders under which work has begun are the works being carried out by those to whom the original Order was granted; and is a clause generally inserted in the Provisional Order requiring an applicant to satisfy the Board of Trade within any stipulated time that substantial progress has been made. (Answered by Mr. Gerald Balfour.) The number of electric lighting Provisional Orders granted during the period named was 268 to local authorities, and 132 to companies and others. In nearly every case the length of time prescribed for the completion of the works in the streets specially named in the Order is two years. The Board of Trade have not the necessary information to enable them to state the number of Orders under which works have been begun or the nominal capital of the companies or others applying for the Orders. Powers have been transferred by the grantees to other bodies in thirty-five cases under special powers contained in the Orders. The Answer to the last inquiry is in the negative, but applicants (other than local authorities) are required within six months from the commencement of the Order to deposit or secure a specified sum as security for the execution of works and to show to the satisfaction of the Board of Trade that they are in a position fully and efficiently to discharge the duties and obligations imposed upon them by their Order throughout the area of supply.
Yorkshire (West Riding) Education Committee—Deduction From Teachers Salary For Time Spent In Giving Denominational Instruction
To ask the Secretary to the Board of Education whether his attention has been called to the fact that the County Council of the West Riding of Yorkshire have resolved that a deduction shall be made from the salary of any teacher in a non-provided school in respect of the time given to denominational religious teaching; whether, seeing that such teacher is bound by the Act of 1902 satisfactorily to give sach religious teaching, he can suggest any means of relieving teachers in non-provided schools in the West Riding County Council area from the position in which they now find themselves placed. (Answered by Sir William Anson.) The Board are aware that the County Council of the West Riding have passed a resolution to the effect described in the Question, and also that the council is now conducting an inquiry into the amount of time given in each school to religious teaching of a denominational character. I am not aware that any teacher's salary has yet been diminished, or that any action has as yet been taken by the county council. The teachers do not, therefore as yet appear to be in a position which demands the consideration of the Board.
Religious Instruction In New Provided Schools—Right Of Parents To Nominate Instructor
To ask the Secretary to the Board of Education whether the Board of Education has made Orders under The Education Act, 1902, in respect of the management of many new provided schools whereby it is provided that if the principal officiating minister of the parish shall refuse to act or is absent from all meetings of the managers during a period of six months an archdeacon or the Bishop of the diocese within which the school is situated may from time to time appoint some person to act as his substitute; and, if so, whether he can see his way to vary these so as to give to the parents of the children attending these schools or to the county council the right of appointing such substitutes. (Answered by Sir William Anson.) The provision referred to occurs in Orders which direct that the principal officiating minister of the parish shall be an ex officio foundation manager. The Board consider that in cases where the circumstances justify such a direction the provision in question is appropriate and reasonable, and, unless special reason is shown in any particular case for a departure from their usual practice, the Board are not prepared to adopt the suggestion of the hon. Member.
Compensation For Injury—Case Of William Welsford, Shipwright, Of Devonport Dockyard
To ask the Secretary to the Admiralty if he will state for what reason is William Welsford, established shipwright, Devonport, denied the injury compensation of twenty-four-sixtieths of his average weekly earnings, being the amount guaranteed by the Admiralty, under their contracting-out agreement, seeing that his capacity to contribute towards his own support has been totally destroyed, and that the incapacitating injury occurred more than a year since. (Answered by Mr. Pretyman.) The award in Welsford's case was based on the report of the Fleet surgeon in November, 1903 that his capacity to contribute to his own support was not totally destroyed, but was materially impaired. Since then, in March, 1904, a further report has been received stating that Welsford cannot now do anything to support himself. The award will be reviewed in November next, when, if there is no improvement, it will be increased to twenty-four-sixtieths. In cases of injury to the head resulting in brain mischief it is always for some time doubtful whether the effects are permanent or to some extent temporary.
Kent Waterworks Pumping Station At Darenth—Inquiry Into Purity Of Water
To ask the President of the Local Government Board whether the Kent Waterworks Company, before giving up the control of their new pumping station at Darenth, Kent, informed him that an experimental inquiry would serve to show whether and to what extent the water raised from the well may be derived from the adjacent land; and, if so, will he say when he will cause such inquiry to be made in order to ascertain whether water so derived is liable to pollution by surface drainage. (Answered by Mr. Walter Long.) The experiment referred to was suggested by an adjoining owner with a view of showing that the well was liable to pollution by surface drainage from his land. The company, however, stated that they were advised that the experiment would only serve to show whether, and to what extent, water raised from the well may be derived from the adjacent land, and would not form any proof of the possibility of deleterious matter passing from such land into the well. As my hon. friend is aware, the undertaking of the company has now been transferred to the Metropolitan Water Board, and I am in communication with that Board on the subject of the complaint addressed to me. I have not at present decided to direct an experimental inquiry to be made.
Telephone Trunk Calls Between 8 Pm Saturday And 8 Am On Monday
To ask the Postmaster-General whether he will grant six minute telephone trunk calls from 8 p.m. on Saturdays till 8 a.m. on Mondays. (Answered by Lord Stanley.) The change suggested by the hon. Member would involve an increase of staff for Sunday duty at most of the larger trunk wire exchanges, and I am unwilling to take any steps which would tend to increase unnecessarily the amount of Sunday duty. The use of the trunk system is available on Sunday at any hour to meet cases of emergency.
Protection Of Salmon And Sea Trout— Action Of The Fishmongers' Company
To ask the Secretary for Scotland whether his attention has been called to a public notice issued and posted in the Firth of Clyde District of Argyllshire by the Company of Fishmongers, London, threatening to search boats and exact penalties against persons in possession of salmon or sea trout; and, if so, whether he proposes to take any action in the matter. (Answered by Mr. A. Graham Murray.) My attention has not been called to the matter referred to by the hon. Member, but on inquiry I learn that notices have been posted up on the west coast by the Fishmongers' Company, pointing out that power is given to officers appointed under the Acts and to police officers to search boats suspected to contain salmon or sea trout illegally taken. The administration of these Acts is primarily in the hands of district boards and officers appointed by them, but for certain offences under the Acts other persons have authority to proceed. No action seems called for.
Capital Expenditure (Money) Bill
To ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer what is the amount of capital expenditure involved during the current year under the Capital Expenditure (Money) Bill, and what are the items that go to make up this total; what is the total amount of capital already borrowed by means of terminable annuities, under the enabling Acts, during the last ten years, giving the totals of each year. (Answered by Mr. Austen Chamberlain.) The capital expenditure during the current financial year under the Acts to which the provisions of the Capital Expenditure (Money) Bill apply, is estimated at £9,233,000, namely:—
| Under the Naval Works Acts | £4,500,000 |
| Under the Military Works Acts | 3,500,000 |
| Under the Telegraph Acts | 750,000 |
| Under the Uganda Railway Acts | 219,000 |
| Under the Land Registry (New Buildings) Act | 17,000 |
| Under the Public Buildings (Expenses) Act, 1903 | 197,000 |
| Under the Public Offices Site (Dublin) Act | 50,000 |
| £9,233,000 |
Of this amount it is estimated that about £6,000,000 will be raised by Exchequer bonds under the provisions of the Capital Expenditure (Money) Bill. The amount of capital borrowed in previous years under these and similar Acts is shown in detail at pages 10–13 of Command Paper No. 2065. The totals for the last ten years are—
| 1894–5 | £760,000 |
| 1895–6 | 1,088,550 |
| 1896–7 | 694,114 |
| 1897–8 | — |
| 1898–9 | 3,932,336 |
| 1899–1900 | 2,985,617 |
| 1900–1 | 4,914,587 |
| 1901–2 | 6,284,100 |
| 1902–3 | 8,140,400 |
| 1903–4 | 5,305,000 |
| £34,104,704 |
In the same period debt amounting to £4,732,195 has been redeemed by the terminable annuities, so that the net addition to "Other Capital Liabilities" in the ten years was £29,372,509.
Publication Of Departmental History Of Lord Curzon's Administration Of India
To ask the Secretary of State for India whether any arrangements can be made under which the departmental history of Lord Curzon's administration of India, now in course of compilation, will be made public. (Answered by Mr. Secretary Brodrick.) I have no information on the subject to which the Question refers.
Cutting Of Turf By Tenants From Bog At Carnagh, Parish Of St John's, Athlone
To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that the Congested Districts Board have purchased a bog in the electoral division of Carnagh, parish of St. John's, and union of Athlone, with a view to letting the use of it to others than the tenants who have been in the enjoyment of it for the last quarter of a century; and that the Board has taken proceedings in Chancery to restrain the old tenants of the bog referred to from any longer using it; and. if so, whether, seeing that those tenants have no other source from which to obtain fuel for their households, he will direct the Board to discontinue those legal proceedings and allow the old tenants to cut turf as usual on the bog in question. (Answered by Mr. Wyndham.) The bog was acquired by the Board last year. For a year previously it was not used by the tenants, and before the Board arranged to dispose of the turbary the former conacre tenants committed trespass, and cut turf in spite of the warnings given by the Board's bailiff. The Board has instituted proceedings with a view to asserting its right to the title. The reply to the concluding inquiry is in the negative.
Londonderry Prison Officials
To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he will explain why the hospital warder at His Majesty's Prison, Londonderry, is, contrary to the arrangement prevailing in other Irish prisons, exempt from night duty and allowed to sleep out of the hospital; and why this official is allowed to act as chief warder; also why the gate warder at this prison has been allowed to retain that post after being convicted of drunkenness in 1902. (Answered by Mr. Wyndham.) The arrangement under which the hospital warder at Derry Prison is exempt from night duty is in accordance with the arrangement existing in all prisons except small ones. Being a married man and unprovided with quarters for his family in prison he is allowed to sleep out. He acts as chief warder in the absence of the latter because he is next in seniority. The gate warder was fined for drunkenness in 1901. Save for this offence his conduct has been reported to be excellent. It is not proposed to remove him from the post.
To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that during the last two years five Protestant officials have been removed from His Majesty's Prison, Londonderry, and their places filled by Roman Catholics; whether Presbyterian prisoners, when attending Divine service, are placed in charge of a warder of another denomination because there is no Presbyterian official in the prison; and, if so, whether he will take steps to remedy this state of things. (Answered by Mr. Wyndham.) At every prison it is necessary to have one or two Protestant and Catholic warders for Divine service duty. But, subject to this, transfers and promotions of officers are regulated solely by considerations of fitness and efficiency and not of religion. It is true that Protestant Episcopalian officers in Derry and elsewhere are on duty with Presbyterian prisoners at Divine service; but this arises from the fact that warders of the latter denomination are few in number and are not available in such prisons. I will inquire whether it is practicable to send a Presbyterian warder to Derry Prison for this duty.
Promotion Of Irish National School Teachers
To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland if, in view of the fact that the condition for the promotion of a principal teacher to second division of first grade for the triennial period ended 1903 is that at least two of the last three annual reports on his school be marked very good or excellent, he will say how many were promoted to this grade who had not at least two reports marked very good or excellent during the same period; and why the award very good is made to cover a period when it was not set down as a printed instruction to inspectors. (Answered by Mr. Wyndham.) During the triennial period ended 1903 the majority of the forms of annual report provided for the terms "very good" and "excellent" to indicate the progress made and the proficiency of the pupils; and it was made one of the conditions for the promotion of a principal teacher to the second division of the first grade that at least two of the last three annual reports on his school be marked "excellent" for at least "very good." In some of the forms of annual report, however, used by inspectors the term "very good" as applied to the progress of the school was not provided for. But, as explained on the 4th instant,† the case of any teacher whose promotion to this grade might be adversely affected thereby was specially examined with the view of ascertaining whether such teacher merited promotion. Two principal teachers were promoted to the second division of the first grade who had not at least two reports marked "very good" or "excellent."
Cost Per Head Of Volunteer Force—Items On Which Reduction Is To Be Effected
To ask the Secretary of State for War if he can supply the House with the items per capita under which the cost of the British Volunteer is estimated at £7 per annum, and name those under which it is proposed under his scheme to effect a reduction of £2 per head. (Answered by Mr. Secretary Arnold-Forster.) The £7 consists of, per capita, the following items:—
| £ | |
| (1) Pay of adjutants and sergeant instructors | 1·34 |
| (2) Capitation and other grants | 2·60 |
| (3) Camp grants | 1·23 |
| (4) Stores, etc., including rifles and ammunition | 1·22 |
| (5) Non-effective charges—(pensions) | ·61 |
| 7·00 |
If the proposed reduction is made it will be best effected under heads 2 and 3.
Allotment Of South African War Trophies
To ask the Secretary of State for War if he will state to what public bodies trophies of the late war have been allotted. (Answered by Mr. Secretary Arnold-Forster.) In accordance with the recommendations of the Trophy Committee, the guns captured in the late war have been
allotted to districts, and have been distributed by the General Officers Commanding as follows: the towns being in most cases either district or divisional headquarters:—† See page 970.
| Great Britain and Ireland. | |
| 1st Army Corps Area | Aldershot. |
| 2nd Army Corps Area | Tidwith. |
| Dower. | |
| Devonport. | |
| 3rd Army Corps Area | Dublin. |
| Cork. | |
| Belfast. | |
| 4th Army Crops Area | Colchester. |
| Rochester. | |
| Guildford. | |
| Not included in Army Crops Area. | York. |
| Chester. | |
| Manchester. | |
| Edinburgh. | |
| Glasgow. | |
| Perth. | |
Cost Per Head Of British Soldiers Abroad
To ask the Secretary of State for War why the annual cost of each British soldier in South Africa is £144 a year, when the cost at Esquimalt is only £122, and at Halifax, Nova Scotia, £115. (Answered by Mr. Secretary Arnold-Forster.) The reasons for the higher cost in South Africa are:—
Preservation Of Wild Animals And Birds In Lagos
To ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he is aware of the extent to which the slaughter of wild animals and birds is now being carried on by the natives in the Colony of Logos; if he will cause inquiry to be made as to the causes thereof; whether he will ascertain if the Governor of the Colony of Lagos has taken any and what, steps to prohibit such slaughter, as he is empowered to do under the provisions of the International Convention for the Preservation of Wild Animals and Birds in Africa signed in London on 19th May, 1900; and, in particular, whether the sale of cheap trade guns and powder to the natives can be regulated or prohibited. (Answered by Mr. Secretary Lyttelton.) An Ordinance was enacted in Lagos in 1900 whereby the Governor of the Colony was empowered to put into force the provisions of the Convention of the 19th of May. 1900. and regulations for the preservation of certain wild animals and birds have been drawn up. Inquiry will be made as to the promulgation of these regulations. Considerable difficulties attend the imposition of restrictions in the Protectorate of Lagos as distinguished from the colony, but I will communicate with the Governor with the object of securing the end which my hon. friend has at heart. The entry of flint-lock guns and powder is subject to a certain amount of control, as duties are payable on the importation of these articles. It is feared that without an international agreement on the subject it would not he possible to prevent their introduction into the territories. Failing such an agreement, any further increase of the duties would encourage smuggling on a large scale, which the Government of Lagos would have the greatest difficulty in repressing.
Port Of London Bill
To ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether, in the event of inability on account of time to pass the Port of London Bill during the present session, he proposes to ask the House to arrange for carrying it over in its present position to the next session of Parliament. (Answered by Mr. A. J. Balfour.) I must refer my hon. and gallant friend to the statement I made on this subject to-day.
Protection Of Trade Union Funds Suggested Legislation
To ask the First Lord of the Treasury if he will introduce a Bill to protect trade union funds in the next session of Parliament. (Answered by Mi. A. J. Balfour.) I fear it is quite impossible for me to make any further statement as to the programme for next session.
Royal Commission On Trades Disputes
To ask the First Lord of the Treasury if he will state the date on which the Royal Commission on Trades Disputes was appointed; and when they are likely to report. (Answered by Mr. A. J. Balfour.) The Royal Commissioners are still engaged in taking evidence, and, I understand, they are not yet in a position to fix a date for the presentation of their Report.
Questions In The House
Rearmament Of The Artillery
I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether the Government adhere to the promises with regard to the re-armament of the artillery with quick-firing guns, made in the Memorandum of the Secretary of State prefixed to the Army Estimates of the present year; and whether orders have yet been given for proceeding with the manufacture of the gun, in addition to the orders for India, the cost of which falls upon the Indian Exchequer.
I prefer not to give any pledge with regard to the programme next year until I submit the Estimates to the House. Arrangements are now being made for placing nine batteries of Horse Artillery and six batteries of Field Artillery with the trade, in addition to the orders for India. Orders to the Government Factories will be given later.
But why so small an order after your promises?
I consider it a large order.
What, six batteries?
That is in addition to the Indian order. When I made my statement I said it was only intended to order in this current year the batteries for India. I think the right hon. Gentleman must have in mind my promises for next year.
Porthcawl Rifle Range
I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether the proposed rifle range at Porthcawl, in Glamorganshire, has been completed; and, if so, if he will state what expenditure has been incurred in completing the range.
Porthcawl rifle range will be ready for use to-day. The expenditure incurred to date mounts to £1,428.
Summer Headgear For Soldiers
I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War if he can state when it is proposed to issue for the use of the troops the light cool headgear in charge of the Army Ordnance Department; and say why it was not issued some weeks ago.
The hon. and gallant Member's Question is not understood. All troops are in possession of summer headgear, either cap covers, helmets, or sun-hats. No stock in the possession of the Army Ordnance Department has been held back. Issues have been made as demands have been received with the exception of about 800 cap covers of special sizes which are now under supply.
South African Campaign—Honorary Army Rank For Officers Of The Auxiliary Forces
I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War how many Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteer officers, respectively, served in South Africa, and for how many, respectively, was the grant of honorary Army rank approved; and whether he will reconsider a relaxation of the rule which makes six months service in South Africa the minimum qualifying service for the grant.
The information required by the first part of the Question is not available at the War Office and can only be obtained by a very laborious process. I hope, therefore, my hon. friend will not press for it. As regards the last part of the Question the reply is in the negative.
South African Shipping Freights Conference
On behalf of the hon. Member for Bedford, I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies at what date the proposed Conference at Johannesburg between representatives of the South African Colonies with regard to shipping freights will be held; and what will be the terms of reference and method of procedure.
The conference will meet about the 22nd instant. The terms of reference and the method of procedure have, I understand, not been finally settled, but Lord Milner informs me that the object of the conference will be to inquire into the charges now obtaining for ocean freights to South Africa and the disposal of shipping orders by the various Governments, and to endeavour to arrive at some means of securing advantages equal to those enjoyed by the Governments for the general public, and that the delegates will be invited to present a report and recommendations. Every opportunity of being heard will be given to parties interested. As the conference commences about the 22nd instant it is desirable that persons wishing to give evidence should attend as soon as possible after that date. But the proceedings will be prolonged, and no doubt English witnesses leaving 14th August or even 21st August would be in time.
Indian Government Departments—Distribution Of Work And Salaries
I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India, in view of the recent creation of a commercial and industrial department for administrative purposes in India and the redistribution of work which the creation of this department involves, will he consider the expediency of laying upon the Table of the House a Return showing briefly the character of the work dealt with by the various Government departments in India and the amount paid in salaries for each department.
It is not the case that a separate commercial and industrial department has just been created, though it is proposed to create one under the present Bill. The various departments of the Government of India, and the amount paid in salaries in each department, will be found stated on page 83 of the Finance and Revenue Accounts of the Government of India for 1902–3, which were laid on the Table of this House in May last.
Anglo-French Convention—Germany And The Egyptain Clauses
I beg to ask the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will lay upon the Table of the House the recent treaty concluded by this country with Germany in relation to the Egyptian clauses of the Anglo-French Agreement, and will he state whether there are any secret clauses attached to such Anglo-German treaty.
No treaty has been concluded with Germany on the subject, but Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy have not only, like Russia, assented to the Khedivial Decree, but have also undertaken not to obstruct the action of Great Britain in Egypt by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation or in any other manner; and agreed that the execution of the last sentence of Paragraph 1, as well as of Paragraph 2, of Article VIII. of the Treaty of the 29th October, 1888, shall remain in abeyance. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government have given an assurance to these Powers that they guarantee to their commerce in Egypt most-favoured-nation treatment for thirty years. That they will respect the rights which, in virtue of treaties, conventions, and usage, they enjoy in Egypt. That their schools in Egypt shall continue to enjoy the same liberty as in the past, and that officials of those nationalities now in the Egyptian service shall not be placed under conditions less advantageous than those applying to the British officials in the same service. The Answer to the last paragraph is in the negative.
Has Turkey, as one of the signatories to the Convention of 1888, been consulted in this matter?
was understood to reply in the negative.
Crime In Egypt
I beg to ask the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in view of the growth of crime in Egypt, as shown in Lord Cromer's Annual Report, will he consider the expediency of recommending an inquiry on the subject.
No, Sir. His Majesty's Government see no reason to interfere with the discretion of the Egyptian Government in such matters.
Egypt And The Anglo-French Agreement
I beg to ask the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, before the final ratification of the Anglo-French agreement by His Britannic Majesty's Government, an opportunity will be afforded to the Egyptian people of expressing, through their chosen representatives on the Legislative Council and General Assembly, an opinion upon those of its provisions which relate to Egypt.
If the hon. Member will refer to Articles 23 and 37 of the Organic Law Egypt No. 19 (1883) he will see that questions of the kind referred to do not fall within the purview of either the Legislative Council or the General Assembly.
American Tariff On Pickled Fish
I beg to ask the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he is aware that the New Ross Urban Council, at a recent meeting, passed a resolution deprecating the increased tax on pickled fish by the United States Government; and whether, as this tax strikes at an Irish industry, the Government will enter into negotiations with the United States Government with a view to lessen or abolish altogether this tax on Irish fish.
The hon. Member is no doubt referring to the recent practice of levying the tax at a rate calculated on the brine as well as on the fish. By a recent decision of the United States Treasury it has been laid down that the weight of the brine in which salt or pickled fish in barrels is immersed is not part of the dutiable weight of the fish and the tax is accordingly no longer so levied.
The Post Office And The National Tele Phone Company
I beg to ask the Postmaster-General whether he is still negotiating with the National Telephone Company for the purchase of their undertaking; and, if so, when will Members of this House be informed of the proposed terms; and whether the London telephone area will be treated separately.
I am still in negotiation with the National Telephone Company, and the hon. Member will recognise that while the negotia- tions are still in progress it is undesirable to make any statement as to the nature or terms of the arrangement under discussion. Having regard to the date which we have reached I shall certainly not be in a position to make any communication to the House on this subject before the end of the present session; but if an agreement is arrived at, it shall, as I have already promised, be laid before Parliament before it becomes binding, in order that the House may have an opportunity of considering it.
Illegible Postmarks
I beg to ask the Postmaster-General if he will give such directions as will ensure that letters and parcels are so stamped that the date and hour of posting may be legibly and distinctly marked on them by the officials of the post office.
As I stated on the 3rd instant in reply to a Question by the hon. Member for Canterbury, † attention has frequently been called to the necessity for making clear postmarks on letters. At the same time it should be borne in mind that postmarking is generally done under conditions of great pressure, and the public would not, I am sure, willingly submit to any curtailment of facilities in order that additional time might be given to making clearer impressions. In many cases, too, the bulky and uneven nature of the contents of letters and parcels makes a clear impression difficult. I am again calling the attention of the staff to the subject.
Vaccination Exemption Certificates
I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is aware that numerous conscientious objectors to vaccination in various parts of the country have recently been refused certificates of exemption; and will he state what steps he proposes to take to enable such objectors to vaccination to obtain certificates.
Representations on this matter reach me from
time to time, but I am not aware of any special development of it recently. I have no authority over the exercise of the discretion of the magistrates; but I may perhaps draw attention to the fact that the Lord Chief Justice in addressing the Grand Jury at Birmingham on the 27th ultimo discussed the principles on which the Act ought to be administered, and I hope that his comments will be generally studied and will do much to remove misapprehensions, and to secure a more uniform administration of the law.† See page 711.
Will the right hon. Gentleman bring under the notice of the justices the observations of the Lord Chief Justice?
I am quite ready to do so in due course.
Metropolitan Hackney Carriages—Police Examination
I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether it has been brought to his notice that the metropolitan police authorities, in the examination of hackney carriages, after the vehicles have been inspected and passed for the year, have damaged the vehicles; and, if so, whether he will issue instructions to put a stop to this practice.
The Commissioner of Police informs me that only necessary tests are applied to the vehicles and in such a manner as not to injure them, but that a specific complaint has been received from a proprietor which is now being investigated.
Life-Saving Gear On Passenger Ships To And From The Continent
I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade if, having regard to the risk run by those crossing the Channel to and from Hamburg, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Ostend, Calais, Dieppe, Havre, Bordeaux, and other Continental ports in foreign built and manned passenger ships, unprovided with the life-saving gear and life-belts for every person licensed to be carried, as required by the Merchant Shipping (Life Saving Appliances) Act of 1888, he will take steps to assimilate British law to that in force in the United States, and require all ships trading to or from a British port to comply with British laws framed for the safety of passengers.
The question of requiring foreign ships trading to or from a British port to comply with British laws framed for the safety of passengers is being considered by a Select Committee, presided over by my hon. friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade. The Committee has suggested its reappointment next session.
Caledonian And North British Railway—Workmen's Trains
I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade whether he will use his influence with the Caledonian and North British Railway Companies to induce them to furnish ordinary third class carriages on the workmen's trains running from Glasgow to Rutherglen and Clyde Bank, and Glasgow to Kilbowie Road, instead of the present accommodation consisting of worn-out carriages in many instances without windows and with defective lighting.
No previous complaint has been made to me with regard to the carriages used on the trains referred to. The hon. Member is probably aware that the Board of Trade have no powers to deal with the matter, but I will call the attention of the railway companies concerned to the complaint.
Fenit Harbour Board
I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade whether he has received a resolution, passed unanimously at a recent meeting of the Kerry County Council, demanding a public inquiry into the constitution and conduct of the Fenit Harbour Board; and whether, in the view of the local feeling on this matter, steps will be taken to have this inquiry held immediately.
I have not received the resolution referred to. The Board of Trade have no power to order such an inquiry as that desired.
Have not the Board power to make inquiry into facts such as these. There are five baronies which contribute £5,000 a year and have no representation on the Board.
Exports Of Smokeless Steam Coal To Russia And Japan
I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade if he will state the quantity of smokeless steam coal exported from Great Britain to Russia and Japan respectively, during each of the months of this year; and if Russia is placing indirectly orders for such coal for ports yet to be advised.
Smokeless steam coal is not separately distinguished in the Export Returns. The quantities of steam coal exported from the United Kingdom to Russia during each month of this year have been:—In January, 31,000 tons; February, 14,000 tons; March, 28,000 tons; April, 126,000 tons; May, 394,000 tons; June, 405,000 tons; July, 383,000 tons; a total of 1,381,000 tons. The figures as to exports to Japan are—January, 22,000 tons; February, 39,000 tons; March, 6,000 tons; April, 4,000 tons; May and June, nil, July, 16,000 tons—a total of 87,000 tons. In addition about 1,800 tons of anthracite have been exported to Russia during the seven months. I have no information as to the last part of the hon. Member's Question.
Treatment Of London Pauper Consumptives
I beg to ask the President of the Local Government Board whether, having regard to the request of the various boards of guardians in the Metropolis that a central authority should take over the treatment of poor consumptives at present chargeable to the poor rates, he will issue an Order to the Metropolitan Asylums Board to undertake the care of these consumptive patients.
I have received repre- sentations from some metropolitan boards of guardians in favour of this proposal, and I have communicated with the Metropolitan Asylums Board on the subect. They realise not only its magnitude and importance but also the extension of their duties and responsibilities, and the large increase in their expenditure which it would involve, and they wish for some expression of opinion from my Department before proceeding further. I share their views as to the far-reaching character of the proposal. It is one which requires, very careful consideration, and I am not at present in a position to express a definite opinion with regard to it. It will, however, continue to receive my attention.
Cooscroum Boat Slip
I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether his attention has been called to the resolution passed by the Kerry County Council on the 28th July, with reference to the slip at Cooscroum, in which the inaction of the Congested Districts Board was complained of; and whether, in preparing the estimate of expenditure for the next financial year, the Board will carry out the improvements required at this fishing station.
The application for further expenditure at this place will be considered in February next. In the meantime the Board cannot give any undertaking that the works proposed will be carried out.
Marlborough Street Training College, Dublin
I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he can state for what number of students is provision to be made in the Marlborough Street Training College in connection with the proposed building and equipment grant of £50,000; what is the capitation payment taken as the basis of the grant proposed to be made; are the existing buildings in Marlborough Street and in Talbot Street to he used under the new arrangement; if so, are the new buildings to be erected merely houses of residence and not a complete college.
The new buildings will provide accommodation for 130 male and 165 female students, the numbers for which the existing college is licensed. The capitation payments will continue at the present fixed rates which are set out in the Estimates. The existing buildings in Marlborough Street will continue to be used as lecture rooms. The new buildings are required as residential establishments. The house in Talbot Street will cease to be occupied as a place of residence.
Police-Constable Robinson Of Letterfrack
I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether his attention has been called to the case of Constable Edward Robinson, now stationed at Letterfrack, Connemara, who married when he was only two-and-a-half years in the Royal Irish Constabulary, against constabulary regulations; whether he is aware that on the 30th May last, his wife reported him to the county inspector at Galway for neglecting to support her; that, on this constable's conduct being brought under the notice of the Inspector-General, he was merely reprimanded and removed to another district in the same county; whether an inquiry will be instituted with the view of compelling Constable Robinson to maintain his wife, having regard to the fact that the extreme penalty of dismissal has not been carried out in his case; and whether he will state why exceptional lenient punishment has been meted out to Robinson for this breach of the regulations.
On the 30th May the wife of Constable Robinson wrote to the county inspector of Galway complaining that he would not apply to the authorities for leave to marry, although he had over ten years of service, but she made no complaint that the constable had neglected to support her. The constable at once admitted the fact that he had married without leave in 1896. Having regard to the excellence of his character for a number of years as testified to by his officers the Inspector-General refrained from recommending his discharge and dealt with his offence by giving him an unfavourable record and ordering his transfer. I am making inquiry into the statement in the Question that the constable has neglected to support his wife.
St Luke's National School, Cork— Examination In Irish
I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that, at the annual examination in St. Luke's National School, Cork, in the year 1902–3, the inspector refused to examine in Irish, and that the special examination which he promised did not take place; and whether he will explain why Mr. Coyne, in examining in Irish in same school eighteen months later, ordered the teacher out of the school.
I am informed that Irish is not taught in any National School in Cork known as St. Luke's, and that the Commissioners are unable to identify the particular school referred to. If the hon. Member will communicate to me the name of the teacher, further inquiry will be made.
Marshall Estate, Kerry
I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether, in the case of the Marshall Estate, Cellinaferey, Kerry, which is being sold, steps have been taken to have the evicted tenants reinstated.
Any application made by the evicted tenants will be considered. So far, the estate has not been brought before the Commissioners to be dealt with.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether under the Land Act of last year any evicted tenants have been reinstated?
That does not arise out of the Question.
It is a very material fact, however.
Irish National Foresters Demonstration At Cookstown
I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that on Sunday, 31st ultimo, a demonstration of Irish National Foresters was held in Cookstown, that a crowd following the procession used Party expressions, threw stones, and made an unsuccessful attempt to pull down the Union Jack, and that on the return journey of the procession disorderly conduct was carried on, revolver shots were fired, and several persons were assaulted; and, if so, will he say what action, if any, was taken in the matter.
I am informed that the Foresters demonstration was orderly and well-conducted and that the persons who created the disturbances complained of were unconnected with that society and were strangers who marched through an Orange quarter. The police acted promptly and with vigour, and it was due to their action that a serious breach of the peace was prevented. Four persons were assaulted, three of them very slightly. No clue to the assailants has so far been obtained, but the police are pursuing their inquiries.
Irish Department Of Agriculture And Technical Instruction—Literature For Village Libraries
I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction have circulated a work on political economy, by C. S. Devas, S.I., in which Roman Catholic doctrines are supported; and, if so, will he say if its circulation is made at the public expense; and if the Department has placed another work on economics on its library aid list; is he further aware that a manual on Christian Art in Ireland, in which the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church are expounded, is on the same list; and, if so, will he say what action, if any, he proposes taking in the matter.
; The Department has issued a list of publications from which selections, not exceeding –3 value, are made by the committees of approved village libraries. The cost is defrayed by the Department. It is not aware that sectarian views are advocated in the work on political economy by Mr. Devas—the only work on economics on the list. The manual on Early Christian Art was written by Miss Stokes, who, I believe, was a Protestant.
Rowe Estate, County Wexford
I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that negotiations have been going on for a long time regarding the sale of the Rowe Estate, county Wexford; that, after an agreement was arrived at between landlord and tenant, the landlord demanded another year's purchase for the sporting rights; if so, can he say whether this has blocked the sale of the estate; and, if not, can he state why the estate is not sold.
This estate is in the Land Judge's Court. On the 4th July the Land Judge approved of a sale on terms which were subsequently accepted by the tenants. No order was made with respect to sporting rights, and when, on the 27th July, the owner asked the Land Judge to place a value on them, he declined and suggested they should be vested in the Land Commission. The solicitor having carriage was authorised, at the same time, to apply to the Estates Commissioners for a request under Section 7 of the Act of 1903, in the event of the tenants agreeing to the sporting rights being so vested. The tenants, with a few exceptions, have agreed, and the application for a request will be made forthwith.
Roscommon And Leitrim County Court Judgeship
I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether it is the intention of the Irish Government, with the view of increasing the Development Grant Fund, to effect a saving by amalgamation, in connection with the vacancy now existing in the County Court Judgeship of Roscommon and Leitrim.
The question of providing for the discharge of the duties of the vacant office is under consideration. I am unable, at present, to make any further announcement in the matter.
Dillon Estate, Ballaghaderreen
I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether the Congested Districts Board have received a memorial from 100 sub-tenants on the Dillon Estate, in the town of Ballaghaderreen, praying to be made the owners of their holdings; have the Board entered into any agreements with the middlemen for purchase in these cases; and whether, in view of Mr. Justice Meredith's recent decision, the Board will take steps to extinguish the interests of the middlemen and sell direct to the persons in occupation of the holdings.
Many of the subtenants are sub-tenants to the wife of Dr. Dillon, who has expressed her willingness to sell to the Congested Districts Board, but her solicitor has not yet furnished to the Board the rental of the property. The other sub-tenants who petitioned hold houses in the town of Ballaghaderreen from residents and others. The ground rents of these houses belong to the Congested Districts Board. In all these cases the Board has offered to sell the ground rents at a most reasonable figure, but many of the houses are very old and dilapidated, and would not afford an adequate security for the purchase money necessary to be advanced.
Irish Local Government Board Surcharges
I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether the Local Government Board can state, from the Minutes of Proceedings in their possession, the total amounts surcharged by their auditors on members of county councils, rural district councils, and Poor Law boards during the six months ended the 31st March last; the proportion of that total remitted by the Board on appeal; and the proportion levied off the parties surcharged.
The total amount of the surcharges in the period stated was about £770, of which 64 per cent. was remitted or discharged, and about 34 per cent. levied off the parties. In the remaining cases appeals are under consideration.
Cookstown Disturbances—Father M'brien's Complaint
I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant or Ireland whether he is aware that the Rev. Father M'Brien, Washing Bay, and a party of friends, were insulted and threatened by an Orange crowd when driving to Cookstown on Sunday last; that, notwithstanding the fact that this circumstance was duly reported to the police, no notice was taken of it, with the result that on their return journey Father M'Brien and his friends were hooted and stoned; and, if so, will he explain why the police did not afford the Rev. Father M'Brien any protection, and will the ringleaders of his assailants be prosecuted.
The Rev. Mr. M'Brien states he informed a constable in Cookstown early in the afternoon of the 1st August that he had been insulted on the road to Cookstown, and that he apprehended a renewal of insult, and possibly an attack on him when returning from Cookstown. I have ascertained that the rev. gentlemen drove from Cookstown at 10.30 p.m., and that stones were thrown at the occupants of his car without, however, inflicting injury. The police have made exhaustive inquiries, but, so far, have not succeeded in tracing the offenders, who are stated by the rev. gentleman to have been six or eight boys and girls. It is much to be regretted that the constable to whom he spoke in the afternoon did not make a report of the matter to his superiors. Had this been done, special precautions would have been adopted for his safety. Every effort has been made to trace the constable, but so far without success. He was, in all probability, one of the strange constables brought in for the occasion from other counties.
Rents In County Down
I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he can state in how many cases the rents have been raised by Mr. Owens, lav Commissioner, in the unions of Banbridge, Newry, and Kilkeel (county Down), since 1st May, and the percentage of increase in each case.
I have no information on the subject.
Will the right hon. Gentleman obtain it?
No, Sir.
The Earl Of Shaftesbury's Antrim Tenants
I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that the Earl of Shaftesbury, who is a member of the Congested Districts Board, has demanded from his county Antrim tenants a sum over and above the purchase price in consideration of the alleged suitability of their lands for building purposes; and whether he will direct the attention of the Estates Commissioners to this matter, in view of the provisions of Section 1 of the Act.
No, Sir. I have no knowledge of the matter referred to in the Question.
Limerick And Extra Police Charges
I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland if he will explain the reason why, in the case of the city of Limerick, which has refused to pay any charges for extra police for twenty years, steps have not been taken to enforce payment.
Is it not the fact that no extra police were required in the city of Limerick owing to its peaceable condition?
The sum claimed against the Limerick Corporation extended over the period from 1st October, 1881, to 31st March, 1886. As the law then stood no satisfactory remedy for its recovery was provided. Many, if not most, of the members of the corporation who refused to pay are no longer members of that body, and successive Governments have declined to take proceedings against the corporation, believing that such proceed- ings would not have led to the recovery of the debt. The claim certainly does not come within the spirit of the 80th Section of the Local Government Act of 1898, nor is it considered to come within the letter of that enactment.
Extra Police Charges In Ireland— Exchequer Loss
I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he will state who was the official whose action prevented the recovery of the charges for extra police from the counties of Sligo, Cavan, Clare, Fermanagh, Galway, Leitrim, Roscommon, Tipperary, and Waterford, and consequently entailed a loss of over £7,000 to the Exchequer.
I have more than once stated that the Law Officers had advised there was no legal power to recover the charges in question.
Will the right hon. Gentleman give the name of the Law Officers?
My hon. friend must know their names.
Veterinary Branch Of Irish Agricultural Department—Promotion Grievances
I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that Treasury authority was obtained by the Agricultural Department for the appointment of a second division clerk in the veterinary branch as from the 1st of April last, who was to be brought in over the heads of the Catholic gentlemen who have been serving in that branch for ten years and upwards, and that the appointment was subsequently abandoned; and, if so, will he state upon what grounds it was desired to make the appointment, in view of its effect on the Catholic officials in the branch.
The appointment of an additional second division clerk has not been abandoned. The remainder of the Question repeats the unwarrantable and unfounded suggestion previously put forward and dealt with by me.
Veterinary Department Staff Salaries
I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that, of the seventeen clerks transferred from the Privy Council to the veterinary staff of the Agricultural Department, ten Protestants got increases of salary varying from £40 to £150 per annum, while of the seven Catholics two got an increase of £32 10s., and five were reduced from £92 to £90, although nominally made permanent, and that the salaries of the Protestant members of the staff average £360, and those of the Catholics £118 11s. 5d.; and, if so, what is the reason for the differentiation.
This is a repetition, in another form, of Questions previously put to me by the same hon. Member. I have nothing to add to the Answers already given.
Recruiting In Ireland—Disloyal Notices At Maghera
I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that on the occasion of the recent visit of the Innis-killing Fusiliers to Maghera, county Londonderry, the walls of the town were placarded with notices to the young men of Maghera warning them to keep out of the company of the British soldiers, and that whoever joined the British Army or kept company with soldiers was a renegade, and to remember that they owed allegiance to Ireland only; and whether he will take steps to prevent such placards being exhibited in future.
At my right hon. friend's request I will reply to this Question. Notices of the character mentioned were posted, and were at once removed by the police when discovered. The police have standing instructions to remove all such notices wherever found.
Is there any possibility of bringing to justice the authors of these notices?
Irish Lace Frauds In Nice
I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade whether he is now in a position to state the result of his inquiries into the facts alleged in the Nice Vice-Consular Reports as to the sale of counterfeit Irish lace in Nice; and what steps he proposes to take in order to safeguard the interests of this' Irish industry.
A report has been received showing that imitation Irish lace has been manufactured for several years at St. Gall and in Plauen, but I am still awaiting more definite information as to the description under which this imitation lace is sold in Nice.
Curragh Camp Building Contracts
I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that the contractor for building work at the Curragh Camp is employing unskilled labour in the execution of pointing door frames and window frames, whether this contractor is bound to carry out the Fair Wages Resolution of this House; and whether he will take such steps as will compel this contractor to employ regular tradesmen on such work as appertains to their several trades, and not to employ handy men on Government contracts.
I am not aware of the matter referred to in the Question, but I have called for a report from the local military authorities.
When I put the Question down it contained the name of the contractor?
I think the proper course is to refer all these matters to the local military authorities.
Does the right hon. Gentleman know the contractor is a Belfast man?
[No Answer was returned.]
Purchases Of Army Remounts In Ireland
I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he can state the number of horses purchased in Ireland during 1903 for Army remounts; what was the average price paid for these horses; whether most of these purchases took place through dealers or middlemen, who had a profit alike on the farmer as well as on the Government; and whether he will consider the advisability of arranging that the farmers shall bring their horses into local depots for examination and purchase, thus constituting a direct transaction between the Government and the farmers of Ireland.
The number of horses purchased in 1903 in Ireland for Army remounts was 2,321 at an average price of £43 9s. 1d. They were purchased mostly through dealers. The suggestion made in the last paragraph of the Question will receive consideration, but I must point out that our experience of many years is that the farmer prefers the dealer, who is in a position to take all the young stock, to the Army purchaser, who is bound down to type, price, and soundness.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say what prices the breeders get?
No, Sir.
Irish Local Loan Funds
I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury whether he can state what interest is paid by the Treasury on money raised for the Local Loan Funds; whether he can state the interest charged on loans issued for 50 years periods for the purposes of labourers' cottages in Ireland; and whether he can state to what purpose the difference in the two rates of interest is applied.
Money is raised for the Local Loans Fund by the issue of Local Loans Stock, which bears interest at the rate of 3 per cent. per annum. Recent issues have been made below par, so that the actual rate of interest paid is higher than 3 per cent. The rate of interest charged to local authorities for loans varies according to the period of the loan, being 3½ per cent. when the period does not exceed twenty years and 4¼ when it does not exceed fifty years. The difference between the interest paid and the interest charged on loans is applied to defraying the expenses of administration of the loans; any surplus which remains on the Income account of the Fund is carried to and accumulated in a separate account, as directed by Section 4 of the Public Works Loans Act, 1897. In the Public Works Loan Bill of this year it is proposed to apply the accumulations, so far as necessary, in making good the deficiency in the Capital Account caused by issues of stock at a discount. In reply to a further Question by Mr. MACVEAGH, Mr. VICTOR CAVENDISH said the rate of interest charged to local authorities was exactly the same as in England.
Postal Arrangements In County Sligo
I beg to ask the Postmaster-General whether he has received a memorial from the clergy and people of Lavagh, Achonry, county Sligo, praying for additional postal facilities in that district; and, if so, whether he will grant the facilities asked for.
The memorial referred to reached me on Friday last. I am having inquiry made and will inform the hon. Member of the result.
Irish Town Sub-Postmasters' Grievances
I beg to ask the Postmaster-General if he will say whether the report made on the 5th May, 1902, by a superintendent of the Sorting Office, Dublin, ascribing to design and fraud the withholding of increases of salary which had accrued to certain town sub-postmasters, was brought to the knowlédge of his predecessor, or whether it was suppressed, contrary to the regulations and the undertaking given by the Postmaster-General in this House relative to memorials and appeals addressed to him; and in whose hands was that report when a decision adverse to the officer who made it was given by the Postmaster-General.
I cannot find that there is any report on the subject referred to by the hon. Member dated the 5th May, 1902, but there is a report dated the 5th May, 1903, which seems to be the one alluded to in the hon. Member's Question. That report was laid before my predecessor in due course and it was in the General Post Office, London, when the decision referred to by the hon. Member was given.
Russian Seizures Of British Ships—The Case Of The "Malacca"
I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether, as stated in the Russian Official Messenger of Tuesday, 2nd August, the British merchant steamer "Malacca," forcibly seized in the Red Sea by the Russian armed vessel "St. Petersburg" and by her forcibly taken to Algiers, there had bulk broken and part of her cargo examined, by agreement. between His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government; if so, can he state on what grounds His Majesty's Government made such an agreement; and why they agreed to any examination at all of the cargo unauthorised by any competent Prize Court.
My hon. friend has put down Questions in considerable detail with regard to the "Malacca." Perhaps he will now allow me to give the view the Government entertain upon this incident. If he wishes to press me further, I shall be very ready to do my best to satisfy him. The House must remember that the objection we took to the seizure of the "Malacca" was due entirely to the fact that we thought that ships issuing out of the Black Sea under the commercial flag were not competent to turn themselves into cruisers in the circumstances of the "Smolensk" and the "Petersburg." We remonstrated, therefore, very strongly with the Russian Government, and they on their part showed a desire to meet us. The important thing to remember is that it was entirely a new case. It was the first time since the Treaty of Paris and the Treaty of London, on which our objection was based, that any such incident had occurred. If the Russian Government was right in its contention, the captors of the "Malacca" would have had the right to take her to a Russian port and try her before a Prize Court. If we were right, there was no justification for having taken the ship at all. The object we had in view was to prevent this new incident from developing into one which would cause a great condition of strain between the two countries—a condition of strain that might easily, in my opinion, have developed further. The actual arrangement arrived at was, as regards the "Malacca," in the nature of a compromise. The Russian Government gave up the idea of taking her to a Russian port, and they gave up the idea of having an examination of her cargo, and they gave up the idea of trying her before a Prize Court. They agreed that she was to be taken to a neutral port, and after a purely formal examination should be then and there released. It was also arranged that these two ships belonging to the Volunteer Fleet were no longer to act as cruisers. The whole substance of our contention was, therefore, I think, granted, and I confess I have not the smallest feeling of regret that we did our best to meet the Russian Government, who on their side showed no impracticable spirit in the matter. If my hon. friend wants further details, I shall be ready to give them, but I think, in substance, I have answered all the Questions he put to me.
I am obliged to my right hon. friend for his Answer, which, I may be permitted to say, I regard with much satisfaction, except that there may be made against us the assertion that we have admitted the right of capture by admitting the right of examination.
Oh, no; that is not so.
Then I am perfectly satisfied. Will the right hon. Gentleman answer my next Question—whether the British Consul at Algiers officially certified that the military stores on board the British merchant steamer "Malacca" were the property of the British Government, and that the rest of her cargo was not contraband of war; if so, whence did he derive the knowledge which enabled him to make such a declaration; whether the Russian captors of the "Malacca" seized and had detained the ship's register manifest, and other papers; if so, what steps were being taken to procure their restitution; and could he now, consistently with the public interest, state what stage the negotiations or other proceedings with regard to this matter had now reached.
The British Consul at Algiers did officially certify that the military stores were the property of the British Government, but all he did about the rest of the cargo was to give a general assurance of its innocence, and that was founded upon a study here at the Foreign Office of the ship's manifest. No official information has been received as regards the fourth point my hon. friend asks me about. that relating to the ship's register, manifest, and other papers.
Do I understand that no information is possession of the Government with reference to the alleged seizure and detention of the ship's papers.
No, we have no information on that score, and I feel pretty confident that the P. and O. Company would have told us if any such event had occurred.
The Sinking Of The "Knight Commander"
I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury, have His Majesty's Government now ascertained, and can he state, the facts connected with the sinking of the British merchant ship "Knight Commander" on the high seas by Russian cruisers; and does he propose, before the House is adjourned for the recess, to make any general statement or to lay upon the Table any correspondence dealing with the seizure or sinking of British merchant vessels by Russian men-of-war, and alleged men-of-war, on the high seas.
We really have no further information upon this subject than that I have already given to the House. There can be no doubt that the ship was sunk, that she was sunk by the Russian officers on the ground that it was extremely difficult to bring her into port, and on the further ground that she was undoubtedly carrying, in their opinion, contraband of war. We adhere to our opinion that these circumstances, whether true or not, afford no adequate justification for sinking a neutral ship.
May I understand from the tight hon. Gentleman that His Majesty's Government have by no means abandoned their position, but intend to adhere to it?
Oh. no, Sir; we have not abandoned our position in the smallest degree.
Port Of London Bill
I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury, whethetr having regard to the representations made to himself and to the President of the Board of Trade by London commercial. industrial. and other organisations, he is prepared to recommend the House to carry over the Port of London Bill to next session.
My right hon. friend the President of the Board. of Trade and I have come to the conclusion that it would not be advisable to ask the House to carry over the Port of London Bill to next session. I do not know that it is necessary again to express my regret that it should have been necessary to drop this Bill; if it be necessary I hereby perform that duty a second time.
The Colonies And The Fiscal Question
I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury if he will consider the advisability of instituting an inquiry by Royal Commission, or other suitable tribunal, upon which Colonial representatives may be placed. as to the fiscal or other measures which may be needful to enable the United Kingdom and the Colonies to co-operate for the defence of Imperial trade and for the promotion of freer trade within the Empire. The following Question also appeared on the Paper—
To ask the First Lord of the Treasury if he will consider the advisability of the calling of an Imperial Conference thoroughly to examine the fiscal situation of the British Empire.
I shall be glad if my hon. friends will defer these Questions till Wednesday or Thursday.
Telegraph Vote—Bradford Committee's Report
I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether he can state the date upon which the Telegraph Vote will be taken.
I hope an opportunity will be found for discussing this before Supply closes—probably tomorrow.
And on that Vote we can discuss the Wages Committee's Report.
I hope so.
Specie Commandeered By The Boers During The War
I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether, seeing that time does not allow for the discussion of the claim against the Government in the matter of the specie commandeered by the Government of the late South African Republic from British banks, he will consider the advisability of leaving the matter to the decision of an arbitrator to be approved by both parties.
No, Sir. I fear I can add nothing to my former Answers His Majesty's Government have considered the whole question and, as I have said, their views are fully embodied in their correspondence with the bank.
Naval Works Expenditure
I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether he is aware that the usual statement of expenditure under the Naval Works Acts has not yet been printed; whether he will take steps to expedite the printing; and what arrangement he has made for the usual discussion of the works in progress, some of which were assented to last year without information as to the works or the amount of expenditure involved.
I understand that the Admiralty have done all in their power to expedite the printing of the statement, and it is hoped that the document will be in the Vote Office this afternoon.
Has the right hon. Gentleman overlooked the fact that the annual discussion has not taken place on this subject this session?
I can only arrange Supply in accordance with the general wishes of hon. Members. I have done all I can to arrange Supply to meet the general wishes of hon. Gentlemen opposite, and I do not think I can be asked to do more.
Exports Of Smokeless Steam Coal
I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether His Majesty's Government exercise any and, if so, what control over the consignments or destinations of smokeless steam coal exported from Great Britain to foreign countries. I beg also to ask the right hon. Gentleman if His Majesty's Government will take into consideration the desirability of making early provision to insure an adequate supply of smokeless steam coal for naval purposes in future years.
I may remind the hon. Member that this subjects being investigated by a Royal Commission, and until it reports I am unable to give an Answer.
But may I remind the right hon. Gentleman that there has been exported recently to Russia 1,381,000 tons of steam coal and to Japan 87,000 tons.
Business Of The House
May I ask the Prime Minister what are the intentions of the Government with regard to the Judicature and Development Grant (Ireland) Bill and the Constabulary Bill.
There is no doubt that the Judicature and Development Grant (Ireland) Bill must be dropped, and I fear that the same must be said of the Constabulary (Ireland) Bill. It will not conduce to economy to drop this Bill, and I am sorry that we cannot find time for its discussion.
What will be the business for the remainder of the week.
After Supply is concluded this evening the Government propose to take the Second Reading of the Cunard Agreement (Money) Bill as the first order and the Capital Expenditure (Money) Bill as the second order. On Tuesday the Scotch Estimates will be taken and the Post Office Vote, and, as at present advised, the Government will proceed with the Committee stages of the Cunard Agreement Bill and the Capitai Expenditure Bill after twelve o'clock. On Wednesday the Education Vote will be taken, on Thursday the Second Reading of the Appropriation Bill, and on Friday the Indian Budget.
Will no time be found for the Admiralty Vote?
I cannot be sure that there will be time for it to be discussed.
What about the Third Reading of the Welsh Coercion Bill?
What Bill?
The Welsh Education (Defaulting Authority) Bill.
I cannot be certain at the present time, but I will give as early notice as I can.
Does the right hon. Gentleman propose to give any opportunity of discussing the revised Estimate for the Irish Development Grant which has been circulated, and, if so, when?
I shall be glad to put it down on the Paper, but I cannot promise an opportunity of discussing it.
Are we to understand that the prorogation takes place Saturday?
I am not able at this moment to give an answer. I cannot promise the Appropriation Bill by the end of the week. As to this evening's business, I do not promise to confine the attention of the House to the two Bills I have mentioned.
When will the Irish Land Bill be taken?
There is no chance of taking it to-night.
Supply Of Electricity Bill
Ordered, That a Message be sent to the Lords to request that their Lordships will be pleased to communicate to this House a Copy of the Report from the Select Committee appointed by their Lordships on the Supply of Electricity Bill, with the proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, etc.—( Sir A. Acland-Hood.)
Weights And Measures (Metric System) Bill
Ordered, That a Message be sent to the Lords to request that their Lordships will be pleased to communicate to this House a Copy of the Report from the Select Committee appointed by their Lordships on the Weights and Measures (Metric System) Bill, with the proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, etc.—( Sir A. Arland-Hood.)
Sea Fisheries Bill
Ordered, That a Message be sent to the Lords to request that their Lordships will be pleased to communicate to this House a Copy of the Report from the
Select Committee appointed by their Lordships on the Sea Fisheries Bill, with the proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, etc.—( Sir A. Acland-Hood.)
Chantrey Trust
Ordered, That a Message be sent to the Lords to request that their Lordships will be pleased to communicate to this House a Copy of the Report from the Select Committee appointed by their Lordships on the Chantrey Trust, with the proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence,.etc,—( Sir A. Acland-Hood.)
Message From The Lords
Private Legislation Procedure (Wales) Bill. That they request that this House will be pleased to communicate to their Lordships a Copy of the Reports, etc., of the Select Committee appointed by this House in the present session on Private Legislation Procedure (Wales) Bill.
Printed Copy to be communicated.
That they have agreed to—Wild Birds Protection Acts Amendment (St. Kilda) Bill; University of Liverpool Bill.
That they have passed a Bill, intituled, "An Act to provide for the Re-vaccination of children after the age of twelve." [Re-vaccination Bill [Lords.]
Also, a Bill intituled, "An Act to transfer to the Army Council certain statutory powers and duties of the Secretary of State and other officers; and for other purposes connected therewith." [Army Council Bill [Lords.]
Army Council Bill Lords
Read the first time; to be read a second time To-morrow, and to be printed. [Bill 296.]
New Bill
Criminal New Trials Bill
"To make provision for a New Trial in certain Criminal cases," presented by Mr. Bousfield; supported by Mr. Lawson Walton; to be read a second time upon Thursday, and to be printed. [Bill 297.]
Supply 21St Allotted Day
Considered in Committee.
(In the Committee.)
[Mr. J. W. LOWTHER (Cumberland, Penrith) in the Chair.]
Army Estimates, 1904–5
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum, not exceeding £331,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Charge for the Salaries and Miscellaneous Charges of the War Office, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1905."
I trust that the Committee will not think it impertinent on my part if I begin the discussion again to-day. The only reason I do so is because it has been borne in on my mind that the elucidation of the proposals I made to the House was not adequate, and that I have left in the minds of hon. Members, and perhaps the public outside, a doubt which does not exist in my own mind as to the nature and the extent of the proposals which I desire to be discussed. As I am quite confident that the only chance I have of carrying with me the good opinion of this House and the country is to be perfectly frank and to say precisely what I mean, I ask permission to begin the proceedings of to-day with an attempt to explain further what evidently was left obscure on a previous occasion. I have been very much encouraged in the interval since I last spoke by what has taken place. I have received, in the first place, an immense amount of support and encouragement from quarters whose authority I recognise and whose opinion I esteem, and from many men throughout the country whose names are unknown to me, but whose support I value; and they have all combined to encourage me to proceed in attempting to carry out the task which I have undertaken. I certainly intend to respond, as far as in me lies, to the exhortations which they have addressed to me. I have received a large amount of criticism which has also encouraged me greatly, because I can vouch for it that, without any exception at all, that criticism has been of the character which I anticipated. It has been sporadic, local, or personal. It has been based on considerations, no doubt important, but still local or personal, affecting branches or portions of His Majesty's service; but in no single instance has it been based on a general review of the situation with which I consider myself called upon to deal. I anticipated that kind of criticism, and I do not complain of it. But it is because any Minister in my position has to meet that kind of criticism that I appeal once more to the general good sense of the House to take a wider view. Since I last addressed the Committee I have had still further assistance in my task I have had the opportunity of conferring with a large number of Members of this House, and of the other House, who either are at present serving, or have served, in some branch of His Majesty's service. It would be absurd to pretend that all of them saw eye to eye with me, or that some of them did not retain opinions which are not in consonance with mind But the result of these conferences has been very salutary, and I think I have made some hon. Members realise that they and I are working really for the same object—the amelioration of the Army at a time when its amelioration is very necessary indeed. The principal facts remain exactly as I stated them. There is a danger—a very serious danger. I read a letter in one of the public prints which might have been written from Laodicea, by an ex-official of the War Office of Laodicea, and which said that there was no occasion for pressing this matter, but that the best thing to do was to leave matters alone. To leave things as they are at present! That is not my reading of the situation. Every day I spend at the War Office I become more and more convinced that there is need for action, and that something has to be done to stop, in the first place, the deterioration of the Army; and, in the second place, to decrease the enormous expense of the Army. Whether I have been able to suggest the proper way in which those evils can be arrested, I am prepared to argue. But there is no Member of the Committee who would deny that these two matters are pressing and that the policy of Laodicea, of doing nothing and pretending that all is well, will not be tolerated by this House. I have said that the policy of the Government is to adopt frankly and openly the view that this country does not require a very large Army for home defence, and that it does require a larger and more efficient force for action over seas; that it is necessary to reduce that which is redundant and inefficient in our service, independent, of whatever branch of the service it belongs to; and that that must be done without fear or favour in the interests of efficiency and of economy. Those are the main outlines of the policy of the Government; and it is that policy which the Army Council is carrying out. I am perfectly prepared, and I am anxious, to discuss that policy with the House; but I do not say that I am prepared, and I am not anxious to go into the details of the execution of that policy prematurely. The work must be long and involves great detail and must be carried out with the best consideration which the Army Council can give to its execution; and it would be time thrown away if we were to devote the hours of to-day to discussing matters on which I cannot give a final answer—the actual dealing with this or that battalion or this or that branch of the service. I desire to confine this debate, as far as possible, to the general principles which, if they are accepted, will give us a chance of proceeding with our task. After those principles have been laid down by the Government, and have been endorsed by the House, the Army Council will charge itself with the duty of carrying out the details. I have had plenty of critics. There have been critics who object to reduction of any kind. Some critics say that it is absolutely impossible to reduce expenditure at all. Others attack me for not having reduced it enough. There are those who say that it is perfectly right to reduce the number of men in the Army, but that on no account is that reduction to affect the Volunteers. I am told by others that reduction is an absolute necessity of the day, but that not a man must be taken from the Militia. Others have repeated the same argument only with this variation—that, while it is legitimate to reduce the Militia and the Volunteers, you must not touch a man in the Regular Army. Then attacks have been made on the policy adopted by the Government as an over-concession to what is known as the "blue-water school." I am told that it is an absolute error to accept the view that the defence of the country is to be found principally in the Fleet and not in the accumulation of men at home. That is a matter on which I am prepared to argue. But what I wish to make clear is, that I am in the position that every single Minister of War must be in when he proposes a reduction in cost and a reduction of men. Those two proposals must necessarily bring upon my head much condemnation. But it the Committee want either of those things—and I think they want both—they must support me, or whoever is in my place. There is not a man in any branch of the service who does not think that, whatever is done, he ought not to be affected. There is not a commanding officer of any regiment or battery who, if you proposed that his command should be touched, would not say you were wrong. And it is only by the support and goodwill of the country, which I believe I possess and of the Horse of Commons, which I think I shall possess, that I can deal with this question as it ought to be dealt with. I have presented three Papers to the House since I last spoke. One is a summary of remarks made by me on a previous occasion, presented in response to the request of the hon. Member for Bristol. Then, on the Motion of the Leader of the Opposition, I have furnished to the House another Return which, as far as I can make it, is a categorical reply to every one of the Questions which the right hon. Gentleman propounded; and, if it be not a categorical reply, all I can say is that it is not my intention which has failed. It is my desire to give to hon. Members on both sides of the House the whole of the material which will enable them to judge whether we are following the right or the wrong road towards the end which we all wish to attain. I have supplied another Return on the Motion of the hon. Member for Perthshire which deals with a portion only of the financial side of this question. In the first place, I must point out that it does not pretend to be an exhaustive statement of the reductions which I believe can be effected, and ought to be effected, in our army expenditure. It is a categorical statement of the results which will follow the reduction of certain units of the Army and the adoption of a certain course with regard to the organisation of the Army. But I make no secret of the fact that I should be very much disappointed if the figure which stands at the bottom of that table were to be the ultimate reduction of the cost of the Army. I am engaged upon an inquiry into the circumstances of other branches of the service which have not been dealt with, and I believe that there is there an opportunity for a large reduction; and, even on the Return itself, the Committee will find that there may be an opportunity for reduction within the limits of that Return on a branch of the service not included in any of the proposed reductions. There is a note in that Return about which I shall be challenged. It is the supposed comparison. between one set of figures and another. I have been anxious to avoid any comparison whatever. It is not desirable. Whatever system may be adopted, there must be a degree of uncertainty as to, its future development, and I should be merely misleading the House if I were to ask them to attach undue weight to I calculations which must be hypothetical. But I should like to explain why it is that this particular note appears on this financial Return. It is really a matter, if I may say so, of financial purity—perhaps I should say of financial prudery. The difference which results is exceedingly small. The note says this:—"It is important to bear in mind that the particulars in this statement do not represent savings compared with the Estimates for 1904–5, which, in many important features, do not provide for the full normal cost of the present system," and so on. What that means is simply this, that you cannot take any absolutely constant figure. There are certain battalions which at the present moment are not up to the standard of strength; there are some branches of the Army which are over-establishment; and, therefore, if you are to make an absolute comparison at the present time, you must either take the actual figures or some mean which will represent the normal establishment which it is intended shall be reached. But I can assure hon. Members, having given that explanation, that the actual difference in the net result is exceedingly small, and that, though I permitted that note to appear in connection with my statement, it is not really one which need give rise, I honestly think, to any discussion, as it so slightly affects the figures which I have given as the result of the whole calculation. I spoke of reductions, and when I speak of reductions I cannot help recollecting that I have been challenged very openly as to the propriety of making reductions at all. Now I want to give a challenge in my turn, and I want, when this discussion is over, to know exactly what the House of Commons thinks with regard to the theory which I propound. My theory is this—that we do want a large Army for service over sea; that a large part of that Army should not be mobilised except in time of war; that we do not want a large Army for the defence of the United Kingdom in time of war. Now, if that be so, and I find myself, as I do, with a very large Army upon my hands maintained solely for the defence of the United Kingdom in time of war, I ask whether it is not the logical, obvious sequence of that state of things that I should ask leave to reduce that Army. I want to know whether that is the view the House of Commons takes, and if I am asked to reduce that Army, in what direction it ought to be reduced. Surely there can be but one of two answers—reduce the ineffective part of that Army. Is there any ineffective part? Undoubtedly there is. I am not dogmatising on this question from my own inner consciousness, but am simply citing the conclusions arrived at by a competent body, appointed ad hoc, which for eighteen months has been deliberating on this question, and that body says this—that two branches of our Army are at the present moment unfit to take the field against a foreign enemy. I ask once more for what purpose are these troops maintained, if they are not to take the field against a foreign enemy? What enemy are they going to take the field against? Are they to shoot down the people of Whitechapel? The thing is absurd; and I conceive that my duty, as I understand it, is to provide, in so far as in me lies, that the reproach shall not be repeated twelve months hence, or at any rate three years hence, that we are maintaining troops who are not fit to face a foreign enemy. I find more in this particular document. I find it stated—what, indeed, I know—that many of these troops are physically unfit for the field. We sometimes, I think, trifle with this question of war. I think I could convince all hon. Members that, so far from being fit to face a foreign enemy, we have thousands of men, receiving money from this House, who would not be admitted to serve in a foreign army at all, who would be put in the intendance, or transport branch, out of the active ranks. That is not an exaggeration. I am sure I could prove that fact; and if that be so, is not the lesson correct that I have tried to put before the Committee—namely, that you should concentrate, and reduce your force, which is notoriously redundant and that you should increase the quality of that which You retain?
And pay for efficiency instead of per capita!
That is a brief way of stating the end at which I wish to arrive. I shall, no doubt, meet with some criticism from those who represent the Volunteer force. I have already made it clear, I think, what is my general view with regard to the Volunteers; but evidently there is one matter which I have not made quite clear, and that is that I do desire most earnestly to proceed in this matter, with the good will and the support of the Volunteer force itself. With that object I have already entered into consultation with some representatives of the Volunteer force. I am sanguine enough to believe that we shall eventually arrive at exactly the agreement I desire—that they will agree with me that it is in the interests of the Volunteer force, as it is in the interest of the nation, that we should consolidate the Volunteer force, make its units more efficient, and reduce its numbers. I have had a consultation on this subject with hon. Members of this House and with a great many other Volunteer officers. I hope I have persuaded them a little; I am quite sure that they have taught me much. They have convinced me, though indeed I required little convincing, that it is not desirable in the same unit to have two classes of efficients. That does not at all deter me from applying the policy which I desire to apply, or from endeavouring to secure that there shall be units which, having had an opportunity of giving to the nation better service, shall have better training and better officers than the others; and it comes rather â propos of this discussion that I should have just received from the Field-Marshal commanding at Salisbury the most valuable testimony to the excellent results of the application of this principle, which some hon. Members suppose to be a new one, but which as a matter of fact has been for some time in existence in the Volunteer force—that is to say, the principle of having two classes of efficiency, not in the same unit, but in separate units. I am confident that the correct solution of this problem is to be found in making a nucleus in the Volunteer force of men who are well trained, well officered, and accustomed to act together, and reinforced, if necessary, in time of war, by that large amount of invaluable military material which is to be found not only in the Volunteer force, but among those who have passed through the Volunteer force, and who are not able in time of peace to give that full time and attention which we desire these units should give. I repeat that I desire and intend to take counsel with the representatives of the Volunteer force, but subject to the policy which I believe is essential and to which I intend to adhere, that we must have reduction and we must have concentration. Apart from those two main principles, I attach little value to any particular application of method in order to attain those results. But I ask the co-operation of representatives of the Volunteer force, not only in this House but throughout the country, to enable me to attain that end in the interests of the force and of the Army. I have before me an extract from a letter by an hon. Member of this House referring to another very important branch of the subject—the Militia. I thought I had made my views clear with regard to the Militia, but I have evidently not made them quite clear enough. I have in the name of His Majesty's Government given a pledge with regard to the Militia, to which, need I say, I intend to adhere. I have said that the idea never entered into my mind that any policy of mine should be directed towards the sweeping away of the Militia. That has never been my intention. It has never been in my mind. What has entered into my mind has been the adoption of measures which I honestly believe are calculated to give to the Militia an opportunity and a value such as they have never enjoyed before. But I cannot better describe my intentions than in the words of the hon. Member for Chester which I have before me. With only one sentiment I disagree. He says—
I think if he sat at my desk he would know that the task was a difficult one: but this is the task—"The task is not a difficult one—"
Now that, as far as I am concerned, is the whole duty of man in regard to the Militia; it is precisely the policy which I should desire to adopt with regard to the Militia. But I have given my pledge to the House, and that pledge has been repeated elsewhere, that no action shall be taken with regard to the Militia which is not consonant with the wishes of the Militia. I made that remark subject to some exceptions, and I want the Committee to understand clearly what those exceptions are. I ask the liberty now and I intend to exercise it, to cut off from the Militia all that is clearly redundant and unfit for war. There are many battalions and many batteries of the Militia which, tested by any test you may choose to apply, are unfit for war. I do not think that this Committee, whatever view it may take of any other proposal I may put forward, will desire that I should ask it, when the Estimates come round next year, to spend money on units—I do not care whether they are of the Militia, the Volunteers, or the Regulars—which are plainly, tested by any test unfit for war. And I propose and intend, and the Army Council intend, to take such steps to test the Militia and, either by combination or reduction. to eliminate those units or portions of units which are clearly unavailable for purposes of war. But with regard to the rest of the Militia they must stand as they now are, unless those who speak for them think it desirable to accept the proposal which I am prepared to make to them. As there has evidently been some misconception with regard to that proposal. I should like in a very few words to repeat it. I want to make my position clear. There are many battalions of Militia which are declining, many which are under-officered, many to which the description given by the Royal Commission is applicable. What am I to do? Am I to ask Parliament to continue to maintain those battalions ad infinitum? We have had a proposal made by the Royal Commission which, if adopted. would strike such a blow at the Militia, as they have long been constituted, that their constitution would be entirely changed in one important respect. The Commission propose that the Militia recruits, sometimes 200 or 250 men in the battalion, should be embodied for six months in the year, and that there should be, in addition to that, six weeks training for the whole battalion. What does that mean? That for seven months in the year the commanding officer, or whoever it may be who really does the work of the battalion, will have to devote his time to that battalion. I should like to take the Militia battalions and ask the Committee how many of these commanding officers are prepared to devote seven months every Year to the interests of their Militia battalion. What I believe would save the Militia would be the frank acceptance of the recommendation of my hon. friend the Member for Chester. Hon. Members speak about improvement. As long as I am at the War Office everything I can do shall be done to improve the Militia. But this question is tainted by one inherent vice. You have this radical difficulty, that the Militia is at present the recruiting ground for the Line. The Line lives on the Militia to the extent of nearly 20,000 men a year. What will happen if you make the recruiting for the Militia more attractive than the recruiting for the Line? The moment the scale is turned in that direction, the recruiting will flow from the Line to the Militia, and you will be sacrificing the interests of the Line to form your Militia. No Secretary for War could face such a state of things as that. We must have the Line. Our difficulty is to get the Line recruits in sufficient number and quality; and if we deliberately deprive the Line of one of its principal sources of recruiting we shall be pro tanto destroying the effect of our first line of military defence. Therefore it is exceedingly difficult to improve the Militia to any great extent, even though we were to adopt, lock. stock, and barrel, all the recommendations—all the valuable recommendations—made by the Commission. It has been said to me, "Why don't You stop Militiamen passing out of the Militia into the Line?" How are you going to do it? Who is to prevent men, who, I believe, enter for that sole purpose, passing from the Militia into the Line? Who is to prevent the officers of the Militia, who go into the Militia, sometimes to the extent of 90 per cent. of the subalterns, for that sole purpose—going into the Line? You cannot solve the problem that way. I am sanguine enough to believe that the Militia may see their way to falling in with this suggestion which my hon. friend makes. What I have in mind is this. We have 124 battalions of Militia infantry. Some of those are not destined. I think, to a long continuance. Any one who knows the condition of some of those battalions will agree with me that it is not right to ask Parliament to consent to their continued existence. Kit when we have either absorbed or eliminated the unprofitable members, there will remain a large portion of the force. It should be possible to go to many counties and say to the Militia battalions: "Would it not be in your interests to become the territorial regiment of your counts? Your officers are either desiring to go into the Line or to remain as territorial officers in their own county.' I would say to the one. "Your wish is gratified. You become officers of the Line after passing your examination." To the others I would say, "You become Reserve officers of your own battalion in your own county. All I demand from you is that you will pledge yourselves that in time of war you will go to the front with your battalion." Do you think the lot of these officers would be worse than it is now? At present for eleven months the depot is practically a deserted spot, tenanted only by a few recruits, by a Line serjeant-major and two or three officers, who are endeavouring to pass through their courses. What is the alternative I propose? That the Reserve officers of the battalion should go back and find a full battalion in possession of their own barracks in their own county, with their own comrades. I think that would be much more attractive and would be a more dignified situation for the officer than that which now exists in the case of some Militia officers. With regard to the men, it is already proposed that the men shall serve seven months in their first year. I sly that is not enough. I am asked why. The answer is this—that I know of no army in Europe, with the exception of the Swiss Army, which has yet been put upon a training of six months as adequate. We are not taking the pick and flower of our country; we are taking the class of men who go into the Line, who go into the Militia—and we must remember that fact in all its bearings. I can find no military authority who will tell me that we shall be wise in contenting ourselves with a six months training, much less the one month's training we now get, in order to enable the Army so trained to take the field against a foreign enemy. The officers and men serving are entitled to have their interests considered, but I ask the men who enlist in the future to give two years service in the battalion and six years in the Reserve. We should give them better terms than they now enjoy. We should give them a more attractive form of service, but we should demand in return that in time of war we should not only have their services with the field army as a matter of grace, but as a matter of certainty. During the autumn, as I have promised, we will consider these matters, and we will do what we can to ascertain what is the true view of the officers and men of the Militia. I should, however, like to say this, that if it be necessary to eliminate the Militia altogether from the organisation and constitution of the foreign-going army we shall not be divested of the duty of making such an army; and I tell the Committee plainly that the Army Council does not propose to pretend that the Militia force as at present organised is capable of taking the place of Regular troops. We shall have to create in these counties these territorial battalions, and until we have created them we shall not be able to effect the reduction in the existing Line battalions which I hope we ultimately may be able to effect. We must have the cadres for the Army in time of war, and if it should be considered necessary by Parliament to maintain the Militia, it must be maintained in addition to what the Army Council and the Government consider necessary as the striking force of the Army oversea. I should like to say one word with regard to that branch of the Army, the Regular Army, in regard to which I have received far the least criticism and far the largest amount of support. I believe that in the proposals I have had the honour of laying before the Committee I have suggested many things which every officer in the Army has for many years been desiring. I believe I have suggested means by which our subaltern officers and our captains will be able to exhibit true interest in their profession. I believe I shall have given to the Commander of our Army in time of war a force ready at the first call such as he has never yet had. I believe we shall be able to put the cavalry on a better basis even than that on which it now stands. I will not enumerate the whole category, but I believe that what we desire to do, and what I trust the Committee is ready and anxious that we should do, is entirely in consonance with the view of officers and men of the regular army. I have never concealed from myself the fact that the great difficulty which will beset me during whatever tenure of office I may hold, and which will beset my successor after me, will be the difficulty of recruiting. We are asking for fewer recruits, and we are giving better conditions; but that recruiting difficulty will always remain. I have never held any opinion but one as to the true way to overcome that difficulty. My way is to make the lot of the soldier a more attractive one, not in the matter of pay—that is not so important, the pay now offered being exceedingly good—but in the way of prospects when he leaves the service, and in the way of the amenities of life whilst he is in the service. The time will come when whoever is standing in my place will ask the House of Commons to sanction some expenditure—and I do not think it need be a large expenditure—for the purpose of improving our barrack accommodation. I face the criticisms on the Regular Army with equanimity. It has been suggested to me that we are not supplying an adequate army. I have proposed a reduction—I do not deny that; but you cannot reduce the Army without reducing the number of men in the Army. That, after all, is the position in which we stand. We say we do not require the number of men, and, therefore, if you take out all my figures, if you sum up all my arithmetic, you will find out that we shall have fewer armed men in the country when we have done than we had when we began. But as regards the Regular Army we hope to arrive at a conclusion which will not make it weaker, but will make it stronger for the purposes to which we desire to apply our Army. I challenge any hon. Member who has ever been in the service, or any officer now serving, to tell me whether, in his experience, he has known a time when an officer commanding a British army has been in the fortunate circumstances in which I desire to place him. For the first time, if we are allowed to pursue our proposals, we shall have 185 battalions of Regular infantry, or, roughly speaking, 180,000 men on mobilisation, with a large Reserve. We shall have 104 battalions out of he 185 which in peace time will not all be mobilised, but which will all be composed of fighting soldiers, and all, even without mobilisation, with the addition of the small number which must be added to a few of these battalions to bring them up to the nominal establishment known as war strength, will be capable of taking the field. I ask any one who knows the condition at the present moment of our infantry battalions whether that is the position in which we now stand. I hope also that we shall be able to give to the generals charged with the command of our troops in war the immediate call on a really mobilised force of some 15,000 or 16,000 men, without calling on a single reservist. We shall, we hope, be able to put the cavalry on a basis which will make it an even more manageable and more effective force than it is now. It has been suggested that we have been proceeding at haphazard in this matter, and I see that some great authority has said that we had made no endeavour to discover what the Army is for or what it ought to contain. I have said over and over again that I do not believe the last word has been said on this subject; I do not believe it ever will be said. I have always maintained that we do not know what the ultimate figure of the British Army may have to be; but we are working now on a known basis. We have at present in India fifty-two battalions of infantry. I do not speak of other arms because it introduces complications without helping the solution of the problem. These fifty - two battalions are actually mobilised up to full strength. We have in the Colonies thirty-seven battalions of infantry, including five garrison battalions, and we have the remainder of the Line battalions at home. We look forward to the time, and I think not without reason, when the number of infantry battalions in the Colonies may be reduced by eleven. I fully admit that, until you can reduce them by that number, the figures I give must be to that extent uncertain and problematical. That is the ideal before us."Make your Militia an organised territorial Army to defend you against raids and supply reserves for the Regular Army in case of national emergency, raise the whole status of the force, give the officers a recognised position."
Does that exclude South Africa?
No, no, including South Africa. That is the figure we desire to work to. It is not a cast-iron figure, but it will fit in well with the proposal we have brought forward to have a smaller number of general-service battalions at home. That will give us fifty-two general - service battalions in India and the same number either in the Colonies or at home. Now, Sir, what would happen in the event of war? I am not going to discuss all the possibilities of wars in which we might be engaged, but I will take one possible, though I hope not probable, instance. I take a case against which we are bound to prepare, the case of a war in India. We have now some indication as to what infantry force is likely to be required for the reinforcement of the Army in India. The figure runs to 70,000 men, including the fifty-two battalions. We should send these fifty-two battalions, and when we have sent them we should have remaining in this country fifty-five battalions with a very considerable number of reservists still to be mobilised. When I speak of fifty-five battalions remaining at home I should like to steer carefully between the Scylla and Charybdis of those who think this number too great and those who think it too small. The fifty - five battalions may be mobilised or may not. If you take them unmobilised there would be 500 men to a battalion. If mobilised there would be 980 to 1,000 men to a battalion, and it lies with you entirely whether you call up from the Reserve the unmobilised reservists of these fifty-five battalions. In addition to this force of 70,000 or 80,000 infantry at home—and of course I have made allowances for all sick and casualties—you will have a force of 180,000 Volunteers. What I want to ask is whether the Committee think that is enough, or too much, or the right number. We believe it is a reasonable answer to the demands likely to be made upon us, and that is the answer we have adopted. We have framed our estimates for the number of units we wish to establish on what we believe to be the probable demands that may be made upon us, with some regard for our power of fulfilling those demands. I want to go away after this debate is over with the feeling that, though there are, and must be, those who criticise what they believe to be the methods of the Army Council in carrying out and adapting these principles to the Army, at any rate there is no large measure of disagreement on the main lines of our policy. The carrying out of details is, after all, a matter for those charged with the administration of the Army, and I should be very loth, even if I were at present in a position to do so, to discuss them in this House. We must deal incidentally with a great many individuals, and all those matters are difficult and unpleasant very often, involving much consideration; but they do seem to me to come distinctly and clearly within the province of those charged with the administration of the Army, and as long as you have trust in those who administer the Army you may fairly leave those matters in their hands. What I hope the Committee will direct its attention to is the general principles we desire to adopt.
desired to call attention to the position of India in the scheme of his right hon. friend. The Committee would recollect that two years ago his right hon. friend the present Secretary of State for India brought in a scheme of Army reform which entailed an extra charge of £2,000,000 a year on the revenues of England and India. That scheme was much criticised, and was defended with great ability by his right hon. friend the Prime Minister and others, and in the forefront of the defence of that scheme they put the case of India, who was to pay £840,000 towards the scheme. It was the requirements of India which called for the creation of the vast Reserve at home. He was in rather a peculiar position at that time because, although he was a member of the Cabinet and responsible with the Cabinet for all these changes, he was then Secretary of State for India, and he had to formulate the objections of the Council of the Secretary of State and of the Government of India against the extra charge put on India. Eventually an arbitration took place. The justification of the extra charge was the creation of a great Reserve. It no doubt had an effect on the mind of the arbitrator, and he gave his decision against the Government of India. Now his right hon. friend the Secretary for War made an enormous reduction in the Reserve. It was well known that the number of reinforcements which in a certain emergency was required by the Indian Government was 100,000 men, and in the debate on the proposals of the present Secretary for India 120,000 was mentioned as the force which under the system of reserve about to be created would be capable of being sent to India. His right hon. friend the Secretary for War said that in the proposals he had laid before the House he had the authority of his colleagues. In describing his scheme in the Paper recently published he desired to call the attention of the right hon. Gentleman to the fact that he stated that he left all his proposals in connection with the Militia in abeyance. If they were in abeyance, he did not think it fair to include them amongst those which the House was now considering. In the recently published statement there was included for the first time the formation of the thirty-three home-service battalions, but the creation of these battalions was dependent upon the abolition of the Militia. ["No."] Had the right hon. Gentleman the authority of the Government for including these thirty-three battalions in his scheme? He gathered that the right hon. Gentleman had not. But the result was that he was able to add some 17,000 men to the colours and 30,000 men to the Reserve. Assuming that the Militia was abolished, the thirty-three new regiments which it was proposed to create would not be in the same position as the other regiments of the Regular Army. Hitherto the men of the Regular Army always had the Militia behind them to take their place if they went abroad. But these thirty-three battalions which were to replace the Militia would be tethered to these islands. Apart from them, were there anything like 100,000 or 120,000 men available for India in an emergency? He identified himself with the language used by the Prime Minister in connection with an invasion of India. He had never taken a pessimistic view of the danger. The possibility of an invasion of India was to a large extent a question of organisation, of commissariat, and transport. It was a gigantic task and would strain the military resources of any country. But it was within the bounds of practical politics, and no Government would be justified in bringing forward any complete scheme of Army reform which did not take cognisance of the contingency. The Secretary for War was sanguine that he would be able to reduce the number of battalions quartered in the Colonies and abroad. He had never vet heard a Secretary for War who had not always been sanguine of being able to reduce the number of those troops. But they were living in an age of Imperial expansion, and Imperial expansion and the reduction of white troops abroad were two incompatible policies. If we were going to increase the area of our Protectorates, it would not be safe to entrust their protection entirely to coloured races officered by British men, especially if these races were homogeneous either in their nationality or in their religion. As the number of those troops increased it was absolutely essential that they should be strengthened and stiffened by a sprinkling of white men. Assuming the same number of battalions were abroad hereafter as now, what was the force which the Secretary for War under his scheme could send to India. He had calculated on a Reserve of 20,000 men from the long-service battalions. That was much too high an estimate, because it was calculated that no less than 6,000 of these men would be non-commissioned officers in the home regiments. He was sure there would not be more than 15,000 men available from the long-service Reserve. The reserve connected with the forty home battalions would number 35,000, so that the right hon. Gentleman had only 50,000 men to meet a minimum demand of 100,000 and a possible demand of 120,000 men. The country would be swept absolutely clean of every single soldier with over two years service; and the home battalions would be deprived of most of their officers and non-commissioned officers, who would have gone with the Reserve. Therefore, this proposal made a fundamental change in the dimensions of the Reserve, for which India had to pay; and he did not think it ought to be considered by the House until they had the opinions of Lord Kitchener, Lord Curzon, and the Secretary of State for India upon it. While he was at the India Office he used all his influence in cutting down the Indian garrison to the lowest possible dimensions. It could not be reduced; some people thought it was too low. But so long as they had a vast Reserve at home they might keep their garrison down, and in proportion as they reduced the Reserve they must increase the Army in India. The Secretary for War proposed to separate the Army into two divisions, one with long service and the other with short service. The home battalions were to be cut out of all expeditions and military enterprises, and out of all the attractions and reward attaching to them. They were to be kept at the interminable drudgery of drilling recruits. Could any one believe that in these circumstances the two branches of the service would remain on an equality? The ability, the intelligence, the enterprise of the Army must gravitate into the foreign service. The result would be that the brains of the army would be abroad, and perhaps the reverse, to a considerable extent, at home. In India at the present moment there were two sets of British officers side by side. The pay of the officers with the native Army was higher than the pay of the officers with the British Army, because the former were subject to continuous service in India, and, therefore, liable to all the evils and dangers of a tropical climate. But if they converted a certain proportion of the British Army into what was practically an Indian Army it would be impossible to deny the officers the same pay as was given to the officers of the native Army. He did not say these objections were insuperable, but they were objections on which the opinions of military men, and military men alone, were valuable, and the Secretary of State's doubt about the scheme was that there was practically nothing behind it but his own ipse dixit. There was one part of his right hon. friend's scheme to which he listened with great satisfaction. His scheme was based on the assumption that the Navy was able to protect this country from sudden invasion. He entirely agreed with that theory; but if they were going to reorganise the Army on that theory they must go further. The Fleet might protect the country against invasion, provided its base of operations was adequately protected. At present the defence of all the great naval fortresses was under the Army. Now, just think of what occurred in the present great war between Japan and Russia. The Japanese, taking advantage of the insufficient defence of Port Arthur, went in and attacked the Russian fleet at anchor. They so disabled that fleet that they got command of the sea, and the whole of their extraordinary successes were due to the disablement of the Russian fleet. There was not a country in Europe which trusted the protection of its naval base to the Army. No man could man the forts who did not understand the movement of troops and the handling of guns, and there was only one body of men who combined this knowledge, and these were the Marines. He hoped his right hon. friend would give his energies and attention to this matter. All that was required was to transfer a certain proportion of the Garrison Artillery into Marine Artillery, and put them under the Admiralty, and to convert the Militia and Auxiliary Forces in the neighbourhood of Portsmouth, Chatham, and Devonport into Marines. He thought the Government were entitled to the greatest credit for having swept away the absolutely impossible system of military administration which had so long prevailed at the War Office. He had had twenty years experience of the Admiralty and the India Office, the two Departments which transacted most business with the War Office, and he was not only expressing his own views, but those of almost every naval man and every Indian administrator and soldier with whom he had co-operated, when he said that the system was absolutely unworkable. The secret of the comparative success of Admiralty administration could be stated in a sentence. The Admiralty had the good sense 200 years ago to get rid of the Lord High Admiral, and decentralise his duties, whereas the War Office had the misfortune 100 years ago to create a Commander-in-Chief. No man could adequately discharge his duties either at the Admiralty or at the War Office if he had not access to the innermost mind of his military and naval advisers; and so long as the military men at the War Office were under the Commander-in-Chief, no Secretary of State could get the military men, such was their sense of discipline, to state opinions which were not in accord with those of the Commander-in-Chief. He entirely agreed as to the necessity for a Defence Committee; but the composition of this Committee was such, with one member the Prime Minister, and the appointment on it of Sir G. Clarke, who had strong views of his own, that it would fundamentally alter the functions of the Committee and determinedly affect the status both of the Secretary of State and the First Lord of the Admiralty. The scheme would work well enough under the present Prime Minister, but what would have been the position of the First Lord of the Admiralty or the Secretary of State for War with a man of the vigour and personality of Mr. Gladstone as head of the Defence Committee? In any case strong views of retrenchment and economy were likely to influence the next Prime Minister more than the present one. They ought to try and ensure continuity of policy, and they could only do that by spending much the same amounts and continuing establishments on much the same scale. He would suggest to the Prime Minister the desirability of drawing up rules more clearly defining what were the proper functions of the Defence Committee, and what they were not to do. At present they were told it was to be an advisory Committee. Lord Esher's Committee was to be an advisory Committee, but he had never read a more mandatory Report than that they gave. To the Secretary of State for War he would suggest that he might do well to hold his hand a little. Many of his ideas were excellent, but he was about to embark on a scheme which if it failed would work great disaster to the country. The other day he informed the House that only 12 per cent. of the recruits under his right hon. friend's scheme had volunteered for long service, and yet he calculated that 43 per cent. of the recruits hereafter would volunteer for long service. What authority had he for the anticipation, and what inducement could he offer to the soldier to make up the astonishing difference? It seemed to him that the deterrents to undertake long service more than balanced the inducements. He suggested to his right hon. friend that in the interval afforded by the recess he should take the advice of the most competent men he could consult in respect of his scheme. At present there was nothing but the right hon. Gentleman's own statement; and the Committee must remember that all these propositions submitted now were the reverse of what every Secretary of State for the last thirty years had laid down. Every other Secretary of State, however, had been able to claim the support of his military advisers for his proposals; and if the right hon. Gentleman could get persons of authority to support his views and to say that what were now paper theories were capable of realisation, that they would reduce expenditure and improve the Army, that they would weld into a harmonious whole all the defensive and offensive forces of the Empire, then he would be able to overcome the opposition in the House and out of it. If he could not do that, then it would not be unreasonable to expect the House to agree to a crude series of proposals which if they failed would involve the Army in serious disorganisation.
said he was satisfied that hon. Members on both sides of the House interested in Army matters would congratulate the Secretary of State for War on obtaining another day for the discussion of the Army Estimates, because he felt that the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman needed further explanation. He rejoiced that the right hon. Gentleman had been able to reduce fourteen battalions of the Line and five battalions of the garrison regiments, but there were other directions in which a saving might be made of from £500,000 to £750,000. As to the Reserve, he thought it would be admitted that this was not a very fortunate time for making any alteration in the position of the Reserve. It would be remembered that a most excellent example had been shown in the South African War by the way in which the Reserve men joined the colours in ten days, afterwards shortened to a week, and were on board ship in fourteen days, the ships not being ready before. The position of the Reserve was now going to be altered, costing the country more money. He wished to associate himself with every speaker in another place in saying that whether this new scheme was good or bad it was not possible to get the number of recruits required on the terms proposed. He contended that nine years service must count for pension. When General Peel introduced the service for ten and eleven years the first period counted for pension at the end of twenty-one years. They were cutting a man off from civil life between nineteen and twenty-eight years, and they gave him three years with Reserve pay instead of nine. A contrast hid been drawn between the number of men who earned their pension in 1886 and 1896. He could assure the Committee that in the former period it would be found that the number of corporals was double and the number of privates triple who went in for pension, compared with the latter. There was no provision made by the right hon. Gentleman for future employment, except for the non-commissioned officers, and even these would find some of their places filled up from the home-service battalions. Two years for the home Army were too short a period for discipline, and he pointed to the success of the three years system in the Guards. He offered to the right hon. Gentleman the suggestion of some reductions which might be affected that had not vet been mentioned. Might he ask the attention of the Committee to the position of the Guards. A few years ago the Guards were increased by the number of three battalions to balance the linked battalion system, and by taking upon themselves some of the duties of the Mediterranean garrison. The result of that increase was to add one battalion to the Coldstreams, one to the Scots Guards, and one to the Irish Guards. But what was the use of keeping up the establishment of the Guards beyond what it was in the past when the Mediterranean service was given up? What he suggested to the right hon. Gentleman was that, although as a matter of sympathy it would be undesirable to disestablish the Irish Guards, he ought to reduce the strength of the Coldstreams and the Scots Guards to what it was before the Mediterranean garrisons were established. If that were done there would be a saving of £131,000. That was a very considerable item. He could speak from experience. He was ten years in the Guards himself, and he knew that their duties were not increased; and at any rate, the reduced battalions could perform all the duties demanded of them. Well, then, they came to the larger question—to the proposal which, he understood, was before the Cabinet but not before the Committee, and which, he thought the Committee would agree, was absolutely just. The cost of the garrison in Egypt was £500,000, and of that Egypt paid only £37,000. India paid for a garrison of 230,000 men. Why should we not in justice to our Indian fellow subjects ask Egypt to pay for the garrison which she enjoyed? Look at the condition of the Egyptian finances. Egypt had a surplus which was recorded by Lord Cromer in his last Report in the following terms—
Now, the actual figures of the revenue for Egypt were for 1903 £12,464,000 and the expenditure was £11,720,000, leaving a surplus of £744,000. From that surplus he maintained that Egypt ought to pay for her garrison; and he was at a loss to understand why the proposals had never been made. There was another reduction which he would suggest. He did not think that the Committee could be aware of the enormous increase which had taken place in the Yeomanry Vote. The original Vote before the War was for 10,000 men for actual service, and their cost was £78,000. Now, on the present Estimates the Vote was for 27,054 men at an estimated cost of £468,000. Therefore expenditure on the Yeomanry had increased more than five times, whereas its strength had not increased three times. He thought the Secretary of State ought to look in the direction of mounted infantry or elsewhere in order to effect a reduction in the expenditure. Then there should be a reduction in the garrison in South Africa. He thought his right hon. friend the Member for the Forest of Dean would agree that it was perfectly ridiculous to keep up a garrison of 21,000 men in order to discharge police duties in South Africa. They should not allow the Transvaal or the Orange River Colony to let down their police force to 5,000 men, in order that this country might pay for soldiers to discharge police duty, which was always a very unpopular service. In his opinion, the garrison in South Africa should be reduced to 12,000 men; certainly, it ought to be reduced far below 21,000 men. Then there was the question of the reserve of stores. Surely, the stores ought to be reviewed from time to time. With a decreased force they could not possibly want the reserve of clothing, ammunition, and other stores which had been provided. He had listened with very great interest to what the right hon. Gentleman had said about the Militia. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would not carry out his scheme in its entirety; but he did hope he would ask the advice of Militia officers and accept it bona fide with a view to making the Militia an active force and mending rather than ending it. The Militia gave 14,000 men to the Line from their reserve, 2,000 officers and 40,000 recruits to the Line, and they sent into the field 1,691 officers and 43,875 rank and file. The men who went out did not want drafts of mature men to strengthen them; they went out as they stood on parade, although there was absolutely no obligation upon any of them. That was very creditable to the Militia; and he did not think that the right hon. Gentleman need be afraid. if war came, that the Militia would not be able to fulfil their duties. The reasons for the decadence of the Force were obvious. The Duke of Norfolk's Commission reported as follows—"For many years it was the practice to frame the Revenue Estimates of the Egyptian Government with the greatest caution. By the end of the year 1901 it was thought sufficient proof had been obtained to show that the growth of revenue which had characterised previous years was not due to any temporary or accidental causes, and that a farther increase could be confidently anticipated in the future. The experience gained in the last two years, as also the present indications of the growing prosperity of the country, fully justified the belief that the revenue would rise."
He cordially endorsed that opinion. He could not understand why the commanding officer of a Militia regiment could not appoint, promote, ort ransfer a sergeant in the permanent staff, and why he should not be allowed to select his adjutant and quartermaster. The Duke of Connaught said that the officer commanding a Militia battalion ought always to command, and have a general supervision of his regiment, whereas he was now allowed into barracks out of training once to inspect his recruits. Then sergeants at the depot were allowed to make 2s. 6d. out of recruits passing from the Militia to the Line. That should not be. He saw great possibilities in the Militia; and he hoped it would be rendered a thoroughly good and effective force. There were one or two points in the Report of the sacred Esher Commission which appeared to call or comment. This was to be a scheme of decentralisation; yet the Adjutant-General had all the duties of Commander-in-Chief except inspection. Instead of that, he had to look after recruiting, the Auxiliary Forces, the medical services, and the Judge Advocate-General and military law. It would be impossible for the Adjutant-General to discharge all these duties. He was perfectly certain that unless the Auxiliary Forces had a representative of their own at the War Office the Regular Army would be regarded as the first consideration. Then the Quartermaster-General had all the arrangements connected with the supply and issue of arms and equipment and stores to the troops, as well as the administration and distribution of the Army Ordnance department. The Master-General of Ordnance had to settle reserves of arms of all kinds, and also provide for the inspection of guns, small arms and ammunition. One officer appeared to supply arms and another to issue them. The Adjutant-General had control of education and supervised all the military colleges and schools in the Kingdom, whilst the First Military Member had to supervise the appointment of the higher staff of the Staff College and the Cadet Colleges as well as instruction at the examinations for the Staff College and the Cadet Colleges. With regard to the Inspector-General of the forces, the position could not be better filled than it was at present; but he should like to know what duties would in future be performed by this General officer beyond those performed by the Generals Commanding-in-Chief. The soldier would be inspected by the Inspector-General, drilled by the Generals Commanding-in-Chief; administered by the District Major-General; and paid by the Brigade Colonel. He would impress on the right hon. Gentleman very seriously to consider a very much greater reduction. The right hon. Gentleman could save £413,000 in Egypt, and if he reduced the Guards to what they were in the past, he would save £131,000. A further reduction of £200,000 could be effected in the Auxiliary Forces."The training place of the Militia, for certainly two years out of every three, ought to be within its recruiting area. Training away from home is almost as certain, though out so rapid in its depleting effects, as an ill-chosen time of the year, with this additional disadvantage, that it is almost certain to lower the class of both officers and men who enter the Militia battalions. To the officer or private of no fixed residence it does not make much difference where the training takes place. Not so the gentleman of good local position who likes to entertain his friends, and induces them to apply for commissions for their sons. The non-commissioned officers and men like to walk out with their friends, and be seen at drill and recreation. This keeps up a military spirit, and is invaluable for recruiting purposes."
said he had heard many War Office schemes propounded at various times since 1876; but he was bound to state that he had never heard one which had given him greater satisfaction, one that promised greater efficiency and economy, or was more in accordance with common sense and the requirements of the country, than the scheme of the present Secretary of State for War. For twenty years the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Forest of Dean had been proposing a long-service Army for the tropics and a short-service Army at home; but his proposal had up to now fallen on arid ground. They could not have a long-service Army abroad and at home. The squeezed lemon idea was now exploded. It was not good business to send men to India with only twelve months to serve, and then to have to bring them back at the expiration of that period. With regard to the proposed reduction, the hon. Gentleman the Member for Oldham had said that we wanted a smaller and cheaper Army, and the hon. Gentleman was right. We could not have the largest Fleet in the world and at the same time the most expensive Army. This reduction was absolutely necessary. As to the fourteen battalions of the Line which the right hon. Gentleman proposed to wip out, they were not regiments which had 200 years of splendid history behind them; they were only regiments raised quite recently, and no harm would be done by their suppression. The garrison battalions were the apostolic successors of these regiments. They were the most expensive regiments he had ever heard of. Everybody knew the way in which they were raised; they could not march twenty miles; they measured more round the waist than round the chest; they cost the country a great deal of money, and he was glad to see that they were to be reduced. With regard to the Militia everybody knew very well that the Militia had a great deal of influence outside the House and in another place. He would rather see the Militia amended than ended, but he did not see how that could be done. What could they do with a force 50 per cent. below strength, which had no officers, no transport, and no guns? As to the Volunteers, everybody knew that 20 per cent. were inefficient, and were only kept upon the roll in order to get the grant. The right hon. Gentleman had not alluded to-day to compulsory service; he had alluded to it six weeks previously, and he (Sir Carne Rasch), was glad to see that the right hon. Gentleman was going to drop it; not that he had any respect for those young gentlemen all through the country, who did not play polo because it was too dangerous, and football because it was too rough, and who did nothing but play lawn tennis and keep tame rabbits: who did not join the Militia or the Yeomanry, but skulked behind the Volunteers. He would like to see the noses of those young men put to the grindstone. He was glad we were to have a striking force of 16,000 men at Aldershot. If there had been such a force at Aldershot in 1899, instead of the sham Army Corps, we should not have had the things that occurred in Natal and Ladysmith. The opinions of the War Office were perhaps a little pessimistic, but he suggested that the right hon. Gentleman should stick to his guns and carry out his scheme in its entirety.
thought that whatever opinions might be entertained in the Committee on the relative scheme of the Secretary of State for War and its effect upon the Volunteers and the Army, there were two things which would command respect and agreement. In the first place, the Secretary of State added to the knowledge of the Department profound and comprehensive knowledge of his own upon a subject to which he had given long years of study. In the second place, in the suggestions which he had made he had considered, not his own view or that of his Party, but the best interests of the country. The right hon. Gentleman had dealt with the question in a spirit of candour and openness and great courtesy. The attitude of mind in which the right hon. Gentleman had approached his great task was one that had won for his proposals, as far as possible, unprejudiced consideration, so that they would not be affected in their consideration by the House by the recollection of other proposals on the same subject that had been made in years gone by. It was quite true that there was a formidable indictrnent to be promulgated against the military policy of the last five or six years, and he looked forward to a more appropriate opportunity of arguing the indictment both here and elsewhere. He did not think that it would be appropriate to go into the subject that afternoon, nor was it necessary, because the right hon. Gentleman had expressed his opinion very clearly and frankly upon the results produced on the Army during the last six or seven years. He would give a history of what had been done during that period: first, there was the Order in Council in 1895; then the increase in 1898 by Lord Lansdowne; then the war increase by Lord Lansdowne in 1895–1900, made, no doubt, very properly under the stress of the war; then the Army Corps scheme introduced in 1901 by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for India; then came the change of pay and of service in 1902, and then in 1903 we had the Council of National Defence. That brought him down to the Esher Report and the far-reaching revolutionary scheme of the War Office. All these schemes varied in their character but had one feature in common. All of them had been accompanied by a steady increase in the Army Estimates. Throughout the whole of this period the power of the Government over the Army had been made absolute. Whatever demands had been made by them had been ratified, and no grant of money had been denied. The changes they had effected had been continual, and this was what the present Secretary of State for War thought fit to say with regard to the results achieved. The right hon. Gentleman, speaking on behalf of his colleagues in the Cabinet, and with the authority of the Army Council, said that the Army upon which this expenditure had been lavished, and upon which these reforms had been made, was an Army the conditions of which were unsatisfactory and which was not sufficiently organised; that the artillery of our Army was inferior to the artillery of any other civilised army in the world, and that it was an Army which, besides being imperfectly prepared, wasteful in its methods, and unsatisfactory in its results, was one of the most unsatisfactory that was ever designed. There was no one who could possibly add to such a statement. He thought the Secretary of State erred a little on the side of severity when he described the British Army in those terms. It was important to have the measured opinion of the Secretary for War, not expressed in the hurry of the moment, but set forth in a cool official Memorandum on the work of Army reform for a long past time. The immediate proposals of the right hon. Gentleman divided themselves into two parts—those affecting the Regular Army, and those affecting the citizen Army. As to the Regular Army, the reductions proposed were not so large as some had hoped, but they were very considerable. The first five items on the White Paper which had been supplied, aggregated, according to his calculation, a reduction of 36,000 men, excluding any reduction that might be made in the artillery and also in the land forces due to the transfer from the Army List to the Navy List of that branch of the service known as aquatics. He understood from the ex-Secretary for India that the formation of thirty-three home - service battalions was contingent upon the general acceptance of the proposals regarding the Militia, and therefore he left that item out of calculation. If that were so, they could see that the financial results of the reduction were somewhat disappointing. In the last five or six years they had added 53,000 men to the Regular Army and added to the cost something over £10,000,000. They now took off 36,000 men and reduced the expenditure only by £2,000,000 or £2,500,000 a year. If this were true it was quite clear that the Secretary of State for War was right when he suggested to the Committee that the financial side of the question had not yet reached its final form. He held very strongly that the Committee ought to welcome the reduction in men and money which was now proposed. He believed that these proposals were a brave and honest attempt to control the rapidly increasing cost of the Army. They should congratulate the right hon. Gentleman upon the abandonment altogether of the Army Corps scheme. The Secretary of State said he abandoned it because he wished to make the words "Army Corps" harmonise with the ordinary significance of the term. But the objection had not been of a purely terminological character; the right hon. Gentleman must not suppose that it was a mere quibbling with words. It was the object of the ex-Secretary for War to make six real Army Corps; three of them were to be thoroughly equipped with all the requirements of an Army Corps. That scheme was objected to because it was not the best way of arranging for troops who would in all probability have to serve over-sea; and it was contended that the divisional organisation wohld be much better. It was also objected that the Army Corps system embodied in a permanent form all the great expansion which had been thought right, and probably was right, during the emergencies and emotions of the South African War. He would urge the Committee to welcome, at any rate in principle, the reductions which the right hon. Gentleman proposed. It was a matter of immense importance, having regard to the general political situation of the country, that a Conservative Secretary of State for War should stand up and give expression to such sentiments. He believed that those who in future had to deal with the Army problem would be very grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for the statements he had made, and that in that way he would have rendered real service to the cause of retrenchment. If the Committee gave general support to the principle of reduction it was obvious that they should give sympathetic consideration to the right hon. Gentleman's methods. The objections which had been urged against the linked-battalion system might have led to misunderstandings. The cliticisms had been well directed in part, but they were not well directed so far as they referred to the aspect of the system which concerned the feeding of battalions abroad by drafts trained in battalions at home. The officers did not like the system, but that did not prove it was a bad system. It was a matter on which military officers were not impartial. Parliament had to consider not what was most congenial to the officers, but what was cheapest and most efficient for the public service. From that point of view he would be sorry to commit himself to the statement that the method of feeding the battalion abroad by drafts of men trained in the battalion at home was an unsatisfactory method of carrying on the Army. But what the criticism had always been properly directed against was the theory that it was necessary to have one battalion at home for every battalion abroad. The equipoise of battalions was not necessary and ought to be abandoned. The true economy of the linked-battalion system doubtless reached its perfect development when there was an equipoise of battalions, and that fact enhanced the wisdom of Lord Cardwell's arrangement at the time it was made, because the number of battalions we then required to keep abroad did not largely exceed the number of battalions which for a quite different set of circumstances we thought it convenient to keep at home. But as the Empire had extended its responsibilities the absurdity of creating a new battalion at home for every battalion added aboard became patent to all, and that had raised a body of criticism which had perhaps led the right hon. Gentleman to believe that the system was more generally distrusted and disliked than was actually the case. So long as the axiom was admitted that for every battalion abroad there must be a battalion at home, the advocates of Army increase had an irresistible lever for enlarging the number of battalions in the Army, and it was against this theory rather than against the use of linked battalions for drafts that the advocates of Army reduction had principally protested. He welcomed the present scheme because it disposed once and for all of the theory that a counterpoise of battalions was necessary for reliefs, inasmuch as the right hon. Gentleman proposed to maintain the circulation of the Army by a system which would keep four battalions abroad for every one at home.
Three battalions abroad.
said that that was at any rate an admission that it was not necessary to maintain an equipoise between the battalions abroad and the battalions at home. As to the substitution of a dual Army for the linked-battalion system, the change was so vast that it was almost impossible to pronounce at once a definite opinion of any value. No one would deny that the old system whereby recruits joined, and Reservists when called up, rejoined, not a depôt, but a real live marching regiment, the system whereby the battalion at home and the battalion abroad reciprocally nourished each other, the battalion at home sending out young soldiers to refresh the battalion abroad, and the battalion abroad sending home seasoned Reservists to sustain in the hour of need the battalion at home—like the tree whose leaves fall back every year to fertilise the soil from which it draws its strength—the system was so complete and compendious as regarded its influence upon recruiting, mobilisation, and the general economy of the Army, that to abandon it now constituted the most supreme and irrevocable departure in military policy that had been proposed from the Treasury Bench since the abolition of purchase forty years ago. He did not contend that the linked-battalion system was the only, or the best system for drafts or for relief, but it was a very good system, even with the counterpoise, and it was impossible for the Committee to decide whether or not the proposals now made were an improvement upon the old method. When he said "improvement," he meant whether these proposals would in fact produce in the hour of need a greater development of force in proportion to the money spent, and that was a question which could not be answered without great detailed calculation and an amount of technical knowledge which the Committee could not pretend to possess. Military men had come to the conclusion that the battalions under the new system of mobilisation would be in every respect inferior in fighting value to the battalions produced in 1897 under the old system, which cost at least £10,000,000 less than the system now proposed. He did not desire to throw obstacles in the way of the right hon. Gentleman. They could not forecast the results of the departure proposed, and their judgment must therefore be suspended until they saw the results. The Committee did not desire to impede or discourage the right hon. Gentleman, they were grateful to him for the spirit he had shown. If, however, the Committee tacitly acquiesced in the changes now proposed, he hoped they would not be told at some future time. when perhaps the scheme had failed, that they had agreed to the scheme, and that they would therefore be inconsistent if they pointed out the defects and the directions in which it had failed. Quite apart from the merits of the scheme, which he admitted, he did not feel himself competent to form an opinion. Was the new scheme practicable? Would 12,000 men of nineteen years of ago enlist each year for nine years colour service, the overwhelming proportion of which must certainly be served in the East? That was the vital and cardinal question before them. A collateral advantage of the old system was that foreign service was mixed up with home service. A man joined the Army and took the rough and the smooth service in England or in the East, but it never presented itself to the recruit when he signed the paper that he condemned himself to six or seven years of certain exile in the East. Would the recruit be tempted by anything which the right hon. Gentleman could offer him to take that solemn step? He felt the greatest doubt and anxiety on that point. Would sixpence a day make the difference to the man who had the choice of shipping himself off to the East for five or six years when he could serve for two years in his own country and after that have six years in the Reserve with pay in civil life? The right hon. Gentleman, no doubt, believed that he would get the 12,000 men each year, but he doubted it. If the right hon. Gentleman happened to be wrong over this matter a disaster would be inflicted upon our Army and the catastrophe both with regard to efficiency and economy would be far-reaching and permanent. The Army was not an inanimate substance, it was a living thing. Regiments were not like houses; they could not be pulled down and altered structurally to suit the convenience of the occupier and the caprice of the owner. They were more like plants; they grew slowly if they were to grow strong; they were easily affected by conditions of temperature or soil; and if they were blighted or transplanted they were apt to wither, and then they could only be revived by copious floods of public money. That was true with I regard to any Army, and it was still more true with regard to a voluntary army. How much more must it therefore be true of the units which composed the Volunteer citizen Army. In the reduction the right hon. Gentleman proposed in the Volunteers and Militia, he could not follow him at all. Those who had made the defence of the soil the principal plank of their military platform were bound to resist the proposal to reduce the Auxiliary Forces and to intercept the supply of men by which they had been sustained. He did not wish to say anything against Royal Commissions, but he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would not pay too much attention to the Report of the Commission on Army Reform. That Commission accumulated evidence to sustain a proposal in favour of conscription. Nobody had more effectively demolished the conclusions of that Commission than the right hon. Gentleman, for he had held them up to ridicule and had shown that their conclusions in regard to conscription were absurd and unnecessary. Was it too much to ask that the same critical eye should be turned on the premises of that Commission as upon their conclusions. Just as the right hon. Gentleman had been able to show that conscription was not so cheap and easy as this Commission had maintained so he would be able to show that the Volunteers and the Militia were not so bad and worthless and useless as the same Commission had seen fit to report. Did the Committee realise the immensity and the revolutionary character of the changes in the Auxiliary Forces which the right hon. Gentleman had proposed? He did not intend to deal with the Militia because he understood that that branch of the subject was only to be dealt with if public opinion would allow it, and he was convinced that public opinion would not allow the Secretary for War to carry out his proposals in that direction. If Militia recruiting had suffered it was because the length of service in the Regular Army had been reduced. By throwing open three years service to the Regular Army they had not only affected recruiting for the Guards but also for the Militia, and that might be the reason why the extra Vote had not operated to swell the ranks of the Militia battalions. If the right hon. Gentleman was able to revert to the seven and five years system on which this country had developed a great military force at a small expense he would find the Militia very much strengthened. They ought not to forget that the Militia did send 90,000 men to the South Africa War. How could it be said that they were unfit for service when they utilised 90,000 of them on active service, and when without their aid they could not have held their lines of communication and garrisoned their Mediterranean possessions in the hour of need. With regard to the Volunteers the proposals to reduce them were much more alarming and far-reaching. The present establishment of the Volunteers was 340,000, and it was now proposed to reduce it to 200,000. It might be said that the present establishment existed only on paper, and did not matter, but it did matter that the Volunteers should be capable of great extension in times of emergency, and that during the danger of an invasion many thousands of men should be willing to join as was the case during the late war. Look at the strength of the Volunteers. They were 280,000 after the last general election when the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for India made his proposals to the House, but the total had fallen to 240,000 on the 1st of January this year. Now it was proposed to reduce them to 180,000 men. So that in five years 100,000 real live Volunteers who were real self-respecting citizen soldiers had gone from the Army and were to be struck off the defensive forces of the country. And what was to be done with the remainder? They were asked to say, "Our patriotism and our desire to sacrifice ourselves for our country is so great that we desire to become second-class Volunteers." That was absolutely subversive of discipline and destructive of a healthy spirit. Some 60,000 Volunteers were to form a sort of residuum and they would be a kind of sham Regulars drawn from other battalions of which they had been the strength, and boiled down into a kind of imitation division of the Regular Army to be moved about according to the caprice of the War Office and the fancies of Pall Mall. He could hardly believe that these proposals were seriously made after the experience of the South African War in which large numbers of Volunteers had served side by side with the best professional soldiers and had proved themselves perfectly capable of discharging their duty efficiently. When they remembered that an economy only amounting to £300,000—little more than one-third of the expenditure added to India by the increase of pay, little more than the amount added without any result in bounties to the Militia the year before last—when they realised also the enormous loss of power and patriotism, because it partook of both, only produced an economy of £300,000—he did not wish to say anything controversial, but it really did appear to him, that this part of the scheme was instinct with all the prejudices and jealousies of the professional and Regular soldier. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would carefully reconsider the whole position. He did not always agree with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham, but he said something shortly after the war about the lessons of the war. which was profoundly true. He said the great lesson of the war was the immense power which could be developed by a citizen force in the defence of their own country. That was a wise counsel which ought not to be overlooked now. He saw hon. Gentlemen opposite who took much interest in the Volunteers. He would even defend the inefficient Volunteer. He might be inefficient one year and perfectly efficient the next. Everybody who knew about Volunteer battalions knew that. It was not always the same lot of men who were inefficient. Anyhow, before they needed to employ the Volunteers in the Line against an invading army, or before sending them to fight across the sea, they would have time to give them sufficient training and to make them a very different force from what they were now. He was not going to trespass on the province that belonged to Volunteer officers. He would only urge upon the right hon. Gentleman that surely when the Regular Army was disorganised and could not be maintained, when it was subject to large reductions, when it was the subject of adventurous experiments of a character the end of which no man could foresee—surely this was not the time to lop off whole slices of the citizen force on which we had depended so much in the past. The right hon. Gentleman could, of course, go on with his changes, which when made would not be easy to undo. He implored the right hon. Gentleman to content himself with doing one thing at a time. If the changes which he now proposed in the Army were successful—as they all hoped—then the right hon. Gentleman or his successor would be able to come to the House, and with added prestige and authority make proposals for the reconstitution of the Auxiliary Forces of the Crown. Some day when our system of local government should have got into a more complete condition, when, perhaps, there were provincial councils all over the country, he should look forward to seeing the Volunteers, the Militia, and the Yeomanry withdrawn altogether from the charge of the War Office, and their whole administration and control entrusted to local authorities. Then and then only would these citizen forces realise their full, proper, and natural development and strength. But that was not an idea that could be profitably or usefully discussed or even adumbrated by a private Member. At any rate they were entitled to appeal to the Government not to compromise the whole future of these great citizen forces, not to revolutionise their character and position, and not in an hour of haste, after scanty consideration, to destroy organisations which had taken generations, and in some cases centuries, to grow. The right hon. Gentleman had a right to have fair consideration for the proposals he had made. The Committee was desirous of according him that fair consideration, but at the same time he did not think he would get it. The hour had passed for Army reform for the moment. The whole current of events was flowing against the right hon. Gentleman. The unique opportunities which presented themselves three years ago, and the driving power that accompanied them would not soon be revived. A series of pretentious awl sensational reforms following upon the immense disturbance after the war had irritated and exhausted the Army in every branch and every unit. This Parliament had a chance of becoming a great Army Reform Parliament and it had particularly failed in fulfilling that great opportunity. It could now only bequeath this question—as complex and difficult as that with which any Administration could be called upon to deal—to its successor with the difficulties aggravated and multiplied by the treatment it had given it. Nobody who knew anything about the Army could fail to recognise the courage with which the right hon. Gentleman had approached this great question, but it was not possible for any Secretary of State now to make any sudden retrenchment or improvement in the efficiency of the army system. Instead of advocating a Laodicean policy, he should say that the policy with regard to the British Army should be a policy of recuperation rather than of reform. Five years thrifty unostentatious administration was required before the real problem of a military system could again be approached with good hopes of arriving at a satisfactory result.
said he did not suppose that the hon. Member for Oldham expected the Committee to take seriously some of the remarks he had made. [An HON. MEMBER: Oh!]He might remind the Committee that one of the remarks of the hon. Member was that he looked forward to the time when the Volunteers and Militia, and possibly also the Yeomanry, should be under the command of the chairmen of the parish councils. They could hardly be expected to take such a suggestion seriously. It had been stated that the members of the Norfolk Commission entered upon their work with preconceived ideas in favour of conscription. He wished to point out that the word conscription did not appear in the recommendations of the Committee except for the purpose of condemning it. The Commission sat for more than twelve months, and they exhausted every means in their power of avoiding the proposal of conscription. So far from their minds having been made up in favour of it at the beginning of their inquiries, the reverse was the case. The recommendation they made was arrived at with the greatest possible reluctance, and anybody who took the trouble to read the Report of the Commission would see that they recommended compulsory training after all other suggestions had been exhausted. Reference had been made to the shortcomings of the Militia regiments in the field. He would not go through the list which had been given to the Committee, but he wished to state that what occurred to him when the shortcomings were being stated was that it was not the fault of the men that they had not the training and equipment which they should have had. It was not even the fault of the system altogether. It was the fault of those gentlemen who did not understand the Militia, but who thought they did. He was very glad that in the scheme which his right hon. friend had put before the country the recommendations of the Royal Commission had not been altogether put aside. There were many points in the scheme of the Secretary of State which were of the greatest value and which would be altogether absent if it had been of a revolutionary or hopeless character. To begin with, he recognised the value of the adoption of a territorial system. The right hon. Gentleman recognised that important consideration, and he congratulated him on the prominence he had given to them. The chief causes of the failure of the Militia and the Volunteer services were attributable to one cause in particular, viz., want of appreciation by those who had the management of affairs in the past of the real circumstances of the case; and want of power and of connection between those who administered in Pall Mall and the commanding officers who had the management either of the regiments in the case of the Militia or the corps and battalions in the case of the Volunteers. There was a class of men now in the Volunteers, which was being enlarged day by day, which originally were not in the Volunteers but in the Militia. The natural tendency, therefore, was to demand an increased capitation grant for the Volunteers, because they could not make for themselves the necessary provision to fit them for a soldier's life. The result was that the Militia was being injured by taking away the very class which ought to belong to it, while the Volunteers were injured because a certain number of their very best men were attracted to join the Yeomanry, in which corps they were paid 5s. a day besides a very handsome allowance for their horses. He did not blame the Yeomanry for taking them at all, for they were excellent fellows; but it was a pity that they should have left the Volunteers and that their places should be taken by more or less inferior men. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War said that he was going to cut down the Militia regiments because they were not fit for war. He did not know how the right hon. Gentleman was going to arrive at what regiments were fit or not fit for war. The numerical test was hardly a fair one. Circumstances had altered in the last twenty years. Some of the young men born and bred in the country did not stay there. They went into the towns where there were more attractions in the way of amusements, and enlisted and spent their money there. Now, these very countrymen were drafted into regiments not connected with the counties in which they were born. He thought that something might be done in regard to the alteration of the area of recruiting. Some Militia regiments where there was a thick population were of over-strength and as a rule these were under - officered, and other regiments were short of men and full of officers. If possible, he should like to see the boys of one county sent for enlistment to their own county and put into the regiment to which they ought properly to belong. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War said something which rather alarmed him—viz., that he did not think it would be possible for Militia officers to take command in the field.
said that that was a mistake. What he had said was that if the recommendation of the hon. Gentleman's Commission were carried out, the Militia officers would have to spend seven months of the year in training and that he thought some officers could not give that time.
said he did not think that that was conclusive. He understood the right hon. Gentleman did not look forward to any Militia officers having the command of their regiments in the field. He knew that there were to be found a great number of them who were absolutely fit to command their regiments in the field; and it would be a great deterrent to the appointment of such gentlemen if they were told that under no circumstances they should have the command of their regiments in the field. The idea had too long prevailed that the present system had produced no great disaster to this country, and that we had better muddle on. But that was a very dangerous principle to act on; and whatever faults were to be found with the present system, they should not be allowed to continue. We were a nation of grumblers, and he had been told that there were a great number of men who were perfectly content to remain grumblers and willing to take no steps to remedy faults of details. He had no intention of speaking on behalf of his brother officers in the Militia, but he should like to remind those who had not taken the trouble to read the evidence put before the Commission of the opinion of those who were asked their advice, in view of the possibility of the invasion of this country, as to what changes were requisite in order that the Militia should be maintained in a condition of efficiency and strength. They were told that invasion was possible, as had been proved by events in the Far East under the new system of sea transport. If we were secure from invasion by the protection of our Fleet, what was the use of their sitting there and voting this money? This was not a matter to be smiled at. Did hon. and right hon. Gentlemen imagine that the conclusion to which the Commission came in regard to this matter was the conclusion simply of the eleven gentlemen who sat on that Commission? He could assure them that it was nothing of the sort; and they could satisfy themselves on that point by reading the evidence. That it was absolutely necessary that all our young men of proper age should be properly trained was not the view of these eleven members of the Commission alone, but of Lord Grenfell, General French, Sir Evelyn Wood, Lord Roberts, the Duke of Connaught, Sir Ian Hamilton, General Kelly-Kenny, and a score more. Would hon. Members consider for a moment the possibilities under which this force might be required? They were told by the Prime Minister that probably the defence of the country might be left to the Militia, Volunteers and Yeomanry. That question had been asked of the Committee of Defence, and they were told that probably these forces would be required to act because there night be new Regular troops in this country at the decisive moment. They ought to remember what took place a short time ago. In the last year and a half of the South African War this country was denuded of every Regular unit; at any rate there was hardly a Regular unit which was up to its full strength. In fact, the Government was blamed for sending out all the Regular troops that could be mobilised and all the Militia. They sent out men who were practically worthless and paid them 5s. a day. That was at a time when we were at profound peace with Continental countries and when our Fleet was free on the seas. Was it necessary for anyone to sound a word of warning as to the possibility or probability of their having to depend upon the Militia, Volunteers, and Yeomanry, for the defence of these shores in other circumstances, when they had an instance of that kind before their minds? This country would not contemplate the possibility of a change until the occasion arose. What would be the occasion that would arise? No one knew. They were told that if the defence of the country required it, every Volunteer would shoulder his rifle. His own opinion was that he had better keep it at his shoulder because it was the safest place for it. What was the good of numbers, when many of the Volunteers were physically unfit, and many of them could not find time to carry out their duties. It had been said that the Report of the Commission was embarrassing to the Government; but the duty of the Commissioners was not to make a Report which would popularise the Militia and the Volunteers, but to issue a Report on the evidence which had been taken. There was not a single member of the Commission who would not sign that Report again and underline every word of it. A great many people spoke of the necessity of a home Army in order to prevent a raid; but what were the facts. The Militia establishment was 32,000 men short, and if they included soldiers under nineteen, they were 43,000 short. The Volunteers were 78,000 short, and that did not include the Volunteers under twenty. The difficulty with which the hon. right Gentleman and the Commission had to contend with in this matter had reference to the want of efficiency on the part of the officers and to the number of the men. The right hon. Gentleman went a long way to remedy both; and he believed that under the right hon. Gentleman's scheme a class of officer would be obtained in the Militia which would be of the greatest value to the country. There were a number of men who would gladly make it practically their profession, and who would be perfectly willing to fit themselves for the work by attending classes. Certainly all the officers needed for the reserve battalions could be readily found; and they would be able to carry out all the duties required of them. As to the number of men, that was a greater difficulty; and he was afraid that, with regard to the Militia, the number required would not be found as easily as the right hon. Gentlemen imagined. The shrinkage at the present moment was something alarming. Why it should be thought that men should join the Line under the new conditions he could not imagine.
said that more men from the Militia than were required went into the Line at present.
said the circumstances were entirely different. As a rule a young man went into the Militia before he joined the Line to see what soldiering was like; but the regular Militiaman joined the Militia for the reason that he liked soldiering. He apologised to the House for the length at which he had spoken, but his mind was very full of the topic. There was one matter to which he should wish to be allowed to refer. This House and the War Office had been blamed for the shrinkage in the Army; but there was also blame to be apportioned to the public. The public did not appreciate the soldiers in time of peace. It was all very well to get up subscriptions in time of war; but soldiers wanted more than that. They wanted the possibility of insults being poured upon them removed. The other day, he was in command of a Militia battalion in training, and a person in his own district said to him, "Oh, the Militia are coming and we will have no vegetables in our garden, or eggs in our fowlhouse." It would be difficult for him to say in the House what his reply was, but he would state that during the period the men were under training there was not a single case of larceny or drunkenness, and there was no case of misconduct even brought before him as commanding officer. He would give another instance. He had listened to many sermons preached to soldiers, and he did not think he had ever heard a parson, except a military chaplain, who did not address the soldiers as if they were inferior to the rest of the congregation; and as if they were open to temptations that they ought to guard against more than others. These were the sort of insults of which he complained. He was glad to know that now twenty-three out of every thirty-five soldiers who had served their period obtained suitable civil employment. That, he thought, would to a great extent remedy the difficulty with regard to recruiting. An hon. Gentleman opposite said that they on the Commission went into it with their minds made up in favour of conscription. That was not so. They only found it out after the most careful investigation; though he himself would always regret that he belonged to a country which had to be defended, not by voluntary effort, but by compulsory service.
said that the hon. Gentleman who had just spoken had carried the Committee with him more in the details than in the actual lines of his speech. Sermons such as the hon. Gentleman described were by no means peculiar to the Army. They had been addressed to every man who, as a boy, had ever attended a school or college; and he was not sure if sermons were preached in the House of Commons nowadays, as they were in the Cromwellian times, that they should not be addressed in a similar manner, though not by their present chaplain. The hon. Gentleman seemed to think that hon. Members on that side smiled at his doctrines; but they did not smile at him, but with him, especially when he admitted that the Admiralty and the War Office contradicted one another in the evidence which was given before the Commission. If this country were in a position to spend hundreds of millions of pounds sterling on the Army and Navy, it might well protect itself against invasion. But the country was spending too much already; and, therefore, it was that they had to pick and choose the essential from the non-essential. The Volunteers, however, gave the country an assurance against panic, and also provided it with a great number of men who would be of use abroad in the event of war. There were a number of other subjects of great importance which it was now necessary to discuss; and he should like to turn the attention of the Committee to one or two which had not yet been mentioned. The Secretary of State spoke of the endorsement of his plans by the House. This was the 8th of August. That was the dominant factor in the debate. At such a period of the session it was impossible that there should be either approbation or disapprobation of such a kind as to commit the House on the Government scheme. The scheme would have to go forward on the sole responsibility of the Administration. The criticism against the scheme had been, the Secretary of State said local and special on particular heads, but as regarded the Regular Forces of the country the responsibility would rest with the Government alone, and there would be no responsibility on the part of the House of Commons. The responsibility which the Government sought to make the House share with them was an illusory responsibility. What the Committee must do under the circumstances, was to accept the scheme on the responsibility of the Administration, the House being uncommitted to the scheme, and regarding it solely as the scheme of the Administration. Whilst he differed from the Prime Minister on the fact that the approbation of the main scheme would be shown by the passing of this Vote, he cordially agreed with the Secretary of State for War to-day in thinking that this problem was urgent. He could not agree with the hon. Member for Oldham and the noble Lord the Member for Middlesex in thinking that the whole thing could be postponed. There were 1,000 reasons why it could not be. The question of the drafts for India alone made it extremely urgent. That question must be met by steps on the part of the Administration, and the Secretary of State for War was bound to act in the direction of his Liverpool speech and to see that the plans which he carried out should be such that any successors of his should not find their hands tied, especially with regard to any reduction. It was sufficient to allege the ground of finance alone in support of the doctrine. The hon. Member for Oldham had assumed that under this scheme there would be a reduction of £2,500,000 on the Estimates. He had looked carefully through the figures but he could find no such reduction, and unless the scheme were carried further, he doubted whether it was possible to keep the promises of substantial reduction which Ministers had made. The words used in the statement of the Secretary of State for War, circulated to the House, went to show that there was to be a reduction at once, sufficient to reduce the Estimates of last year over the present year owing to the fact that the Estimates of the present year were £1,000,000 under what they would have been owing to the surplus from the war. Then there was the fact that the Estimates of next year must be swelled by the cost of a number of quick-firing guns. There were many things reported on by the War Commission which would cost money, and which were, as some thought, essential. Was the saving on this scheme sufficient? Speaking as one in favour of the main lines of the scheme, he must admit that it turned the Amy upside down; and the question was whether such a revolution ought not to be accompanied by a much larger reduction, if only to guard against too hasty demands for reduction in the Navy. Ought we not to do this on a larger scale, and secure that the reduction should be so large that there could not be any danger of that kind. As to the details of the contemplated reduction, the information was very vague. What battalions were to be withdrawn from abroad beyond the garrison battalions?
The suggestion is that eleven battalions are to be withdrawn, leaving twenty - six. The fact that some of them will be the garrison battalions about to be abolished does not affect the calculation. In future we hope to reduce the colonial battalions to twenty-six, the garrison battalions being replaced by battalions of the Line.
said that it was difficult to see where these troops could be withdrawn from, except South Africa. It was impossible to touch those in Malta and Gibraltar, and he doubted the policy of withdrawing the white troops altogether from Egypt. As to the Militia part of the scheme, which was an essential portion of the Army scheme in the mind of the Secretary of State, but which was a portion as to which he had not the slightest idea how this House could express the opinion which they had been invited to express, he agreed that the Militia had been most unjustly abused in the Report of the War Commission for deficiencies not their own. He confessed he thought that the Militia might have been gradually improved, have been revivified rather than destroyed. The Secretary of State had said be would deal with the question of short training and the question of the Swiss army system later. He had not done so. He (Sir Charles Dilke) did not share the view of the impossibility of creating a decent force out of the Militia, which was held by many of the advisers of the Government. He was one of those who would have made the Militia liable to service abroad in time of war, and tried gradually to improve the system, looking to it to create a home Army with which the Reserves would drill. The Government were not quite consistent on this matter, because, while they sought to enforce the words of the Royal Commission that our Militia was not fit to meet foreign troops, and that the Swiss army was not efficient, that was not the opinion of the military experts of our time. If we were to endorse those views the Government were somewhat inconsistent, he thought, in telling us, in one breath, that we ought not to spend money on troops which were incapable of facing foreign armies, and, at the same time, asking us to spend money on rifle clubs and on persons at home who were not even organised. The Government were not quite consistent on this subject, and the Government could not expect the Committee to endorse their view, which might tend to make the Militia die away. There had been a great controversy as to whether the new scheme would give us, not only the reliefs for India, but a sufficient Army for despatch across the seas in time of war. He was sorry that he problem of the British Empire in war should have been complicated by what, he thought, was a new heresy, the idea of sending virtually all the Army to India. It was a curious thing that the noble Lord the Member for Middlesex, who made so fierce an attack on some portions of the Government scheme, adopted exactly the same heresy. The Prime Minister told the House the other day that the problem was the defence, not of the north-west frontier of India but of Afghanistan, and the noble Lord had told them what was true, that Russia had improved her communications towards the north-west frontier of Afghanistan. But that was 420 miles from the Indian frontier. No one could contemplate our placing an army in Afghanistan, unless at the request of the Ameer, who would probably prefer to be responsible for the defence of his own frontiers; but even if we did, that Army would have to march 420 miles across some of the most difficult and dangerous country in the world to get at Russia. Would 100,000 Regular troops organis upon a European system at home, in addition to the Indian forces, be easily transported across 420 miles? The whole thing was a dream, and he was sorry to hear the noble Lord the Member for Ealing accept all this as if it had been admitted and proved. The necessities of the Indian Government in the future might become very different from what they were at present, but they had nevertheless to deal with the present situation and they had to keep the situation for the neat few years in view. The dangers of an Empire like ours changed continually and they might have an entirely different condition of affairs in a few years time. He admitted that the Indian problem must always be kept in mind. He admitted the, necessity of keeping a formidable force for this purpose, but he hoped that in this matter they would not have exclusive regard to the needs of India, and that this force should be as free and as little tied or ear-marked to any particular service as possible. He agreed with the financial argument of the noble Lord in regard to India. The Government alleged this supposed necessity two Years ago, and it was a little difficult to turn round now and tell India that that argument was all moonshine. There was another point upon which the Government, had not perhaps been quite frank with the House. and it bore upon the question of expenditure. Expenditure had forced this scheme upon the House and they had made these proposals in the hope of effecting a reduction in the expenditure. In trying to save money, however, the Government should he most careful not to put aside expenditure which was even more necessary than the expenditure upon rifle clubs and many other matters upon which expenditure was now proposed. He had heard with some alarm Answers given to Questions which rather suggested that the Government were not so keenly alive as some of them would like to the necessity of re-arming our artillery with quick-firing guns. He thought the House believed that the decision to re-arm the Indian Army with the quick-firing gun first was resolved upon owing to purely financial reasons. The doctrine of the Government was that they must not spend money upon anything which could not face the best European army. Could the British Army face a European army without quick-firing guns? An important statement had been made on this point on behalf of the Government of India in the recent debate in the Governor-General's Council, where The Military Member of the Council used these words—
That was an official statement made on behalf of the Government of India, and in the face of that fact, was it not obvious that in regard to one of the first necessities of modern warfare our Army stood in a position of hopeless inferiority. That was a state of things they could not allow to continue. The reductions in expenditure under this scheme would not be so large as those which the House of Commons and the country had a right to expect. When they were turning a system upside down, upon principles which he supported, he thought they ought to have seen a much larger reduction as the result of that change. It had been said that under this new system the home battalions would fall into a condition of hopeless inferiority. Had the French army or the Prussian army fallen into this position? Did his hon. friend mean to say that these armies did not possess a real military spirit? He thought these were old - fashioned arguments. The question which could be addressed to the Committee at this moment was—Did this scheme show that large reduction in expenditure which was the true ground and initiation of the scheme, and which, he thought, the country would demand?"Are we to disregard all warnings and remain in a backward state of military preparation? The South African War showed the inferiority of our field gun, and since then experiments have been carried out to produce a perfect gun of quick-firing type. It is interesting to know how backward we are. Russia is armed with a quick-firing gun firing sixteen rounds a minute; ours probably fires two with difficulty. France is also armed with quick-firing guns stated to fire twenty rounds a minute. Germany has been armed since 1896 but is now re-arming with a better one. Even Switzerland began re-arming in 1901 and Japan commenced in that year, and is believed to have completed its Field Artillery with quick-firing guns."
said he did not propose to enter into any of the details of the interesting and instructive discussion in which the Committee had been engaged. His object in rising was to disclaim, not only for himself, but for the majority of Members on both sides of the House, any sort of responsibility in passing this scheme here. He would tell the Committee in two or three sentences why. In the first place, as the right hon. Gentleman himself admitted, it was a vague and experimental scheme; and in the second place, according to his own confession, it was an incomplete scheme. They did not know up to this moment what was going to happen to the Militia, or how far the proposals which the right hon. Gentleman had in the back of his mind would in the course of the next few months be gradually carried into execution. They were entirely ignorant up to now how far and in what degree this scheme represented the united opinion and settled judgment of His Majesty's Government; further still they did know that it had little or no relevancy to the Army Estimates which they were at present engaged in discussing; and finally, though perhaps this was the most conclusive argument of all, this 8th of August was actually the first opportunity they had had of discussing the details of this scheme; it was absurd, in view of all these considerations, to think that the Vote to-night could be taken as anything like an approval of the scheme. While he recognised the reforming zeal of the Secretary of State, and while so far as he was personally concerned he admitted that there were matters in the scheme which had his hearty sympathy, he protested strongly that when they passed the salary of the Secretary of State their vote was not to be construed, and could not be fairly understood, as an expression of the fair judgment of the House of Commons on the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman.
said that he was very unwilling to intervene in the debate, but he had risen more than once with the intention of making some remarks on the same lines as those which had fallen from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife. He felt that in the discussion of the scheme of the Secretary of State for War they were in a false position. They were now going to vote on the Army Estimates of the present year, but the scheme which had been foreshadowed with more precision than on former occasions that day, had no reference to the Estimates of the present year. It had reference to the question of Army reform in the future, and they did not even know how many points of the scheme of the Secretary of State had the approval of the Cabinet. They did not know that the scheme as a whole was even the scheme of His Majesty's Government. In fact, the Secretary of State for War was reported to have said in another place that the scheme must not be accepted as embodying the final resolutions of the Government. Under those circumstances it was absolutely impossible, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife had said, that in the vote given that night the House could express approval either in whole or in detail of the scheme to which they had listened with such great interest. He thought it would be well not to deprecate the proposals of the Secretary of State, looked upon as a whole. He knew well for years past how great had been the interest and how very useful the researches the Secretary of State for War had made into Army as well as Navy questions. At the same time he was greatly impressed by what had already been said in the course of the discussion concerning the far-reaching and disastrous effects that might follow the failure of his scheme. If they took the Army to pieces and then failed to put it together again, the last stage would be worse than the first. He was very doubtful whether the position of the Army was anything like so desperate as to require such drastic changes. Undoubtedly some changes were required. Experiments had been tried, and not unsuccessfully, but he was by no means persuaded that the system of the Secretary of State for India, which secured the assent of the House, was not beginning really to bear fruit. There had been an improvement in the position of the Guards which was much more valuable than the enlisting of recruits, and this he believed to be the result of the increased pay obtained for them by the Secretary for India, and which only came into operation last year. What they wanted in regard to the Army was a little fixity of tenure, and not to have considerable changes which would unsettle their minds. It was a very serious thing to fill the Army so largely with men who did not extend their service. When soldiers went to India they found the service there pleasant and they became reconciled to it. The result was that the Secretary of State for War told him the other day that in the last six months 42 or 43 per cent. of the men entitled to longer service in India had extended their time. That showed that the present system was not so bad. They did not know what part of this scheme had been accepted by the Cabinet: and they would not know until the Estimates were presented next year, and that was, he thought, a most dangerous position. He had been deeply impressed with the branch of the subject, which had been very strongly enforced by his hon. and gallant friend beside him, which proposed the abolition of the Militia. Of the existing Militia battalions, one-half were to be abolished altogether, and the other half were to be doubled up to one-fourth of their present number, who were to be adjuncts of the new home Army. This was an enormous change. It meant doing away with a force which for hundreds of years had been the constitutional force of the country, and in time of stress had not been found wanting in assisting the Army. It was the abuse of the Militia which had brought it to its present disastrous condition. It was inevitable if the Militia was to be used as a kind of forcing-house for the Line that it could not remain in a satisfactory position. He knew what the Militia was twenty or thirty years ago, but it had been constantly squeezed to make up the deficiency in the recruiting for the Army, and it was no wonder that a state of affairs had been reached when it was deemed undesirable to retain it. Any vote which was given that night must not be taken as an expression that the House was a consenting party in favour of such a tremendous change. Undoubtedly some of the right hon. Gentleman's proposals were excellent. Service Members had long urged the necessity of having a striking force at Aldershot, and the Boer War would probably have been prevented if we had possessed such a force which could be sent abroad without mobilising the Army. Another excellent proposal was that to form larger depots where recruits could be efficiently trained, and he was quite sure that if his right hon. friend would not want to do too much at once he would leave the Army much stronger than he found it. He hoped his right hon. friend would not expect them to consent to this scheme as a whole without letting them know how much of it the Cabinet approved.
said it was rather pleasant to hear from the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War that the Volunteer force was to be taken seriously, and to be treated accordingly. He congratulated the right hon. Gentleman on that change of attitude towards that force. The right hon. Gentleman had announced a scheme of reduction and concentration. As to reduction, he regretted that the right hon. Gentleman thought it necessary. He might say to the right hon. Gentleman that he could not understand his scheme in its entirety, and he wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman a Question in regard to one point. The right hon. Gentleman had referred to a differentiation between Volunteers. Now, he did not, himself, see how there could be a difference between Volunteers without raising considerable friction and dissatisfaction. He understood the right hon. Gentleman to say that this had already been done in some regiments; but he should like to hear more about it before he would consent to such differentiation. He could not help feeling that it would produce much disagreeableness which they did not want in the Volunteer regiments of the country. There was another point. The right hon. Gentleman should consider that there was a difference between country and town Volunteer regiments. If the right hon. Gentleman had served, as he had done, in a country regiment, he would have seen that it was almost impossible to enforce on the country regiments the same regulations as could easily be fulfilled by the town battalions. They had a right to ask the right hon. Gentleman to consider these points when he was introducing such fundamental changes as he had sketched out. Some remarks had been made, he was glad to say, not in the House, as to the uselessness of the Volunteers. He confessed he had been somewhat annoyed at hearing a soldier—whose name he would not give—say "Oh! What is the good of the Volunteers?" He humbly suggested that the Volunteers had not done badly in South Africa. They had sent very good men there who had distinguished themselves. There was another point. He hoped the present Secretary for War, and successive Secretaries for War, would show a little more sympathetic feeling in regard to the administration of the Volunteer force, starting on the premise that they were Volunteers, and that they required consideration and help. He hoped that the right hon. Gentleman would see that the Volunteer force, though not as good as the Regulars, could be of use to the country and ought to be supported by this House.
said he understood that his right hon. friend the Secretary of State for War had abandoned the idea of differentiating as between efficients and non-efficients in Volunteer battalions. If, however, the Volunteers were to be reduced, they should be given some consideration from the pecuniary point of view, in the shape of a larger grant, according to their efficiency. At present a Volunteer battalion received a per capita allowance, which perhaps might induce the officers to think more of numbers than of efficiency; but if the numbers were to be reduced, a greater grant should be given to them. They had been told by a colleague of his right hon. friend the Secretary of State for War that this scheme did not represent the final opinion of the Government. If that were so, he would ask his right hon. friend to pause with regard to one or two matters. He wished to refer especially to the proposed reduction of the Line battalions. They had been discussing that afternoon the possibility of invasion. That such a possibility existed, he would support by a statement of Lord Wolselev before the Royal Commission. Lord Wolseley said, "I take into consideration most fully all our Navy can do to protect us from invasion in my calculations: I will content myself with the remark that Napoleon and Wellington, Nelson and Collingwood, believed in the possibility, indeed, I might say, the feasibility of invasion. If I err in believing in that danger, I err in skilled company." When the present Government came into office in 1900 they promised a reform of the War office and of the Army, and augmentations were made of the infantry, etc. Lord Wolseley added certain battalions, and he estimated that to resist invasion the country required 100,000 Regulars, 50,000 Militia, and 100,000 of the best Volunteers. In that he was supported by other military authorities, such as Lord Roberts, Sir Evelyn Wood, Generals Kelly-Kenny. Nicholson and others. Only last year the Prime Minister stated that the country wanted a much larger force than was proposed under the present scheme, and he was supported by the War Commission. The late Mr. Stanhope proposed a striking force of 20,000 men. The striking force in this scheme was only 16,000 men. The points he wished to emphasise, however, had reference to the infantry battalions, in which he was specially interested, because two of the regiments to be reduced were Lancashire regiments, the Manchester Regiment and the Lancashire Fusiliers. They were augmented recently, and, at the time, they were regarded as permanent institutions. The Guards, the cavalry and the Militia appeared to be outside this scheme of reduction, and, no doubt, to some extent that was due to social influence. He wished to point out the hardship to the officers in the battalions that would be disbanded. 378 officers must be absorbed in other battalions in consequence of this disbanding, in addition to 350 from 50 battalions, the officers of which were to be reduced from 27 to 20. That would be very hard on the present generation of officers. To a large number of them it would mean professional extinction, and, to the majority, it would mean an increase of service abroad unless the foreign-service Army was reduced. It might be said that in any scheme of organisation, reconstruction, or retrenchment, individuals would have to suffer. That was all very well; but the hardship of the battalions he had mentioned was that they were being disbanded within a few years of having been raised and the labour and expense entailed would be lost. The officers of these battalions had not gained accelerated promotion, because of the introduction of officers from other regiments; and after incurring the expense of new uniforms they would have to incur further expense on joining another regiment. There was also the expenditure in providing the mess for the new battalions, which they need not have incurred had they joined an old battalion. It was bad for the Army, and bad for the Empire that, just at the end of a war, soldiers who had served their country well should be the first to suffer. To his mind, the scheme was revolutionary; and, if it were to be introduced at all, it should be introduced slowly and cautiously, and the details should be carefully scrutinised. And, it being half-past Seven of the clock, the Chairman left the Chair to make his Report to to the House. Committee report Progress; to sit again this evening.
Evening Sitting
Supply 21St Allotted Day
Considered in Committee.
(In the Committee.)
[Mr. J. W. LOWTHER (Cumberland, Penrith) in the Chair.]
Army Estimates, 1904–5
£331,000. War Office, Salaries and Miscellaneous Charges.
, continuing his speech, said when the Committee adjourned he was trying to induce the Secretary of State not to disband but to reduce the Line battalions. It required at least two years' hard work to make a soldier, and the trouble was that the greater number of those who enlisted did not like hard work, they enlisted to get food and petty cash, and if they were made to work they at once said they could get more wages in civil life with less restrictions. The scheme went below the irreducible minimum both in numbers and period of service. Ancient and modern authorities alike held that three Years was the shortest period in which to make a soldier efficient, and it seemed to him that the Reservists with two years service and two training, would be little better than efficient Volunteers. In times of stress it was far easier to fill existing battalions than to raise new ones, and he was borne out in that statement by the remark of the Secretary of State in one of his opening sentences, that he would rather have ten men on whom he could rely than 100 raised rapidly under the stress of adversity. He was further borne out by the statement of his friend Colonel Bruxner-Randall, of the Lancashire Fusiliers, who wrote to him—
And then he went on to say—"While I see the difficulty of getting men, still, my experience proves that a regiment is easier to expand from 500 to 1,000 than to originate. I had two entire companies from our 1st Battalion to start the new 3rd Battalion. Even up to a year after the formation those two old companies kept their lead; and this superiority was not the result of better officers."
He could speak, moreover, from personal experience of the excellence of the 4th Battalion, the Lancashire Fusiliers, which it was proposed to disband. One third of the figures recently quoted of these who volunteered for long service in India came from that battalion, and, to spew the excellent men they had in that battalion, at the recent All-Ireland Rifle Meeting at the Curragh, fifty-four of the warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and men won fifty-four individual prizes, amounting to £68. Further, for the Scouts' cup—the blue ribbon of the meeting—their sections took first, second, and third places, the second and third being ties. The high state of efficiency of this battalion under Colonel Hammersley, and now under Colonel Deane, was well known to the general officers under whom it had served, and it was only last year that he himself at the Curragh saw its colours presented to it by the Duke of Connaught. He could illustrate from history how the reduction of units impaired in time of necessity the power of expansion in the case of the 20th Regiment. In 1756, owing to stress of war with France, a second battalion was raised. This subsequently became the 67th regiment. In 1779, again in consequence of war with France, an expansion was necessary, and he 20th Regiment received a draft of Militiamen, and the corps was formed into two battalions which served together in Holland and Egypt. In 1858, the stress of the Crimea, followed by the Mutiny, necessitated expansion and the present second battalion was raised. In all these three cases a new battalion was raised hurriedly for war, and the existing battalion was in each case denuded to supply the new staff and nucleus for the new battalion. What he asked was this, was it necessary to do more than reduce the number of men in each battalion? He suggested that if skeleton battalions were kept that would meet the necessities of the case, and that instead of having battalions of 1,000 men the right hon. Gentleman might have battalions of 500, which were easy to handle, and this, he believed, was the custom in European armies. With regard to the territorial system, he was personally much attached to it. He should not be speaking to-night if he were not second in command of a Volunteer battalion of the Lancashire Fusiliers. He looked upon the territorial system as one of great value, and he always noticed the names of men in his own battalion who had passed into the Militia or into the Line. He looked on the territorial system as a sort of family connection. The territorial system was carried not merely into the Army but into the Navy: our battleships now being named after counties. Everybody was now accustomed to territorial names, and a county name gave a wider I importance to a regiment and a homely and sentimental attachment. The men of the Lancashire regiments were nearly all Lancashire men, men from the county although perhaps not recruited in their own districts, but in different districts. But the men did not cease to belong to the county because their battalion was not quartered in it. With regard to the linked-battalion system, he liked the idea of one battalion feeding another, and although the right hon. Gentleman disapproved of that system, he might point out that Lord Wolseley described it as the only safe one. He considered it was useful when the battalion at home had sent men to its sister battalion abroad, and it strengthened the strong family feeling. They saw that in the active service corps which were sent to South Africa; the three Volunteer battalions of the Lancashire Fusiliers sent out three active service companies to South Africa, and splendid reports came home from the officers commanding. They were bound together by a common feeling of camaraderie, the living together under one canvas, and esprit de corps. He would refer to the farewells to these companies in the recent edition of the History of the Lancashire Fusiliers by Major B. Smyth, M.V.O., of the Royal Hibernian Military School. With regard to the Line battalions to which he had referred, he would ask for special consideration for them; he would ask the right hon. Gentleman to consider the advisability of reducing rather than disbanding them. This scheme had been introduced at the fag end of the session, and he thought some little further time should be given to its consideration. He hoped nothing dra tic would be done during the recess. He wished the right hon. Gentleman all success in his scheme, but hoped that he would not he hard on those for whom he (Sir Lees Knowles) now pleaded."In fact, these companies were alive, and drafts of recruits were digested by them. The new companies were made up of just as good material, but were atoms with no corporate life: And this fault took much time and cultivation to eradicate."
said that much that had been said by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, and by Members on both sides of the House, went to show that, so far as Army reform was concerned, the Government was condemned. They had been eight years in office, and had been dealing with Army reform for the last five years. He would not do the right hon. Gentleman the injustice of supposing that this was the right hon. Gentleman's own Scheme. This scheme had been evolved out of the general knowledge of the Cabinet. He might describe it as a Forster, Brodrick, Wyndham, and Balfour scheme. It was nothing but a shuffling compromise to tide over the difficulty for the day and leave the question of Army reform in a state of confusion worse confounded; it had been whittled away to meet the exigencies of the day. The Committee had been told that this scheme was backed by the united Cabinet, but they were told the same thing with regard to the previous scheme, which was to give us two Army Corps, but which, when it came to war, gave one Army Corps, and what the Scotch called a bittock. The scheme which followed it, which introduced the three years men, was condemned by all military authorities, who warned the right hon. Gentleman's predecessor that the men would not re-engage. He had no desire to attach more importance to the military authorities, who sometimes disagreed, but there were some questions upon which they could give information, and this was one. Those who had been connected with the men all their lives were able to say whether they would re-engage or not. The result of that scheme was that it was a failure. What he would like to know was whether this scheme of the united Cabinet had the backing of half-a-dozen generals of experience who had the confidence of the Army and the country. If the right hon. Gentleman could say that, then the scheme would occupy a different position to what he (Captain Norton) thought it did at the present moment. The whole of the right hon. Gentleman's scheme was economy and efficiency. In regard to economy, the right hon. Gentleman showed a decrease of a million odd, but if they took into consideration the fact that India was paying for the manufacture of guns this year, and that we were living, so to speak, on the stores left over from the South African War; that the money payments would be steadily increasing; that we had to meet the difficulty of Indian reliefs, and that we had not yet paid for Somaliland—if all those matters were taken into consideration—not only would the million which the right hon. Gentleman professed to have saved be wiped out, but a million or two more. He also contended that the reduction of our fighting force was out of all proportion to the economy gained. The right hon. Gentleman placed at least half the battalions of the country on a peace footing, and left us with a balance of 177,000 men, which meant that our total force was reduced by about one-sixth, and such a reduction of men should represent. £5,000,000 instead of £1,000,000. We were, therefore, paying too dearly for the small economy obtained. He was astonished to hear the right hon. Gentleman make the statement he did with regard to conscription. The right hon. Gentleman said that were conscription possible it would be costly! Why, the very reverse was the case. Why did Continental nations adopt it? The Members of the other House had no constituents to face and they did not hesitate to tell the country the truth, nor did the Royal Commission. It was an unpalatable truth, no doubt, but it required to be told. To pretend that conscription was not the most economical way of getting an Army—at the same time we should get the flower of the country in the Army—was not playing the straightforward game. The right hon. Gentleman stated the cost would be £26,000,000 on the assumption that the number of men raised each year would be 380,000. But why in the name of heaven should he want 380,000 men when the right hon. Gentleman maintained that under his scheme he would provide for the garrisons and the defence of the country with 214,000 regular troops minus his reduction of 37,000? He (Captain Norton) had been at some trouble to get out the figures that would apply to an Army of this size if obtained by conscription, and the cost of 177,000 men would be £12,000,000. The right hon. Gentleman stated that the non-commissioned officers would be paid Army rates, and then he would have to provide 1s. a day for the men; but the right hon. Gentleman knew perfectly well that in countries where the Army was obtained by conscription, where the people were bound to serve, they were paid practically nothing. This meant a further reduction of at least £3,000,000, consequently, the cost would be only £9,000,000. Therefore it was not fair to the country to lead them to believe that if this country was prepared to do that which Switzerland and other countries did, it would be more costly. The great difficulty we had to deal with was the question of recruiting. It might be said, in dealing with this liability of the manhood of this country to some form of service, that we might lose from an industrial point of view; but the opposite was the case. It had been found by the insurance companies of Berlin that the men who had given their time to the service of the country lasted five years longer than those who had not been through the service. The result, therefore would be a gain of three years of industrial life. It was not fair to place this question before the country in any but its true light. One specific and definite Question he would like to put to the right hon. Gentleman. When was the new scheme with regard to recruiting to come into force? As to recruiting, the total number required for the home and general-service Armies was 34,500. In a normal year the country would provide about 40,000 recruits, of whom a large proportion were below the proper standard of physique. The alteration in the terms of enlistment really constituted a new gamble in recruiting. There was no reason to believe that men would come forward for foreign service any more readily for nine years than for seven or eight years, because not only was nothing additional offered, but the men were to be taken at a higher age, and were to be physically sound. The physical condition of recruits had a distinct bearing on the question. A high authority had computed that during the last decade 60 per cent. of the men who presented themselves for enlistment were rejected, and that of the men accepted 37·6 per cent. were either rejected within three months of enlistment or were discharged for inefficiency in two years. A larger number than usual had been cast for various diseases during the last nine years, and in Manchester alone no fewer than 49 per cent. of the men presenting themselves had been refused. If the right hon. Gentleman took 34,500 recruits, he would have difficulty in getting 20,000 of the class he required from them, which was not much over half the number he wanted. This matter of recruiting was the basis of the whole question. As his view was borne out by two high military authorities whom he had consulted, he thought the right hon. Gentleman was hardly justified in throwing so much cold water on the scheme suggested by the Royal Commission. The Militia, he believed, had much to complain of. The cause of the depletion of the Militia was the abominable manner in which it had been treated. It had been squeezed absolutely dry. It gave 2,000 officers and 54,000 men to the Regulars during the late war, it sent seventy battalions to South Africa and the Mediterranean, and now that the force had been ruined hard things were said about it. So far as the Volunteers were concerned, he believed the result of this amputation would be to cause a shock to the constitution of the Volunteer force as a whole. The division into two classes would create friction in every corps throughout the country. What the members of the force required was sympathy and consideration in reference to their ordinary avocations, whereas under the proposed scheme many of the very best men would be crushed out of the force. Of the 448,000 men who soldiered in South Africa, 200,000 came from the Auxiliary Forces, and the Volunteers alone supplied 20,000. He therefore thought it would be a fatal mistake to destroy the units in the manner proposed. So far as the broad outlines of the scheme were concerned, he was thoroughly with the right hon. Gentleman, but he would venture to suggest one or two remedies for certain difficulties which would be encountered. A considerable reduction in the Regular Army might be effected if the coaling stations were handed over to the Admiralty, who could man them much more effectively and at the cost of far fewer men. Then it was monstrous that this country should be called upon to furnish 21,500 men for South Africa at an expenditure of £1,360,000 more than they would cost to maintain in this country. There wan no more unpopular station than South Africa. The soldiers there had none of the amenities which they enjoyed in England, they were stationed at great distances from towns; liquor of all sorts was excessively dear; and the men had to discharge duties for which they received only one-third of the pay given to other people to do the same class of work. The British soldiers had had enough of South Africa. Why should not that country do the same as Ireland, which not only supported its own constabulary but bore its share of the cost of the Army? As to the long-service Army for India, there was no reason why the right hon. Gentleman should not get the men he required if he would give them 6d. a day deferred pay, so that they would get a pension after fifteen years service, increasing in amount the longer they were able to serve as effective soldiers. Recruiting at home would doubtless be assisted if a certain number of men of good character were allowed to sleep out of barracks. From the point of view of the physique of the manhood of the country, nothing was more desirable than that physical exercises should be taught in the public schools.
Not on the Army Estimates,
agreed. He was simply throwing out the suggestion as one which would improve the physique of the youth of the country. The right hon. Gentleman would also be assisted in the getting of recruits if he would take boys as they were taken in the Navy, so that on reaching manhood they should be bound for twelve years. The life of the soldier in India would be made more comfortable if he was quartered more than at present in the hills. With regard to the Volunteers, if something like £12 instead of £9 were given the force would be largely increased, and in time of need could be drawn upon for a large proportion of men of fine physique, who in a very short time would be able to take their place in the field.
congratulated the Opposition on possessing so eloquent and able an advocate of the policy of compulsory service as the hon. Member for West Newington had just proved himself to be. Having always felt that we should ventually be driven to some such system to enable the necessary men to be obtained, he had listened with pleasure to the speech of the hon. Member, and he had never heard the reasons in favour of conscription more clearly stated. But his purpose in rising was to refer to that branch of the service with which he was connected, viz., the Militia. There was so much that was good in the general scheme of the Secretary of State that all Army reformers must wish him well in the great work he had undertaken, but he could not say that the right hon. Gentleman's proposals with regard to the Militia were sound, good, or likely to he to the advantage of the Army or the country. The Militia had not been treated fairly in the matter. If the force was absolutely inefficient, by all means let the right hon. Gentleman say so and let it be abolished. But what the right hon. Gentleman said was. "I am going to maintain and improve you; I am going to boil you down to thirty-three battalions; I am going to put you in a better position." As a matter of fact, under the scheme the existing force might be boiled down to thirty-three home service battalions; in that sense its identity would be preserved, but it would not be preserved as Militia. The conditions of service would be so different that the country would not get the Militia, but something altogether changed. Instead of getting officers who joined their county Militia because they liked to serve in a battalion with which possibly their family had been connected for generations, they would get a force consisting of ten so-called Militia officers, not belonging to the regiment which they regarded as their own, but attached to a regiment merely for a month's training, and coming in a position of inferiority to the officers who served all the year round. The actual effect of the right hon. Gentleman's proposals would be to abolish the Militia and increase the Line battalions. That might be a good or a bad scheme, but he had always understood that the great use of the Militia was that they were able to go out in time of emergency as complete units. It the South African War Lord Roberts was enabled to send to the front a tremendously powerful force, and to place in the fighting line practically the whole British Army, simply because the Line battalions had been freed from garrison duty in England, to a large extent in the Mediterranean, and also on the lines of communication, by the embodiment of nearly 100 battalions of Militia which were able to go out as units. In addition to that the Line battalions in nearly every case drew largely from the Militia and the Militia Reserves. We hoped never again to be confronted with so great a national emergency, but it might happen, and then where would the regiments come from to garrison the forts at home, in the Mediterranean, and to play the part which the Militia played in the South African War? The Militia had always stood behind the Line. It might not have been a very glorious part, but it had been a most useful part, and the country would be running a grave risk if they got rid of that force, which in every national emergency had done its duty and enabled the Line to do its duty far more effectively than it could otherwise have done. The Militia were told that they were to be transformed out of recognition because they were inefficient. He thought the Report of the Royal Commission dealt very hardly with the Militia. Nobody ever suggested that Militia battalions which had trained for only one month should, before they had been embodied for some weeks, be sent abroad to meet a foreign foe. They were a large force of willing officers and men, ready to do their best, and who, after three or four months embodiment, rapidly became thoroughly efficient. They had received very hard treatment at the hands of the War Office, their best officers had been taken away, and they had had most restricted opportunities of learning their work. Let there be a large reduction of the Militia establishment to bring it down to recruiting capabilities, let the Militia have encouragement from the War Office which it never had, let there be more training and field exercise, and, with compulsory musketry practice in addition, the force would be as useful as it had been in the past. He had confined his criticisms to the particular proposals of the Secretary of State for War, but he did not think it was right that hon. Members should confine themselves to criticism and make no suggestions in regard to remedies. He understood that the proposals of his right hon. friend had not really received the sanction of His Majesty's Government, and that they had only been put forward for discussion. There were three things which they might do with regard to the Militia. In the first place, they might leave it as it was; secondly they might adopt the plan of his right hon. friend which involved transformation out of all recognition; and in the third place they might reduce the establishment. The Militia establishment at the present moment was a ridiculous one, and bore no relation in the different districts to the recruiting capabilities of those districts. In some places they had eight companies where it was impossible to raise more than four; whilst in some other districts the establishment was exceeded. He would suggest first of all a large reduction in the establishment of the Militia. Let the establishment he cut down to what could really be got in the way of recruits. He would suggest that they might amalgamate many of the districts, and reduce the existing number of battalions to sixty or seventy of 600 or 700 men each. The Militia should be treated less as the feeding-bottle of the Line and more as a force to be maintained on its own account. The present system of training was much too short. He did not see why every Militiaman should not be compelled to do his musketry training at the nearest range on so many days each year, so that the whole of his month's annual training could be utilised for field exercise and drill. He thought that would go a long way towards improving the efficiency of the Militia. He agreed with the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean that the Militia should be enlisted for foreign as well as for home service, and he did not think there would be any difficulty at all about it. If some such proposals as he had suggested were carried out, be believed that they had in the Militia the making of a smaller but a thoroughly efficient body. He thought they were all agreed that any vote which they might give that evening did not imply that they gave their sanction to the scheme. Before any of these changes were made in the Militia he hoped that the right hon. Gentleman would reconsider the whole of this question and consult the Militia officers generally; and he was sure that they would be only too glad to co-operate with the right hon. Gentleman in any scheme which, although it might involve the reduction of their numbers, meant increasing the efficiency of the force. He firmly believed that anything which tended towards the abolition of the Militia would meet with great opposition in the country.
said that whilst exception had been taken to almost every suggestion contained in these proposals there had been a feeling that the intention of the Secretary for War was so obviously sincere in desiring to do something for the good of the Army that his proposals had been treated with greater moderation and leniency than if they had emanated from some other person sitting on the Treasury Bench. The hon. Member for Manchester had suggested that the Committee should place upon record its formal approval of the proposals of the right hon. Gentleman. These proposals carried them back to the suggestions made by the Secretary of State for India three years ago. His scheme suggested the introduction of garrison battalions, but the Secretary for War now proposed to do away with them. The Secretary for India mapped out six Army Corps, but the Secretary for War now proposed to do away with the Army Corps districts and to substitute administrative districts. The Secretary for India created 35,000 Imperial Yeomanry, whilst the Secretary for War had largely reduced that number. If the Committee contrasted the proposals made by the Secretary for India and those now put forward by the Secretary for War they would find that they were diametrically opposed to each other and it was impossible to reconcile one with the other. Unless he had an assurance that the passing of this Vote would not be construed into approval of the proposals of the Secretary for War, he should move the reduction of which he had given notice. The Secretary of State for War told them that none of his colleagues desired these changes to be made. That meant that the Army Council, either in its entirety or by a majority, were against the proposals. The right hon. Gentleman had not been able to cite one single military colleague as acquiescing or giving his authority to the scheme he laid before the House. That was an important point which ought not to be overlooked. He hoped the Secretary for War would give them some information upon this point, to which he attached considerable importance. The Secretary for India told them three years ago that his proposal for a general three years enlistment was "a leap in the dark." He wished to know if the proposal for a nine years enlistment for general service in the Army was any the less" a leap in the dark." What assurance had they got that the results so far as recruiting was concerned would be any the less strange than had resulted from the proposals which they discussed some time ago? He did not wish to labour the point with reference to what had been called "plague spots" in the Army. That was an expression which might very well have been used from the Opposition side of the House, but it was very extraordinary that at the end of the tenure of office by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for India the Secretary for War should refer to the condition of the Army in such a pessimistic way. The right hon. Gentleman had told the Committee that the two mentors upon which he had framed his indictment were the South African War and the Report of the Commission. He wished to remind the Committee that it was not the system of the Army that existed previous to 1899 which broke down in South Africa, but our failure was due to the fact that the Government had deliberately made no preparations previous to the war. They might have been perfectly right from a political point of view, but from a military point of view it was certain that they were absolutely wrong, and we had to pay the penalty for neglecting a precaution which he did not think any other nation would have ventured to indulge in. The Report of the Commission showed, in the first place, that many departments of the Army were served excellently and had exhibited great powers of organisation and development. In the second place the Report showed that the numbers produced by the old system were unexpectedly large; and thirdly that the training was deplorably deficient. In every proposal for the reorganisation of the Army it was essential to remember two things. One was the provision of the necessary numbers, and the other the training of the soldiers. Ever since The right hon. Gentleman's proposals had been before the country he himself had made it his business to ask the opinion and advice of every section of the Army, soldier, officer, non-commissioned officer, Volunteer and 'Militiaman on the proposals of the Secretary of State, and he found a universal agreement that if the Army were left alone to choose, they would almost universally go back to the seven and five years which obtained previous to 1902. He did not know whether the Committee were familiar with the result of that system. In the year ending. April, 1899, the seven and five years, system produced 40,207 recruits, of whom 11 per cent. deserted during the first year. In the year ending April, 1903, which was the first year of the new system, there were 40,339 recruits, of whom 12 per cent. deserted. During the year ending April, 1904, which was the last year of the new system, there were 42,216 recruits and the percentage of desertions was unobtainable. Therefore the old system with lower pay and with worse food and clothing produced within a fraction the same results as the shorter system which was more costly.
But 30 per cent. were "specials" under the old system.
said the right hon. Gentleman was not distinguished for rejecting "specials" when they suited his purpose. He would re-remind the Committee that the physical standard was lowered to meet the exigencies of the war, and it had not yet been restored to the old standard. Under the old system the actual number of men serving with the colours was very significant. On the 1st of October, 1899, there were with the colours 59,000 men, of whom 16,000 had done over five years service,28,000 had done over two years service, and 15,000 under two years service. Of these 25,000 could, if the organisation had been better, have been shipped off to South Africa within a day or two of the declaration of war. All that was wanted was better organisation and mobilisation, but the right hon. Gentleman was now interfering with the supply of the men which had proved adequate to our needs. What would the new proposals produce? The estimate was twenty-six battalions with an average of 800 per battalion, and ten Guards battalions with 800 men each, producing a total of 28,800 men. Not a single man of that total could be moved unless the Reserves were mobilised. The right hon. Gentleman had made much of the fact that this was to be a striking force, but it was no such thing. The thirty-eight home-service battalions would produce at 500 men each 19,000, and that would give a total of only 47,800 men with the colours on the outbreak of the war. The moral of all these figures was that they got not only less in numbers but also a much lower quality of men with the colours than they had before. With regard to the Reserves the old system on the 1st October, 1899, produced 51,000 infantry, and 6,500 cavalry with an average of something like eight years service. He had left out of this calculation the Guards. These Reserves were of the finest quality, and every general who commanded them spoke in their praise, and they were rightly regarded as the backbone of the service. If they added to those 51,000 Reservists 11,000 Militia Reserves then they got a total of 62,000 men under the old system. The Secretary for War had put, the total number of men going from the general-service Army to the Reserve at 23,000, but in the Memorandum issued the other day that number had been corrected to 20,300. They got on an average something like 11,000 recruits yearly, and if every single man passed into the Reserve they would only get 33,000 at the end of that time. On 17th December, 1902, in answer to a Question, the Secretary for India told them that in regard to the men who came into the Army and subsequently went into the Reserve there was a wastage of something like 60 per cent. Taking 33,000 as the possible number of Reserves, at 60 per cent. wastage the number would be brought down to 13,200 as going to the Reserves. The home-service Army of the right hon. Gentleman was to be entirely served, so far as non-commissioned officers were concerned, by men from the long-service Army, and he calculated that he wanted 2,000 a year, or a total of 6,000 for the three years. Therefore that 13,200 had now been brought down to about 7,000. The right hon. Gentleman suggested for the home-service Reserves thirty-eight battalions at 500 men each, giving a 100 each for long service, and sending 200 yearly to the Reserve. That gave a total of 45,600 for the six years, and if they deducted 10 per cent for wastage the total was brought down to 41,000. The net result was that under the old system we got 59,000 men with the colours on the outbreak of war, and 62,000 Reserves, whereas under the new system we only got 47,000 men with the colours and 47,600 Reserves. All they were going to gain by the new system was an infinitesimal reduction in the expense, which upon the most favourable estimate would not amount to more than £1,000,000, and for this they were going to sacrifice this great reserve strength. The Secretary for War had stated that the constant calling up of the Reserves interfered with civil employment. Let them consider how many times in the course of the last generation the Reserve had been called up. They were instituted in 1870, and they were called up for the first time in 1882, and then only 10,000 were called up. They were called up for the second time in 1885 and then only to the extent of 2,000. The last occasion was in 1899, when practically the whole of the Reserves were called up. Therefore it was suggested that they were going to create a very expensive and so-called striking force because it was alleged that the calling up of the Reserve had frequently interfered with civil employment. What was to be the number of the striking force? It was fixed at 15,000 or 16,000 men, but he thought the Committee would be surprised to learn that only four times for thirty-five years had an expeditionary force of over 3,000 quitted these shores. On each of those four occasions it was enormously over the 15,000 men set down by the right hon. Gentleman. What was the moral of that? Surely it was that for a serious expedition a force of 15,000 was too few, and for a punitive expedition too large. What we ought to have was a comparatively small striking force, and behind them there should stand as at the present moment a small special Reserve to come up on occasions of this sort. If that were done we would get rid of the proposed make-believe expeditionary force which could not leave these shores without mobilising the Reserves. A careful and unbiassed examination of the figures of the right hon. Gentleman would show that most of them would not hold water. He begged the right hon. Gentleman before the debate closed to tell the Committee seriously what was the opinion of the Army Council on the subject, whether he could quote any military authority of experience and importance in support of his proposal, and whether it was not the case, that with the best intentions in the world, he was imposing on this Committee and the country proposals which had received no sanction from any military authority whatever.
said he desired to compliment the Secretary of State for War on the great care he had bestowed upon the proposals he had laid before the House. He for one should have been most happy to have supported those proposals in their entirety had it been possible for him to do so, but there were some points he was unable to endorse. He would endeavour in the remarks he had to make to point out the proposals in the scheme which seemed to him not to meet our military necessities. From the speeches which had been made it seemed to be considered that the proposals in regard to the Militia were the weakest in the scheme. Speaking as a Militia commanding officer and also as a former Line officer with many years experience, he thought the remarks made by previous speakers on the Militia were perfectly correct, and he thoroughly endorsed them. He would remind the Committee that the Militia was the old constitutional force of this country, that it dated from the time of King Alfred, and that there was a Militia force in existence before there was any Regular Army at all. Under the present scheme, as he understood it, the idea was to forget this and practically to turn the Militia into a force which would be an entirely different kind of force, to put it in a new guise, in which its old county constitution was to assume an entirely new phase. He admitted that the Militia at the present time was not altogether satisfactory, but he left it to the Committee to judge whether by changing the character of the force they were likely to induce men to engage in it under entirely new conditions of organisation. Military reformers at the present time did not seem to carry their minds back beyond the SouthAfrican War. The services of the Militia in that war were on a par with those which they rendered in previous notable campaigns. A large number of the Duke of Wellington's forces at the battle of Waterloo were composed of the Militia. Great caution should be observed in changing the character of a force which had such ancient and honourable traditions, and which had rendered such great services. But while retaining its present form, it should be possible to strengthen the Militia and to develop its usefulness as the second or supporting force of our Regular Army. He had never considered that one month's training was sufficient to enable the force to perform thoroughly the duties it might be called upon to perform, but at the same time he was bound to say that if seven months training were substituted for this that it would seriously reduce the number of men in the force. The services of the Militia were well known in the country, and in passing from the subject he would only say that no encomium from him was required in that respect, but he wished that the Militia was more appreciated and better treated by the War Office than it had been in the past. There was one remark of the Secretary of State for War to which he wished to refer. The right hon. Gentleman said that whatever system was followed there must be some uncertainty as to the ultimate course to be taken in regard to changes in the Army. That was a phrase which, he thought, the Committee might consider with advantage. It was suggested that we should take an entirely new departure, that we should to a certain extent blot out the broad lines of demarcation between our Military Forces accepted in the past, and take a leap in the dark in regard to the organisation of the future. They ought, if possible, to look for experience to the military past of the Army in order to obtain success in organisation in the future. The counsel which he would offer for the consideration of the Committee might be held to be retrograde, but it ought, nevertheless, to be seriously considered. It was that, having tried a particular course for the last thirty years of short service and Reserves, and that course having entirely failed to meet our military requirements, we should go back to the parting of the ways, where the initial mistake was made, and endeavour to some extent to recreate our Army organisation on the basis on which it was constituted when its military history was the most glorious in the annals of the country. The point in connection with that suggestion was this. Our great difficulty then, as now, was, that we could not get sufficient recruits. It had always been a difficulty in our Army. But in order to get recruits we must adopt a system of service satisfactory to the recruit-giving class, and what we had now to look into was the reason why that class no longer supplied the men we wanted for the Army. He did not mean to say that in the days of long service the recruiting was what it should have been. A Commission sat in 1866 and reported that the system of recruiting was at that time a hand-to-mouth one. We were still in that hand-to-mouth position now, and short service had done nothing to mend it, but in the old days we had men with our battalions, while in these days we had only boys, and when war broke out we had to leave a large percentage of them at home, because they were unfit for service. One reason why we suffered so much from the want of proper men was that the confidence of the recruit-giving class in Army administration had been entirely destroyed by the incessant change of the conditions of service, and when they had grown to know their work they were sent adrift into the Reserves to forget it all. The course he suggests to the right hon. Gentleman was that we should go back to a measure of long service—that a man should be enlisted for at least five years, and that at the end of two years the men who were not likely to make good soldiers should be dismissed from the service. After that the men should be allowed to enlist for a longer period, say ten years, and after that, 50 per cent. of men physically fit and with good characters should be allowed to serve on for pension after 21 years. Short service had been shown not to meet our military needs. The right hon. Gentleman had proposed that the Army should consist of two branches—along-service Army, and a short-service Army. He took entire exception to that proposal. There was no necessity for these two branches if the Army was constituted on a proper system, and the proper system was that the linked-battalion system should be entirely swept away, and the system of single battalion regiments with real depots be adopted instead of it. He was sorry to notice that the right hon. Gentleman in his scheme did not propose entirely to do away with the linked-battalion system, but to retain the cadres for purposes of exchange of officers, and this seemed to be unnecessary and confusing. But in any change now made let our battalions be strong and able to take the field, and let each battalion or unit have its depot at home from which recruits could come as in the past. We did not want large Reserves, but we did want strong battalions filled with well-trained men for our Regular Army, and in reserve a good second force to support them. That Force should be the Militia Force strengthened and improved by all the means at our disposal.
said he desired to dissociate himself from any formal approval of the scheme of the Secretary of State for War as put before them to-night and on previous occasions. Having listened to this and previous debates in this House he was inclined to think that the Secretary of State would have to use his persuasive and whatever didactic powers he might possess on his own side before appealing to hon. Members on the Opposition side to support his scheme. On the general problems of the Army he found himself in general agreement with the Secretary of State. In listening to the Secretary of State he felt that they were emerging from the dark ages of militarism and that they had the advantage of assisting at the renaissance of common sense in Army Questions. It would not be sufficient for the right hon. Gentleman to effect an improvement as compared with those dark ages. The standard by which his success or failure would be judged would be that of the classical period which preceded those dark ages, and therefore he thought the right hon. Gentleman would be well advised if he looked back to the time which he would call the Cardwell era not only for comparison, but also for a system on which he might find a sure foundation for his reform. What were the objects which the Secretary of State had in view. They were, to his mind, efficiency, economy, a small Army at home, and a system under which Reservists did not enter civil occupation, feeling themselves liable to be called upon on slight provocation to leave that occupation and rejoin their regiments. Although the scheme provided for improvements under these heads, there was also a great deal to be said as to where the scheme failed, and that it could not be regarded as an ideal reform. Whatever efficiency might be attained under the scheme, the battalions abroad as compared with the battalions existing to-day would be smaller than they were. There was a reduction in the numerical strength. Another respect in which the scheme seemed to fail was in the Reserve of the general-service Army. The Reserve was extremely small, and without being a military expert, he should say inadequate. An objection to the home-service Army, so far as efficiency was concerned, was that the battalions the right hon. Gentleman sought to create could not possess the number of companies which all military authorities considered necessary to the efficient training of battalions. What about the question of economy? All previous speakers in that debate had lamented that while making such great changes the Secretary of State for War had only been able to effect a very small economy. There was reason to suppose that the economy which was shown in the Paper circulated by him was more apparent than real, and its principal effect was to prevent the natural growth of expenditure under the system we were now suffering from very nearly to the extent to which he claimed to reduce the cost of the Army. The economy that he held out to them, small as it was, was dependent on his ability to reduce the eleven battalions, he supposed, from South Africa. What he wished to know was whether the Secretary of State for War would be able to effect that reduction, and when would he be able to do it. He might hope to be able to reduce them, but he had not indicated to the House how and in what respect he would be able to withdraw them, nor had that step received the approval of the House. With regard to the small home Army, he quite admitted that, so far as the general-service Army was concerned, there was a considerable reduction of the troops to be kept in this country, but the balance was very much against reducing the Army at home, because the Secretary of State was adding to it thirty-three short-service battalions. As to the Reserve, there were to be only 179 to each battalion. That was not a very large allowance, and he felt perfectly certain that when the day of trial came the Reserve would be really in no better position than at present. The mere fact of the reduction of the unit to a figure below the mobilised strength exposed the Reserve to a greater demand than if the units were kept up to strength. The problem, however, resolved itself into a question of recruiting. What reason was there to anticipate that the recruits necessary for the scheme would be obtained? He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would explain in his reply why he was sanguine of obtaining the necessary recruits. He would require 33,000 or 34,000 recruits every year, and very much better recruits than were now being obtained. Nearly half of them were to be over nineteen years of age, and 57 per cent. over eighteen years, and the right hon. Gentleman knew very well that in past years many recruits under eighteen had been taken. When two alternatives were offered to recruits, the one to sign on for nine years and the other to sign on for two years with the possibility of extending, it was very likely that the number who would from the beginning enlist for the longer period would be very much less than the Secretary of State expected. The whole scheme, great as might be its advantages, had given the impression in the House and the country of being stillborn. He agreed with the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean that had it effected an economy of four or five millions it might have succeeded, but it was a serious disadvantage that it proposed to turn the whole Army upside down for a paltry saving of not more than a million. In view of the errors of the past six or seven years he thought they should revert to the Cardwellian system, making whatever modifications and reforms were necessary to bring it up to date. That system produced an Army within 18,000 of the number which the right hon. Gentleman proposed, at a cost of £10,000,000 less. It had produced an Army which enabled us to conquer the Soudan and to send an Army to South Africa greater than ever known in our history. They should go back to that system which had produced such results. The right hon. Gentleman had made a mistake in trying to degrade the citizen Army; he should seek to encourage and improve it. If the right hon. Gentleman were to regularise the Militia instead of territorialising it, he would obtain better results without sacrificing patriotism. With a smaller Regular Army he would have plenty of money to enable him to secure greater efficiency in the Auxiliary Forces.
said that a more varied battery of criticism had never been directed against any Minister and from so many different points than had been opened upon him that evening. He should do his best in the circumstances to reply. He ought to begin by replying to his noble friend the Member for Ealing, because some remarks that his noble friend made would have been in his judgment of great importance if they had been borne out by the facts. His noble friend who had been Secretary for India for a great many years very naturally and rightly took up the case of India awl pronounced a censure upon him which would have been just if the figures on which it was based had been quite correct. His noble friend said we were asking India to undergo a large expense on the faith of receiving a contribution in the shape of a large Reserve, and that we were now withholding from her the Reserve which we had contracted to provide for her. That was an error. The actual Reserve at the present time was 80,000. It must be remembered that the Reserve at present was naturally depleted on account of the late war. The calculated Reserve under the existing system was 121,000. The Reserve calculated under the system which he proposed was 128,000. Therefore, so far from giving India smaller value for her money, India would be furnished with greater value for her money than she had yet received. The noble Lord paid great attention to a point which he seemed to consider very effective. That was that the Army was being cut into two sections—those who would stay at home and those who would go abroad. The noble Lord went on to say that the stars, medals, and decorations would be given to those who went abroad, and withheld from those who stayed at home, and asked how, if they gave no inducements to the men who stayed at home, they hoped to get recruits for the home-service battalions. But that seemed to him to embody a double fallacy. What the noble Lord objected to was precisely the state of things which existed now. The noble Lord also said that all the brains would go abroad. But what about the Brigade of Guards? He did not think all the brainless people went into it. On the contrary, his impression was that it was rather the other way, and he thought it would be able to hold its own with any infantry in the Army. Besides, within a recent date there were six very distinguished cavalry regiments whose privilege it was to remain at home except in time of war. But really the fears of the noble Lord were somewhat fanciful. In all these respects exactly the same things would happen in the future as were happening now. Men and officers who wanted to serve abroad would serve abroad, and the men and officers who wanted to serve at home would serve at home. The picture drawn by the noble Lord of battalions enduring penal servitude in India was equally fanciful. Service in India was not so regarded in the Army. The term of service in India for nearly every man who extended now was seven or eight years. He hoped if his proposals were adopted that the term would be much less. Besides, the total number of battalions serving abroad under his system would be less than it was now. A point of great importance had been raised by the noble Lord and others, though he was surprised they should suppose that this importance did not strike him also. Hon. Members had spoken of the question of recruiting, and had asked him whether he had ever considered whether it would be possible to raise 14,000 recruits for general service for nine years. He should like the Committee to consider the real meaning of that criticism. He had this year to find 24,000 men in drafts for India and the Colonies—12,000 men in drafts for India, and the whole of these ought to be men who were serving for seven or eight years. Were the Government proposing any extension of the demand for recruits? On the contrary, they were asking for far fewer recruits. They were asking for 14,000 directly enlisted men to go abroad. The present period of service was eight years; they were asking them to go for nine. A very large proportion of the men who were serving in India at this moment were serving nine, ten, eleven, and even twelve years. They were not asking for more, but less; they were simply opening another door for the recruit to enter in at. At present every recruit, whatever his age and qualifications might be, must engage to serve three years and three only, and at the end of two years he had the option of extending for seven or eight years, as the case might be. During his two years he only got 1s. 5d. a day; that was not the pay of the general-service soldier, but of the short-service soldier. They were diminishing the number of recruits required, and offering to any man who desired the right to extend his service, not after two years, but after six months. If they did not, under the present system of recruiting, get extensions to the full limit they required for India and the Colonies, to that extent their recruiting failed. They were giving greater attractions of pay, and they hoped they should be able to give greater attractions in employment after men had left the service. But it was an entire delusion to suppose that they were imposing any new liability on the recruits by asking them to come forward for general service. No one knew what the recruiting market would produce, but it was fair to predict that if they got ten recruits at, say a shilling rate, they would get five at a rate of 1s. 6d. The power of extension would be just as much open, and they would have added to it the opportunity to soldiers who had reached the age of nineteen, of whom there were far more than the number they required, to get their full service pay at once if they chose to go on foreign service. His noble friend, who had spoken of the quality of the battalions they would send out to India, was under a misapprehension. Could we now find 114 battalions, all a thousand strong, of trained long-service men and employ them in any part of the Empire? Certainly not. When the Army was last mobilised many thousands of men were left behind for whom there was no unit, no officers, no organisation. He had no hesitation in saving that were we able in the event of war to face that war with 114 battalions of long-service soldiers, including the Guards, and with seventy-one battalions of soldiers, all of whom would have had from one year's training and upwards, we should be in a much better military position than we were when we had tens of thousands of soldiers who were left behind on account of their physical immaturity and because there was no organisation for them. The noble Lord made recommendations with regard to the defence of our coaling stations, and he welcomed him as an ally in what he believed to be a most desirable reform. He entirely sympathised with him, and his only regret was that the noble Lord was not successful, when he held office, in inducing the Government to take that view. He believed the noble Lord was quite right in thinking, in spite of what the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean said, that the prevailing Continental precedent might be followed with advantage in this country, and that we might relieve our troops to a very great extent from a duty which, he thought, was not congenial, and which seemed to him a duty which they could not perform with precisely the same efficiency as those who were acquainted with all the varieties of craft that were at sea, with the difference between friend and foe, and all the peculiarities of work done on the salt water. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Walsall talked about the question of recruiting, but he thought that in what he said he was under a misapprehension. Their present difficulty was not with the recruiting; it was with the retention of the men who had entered the service. Recruiting, so far from falling off, was in excess of any recruiting which had been hitherto known. The right hon. Gentleman was, he thought, a little astray, too, in thinking that these men were not likely to respond to an inducement of 1s. 5d. a day. He was rather sorry the right hon. Gentleman said that, because he wanted it to be very widely known that that sum did not represent the pay of the private soldier, and that any soldier on an extended engagement was now entitled to receive pay amounting to 1s. 11d. a day, which, with a very small amount of efficiency in rifle shooting, would amount to 2s. a day. And when they took into consideration the other emoluments he received—the fact that he was well fed and housed, that he was doctored, and that he was provided for in many ways—he was in receipt of a total income which, he believed, compared well with that of many skilled artisans in this country. The right hon. Gentleman made certain recommendations, which he assured him he welcomed, as to future additional economies. He proposed one with regard to the Guards, but there again he thought the right hon. Gentleman was under a misapprehension, because if he would look at the figures of recruiting for the Guards he would find that, though the number of battalions had increased, the total number of men in the Guards had decreased. Therefore a reduction of the battalions would mean a reduction so much larger than he thought the right hon. Gentleman contemplated, that probably in these circumstances he would hesitate to recommend it. He did not say that circumstances might not make it desirable to consolidate the Guards battalions, but he did not think any one would recommend a reduction in the rank and file of the Guards. He thought the right hon. Gentleman did not remember that the establishment of the Guards had been greatly reduced, and the result was that the number of men in individual battalions was very munch less than it was at the time of which he was speaking. The result of a reduction would be, not merely to diminish the number of battalions, but greatly to reduce the strength of the Brigade of Guards from what it was before the ttalions were added. The garrison in Egypt was a political matter into which he did not feel disposed to enter. He should be very glad, from the War office point of view, to withdraw certain battalions from Egypt, and that, no doubt, would give them a reduction of expenditure. He did not agree with the suggestion that the Yeomanry might be reduced with advantage. He thought we got about as good value from the Yeomanry as from any branch of the service at the present time. It was perfectly true that the expenditure had gone up per head, and had gone up in excess of the number of men, but he was bound to say that he thought the Yeomanry of to-day was a far more efficient force than was the Yeomanry of the time of which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Walsall spoke, when the cost per head was much smaller than it was now. With regard to what the hon. Member for Oldham had said with respect to the length of foreign service, unless his anticipations were much belied, the soldier would spend less time in India than he did at the present time. The hon. Member for Oldham would see on reflection that a soldier would hardly ever spend the whole of his time in India, especially when they remembered that it would be possible, and it was their intention, to move a battalion, as a battalion, from one quarter to another. The hon. Member for Tunbridge spoke about the force with which he had such a distinguished and honourable connection—the Militia. He hoped he had made it clear that it was his desire and hope to enable the Militia to continue to give the valuable service that it had hitherto rendered, and even more valuable service. The hon. Member's battalion was an example of what might be done by the application of the principle of concentration coupled with efficiency, because, if he remembered rightly, the battalion of which the hon. Member was an officer, was an example of two battalions which were unable to support an independent existence, but which by concentration had obtained greater efficiency. Therefore, he regarded the hon. Member and his battalion as allies rather than as opponents in this matter. An hon. Member seemed to associate him with the opinion that the Volunteers were a negligible factor, and not one to be regarded with sympathy by the War Office. He certainly thought that he had committed himself as deeply as any one in his position could do to the opinion that the Volunteer force contained within it the most valuable military material that we possessed. He adhered to his opinion that there was a large amount of redundant material in the Volunteers, but side by side with that material there was some of the finest military material that we possessed. When it was borne in mind that it was part of his proposal to give larger funds to those Volunteers whom they desired to maintain he did not think there was much to complain of. The right hon. Baronet the Member for the forest of Dean had referred to the Swiss Militia. He knew it was an excellent force, but he was reluctant to assume that there was any analogy between the Swiss Militia and our Militia. The Swiss Militia was the conscript and only force of probably one of the best educated nations in Europe. It was charged with the defence of a country whose geographical circumstances were unique in Europe. He would, however, point out that never since the battle of Sempach had Switzerland, despite its geographical features, ever been held against an invading army—invading army had passed through Switzerland like a hot knife through butter. Although he was the first to recognise the excellence of the Swiss Militia, if any one told him that our Militia battalions as they were now, or as they were likely to be forecast they could reasonably make, were the analogue of the Swiss Militia, then he must respectfully contradict him. Moreover, he ventured to believe that there was not a single member of the Swiss War Office—and they were very capable officiers—who would pretend that he could take the Swiss Militia, organised as it was, and put it into the field against a foreign army out of its own country; still less that he would send it to fight battles in a country across the sea. That was our problem—it was not the Swiss problem: whether with a conscript army or a volunteer army, efficiency could only be obtained by thorough training. Those who had read the interesting story of the 93rd Highlanders by the late Sir John Ewart in his "Story of a Soldier's Life," would recognise to what a state of efficiency a battalion could be brought, organised, and led by its own officers, and would understand that it was a work of months or years. We deceived ourselves if we thought we could fight the manhood of a great nation with anything less than the manhood and education of our own. Therefore, he was sceptical when he heard it suggested that we could rely on men selected as our Militia were and trained for a month. The right hon. Gentleman the member for Fife disclaimed all responsibility for what might be done by the War Office, and he was not surprised. Since he had had anything to do with the administration of the Army he had not found it easy to get anyone to take responsibility. He felt himself that this responsibility must be assumed by some one. The days in which we lived were critical days, and from his own knowledge he believed—he did not know if he had succeeded in imparting that belief to others—that this was the time when we must be doing something. He had put before the House over and over again what he thought to be the evils the Army was suffering from, and he did not believe there was a dissentient voice; there was practical agreement among officers and civilians. He had put before them the broad lines of his policy, a policy he had been able to collate from the wisdom of those who could give him the best advice on Army matters for remedying the evils, and they had agreed that the character of the Army must be altered, that expenditure must be reduced, that it must be an Army practically for service abroad, that the numbers at home must be diminished, that the quality of the troops on which we were to rely must be improved; and up to that point he might say there had been universal agreement. Then he in his position had to go a step further and to try to give practical effect to this unanimity of opinion. He had made the suggestions of which the Committee were well aware, and criticisms had been passed upon them; but he desired to call attention to the fact that, apart from small matters such as had been recommended by the right hon. Baronet, there had not been a single substantive suggestion during the whole course of the two days debate; not one single suggestion made of a scheme by which those radical defects he had described could be remedied. Therefore, though he did not desire to press upon hon. Members a greater responsibility than they wished to bear, he did, at any rate, ask that they would give to one who had the responsibility to bear the opportunity of trying to give effect—not to his own opinions, for they were unimportant—but to what he believed to be the opinion of those who had studied the problem of the defence of this country and which he had tried to carry out by the suggestions he had made.
said that even after the explanation which had been given by the right hon. Gentleman, many of them on the Opposition side of the House did not believe that the Secretary for War would be able to get the number of recruits he required. That, of course, was a very important point as affecting the success of this scheme, because if the necessary number of recruits was not obtained they would not be able to undo the damage done to the Army by the various schemes of the last five or six years. Many of them believed that the war destroyed and absorbed the Reserve which existed for the time being. The scheme which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for India introduced began to reinstate tint Reserve, but in doing so the efficiency of the Regular Army was destroyed. Now they had a scheme put forward which might set the Regular Army right, but which would certainly destroy the present system of Reserves. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would be satisfied with what he had got, without starting these thirty-three new battalions. When a great scheme of this kind was brought in it was most important that there should be a large reduction of expenditure. Instead of thirty-three new battalions he should suggest that ten would be ample. Certainly there ought to be a larger reduction in the expenditure than £1,000,000. He believed that the Militia would be destroyed by this scheme, but he was not going to press that point now. The right hon. Gentleman said he did not wish to maintain any troops which were not efficient. What about the artillery? The artillery were armed at present with a weapon that fired one shot as compared with eight fired by the guns of other European nations. It was all very well to say that next year something would be done, for they had been told the same thing for the last ten years, and they still remained in the same unsatisfactory position. The right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean had pointed out that the artillery was now and would be next year armed in a distinctly inferior manner to all the civilised troops in the world, and they could not be put in the field against European troops without quick-firing guns. The Reserves had always been looked upon as their second line of defence when the first line was sent abroad, but apparently these new battalions would be sent to India, and there would be no second line to take their place. He thought this scheme was a tentative one which had been brought forward at a very bad time. The Army wanted to feel certain that there would be no further meddling with them, and they did not like this chopping and changing about. That was what they had suffered from during the last few years. He sincerely hoped that this scheme would be further curtailed, and that a larger economy would be carried out. And, it being Midnight, the Chairman left the Chair to make his Report to the House. Resolution to be reported upon Wednesday; Committee to sit again to-morrow.
Cunard Agreement (Money) Bill
Second Reading
Order for Second Reading read.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."
, in moving that the Bill be read a second time that day three months, said the Prime Minister had explained the object of the Bill as being to carry out an agreement into which the Government had entered. That was doubtless a correct description of the Bill, but if the matter were looked into it would be seen that it was hardly a satisfactory reason for accepting without scrutiny a measure with such far-reaching provisions. The Resolution upon which the Bill was based was passed in August last, but it was impossible for Parliament and the country to take in the essentials of so complicated an agreement from the short discussion which then took place. The Prime Minister had always been too fond of this hasty legislation. The Sugar Convention was another instance of the same sort of thing. It was the business of the House to study the terms of agreements into which the Government entered. The Bill was short, but the agreement itself was very far-reaching. Its object was to sanction a loan of £2,600,000 to a private company, the capital of which was not so large as the proposed loan, to enable the company to buy two ships for its own exclusive use. That was an extraordinary provision. Then the interest on the loan was to be 2¾ per cent. But the company could not borrow money at anything like that rate, and the Government itself would have to pay from 3 to 3½ per cent. Why should the Government pledge its credit and borrow money at a higher rate than it charged the company? Moreover, a huge annual subsidy, amounting to £250,000, was to be paid to the company, and whether the ships were lost at sea or captured the subsidy was still to be paid. In addition, the company were to receive a mail subsidy of £68,000 a year. A further provision gave the company a number of small pickings, and the whole of these onerous conditions were to be binding for twenty years. There were also other provisions enabling the Government to buy the ships at an extravagant price, and fixing the rates at which it could have the ships if necessary. The total amount of money to be paid to the company in the twenty years was no less than £6,966,000. He Protested against the House being hustled into such an agreement, under which this large sum was to be paid for practically no services whatever. Two Government Departments, the Admiralty and the Post Office, were involved in this agreement. He submitted, however, that if the agreement had been entered into for the defence of the country it should be dealt with by the Admiralty exclusively, while if it was a Post Office matter it should come up on the Post Office Estimates with the other mail contracts. The ships were to be capable of a speed of twenty-four and a half knots, but since the agreement the Government had arranged for the building of eight ships with a speed of twenty-five knots. What use, therefore, would these particular ships be? The eight scouts which the Government had arranged for would do the work much more effectively, and at less cost, and in a more regular way. That proved that the agreement had not been properly thought out. One of the most remarkable aspects of the case was that the ships were to trade not with our own Colonies but with a foreign country. Why should we pay this huge sum annually simply to establish a better service with the United States? The principle of the agreement was thoroughly unsound. The recent Subsidies Committee advised the Government to hesitate before giving any more of these naval subsidies, and the Admiralty, acting on that advice, had decided to abandon many of the subsidies they had hitherto paid. No satisfactory defence of this proposal had been made; the agreement bristled with onerous conditions; it would set an extremely bad precedent; and the least that could have been done was to have allowed more competition in the matter. He hoped that even at this late hour the House would reconsider the question. The Government having chosen to adopt an abnormal method of procedure, had no right to expect their difficulties to be considered for a moment and the House should hold itself perfectly free to pronounce any decision it chose with regard to the merits of the agreement. He begged to move.
, in seconding the Amendment, said that, although the principle of the Bill had been discussed on two occasions after midnight, he had not yet heard a single good reason put forward on behalf of the Government to show why on its merits this measure should be passed. All the House had been told was that they had already assented to the principle, and that therefore they ought now to accept the measure. That was not a fair argument. The preliminary stage passed in August of last year did not in the least bind the House. The Cunard Company knew very well that the agreement could not be carried into effect until a Bill had been passed through Parliament; consequently they were fully aware that the preliminary Resolution was not in any way binding. The Government might very well say that they, as a Government, were bound to do their utmost to pass the Bill, but the House as apart from the Government were absolutely free to discuss the question on its merits, and if they came to the conclusion that the Government had made a blunder the best thing that could be done for the country was that they should refuse to sanction the agreement. It was idle to say that the £2,600,000 was to be repaid. The Government would indeed receive £165,000 per annum in the form of sinking fund and interest, but they had to pay a subsidy of £150,000, and the difference of £15,000 was more than made up by the excess of the rate of interest they would have to pay over the rate at which they would lend to the company. As a matter of fact, the country would be £2,600,000 to the bad on the whole transaction, and he submitted that that was not such an agreement as the House should sanction. If all the great shipping companies were to have this example held up to them and were able to do this by a mere threat, millions of money would be extracted from the British Government and all security for economy in the future would vanish. He begged to second the Amendment.
Amendment proposed—
"To leave out the word 'now' and at the end of the Question to add the words 'upon this day three months.'"—(Mr. Lough.)
Question proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."
said that this was a naval subsidy pure and simple,and would appear in the Naval Estimates. It was given only on the ground of exceptional ocean-steaming speed, as recommended by the Shipping Subsidies Committee. It was the measure of the loss which this company expected from running these two high-speed vessels for commercial purposes. That was what it substantially amounted to. The steamship company were responsible for the building of the ships and for producing a speed of twenty-four and a half knots, and the company took the whole of the risk. The House had definitely approved the agreement, and thereupon the company had ordered the ships which were now being built, one on the Tyne and the other on the Clyde. With regard to the point raised by the hon. Member for Islington, he wished to remind him that a speed of twenty-five knots an hour in vessels of the scout class was a totally different thing to the continuous ocean speed required in these ocean steamers. The reason why it was necessary for this country to have vessels of this character was hat there were existing several great ocean steamships not belonging to this country which had a speed of twenty-two and twenty-three knots, and in time of war we would have nothing which could compete with them in speed. It was solely to meet that state of things that this subsidy was granted.
said the proposal of the Government was to have two fast vessels. If it was necessary for this country to have fast steamers the Government were not justified in being satisfied with the building of two ships only. If Germany was so much in advance of us, why did we stop with two ships? If the principle of this agreement was correct, why did not the Government begin to build more? Why should we confine ourselves to the ships of the Cunard Company? Were there not other British steamship companies that would gladly build on the same terms? The effect of this agreement would be to give an advantage to one British line of steamers in the Atlantic trade. If the policy was to protect British shipping, twenty fast ships would not be too many if consideration was given to the enormous volume of British sea commerce in comparison with the commerce of foreign countries. Obviously this policy was too limited to do any good. What subsidy did the German ships get? They did not get a penny, and the ships were run on mercantile principles. He was aware that German ships running to other places got subsidies, but those engaged in the service to America did not get a penny. If the German companies could do this as a mercantile transaction, why should not the Cunard Company be able to do it? Nobody would think of going by the Cunard service if they could go by a German line. Therefore, so far as the Cunard Company was concerned, this was an attempt to bolster up one company in order to compete with other British shipowners who were to have no subsidy. He thought that in this matter the Government should not confine themselves to one British company.
said he was interested to hear the Secretary to the Admiralty say that the subsidy was a naval subsidy pure and simple. Did he intend to convey to the House that this was a naval project pure and simple? If that was so it did not tally with the statement made last year by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, who was then at the Admiralty. He stated quite emphatically that this was partly a business arrangement. One of the justifications put forward for the proposal was that it would relieve a state of purely commercial panic, and support was given to it throughout the debate on the ground that the agreement would combine a commercial advantage with a naval advantage. The truth was that but for the Morgan Combine they would have heard nothing whatever about it. The Secretary to the Admiralty had said that the subsidy was a purely naval subsidy. The right hon. Gentleman who was in charge of the Department stated that it was to preserve our prestige on the Atlantic as well as for naval purposes. To come down now and say that it was a purely naval subsidy was to mislead the House. The Secretary to the Admiralty was asked two or three specific Questions with regard to the functions of these vessels. He was asked whether they were to be merchant cruisers, scouts, or despatch vessels. To these Questions they had had absolutely no reply. He doubted very much whether the hon. Gentleman and the Admiralty had made up their minds as to the definite work on which these vessels would be used in future. It was a peculiar fact that at the very time that the Admiralty embarked on this enormously costly scheme, they were wiping out the old merchant cruiser subsidies and they had laid down something like eight scouts, part of whose work certainly might have been undertaken by these two vessels. Now they understood that these vessels were to go beyond the duties of mere scouts; they were to range over a much greater area and to a certain extent they were to do scouting work. He presumed that was so. Did the Secretary to the Admiralty go so far as to say that the new vessels would be used as merchant cruisers?
That is one of the duties which they will be able to perform if required.
said that last year in the Memorandum of the First Lord of the Admiralty that Minister declared emphatically that the use of merchant cruisers was now abandoned by the Admiralty. How on earth were they to square that with the statement that had now fallen from the Secretary to the Admiralty? But, take it on the basis of the statement the hon. Gentleman had made, did he mean to say that the exact function which those vessels were supposed to perform could only be performed by vessels of 30,000 tons and costing £1,300,000 a piece? The cost to the country of running each of these vessels would be £75,000 a year. But the total cost of running a battleship, which we had entirely in our own hands and under our own control and specially fitted for the purpose for which she was required, only came to something like £100,000 per annum.
That does not include repairs.
How much did that amount to? Last year the amount spent on repairs for the whole Fleet was only £175,000. Really, if they took it on the financial basis alone, the Government had made an extremely bad bargain for themselves. The only reply made to the comparison he had offered was that these vessels running in the Atlantic trade would always be running, and therefore they would always be able to get the maximum speed out of them. If that was the case there was something seriously wrong with the Admiralty control if they could not get the maximum speed out of their vessels, whether battleships or cruisers. What they were entitled to know was, "How far did the Admiralty intend to go with the scheme?" Really if it was justified for two vessels it must certainly be justified for four; and if two were sufficient to compete with the German four, what would happen if the Germans in a few years constructed vessels which, instead of steaming twenty-three-and-a-half knots, would steam twenty-five? Would the Admiralty come down and ask them for vessels of twenty-five-and-a-half knots? Then the Secretary to the Admiralty had made absolutely no reply to the charge that in entering the purchase price of the vessels in the agreement, they entered prices largely in excess of the value of the vessels concerned. He understood that the view taken by the Secretary to the Admiralty was that the reason they had to have inflated prices in this agreement, whether for purchase or hire, was that the agreement being compulsory, they must of necessity pay more than if it were voluntary. That was a reasonable argument, but there surely must be limits even to the amount that they would put on compulsory purchase. The amounts put down for the vessels named in the agreement was far in excess of their value at the time it was made, and even if they knocked off the 6 per cent. per annum it was enormously in excess of their value at
AYES.
| ||
| Agg-Gardner, James Tynte | Balcarres, Lord | Bingham, Lord |
| Anson, Sir William Reynell | Balfour, Rt.Hn. A. J. (Manch'r | Blundell, Colonel Henry |
| Arkwright, John Stanhope | Balfour, RtHnGeraldW.(Leeds | Bond, Edward |
| Arnold-Forster,Rt.Hn. HughO | Balfour, Kenneth R. (Christch. | Boscawen, Arthur Griffith |
| Atkinson, Rt. Hon. John | Banbury, Sir Frederick George | Brassey, Albert |
| Bain, Colonel James Robert | Bigwood, James | Brodrick, Rt. Hon. St. John |
the present time. The vessels were estimated at something like £18 a ton on their total tonnage, and no steamship company would ever for one moment believe that the Cunard fleet named in this agreement was worth an average price of £18 a ton, The Secretary to the Admiralty made no reply to that. He had not justified either the scheme itself or the figures contained in the scheme, and the only defence he had produced so far in the House in respect of the agreement was that the bargain turned out to be a hard one for the Cunard Company. What they had to decide in that House was not whether the Cunard Company had made a bad agreement or not, but whether the Government had made a bad bargain; and looked at from any point of view they had made an extraordinarily bad bargain. They had not justified the policy, and they had certainly not justified the figures. He suggested to the Admiralty that this should be the last transaction of the kind into which they should enter. Last year the scheme was brought down for the approval of the House on the 12th August, just before the House rose, and there was no full discussion on it, though, in a matter involving £2,600,000, the Government should have obtained the well - considered approval of the House before entering into a binding agreement. They should not have entered into the agreement out of pure panic, which those who knew more about the details laughed at at the time. The naval justification for the agreement was extremely thin, and he challenged the Secretary to the Admiralty to get up and say that either Sir George Clarke or Sir John Fisher had a word to say in approval of the bargain which he had made.
Question put.
The House divided:—Ayes, 138; Noes; 34. (Division List No. 315.)
| Butcher, John George | Hudson, George Bickersteth | Powell, Sir Francis Sharp |
| Carson, Rt. Hn. Sir Edward H. | Hunt, Rowland | Pretyman, Ernest George |
| Cavendish, V.C.W.(Derbyshire | Jeffreys, Rt. Hon. Arthur Fred | Pryce-Jones, Lt.-Col. Edward |
| Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor) | Keswick, William | Pym, C. Guy |
| Cecil, Lord Hugh (Greenwich) | Knowles, Sir Lees | Reid, James (Greenock) |
| Chamberlain,RtHn.J.A. (Wore | Law, Andrew Bonar (Glasgow) | Renwick, George |
| Chapman, Edward | Lawrence, Wm. F. (Liverpool | Ridley, Hon. M.W.(Stalybridge |
| Charrington, Spencer | Lee,Arthur H (Hants, Fareham | Roberts, John Bryn (Eifion) |
| Cochrane,Hon. Thos. H. A. E. | Legge, Col. Hon. Heneage | Roberts, Samuel (Sheffield) |
| Coghill, Douglas Harry | Llewellyn, Evan Henry | Robertson, Herbert (Hackney |
| Colomb,Rt.Hn. Sir John C. R. | Long,Col. Charles W.(Evesham | Round, Rt. Hon. James |
| Compton, Lord Alwyne | Long,Rt.Hn.Walter(Bristol, S. | Royds, Clement Molyneux |
| Corbett, T. L. (Down North) | Lonsdale, John Brownlee | Rutherford, W. W. (Liverpool) |
| Craig,Charles Curtis (Antrim, S | Lowe, Francis William | Sackville, Col. S. G. Stopford |
| Crossley, Rt. Hon. Sir Savile | Lucas,Col. Francis (Lowestoft | Samuel, S. M. (Whitechapel) |
| Dalkeith, Earl of | Lucas, Reginald J.(Portsmouth | Sandys,Lieut Col.Thos.Myles |
| Davenport, William Bromley | Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. Alfred | Scott, Sir S (Marylebone, W.) |
| Dickson, Charles Scott | Macdona, John Cumming | Skewes-Cox, Thomas |
| Disraeli, Coningsby Ralph | MacIver, David (Liverpool) | Sloan, Thomas Henry |
| Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers- | Maconochie, A. W. | Smith,Abel H. (Hertford, East |
| Doxford, Sir William Theodore | M'Arthur, Charles (Liverpool) | Smith, Hon. W. F. D. (Strand) |
| Durning-Lawrence, Sir Edwin | Majendie, James A. H. | Stanley, Rt. Hon. Lord (Lancs. |
| Dyke,Rt.Hon. Sir WilliamHart | Malcolm, Ian | Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester) |
| Fergusson,Rt. Hn Sir J.(Manc'r | Massey-Mainwaring, Hn. W. F. | Talbot,Rt.Hn. J.G.(Oxf'd Univ |
| Finlay, Sir Robert Bannatyne | Montagu, G. (Huntingdon) | Thornton, Percy M. |
| Fisher, William Hayes | Moon, Edward Robert Pacy | Tomlinson, Sir Wm. Edw. M. |
| Forster, Henry William | Morgar,DavidJ.(Walthamstow | Tuff, Charles |
| Galloway, William Johnson | Morpeth, Viscount | Ure, Alexander |
| Gardner, Ernest | Morrell, George Herbert | Valentia, Viscount |
| Gordon, J. (Londonderry, S.) | Mount, William Arthur | Walker, Col. William Hall |
| Gray, Ernest (West Ham) | Muntz, Sir Philip A. | Warde, Colonel C. E. |
| Green,Walford D(Wednesbury | Murray,RtHn.A Graham(Bute | Webb, Colonel William George |
| Greene, Henry D. (Shrewsbury | Murray, Charles J. (Coventry | Wilson,A.Stanley (York, E. R. |
| Greene, W. Raymond (Cambs. | Murray, Col. Wyndham (Bath | Wylie, Alexander |
| Gretton, John | Newdegate, Francis A. N. | Wyndham, Rt. Hon. George |
| Hall, Edward Marshall | Nicholson, William Graham | Yerburgh, Robert Armstrong |
| Hambro, Charles Eric | O'Neill, Hon. Robert Torrens | |
| Hamilton,Marq.of(L'nd'nderry | Palmer, Sir Walter (Salisbury | TELLERS FOR THE AYES—Sir Alexander Acland-Hood and Mr. Ailwyn Fellowes. |
| Hay, Hon. Claude George | Parkes, Ebenezer | |
| Heath, James (Staffords, N.W. | Percy, Earl | |
| Hermon-Hodge, Sir Robert T. | Platt-Higgins, Frederick | |
| Hope, J.F (Sheffied,Brightside | Plummer, Sir Walter R. |
NOES.
| ||
| Boland, John | Helme, Norval Watson | Slack, John Bamford |
| Brigg, John | Higham, John Sharpe | Sullivan, Donal |
| Bright, Allan Heywood | Hobhouse, C. E. H. (Bristol, E. | Thomas,David Alfred (Merthyr |
| Buxton, Sydney Charles | Horniman, Frederick John | Toulmin, George |
| Caldwell, James | Jones David Brynmor(Swansea | Warner, Thomas Courtenay T. |
| Churchill, Winston Spencer | Jones,William (Carnarvonshire | White, Luke (York, E. R.) |
| Delany, William | Kennedy VincentP. (Cavan, W. | Whitley, J. H. (Halifax) |
| Dilke, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles | Kilbride, Denis | Wilson, Henry J. York, W.R.) |
| Doogan, P. C. | Layland-Barratt, Francis | |
| Elibank, Master of | O'Brien, Kendal(Tipperary Mid | TELLERS FOR THE NOES—Mr.Lough and Mr. M'Kenna. |
| Ffrench, Peter | Reckitt, Harold James | |
| Flavin, Michael Joseph | Roberts, John H. (Denbighs.) | |
| Fuller, J. M. F. | Samuel,Herbert L.(Cleveland) | |
Main Question put, and agreed to.
Bill read a second time and committed for to-morrow.
Capital Expenditure (Money) Bill
Second Reading
Order for Second Reading read.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."
said this Bill was an example of the injury a Chancellor of the Exchequer could accomplish by upsetting the finances of the country. There were two objections to the Bill. One was that it was bad finance; and the other was that it upset the entire financial world by the issue of Treasury Bills at the present period. Immediately the Resolution on which the Bill was founded was introduced, Consols fell to eighty-seven; but when it was' announced that Exchequer Bonds were to be issued, and that only about £6,000,000 would be required, an improvement in the financial situation at once occurred. He would move that the Bill be read that day three months.
, in seconding the Amendment, said it was very desirable that the House should have a clear statement as to the exact position of the floating debt. As far as he could make out, the amounts referred to in the Bill as authorised by various Acts to be raised by terminable annuities, which the right hon. Gentleman now proposed to take power to raise by Exchequer Bonds, represented a total of nearer £28,000,000 than the £10,000,000 recently mentioned. The amount authorised but not vet raised under the Naval Works Act was £14,800,000; under the Military Works Act £10,580,000; under the Public Buildings (Expenses) Act £1,600,000; and there were also various other smaller items. He believed it was a fact that the net result of the borrowing during the current year would be that the National Debt would be £2,500,000 larger at the end of the year than it was at the beginning. That was a very serious condition of affairs two years after the close of the war, and one which ought to make the House pause before granting these extended powers to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He had given the right hon. Gentleman private notice of the Questions he desired answered; therefore it was unnecessary to detain the House at greater length.
Amendment proposed—
"To leave out the word 'now,' and at the end of the Question to add the words 'upon this day three months.'"—(Mr. Courtenay Warner.)
Question proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."
asked whether there was any special reason for Exchequer Bonds being mentioned as the form in which the money should be raised. Exchequer Bonds were extremely unpopular in the City, and were not accepted on foreign money markets. Treasury Bills, on the other hand, were an extremely popular form of investment. On previous occasions the Chancellor of the Exchequer had taken a discretion as to the manner in which he should raise money, and there appeared to be no advantage in fixing Exchequer Bonds as the form to be adopted in this case.
complained of the House having to discuss at so late a period of the session and at such an hour of the night an important Bill involving a totally new policy with regard to capital expenditure. He feared that the enabling of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to raise capital sums more easily would tend to increase the pressure put upon him to incur capital expenditure. In his Budget speech the right hon. Gentleman said he was doing his best to curtail capital expenditure as much as possible, but inasmuch as the amount had been reduced only from £10,000,000 to £9,250,000 his efforts had not achieved any very substantial result. Last year the net reduction of debt amounted to under £1,000,000, but this year there would actually be an addition of about £2,500,000, and, worse still, the £9,250,000 would be borrowed at a higher rate of interest than was being paid on the £7,000,000 that would be paid off. He could only express his profound regret at this large capital expenditure.
said the more he listened to the observations of the hon. Gentleman on this subject the more impracticable appeared to be his view of the situation. Many of the works upon which this capital expenditure was to be made had been in progress for some time, and contracts for their completion had been entered into. Such contracts could not be stopped in the middle simply because, on financial grounds, it might be convenient to postpone the operations. In consultation with his colleagues he had agreed that new works not necessary for the completion of those already entered upon or not urgently required for the defence of the country should not be begun under present circumstances, and the money which he had indicated as the capital expenditure likely to be required during the current year was for works now in progress and for defensive works urgently required. The hon. Gentleman was mistaken in supposing that it would be easier for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to borrow by means of Exchequer Bonds than under the old system of terminable annuities. It was a much more delicate operation, and he had resorted to it only because it was necessary to carry out the will of Parliament as embodied in previous Acts. The Bill authorised the Treasury to raise by Exchequer Bonds any money which they were now authorised to raise under enabling Acts by terminable annuities. The amount which he anticipated would be expended on capital account under those Acts during the present year was £9,250,000, and under the Bill just read a second time power was taken to raise a further £2,600,000 for the purposes of the Cunard Agreement. He could not say the exact amount that would be required for that purpose during the current year, but he did not anticipate that it would exceed £600,000, so that the total to be raised this year would be about £9,750,000 He had reason to believe that from £3,000,000 to £4,000,000 would be available in the ordinary way, and to that extent he would be able to provide for the expenditure by terminable annuities. The balance he proposed to raise by Exchequer Bonds. It was perfectly true that the Bill did not limit the power to raise money by Exchequer Bonds to the current year. The Questions asked by the hon. Member for Halifax in the letter to which he had referred involved a great number of figures, which could be more conveniently given in reply to an unstarred Question. He might say, however, in regard to the price at which recent issues had been made, that the Treasury Bills issued on 2nd July for six months were issued at rates equivalent to £2 5s. 3d. per rent. The Bills issued on the 2nd of July, for twelve months, were issued at an
AYES.
| ||
| Agg-Gardner, James Tynte | Balfour,Rt.Hn. A. J. (Manch'r | Bond, Edward |
| Anson, Sir William Reynell | Balfour,RtHnGerald W.(Leeds | Boscawen, Arthur Griffith |
| Arkwright, John Stanhope | Balfour, Kenneth R. (Christch. | Brassey, Albert |
| Arnold-Forster,Rt.Hn. Hugh O | Banbury, Sir Frederick George | Brodrick, Rt. Hon. St. John |
| Atkinson, Rt. Hon. John | Bigwood, James | Butcher, John George |
| Bain, Colonel James Robert | Bingham, Lord | Carson, Rt. Hon. Sir Edw. H. |
| Balcarres, Lord | Blundell, Colonel Henry | Cavendish,V.C W. (Derbyshire |
interest of £2 18s. 2d., while Exchequer Bonds were issued during the present month under favourable circumstances at £98 13s. 6d., giving a yield in interest of £3 9s. 9d. The hon. Member opposite had suggested that he should provide for these borrowings by Treasury Bills. There were already nearly £29,000,000 of Treasury Bills outstanding, and they had to rely upon them for financing the Exchequer. He did not think that under the circumstances it would be a wise proceeding to issue a larger amount of Treasury Bills, and they were not suitable for a loan which there was no possibility of paying off when the Bill fell due.
said that by issuing Exchequer Bonds instead of Treasury Bills the country was paying 1 per cent. more. If it was worth 1 per cent why issue Exchequer Bonds? In one of his speeches the Chancellor of the Exchequer drew attention to the enormous growth of local indebtedness and he lectured local bodies for borrowing so largely. His opinion was that corporations like Manchester and Leeds would feel ashamed if their credit fell so low that they had to pay 3½ per cent. interest for their loans, because they only paid 3 per cent at the present time. It was rather a significant comment that when the right hon. Gentleman issued Exchequer Bonds he should have to pay a larger rate of interest than the local authorities whom he lectured for their extravagance.
said he did not wish to put the House to the trouble of a division. He had made his protest, and he asked permission to withdraw his Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Main Question put:—
The House divided:—Ayes 129 Noes, 32. (Division List, No. 316.)
| Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor) | Knowles, Sir Lees | Pym, C. Guy |
| Chamberlain,RtHn.J.A.(Worc. | Law, Andrew Bonar (Glasgow) | Rea, Russell |
| Chapman, Edward | Lawrence, Wm. F. (Liverpool) | Reid, James (Greenock) |
| Cochrane, Hon. Thos. H. A. E. | Lee,Arthur H. (Hants, Fareham | Renwick, George |
| Coghill, Douglas Harry | Legge, Col. Hon. Heneage | Ridley, Hon.M.W. (Stalybridge |
| Colomb,Rt.Hon. Sir John C.R. | Long, Col. Charles W(Evesham | Roberts, Samuel (Sheffield) |
| Compton, Lord Alwyne | Long,Rt.Hn.Walter (Bristol, S | Robertson, Herbert (Hackney) |
| Corbett, T. L. (Down, North) | Lonsdale, John Brownlee | Round, Rt. Hon. James |
| Craig, Charles Curtis(Antrim, S | Lowe, Francis William | Royds, Clement Molyneux |
| Crossley, Rt. Hon. Sir Savile | Lucas, Col. Francis (Lowestoft) | Rutherford, W. W. (Liverpool) |
| Dalkeith, Earl of | Lucas,Reginald J.(Portsmouth | Sackville, Col. S. G. (Stopford |
| Davenport, William Bromley | Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. Alfred | Samuel, Herbert L. (Cleveland |
| Dickson, Charles Scott | Macdona, John Cumming | Samuel, S. M. (Whitechapel) |
| Disraeli, Coningsby Ralph | Maconochie, A. W. | Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.) |
| Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers- | M'Arthur, Charles (Liverpool) | Skewes-Cox, Thomas |
| Doxford, Sir William Theodore | Majendie, James A. H. | Sloan, Thomas Henry |
| Durning-Lawrence,Sir Edwin | Massey-Mainwaring, Hn. N. F. | Smith, Abel H.(Hertford,East |
| Fergusson,Rt.Hn.Sir J(Manc'r | Montagu, G. (Huntingdon) | Smith, Hon. W. F. D. (Strand) |
| Finlay, Sir Robert Bannatyne | Moon, Edward Robert Pacy | Stanley, Rt.Hon. Lord (Lancs. |
| Fisher, William Hayes | Morgan,David J(Walthamstow | Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester) |
| Forster, Henry William | Morpeth, Viscount | Talbot,Rt.Hn. J.G.(Oxf'd Univ. |
| Galloway, William Johnson | Morrell, George Herbert | Thornton, Percy M. |
| Gardner, Ernest | Mount, William Arthur | Tomlinson, Sir Wm. Edw. M. |
| Gordon, J. (Londonderry, S.) | Muntz, Sir Philip A. | Tuff, Charles |
| Gray, Ernest (West Ham) | Murray,RtHn.A. Graham(Bute | Ure, Alexander |
| Green,Walford D.(Wednesbury | Murray, Charles J. (Coventry) | Valentia, Viscount |
| Greene, Henry D.(Shrewsbury) | Murray, Col. Wyndham (Bath) | Walker, Col. William Hall |
| Greene, W. Raymond (Cambs. | Newdegate, Francis A. N. | Warde, Colonel C. E. |
| Gretton, John | Nicholson, William Graham | Webb,Colonel William George |
| Hambro, Charles Eric | O'Neill, Hon. Robert Torrens | Wilson, A. Stanley (York, E.R. |
| Hamilton, Marqof(L'nd'nderry | Palmer, Sir Walter (Salisbury) | Wyndham, Rt. Hon. George |
| Heath, James (Staffords.N.W. | Parkes, Ebenezer | Yerburgh, Robert Armstrong |
| Hermon-Hodge, Sir Robert T. | Percy, Earl | |
| Hope,J.F.(Sheffield, Brightside | Platt-Higgins, Frederick | TELLERS FOR THE AYES—Sir Alexander Acland-Hood and Mr. Ailwyn Fellowes. |
| Hudson, George Bickersteth | Plummer, Sir Walter R. | |
| Hunt, Rowland | Powell, Sir Francis Sharp | |
| Jeffreys, Rt. Hon. Arthur Fred | Pretyman, Ernest George | |
| Keswick, William | Pryce-Jones,Lt-Col. Edward |
NOES.
| ||
| Boland, John | Higham, John Sharpe | Runciman, Walter |
| Brigg, John | Hobhouse, C.E.H. (Bristol, E.) | Slack, John Bamford |
| Bright, Allan Heywood | Horniman, Frederick John | Sullivan, Donal |
| Buxton, Sydney Charles | Jones DavidBrynmor(Swansea | Thomas,David Alfred (Merthyr |
| Caldwell, James | Jones, William (Carnarvonshire | Toulmin, George |
| Causton, Richard Knight | Kilbride, Denis | Warner, Thomas Courtenay T. |
| Delany, William | Layland-Barratt, Francis | White, Luke (York, E. R.) |
| Elibank, Master of | Lough, Thomas | Wilson, Henry J. (York, W.R.) |
| Ffrench, Peter | M'Arthur, William (Cornwall) | |
| Flavin, Michael Joseph | O'Brien,Kendal(Tipperary,Mid | TELLERS FOR THE NOES—Mr. M'Kenna and Mr. J. H. Whitley. |
| Gladstone, Rt.Hn.HerbertJohn | Mr.Reckitt, Harold James | |
| Helme, Norval Watson | Roe, Sir Thomas | |
Bill read a second time, and committed for this day.
Dogs Bill
Order read for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment to Question [23rd March], "That the Bill be now read a second time," read, and discharged. Bill withdrawn.
Marine Insurance Bill
Order for Second Reading read, and discharged. Bill withdrawn.
Port Of London Bill
Order for Committee read, and discharged. Bill withdrawn.
Bishopric Of Bristol Bill Lords
Order for Second Reading read, and discharged. Bill withdrawn.
Provisional Order (Marriages) Bill
Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Question [3rd May], "That the Bill be now read a second time," read, and discharged. Bill withdrawn.
Land Tax Commissioners Names Bill
Order for Second Reading read, and discharged. Bill withdrawn.
Site For Duke Of York's School Bill Lords
Order for Second Reading read, and discharged. Bill withdrawn.
Constabulary (Ireland) Bill
Order for Second Reading read, and discharged. Bill withdrawn.
Education (Scotland) Bill
Order for Committee read, and discharged. Bill withdrawn.
Judicature And Development Grant (Ireland) Bill
Order for Second Reading read, and discharged. Bill withdrawn.
Post Office Sites Bill
Considered in Committee.
(In the Committee.)
[Mr. JEFFREYS (Hampshire, N.) in the Chair.]
Clauses 1 to 5 agreed to.
Clause 6:—
said he had given notice of a number of Amendments on the Bill, but as the Postmaster-General had met him in regard to the questions he intended to raise he would not move the Amendments. The Amendment to Clause 6 dealt with rights of way, and although he did not wish to press it now, he would state his objection on a future occasion. Clause 6 agreed to. Remaining clauses agreed to. Bill reported without Amendment, read the third time, and passed.
Poor Law Authorities (Transfer Of Property) Bill Lords
Read a second time, and committed for this day.
Government Ships Bill
Order for second Reading read, and discharged. Bill withdrawn.
East India Revenue Accounts
Ordered, That the several Accounts and Papers which have been presented to the House in this session of Parliament relating to the Revenues of India be referred to the consideration of a Committee of the Whole House.—( Mr. Secretary Brodrick.)
Resolved, That this House will, upon Friday, resolve itself into the said Committee.—(Mr. Secretary Brodrick.)
Public Works Loans (Remission)
Committee to consider of authorising the Remission of a Debt due to the Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland in pursuance of any Act of the present session relating to Local Loans (King's Recommendation signified), this day.—( Mr. Victor Cavendish.)
Navy And Army Expenditure, 1902–3
Committee to consider the savings and Deficiencies upon Navy and Army Grants for 1902–3, and the temporary sanction obtained from the Treasury by the Navy and Army Departments to the Expenditure not provided for in the Grants for that year, this day. ( Mr. Victor Cavendish.)
Ordered, That the Appropriation Accounts for the Navy and Army Departments, which were presented on the 15th day of February last, be referred to the Committee.—( Mr. Victor Cavendish.)
Greenwich Hospital And Travers Foundation
Resolved, That the statement of the estimated Expenditure of Greenwich Hospital and of Travers Foundation for the year 1904–5 be approved.—( Mr. Arthur Lee.)
Whereupon, in pursuance of the Order of the House of the 2nd day of August, Mr. Deputy - Speaker adjourned the House without Question put.
Adjourned at eighteen minutes before Two o'clock.