I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty whether, in view of the fact that in January, 1902, the Admiralty issued a circular C.P. 57/575 to contractors for tinned goods, pointing out the advantages of the patent in the hands of the Maconochie's Solderless Tinning Syndicate, Limited, and the gain, in spite of the syndicate's royalty, resulting from the adoption of this new process, and that, in a circular in July, 1902, the Admiralty drew the attention of contractors to the fact that this syndicate were prepared to supply any Admiralty contractors with the requisite plant for making these tins at once and at cost price, he will give the names of those who form this syndicate.

The Admiralty is not aware of the names of the persons forming the Maconochie Solderless Tinning Syndicate, Limited. The first circular, referred to in the hon. Member's Question, asked the opinion of leading provision preservers as to the advantages claimed by the syndicate for this tin. The second circular asked for alternative tenders for jam supplied in these tins and in ordinary tins.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty, with reference to the Return, Navy (Vessels struck off the Effective List), can he state as to His Majesty's ship "Sultan," completed in 1871 at a total cost of £506,455, and on which £204,913 was spent in raising and reconstructing her after she had been sunk near Malta, as well as £136,521 in repairs during the last ten years, or a total of £341,434, what has been the total sum expended on this ship, whether in raising her when a wreck, or in repairs, since her completion in 1871.

£132,570 of the £204,913 were spent in the ten years covered by column 6 of the Return, and are therefore included in the £136,521 shown in that column. The total sum expended upon the "Sultan" since her completion has been £411,358.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War if he will state how many Highland regiments are quartered in the Highlands of Scotland, the strength of each regiment, the number of Gaelic-speaking ministers attached to these regiments, and whether weekly services are held in Gaelic.

There is one Highland regiment quartered in the Highlands, at Fort George, viz., the 1st Royal Highlanders. The strength of this battalion is 591, all ranks. As regards religious ministrations, all such arrangements are left in the hands of the General Officer Commanding, to whom the hon. Member should apply for the information he requires.

on a point of order, asked if the Secretary of State for War had not been guilty of a breach of Parliamentary privilege in referring the hon. Member for information to the commanding officer of the regiment, seeing that the right hon. Gentleman was himself responsible to the House.

That is obviously not a question of order.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether, in view of the fact that the military authorities in Belfast are at present advertising for some thousand tons of peat moss, he will give an undertaking that, having regard to the abundance of peat moss in Ireland, the peat moss for which tenders are invited will not be imported from Germany.

No restrictions are placed on the source of supply of the peat moss litter. Consideration will, however, be accorded to suitability and price.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War if he can state whether in recent campaigns in Egypt and the Soudan tins of preserved rations, closed in the ordinary way by solder and subjected to exceptional treatment under active service conditions as great or greater than that to which the rations in South Africa recently condemned were exposed, for the most part remained in a sound state; and what proportion, if any, of such tinned goods was it found necessary to destroy during those campaigns.

No special reports can now be traced of the destruction or condemnation of preserved rations during the recent campaigns in Egypt and the Soudan.

Surely it is known whether the supplies generally were satisfactory or whether a large proportion had to be destroyed as in the late war?

It is a long time since, and no reports are available.

I shall draw attention to this matter later on.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War if he can state what proportion of the 1,034,532 emergency rations, and of the 4,537,090 meat and vegetable rations, referred to in the last Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General as destroyed in South Africa, had been closed and insulated with non-deleterious paper by the patent process of the Maconochie's Solderless Tinning Syndicate, Limited, and what proportion hermetically sealed with solder in the ordinary way.

I beg also to ask the Secretary of State for War if he can state what proportion of the 497,125 emergency rations condemned at home and what proportion of the 365,600 of similar rations replaced by the contractor, many of which latter were subsequently found to be unsound, although guaranteed for two years and not sent out of this country, had been closed by the patent process of the Maconochie's Solderless Tinning Syndicate, Limited; and what proportion had been hermetically sealed with solder in the ordinary way.

All tins of emergency rations supplied during the war were hermetically sealed with solder in the ordinary way. Certain tins of meat and vegetable rations supplied during the latter part of the war period were closed without solder, but the number is not known. So far as can be ascertained, about two-thirds of the tins were soldered and one-third were solderless.

asked whether the right hon. Gentleman thought it desirable to refer to General Butler's Committee the question of adopting the one form or the other.

No, Sir. It is not, I think, a suitable matter to refer to the Committee.

asked if the right hon. Gentleman would give the names of the gentlemen connected with the syndicate, seeing that the Secretary to the Admiralty suppressed that portion of his Question to him.

I will endeavour to answer a Question if the hon. and gallant Member will give notice of it.

May I ask whether the contractors paid for the material to replace the emergency rations at Woolwich, whether they were specially inspected, and whether the Government received the money for all material supplied?

Yes; I believe the facts are as stated by the hon. Member.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether it is intended this year to adopt the recommendation of the Royal Commission on Militia and Volunteer Forces, namely, that officers should travel to and from their homes at the public expense when attending training or courses, or called up for duty.

The recommendation in question refers to Militia officers. As stated in the Memorandum on Army Estimates, until the reductions in the Militia therein referred to have taken place it will not be possible to give effect to the principal recommendations of the Commission. It has not, therefore, been found practicable to carry out the recommendation alluded to in the Question.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he has any intention of proceeding with the enlargement of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst; and, if not, whether this will entail the abandonment of the previously arranged scheme for a two years course for cadets.

The Answer to the first Question is in the affirmative. Until the enlargement is effected, it will be necessary to reduce the course at the college from two years to twelve months in order to increase the output.

On behalf of the hon. Member for South Somersetshire, I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he can state the reason why the War Office did not retain in stock instead of selling a short time ago a large number of suits for discharged soldiers, seeing that they are now asking for tenders for 2,000 suits of similar clothing.

The storage room occupied by the stock in question was urgently required for other more important purposes. The hon. Member will understand that the storage accommodation at the Royal Army Clothing Depot is limited.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether his attention has been called to the statement of Mr. F. Eckstein, to the effect that nothing would give the Rand mineowners greater pleasure than to be called upon to fulfil their obligations in respect of the £30,000,000 Transvaal Loan at once; and whether he will, in view of this statement, take steps to issue this loan.

I have seen the statement attributed to Mr. Eckstein, in the report of an interview in a weekly newspaper. I have nothing to add to what I said in this House on the 20th† and 22nd ‡ of March.

Was Mr. Eckstein one of those who agreed to underwrite the loan?

Either he or his firm were included among the underwriters.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies when was the offer made by the Canadian Government to take over the defences at Halifax and Esquimault; what were the terms and conditions of the offer; and when and why was the offer refused.

I must refer the hon. Member to the Answer which I gave on February 27th§ to a similar Question by the hon. Member for East Perthshire, from which he will learn the date and the terms of the offer, and will also perceive that the offer has not been refused.

† See page 554.

‡ See page 825.

§ See (4) Debates, exli., 1299.

I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt were, in the evidence given before the Select Committee of 1902 on Savings Banks Funds, admitted by the Controller-General of the National Debt to be practically a phantom body; and, if so, whether he will recommend the appointment of a Committee to consider the position and duties of the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, and to report whether any, and, if so, what, alterations should be made in the constitution and status of the body with the view of restoring to it the position of exercising control over the national finances.

No, Sir, I am not prepared to recommend the appointment of a Committee for the purpose suggested by the hon. Member. I may add that there is no foundation for the suggestion that it is the business of the National Debt Commissioners to control the national finances.

asked whether it was not the fact that the Commissioners had never met since their appointment in 1862.

I think they met once—in 1864, but I am not quite certain. The work of the Commissioners is carried on by the Controller's Office in frequent communication with and under the direction of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who consults the other Commissioners if he thinks it necessary.

Have they ever met since their appointment.

I think once, but if the hon. Member wants particulars of these meetings and will put down an unstarred Question, I will, if I can, answer it.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury whether he will consider the desirableness of providing for such alterations in existing regulations as will enable Civil servants who have served in the Army or the Navy to obtain recognition of non-pensioned military or naval service on being superannuated from the Civil Departments.

The alteration suggested by the hon. Member could not be effected without legislation, and I do not think that such legislation is called for in the circumstances of the present time.

Then if a man has served until he is eligible for an Army or Navy pension and then joins the Civil Service is he for that reason disqualified for the pension earned in the Army or Navy?

asked for notice to be given.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether his attenton has been drawn to the fact that, under his Licensing Rules, 1904, if the local bench, after objection by a member of the public, reports a licence as not required, the compensation authority at its preliminary meeting may decide forthwith to renew the licence without hearing the public objector, whereas the compensation authority has no power to refuse the renewal of a licence at the preliminary meeting, but can only refer it for final decision to the principal meeting, at which the licensee concerned must be summoned to attend; and, if so, whether he will modify his rules so as to secure for the public objector the right to be heard in person by any meeting of justices to which is entrusted the power of renewing a licence.

The hon. Member seems to be under a misapprehension. The compensation authority have no power, either under the Licensing Act, 1904, or the rules, to renew any licence. Section 1, Sub-section 2, of the Act provides that they may, if they think it expedient after hearing parties, refuse the renewal of a licence referred to them. If they do not think it expedient, the provisional renewal granted by the renewal authority under the Act and the rules continues in force. The right of the "public objector" (to use the hon. Member's phrase) to be heard before the justices who have power to renew licences is secured by the existing law, and is not affected by the rules, which I see, therefore, no reason to alter.

Does the licence remain a provisional licence throughout the year?

I should like notice of that Question. If the hon. Member will see me privately on the subject I will give him full information.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether his attention has been called to the pending Bill for incorporating a company, under the name of the Metropolitan Pneumatic Despatch Company, for the purpose of laying pipes for pneumatic despatch under the streets of the county of London; and whether, having regard to the fact that a Royal Commission has under consideration the state of London streets and the best mode of preventing the congestion of traffic, he will oppose the grant of further powers of breaking up the streets and impeding traffic to a private company until that Commission has reported.

May I at the same time ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether, having regard to the number of pipes and wires already occupying the subsoil of the principal London thoroughfares, and the interference with traffic arising from the breaking up of streets, the Government will oppose new and extensive powers of using the subsoil being granted to a private company such as that proposed to be constituted by the Pneumatic Despatch Company's Bill; and whether any communication on the subject of the Bill has taken place between the Government and the London County Council as the main drainage authority, the owner of an extensive system of London tramways, and the central representative authority of the Metropolis.

As this affects my Department, perhaps I may be allowed to reply. I have received representations from the London County Council and the Corporation of the City of London with reference to the Bill; those bodies point out the great inconvenience which will result to the inhabitants of London from so extensive an interference with the streets of the Metropolis as that contemplated by the proposed company. I share this view, and I am unable to see that any advantage for the postal service could be derived from the creation of a system of pneumatic despatch which would counterbalance the grave evils arising from the construction and maintenance of a new and extensive system of underground tubes. I therefore view with disfavour the proposals of the Bill, and am strongly of opinion that no such measure should be proceeded with until the Royal Commission which is considering the question of London traffic has made its Report. I am acting entirely in harmony with the City Corporation and the London County Council in this matter.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether his attention has been called to the statement made by the Secretary of State for Canada in the Senate at Ottawa, on February 22nd, 1905, that the policy of His Majesty's Government in refusing to accede to the repeated demands of the Canadian authorities for a reduction in certain postal arrangements wasextraordinary, unwise, unsympathetic, and unpatriotic; and, if so, what action does His Majesty's Government intend taking.

My attention has been called to the statement in question. The reasons which render it impossible for His Majesty's Government to accede to the request for the reduction of certain postal rates to Canada were fully explained by me recently in reply to a deputation. They are too long to give in Answer across the floor of the House, but I shall be happy to furnish the hon. Member with a report of my remarks. He will then see that there are two sides to this question.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Board of Trade if he will state how many ships of the British mercantile marine are now commanded or officered by persons who are not British subjects.

The Board of Trade have no information showing the number of British ships now commanded or officered by foreigners. The desired information for the year 1901 is contained in Parliamentary Paper, 0d. 1342.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Board of Trade whether he can state what area of land around the English coast has been lost within the last fifty years by erosion, and the approximate value of such land.

I regret that the Board of Trade are unable to give even an approximate estimate of the area and value of the land which has been lost within the last fifty years by erosion around the English coast.

I beg to ask the hon. Member for Chorley, as representing the First Commissioner of Works, whether he is aware that a case concerning the legal validity of the regulations prescribing ten miles an hour in the parks is now under appeal to the High Court; and whether, until that appeal is decided, he will allow the ordinary law of the land to apply and cease prosecutions which may be illegal.

The reply to the first paragraph is in the affirmative. The First Commissioner regrets that he is unable to give any pledge pending the decision of the case.

When is the decision of the High Court likely to be given?

I cannot say; we have no control over His Majesty's Judges or the High Court, but we are as anxious as anybody to get the decision without delay.

I beg to ask the Lord-Advocate if he will state whether any Fishery Board cruisers have been utilised for the purposes of the North Sea Fisheries Scientific Investigations; and, if so, will he name the vessels so employed, and state for what period they were respectively engaged.

No Fishery Board cruisers have been utilised for the purposes of the North Sea Fisheries Scientific Investigations.

I beg to ask the Lord-Advocate whether the Secretary for Scotland has yet received a report from the Lewis District Committee relative to the appointment of a medical officer of health for the Long Island; and in the event of effect being given to the suggestion, will arrangements be made for the new officer to be responsible to the Local Government Board direct, and not to the medical officer of health for the county.

The Answer to the first part of the hon. Member's Question is in the negative. With regard to the second part I have nothing to add to the reply given to the hon. Member on March 14th.†

† See (4) Debates, exlii., 1384.

The right hon. Gentleman has not answered the latter part of my Question.

If the hon. Member will look at the reply given on the 14th he will find I have given all the information I have.

I beg to ask Mr. Attorney-General for Ireland, with reference to the case of the absconding rate collector in Newry, whether he has ascertained that Livingstone, as sole executor of the will of the late Francis Fearon, received over £900 of trust money; that instead of investing this money in the names of the beneficiaries he invested part of it in his own name in the Carlingford Steamship Company and in the Dundalk and Newry Steamship Company; and that he subsequently sold these shares and embezzled the proceeds as well as the balance which he had not invested; if so, whether he can state why the Crown held that these facts did not afford sufficient reason for applying in Canada for the execution of the warrant issued against him in Newry; and whether, in view of the fact that he subsequently embezzled the funds entrusted to him as rate collector, he will state whether steps will now be taken to enforce the warrant issued in the case.

I have already explained to the hon. Member that a prosecution in such a case as this can only be instituted with the consent of the Attorney-General, and that my fiat was never asked for or obtained before the warrant was issued; that Fearon and his solicitor were informed what legal evidence should be furnished before any action could be taken to have Livingstone brought back to this country; that no such evidence has ever been furnished, and no legal evidence ever tendered to prove any of the several statements of facts mentioned in the Question. The absence of such evidence is the reason why the Crown have not taken any action. The Newry Urban Council complained to the police that Livingstone had appropriated a large sum of money belonging to them, but refused to have any information sworn in support of that charge, preferring to sue his sureties in a civil Court, which they have done. The Answer to the last query is in the negative.

Why did not the police inquire of the local authority? Is there any doubt whatever as to the facts mentioned in the Question?

The urban council refused the information, and before the Attorney-General can authorise a prosecution he must have evidence before him sufficient to justify his sanction being given.

If evidence is now laid before the right hon. Gentleman will he apply for this man's extradition?

If proper evidence is laid I shall be only too happy to take the necessary proceedings.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland how many English and how many Scotch people are employed in Ireland by the Irish Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction, and what is the gross amount of salary paid to them; and whether, in the making of future appointments, the Department will take into consideration the claims of Irish candidates to employment in their own country.

The Department have no record of the nationality of the members of their staff. In making appointments the Department endeavours to secure the services of those who, in their opinion, are best qualified for the discharge of the particular work required.

Will the right hon. Gentleman, in answering a Question of this kind, try to give us facts. It is scarcely respectful to answer the Question in the way he has done. Everybody knows the nationality of these men.

I gave the Answer in precisely the same form as I should have done had it been addressed to me at the Local Government Board Office. I said the Department have no records. That is the case.

Who was that Answer prepared by, was it by Sir Horace Plunkett, who ought either to be in this House to answer Questions or to resign. It is a fallacious Answer. [Cries of "Order."] Yes, it is fallacious.

The hon. Member is not entitled to comment on the Answer.

I am commenting, Sir, on the conduct of those who by calling me to order are seeking to usurp your position.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether the cost of administration of the Public Loan Fund Board of Ireland is derived wholly or in part from the profits derived from the compulsory purchase of stationery by local loan fund societies from the Loan Fund Office in Dublin Castle; and, if so, will the Government take the necessary steps to abolish this monopoly and to defray the cost of administration of the Public Loan Fund Board out of the Imperial Treasury.

The expenses of administration of this Board are derived in part from the sale of promissory note and debenture forms, under the authority of 6 and 7 Vic., cap. 91, Sec. 46, and 35 and 36 Vic., cap. 17, Sec. 2. The Government are in no way responsible for the administration of the Loan Fund Board. The reply to the second inquiry is in the negative.

Is not the purchase of the stationery compulsory under the statute?

I ought to have notice of that Question. I can only give the facts as they reach me.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that the Department of Agriculture in Ireland has requested the secretary of the County of Donegal Committee of Agriculture and Technical Instruction to prepare a map of county Donegal, showing the residence of each entrant under the Farm Prize Scheme, 1905; and, if so, will he state for what purpose such a map is considered necessary; and whether, in view of the trouble and cost that the preparation of such a map would involve, he will say from what fund such expense would be defrayed, and direct that the information given in the entry forms shall be used to enable the officials of the Department to locate the competitors.

Yes, Sir. The map is required for the convenience of the itinerant instructors in agriculture, who are supplied free of cost to the county, to act as judges under the scheme of prizes for cottages and small farms. The only expense would be the cost of a county index map, viz., 2s. 6d., which would be defrayed out of the administrative expenses of the scheme. It is apprehended that but little trouble would be involved in marking on the map the approximate location of competing holdings.

Is not this map rendered essential owing to the ignorance, of the itinerant instructors?

Order, order! I must ask the hon. Member to refrain from commenting on the Answers.

It is the only chance one has.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he has received a copy of the resolution adopted by the board of guardians of Galway Union at their meeting, held on 22nd instant, protesting against the new rule, No. 127b, issued by the Board of National Education, Ireland, complaining that the enforcement of this rule would mean the withdrawal from their schools of the male assistant teachers of Ireland, and asking for the withdrawal of the rule in question; and, if so, what action does he propose taking in the matter.

The resolution has been received. I have already stated that the Commissioners will specially consider any case in which the enforcement of the rule would lead to the disemployment of an assistant teacher.

Will the Commissioners consider the propriety of withdrawing the rule altogether in view of the objection raised to it?

I have stated they are not inclined to do that, but they will consider individual cases.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether his attention has been called to a letter of Mr. John McGlinchy, dated March 6th, instant, sending to the Local Government Board a petition signed by 220 ratepayers in the Castlederg and Killeter No. 2 Dispensary District of Castlederg Union, North Tyrone, relative to the place of residence of the medical officer, and complaining that his residence is on the bounds of the district, which imposed on many of the destitute poor when requiring medical aid the necessity of travelling up to twelve miles in all weathers for the purpose of obtaining it; and, if so, will he take the necessary steps to obviate this, and insure that the medical officer may take up his abode in a central position in his district which will be reasonably accessible to all the poor inhabitants who are entitled to medical aid.

The petition did not allege that any hardship to the sick poor had resulted from the position of the medical officer's residence. The officer in question has complied with the terms of his appointment by residing within his district, and the Board see no reason for interfering in the matter, upon the facts at present before them.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether the Estates Commissioners have taken any steps to effect the reinstatement of Messrs. David and Daniel Loughnan, Kilmurry, Cordal, Castleisland, county Kerry, whose holdings have been lying derelict since the time of their eviction; and, if not, when the Commissioners may be expected to take such steps in the interest of the evicted tenants.

Applications for reinstatement have been received, but the estate concerned has not yet come before the Commissioners.

But having regard to the fact that these farms are derelict, cannot the right hon. Gentleman instruct the Estates Commissioners to enter into negotiations with reference to them?

It is not the intention of the Irish Government to interfere with the order in which the Estates Commissioners deal with applications.

But these are derelict evicted farms and they could move quickly.

They are perfectly competent to deal with these cases themselves.

I think they are perfectly incompetent.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether the report of the inspector in the case of the Caldbeck Estate, Ballacolla, Queen's County, has yet been considered by the Estates Commissioners; and, if so, can he say what course they propose taking with respect to the distribution of the untenanted land, which comprises half the estate, and for which claims have been submitted on behalf of thirty-four small occupiers in the locality.

The inspector's report is under the consideration of the Commissioners.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether the Congested Districts Boards have yet concluded negotiations for the purchase of the De Freyne Estates in the counties of Roscommon, Sligo, and Galway; and whether he can give the particulars as to price for the different classes of tenancy, the number of tenants, the amount of untenanted land, valuation, rental, and total price.

Negotiations have not yet been concluded.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he can now state when the Chief Land Commission will sit in Kerry to hear fair rent appeals.

It has been provisionally arranged that a sitting will be held at Killarney on June 27th.

Cannot the right hon. Gentleman give a more definite reply?

What possibly could be more definite than the actual date—June 27th.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he can now state when the Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the relations between Trinity College and their tenants will be published; and whether he will circulate the same as a Parliamentary Paper for the use of Members of the House.

The Commissioners expect to complete their Report about the middle of next month. The question of issuing the Report as a Parliamentary Paper will be decided when it is received.

Does the right hon. Gentleman consider "next month" definite?

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether a portion of the Mahon Estate, Ballydonlon, county Galway, purchased by the Estates Commissioners, is to be given to a Mr. Rothwell, petty sessions clerk of Ballinasloe, who was never a tenant on the estate, and who does not live within miles of it, seeing that Mr. Rothwell is already in possession of more than one farm elsewhere.

The purchase of this estate by the tenants was completed in April last, Mr. Rothwell was not one of the purchasers.

I beg to ask the Postmaster-General if he is aware that it is the custom to send men appointed on the telegraph side in Dublin to the sorting office at a moment's notice, where they have to take up duties which they are unaccustomed to; if when employed in the sorting office these men make mistakes, will their want of practice be taken into account when their increments are considered; and, when they eventually return to the telegraph room, will due allowance be made for their absence from the instruments if any mistakes are made in important public messages.

I have no information, but I will make inquiry on the subject to which the hon. Member refers.

I beg to ask the Postmaster-General if he is aware, notwithstanding the statement made by Mr. Kirkwood in answer to the Irish witnesses before the Bradford Committee that in large offices dual working had only to be undertaken during the first few years of service, that officers with over five years service are still employed on dual working in Dublin; and can he say what grounds Mr. Kirkwood had for making this statement when the performance of dual duties was being advanced as a claim for extra remuneration.

The hon. Member has omitted the words "as a rule" from the evidence given by the official witness. It is a fact, as stated by the witness, that "at the larger offices dual working has as a rule only to be undertaken for the first few years of service." The present conditions at Dublin are due to the falling off in the telegraph traffic, which has necessitated a transfer of staff to the sorting office, where their services are required.

I beg to ask the Postmaster-General is he aware that sixteen sorting clerks and telegraphists in Dublin appointed to the telegraph side have within the past few years been repeatedly sent to the sorting office at a moment's notice, and have as a consequence to perform irregular duties; and whether, seeing that such withdrawal from the instrument room interferes with their efficiency as telegraphists, and that public work is endangered when handled by telegraphists out of practice, and, having regard to his condemnation of this system when speaking on last year's Estimates, will he see that it is abolished; and further, is he aware that, although these men have been removed from the instrument room on the plea of surplus staff, since their removal as many as 126 hours overtime were performed in the instrument room.

The officers to whom the hon. Member refers are, under the conditions of their appointment, liable to serve either on the telegraph or on the postal side. Their employment on postal work does not produce the serious results which the hon. Member apprehends. As regards the last part of his Question, I will make inquiry.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury, seeing that candidates for the public service are not allowed to take up appointments unless they have been vaccinated, and that this regulation penalises candidates who have a conscientious objection to vaccination, will he take such steps as may be necessary to enable such candidates to obtain exemption from the rule enforcing vaccination.

I cannot quite understand the use of the word conscientious in the Question. I do not see how anybody can conscientiously object to being vaccinated.

Cannot the right hon. Gentleman understand that I may have a conscience, and in my conscience I may object?

I can understand an objection to being vaccinated, just as I can understand objection to sleeping in an insanitary room; but the objection is not a conscientious one; it has nothing to do with conscience.

I will furnish the right hon. Gentleman with the case of one person who has a conscience.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether the Imperial Committee of Defence will consider the difficulties in adopting any War Office scheme which seeks to group Highland regiments with Lowland regiments, divest them of the kilt, and quarter them with Lowland regiments in the Lowlands of Scotland.

I am told there is to be no grouping of Highland with Lowland regiments, that there is no change to be made as regards their quarters, and that there is no idea of divesting Highland regiments of their kilts.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether he will introduce legislation to enable persons living in towns in Great Britain to enjoy like advantages to those living in agricultural districts in respect of compensa- tion for improvements executed as tenants of lands and buildings held by lease.

I am not prepared to extend our present programme of legislation.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether, in view of recent disclosures in connection with the supply of goods to Government Departments, he will give facilities for passing during the present session through this House the Prevention of Corruption Bill, introduced into the House of Lords by the Lord Chancellor, and which has already been passed by that House several times.

I am afraid that the condition of public business prevents me giving an assurance such as the hon. Gentleman desires.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury a Question of which I regret I have not been able to give him private notice—whether his attention has been drawn to a Resolution standing on the Journals of the House which runs as follows:—"Resolved, nemine contradicente, That, in view of the declarations made by the Prime Minister, this House thinks it necessary to record its condemnation of his policy of fiscal retaliation;" what precedents can be cited in favour of a Government ignoring such a Resolution; if he proposes to ask the House to expunge that Resolution from its Journals, and, if so, when; or whether, if the Resolution stands, he considers retention of office consonant with his public duty or personal honour.

I am sorry the hon. Gentleman did not take the ordinary course of giving me notice of his Question, because if he had done so I would have made myself acquainted with what appears to have taken place last night. At present my sole knowledge is derived from the Question the hon. Member has put to me.

Will not the right hon. Gentleman say if he means to take any step in regard to the Resolution? If he was not here last night, surely he could have made himself acquainted with what occurred through the ordinary channels of information?

I only wish to ask one short and simple Question. Is the right hon. Gentleman still Leader of the House of Commons?

I am Leader of the House of Commons so long as the majority of that House gives me its confidence. If the right hon. Gentleman doubts whether that is the present fact, there are means at his disposal for testing it.

Where were your followers last night?

The right hon. Gentleman has not answered any one of the Questions I put to him; and, if I rightly understand him, he requires notice; and, if so, I will put down the Question for to-morrow.

I have now read the Resolution. What is it the hon. Member asks?

I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he proposes to ask the House of Commons to expunge the Resolution; what precedent he can cite in favour of the Government's ignoring a Resolution which specifically Condemns their official policy; and whether, while the Resolution stands, he considers his retention of office consonant with his public duty or his personal honour.

The last phrase is one that should be withdrawn.

If it goes beyond the limit which Parliamentary language should allow, I willingly leave out the last phrase. I have no desire to go further than the extreme limits of Parliamentary language will allow.

I raise no objection to any language the hon. Gentleman may use. I rate it at its true value. I propose to take no action in the matter. I do not see that any action is required.

said he listened on the preceding night with very deep attention to the speech of the Secretary of State for War, a speech which enabled them to under stand the working of the right hon. Gentleman's mind and of that of the Government, and to appreciate the attitude of himself and his colleagues upon the question of Army reform. The first part of that speech was a clear and emphatic repudiation of the principle upon which all former schemes, for the last forty years, of Army reform had proceeded. The second part dealt with the logical consequence of the adoption of a wholly different basis on which to reconstruct the Army system; while the third part of the speech was an exposition of the difficulties of the situation rather than a declaration of decisions already arrived at, and the concluding portion really was a sort of reconnaissance in order to ascertain the Parliamentary situation and to see how far the logical consequences of the principle adopted could be pushed in dealing with military problems in the House itself. The right hon. Gentleman was justified in endeavouring to discover how far the House of Commons was prepared to accept the logical consequences of the new principle that had been adopted, because no scheme of reform could be carried out unless it secured the assent of the House and of the country, and when they remembered how complete was the reversal of the principle hitherto guiding our Army policy authoritatively laid down by Governments—when they considered that reversal—they were bound to feel that it must take some time before the House and the country could fully grasp the consequences. The right hon. Gentleman was therefore wise to advance cautiously, in order to carry the House and the country with him. That was the state of affairs which the Government had now to face. There had been many voluminous criticisms, in and out of the House, on the action of the Government, and on the action of the right hon. Gentleman in respect to Army reform, but one thing was clear, and that was that the criticism had not been directed against anything the Government or the War Office had actually done. On the contrary, that seemed to have been accepted with great unanimity by Parliament, but the criticism had been directed against what they had not done. No credit had been given for what they bad done, but the right hon. Gentleman and the Government were attacked and scolded for leaving undone the things they ought to have done. When they listened to those criticisms, what did they find? They found that those who were most violent in their attacks had no alternative policy to offer. It appeared to him that this group of critics of the Government policy was very much in the position of the costermonger who asserted, "If you won't let me drive the apple-cart I'll upset it." They were ready to upset the Government, but they could show no alternative policy. Their trumpets blared forth criticism of the Government, but they could not agree among themselves on a practical policy. That was the situation which the Government had to face in the present House of Commons. What had they done so far? They had reconstituted the War Office an undertaking which had appalled most Governments and which every Government had in turn shirked. If they looked upon the history of Army reform, they would find one continued long wail as to the incompetence of the War Office, and yet no Government had had the courage to tackle that question. This Government, however, in a very short time had reconstructed that office and had accomplished a task which previous Governments feared to touch. They had also done a great deal towards the devolution of military administration. They had found them-selves face to face with a situation of extreme danger in respect of drafts for India, and they had made a departure in policy which was full of future possibilities. They had, for instance, come to an agreement with the Canadian Government to relieve the mother country of the cost of the garrisons of Halifax and Esquimault, and he regretted very much that they were called upon to discuss these Estimates in the absence of the correspondence with the Canadian Government on this question, the production of which had been promised. They wanted to know the full effect of that correspondence. The fact remained, however, that these things had been done, and the Government had made essential progress in carrying out principles which had been so long desired by all students of the question of Imperial defence. The causes of the failure of the numerous Army reform schemes which had been brought forward were two-fold—first, proceeding on a false principle, which ignored the influence of sea-power upon military policy; and secondly, the persistent refusal to face the facts of our geographic position and economic circumstances. Further than that, former Ministers had hurried their schemes through in order to avoid the country finding out this mistake. Much waste and confusion had arisen in consequence. But there was another and more modern feature connected with the discussions in this House to which he wished to call attention, and that was that they had a group of hon. Members who had had a few months experience of operations in the field, and therefore thought themselves competent to deal with the full problem of Imperial defence. He did not want to say anything unpleasant, but it seemed to him, so far as the House was concerned, that the South African War had produced a noxious growth of mushroom Napoleons, and that had these exponents of the right way to deal with the Army lived in Germany twenty years ago they would no doubt have condemned Moltke as a slow coach and bustled him along. But the development of a sound policy suited to the military requirements of the Empire was a matter which ought to be cautiously dealt with, they should only proceed with it step by step. He realised that they had to deal with forces created in a totally different condition of affairs, and that that produced a complicated problem which it must take time to solve. Therefore, he would not join with those—and he envied them their youth, eagerness, and impetuosity—who were urging the Government to take a precipitate course in Army reform. It was a testimony to the reality of the efforts of the War Office that they were not going too fast, and he would raise no note of discontent because the Government, having defined the principle which was guiding them, were not sending up balloons and fireworks to catch a passing popularity, but appreciated the full responsibility of the task devolving upon them of trying to adapt existing forces to the true principles which they had accepted. In regard to their general scheme, he must say that he heartily concurred in the decision that whatever else happened, the cavalry and field artillery, who took a long time to create and train, should be kept at a higher standard of relative strength than other branches of the Army which did not take so long to train. He thought it was greatly to the credit of the Government that these most expensive forces were to have this attention, and that they were not giving way to a false cry of economy, but were determined to keep those forces ready for any emergency. He was glad also to see in their policy a clear intention to look closely at the expenditure on the Royal Engineers. The right hon. Gentleman had said that his work in that direction was not completed, and he was not satisfied that the expenditure on that force might not be modified or reduced. For that he thought the Government deserved credit. Then there was another branch of the Army to which he would like to refer, and that was the Garrison Artillery. He would like to point out to the right hon. Gentleman and the House that the arm of the service which had developed most rapidly of late years had been the Garrison Artillery, and the rate of the increase in that force which was now a tremendous charge on the Estimates was due to the collateral position created by disbelief in our sea power. He trusted that his right hon. friend in developing his scheme would remember that, and bear in mind that this large force of Garrison Artillery was created as a necessary corollary to a false principle that an enemy's fleets and armies would be able to move across the sea and attack any place they liked. It was, therefore, an exaggerated War Office notion of naval probabilities which caused fortresses to be created all over the world, and thereby necessitated the increase of the Garrison Artillery force. He presumed the right hon. Gentleman had his close attention fixed upon that point, which required special scrutiny in view of the change of principle in our policy. He did not propose to touch upon naval questions, but allusion had been made by the right hon. Gentleman to the fact that arrangements had been devised for handing over the aquatic defence, to which a large portion of our Army was devoted, to the Navy, and he thought that when the question came to be thoroughly threshed out it would be found that this work might well be undertaken by men in the Navy and Marines over a certain age, and that it could thus be done more efficiently and with greater economy to the country. Then he came to the question of the infantry, to the question of long service and short service. He would not dwell upon that. He agreed entirely in the principle of the policy. Seeing that they had to keep such a very large force abroad during peace he confessed he did not see how they could, out of a necessarily long-service system in peace, create such a reserve as it was necessary for them to have incase of an outbreak of war. It was, therefore, necessary that there should be two classes of service in the Army, long and short. He must express his personal regret that the scheme of short-service battalions had not been based more largely on the Militia. It was a matter of opinion, no doubt, but he thought himself that had the Secretary of State, instead of creating entirely a new system of Regular short-service battalions, built one up upon the Militia system, ho would have found less opposition in the country and in Parliament. He himself felt somewhat uncertain as to whether the Militia had altogether been sufficiently recognised as the basis on which to build up the short-service system which really was the nursery of Reservists. He did not pay much attention to arguments founded upon the present relative value of Militia battalions to one another, because since the districts were originally arranged there had been a considerable redistribution of population which had altered the possible conditions of strength and efficiency. If the right hon. Gentleman had proceeded to re-allocate the Militia according to the distribution of the population he would have had a broad Militia basis on which to develop his short-service battalions He was glad to think the right hon. Gentleman was not regarding that as hostile criticism but rather as a reasonable observation. [Mr. ARNOLD-FORSTER assented.] Of course the first step to be contemplated in such a programme as building up the Militia was the extent and area of Militia service and the rendering the force liable for service oversea. If the Government would make up their mind to pursue that policy he believed it would be a step in the right direction. But, of course, the bed-rock of all their difficulties was the difficulty of getting men.

No.

Of getting any sufficient number for the requirements of a great war. The present inflow of recruiting was to some extent attributable to the condition of trade at the present moment. Looking at it broadly, it must be admitted that the class from which soldiers had hitherto been drawn was a diminishing class.

No.

said that was his individual opinion, and the question was whether they could offer sufficient inducements to men of a different and higher class to enter the Army. He looked upon conscription as an idle dream: he did not believe this country would submit to it to provide for oversea service. What, then, were they to do? He thought that the country would not be sincere in its treatment of this question till it really appreciated the proportion and magnitude of modern war and the insufficiency of our forces to meet the conditions which might at any day arrive. When the country was sincere it would find its way of escape by a very simple arrangement. That was to secure that the only gate into any civil employment in the State should be through the ranks of the Army. He believed that would in the future—and a not very distant future—prove to be the only means of providing a British Army for oversea service which was the only Army we should require in time of war. Now he came to the real crux of the whole matter—the question of the Volunteers—and that completed his review of the reform scheme. In regard to the Volunteers, he yielded to no man in his appreciation of their efforts and of the spirit which created them. When the force was first constituted he was one of those who were selected to help in those great gatherings which took place, and he learned to appreciate the spirit which animated them. Although there was then a professional hostile feeling against the force, he certainly did not share it. But he held, and for forty years had persistently preached that to maintain a gigantic army of Volunteers to repel a great invasion of these shores was incompatible with the doctrine of sea supremacy. At list his view had been accepted by the Government. The difficulty of the Government, now that this force had been created under a false conception of military necessity, was to decide what to do with it. What could they do with a force of 240,000 armed units when they had come to the deliberate conclus on that its maintenance was imcompatible with their true policy. They could not immediately wipe it out of existence, and the process of reduction must be slow. The alternative to a large reduction was to apply the Volunteers to the purposes of service over-sea; but in that case they must catch their Volunteers who were willing to go first, and secure men who were prepared in an emergency to submit to a call for service abroad. He did not think for one moment that the Volunteers would accept that alternative. If hon. Members thought otherwise let them organise a deputation to the Secretary for War with a view of entreating him to circularise colonels of Volunteers, directing them to invite their men who would sign an agreement to serve over-sea in a great emergency to send in their names. Such a proceeding would, he believed, prove up to the hilt that the circumstances and nature of the civil employment of Volunteers rendered it impossible for them to enter into any such obligation. He did not believe 10 per cent. of the men would sign. ["Oh, oh!"] Well, let hon. Members try, and if only 10 per cent, did sign, it meant that they would have to incur the expense of maintaining one hundred Volunteers in order to secure the services of ten men when occasion arose. Would the Volunteer force then be a cheap force? If the House sincerely accepted the doctrine that a great invasion of this country was impossible, the only possible course to pursue with regard to the Volunteers was to reduce them to a certain standard. It was a question of fixing the number that was really the crux of the matter. He thought the Government were shirking the question or fixing numbers too much. He had not heard from the Government any indication of the number of men in the Militia and Volunteers needed for the requirements of the Empire. It was no use fencing with the question. They must determine the standard for the Army on the principle of their military necessities under the conditions of a supreme Fleet, and then they must apply that principle to the Volunteers. Admitting the possibility of a temporary raid on the coast—though he did not admit the probability—he thought the standard should be fixed at a number which could successfully deal with such a contingency, that the disposition of the Volunteers for the defence of the coast should be arranged with a view to dealing with small and insignificant raids, and that the Militia and Regular Army should be relieved from all duties in connection with attempted landing. In conclusion, he desired to refer once more to the fact that there had been a total reversal of the principle upon which, for some fifty years, our Army policy had been founded. It was not a now departure, but a return to the old policy by which the Empire was made—the doctrine of a free sea, with a free Army, with its corollary that the low-water mark of the enemy's coast and not our own coast was our frontier. The tangle of our present military confusion arose from the fact that fifty years ago the War Office started the theory that steam fleets were not to be relied upon, and year by year the idea was developed, until two or three years ago the climax was reached when the Secretary of State for War calmly declared that Members must not confuse their minds on the Army problem by thinking about the Navy. That, he thought, awakened the House and the country to the absolute irreconcilability of an armed invasion while we had predominance at sea. Without that predominance we cannot live. Our present military arrangements were the product of that great mistake, and it was for whatever Government that happened to be in power so to deal with the forces created under that idea as to make them fit for the real and not the sham purposes of war. The difficulties were not so much military as political. When the Government were dealing with any great problem involving expenditure they had to consider the relations of Parties in this House and popular feeling in the country, and that was what made the difficulty in the question of the Volunteers. Personally, he thought the difficulty in course of time would solve itself. The Volunteers themselves were most intelligent thinking men; hitherto they had been encouraged by War Ministers to believe that the country was really in danger of a great invasion, and that they must undergo sacrifices to be ready to resist such invasion; but when they realised that this was only a fad of a defunct War Office and not a fact, they would not consider it necessary or desirable to incur so much self-sacrifice to provide for an emergency which could never arise. On the other hand, if the authorities asked for a real sound force of Volunteers charged with and responsible for the defence of different parts of the coast against small and reckless raids, they would get the very cream of men who, while they could not give over-sea service, were ready to submit to some hardship to perform definite military duties at home. Military arrangements had their ramifications in every grade of society. It was impossible to touch any branch of the service without creating political friction, and when listening to the speeches of distinguished Volunteers in the House he could not help asking himself whether the people of Sheffield, the Isle of Wight, Plymouth, and other places represented by these Volunteer officers really believed that the Volunteers were to rule Parliament, and that Parliament was not to rule the Volunteers. It could not be denied that the Volunteer vote was an important vote, having political influence on the mind of any Government; but he believed that the spread of the truth and a wider comprehension of the obligations and duties of the Empire under conditions of sea supremacy would eventually overcome the difficulties with which the Secretary for War was now confronted. He hoped that both Parties would keep their eyes fixed on the military necessities of the Empire, and manfully crush the opposition which arose from considerations of popularity, which would have to be overcome if the Empire was to be preserved.

in moving a reduction of 10,000 men, expressed his appreciation of the speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Yarmouth, but said his pleasure at finding how near to common agreement were those who wished to arrive at a proper conception of the country's real needs was slightly tinged with regret that he should have implied that Members who happened to be Volunteer officers were influenced by their constituents in thinking it unwise to reduce the Volunteers. He could assure the hon. and gallant Member that he had no desire to influence votes by his support of the Volunteers. Those with whom he acted on Army questions took a view on this question totally different from that of the hon. and gallant Member, but he hoped completely to convert not only the hon. and gallant Member but also the Secretary of State for War. The suggestion that the Volunteers would not go abroad if an emergency arose was a serious allegation, but when the question was last under discussion the Secretary of State for War made a still more serious allegation by saying that the idea that the Volunteers formed any real reserve in case of war was a complete delusion. He hoped to show that the complete delusion was on the side of the Secretary of State for War. It so happened that he was one of many Members of the House who were concerned in the call to arms made during the South African War, when it was really ascertained whether or not the Volunteers would prove a reserve in case of necessity. The hon. and gallant Member for Yarmouth suggested that the Prime Minister should be asked to institute an inquiry as to how many of the Auxiliary Forces would volunteer in the future under certain hypothetical circumstances.

said his point was as to how many would hold themselves in readiness to go abroad in case of emergency.

suggested that a more fruitful matter for discussion was what actually did happen in a period of great national stress, when this very question was asked of the Volunteers and Yeomanry. At that time the War Office decided to call only for a certain number of Volunteers, and when, say, 100 were asked for, it could not be ascertained how many were really prepared to go. But in a few cases—and it was on this point he proposed to convert the hon. and gallant Gentleman and to ask the Secretary of State for a public apology for his statement on the subject—Volunteers without any limit of number were asked for, and he had particulars of the response made. From the Queen's Westminster 690 volunteered; from the London Scottish, 500; and from the 4th Battalion Queen's, 635 men and 20 officers. The hon. and gallant Member suggested 10 per cent., but did he suppose that these figures did not represent a considerably greater proportion than that?

said he was speaking not of the Metropolitan corps only, but of the whole Volunteer force.

said that on the 10 per cent, basis the 1st Volunteer Battalion Middlesex should have provided 69·7 men, but, as a matter of fact, 510 were anxious to go to the front. From the 1st Volunteer Battalion Argyll Royal Garrison Artillery, with an establishment probably of about 500, 300 volunteered, and from the 1st Volunteer Battalion Manchester, although it was said only a small number of Volunteers were required, 370 men and three officers came forward. From these figures, which he had been able to obtain since the Secretary of State's amazing statement that it was a delusion to suppose that the Volunteers were of any use to serve oversea—

Those are not my words.

said he had the words with him, and what the right hon. Gentleman stated was that it was a complete delusion to suppose that the Volunteers could be regarded as of real value as a reserve in time of war for service oversea.

asked how many of those who volunteered were physically qualified for service abroad.

said he had not the figures with him.

Five per cent of the Queen's Westminsters were unfit.

said that if the hon. and gallant Member who asked the question meant to imply that the general standard of fitness in the Volunteers was such that it was not worth while maintaining them, he would suggest that the number of recruits for the Regular Army rejected for unfitness was a more fruitful subject for discussion. The figures he had given showed that the Volunteers were ready to furnish from 60 or 70 per cent, of their total strength to serve oversea in a time of national emergency. That was the bed-rock on which the supporters of the Volunteers stood. He was prepared to go further, and confidently to assert that had the War Office frankly said to the Volunteer force that they were at the end of their resources for men, and that they wanted every Volunteer they could get to go to South Africa, 99 per cent. of the whole force would have come forward. He hoped those figures would convince the hon. and gallant Member that he had underestimated the patriotism of these men. After all, it was somewhat the custom to sneer at the Auxiliary Forces and the War Office. He would ask the Committee to remember that whatever these men were worth it was all they had. When this country was engaged fighting against 40,000 farmers we soon came to the end of the men who had had any training at all. There were at least two hon. Members of this House who had had to command, in a war against 40,000 farmers, brave and gallant Englishmen who had had no military training whatever, and who did not know one end of the rifle from the other. If, instead of proposing to reduce the Volunteers, the right hon. Gentleman had aimed at getting as many men as possible to do something in the way of military training this country would in the future be saved from such a bitter humiliation as occurred in the South African War, which culminated in the capture of a great and gallant British general owing to the fact that a number of the men under him had not learned the elements of military warfare. Now they had the Secretary of State for War coming down to this House and declaring that these men were redundant and proposing to reduce them. This question was going to be fought out, and whatever else they did one thing was certain, that the more men they possessed who had the patriotism and the skill to give some kind of military training to their country the better it would be. Some of them who occasionally cast their eye to what was going on in the rest of the world, and who perceived that in one battle the combatants had lost a total equal to the whole British Army with its Reserves, were occasionally led to think that the more they appealed to the patriotism of the people to fit themselves for war the better it would be. This question would be raised again and again until this foolish policy of sapping the patriotism of the people had been finally condemned. He moved a reduction of this Vote because they had decided that the great questions of Army policy should be raised on Vote 1, and that they should endeavour to understand on Vote A exactly what they were to fight about. Therefore, he proposed to reduce the Army by 10,000, and strange to say the Secretary of State for War proposed the same thing. Apparently this was the beginning of unanimity. Therefore he would direct his remarks to finding out what the Government intended to do, so that they would know what to condemn and what to approve of. The first question, if they proposed to reduce the Army, was, why was it necessary to reduce it, and what did the Government propose to do in order to make up for the loss of military power which that reduction would produce? All sides were agreed that they must reduce the Army, but the cost per man would continue to increase. The more people thought scientifically the more they would see that the more expensive part of the Army must be increased, and the less expensive parts must be reduced. They must have more officers, more cavalry, and more artillery. Consequently, if they were to fulfil the mandate of this House to reduce the total cost, they must greatly reduce the numbers, anticipating increases in the more expensive forces of the Army. The Army was not the actual power of the nation, because they all realised that it was no use sending the British Army in the field against a nation that could mobilise 3,000,000 men. The second reason why they must reduce the Army was because of the effect of increasing the term of service for the recruits. The Leader of the Opposition last year warned the Secretary of State for War that in adopting the nine-years system he was going perilously near that moment when they must provide a life career for the soldiers. That was exactly what the Secretary of State was doing, because by taking a man for nine years they robbed him of all chances of taking civil employment at the end of his service. That day ho had received two letters from soldiers who had not learned any trade, asking him to find them employment. What happened in such cases? The hon. Member for Chippenham knew from his connection with civic authorities and with the Army what happened, and he had a special right to speak upon this matter. If it were true that by enlisting men for nine years they condemned them to unemployment in the future, they had a right to ask the Secretary of State for War what he proposed to do. The right hon. Gentleman said nothing that he had done was going to prevent his successors from either reversing the policy he proposed or continuing it. He did not tell them what he proposed to do in the future, and he did not say at what moment he proposed that the two-years system of enlistment for home service should begin. Was it fair, after having for one year taken advantage of the general wish of the House to give him a chance to undertake a difficult problem, and after saying that he would not produce Estimates on the old basis, to come down and say that while he still intended to prosecute his scheme, for some reason they did not know of the scheme could not be proceeded with? When were they going to begin establishing the home-service Army? Would the Secretary of State for War pledge himself not to proceed with it until the House had had an opportunity of considering it? He I wished to know whose scheme it was which the right hon. Gentleman now propounded. Was it his own scheme? If it was, all he had to say was that it was I very different to last year's scheme. If it was not his scheme, who had approved of it? Was it the scheme of the Army Council or the Committee of Defence? Were his proposals approved of by his responsible advisers, and did the Auxiliary Forces Department at the War Office desire to reduce the Volunteers? Did they wish to abolish the Militia? To all these things they wanted a reply, so that when they came to discuss Vote 1 they would not be talking in the dark. They had been talking in the dark for a year and a quarter, and he was sure the right hon. Gentleman would be ready to admit that the House had continued to give him their indulgence in a policy of concealment due to the fact that his advisers and himself could not agree. Of course there must come an end to this state of things, and he suggested that it should come before they discussed Vote 1. Did the right hon. Gentleman propose to proceed with the abolition of the Militia? In the second place, did he propose to proceed with the enlistment of a home - service Army, a change to which many of them objected very strongly. Thirdly, did he propose to reduce the Volunteers irrespective of whether they were efficient or not, or was he of the opinion that any man who wished to serve his country should have an opportunity found for him of so doing? Did the right hon. Gentleman adopt the extraordinary theory that after all the duty of the people of this country was to look on and pay up, and that nothing more was required than a few men placed at strategic points, numbering about 40,000 or 50,000, to defend certain isolated places. Those were three very definite questions. He did not think they were asking for anything very outrageous in requesting that replies should be given to those points, because the proposals of the right hon. Gentleman were more far-reaching than any which had been made since the time of Mr. Cardwell. When Mr. Cardwell proposed his changes in the Army it was admitted that they could not be carried through without full discussion, and ten days were devoted to Army matters in that year before the 31st of March. The fullest disclosures were made of the intentions of Mr. Cardwell and the Government, and no parallel could be found for the policy of concealment pursued by the War Office until the very eve of a decision being taken by the Committee. He asked for this information in order to enable them to form a right conclusion. Although they wanted the British Army to maintain great traditions they realised at the same time that the expenditure must be limited. They realised also that the Army must be composed of the best men they could obtain. At the same time they would not, if they could help it, entertain any proposal to dispense with the services of any Englishman who would submit to any kind of military instruction whatever. They knew that after all the future was dim and dark. They could not lay down precisely with any certainty what would happen when the dark day of war came upon them, but they knew that after all the safety of this country depended not only upon ships but in the first, in the second, and in the last degree upon the patriotism of the people and upon their spirit of self-sacrifice.

said that in listening to the speeches which had been made in this debate, it seemed to him that the keynote of the speakers was "retrenchment," but he had not heard from any hon. Member a practical exposition of the manner in which the admirable reforms suggested could be effected. If the Secretary of State for War, with his characteristic affability, were to be guided by the criticisms of every hon. Member of this House, he would find his task to be no light one. He would have to reduce the Army in order to please some, and he would have to increase the Army in order to satisfy others, and, besides, he would have to add very largely to the number of the Volunteer force while at the same time reducing the expenditure upon it. The right hon. Gentleman would have to abolish the Army Council and entrust its functions to the hon. Member for Central Bradford by the express desire of the hon. Member for Oldham. It was easy to use retrenchment as a battering-ram against any Government, but how were they going to retrench today? A few years ago the "blue water" theory still held good, but as things were to-day it was impossible to reduce our Army by a single man without its being a danger and menace to the Empire. In the last year or two conditions had radically changed. We had lost our insular position, and our extended Indian frontier had become as vulnerable as the frontier of any European Power. Recent events proved beyond doubt that if our Indian frontier were menaced, our Indian Army of 230,000 would be found totally inadequate for the calls that would be made on it. Although one naturally hesitated to refer to hostile possibilities in connection with a friendly Power, yet facts could not be blinked. Russia had just completed the Trans-Caspian Railway at enormous expense. It abutted on the Afghan frontier, a country we were pledged to defend. She had done more. During the last twelve months, although plunged in external and internal troubles, she had completed a second great trunk line from Orenburg to Tashkend. Troops and stores had been poured into the Trans-Caspian Provinces, which we could hardly believe were solely for the comfort and protection of "trippers" to the Far East. These railways were, beyond doubt, purely strategical. Wise nations, like wise individuals, did not throw away money to no purpose; and if Russia was preparing for a probable rupture with a friendly country, then so must we. Until recently it would have been impossible for Russia to have sent against us and supported a fully equipped army of more than 150,000 men, but now with two lines of railway completed she would, in the event of hostilities, be able to plant on our frontier an army of considerably over 500,000. This had been proved beyond doubt by the enormous number of troops she had poured into Manchuria, over one line of railway 5,000 miles long. Under Lord Kitchener's scheme our frontier Army would consist of 160,000 men, of whom one third would be British. It was quite clear, therefore, that in order to successfully resist an attack of three times the number, we must be ready, immediately on the outbreak of war, to send at least 150,000 more troops from this country. The Japanese War had also shown us that we should require a further 200,000 men every year for depletion from calamities and disease. And it was at this moment that without offering any alternative proposal the amateur military critics would cut down our Army to promote its efficiency. How, then, we were to obtain an Army efficient for the defence of our Indian frontier, which, inadequately guarded, was a direct incentive to any nation envious of our rich Indian possessions? Apart from conscription, a system which would never be tolerated in this country, because it was wholly alien to the British character, there was only one solution which he ventured with great deference to submit to the House. In another year our treaty with Japan would lapse. He urged not only that we should renew it, but that we should make it of such a character that in the event of either country's Asiatic possessions being attacked they should mutually help each other—Great Britain with her Fleet— Japan with her army. It was difficult to gauge the far-reaching advantages of such an alliance, not only to Japan and Great Britain, but to the whole peace-loving world. Great Britain would be relieved of the upkeep of an Army, which if brought to the huge standard of efficiency demanded by the new conditions would become on intolerable burden to the British taxpayer. The idea of all Army reformers might then be realised —a small but efficient fighting force combined with a cheap and serviceable Home Army. And if this alliance had wide-reaching advantages for England, there was no limit to its possibilities for Japan. Like ourselves she was an island Power; like ourselves at the end of this war she would possess a continental frontier, and, therefore, her series of victories, splendid and unbroken as they were would avail her nothing in the future if she should lose command of the sea. Even if peace were happily concluded, Japan could not ignore the fact that Russia's enormous resources enabled her to build three ships where she could build one, and to build or buy three times as quickly. We had it on the authority of a Russian officer of the highest distinction, Admiral Dubassoff, who had publicly stated that if Russia patched up peace it would only be in order to build a new fleet and renew the struggle with increased vigour. Not only could our Fleet guarantee her immunity from this menace, but behind its shadow she would reap the full fruits of her sacrifices and enjoy that recuperation which alone could save her from financial exhaustion. To Russia such an alliance would be a boon in disguise as it would secure the future peaceful development of a peace-loving people.

; This seems hardly relevant to the Army Estimates.

said he would conclude what he had to say by respectfully drawing the attention of the Government to the renewal on a stronger basis of our alliance with Japan, because he saw in it the only possible means by which we could secure retrenchment and efficiency with safety to the Empire.

said it was a remarkable thing to find in an Army debate an alliance recommended on the grounds stated by the hon. Member for the Eskdale Division. He supposed the hon. Member was so delighted with the success of Chinese labour in South Africa that the proposal was to relegate the work of the Army to another yellow race. In a speech of singular earnestness, tinged with such a deep sense of melancholy as to make it somewhat more a lament than a statement of policy, the Secretary of State for War appealed for the non-Party treatment of the Army question, and generously offered to his successor the fruits of his own unremitting toil. He welcomed the spirit in which that appeal was put forth, but he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would not think hon. Members on his side of the House factious if they found themselves not entirely able to go with him on certain Army matters. The Secretary of State developed in its extreme form what was known as the doctrine of the blue-water school. He declared that this country enjoyed practical immunity from invasion, that conclusion having been reached as the result of scientific inquiries by the Council of Defence and the Army Council, confirmed by the observations which took place at Clacton-on-Sea last autumn. If we enjoyed that practical immunity how was it that the Secretary of State for War was able to come forward with the proposals he had made? The Secretary of State was either not logical or had not the courage of his opinions to face the logical deductions to which they led him. If we enjoyed this immunity, so far from retaining any portion of the Volunteer force, they should be completely abolished and the Militia also— all those who were tied to the soil—and the Regular Army, which was the only force the right hon. Gentleman could conceive to be possible in future, should be fostered, if not augmented. What had the right hon. Gentleman done? He had not abolished the Volunteers. He had maimed them, and he had threatened the Militia, and so far from having nurtured the Regular Forces of the Crown he contemplated reducing them by 17,000 in the course of the year. He urged the right hon. Gentleman to continue the course on which he had entered. In order to state to the House his own view as to the necessity of reducing the Regular Army it was necessary to indulge in a short comparison between the state of the Army to-day and in 1898, which was the last normal year before the war. In 1898 an Army of 180,000 was maintained for £20,000,000, whereas the Estimates this year provided for 204,000—after eliminating the 17,000 who were to disappear—and they were to be maintained at a cost of £30,000,000. That was to say, while there was only an addition of 24,000 men the Estimates had risen by £10,000,000. It could not be asserted that the existing Army was in many respects better than the Army of 1898. The Army of 1898 was, at any rate, able to accomplish certain objects, It provided the drafts for our Indian establishment—which he believed to be the first object which it ought to perform, and which the Army of the present Secretary of State for India egregiously failed to do. Then, that Army of 1898 provided and maintained 444,435 men to serve in South Africa. That was a considerable achievement. Again, in 1898 we had a reserve of 78,000 men; while the Auxiliary Forces maintained under that 1898 system actually sent out to South Africa no fewer than nearly 100,000 men. The question that had to be asked was: "Was the present Army able to do half as well again as that Army achieved?" He thought, on the contrary, that it had not attained that state of efficiency reached by the Army of the right hon. Gentleman's predecessors. If so, why was it that it cost £10,000,000 more to maintain an Army to-day which was only slightly larger than that of ten years ago? If hon. Members examined the Estimates they would observe that by far the largest item in the £10,000,000 was £4,000,000 for increase of pay. The pay had risen 66 per cent. and the number of men 30 per cent. The fact was, the limit of the enlistment system had been ignored. The origin of this increase in the Army was due to the days—now happily done away with —of the megalomania of the Secretary of State for India: to the days of the doctrine of home defence by the Regular Army, now entirely abandoned: and also to the days of that bugbear, the equipoise of the linked battalions. Lord Lansdowne was responsible for increasing the Army by 28,000 men; his successor for an increase of 37,000 men—or a total increase of 65,000 in ten years. He entirely agreed with the Secretary for War when the right hon. Gentleman stated the previous night that if a large Army was necessary for the defence of the Empire, the problem should have been squarely faced and the question of compulsory service should have been fairly met. If the Committee agreed with him that there was a limit to the voluntary system, it was obvious that if more men were wanted another means of obtaining them must be devised; and that the present system was not the way by which it would or could be done. Unfortunately the standard of the Army had been tampered with with the most disastrous results. One of the ways by which the increase in enlistment was to be affected was by the late Secretary for War accepting the Motion of the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight insisting on the production of character by recruits. There was a third device by which it was expected a greater number of recruits would be secured— the institution of a short-service system. He maintained that in introducing the short-service system the present Secretary for India had not got the condition of the Reserve in his eye. It was offered as an inducement to recruits in the hope that a considerable proportion of them would prolong their service. Now, what he had been trying to reach was this: the governing factor of the situation by which the size of the Army would be ultimately determined was not the necessities of the Empire, but the normal supply of recruits expected to be obtained in any given year. In 1894 41,000 recruits were raised in this country: but these figures were very misleading, because in the same year no fewer than 21,000 were lost to the Army from causes other than by passing into the Reserve, by purchase, and by completion of service. That was a loss of 50 per cent. It was interesting to observe from what causes that loss took place. There were 1,699 deaths, 1,330 unserviceables, 4,973 invalided; discharged for misconduct 3,656, and other causes 8,444, or a sum total of 21,000. There was not only a large material loss, but a great economic waste. Both from the point of view of efficiency and a consideration of the facts there had to be eliminated, as far as possible, all those men, who, from one cause or another, could not fill the services on which so much money had been spent. There was another ominous fact. He had seen it stated that in 1902 no less than 21,943 soldiers were committed to prison for one offence or another.

said that that included both sailors and soldiers.

said even that was very serious. Then there were the desertions, which averaged 2,000 a year. His contention was that by lowering the standard—

said he never lowered the standard of the Army in his life. He had always set his face against lowering the standard of any class of soldiers.

said he quite agreed that the right hon. Gentleman did not intend to lower the standard; and he knew that the right hon. Gentleman in one particular did raise it very materially. But whatever the right hon. Gentleman might have done, whether by increasing the pay, tampering with the standard, or by reducing the term of short service, more than a certain number of recruits would never be got. The present Secretary for War had much circumscribed the possible cases for which an Army might be needed. All he contemplated was a sufficient force to defend our possessions beyond the seas and the possible provision of a small striking force for dealing with Mad Mullahs or the like.

said the hon. Gentleman had omitted that one of the most important purposes of the Army at home was to furnish large reinforcements for our Army abroad in case of war.

said he would include that. As to the terms of service under which recruits might be enlisted, the Secretary for War had two objects in view. First, the provision of an Army in India and the colonial garrisons; and, second, the creation of a Reserve on which he could rely. There were several ways in which these two objects might be achieved. It was well known that a long-service system was much, more suitable for the one, and a short-service system for the other. The late Secretary for War relied on short service, with the inducement to the soldier of an increase of pay of 6d. a day to extend his service. That experiment failed, and the right hon. Gentleman might have foreseen it, because after a man had been only three years in the Army he had not attained an age which precluded him from returning to civil life and learning a trade. But if the soldier continued his service for another seven years, he would find himself at a time of life when he could not devote himself to learning any sort of trade with success and there would be nothing left to him but his small pension. The present Secretary for War proposed a simultaneous long and short-service system, but that was only the same system as that of his predecessor, only under a different name. There was another system in vogue. First, the long-service Army was to be filled up, and then something was to be done for a short-service Army with an inducement to go into the Reserve. Now, he could not believe that that was a satisfactory conclusion. His own opinion was that they should be driven back to the compromise of so many years with the colours and so many years with the Reserve. The corollary of the reduction of the Regular Army was the maintenance of the Auxiliary Forces. In this country war was only possible if it had the support of public feeling, and that feeling would enable the War Office to rely with certainty on the patriotic readiness of the Volunteers and Militia to serve in any part of the world. The official contempt for Auxilaries was much to be deprecated. In European warfare it was as necessary to protect the line of communication as it was to have a fighting line, and that was a thing for which the Volunteers were well fitted. Again there was the defence of India. If Volunteers could be sent to India to occupy the garrisons whilst the Indian Army went to protect the frontier India itself would still be in a very good position so far as defence was concerned. The creation of the Imperial Yeomanry was the one great achievement of the present Secretary of State for India, and something of the same sort ought to be done for the Militia and Volunteers.

reminded hon. Gentlemen opposite when they criticised the Secretary for India's schemes of reform that the right hon. Gentleman had introduced the most important reform of raising the pay of the soldier after two years service. That was a most gratifying change because it permitted us to obtain the number of recruits we required. The right hon. Gentleman, moreover, had been enabled to enforce the condition that only men of good character should be enlisted, and it was pleasing to hear that recruits were being obtained of a higher class and satisfactory character. He attributed to the action of the Secretary for India the restoring of a depleted Reserve after the war. The Guards, for example, had long been enlisted for three years with power to prolong their service, and about half of the men enlisted had agreed to continue in the Army. At the same time a large Reserve had been built up, enabling the regiments to send 10,000 men to South Africa and keep the battalions at home at their full strength. He agreed in the main with what had been said by the last speaker as to the project of the Secretary for War n respect of the Auxiliary Forces. He hoped that they were not committed to the project of the practical abolition of the Militia. The Militia had received very hard treatment in being reduced to its present condition, and every one knew that the force had been made the milch cow for the Regular Army. It should not be forgotten that the Militia in former times had supplied the Army with men in time of need. This was the case in the Napoleonic Wars and in South Africa, for it was known that many men fought at Waterloo in their Militia uniforms. He contended, therefore, that it was not necessary on grounds either of economy or of efficiency to abolish the Militia as the Secretary of State had practically proposed to do.

supported the Amendment for the reduction, because he was convinced that if they were to reduce the expenditure on the Army it could only be done by a substantial reduction in the number of men. The attack which had been made on the Auxiliary Forces, if carried to its logical conclusion, must become detrimental to the whole military system. He opposed any reduction of the Volunteer force on Imperial grounds. The suggestion that a home-service Army should be established had not taken practical shape as yet, and it therefore became necessary to maintain the only substitute which could provide an adequate Reserve through the maintenance of the Auxiliary Forces. He supported the reduction of men on the Regular establishment, believing it would in no way jeopardise the drafts for India, The extension of the period of service would give the War Office the same facilities in that respect as they had under the old seven-years system. In connection with three years service considerable difficulty arose in the matter of drafts for India, and the system was shown to be most futile and expensive, as men's term of service expired in many instances so soon after their arrival in India. The costliness of the system would be realised when it was remembered that the cost to India and back was about £18, with £4 or £5 for additional equipment, and that within the last six months no less than 5,000 men had been sent out under these conditions. During the war the short service was necessary in order to get the men, but the time had now come when the longer service must be reverted to. But the fact had to be faced that with a nine years service men were placed in a very precarious position at the expiration of their term. The real Army problem was the question of the after-employment of men who joined the colours. In his Memorandum last year the right hon. Gentleman made sympathetic reference to the question, but there was nothing further in that direction this year. Was it not time the House took into its serious consideration the question of the after-employment of soldiers? Men joining the service at the age of eighteen and serving nine years, would be discharged in the prime of manhood, but at a period of life later than that at which they could easily adapt themselves to civil occupations, with the result that they would be thrown upon the casual market. He believed the question of unemployment, which he hoped the House would face in the near future, was closely connected with our military system. If the Local Government Board would procure from the local authorities a return showing the number of men out of employment, marking those who at some period had been with the colours, it would probably be found that a very large proportion had served in the Army, and then through no fault of their own had found their way into that class who were the last to be employed in good times, and the first to be discharged in bad times of trade. The three years system was introduced on the assumption that 70 per cent of the men would re-engage, but only 12 per cent, did so. If an analysis were made of the un-employed during last winter it would probably be found that a large proportion of the 88 per cent. who did not re-engage went to swell the ranks of the unemployed.

pointed out that that could not be the case, as the three years men had not come to the end of their term of service.

thought that, at any rate, many of the men would find it very difficult to obtain employment, although, of course, it would not be so difficult after three years as after nine years service. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would take the matter up, and endeavour to frame some constructive scheme by which the public services and organisations throughout the country might provide employment for these men. No doubt all sorts of objections would be raised and the proposal said to be impossible, but the country was face to face with a great problem; and if the present voluntary system was to be maintained a scheme would have to be devised by which men who joined the colours, provided their conduct during service was good, should be assured of employment when their term with the colours expired. Something might be done through the Post Office, a Department which had 37,000 employees in London alone, and that number represented only 32 per cent. of the total in the country. He would not confine the plan to any one Department, it should be so arranged with different Departments that the men might be evenly distributed about the country. Some assistance might come from the police, though he knew the idea was very unpopular. At present we were moving in a vicious circle. The fact that they were not ensured employment on the expiration of their term of service debarred many men of good character and position from entering the Army. A change in that respect would automatically raise the standard of recruits, and the result would be not only a great gain to the Army, but a substantial mitigation of one of the grievous problems of the day. The local authorities throughout the country might be approached in the matter. He still held the view which he expressed four years ago, that with our voluntary system the more closely the local governing authorities could be brought into harmony with the military system the better it must be for the country. At the outside, only from 30,000 to 35,000 men were discharged per annum in the ordinary course, and that number distributed throughout the country into different organisations need not be a burden to any particular one. To secure a strong and efficient Army every encouragement must be given to men to enter the Army, and the only real encouragement that could be given was an undertaking that if they conducted themselves as respectable citizens during their term of service they should be sure of employment on their return to civil life.

I must say I have no reason to complain of the discussion to-day not being in accordance with the request I ventured to make yesterday. It has certainly lacked nothing in breadth or in depth, and if I may say so, it has been a most valuable contribution to the discussion of Army questions. With much that has been said I am in cordial agreement, but with a great deal I am afraid I still remain at variance. I should like if I can to do justice to those who have differed from me, as well as to those who have agreed with me. I have noticed with great satisfaction that there has been a tendency in the direction which I desire we all should travel—a tendency to recognise the truth that after all we are not keeping up, as we ought not to keep up, a large Army primarily for the defence of these islands.

No, no.

The hon. Members to whom that tendency has not extended have been left behind in the advance that has been made; but I have noticed a very remarkable tendency in that direction.

To whose speech does my right hon. friend refer?

I think almost every speech that has been made. But I will endeavour to make my point good. I do not mean to say that all who have expressed that view are in agreement with me, but I do note that tendency in all their speeches. I am going, not to traverse, but to criticise some of the statements which have been made by the various speakers. If hon. Members will allow me I will explain to them my view of what is the real guiding principle in this matter. We are told we ought to have a great reduction in the Regular Army. The hon. Member who has just sat down was very emphatic on that point, and I wish to know how he justifies that proposition, whether it is based upon a true view of this question, or whether it is really an idea thrown off because he knew it would be acceptable to all of us, and that that is the shortest way of getting a reduction of cost. It is admitted on all sides that we have to maintain an Army which is suitable for our needs in time of peace, and capable of expansion in time of war. Has he considered whether, if he reduced our Regular Army, it would be able to satisfy those considerations? I am working under strictly limited conditions. The Army Council is working with the object of producing an Army which shall supply in time of peace a garrison for India and the approved garrisons for the Colonies, while having a certain proportion of that Army at home, so as to make a proper circulation between all parts of the Army, and which shall be capable of furnishing the drafts and units necessary for the reinforcements which the Indian Government demand in time of war. The hon. Member suggested that we might with advantage go back to the system of seven and five years enlistment. I traverse that statement for this reason. If you do go back to that system you will get no reduction in cost, and you will most certainly get no Reserve which will enable you to satisfy the demands of the Indian Government in time of war. You will not and you cannot get the Reserve necessary for the requirements of the Army in India if you put the whole Army upon that basis. You will get nothing near the infantry Reserve required for that purpose, nor would you get the number of units. You will not get units sufficient to supply the demands of the Indian Government in case of war; if you begin to reduce and cut off units you will be not, as I explained before, cutting off the officers, but you will be making it impossible to add to the number of your effective Army when the stress of war comes. It can easily be calculated what Reserve was produced under the previous system. It numbered 54,000 men in the infantry. If you begin to reduce the number of infantry units you pro tanto reduce that Reserve, and that Reserve is entirely inadequate for the purpose we are compelled to regard as binding upon us. The hon. Member said we had introduced the nine years system of service, and that he considers too long. Well, standing as an isolated period, I should agree with him; I think if it were not joined with the short service it would be too long. I would remind him that the period is practically the same as that upon which thousands have been serving before, and it is only one year in excess of the official term which men have been serving for years past. We have fought this battle over and over again, thinking we ought to do all in our power to provide for men who have been in the Army for nine years. I did make a proposition that we should be able to guarantee to every soldier of good character who had served nine years a congenial occupation in the ranks of the Army in connection with the short-service battalions which would provide him with that certainty of employment to which I think he is entitled. I think the hon. Member was mistaken in supposing that little is done for the employment of these men on their discharge. If he would look at the Report of the Inspector-General of Recruiting he would see that the proportion of men of good character who cannot obtain employment is comparatively small.

I am told it is about 30 per cent.

Oh, no; it is much less, and that fact has been the secret of success in the Navy, and it will be the secret of success in the Army. The hon. Member has said he considers two periods of service at the same time impossible. A great many things have been said about the impossibility of it. I was told by many great authorities that we should have no chance of obtaining our military recruits for the nine years service, but since October we have obtained 11,000 men on that basis; and to that extent we have passed the calculation of many who were entitled to express an opinion. I believe you must come to this double system of recruiting, and if you do come to it you can successfully carry it out if you comply with the ordinary conditions of common sense.

Is that the right hon. Gentleman's policy at the present moment?

Yes. If you continue the long-service recruiting indefinitely you must sacrifice your Reserve. If you do not come to some kind of short-service recruiting you cannot make that Reserve. In order to carry on the two systems side by side you must have great differentiation in the inducements offered to the man who has served the long time and the man who has served the short time. The hon. Member has not remembered that the inducement to the soldier hitherto of enlisting for a long period of service has not been great, and that inducement has never been given to him until he has served two years in the Army. I pass from that view of the question as to how we ought to deal with the soldier in the Army, to what has been the main part of the debate this afternoon; that is, the question whether we can or cannot regard the Auxiliary Forces in their present state as a substitute, or an available substitute, for the Regular Army.

Before the right hon. Gentleman deals with that question would he kindly answer the Question put by my hon. and gallant friend as to whether he is proceeding with the short-service Army proposals?

I have explained that many times, and I say that it is impossible to proceed with the short-service men until the nucleus of long-service men required for the Army has been raised.

When will that be?

That, of course, will depend entirely upon the rate at which recruiting proceeds.

But when will it be?

We are recruiting at the rate of about 400 per month, and it will be about seven or eight months before we shall have obtained enough long-service men.

And will you then begin with the short-service Army?

Yes.