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Commons Chamber

Volume 2: debated on Monday 8 March 1909

House of Commons

Monday, March 8, 1909

Private Bills

The following Bills were read a second time:—

Eastbourne Gas Bill.

Folkestone, Sandgate, and Hythe Tramways Bill.

Hull and Barnsley Railway Bill.

Kirkwall Water Provisional Order Confirmation Bill.

Local Legislation Committee

moved: "That the Committee of Selection do nominate a Committee, not exceed- ing fifteen Members, to be called the Local Legislation Committee, to whom shall be committed all Private Bills promoted by municipal and other local authorities by which it is proposed to create powers relating to police, sanitary, or other local government regulations in conflict with, deviation from, or excess of the provisions of the general law:

"That Standing Orders 150 and 173A apply to all such Bills:

"That the Committee have power to send for persons, papers, and records:

"That four be the quorum of the Committee:

"That if the Committee shall report to the Committee of Selection shall there-clauses of any Bill referred to them (other than clauses containing police, sanitary or other local government regulations) are such as, having regard to the terms of reference, it is not in their opinion necessary or advisable for them to deal with, the Committee of Selection shall thereupon refer the Bill to a Select Committee, who shall consider those clauses, and so much of the preamble of the Bill as relates thereto, and shall determine the expenditure (if any) to be authorised in respect of the parts of the Bill referred to them. That the Committee shall deal with the remaining clauses of such Bill, and so much of the preamble as relates thereto, and shall determine the period and mode of repayment of any money authorised by the I Select Committee to be borrowed, and shall report the whole Bill to the House, stating in their report what parts of the Bill have been considered by each Committee:

"That the Committee have power, if they so determine, to sit as two Committees, and in that event to apportion the Bills referred to the Committee between the two Committees, each of which shall have the full powers of and be subject to the instructions which apply to the undivided Committee, and that four be the quorum of each of the two Committees."

I do not want to object to this Motion, but I want to ask the right hon. Gentleman what is meant by "or other local government regulations" which now appears in the resolution. Will he kindly explain what these regulations are?

Before the right hon. Gentleman answers that I should like to point out that this Motion appears in a very different form upon the paper to-day, from what it did last week, in making applicable to this Committee certain Standing Orders. I think we should have some explanation why the alteration is made!

This Motion appears precisely in the same form now as it appeared in previous years when moving that the Police and Sanitary Committee be appointed except in two particulars. One is with respect to the name. It is proposed to change the name from Police and Sanitary Committee to that of the Local Legislation Committee. This committee in the past has dealt not only with police and sanitary questions, but with streets, buildings, markets, and so forth, and, indeed, the Committee has supervised all kinds of local legislation, which deviate or are in excess of the ordinary law. We hope the new name of the Committee will smell more sweet. It is proposed also to insert the words "or other local government regulations." That is done in order to make it clear that the Committee shall have power to deal with these other local matters to which I have referred. So long as a Bill contained street or market provisions, or building provisions, it was referred heretofore to the Police and Sanitary Committee, but if a Bill consisted only of street and building provisions like the Liverpool Bill of last year, it could not be referred to that Committee because it contained neither police nor sanitary matters, and this Committee had to go to the House to get a special order committing the Bill to them. That was regarded as inconvenient, and, therefore, it is desirable that the Standing Committee should empower what was in the ordinary case arrived at. As my right hon. Friend has pointed out, this Motion, as it appeared on the Paper last week, proposed to apply to this Committee the Procedure of Private Bill Committee, providing that the Chairman should have a casting vote and that the Members should make a declaration that their Constituents were not interested in the matters that came before them. That form was better than now, but it appears that any such alteration would give rise to debate and controversy in this House, and it was, therefore, thought advisable to make the change in the form in which it now stands. For that reason, I move this Motion, and I believe it is generally agreed to on both sides of the House, and I hope it will be passed today as many matters are waiting to come before the Police and Sanitary Committee.

Motion agreed to.

Oral Answers to Questions

Questions

Army Reductions (Officers and Men)

asked the Secretary of State for War with reference to the proposed reduction of 82 officers, 3 warrant officers, and 153 sergeants, foreshadowed in the Army Estimates for this year, whether the reductions of 301 officers, t40 warrant officers, and 2,766 sergeants estimated for during the last three years have been carried out?

The hon. Member has apparently taken his figures for 1909–10 from Page 4 of the Army Estimate, but he will find on further reference to that page that these figures represent only the variation in the ranks concerned among certain large changes of establishment. Taking all changes into account, Vote A for 1909–10 shows an increase in these ranks on 1908–9 of 15 officers, 6 warrant officers, and 151 sergeants. The reductions approved during the last three years have been carried out by absorption, with the exception of a few warrant and non-commissioned officers, who will be absorbed as opportunity offers. I am not able to identify the particular figures quoted by the hon. Members for those years.

Regimental Recruits

asked the Secretary of State for War whether the marked increase in the number of recruits obtained in the regimental districts is sufficient to enable him to carry out an increase of the establishment of line battalions at Home to the standard of 1906–7?

The marked increase in the number of recruits has been accompanied by a no less marked decrease in the wastage. Consequently, it may turn out that the present establishment of the Home battalions will be sufficient to meet all requirements. This point cannot be determined until there has been some experience of the new condition of things, but it is not escaping attention.

Is it not a fact that with regard to infantry recruiting that, so far from being greater this year, there is simply a loss, as compared with the previous year, of 2,000?

No; there are 2,250 more recruits this year. In recruiting for the infantry there are fewer battalions than at one time, and consequently the distribution is different, but in proportion there are more recruits per battalion strength.

Territorials Camp (Question of Pay)

asked the Secretary of State for War whether, in view of the fact that many London employers have signified their willingness to give extra holidays on full pay, in addition to their army pay, to Territorials attending camp, he will endeavour to secure equally favourable treatment for Civil Servants by arranging that they shall receive both Civil and Army pay if they do their annual training outside their ordinary holiday.

I will answer this question. Civil Servants in the Territorial Force who attend camp for at least a fortnight will be allowed one week's leave on full Civil pay in addition to military pay. The second week will either be counted as ordinary leave on full pay or as special leave without Civil pay.

British and Foreign Officers Travelling

asked the Secretary of State for War whether the revised instructions for foreign officers tra-velling in certain parts of Germany, which are now being circulated in military and official circles, are being issued with his sanction; and whether he intends to issue revised instructions for foreign officers travelling in the United Kingdom.

The reply to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. The reply to the second part of the question is in the negative.

May I ask does the right hon. Gentleman adhere to the correctness of his answer to me in July last year that, provided you did not go near the fortifications in Germany you might sketch all over the country as far as he was aware?

There are some revised instructions; but, after all, they are not burdensome.

I do not think the right hon. Gentleman quite understood the meaning of my question. Does he still maintain that his answer to me on that occasion was correct?

As I have said, there have been some changes in the system since, but I do not think they are very material.

Before that, I am talking of. Does the right hon. Gentleman maintain that his answer to me was accurate and not misleading that you could go over the whole of Germany and sketch where you liked?

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether there is any substantial difference in the regulations between British officers in Germany and German officers in this country?

Yes, I think our regulations are somewhat less stringent; but I do not think there is any great difference.

I do not see that the smallest advantage is to be gained by saying that such proposals are taboo.

asked whether the revised rules for the guidance of British Offi-cers travelling in Germany require them to report their movements to the military authorities or the police in any place which they may visit; and whether it is intended to apply analagous regulations to German military officers travelling in the United Kingdom?

In reply to the first part of the question as regards Alsace Lorraine and Eastern Prussia the reply is in the affirmative, and as regards the rest of Germany the practice is recommended in order to conform with the local custom. The reply to the second part of the question is in the negative.

Bakers' Society (Fair Wages Clause)

asked the Secretary of State for War if his attention has been called to the complaint of the Bakers' Society respecting the violation of the fair wages clause, as entered upon the contract form agreed to by the contractor for bread supply to the barracks at Newcastle-on-Tyne; and what steps he proposes to take in the matter?

From the inquiries which have been made there does not appear to have been any infringement of the fair wages clause in the execution of the contract. I can give my hon. Friend details in the matter if he desires them.

Royal Irish Fusiliers

asked the Secretary of State for War how many sergeant-majors on full pay are connected with the depot of the Royal Irish Fusiliers at Armagh; how many are required for the work of the depot; what is the length of service of each sergeant-major connected with the depot; are any of them qualified for a warrant officer's full pension; if so, why are; any so qualified retained on full pay, seeing that one sergeant-major is now, and has been for some time, on indefinite furlough; whether there are warrant officers' quarters in barracks vacant; and, if so, why one of the sergeant-majors is permitted to reside out of barracks and draw lodging allowance?

There are three sergeant-majors present at the headquarters of the 3rd Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers at Armagh, of whom two are supernumerary to establishment. They have 23 years, 130 days; 22 years, 129 days; 23 years, 124 days service respectively. A warrant officer is not qualified for a full pension as such until he has completed 30 years' service, of which five years must be in the rank of warrant officer. All these warrant officers are now at duty. There is no warrant officer's quarter vacant.

Bulford Camp

asked whether any money has been spent, and, if so, what amount, on the cavalry officers' quarters at Bulford during the last eight months?

There are no cavalry officers' quarters at Bulford. No cavalry are stationed there.

Canterbury Cavalry Depot

asked what was the average yearly cost of the cavalry depot at Canterbury, including the contribution paid by the Indian Government, during the last ten years of its existence, the estimated yearly cost of the proposed new cavalry depots, and where will they be located?

The cost of the cavalry depot at Canterbury, which was abolished as a general depot for regiments in India in 1897, cannot be obtained without laborious investigation, and as the functions of that depot were entirely different from those of the proposed new depots, no useful purpose would appear to be served by making the comparison of cost. The localities of the new depots have not been finally settled.

Territorial Forces (Clothing Contracts)

asked whether in the clothing contracts for the Territorial Forces, as in the War Office contracts, there is a condition that all the clothing shall be made on the contractor's own premises; and, if so, whether steps will be taken by the County Associations to ensure that such condition will be observed?

:I have suggested to all county associations that they should in their forms of tender adopt the same clause as to sub-letting and fair wages as is adopted by the War Office; but, as I have already informed the hon. Member, it is not practicable to interfere with their discretion.

Territorial Army Horses

asked how many horses are required for horse and field artillery respectively of the Territorial Army on a peace footing; and how many have been actually secured?

The horse and field artillery of the Territorial Force have no permanent establishment of horses on a peace footing. Horses for the annual training in camp are allowed at the rate of 117 per horse artillery and 78 per field artillery battery. These horses are provided by the County Associations out of the grants for the purpose under paragraph 642, Territorial Regulations.

Field Artillery Practice

asked whether, to parade one battery of regular field artillery for shell practice under service conditions at artillery practice camps, the horses of the two other batteries are required and are actually used?

It is not essential for shell practice that a battery of Royal Field Artillery should utilise the horses of the other two batteries of the brigade, but whenever possible it is desirable that batteries should practice with the firing battery complete in horses. This is arranged as a rule by sending two brigades of field artillery to a practice camp simultaneously.

Army Gymnastic Apparatus

asked whether any contract for the supply of wall bars, beams, etc., to the military depot gymnasiums throughout the United Kingdom has recently been placed abroad; and, if so, with what firm or firms and for what reason?

An order for Swedish gymnastic apparatus was recently placed with a Swedish firm, as the apparatus submitted by them was considered more suitable for the requirements of the service than the apparatus submitted by others.

Is it not the fact that the apparatus referred to in the question can be made by an ordinary carpenter quite as efficiently and more cheaply than it can be made by the foreigner?

No, it is not the fact. It is a special Swedish apparatus made only by these people. It is rather dearer than the apparatus here, too. We think the apparatus can be better made by these firms.

Can the right hon. Gentleman give us the difference of the cost between the two?

I cannot tell, but I should doubt very much whether it was. In these exercises the Swedes have been ahead of us.

If it is not the subject of a patent, surely it can be made by English as well as Swedish artificers?

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether there would not be a certain element of danger in using these things made in England?

I do not think there would be any element of danger. The real reason is we do not know how to make these things very well. The Swedes have brought Swedish exercises and training to a pitch of perfection which we have not yet reached, but which we hope to reach.

asked the Secretary of State for War if he will state how many sets of gymnastic apparatus there are at the headquarters gymnasium at Aldershot; how many, if any, of such sets have been supplied by foreign firms; and can he say whether superiority in style, finish, and durability is found to rest with the home-made or with the foreign-made apparatus?

In addition to the ordinary gymnastic fittings, Swedish apparatus, made by a Swedish firm, has recently been introduced at the headquarters gymnasium at Aldershot, and is considered better in finish and lasting qualities and more suitable to the requirements of the Service than the other apparatus which has been tried.

Do I understand that in durability the apparatus is better than the home-made article?

Then is the House to understand that not only do we go abroad for these things but pay more for them?

My hon. and gallant Friend has got Protection on the brain. It is efficiency we want.

Native Administration in Natal

asked if any notice has been taken by the Colonial Office of a petition presented to this House on 25th November last praying that an inquiry be made into certain allegations made in the petition respecting native adminstration in Natal; if the petition has been referred to any person or persons for inquiry and report; and if any reply will be made to the House to the allegations made?

I am not in a position at present to add anything to my reply to a similar question last Monday put by hon. Friend the Member for South Salford.

Is the right hon. Gentleman forgetting the very important Report of the Committee upon native affairs in Natal, and is it to be altogether ignored?

Oh, no; I am not forgetting that at all, but I am not in a position to say anything about it. I hope to be able to do so before long.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the question of the hon. Member for North Cork relates to a totally different matter to that referred to in mine?

If that be so, I am afraid I cannot add anything to my answer with regard to the question which my hon. Friend puts, with regard to which I am fully conversant. I am not in a position to say anything at present, but I hope to be able to do so before long.

Are we, then, to gather that the petition has been referred to someone?

Rhodesia (Gold and Silver Output)

asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he can state the annual output of gold and silver in Rhodesia for the last 10 years, and the output of coal and lead for the last five years.

The figures are somewhat long for an oral reply, so perhaps my Friend will permit me to circulate them with the Votes.

Transvaal (Native and Chinese Labour)

asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he can state the annual increase in the supply of native labour in the Transvaal and the decrease of Chinese labour since the termination of the war in South Africa; the annual output of gold in the Transvaal during the last 10 years; the average profits earned annually during the last five years by producing companies; and the numbers of tons crushed annually during the same period.

Full figures of native and Chinese labour employed in gold mining up to March, 1907, are given at Page 182 of Cd. 3,528. In December, 1907, there were 129,618 natives and 37,118 Chinese employed; in December, 1908, there were 164,826 natives and 12,275 Chinese. The annual gold production of the Transvaal to the end of June, 1906, will be found at page 153 of the same Blue Book. In the statistical year 1906–7 it was £26,640,490; in 1907–8, £28,508,368.

The following are the profits of gold-mining companies as assessed for the profits tax:—

Will the hon. Gentleman have the answer printed? It is very important.

And the number of persons who have been ruined in consequence of the removal of Chinese labour?

Australian Canned Meat

asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies whether the War Office have placed orders for canned meat with Australian firms; and, if not, whether he will state the reason, in view of the quality of the Australian goods in question?

It is the practice of the War Office to invite Australian firms to tender for supplies of canned meat, and also to furnish the various Agents-General with tender forms for distribution in Australia. Ample par- ticulars are given and full time allowed for consideration and return of tenders, but the responses are fewer than I should like to see. On the last occasion no Australian firm tendered.

asked the First Commissioner of Works whether his attention has been drawn to a scheme which is being put forward for alterations on a large scale in St. James's Park and the Horse Guards' Parade; whether it has been submitted to and considered by him; and whether he has any intention of adopting or recommending these alterations?

I have seen some reference in the Press to this scheme, but I have seen no official representation on the subject. I am sure that my honourable Friend and other Members will be relieved to hear that I have not the slightest intention of doing anything to destroy the historic associations or the present beauties of one of the most charming of the London parks.

Contractors (Messrs. Clarkson & Sons)

asked whether the firm of Messrs. Clarkson and Sons, carmen and contractors, have been struck off the list of Government contractors for his Department; if so, what was the nature of the alleged irregularities charged against them; and is it proposed to take further action in the matter?

For some time I have suspected that Messrs. Clarkson, who, for many years, have held the cartage contract for the Royal Parks, and who, I understand, have contracts with the London County Council, the Lambeth Borough Council, the Holborn District Council, and the St. Pancras District Council, were not paying their carters the wages which were specified in the contract. I had great difficulty in securing evidence of this, but during the last three months I obtained information which convinced me of this fact, and also that Messrs. Clarkson had given gratuities in the nature of bribes to at least two of my employés in the parks. Within a few hours of definitely obtaining this information, I saw Messrs. Clarkson, cancelled their contract, warned them that their carts would not be admitted into any of the Royal Parks on the following morning, and forfeited a considerable sum of money owing to them, a part of which I hope, with the permission of the Treasury, to distribute amongst the employés who have been defrauded by Messrs. Clarkson of the wages to which they were entitled.

Would the right hon. Gentleman be good enough, as he has named the London County Council, to communicate the facts which have come to his knowledge to that body?

My answer to-day will be a communication to them, and I will afford them any information they like to ask for.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that when we brought it before the County Council it was laughed at?

Why was it that the right hon. Gentleman found such difficulty in getting this evidence? Was it due to the fact that Englishmen are not allowed to do what they have a legal right to do—namely, to give evidence on their own behalf?

No. The difficulty was the unwillingness of employés to give the evidence which I wanted against their employers.

Will the right hon. Gentleman send the whole thing back to the Borough Council, so that they may deal with it?

No. I do not think that is my duty. I have acted so far as I am concerned.

Royal Marines

asked what is the total number of Royal Marines on ships manned by nucleus crews; and by how much is this number short of the full complement for these vessels?

The answer to the first part of the question is:— As regards the second part, the figures for these vessels with full complement are:—

asked by how much the strength of the Royal Marines on the Chatham, Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Eastney Divisions was on 15th February below the full establishment as provided for in the last Estimates; and whether any difficulty has been experienced in obtaining recruits for the service?

The numbers voted in Estimates for 1908–09 were:—R.M.A., 3,482; R.M.L.I., 13,754; total, 17,236. The numbers below those voted were, en 13th February, 1909:—R.M.A., 143; R.M.L.I., 316; total, 464. During the last two years it has not been easy to obtain recruits of desirable educational ability and with the physique required. To meet the wastage it became necessary to lower the physical standard more than once during that period.

Not to my knowledge. It is only lower with regard to the light infantry.

Is it the policy of the Admiralty to reduce the establishment to the lowest figures?

H.M.S. "Benbow's" Ammunition

asked whether the battleship "Benbow" was placed in the sale list this year; and how many rounds of ammunition for her two 16.25-inch guns were left over at the time?

The decision to sell the "Benbow" was taken late in last year, but the ship is not to be sold till 1909–10. The full equipment of ammunition for the two 16.25-inch guns of H.M.S. "Benbow" is available.

As there are no more of these guns in the service, and as the information cannot be considered confidential, cannot the hon. Gentleman say as to the number of rounds, which is the specific I point I asked him?

I am afraid it would not be in the public interest to make that statement. In any case it loes not arise, because the vessel will not be sold until the next financial year.

What is there confidential about it? There are no more of these guns in the service.

Shipbuilding and Unemployment

asked whether the orders for five cruisers of last year's programme were expedited in order to relieve unemployment; and, if so, on what dates they were laid down?

The arrangements in connection with placing the orders for the five cruisers of the current year's programme were expedited for the reason suggested; the orders were placed in November last. The keel of the "Liverpool" was laid at Barrow on the 17th ultimo. No report that the others have been laid down has been yet received. It should be understood, however, that the actual ceremony of laying the keel is not always a correct indication of the amount of work carried out in connection with the building of a vessel.

Can it really be said that vessels have been expedited which have not even been laid down in this financial year? And is the Admiralty responsible for the delay by changes of design or anything?

With regard to the question of delay, as I have said, the orders were placed in November last, and the vessels had to be completed in 21 months from the beginning of this year. There is no delay in the matter at all.

May I ask whether any of the workmen who were told they would benefit by getting their wages earlier will be benefited?

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he is aware that shipwrights employed in His Majesty's Dockyard at Pembroke are working overtime; and whether, in view of the number of unemployed, he will take steps to have more men engaged and thus obviate the necessity for overtime being worked.

Overtime by shipwrights has only been worked casually, in order to complete work for docking operations, and as necessary during steam trials. At present no overtime is being worked by shipwrights at this dockyard.

Admiralty Stores

asked if the Victualling Department of the Admiralty has now re-established the full war reserve of preserved meat, which was largely depleted owing to the quality of those stores having been seriously impugned at the time of the public anxiety owing to the revelations as to the Chicago methods of meat preservation?

Naval Works (Granite)

asked if the Government will consider the propriety of appointing a Departmental Committee of experts drawn from the Geological Survey, and similar sources of competent opinions, to report upon the structure and uniformity of composition of the granites used for naval works, with a view to determining the most consistent and resistent type suitable for harbour and defence works?

The Admiralty, profiting by the considerable experience they have obtained since 1896 onwards in large works at Keyham, Dover, Gibraltar, Chatham, and the Cape, do not propose to appoint a Committee, as they are satisfied that granite suitable for their purposes can be obtained from many sources.

asked the names of the Scandinavian quarries from which granite has been taken in preference to granite from the Irish and British quarries in works already carried out for the Admiralty, and the names of the persons having large pecuniary interests in the Norwegian quarries to which this preference has been given?

As a result of the hon. Gentleman's request of 25th February, we have given the matter consideration, and have come to the conclusion that the amount of time and labour involved in the collection of the information asked for would be more than the Admiralty could properly undertake, particularly since it is to be doubted whether full and accurate information on the point is obtainable.

Are we to understand that the mere names of the persons supplying the granite cannot be given?

The hon. Member has asked the names of the Scandinavian quarries. There is no trouble in giving those names.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he will request the Government contractor to supply the Admiralty, for the purposes of information to the House of Commons, with the names of the Scandinavian quarries from which granite is to be taken for works to be carried out for the Admiralty, and the names of the persons having large pecuniary interests in those quarries?

The Admiralty do not consider it desirable to call upon contractors for such information regarding the supply of materials for their contracts.

May I ask why my hon. Friend does not answer this question as to those having a pecuniary interest in the quarries in question, as in the absence of an answer a very sinister construction may be put on the action of these independent men, who are getting money into their own pocket?

The matter is in the hands of the main contractor. He has to tender at alternative prices for British and foreign granite. He has done so, and if the granite is up to sample it will be approved of.

May we not have the names of the Scandinavian quarries? Where is the mystery of that?

The matter is in the hands of the contractor. We followed the practice which has been followed since 1896, when the late Government disposed of the contract for the Keyham Dock, on I which foreign granite was used. We invite tenders for the main work, inviting the contractor to tender at alternative prices for British and foreign granite. He does that, and if his sample is approved of by us he goes on with the work.

Is it possible that the Admiralty does not know the quarry from which this stone comes?

Is it a fact that the Government stipulate for certain British and Scotch quarries, and do not stipulate generally, so as to allow others to be allowed to supply the stone required?

No; I do not. The matter of the granite is entirely in the hands of the contractor. It always has been.

Is the main contractor allowed to sublet the work or has he to get the approval of the Admiralty before he can sublet?

I should like to I look into the terms under which he is invited to tender before answering that.

You have not answered my question as to whether the Admiralty do not stipulate that certain British owners of quarries only are to contract to the Admiralty, instead of leaving it open to all quarry-owners to tender? Is there any restriction to the names of certain British quarry-owners?

No. I may say at once that there is not. I may repeat again that the matter is in the hands of the mam contractor to select his quarries, with the alternative prices. It is not correct to say if he sends in tenders for British or Scottish granite that the stone must come only from certain quarries. That is not the case.

Keyham Dock Extension (Granite)

asked the place of origin of the granite used in the Keyham Dock extension at Devon-port, the name of the contractor, the amount and date of the contract, and whether any stipulation was inserted therein that British or Irish granite should be used?

The Admiralty do not know the place of origin of the granite for Keyham, except that it came from abroad—probably Norway. The contractors for the Keyham Dockyard Extension were Sir John Jackson, Limited. The original contract was made on the 1st January, 1896, for a sum of about £2,940,000; later, further works were ordered, costing altogether about £483,000. No stipulation was made as to source of supply of the granite.

Is it not a fact that Sir John Jackson stood as a Tariff Reform candidate at the last election?

Is he not a political opponent of the hon. Gentleman who asks the question?

Can the right hon. Gentleman say what was the state of employment in 1896 when the granite for Keyham was ordered as compared with the state of employment now existing?

Have the Admiralty any reports from their experts on the various qualities of granite to be supplied under these contracts and a comparison between British and foreign granites?

I should like to ask notice of that. All I know is that under the terms of the contract they are asked to supply alternative quotations for these granites, and, whichever is accepted, they have to come up to sample.

Was the sample of which we have heard this afternoon English or foreign?

In the case of Rosyth it will be foreign. It has to come up to this standard because we have accepted the foreign granite.

Have not the conditions of transit a good deal to say to this question of price?

A great deal of testimony has come into my hands to the effect that no convict labour has ever been employed in the Norwegian granite export industry. The workmen have their own trades union. Every worker is paid under a scale agreed on between the employers and the trades unions. The scale is revised every two or three years. There is no sweated labour in the existing Norwegian trades unions. The fact that the Norwegian quarries are close to the deep-sea fiords enables the producers to transfer the granite direct to Norwegian vessels and to carry it here at very small freights, which give an advantage to the Norwegian quarry-owners, whereas in this country the question of freightage is a considerable handicap to quarry-owners; and, in addition, I am rather inclined personally to think that the question of rentals and mining royalties also operates as a handicap.

Closing Coastguard Stations

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, in view of the possible increase in the practice of smuggling under the protective tariff that it is intended to impose on this country, he will reconsider the policy of closing coastguard stations and detachments?

When, if ever, we find ourselves within a measurable distance of the contingency contemplated, it may be desirable to give fresh consideration to this matter.

Damage to Nets by Warships

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he has received any claim from David Parker, of Cellardyke, skipper of the fishing boat "John and Agnes" ML. 95, who has lost the whole of his nets to the value of £25, having been cut away by the ships of His Majesty's Fleet between 3 a.m. and 4 a.m. on the 3rd instant; whether he will favourably consider this claim, and will further compensate him for the loss of his time while deprived of his means of livelihood; and whether he can now see his way to taking any steps towards safeguarding the lives and property of the fishermen in the Firth of Forth?

The claim has been received and inquiries are being made. If the claim is substantiated as a result of these inquiries, and it is clear that there was no negligence on the part of the fisherman, it would be in accordance with Admiralty practice to grant reasonable compensation. With regard to the last part of the question, I must refer the hon. and gallant Member to the answer given to his question of 25th February. There has been no danger to life so far as the Admiralty are aware.

If the charts are not ready by the time the squadron goes into these waters, I will: undertake that the Commander-in-Chief has placed before him the representations-made by the hon. and gallant gentleman.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the Fleet is now in these waters?

Unemployed Demonstrations (Assaults in Berkeley Square)

I desire to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he is aware that on Wednesday, 20th January last, on the occasion of an unemployed demonstration to Berkeley Square, during the time the people were in the square the police took it upon themselves to break up several banners belonging to the organised workers, and assaulted Mr. Greenwood their leader and other persons; and if he will have inquiry made into the matter?

The Commissioner of Police informs me that on the day in question a body of unemployed marched to Berkeley Square and1 halted at one corner in the middle of the roadway, when Mr. Greenwood, one of their leaders, began to address them. He was informed by the police that a meeting could not be allowed there, as traffic was-being completely obstructed, but he persisted and had to be stopped and escorted out of the square by the police, whereupon the crowd became disorderly and had to be dispersed. In the scuffle the poles of a banner were broken. The Commissioner assures me that no unnecessary force was-used in preserving order, and I see no ground for any further inquiry.

Is it not a fact that meetings are held there for the promotion of religious and temperance principles?

Poor Law Commission Report

Will the right hon. Gentleman state whether he can arrange for a cheap issue of the Report of the Poor Law Commission, to be got out at an early date, for distribution to working men's clubs, reading rooms, and other similar institutes?

Arrangements have been made for the issue in a handy form of a cheap edition of the Report of the Poor Law Commission. The edition will be in three volumes, costing 1s. 6d., 9d., and 1s. 9d. respectively. It is hoped to have the books available for the public by the middle of next month.

Moneylenders' Advertisements

asked whether the right hon. Gentleman's attention had been called to the increase in the number of circulars and advertisements issued by moneylenders, and to the increasing ingenuity and frequent illegality of the arguments and inducements by which they endeavour to get persons to apply to them for loans; whether he will submit to the Law Officers the question whether any of these circulars constitute infractions of the banking laws and other statutes; whether, having regard to the fact that many of the advertisements of these moneylenders are constantly inserted in newspapers all over the country, he will call the attention of the Public Prosecutor to any such advertisements which suggest illegal proceedings; and whether he will consider the advisability of including provisions as to such advertisements in any legislation to restrain lotteries and indecent advertisements, or otherwise deal with this matter by legislation?

I do not know what particular class of moneylenders' circulars my hon. Friend refers to; if he will send me any circulars which appear to him to constitute infringement of the law, I will look into the matter. I do not think this question can be dealt with in a Bill relating to lotteries or indecent publications.

Fatal Accidents (Mills, Factories, Mines, etc.)

asked whether he can state at what part of the working day the greatest number of fatal accidents occur in mills, factories, mines, etc.?

There are no full statistics on this subject as regards factories, but the hon. Member will find in the Annual Report of the Chief Inspector for 1902 the results of an analysis of the figures in certain sample districts, which showed that the greatest number of accidents happened between 11 a.m. and 12 noon. It would not be safe, however, to base any inferences on these results. As regards mines, the annual reports for 1890 to 1895 contain statistics showing the hours of the shift in which accidents happened; the second to the sixth hours of the shift were the hours in which most accidents occurred.

Post Office and National Telephone Company

I wish to ask the Postmaster-General whether he is in a position to make a public statement as to the present position of the negotiations between the National Telephone Company and the Post Office to insure the uninterrupted continuance of the work of telephone construction; and whether, having regard to the recent large number of discharges of the company's telephone construction staff within the Glasgow area, he can expedite the negotiations at present in progress?

The negotiations between the National Telephone Company and the Post Office with regard to arrangements for the continuance of construction works are proceeding. I am not at present in a position to make a statement on the subject. I am informed that since the beginning of the year the National Telephone Company have discharged 17 men at Glasgow, but, of these, 6 have been re-employed by the company, 4 have entered private employment, and 6 have been employed by the Post Office. The only man who is at present unemployed had been only three months in the company's service.

What reason did the National Telephone Company give for discharging these men?

Loss of "Isle of Erin."

asked the President of the Board of Trade if he can now state the result of the inquiry into the loss of the "Isle of Erin"?

The inquiry into the loss of the "Isle of Erin" has not yet been held. The vessel was posted as missing on 17th February, and the date of the inquiry will be fixed as soon as possible.

Importation of Raw Cocoa (Slave Labour)

I desire to ask the Prime Minister whether the Government intends to take any steps to prevent or restrict the importation into country of raw cocoa grown in countries where slave labour is employed?

His Majesty's Government are anxious to take any steps that may be possible to discourage the use of slave labour for the production of cocoa, but they are not prepared, without further consideration, to undertake to adopt the method suggested by the hon. Member.

Is it not a fact that the British Government have advised British cocoa manufacturers to continue the use of slave labour?

Will the Prime Minister state whether the Government will be prepared to give instructions that no contractor shall be permitted to tender for the supply of cocoa or chocolate to any Government Department unless the contractor is prepared to give an undertaking that no raw cocoa produced by slave labour is used in the works of that contractor?

I am informed that no slave labour is employed in the production of the cocoa supplied to the Admiralty and the War Office, and there would, therefore, seem to be no occasion for making representations in the sense suggested in the hon. Member's question.

Is it not a fact that slave-grown cocoa has largely contributed to the rise of the Supplementary Estimate for Prisons?

The Home Secretary informs me that the prison cocoa is obtained from the Admiralty, and therefore my answer would apply to that as well.

The Budget (Date of Introduction)

Will the Prime Minister state whether he can indicate the date on which the Budget will be introduced?

No, Sir. I am not in a position to make any statement at present; but, in any case, the Budget cannot be taken before the 31st of March.

Outrages with Firearms (Ireland)

Is the Prime Minister aware that, since the expiry of the Peace Preservation Act, there has been a large increase in the number of outrages with firearms in Ireland; that at the Clare Assizes on Tuesday last Mr. Justice Wright drew attention to the practice of carrying revolvers by persons who used them for the purpose of terrorising individuals, and the Grand Jury adopted a resolution requesting the Executive Government to take immediate steps to check the unlicensed and unregistered sale of firearms; and whether, having regard to the fact that in Ireland there are fewer restrictions upon the indiscriminate sale and use of firearms than in any part of the United Kingdom, he will take steps to ensure that the question of adopting more stringent measures to check the growing practice of carrying firearms shall be treated by the Government as a matter of urgency?

My right hon. Friend has asked me to answer this question. There has been an increase in the number of offences in which firearms were used in Ireland, but it is impossible to say what proportion, if any, of the increase has been due to the expiry of the Peace Preservation Act. Mr. Justice Wright is reported to have made remarks at Clare Assizes to the effect stated in the question, and the Grand Jury passed the resolution referred to. His Majesty's Government are at present giving careful consideration to the question whether legislation should be undertaken with the object of restricting the possession of firearms in the United Kingdom generally.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that Mr. Justice Wright received white gloves, there being no crime whatever in Limerick; and does he know that Mr. Justice Wright is the fourth judge on this circuit who has received white gloves?

Does the right hon. Gentleman know that in the county of Clare in three instances at the last assizes juries refused to convict persons charged with carrying arms to the terror of the public?

Negotiation of Treaties with Foreign Governments

asked the Prime Minister whether, having regard to the fact that in the negotiations of the treaty between the United States and Great Britain recently ratified, the advice of the Dominion Government, the question being one of special Canadian interest, was sought and followed throughout by Great Britain; that the result of the correspondence in 1880 and 1881 between Sir A. T. Galt, on behalf of Canada, and the Colonial and Foreign Officers resulted in the Imperial Government consenting that the Government of Canada should be relieved from the obligation of new treaties with Foreign Powers to which objection was taken, and that Canada should have the option of acceptance or refusal, the time has now come for the concession to Canada by the Imperial Government of all the necessary powers to enable the Government of the Dominion to enter into direct communication with other British possessions and with Foreign Powers for the purpose of extending the trade and commerce of Canada abroad?

The Canadian Government already does negotiate with other British possessions. Sir W. Laurier about a year ago in the Canadian Parliament expressed himself as quite satisfied with the present practice of negotiating treaties with foreign Governments through His Majesty's Government, and I believe it would be impossible for any other arrangement to secure fuller and more effective presentation of Canadian views and wishes than has been obtained in recent negotiations about matters of Canadian interest with France, the United States, and Japan.

Tariff Schedules and British Goods

I desire to ask the President of the Board of Trade what action has been taken towards making representations to foreign friendly Governments with a view to securing that their ministers and officials should not interpret their tariff schedules so as to require that British goods which have been properly consigned under one class shall pay the higher duties levied for another class, and with what result?

Representations are frequently made through His Majesty's Embassies and Legations abroad in such cases in support of appeals against the decisions of subordinate Customs officials. The result, of course, depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. His Majesty's Government cannot influence the decisions of the foreign boards dealing with these matters, but they can and do take steps to secure a fair hearing.

French Treaty of Commerce

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that the Associated Chambers of Commerce have passed a resolution asking His Majesty's Government to try to arrange a treaty of commerce with France on the basis of equality of treatment of French and British manufactures in each country; and whether any steps have been or will be taken to open up negotiations with the French Government on this subject?

I am aware that the Associated Chambers of Commerce passed more than one resolution with regard to the French tariff proposals. The Board of Trade are not at present prepared to make any statement in reply to the second part of the question.

Norwegian Granite

Will the President of the Board of Trade state whether he can inform the House what duty is imposed in Norway upon granite imported from Great Britain; and whether he will negotiate for the abolition or reduction of such duty, in view of the treatment shown Norwegian granite producers in this country?

No duty is leviable on granite in the form of rough hewn blocks or paving stones which may be imported into Norway from the United Kingdom. There are, however, duties on dressed or polished manufactures of marble, granite, and other stones.

Would it not be possible for the right hon. Gentleman, in referring to retaliation to make use of this instance of Norway?

All-Red Route

I wish to ask the President of the Board of Trade whether he can inform the House what stage the negotiations for the All-Red Route have reached?

I am not yet in a position to make any statement on this subject, which is still under consideration.

Life-Saving Rockets

Has the right hon. Gentleman arrived at any decision as to the advisability of making it compulsory for British ships to carry a life-saving rocket, or some such apparatus, for throwing a line from a ship to another ship or to a shore; and, if not, will he state the result of the specially appointed subcommittee's deliberations and recommendations?

The Report of the Committee has been received, and is being presented to Parliament. The recommendations made in the Report will receive the careful consideration of the Board of Trade.

Agriculturists' Grievances (Scotland)

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, at the recent Railway Conference, any redress of the grievances of traders and agriculturists in Scotland caused by the new rules of the Scotch companies as to demurrage charges and liability of consignors of goods has been secured; and, if so, will he state what the arrangement is?

I presume my hon. Friend refers to the meeting over which I presided at the Board of Trade for the discussion between representatives of various trades and certain Scottish railway companies of difficulties in regard to charges for demurrage of waggons and siding rent. No final agreement as regards the charges for demurrage and siding rent was reached at that meeting, but it was arranged that each of the trades concerned should form a small representative committee to negotiate with the railway companies so far as the particular trade is concerned, and these negotiations are now proceeding. The companies withdrew their demand that the consignor should sign a document admitting liability for detention of waggons by the consignee.

Arbroath Pension Case

asked the President of the Local Government Board whether he is aware that an old lady who applied for a pension in Arbroath has been refused, on the ground that her income exceeds £31 10s., the facts being that this old lady lives with a married daughter whose husband is in receipt of more than £200 per year, and for the domestic services of the mother the daughter gives her board and lodging; whether he is aware that board and lodging for women in Arbroath is valued at 6s. per week; and whether he can take any action in this matter.

Workhouse Infants' Death Rate

asked the President of the Local Government Board whether his attention has been called to the death rate of infants born in workhouses and infants in workhouse nurseries, as set forth in the Minority Report of the Royal Commission; how the death rate figures in such cases compare with the ordinary figures of infant mortality; and whether he proposes any immediate remedial measures?

I have seen the figures on this subject in the Minority Report of the Royal Commission. I do not think that these figures can properly be compared with the ordinary figures of infant mortality. For, as the authors of the Minority Report themselves recognise, it is never satisfactory to compare the mortality rates of institutions having only limited numbers of inmates placed under exceptional circumstances and having peculiar antecedents with those of the population at large. The subject is one of much importance, and I am causing it to be carefully examined.

Vatersay Crofters

asked the Lord Advocate what number of crofters can be provided with crofts of suitable size on the farm of Vatersay recently purchased by the Government; for how many of these crofts can an adequate supply of water be obtained on the island; and what is the estimated cost?

Full particulars of the scheme of settlement will be made public as soon as practicable; but it is not possible to give accurate figures at present; and I consider it undesirable to give estimates. At the same time I may assure the hon. Gentleman that a water supply adequate for the number of settlers will be provided and that it will be obtained on the island.

May I ask whether it is intended to publish a continuation of the paper that we had?

asked the Lord Advocate whether the Island of Vatersay will be placed under the administration of the Congested Districts Board; what steps are being taken to provide an adequate water supply; and what arrangements have been made for the education of the children there?

The answer to the first part of the hon. Member's question is in the affirmative. The answer to the second part is contained in reply to the hon. Member for North Ayrshire. As to education, the responsibility for due provision of facilities rests with the School Board of Barra, with which arrangements are being made by the Scotch Education Department and the Congested Districts Board.

Small Holdings (Essex)

asked the hon. Member for South Somerset, as representing the President of the Board of Agriculture, if he will state the number of applicants for small holdings in Essex, and the acreage of land applied for; the number of applicants approved, and the amount of land agreed by the County Council as suitable and sufficient, having regard to the means at their disposal; whether any applicants for small holdings in Essex have been provided with land or cottages, and, if so, particulars of such with the names of the men; and what steps, if any, are now being taken to meet the demand of the applicants for small holdings in Essex?

Four hundred and sixty-one applications have been received for 7,980 acres; of these 210 have been approved for 2,785 acres. Thirteen of the applicants have been provided with 190 acres by the County Council and 21 others with 568 acres by private arrangement. The Council have also either agreed to acquire or are in negotiation for nearly 1,000 acres more in different parts of the county. They are making inquiries as to the acquisition of the remainder of the land required to satisfy the approved demand. I shall be glad to send my hon. Friend detailed particulars of the 34 cases to which I have referred.

Elementary School Code (Assistant Masters, and Teachers)

asked the President of the Board of Education, if his attention has been called to hardships suffered by assistant masters and teachers having been reported to education committees without their knowledge; and whether it is his intention to so amend the elementary school code that, where a head teacher sends in any report to a committee on the character or conduct of such persons, a copy of such report shall be supplied to the person so affected and an opportunity given for a defence?

This matter is mainly one of internal administration and is, I believe, dealt with by some local education authorities in their regulations or standing orders. My right hon. Friend does not think it is a subject on which definite rules can properly be laid down in the Code.

Clergy Easter Offerings and Income Tax

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if his attention has been called to the fact that, as a result of a recent decision in the House of Lords, by which it is laid down that Easter offerings to clergy are liable to Income Tax, payment of such tax is now being demanded on Easter offerings which were made as much as nine years ago; and if he will issue instructions to the effect that the decision is not to be considered as taking effect retrospectively?

The question as to the liability of voluntary Easter offerings to Income Tax has been in dispute since the year 1903–4, and was finally decided by the House of Lords in December last. In consequence of that judgment payment of the tax is now being demanded in these cases only in which valid assessments upon such Easter offerings have been held in abeyance pending the final decision of the Courts. With one exception, the arrears do not, so far as can be traced, extend back beyond 1903–4; and in that instance the previous arrears were held over by arrangement.

Will the right hon. Gentleman answer the last part of the question?

I think it is a matter of arrangement in these cases; we must stand by the arrangement.

Old Age Pensioners (Ireland and Scotland)

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what are the numbers of old age pensioners in Ireland and Scotland, respectively?

The number of persons in Ireland and Scotland respectively to whom pensions were payable at the end of February were:—

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether pension officers in Ireland are required to make investigations into each individual case; and whether this practice, which obtains in Scotland, is departed from in Ireland1?

The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative; the answer to the second part of the question is in the negative.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the instructions given to revenue officers in Ireland with respect to their duties in connection with old age pensions differ from similar instructions given in Scotland?

Refusal of Cheque by Income Tax Collector

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if an Income Tax collector is entitled to refuse the cheque of an Income Tax payer on the ground that such cheque is drawn to the Commissioners of Inland Revenue?

Has the right hon. Gentleman's attention been called to the fact that cheques have been refused, and will any steps be taken?

Rand Gold Mines (Native and Chinese Labour)

asked whether the figures the Parliamentary Under-Secretary gave last Monday in this House in reply to the hon. Member for Droitwich, concerning the increase of whites on the gold mines of the Rand since the beginning of the repatriation of the Chinese were correct; or, if it is the case that he overstated the increase; and will he now give the exact figures; and, at the same time, say how many natives and Chinese together were employed on the gold mines of the Rand in January, 1907, and in December, 1908, respectively, and also give the number of whites employed on the same area at the same periods of time?

There was a material error in one figure in the list of figures I read out to the House in reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Droitwich last week. I was asked whether the decrease in the number of Chinese had been accompanied by an increase in the number of whites, and I gave the figures for January, 1907, and December of last year. In taking out the total of white men employed for the former date, gold mines only were taken, whereas the total for the latter date, given as 21,277, included all other mines, such as coal and diamond mines. The reply, therefore, made the increase much larger than it should be. The correct figures should have been:—

It will be observed that the figures for whites are different to those I have just given. This is because the Witwatersrand gold mines are referred to by the hon. Gentleman, while the previous figures are for the gold mines of the Transvaal.

I regret extremely that this mistake should have occurred, and I am much obliged to the hon. Gentleman opposite for drawing my attention to it, and kindly consenting to put this question to me as I asked him, in order that I might give the correction the same publicity as the original error. The pressure of work in connection with South African affairs has been considerable during the last few weeks, and the number of figures to be verified in reply to questions on all subjects has been very great. For instance, I have been asked to give no fewer than 76 figures to-day, and the task of verifying them in every case is very great. However, whatever blame attaches is entirely mine, and I can only say that I am glad to have been able to correct the mistake without loss of time.

Course of Business

Can the Prime Minister now state the character of the Motion which he proposed to move tomorrow in relation to Supply?

We have decided to use the ordinary forms of the House, and to ask the House to suspend the Eleven o'clock Rule with reference to Supply on any day that it is deemed necessary without bringing in a special Motion at the present time. For instance, we may move the suspension to-morrow and Wednesday, in order to secure the Army Votes in Committee and on the Report Stage respectively. I propose to put down to-morrow (Tuesday) as the first order Army Votes A and I, if we do not secure them at to-day's sitting.

Navy Estimates

Is it the fact that the Navy Estimates have now been presented in dummy, and may we hope to have them circulated before Saturday next? I understand the promise was that they were to be circulated by Saturday next.

We are making every effort, and I have some hope—I do not pledge myself—that they will be circulated on Friday evening; at any rate, I think I may say that the Memorandum of the First Lord will be circulated before that day.

How many days will elapse between the publication of the Navy Estimates and their discussion?

I am not in a position to make a statement on the subject at present.

Consolidated Fund (No. 1) Bill

Does the right hon. Gentleman propose to proceed with the Consolidated Fund (No. 1) Bill to-night. When the Resolution was moved in Committee it was stated by the Patronage Secretary to the Treasury that the Bill would be confined exclusively to the appropriation of the sum required for old age pensions. I assume that the money voted by Committee will be appropriated for that purpose. Does the Government intend to insert an appropriation clause in the Bill in order to carry out the statement made by the Secretary to the Treasury?

The question is entirely new to me, and I have not seen the Bill. Certainly it is the intention that the Bill shall appropriate for that particular purpose the money which it has already been determined in Committee of Ways and Means shall be appropriated to that purpose. However, I shall look into the matter and see that it is made perfectly clear.

NEW MEMBERS SWORN.—Right Honourable Charles Scott Dickson, for Glasgow (Central); Arthur Dewar, esquire, Solicitor-General for Scotland, for Edinburgh (South).

Presentation of Bills

The following Bills were presented and read a first time:—

Mr. GULLAND—Law Agents (Scotland) Act Amendment.—Bill to amend the Law Agents (Scotland) Act, 1873. (To be read a second time on 15th March.)

Sir GEORGE KEKEWICH—Episcopal Endowments.—Bill to enable the endowments of archbishoprics and bishoprics to be reduced, to limit the endowments of fresh bishoprics, and for other purposes connected therewith. (To be read a second time on 18th March.)

Supply

CONSIDERED IN COMMITTEE.

First Allotted Day

Army Estimates, 1909–10. (Progress.)

[Mr. EMMOTT in the chair.]

Motion made and question proposed: "That a number of land forces, not exceeding 183,200 of all ranks, be maintained for the service of the United Kingdom," etc. (Vote A, p. 12.)—( Mr. Haldane. )

There are very few opportunities in the course of the Session for discussing Army policy, and this is one of them. By Army policy I mean that part of our whole scheme of military defence of this country and the Empire which depends on our land forces. I regret that we have to take this opportunity whilst we are still ignorant of the provision which the Government intend to make for our sea forces. It is obvious to all those who heard the speech of the Secretary of State for War that the connection between them is very close, even in his own mind. May I say at the outset we all of us admire the indefatigable zeal with which the Secretary of State for War has thrown himself into the execution of his Army policy, which he defends in the country and in this House with an exuberance which is no less remarkable. He is no niggard either of deeds or words. I shall not attempt, even if I could hope to do so, to cover all or even nearly all, the ground traversed by the right hon. Gentleman on last Thursday, and I think it would be wholly unnecessary, in view of the effective and trenchant reply made to a great part of it by my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon. There is much in that speech on which I will not venture to take up the time of the Committee. Some parts dealt with disputed points upon which we have had our say, but, to avoid misconception I must inform the right hon. Gentleman that we have not changed our views on those points. We still think it was a grave mistake to reduce the regular army whilst he was engaged in a fundamental and irretrievable alteration of the character of our auxiliary forces. We still think it was a mistake, though a mistake which has been substantially amended, to divert some of our regular batteries of artillery from the purpose which they were so well fitted to fulfil. Before he sat down the right hon. Gentleman indulged in some speculative condemnation of compulsory service. I may have a word to say upon that, but in the main I wish to keep to his policy. Much of his speech in a sense did not necessarily deal with his policy; great tracts of it were devoted to an informing and lucid discussion—he is always informing and lucid— on many matters important in themselves, but which may find a place in any policy, and some of which did find a place, though he does not seem to be aware of it, in the policies of his predecessors. I shall confine myself to a much more limited field, the limits of which I can indicate by asking an answer to two questions, and two only. The first is, What are the objects which his model is designed to fulfil? and the second is, How far is his model likely to fulfil those objects His policy is the only policy before us. He has shattered beyond any hope of reconstruction the old system of variety, which used to make an appeal to all sorts and conditions of men—the militia, the yeomanry, and volunteers, which appealed to the clerk and the husbandman, to the man of leisure and the man of business, and which in the case of the militia we think afforded a better training, fuller comradeship between the men, and closer association of the men with the officers who are likely to lead them in war.

All that has gone for good, let us say, since it has certainly gone for ever, and what we have now is the policy of the right hon. Gentleman. We have to consider that policy in two lights. We have to consider it in the light of the needs of our strategical situation, and we have to consider it, and consider it somewhat carefully, in the light of the provision which is made by the Government for giving full effect to his policy. There has been, I suppose, ever since the days of Lord Cardwell, a development in the view which most people in this country take of the needs of our military situation. There have been at least three phases in the view which is taken, and it is important to note that as each new phase develops it makes fresh demands both in respect of men and money, without in the least diminishing the demand inherent in the view which preceded it. It is not so long ago since many people in this country urged that what we had chiefly to think of, if not almost exclusively, was the maintenance of our garrision in India, in Egypt, and in other parts of the world. That was put forward, if not exclusively, still as the main point to which attention should be directed, and there were many in this House, the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean was one of them, who whilst admitting that those garrisons ought to be maintained, thought that they could be maintained whilst at the same time largely reducing the number of regular forces at home. Nobody who has taken the slightest interest in the proceedings in another place would imagine that we can reduce the garrison in India. And only on Thursday last the Secretary of State for War informed us that at the instance of the Foreign Secretary he had found it necessary to materially increase and to mobilise the garrison in Egypt, so that the first phase stands. You may bring troops back from South Africa, but it is only to put them in Egypt.

There followed another development opposed to the views of the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean with which the Secretary of State for War has closely associated himself. Only on Thursday he told us that to make our command of the sea effective you must have an over-sea army in this country; an Army in this country which you can send over sea at any moment; and it is obvious it is necessary in order to liberate the Navy. Without such a force as that your Navy would be chained to your shores. The Secretary of State for War, more than any other man I should say, has insisted on the necessity of that oversea army being fully organised, fully equipped, and fully trained. In order to begin a war you must be able to liberate your Navy, and in order to end a war you must be able to deliver a counter-attack. This first line exists for both those purposes. He also has emphasised the view that it is necessary also to have a force in cider to liberate an expedition, and in order to reinforce an expedition at the end of six months. For that you want another line, according to the right hon. Gentleman and the general view of this country, which also must be organised, equipped, and trained. That view, held by most people in this country, is accompanied by the consideration that both those forces are necessary for another purpose. I think everybody holds that both are necessary to deter any hostile power from considering the possibility of making an invasion of our shores.

There has been a third and most significant development throughout this country of what are the needs of our strategical situation. I think I can put it quite moderately in this way, that it is widely held, and held by many experienced and intelligent men, that invasion is no longer impossible, and that the probability of it being attempted is greater than almost anybody was disposed to think even five years ago. I do not put it higher than that, but if we put it as high as that then that is a third phase of the development of what our needs are, and is a very important matter which we have to take into consideration. We know Lord Roberts' opinion, and Lord Roberts' opinion is one which exercises, I think justly, a very great influence throughout this country. The people of this country are coming more and more, I think, to regard the views of those whom they consider judges rather than the views of rival advocates in this House. They listen very attentively to views when they come from Lord Roberts or a man like Lord Rosebery, who made a speech on 4th December of a very important character. I do not make myself responsible for one statement he made, but which I am sure he was in a position to make. I can give his words, but I will quote the substance now. He said that the opinions of experts upon the possibility of invasion had changed in the course of the last five years, and that the kind of advice which they tendered to responsible Ministers in the year 1905 was no longer the kind of advice which they were prepared to tender now. It is generally believed that that change has taken place in the opinion of experts.

The right hon. Gentleman himself has used language, coloured, of course, with official reticence, which certainly does lead many to suppose, and has led many to suppose, that he would no longer say that the invasion of this country is an impossibility which we could slight or ignore. He made a statement which, I think, should be remembered. Speaking at Halifax, the right hon. Gentleman used words that I do not think have ever been used before by a Minister for War. He said that the nation at war with us would attempt invasion as the deadliest blow it could inflict, and so strike the very heart of the British Empire. That is going a great deal further than any of his predecessors have gone. And, in a later speech, at Newcastle he spoke of the co-operation between the Territorial forces and the First Line in the event of such an invasion being attempted. I need not labour those points. I am convinced that the country are no more prepared to base their army policy on the theory held by a minority of experts that invasion is impossible than they are to base their naval policy upon the theory that no country will ever be able to build ships as fast as we can.

The three developments in the views of our strategic needs are reflected in the impressive words which the right hon. Gentleman used towards the conclusion of his speech on Thursday last, when he stated our strategic problem in terms with which hardly anyone, I believe, would find fault. He stated that the foundation of British strategy was, in the first place, the command of the sea; in the second place, an oversea army in the country which could make that command of the sea successful; and in the third place, a home defence force to make invasion impossible. Those three demands are cumulative. You cannot borrow from your garrisons to make your expeditionary force, nor from your expeditionary force to make home defence safe. You must have your garrisons, with ten divisions now, because there are nine in India, and the right hon. Gentleman announced the birth of another in Egypt and the Levant; you have to have your oversea army ready to be despatched at a moment's notice in six divisions; and behind that there is the Territorial Force with 14 divisions. It is in the light of these needs that we have to examine very closely the provision which the Government are prepared to make for giving full effect to this plan or model of the right hon. Gentleman. Obviously, anything in the nature of pretence in this matter, affecting either the first or the second line, would be not only uneconomic, but positively dangerous.

With regard to the first line, I would Bay at once that the announcement of the right hon. Gentleman that he intended to have reserve regiments of cavalry based upon six depots and distributed in the six commands, and similarly six artillery depots also distributed in those commands, seems to me an admirable plan in its design. Having congratulated the right hon. Gentleman upon that point, I do not wish to say anything further with regard to the cavalry, nor shall I deal with the regular infantry, but I must say something about the field artillery and the special reserve. The right hon. Gentleman has announced a very important, and, as far as it goes, a welcome change in our field artillery. Instead of 66 regular batteries with the expeditionary force, he is going to have 72; and instead of having 33 batteries for training brigades, he is going to have only 18, and to use 9 batteries for the purpose—which we all welcome—of manufacturing a real reserve under the three-year system. That is in terms of batteries; in terms of men, it means that instead of having 14,800 six-years' men and 15,000 special reservists, who in our opinion receive no training to fit them to go into the first line, he is going to have 9,600 six-years' men, 5,000 three-years' men, and only 6,000 special reservists. That is a very important change, and it goes a long way to justify many of the criticisms we have passed upon his scheme as it was originally unfolded to us. Why has the right hon. Gentleman made these changes since last year? The reasons given are very instructive, and their application cannot be confined to the special reserve of the artillery, but must be extended to every other part of his first and second lines. The right hon. Gentleman gave three reasons. The first was that the regular army stood in need of more regular artillery. There are to be, I think, 12 batteries instead of 11 with every one of the six divisions. That is very important, and its application will become apparent when I come to the second line—the Territorial Force The second reason was that you cannot give enough initial training to make a real reserve of the special reserve. We all agree with that view; we have frequently stated it in this House. To make a reservist worth your money, his training must be timely and united—to give cohesion as far as possible to the men who will serve together in a particular unit. This is a reversion to what the right hon. Gentleman called the Lansdowne principle of having some six-or-seven-years' men to maintain your garrisons abroad, and a further number of three-years' men in order to have a machine which will give you a greater output of a better article. That is what the short service system does in the matter of making reservists. The right hon. Gentleman's third reason also is an important one. He recognises the impossibility of giving even the inadequate training of the special reservist kind to any large body of men. That reason, again, is equally operative whether you are dealing with artillery or infantry or any other branch of the service. These three principles—for they are principles-proved by the experience of the right hon. Gentleman in the case of the artillery, are applicable to other branches of the service, and notably to the infantry special reserve. The infantry special reserve has an establishment of 58,500, and a strength of 55,200. These men do not receive an adequate training; they are not trained together, or under the officers who would lead them in time of war, and they take twice as long to make into really efficient soldiers as men under the system which he has now adopted for the artillery, but not yet for the infantry portion of the special reserve, to which, however, I think it can and ought to be applied.

Now, may I apply the third principle to the infantry part of the special reserve? The right hon. Gentleman cannot give even the training which we consider inadequate to the men who come to the depots, and he cannot hope to get the officers necessary to give adequate training. According to the Estimates—there may be later figures—the number of officers on the establishment of the infantry special reserve is 2,680, but the strength is only 1,543, a deficiency of 1,137, and there is also a large deficiency in the sergeants—an important body of men. That is a great defect in the right hon. Gentleman's first line.

If the account I have given of the view of our military situation is in any measure a true account, it is not cheap, and it is not safe, to have a defect of that magnitude in your first line. I think some 24,000 men of this description are called to the colours on mobilisation, and almost all the drafts in the first six months are derived from men trained in this way, and from no other source. That defect could be remedied, but it would cost money to remedy it. But it must be remedied if the first line is to fulfil the duties which the right hon. Gentleman has placed upon it. Let us suppose that it is remedied, still, according to the view of the right hon. Gentleman himself, and the facts of the case, the first line in order to be liberated should be reinforced after six months—not a very long campaign—and, to resist invasion, depends upon the second line. The second line is the foundation of the first line, and, therefore, we must apply as regards the second line the principles which I have applied to the first line. I may be told that as regards the second line I am somewhat overstating the case, but certainly we cannot allow any pretence or sham to exist in the second line in view of the burden which the right hon. Gentleman says might not improbably be cast upon it.

Let us examine the second line. The Territorial Force consists of fourteen divisions. As the Committee will anticipate, I naturally apply the first principle discovered by the change in the right hon. Gentleman's artillery force. If it is necessary to have more regular artillery with the expeditionary force worked up to the highest pitch of efficiency, and with already eleven batteries in every division, surely a fortiori it is necessary to have some regular artillery for your second line, which, according to the right hon. Gentleman, is to harass the invader until the first line can come up to its assistance? There would not be much harassing done by a Special Reserve Artillery if the invader came, and the supposition is that the invader may come. Undoubtedly he would come with the very pick of his artillery to take up an artillery position before any Volunteer or Territorial soldier could discover where his artillery position ought to be, and long before any men or non-commissioned officers of the Territorial Force could have got guns into proper position, even if the staff could find a position. Artillery depends on its efficiency. The men who discover an artillery position have to be trained, and have to be in practice. It is very nervous work, and if they make a mistake the battle may be lost before it is begun. The men who have to take guns to a position which is found on the map must be highly trained and in constant practice if their skill is to be good enough to achieve so difficult and important a task. The first principle shows that we are not safe for the purpose which the right hon. Gentleman contemplates. Most people believe that we are not safe until the second line is stiffened with more regular units.

Well then, apply what I may call the second principle—the principle of giving men adequate initial training. If you are ever going to call them into the field you should give them longer training and training together, at the beginning and not at the end of their service, before, and not after, the outbreak of war. If that is true of the artillery, it must be true also of the second line as a whole. It must be true that it would be better to give the men a longer training than a fortnight. It must be true, it is vital, that they ought all to be there during tile whole fortnight. That is not the ease now. They conic up in driblets into camp, and they go out in driblets. A large percentage of these men are never together being trained by their officers. I am talking now of the Territorial Force. You may say that there are 50 per cent. of the Territorial Force who are not all there to be trained at the same time, and, therefore, they do not get adequate or united training. They are not trained in the way that fits them for the purpose which the right hon. Gentleman thinks they may have to fulfil. That training cannot be made effective unless the right hon. Gentleman gets more officers and non-commissiond officers who must have received higher and more special training if they are to train the men. The right hon. Gentleman must also have training grounds if the second line is not to be a pretence, for the reasons I have given. The regular officers—the brigadiers—who have to train them cannot carry out the duty which devolves upon them unless they have training grounds. The right hon. Gentleman used words on Thursday which would have led one to suppose that the regular officers who command these units are satisfied with the present state of affairs because a good many men have joined the force. That, I believe, is not the case. I believe they think it is impossible to give these men the military training they require, largely because they are never all there at one time, and largely because training grounds cannot be found. The position has been described to me as heartbreaking. The duty of providing training grounds devolves on the County Associations. The regular brigadiers who command the units have striven for years to obtain training grounds, and after years of negotiation and disappointment the whole thing falls through. In a northern command there are ten regiments, 40 batteries of horse and field artillery, with other troops, and 24 battalions of infantry—making altogether 60,000 men. What provision is there for the practice of artillery, or of training ground for the troops throughout the whole of that command? As regards the artillery, the only available ranges are seashore ranges or across sands, and, therefore, perfectly useless for the training of mobile artillery. As regards training ground for the men, after five years nothing has been done. That being so, the second line, which is the line upon, which the first line depends to be liberated, and with which the first line may have to co-operate in the case of invasion, is not in a state to fulfil the duties which fall upon it.

The provision for giving effect to the right hon. Gentleman's plan is undoubtedly adequate. The right hon. Gentleman spoke the other night with satisfaction, legitimate satisfaction, of the result which we all welcomed from the recent orgy of recruiting. The men have come in at a great pace since the beginning of the year. But increasing numbers increase the difficulty to which I have alluded. If there are not the officers and the non-commissioned officers and the training ground for 50 per cent. of that force, still less are these sufficient for 70 or 80 per cent.. It would largely degenerate into a mockery. There are not enough non-commissioned officers to train the number of men. The deficiency in officers at present is 2,674. What of the sergeants? I do not think any figures are given for the Territorial Force. I see that they are given for the special reserve. What of facilities for training? What chance is there that all horses will not be commandeered? In spite of the efforts which have been made to get in the number of officers, a great deal more has to be done even to get 100 per cent. for the forces. Very much more has to be done if 70 or 80 per cent. of the men in the force are to receive timely, adequate, and united training. They cannot receive that without officers and non-commissioned officers who have been trained in the highest degree, and for that purpose nothing really has been done up to the present moment. Nothing has been done at all. I have examined the right hon. Gentleman's model, and I ask, is the provision adequate for what he needs? Does he think that his first line with a special reserve for infantry, constructed on a system which he has largely rejected for artillery, would give him what he needs for an oversea army? Does he think that his second line, with its shortage of men and its greater shortage of officers, with brief, piece-meal and belated training, will make a sufficient home defence force to make invasion impossible? The Secretary of State made a long statement on Thursday, and published a memorandum, but he has neither in his speech nor in his memorandum even attempted to give us grounds for saying "yes" to those questions. It is very difficult for any one—I think it is impossible—to derive from the Army Estimates or find in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, or in the memorandum a clear idea, in respect of each component part of both lines, of establishment and strength, and still harder to find the actual amount of training and reserve making power. I say it is still harder to find any statement of the real amount of training given, or of the actual progress towards making the reserve effective. I think that it is impossible to find this information because I do not think that it is officially stated. If we are to judge of the great experiment of the right hon. Gentleman we ought to have a clear statement of the actual strength and the actual training, and the quality of which his forces are likely to be composed. Instead of attempting to prove his case, when I thought he was coming to the point on Thursday, he suddenly went off at a tangent in order to criticise compulsory service. Upon that I have to say one word. The right hon. Gentleman dwelt on the difficulty of adjusting a home defensive army upon a compulsory system on to an oversea army trained on a voluntary system. Everybody must admit the danger of starving the oversea army of men and the difficulty about money. I think that should be accurately gauged in time by careful examination by eminent civil servants. It must be gauged by vital statistics and actuarial calculations to show the number of men available and to say what would be the money cost involved.

I think it is the duty of the War Office to investigate these matters in a businesslike and scientific spirit. It is of no use to discuss the abstract principle on this matter and say "I am in favour of compulsion, or I am in favour of volunteer service." It must be decided by an examination of facts and probabilities. The right hon. Gentleman then used these words: "Owing to the weakness of the Auxiliary Forces the nation was never nearer to thinking seriously of compulsory service." Yes; he said there has been a boom in recruiting; but supposing it is followed by a slump? The nation may cease to be satisfied with the moral effect, saying that your troops require a certain amount of training, and then giving them half of that training, and that in a piecemeal manner.

If that view is forced upon the nation then it will come even nearer still to thinking seriously of compulsory service, and it will be justly indignant with any Minister or Department which has not in time worked out the actuarial statistics and the vital statistics which are necessary for compulsory service.

I should like to know what kind of half a dozen compulsory bases does the right hon. Gentleman want? Is it to be two years' training or one of six months or four months, and what are to be the conditions of training? And are they, the men, to he housed, and how?

It was not my intention this afternoon to advise the right hon. Gentleman, much less as to what method should be adopted in this matter, nor is it part of my duty to do so.

I did not ask anything of the sort. I ask what do you mean by compulsion? Do not deal with generalities. Come to the point.

That is not a relevant reply to my observations. It would not be proper for me to express an opinion of what is the proper amount of service to be given; but there are those at the War Office who can give that opinion. Their opinion would be worth having. Mine would not. There should be two or three or five alternatives. You might have a small degree of compulsion, you might have a large degree. This is not the time to discuss that.

I say it is the time for the consideration in a business-like spirit of the vital and actuarial statistics which are involved, and I will tell the Committee why: I have given one reason why the country cannot agree with the statement of the right hon. Gentleman. Let me give another. He said if we were in imminent danger it would then be the legal duty of every man to serve. That is so, but there should be some plan, unless the right hon. Gentleman believes we never shall be in imminent danger. He does not believe that. The trend of his speeches in the country, the trend of the preparation he is making; his experiments in conducting troops rapidly to the coast in motor cars—what does all that mean, unless he believes it necessary to make some provision against a real imminent national danger, against the attempt he thinks would be made to strike at the heart of the Empire. If the country came to think that, they would be astonished and indignant if the right hon. Gentleman had not asked an opinion, not from me, but from the soldiers and civil servants who are at the War Office, and worked out a scheme, which might never be adopted, but which ought to be considered, in case the time came for it to be adopted.

I am very glad to hear that has been done, but I am surprised to hear that the conclusion arrived at justified the right hon. Gentleman in stating, in such unqualified language, that the adoption of any degree of compulsion, so far as I understood him, would involve over-mastering difficulties and dangers which ought not to be run in respect of our over-sea army; because we have to consider always the possibility of being driven to adopt the alternative to any plan which is not quite successful. Well, will the right hon. Gentleman say that his plan—the organisation of which we admire, as we also admire the industry with which he worked it—in its present shape, or that the future progress of that plan, will be such as to justify the country in being perfectly satisfied with that plan as it stands? Will he say that it can be made adequate without involving a cost which may turn out to be as great as the cost of some alternative plan? To have any semblance of efficiency in his plan a great deal more has got to be done than has yet been done.

Efficiency is not all. In a national system of defence, you require something else besides efficiency. You require fairness, and the nearer you approach towards the goal of efficiency, the further you recede from the goal of fairness. A portion of the task has been completed. We congratulate the right hon. Gentleman upon it, namely, his outline of the organisation, and 80 per cent. of the men; but, to complete that portion of the task very considerable sacrifices have been made by only a fraction of the population. To complete that task up to the model as laid down; to get all the numbers instead of some of the numbers; to get adequate training instead of inadequate, which the country may demand, would place a strain upon those who are willing to bear it, which they would find intolerable, and which others would come to think unfair. We cannot go back from this plan of the right hon Gentleman to the system of variety. The right hon Gentleman intends to extend his system of uniformity beyond this country to other parts of the Empire. He has recently taken a decisive step, as the correspondence recently published between the Colonial Office and the Governors of the sister States, shows, towards extending his system of uniformity from this country to the sister States. Uniformity suggests, if it does not entail, some degree of compulsion, and it would be very rash of this country to suppose that it can lead the whole Empire toward a uniform system of defence if it claims to remain for ever the exception when they adopted compulsion, of what is, I think, the consequence suggested, and perhaps necessitated by adopting a system of uniformity. Therefore, I agree there are difficulties and dangers—if you like, great difficulties and dangers—in attempting to adjust the Home system, containing an element of compulsion, to an over-sea system which must be based upon a voluntary principle. But the plan of the Secretary of State presents great difficulties; it is not devoid of dangers. I hold the time has come when all parties in this country will have to consider which of the two plans is less difficult and most safe. This afternoon we are only considering the plan of the right hon. Gentleman which holds the field. In the light of the provisions made for that plan and in the light of the test to which that plan as provided for may not inconceivably be exposed, I cannot say that the provision ought to satisfy this Committee, or that it will appease the country's growing concern.

I listened very carefully to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State and to his very careful survey of the policy of the Government, and there are very few who listened to him who will not be in agreement that a great change and a great development of public opinion has taken place in this country as to the necessary and adequate arrangements which must be made against, if not invasion, at any rate against raids. I do not propose to make any criticism about the Regular Forces, but I should like to say a word or two about the Territorial Army. Is the Territorial Army going to give us complete security on the present basis on which it is recruited? I recognise perfectly well, as I think everybody does, the value of the organisation created by the right hon. Gentleman, and I take this opportunity of paying tribute to it. It is a most valuable organisation and a most admirable one, and I believe the right hon. Gentleman's name will always be remembered in connection with it. But the voluntary system for the Territorial line imposes a severe handicap and penalty upon patriotic employers who are willing to give those extra facilities to the men in their employment who join the Territorial Army, and this penalty is very hard, especially having regard to other employers who do not give the same facilities. I challenge any employer to deny that the penalties and inconveniences which patriotic employers now inflict upon themselves would not altogether disappear if the same rule applied to all employers. The Secretary of State, in his very exhaustive and optimistic speech, propounded the remarkable theory, criticised by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, that to impose any system of compulsion whatsoever upon the young men of the country between the ages of 18 and 19 and 20 would inevitably dry up the stream of recruits for the Army, which he put at 50,000 annually. I read in "The Times" of this morning an article by the military correspondent, in which that gentleman, who usually supports the right hon. Gentleman, ridiculed this notion. I would like to ask the right hon. Gentleman is his opinion on this question unanimously supported by his military advisers? He described them as enthusiasts, but we all know that the vast majority of the recruits that come forward for the regular Army are not enthusiasts. The vast majority of them come forward because they have reached their last shilling, and because they have no chance of civil employment. We never hear of young men leaving civil employment and joining the Army. A very small proportion may join because they are brought up in military traditions, and are always filled with the idea of joining the Army. I should like the right hon. Gentleman to answer that question, as to whether he has the unanimous support of his military advisers in expressing that view which he put forward the other day.

Some criticism has been directed against the Territorial Army on the ground that the period of training is too short. We all know that while you have a voluntary system the people who join will give as much time as possible, but if they are asked to give more than they can conveniently give owing to their civil employment they will leave. As long as you have a voluntary system, you can only impose a period of training which is totally inadequate. Even if you had to resort to a policy of liability for a certain period of training it would be a great mistake to argue as to what period of training is necessary for military efficiency. None of us will agree on that. Some would say three months, others six months, others nine months, and if you argue for adequate training for a longer period than is compatible with the retention of civil employment you are arguing for something that the people of this country will never agree to, except after a most appalling disaster. I have spoken at various small meetings in my Constituency, and I have invariably found, especially among the working classes, that they are in no way against compulsion. As we all know, everybody is in favour of compulsion for their neighbours' sons—["No, no."]—and it is not a long step to be in favour of compulsion for their own sons, but you will not get anyone to give up his employment to take service.

Of course, some people think, say now, and will go on saying, that this is the first step towards conscription, but it is quite ridiculous to call the system which is in operation in France and Germany by the same name as that which is in operation in Switzerland. One has for its object that all the population of the country are to be made into professional soldiers, while the object of the other system is to make the youth of the country into civilian soldiers and give them a period of training which does not withdraw them from civil life and is compatible with the obligations of their civil employment. It is quite impossible to call two different things by the same name. Whether the Territorial Army reaches its full establishment or not personally, I think, makes not the least difference, to those who think that under the present system you cannot have a reliable army of volunteers for Home defence which will be composed of really effective combative units. So long, however, as we have a volunteer system I shall do all I can to persuade people to join the Territorial Army, but at the same time I may point out that if you have an enormous boom in recruiting it will probably be followed by a slump. That is usually the case in most matters.

Personally, I have not any objection to any methods being used to attract recruits, whether they are journalistic or otherwise, but I should like to join in the protest which has been made against the methods pursued in one or two instances in London by large employers who say they will not employ anybody in future who does not join the Territorial Army. It seems to me that if such a system were to be pursued it might have the opposite effect to that desired, as it would not attract recruits to the Territorial Army. Again, if such a system did spread it would apply compulsion to one class and leave free from compulsion the very class which perhaps should be more subject to it than any other. May I make one or two remarks on another subject about which there is a curious fallacy, and that is as to the relative value of the voluntarily enlisted soldier and the compulsorily enlisted one. We hear that the volunteer soldier, whether he is a professional or a civilian soldier, is of greater value than the compulsorily enlisted man. That is a gross fallacy. It is not the way a man has been enlisted, but it is what he is fighting for that makes the difference. If you take the wars in South Africa and Manchuria, the Boers there thought, as the Japanese did, that they were fighting for their national existence, but who by the greatest stretch of imagination could say that our own people or the Russians were animated by the same spirit. It is not, therefore, the way in which a man is recruited, but what he is fighting for that makes the difference, and, therefore, I deny that the volunteer is any better as a fighter than those recruited on the compulsory system.

Here I would like to make one observation on the speeches which have been made by distinguished generals in this country. It sometimes, indeed very frequently, happens, and I am sure many hon. Members here will agree with me, that it is to be deprecated, that generals holding very high official positions are prompted to make speeches on matters connected with the Array. I suppose they are reported without the qualifications indulged in by the people who make the speeches, but they are taken as if a certain policy received the support of these very distinguished gentlemen. You never hear of cases of that kind in Naval matters. You never hear an Admiral quoted as speaking in favour of this or that policy, and saying whether he is in favour of large battleships or whether he thinks that small battleships should be built. (Cries of "Oh.") I think I am right. You do not read of it, but you often hear and read in the papers of distinguished generals being quoted as being supporters or opponents in regard to these controversial topics connected with the military policy of the day. This especially applies to the merits of the Territorial system, and I think hon. Members will agree with me that it is to be deprecated that we should have these expressions of opinion. I think the general concensus of opinion in this House is that it is a very great mistake.

There is one other observation I should like to make on the right hon. Gentleman's speech which, of course, was dealt with by the right hon. Gentleman opposite. It was with regard to the system of compulsory training, and the right hon. Gentleman said, of course, we have all these different schemes put forward, some of which are approved by Lord Roberts. May I for one moment call his attention to the fact that last year a Bill was, introduced into this House for the first reading, but not many people voted for it. It was opposed by my hon. Friend sitting behind me, and, of course, a great deal of ridicule was poured upon it, but it never contemplated anything like the numbers which. have been alluded to. We calculated that 180,000 recruits should come up every year at 18 years of age, and that at 18 or 19 years of age they should be called out as recruits, and do a training which should be compatible with their retention of their civil employment. To fulfil that condition we put down 48 days, and if that was too long, and if that did not fulfil the conditions it would have to be shortened. After the age of 20 we put down that they should be liable for a fortnight for each alternate year for 4 years. That would give 360,000 recruits and 720,000 men of your Territorial Army, of which 360,000, would be liable for a fortnight's training every year. The right hon. Gentleman's own Territorial Army is estimated to cost about-£3,000,000, and it is absurd to say that with this number of men their cost is going to be anything like the gigantic figures which were put forward last year, amounting to something like twenty-five millions. I am sure that I agree most thoroughly with the concluding remarks of the Secretary of State for War's speech last week, in which he laid down certain principles of national defence, and said that our Fleet must always be ready for offensive work, and our, frontier must be the enemy's shores. Of course it will not be possible for me to say anything about the two-power standard of the Navy at the present moment, but it must be remembered that as the number of naval competitors increase, the proportion of British warships to foreign warships decreases, even with the maintenance of the two-power standard. The two-power standard does not now, and will not give us the same world-wide naval supremacy as it has done in the past, and that is the real justification for a reliable and effective army for scope of naval supremacy as it has done in the past, and that is the real justification for a reliable and effective army for home defence. Some people, of course, are opposed to any system of compulsion because they think the country would not have it, and because they think it is unpopular and likely to lose them some votes. Others oppose it because they think that it is likely to lead to an aggressive military spirit, and they think that the best way to avoid war is to make no further preparation for it. But do those hon. Members think that in the future nations will see eye to eye with each other on every conceivable subject, or that it will be possible to reconcile conflicting ambitions and interests in the future any more than in the past. There is no particular virtue in any strong country which has got all it wants desiring peace. We do not want any more territorial expansion, and there is no particular virtue in us always wishing for peace. There is no particular virtue in any country which has everything to lose and nothing to gain desiring peace. If other countries cannot get ready-made colonies as they find they cannot now they will want in future to cripple us to such an extent that our ready-made colonies will fall into their hands. I have heard it said, sometimes in whispers and sometimes here, suffer by any great national danger. There is less margin between their present position and starvation, and they would be the first to suffer if we were engaged in any great national struggle. I am convinced that the more you speak about this question, the more you see it discussed in the Press, and the more it is written about, the more people in the country are realising how much is to be said in its favour, and how little can be said against imposing this liability for a short military training on the whole youth of the country, of every class without distinction for any reason whatsoever.

The speech to which we have listened is, in my opinion, an indication to those of us who are against conscription or enforced military training of any description to keep on the alert. When we come to have the suggestion made from the Liberal benches that we are not going to he safe unless we enlist the services of a greater number of the people in the defence of the country it seems to me that we ought to take warning.

But I have not risen to follow my hon. Friend into his speculations regarding the future. I have risen specially to call attention to one aspect of the policy of the Minister for War, and one part only of the very interesting speech he delivered on Thursday. In that speech he said:—

Will the hon. Member forgive me? He quoted words from my speech on Thursday which had not the remotest reference to anything of the sort. They had reference to the newspapers, and had nothing to do with this method of recruiting. They had reference to employs being given a holiday on full pay. It is quite true that I said I approved the efforts of the Alliance Company to get a start when there was much difficulty and very little help. In that particular case I have approved that an effort should be made to make a beginning in this matter. I have never laid down that it is desirable that the policy should become the universal custom or anything like it.

I have no desire to misquote or misrepresent the right hon. Gentleman. I read into his speech, and was probably tempted to read into it because of the fact that he by letter had approved of the policy of the Assurance Company—

I was probably tempted because of the letter to read into the speech the meaning and interpretation that I have placed upon it. We hold, and I think there is a large number amongst all sections of the House who hold, that a policy of this description on the part of any section of the employing classes is an unwarrantable and an unscrupulous abuse of their rights so far as their employés are concerned. In our opinion it is a flagrant violation of the principle of the freedom of contract which for over 100 years the trades unions of this country have been endeavouring to obtain and to maintain. We also hold that such a policy is a departure from the declared intentions of Parliament.

It is now over 50 years since Parliament passed the first Truck Act. By that Act the Legislature sought to restrict the powers of employers within the legitimate sphere of the service to be rendered by those whom they employ. What is going to be the position of the poor unfortunate unemployed clerk or shop assistant under this new military r—gime ? Let us try to imagine his position. Let us try to realise how harshly he may be treated. He may have character, he may have capacity, he may have experience. His testimonials may be excellent, he may be devoted to social or political work. In short, he may be in the opinion of many a true patriot giving willing service according to his ability for the promotion of the well-being of his fellows. To him, in spite of all these qualifications, should he apply to the Assurance Company and these other firms who have obtained the benediction of the right hon. Gentleman, it must be said to this unfortunate clerk, "One thing thou lackest." It must be said, "You have not yet joined the Territorial Army, and in consequence of your not having joined we cannot employ you unless of course we can coerce you into doing so. We admit that we have nothing against your character. We admit that your testimonials are all that we could desire, but you lack the one essential. We have to say to you that you have not yet been inoculated with the 'Daily Mail' Territorial lymph, and only those who have need apply for engagements in our employment." In these days of acute unemployment it is often very difficult for a man of conviction to keep himself from going under. These difficulties are now to be increased or else he must sacrifice his convictions in order to obtain employment. This is the policy that the right hon. Gentleman has given his cordial approval to. By this official sanction Liberalism is committed to an insidious form of enforced military service, which, in our opinion, has associated with it some of the worse features of conscription.

I wonder if the hon. Member has ever been on the unemployed list. I wonder if he has ever Known what it was to have the children at home and the wife without anything coming in.

May I explain what I meant? I simply meant I did not admit that Liberalism was committed to the policy of indirect compulsion.

When my hon. Friend becomes the Leader of the party he may be able to tell us exactly what Liberalism is committed to. What I have said I repeat. Unless my hon. Friend is going to repudiate his leaders, unless he is going to say that in this particular he does not represent them, I hold to the opinion that Liberalism is committed to a form of enforced compulsory service.

I was about to ask my hon. Friend if he had ever been unemployed and had his wife and children at home. I know he-has not; therefore it does not appeal to him. He may shake his head, but it is not an unreal picture. There are thousands to-day wanting employment and they cannot get it, and as I have pointed out they do not get it unless they are prepared to join the Territorial Force. Surely it is wrong for a man who has all the capacity and experience, and character essential to be denied the opportunity of earning bread and butter for the maintenance of his wife and children merely because he lacks this one qualification that he has not joined the Territorial Force.

That is only one company. There are others in the country besides this.

I hope this does not represent the attitude of Liberalism towards a principle. We are not denying that there are other companies. We are debating the principle that certain companies refuse to give employment unless the workman, the clerk, or the shop assistant is prepared against his will to join the Territorial Force. We are debating the point that such a policy has received the approval of the right hon. Gentleman who in this respect represents the Liberal Government. That policy is not only a departure from the traditions of Liberalism, but no longer with such a policy obtaining can Liberalism claim to stand by the declaration of their great leader that the essence of Liberal aims was trust in the people qualified by prudence. What a travesty of the position for which Liberalism stood when they were in opposition. I may call attention to the position which Liberalism took up in 1902 and in the early days of 1906. I may recall how from that Front Bench we heard time and again that the Liberal Government was strongly opposed to unjustifiable interference with the teaching profession of this country. How often have we heard the old story that the teacher was engaged not to play the organ, and not to teach in the Sunday School, but that the teacher was engaged for five days to teach according to the curriculum, and that we ought not to have a civil servant tuned into a lackey for the vicar and the trustees of a sectarian school. That was the position declared for by the Liberal party when they sat on these benches in 1902, and declared for when we were debating the Education Bill in 1906.

May I ask the difference between compelling a man to join the Territorial Force, which is not part of the service that he is going to render to his employer, and compelling a teacher to teach in Sunday school and play the organ? The principle involved is exactly the same. It is a test, and it is a test that is absolutely opposed to the traditions of the Liberal party. It is altogether inconsistent with the position put before the country at the General Election of 1906. The chief watchwords of Liberalism in those days were—freedom in trade, freedom in religion, freedom in the teaching profession, and freedom in South Africa. We were not thinking of Territorial armies in those days. We were thinking of electoral armies. Therefore we declared for some of the old watchwords of Liberalism. If that was so when Liberalism appealed to the electors of the country it ought to be so to-day. I do not think that my right hon. Friend would be disposed to call in question that these were the questions put before the country as being the standard of freedom for which Liberalism stood in those days. I have here a book of leaflets issued by the Liberal Publication Department in 1905. In the middle of the book I find a portion entitled "The Poets and the People," and as showing what Liberalism thought in those days. In the first page of this part of the book we find— workers of this country. Is it the intention of the Government to continue official approval of a policy that is an undoubted menace to the personal freedom of a great number of wage earners in this country? I venture to say that unless we get an assurance that it is not the policy of the Government, and that they do not intend to perpetuate this evil then we on these benches will have to avail ourslves of the earliest opportunity placed at our disposal by the rules of the House for testing the opinion of the whole of the Members of the House as to whether they approve of this retrograde policy.

There were one or two of the topics touched on by the last speaker which were not confined in their interest to the military expert. With much that the hon. Member who has just sat down has said I cordially agree. I do not know that I shall be able to persuade him to adopt some of the views which I am about to put forward, but at all events I hope that he will agree that they can be looked at from something else than a party point of view. I am not aware that either party in this House has taken up compulsory service as a party matter. It is one of these matters which are to be discussed without dragging in party controversy. I wish first to refer to the cadet corps in schools and their influence upon the future of the Army. Whatever the right hon. Gentleman put forward he should have a consistent view and not shift about under various impulses from that clear thinking which we know he is always able to command. With regard to the cadet corps, we had a Bill introduced in reference to the Territorial Army which we were told was the fruit -of the most careful thinking and the highest expert knowledge. That Bill recognised cadet corps as part of the system, and expressly permitted the making of grants to these corps, and fully recognised the fact that from these cadet corps a nursery for military forces might be obtained tinder pressure from my right hon. Friend below the Gangway and others the right hon. Gentleman deleted that part of his well-considered Bill. He altered the position which he had taken up, and apparently now he has left the cadet corps so far as we know in the position of being suspended between heaven and earth. Their position has not been recognised in relation to the War Office. They may get certain grants, but I think that they have not yet been recognised.

We have always recognised cadet corps. They get grants of rifles and a certain amount of ammunition. Cadet corps in schools can be used as training corps.

There are certain cadet corps which have not yet received any definite recognition and which are waiting anxiously for it. But the real difficulty of the hon. Gentleman is not so much their existence as the question whether they should be dealt with by the Board of Education or the War Office. That does not so much matter. If they are good, the War Office can encourage and help them, whereas if they are bad, harm will he done just as much by the Board of Education as if it was done by the War Office. But the right hon. Gentleman has given us in his speech in the country a further reason for his fear of this cadet corps. He spoke in that speech of a disease which he called military measles. He is afraid that. there may be some inoculation which may impart to the boys in this cadet corps immunity for the future from that military measles.

I think I understand his reasoning correctly. Is it the case that these cadet corps are likely to discourage boys from entering the Army? Is it not a fact that at the Royal Hibernian and the Duke of York Schools 90 per cent. of the boys enter the Army, and they are not driven by their early experience to lose enthusiasm for the Army? Before the Royal Commission on Physical Training, of which I was a member, which sat about seven years ago, we had the evidence of two persons, both of whom will be accepted as high authorities by the Secretary for War—one of them was a most eminent military man (Sir Ian Hamilton) and the other was the hon. Member for the Abercromby Division, who is now a colleague of the right hon. Gentleman. Both these gentlemen urged very strongly that much of the success of the Army in the future would depend upon the encouragement given to the cadet corps and to the early training given to the youth of the country. It is much to be regretted that the right hon. Gentleman has acquired such a sudden suspicion of these cadet corps. He has eliminated them from the high position which they originally had in the Territorial Bill, and has left them in an indeterminate position in connection with the Army. The other part of the speech to which I wish to allude is the criticism of the right hon. Gentleman upon the proposals of the National Service League. I think I can show the right hon. Gentleman that his opinion upon the manifesto issued by that League was hardly deserved, and was not based upon accurate statistics. The cost of compulsory service, or if you like, universal military training, for four or five months in one training and a fortnight's training each successive year has been represented by the National Service League as amounting to £4,000,000. On a previous occasion the right hon. Gentleman committed himself to a figure of £20,000,000.

The right hon. Gentleman stated that the cost, instead of being 24,000,000, would be nearer 220,000,000, and his colleague, Lord Crewe, made a similar statement in the House of Lords, and I presume his lordship was speaking with the authority of the War Office. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will not force me to look up a quotation in the same connection in which he used the same figure.

When that discussion took place in the House of Lords the National Service League had not put forward their manifesto, and we supposed it was something analogous to the special reserve training. Since then the National Service League has put forward considered views, and they placed the training at four months. I do not know whether any pay is to be given or not. All I have said about it is that the National Service League said it would cost £4,000,000 extra above the present cost of the Territorial Force. I rather think it would be considerably more.

This is a matter which ought to he examined with some care. The right hon. Gentleman says he understands that the National Service League have since issued their proposals. I would like to ask him if he had not these proposals before him the other night when he was speaking. I think he is simply quibbling and playing with words. These proposals have been issued, and they are perfectly explicit, and correspond to the views which were put forward by Lord Roberts some time previously. I distrust the pure amateur on military matters, and also the man who professes to be a military expert and speaks constantly with his eye to the gallery. [An HON. MEMBER: "There's nobody there."] I mean a gal- lery very much more attractive than the Gallery of this House. What did Sir Alfred Turner propose His criticisms of the National Service League were supposed to be in unison with the War Office, and he puts forward their theory as an instance of the baseless nonsense that can be submitted to the public as the effort of a careful financier. The amount is put down by the League as £4,000,000, and Sir Alfred Turner said that the Norfolk Commission reported in favour of compulsory service. The right hon. Gentleman, the member for Croydon, asked the experts to find out the cost of training 190,000 men, and it turned out the cost would be £27,500,000. That, however, was for a much larger number of men. The National Service League proposal, the very calculation which Sir Alfred Turner describes with such inaccuracy, not only supports the results of the inquiries of the National Service League, but gives rather a lower figure than the one adopted before. It is all very well for the right hon. Gentleman to say that this is a casual, careless, and amateur proposal. The Committee which drew up that proposal was presided over by Lord Roberts, and included several well-known generals as well as Lord Milner, and I hardly think that a memorial put forward on such authority as that should be treated as something careless, inaccurate, and insufficient for the judgment of the right hon. Gentleman and turned aside by a sneer. How did those who drew up that calculation proceed? They took two distinct bases—one was a proportionate calculation based upon the cost of a regular soldier and his training for one year. We all know that the training of a regular soldier in India is the most expensive training in the world. I do not say anything against it, but that is the fact. We adopted every item in the Estimates with the exception of one or two which evidently had no application, and we took that proportionate basis as our guide in calculating the cost. We took the basis of the special reserve—not of the whole special reserve—but that part which is in actual recruit training.

Now the curious thing is that the two calculations came very near, considering the large figures that are dealt with. The variations, allowing for some items that were doubtful, were from, in the one case, £7,800,000 to £8,000,000—to something a little over 8,000,000. Of that the right hon. Gentleman knows that we have to take the 3½ millions which the Territorial Army is now costing, and that it will cost when it has reached its full numbers. In addition to that we have to take £1,300,000, the cost of the special reserve.

Why do you take it off then? Because we are allowing in our calculations for a certain bounty in order to produce a large number. Do I understand, too, that the mobilisation of the Army that is going abroad is to be without any arrangements?

Certainly not. I said the bounty would be given to those who passed into the special reserve exactly as the right hon. Gentleman stated. This was admitted. All these points were laid down fully and accurately. The inquiry lasted for many days—nay, even for weeks and for months. Men were examined carefully by eminent military authorities and financial experts, and I do not think that the evidence could be pushed aside so lightly as the right hon. Gentleman thinks. He complains that he has no statistics, and that we will not lay down our ideas as to what is required. We have done so as clearly as can be imagined.

I am quite sure the right hon. Gentleman has seen these details. I am quite sure that we would not desire to give the right hon. Gentleman any vague course that we are going to pursue. There is no disposition to withdraw from his knowledge any part of our information. We cannot pledge ourselves to accuracy, but we say the matter has been carefully inquired into, and there are such sound foundations, and the investigation has been done with such care, that it deserves, and should receive, careful official criticism, and probably the criticism of some commision of inquiry. Well, Sir, the right hon. Gentleman declares that our proposals are absolutely in excess, that they might safely be set aside because his own scheme has advanced so well. I confess to distrust in recruiting upon a newspaper boom. I am entirely in favour that if we are to have compulsory service as a part of our military system, let it be not delegated compulsion of private firms; let it be compulsion carried out by authority and on the responsibility of the State.

I do not think the question is in any way a party one. As the right hon. Gentleman himself urged, it has never been a party one in the past. We have Oliver St. John as an authority. He spoke not as to whether compulsion was a good or a bad thing, but dealt with it as an existing fact. I understand the right hon. Gentleman himself to say that he admitted that it was the duty of men, and the responsibility rested with them, of taking part in the defence of the country—that this was part of the common law of England.

But I contend that it is not only a question of the common law of England, that it rests not only upon the authority of Oliver St. John or anyone else, but the question involved is that of the very existence of the State. The State cannot be conceived to exist without being able at its discretion to call upon every subject to take part in the duty of defending it. It is only a question then how you shall enforce that duty, and whether it is expedient at a particular moment to enforce it, whether you may injure the industries of the country, and at what time you may make a suitable experiment in that direction. One thing I am quite certain about is this: That with the growth of the democratic ideal we shall get closer to the re cognition of this general compulsion resting upon every citizen.

I could say, were I sent here as the hon. Members below the Gangway, to advance especially the interests of the labouring classes of this country, I could conceive no subject would tell more, more rouse those citizens, more stimulate their duty and their ambitions, than inclusion under this wide democratic movement of compulsory service. Is it fair as it falls just now on the great mass of the people? Is it fair that a small number should bear the burden of the whole? Is it fair that the burden, which would only mean 3 per cent., as it comes out of the full inquiry of the statistics of Norway, Sweden, etc., should fall upon a comparative few? If compulsion prevailed, the tax upon all those involved between the ages of 18 and 24 would be not more than from 2 to 3 per cent., a very much smaller number than upon those who now put themselves into the forefront and accept the burden that others will not share.

It is all very well for a few employers to say that they will attach particular conditions to employment, but it seems to me that the argument urged by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Forest of Dean was unanswerable; that a man may find himself under one employer compelled to serve in the Territorial Army, and he may be forced by circumstances to change, and, applying for employment to an employer who says that he will on no account or circumstance accept as an employee anyone who belongs to the Territorial Army. It is unjust and unfair that citizens who are ready to sacrifice themselves should be subjected to this disability and this uncertainty.

The right hon. Gentleman asks us, even if it costs no more than four millions, what we can get for less. Well, we are not getting the immense benefit in the improvement of the health of the population. One hundred and fifty thousand of our young men every year at the public expense would escape from the degrading influence of the town. [Cries of "Oh."] Escape into the country and have a healthy life, and would possibly be stimulated to recognise their responsibilities and reap physical, moral, and mental benefit. If you can get the great mass of our young men who hang about the street corners, or waste their time and their strength in looking on in winter days at football matches in which they take no part, I say if you can get these young men away into the country at the public expense to a healthy life, the benefit—mental, moral, and physical—would be immense, and you would give them beyond this an amount of enjoyment and happiness that would colour their whole life afterwards. This would be an addition to the security which you will get. The right hon. Gentleman does not deny that there is something in it. We must seek security.

In addition to these moral and physical benefits, the great mass of the population would have for your £4,000,000 security that no other effort whatever will bring; certainly no incomplete, untrained, and uncertain body, which, however well organised—and we all admit the ability with which the organisation has been devised—is not yet full, and show no signs yet, either of being complete in numbers or any approach to anything like adequacy of training.

Most of the Members who sit on this side of the House will agree with me as to the question of compulsory service. We are not only against it, as our hon. and gallant Friend who spoke from these benches said, because it is impossible, but also because we do not think it is necessary. We are quite against it, whether it comes from the Government or from private firms. We, I believe, the great mass of the Liberal party, are as strongly against the compulsory pressure put on by private firms as any of the Gentlemen who sit on the opposite benches. But, however strongly we may feel, we are far too conscious of the ability and earnestness, and I may say the democratic feeling, that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, has at heart, to turn round against him because he said, on this matter, one firm had done well to use this compulsory service. I do not agree with him; I do not think he has. At the same time, I am not going to set myself up against the Secretary for War on military matters of so little importance as this one case is to the general public. No doubt the great majority of Liberal Members are strongly against any compulsion. I agree with what the Secretary for War said as to his being grateful to the "Daily Mail" for their action, and to members of private firms who will give their men holidays to enable them to join the Territorial Army and make themselves efficient and useful to their country. It will be time for compulsory service when the country and the Government think it necessary, and then will be the time for the War Office to prepare accurate estimates as to the cost of such a scheme War Office clerks are not a cheap staff to maintain, and they should not be put to work in getting out the cost of hypothetical schemes which are not likely to be brought into operation for at least 20 years. The most serious attacks on the right hon. Gentleman's scheme have had reference to the special reserve. I have served in the militia or the special reserve for 30 years, and I know something of the style of recruits and officers who used to go into the old militia, and something of the style of recruits and officers who go into the special reserve. I can assure those hon. Members who, like the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Croydon, think that the militia has been destroyed, or those who say that it has been converted into a useless force, that the force which was formerly the old militia is now far more efficient than ever it was before, as far as infantry is concerned, to which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover specially referred.

I wish to make some reference to schemes which have preceded the present one. It is always the way of right hon. Gentlemen on the Front Opposition Bench to get up and say that our schemes of defence are utterly inadequate, never thinking, when they are out of office, that the coat must be cut according to the cloth. But the moment they get into power again, then it is quite a different thing. Over and over again hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite have clamoured for a large Army. When they get into power what do they do? They make a very large Army on paper. That was done by several consecutive Ministers in former Administrations. Army corps were talked of, barracks were built, money was spent, and the actual available force was never nearly so strong as it is to-day. [Cries of "Oh."] No, it was not so strong as it is to-day. This is the contention of the Secretary for War, and I think he is correct. If the hon. Gentleman who doubts the fact were to go into the question of the amount of Reserves and the way the regiments are filled up he will see that we have a larger available force than ever we had in the history of this country. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Croydon, when he introduced his scheme some years ago, wanted to do away with the militia, and to substitute for that force something else. The substitution was to cut it down just as much as it is cut down now, and there was no line behind it; but in the present case you have a line behind. Hon. Members do not realise very often that the old volunteer was only available when he chose to go out; but the Territorial is in practice a militiaman in this sense: The old militiaman was a man partially trained, and must be embodied when required. The Territorial when required can be called up for six months and be made a real soldier. That is the difference between the old volunteer and the Territorials, and between all the schemes that have gone before and this scheme. You have the men, and they can be called out for six months and made into real soldiers. Hon. Members talk about 15 and 21 days' training, but that is not the point. If you give them a month or two months' training it would not make them fit for the Army at the time when they come to be embodied. With the six months' training, however, you can form the Territorials into real soldiers, and make them fit to meet a foreign army. There are three methods of raising armies which have been tried. There is the old feudal system, under which every man was trained to arms; then as civilisation advanced in most countries there were soldiers who were paid. They were professional soldiers, UUG it was impossible to have them in large numbers, because they were so expensive. That was the old form of the English Army, and for a considerable time we used to pay for professional soldiers. There is the intermediate system, by which everybody, as far as possible, should be in the militia, that is to say, they should be partially trained, and should be available when required. This has been tried to a certain extent in England, where it was partially introduced. But this system has now been replaced, so far as the militia are concerned, by the Territorial Army, which, however, is in the same position as the militia, because it is a force that can be made to serve if required. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover endeavoured to show how the special reserve are deficient. He said they ought to have 2,600 officers, and that they had only 1,100. But if they had been trained for three years in the way the right hon. Gentleman suggested, they would have had no officers at all. The special reserve is short of officers according to the establishment, but we have 1,000 more than we should have had under the system of training the men for three years. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover, that it would be better if the men were trained together with their officers to a rather greater extent than they are at present. I have always said, and I think some day military authorities will come to the view, that six months' training is necessary, though I think it would be better if we had four months' recruit training, and the original three weeks' training as a battalion every year. I think that would be a better system. I can assure hon. Members that the men do know a good deal of their officers nowadays, and see a good deal of them. I have only had one training with the special reserve, because we were only made a special reserve last year, but my experience on that occasion was that the men were quite as much in touch with their officers as ever they have been before. I also think that the special reserve are in closer touch now than they were before, when they trained for a month, because they are more in communication with the depot, which is much more part of the battalion than it was in the old days. Then reference has been made to the artillery, and it is said that the Secretary of State found he could not train the artillery in large numbers. Anybody who has gone into the militia question knows that it is very difficult indeed for militiamen to be trained as artillery, because it takes longer to train them, and because both officers and men must have an amount of skill and technical knowledge which is not required by the ordinary infantry soldier. Though it is true to say that of militia training in connection with the artillery, it is absolutely untrue when you apply it to the infantry. Most countries have found, whether you take the German system of training for two years or whether you take the Swiss system of training, that the partially trained infantry soldier is quite good enough after having been trained three or four or five months, and then for three weeks or a month every year. They find this to be the cheapest system of producing the best article in the way of infantry. Under that system you can provide 1,000 men who would be as effective or more effective than 500 men trained under the long service system. Therefore the present system of producing reserve is one by which you get the largest number of men for the cheapest possible amount.

Fault has been found with there not being reservists after the first six months, but that is not the case. Take the case of my own battalion, which is 700 strong, and that the other battalion goes abroad, and that there is mobilisation. They are filled up with their own reservists, the line reservists, and over that above the numbers required to fill up the two battalions there would still be a considerable surplus of line reservists in almost every battalion. That would bring our battalion to something like a thousand men, but with the men too young to go abroad, and whose place reservists will have taken, and older recruits and persons not going abroad, we should probably have about 1,500. At the end of six months those boys, as they are called, would be more than up to the age and efficiency of being able to fill up gaps in the fighting line.

I was answering the point that at the end of six months there would be nobody left to fill up the gaps. The regular battalions are filled up by their ordinary reserves. [An HON. MEMBER: "Special Reserves."] No; not special reservists, but regular reservists, and there is a surplus from them. Then there is the special reserve, and about 60 per cent, are ready to go abroad; that is 60 per cent, of 55,000 men.

Would that 60 per cent, represent militia, who have been transferred to the special reserve, and who will not be the same as the recruits?

It is not so. As a matter of fact for the present to a great extent some of the militia that have been transferred to the special reserve would be the people who would go abroad first. But the recruits we are getting to-day have a better physique than the old militia recruit, and are more plentiful; and in every way we, as officers of the battalion, are better satisfied with the quality than that we used to get a year or two ago. I think the 60 per cent. I mentioned will be largely exceeded in a year or two, and that it will be something like 80 per cent. The militia were not all quite medically fit to go abroad. Of the special reserves a larger proportion are more medically fit than the militia were a year or two before.

I think the one point that has been attacked in the right hon. Gentleman's scheme—namely, that of the special reserve of infantry—is the least vulnerable point in it. I think the Army generally is in a stronger position than ever it has been, and, what is more, it is a great improvement, and that has been done without increased cost, which is, after all, a very, very important thing in these days, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer is in somewhat of a difficulty in finding the enormous requirements of the country in various ways. I think the right hon. Gentleman deserves great credit, and I hope that any further attack made on him will not be as to the infantry special reserve. I do not say that the artillery cannot be improved. It has always been a weak point, and there is the militia and the Territorial Army. I do not say that the British Army is quite perfect in the way of cavalry. There is a lack of trained old soldiers in the cavalry, and there is a great lack of horses, as we know—of horses available to be made cavalry horses at once. I believe that is also the case in many other countries, but nobody has got an army quite as perfect as they would like. However, from our insular position, and while our fleet is kept up strong and at its proper strength, as I believe this Government will always keep it, I do not think there is much fear of invasion, and that we would require nothing more than we have at present to repel it. I am quite aware it is quite possible for a certain number of men to be landed without people being ready for them, but our present defence, both regular and auxiliary, is a force that is quite able to cope with the sort of force that could be landed, in spite of a hostile fleet.

Reference was made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover to the land forces in this country all being one class. He said there was great danger in that because in the old days there was such a variety of corps. I think I heard him making speeches in this House saying that he wanted to bring those different varieties into closer touch, so that they could work better with each other, and that War Ministers should endeavour to make the forces more homogeneous. I must say that if, without inconvenience to the public, to the soldier, to the volunteers, or territorials, or militia, or the various classes, the Secretary of State for War has made all those kind of soldiers into one universal compact body, he will have done one of the greatest pieces of work for strengthening the land forces in the Empire that has ever been done by any Minister for War.

I desire to ask the right hon. Gentleman a few questions on matters dealt with in his speech. Reference was made to the difference between War Office regulations in respect to Civil Servants who join the Territorial Army and those generous private employers who give full pay and holiday during time of training. Why should not the War Office do as those employers he highly commends and give full pay and holiday to Civil Servants during the time of training? He can hardly ask private employers to do so unless the War Office and other Government Offices do so. We heard a great deal about the men of the regular Army, the special reserve, and the Territorial Army, but I do not think we heard very much about the officers. I dare say some hon. Members will remember the speech of the right hon. Gentleman in introducing the Army Estimates last year, in which he told us there was a serious condition of affairs in respect to the officers. He told us that for mobilisation purposes there were no less than 5,000 officers short in England and 3,000 short in India.

There are already 17,000 in the officers' training corps out of whom we hope to get a considerable proportion.

I think those are boys, some of them at private schools, some at public schools, and some leaving public schools for the universities, and is that the class of officer he intends to send out to fill the places of the officers who are accustomed to lead men? The position of an officer in war is one of the greatest responsibility, the lives of a large number of men often depending on his action, and the officers of the special training corps are hardly of the quality or class required to make good the waste of war. I should like to say a word with regard to the officers of the special reserve, the men having been dealt with by my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon. How the right hon. Gentleman can be satisfied with the position of the special reserve is more than I can understand. They have plenty of lieutenant-colonels; in fact, there are several more than the establishment; there are also 22 majors and 190 captains more than are required for the establishment. But lieutenants are no less than 1,573 short on an establishment of 1,907, and second-lieutenants are 647 short on an establishment of 1,073. Is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied with that state of affairs?

Certainly not. There was the same sort of shortage under the militia system; it was one of the things they could not fill up, and no effective attempt was made to do so. We, however, have tried to fill it up under the officers' training corps, which I hope will meet the difficulty in the course of time.

I hope the right hon. Gentleman's expectation will be realised; certainly the members of that corps will be more suitable for this purpose than for filling the vacancies caused by war. There is one other point. There is building going on at present at Sandhurst, and possibly the period of training there has been shortened temporarily in consequence. But could the right hon. Gentleman possibly arrange for cadets going into the cavalry to be given a special course, even if it were only for a month? All squadron leaders and cavalry officers will agree that one of the greatest difficulties with newly-joined subalterns is teaching them stable-work and stable management; they know nothing whatever about the grooming, feeding, or shoeing of horses, and if the right hon. Gentleman could give them even a month's training in these matters it would be a great step forward.

The Secretary of State has outlined a new scheme for horsing the Army. I gather from his speech that, for the purpose of mobilisation, the regulars require 70,000 and the Territorials 86,000 horses, a total of 156,000. Towards that number he has 15,000 on the peace establishment, and 25,000 registered, leaving 116,000 to be provided. The deficiency for the regular army, in order to mobilise, he said, was about 54,000; so that, after allowing for the registered horses, 29,000 more are required. Moreover, to take the registered horses as 25,000 is very generous, as there must be a large number sick, lame, or otherwise unfit.

In any case, there are 29,000 to be provided, and, if I understand his scheme aright, the right hon. Gentleman now proposes to go about the country purchasing 29,000 horses.

Then I entirely fail to understand the scheme. The right hon. Gentleman said he would have a large number of fully trained horses, which he would send about the country to farmers, who would have the use of them for their keep.

The hon. Baronet is mixing up two entirely different schemes. I described them quite separately and distinctly, as he will see if he looks at the report of my speech. They have nothing whatever to do one with the other.

The impression left on my mind was that he was going to send round horses fully trained.

I thought I made it quite clear. We are proposing to add to the cavalry establishment a certain number of horses, by purchasing about 200 every year for three years, and, in that way, bringing the number up to a figure in excess of the present establishment. The horses used for that and those horses alone are those which will be lent about the country.

Then there is no provision whatever made for the purposes of mobilisation. Two hundred a year for three years will not go far towards providing 29,000. I seriously doubt whether the right hon. Gentleman will get farmers to take these horses. What is the use of a light cavalry horse for agricultural purposes? A farmer might hack such a horse about, hunt it, break its back, or kill it, but it is certainly useless for agricultural purposes. If a farmer has a horse of that description he simply has it for the purpose of making money out of it; he sells it, or he may buy it in the hope of selling it at a profit. I would commend to the right hon. Gentleman's attention the scheme in operation in France.

The right hon. Gentleman might get farmers to take mares, especially if they had a market for their produce; but it is extremely doubtful if he would get them to take horses in the way he proposes. The only thing that seems to have been done is to take a census of horses, and to establish agents throughout the country for mobilisation purposes. I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman upon that, but I do not think he has gone far enough towards providing the horses necessary for mobilisation.

My hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool put a point which has not yet been answered. The right hon. Gentleman must have based his figure of 300,000 for the Territorial Army upon some calculation as to the number who might possibly invade this country. In an interesting debate in another place Lord Roberts made a weighty and interesting speech on this question, but the Government reply was hardly satisfactory, and did not give the information asked for. Cannot the right hon. Gentleman take the House into his confidence so far as to state the conclusions at which the Government have arrived upon which this 300,000 is based? In conclusion, I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman upon his organisation; he has gone far to add to the efficiency of the cavalry and of the yeomanry by the institution of the cavalry depots. I congratulate him also on having come round I to our way of thinking in regard to the artillery, and upon the reorganisation which he says he has carried out at an increased cost.

I desire to express my entire agreement with the greater part of the speech of the hon. Member for the Barnard Castle Division on the question of indirect compulsion upon Territorials. But, first, I should like briefly to call attention to the general question of the cost of the Army. In the Army Estimates it is stated that the cost of the Army is something over £27,000,000. That figure is rather deceptive, because there is nearly half a million more charged to Civil Service and Revenue Votes for the benefit of the Army.

Surely the right hon. Gentleman is familiar with his own Estimates? On Page 10 there is a "Statement showing the total estimated expenditure for the Army, including amounts provided for in the Civil Service and Revenue Departments' Estimates"; and if he will deduct the top figures from the bottom he will find the difference of nearly half a million sterling.

No; the cost of the Army. This is a general discussion on the Army. The importance of the point is evidently greater than I had anticipated, because even the right hon. Gentleman himself is unfamiliar with the fact. It only shows the utterly misleading character of the Estimates, and I have no doubt the right hon. Gentleman will now study that page. But that is a comparatively small point. My point is that the Army paid for by this House is only a small part of the total British Army. The real British Army under the control of the Crown includes the Indian Army. Last Session I asked a question to bring out the relative cost of the British and German Armies, and the right hon. Gentleman told me that the cost of the British Army, including the Army in India, was £49,000,000, for which we got a strength of something over 1,000,000 men. In addition to the Indian Army, there are also various Crown Colony armies, which are equally under the control of the Crown, and my right hon. Friend the Member for the Forest of Dean asked a question two Sessions ago bringing out the cost of those Crown Colony Armies. At that time the Transvaal was still a Crown Colony, and if we deduct the Transvaal contribution there remains a total of over £2,000,000 paid for the various Crown Colonies. Adding that to the £49,000,000 we have a total of £51,000,000. That is the cost of the British Army per annum, apart from the self-governing Colonies. That is the cost of the Army under the control of the Crown. [An HON. MEMBEB: "Not to the British taxpayer."] Now what is the cost of the German Army—the greatest Army in the world? Fifty-one millions also, so that we are paying for our Army as much as the Germans are paying for their Army. The Germans get an Army of over 4,000,000 together with the Landwehr, and we get an Army altogether of 1,000,000. That shows I think that there is some serious defect in our Army organisation. I quite admit, as everyone will see, that we must make allowance for the fact that our Empire is scattered, and that our Army has to be moved about. I venture to submit that when we make this allowance there still remains a large unaccounted for excess.

There is another point which is very important, as to the cost imposed on this country, and that is the fact that we maintain large garrisons in South Africa, to which the Colonies make practically no contribution. For a time Natal paid £4,000 a year, but that has come to an end. We are spending over £2,000,000 a year in maintaining a garrison in the Transvaal. I submit that it is extremely unfair that the people of this country should be called upon to pay for the local defence of the people of the Transvaal, and that applies to other Colonies as well. Take for example Mauritius. There again the cost of the garrison has gone up enormously in the last few years, but the contribution paid by Mauritius is very small. When I raised the question some time ago the present President of the Board of Trade, who was then Under-Secretary for the Colonies, had the duty of replying, and he then told me that it was not a business relationship between the Colonies and the Mother Country, and with one of those epigrams which he is so successful in making he said that the British Empire was not a syndicate, but a family. I do not pretend to rival the right hon. Gentleman's ability in making phrases of that kind, but I am able to say that my conception of the British Empire is totally different from his. I look upon the British Empire as a union of self-respecting nations, and not as a nursery of spoilt children.

Now let me pass to an important question raised by the hon. Member for Barnard Castle. He took as an analogy the employment of a teacher who was also to play the organ. As Liberals we condemned that. He also condemned the action of an assurance company which engages a clerk to work at figures of assurance and also to serve in the Territorial Army. I entirely concur with the hon. Member in that. It occurred to me that he and his friends might carry that argument a little further. I have heard of cases where men subscribed to trade union funds for sick pay and who were forced to forfeit that unless they were willing to pay the salaries of Members of Parliament.

The hon. Member ought to remember that that was decided also on the democratic principle.

I repudiate the doctrine that democracy has any more right than a single individual to impose tyrannical laws. So far as the hon. Member was protesting against compulsion in any form in the military system which in this country has hitherto been a voluntary system I am entirely at one with him. I rather regretted that the right hon. Member for Dover more or less supported the principle of compulsion, because, as he argued, invasion was possible. I remember listening some years ago to a speech by the right hon. Gentleman the present Leader of the Opposition, in which it seemed to me that he demonstrated with his customary lucidity, and more than his customary conclusiveness, that it was absolutely impossible for this country to be invaded. I entirely agree with him, and I was glad to see that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War expressed the same opinion the other day. What puzzles me is how the Secretary of State for War, holding that opinion, can still go about the country making speeches which have the inevitable effect of inducing men to believe in the idea that this country would be invaded were it not for his Territorial Army. On other occasions, as I think, without the respect which he ought to pay to his own creation, he somewhat underrated the value of the arm. I think it was last Session that the hon. Member for Shropshire asked a question about the Territorial Army, and was not so complimentary as he might have been, and the right hon. Gentleman replied that this Territorial Army would be all right if only hon. Members opposite would not carp. I venture to suggest that this country would be in a bad condition if its safety from invasion depended on a force which might disappear altogether if hon. Members opposite ceased to carp at it. I should be very glad indeed if the Secretary of State for War would tell this House exactly for what purpose his Army exists. When I say "his Army" I mean the Territorial Army. It does not exist to repel invasion, for he tells us that invasion is impossible.

Then I am afraid I have altogether misunderstood the speech which the right hon. Gentleman delivered last Thursday, when tie advised Members of this House to read an article in the "Contemporary Review." I at once read it, and I was more convinced than before that invasion was impossible.

I am afrail my hon. Friend has read the article as loosely as he read my speech. What I did say was that if you had such a defending force at home as would compel the enemy to come in large numbers, then invasion was impossible.

I accept that correction, and I am quite willing to argue the proposition on that basis. It is quite certain that since all our Army is recruited in this country we must retain in this country the bulk of our military forces, and therefore it is absolutely secure. We cannot send troops across the sea until we have absolute command of the sea. Therefore until we have absolute command of the sea we must keep our troops in this country, and that would suffice to do what is necessary. If the enemy were to send such a large force as the right hon. Gentleman indicates it would inevitably be intercepted by our ships.

Now comes the other question—the question of a raid. I think the right hon. Gentleman said that though invasion was impossible, yet a raid was possible. I think the Admiralty took that view. I think it is in the evidence given before the Royal Commission on the Militia that the Admiralty were willing to guarantee the country against any invading force except a raid by less than 10,000 men. How are we to guard ourselves against a raid? The Admiralty will not do it. Is it really suggested that we are to guard against it by means of the Territorial Force which ex hypothesi is not to take the field without six months' train- ing? Is the enemy going to give us six months' notice? This Territorial Force was to have a small training, but it was not to be liable to be asked to take the field until it had six months' training. The right hon. Gentleman has said that it was unfit for anything until it had had that training. If a raid comes it will come suddenly. Where are your Territorials then? They will be engaged in doing clerical work in an assurance office. How are they going to meet this sudden descent of troops upon our coast? I submit that the right hon. Gentleman has not clearly thought out for what purpose a raid would be undertaken. The Germans will not raid this country for the purpose of having a picnic on the Norfolk Broads. It will be for the purpose of doing as much damage as possible on a vital point of our arms. It will be to damage Portsmouth, or Woolwich, or possibly Chatham. We guard against that by having regular troops to protect these particularly vulnerable points—I will not say particularly vulnerable, but precious points. Does the right hon. Gentleman suggest that Portsmouth should be guarded by Territorial troops? Is he willing to risk the safety of Portsmouth by putting it under that force? We must always have regulars to guard the only points which a raider would be likely to attack. A raider might think it worth his while to land on some undefended part of our coast and march upon London. I imagine that we should still have troops in London. But let us take this supposition, that the enemy is prepared to land a small body of desperate men on some undefended part of the coast, to march on London with the view of capturing the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. [An HON. MEMBER: "And the Secretary for War."] The right hon. Gentleman the Minister for War would be defended by the clerks of the War Office. I admit that that is a danger which we have to consider, and the point which I wish to press upon the Committee is this. I submit it is a very serious question indeed. The whole of the question of the defensive strength of the Empire depends upon this consideration. How is the country to defend itself against a raid of men to attack London, or some other place?

I contend that it is best guarded against by Naval defence, that it is cheaper and safer than to wait until the enemy lands and then try to kill him—because he may kill you. I shall be out of order if I discuss the Navy Estimates, but I think the Admiralty have taken means of defence which are infinitely cheaper than the methods proposed by the right hon. Gentleman. I recently got from the Admiralty the annual cost of a battleship, what you allow for wages, what you allow for food, the cost out of capital, and so on—I mean the cost of a first-class battleship in full commission—and I found that it amounted to £231,000 a year. The Territorial Army of the right hon. Gentleman will cost £2,300,000 a year. The right hon. Gentleman's Army will cost this country ten "Dreadnoughts"—that is what it is going to cost the country. I venture to think that everybody will be of opinion that this country would be immensely stronger with ten "Dreadnoughts" than with the proposed Army with its six months' training. Additional costs would be tantamount to 18 "Dreadnoughts." If we take the Swiss system, to which the members of the National Service League appeal, it would cost this country £20,000,000 a year. I take that figure from the calculation given by the lecturer to those Members who were specially invited by the National Service League to give a lecture to Members of Parliament, of whom I was one, who had visited Switzerland. He informed us that if the Swiss system applied to England it would give an effective force of 4,000,000 men at a cost of £5,000,000. When you say this, you wipe out the whole of your argument for universal training.

When we visited the country the period was 45 days, and it was being considered whether there should not be a Referendum so that that period should be lengthened, because it was contended that 45 days were not sufficient. If the Swiss system was then insufficient, clearly we are not going to have the finished article by taking something less than the Swiss system.

There is no economy in reducing expenditure if at the same time you reduce efficiency. It is much more economical to pay a good price for a good article than to pay a moderate price which is worth nothing. If we really have men as a defence against a raid we have no protection against a raid on our ships. The most urgent duty would be to increase our ships. If we have sufficient ships we can do that, but we must have sufficient land forces to protect the ships. If we have sufficient ships a fortiori over the forces will be sufficient to protect us against invasion from a raid. I do not wish to depreciate the service of anyone who joins the Territorial Army, but the real service which a volunteer gives his country arises from his willingness to fight his country's battle, and not from the false delusion that he is defending his hearth and home. Has he realised that conscripttion is even more unfair? Is it not far away the best to pay a sufficient price to induce men to come forward? We do not want everybody in this country to serve. You cannot compel cripples to serve. If you want 1,000 or a million men you can get them by paying the men a sufficient price to induce them to come forward if the men who actually serve are shown that the arrangement is advantageous to them. The voluntary service is infinitely superior to compulsory service by what ever name you choose to call it. I say that these conscriptionists have a false conception of what is the duty of the individual towards the nation. After all it is admitted that it is the duty of every man to serve his country. In the case of an island like our own it is admitted that we must have a volunteer Army to serve abroad, and it is admitted that we must have a gigantic Navy. It is clear that it is not the duty of everybody to become a soldier. We do not want every body to become a soldier. If you wanted to raise a large Army you could not get it unless other people were doing the work of civilians. For instance, how is an army to be fed? You are bound to admit that there are other forms of national service beside that. It seems to me that the gentlemen with the most laudable motives who are at the back of the National Service League often get themselves into the mental attitude of a mediaeval saint. They think that it is necessary to become uncomfortable, just as a mediaeval saint who wore hair shirts. It seems to me that these gentlemen go to sleep thinking that the country is going to the dogs, and about 2 o'clock in the morning they awake from a dream that the Germans have invaded England and captured the bathing machines at Margate. We have got to dismiss altogether from our minds the idea that we want a gigantic army in this country for home defence. If you once convince the people of this country, either by speeches of Ministers of War or articles in halfpenny newspapers, or by sensational dramas, that their safety depends upon soldiers and not upon ships they will pay for soldiers and not for ships, and that would mean the end of the British Empire.

People under compulsory service will not be expected to serve after a certain time of life. A man would be expected to serve for four months once in his life, then for three years for 15 days each year. The cost does not in the least work out at the amount stated by the hon. Gentleman, but at about 4 millions a year. After the men had done their training they would go into the reserve, and would be called out only when the country was actually invaded. After all if the men of this country declined to prepare themselves to defend the country who is going to do it for them?

I think that everybody must congratulate the right hon. Gentleman upon his organisation and the magnificent energy he has shown in preparing his scheme, but I am afraid the result of it all appears unfortunately to be that the Army costs nearly, if not quite, as much as it did before, and that we are less by 20,000 men of our very best infantry, and we are also short in their reserve, and we have less men for the auxiliary forces than we had before. Organisation of course is very necessary and very excellent, but organisation is useless if you cannot get a sufficient number of fairly trained men. The Territorial guns are admittedly not first class, and our rifle is considerably behind the rifle of other, nations. Our men under the Territorial Act admittedly do not have enough training, and there are not near enough of them to be able to defeat a sudden invasion of this country. The right hon. Gentleman, the Secretary for War, refused altogether the other day to allow a reserve to be formed of the old soldiers, who had served four or five years in the Army or with the volunteers, although these men could by no possibility have enlisted because they were far past the age. I cannot help thinking that a very valuable reserve of men might be formed between the ages of 35 and 55, at which age they could not possibly of course enlist in the Territorial forces. I think with rifles, and ammunition, and uniforms supplied by the Government that these men once a year could be called up for a very small expenditure, and that at all events they would be available to do garrison duty and would allow the Territorial Forces to be free to face the enemy. You could get them very cheap; indeed, probably cheaper than any other soldiers. We have been told by the right hon. Gentleman that compulsory training would be a deadly peril to this country. I think the answer to that is the fact that when Colonel Pollock began the training of his men only one man wanted to join, and when he finished 30 men wanted to join, and these 30 men are in the Army now. I do not know how he can have objection to compulsory service on this ground. He tells us he is dead against compulsory service or any form of it, and that his scheme has saved the country from it. I cannot see how anybody of ordinary common-sense can agree with him. According to the War Office account not only did the Alliance Assurance Company compel all their employés to join the Territorial Army, but they also agreed to do their best to make all those whom they employed join it, and the right hon. Gentleman himself told us that there was a very long list of men waiting to be employed by the country. In the "Broad Arrow" I find the right hon. Gentleman said this: State for War, and neither he nor anybody else can deny it. The right hon. Gentleman compels a very small minority of helpless workmen to join his Territorial Army, whether they like it or not. Whilst proclaiming that he has saved the country from compulsion, and that he is strongly opposed to any form of it, the right hon. Gentleman and a millionaire banker have got up a scheme to force the most helpless class amongst our people into the Territorial Army by economic necessity, and is afraid to apply the same princple to the men employed by his own Department, and to the great trades union organisations. He only applies it to the people who cannot help themselves, and, except the "Daily News," the democratic papers and peace-at-any-price people have taken all this lying down. If such a thing had been done by a Conservative Minister the Radicals and their papers would have been screaming in condemnation all over the country.

You would have placards issued at elections with the inscription: "Conscription for the Poor Only, enforced by a Tory Cabinet Minister." It would have been almost as good a cry as Chinese slavery. After all, universal military training in the ranks for four months once in a man's life would be far more just and far more democratic than the right hon. Gentleman's scheme. Even without the extra squeezing of those companies that are going to help him, the scheme is not fair. Working people and the poor have got to work for their living in any case. It would be no harder for them to serve four months' military training, and it would probably be of more interest than their ordinary work. They would get good food and clothing, fresh air and healthy exercise, and, let me remind the right hon. Gentleman, the rich and the well-to-do would have to take their share, which is certainly not the case under the present system.

The Secretary for War has told us that it is the duty of every man to repel the invader, but, under his scheme, a very small minority would be armed and trained and the great majority will be absolutely useless. There cannot be any doubt about that, and if the great majority of our men are not prepared, ready and willing to defend the country, who is going to do it for them, and what is going to happen to the country? The Secretary for War has told us more than once that the enemy would be sure to try to strike a blow at London, which would end the war at once. Anybody can see that, and it is quite possible that the regular Army may be urgently and instantly wanted to go abroad to defend our interests and our fellow countrymen and women. In that case, even if the Territorial Army was filled, we should only have 140,000 of these slightly trained troops to defend the country, and if Napoleon and the other great war captains are right, we should require at least double that number to make us safe, and it would require at least double that number to stop 70,000 trained troops of a foreign power, and, with the regular Army abroad, we should necessarily be defenceless for months on land in this country, and our Navy would be like a watchdog chained to our shores, and, what is more important, quite unable to protect our food supplies, without which it is perfectly impossible that our working people can live. It is hard enough for them to live now, and let me remind the right hon. Gentleman that this would mean starvation and surrender.

The War Secretary and the Government are gambling for the greatest stakes that have ever been played for before. They are gambling for the safety of the British Empire, and it is all because they have not got the courage to tell the people that it is necessary that every sound man should learn enough to be able to defend his country and his women and children in time of war. [Laughter.] Hon. Gentlemen laugh now, but they would not laugh when they have got a German non-commissioned officer and a dozen men planted on them. There will not be much smiling then. The necessities seem to me perfectly plain, and it is written in letters of misery and bloodshed all through the history of the years that have passed. It has always happened if the men of a country have got too apathetic or idle, or cowardly, to learn enough to defend their country—it has invariably happened that they have been conquered and destroyed by a stronger nation.

I have ventured to put before the House of Commons what appears to me, and, I am quite sure, to many others, a true statement of our present defenceless and dangerous condition, and to ask Liberals, Unionists, and Socialists what the condition of our working classes would be like if, like France, we were caught napping and unprepared and were destroyed for ever as a great Nation and an Empire, as we certainly should be. There will be no chance of recovery, and the position of our people would be a hundred times worse if our Navy were chained to our shores and unable to protect our food supply. Would it not be the case then that thousands and thousands of our people would die of starvation. We have had in the past very serious warnings from the Duke of Wellington, from Napoleon, and others, and let me remind the House that Napoleon succeeded in invading Egypt in spite of the vigilance of Nelson. We have been warned in the present day by all sorts of people, from Lords Roberts and Wolseley down to the Socialist leaders. We have been warned by all sorts of people in Germany, from the German Emperor down to the Socialist leaders there, and yet we send our warships out half manned because we have not got men enough to put into them. I wonder whether the British people will recognise before it is too late that sea warfare in the past has always been most uncertain. At the present time they are risking every month not only untold misery on the part of the people of this country, but they are risking our very existence as a great nation.

in moving to reduce the Vote by 10,000 men, said: In moving the Resolution which stands in my name I have to make the confession to the Committee that when the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies moved a similar Resolution three years ago I voted with the Government. I voted with the Government then, Sir, because of the blandishments of the Secretary of State for War, and still more because of the appeal of the Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and particularly because of the distinct promise that he gave on that occasion of a great reduction in our military expenditure. When the hon. Member for the Falkirk Burghs introduced his Amendment last year for the reduction of armaments I felt it my duty to vote with him against the Government. In bringing forward this reduction of men I do so because I feel that the expenditure upon the Army is far too excessive. The Prime Minister last year told us that if we wanted to reduce the cost of the Army the only way to do it was to reduce the number of men. In 1896–7, the year in which the Tory dêbacle began, there were 156,000 men in the Army, costing 18¼ millions. Ten years later, 1906–7, there were 204,000 men costing 29¾ millions, so that in ten years of Tory rule we had an increase of men of 30 per cent. and of cost of 33 per cent., while the population during the period only increased 10 per cent. The Liberal record since 1906 is that the 204,000 men have been reduced to 183,000, and the cost has been reduced from 29 to 27½millions. I should like the Secretary of State for War to explain why, with that considerable reduction of men, he has not succeeded in reducing the cost more than he has done. When we compare the present number of men with the numbers which existed in 1896 we find there is still room for great improvement and reduction. We are still 27,000 men above what the Tories had in 1896. with an extra cost of nine millions, so that in asking the Committee to reduce the Army by 10,000 I think we are erring on the side of moderation. In the speech of the Secretary of State for War in March, 1006, he told us that the main factor in the reduction of Army expenditure lies in policy abroad, in India, and in the Colonies.

Let us look first of all at our international relationship. We find that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has surrounded the Secretary of State for War with a happy group of ententes cordiales. We feel, however, that instead of taking advantage of the diplomacy of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the Secretary of State for War has neglected his opportunities. I think he was extremely unfortunate in his Newcastle speech, for the only Power with which we have not an entente and with which we desire to have thoroughly cordial relations is Germany, and that speech, of course, seemed to embitter the situation. We sincerely trust that the Foreign Secretary will not relax his energies, but will increase them and seek to bring about an understanding with Germany which will remove every obstacle from the path of both the Secretary of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty in making reductions.

I should just like to quote one sentence from the Foreign Secretary in a speech in May, 1906, in this House:— that part of the King's dominions, we have brought about a true union of hearts, and we expect soon to have a true united South Africa. Under these circumstances I have to ask the Secretary of State for War why he retains a single soldier in South Africa? We know that the South Africans are perfectly capable of defending themselves from any trouble which may arise from within. Any trouble which may come from without, of course, will be attended to by the Navy. The right hon. Gentleman said the Colonial Premiers when they were over here stated that they were very pleased to have our soldiers. Very naturally. It costs two or three millions a year, and that money must be of benefit to the Colonies. At the same time, one feels that if we ask the Colonies to relieve us of this serious financial burden, they would at once reply: "We think it is time you took your soldiers home." We feel that this is really one of the chief reasons for our demanding that the Secretary for War shall bring back what remains. There are 11,000 troops still stationed in South Africa and this will save us, on the linked-battalion system, from one and a half to one-and three-quarter millions a year.

Leaving South Africa, we come to Egypt. Again, owing to the beneficent and wise diplomacy of the Foreign Secretary, we are on the very best of terms with the new Turkey that we see to-day. The only danger to the Egyptians from any foreign foe, so far as we can see, would he from Turkey, so that here is an opportunity for further reduction in that portion of the King's dominions. If the Foreign Secretary could see his way to do for Egypt what the Government as a whole did for South Africa, and restore to Egypt her right of self-government, we could remove the whole of the garrison there, and in that way again reduce our liabilities tremendously. After all, we have to realise that we went to Egypt for the benefit of bondholders, and that we. have accomplished our purpose in relieving their financial anxieties. We have brought about law and order and we feel that the time surely has come for seriously considering restoring the government of Egypt to the Egyptians.

I will now come to perhaps a little more difficult part of my subject, and that is. India. In 1870 we had an Army of 56,000, Europeans, in addition, of course, to the native Army, which was 115,000, costing 12 millions. The Afghan War, in 1879, brought up the white forces in India to 65,000, and the total cost of the Indian Army was 17 millions. In 1855 we find that there were 78,000 white troops in the Indian Army and 153,000 native troops, because of the Penjdeh incident. When the Boer War broke out there was a considerable reduction in the number of white troops in India—

On a point of order: Is the hon. Member entitled to discuss the Army in India on this Vote?

The hon. Member is not entitled to discuss the Army in India. I was not quite sure whether he was referring to the question in connection with the force that we are to keep at home, but any discussion in reference to the Army in India is out of order on this Vote.

I quite understand. I was using the argument that, if we can reduce the number of white troops in India, then, on the linked-battalion system, we would reduce our Army at home. I would not think for a single moment of using these arguments if I did not think they were relevant. I may pass to 1902. In that year the white troops in India numbered 59,000, and the total cost of the Army was only 15 millions. In 1908 the white troops had gone up to 76,000, and the cost was 20 millions. We have several times in this House debated the question whether the Anglo-Russian convention might not enable a reduction to be made. I think that a considerable section of this House feels that that is a legitimate and proper reason for reduction in India. The Secretary of State for War told us in 1906: "A short time ago we were menaced on the North-West frontier of India by Russia. Are we menaced to-day? We are riot." If the danger of menace from Russia is removed, we have to ask what is the reason that we have not a reduction in the Indian Army—

The hon. Member is now obviously discussing the question of the Indian Army, which is not in order. It is only in order here in so far as it affects the force which we have to keep at home.

I will conclude that portion of what I have to say, and I am sorry that I have overstepped the bounds in what I said.

It was stated that, upon this Vote, we might discuss in Committee the whole question which related to the Army, as if the Speaker had been in the chair; ant that was one of the reasons given for moving the closure.

No statement of that kind was made by me. As a matter of fact, I think that this is an open and a general discussion: but on these Votes there is no money for the Army in India, and therefore that matter is excluded except in so far as it affects the establishment that we have to keep at home.

But the Indian White Army is linked with the English Army, and if there are arguments for reducing that Army they are arguments for reducing the English Army by a corresponding amount, as they show how you can reduce it.

I have pointed out that the hon. Member is going beyond the line which he should keep to.

The argument was that by reducing the white troops in India you could reduce in proportion the white troops at home.

I beg to draw attention to the fact that there are not 40 Members present.

House counted, and 40 Members being found present,

Another aspect of the matter is that of money. If we keep a low establishment in time of peace it makes us better prepared for war when the time comes. That was the doctrine that was long adopted by leading statesmen on both sides of the House—Sir Robert Peel, Mr. Disraeli, Lord Randolph Churchill, and Mr. Gladstone. Another reason was that a large peace establishment is actually a menace to peace. As the poet says— ment." We feel that we are in honour bound to redeem those pledges that we gave. We feel that it is possible to do it. If the Secretary for War says it is impossible, we have to remind him that Mr. Gladstone was faced with far more difficulties in 1860, and he succeeded in effecting great reductions. So did Mr. Cardwell and the late Lord Randolph Churchill.

Some people may think that he failed, but his resignation had the effect of cutting down the Estimates for two or three successive years. To avoid any misunderstanding, I may say that this Resolution of mine, if carried out by the Secretary, would not increase the amount of unemployment to-day. There is another serious danger facing our party. We feel that it is threatened with partial paralysis. Its general functions, after all, are wrapped up with retrenchment. If we do not have retrenchment, it is impossible to have adequate and satisfactory reform. Whenever John Bull has been knocked down and his pockets rifled by the Tories the Liberal party has always come to his rescue as a true Samaritan. I have to ask the Secretary of State for War if he has not been playing the part of the Levite or the priest passing by on the other side? We feel that, after all, he has not succeeded in reducing the Army in anything like a satisfactory degree. We feel that the present Estimates are a complete failure. Instead of any real reduction, there is an increase of £275,000, even by robbing India of £300,000. There is not the slightest justification for this mean and contemptible act, and I trust the Government will see their way to reimburse the Indian Exchequer, and not allow the world and the Indians to feel that we are lacking in honour and uprightness.

There is absolutely no ground for saying that we are not acting in honour. It is a perfectly friendly settlement between the two Secretaries of State.

The Government of India protested in the strongest terms against this filching of £300,000 from the Indian people. I can give the Government of India as my authority. We feel, whatever the Government may feel, that our honour is at stake in this matter, and that we have sacrificed our honour. It is with deep regret that we feel that the Secretary of State for War has been fanning the flame of militarism in our country. I need not refer to his speeches beyond saying that the views he has put forward on this question are absolutely alien to Liberal principles—for example, "a striking force of 167,000 men," and "a nation and an empire in arms." What we feel is that if we fail to reduce our Army and bring about retrenchment then Liberalism fails. Mr. Acland spoke the other day with wisdom, strength, and character when he lamented the fact that we required heaps of money for educational purposes, and he did not see where it was coming from. Why have the Government in their scheme for unemployment this year not dealt with afforestation? Is it because of the vast expenditure upon the Army and the Navy? Why have we not made a beginning with an insurance scheme against unemployment'? I know the Chancellor of the Exchequer is looking forward to the day when he will be able to extend and enlarge the area of his Old Age Pensions scheme. For all these purposes money is absolutely essential, and it is extremely difficult to find it. I trust I have shown that there is a reasonable possibility of reducing the Army to what it was in 1896, and that it is possible to effect a saving of a very considerable sum. May I remind the House that Lord Rosebery a short time ago lamented the fact that national waste and national extravagance is a serious evil in our national life, and he regretted that there was not a great economist in the House of Commons to-day like Mr. Joseph Hume. I should like this House to become the missionaries of truth and freedom. We ought to tell the people of this country that the missionaries of the Empire have brought a harvest of national debt and dishonour. They have demoralised our people, and, after all, the supreme enemy of our country, as it is the supreme enemy of the world, is militarism. If we preach that gospel up and down the country we shall have a great change in public opinion and feel that we are playing a handsomer and more beneficent part in the history of the nation and of the world. Instead of rivalry in armaments and weapons of destruction we ought to endeavour to bring about a rivalry in constructive policy which will build up the character and the nobility of the peoples.

When the Liberal party were in Opposition we never lost an opportunity of criticising the late Government for the great increase in national expenditure. We directed our political thunder against increased expenditure on armaments, and particularly in regard to Army Estimates; and although during the last three or four years we have made a considerable reduction in our Army expenditure, there are still many hon. Members on this side of the House who are not altogether satisfied with the progress which has been made. When I first saw these Estimates I thought the right hon. Gentleman had at least made some effort to reduce the great burden of military expenditure in this country, and I was led to believe that he had reduced that expenditure by the magnificent sum of £24,000, and that is not a very large amount when you are dealing with £27,000,000. But when I looked into the matter still further I found that we had got an increased grant from India of some £300,000, which, instead of making a reduction on our Army expenditure of £24,000, actually made an increase of £280,000. I do not agree with my hon. Friend about this money having been filched from India. I understand that it is brought about by an understanding between the different Governments, and if the two Governments are agreed upon it I for one am perfectly content to abide by its decision.

I said distinctly that the Government of India was no party to this increased expenditure, but, on the other hand, protested against it.

It is very disappointing that instead of having a reduction in this year's expenditure there has actually been an increase of £280,000. I am afraid we cannot hope to get back to the happy days when our military expenditure was something like £20,000,000. Nevertheless, I think great reductions might be made, and I hope will be made in the near future. The right hon. Gentleman last year told us it was impossible to reduce our Army expenditure to a very large extent unless we were willing to reduce the number of troops serving abroad, but he would reduce the Colonial garrisons still further whenever withdrawals could be safely effected. Last year the garrison in South Africa was 16,200, and we reduced it by one cavalry regiment and four battalions of infantry. I regret we did not get the full advantage of that step, because the actual reduction in the number of men was only 1,800 at the end of the financial year.

But I contend that 11,400 troops is too large at the present time to garrison South Africa. If South Africa is not safe at the present time without this large number, I begin to doubt whether we were wise in granting self-government to the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony. I find that in 1895 our garrison in South Africa was:3,250; in 1898 it was 8,500. Well, I fail to see why in South Africa there should now be a necessity for 11,400. Of course, we all know that for some time after the war finished in South Africa it was necessary to have a large garrison. But surely our policy in South Africa during the last two years has done away with that necessity. There is only one reason why troops should be retained in South Africa, that is to police the country, and to protect the white colonists against a rising from the natives. Well, I say that is surely a domestic question. That is a question for the self-governing Colonies themselves. If they prefer to have a kind of police made up of British troops, I personally have no objection so long as they pay their bill.

They are not allowed to manage their own affairs; the natives are incited against them.

They can pay for the police of the country for all that. There is another reason why, to my mind, the troops, at least a large proportion of them, should be brought home. The Secretary of State for War only last year said:—

"The presence of regular troops in self-governing Colonies had a distinctly deleterious effect, in that it tended to prevent the Colonial Governments concerned from exerting themselves to develop their own military resources."

I think that is perfectly true, because I got a return from the Under-Secretary the other day giving me the number of local troops in the self-governing Colonies of South Africa. I find that in Natal the actual strength of the militia last year was 2,400 officers and men. There is a white population in Natal of 82,000. In the Cape at the end of 31st December the Colonial forces were 5,500. Well, there is a white male population at the Cape of over 300,000. Only 2 per cent. of the male population are in the Colonial forces. In the Transvaal the actual strength on 31st December last year was 3,300. The white male population was 180,000. In the Orange River Colony, although there was a white male population of 81,000, there was no military force whatsoever. I think that what the right hon. Gentleman said last year was perfectly true, that so long as we keep British forces in South Africa the South Africans will not do their duty, and will not arrange the necessary force to look after themselves. I do hope and trust that when the right hon. Gentleman gets up to reply that he will be able to give us some really sound reason why such a large number of British troops should be retained in South Africa, after we have granted them the great privileges of self-government?

I wish to confine my remarks to Army training—the training of the Army at home. In the discussion this afternoon a significant remark was made by the hon. Member for Lichfield, who said the troops he was getting at the present day were very much better than were obtained a few years back. I can only say that I wish that was my own experience. I can only assure the Committee that the troops we are getting in our own Territorial Yeomanry are very different men to those we used to get shortly after the war. We used to get men like auctioneers, land agents, very highly skilled artisans, and others like them to join the Territorial Army.

There is one other point in connection with this that I want to mention, and that is the training of the officers of the Territorial Forces. I do not think it is difficult to give the men a certain amount of training in shooting, drill, and certain incidentals. This remark also applies to troopers in the Territorial cavalry. But what cannot be done, what it is impossible to do, is to improvise officers and noncommissioned officers for these different arms. The training corps which has been instituted by the right hon. Gentleman will take some years before it will work. I do hope the War Office will use very clear minds to think out this problem of how you are going to get and train officers for the Territorial Army. It is all very well to take a man for a fortnight's training. You might make him useful in a case of emergency. But I defy any instructor, however skilful, to teach an officer anything practical in a fortnight. It is absolutely useless. In my own case I have had a good many subalterns in the yeomanry passing through my hands, and the difficulty has been, especially when engaged with other arms, to give them something to do that would not hurt their feelings. I know the difficulties, nobody realises them more, but I do think this training corps which has been instituted is not nearly sufficient for providing efficient officers for the Territorial Army. You cannot improvise officers or non-commissioned officers for the infantry and the cavalry; and still less can you do that in the artillery or the engineers. Regarding the Territorial Forces at the present day, I must say that I agree a great deal with the words that have fallen from the hon. Members on both sides below the Gangway. To my mind there is something very repugnant to the Territorial Forces in the adoption of the methods of recruiting which have been entertained at the present time. I think when you have to depend for your recruits upon the halfpenny Press or the sensational melodrama and such-like methods that these may be excellent methods of pushing somebody's soap or somebody else's encyclopædia, but they are utterly unworthy of the Army.

Are we discussing a reduction in the regular forces or recruiting for the Territorial Army?

A certain distinguished cavalry regiment was ordered by the War Office to turn out and provide a certain number of men and horses to act—what shall I call it?—to give a show before a cinematograph gentleman with a view to the production of pictures at a music-hall! When a cavalry regiment is turned out to do work of that sort it is not, I think, very dignified either to the officers, noncommissioned officers, or the men. The question of horses is one in which I have always taken great interest, and it is one on which I can speak with a considerable amount of experience. I agree with what has been said about cavalry horses on the ordinary farm. It is all very well for the Germans to send cavalry horses to the farm. The land in Germany is sandier and lighter than in this country. To put an ordinary troop horse on an English farm would be absolutely useless. Every farmer knows how useless horses accumulate around his farm; and if the Government is going to do anything in that way it will have to consider the question of mares. I can assure the Committee that the question of the supply of horses will not be solved by sending a few horses every year to the farms. I doubt very much indeed whether you would find practical farmers willing to take hones on any terms. The idea of taking a census of horses is an excellent one, but unless you make it compulsory, and institute a penalty for a false return, it will not be worth the expense of making it at all. I had a visit from the police, asking me to fill up the census form, and I happened to see the return of a neighbour 0f mine. To my certain knowledge he possesses a good many horses eminently fitted for cavalry service, but he had filled in the form "nil." That is a kind of patriotism which I am sorry to say exists among a great many of the community. The Secretary for War in his speech on Thursday night made one very remarkable statement. He said it had been computed by the Board of Agriculture that in this country there are upwards of two million horses. Nobody can dispute that. The right hon. Gentleman went on to say that he would knock off half as being horses under five years of age, or otherwise unfit for military service, leaving one million. From that million he again knocked off half, leaving 500,000 horses available. I confess I was absolutely aghast when I heard the right hon. Gentleman make the statement that one in four of our horses is suitable for military purposes. To talk of Shire horses, of horses under 12 stone, and of the horses which we ordinarily see in the streets, as being, in the proportion of one in four, suitable for military purposes, I think is a very misleading statement; yet the right hon. Gentleman went on to say that this left half a million horses in the country sufficient to "mobilise the Army between three and four times over. There is that satisfactory feature of the situation." We have only got to utilise our eyes, or to call on our experience to recognise that the statement of the Secretary of State, that one horse out of four is suitable for military purposes, is a preposterous one.

I am in disagreement with the hon. Gentleman who stated that the reduction in the cost of armaments must determine the progress of social reforms in this country. If the Government insists on facing the cost of armaments, that cannot be accepted as a reason why the scheme of social reform must be retarded. I associate myself with those who have pointed out that the statements made by the Secretary for War are most misleading. It is claimed that there is a reduction of £24,000 on the Estimates for the year, whereas the truth is that the actual increase is £276,000. I associate myself with those who protest against this further drain being made on the already overburdened people of the Indian Empire. It is not sufficient justification to state that two Secretaries of State have agreed in the matter. I have always re- garded it as one of the principles of Liberalism that the people themselves had the right to determine how these things should be carried out. I do enter another most strong protest against statements being submitted which are calculated not only to mislead Members of the House, but also to mislead members of the country.

Does the right hon. Gentleman suggest that the Estimates should not show the total burden on the taxpayers when it is presented?

No; what the right hon. Gentleman has done is to show the people of this country the decrease that has taken place, when, as a matter of fact, an increase in the cost of armaments has taken place, and we have to recoup ourselves by imposing a heavier burden upon a class of people who are less able to bear it than are we ourselves at home. If this increase continues from year to year. are you going to call upon the Indian people to bear that further proportion of expenditure? It has been emphasised in every one of these debates that the Indian Government are not only opposed to this further demand. but they have entered a strong protest in the matter.

If my memory serves me rightly, some two years ago the Secretary for War stated that he did not propose to increase by a penny the expenditure on the auxiliary forces, which had already grown to portentious dimensions, and he hoped there was room for economy. He led us to expect that, under his new scheme, a reduction in national expenditure would shortly ensue. As a matter of fact, we find that whereas last year the Vote for the Volunteer and Yeomanry services was well under £2,000.000, this year it is £2,307,000. I believe Members in all quarters of the House are agreed with us that the peculiar methods which seemed to be approved by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War are entirely disapproved by many gentlemen in this House.

There are some gentlemen who have said that we are not correctly appreciating the position of the right hon. Gentleman. We base our case upon the reply given by the right hon. Gentleman to the hon. Baronet the Member for West Kensington. I think. who asked directly whether the right hon. Gentleman approved or disapproved of this indirect method of conscription. The right hon. Gentleman in reply said:— That narrows the issue down to this, that the right hon. Gentleman assumes that it is not an indirect method of conscription. We argue that owing to the peculiar circumstances attending industrial conditions that it is tantamount to, and therefore it is actually, a method of conscription. It is all very well to say that the workmen has the right to choose whether he will accept that condition or not but we know that so long as there are many thousands anxious for situations that might be held by clerks in the employ of this company or similar concerns they are not free to select, but are compelled by economic necessity to accept conditions that otherwise their manhood would object to. I read in one of the newspapers the other day that a London firm advertised for a clerk at the rate of 30s., and they were besieged by over 800 applicants. That shows that even the poor clerk is not free to choose.

I believe in this matter we are associated with a considerable number of Members of the Liberal party in this House, and certainly, I believe, with the great majority of the rank and file of that party in the country. That party, I am pleased to acknowledge, has a splendid record of struggle to grant individual freedom and the right to every man and woman to hold whatever political or religious views they may desire. I feel that this departure on the part of the right hon. Gentleman is such that if the party opposite were free to choose they would as heartily repudiate it as we do ourselves. It is not sufficient to tell us that the party opposite repudiate. I believe they would, and they will, too, if they can have their vote in this matter, but unfortunately, owing to our peculiar party system, the party is bound to accept responsibility for many things that many of them are unwilling to give personal adhesion to.

We find underlying many of the speeches delivered in this debate a desire to force the nation towards the institution of a conscribed army. I have viewed with great apprehension the utterances of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, and yet when we know the influences to which he is subjected perhaps we need not entertain such surprise as otherwise would be the case. When we know he has an Army Council for his immediate advisers, and that that Army Council consists of four military men and only three civilians, of whom he is one, we can quite see how it is that this body is likely in course of time to become even more powerful than the House of Commons itself, because if this Council can impress its particular views upon the Secretary of State for War, and he in turn submits them to the Cabinet. It seems to me that what he submits is generally likely to be accepted, and then again we have the Cabinet decisions brought to this House, and it is placed as a matter of honour before the Members of the party that may be in power, that they are bound to vote for those things, otherwise they may turn the party out of office. Therefore we have one spectacle of men voting for things with which they themselves heartily disagree. It does give cause for great apprehension to listen to the tenour of some of the speeches that have been made.

Undoubtedly there is a desire on the part of some people in this country, and one could not read the evidence of the Norfolk Commission without being impressed by it, to work up a scare in order that the people may submit to some sort of conscription. Reference has been made to the many methods that are now being adopted. It seems that some of the utterances of the military leaders of our nation go to show that they realise that unless a panic can be worked up that the people of the nation will not submit to compulsory service. They are, in my opinion, intentionally engaged in working up an unreasoning panic in order that they may be possessed of an excuse whereby they can force conscription upon the people of the nation. I did certainly hope that the Liberal party of all others would have engaged in the task of exposing those tactics to the people in order that they might secure the necessary warning and take the desired steps to checkmate the operations of those gentlemen.

We have been told we should leave these matters entirely to soldiers. After all, I quite admit the soldier has a right to proffer advice and make suggestions, but after all if a scheme of compulsory service is necessary you have first of all to convert the civilians of the nation. My view is that no such scheme is necessary. I find myself in almost entire approval for once with the very able speech of the hon. Member for Preston. It seemed to me to be a speech of great force, and conceived on lines that I have been thinking over myself for a long time. We find here a demand for a large increase in our Army, based upon the danger, or assumed danger, of foreign invasion, which emanates entirely from Army sources. We are assured it is impossible for any other reasonable combination of Powers to effect an invasion of our nation.

What always seemed to me to be the chief point is that, first of all, if invasion is possible, our fleet has to be defeated, and if that happens, no amount of men that we can put into the field would be powerful enough to defeat a Continental army. What we have to do is to regard our nation, not from Continental standpoints, but, realising the geographical and natural situation of our country, our first, and, I believe, most important line of defence is our Navy. I believe that our Navy already is invincible. I am not convinced of the necessity of further expenditure even upon that beyond the normal natural increase from year to year.

I believe it is our duty to maintain the Navy in a state of efficiency in order to carry out its true functions; but if we are to be led by the scaremongers into believing that our Navy can be easily defeated, no quantity of men that we can put into the field would be sufficient to withstand a Continental army. More than that, I fail to see what inducement a Continental Power would have for throwing a large Army into this country. I believe it is an acknowledged principle of strategy that it is much easier to starve out a people than to subdue them by fighting, and if it did happen that our Navy was defeated, all the other people would have to do would be to bide their time and starve us into submission. In my opinion, the scare has no foundation at all.

Further, I have failed to observe any desire on the part of other nations to invade this country. I believe more in treaties with other nations than in building up large military resources. It seems to me that the speeches to which we have listened and the agitation which is being carried on in the country can only have the effect of provoking other people into adopting similar measures to those desired on this side by the agitators. It would be much better to set about the task of reducing our expenditure on war and giving greater consideration to matters here at home. It is often alleged that compulsory military training would put an end to some of the deteriorative defects which we lament in our population. But no physical training would ever compensate for the lack of suitable and sufficient food or for life in the slums and the fever-stricken alleys with which we are familiar. We ought to make better use of the resources of the nation than to squander them on munitions of war, by giving greater consideration to the life and well-being of the people as a whole. I sometimes think that when we get a little further afield and the Government are able to improve the incidence of taxation they may thereby have a method by which to diminish the ferocity of the Jingoism which prevails in some quarters. I have failed to find any great evidence of a desire on the part of the working classes to go to war, but if we press a great number of the population into military pursuits there may be a great inducement for those who control them in future years to enter into warfare with other people. I am inclined to the opinion that underlying the methods of the Service League is the desire not only to repel invaders from our shores but to have a large Army by which we may invade the shores of other people. If the incidence of taxation could be so adjusted that it bore entirely upon the large incomes and accumulations of the well-to-do classes, it would do something to diminish this agitation. I have endeavoured to show that there would be not a decrease but a large increase in the Army Estimates were it not for the fact that we are imposing a further obligation upon the starving people of India, who, of all peoples under our rule, are most subject to famine and plague. I have also emphasised the fact that we or these benches strongly protest against some of the methods adopted by the right hon. Gentleman in his desire to secure recruits for the Territorial Army. He has been repudiated by Members of his own Party, and I hope there will be an opportunity for that party to express that repudiation in the Lobby. I have also entered a protest against the marked tendency on the part of the War Department to give its adhesion to one of the most unscrupulous agitations ever initiated in this country, designed, in my opinion, to force us into a conscribed army without the people of the country being aware of the true circumstances of the case. If we trust the people in this matter I feel assured that there need be no compulsion of that sort. If you make the Army sufficiently attractive you will find men willing to join it as a profession, and to do the work which the Nation expects of them. The right hon. Gentleman has told the House that recruiting has been eminently satisfactory. When a statement of that sort coincides with a condition of severe depression it gives us something of a serious character to contemplate. Un- doubtedly many men have been forced into the Army by their inability to secure employment. That is not the right sort of material upon which to build up our standing Army. The Governments of the future will have to face the question of making the Army sufficiently attractive from the point of view both of pay and genjral conditions to induce men to adopt it as a profession and from a genuine desire to maintain their country and the prestige of the Empire. These being my views, I shall be compelled to vote with the hon. Member who moved the reduction.

As I understand that this is a general discussion, I should like to express my disagreement with some parts of the otherwise excellent speech to which we listened a little while ago from the other side of the House. I do not see at all why horses should not be used in the manner suggested by the Secretary of State. There is a great deal of work about farms to which horses of this kind could be put. Nor do I agree with the hon. Member as to the small number of horses available in this country for military purposes. First of all, he said there will be two million horses, and then, following the plan of the Secretary of State, he deducted a million, and then half a million, leaving half a million, and h^ said it was absurd to suppose that out of five horses in omnibuses or doing other work you could get one that was fit for Army purposes. That seems to me an extraordinary statement, because there are so many purposes for which horses are required in the Army—for hauling guns, for any amount of commissariat work, and for all manner of transport.

With regard to compulsion, I think it is very unfortunate that anything like pressure should be put upon people to enter the Territorial Army. I altogether disagree with the action of the right hon. Gentleman in connection with the insurance company referred to. I also strongly disagree with those methods of enlistment which have lately come into vogue, especially the play to which reference has been made—"The Englishman's Home." A friend of mine who saw it said the conclusion that he came to was that the stalls were firmly convinced that the pit and the gallery should immediately join the Territorial Army. That is the view which he expressed, and there may be some truth in it. He was a stall. The great danger of any form of enlistment of that kind, of course, is that it is not owing to any fixed feeling on the part of those who enlist. It is simply some emotion stirred up by the circumstances of the moment. It is a spurious enthusiasm—in short, the very thing we do not want. On the other hand, so far as I am concerned, I firmly believe that every man in this country of full age and physical strength ought for manhood's sake and for the dignity of his manhood to acquaint himself with the use of arms for cases of emergency. It was rather startling to me and a little disconcerting to hear certain statements which were made by the Secretary of State for War. But before going on to discuss them I should like to offer a tribute of admiration and gratitude to the Royal Army Medical Department for the work they have lately done in the Army. They have done very excellent work indeed, especially in the direction of reducing death rates, and also invaliding rates. We all know how greatly these have fallen, and I need not do more than refer to the success which has attended their investigations and discoveries and their subsequent treatment in relation to Malta fever. By that means many of our soldiers and sailors have been saved from that particular fever which was so troublesome. Then there is what has been done by inoculation for enteric fever. That has been of the greatest service, and I understand that it will be continued.

I will tell the hon. Member some time when he is at leisure, and I shall be willing to sit at his feet and learn. I heard with a great deal of interest and satisfaction that a Committee had been sitting in regard to another important matter connected with the soldier, namely, the question of heart trouble. The Committee, I understand, considered that the soldier's equipment had a great deal to do with this trouble. I do not think it is due to equipment. I am not sure but that I know the cure. I am afraid that the trouble is due to tobacco. When I was in India all the soldiers afflicted with heart troubles were found to be great smokers. [An HON. MEMBER indicated assent.] I am glad to get the corroboration of my hon. Friend below me. I have experimented on this subject myself. I smoked rather excessively with the result that I got heart trouble. The young chiefs in India formerly did not smoke, but they learned to do so. When I returned two years later to the Cashmere Border these young chiefs told me how they were getting on. I asked them in the usual way what they were doing, and whether they were having good sport? They said they had good sport, but that of course they were not able to climb up hills now. The reason was that they had learned to smoke, and had lost their staying power. If our soldiers were to use less tobacco there would be less invalidity from this cause.

I come to the point upon which I wish to ask a question of the Secretary of State for War. It is rather a difficult one; it is connected with what he described as national strategy, and to put the case in a concrete form I might mention the case of Germany in relation to the agument about the necessity for an increase of armaments—naval and military. The position has always been maintained that it was quite unreasonable—it showed a large dose of original sin in a foreign country such as Germany—to try to compete with us by building up a great Navy. I know that this is not a question of Navy Estimates, but I am sure Mr. Caldwell you will agree with me when you are considering the number of men required for the Army you must take into consideration the state of the Navy. Both of these depend upon policy and upon finance. As to finance I should like to refer to a remark made by the hon. Member for the Montgomery Boroughs the other day. He eulogised very properly the British regiments in India, and mentioned that he had seen a battalion a thousand strong, and cavalry with a full supply of horses, and he drew the conclusion that this was due to the efficiency of the Indian Government. I quite agree that the Indian Government is an extraordinarily efficient institution—one of the most remarkable in the world at the present time. In fact some of us think that it fails almost in being too efficient, and that it leaves out the human equation a little too much. Supposing the Indian Government had, in addition to keeping up this large force in excellent condition, also to provide to the same extent a Navy. Then you would see where the difficulty came in. This proves I think exactly that the whole question is mainly one of finance. Reverting to Germany, I have always argued that that country was really to blame because it started the rivalry in these great naval armaments.

That is going too far. This question of the Navy does not arise on the Vote now before the Committee.

I bow to your decision. I put it in this way without saying anything about the Navy. I will say that Germany had, and has a preponderating army. But she could never invade this country, for although she has great military forces she would require an overwhelming Navy to give her command of the sea We have an enormous Navy, but no Army at all calculated to make anybody fear that we might invade a Continental country. Free trade, too, has a particular bearing on this question because there is no necessity of rivalry on the part of any other nation, but that I might easily explain, but I suppose I should be out of order.

Last Thursday the Secretary of State for War made the startling statement that there was no possible chance of Germany ever invading this country, but I heard him say that questions of national policy might arise which should compel us to be ready to throw a force on to the Continent itself. That meant to say that Germany could not invade us because she had not a strong Navy, and that although we had a strong Navy, and a small Army we might be prepared under certain contingencies to throw a force on foreign shores. That is a strange argument in support of the statement, that Germany was the real aggressor in these war armaments. We do not know anything at all of secret policies. That is kept from Members of the House of Commons. We do not know what obligations of an Inter-rational character there may be, or what arrangements may have been made with different powers. It is unfortunate that this should be so, and I think we ought to have some clear information on this point. I am not arguing against these arrangements, for I do not know what they are, but am simply stating the facts, and after the statement on Thursday of the Secretary of State for War there are reasons why we should know more. He truly remarked that defence depends upon readiness and time. It seems that national policy is dictated by the power of throwing across the Channel an expeditionary force. That I regret. It deprives us of a most valuable argument, and it seems to justify Germany in doing what she can. She has a big army, and from these circumstances which I have mentioned she must try as hard as she can to have the command of the sea. I suppose we have started on a splendid career of peaceful operations, and time will show which of us is in the wrong. I should like to have a reply from the Minister of War when he rises on these matters, and I can only say, in conclusion, that I appreciate the moderation of the speeches which I have heard on this question from those I agree with and from those from whom I disagree.

:We have heard an allusion to-night to mediæval saints. I should like to point out the reasons why I think many of the arguments to which we have listened are founded on a false base. Within the four walls of this House it has often been said that we should try to reduce the science of war to an exact science. That has been tried in this House ever since it existed. We have been told by Oppositionists and by critics what should be done in times of war and what should not be done, but it is undeniable that in no great war in which this country has ever been engaged has there been freedom from serious and unexpected events which have prolonged the course of wars. I will not go back to the Crimea. We had the experience of the Egyptian War and the experience of the South African War which is fresh in everybody's mind. I do not believe it is possible, no matter how enthusiastic hon. Gentlemen may be for this House to lay down with certainty what is actually going to take place. Hon. Gentlemen opposite are making a mistake if they think they can really found a certain scheme. At the back of their minds is the thought that in certain contingencies the whole nation would rise, and that feeling was expressed by the hon Member for Stoke when he said that at the time of danger a million bayonets would flash in the sun. Those who heard the speech of the Secretary for War remember that he told us what the Territorial Army was going to do. He said that if this country was really the invaded country it would be aroused, and that would mean a real and moral service of men. Of what use would that be? I do not think you will find any historical precedent in this country or any other country, where an untrained army had defeated a trained army. If the right hon. Gentleman replies I hope he will deal with the idea which his speech has given rise to, that we have not got two lines but three lines. If we train our first and second lines why not our third line? The National Defence League is not to be deterred by the amount of scorn which has been thrown upon it. I should be a totally irresponsible member if I were to rush in where other members feared to tread, but I should be perfectly prepared to put before the right hon. gentleman some scheme if he would work out the cost of it, and give the House the advantage of those figures, and show us how it was done. When hon. Gentleman opposite are in search of some democratic idea they take a mental flight to the antipodes, and they return with some scheme of woman suffrage or taxation of ground values, but they leave behind them everything about national service which has had a remarkable development at the antipodes. I wonder why they think it necessary for the Australians to have a national service with no army within 2,000 miles of them, and not necessary for us with an army not more than 500 miles from our shores. I am an individualist in peace, but I am a collectivist in war, and unless we are prepared to accept collectivism in war as our principle it is only a question of time when we shall get into a position out of which nothing can pull us.

I have heard so many hard things said about the right hon. Gentleman, the Secretary of State for War, that although I came here to say some hard things about him I must say my heart has almost melted towards him. When I heard on Thursday the bitter speech, and, if I may be allowed to say so, the mischievious speech of the right hon. Member for Croydon, I felt inclined to enlist myself as one of the bodyguard of the Secretary of State for War. If ever the Secretary of State for War is canonised, and I hope he may be, and if there are any reluctant consentors to that honour, I do not think he can do better than engage the Member for Croydon to speak against him, and I venture to say the most reluctant of his friends will then be convinced in his favour. Denunciation from the right hon. Gentleman was of course to be expected, but I am bound to say it fell very flat not only in this House, but in the country as well. In truth the right hon. Gentleman has become somewhat of a favourite in the country, and as one of his critics in this House I venture to say therein may lie a danger. But if all the transient and short-service Secretaries for War in the last Unionist Government sat upon the benches opposite, and shook their gory locks, and pointed their grizzly fingers at my right hon. Friend, I venture to say he might treat the exhibition with the utmost complacency.

We on this side of the House are grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for many things. In the first place, he has instituted in his Department sound finance. He is paying his way, and he is carrying on his very capable shoulders very heavy burdens which he has inherited from his predecessors, and he has been for many months past making very mighty and very successful efforts with regard to the Territorial Army scheme, for the success of which he has our earnest hopes. But when I have said that about the Territorial scheme, may I be allowed to reiterate what has been said before on these benches, and say that I hope that he will cease to extend his approval to those methods of compulsory recruiting which we on this side of the House are deploring. But if the Secretary for War persists in this policy I would invite him to make it an all-round policy, and I would suggest that he should appeal to the Kitchen Committee of this House and insist that all the waiters in the dining and smoking rooms become members of the Territorial Force. We are grateful for other things. The right hon. Gentleman has certainly done a good deal to improve the condition of the private soldier, and his condition being improved the private soldier will be a better man in the future than he has been in the past. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Croydon had no scorn too bitter to heap upon some of the recruits of our Army. On the other hand, the Under-Secretary drew a very idyllic and delightful picture of the British soldier as reformed by his Department, who was in the habit, I gathered, of strolling from the barracks to the manse and, having discussed theology with the Army chaplain, to talk things over with the minister of his church. I think we may draw an average between those two pictures.

I really must harden myself up to say some disagreeable things about my right hon. Friend. I am here to support this Amendment. I want to see a considerable reduction in the size and in the expense of our military force. I ask the right hon. Gentleman to try now that we are on a peace footing to return to peace expenditure, and I support Members on this side of the House who have pointed out that instead of there being a saving of £24,000 this year, there is actually an increase in expenditure of nearly £300,000. Of course, we know that poor, poverty-stricken, helpless India has had to come in to relieve the strain of the situation. Now, it seems rather too bad to the taxpayers of Great Britain, who have their representatives in this House, the Secretary of State for War comes and offers £-24,000, but from the taxpayers of India who have not their representatives in this House he would take away—I admit it is with the consent of our Government in India—£300,000 out of their poverty. The Estimates of this year really mean this—we have got back in the Estimates of this year to the Estimates of 1907–8, and mean that we are going to increase largely on these Estimates in the future. How can we otherwise interpret the remarks of the right hon. Gentleman who has indicated that in the future we shall have to provide a considerale amount of money for barrack accommodation?

We are paying off debt just now and I explained that in two years from now there will be a drop of £.300,000 a year and ultimately of £1,200,000 a year, which will cover all these things.

I am, of course, delighted to hear that. Now let me take the right hon. Gentleman on another point. The Territorial Force in future will cost us more—I believe the hight hon. Gentleman has stated that in his own speech—even if the barrack accommodation is not going to cost us more, although if Gentlemen opposite had their way I think they would press for even higher expenditure than the right hon Gentleman has indicated. If he would reduce the numbers of the Army we could save this expenditure, and I ask the right hon. Gentleman why can he not recall a large number of these men who are now, I will not say garrisoning South Africa, but who are in South Africa. It seems to me that keeping these men there in such large numbers is simply subsidising the Colony at the expense of Great Britain. India pays for her Army. If the South African Government demands an army they should pay as well as India pays. The Financial Secretary said a moment ago in an interruption in debate that they were there because the Colonial Premiers had asked for our soldiers to be stationed there. But the Colonial Premiers have also asked for other things which I think he himself would not so readily grant. They have asked for what is called Colonial Preference, which means that they ask us to tax our foreign imports, and we call that Protection. I do not think the Financial Secretary would so readily fall in with all the wishes of the Colonial Premiers as he falls in with this one wish affecting his own Department.

Will the right hon. Gentleman give us some little explanation of the ever growing cost of our Army? In 1898–9 we had 181,000 men provided for in the estimates, and for pay, for medical service, supplies, clothing, education and things of that sort particularly affecting the men, we spent at the rate of £61 per man. In this year's estimates for 183,000 men that sum has gone up to £77 per man. If you take the balance of expenditure on items other than those which I have indicated, I find in 1898–9 it works out at £50 per man, and in the current year it has gone up to £56. I should like to know why transport is this year £676,000 more than in 1898, and I should like, above all, to know why the War Office itself is costing £350,000 a year more than it did in 1898. I am appealing in the most friendly spirit to the right hon. Gentleman. He is as desirous of economy as I am. We have a mandate for economy. We have a desire for economy. We regard our mandate for economy as a reasonable mandate and one which we are anxious and eager to fulfil, and I think the right hon. Gentleman might have been a little quicker in his action and might have reduced the number of men to the extent the Amendment indicates, and I shall give my hearty support to the Amendment.

The hon. Member who addressed the Committee last seemed to be in a very melancholy frame of mind altogether as regards the position of the Army, but I may congratulate him on his ingenious feat in bringing in the Fiscal question in the middle of an Army debate. I note for future reference that he admitted there was a desire on the part of the Colonies to have preference with the mother country. He spoke about the necessity of further reducing the Army, but his desire for that further re- duction seemed to be rather in the nature of a pious wish than of a serious hope that it would be followed by the right hon. Gentleman, and I have noted further that in speaking of this reduction he did not really base his desire for reduction on any balanced strategical view of the situation, or the necessity of an Army of a certain size, but surely on the necessity of reduction for the sake of economy alone. On the whole I am very grateful for the speech of the right hon. the Secretary for War, because it was based on a very different tone from that of the hon. Member who spoke last. It was full of cheerful optimism. After listening to that speech I passed a very happy Saturday to Monday because I felt that all was perfectly right in the Army. We were told that recruiting was very good, that the nine divisions were entirely satisfactory, that the special reserve which had been substituted for the old militia was calling up a far better class of men than we had had before, and he went through all the details to show that there was a great deal of useful activity going on in Army administration. Then he drew a most delightful picture of what was going to happen in war. The beautiful plan of the general staff would settle the whole thing. It was entirely different from what happens in other wars. There was to be no confusion between the civil power and that of the military. It would make the mouths of generals in the American and other wars water to think that all those old difficulties were to be removed. There was to be an area marked oil within which the General was to have supreme power over fianance and the management of stores, and the Army was to be left entirely free for the consideration of the higher strategy, because it was to be equipped and staffed so as to apply thoroughly to all the different necessities of war, and it would have nothing to do but look after the main conduct of the war.

The only trouble about that was that it was so very unlike the real thing that actually happens that one felt all through that the right hon. Gentleman as regards his description of the future war was rather moving in the realm of fancy instead of treading the pathway of reality. But I suppose we may now consider, as the right hon. Gentleman has at last settled his scheme of defence, that the relations of the regular army to the special reserve, and of the special reserve to the territorial, are finally fixed, so far as he is concerned, and that the definitions of that Army, and of the Territorials, are finally settled. There is certainly some advantage in that, because those of us who have followed military affairs for some years now have been accustomed to see changes from divisions to army corps, and from army corps to divisions, and changes in terms right through, going right down to minute changes in the clothing of the army itself. It is satisfactory to find that the right hon. Gentleman thoroughly satisfied that his work is going to have no further large changes, at least so far as he is concerned, But I was surprised in listening to this debate to find that no vigorous attack was made on the right hon. Gentleman on the score of economy, because I have listened in this House in past years to a great many very eloquent and vigorous denunciations of administration, because he did not do more to cut down the vast cost of the Army.

I have often heard speeches very much like that delivered by the hon. Member for Preston, displaying the enormous cost of the Army, and arriving at a very large figure by adding together the cost of the Indian Army and the British Army at home, and then comparing it with the cheaper expenditure of Germany and other conscript armies. One often heard those perorations when economy was desired. It has long been said that, although perhaps no economy is possible in regard to education or the Navy, on the Army there is always a great opportunity. But after all these speeches one finds the reductions are very small, and the Secretary of State for War has only been able to cut off £1,000,000 or £2,000,000 from the Estimates, and he has only done that by cutting down the number of men. He has not given us a stronger Army, and has only affected his economies by cutting off a large number of useful troops and largely diminishing the number of trained officers In addition to that, the cost of the Army must in future largely grow, and everybody familiar with the Territorial Army knows that must be so. When the right hon. Gentleman constituted the County Associations he really started a large opportunity of expenditure, because, although colonels of regiments before might have made demands upon the War Office for drill halls, ranges, riding schools, and other matters, those demands come with enormously enhanced force when made not by colonels but by the whole force and weight of a County Association.

The Secretary of State for War also congratulated himself upon the fact that for once he has obtained what he calls the balance of the Cardwell system of the Army at home being equally balanced by the Army abroad, and that at last we have obtained that remarkable consummation according to a principle which decides that the size of the Army here for strategical reasons is apparently balanced by the size of the Army we find it necessary to keep in foreign parts. One has to ask whether the Army is really strengthened by the substitution of the special reserve for the old militia. I admit that it is very difficult to estimate the exact fighting value of a particular force. The special reserve is to a certain extent unformed, and perhaps it is not quite fair to compare it with the militia, which the right hon. Gentleman destroyed. The Secretary for War spoke in very glowing terms of the new men who are coming forward to join the new Army, but I am bound to say from my own observation—and I am backed up in this opinion by what has fallen from hon. Members behind me—that so far as we have been able to see these new recruits they are not of a very remarkable caste. They are first of all very young, and a great many of those I saw myself had certainly not attained the age of 17, which they were supposed to have attained. With regard to officers, we have already heard that there is an enormous deficiency of officers in the specia- reserve. The right hon. Gentleman says this special reserve is not to be considered as a first-rate fighting force to meet the trained troops of armies abroad, but is only to be treated as a support for them to cover the lines of communication. I fancy the right hon. Gentleman will discover in war that it will be extremely difficult to locate these special troops.

It has been observed that it is perhaps a pity that the right hon. Gentleman has not allowed the reservists from the regular forces to enlist in the special reserve. It was reading the report of the Inspector-General, and I saw it there stated that men over 30 were not capable of meeting all the hardships of war. Yet at the same time in the regular Army there are many men who have re-enlisted for the longer period. The right hon. Gentleman has told us that the special reservists themselves are not intended for the fighting line, but are to be maintained, first of all, along the line of communication. One would have thought that it would have stiffened these boys to have a reserve of the regular veterans who have served in the Army! I do not, of course, deny that a change of name is of fair value. It freshens the interest of the people, although it may appear ultimately to work out about the same. It gives a stimulus and interest to the new body, and draws enlistment in a way which perhaps they have not enlisted of late. So that if the right hon. Gentleman finds that there is more advantage or superiority in the case of recruiting for the special reserve well and good; but I am still afraid that as the interest wanes he will find that he is back to the old recruits that joined the militia.

I listened with great interest to the speech of the hon. Member for Preston, in which he appeared to argue that there was really no necessity for the Territorial Army at all. His argument was the old one. I think we have got beyond that easy division. The danger of raids, or a locked-up fleet—at the time when it ought to be used quite freely in foreign waters—has persuaded most people of the necessity of some class of territorial army. The right hon. Gentleman has not told us very clearly on what size his army is based. He has said that it would number 300,000. I have no doubt he will obtain these men. He is going to increase that force by 100,000. Who are to form the reserve of the Territorial Army. But when he was discussing the size of the Army, he did not seem to base it upon any general strategical principles, but upon this fact: that if you are to make your Territorial Army too large, or to spend too much money upon it, you must thereby reduce the diminished strength of the regular Army. Therefore, the Territorial Army is not really based upon purely strategical conditions, but upon the necessities, upon the leavings, after he has provided for the necessities of the regular Army. I cannot help but think that considerations of these kind—this taking of money from the regular Army—largely determine the view in which the Territorial Army is held by the regular soldiers. Therefore, we must take the opinions of the regular soldiers on the matter with a great deal of reservation As regards the fighting value of the Territorial Army, I am afraid we must take their opinions with even greater reservations still. I am not one of those who strongly condemn the right hon. Gentleman for the efforts which he has made to secure a Territorial Army. First of all, it is always difficult to excite great interest without some rather violent system of getting a matter under notice, and you must adopt those methods which are taken by others when they desire to advertise. I do not complain of his having gone to some daily newspapers in order to get recruits, and I do not sympathise with those who object to the methods adopted by large firms of obtaining recruits. It has been said that those firms give a preference to men who are prepared to join the Territorial Army. I think there are two sides to that question. There is a very great hardship when it is found that those who join the Territorial Army are highly penalised in their efforts to obtain work, because they have patriotically come forward to join that force. As a member of the Territorial Force myself I know there is a very great and severe burden cast upon those who give up then-time to it. I do not say that a great many people do not join because they like a little soldiering, or because it gives them an admirable holiday. A better holiday in my opinion could not be given than a fortnight with the Yeomanry or the Territorial Infantry. At the same time, many of these people do sacrifice their only holidays for the sake of the Territorial Army, and I am not one of those who feel Interested in condemning those employers who give a preference to the men who wish to join the Terirtorial Force. Rather I think there is not sufficient encouragement given by the Government to those who spend time, trouble, and money by joining the ranks of the Territorial Army. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War paid a tribute to those firms who have encouraged their men to join the Territorial Force. May I suggest to him that he either forgot or did not pay the-same generous tribute to the great municipalities which have also done so much? In his speech he hardly recognised what has been done by the London County Council. That body have offered generous holidays and great advantages to their employés, with of course the necessary reservation, who join the Territorial Army. They have given those employés advantages of pay as well as holidays; in fact, the County Council have gone in that direction as far as they possibly could consistent with due regard to the feelings of the ratepayers. In considering the numbers of those who join the Territorial Army there is brought into prominence one great difficulty as between a voluntary and compul- sory Army—that is the matter of mobilisation. I should be very much interested myself to see the right hon. Gentleman mobilise one of these Territorial divisions. I should not like myself very much to do it, because of the unpopularity which no doubt would be incurred. Take, for instance the 6,000 or 7,000 employees under the London County Council. If they were to join the Territorial Army and were called out in case of mobilisation, difficulties would be put in the way of municipal administration. Take the case of the tramways. A large number of the men employed on them might join the Territorial Army, and if they were called out in case of mobilisation the whole of that service would be disorganised.

The hon. Member has had the advantage of being in the French Army, and therefore knows more about mobilisation there than I know. If you call out all these men serving in the Territorial Army, as I suppose you must do—otherwise I do not see how you could get your division—there must be disorganisation of the employment which they follow. You could not call them out in classes, because you have very small reserves. Therefore when you get a division mobilised in London you would have to call out all those employés of the municipality.

But there again I was not quite able to follow the right hon. Gentleman in his argument about the difference between .the compulsory and the voluntary system. He told us that as soon as you establish a compulsory system for home defence you would cause a drying up of recruits for the voluntary army. I found it a little difficult to follow his reasoning in that matter. Supposing a certain period, say five months, was laid down for general service—I am not now arguing for or against that system—I do not understand how that would make it impossible or less possible for recruits to come forward for the regular Army. The fact that everybody else had to serve for five months in the Territorial Army surely would not have that effect on those who are keener soldiers, who desired to serve for seven or 'five years, coming forward. I should have thought it would have had the opposite effect, because everybody being so accustomed to see soldiers round them that the whole idea of military service being unpopular would be dispelled by men seeing all their friends in it, and that every man had to contribute his quota of labour for the general work.

We listened to a very interesting speech from the Financial Secretary on the recent changes in the condition of the soldier. He told us the extra pay which had been given to the soldier five years ago did not at all influence the class or number of recruits that joined the regular Army. He told us that the changes that had been made as to the soldier's conditions, the extra advantages and such like, had on the contrary induced a better class of men to join the Army, and had gone far to diminish the unpopularity under which the Army in some parts of the country still suffers. That was a very satisfactory statement. I believe the right hon. Gentleman himself I has done by his speeches much to diminish that feeling of hostility to the Army which is, perhaps, hereditary in this country, but which, I believe, is largely dying away, even in those country districts where it has so long lingered. The Financial Secretary drew a very attractive picture of those conditions. He told us how recruits were now reading works on German philosophy, discussing scientific subjects, and engaging in still more edifying discussions with the Army chaplains. It was a very charming picture, but is it not rather more like an arrangement for educating young curates than educating young soldiers? When we compare the system of to-day with the system of one hundred years ago, and the changes that have taken place, not only in the system of recruiting, but in the method of training, one is inclined to say: Have all those changes made a very vast differ I ence in the fighting value of the British soldier? It is extraordinary, looking back a hundred years and reading in the work of Fortescue and others, of the system of press recruiting gangs sweeping out prisons and workhouses that then prevailed; and yet, in spite of all these advantages which have been given to the soldier, one is inclined to ask whether the men of today can fight better than the men who fought in our battlefields of 120 years ago. and whether these recruits, with the advantage of conversations with Army chaplains, better terms, more comfortable barracks, better rooms, longer holidays, and so on, are really better from the point of view of fighting material—and that is what you have to consider—than that ancient British infantry who stood unmoved before the charges of the finest cavalry in Europe.

The opportunities of discussing the military policy of the country are very few; perhaps there is no department of public life which more escapes the attention of the House of Commons, with the exception of foreign policy. One might be tempted to speak on three or four important points which have not yet been dealt with in the debate. For instance, we have not heard of that, to my mind, vital point—namely, the fortification of the land front of our sea ports; nor has there been sufficient congratulation of the present Minister for War on the fact that he is trying to make the English soldier carry weight. In the speech of the Secretary of State there is nothing more progressive, in the true sense of the word, than his remarks with regard to the weight of the equipment with which he proposes to endow the Army. One might also speak on what I personally regard, and it is an opinion shared by many who are competent to speak on the matter—as the too great weight of our excellent, perhaps the first field gun in Europe. But points of that sort, though they may have arisen in the debate, are hardly suited to this discussion. I wish to refer to a matter which is more important, and will be increasingly important now and henceforth; it has been in the forefront of the debate, but I wish to put it in a new aspect. I refer to the question whether military service in the future, no matter in what form, no matter for what length of term, is to be compulsory or voluntary. That is undoubtedly going to be the pivot of civic and civil discussion in the country with regard to military matters during the next few years. Men object to compulsory service for such diverse reasons that it behoves anyone who proposes to discuss the matter to state the reasons—it may be academic to do so—which he does not mean to put forward. I believe I am the only man in this House who has been under a compulsory system. I will never argue against the system on the score of its hardship. They were the happiest months of my life. I would not argue against it on the ground which has been put forward so often in this debate, namely, that invasion is impossible. In war nothing is impossible. It has been truly said by the hon. Member for Taunton, and it might be said with even greater truth with regard to the military history of Continental countries, that no great military struggle has ever been entered into without its producing developments so extraordinary and so unex- pected that, though war, indeed, is not a game of chance, yet it is a game of human wills into which what looks like chance enters to an even greater degree than into commerce. Nothing is impossible in war. I would not argue against it either in reference to that phrase connected with the impossibility of invasion, "Command of the Sea." I confess that that is a phrase—this is a mere personal opinion—I do not much like. It is too mechanical to apply to so human a thing as armies. Command of the sea merely means command of a special type of communications. A command of communications is never absolute. There are a large number of gradations between such a situation as England possessed in December, 1905, and such a position as Russia suffered under at the end of the war with Japan. From having no naval force to having a force such as no combination; could challenge there are an infinite number of gradations, and these do not depend upon the number of your ships or upon your gunnery, but upon local accident and place, where the war may be fought, the chances of being able to repair your ships and a thousand other things of that sort. Command of the seas implies to the civilian mind an absolute despotism over your enemy, whose frontier is the shore of their country. The phrase. "Command of the Seas" is a journalistic phrase, and I would sweep it out of serious political discussion. Again, it is not upon the numbers that conscription would give us—for it would give us a much greater number than we now have of armed men—that I object to the movement; it is not upon the score that your volunteer is superior to your compulsory and conscribed man. I suppose there is nothing upon which public opinion has-gone more astray than that. You get your man into that hardest of all human trades under some form of compulsion. There are moments in life where the flame of patriotism is to be found working, but I am afraid that it lasts only for a short time. If you force a man into the Army and he has to march 28 miles with a full kit in a cold rain he realises that he is a machine. I regret that, because I know that to some men it may destroy their ideals; but there are other ideals which may be served. One of the greatest armies that ever fought for this country was that under Sir John Moore, which was kept together by the most brutal methods; it was kept together by methods which would revolt the House. But it was kept together, and escaped capture, and added a glorious page to the military annals of this country. It is not because, in my opinion, the trained man is not in comparably better than the partially-trained man that I object; I think he is. It is not because there is—still less because there is—no political difficulty of arranging the relations between compulsory service at home and in our oversea possessions that I shall vote against conscription. That has been made too much in these debates. It is not merely the mechanical difficulty. Your forces which garrison India may be separated entirely from the forces that you keep as a striking force in Europe.

It is not on these grounds I oppose the principle of compulsory service. I do not say that under all circumstances and conditions I should oppose it. I oppose it principally from the social state in which we live. I do not think that those who are in favour of compulsory service can see how far our social conditions would alone make such a service possible. You must have everywhere the control by the police over the individual. Every man must have upon him the certificate of his birth, even that of his vaccination. There is nothing on which the trained armies of the Continent think more of than to pounce upon a man who tries to avoid compulsory service and treat him as a criminal. If it were not for that, compulsory service would break down. The hard and fast machinery very often makes for the equality of the nation. It makes very often for democracy. It may not press very hard on the individual, but you cannot call it into existence in modern England. Your social machinery, your instincts, your way of living, your vicars, would would break the system down if you attempted to introduce it. The compulsory system in any form has never been adopted willingly. From the fall of the Roman Empire to 1793 there was no attempt at universal service, and had there been such an attempt it would have failed. In 1793, though probably 99 out of every hundred men were willing to serve in France—and the ardent patriotism of our newspapers is like moonshine compared to sunlight to what the patriotism was then—it was not until the nation had passed through many troubles, until every family had seen a wounded man, until the State was in danger, that the Napoleonic system was adopted.

Pressure of that kind is necessary I do not say, and I am not for a moment saying, though I do not think so, that pressure of that kind might not produce compulsory service in this country. But there is no such pressure. You could not get the English people into that state of mind in which a man would subject himself to such a machinery; there is no excuse for it. Then with regard to what has been said about the employers. My hon. Friend said most employers would be better inclined if they knew the young men they employed had to do such and such a time of training, and that they would arrange better for the voluntary system which is proposed by the Secretary of State for War; but he forgets that the great mass of the English people are not employed at constant work of that kind at all. Casual labour fills the lives of I do not know how many of our citizens.

And again, how are you going to deal with Ireland? Do you seriously think—I know the Unionists are capable of anything—you can expect the Irish peasant to come up, and drill, to defend East Anglia? Good heavens! You tried to take away his land, and your fingers were burned to the bone in that attempt. Do you think you can make him a conscript? and if you do not make him a conscript then you will have a privileged body at your very door. It seems to me it is impossible from the social state of the country, from its traditions, from the way it looks at the world, from its own daily life, to establish a compulsory system. But there is something stronger. Arguments of that kind do not prove that a compulsory system ought not to recommend itself to patriotism. A man might say, "Yes." Such is the psychology of our people that if we work long enough on the public mind and prepare our machine slowly we may perhaps at last establish it. But wait a moment. The armed force of every nation is determined by the strategic purposes for which that force is designed. That is just as true with regard to the Army as with our Navy. With regard to the Navy, you hear that in every column of your newspaper, because the Navy is taken seriously, but you do not hear it in regard to the Army. We have heard a great deal to-night with regard to the Swiss system. Why was the Swiss system adopted? Because of the peculiar conditions of Switzerland desiring only to defend herself in the very unlikely case of not finding any strong supporter against invasion, and only in her mountain districts, where such a system would be very valuable for prolonging the war. Why, the German Army if not thwarted by a French invasion could march down to the Lake of Geneva without losing one per cent, of her forces. The Swiss system would prevent or delay for a very long time a permanent occupation of that mountainous country. Take another example: Italy could certainly raise an army of nearly double what she does. In my own personal opinion—and I have very carefully watched the Italian Army on four occasions at manoeuvres—the Italian Army is an excellent Army for the purposes for which it is designed. Italy is a maritime country. She has a narrow frontier, which can only be attacked at certain places, and her railway system happens to be very well designed for reaching the only place by which the invader could reach the Italian land.

Under these circumstances the Italian Army in its training, in its method of recruitment, and its numbers is admirably suited for its purpose. Take the case of Russia. Russia has a fleet inferior to that of the great Powers. She lost that altogether, yet she remains a great Power. It may truly be said that but for that adventure in the Far East Russia might have had no fleet, and yet been a great power. The strategic purpose for which her armed force existed demanded—that vast open frontier of hers on the one side—demanded an enormous and efficient force of cavalry and an overwhelming number of infantry, and she has them, and in that she was successful in regard to her strategic line. Now, what is ours? On that depends the whole point. What has England got to do if she fights? Fighting is not a general game in which somebody hits somebody else. Each nation must necessarily from its geographical position, from the place which it holds, and the position which it holds, fight in a particular manner. What is the position of our strategic force? It is threefold, and I believe it will be difficult to challenge. It is in the first place the releasing and the defending of those places which are held over the sea, and that may be almost summed up in a word—India. We are very unlikely to have to fight against a European large trained force for anything but India. We shall not have to fight it is very unlikely we shall have to fight against any external force elsewhere. India on account of its distance, far more on account of its climate, offers a separate problem which no other European country has to face, India being an exhibition of the power of England beyond the seas India has absorbed too much of the expert military opinion of this country, although it is almost impossible to do so on account of its complexity. Quite separate from India is the defence of these islands. Now, what does the defence of these islands require? It is not true, and nothing is impossible in war—it certainly is not true to say that invasion is impossible, but it is true to say that until the Navy were permanently crippled invasion in force by a very large body of men is impossible. What would the enemy do when attempting to strike England? An hon. Member who sits behind me very well said he would try to strike at a vulnerable point. That would be one of our naval bases. That seems perfectly plain. Anybody who wanted to hurt England in a rapid way would strike at one of our naval bases, and that is why, if I had time, I should plead for a policy of the fortification of our seaports. There would be an attack with a comparatively few number of men upon a naval base. It is not true, as has been suggested, that if a foreign nation could strike at a naval base it could also strike at our commerce. The two problems are quite different. Our food comes from the West, and our naval bases are Chatham, Plymouth, Portsmouth, Sheerness, and shortly to be Rosyth.

A stroke at the mouth of the Medway, Portsmouth, Plymouth, or even Rosyth is a question of the narrow seas, and it is quite conceivable that a small expedition could destroy one of our naval bases, but it would not dream of interfering with the oceanic commerce of our western ports. It is over the narrow seas that the blow will come if it comes at all. For the defence of the few and narrow centres of action, such as our naval bases, you want a comparatively small force. I should have preferred, if such a scheme had been proved possible, a small trained force for that object. But it is at least true that the Territorial Force is amply large enough in the first place to prevent such a threat of a raid from taking place at all—it is a sort of threat overhanging the raiders before they come, and that is a very powerful thing, and secondly, with the communications of this Island and with the ample means we have of reaching in a few hours the sea coast at any point, undoubtedly a compartively small portion of that force mobilised even with its artillery, which is insufficient, would prevent a small raid on a seaport from being successful. What third thing is there for the British Army to do. Undoubtedly in present European conditions it must lend its aid to a small extent, perhaps, but still to some extent, in virtue of alliances. There are many men in this House who would say that is not the case, and that we are better without any alliances, without any ties and without any pledges to land men upon Continental shores. But unfortunately it is strictly logical and necessary to our great sea power. We approach a foreign nation and say "you have such and such a powerful neighbour. He is your enemy. We will help you as against some advantage we receive from yourself." The foreign Power says "Your Navy is very fine in your Press. It sounds omnipotent in the books read by your schoolboys, but it does not happen to be much good to us. We do not live by oversea commerce. Your Navy is a wall. Whether it is strong or weak is indifferent to us. If you can hold this place even for a few weeks your Navy, which means your command of communications over the sea, is indeed of priceless value. Can you do it?" We do not answer in this House because nowadays Parliaments are not supposed to know high matters of International policy. We have returned to the time of James I. We are not worthy of it. No Parliament in Europe is told exactly what its masters are doing, but it is a logical necessity that such accommodation should be arranged, and it has been arranged. It stands to reason that if you desire your Navy to be more than a wall, if it is to be a guarantee of communications, you must have something to move along those communications. You must have something to strike with. That thing with which you desire to strike cannot be a conscript Army. It is, on the contrary, one of the great arguments against conscription, used continually in France, in Germany, and in Russia, that you cannot move a conscript Army save in case of invasion against an enemy. A conscript Army is bound by a thousand ties of family and of local and individual affection, and in many ways to the soil on which it is based. It is a professional army alone that you can use as the spear point of your attack. I desire to see such an army. I should not be the last to say from my own reading that this country possessed in the past perhaps as adequate an army of that sort as ever fought against an enemy. The Light Brigade that marched on Talaveras carried a weight superior to that which the present Secretary of State proposed to put on the soldiers' backs. They made a very long forced march, and right through the war the "spear point" was presented to the enemy by as admirable a body of infantry as has ever been sent from this country anywhere. But that was not secured by conscription. You can get an army of the best possible quality by conscription, but you will not get an army which you can throw from your shores independently, as it were a weapon, a thing slung. You cannot get that by universal service.

For all these reasons, quite apart—the House will believe me—from party politics—and with a deliberately formed opinion, based, not as my hon. Friend has suggested, on my having been a conscript in a foreign army, which I was not compelled to join, and the experience of which I enjoyed, not from that, but from reading, and meeting men and knowing of campaigns that have taken place, I can say that until the strategic purposes for which an English Army can be used differ greatly from what they are to-day, there is no need, and there can be no need for compulsory service, and that is the reason why I shall always vote against the proposal.

We have listened not for the first time to an extremely interesting speech from the Member for South Salford. He has the art of presenting abstract propositions in such a fashion as gives them life and application to the incidents with which he deals. He has done this to-night with a speech which abounded in a great deal of solid thought. In putting his case in such a fashion he brings it home by these very living illustrations of which he is so great a master in point of expression. He has brought before the Committee what I think after all is the question that underlies the whole of our discussion—for what purpose are we fashioning this Army? Why does it exist? What use do we propose to make of it? My hon. Friend has shown in his speech that this is a question which must be answered quite differently in the case of each country; in Italy in one way, in France and Germany in another, and in Great Britain in quite another way. It is not true that we live merely in an island. We live in the centre of an Empire for which we are responsible, which we have to protect and watch over, so that we require command of the sea, and that which is necessary to make command of the sea effective. And when you have said that you have made clear, if he will permit me to say so, what is an extraordinary fallacy for an acute and logical mind such as that of my hon. Friend and hon. Member for Preston to fall into, to think that you can do that with such a Navy and such an over-seas Army. The burden of his argument was that the overseas army was to remain at home, as I understood him, and keep the enemy off, and when the Navy had made a ring around the shores so that no enemy could come, then the over-seas army was to go to its destination.

I did not suggest for a moment the making of a ring around this country. What I said was we could not send our soldiers out unless we were absolutely secure of the command of the sea.

In the case of even a small raid our ships were supposed not to leave a hole for the foreign army to come in at all. How is the over-seas army to become effective? There is one clear principle of strategy which characterises the policy of the Government. It is a principle which has been perfectly well worked out and thought over during the last two years, and about it we are quite clear. That is, we require a home defence force sufficiently strong to oblige the enemy to come in such numbers and with such transport as to offer a plain target to a Navy that has command of the sea. I have never said that invasion of these islands was impossible, but there is great ambiguity about what is meant by an invasion. A small raid might take place or an invasion upon a considerably larger scale might well be possible. What you have to consider is what is the size of the invading force which the Navy can make sure of intercepting? That is a problem you cannot answer with exactitude, ut which investigation and consideration makes it pretty plain that a force somewhere between 70,000 and 100,000 is the force you must guard against by keeping your home defence army sufficiently strong to prevent the enemy com-in larger numbers than the Navy can deal with with something like certainty. That is the whole principle which underlies what we are proposing in our plans to Parliament.

Do I understand that the right hon. Gentleman holds if we have a home army sufficiently strong to compel the enemy to send 70,000 or 100,000 that, therefore, a raid is impossible?

A fortiori, if you have a home army capable of defeating 70,000 men, it can defeat 5,000 men.

That is not the point. The right hon. Gentleman said we should have a home army sufficiently strong to compel the enemy to send at least 70,000 or 100,000 men. If you have this force that means you cannot have a raid.

It seems to me if an enemy cannot do it with 70,000 they most certainly cannot do it with a smaller force.

I really do not follow what is in the mind of my hon. friend, because no enemy would send 5,000, because they would be sure to be extinguished before they could do anything effective. It is only when we are so weak that a raid might destroy some undefended place that you are in real peril from a raid. That at least is a plain principle, and it answers the question of the hon. Baronet the Member for Marylebone. We are asked how we come at these numbers? I think I have answered that question. After all, the question of what sort of force can get over the seas without being intercepted is a naval question. It is a question to which the Government has given great attention, and it has been closely and minutely considered by the Defence Committee. It is that principle upon which the size of the force is decided. and it is an arrangement which we have worked out with the co-operation of the regular and territorial forces. That principle has a bearing much wider than merely the size of the force, and the strategy principle which underlies it goes far beyond it. What ought to be our attitude towards compulsory service.

I have listened to-night to an immense deal of discussion. I have been criticised for being opposed to compulsory service, and I shall be criticised for appearing to be in favour of it. My difficulty is to get my critics to appeal from some common point of view in which one may consider their respective arguments. There is my hon Friend the Member for Barnard Castle. He says what we are doing is veiled compulsion. He says that our methods cannot certainly be defended. I want to know the methods to which he objects? It is quite true that the Press, and a great many public spirited employers have done their best to recruit these forces—the Press by advertising the movement and makings appeals, and the employers by offering holidays at full pay to their men. The objection seems to be that certain employers here made it part of the conditions of employment that their men should join. Well, at the time when the force had not made a very great advance, when the troops were not coming forward, one of the great insurance companies took that step. They took it on no suggestion of mine. It is quite untrue that I then saw or talked with them on the subject. I knew nothing of it till the suggestion came from the general manager, who based it not only on public policy, but thought it would be good for their staff if the staff had the extra holiday, the time in camp, and the healthy exercise.

That suggestion came most opportunely to me, because I was face to face with people who said the employers would stifle the cry, and the volunteering would stop. From certain hon. Gentlemen I was getting very little help. I was certainly grateful to every employer of labour for any encouragement given. One big firm, the Alliance Insurance Company —I know nothing of others, nor do I believe there were many—took the line that I have stated at the time, when everybody was saying that employers of laoour would snuff the movement out. I am grateful to them as to those great municipalities that have helped. If this Force succeeds it is only between 4 and 5 per cent, of those of available age who will train each year, and of those we are having only 3, 4, or 5 per cent, of their time —a twentieth of a twentieth! That is spread over the whole lot of employers, and means a very small percentage indeed. Of the Alliance Insurance Company there must only be probably a small percentage of their employés, even if the maximum came forward. Now, I think I have said enough to show that out of this matter a big mountain has been made out of a very small molehill.

Is it not much more serious that this very assurance company has set it out publicly as a condition of employment in their service that their employés must be members of the Territorial Army? Surely that is much more serious than the right hon. Gentleman says.

If the units are full, as the units in London are, they cannot be always enrolling for the Territorial Army.

Does the right hon. Gentleman approve of this or not—making it a condition of employment that the em ployée members of the Territorial Army?

At that time I certainly did approve the way in which the Alliance came forward. Their willingness to come forward was just the thing which obviates the necessity of those methods which the hon. Member criticises. I should like to know what is the difference between doing that and saying you would take no employé who is not a teetotaller or a member of a trade union? There must be some freedom for employers as well as employés to conduct their own business, and if employers consider that it is good for the health of their employés that they should join the Territorial Army, and so long as they pay them well and give them holidays, I do not see for my part what exception can be taken.

This is a very important matter. The right hon. Gentleman has referred to freedom and associated it with membership of a trade union and the employment of a teetotaller. Has ever a Government Department approved of any employer making such a condition of service?

The hon. Member misses the point. It is not a question of a Government Department; it is a question of one great firm coming forward at a time when great firms were hanging back, and no encouragement was given to this force.

Did not the right hon. Gentleman express a great hope that other firms would do the same?

I never said a syllable on the subject. The Territorial Force is filling up rapidly, and methods which were adopted at that time are absolutely unne- cessary and out of place now. What I am most anxious to get is a distribution of the burden of this Force over the whole body of employers, and not to concentrate the matter on the shoulders of one or even of a few. What I was concerned with at the time, and I am glad to says am less concerned with now, was to get over the unpopularity which has existed among large classes of employers, and of fear on the part of the men of losing their places through joining the force. I say it was a good thing that somebody came forward at the right moment, and gave the impulse and impetus which have gone a long way to change that. So much for that question. Now I come—

I think my hon. Friend has put a straight question, and some of us would like just as straight an answer. Does the right hon. Gentleman still support those employers who make it a condition of employment that their employés shall belong to the Territorial Force?

I certainly supported the action of the Alliance Assurance Company, and I have not seen the slightest reason to take back a word I said. Fortunately, the question is now an academic one, because numbers have come forward so freely that there is no necessity for any one employer to make that special effort.

No; so far as I know, they are not. I do not know of a single other firm that has taken this course. It is the only case I know, and I do not think any firm will follow that course now, because it is absolutely unnecessary to do so. The prejudice has been got over, the thing has succeeded, thanks largely to the efforts of one or two big firms. Now, that being so, I come back to what again I say was the justification for making a great effort. I felt myself a good many people were moving in the direction of compulsory service. The debate this afternoon illustrates that I am not sure of what the mind of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover was in the discussion. I am not sure that he does not think that it may be necessary that some form of compulsory service for recruiting the ranks and filling up the ranks of the Territorial Forces may be necessary. I do not know what his view is. He stated it rather as an open question. If it is stated as an open question not only by him, but a good many hon. Members on the other side, and I think by some hon. Members on this side, then it becomes plain that in the recruiting of this Territorial Force and its maintenance you have something which enables you to maintain that compulsory service is unnecessary in this country. I maintain that, and I maintain it because I found that whenever an appeal is made and put on a solid basis for men to come forward to do their best for their country, they came forward to the extent of some 240,000 to provide us with that home defence army which is necessary, and to the number which was stated in general terms by the hon. Member for Salford, and which I stated more definitely, and that you do require such an army as to compel the enemy to come in such numbers that the Navy can take care of it. If so, then the greatest mistake of hon. Members who sit below the Gangway is to do anything which can discourage the efforts of those who are seeking to keep this Territorial Force upon a voluntary basis, and the efforts of those who are seeking to make any form of conscription unnecessary.

I come to another class of critics. My hon. Friend the Member for Central Bradford, speaking on this side raised the question why do we keep the Army which we do. The answer to that is a very simple one. It depends on the state of things in India and the State in India depends on the policy of the Foreign Secretary and upon the policy of the Colonial Secretary. I, as a member of the Government, am responsible for those principles, and I concur in the reasons which actuate my right hon. Friends, who are responsible for their Departments. I am merely supplying what they consider necessary. In Egypt there is no question with Turkey. I am thankful to think we are on the very best terms with Turkey. There are other places besides Turkey. I refer to the Soudan; I may have to refer to a possible difficulty in Somaliland, which I hope will pass by.

I have only to remind my hon. Friend that these are days in which the clearest horizon becomes clouded in a week, and in which we have the certainty that the most costly, the most expensive, and the most fatuous policy to pursue, is not to make reasonable preparations in having men for those contingencies. I am entirely in accord with the views of my right hon. Friends who represent the three Departments. Such an Army cannot have its place taken by the Navy. Such an Army must co-operate with the Navy and be determined by considerations of strategy. My hon. Friend the Member for Brent-ford said that we had taken unduly from India £300,000.

I wish to give the true facts in regard to that subject. Long ago, in the time of Lord Northbrook's Committee, it was determined that the contribution of India for the Army which we raised in this country and sent out should be a certain amount to meet the cost of training the drafts required for India and so forth. That cost was a much small amount than obtained subsequently. It was supposed that six months was a sufficiently long training. Lord Welby's Commission some years ago reported that the figures ought to be subject to revision and reconsideration from time to time. They have been under reconsideration for some time past, and it was plain that India was paying vastly less than it cost this country. The last thing we wished to do was to take anything from India in the way of a contribution towards the cost of our own Army or in relief of burdens which we ourselves ought to bear. All we ask is that, under the principle which regulates the relation of India to this country, she should bear the cost of what she gets.

I am talking of India. In the case of India the contract is that India should pay the out-of-pocket cost— there is to be no profit—of providing her with the force she requires. The matter was referred to a very strong committee— Sir Robert Romer's Committee. Certain principles were made perfectly plain, and it became apparent that we were being underpaid by India to a very large extent— in fact, to an amount of over half a million We did not wish—we did not think it right—to go in for our utmost pound of flesh in this matter, and we came to an agreement—

My right hon. Friend says "No"; but what does he know of what passed between us?

was understood to say that there had been three questions answered by the India Office.

I only know what the Government have told us. They stated that the Government of India had made observations in this sense, and they refused to lay papers before the House.

The inability of my right hon. Friend to allow me to finish a sentence has led him into a fallacy. What I said was that between the Secretary of State for India and myself an agreement had been come to under which we are paid some £200,000 less than we can legitimately claim. We made that bargain simply because we thought we ought to do something for India. India was underpaying us very largely for the increased cost. The time of training was no longer six months; it was over a year. There were also other expenses we had to incur. Three hundred thousand pounds a year does not nearly cover the cost we are out of pocket on the Indian Army. It is an expense which belongs not to us, but to India, which under the terms of the agreement ought to be borne by India, hut which is borne by her only to the extent of about two-thirds.

Why, in the case of the Colonies, as you have started from the principle that they also are paying the cost of their defence—Ceylon, for instance—do you impose on them only an infinitely less charge?

Surely my right hon. Friend knows that we are getting contributions from nearly all these Colonies. It is only when they are unable to do for themselves that we provide things for them. Canada we have wholly released now; Hong Kong pays a large charge, and so do others. As at Hong Kong so at other places, our policy has always been to put them on a footing to provide for themselves under contract.

I pass to another topic. My hon. Friend the Member for the Brentford Division said "Reduce the number by 10,000." I do think by hon. Friend is a little unreasonable. When this Motion was moved originally, I said I would take my own time and reduce the numbers. I have brought down the Estimates by well on for £2,500,000, and I made a further reduction of the money borrowed out of loans. We are spending out of loans and taxes the sum of £4,000,000 less than we did, and we have reduced the number of men by some 29,000. But that is not all. I found the state of things one in which a great deal had to be built up. Order had to be produced out of chaos, and that is a costly process. That is being done, and you have got that, with a less number of men, and now my hon. Friend comes and says " reduce by 10,000 or more." If that were done the whole plan which is before Parliament and the country would be reduced to a state of chaos. That number of 10,000 is based on no principle and on no conception of what is required. My hon. Friend did not attempt to consider what would be the effect of the withdrawal of these troops which we have as reserves for India and other places. I can only say that to strike off with an axe in this fashion would be to make a man more efficient by cutting off his limbs. There were certain minor points raised. It is said in connection with the special reserve that it was short of officers I admit that it is, but not shorter than the old militia was. We have nearly as many officers as the old militia had, and the militia had a larger establishment.

Yes, and these officers are reserve officers, who will be used in case of war, and our duty in future will be to bring up these reinforcements, which are not reinforcements for the first line but drafts. As regards the training of the special reserve there are no less than 740 regular officers who have submitted to this training, so that in troop training w are much better off, and for the annual training we are not worse off. As regards the National Service League estimates, to which the hon. Member for Glasgow and Aberdeen Universities referred, I understand that that League are going to give us some details, in which case I shall have great pleasure in working out our estimate of what the cost is. I will tell you in a sentence what is my difficulty. I understood from Lord Roberts' speech that he wished to raise troops fit to meet troops of a European Power. These would not be troops trained only for four months.

Yes, but if what my hon. Friend has been saying about the Territorial Force is true these are not what Lord Roberts would regard as properly trained troops. I have endeavoured in the compass of a short time to reply to one or two of the most salient points which have been raised, and to-morrow the discussion will go on, because everything is open on Vote I. If the Committee will consent to take Vote A now, Vote I leaves the discussion to go in the same fashion.

Motion made, and question proposed, "That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 183,200, all ranks, be maintained for the service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland at home and abroad, excluding His Majesty's Indian possessions, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1910."

Whereupon motion made and question proposed:—"That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 173,200, all ranks, be maintained for the said service."—[ Dr. Rutherford. ]

And, it being Eleven of the clock, the Chairman left the chair to make his Report to the House.

Committee report progress; to sit again to morrow (9th March).

CONSOLIDATED FUND (No. 1) BILL

On the motion for the second reading of this Bill:—

I am glad that we have an opportunity of discussing the important question of old age pensions at a more sensible time than the Prime Minister had intended to give us. He said that he would take the second reading of this Bill, which deals with the finances of the year, on Friday afternoon, and it was on that I divided the House. The Official Report is absolutely clear on the point I am glad to see the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his place, because he had said that it would be a great blot on Parliamentary procedure if there was any endeavour to make party capital out of old age pensions. "A Liberal M.P." says, in the "Westminster Gazette" of this evening that if "the Tory tactics of Thursday had been successful, the Consolidated Fund Bill granting £910,000 (Supplementary Estimate) for old age pensions could not have ever been introduced."

That is an absolutely false statement, and the "Liberal M.P." who made it, and who does not dare to give his name, must have been absent at the time of the incident, or he must have deliberately written to the " Westminster Gazette " in order to create a false impression.

I want to raise a question as to the granite contract for Rosyth.

May I ask you a question, Sir, on a point of order. You will observe that this is a Consolidated Fund Bill, not, as it might have been made by the Government, an Appropriation Bill; that the terms of the Bill authorise the issue and application from the Consolidated Funds of the United Kingdom of a sum of £910,000 towards making good the Supply granted to His Majesty for the services of the year. If it were an Appropriation Bill that money so granted would be appropriated to specific services, and could not be applied to any other service, and no discussion would ht in order upon any matter except for he services concerned. But I venture very humbly and respectfully to submit that this being merely a Consolidated Funds Bill with an Appropriation Clause the grant is for any purpose for which Supply is granted in the course of the current financial year, and, therefore, Members, though I do not suppose they will, could use their discretion very largely, and they have the discretion and right to discuss any of the purposes to which this money may be voted—

May I further refer to "Sir T. Erskine May," eleventh edition, page 558, in which reference is made to—

"The power of the Treasury to use, for any service for which a Vote has been agreed to by the House, the issues authorised to be made out of the Consolidated Fund under the Consolidated Fund (No. 1) Act of each Session have rendered unnecessary as a rule Consolidated Fund Bills after the 1st of April, in anticipation of the Appropriation Bill."

This is a Consolidated Fund (No. 1) Bill, and therefore the Treasury may ues this £910,000 which this Bill proposes to grant for any service for which the Vote has been agreed to in the current financial year, of which we are now in the last month. Therefore I submit that this £910,000 might be applied to any service for which a Vote was granted since the 1st April last, and therefore any such service may be the subject of debate.

What the hon. Member has said may be, and is, probably correct, but it has no bearing on the point of order. If the hon. Member looks at page 594 of Sir Erskine May he will see that—

"Debate and Amendment on the stages of the Appropriation Bill and other Consolidated Fund Bills must be relevant to the Bill, and must be confined to the conduct or action of those who receive or administer the grants specified in the Bill."

And again, if he will turn to page 592, he will find:—

"It is the duty of the Public Bill Office, acting on behalf of the Speaker, to ensure compliance with this rule, that is, that 'the drafts upon the Consolidated Fund' must not exceed the amount of supply which has previously been granted for the service of the year."

The matter does not rest there. This is a subject which has been referred to Speakers in the past, and there is a decision of the present Speaker—at any rate it was in the summer of 1905 in which a precisely similar point on a precisely similar Bill was raised. The Consolidated Fund Bill, which was No. 2 Bill of that year, contained only Army Votes for pay-clothing and stores, and the Navy Vote for works, etc. Therefore when a Member proposed to discuss the militia the Speaker interposed, saying:—

"The question of the militia does not arise here: there is no Vote for the militia in this Bill."

And so the only question that arises on this Bill is that of the administration of the Old Age Pensions Act.

With very great humility may I say the Bill does not mention old age pensions at all. Therefore under your ruling we should be precluded from discussing anything, because nothing is specified here except a grant of £910,000 to the Government.

I am perfectly well aware that nothing is stated here. I stated that the Bill on which that decision of the Speaker was given in 1905, was precisely similar in form, and does not specify in that case as the Appropriation Bill does, what the money is to be applied to; but the Speaker having satisfied himself that the sums issued from the Consolidated Fund are not larger than those granted by the House, has to know what the sums granted by the House are and what they are for, and the debate is confined to them.

I thank you for your answer to my question, but may I suggest that in this particular case other sums have been granted by the House. [Cries of "No."]

May I correct the right hon. Gentleman. Is it not the fact that the only sum Voted in Committee and reported from Committee has been Voted for old age pensions?

The Unemployed Vote as a matter of fact has not been reported to this House. The only sum granted is this £910,000 for old age pensions.

Question proposed, "That this Bill be now read a second time."

I do not desire to speak on the point of order, but I just want to really finally clear up the matter as it affects the Treasury. I am really very sorry to impose another task upon the smiling urbanity of the Secretary to the Treasury, but he really has not answered my question. He said that the Consolidated Fund Bill was not necessary, and that they could have got the money otherwise. He said that under similar circumstances, Governments formed from our party have got money otherwise. I should like to know how he could get money otherwise. It would be interesting to our party to know in similar circumstances. At page 557 of Sir Erskine May's book I find the following:—

"Consolidated Fund Bills.—Until a Grant of Supply has been appropriated by Statute to the service and object for which the Grant is destined, the Treasury, unless otherwise authorized, is not capable of making an issue of the sum so granted from the Consolidated Fund."

Therefore, I submit that this procedure is not a matter of financial purity, but of necessity. The hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury has endeavoured to take credit for a high standard of financial purity. I should like to ask whether Sir Thomas Erskine May in his judgment is wrong and the paragraph can be written off, or whether it is absolutely a matter of necessity, and if it is not a matter of necessity how is he able to get the money?

I think it would interest the House to know why the Government have taken the very unusual course they have taken in presenting this Bill for one, and one only, of their Supplementary Estimates. For the others they are content to wait till the close of the financial year. There are ways of financing practised by all Governments which might have been adopted for this Estimate. I have done it myself, and if I have the opportunity shall probably do it again. The Government are doing it this year.

I hope at the same time the Chancellor of the Exchequer will respond to the appeal of the hon. Baronet the Member for the City of London. Our financial procedure in this House is peculiar. If anybody wishes to make an inaccurate statement about the action of other Members, he has only to take the records of Votes in Supply. If you look at the division lists and no further you will give a most untrustworthy account of the action of any Member. My hon. Friend, I think, was entitled to make the protest which he has done against a newspaper which has many merits, but which in respect of its Parliamentary information is persistently misleading.

I feel grateful to the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down for the lecture which he has read me upon financial orthodoxy. I can assure him that I shall be very careful indeed how I shall in future attempt to be so orthodox as I thought I had been. It would have been possible for the Treasury to have found the money for last year's expenditure. It would have been difficult to find the money for next year's expenditure.

I only wish to give the plain simple explanation which the right hon. Gentleman asked for. With regard to the circumstances alluded to by the right hon. Baronet the Member for the City of London, when the discussion took place on Friday with regard to the Day-light Saving Bill—

Might I explain that the division to which I alluded took place on the Thursday. It was on the Report stage of this Bill. The remarks of the "Westminster Gazette" were directed to the division which took place on the Thursday. My remarks on Thursday were to the effect that I objected to the Bill being taken on Friday because there would be only one half-hour, from 5 o'clock to 5.30 o'clock, available for it, which in my opinion was not sufficient.

I cannot help thinking that there was some unnecessary heat in the matter. Certainly I do not interpret the action of the hon. Baronet in the way in which he suggested, and I venture to think that the incident is one which may be regarded as closed. I hope that the explanation which I have offered will be enough.

If all legislation were adjourned for a whole year and this House devoted itself entirely to finance, dividing itself into committees and studied for the most expert advisers of the country all branches of expenditure—

I bow to your ruling. On the financial resolution this Bill came before the House on Report on Thursday night. We thought we were being let into something like a Cabinet secret. It was put to the Financial Secretary to the Treasury why did Le bring on his resolution in that shape? Why was he going to bring on this Bill? He explained it somewhat in this fashion, that he himself did not desire to do so, but Le consulted the Prime Minister, who said something like this: "You see now the Tories have been very wicked. They have for several Sessions taken the money without going through this formality, which we believe to be absolutely essential to financial purity." The Prime Minister might be saying something like this: "Whatever the wicked Tories have done in the past, Hobhouse, my boy, we must be pure."

The hon. Member must not refer to Members of this House in that way.

The hon. Member was not quoting anybody; it was only presumption of his own.

I thought it was a quotation of a speech that had probably been delivered, acting upon the instructions of the Prime Minister, given in that way. We have had a financial Resolution brought forward in Committee for these old age pensions, and that was followed last Thursday night by the Report stage, and both these stages came on at a most unearthly hour. I do protest most solemnly against a million of money being voted in a Bill like this, be the subject old age pensions or the grant of any other money whatever. I protest against this being called financial purity or being done at all when an important matter of this kind is brought on at this period of the evening.

Bill read a second time.

Police (Weekly Holiday) Bill

Read a second time, and referred to the Select Committee on Police Forces Weekly Rest Day.

And, it being half-past Eleven of the clock, Mr. Deputy-Speaker adjourned the House, without Question put, in pursuance of the Standing Order.

Adjourned at half after Eleven o'clock.