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Commons Chamber

Volume 2: debated on Monday 22 March 1909

House of Commons

Monday, March 22, 1909

Private Business

Leyland and Farington Gas Bill.

Read the third time, and passed.

Wandsworth Borough Council (Superannuation) Bill.

Read the third time, and passed.

North-West London Railway Bill.

Read a second time, and committed.

Newry, Keady, and Tynan Railway Bill.

Read a second time, and committed.

Divorce Bills

Ordered that the Select Committee on Divorce Bills do consist of Mr. Attorney-General, Mr. Attorney-General for Ireland, Sir Edward Carson, Mr. Cave, Sir David Brynmor James, Sir John Kenne-way, Sir Joseph Leese, Mr. Solicitor-General, and Mr. Solicitor-General for Ireland.—[ Mr. Joseph Pease. ]

New Writ

For the County of Denbigh (Eastern Division) in the room of Mr. Edward George Hemmerde, K.C. (Recorder of the City of Liverpool).—[ Mr. Joseph Pease. ]

Oral Answers to Questions

Questions

Horses for the Army

asked the Secretary of State for War whether, in any scheme for the granting of prizes for horses suitable for the Army at agricultural shows this summer he will bear in mind the claims of Ireland?

Prizes will be awarded at horse shows in Ireland under the same conditions as apply to horse shows in Great Britain as heretofore.

asked the Secretary of State for War how much money will be allocated to Ireland as prizes for horses suitable for Army purposes; and if he will consider the desirability of issuing in leaflet form the conditions of these prizes for distribution amongst the local agricultural societies in Ireland?

The amount to be allocated to Ireland depends upon the applications received and the recommendations of the local military authorities on these applications. The conditions under which prizes will be awarded are invariably communicated to Societies whose application for prizes are acceded to, but there would be no objection to issuing them in leaflet form.

Will the right hon. Gentleman allocate a similar sum to Scotland as to Ireland?

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that Scotland supplies hardly any horses, while Ireland supplies double the number of any other part of the Kingdom?

Army Pensioners

asked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that the Majority Report of the Poor Law Commission (Part IV., paragraph 554) expressed disapproval of the system whereby Army pensioners for the most part receive their pensions quarterly; and whether he will endeavour to secure the adoption of their recommendation that all these pensions be paid weekly through the medium of the Post Office?

I am aware of the opinion expressed in the Report referred to; but, as I have explained on several occasions, a universal system of weekly payments would not be in the interests of the majority of the men, and arrangements can be made for weekly payments in cases where circumstances render it desirable.

Cavalry Sword (New Pattern)

asked the Secretary of State for War whether the new pattern cavalry sword has been yet issued; and what is the reason of the delay?

No issues have as yet been made. The manufacture is proceeding with all due despatch.

Home Defence

asked the Secretary of State for War whether the recent discovery by His Majesty's Government concerning the rapid expansion of the navy of a foreign power has affected the considerations upon which the scheme of home defence has been constructed and entailed any revision of the existing plans?

No revision of existing plans has as yet been thought necessary, but the strategical effect of the expansion of foreign navies has engaged, and will continue to engage, the attention of the Committee of Imperial Defence and the General Staff.

Military Barracks (Wexford)

asked the Secretary of State for War whether he has received a request from the Wexford Corporation that the military barracks in that town should be re-opened and troops stationed there; whether he is aware that the members of the corporation have been threatened with a rigid boycott in consequence of their having passed this resolution; and whether he intends to comply with the request of the corporation?

Mobilisation Regulations

asked the Secretary of State for War whether county associations are to have any, and, if so, what duties in connection with the impressment of vehicles or mobilisaion under paragraph 277 of the Mobilisation Regulations, 1909?

It is intended that the county associations shall have assigned to them the duty of furnishing in accordance with the direction of the Army Council such carriages, animals and vessels as may be required on mobilisation for the Regular or Territorial Forces.

asked the Secretary of State for War whether any list has been prepared of what additional articles of clothing will be required on mobilisation; and what articles will be issued by the Royal Army Clothing Department, and what obtained by county associations under paragraph 278 of the Mobilisation Regulations, 1909?

The details of the articles to be provided by county associa- tions on mobilisation are under consideration. There is no intention that the Royal Army Clothing Department shall issue any articles.

asked the Secretary of State for War whether any decision has yet been arrived at as to the amount of special grant to be issued under paragraph 667 of the Territorial Force Regulations.

Reserve Service

asked the Secretary of State for War what training a man who enlists for three years with the colours and nine in the reserve receives during the nine years of his reserve service?

The training for the reservist of the Foot Guards and Infantry of the Line who enlisted for three years with the colours and nine with the reserve is varied from time to time; the details for the present year will be found in the instructions issued with Army Orders for February this year, of which I will hand the hon. Member a copy.

Preference to Goods (Crown Colonies)

asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies if any of the Crown Colonies give any preference to goods from the United Kingdom; and, if not, why they do not give at any rate the minimum preference given by the self-Governing Colonies?

There has never been any question of preference to goods from the United Kingdom imported into the Crown Colonies and Protectorates. Their tariffs are arranged for revenue purposes (and there would seem to be no reason for seeking to impose on them such preferential treatment of the Mother Country as in some instances has been accorded voluntarily by self-governing Dominions and Colonies. The only exception is that of the Protectorates in South Africa, which must necessarily follow the regulations of the South Africa Customs Union of which they are members.

Is there any legal or other difficulty why the Crown Colonies should not fall into line with the self-governing Colonies?

It is not a question of the legal difficulty. There has never been any question of our imposing any such arrangement.

May I ask if a Crown Colony offered preference to the Mother Country would the assent of the British Government have to be received?

Australia and Great Britain (Cable Communication)

asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies whether, in view of the eagerness of the Commonwealth of Australia to assist in facilitating telegraphic communication between Australia and Great Britain, the Colonial Office would call the attention of the Commonwealth Government to the fact that, while on telegrams reaching Great Britain from Australia the Post Office here charges no terminal tax whatever but only the equivalent of the ordinary inland rate of one-halfpenny per word, the amount charged by the Commonwealth as terminal tax is fivepence on every word reaching Australia from Great Britain, while the inland rate for telegrams throughout Australia is only one penny per word; and whether, under these conditions, the Colonial Office would call the attention of the Government of the Commonwealth to this difference of dealing, so injurious to the fiancial progress of the Pacifie cable enterprise?

The attention of the Commonwealth Government was drawn to this matter by the report of the Pacific Cable Conference of 1905 (Cd. 2,663), but that Government has not seen their way to reduce their terminal charge for telegrams as suggested in that report. The hon. Gentleman's question is being communicated to the Commonwealth Government.

Fighting in Nigeria

asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he could make any statement with regard to the recent fighting in Nigeria; and whether there had been any loss on the British side?

The British and German Joint Boundary Commission engaged in the delimitation of the Anglo-German Boundary betwen Nigeria and the Came-roons were, early in December last, in the neighbourhood of Takum, a place about 180 miles from the Cross River, the southern end of the boundary. Colonel Whitlock, the British Commissioner, decided to move his headquarters to Sonk-wala, 90 miles further on, and sent an officer with an escort to establish a camp there. This officer met with considerable opposition, and as his force was a small one, Colonel Whitlock and Oberleutnant von Stephani, the German Commissioner, moved to Sonkwala with all available troops, arriving there on the 23rd of December. The total force was approximately 136, of which 40 were men of the German escort. Somewhat severe fighting took place on the 24th of December, and desultory fighting during the next four days, after which organised opposition was at an end. The total casualties among the combined force were 5 killed and 18 wounded. Among the latter I regret to say was Oberleutnant von Stephani, who was severely wounded, but has since been reported to be progressing favourably. No Europeans were killed.

Specific instructions were given to the Boundary Commission to limit the boundary without provoking hostility in any way whatever. In this case that was impossible, for the natives were very hostile.

Was any request made for permission to the native chiefs before this military expedition was sent out?

Is there any account of the casualties—how many were killed or wounded?

China and Japan (Manchurian Railway)

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, referring, to the recent announcements in connection with British and American representations to Russia with regard to the enforcement by Russia of the scheme of territorial jurisdiction and the imposition of taxes on Chinese and foreign residents in the zone of the Russian section of the South Manchurian Railway, had the Government considered that this interpretation of the Portsmouth Treaty of Peace would still further encourage Japan in her reported assumption of territorial jurisdiction in Manchuria, and to persist in her refusal to permit China to extend her railway system for the benefit of the large agricultural regions, of which Fakumen is the centre, west of the Liao River; and, as the first object of our alliance with Japan was the maintenance of China's unimpaired sovereignty, will the Government represent equally forcibly to Japan that Great Britain is under the necessity of reaffirming her previous attitude, and must insist on the necessity of observing treaty obligations?

There appears to be no parallel between the action of the Russian Government at Harbin, to which the hon. Member no doubt refers, and the objection of the Japanese Government to the construction of the Fakumen Railway. This latter subject was fully gone into in the House on the 17th instant, in reply to a question put by the hon. Member for the Epsom Division, and we have nothing to add to what was said on that occasion. His Majesty's Government have no reason to believe that Japan is assuming, or is endeavouring to assume, territorial jurisdiction in Manchuria.

Steam Trawling (Three-Mile Limit)

asked the Hon. Member for South Somerset, as representing the President of the Board of Agriculture, whether he was aware that on the South-West Coast of Ireland some of the bye-laws made by the inspectors of fisheries extend beyond the three-mile limit, with the result that the British steam trawler owners cannot trawl within a radius prohibited by these bye-laws, whereas Norwegian, Danish, French, and German trawlers could do so; and whether he could take steps, by legislation or otherwise, to place British trawler owners in at least as good a position as foreign trawler owners when trawling off the coast of Ireland?

The reply to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. The bye-laws are made by the Department of Agriculture for Ireland and we have no power to take action in the matter.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the cable companies suffer great loss owing to the action of those trawlers, and whether Parliament will take some action to obviate this loss?

Dairy Produce (Dishonest Practices)

asked the hon. Member for South Somerset, as representing the President of the Board of Agriculture, whether he is aware that margarine is made up into rolls and pats, and covered with linen to represent the best Dorset butter, that eggs bought in crates are stamped with an India-rubber stamp showing the day that the seller's hens laid them, and that, with the aid of a female accomplice looking like a country girl, these goods are carried about in a basket from house to house in the suburbs of London and sold as fresh butter and eggs from the seller's own farm; and whether, with a view to protect the public from these frauds, and to safeguard the agricultural interests of Great Britain and Ireland, he would take steps to have an end put to these dishonest practices?

Cases of the character of those to which the hon. Member refers have from time to time come under our notice, and we have done what we can to put a stop to them. If my hon. Friend will be good enough to supply me with any information in his possession, inquiry will be made, and legal proceedings taken, if necessary.

Have prosecutions been taken in the cases of this kind that have already been brought under the notice of the Board?

I cannot say in regard to particular cases, but if the hon. Member will specify any particular case I will inquire.

I wish to know whether in cases similar to those mentioned in the questions which have already come under the notice of the Board prosecutions have been instituted?

I could not say whether that is so. In all cases where it was thought likely a conviction would take place we have prosecuted.

Horse Breeding

asked the hon. Member for South Somerset, as representing the President of the Board of Agriculture, whether he is in a posi- tion to state whether any contribution has been offered to the Board of Agriculture towards the breeding of horses; and, if so, to what amount and under what conditions; and, if so, whether the offer has been refused or accepted?

An offer of the nature to which the hon. Member refers was received a few days ago. It is under consideration.

Shangford Bar Buoy

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he could state the result of his communication to the Irish Lights Commissioners regarding the dangerous and misleading spot in which the new temporary buoy is moored off Strangford Bar; whether he could state who, if anyone, was consulted by the Commissioners before the present place was decided upon; and if he is aware that local opinion among pilots, fishermen, coasting captains, and everyone who knows that dangerous part of the coast, is in favour of a position 1½ miles off the Bar mouth?

I have received a communication from the Irish Lights Commissioners stating that the position in which the lighted buoy off Strangford Bar has been placed has been decided upon in consultation with Trinity House; that the Commissioners do not concur in the local opinion that the buoy should be placed in a position one and a half miles off the Bar mouth; and that the allegation that the present position of the buoy is dangerous and misleading is, in their opinion, unjustifiable, seeing that the buoy is intended for protecting the passing trade at this dangerous part of the coast and not as a guiding mark for Strangford Lough.

Is the hon. Member aware that no less than ten wrecks of valuable vessels have taken place in this very spot, and whether, under the circumstances, some methods will not be taken by the Board of Trade to urge the Lights Commissioners to put the light in the proper place in order to prevent these losses in the future?

I am aware that wrecks have taken place in the place in question, but I have been informed by the Lights Commissioners that they have had nothing to do with the buoy in question.

Is the hon. Member aware that the consultation referred to that Trinity House is limited by statute to informing that such a change is about to be made, and that Trinity House has no power to alter the decision?

I think that is practically correct, but, as I said in reply to another question, there is a conference every year on the question of new works.

As I understand it, the Board of Trade cannot prevent the Irish Lights Commissioners carrying out work or doing anything. They apply to the Board of Trade to do something, but the Board of Trade cannot really prevent them.

No, that is not quite it. The Board of Trade powers are limited to negation. The Board of Trade cannot order the new work, but they have the power to say "yes" or "no."

Was this light placed in its present position without consulting a single man in the locality? Did not the Lights Commissioners simply drop the buoy there without consulting a soul?

No; that is not my information. If the hon, Member tells me it is so I must accept his word. I think the Irish Lights Commissioners did consult local people, and they came to the conclusion that this was the right place for the buoy.

Notice of Accidents Act (Birkenhead Dock Disaster)

asked the President of the Board of Trade, whether his attention has been called to the accident at Birkenhead Dock, involving the death of 14 men; and whether he intends to hold an official inquiry into the cause and circumstances of the same, in accordance with Clause 3 and Schedule 1 of The Notice of Accidents Act, 1894; and, if not, why not?

My attention has been called to this distressing accident with regard to which, as my hon. Friend is aware, inquiry is being made on behalf of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department, although, as stated in a reply to a recent question of my hon. Friend, there is no power to order an official investigation. The application of the Notice of Accidents Act, 1894, to docks was repealed by Section 54 and the Third Schedule of the Factory and Workshop Act, 1895.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that, under this Act, which he says was repealed 18 years ago, enquiries have been held in the last nine months?

Yes, Sir; my point was that Parliament thought it was enacted under the Factory and Workshops Act, 1895. But that was not so. It only did so with regard to docks.

Automatic Couplings (Trials in Italy)

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he has made arrangements for his Department to be represented at the forthcoming trial of automatic couplings to be held in Italy under the auspices of the Italian Government?

The Board of Trade were invited to give their support to a prize competition for automatic couplings, held by the National College of Italian Railway Engineers, but they were advised that no sufficient advantage would be gained by their participation to make it expedient to accept the invitation.

White Lead Imported

asked the President of the Board of Trade, how many hundredweights of white lead were imported into the United Kingdom from America and Germany respectively during the year 1908; how many hundredweights were imported from these countries during the months of January and February, 1909; and at what price American, German and English white lead is delivered in the English market, respectively?

In the year 1908, 96,624 cwts. of white lead were consigned to the United Kingdom from the United States, and 158,186 cwts. from Germany. During January and February of this year, the quantities were 19,217 cwts. from the United States, and 18,428 cwts. from Germany. I am informed that the present market prices in this country are about £16 15s. per ton for German white lead made by the chamber process, from £l6 12s. 6d. per ton to -£16 15s. for American white lead made by the Dutch process, and £17 per ton for British white lead.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that a patent was taken out by an English firm reducing the cost of manufacturing white lead by 40 per cent, or 50 per cent?

Rosyth Contract (Foreign Materials)

asked whether any of the other materials, except granite, required in fulfilment of the Rosyth contract will be obtained from foreign countries?

The supply of materials is not restricted to British sources. The description and quality of materials are clearly specified, also the tests to be ap plied, and provided these are complied with the materials would be accepted.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of any other material from foreign countries being used under the Rosyth contract other than granite?

No. The source of supply of materials is not specified, and I am unaware from what country the contractor may obtain the necessary supplies.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, whether, in view of the fact that, in the interests of the service, foreign firms are not allowed to tender for forgings to be used in British war-vessels, even though their prices were considerably below the British price, he would explain why the same principle is not followed in the case of the Rosyth contract and thus insure a supply of British granite for dockyard purposes?

The steel forgings used in the construction of ships of war must necessarily be closely inspected and subjected to strict tests during the process of manufacture, and prompt replacement of defective forgings is essential. These operations could not be carried out in a foreign country except at considerable inconvenience, delay, and extra cost. Moreover, it is important that manufacturing plant for the production of important forgings should be available in this country for use in time of war. The circumstances of the production and use of a natural raw material such as granite are obviously on a different footing

Is there any test applied to this foreign granite supplied for this work?

Has the Admiralty any means of ascertaining the state of employment in the particular trades affected at home?

That question does not arise. I should be glad if the hon. Gentleman would give notice of that question to the proper authority.

German "Dreadnoughts" and "Invincibles."

asked whether the Board of Admiralty possessed certain information to the effect that, of the four German capital ships laid down in 1908–9, three are of the "Dreadnought" type and one of the "Invincible" type; and whether there is any information as to the types of the four further ships of the German programme, the preparations for which are understood to have been accelerated?

The German shipbuilding programme, 1908 Amendment Bill, gives three battleships and one cruiser for 1908–9, and a similar number for 1909–10. It is understood that these types are being adhered to.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say are the types of the German battleships and cruisers exactly the same in principle as our "Dreadnoughts" and "Invincibles," or are they stronger and better?

I cannot say whether they are stronger and better until they are built.

Then may we take it that the right hon. Gentleman's Depart- ment has no information as to what the ships are" going to be?

I did not say that; I said I could not say whether they would be stronger and better.

May I ask whether the German programme for the year is necessarily for construction within the year?

I think that is a question which might be better addressed to the German authorities.

Navy (Length of Service)

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he can inform the House what is computed by the Admiralty to be the average length of service now performed by men in the British Navy, excluding commissioned officers?

It is estimated that the approximate average length of service of men of all ratings on discharge from the Navy is nine years eight months. This estimate excludes warrant officers, coastguard and marines.

Can the right hon. Gentleman give us the approximate length of service in the German Navy?

Coastguard Service (Fife Coast)

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty what changes, if any, are to be made in the personnel of the coastguard service on the Fife coast during the next twelve months?

The question of the personnel of the coastguard stations generally is still under consideration.

Can the right hon. Gentleman give any idea of when we shall know the result?

British and German Naval Programmes

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the Admiralty placed any impediment in the way of other nations obtaining information as to when work is begun on British ships; whether he can state why the Admiralty were in ignorance of the dates on which certain recent German warships were commenced; and whether he will take steps to obtain earlier information in future?

No secret is made as a rule as to the date of placing the orders or of laying down ships in this country. Latterly, in Germany, the dates of officially laying down have been published, but this date has not corresponded with the actual date of commencement of building, which is kept secret.

Arising out of that answer of the right hon. Gentleman, I would like to know whether the principle in reference to the inspection of ships under construction that is in vogue in the Pembroke Dockyard, where a visitor has to sign his name and address and declare that he is a British subject, also applies to other of His Majesty's Dockyards?

Was the right hon. Gentleman aware of the intended acceleration of the shipbuilding-programme at the time of Messrs. Krupp's expansion last summer—that is to say, was he informed—

Torpedo Destroyers

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, if he could state approximately the total number of torpedo destroyers, now either built or building, which would be less than 12 years old on 31st March, 1909, belonging to Great Britain, the United States of America, Germany, France, and Austria respectively?

Messrs. Krupp (Extension of Workshops)

asked whether the Government knew in July last that Messrs. Krupp had contracted a large loan for the purpose of extending their workshops in consequence of orders given by the German Government to accelerate their shipbuilding programme?

asked whether the Admiralty were at the time aware that in July, 1908, Messrs. Krupp placed in Berlin a loan for 50 million marks for the construction of new workshops for armaments; and, whether, if so, they connected at or near that date this circumstance with the acceleration of the German shipbuilding programme?

The expansion in Krupp's works, and the means adopted to enable the expansion to be carried out, was well known at the Admiralty before the date mentioned, and it was partly in consequence of it that the time estimated as being required for the construction of a battleship in Germany was reduced by upwards of nine months. The expansion in question undoubtedly foreshadowed increased rapidity in the building and completion of individual ships, and a cessation of the numerous delays which had previously taken place, and it was at once accepted as doing so; it did not, however, either necessarily or reasonably foreshadow an intention on the part of the German Government to anticipate the dates of the commencement of the ships authorised under the Fleet Bill.

The right hon. Gentleman says that the time taken in building German ships was reduced by nine months, in his estimation. Will he now add what is the official estimate of the time taken giving the total estimate?

The total time is, roughly speaking, if nothing occurs to prevent the completion of the ship, two years and six months.

Brazilian " Dreadnoughts " (Suggested Purchase)

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether it is intended to open negotiations for the acquisition by His Majesty's Government of the three battleships of the "Dreadnought" type now being constructed in this country for the Brazilian Navy?

German Official Statements

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, whether the statements of the Minister of Marine in the German Reichstag, to the effect that there will be no acceleration of the ship-building programme and that Germany will not have more than 13 "Dreadnoughts" by the autumn of 1912, have been officially confirmed; and, if so, will the Admiralty give due weight to these considerations in regard to their own building programme?

In the German Press it is stated that Admiral von Tirpitz made these statements to the Budget Committee of the Reichstag. The proceedings of the Budget Committee, however, are not reported—a short précis only being given. We have no official information on the subject.

Perhaps it would be more convenient if further questions on this matter were addressed in debate to the Prime Minister?

Scottish Sheriffs (Age of Retirement)

asked the Secretary to the Treasury, whether it is the rule that all civil servants have a compulsory retiral age of 65 years; and, if so, will he explain why Scottish sheriffs of counties are made an exception, and are permitted to remain in the service of the State to a much greater age than 65?

Scottish sheriffs of counties, whose salaries and pensions are paid from the Consolidated Fund, and whose tenure of office is regulated my statute (7 Ed., 7, cap. 51), are not subject to the provisions of Orders in Council which prescribe retirement for Civil Servants at the age of 65.

Shorthand Notes in Sheriff's Courts

asked the Lord Advocate whether, in sheriff court cases in Scotland, the litigants are made to pay for the shorthand notes, taken in reality for the benefit of the judges; whether this expense is usually a very large proportion of the costs to the litigants; whether it would be possible to pay this charge out of the court fees that go to the Crown; and, if so, will he see that this change was brought about?

The Statutory right to have the evidence in sheriff court cases taken in shorthand is in reality for the benefit of the litigants, and not of the judges, and it has resulted in a considerable cheapening of legal procedure in the sheriff courts. The proportion which this item of expense bears to the expenses of the action is not, as a general rule, very large. I can see no good reason why the cost of the shorthand notes should be thrown on the public, and not, as at present, on the parties-litigant.

May I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman whether it is not the case that this system was instituted in order to save the sheriff the trouble of taking notes, and why should the litigant be asked to pay for that?

No; it was introduced for the convenience of the litigant, and not for the convenience of the sheriff.

Mail Contracts (Aden and Zanzibar)

asked whether, in view of the fact that the mails from Aden to Zanzibar cost the country £9,000 a year, and that the same mails could be conveyed for £l,650, what advantage accrued to this country or to East Africa and Zanzibar from such payment?

The sum of £1,650 a year represents the estimated amount which would have had to be paid at the Postal Union transit rates for the bare conveyance by foreign services of the mails sent during last year by the British India Company's Packets, between Aden and Zanzibar, but these rates cannot be taken as the measure of the sum that may have to be paid, if it is thought desirable to have a regular service, under contract. If the mails were sent by foreign ships, the Postmaster-General would have no control over the movements of the foreign vessels concerned, and no guarantee that they would continue to run regularly. The time table of the British Contract Service, on the other hand, is subject to the approval of the Postmaster-General; and has been arranged to give the most advantageous connections with the Peninsular and Oriental Packets at Aden. Power is also-reserved to delay the departure of the vessels up to 24 hours, and to require them to> call at places between Aden and Zanzibar not in the ordinary itinerary. Other advantages are, as already indicated, the maintenance in conjunction with the Peninsular and Oriental Packets of a regular British Contract Service throughout the whole distance between the United Kingdom and Zanzibar, and the free conveyance of Government officers when travelling on official business. The contract with the British India Steam Navigation Company will provide for the free conveyance of Postal Stores, and admit of the maintenance of lower postage rates for parcels exchanged between the United Kingdom and British East Africa and Zanzibar than would otherwise be practicable.

Telegraphic Communication (Orkney and Shetland)

asked the Postmaster-General, if, in view of the fact that certain islands in the Shetland and Orkney quarter have long been and are still destitute of much needed telegraphic communication, he would consider their claims to consideration from the savings which might be effected by the abandonment of the service between Aden and Zanzibar?

The mail service between Aden and Zanzibar has no connection with the telephone communication between the Orkneys and Shetland. As regards North Ronaldshay, in which I understand my hon. Friend to be particularly interested, the question of establishing a wireless service is still under consideration The experiments referred to in my reply to my hon. Friend's question of the 4th instant on the subject are not yet complete, but are being pressed forward.

Franking Correspondence

asked what are the rules governing the franking of correspondence; and what steps, if any, are taken to insure that the rules are not infringed by Junior Lords of the Treasury when congratulating their constituents on the fact of their being about to benefit by the efforts made during many years past to secure them old age pensions?

In order to pass unpaid, letters must bear an authorised frank in order to indicate that the contents are sent upon the public service, and they must be posted either in an official bag, or at certain special offices, amongst which is included the House of Commons office. The rules are, I believe, well known; and it is for the head of each Department to see that the frank is not improperly used.

Poor Law Officers (Superannuation)

asked the President of the Local Government Board whether he is aware that, under the Poor Law Officers' Superannuation Act, 1906, no repayment of the contributions made by poor law officers to the superannuation fund, nor any portion of them, is allowed if an officer leaves his employment with an excellent character of his own accord in order to better his position, nor is any repayment made in the case of a female employé who leaves her employment in order to get married, nor is any allowance made from the fund to a widow on her husband's death, although he may have contributed to the fund for many years; and whether he is aware that under this Act the completed number of years of service only of a poor law servant are counted for superannuation, no allowance being made for part of a year's service; and whether he will introduce legislation at an early date to amend the law in these respects?

I am aware of the points referred to in the question. I will take note of them, but I do not at the present time propose to introduce a Bill for the alteration of the Act.

Naval Expenditure (Germany and Great Britain)

asked at what date and' in what form was the question raised by His Majesty's Government with a view to ascertain whether any proposals for a mutual reduction of expenditure for naval purposes would be accepted by the German Government; and when and in what form was the assurance conveyed to His; Majesty's Government that these proposals would not be accepted?

The following questions also stood upon the Paper:—

to ask the Prime Minister whether he is in a position, without detriment to the public interest, to inform the House on what occasions the question was raised by the British Government whether a mutual reduction of expenditure for naval purposes would be accepted by the German Government?

to ask the Prime Minister whether, in view of the recent statement in the Reichstag by Admiral von Tirpitz that no proposals for naval disarmament had been made to the German Government by the British Government, he can state what has passed between the two Governments on the subject of a mutual reduction of expenditure for naval, purposes?

asked, having regard to the statement made by Admiral von Tirpitz in the German Reichstag that no proposal for disarmament had ever been made to Germany what approaches have been made in this matter to other Powers?

Perhaps I may be allowed to reply to my hon. Friend the Member for the Newbury Division of Berkshire, the hon. Gentleman the Member for York, and my hon. Friend the Member for North Salford at the same time. I must refer hon. Members to the statement I made last Tuesday, which sets out the exact facts and to which I adhere in every particular. The matter has during the last year more than once formed the subject of informal communications between the two Governments, with the view on our part of ascertaining whether any such proposals as are referred to in the question would be entertained. We did not formulate any proposals because we were given to understand that the German naval programme was fixed by law, and in no way dependent on ours. So far as I am aware, there is no authentic report of the remark attributed to Admiral von Tirpitz, which was made in the Budget Committee of the Reichstag, but I observe that it is stated in the German Press that the German Foreign Secretary will take an early opportunity of dealing with the matter. I have no doubt that what he says will be fully reported, and I reserve any further comment until we have his statement before us.

asked whether at any time since information was given to His Majesty's Government in the autumn of last year, that there was an anticipation with four ships belonging to the German programme, any friendly inquiries have been addressed to the German Government with a view to ascertaining the extent and object of that anticipation?

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will take an early opportunity of making a statement, which will include this and other matters which can be more satisfactorily dealt with in that way than by question and answer.

Can the right hon. Gentleman give us any indication when the Foreign Secretary will make the statement?

I see on the Paper a motion for a vote of censure. That will be the proper occasion.

Absence of the King

asked what arrangements have been made to carry on the Executive Government of the country during the absence of the King from the Realm; who is the Member of the Cabinet in attendance on the King and responsible to the House of Commons, and through the House of Commons to the country, in reference to correspondence in relation to matters of international policy between the King and the heads or Ministers of foreign States; and whether any record of such correspondence is to be preserved for the perusal of the persons responsible to the people for the conduct of the foreign policy of this country?

The arrangements made are similar to those adopted on other recent occasions when the King has been sojourning abroad.

Until the present reign has it not been the uniform practice for the Sovereign to be accompanied by a Minister? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in 1876 notice was called to the fact that Queen Victoria was absent from the Realm during the sitting of Parliament, and the Prime Minister of the day then said, "She is attended by a Minister, who is in constant communication with the Executive Government." What is the practice now?

His Majesty the King is now abroad in search of health, and in a perfectly private capacity. There is not the least occasion why a Cabinet Minister should accompany him.

Was His Majesty the King in search of health on the Reval occasion, when he went with a permanent official, but without, a Minister of the Crown?

Unemployed Workmen Act (Grants)

asked how many distress committees, constituted under the Unemployed Workmen Act, 1905, and county or county borough councils, constituting special committees in accordance with Section 2, Sub-section 3, of the Act, had received contributions from him out of the imperial grants during the last two years; and how many of these authorities have discharged their statutory duty to establish labour exchanges?

Payments have been made from the Parliamentary grants to the Central (Unemployed) Body for London and to 73 distress committees during the last two years to assist them in providing useful work. The bodies referred to in Sub-section (3) of the Section 2 of the Act are empowered to provide work, and no payments from the grants have been made to them. According to the Returns received various forms of organisation have been set up in a number of towns for the purpose of facilitating the obtaining of work for unemployed applicants under the names of labour exchanges, labour bureaux, and employment registers, but I cannot at this moment give precise figures as to the number of cases in which such institutions are at present at work.

Old Age Pensions (Disqualification)

asked the Lord Advocate if his attention has been directed to the case of an old soldier in Orkney, who was awarded a pension of 5s. a week by the pension committee, and disallowed by the Local Government Board on the ground that he had been allowed by the parish council to occupy an empty house; and, in view of the fact that the said old soldier, aged 76, who has served his country with distinction, has never received a penny of parish relief, if he will request the Scottish Local Government Board to reconsider this decision?

I am informed that the applicant has been allowed by the parish council for nearly fourteen years to live rent free along with his wife in a house owned by the parish council, and used by them for housing poor persons. Under the circumstances it was impossible for the Board to hold otherwise than that he was receiving poor relief in the sense of the Act.

Illegal Trawling (North-West Coast of Scotland)

asked whether arrangements will be made for the new Fishery Board cruiser to be detailed for service off the North-West Coast of Scotland, especially in view of the numerous complaints of illegal trawling off the coast of Lewis and the western mainland of Ross-shire?

The requirements of the North-West coast will be fully taken into account by the Fishery Board in detailing the Board's various cruisers, including the new cruiser, for service. Complaints from that district have, I am informed, not been numerous this winter.

Loans for Fishermen

asked the Lord-Advocate, having regard to the fact that the Fishery Board for Scotland stated that they have no longer funds at their disposal such as will admit of their granting loans for the purchase of boats to fishermen, as authorised under section 32 of The Crofters Holdings Act, 1886, will he consider the expediency of recommending the Congested Districts Board for Scotland to grant loans for this purpose to fishermen in congested districts under section 4, sub-section (e), of the Congested Districts (Scotland) Act, which empowers the Commissioners to apply the funds of the Board in aiding and developing the fishing industry?

This question has been repeatedly before the Congested Districts Board, whose conclusion, after careful consideration, was unfavourable to the course suggested by my hon. Friend, having regard to the amount of the funds at their disposal and to the other claims on their resources.

Small Holders (Dalbeg)

asked the Lord Advocate, having regard to the fact that the cottars of South Shabost, island of Lewis, had obtained from the proprietor of the island a promise to place the sheep farm of Dalbeg at the disposal of the Congested Districts Board for the creation of new holdings, would he state when he proposes to take action in the matter, especially bearing in mind that the farm in question adjoins the district in which these cottars reside and was formerly in the occupation of small-holders who were evicted prior to the passing of the Crofters Act?

As I have already informed my hon. Friend, all opportunities for making additional land available, both in the Lews and elsewhere, are carefully considered by the Congested Districts Board, but I cannot at present give any specific undertaking in regard to the farm in question.

Will the Secretary for Scotland approach the proprietor, who appears to be willing to allow the farm to be placed at the disposal of the cottars?

Court of Session

asked the Lord-Advocate if he will grant a Return of the number of cases heard in the first division in the Court of Session during the last twelve months, giving the dates of hearing proofs and the dates of judgments?

I am unable to give a Return such as my hon. Friend asks. The First Division does not take proofs. I refer my hon. Friend to the answer I gave him on the 16th instant, which really contains all the information at my command relative to the topic raised by his question.

Does the hon. and learned Gentleman realise that sometimes five months elapse between these events, and that some dissatisfaction exists in the public mind?

Yes, but, as I have informed my hon. Friend, no period of time at all elapses between the date of hearing the proofs and the date of giving judgment.

Chemical Preservatives

asked the President of the Local Government Board whether he is aware that, under the Regulations issued by his Department under the Public Health (Regulations as to Food) Act, 1907, the use of chemical preservatives is not prohibited in all cases; and whether he will instruct that in future salt shall be the only preservative allowed?

So far as the application of chemical preservatives to imported meat is concerned, the Regulations only deal with cases of tripe, tongues, and kidneys. In view of the importance of the public health and trade interests concerned, restrictions of the kind referred to in the question could not be imposed generally without considerable preliminary investigation. I am, however, causing inquiries to be made with regard to the present position of preservatives in certain food stuffs.

Distress in Manchester and London

asked the President of the Local Government Board whether he is aware that on the 3rd March more than 3,000 extra men were employed by the Manchester cleansing department in snow-shifting, and that 1,300 of these men had their names on the unemployed register; whether he has seen the medical officer's recent night census of homeless persons, showing more than 2,000 homeless persons in London; and whether, in view of these proofs of acute distress, he would take effective steps to continue and extend the relief works in these centres?

I am informed that on 3rd March 3,360 men were engaged in removing snow in the streets of Manchester, that they were principally men thrown out of employment through the severe weather, and that amongst the number only 396 had their names on the unemployed register. I have seen the report of the medical officer of the London County Council referred to in the question. I have given consideration to all the applications made to me by the Central (Unemployed) Body for London and the Manchester Distress Committee for assistance from the Parliamentary Grant, and as far as I felt I properly could, I have given such assistance. In the case of London, I have this winter made grants amounting to £101,156, and in the case of Manchester amounting to £13,143. I am in communication with both bodies as to the further payments to be made from the Grant before the close of the financial year.

Old Age Pension Disqualifications

asked the President of the Local Government Board if, seeing that the Law Officers of the Crown have decided that poor law relief enjoyed by an applicant for an old age pension disqualifies him, though refunded by him out of his own pocket owing to a small and unexpected legacy, as in the case of Henry Austin Williams, of which the Board are cognisant, and such payment having been accepted by the board of guardians as full satisfaction and discharge of all claims the guardians had upon him for poor law relief, he will undertake to make provision in an amending Bill to provide for such cases?

As I have stated on previous occasions, I have no doubt the point referred to in the question will receive the consideration of my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer in connection with any amendment of the Old Age Pensions Act.

Prosecution of Motorists

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will state the number of prosecutions that have been instituted by the Metropolitan Police against motorists for exceeding the 10-mile speed limit in the boroughs of Bromley and Kingston-on-Thames since the issue of the speed-limit orders, and the number of convictions obtained; whether his attention has been drawn to the fact that in nearly every case the defendants have stated that they were unaware that a 10-mile speed limit was in operation, as they had not observed the notices which had been erected; and whether he will cause the police to suggest to the borough councils of Bromley and Kingston-on-Thames that larger and more prominent notices should be erected?

A 10-mile speed limit was authorised at Kingston-on-Thames on 13th November, 1905, and at Bromley on 16th March, 1908. At Kingston 124 prosecutions have been undertaken, with 122 convictions. The defendants stated m 56 cases that they were not aware of the speed limit. At Bromley there have been 22 prosecutions, all followed by conviction. In some of these instances motorists have stated, when stopped, that they were unaware of the speed limit. The Secretary of State is informed that in each Borough the notices are those recommended by the Local Government Board, and in general use throughout the country.

May I ask my hon. Friend if he will do his best to see that these notices are made more conspicuous?

That is a question which will come within the province of the Local Government Board.

Purchase of Striped Canvas

asked what amount (and at what cost) of 52-inch striped canvas was purchased with the £5,314 15s. 5d. given in Command Paper 10; and where this striped 52-inch canvas was manufactured?

The quantity of 52-inch striped canvas purchased with the sum above mentioned was 17,208 yards, at a cost of £961. It was manufactured in France.

Dividing Jury Lists

asked the Attorney-General whether he is aware that the system of dividing the jury list into two sections has been the cause of delay in the trial of actions, especially when one Judge is ill or has to attend the Court of Criminal Appeal or is blocked with a long case; whether the inclusion of a case in the week's list is meant to give notice to suitors that such case is likely to be reached within such week; whether he is aware that case No. 175 came into the week's list on 23rd November, 1908, and was not heard until 22nd January, 1909; that case No. 283 came into the week's list on 30th November, 1908, and was not heard until 17th February, 1909; and that case 390 came into the week's list on 18th January, and was not heard until 10th March, 1909; and whether he will take steps to prevent such cases of inconvenience to suitors and witnesses in future?

In answer to the first part of the hon. Member's question, opinions differ as to the practice of dividing the jury list into two sections. This practice has, in certain instances, caused delay in the trial of actions through circumstances such as the hon. Member suggests. The inclusion of a case in the week's list is meant to indicate that the case may be reached within such week, but the hon. Member will readily understand that in the compilation of the list it is necessary for the officers of the Court to guard against contingencies. They are always willing to give the fullest information as to any particular case. I have been furnished with particulars in reference to the latter part of the hon. Member's question, and find that the actions he mentions were preceded by several cases, some of which occupied considerably more time than was anticipated.

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether in cases in which the practice has broken down he will consider the advisability for altering it?

I have only read the answer to the question which was asked. If the hon. Member desires further information I hope that he will address a further question on the subject.

Press Attacks on Germany

asked the Attorney-General whether his attention has been directed to the case of B. v. Peltier, XXVII., Morrell's State Trials, pp. 538–619, in which the defendant was tried in the King's Bench, on the information of the Attorney-General of the day, for a libel on the French people and on Napoleon as First Consul of France during the subsistence of peace and amity between France and Great Britain and was convicted, Lord Ellenborough in his charge to the jury having laid it down that publications which defame persons in eminent positions of power and dignity in other countries in terms inconsistent with amity and friendship, expressed in such language as to interrupt friendly relations between Great Britain and other countries, are libels; and whether, regard being had to the many violent attacks on the platforms and by a section of the Press in Great Britain on the German Emperor and the people of Germany, calculated to interrupt friendly relations between Great Britain and Germany, he will consider the propriety of putting the law in force by the institution of proceedings for the purpose of abating this evil, which is a menace to the existence of peace between Germany and Great Britain?

Except by the terms of this question, my attention has not been called to the alleged attacks upon the Ruler and people, of a friendly Power by any section of the Press, and I have no present intention of instituting any proceedings as suggested in the question.

Has the hon. Member noticed one newspaper, in which the acceleration of the German naval programme is described as an act of moral treachery which would almost justify intervention by us, and can nothing be done to stop this course of conduct?

I will convey that supplemental question to my hon. and learned friend.

Over-crowding Schools

asked the President of the Board of Education whether he is aware that the List of Public Elementary Schools on 31st July, 1908, recently published, .shows that in more than 300 school departments in London, containing over 70,000 scholars, the average attendance for the year exceeds the accommodation; what steps the local education authority are taking to relieve this pressure; and what the Board of Education are doing to prevent over-crowding and to stimulate the local authority to provide the accommodation needed?

I doubt whether any inferences drawn from statistics of so large an area can be of any value. But I find that in the 300 departments referred to, the total excess of average attendance over the accommodation was 7,219. The local education authority have published notice under Section 8 of the Education Act, 1902, for 41 new schools, with accommodation for 30,599 scholars, and 16 enlargements, with accommodation for 4,830 scholars. In addition to this, notices have been issued for four new schools and five enlargements, with accommodation for 2,338, to be provided by voluntary effort, giving a total of 37,767 places. I do not think, therefore, taking London as a whole, there is any serious shortage of school accommodation, but if the hon. Member has any particular schools or districts in his mind, I will have inquiries made.

Teachers' Registration Council

asked the President of the Board of Education whether, having regard to the statement in the recently issued Report of the Board of Education that the Board cannot advise His Majesty in Council to issue an order constituting a new teachers' registration council until they are satisfied that it will be represenative of the teaching profession and not of certain sections of it only, he will state whether, in order that the council may be representative of the teaching profession, as intended by the terms of the Administrative Provisions Act, it must necessarily include teachers of gymnastics, of shorthand, and of bookkeeping, referred to in White Paper [Cd. 4402], to whose associations the scheme for a new teachers' registration council, submitted to the Board, was forwarded by the Board for consideration; and whether, in the event of any such sections of the teaching profession being unable to agree as to the constitution of a teachers' registration council, he intends to postpone indefinitely any recommendation for the formation of a council?

I do not think it is possible to discuss by means of questions and answers what bodies should or should not receive representation on a new registration council, and I can only refer the hon. Member to the answer which I gave on the 9th instant, to which as yet I have nothing to add.

Is the right hon. Gentleman able to answer the ques- tion which I put down as to whether this registration council will necessarily include teachers of all these special subjects referred to in the White Paper issued by the Board of Education?

I have answered that question several times. I can only add that, as I have said on previous occasions, a registration council cannot be considered representative if it excludes large sections of the teaching profession.

May I ask whether the Board of Education are opposed now, as they certainly were in 1906, to the reconstitution of any registration council?

If the hon. Gentleman will put a question down on the paper I will give an answer.

Training for Secondary Teachers

asked the President of the Board of Education whether, seeing that the movement in favour of providing systematic training for the teachers of secondary schools is stated in the Report of the Board of Education to have received, so far as women were concerned, some stimulus from the regulations of the Teachers' Registration Council, and seeing that the Headmistresses' Association, the Assistant Headmistresses' Association, the College of Preceptors, the Teachers' Guild, and the National Union of Teachers, each of which bodies includes a large number of women teachers, have petitioned the Board in favour of the reconstitution of the council, now in abeyance, he will take steps to accelerate the formation of the council so that it may continue to give the much needed stimulus and encouragement to the training of teachers for secondary schools?

The point referred to was made with reference to the former register, the principal feature of which was the registration of secondary teachers on a separate list (known as Column B) from elementary teachers. That form of register was, it is believed, scarcely in conformity with the Act. I doubt whether the same stimulus would be supplied by any register in which the names of all registered teachers must be "in alphabetical order in one column." This point was fully dealt with on page 21 of the White Paper (Cd. 4185) issued in July, 1908. I am informed that some people, whose opinion is entitled to respect, think that a more effective stimulus for the training of secondary teachers, men as well as women, will be derived from Section 15 of the Board's Regulations for secondary schools.

Excavation at Hampton Court

asked the First Commissioner of Works if he will state whether the excavations now in progress at Hampton Court Palace are being undertaken by his direction; and, if so, whether he is able to give any description of them; and whether it is intended to proceed further with them?

The excavations at Hampton Court Palace have been instituted in consequence of inquiries made by the late Mr. Fitzgerald, Acting Inspector of Ancient Monuments to the Office of Works. They are being carried out with the approval of His Majesty and by my authority. The work is entirely in the hands of my Department. The remains of the ancient bridge, which is believed to have spanned the moat at the great entrance, have been unearthed. It is hopd that it may be possible to remove the soil from it and to expose the original moat.

Sedition in India

asked the hon. Member for the Universities of Glasgow and Aberdeen whether he has made or intends to make any effort for the purpose of securing a time for the discussion of a Resolution of which he has given notice, standing in his name on the Order Book, stating his purpose of calling attention to the affairs of the Indian Empire and to the measures rendered necessary for the suppression of sedition?

In reply to the hon. Member, I can only say that, after careful consideration, I am unable to find any method, promising success, of inducing the Prime Minister to assign a day for the discussion of the motion in which the hon. Member takes so kind an interest. I shall be glad to consider any method which his experience suggests, or to avail myself of his influence in that quarter, which is much greater than any to which I can pretend, for securing the object he and I desire.

As the hon. Member cannot get a day will he take the notice off the paper, and thus allow other Members to raise the matter?

Trans-Indian Telegraph Line

asked the Under-Secretary of State for India whether any negotiations are now, or have been, in progress involving the possible leasing by the Indian Government of a trans-Indian telegraph line to any of the telegraph companies which are partners with India in the Joint-Purse pool; if so, what are the terms which India is asked to agree to in such negotiations; and whether, in the conduct of such an arrangement, and in view of the admitted financial loss lately sustained by India owing to the diversion of traffic which would otherwise have passed across India, but which now passes over cables belonging to other partners in the Joint-Purse pool, the Indian Government will consider the advisability of seizing the opportunity to press their partners for a reduction of the present rate charged for telegrams to and from India, and also to rearrange the Joint-Purse pool agreement so that India may stand in a more favourable financial position than she at present does vis-à-vis her partners in the Joint-Purse?

It is known that the Eastern and the Eastern Extension Telegraph Companies have applied to the Government of India for permission to telegraph their trans-Indian traffic directly between their cable stations at Bombay and Madras instead of handing it over to the Indian Telegraph Department for transmission. It is believed that this application is at present under the consideration of the Government of India. With regard to the last portion of the hon. Member's question, the Government of India would no doubt avail themselves of any favourable opportunity for effecting a reduction of rates between India and Europe, but it is not probable that the negotiations referred to would afford an opportunity for effecting reductions of rates or making the rearrangements suggested by the hon. Member.

Estates Commissioners (Voluntary Sale)

I desire to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that 255,848 acres of land have been voluntarily offered for sale by landlords to the Estates Commissioners, and that the number of acres not yet accepted by the Estates Commissioners amounts to 107,046; can he state if any of this land will be acquired by the Estates Commissioners; and, if so, for what purpose?

The Estates Commissioners inform me that the owners have instituted proceedings for sale to them under the Act of 1903 of estates which comprise 216,026 acres of untenanted land, including bog and mountain. The Commissioners have made formal offers to purchase estates comprising 160,047 acres of this area. The residue is situate on estates which are either in course of inspection or will be inspected in their order of priority. Untenanted land acquired by the Commissioners under the Act of 1903 is utilised for the relief of congestion, the enlargement of small holdings, migration, and for the provision of holdings for evicted tenants. The Commissioners are also acquiring, under the Evicted Tenants Act, untenanted land in suitable localities to provide holdings for evicted tenants whose former holdings are not available, and who cannot be provided for on lands being voluntarily acquired.

Mr. A. J. Crichton's Estate (Roscommon)

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary whether the estate of Mr. A. J. Chrichton, situated in county Roscommon, has been offered for sale by the owner to the Estates Commissioners; whether the farms of Doorty and Carnalassion form a portion of the estate so offered; and, if so, whether the Commissioners will expedite the sale as much as possible in order that these farms may be speedily divided amongst the uneconomic holders of the estate and district?

This estate, which comprises 221 acres of the lands of Carrownalassan, has been purchased by the Estates Commissioners.

Extra Police (Roscommon)

asked the right hon. Gentleman whether he is aware that the Roscommon County Council has passed a resolution protesting against the continuance of the large force of extra police stationed in the county and the consequent burden thrown upon the ratepayers, and setting forth that, in view of the absolute crimelessness of the county, and that every form of agrarian disturbances has disappeared owing to the hopes of an early settlement through the introduction of the Land Bill, in their opinion the ordinary force is more than sufficient, and could be reduced; and whether, in view of the facts set forth and of the opinion of the most representative body in the county, he will take the matter into early consideration?

My attention has been called to the resolution referred to. I am aware that the condition of the county of Roscommon has improved, and I hope that, with the growth and continuance of that improvement, it may be found possible to reduce or remove the extra police. No date can yet be fixed for such reduction or removal, which must depend upon the progressive improvement of the county.

Teaching of Irish (Kildare)

I wish to ask the Chief Secretary whether he is aware that the fees for teaching of Irish in Castledermot school, county Kildare, for the years 1907 and 1908 have not yet been paid; whether the instruction given did not comply with the rules of the board; and, in view of the fact that the National Board inspector has found the teaching satisfactory, will steps be taken to have payment made of these overdue fees without further delay?

The Commissioners of National Education inform me that payment of fees for the instruction given to the pupils of Castledermot national school in Irish during the school year ended 30th June, 1908, has not been made because the condition in the Board's rules requiring such instruction to be given throughout the year was not complied with, the teaching of Irish in that school not having begun until October, 1907.

Estates Commissioners (Hickey's Farm, Dundrum)

asked the right hon. Gentleman if he would state under what section of the Act of 1903 the Estates Commissioners gave a farm to the Hickeys, of Demone, Dundrum, county Tipperary, instead of the farm hitherto occupied by them; in what county is the substituted farm situated and on what estate; is there any difference in the quality of the land and the value of the farms; and, if so, on which side does the difference lie?

I have referred this question to the Estates Commissioners, who inform me that the matter referred to is at present being dealt with by them. At this stage of the proceedings, they do not think it desirable to furnish any further particulars than those which I have already given to the hon. Member in my reply to his question for the 1st instant.

Estates Commissioners (Mr. Joly's Case, King's County)

Will the right hon. Gentleman state whether Mr. Joly, a tenant on the Moss estate, near Clonbullogue, King's County, has offered to buy out the landlord's interest over a portion of the said estate, although the tenants of the estate as a body has already offered a purchase price that the landlord's solicitors (Messrs. Mecredy and Sons) had expressed themselves as willing to accept; whether the said Mr. Joly is already landlord of the larger part of Clonbullogue itself, in addition to being landlord of an estate elsewhere which is actually listed for sale in the Estates Commissioners' office; and whether the Estates Commissioners will carefully inquire as to whether Mr. Joly's proposal could be entertained by them under such circumstances?

The Estates Commissioners inform me that Mr. Joly has signed an agreement to purchase certain lands on this estate, which he holds as a yearly tenant. When the estate is being dealt with in its proper turn, the Commissioners will inquire into the matters referred to in the question. Mr. Joly is understood to be the owner of other lands in the King's County, including an estate which is being sold to the tenants.

Land Purchase Agreements

I wish to ask the Chief Secretary whether he can say if the Board of Works is of opinion that the signing of a purchase agreement worsens the position of a tenant to borrow money for the improvement of his homestead, although it lessens his annual payments; can he say if any purchase agreements have fallen through; and, if not, what object has the Board of Works in view by refusing loans to tenant purchasers for the erection of hay-barns, etc.?

Tenant purchasers whose holdings are not yet vested in them are treated as tenants, and loans are granted or refused to them on exactly the same principles as to other tenants.

Loans to Tenants (Ireland)

asked the right hon. Gentleman whether he is aware that tenant purchasers have lost a considerable amount of crops during the last two or three wet years for the want of hay-barns, etc.; whether the refusal of the Board of Works to lend them money for the erection of such farm buildings, which would be certain to effect a saving and place them in a better position to meet their liabilities, is opposed to the interests of the Treasury; whether there is any excuse for refusing a loan to a tenant who has purchased within the zones; can there be a doubt that the Land Commission will advance the money; and will he instruct the Board of Works, in cases where purchasing tenants require loans, to send down an inspector before refusing and see if the holding is security for the outlay?

I have no information as to the first part of this question; and as regards the remainder, I can add nothing to the reply I gave to the hon. Member's last question.

Issue of Demand Notes (Income Tax)

I desire to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will explain why income-tax collectors generally issue the demand notes on the last day of the year, so that no opportunity occurs to the income-tax payer to obtain the discount of 2½ per cent.?

I may perhaps be allowed to refer my hon. Friend to the reply given by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer to his question of the 1st instant on the subject of the date at which demand notes can be issued.

I asked the hon. Member why the income-tax collectors issued the demand notes so late in the year.

The explanation is that both the Income-Tax Commissioners and the assessment committees are voluntary agencies, and they cannot get their work through until the end of September, therefore it is not before the early days of December that the demand notes can be sent to the collectors.

Is it not a fact that this discount of 2½per cent. is practically unobtainable under the system in force?

Will the hon. Member promise to make it practical at the earliest possible moment?

Government Securities (Foreign Investors)

Will the Chancellor of the Exchequer state if the investments standing in the names of foreigners or persons residing abroad in Consols and other Government securities have been decreased to any large extent during the past two years?

My right hon. Friend has no information which would enable him to answer this question.

Naval Policy-Vote of Censure

Perhaps the Prime Minister will tell us when he thinks he will be able to find it convenient to discuss a Motion which I put down on Friday last with regard to certain aspects of the Naval problem. I am aware that the state of public business makes it difficult during the present week, but perhaps he will tell us now which day he can give us.

I need not assure the right hon. Gentleman and the House that the Government are anxious, and I presume the right hon. Gentleman is also anxious, that his Motion should be discussed at the earliest possible moment. As the right hon. Gentleman has said, we are obliged by Constitutional necessities to wind up the financial business of the year before 31st March, and to-morrow and Wednesday must be given to the Report stages of outstanding Votes. On Thursday the Consolidated Fund Bill will be set down for the second reading. I know it is usual on that occasion to have a more or less discursive debate, but I feel sure the right hon. Gentleman will agree with me—and I think hon. Members generally will also agree—that his Motion raises a question which overrides our ordinary proceedings. I suggest, therefore, that on Thursday in this week we shall take the second reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill as a formal stage, and devote the whole of the sitting until 11 o'clock to the discussion of the right hon. Gentleman's Vote of Censure. Any matters which could have been raised on the second Reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill will be open for debate on the third reading of that measure next Monday, and I think that is an arrangement which the House generally will deem satisfactory.

As far as giving the whole of Thursday to the Vote of Censure is concerned, that is in itself perfectly satisfactory. I may point out, however, that the arrangement suggested by the Prime Minister deprives the House of one of the very few opportunities which the rules of the House allow for discussing matters of general interest to the House and bringing forward criticisms of the Government upon a large number of miscellaneous matters, which I agree have not the immense importance of the Vote of Censure. Besides the opportunity afforded on the third reading of the Appropriation Bill, I hope the Prime .Minister will find some other expedient for giving the House another sitting to discuss questions at large. If he will do this I should rejoice at once to accept his proposal. Otherwise, I think he will feel that he is giving not his own time but our time. Whereas, by what is an unbroken chain of constitutional precedents on these occasions—in the present Parliament very rare—when a vote of censure is asked for, the Government find out of their own time the necessary hours requisite for discussion.

I hope the right hon. Gentleman will agree that it is desirable to have this thing brought on at the very earliest possible moment. Apparently he does not.

This is a matter everybody acquainted with our procedure will admit that the third reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill is merely a formal stage.

It very rarely takes more than half a day any time. I propose to give a whole day to the Consolidated Fund Bill, in order, if the right hon. Gentleman wishes, that his Motion should come on.

Of course I wish it. Of course, I wish to get on with the Vote of Censure. The right hon. Gentleman after all, must be perfectly well aware that he is doing precisely what I said he was doing. He is using the anxiety of the whole House to get this Vote of Censure discussed quickly—a desire in which we agree. But he is depriving the House of one of its opportunities for discussion. We cannot get out of that. My statement was absolutely accurate and absolutely plain. But after the unnecessary taunt which the right hon. Gentleman has levelled at me in regard to our anxiety to bring this on quickly, I still say I shall, individually and personally not raise any objection to the plan which he is forcing upon us. I still say it is grossly unfair. It is grossly unfair. to those independent Members—of the general body of independent Members on both sides of the House. I say—speaking in their name—that the right hon. Gentleman has deliberately trenched upon their time.

The third reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill must be taken on Monday next—

Otherwise we cannot comply with the exigencies of the law. If the right hon. Gentleman insists on having two days, then the only day I can give him for his Motion is Thursday, 1st April.

The day would be a most appropriate day for discussing this question, if it was only a question of folly. I fear what we have to discuss is something worse than a question of folly. The right hon. Gentleman forgets what my suggestion was. It was that we should take the Vote of Censure on Thursday next. If he can guarantee that, I will do my best with my Friends—if he can guarantee that the second reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill is not discussed.

Then I fear the matter ends—through no fault of mine. My suggestion was that, so far as I and my Friends are concerned, we would be perfectly ready to treat the second reading as a pro formà Motion, provided that the right hon. Gentleman would find some other opportunity for that general discussion, which is the right of the House, on the Appropriation Bill.

This is a matter which cannot be settled between the two Front Benches. I do not quite understand what the suggestion of the Prime Minister is for Thursday. Is it that he would put down the second reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill first? If so, how can he prevent discussion on it? Surely he does not mean that he proposes to immediately closure it? Speaking on behalf of one section of this House who desire to have the opportunity to raise other questions for discussion, I certainly would not agree to allow the second reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill to go without discussion on Thursday. The Government would have to take into account that they cannot make an arrangement of this kind between the two Front Benches without consulting every section.

I am quite sure the hon. Gentleman knows I do not want to do that. What I suggested was to put the Vote of Censure first, and the second reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill as the second order. It can be taken after 11 o'clock, and then a general debate can be taken on Monday. If that is not generally agreeable—

Most decidedly it is not generally agreeable to those for whom I speak. We shall resent most bitterly the taking away of any opportunity of raising any questions we desire to raise.

Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman, after an opportunity of consulting the various sections of the House, will tell us to-morrow on what day he proposes to take the Vote of Censure.

Presentation of Bills

The following Bills were presented and read a first time: —

Mr. SOARES—Sir R. Whittington's Charity.—Bill to confirm a scheme of the Charity Commissioners for the management of the Charity of Sir Richard Whittington, under the management of the Mercer's Company of the City of London. (To be read a second time 29th March).

Mr. SOARES—Bridgend (Hope English Baptist Chapel, etc.) Charity.—Bill to confirm a scheme of the Charity Commissioners for the management of (1) the Charity consisting of the proceeds of sale of Hope English Baptist Chapel in Queen-street, in the township of Bridgend, in the parish of Coity, in the county of Glamorgan; and (2) the Charity consisting of the Hope English Baptist Sunday schoolroom in Queen-street aforesaid. (To be read a second time 29th March).

Mr. SOARES—John Marshall's Charity.— Bill to confirm a scheme of the Charity Commissioners for the management of the Charity of John Marshall. (To be read a second time 29th March).

Mr. SOARES—Lichfield and Longdon Congregational Chapels and Trust Property Charity.—Bill to confirm a scheme of the Charity Commissioners for the management of the Charities consisting of the Congregational Chapel in Wade-street, in the city of Lichfield, and the Congregational Chapel at Longdon, in the county of Stafford, and the Trust Property held in connection with such chapels. (To be read a second time 29th March).

Mr. SOARES—Dewsbury and Batley Congregational Chapel Charities.—Bill to confirm a scheme of the Charity Commissioners for the management of the Charities consisting of the Trinity Congregational Chapel and the Ebenezer Congregational Chapel Burial Ground Caretaker's House and Mission Room, in the parishes of Dewsbury and Batley, in the West Riding of the county of York. (To be read a second time 29th March).

Mr. SOARES—Wortley Congregational Chapel Charity.—Bill to confirm a scheme of the Charity Commissioners for the management of the Charity consisting of the Bethel Congregational Chapel and Trust Property at Wortley, in the city of Leeds. (To be read a second time 29th March).

Business of the House

Supply

moved: "That the proceedings on the Business of Supply, if under discussion at eleven o'clock this night, be not interrupted under the Standing Order (Sittings of the House), notwithstanding anything in Standing Order No. 15."

Question put. The House divided: AYES, 223; Noes, 79.

Division No. 39.]

AYES.

[4.0 p.m

Acland, Francis Dyke

Beaumont, Hon. Hubert

Bryce, J. Annan

Ainsworth, John Stirling

Beck, A. Cecil

Buchanan, Rt. Hon. Thomas R.

Alden, Percy

Belloc, Hilaire Joseph Peter R.

Burns, Et. Hon. John

Ashton, Thomas Gair

Benn. Sir J. Williams (Devonport)

Burnyeat, W.J.D.

Asquith, Rt. Hon. Herbert Henry

Benn, W. (Tower Hamlets, St. Geo.)

Burt, Rt. Hon. Thomas

Baker, Sir John (Portsmouth)

Bennett, E.N.

Burton Rt. Hon Sydney Charles

Baker, Joseph, A. (Finsbury, E)

Bethell, Sir J. H. (Essex, Romford)

Bylss, William Pollard

Balfour, Robert (Lanark)

Birrell, Rt. Hon. Augustine

Causton, Et. Hon. Richard Knight

Baring, Godfrey (Isle of Wight)

Boulton, A. C. F.

Channing, Sir Francis Allston

Barlow, Percy(Bedford)

Bowerman, C.W.

Cheetham, John Frederick

Barnard, E. B.

Branch, James

Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S.

Beale, W. P.

Brocklehurst W.B.

Cleland, J. W.

Beauchamp, E.

Brooke, Stopford

Clynes, J.R.

Cobbold, Felix Thornley

Lambert, George

Robertson, Sir G. Scott (Bradford)

Collins, Stephen (Lambeth)

Lamont, Norman

Robertson, J. M. (Tyneside)

Collins, Sir Wm. J. (S. Pancras, W.)

Layland-Barrett, Sir Francis

Robinson, S.

Cooper, G. J.

Lea, Hugh Cecil (St. Pancras, E.)

Robson, Sir William Snowdon

Corbett, C. H. (Sussex, E. Grinstead)

Leese, Sir Joseph F. (Accrington)

Roch, Walter F. (Pembroke)

Cotton, Sir H. J. S.

Lehmann, R. C.

Rose, Charles Day

Cowan, W. H.

Lever, A. Levy (Essex, Harwich)

Rowlands. J.

Cox, Harold

Lever, W. H. (Cheshire, Wirral)

Runciman, Rt. Hon. Walter

Crooks, William

Lloyd-George, Rt. Hon. David

Russell, Rt. Hon. T. W.

Davies, Timothy (Fulham)

Lough, Rt. Hon. Thomas

Rutherford, V. H. (Brentford)

Dewar, Sir J. A. (Inverness-sh.)

Lupton, Arnold

Samuel, Rt. Hon. H. L. (Cleveland)

Dickinson, W. H. (St. Pancras, N.)

Lyell, Charles Henry

Scarisbrick, T. T. L.

Dickson-Poynder, Sir John P.

Lynch, H. B.

Schwann, Sir C. E. (Manchester)

Dilke, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles

Macdonald, J. R. (Leicester)

Scott, A. H. (Ashton-under-Lyne)

Dobson, Thomas W.

Mackarness, Frederic C.

Sears, J. E.

Duckworth, Sir James

Maclean, Donald

Seely, Colonel

Duncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness)

Macnamara, Dr. Thomas J.

Smeaton, Donald Mackenzie

Dunne, Major E. Martin (Walsall)

M'Cullum, John M.

Soares, Ernest J.

Edwards, Sir Francis (Radnor)

M'Crae, Sir George

Spicer, Sir Albert

Ellis, Rt. Hon. John Edward

M'Kenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald

Stanger, H. Y.

Erskine, David C.

M'Laren, Sir C. B. (Leicester)

Stanley, Albert (Staffs, N.W.)

Essex, R. W.

M'Laren, H. D. (Stafford, W.)

Stanley, Hon. A. Lyulph (Cheshire)

Esslemont, George Birnie

M'Micking, Major G.

Steadman, W. C.

Evans, Sir Samuel T.

Maddison, Frederick

Strachey, Sir Edward

Everett, R. Lacey

Mallet, Charles E.

Strauss, E. A. (Abingdon)

Faber, G. H. (Boston)

Mansfield, H. Rendall (Lincoln)

Tennant, Sir Edward (Salisbury)

Falconer, J.

Marks, G. Croydon (Launceston)

Tennant, H. J. (Berwickshire)

Findlay, Alexander

Marnham, F. J.

Thome, G. R. (Wolverhampton)

Foster, Rt. Hon. Sir Walter

Mason, A. E. W. (Coventry)

Toulmin, George

Fuller, John Michael F.

Massie, J.

Trevelyan, Charles Philips

Gibb, James (Harrow)

Masterman, C. F. G.

Ure, Alexander

Glen-Coats, Sir T. (Renfrew, W.)

Menzies, Walter

Verney, F. W.

Glendinning, R. G.

Molteno, Percy Alport

Villiers, Ernest Amherst

Gooch, George Peabody (Bath)

Mond, A.

Vivian, Henry

Greenwood, G. (Peterborough)

Money, L. G. Chiozza

Ward, John (Stoke-upon-Trent)

Guest, Hon. Ivor Churchill

Montagu, Hon. E. S.

Ward, W. Dudley (Southampton)

Gulland, John W.

Morgan, G. Hay (Cornwall)

Wardle, George J.

Haldane, Rt. Hon. Richard B.

Morrell, Philip

Waring, Walter

Harcourt, Rt. Hon. L. (Rossendale)

Murray, Capt. Hon. A. C. (Kincard.)

Warner, Thomas Courtenay T.

Harcourt, Robert V. (Montrose)

Myer, Horatio

Wason, Rt. Hon. E. (Clackmannan)

Harmsworth, Cecil B. (Worcester)

Nicholls, George

Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney)

Harmsworth, R. L. (Caithness-sh.)

Nicholson, Charles N. (Doncaster)

Waterlow, D. S.

Haslam, Lewis (Monmouth)

Norton, Capt. Cecil William

Watt, Henry A.

Hedges, A. Paget

O'Grady, J.

Weir, James Galloway

Henry. Charles S.

Parker, James (Halifax)

White, J. Dundas (Dumbartonshire)

Herbert, Col. Sir Ivor (Mon. S.)

Partington, Oswald

White, Sir Luke (York, E.R.)

Herbert, T. Arnold (Wycombe)

Paulton, James Mellor

Whitehead, Rowland

Higham, John Sharp

Pearce, Robert (Staffs, Leek)

Whitley, John Henry (Halifax)

Hobart, Sir Eobert

Pearce, William (Limehouse)

Whittaker, Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas P.

Hobhouse, Charles E. H,

Pickersgill, Edward Hare

Wilkie, Alexander

Hodge, John

Pirie, Duncan E.

Williams, A. Osmond (Merioneth)

Holland, Sir William Henry

Ponsonby, Arthur A. W. H.

Williamson, A.

Howard, Hon. Geoffrey

Price, Sir Robert J. (Norfolk, E.)

Wilson, Hon. G. G. (Hull, W.)

Hudson, Walter

Pullar, Sir Robert

Wilson, Henry J. (York, W.R.)

Hyde, Clarendon G.

Rainy, A. Rolland

Wilson, J. W. (Worcestershire, N)

Illingworth, Percy H.

Rea, Russell (Gloucester)

Wilson, P. W. (St. Pancras, S.)

Jenkins, J.

Rea, Walter Russell (Scarboro')

Wodehouse, Lord

Johnson, W. (Nuneaton)

Rees, J.D.

Wood T.M'Kinnon

Jones, Sir D. Brynmor (Swansea)

Richards, T.F.(Wolverhampton, W.)

Jones, William (Carnarvonsh)

Ridsdale, E.A.

TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—

Jowett, F.W.

Roberts, Charles H. (Lincoln)

Mr. Joseph Pease and the Master of

Kekewich, Sir George

Roberts, G. H. (Norwich)

Elibank.

King, Alfred John(Kuntsford)

Roberts, Sir J. H.(Denbighs.)

NOES.

Anstruther-Gray, Major

Coates, Major E. F. (Lewisham)

Heaton, John Henniker

Arkwright, John Stanhope

Cochrane, Hon. Thomas H. A. E.

Hill, Sir Clement

Ashley, W. W.

Corbett, T. L. (Down, North)

Houston, Robert Paterson

Baldwin, Stanley

Craig, Charles Curtis (Antrim, S.)

Joynson-Hicks, William

Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J. (City Lond.)

Craig, Captain James (Down, E.)

Kerry, Earl of

Banbury, Sir Frederick George

Craik, Sir Henry

Kimber, Sir Henry

Baring, Capt. Hon. G. (Winchester)

Dickson, Rt. Hon. C. Scott-

Lambton, Hon. Frederick Wm.

Beckett, Hon. Gervase

Dixon-Hartland, Sir Fred. Dixon

Law, Andrew Bonar (Dulwich)

Bignold, Sir Arthur

Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers-

Lee, Arthur H. (Hants, Fareham)

Bowles, G. Stewart

Du Cros, Arthur

Lonsdale, John Brownlee

Bridgeman, W. Clive

Duncan, Robert (Lanark, Govan)

Lowe, Sir Francis William

Burdett-Coutts, W.

Faber, George Denison (York)

Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. Alfred

Campbell, Rt. Hon. J. H. M.

Fardell, Sir T. George

Magnus, Sir Philip

Carlile, E. Hildred

Fell, Arthur

Marks, H. H. (Kent)

Carson, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward H.

Gardner, Ernest

Meysey-Thompson, E. C.

Cave, George

Gibbs, G. A. (Bristol, West)

Morpeth, Viscount

Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)

Guinness, W. E. (Bury St. Edmunds)

Morrison-Bell, Captain

Cecil, Lord John P. Joicey-

Hamilton, Marquess of

Parker, Sir Gilbert (Gravesend)

Cecil, Lord R. (Marylebone. E.)

Harris, Frederick Leverton

Percy, Earl

Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J. A. (Worc'r.)

Harrison-Broadley, H. B.

Powell, Sir Francis Sharp

Pretyman, E. G.

Sheffield, Sir Berkeley George D.

Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart

Randles, Sir John Scurrah

Sloan, Thomas Henry

Wyndham, Rt. Hon. George

Rawlinson, John Frederick Peel

Stanier, Beville

Younger, George

Remnant, James Farquharson

Starkey, John R.

Renwick, George

Talbot, Rt. Hon. J. G. (Oxford Univ.)

TELLERS FOE THE NOES.— Sir A. Acland - Hood and Lord Edmund Talbot.

Eonaldshay, Earl of

Thomson, W. Mitchell-(Lanark)

Salter, Arthur Clavell

Tuke, Sir John Batty

Sassoon, Sir Edward Albert

Wilson, A. Stanley (York, E.R.)

Supply

CONSIDERED IN COMMITTEE.

Fourth Allotted Day

Navy Estimates, 1909–10 (Progress.)

(IN THE COMMITTEE.)

[Mr. EMMOTT in the chair.]

Question again proposed: "That 128,000 officers, seamen, and boys be employed in the sea and coastguard service in the year ending the 31st day of March, 1910, including 17,719 Royal Marines." (Vote A, page 10.)

On a point of order. I was speaking on Thursday night when the debate stood adjourned.

I am very sorry to stand between my hon. Friend and the Committee. I had no knowledge of the fact that he was in possession of the Committee, and, indeed, I am quite ready to give way to him now if that be his desire.

The Committee has gathered from what passed at question time that we shall learn to-morrow the day on which we shall have an opportunity of discussing in this House the vital, perhaps, nay certainly, the most vital question which arises on the discussion of the Navy Estimates—I mean, of course, the question of the adequate and timely provision of battleships of the most modern type. We are going to have again on Thursday, or in the near future, or when it will be possible, an opportunity of examining that question: in all its bearings. I, therefore, propose to say no word upon it this afternoon. Indeed I have considered somewhat carefully whether it is wise to speak at all upon any other naval question while this great and vital question is in suspense. The fear which is present to my mind is whether by even referring to other matters, however important—and they are important—we might lead the unin-strueted to suppose that our interest in this question—if that is possible—can be minimised. That is not so. If the country were so alarmed by circumstances which are sufficiently alarming as to be unable to consider the other aspects of naval policy, then I quite agree that it would be well for us to be silent until this Vote of Censure has been taken. But that is not the case. The country is deeply concerned, but the country is quietly determined to have its will carried out upon this matter. As we are not in any degree flurried by the announcement recently made by the Government, this is the proper occasion for considering whether there are not other elements necessary to our naval supremacy as well as that first vital element, and for considering to what degree and to what extent proper provision has been made for securing these other necessary elements to our naval supremacy. We know that upon the vital issue which we are to discuss in the near future, but not to-night, there has been miscalculation; if the right hon. Gentleman objects to that word I will withdraw it. We know that upon that vital element the provision of first-class battleships of the newest type, the Board of Admiralty and the Government have become alive to a sudden strain of unexpected magnitude. We know that they have cared more perhaps for that feature in their policy, the provision of "Dreadnoughts," than for other features; at any rate, it has been a prominent feature in their policy. It is therefore the more incumbent upon us to examine and consider closely and searchingly, almost jealously, every other element which is necessary to our naval supremacy. Let me name one necessary adjunct to modern battleships in a fleet, if it is to be a fleet at all. We have got to concentrate out attention on "Dreadnoughts" and "Invincibles." which we know are more or less, more rather than less, comparable to the great artillery and infantry of the Army. So if another country builds great ships, or if you start a type of great ship with longer range, you must proceed with that type of ship, and you must be ready to fight on the longest effective range. Indeed, the "Dreadnoughts" are more than that—they are the infantry as well. Just as with your Army you cannot win a battle without superior artillery and superior infantry, so also you cannot win a battle with a fleet if you depend only on having the most powerful type of modern battleship. You must find your enemy in time. Unless we are to depart—and there is no suggestion that we are—from the traditional policy which has been followed in this country for a century, we must in case of war take the offensive. We are not going to wait for the enemy along our shores; we must discover the enemy, and we must discover the enemy in time; we must have our plan of action. From that, among other things, we require two classes of vessels. We require smaller cruisers and we require torpedo-boat destroyers—smaller cruisers to act as does the advance guard that goes with the Army, and torpedo-boat destroyers which shall act as does the cavalry with the Army. The right hon. Gentleman will forgive me for using these illustrations which make the matter more clear to my own mind. Now has there been adequate provision in respect of smaller cruisers and in respect of torpedo-boat destroyers, two necessary adjuncts which are as vital to "Dreadnoughts" as "Dreadnoughts" are to our naval supremacy. I venture to bring this question before the Committee because it is one on which we have often insisted, and one upon which, so far, we have not received any adequate information from the Government.

My right hon. Friend, the Leader of the Opposition, raised this question two years ago, in March, 1907, and then received no reply. He raised it again in March of last year, and used very emphatic language, which I will not trouble the Committee by quoting. We received no reply in March of last year. We received no sufficient reply in July of last year when the question was again raised. Perhaps the Parliamentary Secretary may say that he has given an adequate reply on Thursday night. On Thursday night he said that the Navy League had expressed their satisfaction with the provision which the Government was making in respect of small cruisers and of torpedo-boat destroyers. The events of the last week show that this House is not concerned with, and cannot absolve itself of responsibility in view of opinions which may be held in any quarter. It showed that this House may receive assurances from the Admiralty that the naval advisers are asking for nothing more, but that this House has to decide, as the representative of the citizens of this country, whether to the lay mind there is any margin of doubt in respect of any one element, which is necessary for our naval supremacy. Therefore, I venture to refer to this question of smaller cruisers.

In order to concentrate the attention of the Committee, if I can, upon it in relation to the fleet, I deliberately set aside one reason which does exist for building those smaller cruisers, the reason referred to by the First Lord of the Admiralty in his speech on Tuesday last, namely, that, for the sake of Empire, we must be able to show the flag in many quarters of the world. That is very important, and I hope adequate provision is being made to meet that need, but I do not elaborate it. I put it on one side, and I wish to concentrate the attention of the committee on the question that small cruisers are a necessary adjunct for battleships of the most modern type. This may be conceded, that since the First Lord of the Admiralty recognises the necessity for having small cruisers for those other Imperial purposes a double demand is being made upon vessels of that kind, and therefore we must examine very closely whether the supply for both these purposes is equal to the demand. It is essential and vital, in order that the smaller cruisers should be in sufficient numbers, to make modern battleships effective in a fleet. I have used the words smaller cruiser advisedly, because the work performed by such a cruiser cannot be performed by a large armoured cruiser and still less by obsolete battleships. Large armoured cruisers are costly, and therefore for this kind of work you need a number of vessels in order that the watching that is necessary should be effectively carried out.

I knew that much importance is attached to wireless telegraphy, and that it is sometimes suggested that, thanks to wireless telegraphy, you can diminish the number of those ships which serve reconnoitering purposes. Wireless telegraphy can do one thing and only one thing. It can assist you, to say what you have seen, but it does not assist you to see. The power of seeing is limited by the radius of vision, and the radius vision is short in the North Sea, and therefore you cannot diminish in the North Sea the number of your smaller reconnoitering vessels, that merely because they can supply you with intelligence far more rapidly than used to be the case. Your art of observation must be complete. In the case of large costly vessels the tendency will be to make the gap between them large. If one of them is destroyed, as it may be, then the gap becomes larger still and dangerous, and, therefore, we require an ample complement of those smaller cruisers, if the battleships of our fleet are to effect the purpose for which they are built. The right hon. Gentleman may say that the Navy League is satisfied that we keep a sufficient number of those cruisers. Then may I press upon him the point—in fact, I must. Last year in new construction there were only six of the type of cruiser to which I am referring. This year in new construction there are only six projects for future vessels. How many were completed to March of this year? None. So that there has been no increase in this kind of vessel at the present moment. How many are under construction? Two unarmoured and five of the second class of protected cruisers.

The right hon. Gentleman may be able to satisfy the Committee that that is ample provision, but the demands which are to be made on this type of ship act cumulatively, and if we are to show the flag and if we are to have a sufficient number of those ships to reconnoitre in the North Sea in co-operation with the large Home Fleet then we are bound to press the Government most closely and almost jealously to satisfy the Committee that they have made adequate provision in ample time. The more so since we all know that there must be heavier charges in respect to battleships. We urged last year, and we urge again now, that the Government ought not to defer any financial applications which they can sufficiently undertake at the present moment. That is all I have to say about the smaller cruisers.

I pass to torpedo-boat destroyers, and on this point I would like to quote to the Committee the language used by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition as to torpedo-boat destroyers on 9th March last year, because what he said then is very pertinent, having regard to the answer given this afternoon in reply to a question and to the statement made by the Parliamentary Secretary upon this very point on Thursday last. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Admiralty said on Thursday that we have 91 torpedo-boat destroyers which have been built within the last 12 years.

I do not want to press this matter in any unduly hostile spirit. Of course, the hon. Gentleman is excluding the coastal type of torpedo-boat destroyers. We are talking of what are called torpedo-boat destroyers. He stated on Thursday that we had 91 built within the last 12 years. He stated this afternoon on some near date we would have somewhat more—105.

In view of that reply, which might seem to meet the point which I am making, I wish to quote the words used by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition last year on 9th March, when he said:

Two years ago we pressed this point, last year we pressed, and my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition defined the issue in the words I have quoted. We pressed it in July, and we were told then that the Admiralty had no material for answering on the point. What was the effective value of our newest torpedo-boat destroyers with those Germany could put into the North Sea? The point comes up again on these Estimates, and when once again attention is concentrated on the problem the hon. Member says he is unable to answer offhand. But is it vital. No provision which we may make after the Vote of Censure will be sufficient unless the fleet of modern torpedo-boat destroyers in the North Sea have a marked and overwhelming superiority over any destroyers to be put against them. It is hardly necessary to labour the reasons for that. The North Sea is a wide arm of the ocean. We have to operate in a distance of about 230 miles. In order to do that effectively you must have constant reliefs, because effective constant watching depends on the freshness of the watcher. You cannot keep torpedo-boat destroyers day and night without danger of the attention waning, the eyes becoming affected, and the nerves "becoming unhinged. You must have ample reliefs in order that this work should be properly carried out. You have to watch two egresses, and that doubles the problem.

I read that the German North Sea fleet is to reconnoitre for a whole month in the course of this early summer. I have read, do not know whether I am correctly informed, the Admiralty may, that the fleet will be accompanied by 60 torpedo-boat destroyers. We are told that the fleet will enter the North Sea by two routes—one at the North of Denmark and the other at the Kiel Canal. Therefore, if we are to see this question of naval supremacy is a reality, we must have an adequate number of the most modern torpedo-boat destroyers to watch both those egresses constantly, to have a marked superiority in position to both those egresses into the North Sea, and to have a sufficient number to relieve the watchers frequently to prevent them losing that freshness which is necessary if watching is to be effective. We have no answer on that point. There is nothing either in the Estimates or in the First Lord's statement last year or this which really meets the point I have endeavoured to press upon the attention of the Committee. We have a great number of torpedo-boat destroyers—in round numbers, from 140 to 150. But how many of them have been built under the conditions which I have argued are necessary for the purpose we have to contemplate? How many of them have been built within the same period as the German torpedo-boat destroyers? How many of them are suitable for the North Sea? I suppose, certainly 40. But can the First Lord state to the complete satisfaction of the Committee that there is a marked superiority over the torpedo-boat destroyers of the newest type, suited to the North Sea, which our torpedo-boat destroyers would have to meet? Where is the provision to establish that marked superiority? Last year we completed to the end of March three torpedo-boat destroyers, and there were ten under construction. This year we completed to the end of this month five destroyers (Tribal class). I do not pretend to be an expert, and I do not know whether these are the kind of destroyer that I desire to see constructed. I hope they are, but I note this very significant parenthesis which followed the declaration: "Three delayed from last year." There were 10 under construction last year and 25 this year. Here we have the German fleet manœuvring for a month in the North Sea with 60 of these advanced guards of the Navy, suited to the North Sea, and all we have got is 40 or 50, with the chance of an additional 25 within a reasonable period. That does not establish the marked superiority in that class of vessel, which is as necessary as the marked superiority which you must establish in the most modern type of battleship. These are component parts of the fleet which must be made good if it is to be a fleet at all. I have suggested very earnestly, and not in any party spirit, the necessity of a close examination in respect of these two points—smaller cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers. I have given reasons for believing, until the Government satisfy us otherwise, that there are deficiencies in these two respects in view of the conditions in which we are now living, and I say that those deficiencies must be made good forthwith if we are to treat seriously the problem which we are going to discuss when the Prime Minister can give us a day for the Vote of Censure. Now is the convenient time for driving that home on the attention of thé Committee. These deficiencies must be made good, and they must not be delayed in order to satisfy anxieties on the score of modern battleships without making them good. It becomes a mere game of counters if the country is to be told that it can sleep securely because enough battleships are being built—supposing you are going to build them—unless these other necessary adjuncts are built also. When you defer financnal obligations in respect of battleships which cost so much, there is an additional reason—we urged it last year, and we urge it again this—for getting on with the necessary adjuncts, which do not cost so much, which can be undertaken, and which are needed now, before the problem of two or three years hence arises.

That is one other element essential to our naval supremacy, but it is not the only one. Let us hope that in respect of these necessary adjuncts, as of modern battleships of the newest type, the Government do mean to build an adequate and complete fleet. Even then there is another element no less necessary to our naval supremacy, and that is that such a fleet, so composed, should be prepared for war. How ought our fleet to be exercised in peace so that it may be prepared for war— and, I must say, prepared for war in the North Sea? We are glad that the Government are approximating to the ideal of exercising the fleet as one fleet under one Commander-in-Chief. But they are approximating to that ideal after a great deal of vacillation. This point has been pressed for, I think, three years—certainly two; but the Government have given one reason or another for not doing that which I believe all experts demand, namely, that this fleet should be one great fleet and exercised under one competent Commander-in-Chief. The Statement of last year told us that it was only in 1907 that they actually added 24 torpedo-boat destroyers to the Channel Fleet. Before that moment it was not a fleet at all. So, by degrees they have put a fleet together, but it does not appear from either statement or speech that they have wholly accepted the policy which we believe to be essential for the safety of the country. It is not clear that the great fleet which they are trying to collect will really be one in every sense of the word, with all its parts trained under one competent eye, and adjusted one to another, so that the whole may be one homogeneous machine. That is not clear, and it has got to be made clear. Apart altogether from the question of providing the most modern type of battleship, it has to be made clear that there will be all the component parts of the fleet, and that that fleet will be exer- cised in time of peace as a homogeneous whole. I know that that is a somewhat expensive matter. I do not wish to put this offensively, but I suspect that this Board of Admiralty, like every other Board of Admiralty, has not always had its original demands complied with. I suspect that its advisers have often had to choose the more important and give up the less important, to choose the more urgent and give up the less urgent. We know—it is not a question of surmise—that this Board of Admiralty has been exposed to greater economic pressure—if I may use the term —and to a more sudden and greater strain than perhaps any of its predecessors. Under these circumstances the time has come for us to insist that in respect of every element necessary to naval supremacy the Government will take their courage in both hands and cease to endeavour to economise upon one item in order that they may meet the demands of the country upon another. There has been economy on this essential element of naval supremacy, namely, that the fleet should be properly exercised in time of peace to prepare it for the realities of war. The Government have blurred the distinction between the active or sea-going fleet, in the sense in which it used to be understood, and the reserve. In the time of Lord Cawdor there were 32 battleships, always sea-going, at sea, and a reserve, with nucleus crews, of 14 battleships. We have had a number of phases since then. The Government is approximating towards having a greater number of fully-commissioned sea-going ships, but it has not reached the ideal necessary for our national safety. At the present moment you have only 28 fully-manned sea-going battleships—six in the Mediterranean, six in the Atlantic and 16 in Home waters. Behind that you have this third division, the composition of which was published the other day, containing eight battleships with nucleus crews of from one-half to three-fifths. That blurs the distinction between the sea-going fleet and the reserve. It may be a proper expedient in time of profound peace, in order to effect economy on one head, so that you may have money enough to build the most modern type of battleship which is-absolutely requisite; but when we are faced with the conditions which now confront us, it ceases to be an economy: it becomes a danger. Every ship which may take its part in the battle line when the day of stress comes—if it does come— ought to be fully manned and fully manœuvred during an adequate period. That is not the case yet. We must press the Government to see that, side by side with the steps they are going to take to give us an adequate number of the most modern type of battleship, they will also vote the necessary money for men and coal in order that the active sea-going fleet may be prepared for the realities of war. Why is not this done? Because, of all the items of the Navy Votes, the Vote for men is the most dear. Nobody would suppose that a Government confronted with a challenge to our naval supremacy—we have to face that—would come down with a largely increased Estimate in respect of the number of ships and the type of ships, and then not have those ships fully manned, unless they were driven by reasons of economy which have no relation to the naval problem to effect savings for the sake of accomplishing that upon which the country insists. But when the country understand, as I believe they will understand, that all the ships in the first line have to be manned and manœuvred, I believe they will not only insist, but will encourage the Government to pass adequate Votes in respect of the men and coal necessary to secure that end.

If the argument which I have ventured to lay before the Committee has any validity, and I think it has, we must have more of the necessary component parts of the fleet, in addition to the most modern type of battleships, and we must have that fleet exercised as a sea-going fleet. The German fleet is to exercise for a whole month in the North Sea. What were our manœuvres last year? Four days. What is happening now? This fleet, of which two divisions only are fully manned, is making a perambulation up the North Sea, with the third division, manned only with nucleus crews, whilst there is a fourth division with really only sufficient men in it to oil the guns and machinery. It is evident that if we are faced with equally serious crises—as we are—in respect of the number of our battleships, in respect of preparing the fleet to fight, and in respect of getting the men needed for the fleet, all these considerations are cumulative. If you are going to have smaller cruisers, you ought to have enough smaller cruisers for the fleet and enough torpedo-boat destroyers for the fleet, and if you are going to increase your fleet, then the time has come, and the time has passed, in which you should increase the number of men on this Vote. The number of men on the Vote, 128,000, stands to-day at the figure it stood at when the Government took office. It is an absurdity, in view of the policy you have pursued, that the number of men on the Vote should be two or three thousand lower than the number when Earl Cawdor was First Lord of the Admiralty. But since then you have diverted 12,000 or 13,000 of these men to the formation of nucleus crews, and did it not follow that the number of men available to man the fleet, which must be a fully-manned and exercised fleet, is absolutely and relatively far less than it was, and certainly less than it ought to be, unless the whole of your policy is a pretence. You cannot come to this House and ask for an increase in the number of battleships without asking for more men. These ships to be fully commissioned require a greater number than in the past, and unless you take steps in time—and it takes four years at least to have the number of trained men necessary—your ships cannot be manned in 1911 or 1912, as the country insists they shall be. Have the Government, or can the Government, satisfy us on all these points?

There is one other element very necessary and essential to naval supremacy. It is a point on which I speak with great diffidence, but with great earnestness. If you have ships, if you have men, and if you have adequate manœuvres, we must still have for our naval supremacy that spirit of comradeship which used to be the note of the British Navy. I do not wish to speak on that at length. Evidently that question is present to the mind of those who are taking an interest in this question. What steps can be taken to restore that spirit of comradeship? I put it in no critical sense, but I do put it to the Government that a sound preliminary of any advance towards that desired end would be that the Government should cease, in view of the opinion of the country, from almost forcing naval experts into opposite camps by pressing them to choose between expedients, all of which they regard as evil, in order to restrict our naval expenditure within certain financial limits. That is at the very root of the problem. They have to find where economy is to be made, but they differ as to the place where it can be made with the greatest danger, or the greatest safety, and they are bound, therefore, to champion adverse opinions. Let the Government relieve the naval experts from that necessity, and let the Government agree that our naval supremacy must be unchallenged and unchallengable. Let them take the lead now, even at the eleventh hour, upon the vital question of modern battleships, and upon those other two questions which I have submitted to the Committee. Adequate and timely provision are necessary adjuncts for the proper preparation of the Navy for the stern realities of war. Our Navy must be prepared for war. That is vital to our existence, but that is not all. Our discussions on these Votes are being followed, I know, by all our sister States, but they are being followed also very closely by many of the nations in Europe and by many of those smaller nations for which the Liberal party in the past have cared so much and done so much. We owe it to ourselves, and we owe it to them, to make our naval supremacy unchallenged and unchallengeable. If we are true to ourselves, we shall not be false to others. We have talked a great deal about the cause of peace in recent years. Let us now do the only thing which we can do to insure peace, and that is to put our naval supremacy in every respect beyond the reach of challenge.

Some of us in this House who have for many years past tried to work at naval questions, and to inform ourselves on the matters to which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover referred, think that these are matters on which we ought to have an opportunity for discussion before the Navy is turned into a whirlpool of party discussion on a Vote of censure, and we ought to have that opportunity of reviewing more calmly what is turning one way or another in our minds. We shall not be all agreed, but in our differences we should try to make them well-informed differences. The right hon. Gentleman made an observation in the last words of his speech which I confess made me jump, just as the taxpayers are inclined to wince when they hear of increased taxation. He talked of rigid economy, but we cannot discuss the total expenditure on the Forces, under this Vote, in relation to the question whether it ought to be increased or not. Three weeks ago we had discussions in regard to military expenditure, but the panic then was different from the panic in regard to the Navy. There our hope was only in the Territorial Army.

We have had nothing new about the Navy. The right hon. Gentleman did not tell the House that while he is calling upon the Committee to increase Navy expenditure on every head, so that we shall have two to one in every class of ship, whether suitable to us or not, that our military expenditure is enormously increased, if you compare the 58 millions we spend on land forces with what we spent in former years, and yet if you look at the newspapers or listen to public meetings you would think that the Navy was being starved and the Army too. It is only on Sub-head E on which we are promised a discussion that we can discuss both together as they ought to be discussed in order to see where the necessities in each case really lie, and to see whether it is necessary to increase expenditure in regard to both the land and the sea forces at the present time. The discussion on Sub-head E ought to have come first. I confess that I can see no occasion for alarm, and as one who has given some time to these subjects in the past, I am going to state the reasons why we may calm excitement. I do not see the new facts which are supposed to some extent by the Government, and altogether by the Opposition, to have occurred since our last discussion of these subjects. I shall point out directly the gravity of the circumstances which may occur, and which may lie before us, and which very likely will occur in years ahead. I say that I see no cause for alarm which was not fully in our view a year ago. Those who had rather gloomy previsions for the last two or three years on these points have no reason to think that they have grown worse. They have pointed out that they are dangers which concern years more distant than those immediately in contemplation in this debate.

The right hon. Gentleman began his speech with the hypothesis, "If the country were to be alarmed." I am afraid that the country is alarmed, and I do not wonder at it. If there is no such cause for alarm as is alleged there can be no harm from the most patriotic point of view in pointing out the reasons for not indulging in scare which, I am sure, all will agree in some of its manifestations must be contrary to the dignity and the interest of this country, and not calculated to solidify or strengthen our position. There was a great deal of light thrown recently by words which were published in regard to our position in 1859. We now know that we had lost command of the sea for a few months against a single Power. We know that from a Cabinet Memorandum. It was the only occasion on which we were in that position, and surely we can do without alarm at this time, for in regard to ships of every kind we have a much greater naval preponderance than we ever had. I am prepared to argue that there is no extraordinary new discovery in the facts which may affect the position of the Navy in four or five years time. We had these facts pretty well in view last year; I think I can prove that. I have stated in many discussions that they were not sufficiently acted upon, and that I am prepared to re peat. The right hon. Member for Dover has diverged into a number of interesting secondary points, on all of which it may be said that there may be some doubt. We may doubt whether it is good for any of us to try to do the business of the Admiralty. Interfering with their estimate of the margin or standard in every class of ship may mean a position a great deal worse. Is it to be applied all round? If so, why have a fifty to two standard for submarines? I have never been a partisan of submarines, but I am persuaded that the Admiralty have given an enormous amount of time to the consideration of the question of submarines, and that they have acted with good reasons. I am prepared to accept authority in regard to that. If continuity of policy is important in regard to military matters, it is still more important in regard to naval matters. You cannot build from year to year, and you cannot shift your policy from year to year without enormous risk. It is part of Parliamentary discussions to fall into the habit of judging of fleets by adding up so many counters; material is tangible, personnel is not. There is no proof of the value of personnel except by the storm and stress of war. With regard to men, a witness gave some valuable evidence before Sir Edward Grey's Committee, which was appointed by the late Government. I have some acquaintance with the evidence, and the evidence was not laid before the House. I confess that the report of the Grey Committee entirely changed my own views. I suppose because it taught me the business. When the right hon. Gentleman speaks of personnel is it not well for us to remember how little we can know of the exact call made upon the different classes of men. The old idea of so many seamen and so many stokers has sometimes led people to believe that it is a great advantage to the Germans to have a short-service system. The matter was mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman in his speech. It is now supposed that there is an enormous increase of seamen who are employed as skilled artisans even in countries which have marine conscription, and that those countries have more men than they could employ in time of war. I will do anything I can to allay, if it can reasonably be done, what I may describe as the unworthy panic which exists, and into which the country seems inclined to fall. I have said panic, I might have said two panics. There was the Territorial Army panic three weeks ago, and now there is the present panic. They are two inconsistent panics which have taken hold of the public mind. I should like to ask the Prime Minister, whom I see in his place, a question or two. He will not misunderstand my reasons for pressing him with reference to a certain point, for the matter is one of enormous-importance to the country. We understand that the attempt to reduce naval armaments against the will of Germany failed. The question was excluded from The Hague Conference—it was boycotted. This communication, or these communications, must have been based on the unanimous suggestion which was made at The Hague Conference. It is the only chance we have of anything like international action leading towards the reduction of armaments. It is somewhat curious that we are only a few weeks off a meeting at Berlin which was expected to-improve the relations between ourselves and Germany. As I understand it, it was since that time that the definite assurance was given which was read to us the other night by the Prime Minister. I am not going one inch beyond the importance of taking that matter up. I am most anxious that our response should be complete, generous, and courteous. My right hon. Friend had a most distinct declaration and, believing most implicitly in the good faith of that declaration, said we cannot but believe that it will be carried out. My sole object in dealing with this matter is to prevent now or in the future anything occurring in the direction of friction. There had been a complaint in some quarters set up by persons unknown, and the result was a voluntary declaration which was definite as regarding the number of ships: "There would not be more than 13 'Dreadnoughts' and 'Invincibles' which would be completed by the end of 1912." That is the statement. If that voluntary statement were made to us it is very important that it should be known, and that we should not change our pro- gramme on the contrary hypothesis. Except in the narrowest limits of absolute safety we should do our best to meet any suggestion of the kind. It is our only chance of any limitation. I wish to justify my statement. It is difficult to see what new element has entered into this controversy. At the present moment it is admitted that we have an absolute overwhelming predominance, and that we have a stupendous fleet compared with any other fleet save that of the United States. The German fleet contains no ships that are capable for one moment of standing against our older fleet. How long will that last? When this matter was discussed the other day it was assumed that the older fleet was very good and that we are all right at present. There was no great change. Our experts had told us so. But in the last three weeks there has been a total change, and we are told that there are new discoveries. I want to know when those discoveries were made and what have been the discoveries. If you take the ordinary sources of information, if you take all the ordinary works of reference, you will not find any discoveries.

Take our own ordinary books of reference, and I undertake to say there is nothing discovered that you will not find a year ago. Hislam pointed out before our debates last year that the average rate of construction in England is now slower than in Germany; that was a year ago, and on page 69 of the same book he pointed out that Germany has shipbuilding resources which will allow her to build 12 to 14 "Dreadnoughts" a year. So can we, if we choose to pay for them, and that rather negatives this great new discovery. Then what is the point of this panic about this new discovery?—I believe the only new discovery, and it is a very important one, is the discovery made by the general public of the facts which have been known to everybody closely connected with these matters? Of course, it is very important for the purposes of panic, and you must consider panic in this matter. The general public was very much put out because for the first time it discovered there is no physical impossibility, except the impossibility of paying for it, which will prevent Germany from having as large a fleet as it likes. It cannot be done in a minute, but it can be done in four or five years, because, as was pointed out a year ago, but although Germany has made progress. It could not but have been expected from her power in steel, and from her high scientific intelligence, in which she is not absolutely superior to us. In all these qualities Germany has been able to overcome largely the difficulties which existed for her some time ago. She has been able to overcome difficulties which to some seemed insuperable. Every reasonable man knows that in the scientific improvement which has taken place in Germany all these difficulties must disappear. It comes back to that, that you will have to count on a Power close to us which can have as many ships as she chooses, which has an enormous Army which is a great drain upon her, great and powerful and rich as she is, in devoting sufficient attention to many matters, such as educational work, if she is to keep up so stupendous an Army and rival our fleet.

But we are protected by the sea, and so are all our great dependencies, India and South Africa and Australia, and we must be careful before we try to have at one and the same time, before we have a predominating fleet and a great Territorial Army. Now we come to what is new— slips. The First Lord made more of slips in regard to the actual physical difficulties of building ships than should have been the case, because, even in so ordinary a work of reference as the "Naval Annual," it was pointed out this time last year that Germany had ample slips and could build as many ships, so far as slips went, as she chose to build. That is to be found in the "Naval Annual," and, therefore, is it not delusive to state in regard to rapid building that things have greatly changed. The hon. Member (Mr. Arthur Lee) agrees with me that there is nothing new, and that every material fact was stated this time last year. I yield to no man in my desire for naval predominance, for naval expenditure as against expenditure on the land forces; nevertheless, I think that a great deal may be said for the policy of going slowly in the building of ships, provided the country is not caught napping. Do hon. Members opposite think that we have been caught napping? Do you think that in five years hence it is conceivable that the value of our older fleet will have decreased in the sense postulated by right hon. Gentlemen opposite? I have been a big ship man. The reason I did not speak on the two previous occasions was that at that time I said I was not going to speak in order that I might teach myself the facts. Since then I have seen it discussed in the United States. Then I made a full statement, and that statement was quoted from America by France. It is idle to tell me that there is not always a great element of doubt with regard to guns at over 7,000 yards range, and we are told if they had to fight at night the advantage is diminished until it is almost gone. We have that class of ship with guns of under 7,000 yards range in our older fleet, and if the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover is right in his contention that the range of vision is always limited in the North Sea, then "Dreadnoughts" are no use in the North Sea. I do not believe that, but you cannot have it both ways, yet many of those who raise this panic, men who make most atrocious attacks upon everybody who does not vote for doubling every ship and for a two-to-one superiority at all times, in every class, these very men, two years ago, were most of them partisans of the theory of small as against big ships. That throws some light upon the manner in which a panic is got up, and it would be really better if people want to have a reasonable opinion upon these facts they should learn to think a little for themselves. The hon. Member for Fareham, who is always heard by the House upon these questions with interest, because he knows thoroughly the subject of Army and Navy matters, was present at a discussion last year on this point at the Royal United Service Institution: so was my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for King's Lynn. They were all men in favour of a strong Navy. There were no economists there, no Labour Members and no Irish Members. It was a parliament of naval experts, but I ask anyone who read that debate on the standard of naval strength to say if there is any ground for anything like a panic. The Admiralty policy was represented and the anti-Admiralty policy was represented. The speeches were hot as regards detail, but there was a general agreement between such different persons besides those I have named as Mr. Horton Smith, Mr. Burgoyne, Admiral Nathaniel Bowden-Smith, and others—there was general agreement that the two-Power standard was maintained, though a great deal of building would be necessary, some said this year, some said this year or next. Now, as I understand, we are to have a Vote of Censure upon a particular point of prospective danger, as to the extent to which danger is prospective, that it is coming, and what steps we should take to deal with it. Now I, for one, have never voted in this House —although I often vote in the manner dis- tressing to Whips—I never voted against the Board of Admiralty. The extent to which I did go was that I walked out on one occasion, and the next day the Board of Admiralty sent the Leader of the House down to say he was wrong. It is estimated that the danger is prospective, and that the danger is the particular danger alluded to in the debate and in the article of "The Times" of June last, to which allusion was made just now. As regards that danger, without attaching any weight to international assurances except as signs of goodwill and amity, except as a desire to be on good terms, which in itself is an enormous asset, without attaching any definite importance to the actual terms, yet I think that the assurance described by the Prime Minister in his speech should be taken up and received in the sense of being taken note of and believed in unless circumstances affect it or appear to affect it. The panics did affect it, and if panics go on, and newspapers rate one another as they do, it is very difficult for reasonable men to keep their heads. There is a precedent which has not been named in this debate so far as I have heard it, that was the year in which large cruisers first began to be built very rapidly by a certain Power against our fleet, and Mr. Goschen, who was then First Lord, came down to the House in February with a proposal of this kind. There was a speculative or conditional or hypothetical element in it; four great cruisers were believed to be built, or were in course of being built, for Russia. It is a very curious reflection, by the way, on the mutability of fleets, that three out of these great Russian cruisers which were built at that time are now ships sailing under the Japanese flag. Upon that occasion there was a small Supplementary Estimate brought in in July for £250,000 for beginning the four ships. They were to be a reply to what has been forced upon us by the Russian Government. It was on 27th July on the shipbuilding Vote that he moved the supplementary estimates, and in words which are very applicable to the present situation he said that if exceptional efforts were made by rival powers—[An HON. MEMBER: "What year?"] It was 1897— it was the great Russian cruiser scare. Eight cruisers were laid down by Russia, and a second lot of four British having been conditionally promised by Mr. Goschen, the question was whether the second lot of four would be laid down. As soon as they laid down four we laid down ours at an expenditure of a quarter of a million of money, as he said in February we should naturally follow suit, but we watched for modifications which would have a very considerable influence on international circumstances, and we thought it right to modify in a very moderate manner our estimate. He said he proposed to lay down four armed cruisers in addition to the very powerful provision made, and that was the additional vote mentioned in February, and accomplished in July in addition to the ordinary shipbuilding estimates. There does not seem to me to be much difference between one method and another, and I offer that suggestion to the House. The policy is, I think, a reasonable one. It is reasonable, I think, having heard, I will not say the offers or the promise of Germany—but in view of this one ewe lamb, this first child of the Hague Conference in favour of approaching one another. If Germany is not going to exceed her programme, then I think we should have taken note of that assurance and waited, in the same way as we waited before, before we completed our programme, if it is necessary, in fact, to complete it.

I feel an apology is due to the House for once more intervening in this debate, but I am not going into the question which we now know is going to be raised in the formal shape of a Vote of Censure on the Government, as to the provision of Dreadnoughts, actual or contingent, which h to be found in the Estimates. I am going to dwell on one or two other topics which seem to me for the moment of greater urgency. In regard to the speech of my right hon. Friend who has just sat down, I confess that on all the main points of it I am in general agreement with him, and I thank him for the extremely lucid and cogent way in which he has brought out before the Committee points which are ignored in the Press and in the extraordinary agitation which is going on outside— an agitation of a very artificial kind—and which it is eminently necessary should be present to the minds of the public. As regards one point which my right hon. Friend raised—viz., our communications with the German Government, I will ask the Committee to defer any judgment on that subject until they have heard the full statement which will be made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I am glad to think that as between ourselves and the German Government there is on this matter not only no friction, no unfriendliness, or suspicion either on the one side or the other of ulterior and indirect motives, but a mutual sense of what is due to the independence of the peoples of two great nations and a common feeling that they must in these great matters of national defence primarily and mainly have regard to what they conceive to be their own particular interests. In all the communications we have had with the German Government on the subject, though they have not resulted in all cases in bringing about that which we should have desired, we have nothing to complain of, and I believe that the House and the country and Europe will see that they have nothing to complain of.

I pass from that to another matter. A week ago, when the Navy Estimates were introduced, I confess I had hoped two things: In the first place, I had hoped that the discussion of this great question of national security might be carried on from first to last without any infusion of party spirit; and, in the next place, that grave, as in one of its aspects the situation undoubtedly was, necessary as it seemed to us, as it was to make provision for events, for the new state of things, which a year ago was not in existence, yet that there would be a universal feeling in this country that there was no occasion for anything in the nature, I will not say of panic, but of alarm or even disquiet. The First Lord of the Admiralty and I myself, in that belief, took the House and the country into our confidence to a degree which, I believe, has rarely been paralleled in the past, because we were perfectly certain that it was our duty to lay the new facts which had come to our knowledge before Parliament and the nation, and that in dealing with the changed state of things which had been so created, we could rely not only on the sympathy and the consideration, but on the co-operation of all sections of opinion both in and outside the House. I am afraid these hopes have not altogether been realised, but I am not making any complaint of that on this occasion. My object is a much simpler one. It is to dissipate, so far as I can— and I think I shall be able to do so completely — the absurd and mischievious legends, to which currency is being given at this moment, as to the supposed naval unpreparedness of this country. A more unpatriotic, a more unscrupulous, misrepresentation of the actual situation than that which is now being presented in some quarters I have never experienced.

Let us see exactly how we stand. I am not, as I have said, going into the controversial questions which will form the subject of a future debate as to the necessity or inadequacy of the provision we are asking to be made for "Dreadnoughts" in the next financial year. I want to see what the situation actually is. How do we stand as compared with Germany at this moment, and how shall we stand in the year, 1912, which is the year to which and in regard to which the Estimates now before the House are directed? First of all, take the actual "Dreadnought" construction. How do we stand there? Our first "Dreadnought," the original mother ship, if she may be so called, was commissioned in the year 1906. She has now been 27 months in active service, and during that time she has cruised over 30,000 miles. I venture to say that we have gained invaluable experience as to the merits of this particular type of ship, as to the improvements which can be made on it, and as to the developments of which it is capable, experience which, I believe, everyone of our naval experts will agree with me in saying makes it in the highest degree undesirable, when you are dealing with a new type of ship, to multiply in the early years stereotyped reproductions of the first model, and not to wait until you have got that knowledge and experience which use alone can give. So much for the first vessel. We have at this moment three more "Dreadnoughts" —of course, I wish to be understood, as it is very probable I shall be understood, in speaking of "Dreadnoughts," to be including the "Invincibles" among them— in commission. That is, four in all, and we shall have five at the end of next month, or thereabouts, and at the end of the year we shall have seven.

In other words, at the end of this year, 1909, there will be seven British "Dreadnoughts" commissioned and capable of taking their part with the British Fleet. How does Germany stand? Of course, as everybody knows, at this moment she has not got a "Dreadnought" in commission at all. The first is expected to be ready for commission some time in the autumn, and the anticipation is that at the end of this year she may have two. In other words, translating these numbers into a different vocabulary, at the end of the year we shall have in commission "Dreadnoughts" with a displacement of 125,000 tons and carrying 64 12-inch guns, as against Germany's two "Dreadnoughts" with a displacement of 36,000 tons and carrying 24 11-inch guns. There is nothing very alarming in that. If I may say so, the old women of both sexes, whose slumbers are at present being disturbed by fantastic visions of flotillas of German "Dreadnoughts," sufficient to land an invading army on our shores, may dream without any real apprehension for another twelve months. Now I want to come to a factor in our strength which I do not think has been at all sufficiently brought to the front and appreciated in the course of these debates, and as to the real value and magnitude of which, I believe, at this moment the people of this country have a very inadequate conception.

I mean that vast fleet of battleships of ours which belongs to what is called the pre-"Dreadnought" era. The tendency —I assume it is a correct tendency—of modern naval science, has been to shorten for the purpose of effective fighting power the duration of the life of the great battleship. Only a few years ago the battleship was supposed to have an effective life of something like 25 years. They have all been written down, and a life of 20 years is the outside which naval experts are prepared to allow. What I want the House and the country to see is how we stand in the year for which these Naval Estimates have been prepared in 1912 in regard to this class of pre-" Dreadnought" ships. I am going to make a comparison between ourselves and Germany.

In that year we shall still have in effective life, many of them almost in the first bloom of youth, "The Lord Nelson" and the "Agamemnon," for instance, which have hardly cut their teeth yet. Many people will regard them as belonging very much to the same class as the "Dreadnoughts" themselves. Many of them, as I say, are in the first bloom of youth, and none of them are in a condition of anything like senility or dotage, but are all in full fighting effective strength. We shall have in that year no less than 40 first-class battleships of the pre-" Dreadnought" type. It is most important that these facts should be generally known. Let me enumerate what they are. First of all, you have the two "Lord Nelsons"— the "Lord Nelson" and the "Agamemnon," each of 16,500 tons displacement and with their main armament af four 12-inch and ten 9.2-inch guns. You have next the eight "King Edwards," with a displacement of 16,350 tons and each mounting four 12-inch, four 9.2-inch, and ten 6-inch guns in its main armament. You have, thirdly, the two "Swiftsures" which were acquired from Chili some years ago, one of 11,800 and the other of 11,900 tons, and each mounting as main armament four 10-inch and fourteen 7.5-inch guns. You have again the five "Duncans," each of 14,000 tons displacement, and each with a main armament of four 12-inch and twelve 6-inch guns. There are eight "Formidables," each of 15,000 tons displacement and each mounting as main armament four 12-inch and twelve 6-inch guns. There are six "Canopuses," of 12,950 tons, with four 12-inch and twelve 6-inch guns; and, lastly, the nine "Majesties," of 14,900 tons displacement and four 12-inch and twelve 6-inch guns. That makes up the 40. What will Germany have? Twenty. The displacement of the British ships, whose names and classes I have been enumerating to the House, is 585,000 tons. The corresponding displacement of German ships is 241,000. To come to armament, the 40 British ships have 650 guns of from 6-inch to 12-inch. The corresponding German ships have 384 guns from 5.9-inch to 11-inch. We shall have 152 12-inch guns on these 40 battleships, against their 40 11-inch guns, and of the whole 40 first-class battleships to which I have been referring no fewer than 38 have 12-inch guns. It is ridiculous to pretend that we shall be in a position of inferiority as compared with Germany or any other Power in the world in 1912.

Now to complete the story, passing away from first-class battleships, let me come to armoured cruisers, still speaking of the same type. We in Great Britain shall have 35 as against Germany's eight. The displacement of our 35 is 416,000 tons against their 78,500 tons. In armament ours possess 470 guns as against their 112, and of these 470 guns in our case no less than 68 are 9.2in., while only six of their 112 are 9.4in.s so that in the matter of armament their inferiority is even more marked. It is essential that these facts should be known. It is essential that the country should clearly have it in its mind that with this gigantic fleet—a finer fleet, as I said the other day, than I believe has ever been possessed by any Power since the waters were first attempted by man— the result of years of expenditure, of skill, of ingenuity, of labour, and all the resources that British science and naval architecture could bring to bear upon them—it is absurd to attempt to suggest that we are in a condition which ought to excite alarm and disquietude, and that we are not fully able to meet all the Imperial responsibilities which devolve upon us. I have thought it necessary to make that statement upon the authority of the Government in view of the agitation which is now being manipulated outside. When we come to the discussion, which I have purposely not anticipated in any way, on the question of " Dreadnoughts," I believe I shall be able to give an equally good account of both our present and our prospective situation, and in the meantime I make an appeal, not from any party point of view, but in the interests of the nation, which in the last two or three days must have felt ashamed of itself in view of not a few that things which have been said and written on the platforms and in the Press—on behalf of the nation I make this appeal. I believe whatever party is in power, I do not care whether they sit on these benches or on those, the first care of every British statesman who is worthy of the name is to maintain intact, unasailable, unchallengeable, that naval supremacy by which our independence and our freedom depends.

The right hon. Gentleman concluded his speech by making an appeal, not as he said, on behalf of a party, but on behalf of the nation, for a more cautious estimate of our naval position than some people are disposed to take. I have no objection to the right hon. Gentleman making appeals of that character, but I think if you do make appeals of a national and not a private character you should lead up to those appeals by a very different class of speech from that in which the right hon. Gentleman did, in fact, indulge. He used the most violent language towards those who happen to differ from him as to our condition of security in the year 1912. He said they were unpatriotic and unprincipled, and that the agitation which these unpatriotic and unprincipled persons were in the act of getting up in the country is an artificial agitation. I do not particularly quarrel with strong language, but let the person who uses strong language be frank. The right hon. Gentleman made a strong party speech. I do not object to his making a strong party speech. He is a party leader of great ability and great powers of speech, but do not let him, at the end of his speech, adopt a tone saying, "I represent, not a party, but the nation. Listen to the moderate, well-balanced, carefully weighed statement which I, on behalf of the nation, and not on behalf of a party, now present." I shall not imitate the right hon. Gentleman on that part of his speech in which he did make violent observations to his opponents, and I really have not very much to say upon an intervention in our debate which seemed to me, though the right hon. Gentleman did not appear to share the view, to be distinctly an anticipation of the debate which is to take place on the Vote of censure. He seemed to think he had entirely avoided it. I thought he was talking of nothing else. He did, indeed, begin by some observations upon the diplomatic situation—the relations between the Government of His Majesty and the Government of Germany—and I was rejoiced, though not surprised, to hear that they were of the most friendly character. Statements have been made from the bench opposite and in the German Reichstag on the present situation. Those statements are not, on the face of them, very easy to reconcile, but I think that is quite immaterial. I do not wish to say a word about it, because I am most anxious that we should not go off the fundamental and essential question of national safety into any mere transitory and trifling discussion upon whether the right hon. Gentleman perfectly correctly described, or did not perfectly correctly describe, the approach which this Government made to the German Government about disarmament or the reduction of the shipbuilding Vote, and all the rest of it. If the German Government is satisfied let us not trouble our heads any more about it. It may be that the right hon. Gentleman was wrong, and that the representatives of the German Government expressed themselves hastily. It may be that the right hon. Gentleman expressed himself hastily and that the German Government are, technically, absolutely in the right. That is a small matter, and it is immaterial. If it can only lead to national friction through the Press let us put it on one side.

The right hon. Gentleman went on to boast that the Government had taken the House and the country into their confidence to a degree which had never been paralleled in previous history. That is not the way I read the Government utterances during the last year. The right hon. Gentleman himself, following me on Tuesday, did indeed make a great many very frank statements to the House. The first Lord of the Admiralty, the Minister in charge of the Department, did not tell us any of these things. It was not until he was directly challenged, and until the Government were subjected to criticism, commentary, and cross-examination, that we heard all these things, and though I am not prepared to dispute that the Government may have been a frank witness, I do not think they were a very willing witness, because, if so, these statements would have been made by the Minister in explaining his Navy Estimates to the House. If anybody who remembers the debate on Tuesday will recall it to his mind, he will find that the really anxious statements, which legitimately caused disquiet in the country, were not the statements of the First Lord, but the statements made in answer to me by the Prime Minister. If I go back to a period anterior to the beginning of these debates the Admiralty were cross-examined as far back as last November with regard to the supposed anticipation of the German programme. What did the Government do? Did they take the House into their confidence? They knew the facts at the time, so we know now, but what they said in answer to an hon. Friend of mine on these benches was that they had no official information on the subject.

Will the right hon. Gentleman read at the bottom of page 1,934 of the Report?

I had left Tuesday's debate, and had gone back to last November, when I think the right hon. Gentleman will admit he did know what was going on in German yards. He never told the House. He was asked, and he said he had no official information. I think if the First Lord would look back to the answers he gave in the Autumn Session he would see that even then suspicions had been aroused over this vital fact of the anticipation of the German programme and that so far from taking the House into his confidence he said that he had no official information on the subject at all. I do not mean to make that a subject of special complaint, but I think that it absolutely disposes of the boast of the Prime Minister that the House has been taken very peculiarly into the confidence of the present Administration.

Perhaps I may remind the right hon. Gentleman of the First Lord of the Admiralty's opening statement, where he says we know the Germans have a law which, when all the ships are made, will give them a navy more powerful than any at present in existence, and then he goes on to state what has taken place.

I think that the hon. Member is going back to an earlier criticism of mine, and is not referring to my criticism with regard to answers given in November. But it is quite true that the First Lord of the Admiralty said a great many important things; he mentioned the anticipation of the German ships, and that the Germans had greatly improved their shipbuilding; but it was the speech of the Prime Minister and not the speech of the First Lord which, I think, has caused this anxious feeling throughout the country. As the right hon. Gentleman has belauded himself and his colleagues for the frankness with which they had treated the House, I may remind the House that on the 20th of November Mr. Middlemore asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the large armoured vessels of the German 1908 programme were laid down or were in process of being laid down, and the Parliamentary Secretary replied: " We have no official information on the subject." "Mr. Middlemore: Has the hon. Gentleman any information as to the accumulation of material for this work?" "Dr. Macnamara: We have no official knowledge."

Those were the four ships in the 1908–09 programme which were, in fact, laid down in the month of November. They will not be ships which were accelerated beyond the 1909–10 programme. Although the fact that the orders were given was known to the Admiralty, there was no information on which the Admiralty could act, or which it could at that time communicate to the House of Commons. Before using information of that sort they should be sure that it was true, and, of course, verified by the actual facts.

I am myself incapable of these subtle distinctions between information which the Admiralty had and information which the Admiralty will act on. If the Admiralty had the information absolutely right, of course the arrangement of the programme is clear, but I understand that the Admiralty could not have them. Now I should have thought that the Admiralty could quite easily have had them. Why could not they collect the material?

You ask why did not they communicate these facts to the House in November? The facts were not of a kind that could properly be communicated. We made no such communication until sure of our facts by their having been verified by the circumstances; and when we did know the circumstances, and on the presentation of our Estimates a full statement of policy was made to the House. There was no concealment at any time.

When the right hon. Gentleman speaks in the early portion of these debates of the Admiralty not having adequate and early information on these points he told us the Admiralty had immediate information. Apparently he knew, but did not know officially, about these facts on the 10th of November.

I think that the right hon. Gentleman stated that there was an uneasy feeling that these ships were being anticipated, and the right hon. Gentleman, I suppose, had ample confirmation before the 19th of December, when the House was up. It may have been right or wrong to conceal the fact from the House, but the Government that does conceal them from the House cannot now boast of its admirable candour. The right hon. Gentleman, having dealt with that aspect of the Government, went on to say we were perfectly safe now. Nobody denies that we are perfectly safe now. What Member on this side of the House, either from the Front Bench or the benches behind the Front Bench has suggested that at this moment we are not perfectly safe? [An. Hon. Member: "All of them."] Who says "All of them?" The hon. Gentleman either did not listen to the debate or is incapable of understanding it. This is quite an impersonal observation, as I do not know who it was. But nobody has suggested that we are not safe now. If you will look at those debates you will see that the period of anxiety, rightly or wrongly, was taken as beginning at the end of 1910, and that it increased in severity through 1911, and that beyond 1912 we did not know, because the years beyond 1912 are still to be dealt with by programmes which are to come. I notice that in the right hon. Gentleman's speech he was not content with saying, what I believe no person has yet disputed, that we are safe now, but that he jumped over in the speech which he made the years about which we are most anxious, and he went through a catalogue of battleships of the British Navy, and said:—

I am rather puzzled to account for the intervention of the Prime Minister this afternoon. If he thinks that the serious aspect of this question has been modified by what he has said surely he is profoundly mistaken. If there are—and I do not deny that there may be—people who are taking too gloomy a view, I do not think they will be consoled by what the Prime Minister said; but there are a great many people who are not by any means given to undue panic who will be alarmed by what the Prime Minister said. They will say, and they will have a right to say, that as the debate appeared to develop itself in the early days of last week there seemed some hope that the Government were aware of the real gravity of the situation, and were prepared in the face of criticism certainly not offered in any hostile spirit to modify their programme in the direction of using such building powers as we already possess to their utmost limit and improving those powers against the future. Certainly the Prime Minister's speech on Tuesday led to that hope. It was rudely shaken by his speech on Thursday. It was entirely shattered by the reply made to me by the right hon. Gentleman after I spoke on the same day, and it was not until then that I saw that the Government had clearly determined that they would not modify the programme they had brought forward even by an iota, not until then that I saw that if we were to absolve ourselves from the responsibility which we have before the country that we were obliged to take the only step open to an Opposition who want to try conclusions on a matter of vital national interest. I saw no tendency to move on the part of the Government. I frankly admit, that, so far as I am able to understand the situation, nothing would be satisfactory which did not use all the ship-building and gun-mounting capacity which we possess to set in hand eight "Dreadnoughts" as soon as possible. That, and that alone, would meet the views which, with great reluctance, I am forced to entertain. The Government not only do not go that length, but they do not move an inch in that direction, and it is because they have quite clearly announced their intention of not budging by a hair's breadth from a policy which seems to involve grave national peril, that, after the fullest consideration, and with the utmost reluctance, I have taken the step with which the House is acquainted.

I really owe the House an apology for intervening in this debate, because I have no particular special knowledge on naval matters, and I merely speak as a business-man, applying a business mind to the facts brought to his notice by His Majesty's Ministers. I deeply regret the great alteration in tone which has taken place in this debate during the last two days' discussion. I had hoped that the Navy would have been kept above the line of party politics. I do not wish to impute where the fault lies, but it is quite obvious that the Navy is now in the pit of party politics. It is, therefore, all one more incumbent upon one who feels as I do, that the proposals made by the Government are insufficient for the needs of the moment, that I should plainly speak out and state the side on which I stand.

The Prime Minister this afternoon pictured a poke-bonnet and a petticoat for anyone who expressed alarm with the present state of our naval preparations. Now I am prepared to enter that poke-bonnet and parade in that petticoat in the imagination of the right hon. Gentleman, because I am not satisfied with the programme of the Government as it stands. It is much easier to raise a spectre than to lay it. There is no doubt that at the present moment there is very grave anxiety throughout the length and breadth of the land on this question, and I do not think it is fair to describe that anxiety as manipulated. That it may have been to a certain extent exaggerated for party purposes I should be the last to deny. I have already alluded to the unfortunate character the debate is taking, but that it has been started and developed by anything else except the plain statements of facts made on the first day of this naval debate I entirely deny. Why is it that there is this state of unrest throughout the country? The Prime Minister has stated that apparently, in his opinion, the facts given to the House on Tuesday did not warrant the state of alarm that has been set up. Perhaps I might say what, in my opinion, are the reasons why this alarm has taken such an acute form. The country has now began to examine the reasons why the Government have been delaying their shipbuilding programme.

In anything I am going to say I hope no one will think I am criticising the full right of any great Power to do what it pleases within its own borders. It is no business of ours to know, except for the purposes of our own information, the reason why Germany should be preparing all this fleet, but there is no doubt there is hardly a British citizen who turns his attention to politics who has not given that question his most anxious consideration, and the answer which the ordinary man in the street makes to himself is this: "'Dreadnoughts'! Why Dreadnoughts'?" The hon. Member for Tyneside suggested a reason why Germany was building "Dreadnoughts," and he said it was to protect commerce. The man in the street says: "'Dreadnoughts' to protect commerce ! I always thought cruisers and coaling stations were the desiderata for the protection of commerce." Again, the man in the street sees the German population increasing, German emigrants setting out in large numbers from that country, and he notices that the authorities in Germany are very anxious that that emigration should be turned into colonies which may be in touch with the mother land. When he asks where these colonies are he finds that they are all in possession of this country. He finds that Germany is our great trade rival, he knows that the very life of this country depends upon the maintenance of our sea power, and he knows that if by any mischance we should happen to lose the supremacy of the sea an acute question of semi-starvation must arise in this country, and would, in all probability, arise within a period of a few weeks. Amid all these considerations the man in the street asks why—when the British Government were making peace overtures at the Hague and cutting down its programme of "Dreadnoughts" to two—was the immediate answer of Germany to increase her programme or accelerate the programme she had already laid down. Germany had not only four "Dreadnoughts" in being for that year, but she had at least one other laid down and two others in such a state of further preparation that they were almost equivalent to ships being built.

The ordinary observer asks why within the short space of time of two years Germany suddenly develops 17 slips for "Dreadnoughts "? We were told by the First Lord of the Admiralty that two years ago Germany had no slips of a capacity to take a "Dreadnought" except those in one or two private yards. If Germany had put up four, six, or eight slips the ordinary British observer would not have been very much alarmed, but when he sees 17 slips prepared in two years it makes him think, and the result of that thought is what right hon. Gentlemen on the Front Bench are pleased to term unreasonable panic. I have had some experience of panics, and I am not given to be carried away by them, but I do confess to being greatly purturbed by the statement made to us on Tuesday. I confess that I have heard nothing since— unless, indeed, it must be the speech of the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean—to in any way shake my opinion. He showed such a complete grasp of detail in dealing with this subject that I did feel reluctant at getting up and pitting my general observations against his well reasoned speech.

I now turn back to the facts which were given us by the First Lord of the Admiralty on Tuesday. After all, one has to deal with the facts as given us, and do the best we can in forming our judgment. What were the statements made? One was that Germany had the facilities for laying down the whole of the necessary component parts for eight battleships in the short space of one year. We were told by the same right hon. Gentleman that this country could not do anything like that—as we well know she could not—and at the same time we were told that those component parts such as turrets, guns, and gun-mountings are the parts of the battleships which take the longest to prepare, and for which it is the most difficult to make arrangements. I am bound to say that I am not one of those who share any exaggerated alarm as to our position before the year 1912. I think we have, as far as I can form an opinion, run it a little close, but I do not think up to 1912 that we really have got into danger. I am quite aware that we are only dealing in our discussion with the Estimates which will tell in 1912. The point we have to deal with is that it is necessary to look ahead.

I believe there are two parties in the Cabinet, and I do not know whether the Secretary to the Admiralty spoke for the Little Navy party or not, but he said that he only cared for the ships which existed and which were at sea. Now that is exactly opposite to the view which I take up. I have no fear of the ships at sea, and T do not even fear those ships which are at present laid down, but I look with the very gravest apprehension at the facilities for rapid production on a large scale which a great Power, which might at some future date have interests in conflict with ours, has suddenly and rapidly set up at a time when we have been reducing our Navy. So much of this debate has been taken up by right hon. Gentlemen on the Front Bench, and so many of my hon. Friends are anxious to speak, that I have put my views as rapidly and precisely as I can, and all I wish to say in conclusion is that I feel most keenly the necessity for the Government laying down those eight "Dreadnoughts." It is admitted on all hands that the country, rightly or wrongly, has put itself into a ferment which has been characterised as a panic, and if that ferment can be allayed by four "Dreadnoughts," for Heaven sake why not lay them down?

The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister made a violent attack on the party opposite. In effect he told the House that those who did not agree with him were either unpatriotic, or unprincipled, or old women. I do not think that is the way of treating a question of the Navy, which has hitherto in this House been considered apart from party considerations. I venture to say that it has so been discussed by every hon. Member on this side of the House up to the present moment. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition has felt it necessary to put down a Vote of Censure, and there is no reason why our discussions up to that point should not be harmonious and considered apart from party differences. Whether that Resolution is justified it is not for me to say at present. Members opposite—the right hon. Member for the Forest of Dean, who has gone out— and the Prime Minister himself, talked of panic. I do not think there is any justification for using the word "panic" about this thing. I am certainly not in a panic myself. I regret that these reflections have been made upon the people of this country. I read in this morning's paper an account of a speech made by a Member of the Government, the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Local Government Board, at Croydon. In this he said:—

"This building rivalry between England and Germany was caused by panic fears."

He further said:—

"Panic was of all human qualities the meanest and least reputable."

I agree with him there. A few sentences further on he went on to say:—

"The difficulties of this Government were great because this country was peculiarly liable to panic."

If hon. Members opposite intend to go down to their constituents and say to them that the country is peculiarly liable to this meanest and least reputable—the hon. Gentleman shakes his head. Did he not say what I have quoted?

I never said anything of the kind.

I stated that I only read the report this morning in that excellent newspaper the "Morning Post." The hon. Member repudiates the statement. I am very glad to hear that he did not use these expressions, but right hon. Gentlemen opposite talked about panic, and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Forest of Dean spoke about panic. What I want to know is: Why this panic has been caused and what had occurred to make it? He said that our only source of information was the reference books of last year, and that they told us everything we knew now, and nothing had occurred since to put this country in a state of alarm. He must have entirely forgotten the speech of the Prime Minister. I will read it. The Prime Minister said—he was talking about the enormous development in Germany:— Member shakes his head, but he did say so. At all events, he took the line that we cught not to criticise the Naval Lords in this House. Therefore I say we are in a vicious circle. If we endeavour to discuss these Naval Estimates, on the one hand we are told we must not introduce party questions, on the other hand, we must not traduce the Naval Lords. We go round in a circle, and do not come to any conclusion. In 1906 the hon. Gentleman who in this House represented the Admiralty (Mr. Robertson) said he was taking a new departure. I myself objected to his taking that new departure. He said it might be an unwise thing. I look back now, and consider what has occurred. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said:—

I want to know, and the country wants to know, what confidence we can have in these statements: whether the present is a correct statement, or whether it is a reflection upon the Naval Lords? Did these Naval Lords really desire these things to be done? If anybody is to blame for introducing the Naval Lords into this House, it is the hon. Members who sit opposite.

But I said I did not want to speak on the general question. It will probably be raised in the debate later. I want, however, to be assured that we are being told the truth.

There has been a great deal of self-congratulation on the opposite benches. They have appeared to put things frankly before us. I want to know whether these appearances are real. There is one subject upon which I want to say something. Apart from the question of "Dreadnoughts," or whether sufficient ships have been allowed for at the present moment, we know perfectly well that however many ships we have they are perfectly useless unless our personnel and materiel are sufficient I wish to say a word or two on our materiel. The First Lord of the Admiralty, in his figures for this year's Estimate, showed that there had been an increase demanded for materiel. He pointed out that for several years past we had used an enormous amount of stores without replacement. During the last four years stores to the value of £3,588,000 have been used without replacement. This year the Estimate similarly was only £156,000. That shows, I think, that we have arrived at the end of the surplus of these stores. I should like to ask the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty if he will kindly say how the value is taken of these stores. How is the valuation made? Can the right hon. Gentleman answer that now?

Are these stores valued at cost price or not? Is there any depreciation allowed. My point is this. The First Lord of the Admiralty, in dealing with these specific figures, explained that they represented the difference between the true and apparent expenditure. I want to know how much reality there is, and how much appearance there is in these matters; and not only these, but a great many more in connection with the Navy? What is the percentage of reality? I want to know how many stores you have left. Just refer to page 1. Take the year 1905–6, when the late Government was in office. They withdrew from stores, without replacement, to the amount of £768,000. The next year it was £1,000,000. The next year it was £1,200,000. The total, with other items, amounted to £3,700,000. Now, I want to ask whether the Board of Admiralty five or six years ago, when they bought these stores, bought £4,000,000 worth more than they required? Did they require them or not? If they were required then, are they not required now? Are we to understand that all these stores have been taken away, and not replaced up to the present moment? If that is the case, I venture to say that the position of the Board of Admiralty is by no means a satisfactory one.

Then as to personnel; there are 128,000 men. Are all these men efficient? As has been pointed out, the personnel should be increased rather than diminished. I am not sure that the ratings of able-bodied seamen have not been reduced of late, and that a certain number of ratings have been changed. All these are reductions which take away from our real fighting power, and it is our real fighting power that we want to promote. Will the hon. Member give us a plain answer to these queries? I want to know, in the words of the right hon. Gentleman who introduced the Estimates, how much we can trust to reality, and how much to appearance? It has been said that speech was given to us to conceal our thoughts. I have often thought in this house that official arguments and answers were given to conceal facts. Surely we do not want the facts concealed any more in this great service! The reason why so many people have distrusted the statements for the Government of late is that we have not had straightforward answers. This has produced an unsatisfactory state of affairs. There is one party in the House always advocating an increase in the expenditure because they believe it is 10 to 20 per cent. below what is necessary. There is another party in the House who are always advocating a reduction, because they believe there is from 10 to 20 per cent. waste. One party is always alarmed at the state of the country; the other is alarmed at the waste of our resources. If hon. Members have made a mistake I hope even at the last moment they will have the courage to alter their opinions, and to put increased Estimates before the House. Surely you will have the courage to confess mistakes or the mistakes of your naval advisers, if they have made mistakes. After all, the country is generous, and does not want to make a scapegoat. You can trust the country to do whatever is wanted for the safety of the Empire. If you do not trust the people, how can they possibly trust you? Right hon. Gentlemen opposite might have faith in themselves and faith in us, and tell us what is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

I had not intended to intervene in this debate but for the speech made by my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton. On many subjects I feel so closely with him, and on so many political points I am so much in agreement with him, that I must confess I heard his observations with considerable surprise, more particularly after listening to him with great care, because he seems to me to have come to the conclusion, to which I myself have come, that the steps which the Government are taking were quite adequate to meet the present situation. Nothing was more clearly defined than that in my hon. Friend's observations towards the end of his speech. After having indulged in a considerable reference to the panic which was existing in this country, he arrived at the end of his remarks at an argument in favour of the Government on the precise point put forward by the Leader of the Opposition, which we are discussing to-day—viz.. whether or not the steps which are being taken are not sufficient to meet the situation as it will be in 1912.

In regard to 1912, I said we must have a margin, especially if Germany builds more quickly than we can. That will enable us to be ready, with all arrangements made, to go on building quickly.

There is no difference between what the hon. Gentleman thinks on that point, and probably what the majority of the House thinks, but that does not seem to me to in any way meet the position which the hon. Gentleman has taken up in this debate. What is the situation? I confess from what fell from the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition that anything he said was not in consequence of what had fallen from the First Lord of the Admiralty, but of what was subsequently said by the Prime Minister.

I listened to every word of the debate, and to everything which fell from the Leader of the Opposition. In regard to national defence it is always interesting to listen to the right hon. Gentleman. For my part, on the subject of the national security I have always listened to the speech of the Leader of the Opposition with the greatest care and attention, and speaking entirely for myself, I thought the tone which the right hon. Gentleman adopted in the debate on Tuesday was quite worthy of the reputation he has acquired by the speeches he has made on this subject. What struck me at the time was that there was a difference in arriving at results between the right hon. Gentleman and the Members of the Front Bench, and that this was the sole issue between them. It is -quite true that the right hon. Gentleman in his speech on Tuesday said that he was very much concerned about what had fallen from the First Lord of the Admiralty, and it was to the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty he alluded when he was led to make this statement, which, I think, quite sufficiently shows the importance which he attached to the words of that Minister:—

"I confess to the House that I have never risen on any occasion with a greater sense of the responsibility which attaches both to the speeches to the House—if they will listen to me—or a greater sense of the immense -effect on the national destiny which may result from the decision that the House will take during the course of the next two or three days."

The right hon. Gentleman certainly impressed his views with great force, and, in consequence, led to the speech from the Prime Minister, which was carried out on exactly the same lines as the speech which had fallen from the First Lord of the Admiralty. I could see no divergence of opinion in any way between the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Prime Minister. The great question raised during that debate was entirely in relation to "Dreadnoughts" and what would be the position in the years 1910, 1911 and 1912, when the German programme was being carried out to the extent of giving them 13 or 17 "Dreadnoughts" or "Invincibles," it does not seem quite clear at present, and in respect of which we must wait until we get fuller statements and fuller assurances. There were two disturbing factors, it seemed to me. One was the acceleration by the German Government of their programme, and the other was the increase of the number of slips which the German Government have managed to obtain during something like the last twelve or eighteen months. Everybody in the House will agree that this was a situation which required to be dealt with, and which necessitated the Government's coming to the House and telling us what the position was and how they proposed to meet it. The only issue it seems to me is, whether the Government programme is sufficient, and whether it is necessary, as my hon. Friend seemed to say, to lay down the eight "Dreadnoughts" during the current year, instead of waiting to carry out the programme in the manner proposed by the Government in the Estimates now before us. Let us consider what the position is in relation to the speech made by the Prime Minister to-day, and what had already been stated almost, if not entirely, in the speech made by the Parliamentary Secretary. The comparison made between this country and Germany for the next few years is almost solely based on "Dreadnoughts" which are to be built. We have had it stated to-day in very clear and lucid terms by the Prime Minister what the situation is at the present moment, and everybody agrees, and I am sure the Leader of the Opposition will agree that there is no occasion for alarm at the present moment. There is not the slightest fear now, when we have five "Dreadnoughts," and Germany has none. Nor, as far as one can see, is there the slightest fear for next year, when, apparently, we shall have the nine German "Dreadnoughts." It is on what is going to happen in 1912 that the real interest arises. [An Hox. Member: "And 1911."] It is to be remembered that we are dealing with the situation in 1912; and surely if you go to the extreme limit and take the situation at ist best from the German standpoint— that is to say, putting it as high as it can be put against ourselves for the purpose of the comparison, which is now being instituted, you cannot do better than take 1912. In that year there will be, according to the programme, 13 "Dreadnoughts." There will be, according to the other statement, certainly 16, and according to the power which is taken under these Estimates, there may be twenty. These are the figures, I understand, laid down by the First Lord of the Admiralty, and by the Prime Minister. According to my hon. Friend, I take it that the German Estimate will be 17. There is some question as to whether the number is 16 or 17, but I followed the Prime Minister's figures with considerable attention, and I think the figure is that which I have given.

The words of the First Lord of the Admiralty were:—

"The German law provides for four more ships to be laid down in 1910-11. If the construction of these ships were to be accelerated I understand the four ships of the 1909-10 programme would be completed by April, 1912, and at that date Germany would have 17 Dreadnoughts ' and ' Invincibles.'"

I do not think the hon. Gentleman quite appreciates my point. I said that, according to the present statement, there would be 13 Dreadnoughts in 1912. If there is an acceleration, there might be 17. On the strength of what Admiral Von Tirpitz said, there would be 13. According to the statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Prime Minister, in regard to our position, there will be 16 and 12, and, assuming that we carry out the programme for which power is now being sought there will be 20. The whole point seems to resolve itself into this: Is sufficient care being taken to meet anything Germany may do—to meet any possible emergency that might happen in 1912, based on information such as is contained in the Estimates now before the House—namely, to lay down four "Dreadnoughts" during next year, and to take power to put down another four if it becomes necessary? I gathered from the Leader of the Opposition in the course of the debate that there was ample power to do that. There is no difficulty in doing that at any time, or in the Government's doing that during the ensuing year. If you therefore take the figures which have been given to-day by the Prime Minister of the 40 first-class battleships which you cannot possibly leave out of account, if you mean to make a comparison by taking " Dreadnoughts" alone, and leave out everything else, the result is, you are giving an absolutely false estimate of the power of the British Navy. You have got the statement which we have heard to-day, of the enormous tonnage which was told us, of the displacement which was related to us by the Prime Minister, the gigantic superiority over the German Navy with regard to these first-class ships. We have heard of the 40 first-class battleships as against 20. We have heard of the displacement and also of the guns, of the difference that there is, and of the immense superiority of the British fleet.

How are you when you are discussing this question, when you are considering what it is prudent for us to determine as our programme in order to meet what we now know with reference to the acceleration of Germany and of the new slips, how are you going to leave out of consideration this immense mass of material which you have—fighting material of the very first class, only surpassed apparently by the Dreadnoughts? I should have thought it would have been absurd for the Government to come here to this House and to state in any feeling of panic or of such alarm as to say let us have eight "Dreadnoughts " at once, when they had also in mind and knew of the immense superiority we had over Germany in other respects. I may venture to point out again to the House that there is no dispute, and there can be no dispute in this House, between us upon any other point but as to whether four, which are to be taken into account, should be laid down in this year. That is the sole question.

Everybody must be agreed, of whatever party, that the feeling and the invincible resolve of this House and of the country is that our Navy shall be supreme throughout the world, and, after all, that is the policy which has been laid down, and from which no one will dissent in this House.

All I can say is if anybody will dissent from it in this House he will not dissent from it on the platform when he is addressing his constituents. That, at any rate, we may pass as one of the matters upon which there will be, perhaps, a minority of one or two, but upon which the vast majority of the House will entirely agree.

Secondly, there is this, upon which there is complete agreement on both sides, certainly from the Leader of the Opposition, who said on a recent occasion, on Tuesday's debate and again to-day, we are all agreed about this, that there is the greatest desire to maintain the friendliest relations with Germany in spite of what is now happening, and in spite of discussing this programme. The desire on all hands is to recognise freely and fully and frankly that Germany is entitled to say for themselves what is the best policy, the German policy, and if Germany thinks it necessary to have these "Dreadnoughts" for the purpose of protecting her commerce or whatever other account, all we can say is that is Germany's affair, and not ours. [Hon. Members: "No, no."] If the House will forgive me, I think there will be no difference of opinion as to that. Where it does concern us, we must not forget, is, of course, if we find with the determination that we have to maintain our supremacy, that Germany is going ahead and laying down a greater number of "Dreadnoughts," and that in any way our supremacy is threatened, then we should have what we have at the present moment.

We have the situation met by the present Government and by the First Lord of the Admiralty in the Estimates he laid before the House. What is the reason for the special demand which is being made? The speech of the Prime Minister stated with the fullest frankness what the situation was, so that we might be able to judge of it for ourselves, and that the country might thoroughly realise the necessity for the increased demands, and not to go into a state of unnecessary alarm and panic. Looking at it with the greatest care—and I agree with the hon. Member for Brighton in this, that it is one of those subjects on which every Member has to exercise his own judgment in determining the matter for himself. Where I differ entirely from him is in his thinking that in what has been laid down as the policy sufficient precautions have not been adopted by the Government to meet the case, and the situation created by the new development in Germany. Again I may point out to him, and perhaps to other Members who may have views of a similar character, what has led to that speech from him being fraught with so much alarm as to the future in 1912 is apparently my hon. Friend seems to leave out of consideration that power is being taken under these Estimates for doing the very thing he requires, that there is a discretion vested in the Government, and a most desirable discretion, because, after all, many things may happen which may make it unnecessary to lay down those four ships.

And again we have heard on the authority of the First Lord of the Admiralty and from the Prime Minister today that every experience which you get with your new vessels, in the crusings of these new types of vessels, enables you to go one step further in advance and to make the new vessel which you are going to build a better one than the last. And as we were reminded by the First Lord of the Admiralty, the " Dreadnoughts " now being constructed will be 30 per cent, better than the original types of "Dreadnoughts" which were laid down. I really would remind the House and my hon. Friend that in truth what the Government has done is to meet the situation not only with the candour which one would expect in the statments made to the House, but convinced as it is of the gravity of the situation has laid before the House a policy which is sufficient to cope with the seriousness, and enables them to say, and the Prime Minister to say that he is not false to the trust, but is true to the trust which is reposed in him, because he has told us again and again, and there can be no doubt about it, he has realised, I am sure no one will think he has failed to realise, how important it is we should proceed apace and take prompt steps in order that we should meet the situation which is created to-day. Under these circumstances I do think that the declarations which have been made, that the definitely clear, firm statement made by the Prime Minister as to the policy, and that there need be no anxiety, but that the steps are adequate for the protection of the British Empire.

We have heard a-great deal about the situation at the present moment, and we have heard a good deal about the situation which will occur in 1912 and afterwards. I think it was rather unnecessary for the Prime Minister to come down and make a speech this afternoon pointing out that at the present moment we are absolutely secure from any attack by any foreign Power. No man, I am sure, denies that, and no sane man denies that at the present moment we are absolutely secure from any naval attack made upon us. We heard from the hon. Member who has just spoken so pointedly and well, and from other hon. Members, what the situation they imagine will be in 1912 and afterwards.

I do not intend to deal with that, but what is of grave and immediate importance, the situation which will arise in December, 1910, and the first six months of 1911. We heard the Prime Minister make a very important declaration last autumn that he intended to maintain the two-Power standard—that is to say, that the capital ships in this country were to equal the two strongest Powers plus 10 per cent. I ask the Committee to consider has the Government in its present programme, or in the past, come up to this valiant declaration. In three years of the programme—1906, 1907, and 1908—Great Britain laid 150,000 tons of armoured tonnage. Therefore, in those first three years they laid down 33,000 tons less than Germany, and during that time the "Montagu," of 14,000 tons, was lost, so that during the first three years they provided 47,000 less tons than provided by Germany alone. I ask the Committee and the hon. Member who represents the Admiralty, Is that keeping up the two-Power standard? We have heard from the hon. Member for Durham about those surplus stores. Will the Government say that the late Government provided £3,000,000 too much in stores, and if they do not say that, may I ask how they can justify dealing with the stores in the way in which they have? I have gone to some trouble to endeavour to come to a correct conclusion of what will be our strength not only in "Dreadnoughts," but also in pre-" Dreadnoughts" in December next year and in April, 1911.

I confess that to me the situation in December of next year will be grave, but that in April, 1911, it will be extremely dangerous, not only in numbers but also owing to the armaments of our "Dreadnought " type. I think it will not be denied by anybody in the Committee that in December of next year Great Britain will have ten "Dreadnoughts" in the water, that is including "Invincibles," Germany will have nine. The First Lord of the Admiralty admitted "Four ships of the 1908 programme can be laid by then." That is admitted.

Not "possibly" at all. The First Lord stated on 16th March, with reference to these four ships:—

"We anticipated that work on the 1908–9 programme would begin on four ships in August, 1908. The preparation and collection of materials began some months earlier. We now expect these ships to be completed, not in February. 1911, but in the autumn of 1910."

At any rate, the Government expect it is possible; therefore, it is not in the least unfair for me to say that it is a practical certainty that in December next year Great Britain will have 10 " Dreadnoughts" and Germany nine. Then I go a step further. The First Lord said, with respect to the 1909 programme, that one had been laid down, one he did not know—

He cannot know if it is not laid down.

If it is not laid down, why does he say he does not know? And, he continued, two are not laid down. The right hon. Gentleman said that materials for all these batleships had been collected since the end of October last, and I think, after the very cogent reasons given by the Leader of the Opposition why these ships should be ready by 1910, it is extremely probable that they will be ready. But admit for the sake of argument the most favourable condition for this country, that three cannot be ready, I cannot understand how it can possibly be contended by the Admiralty that he one which has been laid down will not be ready by December, 1910. The First Lord has stated that the English and the German rates of building are now practically the same, and that the ships which we propose to lay down on 1st April, 1910, will be ready in 24 months, if we give three months' notice ahead for collecting the armour plates, etc. We can build, therefore, in 27 months, and if the Germans can do the same will anyone say that it is impossible for this one ship which has been laid down, and the armour platas for which began to be collected in October last, to be ready in December, 1910? That raises Germany to 10 "Dreadnoughts."

Then, as to the two-Power standard, which I do not understand has been thrown over, the United States will have two "Dreadnoughts" of the 1907 programme ready by December, 1910; therefore, in all human probability, at that date we shall have 10 " Dreadnoughts," and the two-Power standard against us will be 12. Adding one for the 10 per cent, margin, we shall have a deficiency of three. It may be said that I am not taking into account our magnificent fleet of pre-" Dreadnought" ships. I admit that they must be taken into consideration. We have 40, and the Germans 20, of these ships, all of which will be under 17 years of age in December, 1910, and the United States have at least 15. That is to say, we have a superiority over the next two Powers in pre-" Dreadnought" ships of five, or, taking off 4 for the 10 per cent, margin, one.Therefore, on the two-Power standard, we shall have a deficiency of three "Dreadnoughts," and a superiority of one pre-" Dreadnought" ships. That is on the most favourable condition for this country. The Committee must remember that this is supposing that the three German "Dreadnoughts ''—which the Leader of the Opposition convinced me at any rate will be ready in December, 1910, are not ready. If those are ready, the deficiency will be six "Dreadnoughts" against a superiority of one pre-" Dreadnought." But while our position in December, 1910, according to the two-Power standard, is very unsatisfactory, in April, 1911, the situation will be far more alarming. According to the Prime Minister, we shall have 12 "Dreadnoughts" ready, and Germany nine. No one will seriously dispute that we must add in April, 1911, to the nine German ships all those of the 1909 programme which have been anticipated as from October of last year. That would be giving them 29 months in which to complete them, or two months longer than the 27 months to which I have referred. Therefore, adding those four ships, in April, 1911, Great Britain will have 12 and Germany 13 " Dreadnoughts," so that we shall not be up to even a one-Power standard in "Dreadnoughts." If we take the two-Power standard, we have to add the four which the United States will then have, because both their 1907 and 1908 programmes will be finished. So that against our 12 " Dreadnoughts," the United States and Germany will have 17. Adding one for the margin, we shall have a deficiency of six "Dreadnoughts," and all we should have to put against it will be the superiority of one pre-" Dreadnought" ship. To pretend in the face of these facts that we are living up to a two-Power standard is to play with this Committee. We have absolutely thrown away the two-Power standard. What becomes of the solemn pledges given by the Prime Minister last autumn 1 If the Government are going to throw over the two-Power standard, let the right hon. Gentleman do it decently and in order, and not come down here and say in answer to questions, "I am going to maintain the two-Power standard," knowing that probably in De- cember, 1910, and certainly in April, 1911 the two-Power standard will be entirely gone.

I should like also to refer to the destroyers. The two-Power standard in these boats is absolutely gone. On 1st April next we shall have, according to an answer given to-day, 105 destroyers under 12 years of age, Germany 73, and United States 35, so that we shall be in a minority of three, according to the two-Power standard. I have endeavoured to show that, as far as Germany is concerned, in December, 1910, we shall be on an equality in the matter of big ships, and that in April, 1911, we shall be in a minority of one. When we come to consider the fighting value of the ships of the two-countries the situation, which is unsatisfactory to the last degree, as far as the units of ships are concerned, becomes positively alarming. No one will be more pleased than I if my information can be shown to be. incorrect. The "Dreadnoughts" of the two countries will have practically the same speed—ours are 21-knot boats, seven of the Germans are 21 knots, and three are 19½ knots. In the matter of guns and total broadsides the difference is so alarming that I can hardly believe that my figures are correct, and I shall be glad if the right hon. Gentleman can show that they are wrong. I understand that our eight "Dreadnoughts" will carry 10 12-inch guns, and each of the 10 German "Dreadnoughts" will carry 12 11-in. or 12-in. guns. Therefore the German "Dreadnoughts" will have 120 11-in. and 12-in. guns, against our 80 12-in. guns. In weight of gunfire the comparison is still more appalling. The total broadside of our "Dreadnoughts" is 68,000lbs., whilst that of the Germans is 107,000lbs.; so that they have in their " Dreadnoughts " a superiority of 40 11-in. or 12-in. guns and 39,000lbs weight of fire, It is hardly necessary to point out that eight ships opposed to 10 ships with a superiority in broadsides of 39,000lbs. would have little chance in a fight on the high seas. In big cruisers the comparison is not so bad, but it is serious. In April, 1911, Great Britain will have four "Invincibles" against three German big cruisers called F.G. and H. Both classes of ships will have a speed of 25 knots, but we shall have only 32 12-in. guns against 36 11-in. guns in the German ships. Then the tonnage of our ships is only 17,250 against the Germans 19,500, and I noticed in the paper this morning that their next ship will probably be one of 20,000 tons. In addition to this disparity in guns, broadside, and tonnage, every German vessel has lin. thicker armour than our vessels. Therefore we come to this melancholy conclusion, that as far as the "Dreadnought" type is concerned, in 1911 we shall be one ship short, we shall be 44 12-in. guns to the bad, and our broadside will be 39,200lbs. less. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will give some consideration to these statements, which I believe to be facts, and if he can show that they are incorrect no one will be more thankful than myself.

The hon. Member who spoke last will excuse me if I do not at once reply to all the points he has raised. I think he will agree with me that everyone of those points will be more properly discussed on the Vote of censure.

I understand that these technical points will be answered, and I only hope that he will keep them in mind and that they will be answered when the Vote of censure comes to be discussed. I think they are important.

They are most important, and they will be answered. My present purpose is to answer some of the questions which were asked by the right hon. Member for Dover. He gave the debate a different, a more technical character, than what it has had hitherto. I was glad he did so, for the fact is: that the more general question has been sufficiently discussed.

I rather said that the question of "Dreadnoughts" has been reserved in my opinion, and, therefore, I purposely avoided reference to it.

I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that it is most desirable that the general discussion on the whole policy of the Board of Admiralty might be brought to a close, and that the Government should be allowed to have this first Vote as to the number of men immediately. We shall then reserve until the other occasion, when the Vote of censure is debated, the continuance of the discussion of the general policy of the Government. The right hon. Member for Dover asked two very serious questions. He desired to know whether our policy with regard to the building of small cruisers is adequate; and secondly, whether we were sufficiently supplied with destroyers, not merely in numbers, but of a type suitable for work in the North Sea. Upon both of these points I trust I shall be able to give the right hon. Gentleman a complete and satisfactory answer. With regard to small cruisers: last year we laid down six very fast ships of a type quite up to the best of anything that has been built up to the present time. And, if I may be allowed to refer to a Power to which constant reference has been made, last year Germany only laid down 2. In our present programme we provide for a further 6 small cruisers. These 12, will be completed in, roughtly speaking, a little over two years from the present time. This programme will give us a very marked superiority in this particular type of ship.

Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us whether these cruisers-which have been laid down are as heavily armed as the German vessels of the same class.

I do not think I am anxious to disclose at this moment what the proposed armaments are. I think it is sufficient if I say that we are satisfied this type of cruiser we are building is quite equal to anything which is being built elsewhere of that type. It must be remembered that behind these cruisers we have great superiority in cruisers of the older type. But I quite agree with the right hon. Gentleman that it would not be sufficient to rely on slower vessels with less sea-going qualities and not quite so well armed. But we are making provision in the current year and in the next year, and I think it will be satisfactory to the critics of the Navy that we are making provision for a full and adequate supply of this type of ship. When it comes to the question of destroyers I have to say that since the right hon. Gentleman spoke I have had most accurate examination made of the whole of the destroyer fleet of this country, in order to compare it with the destroyers of Germany. When the right hon. Gentleman spoke of Germany having 66 destroyers—

We were told that there was no accurate information as to the number of destroyers this year, and I merely mentioned that I had read of 60 destroyers going to take part in the manoeuvres of the German Fleet in the North Sea.

I take that figure-There were 60 destroyers going to take part in the manoeuvres in the North Sea with the German Fleet. Last year 112 destroyers took part in the British; manoeuvres in the same sea. Therefore, when you are speaking of the type of destroyers taking part in manœuvres, jou must compare our 112 with the German 60.

The right hon. Gentleman admits the importance of this matter, and I admit there is some consolation in that. The point is this, as I understand it: We shall only have 40 or 50 out ot our 150 of really modern torpedo-boat destroyers of the Tartar class; the other, .so I am told, are admirably suited for the Channel, but are not so well adapted for the North Sea. I want to know how many torpedo-boat destroyers constructed in recent years there are suited for the North Sea.

I was going on to give the right hon. Gentleman the precise figures in regard to the particular points lie raised. When he speaks of the number taking part in the North Sea manœuvres, I may mention that we had last year 112 taking part in the manœuvres there. Now he wants to know the precise number of destroyers we have got capable of keeping the sea fo ra long time, well-armed and fully equal to anything that can be put against us by any other nation. In the first place, we have destroyers of from 550 to 850 tons in size to the number of no less than 46. Germany has another type from 486 tons to 670 tons to the number of 30. We have in addition the Swift of 1,800 tons. These are all relatively modern and what might be termed of the first quality, up to date and capable of fighting anywhere — ocean - going destroyers.

I am giving the right hon. Gentleman the information I have. There is nothing to conceal in the matter. This is not a question upon which either side can claim or wish to claim any party .advantage. Both parties have laid down destroyers in large numbers and both parties have at particular periods dropped their programme, and in doing so both parties have been actuated by precisely the same policy in regard to destroyers.

For some two or three years past we have in both Houses of Parliament been most anxious on this subject of the relative age of the vessels possessed by us on the one hand, and by other Powers on the other.

Yes, I quite admit that. In 1904-5, the late Government, having a programme of 14 destroyers, dropped 13 of them. I quite agree that the comparison was not so serious as it is now. On the other hand the present Government last year had a programme of 16, and for the present year of 20. I am convinced that successive Boards of Admiralty have throughout the period of 10 or 15 years always had in view the total requirements of the nation in regard to destroyers, and have endeavoured to present to Parliament programmes dealing with the case as existing at the time. I have just given the figures indicating so far the state of our fleet with respect to destroyers at the same time In addition we have 41 smaller destroyers, ranging from 275 to 320 tons, and 10 from 225 to 374 tons. Behind these we have got a very considerable number of first-class torpedo boats.

Will the right hon. Gentleman state how many destroyers are of the pre-River class? Does he consider them absolutely fit for work in the North Sea? There are 13 Tribal destroyers. What we want to know is how many of the pre-River class before the 34, the 13, and the 16 now in hand were constructed before the 20 in the programme of this year. Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us on the authority of the Admiralty how many of these he considers to be really fit for first-class work in the North Sea?

I regret to say that these figures have only been handed to me in their detailed form since the right hon. Gentleman spoke, and, therefore, I must ask the indulgence of the House if I repeat them. In speaking before I was inaccurate of my summary of our destroyers. I should have compared the same types in our fleet with the corresponding types of the German fleet. That I understand is the question which the hon. Gentleman asks now.

That is not the question. I am familiar with these comparisons, and the comparison of tonnage means nothing necessarily. The real weak point I think has already been touched upon when the right hon. Gentleman was not in the House, and I would venture to point out, for it bears on what the right hon. Gentleman has said, that the reason we delayed the programme of destroyer construction in 1904–5 was because we were not satisfied with the existing type. The weakness of the type was that it was not of structural strength to face the North Sea. The point really is that the pre-River destroyers have not sufficient structural strength to face the North Sea, and are not considered by the Admiralty fit to face German destroyers, whereas the German earlier destroyers were of a stronger structural type than our destroyers.

I will answer the hon. Gentleman as well as I am able. There are 46 destroyers of the post-River class capable of any work in the North Sea. The tonnage of these destroyers is from 550 to 850. We have 46 against the corresponding German number of 30.

I accept the figures. Let them be 46, 47 or 48. The corresponding German figure is 30, the tonnage ranging from 480 to 650, while we have one "Swift" of 1,800 tons. Behind these we have 66 smaller destroyers, against 43 German. Of course these figures show that we have a larger number of British destroyers in comparison with those of Germany of a tonnage varying from 275 to 320. In fact, there is a great superiority of British destroyers of this type, 112 to 73.

I can give the hon. Gentleman only such figures as I have in my possession. When we come to the discussion of Vote 8, I will give the right hon. Gentleman the most ample details. With regard to those destroyers which are suitable to fight in the North Sea, this year Germany is to lay down 12, and we are laying down 20.

I am sorry to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman, but I cannot accept his statement as meeting my argument. As regards the egress of the North Sea, 46 to 30 do not give that superiority. What I said was that to watch two egresses into the -North Sea a marked superiority was required.

Of the kind of destroyers necessary to watch the egresses of the North Sea we have not got merely 46 but over 100. The right hon. Gentleman will find in this matter that his fears are groundless. We have got over 100—I believe the exact figure is 127—destroyers all told, which are capable of working in the North Sea. Any one of these boats could be used for the purpose to which he alludes. Germany has got 76 or 77 boats of equivalent power. It is, therefore, quite out of the question that we have fallen behind in this particular class of vessel. With regard to this particular type of vessel we have ample security. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the inadequacy of our fleet exercises. He made a comparison between ourselves and Germany, in which our exercises were supposed to last four days in the year and the German one month. The true comparison is between one month and three weeks. We gathered together last year for three weeks a fleet overwhelmingly larger than anything Germany could produce for some years. Our exercises last year gave our fleet commanders an experience such as German commanders are incapable of getting at the present time.

May I ask whether the manœuvres are manœuvres carried out only by different sections?

Yes, Sir, they are manœuvres carried out by different sections. The right hon. Gentleman seems to wish to do away with the system of nucleus crews. He asks that the whole of our sea-going fleet shall be fully manned. We have a most admirable system of nucleus crews under which our fleet is given all the exercise which is required, and at the same time we prevent the accumulation of men and a consequent expenditure which would be entirely unnecessary. What we have to remember in war is that great losses will take place, not so much in the personnel, but in the material, and our numbers are now fully adequate for any emergency. We find that the nucleus crew ships have done extremely well in the course of last year so far as adequate training is concerned; and the Home Fleet, which consisted in a large part of the nucleus crews, stood at the top of the list. The great object of training men is to teach them to hit the target, and the nucleus crews showed themselves just as capable of meeting that first urgent need of any ship as the Channel Fleet or any other fleet. Experience has shown that we can get admirable results from our nucleus crew system, and I hope the Committee will not be misled by any irrational alarms into the additional expense upon our Navy estimates which would run into millions. I think these are all the points raised by the right hon. Gentleman, and I hope I have been able to give him, at any rate, quieting answer to relieve his alarm until we get to the ship-building Vote in the summer.

I am glad of the opportunity of giving a few reasons for the vote that I shall be called upon to record when this question goes to a Division. I came down to this House last Tuesday with some feeling of misgiving as to the adequacy of the provision which the Government were going to make in view of the acceleration of the German shipbuilding programme. These misgivings were not allayed in any degree, but they were increased not by what fell from the Opposition benches, so much as by what fell from the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Prime Minister. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Islington made what seemed to me to be a very unfair and unjust attack upon the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty. He accused him of having produced a skilfully manufactured panic. In the first place I do not think there is a panic at all either in this House or in the country, but I think there is anxiety in the future. That is the position which I take up myself. I have no doubt whatever that at the present moment we are in a perfectly secureable safe position. We are able to meet any attack that might be made against us, but it is in regard to the future, the year 1912 especially, that we have some grave cause for anxiety.

The right hon. Gentleman the First Lord himself has given us some reason why we should have that anxiety. He said the difficulty the Government finds itself at the present moment is that "we do not know, as we thought we did, the rate at which German construction is taking place. We know the Germans .have a law that when all their ships are built will give them a Navy more powerful than any at present in existence." I think we are still practically unanimous upon one point, and that is the position in which this country will be in in 1911. The figures have been practically agreed to by both sides of the House. The position is that we shall have 16 battleships and Germany will have 13 [An HON. MEMBER: "Dreadnoughts."] We have to reckon on such other German ships as may be begun in the course of the next financial year. The right hon. Gentleman went on to say that the German law provided for four more German ships to be laid down in the year 1910-11. Now, if the construction of these ships were to be accelerated—he said four ships of the 1910 programme would be built by April, 1912, and then the Germans) would have 13 "Dreadnoughts." Even if no acceleration took place before April, 1910, that number would be built in the autumn of 1912. The point I want to put to the Committee is this: The First Lord of the Admiralty told us you cannot build battleships in two years unless you give orders for guns and mountings and armaments some months in advance. Unless you give the orders for these component parts, at any rate by the end of that year, you cannot lay down until next year and complete in 1912. Suppose the Germans in the meantime gave orders for four more new battleships—and we must recognise the fact she can do this without letting us know—then she would be in a position to commence the construction of these ships in April, 1910. On the showing of the First Lord of the Admiralty she could do that, and build these four ships before we could. That seems to me to be an intolerable position in which to put this country, and I for one shall not feel satisfied unless we can be assured by the Government that orders for the four contingent "Dreadnoughts" will be given this year. I think anybody will agree with me that the provisions that are made with regard to the four provisional "Dreadnoughts" mentioned in the Memorandum of the First Lord are made in the form they are in order to conciliate a certain section of the followers of the Government below the Gangway. I do not know that they have conciliated either section. Those who are in favour of a reduction of armaments, though they have been silenced for the moment, I do not think have been satisfied, and I am perfectly certain that those who think as I do, and there are a number on" this side of the House, have not been satisfied. I wish the Government would take their courage in both their hands an announce frankly at once that they intend to lay down these additional battleships, which they know in the course of a few months they will have to do.

I want to pass from that point for one moment and deal with another. We have had announced to us within the last few weeks the composition of the new Channel Fleet and also what is to become of the Atlantic Fleet. We are to have 16 battleships in the Channel Fleet, and attached to that we are to have six battleships in the Atlantic Fleet, but the Atlantic Fleet is to be placed under a separate Commander-in-Chief. This, I think, would be a great mistake. Why should not the Atlantic Fleet be intimately joined with the Channel Fleet and be placed with that fleet, not only in peace time but in time of war, so that they would be under the same Commander-in-Chief? It is these constant and varied changes which we have in the composition, dedication, and distribution of our fleet, that, I think, perplex the ordinary mind, and lead us to wonder whether the great problems of war- ever have concentrated and scientific attention on the part of the Admiralty. The duties of the First Sea Lord are fixed in a Paper which gives the distribution of the business. The First Sea Lord is responsible for the preparation for war and for large questions of naval policy. He is responsible for the sea-going efficiency of the fleet, for its organisation and mobilisation, and for the distribution and movement of all ships in commission. Then he has also under his control the Intelligence and the Hydro-graphical and Naval Ordnance Departments. If he has all these multifarious duties to perform, it is perfectly impossible that he can give the requisite time and attention to working out these great questions in naval warfare. And, as I understand, I am not sure that I am absolutely correct on this point; but, as I understand, it is not often within the province of the Intelligence Department of the Admiralty that any action of this kind is taken. We have no General Staff, as I maintain that we ought to have, in order to work out these great problems of naval warfare. As far as I understand, they are only worked out at the college at Portsmouth, and what becomes of them afterwards I am unable to understand. I feel disappointed that there is no suggestion in the statement by the First Lord of the Admiralty as to any intention to inquire into the organisation and administration of the Admiralty. I believe that everybody outside the Admiralty thinks that that is a very necessary thing to be done, and I commend to my right hon. Friend the First Lord the suggestion that he should appoint a strong committee to inquire into the organisation and the administration of the Admiralty. I do that because I think it would be a splendid thing for the great service of which he is the head. Nothing, to my mind, can be so detrimental to that great service, and more foreign to its past history, than the recriminations, the bickerings, and the unrest which at present exist within its walls.

There are two or three points which have arisen during this debate which, I think, are calculated to mislead the country, and which I should like to have put right. On Thursday last the hon. Member for the Black-friars Division of Glasgow made what I think was a most extraordinary statement. He said that the "Dreadnoughts" were paid for not by hon. Members above the gangway, but by the working men. Surely he must have known that that was the opposite of the fact. What would be the effect of laying down these eight "Dreadnoughts"? It would be an enormous increase of work for the working man. If last November, instead of talking about afforestation and coast erosion, two "Dreadnoughts" had been laid down and work at Rosyth and elsewhere carried out, the effect would have been to provide a large amount of work for the working men at their own trade. I should like to contrast what Germany does in this respect with what we do ourselves. The explanation which Germany has given for hurrying the building of her ships was that there was great scarcity of employment at that time, and therefore to keep the workmen going in the shipyards they put two ships in hand very much sooner than they otherwise would have done. I think that is a very important point that the Government should keep in mind, and that they should keep our shipbuilding going, so that we should not lose our workmen, and they would encourage the private shipyards to build and keep up their plant, so as to be able to turn out ships quickly when we required them.

A list of ships has been given other than "Dreadnoughts." I think it is very interesting, but that does not meet the point. There is no comparison between the requirements of Germany and ourselves with regard to battleships and cruisers other than the "Dreadnoughts." The fact of the matter is this, that the greater part of our food supply comes over sea, whereas the greater part of Germany's food supply comes overland. Therefore it is absolutely necessary for us to keep a number of our cruisers in different parts of the world to enable that food supply to come here, whereas Germany is not under that necessity, and can do with a very much smaller number. We cannot withdraw these cruisers from where they are and bring them to defend our coasts here. It is no use defending the coasts of England if our food supply is stopped at the other end of the world, and we must have a larger supply of cruisers in order to enable that food supply to reach us than foreign nations. Take another point for the working man. Supposing our food supply was not even cut off, but merely threatened for a single day. What would be the effect? The price of foodstuffs would go up enormously to famine rates, and who would that fall upon first, the rich man, who is able to afford to pay more, or the poor man? The latter would be reduced to the greatest straits and to starvation. Therefore, it is of the very utmost importance to the working man of this country that our Navy should be maintained at full strength, and I think the working man would be the first to acknowledge that fact. I think better of the working men than some of their so-called friends. I do not believe for a moment the working men of this country would shirk their duty, but they would be as ready as anyone to bear their share of the cost of keeping the Navy up to the strength which is absolutely necessary to our national existence.

There was another rather extraordinary statement made by the hon. Member for Rochdale. He said he did not believe in experts. He had already explained that he was not an expert; in fact, that he was inexpert, and I think he said he knew nothing whatever about the subject on which he was talking, and the House was entirely ready to agree with him. He may not believe in experts, but the country does. If it was a question of sending a "Dreadnought" to sea under the charge of an expert like Lord Charles Beresford or an in-expert like the hon. Member for Rochdale the country would very soon show whether they believed in the expert or in the hon. Member, who did not know the subject he was talking about. If I was going to put him in command of a ship I would put him in command of a steam pinnace. He would do less harm. It is a very curious thing that when an inexpert like the hon. Member for Rochdale speaks he is cheered to the echo, but when an expert like the hon. Member for King's Lynn speaks he is received with chill disapproval on his own side, and receives a stern rebuke from the First Lord of the Admiralty for having had the audacity to state facts which were, I suppose, inconvenient for the First Lord to have pointed out. The hon. Member for King's Lynn said we had been three or four years in the building of two ships. The First Lord said that was the case, but there were special circumstances why they were delayed in the building. But it was a fact that they were delayed, and these delays might occur with any other ship. I could not, therefore, quite see why the hon. Member for King's Lynn called down on him that very severe rebuke unless it was. that the remarks were inconvenient to the Admiralty.

If you take exceptional cases and endeavour to prove the rule from the exceptions you ought in fairness to-state the circumstances which particularly attach to the exception. The hon. Member was arguing that the rule was that, there were these delays in building. There have been exceptional cases which' were fully familiar to him, and I think still that the exceptions ought to be stated fully.

I quite agree; but at the same time I think what the hon. Member for King's Lynn wished to point out was that delays might occur at any time in the building of our ships, and that is what he was warning the House of, that we cannot count on building a ship in two years and three or six months. One point which is making the country very uneasy at present is that it is stated that we cannot as a rule turn out a ship under two years and three or six months. But, on the other hand, what really happened in the case of the "Dreadnought" was, I believe, that she was turned out in 10 months, and the country wants to know why she should be turned out in 10 months. Simply because the whole of the material for building the ship, the whole of the gun-mountings, and the whole of the equipment was ready beforehand. What the country is not satisfied about is this—has Germany got the materials and equipment for seven or eight "Dreadnoughts" ready now, or is she preparing it as fast as ever she can 1 If so, what is to stop her turning ing out "Dreadnoughts" in less than 12 months. We all know that Messrs. Krupp have enormously increased their power of output, and they have a £2,000,000 loan to enable them to enlarge their works, so that they can turn out ships in a very short time. We have not, I believe, got material accumulated for building a very large number of "Dreadnoughts," and what the country is uneasy about is that we have not the material ready and Germany has, and that she will be able to build ships very much more quickly than we can do in the next few years. The official laying of the keel is no measure of the rate at which the ship can be turned out. It is a question of the accumulation of material. Until we are satisfied that Germany is not accumulating that mass of material the fears of the country will not be readily allayed.

The First Lord said he was very glad he had not turned out more "Dreadnoughts," because the ships we shall now build will be more efficient in consequence of the knowledge that we have gained. I quite allow that, but you cannot carry it too far. You might say, you must mount a cavalry regiment on nothing but foals or yearlings. You can buy them much more cheaply, and in four years they would certainly be in a better condition. But, in the meanwhile, the regiment must have horses to ride. It is no good having very young horses now if they will not be fit to use in four years time. We must have our supply of ships now, next year, and the year after, and not put off building them until the time that we supposed we are likely to want them.

We have been accused over and over again of advocating an aggressive policy. We are told if we build ships it incites other nations to build too, and if you prepare for war you bring on war. But that is not the case. You have only to look at history. Take India for instance, where I was last year. When we put up factories there we were very weak, and the factories were constantly attacked. We were always having little wars for years and years until we finally established our power after the Indian Mutiny, and because we have had a strong army there ever since there has been no attack, except on the frontiers, and the whole of India has enjoyed the blessings of peace. I believe if we had maintained a strong Navy and the rest of the world had known we were determined, whatever happened, to keep up our two-Power standard, it would have saved both this country and other nations many millions of pounds in the competition which is now taking place.

I have been rather astonished at the levity with which this subject has been treated. It is a most grave subject. Whether we are keeping up the strength of the Navy or not is the question. It is one which affects us all from the highest to the lowest. Whatever levity hon. Members may meet with in the House, the country is very serious about it, and they intend that the Navy shall be kept up at full strength at all costs.

Private Members are not anxious to take up the the House when they consider the amount of oratory, and very necessary, that we have had two front benches. I believe that there is no man in this House who hates the idea of a great nation in a panic more than I, but it must be realised by any impartial man who considers the whole question from the beginning that if there is any panic it is entirely due, and rightly due, to the speeches made by my right hon. Friend on the Front Bench and the Prime Minister on Tuesday. If we carry our minds back to the autumn he can remember the declaration by the Prime Minister, which all of us who value our Navy appreciated—the declaration of the two-Power standard plus 10 per cent. We remember with what relief the great majority of the people heard that statement. We will also remember, if we consider that during the months before that, as the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean said, experts had been dissatisfied on naval questions for some considerable time, but the efforts they made to instruct the country did not cause any panic whatever. It was not until those speeches were made on Tuesday afternoon that anything like what might be called a panic arose. I personally am grateful to the Government for these speeches, because I do think that they have stated plainly the position that this country is in; but it is difficult for any man to read those speeches and reconcile them with some of the statements made in the course of this debate.

There was a great deal of criticism by my learned Friend, whom no one admires more than I do, the Member for Beading, on the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton. It really comes to this: Are we in this House to hear speeches like that of the Prime Minister, which so astounded this House that a thing occurred the like of which never occurred before—no one rose to his feet when the right hon. Gentleman had stopped speaking—are we to hear such speeches and let them pass from our minds like water? Today there has been an attempt to draw our minds away from the crisis that has arisen. There has been talk about the danger that we may be in at the present moment. I have heard no one suggest that we are in any danger at the present moment. What I have heard is that this country has suddenly realised that a great Power has grown up which is capable, as far as I can understand this debate, of building ship for ship with us in the future. If that is so, and if it is really as someone has said a question of money, then I say that a really grave crisis arises in the very near future. All I wish to do is to impress on the Government with all the power at my command, and with all the seriousness of which I am capable, that they will put some sum, however small, upon the Estimates towards the building of the four so-called phantom "Dreadnoughts." If this fear, this panic as has been said to-day, is being engineered for party purposes by hon. Members opposite, Members who sit below me will not suggest that the ubiquitous power of the hon. Members opposite extends to New Zealand and our other great dependencies oversea. We have had practically an offer already from these dependencies, after reading the Prime Minister's speech, to provide us with these great capital ships. I have listened to the speeches during the entire course of this debate, and I have heard the very able speech of the Member for one of the Glasgow Divisions who sits opposite, and I was struck by the lofty tone of that speech. He told us that the party to which he belonged were endeavouring so to educate the democracy of Europe, and for all I know, of America, so that this mad shipbuilding competition might stop. I say more power to his elbow. I hope that he will educate the democracy of Europe in order to stop them from entering into the shipbuilding competition with ourselves; but I say that there has not been the slightest sign that the efforts in which the hon. Member and his friends are engaged have produced any improvement. They may have brought forth fruit, but it is not fruit that is visible to the naked eye.

The result of our attempt to slacken the pace of the race for armaments has been that Germany has accelerated her pace. She has taken the effort that this Government has made to reduce the shipbuilding programme as a sign of weakness, and has responded to that by accelerating her own programme. Now, a word as to the pre-"Dreadnought" ships. I am not an expert, but we have had some very remarkable statements about "Dreadnought" ships in this debate. If we exaggerate in any way the value of the "Dreadnoughts" it is because it was so repeatedly borne in upon us that the "Dreadnought" was so immeasurably superior to anything else afloat; and, as my right hon. Friend said in his speech, the new "Dreadnought" shortly to be launched will be 30 per cent. better than the original "Dreadnoughts," I say that, taking that figure, it does not lead to our putting any great fighting value upon the pre-"Dreadnought" ship. We were also told by one of the speakers on the Front Bench that under its present naval law Germany will have a greater fleet than any fleet at present in existence, so that our margin of safety will depend entirely upon the ships we build now and in the near future, and our fleet of to-day will be wiped entirely out of existence in the very near future. I noticed in a newspaper to-day a very remarkable article on navigable airships. The Committee, I hope, will not be frightened at this excursion into the air, but I merely wish to point out that a gentleman who writes as an expert says that it is very possible that in times of war these dirigible airships, of which a great number are being built in Germany, may easily account for one or two battleships, and I think that all these inventions nowadays make it more necessary for us to have an unchallenged supremacy as far as lies in our power in capital ships. Another point very often forgotten is that we are not responsible for setting the pace in this ship-building. The First Lord of the Admiralty declared that this was so on Tuesday. I am perfectly certain that if the Government stiffen their necks to-day, they will regret it before many months are over. I am perfectly convinced of this: that, do what they will, public opinion will force them to lay down those four great ships which have been described as phantoms. I hope that the Government will meet this great crisis in a way worthy of our national tradition.

I almost rise with bated breath to say a word upon this great question. I always was more or less of opinion that in this House we approach the question of our first line of defence on nonparty lines, and from a national or Imperial position. On the Labour benches we are sometimes accused of approaching all questions too much from a parochial point of view. I do not think that argument can be sustained from our actions in the past. To-night, however, I am not speaking for any party, but I am simply speaking for myself. I am, and I always have been, a strong advocate of an efficient Navy, and by that I mean not superiority in mere numbers or gun power, but superiority in the men behind the guns by which in the old days we were not afraid of tackling an enemy twice or even thrice our strength. I believe that same old spirit is still alive in the people of this Empire, and would show itself should the nneces-sity arise.

My opinion is that in the North Sea it will be found that the ships tiring at a short range would be equally effective in a great battle. I am not an alarmist in these matters, but I should like to say that I agree with almost every sentence uttered by the hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean, who possesses unrivalled information upon these matters. I think the right hon. Baronet's speech shows that there is no necessity whatever for this panic throughout the country. There is absolutely no necessity for some of the statements which have been made in regard to which I am inclined to use a very much stronger phrase, although I am not sure it would be Parliamentary. In the old days they would have been brought to the Bar of the House for making such statements, and announcing that our Navy was weak, when, as a matter of fact, just the opposite is the cage. I believe that the old vessels built before the "Dreadnought" will give a good deal of trouble to our opponents before they are silenced. I happen to know something about what I as speaking, although I do not claim to be an expert. I feel bound to say that in the case of any nation such as the one which has been mentioned in this debate, which has an unrivalled and unique land force or striking power for defence or offence, we are obliged to ask what is the necessity for that Power to have a striking force equal to our own on the sea. Has the nation which has been mentioned a vast sea board like us to protect? We know it has not. Has it a huge commerce to protect? Whilst glorying in the advance Germany has made in the industrial world, we still say that it has nothing like the commerce to protect or the shipping that this country has. I wish I could take the same view as the hon. Member for Tyneside in the reasons he has given why Germany desires to have such a striking power on the sea as well as on the land. When you look for the necessity for this one is obliged to confess that it does not exist. The supremacy of the sea is vital to our existence. I agree with those who say that we do not require bloated armaments, but we do require a sufficient margin of strength to make our commerce and our coaling stations secure. I am afraid if Tariff Reform was in operation there would be a danger of war very close to our own door. If our Colonies will only take their share of the responsibility and help us to provide the sea power for the Empire this debate will not have been in. vain. It is well known that in recent years the conditions and centres of naval operations have changed, and we require a naval base much nearer to the North, because all our main constructive works for the Government are in the South. You are now engaged tardily building up a base in the North, and you are still more tardily negotiating for a base for submarines and smaller vessels. To save greater expense in the future you should take the opportunity now to secure these bases, and then you would be in a position to have a base for your fleet within a short distance of the North Sea, where the fears of the future lie. A great deal of discussion has been caused of late by the statement that the Germans were having a number of new slips prepared. We on these benches must know a little about this, and we have some experience of the matter. Let me say that I am amazed at the frenzy that these statements have put certain people in throughout the country. We could have 40 or 50 building slips if necessary. I notice the First Lord shakes his head.

It would take a few months, of course, to prepare some of these building berths where we could build "Dreadnoughts" or "Fearnoughts," or anything else. My point is this, that it has been proved that we have sufficient slips whenever the Government desires them, or the necessities of the nation requires them to be used, and, therefore, from that view there need be no alarm throughout the country. Let me also repeat what I have said, that those we represent on these benches pay more than their share for all that is required in the defence of our country, and when it is required. It is not even money value, but our life's blood, and the life-blood of our brothers. In proportion to means we pay more than any other class in the country. Therefore I want simply in closing to say that I have not the slightest doubt that when this discussion closes, the Vote of Censure is disposed of, and the real facts telegraphed throughout Europe, that it will make the position of this country stronger, better, and more powerful among the nations of the world for peace, and for the benefit of the people of the world as well as for our own citizens.

It seems to me that the attacks that are being made upon the Government on this side of the House have been all of a somewhat pusillanimous character, because if they mean really that the hon. Members distrust the Government it must take this form: They must say, "You, the Government, say that your programme involves the means of laying down four additional "Dreadnoughts" should the occasion require, but we do not believe you will do it." If the two hon. Members who alluded to this had said that I could understand their position. You must either say that we do not trust you or acquiesce in the view, believing, as I firmly believe, that the Government will watch the occasion, and they will have these "Dreadnoughts" if the occasion requires. I wish to say also there are a great many whom we know that look with great disfavour upon the increase of naval power. There are many who go as far as to say that if we could take the bold policy of setting an example of disarmament that the Germans might be willing under present circumstances to follow. I openly say that I am not sure that this last body are not taking a pretty correct view of the prevalent German opinion—not represented by the Press or by the militarists, but a view which is very prevalent. I say this, that the danger of adopting practically that view is, although I believe the chances are against it, yet the consequences of the peaceable disposition of Germany, the consequences of miscalculating the chances, would be so great for this country that I cannot blame the Government for taking up a policy of being prepared for any emergency. While I stand by them in that part, I think it is also right to stand by them in the other policy, and to say that we trust them to be the judges as to whether the occasion arises that we require this considerable addition to our naval forces.

Anyone who has listened to the debate this afternoon will admit that it has been singularly free from any kind of party feeling. I shall try, in the very few words I have to say, to avoid both party recrimination or any appearance of panic. What the country wants is this: First to know the facts, and secondly to face the facts. To my mind the central fact which we have learned this week is this—that for the first time, at all events, in a hundred years there is a direct and conscious challenge to the naval supremacy of this country. And the challenge is by a Power which happens to be the greatest military Power in Europe. I am not going to say one word of blame to that Power. It would be foolish to do so. Every Power has a right to cherish its own, and to shape its own future. But see what the real facts are. I believe that the present naval policy of Germany was really designed some few years ago. That design was to frame a Navy equal to or greater than ours. Preparations were made, the nation waited its opportunity; the opportunity came when our rate of shipbuilding began to slacken. In 1906 we built only three "Dreadnoughts." In 1907 we built only three. In 1908 only two. Then Germany saw her chance, and made the dash which we saw in 1908, and which has brought up that Power to the level that she occupies now. I am afraid it is true that the acceleration of building by Germany in 1908 was their answer to the talk about peace, however well meant, which was heard in this country something like a year ago, and which was encouraged by the Government when they introduced their programime. What is the position as the result of that state of things? And when I say position, I do not mean the position this year. That is not what is being put forward. I do not | even mean the position of next year, but the position of 1911. Taking that position, I think we are justified in dealing with "Dreadnoughts" alone. We have the very highest authority for this—that of the First Lord of the Admiralty. What he said was that there would come a day when by an almost automatic process ships of the earlier type would be sent to the scrap-heap, and the maintenance of our superiority would depend on "Dreadnoughts" alone. What, then, is the position? It has never been more clearly stated than by my hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford the other night, when he said that Germany has in ships built and building 13 "Dreadnoughts," that Great Britain has in ships built and building 12 "Dreadnoughts," and that Germany can build as fast as Great Britain. Taking this proposition—you cannot get away from it—Germany will get ahead of us in "Dreadnoughts." If that be so, and I believe it is true, and if, bit by bit, "Dreadnoughts" will become the ruling factor in naval supremacy, then, apart from any question of panic, the position is really a serious if not perilous one. Is it wise to treat that as a matter to be pooh-poohed or made little of, when there is a prospect of a position of things almost too grave to contemplate? I believe everybody agrees that the peril is real. What is the remedy for it? Take the proposal for the reduction of armaments. The answer from the Germans in regard to that proposal was a courteous refusal. It is perfectly clear that no assurance that Germany can give us. as to her present intention would be any real security for this country. They would be at liberty to change their intentions next month, and away your security would go; and if cur programme were framed with reference to intentions of that kind, we should in a very short time be in the same peril again. Hon. Members say that we should hold out the hand of friendship to Germany. Of course, we all desire to do that. But what would be the result? The hand would be very cordially grasped by Germany with one of her hands, and she would go on building ships with the other. Germany has laid down her plans, which will not be altered by anything we can do. So sure as we are here, so surely will the present programme of that country be resolutely and steadily carried out. Hon. Members below the Gangway say that we should give up the right to search, but I feel sure that Germany, while accepting that concession, will still go on building. We have only one thing to do, and that is as my hon. Friend has said, to set our teeth and build what is necessary for the permanent security of the country. There is no provocation in that. The provocation for war is not self-defence, but weakness, and I feel perfectly certain that the stronger we are the less is the danger of war. This country, we know, has no kind of aggressive desire. We covet no man's land and no country's possessions. I think that is perfectly true of the vast majority in this country. I think that when any quarrel occurs between the two countries the question of peace or war will be decided by a consideration of the relative strength of one party or the other. If we are the stronger there will be peace, and if we are the weaker there will be war. This competition in building involves enormous financial sacrifices to this country. We know it, and there are none but must feel it. But how very much greater will be the financial sacrifices involved in the risk of war. You cannot compare this kind of competition in building, extremely costly thought it is, with the enormous cost which would arise in actual war. If the choice lies between building ships and risking war, no man in this House would hesitate as to his choice. If funds are needed I think we know that the country and this House will not refuse their assent to any loan which the Government may think necessary for the purpose of making this country secure. What is the actual? They are to build four "Dreadnoughts" this year— two in July and two in November, and are to take power to build four more, which are to be proceeded with if the acceleration of the German programme goes on. I want the House to consider really what is the value of that position. In the first place, how can you make sure whether or not the acceleration is going on in Germany, or is not going on? How can you make sure that material is not being purchased for ships which are not actually laid down. According to the Government's statement it is perfectly certain that four extra German ships must be built by August, 1912. If there is acceleration, they say the four ships, making 17 for Germany, will be ready in April, 1912, and if there is not acceleration the four would not be completed until August, 1912. It is only a question of a few months, and if the four "Dreadnoughts" are to be completed in April or in August, why is it not right for us to lay down the four extra "Dreadnoughts in any case? Why can we not do what we think is right to make us secure, whether Germany accelerates or not? I do not; like this making the building of additional ships depend on what some other Power is building. I do not like this peeping from time to time round the corner to ascertain whether another Power is building or not. We ought to frame our programme by our needs. I would far rather say, "Whatever happens, that is our programme; we intend to build eight ships, whether Germany builds or not." I admire Germany's attitude: "We think so many ships necessary for the security of our country; we mean to build them, whether other people build or not. That is our estimate of what is required for our own security, and whatever you do makes no difference to us. "That is a wiser and more dignified line to take, and I would far rather see the Government take that line and say eight "Dreadnoughts" are necessary. I feel perfectly certain that in that course they would be supported by the country. We have seen the generous offer which is coming from one of our Colonies, an offer of help if need be, not of course to be taken as part of our programme, but additional help, which would be useful to us. Let this Government have the courage to say, "We will meet that spirit with a like spirit. "The resources of this country are very great. The peril to this country if our naval security were affected is almost incalculable. There is no sacrifice the people as a whole would not make in order to meet it. Let the Government say, "Well, we always meant to build those ships if the need arose; we think now, from what we have learned lately, the need has arisen, and we will build, not four, but eight ships. "Then, I think, they will gain such an accession of power in the country as will surprise even the Members of the Government themselves. I cannot but hope that the matter may be further seriously considered, and it was with a view to pressing the opinion on them that I rose.

The hon. and learned Member who has just sat down expressed his appreciation of the seriousness of increased expenditure, but he concluded his speech by telling us that the resources of the country were very great, and that no sacrifice would be too great for the Government to place upon the nation, and that they would bear it cheerfully. I cannot quite reconcile that statement with what we heard only a few nights ago about the vast amount of money which is fleeing out of the country already through lack of confidence in the Government.

Now the hon. Gentleman suggests that there has been a great investment of British capital abroad because we have not enough of a fleet.

You are quoting me entirely wrong. I did not say anything of the sort.

Really, the right hon. Gentlemen must think I have a good deal of leisure if he thinks I was quoting him. I do not really see why he should interrupt me with an irrelevant interruption. I tell the hon. And learned Members, when he talks about the great resources of this country, and so minimizes the expenditure, that it is quite a different tone from that which will be adopted when the Budget is presented. And I do hope when the Chancellor of the Exchequer introduces his Budget that, whatever else he does, he will take great care that the burden, especially of "Dreadnoughts," rests upon that class largely represented by hon. Members opposite, and that income taxpayers, of large incomes especially, will be taxed as heavily as it is possible to impose taxation on them, and that it will be borne lightly, because they are more anxious than others that it should be incurred. You will see the extent of all this patriotism, and how the bubbles will have subsided so utterly when the Government will be attacked for placing burdens on property once again after the Budget.

I listened with a great deal of pleasure to my hon. Friend the Member for Dundee. I mean pleasure in this sense, that he still retains the old views about the Navy. I can assure you that his views are very old because the views he entertains are the views of Nelson. Nelson is the most unfashionable man in naval debates of any one that could be mentioned. If that great Admiral, who I believe never had a majority of ships, if he had had at any time an excess of ships I do not think he would have gone into action. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]I do not think he would. It would not have been up to the Nelsonian tradition at all. The fact remains that he never had an excess of superiority in numbers. It is equally true if he could come back to this House the man he would not like to sit against would be the hon. Member for King's Lynn, because he seems to be always unsafe. Unless he has an extraordinary excess of superiority over the enemy. I think the hon. Member for Dundee represents the true naval tradition far better than the hon. Member for King's Lynn.

I want to say this, that there is no crisis. There is any amount of panic: yes, any amount of panic, and any amount of panic-mongers, any amount of scare-mongers, but there is no crisis. There is a certain paper in this Metropolis that has been getting the opinions of leading citizens upon what they call "the crisis. "They have got the opinion of the Mayor of Devonport. Now, the Mayor of Devonport is greatly impressed with the situation, and he can find no possible way out of it but eight "Dreadnoughts," to be built at Devonport. Then the Mayor of Newcastle is equally impressed with the situation, and he is really nervous about the security of the British Empire. He can only find a solution of it in eight "Dreadnoughts, ' to be built on the Tyne. So this sort of thing goes on.

If you take the ordinary man, the ordinary plain man of the world, who reads his debates and who takes notice of things as they go on, I venture to say that you will find that he is not in any panic condition at all, and that he does not believe that there is a crisis in the affairs of this country at this time. The other night the hon. Member for the Blackfriars Division, in a moderate and impressive speech, was very much misunderstood by some hon. Members opposite when he said that he represented more than the English nation in this House. I do not wish to interpret the hon. Member's speech at all, but in this interpretation I would say that those of us who believe that there is no need to increase the naval Estimate that we are Nationalists, and not cosmopolitans. Speaking for myself, I may say my first duty in this House, as elsewhere, is to my country. Yes, but my duty does not end with my country, and I do not conceive of patriotism that it cannot take regard of others within the circle. It is all very well for hon. Members to talk glibly about "Dreadnoughts" and this enormous increase in expenditure; but, believe me, there will come a day, and that day is not so distant as some hon. Members think, when there will be a great revolt on the part, first, of the organised workers of Europe and of the world, who will tell statesmen plainly that "Dreadnoughts" are not the last word of statesmanship. Some of us deplore very much the great advance of anarchy-throughout the world. There are symptoms which are more disquieting. I hate anarchy; I abhor it. But what is anarchy? It is a resting upon force instead of upon reason. And what an awful example the nations of the world have given these men! They will try anything but reason in the settlement of disputes', they will do anything rather than come to close quarters with what appears to be ready to any man's hand. Therefore, I would say to this Government, as one of the Governments of the world, that they are setting a terrible example in constantly keeping up this race of armaments. I know there are great difficulties, but it is not the flabby sentiment that some hon. Members think, but solid reason, and, I think, high statesmanship, to recognise that the Foreign Office ought to play as potent a part, if not a more potent part,, in these affairs than the War Office or the Admiralty.

Throughout these debates, on both sides of the House, we have been discussing this question of armaments, and we have been discussing it from the standpoint of German hostility. I fully admit, and greatly appreciate, the ordered utterances of the representatives of the Government, and of the Leader of the Opposition, with respect to Germany. As far as I know, there has been no disrespectful or provocative language used by those right hon. Gentlemen; I regret very much that their example has not been followed by at least the right hon. Member for Dulwich. I have no hesitation in describing his speech as a mischievous speech, and it was especially mischievous in that part where he was led, as he said, by an interruption, into referring to Germany as a country against which we might be at war. He is the only member who has connected war with Germany. It is this way that wars are created. It is from such unstatesmanlike language as that that bad feeling is generated, and by it half the mischief in the world is caused. I want my country to be safe and secure. I believe that it is secure. From the bottom of my heart I conscientiously believe that if the right hon. Gentleman had kept the Estimates at the level of last year we should have been safe, not only this year, but also in 1912. With that level of expenditure "Dreadnoughts" were not precluded. I suppose the naval experts are right for the moment, but they exist only for one purpose, and that is to bring forward a design which for the moment occupies the field. That expert then passes away, to be succeeded by another expert, equally dogmatic, and, as time shows,, equally wrong. Within that level of expenditure the right hon. Gentleman could build "Dreadnoughts"; but, until to-day, perhaps not sufficient emphasis has been laid on the fact that our effective fleet does not consist only of "Dreadnoughts." I listened very carefully to the First Lord's speech, and while it is true that in appeal ing to hon. Members below the Gangway, he referred to "that mighty fleet," he laid no emphasis upon it, and the debate would almost have led one to the conclusion that the two countries had only "Dreadnoughts," that Germany was getting perilously near our level, and that, therefore, we were likely to lose the supremacy of the sea. What is the fact? You do not need to be a naval expert; you have only to read naval literature and to hear the opinions of naval men to find that the "Dreadnought," while given the supreme place for the moment, is not given the exclusive place in the scheme of fighting, and that, while the "Dreadnought" has functions which may make it all-powerful, those same functions prohibit or prevent it from taking certain other action which is very necessary in war. Therefore, I am not going to be misled into taking "Dreadnoughts" as the only assessment of strength of the British Navy. The comparison with Germany must be a comparison not of "Dreadnoughts" alone, but of all the effective ships in the two navies. When you take that comparison, not only now, but in 1912, I do not think any man in this House will say that we have not an enormous preponderance. Therefore, holding these views, I believe there are resources of statesmanship which have not been exhausted, or yet entered upon, with a real belief that they could accomplish something. My charge against the diplomatist is that he has not had so much faith in diplomacy as the soldier has in war. When once the diplomatist believes that he has mighty powers something more substantial will be achieved. I am not going to discuss the question of the abolition of the right of capture of private property at sea in time of war, but in my judgment that will afford a way out honourable and safe to both countries alike.

May I appeal to the Committee to come to a decision upon this Vote now? We can go on with the general discussion on Vote 1, and it would be a great convenience if we could begin to get some of the Votes.

My hon. Friend and I gave way in response to the First Lord's appeal.

Several hon. Members gave way, because they thought the hon. Member for Sleaford wished to raise a point of order. He was not called by the Chair.

I did not call the hon. Member; I understood the Committee were practically unanimous in their willingness to give this Vote provided the general discussion could go on. Of course, hon. Members can go on with the general discussion on the next Vote.

I should be very glad to give way, but I have no guarantee that I should get on on the next Vote; therefore I should like to take this opportunity—

On a point of order, I desire to ask whether or not you have called upon the hon. Gentleman who is now speaking?

On the point of order, I want to ask whether the hon. Member for Gravesend was not on his legs before the hon. Member for Sleaford?

The hon. Member for Gravesend gave way, and then the hon. Member for Sleaford rose. Therefore he is entitled to proceed.

I shall not be longer on this Vote than on the next. It seems to me that the Government are deserving of our sympathy. They are in the position of a sperm whale in the ocean, which is attacked by two fish—one was a sword-fish which came up from below, and the other was the hammerfish, which jumped out of the water and came down from above and gave a blow on the head. The Government are between the economists on the one rand and the alarmists on the other, and they are trying to steer a course between the two. I listened to the First Lord of the Admiralty with great interest. With one sentence in his speech I entirely agree. He asked what there is to fear. The condition of this country was not always one of funk. If .You read history, you will find that in the early part of the last century we had no thoughts of having a Navy superior to that of other people. Indeed, in 1858 the French Navy was superior to our own. Even in 1888, according to Admiral Colomb, the French had a preponderance in ships of the line. Admiral Colomb said that the British strength was less than that of France, and up to within 20 years we had no idea of supremacy at all. We were content to be weaker than France as regards our naval position. The French position is one of greater danger to us than that of Germany, and I cannot understand this sudden fear of a more distant Power. We are not afraid of France, and we need not be nervous about Germany, which is so much further off. It has been asked, Why does Germany build the fleet she is establishing, except to injure us? The reason which is put forward by the Government and by hon. Gentlemen opposite why we should have a great fleet is that we are dependent on our over-sea trade for the enormous imports which we require for our happiness and welfare. They say that that trade must be defended by the fleet. Surely anybody who has studied the statistics of Germany knows that that country has an enormous over-sea trade. I think it is £250,000,000 a year of imports. Surely Germany is entitled to a powerful fleet to protect her trade. We know that there is a great country beside Germany which claims to have revenge. I think that feeling is dying down in France, and that they do not mean to go in for revenge. I think it is reasonable that Germany should provide a fleet as against France and Russia in case of need. It is absurd that we should claim the right to protect our own trade, and deny the same right to Germany in respect of her fleet. Why do we build "Dreadnoughts" except for the purpose of protecting our trade? If we do so, why is it wrong for Germany to build "Dreadnoughts"? It seems to me an arrogant position to take up that while we may have a preponderating fleet Germany may not build a fleet to enable her to assert herself in case of any difference of opinion. Our expenditure on the Navy in 1905–6 was £41,000,000, in France the Navy expenditure was £13,000,000, in Russia only £12,000,000, in Germany only £11,000,000, in the United States £24,000,000, and in Italy £5,000,000. Germany has been stimulated by the enormous expenditure of previous Administrations. They ask what England is preparing mighty armaments for unless it is to have a preponderating power and supremacy on the seas. What would be thought of a boy at school if he went about saying, "I will dominate the playground." They would very soon put him down. If any man in a club went about saying "I am master of this club," they would put him out. If a nation goes about saying it must have a preponderance, other nations will say it does not know how to behave. Germany, with its enormous population, its great engineering power and wealth, is not going to allow this country to dominate, but to suppose that Germany is going to attack us is in the highest degree absurd. I have travelled a great deal in Germany, and I know that the German people have the highest possible respect for us. They wish to treat us well, and when we talk of having a striking force of 160,000 men, they naturally think we must have some-purpose for this preponderating fleet. Let me congratulate the First Lord of the Admiralty on his exceedingly clever tactics. He was in this position. There was a mutiny in the Ministerial camp, and the economists said there must be a reduction in the Navy Vote. When he began the debate on Tuesday he aimed his 12-inch guns on the Members of this side of the House below the Gangway who wished for a reduction. He said:—

"The difficulty in which the Govern merit finds itself placed at this moment is that we do not know, as we thought we did, the rate at which German construction is taking place. We know that the Germans hare a law which, when all the ships under it are completed, will give them a navy more powerful than any at present in existence."

That was the sentence which frightened people. Their law would give them a navy more powerful than any at present in existence. Anyone listening to that would think that Germany was going to have a more powerful navy than any other nation. That was the construction placed upon it.

rose in his place and claimed to move: "That the question be now put."

Question, "That the Question be now put," put and agreed to.

Question put accordingly; agreed to.

Coastguard and Royal Marines

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum, not exceeding £7,280,200 be granted to His Majesty, to defray the expenses of wages, etc., to officers, seamen and boys, Coastguard, and Royal Marines, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1910."

I wish to say that when I interrupted the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty, I did not do so from any desire of obstruction, but only to gain information. We have listened to a series of interesting speeches from both sides of the House, and the sum of the speeches, with one or two exceptions, is that the Government, if there is any agitation in the country, which may be construed into a panic, is itself responsible for that agitation and for that panic. I really do not think that there is a panic. I do think there is agitation, and very intense agitation. I cannot conceive of there being anything else but anxiety when I recall the speeches made by the Prime Minister, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the Secretary of the Admiralty. Hon. Members below and above the Gangway on both sides of the House have heard that if there is any possibility of the four extra "Dreadnoughts" being needed this country is in a position, strong and wealthy as it is, to see that the provision is made. It is not a partisan position. I have been in this House for nine years, and I have never heard a party debate on the Navy during all that time, and we have not even now had a really partisan debate. That hon. Members have spoken with strong feeling, and with strong conviction from both sides of the House, it is perfectly true, but they have not spoken with any idea of merely making party capital out of it. The intention has not been to make party capital by Members on either side, and the Government must be aware if they have raised a storm of anxiety and agitation that they must quiet it down, and that it can only be quieted down by answering the questions which are propounded to them. The hon. Member for Burnley, speaking a little while ago, said that we were responsible—that this country is responsible—for this race of armaments. What was the position of England 20 years ago in regard to the Navy? She had a predominating and overwhelming position. That position has been challenged. There has been a steady attempt to challenge it on the part of other nations who have aspirations of their own, and trade of their own, who look forward to the power to carry out, in their relations with foreign countries in the East or elsewhere, their large imperial intentions. With that we have no quarrel, and when the hon. Member for Burnley spoke about the spirit of Nelson and the men behind the guns, as though the individual heroism of the Britisher was the thing of most account in the Navy, I could not but recall an incident familiar to most men which occurred 20 years ago. My right hon. Friend the Member for the Forest of Dean will recollect every circumstance in connection with the matter. I was outside the harbour of Samoa in a little German steamer when there occurred that hurricane which destroyed three American ships—"Teuton," "Vandalia," and "Nipsic," and also three German ships—"Ebor," "Adler," and another. Out of that hurricane, there came but one ship—the British ship "Calliope." What was the secret of her escape? [An HON. MEMBER: "Coal."] That is accurate. The secret of her escape in that crisis was her engines and coal. But the lesson that I want to draw from that is this: Here you had three German ships and three American ships, each one of which was manned, I presume, by men personally as brave as any individual Britisher on board the "Calliope," but we had the predominence of metal, of machinery, of navigating power, and it was because of that predominance, not because of any particular heroic ability on the part of Britishers—because the Americans and Germans showed equal heroism on that occasion—it was because of that superiority in the way of metal and engine-power that we owed our escape from that crisis. It seems to me that that lesson is an important one. If you apply it not only to that indvidual instance, but if you apply it to the larger question of our position in the presence of the United States, of Germany, and of all the Powers in the world, and when we ask what will be the secret of England's predominance in any struggle it will not be alone the personal heroism of the individual seaman, not the ability of the navigating officer, nor of the commander-in-chief, it will be as well, and more important than all, the predominating power of her armaments. It is that to which the efforts of the Admiralty have to be directed.

Our position has been steadily—I will not say over-reached, nor will I say steadily attacked, but Germany and the United States and other countries have, according to their own ambitions, enlarged their own naval strength, until at the present time we have against us—I am speaking now geographically—over in the North Sea a strong power which is equal to sending into that sea a powerful and combined fleet of eighteen battleships, with its congerie of cruisers, torpedo destroyers, and all the apparatus which go to make up a fighting fleet. They will manœuvre together for a whole month in the North Sea, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Dover has asked some very pertinent questions concerning our exact position in relation to that exhibition of power in the North Sea. He asked, for instance, whether we are able to put in the North Sea, in our Home Fleet comprising the future Channel and Atlantic fleets, a fleet in all its elements and parts and as powerfully balanced and complete. On Thursday last I asked a question about destroyers, and the Secretary to the Admiralty, in reply to my interjection, said he could not reply off hand to my question, but in reply to my hon. Friend below me, he asked if the two-power standard was to be applied to "Dreadnoughts," to destroyers, and to cruisers. That is exactly the point. Whether the objections of my right hon. Friend the Member for Dover are correct or not, whether anything that I may say has any weight with the Admiralty or not is of very little consequence in one sense, but the Secretary to Admiralty and the First Lord know well that outside this House there is a continuous agitation going on, backed up, I will not say by expert opinion, but backed up with the opinion which is very widely distributed throughout the Press that in the matter of destroyers we are not so strong as we ought to be. We are not, it is said, so strong as we ought to be in the matter of swift cruisers. We are not so strong as we ought to be m the matter of the manœuvring of a combined fleet in the North Sea. We have not given the fleet that practice that it ought to have. We have denied coal for the fleet when the fleet ought to have coal. I do not make the charge, but I am one of a great number of people who have been more or less affected by these constantly repeated statements made in the public Press. They are questions which the hon. Gentleman and the First Lord of the Admiralty have not yet fully answered. Does the hon. Gentleman really maintain that the answer given by the First Lord of the Admiralty this afternoon is absolutely satisfactory concerning the torpedo-destroyers? Why is it, in view of this constant criticism that has gone on in the Press, and which has been repeated in this House during the last four days, that the First Lord and Secretary to the Admiralty have not given that fuller information which would set at rest these anxieties and remove the force of these criticisms if they are unsound or unfair.

I do not believe there is a single newspaper in the country nor a single critic who desires out of mere malice to criticise the Admiralty or anybody within the walls of the Admiralty, but what we heard this afternoon regarding the torpedo-destroyers did not satisfy me. I have asked questions again and again regarding these destroyers. This afternoon the First Lord said we had at least 46 destroyers capable of North Sea work equal to the 30 destroyers of the German Navy, and that we have 20 building, or 66, and Germany has 12 building, which makes 42. The First Lord went further, and said we had 127 destroyers fit for work in the North Sea. I wonder if that statement will bear the analysis of the experts—of those people who are supposed to know what our Navy is doing? Many of these critics are men who have served in the Navy—admirals, captains, commanders, and others of wide experience, which so few of us possess. I put this point to the Secretary to the Admiralty to urge him to make it clear. I ask him if these 127 destroyers, which he says are capable of work in the North Sea, are capable of battle work. If a fleet is not a battle fleet it is not a fleet in our sense of the term at all. If we cannot construe the two-Power standard in terms of fleets and not of ships alone, then the two-Power standard will prove a delusion and a snare in the end. The two-power standard must be applied, I take it, not only to the number of "Dreadnoughts," not only to the number of "Invincibles" and armoured cruisers, but must also apply to the fighting capacity of the fleet—the fleet in the North Sea in particular, because that is the fleet with which we are concerned at the present time, and with which we have been concerned for the last two or three years. I ask the Secretary to the Admiralty: has he any further information to give concerning those 127 destroyers? Does he think they are capable, in all weathers, in storm and stress, of doing what may be called battle work in the North Sea? If he is sure of that, and will give the House that assurance, then I am satisfied that a great deal of the discussion that has gone on in the Press regarding this particular thing will subside.

There is another point which wants elucidation, and I put it to the Secretary to the Admiralty in no hostile spirit. It has been stated again and again in the Press, and in this House by my hon. Friend the Member for Dover, that anxiety regarding the personnel of our fleet has been shown since we began scrapping our ships under the Cawdor programme. I believe that the personnel is now something like 2,000 less than it was when the Cawdor programme was projected. It may be that the 128,000 men now in the Navy are all that are needed. But are we sure? Do we not need an assurance, something more than a casual reference made in debates in this House, that the 128,000 are sufficient in all respects for our needs? We are increasing our Navy—so we are told—in spite of the ships that have been scrapped. We have added great capital ships to the Navy, and we are adding every year, and we are now going to add, I hope, eight new capital ships to the Navy. That ought to represent an extra 7,000 or 8,000 men. There is nothing in the Estimates to show that there will be any increase in the number of the personnel of the Navy to meet the demand of these new capital ships. What is the explanation of that? In his statement the First Lord of the Admiralty said that as "Dreadnoughts" were added, there would be dismissed from the fleet the great capital ships like the "Invincible" and the great armoured cruisers which we now consider to be our safeguard and our bulwark against attack. It may be that the Secretary to the Admiralty will say that as we add the "Dreadnoughts" we will dismiss these great capital ships or other ships, and so free men for the use of the new great capital ships—the "Dreadnoughts." It may be that the calculations of the Admiralty are absolutely correct. It would not lie with me to challenge them. I hope that I have been speaking with something like care in this matter. I am one of many who are anxious about this particular thing, and should like to have my mind satisfied on a matter as to which a vast amount of doubt exists in the minds of hundreds of thousands of persons in this country. I ask the Secretary to the Admiralty in his reply to give us some clear statement concerning the personnel of the Navy. We have lowered the marines and the coastguard service, and we have cast into the nucleus ships a large number of men who were employed in ships in full commission, and yet we are told that the personnel of the Navy is at the present time admirable. The right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean, whose authority upon naval matters cannot well be disputed, has spoken in terms of great confidence as to our present position. I can only say, as the hon. Member for Brighton has said, that what the right hon. Baronet has stated has more weight with me than anything else that has been said during the four days of this debate. I can only say that I know where the Navy is concerned the right hon. Baronet has always stood for a strong Navy and the impregnability of our position by an overwhelming weight of armament and efficiency in the training of the men of our fleet. If the hon. Member who is going to reply will satisfy me upon the three points I will mention I think he will do a service to the Committee and to the country. The three points I allude to are, in the first place, the adequacy of the personnel; secondly, the adequacy of our light cruisers; and, thirdly, as to the adequacy of the torpedo destroyers, concerning which, I presume,, there is more anxiety than in any other branch of the activities of our fleet.

Finally, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether, in regard to the-manœuvres of the fleet, there will be any kind of assurance that a sufficient time will be given to accomplish more than was accomplished last year? Is the report true, for instance, that Lord Charles Beresford, who commanded the Channel Fleet, was provided with insufficient cruisers to hunt out the enemy, and that the enemy likewise was provided with insufficient cruisers to hunt him out, and that they were unable to carry out their proper devolutions and manœuvres and battle activities because of insufficient light cruisers for spying each other out? If that is so, it is an extremely serious thing. These are statements which are being made broadcast through the country, and they ought to be answered by the Admiralty. I think they are points upon which the Committee ought to have the fullest satisfaction. If the hon. Member will give the Committee the assurance that the next combined manœuvres of the fleet will represent a fuller form of efficiency than the last manœuvres represented in the minds of a great many experts by having under one control the Channel fleet or the Home fleet; if the Admiralty will have an efficient scheme of manœuvres by which the efficiency of the fleet will be more complete, they will have given to a great many rumours and unrest a quietus which they ought to have. I have ventured in this debate with all diffidence, but with an anxiety that has been shared by many, and I trust the hon. Gentleman will give an adequate reply to my questions.

I am sure that for some days we have listened to an interesting debate on shipbuilding, particularly with regard to "Dreadnoughts." At the same time one cannot help feeling that as a result of this debate that we can place the utmost confidence in the Government; that they will do what is right and proper to protect and defend our shores. I would only ask the Government, when later they consider the matter, if they have any doubt in their own minds about building these four ships, to build. We are really on the question of men. We have had a great deal of talk on the two-Power standard. Whether we have a two-Power standard or not in ships, I think no one will contradict me when I say that we have undoubtedly got a two-Power standard in men. Officers and men are right, proper, efficient, and perfect, and no nation could possess better, and we need have no trouble or anxiety on the score of the personnel of our Navy. But I have risen to make a few remarks with reference to the men and officers, their life and their duties. I would like, first of all, to refer to the engineer officers. These have a, very grave and deep responsibility in the engine-rooms and stoke-holes of our ships. The proportion of the staffs of the engine-rooms and stoke-holes represents between a fourth and a third of the personnel of the Navy. The officers are efficient and deserving of the very highest praise. Is the power and position that these officers have sufficient for the purpose of efficiently carrying out their duties? Engineer officers commenced in a comparatively humble way. They are educated and efficient, and they have arrived at great control over the machinery of the war vessels.

But my suggestion is this: That these officers are not sufficiently entrusted with the power of control over their men which officers in the Navy ought to have. They have practically no command over their men at all. They are not allowed to exercise any power as to punishment, they have no real control, and if anything is done in the engine-room department by any of the men they do not come under the control of the engineer officer, but have to be taken on deck to be subject to the discipline exercised by another officer not connected with the department. That is a very great grievance amongst engineer officers; naturally they want power and control over their men in order that they shall have the necessary discipline among them, just as exists in other departments of work. In Japan and in America and in Germany executive power is given to the engineer officer. Nothing is more important on a ship than the exercise of proper discipline, and you cannot have discipline in the engine-room unless you give the engineer officers a proper control of the men under them. The men soon know who has executive authority, and if their engineer officers were given this executive control there would soon be proper discipline. I would point out further that if the engineer officers were given executive control the men would soon come to have that confidence in them which is given to officers invested with executive authority in other departments of the vessel. It is highly desirable also to bring about this result in the event of war, because in the engine-room and stoke-hole the men should possess all that sense of discipline which is required in other parts of the ship. If you are chasing the enemy, or if you are avoiding the enemy, you must put the engine-room and stoke-hole in a position of the greatest readiness; it should be under instant command and control, and therefore it is absolutely necessary that the engineer officers should have executive control in order to ensure among their men that discipline and that readiness for action, that means of getting a ready response to their commands, which are so necessary for efficient control. Last year Mr. Edmund Robertson (now Lord Lochee of Gowrie), who was then Secretary to the Admiralty, said:—

If you want success in regard to the future engineers of our Navy, you must pub the present engineers on a better and more satisfactory basis. At present I understand there is nothing like a proper and due proportion of the officers who are to constitute the future officers of the Navy, because they do not learn, and are unable to appreciate the duties which the present engineer officers are carrying on. I trust my hon. Friend will be able to give a more satisfactory answer on this subject than has been given in the past. I come to a little more domestic matter in connection with the Navy, and to deal with the question of meat. I do not know if my hon. Friend is aware of the great commotion which exists at present owing to the rise in the price of meat which is announced from 1st April. The price of meat served out to the Navy has been fourpence per pound, and it is proposed to raise that price to sixpence per pound. I think you will appreciate the great commotion that creates amongst the men in the Navy. I hope my hon. Friend will be able to afford some consolation to the men either that the men will get more money in wages, or that the question of the meat will be raised in some way. The first-class petty officers get what is called a victualling allowance of 9½d., and the greater portion of that is, of course, represented by meat. They get what is called standard rations also, and as that is largely meat you can easily see that the increase in price means that our Jack Tar has a grievance, and I do not think any of us would wish him to have a grievance. There are several other matters, but I feel some other opportunity may be given to raise them, and that the First Lord of the Admiralty may arrange for an interview which would perhaps be a more practical way of presenting our views before him.

I am going to confine myself strictly to the Vote under consideration. I am not going to refer to the supremacy of the British Navy now, but what I am concerned about in this Vote is the condition of seamen, the condition of firemen and many other trades connected with His Majesty's Navy. In the Memorandum of the First Lord reference is made to the fact that this Vote has been increased in consequence of an advance of 2s. a day to commanders of ships. I have not the slightest objection to the advance; I am one of those who respect the position held by these officers; but at the same time I want the First Lord to recognise that there are other people on board His Majesty's vessels who need consideration at the hands of the right hon. Gentleman. The men engaged in the Navy have nothing like the position of the men in the merchant service. For instance, the ordinary seaman gets the handsome sum of 1s. 3d. per day and his food, whereas the ordinary seaman on a merchant ship gets £3 or more a month. When a man has graduated in the Navy from ordinary to able seaman he gets 1s. 8d. per day, if engaged on continuous service, or 1s. 6d. otherwise. When he becomes "leading" seaman, he gets 1s. 10d. per day. You may have any number of ships, even to a three-Power standard, but if you have discontent among the men, it will be a very great disadvantage. I wish to refer also to the stokers. If there is any class of men deserving of consideration at the hands of the Admiralty it is those who go down into the bowels of the ships, and fire in an atmosphere that some of us would not care to breathe. A second-class stoker receives 1s. 8d.; a first-class stoker, 2s. 1d.; and when after a considerable number of years he becomes a "leading" stoker, he gets 2s. 4d. per day.

Will the hon. Gentleman say what arrangements are made with regard to pensions in the Navy and in the merchant service?

I admit that there are emoluments such as pensions in the Navy, but the difference in pay would more than counter-balance them. I wish to move a reduction of the Vote, in order to call the attention of the Admiralty to the position of these men. You can get men, but not men satisfied with the conditions. This is the only opportunity when these men can get the ear of the House of Commons in order to ventilate their grievances. Dockyard men can present their petitions, and are allowed to put their position before the Admiralty through their accredited representatives, but these men have no such power at all, except through the commander of the ship, and I am afraid that most of the appeals through that channel are placed in the waste-paper basket when they get to the Board.

I want to draw attention to another class of men. I desire to put before the committee the condition of the ship-wrights in His Majesty's Navy. You have on board of each battleship a full complement, numbering 21 or 22 men. The shipwrights at first receive a pay of 4s. per day. I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether shipwrights in the dockyards receive 4s. or 5s. 6d. per day. It takes a considerable time before that class of men can better their condition. Four shillings per day is what the shipwright receives on board ship, then when he graduates as a leading shipwright he receives 4s. 3d., when he becomes a carpenter's mate he rceives is. 6d., when he becomes chief carpenter's mate he receives 4s. 9d., and he receives 5s. 6d. when he is considered a chief petty officer with commissioned rank. In your dockyards these are the people who graduate from apprenticeship, until, when a vessel is launched, they take command of the shipwright work in every respect. There is not a warrant officer who receives less than the carpenter warrant officer. I do not wish to refer to other warrant officers, because I would rather give them a lift up. The artificer receives 5s. 6d. on joining, but it takes the carpenter all his time on board to reach that pay. He has to pass a theoretical and practical examination before he can take the position. Whilst they have appealed from time to time to the predecessors of the right hon. Gentlemen at the Admiralty, they have not received up to the present time any redress whatever. The First Lord of the Admiralty has referred to the fact that Commanders in the Navy have received no advance in salary or allowances since 1864. The same thing precisely can be said of the grade I refer to, and I do appeal to the right hon. Gentlemen to consider the case of these men. I could place some startling cases before the Committee showing how vessels have been saved by the skill of these men in fixing cofferdams in the ships, and so enabled them to be brought safely to shore. But for that work the vessels would have gone to the bottom, and many of the lives of those on board would have been lost. Unfortunately, when this Vote comes before the Commitee, we do not get sufficient time to state the grievances of the men. The whole of the warrant officers complain of the time it takes to arrive at the position they occupy. A man cannot attain the rank of chief warrant officer until he is 51 or 52 years of age. He only occupies that position because, according to the rules of the service, he has to retire at 55. I hope that the hon. Member will be able to consider the position of these men. I have gone over, in the short time at my disposal, the grievances of these men, and I ask that consideration should be given to those grievances. I formally move the reduction of the Vote by £100 in order to hear what my hon. Friend has to say.

Question put: "That a sum not exceeding £7,280,100 be granted for the said service."

I wish to ask whether, if the additional four "Dreadnoughts" are built or laid down, the Board of Admiralty are prepared to supply additional men, and whether they have regard to the additional men that will be required for the destroyers?

Arrangements are now being made to obviate the difficulty of the very short time in which crews remain in nucleus-crew ships at the present time. The arrangement for a nucleus-crew ship is generally that when the crew is placed on a ship it remains there until it becomes thoroughly acquainted with the working of the ship. But when a new ship is commissioned she is invariably manned by the crew of a nucleus-crew ship. That involves a double change; and the consequence is that men never stay long enough to have a thorough acquaintance with the ship. I do not make these remarks in any spirit of hostility. When the ships come out in commission it is desirable to have a nucleus crew. I know that the subject has been under the consideration of the Admiralty, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will be able to tell the Committee that it has been possible to get over that difficulty.

A great many points have arisen since the First Lord replied. I will endeavour to deal with them. I wish to refer, with regard to fleet exercises, to last year's Manœuvres. The nucleus-crew vessels were completed in full numbers on the 30th of June last, and they left on the same day. I was at Devonport myself at the mobilisation on the 30th of June of the Devonport Division. They assembled at the Sound at one o'clock, 30th June. During the period between the 1st July and the 16th July—a period of considerably more than four days—the vessels under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Home fleet carried out various tactical exercises and cruised Northward on the East Coast of England and Scotland. By the 14th July they were at their stations for strategical exercises, with .vessels under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet, which had been ordered to commence on the 16th. These exercises lasted from the 16th to 21st, and that is where the hon. Gentleman got his four days; but he must take the whole of the exercises. The mobilisation was on the 30th June, and now I have come down to the 21st of July. Our total number of vessels, excluding two repair ships, was 268 of all kinds and 45 ships that were carrying out exercises outside the manœuvre areas. Some of these, I think, came some distance up the Thames. We mobilised within a few hours in a most remarkable way 29 battleships, on a warlike basis and footing, 23 armoured cruisers, 28 un-armoured cruisers, and a great many other ships of various sorts, including 130 destroyers manœuvring in the North Sea upon this particular occasion. "We assembled 268 in all, and in my humble judgment, as a mere layman watching things with very great interest since I have been at the Admiralty, I look upon that as one of the most remarkable pieces of organisation ever put to the credit of any Admiralty in this or any other country.

I cannot speak for all, but I should think that the battleships had. I hope it will be understood that, if I do not give the full information, it is because I am not actually sure. Any information I give I will make sure it is accurate so far as I can.

I merely want to clear up a point. What the hon. Gentleman is now saying refers to the particular point I raised. Is he prepared to say that the 132 destroyers employed in the manœuvres were employed in the North Sea?

I said 130 destroyers, and they were in the North Sea manœuvring on that occasion. I was coming naturally to the question of destroyers. I said on Thursday that in July of this year we shall have 91 destroyers, and eight scouts additional of 12 years of age and under. I was wrong, earlier in the day, in thinking that the scouts were in the 91. Then, also, we shall have 36 torpedo-boats quite as good as the old 27-knot destroyers. Then I was pressed for a closer analysis—what their range was, their ocean-going powers, and so on? The First Lord of the Admiralty, under some difficulty to-day, made a statement of an analysis of these torpedo-boats, and I am afraid I cannot profitably, at this juncture, add to the statement which he has made except by saying this—that, in addition to the 91 destroyers, eight scouts, and 36 torpedo-boats for what they are worth, we shall have in July of this year, as I think I said on Thursday, have 41 destroyers between 12 and 14 years of age (the others are 12 years and under), 14 between 14 and 15 years of age, and four between 15 and 16. I hope I may be allowed to leave the destroyer question for the present.

With regard to personnel the suggestion is made that we have seriously reduced it in recent years. That is scarcely the fact. In 1905–6 the number voted was 129,000; in 1906–7 it was 129,000; in 1907–8 it was 128,000; in 1908–9 it was 128,000, and in 1909–10 it is 128,000, so that there has not been very serious reduction during the period I am dealing with. Then we have on the Estimates 56,000 Reserves. It is put to me that if we are going to have four bigger ships, and if we are going to have ships generally of bigger power and displacement, how are we going to manage with the same personnel. I confess, on the face of it, it seems to present a difficulty. But I tried to explain on Thursday, and I will explain again, that it is the great advantage of the "Dreadnought" class of ship and the uniformity of her armament, her ammunition, and her gear enables the personnel unit to have a higher value in that ship than in previous ships. As a matter of fact, I think I said on Thursday last that the "Dreadnought" would have a complement of something like one hundred men less than the "King Edward" type. That is the fact roughly, although the ship herself is a very much greater fighting unit, and it is because she is a better machine than the "King Edward." If these four extra "Dreadnoughts" especially are laid down, the contingency for which is provided for on the face of the Estimate, we may have to consider whether fresh men would be required in that case. I don't think they would. I can only say I was very glad to hear the hon. Member for Dundee speaking of the efficiency of the Navy, as depending to a very material extent on the man behind the gun. I quite agree, also, with what the hon. Member for Gravesend said, and can assure him that, as far as I have been able to see the officers and men, and I have watched them very closely in the last twelve months, they are as good as they have ever been.

Of course the hon. Member was not questioning the efficiency of the men. I ought not to have put it in that way, but I say that the least we can do for the man behind the gun that my hon. Friend refers to is to put in front of him the very last word in scientific development. If you do not do so you take an unfair advantage of his gallantry. You can call upon him to fight at long odds as he has done in the past, and I have no doubt he will do it again. But personally I do not want him to fight against long odds. If there are going to be any odds, I hope the odds will be on his side.

The hon. Member for North Cambridgeshire wanted some money put into these Estimates in respect of these four contingent ships. [Cheers.] I rather gather from the cheers that he is not the only one. As a matter of fact, there is no need to do that. You can incur liabilities in respect of the 1910–11 Estimates, if it is necessary, and if the contingencies should arise, which may be liquidated in that year. In fact, you always do at the end of one year incur liabilities to be liquidated in the next. As a matter of fact, I am sorry to say in one way or another—the ordering of stores of various kinds, which will ultimately be necessary, and for going on with ship construction, which will be paid off in the next year's Estimates—I have at the present time incurred a liability, I think, of between 9,000,000 and 10,000,000 worth, not a single farthing of which is voted in the 1908–9 estimates, and which will be paid in the next Estimates. They come in course of payment at that time. That is inevitable. In issuing prospective orders for coal, victuals, and so on, and in carrying on, as you are bound to do, the steady continuity of administrative policy, it will always be true that on 3lst March in any particular year there are orders which have been placed and to which you are committed, but the liquidation of which will come in the next year.

Yes; that is probably true; but I assume in any year the Admiralty could at any time vary its policy and obtain sanction subsequently for that. Take the case of the "Swift-sure" and the "Triumph." They were not in the programme of that year. They were bought subsequently, although I admit my illustration from the financial point is not very good because a Supplementary Estimate was necessary. The point I am trying to make is this: You can in respect of any prospective order which would arise make provision for collecting materials, and so on, and carry on the administrative work of the Departments, although you have not got a Vote for a single farthing of the money which will ultimately have to be paid in the succeeding year. In regard to a great many matters in carrying on the continuity of Admiralty policy, I stand committed now to a large expenditure in the year 1909–10, not a penny of which is voted, but which will be voted when we pass this and other votes. There is no need, in my opinion, to put money into the Estimates, as my hon. Friend seemed to think. What has happened is this: We have taken power, on the face of the Estimates, to make preparations for the rapid construction of four further ships to be laid down in April, 1910, and to be completed in March, 1912. These are contingent upon the acceleration of the German programme. If the necessity arises down these keels will go on 1st April, 1910, and we shall arrive at our determination in the matter in due course, and. having in view the necessities of the case. Certainly we shall not be turned aside from that determination whatever it may be by pressure from one side or the other.

I am speaking for myself because my name is on the face of the estimates. But, certainly, I speak here too on behalf of the Government. I really do not think my hon. Friend need have such anxiety about it. These new monsters are able to work with a smaller personnel than these earlier ships.

It is rather a considerable percentage, a hundred on seven hundred. I am quite sure we shall be found ready and capable of meeting that contingency if and when it arises.

The hon. Member for Portsmouth raised the question of the Engineer Officers, and certainly there is no word that he could say about the value of the engineer officers that I would not affirm. But there have been a number of concessions recently granted to engineer officers. Last year two good service pensions of the value of £200 a year were established for engineer vice-admirals and rear admirals, and two of £150 a year for engineer captains who have held and are holding that rank on the active list, and we decided that the pension for widows and the compassionate allowances for children of engineer vice-admirals, rear-admirals and captains should be on the same scale as the military branch. In addition to that, the increment of engineer captains was raised from Is. a day to 2s. 6d., and there have been improvements in the pay of engineer commanders.

I did not say a word about the pay of the engineer officers. What I referred to exclusively was their status. About this nothing has been done.

I thought my hon. Friend referred to the prospects as well as the pay. He went on to claim greater disciplinary power for the engineering officers within their own department. If he looks into the matter he will find that the engineering officer is vested with the necessary authority over his own subordinates, officers and men. As to the question of courts-martial, that is portion of the disciplinary regulations that would require an Act of Parliament to alter it. I come now to the question of victualling the Navy. It is not by any means a simple one, and it is a very old one. Indeed, in olden times the great problem often was the problem of the victualling. We have given up the policy of "Savings," and have introduced many improvements. We have endeavoured to improve the canteen system very much. We have brought the working to a much greater extent under the Admiralty. We have provided for a form of contract which secures that prices shall be specifically stated in the contract, and that the Admiralty shall have the right to take samples and test and analyse, and see that the men get a good quality of food, and a fair quantity for the price that they pay. We do desire to do everything in our power to feed the sailor properly. In addition to the matters that I have referred to, we are steadily introducing, with the concurrence of the men themselves, what is generally known as the General Messing system, which is the system in use in the American, Italian, and German navies. We desire to meet the men in this matter and are doing the very best we can for them. My right hon. Friend the First Lord will be only too glad to meet my hon. Friend in interviews, or any other Member of this House, at any time whenever any matter affecting the well-being of the sailors or of the Navy is in question. The hon. Member for South-East Durham put a point to which I may refer. He stated that the First Lord of the Admiralty apparently objected to any criticism in this House of the Sea Lords. I do not think that that is quite so. I personally never have proposed, and I do not propose, to bring the Sea Lords into any discussion in this matter at all. I neither shelter myself behind them nor criticise them in this House nor in the country in any action which I may take. I, with the other Parliamentary representatives of the Admiralty, are here responsible to the Government and this House and to the country for what we have set forth in the Estimates to which our names are appended. What happened was this: My right hon. Friend was referring to a criticism of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for King's; Lynn, and said:—

"I beg my hon. Friend in future to be absolutely candid in criticising the Board of Admiralty and state to the Committee all his information, and not criticise, as I think unfairly, old brother officers of his. It is not fair to criticise them without stating all the facts in his possession."

As this point has been referred to several times may I say that from the first to the last in my speech there was not one comment on any naval officer, but I criticised all through the Government and the Admiralty.

I only referred to the point in order to remove the impression that we objected to criticism. The hon. Member for South-East Durham asked me about stores, and I think when I have dealt with that point I have covered most of the ground. We have in the gross estimates for victualling stores £2,985,631, as against £2,862,071, or an increase of £130,400. In naval stores this year the amount is £2,521,000, whereas last year it was £2,208,700, or an increase of £332,000. The reasons are given in the First Lord's Memorandum both in regard to victualling and naval stores. It is true that stores have been drawn upon which were purchased in previous years without replacing. The Member for South-East Durham said if you can draw from stores year after year without repayment why did you buy so many at a time. We have not as a matter of fact drawn upon the £5,000,000 worth from 1904–5 onwards. We have drawn to the extent of £768,850 in 1905–6, £1,024,200 in 1906–7, £1,241,800 in 1907–8, £500,150 in 1908–9, and £156,000 in 1909–10. That is a total of £3,691,000. I am not now speaking of a policy for which we are responsible. It was a policy initiated by the late Administration. But it was not a question of the late Administration buying more stores than they wanted, and being able to use them year after year without replacing them. In several important particulars at that time 1904–5, they substantially altered their policy. In the first place they fixed their reserves of stores at a lower rate than previously, and quite rightly, particularly in regard to victualling stores, in order to obviate deterioration. In the second place they dismantled many ships in which there were stores, and in the third place they closed a number of foreign stations which had a large amount of stores. The reduction of the foreign stations gave us a very large accumulation of stores which we have been using since that time. Now, we have gone pretty well into them, consequently we are putting money into the Estimates to spend. I have shown an increased estimate of £130,000 for victualling stores and £332,000 for Naval stores so as to meet the situation. I can say quite sincerely that we, at the present time, certainly intend to maintain the sufficiency of the reserve stores. The hon. Member for South-East Durham asked "What, sort of a valuation have you? Is it a genuine valuation?" I have gone into this very fully. I have been in the home yards, some of them more than once, and have spent a good deal of time over the matter. Certainly the valuation is quite genuine. Stores are valued generally at their present or Rate Book values; in some there is depreciation for deterioration. These goods are valued at a lower rate. The machinery for valuation is very effective indeed. Indeed, if I were a private merchant, I should frankly have to ask myself whether that machinery was not really more than it need be. But in regard to Government stores I quite admit that you have to have great thoroughness in your checking, testing, and valuation. I may add that in the Store Votes in the Appropriation Act, we give the values of the stores in reserve.

The hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Admiralty occupied his speech in dealing with several points that have been raised in the debate. Let me bring the debate back to its general topic. The hon. Mem- ber said that we on this side of the House had very little complaint as to the party tone of the speeches on the other side. That is quite true. With few insignificant exceptions we have nothing whatever to complain of hon. Members' tone. But even if hon. Members opposite had attempted to raise the party tone, or even my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister had made a very much more vigorous party speech than he did to-day, still I think this question would be raised above the level of party questions—at all events for hon. Members sitting upon the back benches upon this side. After all, the Estimates which are now before the Committee are the Estimates of the Government and of the Prime Minister. He has quite a right to defend them. It is within his right to make as strong a party speech as he likes in that defence. But a very heavy responsibility, I feel, rests upon every single Member of this House, particuarly upon the Members of the back benches on this side. Every single private Member has got to weigh in his own mind whether these Estimates are adequate or not.

I venture to think that they are adequate. If I did not think so no party ties, no considerations of party loyalty would, in this matter at all events, prevent me from registering my opinion, by my vote, that they were inadequate. But I do not think these Estimates will be adequate unless these four battleships—these four additional "Dreadnoughts"—are laid down. I am perfectly prepared to leave this matter in the hands of the Government, as to the chances of the unexpected happening, for I have every confidence that they will meet events. If I thought for a moment that they were going to take advantage of the possibility of this House not sitting, of Parliament not being in Session, to shirk the responsibility of building these ships, then I would not hesitate to vote against them at the present moment. I have one or two questions to ask my right hon. Friend. Will he tell us whether these four ships which he thinks likely he may have to lay down are not merely in anticipation or acceleration of the 1910–11 programme, or whether they are something in the nature of an intermediate programme between the year we are now discussing and the next year? I am not going to make any apology for pressing my right hon. Friend in this matter, because I think the Government must be aware themselves that there has been rather too much secrecy. I am not making any complaint about the present time, because I think the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty have been perfectly frank and perfectly open with the House during the last four days; but there has been a great deal of secrecy before, and I think that some of the trouble which has arisen might possibly have been avoided if some hon. Friends of mine below the Gangway had not been allowed to go into something in the nature of a plan of campaign in favour of a reduction of Estimates. I wish to know whether or not these four contingent ships are something in the nature of an intermediate programme or merely an anticipation of the programme of 1910–112? Another thing I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman is this: Whether he can produce something showing the progress of German shipbuilding? We have had divergent figures on this subject, those given us by the First Lord of the Admiralty, the figures given by my hon. Friend, and the figures given by the Leader of the Opposition, and we have had so much difficulty that even the hon. Member for Reading, who has a great reputation for being able to understand figures, was not able to make the matter clear. In order to ascertain the progress of German shipbuilding we should be very grateful to the Admiralty for issuing a diagram showing us month by month, through the years which we may regard as critical years, the possibilities or probabilities of the actual shipbuilding of Germany. If the information could be given in that official form, I think it would make the matter a great deal clearer. Another thing on which we want a clearer statement is in reference to the official ratio as between the value of "Dreadnoughts" and pre-"Dreadnoughts." We do not know exactly what value the authorities place upon these pre-"Dreadnoughts" in comparison with "Dreadnoughts." One thing quite certain is that the ratio which is now established is a changing ratio, and it will not be the same in 1912 as it is now. The two ships of the "Lord Nelson" and "Agamemnon" class, it has been claimed, are very near equal to the "Dreadnought." There is one thing which I think will bring them probably into the King Edward VII. class, and that is the question of speed.

They are three knots slower. It is true they are nearly the ordinary gun category of 12 inch and 9.2 inch guns. Let us take the simplest case at all, that of a "Lord Nelson," manœuvring against a "Dread- nought." The extra three knots speed of the "Dreadnought" enables her to keep at such a range that she is at the extreme limit of the 12 inch guns and outside the limit of the 9.2 inch guns. Under those circumstances the "Dreadnought" will in all probability be able to bring to bear eight of her guns and the "Lord Nelson" only four, or, may be, only two. Under these circumstances I think it would help if we could have something like a comparative statement as to the proper ratio of fighting efficiency between "Dreadnoughts" and the "Lord Nelson" class, and the "King Edward" class and the other pre-" Dreadnought" boats from the third. In connection with the difference as to figures between the hon. Member for King's Lynn and the First Lord of the Admiralty—heaven forbid I should enter into the merits as to the question between them—but as far as I can make out the question at issue was whether or not the delay that has taken place in shipbuilding in this country were exceptional or not. I understand the hon. Member for King's Lynn mentioned a large number of cases where the estimated period of twenty-four months was very considerably exceeded. The First Lord of the Admiralty claimed those were all exceptions due to circumstances which were quite unusual and quite exceptional. I have no doubt my right hon. Friend is quite correct, but is it or is it not the fact that the exceptions outnumber the rule? I merely ask for information and I will illustrate my point with a story. There was a certain man who was always getting badly beaten at billiards. He always claimed that he was not in anything like his true form. One of his opponents said: "Tell me, have you ever been in your true form," and he replied: "To tell you the truth, I do not think I ever have been in my true form." I want to know if the right hon. Gentleman in his official capacity is in his true form or not? If those exceptions almost outnumber the rule, they vitiate the rule or introduce a considerable element of doubt whether we are right in taking twenty-four months as the regular period.

I said that with very few exceptions we had nothing to complain of in the tone of hon. Members' speeches opposite. That is quite true. I am not quite sure it is quite true, particularly of the Press outside this House. I think outside of this House a very determined effort is being made to work up party capital and make a scare, out of which something may be got I am quite sure that the best way of defeating that attempt, and it is important that the attempt should be defeated, is for the Admiralty and for the First Lord to make it perfectly clear that his programme is going to be adequate in all circumstances, and, whatever the acceleration of the German Navy may be, is going to be adequate to maintain that crushing superiority which we had in the past, and which we are determined to enjoy in the future.

The hon. Member for Gravesend asked a very important question, which has not yet been answered. You are providing some 138,000 men in the Estimates; the point is, what provision are you making for the contingent ships which may be laid down and for the four which are to be laid down? I understand that it takes five or six years to train a man adequately to serve in one of these modern ships; so that, at first sight, it would appear from the Financial Secretary's statement that one of two things must happen: either you are not going to have fully-trained men for the ships, or else you are going to scrap some of the less serviceable ships. The hon. Member told us that a "Dreadnought" requires 100 men less than a ship of the "King Edward VII." class. But, even so, "Dreadnought's" require 700 men, which means 2,800 for the four which are to be laid down. If a supplementary Estimate is to be presented, the answer is more or less satisfactory; but at present the point is not at all clear.

In all the calculations which have been given of the ships which will be in commission or on the special service list in 1912, no mention is made of the "Royal Sovereign" class. The noble Lord is perfectly right in suggesting that as these new ships are added the older types of ships are passed out of the Fleet. It would not be worth the cost to keep still in the service of the Fleet the older types which you could not in any circumstances put into the battle line against the newer battleships. Consequently, the necessary men for the new ships will be obtained by conveying them from the oldest to the next oldest type of ships which will themselves go into the special service list, and those who are now in the special service list will pass out of the Fleet entirely.

There will be no increase in the total number. The total number of battleships kept in the service is, roughly, 50, and that number will be more or less retained. But, of course, the fighting capacity will be much greater if you have 50 modern ships with the best kind of armament; than if you have 50 older ships, some of them 20 years of age. My hon. Friend behind me asked a question to which I shall give a very brief and I hope satisfactory reply. Instances of retardation in building were given. The special cases were those of the "Advance," the "Lord Nelson," and three ships of the "Invincible" type. In regard to the last three ships I stated that the delay was due to the fact that these ships were of a new class, and consequently in order to secure the best results it was unavoidable that various changes should be made while the ships were in course of construction. The result was to greatly delay the completion of these vessels. Pembroke Dockyard has not a suitable graving dock of its own for large ships, and consequently a ship of that class has to be sent away to another Dockyard, and then brought back to Pembroke to be finished. My hon. Friend is thoroughly familiar with the circumstances of the "Lord Nelson." He asked if these cases of delay were usual in the building of ships. I answer they are not typical. The "Advance" and the "Lord Nelson" took four years to build. That is an unusual time. We have completed ships in two years and three or four months sometimes. The delays in the cases referred to have been undoubtedly due to the fact that that we have introduced changes in the course of construction, because there has been no urgency to finish the ships hurriedly, but they could have been finished in time if we had been content to take the scheduled type and build in accordance with the scheduled time.

Is it not a fact that the "Defence" could have been built at Pembroke in two years?

No, Sir, it is not a fact that it could have been built in two years without further expenditure.

Is it not the case that there is not a graving dock there? My right hon. Friend knows that the detention of four years was not caused in the building, but owing to the fact that there was not sufficient money provided for the necessary number of men to finish the work.

To some extent my hon. Friend is right. To some extent it was because the number of men employed was not so large as it might have been, but there were other causes which made it practically impossible to complete the vessel quickly. My hon. Friend has asked me whether the second group of four ships was to be regarded as an anticipation of the 1910 programme. Whatever the 1910 programme may be will be declared this time next year. It is impossible to anticipate or to make any statement in regard to the 1911 programme. We have already seen the difficulty in making sure what the programme will be as regards 1909–1910. I hope after this brief reply the Committee will be so good as to come to an immediate decision.

I am not a Naval expert, but there are one or two questions I should like the right hon. Gentleman to answer. The hon. Member for Chatham called attention to the pay of shipwrights in the Navy. We have had no reply upon that. These men have had no advance in wages for the last 30 years, and T do think it would be well if the Admiralty would take into consideration the position of the men. A question was asked also with respect to the warrant officers. It appears that under the present regulations they cannot reach the position of commissioned warrant officers until they have had service of 20 years. What the officers really require is that they should have warrant officers' commision after 15 years' service, because the men say that after they are 50 years of age they are practically worked out and not of much use. I hope the Secretary for the Admiralty will make some statement with regard to warrant officers.

With regard to shipwrights, they are included in the class which two or three years ago received their share of an additional £60,001 which was given in pay.

That was in the dockyards. I was speaking of shipwrights in the Navy and of the warrant officers.

I thought that the hon. Member referred to shipwrights in the dockyards. I hope that the Committee will understand that it is quite impossible for me to make any terms with regard to increase of pay during this discussion. These questions cannot be considered in public. After I have had an opportunity of discussing the question with my hon. Friend, I think we shall be able to come to a settled conclusion as to what it ought to be. These are not a kind of questions that can be argued with advantage across the floor of the House. I hope the Committee will now allow this Vote to pass. Those hon. Members who have not had an opportunity of addressing the Committee will have an opportunity to-morrow of speaking on the Report stage.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Further debate arising,

rose in his place and claimed to move "That the question be now put."

Question, "That the question be now put," put and agreed to.

Question, "That a sum not exceeding £7,280,200 be granted for the said service," put accordingly, and agreed to.

Motion made, and question proposed, "That a sum, not exceeding £890,200, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the expense of half-pay and retired pay to officers of the Navy and Marines, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1910."

Mr. LUPTON
(whose observations were indistinctly heard owing to cries of "Divide, divide")

I want to say a few words in the interests of economy. I think if people understood the position they would not be so impatient. The total cost amounts to something like 50s. per—[Cries of "Agreed, agreed," and "Divide, divide."]

May I ask hon. Members to allow the hon. Gentleman to speak. I think he is out of order, but I really cannot hear him sufficiently well.

I shall move a reduction of this estimate, because the total cost of our armaments are so excessive that they come to 50s. per quarter—

The estimate, as I understand it, is to pay the salaries of some of the officers.

I thought it was retired pay and half-pay, and so on, and so it must really be considered as part of the salaries of the officers, but it is in expectation of that that they work, and, therefore, I am entitled to move a reduction. We have 32 Admirals on half-pay and 87 on retired pay. The Admirals on half-pay have £600 a year and those on retired pay £800. Altogether we have about £1,000,000 of money paid every year in half-pay and retired pay, and when we consider that the amount we spend on armaments is equal to three times the rateable value of all the agricultural land in England and Wales there is some reason for moving a reduction of the Vote. I think these amounts of retired pay is quite unnecessary. The amount we have to pay for other officers is enormous.

rose in his place and claimed to move: "That the question be now put."

Question, "That the question be now put," put and agreed to.

Vote agreed to.

On the Vote of £1,387,800 for Naval and Marine Pensions, Gratuities, and Compassionate Allowances—

I am only going to put my speech in the form of a question. Will the right hon. Gentleman, the First Lord of the Admiralty, be prepared to receive a deputation on the question of Bounty Allowances to Warrant Officers which are not included in this estimate?

Yes; certainly.

Vote agreed to.

Vote, £369,800 for Civil Pensions and Gratuities agreed to.

On the Vote of £2,916,300 for Works, Buildings and Repairs at Home and Abroad—

I notice that in this Vote there is a sum for extending No. 1 boiler shop at Chatham, also one for Portsmouth for extension of the boiler house and large sums for machinery. I do not object to the necessary machinery being provided, and I believe in boilers and machine shops being kept in the highest state of efficiency, but I do ask the First Lord of the Admiralty if, instead of spending this money upon extending these boiler shops, in view of the fact that there are boiler shops elsewhere with the very best machinery standing idle at the present time, and that there are a large number of boilermakers out of work, he could not see his way to give a share of this boiler work to those private shops and employ the men out of work?

I only wish to make it perfectly clear that the understanding which was foreshadowed by the Leader of the Opposition was that we should have a clear opportunity of discussing this very important Vote on Report. This cannot be taken to-morrow and we may take it as a distinct understanding that we are to have a sufficient opportunity to discuss this very important Vote, which includes Rosyth and also, what used to be given an entirely separate day, the whole of the works originally commenced on loan, and I fancy many hon. Members would have something to say on this question. I do not think my hon. Friends would desire to? take up the time of the Committee now.

The hon. Gentleman; has perfectly accurately stated what the arrangement was. We are obliged to have the Committee stage of this Vote if we are to commence the works, and it is desirable that some of the works should be commenced as early as possible, and we ask the House to give us the Committee-stage to-night. We do not propose to take the Report stage to-morrow. We shall put it down on some other occasion, when the Committee will have a full opportunity of discussing every question.

With regard to the remarks of the hon. Member, it has of late years been the policy of the Admiralty to give the construction of ships, as far as possible, to the private yards and to reserve the dockyards for repairs. If we were to give the repairs as well as the building of large ships to private yards it is quite obvious that many thousands of men who are now employed in the dockyards could not continue to have any such employment. As we have the men, and wish to continue to-employ them in the dockyards, we must give them adequate machinery, whether in the boiler shops or elsewhere, and it is for that reason that we do the repairs in our boiler shops.

As the First Lord recently quoted the case of the "Pembroke," which took four years to build, very largely owing to the fact that there is no graving dock at Pembroke large enough to dock it, I wish to ask whether the Government will favourably consider the question of providing a dock large enough in a Welsh dockyard, or provide a floating dock suitable for the purpose.

May I point out that we have in the Mersey a yard capable of building a "Dreadnought," with everything ready to start? In addition, I wish to say I have found during the last three days, in trains, in omnibuses, everywhere where men congregate, the eyes of the whole country are fixed upon what we are doing with respect to the Navy. It is not a political matter. It is not a question of whether one is a Conservative or a Labour Member or a Liberal. The point is this. Is the Government going to rise to the occasion and provide for the serious crisis in the safety of the country, which is the opinion of the great majority of the people. I simply wish to make my protest against the policy of looking over the wall before you decide what you are going to have in the shape of works and ships. We ought to have a policy and stick to it. It is undignified and a perfectly ridiculous policy for us to be employing spies, and to be resorting to that kind of thing, and let our policy of shipbuilding, and our works, and these other Votes, depend on what some other nation may be doing behind a screen. It is not a policy that we ought to adopt. We ought to lay down our plans and put the safety of the country, and its food and commerce beyond all question.

In reference to the £28,000 now allocated for dredging in the Medway, I would like to know if that will give a depth sufficient to admit a "Dreadnought" up to the dockyard?

I do not think that it would permit a "Dreadnought" to be taken up to the slip at Chatham. It might under certain conditions, but the depth would not be sufficient to enable this to be done under all conditions.

Is the £28,000 included in this estimate for deepening the Medway generally right through?

No. It is for dredging. It is not for new work, but is for the continuous dredging which is now being done.

Vote agreed to.

Resolutions to be reported to-morrow (23rd March), Committee to sit again tomorrow.

Ways and Means

CONSIDERED IN COMMITTEE.

(IN THE COMMITTEE.)

[The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN (Mr. Caldwell) in the chair.]

1. Resolved, that, towards making good the Supply granted to His Majesty for the service of the years ending on the 31st day of March, 1908 and 1909, the sum of £195,405 4s. 10d. be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.

2. Resolved, that, towards making good the Supply granted to His Majesty for the service of the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1910, the sum of £48,475,000 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.

Resolutions to be reported to-morrow (23rd March). Committee to sit again tomorrow.

And, it being after half-past Eleven of the clock, Mr. Deputy-Speaker adjourned the House without Question put, in pursuance of the Standing Order.

House adjourned at ten minutes before Twelve o'clock.