moved, in Subsection (1), after "tenancy" ["Where a present tenancy was determined"] to insert the words "or any existing lease within the meaning of Section 21 of the Act of 1881 as amended by this section."

Go on.

Certainly!

"In like manner, and subject to like conditions, and subject to the same right of resumption as if his lease had expired." Is it not plain from Section 21 of the Act of 1881 and Clause 1 of the Act of 1887, that the leaseholder was not a present tenant until his lease expired? It is per- fectly plain. The right hon. Gentleman knows that the first declaration in the order which the tenant got under the Act of 1887 was an order declaring him a present tenant. Furthermore, if under the Act of 1887 the tenant wished to proceed to fix his rent by agreement, he could not do so until he first entered into what is called an originating agreement and application declaring him a present tenant. What I have said cannot be questioned or denied. It is as plain as the light of the sky that if this Clause is passed in its present form, the typical case for which it was intended—and the harshest case—will be excluded from the benefits of the Act. The leaseholder between 1881 and 1887 could not be described as a present tenant. He only became a present tenant when his lease expired. But if he was evicted his lease never expired! If the right hon. Gentleman follows the argument he will see that if this Clause is passed in its present form there will be a very big hole in it indeed, and it will provide the Irish legal tribunals with a further means of turning the Land Acts into a sieve, and giving work to the judges of the High Court.

I assure the hon. and learned Gentleman that this question was carefully considered before this Clause was put down in its present form. It was taken from a Bill presented to the House by one of the hon. and learned Member's colleagues. We considered very carefully whether it would apply to the cases referred to by the hon. and learned Gentleman, and we came to the conclusion that it would. Therefore the Amendment is entirely unnecessary. I think I will be able to prove that in a very few minutes. The definition Section of the Act of 1881 defines a present tenant clearly. It says:—

"Present tenancy means a tenancy subsisting at the time of the passing of this Act, or created before the first day of January, 1883, in a holding in which a tenancy was subsisting at the time of the passing of this Act; and every tenancy to which this Act applies shall be deemed to be a present tenancy until the contrary is proved."

That proves conclusively that taken section by section it is perfectly clear that all leases, whether existing on 22nd August, 1881, or whether they were made on 1st January, 1883, are included. A few cases came before the courts and they fixed a fair rent, probably on the ground that the lessees were present tenants. The hon. and learned Member says, "Oh, that is all very true, but the 21st Clause excludes them from the Act." He has read the 21st Section rather cursorily.

I said it excluded them from the Act, but I said it did something more. It said they were to be present tenants at the expiration of their leases, which negatives the idea that they were present tenants.

If the hon. and learned Member had read the Section more carefully he would see that—

"Any leases or other contracts of tenancy existing at the date of the passing of this Act, except yearly tenancies and tenancies less than yearly tenancies … shall remain in force to the same extent as if this Act had not passed, and holdings subject to such existing leases shall be regulated by the lawful provisions contained in the same leases, and not by the provisions relating to tenancies in that behalf contained in this Act."

It only says that the terms of the leases and contracts contained in the leases are to prevail. The Clause goes on to say "that at the expiration of the lease the lessee ceases to be a present tenant"; otherwise these words would be "future tenant."

He need not be a tenant at all.

The Section very lightly and properly provides that at the expiration of the lease the existing lessee becomes what is deemed throughout the Act to be a present tenant, so that there was a future tenancy really created. This Clause 21 does not, as he says, override the Definition Clause at all, but merely provides that a lessee during the term of his lease shall not have a privilege inconsistent with his lease. Then as regards the application of the Act of 1887, which gave the right to existing lessees to fix their rent, "provided," and so on. The assumption was that the lease had run its course, and that the tenant then came Tinder Clause 21, to the effect that a new tenancy was created, and that that tenancy was deemed to be a present one. So that the Act of 1887 fits in exactly with the Act of 1881, except that it anticipates the right of the lessee, and enables the lessee to proceed to have a fair rent fixed, as if his lease had expired. So that I think I can assure the hon. and learned Member that the case he puts is fully met, and his Amendment is therefore unnecessary.

I am glad to hear the right hon. Gentleman's declaration that he intended the Clause to meet the cases I cited, but having regard to the extreme ability of the courts for picking holes in these Land Acts I think it is well the matter should be made plain. May I call the right hon. Gentleman's attention to the form of the originating notice under the Act of 1887, to the form prescribed by the rules:

"I, so-and-so, the lessee, being in bonâ fide occupation of the above holding, which is held under lease bearing date so-and-so, do desire to be deemed and declared the present tenant of the said holding."

This is the form prescribed under the Act of 1887 as a preliminary to enabling the leaseholder to fix a fair rent. If the leaseholder was the present tenant what was the necessity of making a formal application to the Courts to be "deemed and declared" a present tenant. Supposing the right hon. Gentleman is right, as a matter of argument, does he suggest that with the words I have quoted from the Act of 1887, and in the form which I have quoted, it could be fairly argued before the Land Commission and the Court of Appeal that the leaseholder in the interval between 1881 and 1887 was a present tenant? I would ask the right hon. Gentleman, is it possible to argue it? If the leaseholder between 1881 and 1887 was a present tenant, what is the meaning of that form of words which he will find in his own very excellent book, which I take leave to say is the best text-book on the Land Acts written on Ireland: "I desire to be deemed and declared to be the present tenant"—do not the rules make that form necessary, and if the form was unnecessary what was the necessity for putting upon a tenant the obligation of getting himself declared a present tenant? If the right hon. Gentleman comes to the second case where the rent is fixed by agreement, he will find the very same thing. The ordinary yearly tenant, if he wants to get his rent fixed by agreement, enters into such agreement; but the leaseholder, before he can fix a fair rent by agreement, has formally to get himself declared a present tenant. The right hon. Gentleman says it is perfectly plain he is a present tenant. If that is so, what is the meaning of the rules and forms I have read, and which makes it necessary for the leaseholder to get an order of the Court declaring he is a present tenant if he is one already. I entreat the right hon. Gentleman to consider this matter. It touches the case which most requires legislation—the case of the men who were unprotected between 1881 and 1887, because, being a leaseholder, a man was excluded from the Act of 1881, and was, therefore, at the mercy of the landlord, and hundreds of them were converted into future tenants. While I attach great weight to anything the right hon. Gentleman, who is an authority on these matters, may say, I think this thing ought to be put beyond a shadow of doubt. It ought not to be left in such a way as to be a subject of argument in the Courts afterwards as to whether these men should be excluded or not. To say that the matter is not arguable in face of the form I have quoted is a little bold indeed.

I am not sure whether it is most in the public interest that the Amendment of the hon. Member for Cork City (Mr. Maurice Healy) should be accepted or rejected, but I think the matter should be very carefully considered. If I understood the hon. Gentleman's remarks they went to show this, that when you put in "lease" here it was to protect a leaseholder whose lease expired—

No; whose lease was determined by eviction.

A leaseholder whose lease expired or was determined.

Determined by eviction.

That is another thing.

I cited the section of the Act of 1881 to show that that section did not regard a leaseholder as a present tenant until his lease expired, because it expressly enacted he was to be a present tenant when his lease expired.

I think I understood the hon. Member's general view of the position of the leaseholder under the Act of 1881, which was that a tenant could not have a fair rent fixed until his lease had expired. If the hon. Member contends that the terms are determined by eviction, I understand his position. A lease may fairly be determined by many other causes. It might be that until a boy came of age a lease might run, and it would be a gross breach of understanding between the parties to determine such a lease under a notice, and to reverse the terms of the contract. I suggest, at least to clear the matter up, that the hon. Member should add the words "determined by eviction for non-payment of rent."

I do not think the point the hon. and learned Gentleman has made is relevant to the particular Amendment before us; it has nothing to do with it. The clause as it stands provides where the present tenancy was determined for whatever cause. "Determined" has been judicially decided to mean something different from "expiring." The clause as a whole applies to "determined" in any form. I cannot therefore make a distinction between one method of determination and another, because it was not I who introduced this word "determine."

A present tenancy in an ordinary sense means a yearly tenancy, and practically the only way of determining a yearly tenancy was under a sort of common law for non-payment of rent. A lease was a peculiar instrument executed between the parties, and it is impossible to put it on the same footing as a present tenancy.

I am, of course, aware that the ordinary or present tenancy is a tenancy from year to year. The Attorney-General is perfectly accurate in saying that certain leaseholders were held to be present tenants; that is to say, if a leaseholder took a lease between the 22nd of August, 1881, and the 1st of January, 1903.

On the very grounds that I stated.

That is perfectly true. That was a present tenancy, and not being an existing lease was not excluded from the right to fix a fair rent as other existing leases were. The right hon. Gentleman, however, has limited his construction of "present tenancy" to the definition clause alone, and, of course, as he knows, the words in any definition clause provide that the words shall have the meaning defined "unless the context otherwise requires." But there is something in Clause 21 which is repugnant to treating a leaseholder during the continuance of the lease as a present tenant. What is the good of quoting a definition which is excluded from having any effect by the preliminary words in the Definition Clause? If the tenant was at present tenant before, what is the meaning of the prescribed form by the Land Commission, which the right hon. Gentleman never alluded to or gave any explanation of? This is an invasion of contract, and if there is to be an invasion of this kind, it is usual to look for express words to justify it, and unless you can find express words the court will not act upon it. Under these circumstances I think the right hon. Gentleman will at least admit that this matter is doubtful, and if it is doubtful I ask ought it to be left in doubt?

I have a very strong opinion myself on this point, and I have discussed it with my colleagues, but in deference to what the hon. and learned Member has said I will undertake to further consider the matter between now and the Report stage, and if I find it is necessary or desirable to have other words introduced I will see if that can be done. As at present advised, I cannot accept the Amendment.

I will accept that assurance from the right hon. Gentleman, and I will ask leave to withdraw my Amendment.

The two next Amendments standing in my name are merely consequential upon the first Amendment. I will move my fourth Amendment on the Paper in paragraph (a) of Sub-section (1) to insert after the word "determined" the words "or the assignee of such tenant." The wording of the Clause assumes that there can only foe two classes of persons competent co make this application. The first is the legal tenant, and the second his legal personal representative. But there is a third person interested, namely, the assignee of the tenant. I refer to the assignee not of sale but the assignee by family arrangement. The vast bulk of Irish tenancies do not pass from father to child on death, but they pass on assignment. Under this Clause the only persons competent to make the application are "the person who was the tenant of the original holding at the time when the present tenancy was determined," or "a person who would have been entitled, whether under the will or as one of the next-of-kin or issue of the said tenant." Those two provisions omit the largest class of applicants. It is not the case of sale so much that we wish to provide for as the assignment by the tenant to his son or daughter, or son-in-law on marriage.

That is provided for under paragraph (b).

I assure the hon. and learned Member that he is wrong, because the assignee would not come under paragraph (b), and I think it is admited that he does not come under paragraph (a). Supposing the owner of the land has assigned it to his son or his daughter, or a stranger in blood, I do not care which, I assume that the hon. and learned Member does not suggest that if one person is in the occupation of a farm as tenant another person can make this application. It is quite plain that the largest class of applicants will be excluded if you exclude the assignee, because in nine cases out of ten the original tenant has gone or has parted with his farm, and when he has parted with it he has not parted with it on death in the majority of cases but by assignment. The Clause, as it stands, excludes the assignee.

I really think I shall be able to convince the hon. Member that in this case he is mistaken. If he will turn to the Definition Section in the Act of 1881, he will see the word "tenant" is denned to be "a person occupying the land under a contract of tenancy, including the successor in title of the original holding at the time the tenancy was determined." This Clause is to be read as one of the Land Acts, and it will therefore incorporate that definition. Substitute that definition for the word "tenant," and the assignee will be included.

That will make nonsense of the Clause.

Of course, you will have to frame the Clause slightly differently. It is distinctly laid down in the definition that a "tenant" means a person occupying the land under a contract of tenancy, and that is certain to include the assignee. Thousands of assignees come into the Land Commission Court and have their rents fixed under this Definition Clause. There is actually a double protection. The word "tenant" is defined as being "a person occupying the land under a contract of tenancy," and then it goes on to say it includes "the successors in title," which, on the whole, is a wider phrase than "assignee." The hon. Member's Amendment would, therefore, actually narrow the operation of the Clause. It seems to me so clear that I. really cannot see how any person could reasonably argue the question before any court.

It is not very safe perhaps to interfere in a contest between two such authorities upon the effect of the construction of the Land Acts and the actual meaning of the language to be found in this Section, but I think I shall be able to show that the right hon. Gentleman opposite is dealing with one point and the hon. Member for Cork is dealing with a wholly different point. The hon. Member for Cork contemplates the case where there is a present tenancy in existence. That is determined, and the former holder is turned into a future tenant. He is left in possession and turned into a future tenant. On that he assigns. In that case, the assignee is undoubtedly excluded from the operation of this Section.

Undoubtedly.

That is the point to which the hon. Member for Cork has directed his attention, whereas the point to which the right hon. Gentleman directed his attention was the case where, at the time of the determination of the present tenancy, even although there had been an assignment in the interval, the assignee would be the present tenant. That case is wholly different from the case contemplated by the hon. Member for Cork. I certainly think it would be a great mistake, unless the hon. Member can suggest some limitation of the words, for the Committee to adopt his Amendment. I will tell him why. In the case of the present tenancy which has been determined, and the former occupier turned into a future tenant, that former occupier assigns on the assumption that he is only a future tenant. He sells in the open market, and the man who buys buys a future tenancy and gives so much less on that account. He, and not the original person, has lost his future tenancy. He is the person whom the hon. Member wants to benefit by his Amendment.

No, no.

I know that is not his object, but it is the effect of his Amendment, which would include that case, and, so long as it does, I could not possibly support it, because, to my mind, it would be an act of injustice that a man who has purchased and become the assignee of a future tenancy, knowing he is buying a future tenancy, and therefore giving the holder less than if he had been the holder of the present tenancy, should be included. Why you should enrich the purchaser of the future tenancy at the expense of the present holder I cannot for the life of me see. I do think there is a case which is not covered and which might be included. It is the case where the present tenant has his tenancy determined and is turned into a future tenant, and then assigns for marriage consideration or for love and affection to a member of his family or to his son-in-law. I do not see why that case should not be included in this Section, because he had not become the assignee while the present tenancy was in existence. If he had, the argument of the Attorney-General would be sound, but the right hon. Gentleman assumes the assignment has taken place during the existence of the present tenancy.

No, I do not.

Whereas the hypothesis of the hon. Member for Cork is that the assignment has taken place after the determination of the present tenancy and during the existence of the future tenancy. I apologise for troubling the Committee in this highly technical matter, but I rose to give the Committee any assistance in my power. I do think that in one particular the hon. Member's Amendment would, properly framed, cover a blot on this Bill.

The right hon. Gentleman has omitted to notice that the word "tenant" occurs also at the beginning of Section 8 of the Act of 1831. The word where it originally occurs includes "successor in title." The Clause, as it stands, undoubtedly includes not only the assignee of the old original tenancy before the determination of the tenancy, but also the assignee of the future tenancy created after the eviction. The words are plain enough. They are drawn as widely as possible, having in view the definition which we seek to incorporate in the Act. The "tenant" is to include, and must always include in every proceeding under the Land Act, the assignee. But in view of what has been said I will undertake to reconsider the whole matter between this and the Report stage, and we will try to make it clear beyond all possibility of doubt.

I thank right hon. Gentleman for the promise he has given, but will he permit me to say one word to show how necessary the Amendment is? The right hon. Gentleman relies on the definition of the word "tenant" in the Act of 1881. I think we are all agreed that under that Act "tenant" does include the assignee of the tenant unless there is something to limit it. I say there is a limitation in this case. If you had let the Clause end with the word "tenant" ["in the prescribed manner of any tenant"] I quite agree it would have been in accord with the Definition Section of the Act of 1881, but you have added the words "the person who was the tenant of the original holding at the time when the present tenancy was determined," etc. That fixes one individual in existence at a particular time, and with that limitation on the general meaning of the word "tenant" in the earlier part of the Section, I venture to submit it is impossible here to construe the word according to the general interpretation of the Act of 1881.

I am very much obliged to the hon. Member for his explanation. I do not think it is necessary to continue this discussion; we have many other matters to debate.

If the Attorney-General is right in saying that the word "tenant" includes the assignee or successor in title, what is the meaning of Sub-section (3)? A person entitled under a will is a successor in title.

I cannot understand the argument of the Attorney-General. It would have been all right if Sub-section (1) had stopped at the word "lands" ["or of any portion of those lands"]. In my own Constituency there is one estate on which there are at least 12 future tenants, who have got their holdings subject to a settlement, and I say it would be an intolerable thing for these future tenants to get a fair rent fixed and the purchasers or assignees not to reap any benefit. I would urge the Attorney-General to make this Clause wide enough to carry its operation to sons and daughters of future tenants who obtain the land under a family settlement or in consideration of marriage. I do not ask that all classes or assignees should the be taken in, but let us have those which I have specifically mentioned.

I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

I think the next two-Paper are consequential.

No; only the first. The second deals with a wholly different point. I beg to move to add at the end of Sub-section (1) the words, "and the statutory term resulting from the fixing of such fair rent shall not nor shall the tenancy be determined by the expiration of any lease or tenancy existing at the date of such application but shall continue in like manner as if such lease or tenancy were an existing lease within the meaning, of the Act of 1881." Has the right hon. Gentleman considered the effect of the decision in the Irish Appeal Court in "Cope v. Garrett," in 1904? Has the right hon. Gentleman considered what is the effect of fixing fair rents under this Clause as regards certain future tenants? I think the decision in "Cope v. Garrett" is exactly the reverse of what this Clause, in his opinion, will do. This was the case of a leaseholder who took his lease between 22nd August, 1881, and 1st July, 1883. He was therefore a present tenant entitled to fix a fair rent. But his lease was not an existing leaser and therefore it was excluded from the operation of the enactment of 1881, which provides that at the expiration of an existing lease the tenant is to become a yearly tenant. According to "Cope v. Garrett," it was a lease for 21 years. The tenant went into court in 1886 and fixed a fair rent. He was quite happy, because he thought he could not be evicted—at any rate, for a term of 15 years. But the Irish Court of Appeal held that, notwithstanding the fixing of a fair rent, the tenancy came to an end at the termination of the lease, and accordingly, though the tenant had a fair rent fixed in 1886, he was evicted in 1903. That was in consequence of the words in Section 8 of the Act of 1881, which, having, provided that a present tenant might fix a fair rent, goes on to enact that a statutory term shall result from the fixing of the fair rent, but, unfortunately, it is provided that "Where the judicial rent of any present tenancy has been fixed by the court, then, until the expiration of a term of 15 years, from the rent day next succeeding the day on which the determination of the Court has been given (in this Act referred to as the statutory term), such present tenancy shall (if it so long continue to subsist), be deemed to be a tenancy subject to statutory conditions." It says if it "so long continues to subsist," but a statutory term cannot continue for 15 years unless the original tenancy was a tenancy which would so long continue to subsist. Let me illustrate my argument by putting a particular case. Take the case of a present tenant who was evicted in the year 1883, and who took a lease for 30 years in 1883—

I think I can save time. I am sorry that these Amendments were not put down earlier, and I only saw them a short time ago. I have got the particular case to which the hon. and learned Member refers in my mind, and I think it is possible that, that decision might have the effect he assumes, and might deprive the tenant of the right to fix a fair rent on the expiration of the lease. I think, therefore, his words would be an improvement of the Clause, and on behalf of the Government I accept them.

The next Amendment of the hon. Member—[To insert at the end of Sub-section (2) the words, "For the purposes of the Land Law Acts the expression 'present tenancy' shall be deemed to include a tenancy subsisting on the first day of January, eighteen hundred and ninety-seven, provided that or so soon as such tenancy has been in existence for a period of fifteen years"]—is not in the right place.

May I ask, Sir, in what, respect you consider the Amendment out of place at this particular point? Perhaps I may explain the reason why I put it on the Paper in that portion of the Clause which precedes what I call the definition sub-section. I did so in order that it might be covered by the definition sub-section. The last Sub-section of the Clause is what I call the definition sub-section, and if I placed my Amendment at the very end it would be excluded from the benefit of that Sub-section.

It will not be in order in this Sub-section to put in a definition of "present tenancy," applying to the whole of the land clauses. If the hon. Member desires to define it in this Sub- section he must define it in regard to this Clause only, and the place to do that is in Sub-section (3), where the definition is.

This is a Clause dealing with future tenants, and it entitles certain future tenants, as I understand, to get the benefit of the Land Act and become present tenants. The only object of my Amendment is to give it some extended scope, and to extend it to certain other future tenants which at present are not included.

I am quite clear about it. We cannot in this Clause insert words for the purpose of defining present tenancy as so and so. If this is to be done it must be done either in the general Definition Clause, or, if it is to apply to Part V. only of this Bill, I think it should be a separate Clause by itself—a new Clause.

I am sorry to press the point. It is rather an important one, and I am sure you will bear with me with some patience. I understand that your ruling is that this as a definition should appear in the Definition Clause of the Bill. That would be so if I were devising a definition for the purpose of the present Bill alone, as the Definition Clause of this Bill, as in every Bill, is for the purpose of this Bill alone. But when you are amending a definition in a previous Act you cannot put that in the Definition Clause of the Bill, as it is a substantial Amendment of the law, which must go in some previous part of the Act, and there is no other part of the Act to place it in except this.

It is abundantly clear, if it cannot be put in the Definition Clause, it must be in a new clause. The next Amendment of the hon. Member appears to me to be also not in the right place, and the next is consequential. The next in the name of the hon. Member for Waterford is outside the scope of this Clause.

In so far as the object of this Clause is to do away with certain anomalies existing in the status of certain persons known as future tenants and present tenants I should not have very much to say against it. If there is to be an effort made to arrive at some solution of all these difficulties of land purchase I should gladly welcome any Amendment which would dispose of any real grievance of which any future tenant would have to complain. Therefore I am not opposed in principle to any well-reasoned proposal in certain well-defined cases to do away with any real or imaginary grievance. The Chief Secretary in 1908 introduced a Bill which contained a proposal to deal with this question, but he dealt with it on the following lines. He limited the application of the Clause to a present tenancy which had been determined after the passing of the Act of 1887. That is to say, in the case of any owner of a present tenancy prior to 1887 who, under the machinery of that Act had afterwards lost his present tenancy, but had remained from that date to this in the occupation of his holding, the Bill of 1908 provided that he should be in the position of a present tenant, in so far as having a fair rent fixed was concerned. That, of course, was a very strong proposal, but had it remained in that position, and had it been confined to that class of tenants, I doubt very much whether I could oppose it, because I should have thought that perhaps a reasonable compromise to make when we were endeavouring to settle and get rid of this question. The reason I should not oppose it is that under the Act of 1887 there was for the first time provided a means by which, without any tedious process of law, but merely by the service of a notice, in the case of a tenant whose rent had been in arrear, or who was liable to be evicted, he could be deprived of his present tenancy, though not actually turned out of occupation. He remained in occupation in the position of a caretaker, with the result that he lost his status and his rights as a present tenant. In all these cases in which a landlord chooses to allow a man to remain, and he and his family have remained on under those conditions up to the present day, I do not think, on the whole, it was unreasonable to say: "We will assume that the parties have, by mutual consent, agreed to put the man back in his former status and let him remain." But the right hon. Gentleman has abandoned that, and has brought in a proposition of a much more extensive character, which, undoubtedly, would include cases that I do not think he ever intended to include, and certainly, whether it was his intention to include them or not, they ought not to be included. After all, these future tenants are not in that desperate condition that we are sometimes led to believe. What is the position of the future tenant? It is quite true he cannot get a fair rent fixed, but he can become a purchaser under any of the Land Purchase Acts.

Yes, if his landlord will sell.

That is exactly the position all tenants are in, whether present or future, until the Compulsory Clause of this Bill becomes law. But if this Compulsory Clause should become law it applies to present as well as future tenants, and therefore in the matter of purchase the future tenant is precisely in every particular in the same position as the present tenant. What is his next privilege? He can sell his tenancy to the highest bidder, and if, in consequence of the rent he is paying, or of an increase of rent, he is able afterwards to satisfy the Court that he has sustained a loss, he can get from his landlord, under a decree of the Court, compensation which will represent the loss by reason of the holding not having been sold at a fair rent. That is a tremendous privilege for him. But over and above all that he practically has got security of tenure if this Bill ever passes into law. Under Clause 16, if the Bill becomes law in that shape, no landlord will ever be able to evict a tenant, present, past, or future, for any cause.

That is the worst Clause in the Bill.

In addition to all these advantages the future tenant has this advantage, that if Clause 16 in its present shape becomes law, no landlord will ever be foolish enough to evict him or any other tenant, because when he has got the holding back all he can do is to relet it. He will get no tenant to take it, because any tenant who takes it will be deprived of the benefit of the Land Purchase Act, because it never can again form the subject of an advance under the Land Purchase Act. When you talk of the hardship on future tenants you are really talking of a man whose tenure is incomparably better than that of any agricultural tenant in this country or in Scotland, and immeasurably superior to any person in a town holding. If a real sentimental grievance remains owing to the fact that he could not have a fair rent fixed, and had that been confined to the cases of persons who had been deprived of their present tenancy under the operation of that Section in the Act of 1887, there would not have been very much to say against it, and as at present advised, I do not think I would oppose it. But this Bill for some reason that I cannot fathom, has gone out of its way to make a tremendous extension of the proposed provisions of the Bill of 1908, and, to start with, I think the cardinal objection to it is that it proceeds at once to give a new life and new material to the rent fixing tribunals in Ireland. Anyone who knows what has gone on in connection with rent fixing under the Act of 1881 must view with dismay the prospect that you are going to provide a new field and new subject-matter for these tribunals to operate on.

Let me point out some cases which will be included under the operation of this Clause should it become law in its present form. There are a substantial number of cases—I do not say that they are very numerous—in which, after the passing of the Act of 1881, the tenants have sold their holdings voluntarily to their landlords; they have got their own price, and the landlords have got their goodwill. The tenants have gone to America or elsewhere, and they did not want to leave the holdings to anyone else but the landlords. Having got the holding, the landlord relets it to one who had never anything to do with it before. That man buys with his eyes open, knowing that there is no right of fixing fair rent attached to the holding. He will be included under the Clause, and will be entitled to have a fair rent fixed in spite of the tenancy which the landlord bought. Surely hon. Members below the Gangway do not wish that.

Does it include him?

It includes him beyond all question. I am glad to hear the hon. Member say that he would not agree to that.

I did not say that I would not agree to that, but I say that I would not ask for it.

Well, if you would not ask for it it would not be in the Bill. On what plea of fair play should that man have the right attached to the tenancy of having a fair rent fixed, having at the time he bought paid less in consequence of there being no such privilege attached to it?

The landlord has the right of pre-emption, and if he relets he makes it a present tenancy.

Surely I must have been speaking very loosely when an expert like the hon. Member for Cork did not appreciate what I said. I was not talking of the landlord's right of pre-emption. I was talking of a free sale and surrender by the tenant. I have known cases in which a man has made up his mind that he was not going to continue in occupation of his farm in Ireland because he is going off with his family to America or elsewhere. He hands the farm over to the landlord, who gets the goodwill and gives the tenant the price mutually agreed upon. The landlord goes into the open market, and a man who never had a present tenancy acquires the holding by purchase from the landlord. That man buys at a price which is correspondingly less, by reason that it has not attached to it the right of having a fair rent fixed, than he would have to pay if he were buying a present tenancy. That man got what he knew he would get, but under this Clause he would be entitled to have a fair rent fixed.

The right hon. Gentleman has made a long explanation showing what has occurred, but he has not told us how that brings the man under the Clause.

I thought that was so plain that even the hon. Member would be quite adequate to the occasion; but, as he seems not to be, I will endeavour to assist him. The Clause says: "Where a present tenancy was determined at any time before the passing of this Act, the Land Commission may, subject to the provisions of the Land Law Acts, on the application in the prescribed manner of any tenant in occupation of the lands comprised in the said present tenancy or of any portion of those lands," do so and so. I think the hon. Member for West Waterford has forgotten that at the suggestion of the hon. Member for Cork the assignee of the tenant is to be included.

I made no promise of that kind. I only promised to consider the proposal. The right hon. Gentleman must not assume that I promised that the asignee of the tenant would be included.

The landlord is just as much an assignee of the tenant as the person purchasing in the open market.

There is nothing in the Clause as it stands to show that the man who buys will be included.

I was dealing with the Clause as I understand it is supposed to be. The hon. Member for West Waterford was very silent and acquiescent when the hon. Member for Cork was making his point. I thought hon. Members below the Gangway were sympathetic with the hon. Member for Cork, and that there was a very substantial point raised by him. It is very difficult to satisfy them, but I am doing my best.

The right hon. Gentleman told us that this was so simple that anybody could understand it.

I said so, but I made an exception in favour of the hon. Gentleman. No one, I think, will deny that there are a great many persons included by virtue of this provision who would not have come within the provision of the Bill of 1908. The addition is taken not from 1887, but from 1879. That is a difference of nearly ten years, so that there are added under this Clause, as compared with the Clause of 1908, all persons who became future tenants between 1879 and the beginning of 1887.

I do not know whether the Chief Secretary has any particulars as to the number of persons represented by that description in those years. In introducing the present Bill he stated that the number would not be very great, but, whether great or small, we have got no figures as to what the number may be. In any event, it is a substantial extension of the class of persons whom we are going once more to bring into the rent-fixing machinery. You are going to give fresh life and vigour to the rent-fixing tribunals under conditions that I think never yet quite satisfied any party in this House or fulfilled the expectations either of tenants or landlords. Speaking for myself, and speaking, I believe, with the general approval of all who take an interest in this question, it would be regrettable now, when land purchase is making such progress in Ireland to bring into competition with it the rent fixing provisions of the Act of 1881. I think myself that people who, with their eyes open, through their own fault, for instance, for breach of a statutory condition such as that against sub-letting, were deprived of their present tenancy, have no right to have their status raised, as is being done under this Clause. On what principle is a man who has lost his present tenancy by breach of one of the statutory conditions, apart from non-payment of rent, to have his status restored? The statutory condi- tions which were made applicable to judicial tenancies were all the subject of discussion when the Land Act of 1881 was being passed, and I never heard any attack made on them. All parties were agreed that a breach of these statutory conditions should lead to a forfeiture of the tenancy, and many of them were inserted for the benefit of the community. Why is this Clause not confined to persons who have lost their tenancy through non-payment of rent? Why does it cover forfeiture of every class and kind? That is an objection to the Clause. But I object to it mainly because of the substantial addition to it which the right hon. Gentleman has incorporated in this Bill. It will help to keep alive for many years to come the objectionable rent fixing machinery of the Land Act of 1881, with all its expense and friction, and with ail the cost to the State of the equipment of inspectors, sub-commissioners, and valuers, and others. On that ground I intend to vote against the insertion of the Clause in the Bill.

I regret that the right hon. Gentleman should wipe out, by his statement that he intended to vote against the Clause, the effect of his statement in the opening part of his speech that there was no objection to the principle of this Clause. He gives as his reason for voting against the Clause the addition to it that has been made since last November. It is exceedingly difficult to ascertain the exact number of additional people who will be affected by the extension, but I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that the number is comparatively small. The overwhelming majority of the future tenants in Ireland have been created under the Clause in the Act of 1887; and the number added by the extension of this Clause is entirely insufficient to justify the opposition of the right hon. Gentleman to a Clause the principle of which he says he approves of. He asked one question, to which I can give a satisfactory answer: "Why was this Clause inserted?" Without mentioning the names or going into details, I will give two cases with which I am familiar, which show how unjust it would be not to make this Clause date back to that date, which has become a classic date in all those Bills, for doing away with the bad blood and the evils that have arisen during the land war. The reinstatement of the evicted tenants goes back to 1879, and that is the date that has been adopted in a whole series of instances. The first case which I will give is that of a very well-known estate, the whole of which was cleared by a large military force in the very height of the land war, while the Land Act of 1881 was actually being debated in this House. These poor people were put out on the roadside. For six years they were living in wooden huts in the neighbourhood of their holdings. Had they remained outside ever since until last year, the Evicted Tenants Act would have put them back into their holdings and given them a large grant to start again; but, inasmuch as they were readmitted about 20 years ago by the landlord, forfeiting their rights under the various Land Acts that have passed, and readmitted under the most stringent conditions in fresh contracts of lease, they are now cut out from all benefits under the Land Acts and of the various measures that have been passed to undo all the evil work of the land war. Would any rational man be in favour of leaving those men in the state in which they are at present? That is an extreme case; but it would be the grossest injustice if this Clause were so limited as to shut out these people. The second case is that of an estate in a lonely mountainous remote part of the county Mayo, where there was a large head landlord and a large middle interest.

Owing to some circumstances—I forget the exact details—just on the eve, I think it was actually while the Act was passing through this House, the middle interest was extinguished. There are 40 tenants on that estate who are most cruelly rented. These mountain people, owing to their ignorance, took no steps to save their rights, but if they could have come into the courts 25 years ago I do not think they could have saved them or have got fair rents fixed. They could not get the benefit of the Act, because they were not tenants at all owing to their interest having lapsed. They could not get the benefit of the Act passed 25 years ago and subsequent Acts. These are the people to whom we wish to apply the benefits of this Clause. I think anybody who has listened to the Debate will have formed an idea of what Irish landlordism is. There may be a limited number of cases, but be they numerous or few, I do not believe there is a single man who, if he was informed of all the circumstances, would say that we ought now to deprive them of all the benefits of these Land Acts and the protection they afford. That is the reason for this extension Clause, and I do believe that if the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Campbell) applied his mind to these cases he would withdraw his opposition to the Clause, the principle of which he has accepted.

It is evident that the treatment of this Amendment by the Government has a bearing upon the treatment which the Committee as a whole may give to the Clause as a whole. I am a layman in these matters, and after listening to experts like the hon. Member for Cork City (Mr. Maurice Healy), the Attorney-General, whom I regard rather as the author of a text book than as a Law Officer of the Crown, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Dublin University (Mr. Campbell), I have arrived at the conclusion, as a layman, that if this Clause is passed it is of paramount importance that its meaning should be absolutely clear. After weighing the arguments as to what persons are included and excluded under this Clause as it stands, and not the Clause as it would be amended, I say the Committee ought not to pass it unless that matter is made absolutely clear by the use of non-legal language which would be understood of all, and would not involve litigation as to who are to benefit and who are not to benefit by its operation. I am not opposed to the Clause on its merits as an attempt to round-off the symmetry of the land laws, but I object to it because it runs in competition with land purchase, which I personally believe to be the true solution of these difficulties. I believe in land purchase, and not in landlord litigation. I am prepared—I have the courage of my convictions—to leave future tenants the option on the one hand of trying to get fair rents fixed by litigation, and on the other the option of entering into a reasonable bargain to purchase, and I believe that of the two they would choose the latter. I believe that if it were left to the people of Ireland it would be seen that they are in favour of a solution of the matter by entering into bargains to purchase. Before the Report stage I should like to have two things made clear. First, that a man who has bought a future tenancy, knowing it to be a future tenancy, and that the price he paid included no right to have a fair rent fixed under the Land Acts, should not be able to come in now and get something for which he had not bargained or for which he had not paid. The second is that a man who has not lost his tenancy through non-payment of rent, but for some other reason, such as breach of contract, should not be allowed the opportunity of litigation at this stage. I think that is a very fair compromise. I will Lot vote against the Clause if the Government will give me an assurance on these two points. This is a Purchase Bill, not a Land Law Amendment Bill, and I want to get on to the new Clauses, and, if possible, to the bonus, though I am afraid we shall not reach that part of the measure. To pass a Purchase Bill without dealing with the bonus is like buying a horse without looking at its legs.

This Clause does not establish any plan which would be in competition with land purchase, of which the right hon. Gentleman is such a strong supporter. These future tenants will be placed in a position to have fair rents fixed with a view to land purchase. As things stand, in very many of these cases, the rents on which these future tenancies are held are of such a character that no satisfactory purchase arrangements could be carried out on that basis.

They are not subject to the zones; they are not judicial tenancies.

Of course they are not. They will be dealt with as direct cases outside the zones. The rents at the present time are of such a character that no one with any regard for the future interests of these tenants would ask them to carry out purchase upon that basis. One of the most desirable results of including them in this Clause will be that fair rents could be fixed by the tribunal, and purchase could be carried out on the basis of these fair rents. It would bring them within Section (1) of the Act of 1903. Instead of obstructing or embarrassing sales, or in any way hindering purchase, pro tanto it will afford facilities for purchase.

I cannot agree.

The right hon. Gentleman is anxious for a clear exposition of the meaning of the Clause as it stands.

What I want is a clear promise from the Government on the two points I have stated, that a man who has bought a future tenancy shall not benefit under the Clause, and that the man who has lost his tenancy for some reason other than non-payment of rent shall also not obtain the benefit of the Clause.

The House is in possession of what the right hon. Gentleman the Attorney-General said as to what the position of the Government is in regard to this matter. We do not at all take the responsibility at this moment of stating what form this Clause will have if it is to be recasted as a result of further consideration given to it. Take the Clause as it stands at present, and as the Committee are invited to vote on it. I am sorry the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University (Mr. J. H. Campbell) is not now present, because I cannot but believe that further consideration of the true meaning of this Clause would dissipate any real ground of objection that seemed to exist from his point of view. As I understood he was quite in favour of the principle of the restoration of persons who had been evicted from their holdings and from the status of present tenants; but he limited it to the cases of persons evicted from 1887. What distinction of principle is to be drawn between that class of persons who were evicted since 1887 and those who were evicted prior to that date I fail absolutely to understand. The argument in favour of the present view of the Government would seem to me to be much stronger than in favour of the proposal of the Bill of last year. As I understood it, the principal objection of my right hon. Friend was that this Clause included an absolute stranger to these lands, who had come into possession as tenant by reason of an arrangement with the landlord made since 1881, and that it would be open to such a stranger to go to the courts and have a fair rent fixed. The House will remember with what urgency he pressed that view on the House. I think the right hon. Gentleman must be perfectly satisfied that the Clause has no such effect as that. The Clause, on the contrary, deals with a state of affairs which, I think, when properly understood, will commend it to any Member of this House. The state of affairs is simply this: that it deals with the tenancy which existed in 1881 or since 1879, now in the hands of a man who was tenant in 1881, or of some member of his family; that is practically what the Sub-section comes to. The Clause deals with the original tenant, the man who was there in possession in 1881, and who, say, in 1884, may have been evicted, and in whose case the landlord may have allowed the six months' period of redemption to expire, and then made a fresh letting, the man continuing in the lands as a future tenant. What is proposed is in that case that the man or his successor, any member of his family who has succeeded him by will, or who would succeed to him as next-of-kin, and being now in possession of the same holding, that he should have the right to have a fair rent fixed. That is the scope of the Clause, and I fail to understand how anyone who was in favour of reinstating a man who was evicted in 1887 should be opposed to reinstating a man who was evicted in 1881, and who, by reason of a subsequent arrangement, is now in possession of the same holding. That is the entire scope of this Clause as it stands. My right hon. Friend must see that it will not apply to the case he supposed, where there had been a surrender or sale by the present tenant to the landlord, and a subsequent letting of the land by the landlord to an absolute stranger. The Clause would not affect such a man at all. I fail to see why in principle my right hon. Friend would be justified in opposing, if in principle he is prepared, as he said he was, to support the Clause of last year. I think the Clause is one which should receive the favourable view of the Committee, and indeed of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Wyndham). I do not think it will, as he is disposed to think, interfere in any way with the progress of land purchase, but quite the contrary, because as things stand, no one will suppose that those persons, entitled as they are to buy their holdings under the present Acts, would be prepared to do so on the basis of their present rents. That is indeed the very purpose of this, to remove that difficulty which lies in their way, and which is one of the chief objections to purchase. It is as well to remove a considerable source of irritation of having people who were evicted in 1881, and who, having been reinstated as future tenants, were deprived of the privileges which their neighbours have all around them. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover also asked as to persons who have lost their holdings by reason of forfeiture under Section 8 of the Act of 1881, other than through non-payment of rent. The right hon. Gentleman made no proposal to deal with those persons, and I do not know if there are any such persons. I do not believe there are. If the Clause is to be opposed owing to any objection to that class of person then, I think, the right hon. Gentleman may take it—

From the last words clearly it is not meant to include those persons, but all I have asked is to say before this Clause passes he will say they are not included. He does not intend—

We do intend. We do not intend to confine the Clause to tenants evicted for non-payment of rent. There was a form of eviction very common, obtaining a personal judgment and selling the tenancy.

That only shows how difficult the matter is, because the hon. and learned Gentleman would not say include the men who had lost the present tenancy for a cause of any character. Really the future tenants would be better advised if they took advantage of land purchase instead of this Clause. I do not wish to be pedantic in this matter, but the other point the hon. Gentleman has not dealt with. The hon. Member for Cork pointed out with force, and his argument has not been answered. Under paragraph (a) of this Clause you would have to put in "assignee" to cover certain persons who are not covered in paragraph (b). That was his point. In replying to that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University (Mr. J. H. Campbell) said that if the Government include the word "assignee" that would include the person who had bought a future tenancy knowing what the future tenancy was. What I said was that if the Government accept the intention of the hon. Member for Cork they must accept it in such a way as not to include by accident a person who has bought a future tenancy knowing it to be a future tenancy.

The right hon. Gentleman must not vote under any misapprehension. We have given no pledge whatever. All we have promised is to consider the whole matter, and, if necessary, to put down an Amendment. If we think the Clause ought to be amended we shall amend it in the way we think right.

My chief objection to this Clause is that it gives a new lease of life to the Land Courts in Ireland. Everybody who has had experience of those courts will agree that they are not satisfactory tribunals, and if it is possible to finish up the small amount of work remaining to them the sooner it is done the better. But the last way to achieve that object is to open the door for a new lot of tenants to open the door for a new lot of tenants that there is nothing unreasonable in hoping that the holders of future tenancies will be able to negotiate satisfactory terms of sale with their landlords, although they are future tenants, and are undoubtedly paying a higher rent than ordinary judicial tenants are. The landlord knows perfectly well that he cannot expect to get the same number of years' purchase from them as in the case of a judicial tenant. Under the compulsory clauses of this Bill the path of those future tenants will be made very much easier. I see nothing to prevent a future tenant joining with the rest of the tenants on an estate in negotiation with the landlord, or to preclude him in that event from having exactly the same advantages as the judicial tenants. As nearly all the operations of Irish land purchase will in future be conducted under Clause 39 of this Bill, I cannot see how future tenants are to be ruled out from taking full advantage of the compulsory clauses. If all that a future tenant has to do is to enter into negotiation with the landlord the same as any other tenant, and the sale must inevitably follow at a price fixed by the Estates Commissioners, what is the necessity for giving the future tenant the right to have a fair rent fixed? I suppose we are right in assuming that all future tenants, or, at any rate, 99 per cent. of them, desire to acquire their farms, if they can do so at a fair and reasonable price. If Clause 39 gives them an easy way of doing that, I do not see the object of enabling them to have a fair rent fixed. If I am wrong in the view that these tenants will be able to avail themselves of the Compulsory Clauses, that would put a slightly different aspect on the matter, and I should be ready to reconsider the vote which at present I am inclined to give against the Clause.

One view of this Clause, expressed from above the Gangway, is that it goes too far. Another view, expressed by the hon. Member for East Mayo (Mr. Dillon), is that it goes just far enough. I rise for the purpose of expressing the view that the Clause does not go far enough, and that in order to settle the question of the future tenants a large extension of its provisions is necessary. In the first place, there appears to be some controversy as to the facts in the matter. The views of the hon. Member for Mayo are sufficiently advanced in the matter of land legislation, and I am sure that he has expressed the view that the Clause goes far enough, not because we differ upon any principle involved, but because he takes a different view of the facts. He thinks the Clause goes far enough because he considers that it covers the bulk of the future tenants. I take a different view, because I believe that the Clause covers only a comparatively small fraction of those tenants. We must remember that the Land Act of 1881 has now been in operation for nearly 30 years, and in that interval a considerable number of future tenancies have been acquired. This Clause deals with only one class of future tenancies, namely, future tenancies created in cases where present tenancies formerly existed. The hon. Member for Mayo takes the view that that class represents a majority of the future tenants; I take the view that it represents a minority. This is a question on which we have no figures; we can only make a rough guess. Even if we knew the exact numbers, we should still be at a loss how to divide them into the two categories, and to say which category represented the greater number. On that matter I must judge by my own experience. My experience is that for one future tenant who comes within this Clause, at least three do not. I quite agree that there were originally a very considerable number of future tenants with which this Clause deals created by the effect of eviction. But it is an error to suppose that a majority of these men were left future tenants. A great many men, since the Act of 1887, who were evicted under the "Eviction-made-easy" Clause were in that position that the landlord could have made them future tenants if he had desired to do so. But in Ireland there is pressure outside the law, as well as pressure inside the law. In a very large number of cases the landlord found it to be to his interest, instead of treating them as future tenants, to treat them as present tenants, and give them the right to have a fair rent fixed. We cannot forget this, that the Fair Bent Courts were in the beginning a very ugly dose for the Irish landlords. In the end, however, the average landlord knew that he had better submit to the Fair Rent Court, and the reasonable landlord constantly replied to his tenant who said his rent was too high: "There is the Court." That strengthened the landlord's position in many cases, for he could tell the complaining tenant that the rent paid was the judicial rent. For that reason a very large number of tenants, evicted under the "Eviction-made-easy" Clause, were permitted by the landlord to have a fair rent fixed, and in that way the noxious effect of the Clause was somewhat nullified. That is one reason why the number of present tenants converted into future tenants is not so large as the hon. Member for Mayo supposes it to be.

But there was another reason. For at least 10 years the courts in Ireland took a view of the law which the Court of Appeal ultimately decided to be a false one. Under the operation of Section 20 of the Act of 1881 the Land Commission for many years took the view that unless the landlord had actually and physically expelled the tenant from his holding no future tenancy was created. In a very large number of cases where the landlord determined the tenancy he did not need to put the tenant out physically at all; and I should suppose that, in fact, the great majority of future tenants who were created were cases where the tenant had never lost physical possession of the soil. It was not until the Conway appeal case, decided in 1897 or 1898, that the court entirely reversed the view that had for so long prevailed, and declared that it was not at all necessary for the creation of a future tenancy that there should be any physical separation between the tenant and his holding. The third reason why future tenants are not so numerous is the very large number of cases that have been settled by purchase. So, on the whole, I venture to say that the operation of this Clause, as it stands at present, would not be the wide operation supposed, but one comparatively narrow and limited. This is a defect in the Clause that the House ought to remedy. I ask why the future tenant generally should not get the benefit of the Act? The bulk of future tenants were not formerly present tenants. I am not here to say one word in favour of the grabber. I believe nine-tenths are already owners of their holdings under the Act of 1903, and will be owners as long as grass grows and water runs. It is a minority of gentlemen who have that opprobrious name, and for whom, certainly, I do not desire to say one word. But to say that the future tenant who is not a present tenant is, as a rule, a grabber is a complete mistake—is an allegation for which there is absolutely no foundation. There is a large body of future tenants in Ireland who are not grabbers, who are not tenants of holdings, and who are excluded from the benefit of this Clause. Why are they to be excluded? We know that Mr. Gladstone excluded them when passing the Land Act of 1881—I was only a young man, but I remember vividly those Debates, because, as he declared, he wished to preserve the germ of free contract. It was his hope that that small germ—like the grain of mustard seed, which "is the smallest of all the seeds, but which ultimately becomes a great tree, and the birds of the air build in the branches thereof"—should grow, and he believed that the future tenant would ultimately spread all over Ireland. Mr. Gladstone hoped that the reign of contract would once more spread and flourish. If you read his speeches you will see that he actually hoped that the reign of the general sections of the Act of 1881 would be a short one, and that future tenant, or contract rights—rights regulated by contract alone—would ultimately prevail and overspread the land. Although a hope of that kind may have been entertained in the year 1881, I do not think anyone entertains it in the year 1909! No one now hopes that, any large portion of the land of Ireland will be held under any contractual relations between landlord and tenant; no one would seek to revive that state of things or to resurrect these relations. These relations are now being put an end to by land purchase. We often hear that it is a hardship that tenants on one side of a fence should have one set of rights and that tenants on the other side should have a different set of rights. I have great sympathy with the views of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover, who says these tenants can purchase. No man in Ireland has profited more from the fair rent courts than I have, but no man in Ireland is better pleased to see them coming to an end, and I quite agree that it is for the interest of the country as a whole that the sooner we are done with fair rents the better, and the view which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover expressed has my entire sympathy. These future tenants are not a very large body. I have seen their numbers estimated at 80,000 in a document I got the other day. I think probably 20,000 would be much nearer the mark, and of that 20,000 I do not believe 5,000 will be helped by this Bill—indeed, the proportion will be very much under that figure—but why should the others be excluded? The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover said let them purchase. An hon. Member told us that these future tenants, as a rule, hold at a much higher figure than the ordinary judicial tenant. The ordinary tenant, as a rule, does not buy his holding on his own account. The question of buying or not buying has nothing to do with it. The average Irish tenant does not want to sell his land at all; he wants to hand it down to the twenty-third generation after him. It is his glory and his pride to keep his holding for his family, and I hope that is a sentiment with which the general bulk of the House will sympathise. It is admitted that there are a large number of these tenants who are excluded, and that these men hold at much higher rents than the judicial tenants. Is it really in the interest of the landlord that his tenant should hold at a rent which is unfair? I ask any Member of the landlord party above the Gangway to answer that question.

Does not the hon. Member for Cork City consider it a simpler transaction for a future tenant to put in force the compulsory Clauses of.the Bill, and thus force his landlord to sell his holding to him at a price to be fixed by the Estates Commissioners than to embark on the cumbersome and tedious course of having a fair rent fixed, and then proceed to put the compulsory Clauses into force. Surely it is better for the tenant to acquire his holding by one operation than by two.

I am glad to have the forecast from the hon. Gentleman as to the result of this Bill. We may confide in the compulsory Clauses, and if he will guarantee to me that it is open to me to amend this Clause when it comes back from the House of Lords, I will accept his argument. I was delighted in listening to these Debates to hear the moderate tone in which this Clause as a whole was dealt with by Gentlemen above the Gangway. I argue from this tone that this Clause will have an easy passage in another place, and that it will most likely come back intact and unimpaired from the House of Lords. To come back to the question I asked, is it really in the interests of any landlord to have his land let at a higher figure than a fair rent? We are not dealing with houses or town parks or demesnes or temporary lettings, we are dealing with the ordinary agricultural holdings, and I ask: Will any Member get up and say that it is in the real interest of a landlord to have an agricultural holding let at a higher rent than a fair rent? I ask that every future tenant should have a right to come into Court and have a fair rent fixed. We are told it is unnecessary. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover says that whatever the disability of the future tenant may be he has a right to purchase, and that when he proceeds to purchase he has the right of inspection. That is true; but what about the unhappy tenant? He bargains with his landlord to buy his holding for £3,000. Inspection takes place, and the inspector reports it is only worth £1,500. What good is inspection to that tenant? The landlord comes along and says, "Sir, I beg to inform you that when your holding was inspected by the Estates Commissioners they came to the conclusion it was only value for £1,500; the amount agreed upon was £3,000. Will you kindly arrange to lodge the balance in Court as soon as possible?" That is the regular form. I do not say the landlord will get the £3,000, but he will get a great deal of it, and if he does not he will not sell. That is my answer to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover (Mr. Wyndham) when ha says that the future tenant is perfectly protected by the fact that he can purchase. If a tenant is "an undesirable person," why is he to get the benefit of the purchase? I am astonished at the hon. Member saying that if the future tenant happens to be a grabber he is prepared to give him the benefit of purchase. It is not the grabber, but the man who has taken for the first time since 1881 a holding which was never previously occupied by a tenant. I can tell the right hon. Gentleman that the Government are in a fool's paradise if they consider that this Clause settles the question of the future tenant. This Bill does not deal with one-fourth of them, and the remaining three-fourths will remain demanding that they should be put upon the same basis as the other tenants. Let me tell the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover that the existence of these future tenants on an estate and paying a higher rent is often the greatest obstacle to a sale, because they are the tenants with whom the landlord has the most difficulty in coming to a bargain. When I was discussing an earlier Clause of this Bill, and arguing that you could not apply the graduated sliding scale, the hon. Member for East Mayo told me that he hoped the future cases would be able to have a fair rent fixed. He said he thoroughly believed that that would be the case, because he explained that this Clause covered the bulk of the future tenants. That view I believe to be a profound mistake. I do not believe it to be a fact at all. On the contrary, I believe that it only includes a comparatively small number of them, and I think it would greatly aid the settlement of the land problem generally, and in particular would aid and facilitate purchase transactions if these tenants were given once for all the right to go into the court to fix a fair rent. I apologise for having spoken so often today; but, holding the views I do as to the extent of this Clause, and not hearing that view expressed from any other quarter, I thought it my duty to express my opinion, and leave on record my view that this Clause does not adequately deal with this question.

Will the hon. and learned Member say who are the tenants who are excluded?

That is exceedingly simple to answer. The Clause only deals with the case of a holding which was at one time the property of the present tenant. Whatever else we have done or hope to do when this Clause passes, it will only apply to holdings on which a present tenancy at one time existed and where it was determined. Those are the governing words of the Clause. The Attorney-General for Ireland asked me why I did not put down my Amendments earlier, and thought he had some ground of complaint because I had not done so. I did not put my Amendments down earlier because I thought they would have been put down by the Irish party. I do not want the honour and glory of moving Amendments, and I thought Amendments to this Clause would have come with much more force from the Irish party, and if hon. Members of that party had put down any such Amendments I should have supported them. I waited until the last moment to allow that course to be adopted. Apparently Amendments of the class I have suggested to widen the scope of the Clause were not put down because it was thought the Clause had a wider operation than it really has. One thing about it is plain, and it is that in whatever way it has been amended to-day or discussed, as it stands, and as we hope to see it amended in view of the promises given, it will be a Clause extending only to holdings on which a present tenancy once existed.

Will the hon. and learned Member give us a specific case?

I am asked to-give a specific case. I have said already that I do not want to dogmatise, or force my opinion upon anyone else, but from my own experience in advising tenants I say that for one case of a future tenant who holds a holding on which a present tenant formerly existed, there are at least three cases of future tenants who do not hold land under that condition. [HON. MEMBERS: "No, no."] Hon. Members below the Gangway do not think that is the case, but I am expressing my own opinion. The Attorney-General for Ireland made a piteous appeal for the landlord who had evicted his tenant for a breach of statutory conditions for non-payment of rent. I do not believe there are many cases of that kind. I believe there once was such a case on a "campaign" estate where the holding was taken for the purpose of planting huts, and the landlord said that was a breach of the statutory conditions. The tenant, however, could come in and say, "I am sorry for having broken the statutory conditions," and that would put art end to the state of things obtaining. There is a legal maxim de minimis non curat lex, and I suggest we might apply it here. We cannot deal with infinitesimal cases. When we come to discuss the Clause as a whole, I say we are entitled to discuss it as to its general effect, and not take a microscopic view, and try and find whether in a small number of cases it would have the application contended by the right hon. Gentleman. I again apologise for troubling the Committee, but I feel bound to express the opinion that the Clause falls far short of the grievance of the case which it is intended to right.

I quite agree with the construction the hon. Member has put upon this Clause. It is as he points out, limited distinctly to those cases where land which is now subject to future tenancies was subject to present tenancies in 1879. I do not agree with the hon. Member for Cork that every future tenant ought to be put in the same position as the present tenant. A future tenant is any tenancy which has been created since 1881. Suppose I have land in my hands this year, and I come to an agreement with my labourer and make him a future tenant at a rent of £20, he knows, being a future tenant, he cannot come to the Land Court to get the rent reduced. Would it not be very hard if two men, having made that agreement with their eyes open, the future tenant should —before the ink is dry—be at liberty to go into the Court and get that £20 reduced to £15, £12, or £10? That would not be fair dealing, because the transaction is entered into on the basis that the land is outside the scope of the Land Court. I do not think any fair-minded man could possibly go with the hon. Member when he is going to extend the scope of the Clause to such a case as that. The hon. Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Campbell) pointed out another case. A man goes into the market, and at auction buys a future tenancy for, say, £300. By a stroke of the pen, you would again, by this Clause, present him with a tenancy which, if he sold to - morrow, would be worth £550, £600, or £700. I do not know what he has done in a meritorious way to be entitled to such a bargain. If there is to be a general inclusion of all future tenancies cases like that, where absolutely no hardship exists, should be provided against and excluded. I could not possibly agree to all cases of future tenants, especially under the heads I have mentioned, being admitted. I think the class to which this limiting Clause applies have a certain amount of claim on public policy to the benefit of the Clause, but, like other hon. Members, I have very little idea what the actual number may be. I am not able to attach implicit confidence to the estimates we hear from time to time from hon. Members below the Gangway. We were told time and time again that the settlement of the evicted tenants' question would affect a very small class. The hon. Member for Mayo once put them at 800, and at present we have 9,000 applications. I do not know about this particular class, but if it exists at all in the Northern counties it certainly exists in an infinitesimal degree. We have very few caretaker tenants there, and there have been very few evictions there under the Act of 1877. They have generally taken place, as intended by the framers of the Act, in those parts of the county where the evictions would actually prevent disturbance, riot, and opposition to the district sheriff when he came to seize. I am glad to say we have little of those proceedings in the North. This Clause is very much in the same form as the Bill of 1908. There was a National Convention in Dublin to consider that Bill, and one of the gentlemen attending the Convention got up and practically moved what the hon. Member for Cork has moved—that every future tenant, irrespective of the date of his tenancy or contract, should, without exception, be allowed to come in and fix a fair rent. One would have imagined that would have met the views of hon. Members below the Gangway, but the hon. Member for Waterford (Mr. John Redmond) and others pointed out that it would be a terrible thing to allow, because every planter and everyone who has been brought down from the North and settled on an evicted holding would come in under the Clause. That was enough for them to get up and damn the Clause, and say it should be restricted to the people evicted and made caretakers under the Section of the Act of 1877. If the whole of the future tenants in Ireland are excluded, it is the result of the Dublin Convention; it is due to the action of hon. Members below the Gangway, who were afraid that the emergency man or planter from the North would become a tenant, with a right to have a fair rent fixed under this Bill. It may be a matter of policy, but it is their policy, and not ours. All I have said is borne out by the facts, and those who are sufficiently interested can find out for themselves where the responsibility lies. The Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Maurice Healy) should not blame the Government or us. It was the Irish Nationalist party which said that sooner than allow every future tenant in Ireland to have a fair rent fixed we will exclude them, lest some emergency man should get the benefit of the Act. In my opinion there are certain cases of future-tenants where it would be an equitable and fair thing to allow them the benefit of the Act, but I am not prepared to go the whole length, and, under the circumstances as the Clause is framed, I shall not go into the Lobby either for or against it.

I am not going to make a long speech, for certain hon. Members seem to think that in connection with this Debate there is no such thing as time. We in Ireland are unanimous in our desire to get rid of the entire land question and of the Land Court as well, but before that happy day arrives there will always be certain problems to be solved. There are many cases where tenants holding under agreements as future tenants are called upon to pay most exorbitant rents. In my own Constituency, to my personal knowledge, there are future tenants paying for their holdings a rent 50 per cent. higher than the rent of adjoining farms, and in these cases, if the landlord offers to sell, he wants 24½ years' purchase on these higher rents. It is all very well to say the matter is open to inspection. The fact is, if the inspector goes down and says the rent is exorbitant, the landlord promptly makes other excessive claims. It has been asked, "Is it to the interest of the landlord to let holdings at high rents?" It may not be, but, as a fact, he does do it, and you may rely upon it that, if the tenant on these holdings has a lease, the landlord will extract that rent to the last shilling. No doubt there exists considerable difference of opinion as to the number of tenants who will benefit by this provision. The hon. Member for North Armagh has quoted the estimate of the hon. Member for East Mayo, who stated years ago that there were 800 evicted tenants, although the figure was afterwards raised to 10,000. But the hon. Member should remember that the hon. Member for East Mayo was at that time referring only to the Plan of Campaign tenants. I was pleased to find the hon. Member for North Armagh joining the hon. Member for the City of Cork in a shot at the Members of the Irish Nationalist party. But let me assure both hon. Members that, so far as that party is concerned, the Members are satisfied that they, at any rate, have done their duty to their constituents, and can completely ignore the sneers thrown at them.

I entirely agree with the opinion expressed by the Solicitor-General for Ireland, and I think if the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover would apply himself practically to the operation of land purchase in Ireland he would find the experience a very valuable one. I have had not a little experience in this matter, and I can assure the Committee that since the passing of the Act of 1903 we have found that the hardest estates to sell are those on which there are future tenants. Whether the rents charged are too high or not is beside the question, but undoubtedly there is a consensus of opinion that the future tenant who is paying the same rent as obtained in the year 1882, which was then higher than the first term rent, and has not since been reduced, does not get such fair terms from the landlords as he should do in the event of purchase. It has been said that if they go into court they subject themselves to prolonged and costly litigation. But, after all, the fixing of a fair rent is a very simple process. I hear an hon. Member say "and a lengthy one," but I have had to do with the fixing of thousands of fair rents, and I assert it is possible to complete the process in two months. It becomes lengthy when the landlord does not accept the decision of the sub-commission, which he rarely or never does, and then when appeals are entered we have to wait until the majesty of the King's Bench can be brought down to some little country town to decide whether a tenant should pay £2 or £2 5s. for his holding. But that prolongation of the process is entirely due to the action of the landlords. I say it is an essential of the land purchase system that the future tenant should be brought under the Act, and I would add it would be a very simple process to fix a fair rent for him. In my opinion it would not be necessary to fix one rent in ten by order of the court, for this reason—that the landlords will gladly meet them when any of them have a right to get a fair rent fixed. Another reason why I am anxious to see this Clause passed is that at the present time landlords are exercising powers which are strictly within the law, but they are unreasonable. We are told that no landlord has ever evicted a tenant for the breach of a statutory condition, and I do not know a case, but I have known landlords where there has been a breach of a statutory condition, and the tenant goes into court, come in and plead the breach which defects the tenants' rights under the fair rent provisions. If you enable future tenants to go into court and get a fair rent fixed, this power will be in the landlords' hands. I know many cases where future tenants have been anxious to try and get for themselves some permanent basis so that they could really throw all their energy into the farm, and have gone to the landlord and said: "Do not make us present tenants but give us some relief from this heavy burden." The landlord says "No." But this is the temptation held out; he says: "Sell your farm, you are only a future tenant, but I will allow you to sell as present tenant." If this offer is accepted, the tenant would get a high price, but the landlord knows that he is perpetuating for himself, for fifteen years at least, the rent which he has been dragging out of that man since 1882 or 1883. I think that an end should be put to this pressure within the law by landlords, and then you will enable a great many men to take advantage of the great system which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover (Mr. Wyndham) set moving. If the present process is continued, the landlords will have a right to extract this unreasonable rent, which the whole policy of land purchase condemns as a burden which is intolerable. What is the proposal before the Committee at this moment? Some hon. Members think it does not go far enough; some say it goes exactly far enough, while some say it goes too far. It does not satisfy me, and, as to future tenants, if you were to bring before this House a legislative scheme to deal with them, you would require a measure as big as that which I hold in my hand. This Clause goes a long way however, and even if it is imperfect, I am prepared to accept it for what it is worth.

We on these benches are most anxious to assist land purchase in its entirety, but it would be an ungracious thing when a great measure of this kind is passing through Parliament that a large number of tenants should remain excluded from the benefits of the system and subject to unfair rents for which they cannot seek redress in the courts. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover (Mr. Wyndham) met that argument by saying that these tenants could try to purchase, but my hon. Friend's answer is, that if they do, it is under terms which would perpetuate the onerous and rack-rented conditions they are under at present. The burden which can be put upon these future tenants renders it impossible to get the fair conditions that the first or second-term tenant is getting. There can be little doubt that the ill-omened "Eviction-made-easy" Clause of the Act of 1887 is responsible for the position of a large number of the unfortunate people who stand in the position of present tenants. The hon. Member for South Tyrone at one time, I have no doubt for the very best possible motives, championed that Clause with a great deal of energy.

May I say that my policy was to avoid the physical and distressing effect of actual eviction.

I was going to say that the hon. Gentleman never anticipated 22 years ago that the provision would have worked in such a wholesale and sweeping manner as it has. We quite understand it was done to avoid the physical and distressing effect of actual eviction, accompanied by the crowbar and other shocking accompaniments; but, while you got rid of the actual physical eviction, the unfortunate man who was subjected to the proceedings did all he could to redeem, within the period allowed by law, and then came back, not as a tenant enjoying the benefit of the Land Act, but as a kind of servant, paying a rack-rent, and only anxious to escape from the morass into which actual and physical eviction would have thrown him. That is the whole history of the-tenants for whom we are pleading to-day. I know the hardships under which they are suffering, and I would welcome any proposal which would enable them to have a fair rent fixed. I want to exclude nobody from the benefits of the Act, but I do not think the sympathy of the Committee ought to go out in an overwhelming manner to the comfortable man, not necessarily a farmer, who, ten years ago, with his eyes open and as a commercial transaction, and not in order to live on the land, acquired for a reasonable or unreasonable sum the holding of a man who, to save himself from eviction, sells his holding to this rich man. Our sympathy ought not to go out to that man in an overwhelming manner. But take the case of the mass of the future tenants of Ireland. They have been the victims of misfortune. They are, to a large extent, the residue of the unhappy "Eviction—made-easy" Clause. I trust the Clause will be carried into operation, and that it will not be divided against.

The Irish party have never taken the position that it would be just or fair or honest to give all future tenants in Ireland a right to have fair rents fixed, and in all the legislation of this House since 1887 there have been restrictions imposed, to some of which we were parties. We are not prepared now to extend the principle of fixing fair rents to every single evicted tenant, nor do we say it would be honest or fair. I think the provision in the Clause as it stands, that every tenant under all conditions will be admitted to have a fair rent fixed where there was at any time a statutory tenancy in the holding;, is a fair and reasonable proposition, though I think it requires to be strengthened. I have been surprised at the hesitation on the part of some hon. Members above the Gangway against the admission of future tenants to be present tenants, because certainly the landlords of Ireland for four or five years have had no such hesitation. They have been, creating future tenants into present tenants in batches when the object was that they should sign an agreement to purchase the farm under Section (1) of the Act of 1903. I think my Friends are going too far in raising all these difficulties in the way of the creation of present tenures. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Wyndham) asked the Attorney-General to enter into a contract with him that he would provide that any tenant who had bought his future tenancy, knowing that it was a future tenancy, and was to be such, was not to come under this Section. There is a case of a whole batch of tenants on an estate in the South of Ireland who, when the Land Act of 1881 was going through this House in the month of June, had their interest sold by the sheriff. When the Act passed they were out of occupation. They were not present tenants within the meaning of the Act, and after they had been a long time upon the roadside the landlord entered into an agreement with them by which they were to become future tenants at a considerable increase of rent. The landlord purchased all those farms for the sum of £5. I thought that under the provisions of this Clause, and especially of Sub-section (3), having regard to the fact that these tenants could claim to be in occupation of present tenancies in 1881, they were covered by this Clause, but when I heard the dialogue that took place between the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Campbell) and the Attorney General for Ireland I am now satisfied that they are not in under this Clause, and I think language should be introduced to cover cases of that kind.

Will the hon. Member kindly explain why he thinks they are out?

Because when the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Campbell) said that wherever there was a case of a tenant having purchased from the landlord the tenancy which was in his own hands since the Land Act of 1881, that future tenant should not be in the position of having a fair rent fixed, the Attorney-General seemed to assent.

I did not assent to-day to anything that the right hon. Gentleman said. I was very anxious not to assent to anything.

Of course that carries us no further. I am precisely now where I started from. I am not satisfied that these eases will be included. I did think before the discussion took place that these tenants, being able to show under the first part of this Clause that they were in occupation of a tenancy which was a present tenancy in 1881, would now be entitled to come in. But then the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Trinity College says that would be wholly unjust and inequitable, and I am not satisfied that the Clause, if it is to be interpreted in that way, will include these tenants. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Wyndham) suggested to the Attorney-General that words should be introduced into the Section making the provision absolutely clear. I have great confidence in the sagacity of the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General for Ireland, but I despair of any lawyer, however eminent he may be, making anything clear in reference to these Irish Land Acts, and, while I do not ask them to make this provision in regard to future tenants absolutely clear, I think words should be introduced which will embrace the case of tenants who were temporarily out when the Land Act of 1881 was passed, who are not present tenants within the definition of the Land Act of 1881, and who have remained as future tenants since, and to whom even the landlord refuses to sell, because he has them absolutely in his own hands. The suggestion that the future tenant has a perfect remedy in his hands for his future relations with the landlord, because he has a right to come in under the sale, is altogether illusory and is really no advantage whatever to that tenant except that the landlord in all such cases has made his terms with the future tenants, because they were persons who could not stand up with them upon a question of bargain and sale, and these have been the people who have really stood in the way of land purchase in Ireland. Anyone who wanted to prevent land purchase in Ireland could not go about it in a more efficient way than first of all securing that the future tenants had become present tenants, which was the method adopted by the landlords themselves, who have no hesitation about creating future tenants in large batches when it was for the purpose of signing these agreements. I disagree entirely with the speech of the hon. Member for Cork that any large number of deserving cases are going to be excluded under this provision. With the limitation I have expressed, as regards the batch of tenants whose case I had in my mind, this provision is a reasonable one, and is calculated to include in the future most honest cases of a future tenant.

If another argument were needed in favour of purchase and against fair rent, I think it would be found in the Debate of three and a-half hours that we have had to-day. It revived my earliest political recollections to hear the hon. Member (Mr. Maurice Healy) producing with unfailing ingenuity arguments to prove that everyone else is wrong in the interpretation of Irish land law. We had this duel between legal experts upon the subject. It is an interesting game to watch. The hon. Member for East Wick-low showed that this Clause went too far according to some men's views, and not far enough to meet the views of a fair contingent of those who have taken part in this Debate. That will always be the case when you attempt to meet the views of men who hold different views. I ask that the consideration which the Government have promised to give to this Clause shall be a real consideration, and that it shall be considered with the object of trying to make the Clause more intelligible than it is as it now stands.

I wish to call the attention of the Attorney-General to the proposal to repeal Section 2 of the Land Act of 1903 as it affects Section 19 of the Labourers Act of 1906. The right hon. Gentleman has already undertaken that he will make it clear that Section 19 of that Act shall be made applicable to the Section 17 of this. Bill, which is to be substituted for Section 2 of the Act of 1903. I want the right hon. Gentleman to say whether he will make it absolutely clear that Section 19 of the Labourers Act of 1906 is not consequentially repealed. Will he put words in Clause 17 of this Bill on the Report stage to make that absolutely clear?

That matter has been considered by the draftsman, and he has already put words in Sub-section (4) of Clause 17 for the very purpose. The Subsection says: "Section two of the Act of 1903 shall cease to have effect save as regards the sale of any parcels of land in respect of which purchase agreements have been entered into before the passing of this Act, and any reference in any enactment to that Section shall be construed as a reference to this Section." The last words of the Sub-section have reference to the matter which my hon. Friend has in his mind. I think the thing is as clear as possible; but, if my hon. Friends have any doubt on the matter, I will undertake that most careful consideration will be given to it between now and the Report stage, and if it can be made clearer I will introduce words for that purpose.

What I fear is that the words at the end of Sub-section (4) might be held as not applying to Clause 17 of the Labourers Act of 1906.

If that is so, I think the words could be made a separate sub-section.

This Clause confirms the Schedules, and, as we shall never have an opportunity of discussing the Schedules, I only want to ask the Government to examine the Schedules with a certain amount of care in certain directions. I am not at all sure that by leaving in Clause 72 you leave the financial relations of the Congested Districts Board and the Land Commission to the Treasury in the way that is intended. I could give many examples which lead me to believe that the second Schedule as it at present stands has not been fully considered. All that I ask is that the Government should go carefully through the previous Acts before asking us to pass the Schedule. We have had difficulties arising in connection with schedules before.

I agree that it is a matter of very great importance. After the full discussion of the Bill the Schedule will be gone through.

proposed the following new Clause:—

I beg to move the second reading of the Clause. It relates to a matter of great practical importance and interest to those concerned in the investment of moneys arising under the operation of the Land Purchase Act. Section 51 of the Act of 1903 was certainly a measure in no sense deficient in title. The provisions are very sweeping, because they authorise the investment of the purchase money in any of the securities named in the various Subsections, and these investments can be made at the request of a tenant for life without the consent of any other person whatsoever, however great his interest may be in the future of the property, and they may be made notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in the settlement, and also have the effect of relieving the trustees of the settlement of any liability by reason of their making any such investment.

I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Wyndham) upon the courage of the party to which he belongs in tearing up trusts when he has a mind so to do, because, having all my life before, fortunately or unfortunately, I became a Member of this Administration, practised at the Chancery Bar, all I can say is that anything more sweeping, more startling, and, I dare say, useful, than these Clauses I never heard of, because they enable a tenant for life, a person profoundly interested in increasing his own income, to set aside the trusts of the deed under which alone he became entitled to the property; and, in order to secure that that can be done without any opposition from the trustees, the Act goes on to relieve the trustees from any liability by reason of the investment being made. I do not quarrel with it at all, but I feel bound to mention the fact that it is of a very sweeping character. Six of the several classes of investments are authorised in Subsection 1, and there has been a decision of the Court of Appeal, in the Blacker Douglas estate, in 1905 First Irish Reports, which decides that these investments, which are included in paragraph (c) of Sub-section 1, debentures or mortgages of any railway company in the United Kingdom incorporated by Act of Parliament, are included without regard to the usual conditions that a dividend must have been paid on its ordinary stock for some period, and that those in paragraph (f) refer only to the shares in any home, colonial, or foreign railway which is registered in the United Kingdom. I do not know that this last condition is one to which I would attach very much importance. The whole question, to my mind, is really the character of the investment and how far it can safely be made, and, although I can understand the legal mind which prefers a foreign railway which has a registered office in the United Kingdom, where notices and the like can be served, I do not know that a business man would attach any greater importance to a foreign railway which had a registered office in this country than he would to one that had not. I think the hon. Baronet (Sir F. Banbury) would agree with me in that. All foreign railways would require to be considered with the utmost care before any investment was made in them; but I am not disposed to think that the mere fact of a foreign railway having a registered office in this country would justify one in making an investment in it while excluding perhaps a much better railway that was not registered in this country.

I think everybody will agree with regard to a range of investment which is so wide, though not in my judgment unnecessarily wide—I should be willing in some respects to see it wider, having regard to the kind of investments that prudent men have been in the habit of making during the last few years—but still it is a very wide choice of selection, and I think, having regard to the fact that these investments may be made with the consent of the tenant for life and without anybody else's consent, and that the risk of liability of the trustees is swept to one side, some provision must be necessary to protect the interests of persons claiming under the settlement other than the tenant for life. Thereupon the proviso for which I think the right hon. Gentleman is not responsible, at the end provides that the sufficiency of any such investments as are hereinbefore in this Section recited to realise the sum invested therein on the death of the tenant for life or the termination of the trust, shall be secured to the satisfaction of the Public Trustee under this Act. I think that that must have been done in the House of Lords. But, however that may be, it throws a very great burden on that functionary. "Secured" has been held, I believe, in the Irish courts to mean "established." It has got to be established to the satisfaction of the Public Trustee The proviso extends to all the six new classes of investments mentioned in the Sub-section. A Public Trustee placed in that position is not very likely, you could hardly expect him, to approach the question with a very open mind, because there is a very considerable liability imposed upon him. He is made the only person standing between the remainder man and the tenant for life. Therefore, it is not surprising that it is found difficult to induce him to authorise all these investments which, as a fact, business men would recognise to be a safe kind. I do not wish to say anything against the Public Trustee. I think he has discharged his duties perfectly well. In fact, I think he shows more courage certainly than I should have done in the same circumstances. But at the same time there he is; and I think if you look at these investments you will see that in (c) and (f) in the Act of 1903 it would be impossible to relax these conditions. I do not propose to remove the restrictions with regard to them. I think that as regards (c), debentures or mortgages of railway companies in the United Kingdom incorporated by Act of Parliament, investments should not be made, unless the Public Trustee is satisfied that they establish the security of the persons entitled. In the same way (f), debentures or fully-paid shares of any railway company where for 10 years immediately preceding the date of investment has paid dividends on its ordinary shares, there again I think that if you are to act with prudence you must secure the protection which is granted by the proviso. I am not altering the proviso. I am simply excluding from its operation all securities mentioned in Section (51), except (c) and (f). With regard to all the others, I think that the condition may safely be lapsed. The investments are of a truly conservative character, and I think trustees may safely invest in them without really incurring the least risk, unless it is that their trusts are of the most unusual and exclusive character. Investments of such a character in my opinion do not require the protection of the proviso. Therefore, the new Clause which I am moving is as follows: "The proviso in paragraph (f) of Sub-section one of Section fifty-one of the Act of 1903 with respect to sufficiency of investments shall be construed as applying only to the investments mentioned in paragraphs (c) and (f) of that Sub-section. "The Section of the Act of 1903 was accepted reluctantly in the other House, and on the condition that the proviso should govern all the investments authorised. I daresay the right lion. Gentleman (Mr. Wyndham) was the original begetter of many things that appeared in the other House. The only thing I am proposing now is to modify it in a particular way. Some hon. Members may express regret that my Amendment does not go further. I am perfectly willing to hear anything that may be said on the subject from the business point of view, because I feel it is of very great importance to the Irish landlords that they should be able, with safety, honour, and justice, to make the right sort of investments, and I have always felt, speaking with some experience of these matters as a lawyer, that nothing requires more careful consideration than an investment clause. A harsh, unreasonable, or foolish investment clause often prevents the fortune of a family from receiving that access which is desired. In the case of Ireland we are particularly desirous of giving assistance to the landlords who have been accustomed to rely with more or less certainty on the income derived from their land, and it will facilitate land purchase enormously if you can secure for them a good range of investments. What we want is a thoroughly sound and up-to-date investment clause, and if anybody can assist us in that matter we shall be glad.

The right hon. Gentleman has expressed some surprise that a Member of the Tory party should have made himself responsible for this proviso in the Act of 1903. I would remind him that one of the most honoured and one of th3 most typical representatives of the Tory party (Lord Halsbury) has always been in favour of great latitude for these investments. I do not recollect whether originally the Clause was in its present state, but I do not mind confessing that in its earlier stages it embraced even more than it does as it now stands, and in its ultimate form it excluded a certain number of investments, with the proviso that the Public Trustee should give his advice upon the security of these investments. I am very glad to associate myself with the tribute paid by the Chief Secretary to the Public Trustee for the way in which he has discharged his novel and delicate duties. What we are now asked to do is merely to say that the Public Trustee is not to give his advice upon three kinds of investment out of the five which are contemplated by Clause 51. He is a bold man who will say in this year of grace, 1909, what are going to be the safest forms of investment ten years hence. As at present advised, the Chief Secretary thinks that the advice and sanction of the Public Trustee is necessary in the case of the debentures of a railway company, because there are certain cases of railway debentures where the company does not pay a dividend on its ordinary shares. The Chief Secretary thinks the sanction of the Public Trustee is still necessary in respect of securities under (c), that is to say, debentures and mortgages of railway companies in the United Kingdom incorporated by Act of Parliament, The right hon. Gentleman points out that there are cases where railway companies pay no dividends on their ordinary shares. I should have thought that, the debentures, or even the stock of a company like the London, Chatham, and Dover, which has never paid a dividend once in the whole course of its existence, and only twice paid interest on its ordinary shares, ought not to be picked out for special condemnation from this point of view by the Chief Secretary, because when we come to the kind of security which he thinks will be perfectly safe, and may be invested in without calling in the advice of the Public Trustee, there are the ground rents of hereditaments. Under the policy on which the Government proceeds will anybody say that in 10 or 15 years' time the debentures of British railways will not be a safer form of security than ground rents arising out of hereditaments?

Or aeroplanes.

I think that is a very irrelevant interruption. I say you cannot pick certain forms of security and be quite sure that they will be of the best character in the future. It is of the first importance that the Irish landlord should have a great latitude of investment, so that he may get the income which he derived from his land; therefore, I am always in favour of extending the latitude of investment open to him. My Amendment of Clause 51 would be to have a greater latitude of investment, but to make the advice and sanction of the Public Trustee obligatory in every case. The Chief Secretary is not relieving him of the hardest part of his duty. The right hon. Gentleman says, "I will not ask the Trustee to go into the matter if I think the security is safe, but where I think there is some doubt," as in the case of railway debentures or as in other cases of foreign railways, "then I will ask the public officer to resolve those doubts in the minds of the parties." I think it would be far more in conformity with the interests of all parties and the necessities of the case if this Clause is to be amended, to consider all the securities that might be reasonably invested in under the circumstances, and to say in every case that the advice and sanction of the Public Trustee should be given. That is an Amendment of which I should approve.

This is a point on which I thought Members below the Gangway and Members above the Gangway would be able to act in harmony. This Clause was put down, I assume, by the Chief Secretary to meet, as far as he was prepared to go, the Amendment which stands on the Paper in the name of the hon. Member for the St. Stephen's Green Division of Dublin (Mr. Waldron); that Amendment proposed to repeal the proviso altogether. The hon. Member is unable to be here, but the grounds upon which he wants repeal is entirely owing to the fact that the proviso, as interpreted in a recent judgment a few years ago absolutely killed the Section. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover does not appear to be aware of that fact. That judgment killed the Section and left it in operative. What was the nature of that judgment? The Attorney-General will know whether I am stating it correctly. I understand that the judgment of the Irish courts said that the Public Trustee, acting under this proviso, and giving it as his opinion that the investments would here after reproduce the capital, and if he were wrong, he might be personally held liable. What Public Trustee in the world could act under such circumstances? That is a very ex- traordinary judgment. The hon. Member for St. Stephen's Green, who is an expert in these matters, said that the Clause was killed and ceased to operate altogether. No trustee could act if he were to be held liable for an error of opinion.

Amend that.

That ought to be amended. That is the difficulty, and, in my opinion, until you get rid of that it is no use to amend it to the extent proposed by the Chief Secretary, which would still leave the Trustee helpless in paragraphs (c) and (f). It appears to me to reduce the whole Clause to an absolute absurdity. In my opinion the best way out of the difficulty would be to extend the jurisdiction of the Public Trustee all over these investments and to relieve him absolutely of personal liability in the case of these doubtful matters. I quite agree with the hon. Member that the list ought to be extended and made as wide as possible, with this check: that the Public Trustee should be satisfied whenever his power was put in force and that he should be held absolutely free from liability, because no Public Trustee, not even the hon. Baronet the Member for the City of London (Sir F. Banbury), would undertake to give a judgment as to what stock would sell for 10 years hence, if he was to be held personally liable. That is really the great point of the Clause. As regards the principle at stake in this Amendment and in the Clause, I am entirely at one, and so are all the Nationalist Members, with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover. This is a clause we heartily approve of. In this case the interests of the landlords and the tenants are exactly on all fours. We are most anxious to allow the landlords the utmost possible liberty of investing their money. I have always maintained, and I know it from personal experience and knowledge, you can get absolutely sound investments—far sounder than Irish land, or than many investment sin this country that are trusteeinvestments—in American bonds which will bring you 4 per cent., or at the very lowest £3 18s., at the present price of the market. Those are not fluctuating securities, but absolutely secure, and, of course, it is manifest that in the interests of the highest degree of the tenantry, as well as of the land, that the landlord should be able to invest their money so as to get £3 15s., £3 17s., or 4 per cent. In such case they would be able to accept a lower price. Therefore, on the principle of the Clause, we are at one, and the only question is how best it can be worked out. I think the new Clause proposed by the Chief Secretary is important, but I do not think it goes far enough.

I quite agree with the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Birrell) as to the desirability of making the field for investment as wide as possible. Nothing has struck me more during the last few years than the great change which has come over the class of investments which 30 years ago were considered to be the only investment in which a prudent man could invest his money. Cases have come within my own knowledge in which trustees have been held confined to first-class investments, and which have changed very much at the present moment. I think the general consensus of opinion in the City is that it is a mistake to limit too narrowly the scope of investments. Therefore I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that the scope should be as wide as possible. I did not quite understand what the right hon. Gentleman said about foreign railways registered in England, but I cannot find anything in his Amendment.

No. It was a decision of the court which held that under paragraph (f) ordinary shares in any home, Colonial, or foreign railway which is registered in the United Kingdom—that is to say, if it was a foreign railway and was registered in the United Kingdom it came within the list of investments, but if it was not so registered it could not be accepted even with the sanction of the Public Trustee.

Does the right hon. Gentleman propose to alter that?

No. I invited the hon. Baronet to tell me his opinion on that subject.

I certainly would alter it, because it does not seem that the fact that the company is registered in the United Kingdom has any bearing. On the contrary, it may have the opposite effect, because it may be difficult to obtain the money for that railway in the country in which it is, and so they come to England for it. I venture to say it is always better to put money in an investment in which the natives of the country put their own money. Therefore it is much better to have it in an investment which is popular abroad in the country in which it exists, whereas if you limit it to companies registered in England it may be to companies which are not able to obtain the money in their own country, but have to come over here and register here.

I quite agree. I indicated in the observations I made that that was my opinion, but I desired to be fortified by that of the hon. Baronet.

There can be no question about that. With regard to the right hon. Gentleman's Amendment, I think it would be an improvement to leave out paragraph (c). I do not say that the class of securities mentioned there have always been held to be trust securities, but with one or two exceptions it would be impossible to find debentures in a British railway which were not good securities. Therefore I do not think it is necessary to make the provision relating to the Public Trustee apply to that particular paragraph. The present Public Trustee is a very good man, but I do not know that he has had very much experience in investments, and it does not at all follow that the Public Trustee will be a good judge of investments. His duty is to see that the trust is administered according to the terms of the Act, and I do not think I should be prepared to hold him up as a man of great experience in investments. I should be inclined to agree that the less you have to do with the Public Trustee in the matter of consulting him about investments the better. It would be preferable to give a wide interpretation as to what investments are allowable. I should read paragraph (f) as including any ordinary shares or stock of any railway. It looks to me as if the paragraph got into the Act in an imperfect state. The usual rule is that you may invest in the debentures or preference shares of a railway which has paid a dividend during the last ten years or for a certain period upon its ordinary stock. Apparently this paragraph would apply to any railway in any part of the world. I think that is too wide. If the Chief Secretary would make his new Clause apply only to paragraph (f) and not to (c) there would be no objection to it.

The Public Trustee has never been held to be liable, but there was one of those observations, which are sometimes called obiter dicta, in which the judge said that in his reading of the Clause he was a trustee in the ordinary sense of the word. A trustee in the ordinary sense of the word may under certain circumstances be personally liable, and that is quite enough to frighten any man. Therefore I agree that it would be desirable to relieve the mind of the Public Trustee from any doubt on the point.

I believe I am right in saying that an ordinary trustee is not liable at the present moment provided he does not go outside the terms of the trust, and provided he exercises his discretion, and does what he has got to do in a proper and businesslike manner.

As I understand it, the effect of the judgment is that this proviso places a special duty upon the Public Trustee beyond that of the ordinary trustee; that he must be satisfied personally that such an investment is safe; and the dictum of the court was that he might be held personally liable if the investment failed. According to my information, that has absolutely paralysed the whole Section. The Public Trustee said he would not run the risk. I do not think you can expect any public official to make himself the target for innumerable actions for breach of trust.

That would possibly be an argument for omitting the proviso from all the provisions except Section 10 of the Act of 1903. I really do not think it advisable to relieve him from all responsibility.

I do not think that the Chief Secretary will be quite justified in putting in an Amendment which frees the Public Trustee from liability in all cases and under all circumstances. If the Public Trustee does his duty he will take reasonable precautions to satisfy himself that the money is likely to be forthcoming. Besides, a man should take responsibility, particularly a man who is getting a good salary for it. The Public Trustee has, contrary to what has been said by the hon. Baronet, possibly as large an experience as most people as to investments and the state of the money market. I would join the hon. Baronet in suggesting to the Chief Secretary that he should omit the reference to paragraph (c). There is really very little in this matter, and I would suggest that at present it should be restricted to paragraph (f), and that the Chief Secretary should remove from this proposal paragraph (c).

We are all agreed, I think, that in this matter we should be just as careful as if we were dealing with our own money. I would ask every Member, therefore, to put himself in the position as if he was making his own will or settlement, in the pursuance of which he would be deeply interested. And let him consider in what trusts he would wish to have his moneys invested for the purpose of securing a safe income. We are all agreed upon that. There are — — I will not say rival views, because it does not amount to as much as that — as to the investments, but we are all agreed that there should be as wide and ample a range of investments as possible, and I shall therefore, between now and the Report stage, consider this matter.

I should be only too pleased if the right hon. Gentleman would allow me to show him the terms of my trust.

If the hon. Baronet will acquaint me with the terms of his trust—I hope it will be a long time before it comes into operation—I shall be very glad; it is just the kind of assistance I am in need of. Then you must have someone who is to have a controlling judgment. You cannot leave it to the tenant for life to pick and choose one particular moment for one particular form of investment because it might not be the best. Therefore there must be someone to exercise control, and there must be a Trustee. I have not really fully grasped the long judgment of the Court of Appeal, but I have seen enough of it to make me comprehend that it would largely affect the action, and, to some extent, limit the action of the Public Trustee, and I think there is no doubt it ought to be removed. The Public Trustee should not carryon his difficult task under any such blighting fear as that. But I agree with the hon. Member who has just sat down that the words would require great care. We are not to sanction recklessness or carelessness, or anything approaching want of good faith. The man employed has got to know he must be acting as a public official, receiving a salary, and I cannot contemplate any situation in which we could hold a man free from obligations which he had grossly neglected. I think we may find words to the effect that personal liability is not to attach to him so long as he, in the exercise of his discretion, discharges the duties for which he is paid. Then the question arises, is it necessary to distinguish between (c) and (f). They might see no good in our new investments, but I should be disposed to agree that if you have this wide range of trusts the duty of the Public Trustee attaches to both (c) and (f). It may be better to substitute a new Clause altogether, and I will undertake, with the assistance of the hon. Baronet (Sir F. Banbury) and anyone else who can give me expert knowledge and advice, to substitute a new Clause on Report.

I think we are agreed that there must be a Public Trustee. If you have a Public Trustee he must be protected from those unexpected effects of a recent decision. I hope the Chief Secretary will be able to bring up a Clause to carry out this object.

moved the following Clause:—

I do not think the Attorney-General for Ireland will contend that the case of examiners of title is on all fours with the two precedent she has quoted. In the case of the Dublin police magistrates the work performed is of a very varied character, and so is the work of the Assistant Commissioners. The work of examiner of title is a very small department of law, and for a person who has been pursuing that avocation for six or seven years I think it is straining the term "practising barrister" to its utmost limits to put him on the same level as gentlemen following their profession in the law courts. I do not think former Parliaments have thought fit to put a restriction upon a person who has ceased to practise his profession for a number of years. I do not think the right hon. Gentleman adduced any reason for stretching the term "practising barrister" to such an extent as this. I should really like to hear from the right hon. Gentleman that there is something more than the mere fear that these gentlemen will be prejudiced in any way after a number of years from being considered what they really are, namely, gentlemen who have retired from the practice of the law for some considerable time.

I think the right hon. Gentleman is quite right in bringing forward a clause of this kind. I think it is understood that most of these gentlemen who are to be appointed will only be appointed temporarily. They may possibly be appointed for a long time, and I think it would be rather hard upon them when an appointment is to be made where the applicants must have had practice as a barrister, they were told, "Oh, you have not been practising as a barrister; you have been doing work as an examiner under the Land Purchase Acts." I should like to ask two questions: Does the right hon. Gentleman think the Clause is necessary, and that they would be treated as having retired from practice by reason of these temporary appointments; and does he intend this Clause should in any way apply to a barrister who has got a permanent appointment as an examiner? There is nothing necessarily in the Clause itself to exclude a person who has a permenant appointment. It is one thing to make this apply to a man who holds a temporary appointment and another thing to make it apply to a barrister who has given up his profession entirely and has accepted a permanent appointment as examiner under the Land Acts. I hope the right hon. Gentleman can answer these points. Subject to that, I think the Clause is good.

I have no objection to barristers being appointed as examiners if they have special qualifications; but I would point out that solicitors have special qualifications, and if he will give me an assurance that solicitors will be appointed I will glady welcome the Clause. Otherwise I can only look upon it with some suspicion.

In reply to the hon. Member for South Kerry I think the Clause is necessary. Unless it is passed a gentleman who accepts an office which debars him from practising while holding that office will be shut out from receiving any appointment which is confined to persons who are actually barristers. With regard to the second point the hon. Member put to me, I confess it had not occurred to me, but I should imagine the Clause could not apply to permanent appointments. With regard to the appointment of solicitors, I believe they are qualified for these posts—

They are not qualified for positions as county court judges.

I should say solicitors are qualified both in theory and in practice for appointments as examiners of title. I cannot say whether any have been or will be appointed, but I should gladly welcome applications from them. I may add that in including the term "solicitors" we are following the precedent of the 1881 Act.

moved the following new Clause:—

The Chief Secretary, whilst inviting the Committee to consider the new Clause on its merits, has frankly recognised that it must appear in our eyes what, indeed, it is, the initial stage in the compulsory machinery which the Bill now embodies. We have not had an opportunity of discussing compulsion, and we have not that opportunity now. We believe that the introduction of compulsion into a voluntary system will prove inimicable, and perhaps fatal, to that voluntary system, and all that was said yesterday confirms us in that opinion. Holding that view we are bound to oppose this Clause. But I have another ground for opposing the Clause in its present shape, which I think the Chief Secretary will take into consideration when I remind him of some of the undertakings which he gave in the course of yesterday's Debate. We urged that, waiving for the moment the question of compulsion, no direction should be given in this Bill favourable to what, for the sake of brevity, I may call the landless men, and in a manner which was prejudicial, as we think, to the interests of those who are now occupiers under existing Irish Land Acts. We have always maintained that the primary purpose of land purchase is twofold, to put an end to the system of dual ownership and to cure congestion in its worst forms where it exists—that is to say, to do something more than to sell his holding to the occupier where that holding is what is called uneconomic in its character. This new Clause of the Chief Secretary, as it stands, seems to us to favour the idea which he has more or less discountenanced, namely, that this Bill will be used on behalf rather of men who are not, and never have been, occupiers, who are neither present nor future nor evicted tenants, but are men who merely think they would like to try their hand at farming. We think it a danger to bring this new element into the already sufficiently crowded scene of Irish agrarian conflict. This Clause as it stands is distinctly against the interests of occupiers, and on behalf of the interests of the new men. Paragraph (a) gives these originating powers to the Estates Commissioners in respect of "any estate." It is the initial stage of a process which gives the Estates Commissioners a freer hand in respect of "any estate" than they have in respect of a "congested estate." I wish to make that point clear, because I think from what fell from the hon. Member for East Mayo (Mr. Dillon) he does not quite appreciate it. My position is that our primary duty is to the occupiers, and next to the occupiers of the congested holdings on the congested estates. That has been recognised, and that policy has not been repudiated. Under the Act of 1903 congested estates are defined in Section 6, and certain directions are laid down as to how they are to be treated with the view to meeting the general wants of those upon them. There are certain financial limitations restricting the power of the Estates Commissioners in dealing with congested estates so devised. What I said in respect of Sub-section (a) is that you give the Estates Commissioner wide roving powers in respect of "any estate" without any direction with regard to meeting the wants of the tenants and without any financial limitation. I say, again, that you are throwing your weight into the scale on behalf of those men who are not tenants at all, and you are putting your weight into the scale against those who are tenants, and, above all, against those who are tenants of congested holdings. I hope I have made that quite clear to the hon. Member for East Mayo.

Quite plain.

The hon. Member agrees with me. In the case of a congested estate the Commissioners may only lose 10 per cent., but in the case of "any estate" they may lose 100 per cent.—that is, 90 per cent. against the interest of the tenants of the holdings on congested estates. I come now to paragraph (b). I do not think the hon. Member for East Mayo will deny that that paragraph as it stands is a plain direction on behalf of the landless men, and consequently against the interests of the occupiers, and, above all, of the congests. It is an Amendment of Clause 8 of the Act of 1903, which states that in the purchase of untenanted land such land is to be purchased as the Commissioners think necessary to facilitate the resale or distribution of the estates purchased or proposed to be purchased by them. Re-distribution means, of course, the curing of congestion. That is the meaning throughout the Act of 1903. I think the Chief Secretary says that under the new Clause, in purchasing untenanted land, the Estates Commissioners may have no regard to the direction given in Clause 8 of the Act of 1903 as to facilitating resale and distribution of estates, but for some other object, namely, the selling of it out of hand to other persons who figure in this Clause as they figured in the notable Clause 17. On Clause 17 we objected to the inclusion of any persons, and we were told by the Chief Secretary and the Attorney-General that that meant very little. If that is so, why do you bring up a new clause expressly relieving the Estates Commissioners of the limitations, and particularly empowering them to buy land for the benefit of those celebrated "any persons," whose inclusion in the benefits of land purchase we think will not be a blessing, but an evil?

I will only deal with the direct challenge made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover. I am of course, and always have been, interested strongly in the safeguarding of the interests of congests, but having given most careful consideration to the wording of the new Clause, I think it is more favourable to congests than the Act of the right hon. Gentleman. We know perfectly well that owing to the loose wording of his own Act all this trouble arose. The wording of the new Act, so far as it is operative, will have a distinct effect in checking that; it will be favourable to the congests and the occupiers of the poor holdings. This particular Clause and Subsection have really no bearing on the congests at all, because they only operate on the Estates Commissioners, who will now operate outside the congested districts, where the vast majority of the congests live. Therefore, the right hon. Gentleman is quite mistaken in supposing that this particular Sub-section will be operative to any large extent on congested estates. Even with the restrictions to which the hon. Member alludes work has been done by the Estates Commissioners in these districts, apart from the Congested Districts Board, in my opinion most admirable and useful work, under which large tracts of land in Tipperary, Meath, and Westmeath have been purchased, and have been distributed to landless men under this Act. I think they are most properly distributed to these landless men, or so called landless men. There has been a great deal of nonsense talked about them. They have been described as men who would like to try their hands at farming. The best farmers in the country are the sons of farmers who have been working on their father's land; and if there was sufficient land in the country to go all round, I do not know any better work than replanting these men in the country and repopulating the country, which was desolated by the laws which England enforced. We must always keep dealing with the problem of these great districts which, to some small extent, have been repopulated by the working of his Act, of which he should be very proud, as far as it has gone in putting the population back. But that is a totally different work in the eastern provinces—in Tipperary, Meath, Westmeath, and King's County—from the problem west of the Shannon, to which this Section does not apply at all. Therefore, the right hon. Gentleman is entirely mistaken in the view which he takes of this matter. There is one other point in his speech which appears to me to show the failure of his memory in dealing with his own Act, with which he should be very familiar. This idea appears lo be a kind of obsession with him. He speaks

moved the following as a new Clause:—

moved the following new Schedule:—