House of Commons
Wednesday, September 8, 1909
Mr. SPEAKER took the chair at a Quarter before Three of the clock.
PRIVATE BUSINESS.
Aberdeen Harbour Order Confirmation Bill—read the third time, and passed.
Clydebank and District Water Order Confirmation Bill—"to confirm a Provisional Order under The Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1899, relating to Clydebank and District Water," presented by the Lord Advocate; and ordered (under Section 7 of the Act) to be considered upon Friday.
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (IRELAND).
Return ordered setting forth the name, age, length of service, and official position of all salaried officials in the various Government Departments of Ireland who have been appointed ( a ) by nomination without examination, ( b ) by nomination with limited competition, ( c ) by nomination with qualifying examination, since the 12th day of July, 1906 (in continuation of Parliamentary Paper, No. 8, of Session, 1907).—[ Mr. Jeremiah MacVeagh. ]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.
Battleships (Orders for Gun Mountings).
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he can now state whether the orders for gun-mountings for the two November battleships of this year's programme have been placed; and if a decision has been reached and the orders placed for guns and gun-mountings for the four additional battleships?
Orders for gun-mountings for the two November ships and for one of the four additional ships have been placed.
May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether the Admiralty have given consideration to the subject and are ready to place the orders for the remaining three additional ships which have been sanctioned?
We are perfectly ready to place the orders, but we shall not do so until it is considered necessary to do so in order to complete the ships within the time named.
Will the right hon. Gentleman state whether any of the orders have been placed with the Coventry Ordnance Company?
It is with the Coventry Ordnance Company that the order for mountings for one of the ships has been placed.
May I ask what is the time named for the completion of the three additional ships?
It has been stated again and again that the four additional ships would be completed by 31st March, 1912.
Nyassaland (Native Preacher).
asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies whether the court at Chinteche, Bandawe, which sent Elliott Kamwana, a native of Nyassaland, to prison for six weeks without any charge being made or witnesses called, took any action to suppress or withdraw from circulation the six volumes written by Kamwana in which the views for which he was imprisoned are fully stated; and, if so, will he say what was the nature of that action?
No, Sir, I have no information as to any volumes written by Kamwana, and I would point out to my hon. Friend that he must not asume that I accept the terms of his question as conveying an accurate statement of the case. I am not aware that the man was sent to prison by the court; he was legally detained under the Ordinance pending the Governor's decision.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the action was initiated by the missionaries?
I do not know, Sir; but I believe that the missionaries do not regard this particular individual with favour.
asked whether Elliott Kamwana, a native missionary working in Nyassaland under the auspices of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, was detained as a prisoner at Chinteche from 18th March till 4th May and then deported to Cape Town, at his own expense, by the Governor, Sir A. Sharpe; whether all this was done without any charge having been formulated against Kamwana or any form of trial having taken place; and under what authority the collectors and Governor acted in the matter?
With regard to the first part of my hon. Friend's question, I would refer him to the answer to the question put by my hon. Friend the Member for the College Division of Glasgow. With regard to the latter part of the question, the Governor and Resident were acting under the authority of "The Political Removal and Detention of Natives Ordinance, 1909."
asked what was the nature of the complaints lodged against Elliott Kamwana, a native missionary, who has been deported from Nyassaland, to which he belonged; by whom were they lodged; and by what evidence were they backed?
The Governor caused careful enquiries to be made into the doings of Kamwana, and from sworn evidence given by Europeans and natives ascertained that his teachings were as follows:—That in October, 1914, the second Advent will take place, that Christ will then abolish all the present forms of government, that there will be no more taxation; that all the white population will disappear from Nyasaland, and that the country will be placed entirely in the hands of the natives, who will govern themselves. The head of both the Scotch Mission and of the Dutch Reformed Church Mission have expressed to the Governor their very strong feeling as to the necessity for preventing the entrance into Nyasaland of such doctrines.
May I ask the hon. and gallant Gentleman whether he has seen a statement in which Kamwana denies holding the views which are attributed to him?
My information is that Kamwana was asked by the Governor if these were his views, and he replied that they were. The Governor said that he could either stop preaching these doctrines for the reasons which I gave the other day, or he could go away. He preferred to go away.
Can the hon. and gallant Gentleman say whether Kamwana had a great number of followers who adopted his views?
Yes, parts of his doctrines were exceedingly popular, and especially that part in regard to there being no more taxation.
Ceylon Police (Eligibility of Cingalese)
asked the Undersecretary of State for the Colonies if he will state under what conditions, if any, Cingalese gentlemen may sit for the police service (probationary) examination for Ceylon under the Colonial Office Circular of April last?
The probationer system is intended only to provide for the European element in the force. Local appointments are provided for in a different manner, by promotion from among the inspectors. I am sending my hon. Friend an extract from the report of the Inspector-General of Police, from which he will see chat there is every disposition on the part of the local Government to reserve for Ceylonese members of the force a due share of promotion to the gazetted ranks.
May I ask whether this limitation to persons of European descent excludes Cingalese gentlemen from offices for which they have hitherto been eligible?
I do not think there is a further extension of the colour bar. There always has been a colour bar in that sense, as my hon. Friend knows.
Nyassaland (Power of Deportation).
asked the Under-Secretary of State far the Colonies whether the power of deporting mischievous persons who disturb, or are likely to disturb, the public peace and tranquillity was exercised by our predecessors in power in Nyassaland; and whether, since the discreet exercise of this power by the present Administration is highly appreciated by those who are interested in the good government of the Protectorate, the Secretary of State will consider the advisability of abstaining from any interference on behalf of the missionary, Kamwana?
A power of this kind was given by Section 25 of the British Central Africa Order in Council of the 11th August, 1902, which was passed when the Protectorate was under the administration of the Foreign Office. With regard to the second part of my hon. Friend's question, the Secretary of State does not propose to interfere with the action which has been taken by the Governor of Nyassaland in this matter.
Persian Gulf (British Trade).
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can give the House any information regarding the condition of Southern Persia as it affects British trade therein and in the Gulf?
There has for some time past been a condition of insecurity on the roads of Southern Persia which has reacted disastrously on British trade in that part of the country. The depleted condition of the Persian Treasury makes it very difficult for the Government to take effective steps to remedy this state of affairs, but the question is engaging the serious attention of His Majesty's Government.
Egyptian Administration (Deportations).
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the new Egyptian police ordinance relating to the deportation without trial of persons suspected of criminal tendencies is meant to apply to or will be used against persons whose only offence is that of taking part in a constitutional political agitation to -secure reforms for the better government of Egypt?
The reply to the hon. Member's question is in the negative, as he will see by reference to Article I. The ordinance could never have passed the Legislative Council and received, as it has done, the support of native opinion, if there had been any possibility of the kind contemplated in the question.
Is the hon. Gentleman aware of the extremely wide interpretation given by agitators to "Constitutional political agitation"?
Old Age Pension (Case of John Mannion)
asked the Secretary to the Treasury whether he is aware that John Mannion, of Lismihill, Killimore, county Galway, applied for a pension last November, and that his application was accompanied by a certificate or letter from the Rev. John Callanan, P.P., Killimore, stating his belief that the applicant was over 70 years of age; whether the Census shows him to be 76 years of age; and, if so, will he direct that Mannion's pension dates from 1st January last?
No trace can be found of a claim for pension having been made by John Mannion in November last. A claim dated 8th January last was received by the Pension Officer on the following day. It was necessary to refer the case to the Census Office for verification of age. The Census records showed the claimant to be eight years of age in 1841. I will make further inquiry into the case, and communicate the result to the hon. Member.
Customs and Inland Revenue Departments (Appointments).
asked the Secretary to the Treasury whether he is aware that the delay in publishing the scheme of examination and in notifying the limits of age for future competitions for appointments as assistants in the Customs and Inland Revenue Departments is causing inconvenience and hardship to those who wish to become candidates for such appointments; whether the new scheme and the limits of age have now been settled, and can be made public; and whether he can announce when the next examination for these posts may be expected to take place?
The subject referred to by my hon. and learned Friend has been engaging my attention for some time, but I regret that I am not at present in a position to make any announcements relative to it. My hon. and learned Friend will find further information on this subject in an answer which I gave to a question put by my hon. Friend the Member for the Thornbury Division of Gloucestershire, on 16th June last, of which I am sending him a copy.
Paupers (Cost of Maintenance).
asked the President of the Local Government Board if he is aware that the amounts spent on the maintenance of paupers in the month of July was greater than in the preceding July or in any July in recent years; and if he can give any reason for the increase, having regard to the sum now being distributed in old age pensions?
I am not aware of the amount actually expended on the maintenance of paupers in July, but there was some slight increase in the number of persons relieved in that month over that for the corresponding period in 1908. The ratio of paupers to population remained, however, substantially the same. The increase occurred largely in certain of the Northern districts of England, where there has been some slackness in employment.
Does the right hon. Gentlemen anticipate that the pensions will have any effect upon the pauperism of the country?
It is rather early to state what the effect of the pensions will be on the normal increase of pauperism, but as soon as it can be ascertained I shall be informed of it.
What does the right hon. Gentleman mean by the normal increase of pauperism?
What would ordinarily occur in the absence of pensions.
Dismissal of Schoolmistress (Chatham).
asked the President of the Board of Education whether his attention has been called to the action of the Chatham education authority in dismissing Miss M. Handford from the post of schoolmistress of St. John's School, Chatham, in consequence of her refusal to submit to an instruction by that authority to discontinue the training on natural -history to the infants under her charge by getting rid of several pet animals which were kept scrupulously clean; whether he is aware that an appeal made by Miss Handford for an interview with the local education authority to explain the reason for her action was not granted; that previous to the report of the local medical officer, upon whose report the local authority acted and which resulted in the dismissal, His Majesty's inspector of schools saw the pet animals in school and reported on 29th March of this year that the work in the infants' department was progressing vigorously and effectively, all the teachers having improved under Miss Handford's guidance, and the outlook was full of promise; whether he has received a Petition from the parents of the children attending St. John's School, who are deeply interested in Miss Handford's method of training the children; and whether, having regard to the qualifications of Miss Handford, he will have immediate inquiry made, and, until a report of the same be issued, have her reinstated?
I have seen a statement of this case, from which I understand that the teacher's engagement was terminated owing to her refusal to obey a direction given by the local education authority. The direction was one which the local education authority are entitled to give, and which the teacher should, therefore, have complied with. The Board have no power to secure the teacher's reinstatement, and as the matter is entirely between the teacher and the local authority I do not think an Inquiry would serve any useful purpose. I can find no trace of the Petition referred to in the question.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware whether this teacher was carrying out the instructions of the training college, and is there not a case for the Department to inquire into so as to see whether the local authority exceeded its jurisdiction in dismissing her?
From the information placed at my disposal it is quite clear that this is not a case in which the Board can interfere.
If it can be shown that the teacher was merely carrying out the instructions to teachers as laid down by the training college, will the Department intervene?
If any further information is given to me, of course I will inquire into it.
Portland Council School.
asked the President of the Board of Education whether the Board is in communication with the London County Council regarding the transference of the headmaster of the Portland Council school to the Barrett-street school; whether the inquiry regarding the organisation of these schools has now been begun, and when is it likely to be finished; and whether the Board of Education is pressing the London County Council to appoint a new properly qualified head for the Portland Council school on the ground that, if this is not done, the understanding arrived at between the Board of Education and the London County Council will be violated, and the Portland Council school will permanently suffer?
The Board have communicated with the London County Council as to the appointment of a properly qualified head teacher to the Portland School, and the council have informed them that no action has been taken in the matter of appointing a permanent headmaster, but that the question of the staffing of the school will be considered by the Education Committee at an early meeting after the recess, and that meanwhile the second master is in charge. The second master is a certificated teacher, and is, therefore, qualified under the Code for recognition as a head teacher. As I have already stated, I consider the action of the council to be inconvenient, but I cannot regard it as a breach of their undertaking that the question of reorganisation shall be left in abeyance pending the inquiry to be held by the Board. I anticipate that the inquiry will take place during the course of next month.
Birmingham School Site (Purchase).
asked the President of the Board of Education whether a price has been agreed upon for the purchase by the local education authority for Birmingham of a site of about 7,500 yards of land in the Rotton Park district at about 10s. per yard; and whether he can now say what is the ascertained area of that site, and what is the actual total amount of the purchase money?
I am informed that the area is 7,020 square yards, and the price is 10s. per yard. The contract has not yet been completed.
Income of Charity Commissioners (Royalties).
asked the hon. Member for the Barnstaple Division, as representing the Charity Commissioners, if he will state the total income derived by charities under the control of the Commissioners from royalties and wayleaves during the year 1908; the maximum charge per ton and per acre levied for wayleaves during the year 1908; and the maximum royalty per ton and per acre levied on coal during the same period?
The Charity Commissioners have not found it practicable with the limited staff at their command to require from the trustees of every charity within their jurisdiction particulars as to the income derived from royalties and wayleaves respectively. They are therefore not in possession of the information asked for by the hon. Member.
Income of Ecclesiastical Commissioners (Royalties).
asked the hon. Member for the Crewe Division, as Church Estates Commissioner, if he will State the total income derived by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners from royalties and wayleaves during the year 1908; the maximum charge per ton and per acre levied for wayleaves on coal; and the maximum royalty per ton and per acre levied on coal during the same period?
The receipts of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners from mineral royalties and wayleaves in respect of their estates in the year ended 31st March, 1908, amounted to £463,438 11s. 3d. as shown in their sixty-first Report duly laid upon the Tables of the Houses of Parliament and published. For way-leaves on coal the maximum ordinary rate per ton received by the Commissioners is three-halfpence; in one case a rate of 2d. per ton is received. There are no acreage wayleave receipts included in the above-mentioned sum. The average rate of royalty on coal received by the Commissioners is approximately 6d. per ton. In respect to one seam included in a letting the royalty received was at the rate of 1s. 1d. (thirteen pence) per ton. With this exception the maximum rate was 10d. per ton, and this, as well as the rate of thirteen pence per ton, resulted from the operation of a sliding scale of royalty based upon the selling price of coal, which was much above the average. The maximum acreage royalty was at the rate of £30 per foot thick per acre, equivalent to about 5½d. per ton.
Have no returns been presented to this House since 1906, and if so, what is the cause of the delay?
The total receipts are published every year.
Is the way leave on coal in respect of screened coal, or of the gross output?
The gross output.
Blind Passengers on Railways.
asked the President of the Board of Trade if he is aware that there are still six Metropolitan railways, as also the whole of the tubes, that are imposing conditions compelling blind passengers to provide guides; and, if so, can he state whether he is prepared to approach such companies with a view to the withdrawal of such conditions, as in the case of the Great Eastern Railway Company?
I have seen a statement in the Press to the effect mentioned, but I have no other information on the subject. If the hon. Member will furnish me with the names of the companies which, according to his information, make the condition referred to, I shall be prepared to communicate with them in the matter.
asked the President of the Board of Trade if he is aware that there are at least 20,000 blind workers in this country who make use of the railways for reaching their work; that the stipulation of the Great Eastern Railway Company, if generally adopted by other railway companies, was that such passengers should not seek any indemnity in the case of accident, it being understood that they travel at their own risk; and, if so, and in view of these circumstances, can he state if he is prepared to take action with a view to these people being carried as a reduced rate?
The Great Eastern Railway Company do not now require any undertaking from blind passengers travelling over their line, but they understand that such passengers travel at their own risk so far as accidents due to their blindness are concerned. As a railway company in such circumstances contracts itself out of no existing liability, there would seem no reason why a reduction should be made in the fare.
Accidents at Midland Depot, Poplar.
asked the President of the Board of Trade if he can say what number of fatal and non-fatal accidents have occurred to men and boys engaged at the Midland Railway Depot, Poplar, during the year 1908 and the eight months ending 31st August, 1909?
Accidents at railway depots are reported in the first instance to the inspectors of factories, and only those actually occurring in railway working are forwarded on to the Board of Trade. Reports of one fatal accident and five non-fatal accidents during the year 1908, and of one fatal and one non-fatal accident during the first eight months of the present year at the depot in question have been, so forwarded.
asked the President of the Board of Trade if his attention has been called to the fatal accident which occurred on 28th August last to George Brewer, a boy of about 17 years of age, at the Midland Railway Depot, Poplar, and who was until quite recently employed as a van lad; whether the work he was performing at the time of the accident was scotching and breaking wagons; whether the wagons causing the accident were being drawn by a capstan, the driver of which was also an inexperienced person and was not in the service of the company; and whether he proposes to hold an inquiry into the circumstances?
I have received a report of the accident referred to. An inquiry will be held into the matter, and pending this I do not think it desirable for me to make any statement as to the circumstances of the accident.
North-Eastern Railway Engines (Equipment).
asked the President of the Board of Trade if his attention has been called to engines being turned out of the repairing shops, Darlington, North-Eastern Railway, and placed in the working of trains to the Middlesbrough district without tools and proper equipment on them; and what steps, if any, he proposes to take in the matter?
I have asked for the observations of the railway company upon the hon. Member's question, and will communicate with him on receipt of their reply.
"Waratah" and Wireless Telegraphy.
asked whether the missing ship "Waratah" was provided with wireless telegraphic apparatus?
I am informed by the owners of the "Waratah" that she was not fitted with a wireless telegraphic-apparatus.
Does the right hon. Gentleman not think that the time has come to make it obligatory on owners to provide this great safeguard against loss of life on passenger ships?
No; I do not think that the time has come for that yet.
Clubs in Mansfield.
asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department will he say the total number of clubs on the register in the petty sessional division and borough of Mansfield in the years 1906 and 1908, respectively; the number of clubs in the same area struck off the register from 1st January, 1907, to 30th June, 1909, for betting, gambling, and drunkenness; the names of the brewery companies given in evidence before the local justices who financed those clubs; and whether any of the premises used by clubs struck off the register have again been opened for the consumption of liquor?
The Licensing Statistics show that the total number of clubs on the register on 1st January, 1906, and 1st January, 1908, was, in the petty sessional division, 13 and 15, and in the borough five and four respectively. I am informed by the justices' clerks that in the period 1st January, 1907, to 30th June, 1909, six clubs were struck off the register in the petty sessional division for betting, gambling, or drunkenness; and one, in the borough, for betting and other causes. In three cases the premises of a club struck off have since been opened as registered clubs, the period of twelve months during which the justices in each case prohibited the use of the premises for clubs having expired. I am not sure what the hon. Member includes in the term "financed," but it was mentioned that the premises of two clubs struck off the register were mortgaged to brewery firms.
FINANCE BILL.
REGISTERED CLUBS (MEMBERSHIP)
asked if the right hon. Gentleman can say the total membership in the year 1908 of the 7,133 registered clubs in England and Wales, and the increase of clubs and membership since the passing of the Licensing Act, 1902, to the end of the year 1908?
As I stated in reply to questions on 27th July and on 18th of last month by the Hon. Member for the Tamworth Division, I am not in possession of figures showing the membership of registers clubs in England and Wales. The increase in the number of these clubs between 1st January, 1904, and 1st January, 1908, is shown in the Licensing Statistics to be 762, and it is estimated that by the end of 1908 there was a further increase of 220. This figure will be verified when the volume for 1909 is prepared.
TAXATION OF WOODLANDS.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he is aware that if woodlands are taxed under the Death Duties, and, seeing that an oak wood under a rotation of 120 years will have to pay Death Duties at least three times, and other hard woods under a rotation of 80 years will have to pay at least twice, after the initial expenses of tree-planting have been capitalised and rates and taxes paid, there will be no profit left for any estate or municipality that attempts this form of employment; and, if so, whether he will consider the desirability of exempting woodlands?
My right hon. Friend is considering the question of woodlands in connection with Estate Duties.
INCREMENT DUTY ON MINERALS.
asked whether the right hon. Gentleman can give an estimate of the amount which he expects to receive from the new proposals with regard to the Increment Duty on minerals in this financial year and in subsequent years?
My right hon. Friend cannot undertake to indicate in detail the proportions in which this tax will be divided between the various forms of property to which it will be applicable under the proposals of the Finance Bill.
Has the right hon. Gentleman any estimate of the yield of the tax under the new form which is suggested?
It is not so much a question of giving an estimate, for which the Government would be held responsible if it were inaccurate, as of giving an approximate estimate. It can only be an approximate estimate.
May we have the approximate estimate in reference to the various classes of property?
The reason it is not given is that the Chancellor of the Exchequer does not think it advisable to give it.
Can we have some estimate which will enable us to judge of this?
If the hon. Member will refer to the great many answers which have been given he will see the appropriate answer to the question he has just put.
FRIENDLY SOCIETIES.
asked whether the right hon. Gentleman has received protests from friendly societies concerning the proposed Amendment to Clause 25, which is designed to offer relief to such societies, and if the substance of those protests has been that the proposed relief is illusory, and that in any case the Amendment sets up a differentiation between friendly societies which are restricted by their rules from dividing any part of their funds among their members and other such societies, which, under certain well-defined conditions, may divide their funds?
My right hon. Friend has received protests on this subject, as to which I may refer the hon. Member to the reply which I gave yesterday to the Noble Lord the Member for the Thirsk Division of the North Biding of Yorkshire, and to my hon. Friend the Member for Dumbartonshire.
TENANT PURCHASERS.
asked whether it is intended that tenant purchasers shall, under the Finance Bill, be entitled to deduct the capital value of the annuity due to the Land Commission from the market price of the holding subject to that annuity before assessment for Death Duties?
The Finance Bill does not affect the existing law under which the capital value of the annuity may be deducted from the market price of the holding in cases where the ad valorem Estate Duty is paid.
VALUATION OF LICENSED PREMISES.
asked whether the right hon. Gentleman will defer putting into operation Sub-section (2) of Clause 30 of the Finance Bill, except on premises of the annual value of £500 and upwards, until the Irish representatives request him to do so?
My right hon. Friend cannot give any such undertaking.
FOREIGN CEMENT.
asked if the right hon. Gentleman proposes to put a Customs Duty upon foreign cement equal to the amount of the Mineral Duty payable in this country under the Finance Bill on chalk and clay out of which cement is manufactured?
No, Sir.
SPIRITS TAKEN OUT OF BOND.
asked what quantity of spirits was taken out of bond in August of last year in England, Ireland, and Scotland, respectively, and the amount of duty paid thereon; and whether he will grant a similar Return for August of this year?
The quantity of spirits on which duty was paid in England, Ireland, and Scotland, respectively, and the amount of duty received thereon, during the month of August in each of the years 1908 and 1909 were:—
HOTEL LICENCE DUTIES.
asked what will be the maximum Licence Duties in Dublin under the Finance Bill on hotels valued at £1,000, £800, £750, and £660 annually respectively, and what is the minimum to which they can be reduced under Sub-section (2), Clause 30; and whether this Subsection will apply immediately to hotels under £500 annual?
The maximum duty, on the assumption that the hotel does not come within Clause 31, and without regard to the alternative basis of compensation value provided by Clause 30, Sub-clause (2), is half the annual value. The amount to which the duty can be reduced by adopting the basis of compensation value cannot be given without a special valuation being made for the purpose, but it cannot be brought below the statutory minimum of one-thirtieth of the annual value fixed by Clause 31, Sub-clause (4), as amended. If the hotel is one which comes within Clause 31, Sub-clause (1), it will be possible for it to take advantage of the compensation value basis, whatever its annual value may be.
DUTY ON SPIRITS.
asked if the right hon. Gentleman's attention has been directed to the fact that since the increased duty on spirits was imposed inferior qualities of whisky, consisting largely of raw grain and new whisky, are now chiefly sold; and whether, in view of this and of the Report of Lord Peel's Commission adverse to the sale of new whisky, he will take steps in the Finance Bill to graduate the tax according to age?
I have no information on the point referred to by my hon. Friend in the first part of this question. As regards the latter part, I can add nothing to the reply which my right hon. Friend gave to the hon. Member for North Meath on the 26th ultimo.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that without graduation the proposals of the Bill will fall unequally on the two classes of distillers in Scotland, and will be adverse to the interests of Scotch and Irish farmers?
I am not aware of the fact. What I am aware of is that a Select Committee of this House and a Royal Commission have both reported adversely to the inferior quality of whisky made in a short time by the patent still process.
Is my right hon. Friend aware that the Royal Commission on whisky reported that the evidence taken before them failed to establish the statement that new spirit was more deleterious than old, and that any specially evil effects observed were to be attributed to the quantity rather than to the quality of the spirits consumed?
That simply confirms the statement I have just made.
Does the right hon. Gentleman remember my statement about the monkeys, and the effect of new and old spirit and the evidence given before Lord Peel's Commission?
We cannot have this re-hash of old speeches.
Attack on Trawler(Barra).
asked the Lord Advocate, with reference to the attack by the population of the island of Barra on the crew of a trawler, in which two of the crew were thrown into the sea and the captain was threatened with his life, would he state the total police force in the island at the time of the riot and the police force at the present moment; and can be now guarantee that the force is sufficient to maintain order and to prevent a recurrence of the outbreak?
My hon. Friend's reference to the lawless action of the Barra fishermen is, so far as. I can judge from the information before me, exaggerated. At the time of the occurrence there was one policeman on the island, and his services had hitherto, proved sufficient. On receiving intelligence of what had happened, the chief constable at once sent extra police to the island, and I understand that the question of permanent increase of strength is now under the sheriff's consideration. I have no reason to anticipate any recurrence of disorder on the island.
Scottish Church Commission.
asked if the right hon. Gentleman can give any assurance that the work of the Scottish Church Commission, will be completed within the period for which extension has been granted; and if he is aware that the delay due to the repeated extension of time is causing embarrassment and expense to the United Free Church?
I am informed by the Secretary to the Commission that it is expected that the work of the Commission will be completed within the period for which extension was granted. It is obviously in the interests of both parties that all matters outstanding should be settled with as little delay as possible, and I trust the expectation of the Commission will be fulfilled.
Hobhouse Report (Women Supervisors).
asked the Postmaster-General whether he is aware that, notwithstanding a promise given on 2nd December, 1907, that no existing Post Office servant should be adversely affected by the application of the recommendations of the Hobhouse Report, the lower grade of women supervisors are now compelled to perform eight hours per day instead of seven, and that in the process of devolution into the higher class of supervisors, for relief in sickness and holidays, they have recently been refused a seven-hour day whilst temporarily performing the duties of the higher class; and whether he will consider the claims of the women to the full privileges of the class into which they devolute, seeing that these privileges were formerly allowed them and still apply to the male overseers?
The Parliamentary Committee recommended that the class of female supervisors, lower grade, employed in the Central Telegraph Office, on scale £100–5—£120 should be replaced by female overseers on scale £115–5—£130, who should perform a 48-hour week. All the officers on the old class were given the choice between the new and old conditions, and no compulsion has been resorted to. Inquiry has failed to bring to light any case in which an officer temporarily performing duty in a higher class has been required to give an attendance in excess of that proper to the higher duty.
Development Bill (Light Railway Commissioners).
asked if it is proposed to transfer the functions of the Light Railway Commissioners to the Treasury if the Development Bill should become law?
The answer is in the negative.
Are we to understand that there will be two authorities?
The hon. Member is not to understand any such thing.
Will the Government consider the converse question, whether it is not desirable to transfer the greater part of the powers of the Treasury under the Development Bill to the Light Railway Commissioners?
I think that might be a question worth considering.
Adult Male Labour in India.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for India whether the Government has any information to the effect that the Government of India proposes to take power to limit the employment of adult male labour to a fixed number of hours per day in all factories in India; and whether the Commission which recently reported advised direct restriction upon the hours of male adult labour to an extent which has not yet been enforced by law in Great Britain?
The Bill now before the Governor-General's Legislative Council provides for a reduction in the hours of labour in textile factories, which sometimes extended to 15 hours a day or more, to a day not exceeding 12 hours, deals drastically with serious abuses that existed in connection with the employment of children, and gives power to local governments to apply its provisions to other factories if necessary. Direct restriction on the hours of labour was recommended by the Committee of 1906, and a minority Report of the subsequent Commission. The majority of the Commission proposed to attain the same end by indirect means. The hon. Member will recognise that in the East labour is not organised as it is in Britain, and is not continuous but intermittent and spasmodic.
Land Taxation in India.
asked what proportion of their income received from land the landlords or zemindars in India require to pay to the State as revenue or tax; whether there are, in addition, any local rates or cesses payable by them, and what these amount to; and whether the percentage of the harvest yield which the peasants pay as revenue or tax, as recently quoted by him, is based upon the presumptive or actual crop?
asked whether the British Government, in settling the proportion of income demanded by the State from landlords or zemindars, takes into consideration the fact that the revenue so received is collected from the classes and spent upon the masses; and whether, when demanding a comparatively large share of the assets of the landlords as revenue for public purposes, the British Government has concurrently protected the tenants in various parts of India, and conspicuously in Bengal, from the exactions of the landlords by numerous legislative safeguards?
Fifty per cent, is the general standard for the ratio of land revenue to the landlord's income from the land, in the areas where landlords exist; and the actual proportion more often falls below than exceeds this standard. The cesses amount to not more than 4 to 6 per cent, of the landlord's income. In calculating the rates of incidence of the revenue on the gross produce, recently quoted by me, the danger of over-valuation in the matter of crop outturn was guarded against by excluding from the calculation of crop yield the produce of all double or second crops, of all non-food crops, such as sugarcane, cotton, etc., which are usually more valuable than the staple food crops, and of the very valuable garden produce. These safeguards clearly make for a crop valuation under rather than over the actual yield. The principles on which the land revenue is assessed were stated in the Government of India's Resolution presented to this House in 1902, to which I may refer the hon. Member(Mr. Rees). The reply to the latter part of the question is in the affirmative.
May I ask whether Sir Antony Macdonnell's Commission reported that the incidence of the general assessment throughout India was not heavy upon the average crops?
That is the case.
Motion on Procedure.
asked the Prime Minister whether he will consider the advisability of so enlarging the scope of the Motion on Procedure set down in the name of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Saffron Walden Division, as to enable the Select Committee to include in its deliberations the hours of the sittings and the periods of the year during which the House is usually in Session?
The hon. Member will see from the answer that I gave yesterday to a question of the hon. and learned Member for Waterford that it is not proposed to persist in the Motion, for the Select Committee this Session.
May I ask whether it will be set up early next Session?
It is too early, I think, to arrange that.
Land at the North Pole.
asked the Prime Minister whether the land at the North Pole is considered to belong to the Dominion of Canada; and, if so, providing it is established that Dr. Cook has reached the North Pole and has planted there the American flag, whether that act would, in any way, give the United States any right of possession over that region. [The HON. MEMBER added, I assume the Prime Minister will understand "land at or adjacent to."]
I did not understand that. In answer to the first part of the hon. Member's question I do not understand that there is any land at the North Pole.
Adjacent to.
Perhaps the hon. Member will put down another question. The second part of the question involves too much hypothetical matter for me to give any definite answer.
In the event of it being found to be British territory, will he include it in the tax on undeveloped land?
North Tipperary Land Purchase.
asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland whether he is aware that Mr. James Wallace, of Cangort Park, Shinrone, King's County, is the owner of about 180 acres at Kilcunnihin More, formerly Trench estate, North Tipperary, and about 170 acres at Wingfield, formerly Crosdale or Spunner estate, North Tipperary; is he aware that the above estates were purchased by the said Wallace under the Irish Land Act, 1903; and will be state what was the amount advanced by the Land Commissioners in connection with the sale of these estates?
The Estates Commissioners inform me that no advance appears to have been made or applied for for the purchase of these lands under the Land Purchase Acts.
asked what is the extent of the lands at Clyduff and Ballybrack, Spunner estate, North Tipperary, in the occupation of H. Briscoe Kenny, and what was the amount of purchase money advanced in connection therewith?
The Estates Commissioners inform me that the extent of the lands referred to is 552 acres, and that an advance of £5,000 was made for their purchase, the balance of the purchase money (£4,361) being lodged by Mr. Kenny.
May I ask if this gentleman has not received £l,000 from them?
I cannot interfere in the matter.
Will he consider the advisability of giving public information about a private transaction of a man who is severely boycotted and under police protection?
I know nothing about it, and I have given no information.
May I ask whether this man and his brothers graze enormous tracts of land in more counties on the 11 months' system, and are trying to extract enormous sums from the Estates Commissioners?
The hon. Member must give notice of that question.
asked what was the amount of purchase money advanced in the case of a farm of about 170 acres at Ballinahinch. North Tipperary, formerly in the occupation of a tenant named Homan, now deceased?
I am informed by the Land Commission that the amount of the purchase money advanced in the case referred to was £1,000.
Salisbury Plain Motor Disaster.
asked the Secretary of State for War if he will state whether the driver of the "Chronicle" motor car who recently caused a disaster amongst the troops on Salisbury Plain had, a few days previously, run into another body of troops; whether he is going to take further action in the matter; and whether he is aware that cans have been most recklessly driven during this summer in that locality?
As regards the points raised in the first and last sentences of the question, no Reports have reached the War Office. The Director of Public Prosecutions is taking the steps that are necessary.
Captain Marindin's Range-Finder.
asked the Secretary of State for War if he will state whether Captain Marindin's range-finder has been adopted for the infantry; and, if so, whether any award has been granted to him?
The reply to both, questions is in the affirmative.
Lord Kitchener.
asked the Secretary of State for War if he will state whether Lord Kitchener will be under the orders of the War Office or the Colonial Office when performing his future duties in East and West Africa?
It would be premature to enter at present on the details of Lord. Kitchener's appointment.
Territorial Forces (Dress of Chaplains).
I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War a question, of which I have given private notice, with reference to the circulars issued by the War Office to the Territorial Forces. Whether the Order No. 14 deals with the dress of chaplains, and the form the scarf should take, and whether the second Order says that, as uniform, only the above-mentioned scarf is authorised. In view of the approaching winter, will he give the matter further consideration, so as to avoid unnecessary disturbance to the chaplain?
All that has been done is that the War Office does not give its authority for any other scarf. Amongst the ecclesiastical gentlemen there might be some difficulty, and the War Office does not intend to embroil itself.
The right hon. Gentleman does not understand my question. Is he aware that nothing else but the scarf is authorised to be worn?
I am not myself conversant with the details of these matters, but I presume it is open even to the humblest man to wear clothes.
ORDER OF BUSINESS.
May I in the first place ask the Prime Minister if he can give us any view of the Government's intention with regard to business in the course of next week? I put the question to-day rather than on Thursday because it is very convenient, especially at this time, to have full notice as soon as possible of the way the Government intend to proceed. Then may I ask another question on a matter of great public importance. As he is aware, the Development Grant Bill has now gone to Grand Committee. I think at the time he was giving us the statement known as the "slaughter of the innocents" he implied if that Bill was controversial—I do not wish to impute any breach of faith, but he certainly used language which by ordinary Parliamentary methods of interpretation would be understood as indication that that was not a Bill that the Government intended to press if it excited much Debate. Whatever its second reading merits may be, I think the Government will admit it is a Bill that ought to be most carefully discussed in Grand Committee, and the appeal I wish to make to him is if he intends—really intends—to proceed with the Bill that he should so arrange the days on which the Grand Committee sit in relation to the days on which the Budget is taken, so as to make it possible for Members interested in both those important measures to take some part in them. I think he will feel that is not an unreasonable request to make at the present time. Those are the two points.
Would the right hon. Gentleman say whether it is the intention of the Government to take at an early date the Resolutions in regard to Mineral Duties that appear every day on the Paper? It would be a great convenience to know if they are going to take them at an early date.
As regards the business for next week, we propose to take on
Monday and Tuesday, Finance Bill (Committee);
Wednesday and Thursday, Irish Land Bill (Report);
Friday, Irish Land Bill (Third Reading).
With regard to the Standing Committee on the Development Fund Bill, perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will repeat the question to-morrow. Upon the question of the hon. Member for Ashford (Mr. L. Hardy), I will consult with the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
In reference to the Bill of which notice appears on to-day's Paper (Places of Worship) (Enfranchisement), may I ask whether its appearance indicates any hope of its being passed? The right hon. Gentleman will recollect that the Enfranchisement of Places of Worship Bill and the Bishopric of Sheffield Bill were more or less dependent on one another.
I am anxious that both Bills should go through. I am afraid their fortunes are somewhat intertwined, and there must be some arrangement between the promoters of both if either is to go forward.
PRESENTATION OF BILL.
The following Bill was presented and read the first time:—
PLACES OF WORSHIP (ENFRANCHISEMENT) (NO. 2).
Bill to authorise the enfranchisement of the sites of places of worship held under lease—[ Sir Samuel Evans. ] (To be read a second time on Monday, 13th September.)
FINANCE BILL.
Considered in Committee.—[ 26th Day. ]
[Mr. EMMOTT in the chair.]
(IN THE COMMITTEE.)
CLAUSE 32.—(Distribution of Payments on Account of Licence Duties in Certain Cases.)
Where the licence holder is bound by any covenant, agreement, or undertaking, or is otherwise under any direct or indirect obligation of any kind, to obtain a supply of intoxicating liquor from any person or persons, the licence holder shall be entitled to recover as a debt due from any such person such part of any sum paid by him in respect of the duty on his licence as may be agreed upon, or in default of agreement determined by the Commissioners to be just under the circumstances.
moved to leave out the words "by any covenant, agreement, or undertaking, or is otherwise under any direct or indirect obligation of any kind."
It appears to me that these words are entirely unnecessary. Either a man is bound or he is not, and to introduce all this surplusage can serve no useful purpose. It has been more than once pointed out that portions of this Bill are a réchauffé of our dear departed friend, the Licensing Bill of last year. If the Committee will compare the words in the two Bills they will see how closely allied they are. In Clause 37 of the Licensing Bill, dealing with clubs, the words were "on the ground that the club is bound by any covenant, agreement, or undertaking, or is otherwise under an obligation." The words here are the same until you get to "obligation," when they are stiffened up by the insertion of "direct or indirect." I beg the Government to preserve simplicity of style. You cannot have a stronger word than "bound." I hope the Amendment will be accepted.
The hon. Member said that this Clause was a réchauffé of a dear departed friend. A réchauffé is never really agreeable, and I should imagine that nothing could be less agreeable than a réchauffé of a corpse. I should prefer to say that the Clause is a resurrection. I admit that the words are similar to those used in the Licensing Bill of last year in relation to clubs. The hon. Member proposes to leave out the words after "bound" which indicate the way in which a tie is brought about in these houses. If we left the provision at "bound," I am afraid we should be asked over and ever again, "Bound, how? In what circumstances"—and so forth. Therefore the Government cannot accept the Amendment. These words were very carefully considered after the long Debates on the Licensing Bill, and, subject to further argument, I do not think that better words could be found to indicate our meaning.
As far as I am concerned, a good deal will depend, in reference to this Amendment, on what the 'Government intend to do in connection with my proposal to leave out the words "or indirect." That Amendment does not go so far as the present proposal, but I agree with my hon. Friend that these words are quite unnecessary. I do not think that in this particular case you want to rope-in certain arrangements which may be very beneficial to the licence holder, and which are not in the nature of a binding covenant such as you often find in tied-house agreements in England. But I will deal with the case I have in mind when we reach my Amendment.
The words "any covenant, agreement, or undertaking" are very wide words, and would cover every legal obligation I can think of. I cannot imagine what the words "direct or indirect obligation" are intended to cover, or of what use they will be. I suggest that the point could be met by leaving out the extremely vague words referring to direct or indirect obligations. We ought to be precise in a statute of this kind. These words might be twisted to mean something which is not intended; at all events, their meaning is not plain. I hope, therefore, that they will be left out, and that we shall keep to the plain words "covenant, agreement, or undertaking."
I do not think that any lawyer will dispute that the words of the Clause as at present drafted—the two expressions, "bound by any covenant, agreement, or undertaking" and "any direct or indirect obligation of any kind"—are tautology. It really does not matter whether you, in regard to the licence holder, make the provision the one or the other, but I state, without fear of contradiction from the distinguished lawyers on the Front Bench opposite, that the words "any direct or indirect obligation" add nothing to the words "any covenant, agreement, or undertaking," and in the same way the words "any covenant, agreement, or undertaking" can add nothing to the sentence that follows. But what follows if you thus repeat in its duplicated form the expression of the same thing? Anyone familiar with the practice of the Law Courts is aware of what happens. Some lawyer gets up and argues that the Legislature would never have used the further expression if they had not meant to add something to the phrasing and meaning of the first. I hope the Government will destroy the tautology of this phrase, and make up their minds which of the two sentences they mean to adopt as being more calculated to convey their meaning.
I thought, when I first saw this Amendment, that the point was a small and unimportant one. I confess on listening to my hon. and learned Friend that I have reconsidered the matter. He knows what he is talking about in these matters. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Kingston (Mr. Gave) has also told us that so-far as his ingenuity and imagination go, every legal obligation would be covered by the words "any covenant, agreement, or undertaking." Putting, therefore, these two considerations together, the court might be compelled to hold, against its will, that not a legal, but a purely moral obligation of some sort existed. The tenant of a tied house might be under a. moral obligation—gratitude or something of the sort—not expressed in the words "any covenant, agreement, or undertaking" and it might be that a moral obligation of the sort would be held to enable the licence holder to pass some portion of the duty on.
Those who practice in the courts know perfectly well that the point that the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Smith) has mentioned is constantly being raised in the way he has suggested. No doubt outside there is considerable doubt as to what these words mean. I would like to ask the Solicitor-General if he will say whether they apply to a case similar to that stated to me the other day, where the tenant is tied by a loan from a person?
indicated an affirmative reply.
The Solicitor-General says that is included. That will settle that point. I would also like to ask the Solicitor-General another question: Cases occur where the tenant occupies a house, and takes the commodity from the landlord. There is no tie in the ordinary sense of the word, but he might be turned out if he did not take the commodity from that particular trader. Is he included in this Clause? It is not a direct tie, but a most indirect tie. Do the provisions of the Clause apply to Ireland and Scotland? There are a tremendous lot of tied houses in the Cork district.
I think this brief discussion is illustrative of the kind of difficulty which we must get into when we attempt t to deal with these complicated relations of modern industry. The difficulty chiefly centres round the, words of the Clause "or indirect obligation." It is very difficult to understand precisely what the Government themselves mean by "indirect obligation." My hon. and learned Friend who has just sat down mentioned a case in which there was a mortgage where, without any specific obligation on the part of the tenant to buy his beer and spirits from that source, there was an understanding that he should buy his liquor from the firm that lent him the money. My hon. Friend rather went on the hypothesis that there would be a fear that this should be used as an instrument of compulsion to induce the tenant to buy the liquor of a particular manufacturer. A more difficult case than that arises, because there may be no attempt to use this mortgage as an instrument of oppression, but the man who has borrowed the money may be well aware that he is merely a mortgagor like anybody else. There is no reason why those who lend the money should not call up the-mortgage just as they would with the ordinary borrower in the ordinary market, whereas if he is one of their assured customers he might expect more favourable terms than merely the ordinary borrower in the ordinary market. That case must be not an uncommon one. Is that case aimed at by the words "indirect obligation"? Is the mortgagor in these circumstances under an indirect obligation to buy his liquor from a particular manufacturer? There is another case which I think is more difficult, and more difficult because it is more common and universal. I understand that one of the most familiar practices in the relations between wholesale traders of all descriptions and the retail traders of all descriptions—not merely the wholesale and retail liquor traders, but between the wholesale manufacturers and retail dealers in all businesses—is that some wholesale firms will supply their retailers with goods of a particular kind or class, and will, if the trader requires it,, not exact immediate payment. The matter will hang up as a sort of obligation between the two, and no doubt the practice and the result in all cases is that the retail dealer in these circumstances has a strong motive for continuing to use the particular wholesale manufacturer as the person from: whom he buys his goods, whatever those goods may be. That is a common practice, and a practice which, on the whole, is for the advantage of both parties. At all events, it is a practice that this House never would think of interfering with. Is that kind of relation between the wholes sale dealer and the retail dealer, and the resultant motives given to the retail dealer to continue his custom with the wholesale dealer—is that practice to be regarded as in the nature of that indirect obligation with which this Clause is in tended to deal?
I think the Committee will see we are really embarking on a rather difficult and delicate question, and while there are certain cases plain and simple, the case of the free house may be simple and the case of the tied house, in relation to a particular kind of liquor, beer or spirits, or both, may be perfectly clear, there is the great middle position in no sense characteristic of the liquor trade, but common to all retail and all wholesale dealing, and with this kind of transaction I understand the Government do mean to interfere in some way in this Clause. I should like to know exactly how they are going to interfere, and what view they take. I suppose the Prime Minister will answer that he recognises the difficulty, and that, adopting the usual expedient of the Government, he is going to invoke the aid of the Commissioners. That, of course, really means they are going to give some gentleman £1,000 a year to solve the problem. I do not know that that is a satisfactory arrangement, and I hardly think it fair to the Commissioners themselves, unless something is laid down either in this Clause or in the regulations, or by a schedule to the Bill, which will give them some guidance. At all events, I hope I have made the sort of difficulty that suggests itself to me perfectly clear to the Government.
The right hon. Gentleman has stated some difficulties which arise from this middle case. We appreciate these difficulties as much as the right hon. Gentleman and his Friends, but I think they will concede that if a provision of this kind is required at all, it ought to meet some cases of that description. Let me put two concrete cases, one mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman and another analogous case. Take the case of a loan made to a tenant, in which there is no covenant, no agreement, no legal obligation, but where it is well understood between the parties that something will happen, if I may say so, unless the beer or other liquor is bought from the person who lends the money and who may be the brewer. The other case was the case put in the course of the discussion last year, and it was this: Supposing a brewer supplies intoxicants to a tenant of a house without there being any legal tie or obligation, and he allows a considerable balance owing to him, which is held, so to speak, in terrorem, or is intended as an obligation, whether moral or terrifying, or otherwise, upon the tenant, and if, thereby, an advantage is gained by the person who supplies the beer, is not that a case which every fair-minded man would admit ought to come within this Clause?
Supposing he raises the price of the beer—
4.0 P.M.
One question at a time is sufficient, and I am now dealing with those of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition. If such an arrangement or understanding existed—neither of these is a legal term—I think everybody will admit that as to the duty in this case some distinction ought to be made. I may say at once, we intend to accept an Amendment which will only make the Clause operative in the case of the increased amount of duty under this Bill. Some distinction of that kind ought to be made. The right hon. Gentleman said that apparently this is to be decided by the Commissioners. It is to be decided by the Commissioners, as we think it ought; it is not to be decided by lawyers.
Are the Commissioners to decide and to construe words relating to tie? Is not the function of the Commissioners really the determination of the amount?
Certainly. They will have to determine the adjustment between the tenant and the landlord, or the brewer or the person who has the tie. No Member of this House, whether lawyer or not, would have any difficulty in saying what would be the fair adjustment of the increased duty in any circumstances. You do not want a lawyer for that at all; any fair-minded man could do it, and that is what we intend the procedure to be under this Clause. As I have already indicated that the Clause in its final shape will only be made to apply to the increased form of the duty, I also desire to indicate we are prepared to accept, instead of our own words, the words proposed by the hon. Member for Kingston, which would come in at the end of the Clause. The hon. and learned Member for Kingston proposes to leave out the words we have put in, "just under the circumstances," in order to insert the words "proportionate to the benefit obtained by such person from the licensee." I think I have already indicated that we want to make it perfectly clear that there should be an adjustment of the increased duties, and it must be conceded that these middle cases, where there cannot be said to be any legal obligation, ought to be dealt with. I submit that the words "direct or indirect obligation" ought to stand to enable the Commissioners to do justice between the parties concerned.
From the case stated by the Solicitor-General, I imagine that he supposes under an obligation of that kind there would probably be a certain price charged, and the tenant would be under the obligation to pay more than the ordinary free trade price. The Amendment I have on the Paper is designed to make it apply only in that case. It will apply, for instance, where a man borrows a few hundred pounds from the brewer or distiller, as is frequently done in Scotland, where he is placed under no tie whatever, and where he gets his beer and spirits at the ordinary price. Of course you cannot have it both ways.
I am much obliged to the hon. Member for his explanation. I omitted to deal with the case of a mortgage. In the case of an ordinary mortgage where no benefit accrues to the mortgagee, there would be no. adjustment at all. It is only intended to make a fair and equitable adjustment such as any reasonable man would make between a person who uses the position he has whether by loan of money or in any other way to obtain for himself an advantage from that position entirely outside the mortgage.
Are you going to accept my Amendment?
Probably, or at any rate something of that kind.
I want to bring this Debate back to the real point. I am glad to hear it is intended to accept the Amendment of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kingston. In this case the duty will be an exceedingly important matter, and this is a Clause which proposes that in the case of tied tenants the duty shall be adjusted. It is perfectly clear that the point which this Amendment raises is not of a drafting character, but it raises a principle of the greatest importance not merely as affecting this Bill, but as affecting the very much wider question of legislation. It is a question of defining the class of tied tenants who are to have the benefit of this Clause. The free tenant is not to have the benefit, but the tied man is to have the benefit. How is this class defined? It is defined as those persons who are tied by law, and the opening words of the Clause are enough for that. Every lawyer will agree that that exhausts the class of tied tenants in the eye of the law. This question—which will be the initial and main question—whether a given publican, asking for this relief, comes, or does not some, within this class of tenants, is not going to be determined by the Commissioners but by the court. The court will determine that according to legal principles. This Clause proposes to define the class of tied tenants, and it defines them as those who are legally tied. This is a matter of great importance. Who are the second class? They are persons who, in the eye of the law, are not tied tenants.
Therefore, you are proposing to create a class for legal purposes upon whom you are going to impose legal liabilities who, nevertheless, are not bound in law. What are they bound in? How can a court of law judge in this matter? If they are not bound in law how can the court judge whether they come within this class or not? Is this going to be a matter of right feeling or emotion, and not a matter of law? I know the Solicitor-General sees this great difficulty, and to meet it he keeps putting in words which are getting him into strange regions. If this was intended by both parties as an obligation the words are unnecessary, and we are once more on the safe, familiar ground of legal obligations. But that is not so. Here is to be a class of persons who are to be brought within the Clause, or stand outside it, according as to whether they entertain or do not entertain an apprehension. It need not be a reasonable apprehension. Supposing a publican has borrowed money from his brewer without any tie at all, and he says, "I am not bound to take my beer from this man; he has never spoken to me about it, and he has never threatened to call his money in. I am afraid, however, if I do not take my beer from him he will call his money in." The brewer might be called before the court, and he might say, "I assure you on my honour I have no intention of doing anything of the kind." Has the court to say under those circumstances, "No, we believe this man's fear is well grounded, and we think you would; therefore we shall treat him as a tied tenant, although he is not a tied tenant"? Take another case. A publican might say, "I have no tie or loan of any sort, and the brewer is not my landlord, but I am afraid he might put up the price of my beer, or he might set people against me, and I am afraid if I do not take my beer from him he might set up another public-house in my neighbourhood." There is no fear too fantastic or remote which could not be set up. If this Committee is going outside legal obligations and allow a court of law to take note of all the matters I have sug- gested, then I say we are embarking upon a new and an enormous field.
This Amendment deals with the words "any direct or indirect obligation," and I think it is not desirable that we should have a fresh discussion on this point. We are now merely discussing those words.
Probably the Amendment in the name of the hon. and learned Member for Kingston is a better Amendment upon which to have this discussion than the one I have moved.
Does the hon. Member withdraw his Amendment?
I am quite willing to withdraw my Amendment.
The remarks I wish 'to make apply more to the first than to the second Amendment, therefore I would like to state my point here. The case I raise is such a peculiar one that I think it requires special attention. Take the concrete case of the licensed victualler who ties himself voluntarily to the brewer in order that he may obtain the advantage of selling that particular brewer's goods under that brewer's name. This is an actual case with which I am familiar. The custom is as follows: A free house desires to sell the goods of a particular brewery under the brewer's name. The brewer goes to a particular licensed victualler in a certain street, and says, "I understand you want to take my goods. There is another man wants to sell them a little lower down in your street, but if I supply you my condition is that you take my goods, and no other, and sell them under my name." That is a particular case to which I wish to draw the attention of the Prime Minister. It is a case with which I am personally familiar, and it has been the practice for the last 60 years. Under this Amendment that brewer is responsible for the Licence Duty.
No.
Yes, because it is a direct obligation, and this particular publican I have alluded to is tied by this agreement as long as the lamp of the brewer is fixed outside his premises, because he can take no other goods, and therefore it is an absolute agreement.
I was not denying that it was an agreement. The hon. and gallant Member said the brewer would be bound to pay the whole of the Licence Duty, and that is why I denied it.
The Clause says, "under any direct or indirect obligation of any kind." I contend that where goods are of a certain value, and are appreciated more than other goods of the same character, the goodwill attaches to the brewer, and not to the publican. It is an extraordinary thing that under this Bill such firms are hit all round, because they have to pay extra Licence Duty upon the goodwill of the article they supply. This shows the extraordinary folly of a Bill of this kind being framed by people who do not know anything about the trade, and they have never taken the trouble to consult the trade. Nobody has asked the brewers' opinion and advice as to how this proposal will affect the trade. The Government go to the professional scribbler, probably a most worthy and estimable individual, but he cannot be familiar with all the technicalities of a vast trade which represents £200,000,000 or £300,000,000, and which is collecting for the State £38,000,000 free of expense. This is a case totally different from those which have been discussed. We are familiar with the case in which the brewer gets the advantage. In this particular case, with which I am personally familiar, it is entirely the other way. I want something definite put in the Bill, and not leave it to the individual opinion of some unknown person called a Commissioner. I think I am entitled, before this Amendment is withdrawn, to press for an answer from some responsible Member of the Government as to what will be the effect on that particular case.
The case put by my hon. Friend certainly deserves an answer. It is not met by the Bill as it stands, whatever may be the effect of the Amendments the Government intend to accept. I would like, before the Government answer, to ask another question in regard to those words which deal with the case of direct obligation. I shall not speak at this moment about the indirect obligation. Is it, or is it not, the intention of the Government, where there is a direct obligation, as there constantly is on the owner of a licensed house, to take his mineral waters from a particular firm, that the mineral-water firm should pay a portion of the new Licence Duty?
The words are "intoxicating liquors."
Those are the words, but I want to know whether they really express the meaning of the Government. If so, on what possible ground do you make the distinction? You make this charge upon the brewer who has a tie over the house on the ground that he derives a benefit from the licence. He secures a place and a market for the sale of his goods which, but for the licence and the tie he would not have, and accordingly you say, deriving that benefit from the licence through the tie, he is at any rate to be charged with a part of the new Licence Duty. What possible distinction is there between his position and that of the mineral water manufacturer who has a similar tie? Do you mean to tell me that the right to sell mineral waters in a fully licensed public-house is of no value, or at any rate that it is of no more value than the right to sell in any house in the same street where there is no licence? Do you mean to tell me there is no value given to the right to sell mineral waters in a particular house by the fact that that house is licensed at the same time to sell spirits? It would be the greatest nonsense to pretend any thing of the kind. The advantage to the mineral-water manufacturer in the case I have named is exactly on a par, whatever its worth, with the advantage to the brewer who has a tie in beer, or to the distiller who has a tie in spirits. Having, thanks to the courtesy of the Solicitor-General, got it that the words of the Bill do express the intention of the Government, I now invite them to justify that intention, and to explain to the House the distinction between the two cases which renders it just that you should tax the brewer for the advantage which the licence confers upon him, and should allow the mineral water manufacturer, who receives a similar advantage, to go free.
I wish to ask a few questions. This is the first of the Licensing Clauses with which I entertain any sympathy, strange as it may appear, because, as a rule, I represent the tenant class in this controversy. I should, therefore, be glad if I could see any effective clause which would enable the burden to be thrown upon another class. I make that avowal frankly. There will be two innocent persons, and I have to consider which of them should suffer. Naturally, I prefer that the poorer man should escape, and that the richer man should have thrown upon him a burden which prob- ably his shoulders would be more able to bear. I have, therefore, brought to this Clause the most benevolent intentions on my part. At least, I will say I will not cast an evil eye upon it. I am, however, convinced it will do no harm to the hon. Gentlemen above the Gangway. I am convinced it is futile as it now stands, and it will not be of the smallest advantage to the tied tenant. The first words are "bound by any covenant, agreement, or undertaking." It must be a legal covenant, a legal agreement, and a legal undertaking. It must be something that the law will recognise and act upon. I think the next words, "under any direct or indirect obligation," are mere moonshine. The courts treat adjectives and adverbs with very scant courtesy. Unless you have a legal obligation, you may take it for granted that men learned in the law will pay very small attention to any embroidery that precedes it in the way of adjectives. You must, therefore, have a legal obligation. Then what is the good of putting in mere poetry? The point is, there must be a legal, enforceable obligation. It is perfectly idle to contend that these words have any force.
That is on the legal aspect. Let me put it on the human aspect. Take the case of a monthly tenant. Unless you are going to give that man fixity of tenure, what is the good of providing for a fair rent? If he can be ejected at the end of his month, and if the annual tenant can be evicted from his premises at the end of twelve months, what is the good of making this provision? The Clause, as I understand, only applies to existing agreements. It would be perfectly futile to apply it to future agreements, because the man who is tieing the house would then know what fatal number he had drawn in his register, like the French conscript who had drawn his fatal number in the recruiting field, and he would know the exact amount of his liability, and he would say to his tenant, "Do not blame me, I am only a poor brewer. My rent is only £60, but the British Government want £150 more. Your rent, therefore, will be the total of the two amounts." Mr. Gladstone saw this point when dealing with the landlord and tenant case. Why does not the present Government see it? Unless you give the tenant absolute freedom, these words are not of the smallest importance. Supposing a man is tied to one house for beer and to another house for whisky, who is going to pay? I have known that class of case. Sometimes a man is free to take his whisky where he pleases and is tied only for beer. I want to know against whom he is going to bring his action? I take it this matter has to be decided by an action before a jury. The Commissioner, if there is no agreement, would certify that a particular amount was due, and then the man would bring his action in the High Court. The Court would say, "The Commissioner was not a lawyer. He told you you would be entitled to recover £100, but this is a court of law, and we very much regret you have had your action for your pains." Would it not be a fairer way to deal with it if it was sufficient for the Commissioner to certify that John Smith had to be repaid £50, and not drive the man into the law court in order to ascertain whether the amount is repayable or not?
I come to the next point. How is it, when dealing with the criminal law, you are always so generous in your language and do not leave a single loophole? Take the case of conspiracy. It is not "obligation," but "compel or induce." The most effective tie is enforced in Ireland by a system of inducement that is as absolutely ^coercive as the alleged obligation under this Bill. A publican in the poorer parts of Dublin dare not have the dray of any other brewer outside his door unless it is Gtuinness's. I remember once a brewer told me about his business. He said, "I can only deliver my beer at night, because the population who do custom in this public-house, if they saw beer of a class not suitable to their palate, would not go to that house." Guinness's label is most potent and coercive. A man puts it in his window, and it means no other goods in the world are sold in that house. You cannot say there is an indirect obligation, but, if you ask any person acquainted with these matters, he would tell you that, so far as the tie is concerned, it is a sort of wireless telegram that reaches everybody through the palate. The public will not "have anything else. While Guinness's reap their profits as usual, the whole of these tenants—and there are whole streets of them—will still be compelled to pay the higher duty. I suggest this Clause is not strong enough. Hon. Gentlemen above the Gangway want to weaken the Clause, but I want to buck up the Government to strengthen it. That is the test of their bona fides. Now let me put this case to my hon. and learned Friend. It is the very common case of one man starting another in business in Ireland. He starts him in a grocery business. You do not use the word "publican" at all in Ireland. When one publican speaks of another he calls him a grocer, and the trade is called, the "grocery trade," because they also sell commodities which are not intoxicating liquors. Nothing could be easier in the world than for an arrangement to be made whereby this Clause would be absolutely defeated, and I want to know why is the man who is tied to a public-house to get an advantage which the free man does; not get? That is the astonishing point. The tied man is a bird of passage—
This really should come on later on a new clause.
Very well, I thoroughly accept your ruling, and I will confine myself to asking the questions which I put sympathetically to the Government. I ask the hon. and learned Gentleman not to cut down this Clause by accepting any Amendment so as to weaken it in anyway, because it is true there is a trembling class of tied tenants seeking relief and hoping to get it under this Bill. The right hon. Gentleman, instead of weakening, should strengthen and extend the Clause and give it a far wider application than is at present contemplated.
Several hon. and learned Gentlemen who have discussed the question of mortgage seem to have, I think, a rather different idea of the form which many of these mortgages take. As far as my experience goes—of course, I do not pit it against their knowledge—mortgages have been somewhat in this way. The lender of money, if he happens to be engaged in the trade, says, "You may have this money for the purpose of acquiring the business, but in the deed you will be called upon to pay me a certain interest." And then there is a further provision that that interest shall be reduced to a lower rate as long as the tenant takes all his malt liquor, or whatever it may be, from the lender. I venture, with all respect, to say that that is a very well-known form of mortgage. It is the constant practice in places with which I have been connected. I do not believe myself it matters very much what you say. I do not believe that under any conditions you will be able to effect the good object which the Government have in view. There is no-doubt that people can, by either raising the rent or raising the price of beer, practically speaking, render this Clause in operative.
Perhaps it would be convenient I should say a word or two in reply to this Amendment before it is withdrawn, and before the Amendment to leave out the Word "indirect" is put from the Chair. The hon. Member for the Widnes Division (Colonel Walker) asked whether in a particular case which he put clearly before the House, the essence of which, as I under stood, was whether the landlord under certain conditions was to bear the whole burden of the duty. In reply to that I would suggest that the Commissioners would say that where the benefit of the tie accrued to the brewer alone he would have to pay the duty. The very essence of the case put by the hon. Member was, I believe, that no benefit did accrue to the brewer, and, in that event, I venture to say he would not be saddled with any portion of the duty. Then there was the question put to me by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Worcestershire (Mr. Austen Chamberlain) whether or not mineral waters would be taken into account—
In the interests of brevity perhaps I may rise to a point of Order. I understand that an hon. Friend of mine has put down an Amendment later in the Clause to leave out the words "intoxicating liquors." Therefore, perhaps this point may be deferred until that Amendment is reached.
Certainly, and that makes it unnecessary for me to answer the question of the right hon. Gentleman, if he will consent to that. Other speeches have been made, but I think I need only now deal with that of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Louth (Mr. T. M. Healy). He says he looks upon this Clause as excellent in intention, but nevertheless he thinks it is all moonshine, and says that, instead of basking in the light of the sun it only has the inconstant light of the moon. I can assure my hon. and learned Friend there was no necessity for him to use to me the colloquial phrase "buck up." All I think is necessary is that we shall put our heads together in order to deal with a matter which everybody admits ought to be dealt with and to be dealt with clearly as between all the parties concerned. My hon. and learned Friend said that in his opinion the Clause would prove futile. An argument of that kind does not, of course, fall without effect on me. I see all the difficulties ahead. A man may be a monthly tenant; he may be a tenant capable of being turned out at three or six months' notice. I admit all these difficulties, and I say that all we can aim at is to do our best. Surely the monthly tenant, in the case put by the hon. and learned Gentleman, will be able to say that the Legislature intended that some particular portion of the burden should be borne by the brewer in proportion to the-benefit he receives, and some additional pressure might in that case be brought to bear on the brewer, inasmuch as the new tenant will be coming in under precisely similar circumstances. I quite agree the-Clause might be rendered futile by increases of rent, but the hon. and learned! Gentleman will surely agree with me that it is impossible for us to provide for all these different tenures. If we attempted to do that it might be suggested, with some degree of justice, that this is not merely a fiscal Bill, but that it deals with matters outside fiscal questions. All I can; say is that so far as we can we propose that what is considered by fair minded men to be the equity of the case, and what is considered to be a fair adjustment of the increased duty as between the tenant of the premises and the person who gains, some benefit from the tie, shall take place. The hon. Gentleman criticised the use of the word "obligation." I admit it is very difficult to get a word which expresses, exactly our meaning without its being open to very considerable criticisms. The word "obligation" would no doubt carry with it the idea of a legal obligation. The words have been here used in connection with the words "direct" or "indirect," and I think it is fair to believe that a court might so construe the words "indirect obligation" as an obligation not binding directly in law but one of a more or less moral kind.
Put in the words "moral obligations."
I will consider that phrase, but I must say that my hon. and learned Friend does not like adjectives except he uses them himself. Suppose we had put in this Clause the words "moral obligation," what a torrent of abuse and invective we might have had from him! There is no question at all about the intentions of the Government. Everybody knows what we mean. We mean that persons who levy money or give credit and intend to have the benefit of it shall bear their fair share of these duties. I again admit that the mere word "obligation" would by itself imply a legal obligation, and we intend to express something different when we couple with it the word "indirect." If the hon. and learned Gentleman can suggest a better word there will be no difficulty on the part of the Government in accepting it. I do not want to say any more. I have answered the question put to me. I have indicated, and reiterated, perhaps too often, what the idea of the Government is. It is that this increased duty put upon the trade in intoxicating liquors should be borne fairly, equitably and justly by the persons who benefit from the sale of the liquor which is sold or consumed on the premises.
I gather from the explanation just given by the Solicitor-General that the Government are now engaged on another fishing expedition. They think there is something they would like to catch, but they cannot determine how to proceed to do it. I think I can point out to them a matter of which they appear to have entirely lost sight. They have laid down for their own guidance certain principles with regard to dividing the increased duties among the different persons who benefit from the sale of intoxicating liquors. But they have forgotten altogether the case of the tenant who has taken licensed premises from the landlord and paid that landlord an increased rent because of the licence attached to the premises he had taken. They have forgotten to look into that side of the question, although they had some precedent for doing so under the Act of 1904, where we were careful to give compensation to the ground landlords and all the other interests concerned. Then I would ask, What is to become of the free tenant? It is only provided under this Clause that the increased Licence Duty shall be shared by the tenant and the persons who supply him with intoxicating liquors if he is under some obligation to purchase his liquors from them; but where a man is under no such obligation, how will he be affected? You must remember always that the Government have announced, and have never denied, that these new duties are very high; they have, an fact, been described as swingeing duties on platforms in the country—as duties which press so heavily on the licensed trade as to crush out a considerable number of the persons who are engaged in it. What is the free licenced person to do, if the only remedy that he has is to enter into some obligations, such as those which are described in this Clause as direct or indirect, with some particular person? That is all. He has no resource but to enter into such an obligation and share the burden with some one who is willing to share it with him. What does that mean? It means that every free publican in this country—and there are not a large number of them—that every free tenant in this country, must proceed to "tie" himself as soon as possible to some wholesale dealer who will supply him with the wines and spirits necessary for carrying on his business. The real difficulty in this Clause, as in so many others, is, that the Government are acting on imperfect information and imperfect knowledge in regard to-their speeches, and such information as they obtain is from sources which are not able to inform them correctly. On this particular point I have no objection whatever to the principle that all the persons interested in the licence should share the cost of it, but the Government have not taken means to ensure that that shall be done, and the means adopted in this Clause are of a nature to crush out the free tenants who have not shared their burdens with somebody else. I think that is absurd. We all agree, however, that those who are interested in the property shall pay their share of the obligations.
I want to intervene for a few minutes in this Debate, because I am in the unusual position of having received a letter from the Lincolnshire Licensed Victuallers' Association, asking me to support this Clause. They appear to think that I am a fit and proper person to do so, although, of course, I assume that the hon. Member for Widnes (Col. Walker) may not be of that opinion. They not only wish me to support it, but ishey wish it supported in the stronger form which is suggested by the Amendment of the hon. Member for Mid-Leicestershire (Sir M. Levy), who has an Amendment on the Paper, and for once I find myself in some agreement with them. It has been said that it is too difficult to-enforce what is proposed in this Clause. It is urged that the task of adjusting the burden of the new Licence Duty between the classes generally known, or popularly known, as "tied" tenants and those to whom they are "tide," is impossible for-legislation to do.
On a point of Order, Sir. I myself wanted to discuss this point, but I thought that the proper place would be on the discussion of the Clause. Is the hon. Member in order in discussing it now?
On that point I myself thought that the discussion was confined to the narrower limit, but the hon. Member for Rutlandshire (Mr. Gretton) dealt with very much larger limits.
The hon. Member for Rutland took the opportunity from time to time of actually referring to the Amendment. As to what the hon. Member is now saying, he has not said anything yet which has anything to do with the Amendment, and he seems to be discussing the general effect of the Clause, which cannot be permitted.
I think the lion. Member for Louth (Mr. T. M. Healy) said the language of the Clause was illusive, and he therefore referred to it.
Should we not hear the letter, which my hon. Friend has stated he is going to read, before we know whether it will be in order to read it or not?
I have only ruled on what the hon. Member has said: not on what he has not said.
I was not going to read anything at all, but if I am confined to the narrow point as to whether it is desirable strictly to construe this Clause so as to confine it to "tied" houses, in which the tenants are bound by a direct obligation, and to leave out those who are under some indirect obligation, and that I think is the point involved, then I should ask the Government certainly to leave the Clause wide, because everyone knows that it is quite possible to have a very substantial and effective "tie" without having any written or legal document. I have certainly come across cases in my own experience where, by means of loans and leases, the tenant was for all purposes "tied," and certainly was not free to be supplied with liquor by any other firm than that to which he was "tied." But if the Government were to restrict the application of this Clause to those tenants who were "tied" by an absolutely direct obligation, I am quite certain that they would then make their Clause illusive, because a system of "tie" can be built up in the form of indirect obligation, and in that way the Clause could be entirely nullified. Personally, it seems to me that the Clause is really logical. You tax monopoly value and you tax those in whose hands the monopoly values are. The free tenant is the man who has this monopoly value in his hands, but the "tied" tenant does not. You can get rid of the "tied" tenant and his interest for a £5 or a £10 note, and, therefore, it is really to throw the burden of the taxation of monopoly value upon those in whose hands the monopoly value rests, and there is a precedent for that in the case of the compensation levy—the sum of £1,000,000 — which is deducted by the tenant from the brewer, so that there is little difficulty. If it is possible for the tenant to-day to deduct that million of money, and we have always understood that it was the brewery companies who paid that compensation, if this is levied in exactly a similar way, this one and a half million of money can be deducted, and will be deducted under this Clause. I think it might be strengthened with some subsequent Amendment, but I think it does absolutely carry out that object.
I did not quite follow the hon. Member who has just sat down in the discussion of the Clause, but I want to make one more appeal to the Government to accept this Amendment. From the many kind speeches which the Solicitor-General has delivered on this subject, and I use the word kindly in appreciation because, to my mind, those speeches are in favour of the Amendment, the hon. and learned Gentleman made it abundantly clear what the intentions of the Government are, and he wishes to get in, and this is the whole point, the obligation, whether it be a legal or a moral obligation. Then let him accept this Amendment and leave it at the word "bound." We know what the intentions of the Government are, but the members of the trade who will be affected by them, whether landlord or tenant, those who supply or those who receive the intoxicating liquors will not have the opportunity of knowing what those intentions are, and the Law Courts—even if they know what they are—will not care a snap of the fingers for them. They will go by what is put in the Bill, and they will assume that all these other words are put in for some definite purpose, and they will want to know what that purpose is, and the only result of leaving these words in will be to mislead all the members of the public, give unnecessary trouble to the courts, and give a large quantity of entirely unmerited employment to the members of the legal profession.
I think there is no doubt that if these words are left in they will give rise to a considerable amount of trouble and dispute, and a considerable amount of litigation. Let me take a case. Let us assume for a moment a free house, the tenant of which has an outstanding account with a brewer, or a spirit distiller, or a wine merchant, and he feels in his own mind, probably rightly, that he must go on getting his supplies of beer, wine, and spirits from those firms. His account with one of them is outstanding; an inconvenient pressure may be put upon him to settle it. The Government do not intend, we know, that an indirect obligation of that kind should hi included, but it is very reasonable for the tenant who reads this Section, if it remains as it is at present, to think he would come under the wording of the Bill as it now stands. Personally, I think he does; but all these cases would give rise to incessant litigation, and I do appeal to the Government to give effect to their own express intention to leave the question whether a person is or is not bound in fact, and cut out all these words which, however meaningless they may be intended to be, will be held to have some meaning in them by the licensee and the court who will interpret them.
There is one small point on which I think some explanation is needed. I think it was said that the credit which the licence holder had from the wine merchant or the brewer would, in fact, constitute an obligation. If that is admitted, it is rather dangerous for the tenant, and the only result will be that his credit from the person who supplies him with goods for his business will at once dry up, and he will be deprived of that which he has hitherto enjoyed. I do not know whether the hon. and learned Gentleman insists upon that point, but if he does I think it is very dangerous.
5.0 P.M.
Speaking as one who has had a good many years' experience, both of these indirect obligations, if such things do exist, and the way they are handled by the courts, may I say that I fail entirely to understand the apprehension of litigation which is put forward by so many speakers on the other side. The hon. Member for Basingstoke (Mr. Clavell Salter), for instance, seemed to think that you must be convinced that it is a legal obligation, or that it is something in itself enforceable in the courts. The point is that it is not in itself enforceable, but it may be indirectly enforceable through the medium of some other agreement between the parties. I cannot see where all this danger of litigation arises. The tenant is supposed to come forward and say, "I am under an obligation of this sort, and therefore this man, with whom I am directly or indirectly bound, must bear his share of these duties." The other man's answer is, "You are not under any such obligation, and where is the litigation to come from? If he is not, let him record that he is not, and the subject matter of litigation will disappear altogether. I know that it may be that the obligation may be so remote a possibility of turning him out that the Commissioners may have some difficulty in fixing the amount. Therefore, I shall be very glad to see the words "the amount if any," introduced into the Clause. But I do not see that there is any danger at all of giving rise to litigation. The Clause is, of course, imperfect. In such a case as this, where people have indirect power arising from their relationship, you cannot define everything in language, and I must not be supposed to commit myself to the opinion that this matter could not very well be left out altogether. But the apprehension may be in practice very well founded, as we know from the letter received by the hon. Member (Mr. Charles Roberts), and the attempt to meet it is, I think, fairly expressed by the words of the Clause as they stand.
The speech of the hon. Member who has just sat down is quite out of harmony with the speech of the Solicitor-General. The hon. and learned Gentleman made an admirable speech, and no one enjoyed it more than I did, but he has asked us, and he is entitled to some response to his appeal, 10 suggest an effective Clause instead of the ineffective Clause which he admits the Government have put upon the Paper. It is not very easy to suggest effective words, and I am far from saying the words I am going to suggest will be effective, but I think they will be more effective than the words in the Bill. The Solicitor-General has stated that the anxiety of the Government is to fairly divide the application of the new duties between the brewer and the publican, or to throw upon the brewer the whole enhanced duty recoverable under the Bill. If that be so, that is the first word of encouragement which the publicans have yet had. The Government have now declared that the intention is that it is the brewers who should pay this tax, and I suggest some such words as these, "Where the licence holder is not free to obtain a supply of intoxicating liquor from any brewer that he wishes to resort to," or if he does not like that form, "where for any reason the licence holder has exclusively obtained in the three years last before the passing of the Act, his supply of intoxicating liquor exclusively from one person," in either of these cases let the increased duty be paid by the brewer. What we are doing is to hold out a promise apparently to the hope, and deceiving it in reality to the head or the heart as the case may be. The Clause as it now stands will do no one any good. It will not hit a single brewer or distiller, and yet the hope is held out to tied men and publicans all over the country that the Clause does not throw upon the licence holder the obligations which the Government suggest. The Clause will relieve practically no one. The hon. Gentleman who has just sat down deprecates litigation. How is a man to decide his rights when they are contested except by litigation?
My observation was that if one party says, "He put me under an obligation," and the other says, "No, I have not," they are under no obligation to go to litigation.
That is not human nature. The hon. Gentleman is not dealing with beings on this planet, but with people I have never met. That is not the way they act in real life. The brewer upon the one side simply does nothing whatever. He is ramparted round in his fortress. The publican has to pay the Licence Duty in October, and then he looks for the amount to the brewer, who is ironclad behind his defences, and, of course, the brewer says, "My good friend, it was the Liberal Government who imposed this tax upon you. It was not I. Go to Mr. Lloyd-George, or to the Law Courts." That will be the song which the brewer will sing. So far as I can make out this Clause is intended to suggest to publicans all over the country that in fact this obligation is being thrown upon the brewer, when I say that you have put down words which will not effect it, and which the Solicitor- General has practically admitted wall not effect it I suggest an alternative. The alternative the Government want is to make the brewer pay. Then why not say so? The words are so simple. If you are dealing exclusively with the brewer let the brewer exclusively pay the tax. That being the intention of the Government there is absolutely no difficulty in carrying it out. One of the ways would be to-put the whole tax on the brewer. You do not do that. You put it on the publican I suggest the words should be "where the licence holder is not free"—do not say from whatever cause—"to obtain a supply of intoxicating liquors where he pleases the brewer shall pay." If the Government mean business in this Clause, they ought to suggest some such words.
I am interested in the suggestion made by the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Mr. Beale) a moment ago for the avoidance of all litigation and dispute under the Clause. I invite him to consider how it would work, if it worked at all. He says the tenant will come to the landlord or to the brewer to whom he is tied, and to whom he is under an obligation of some kind, and will say, "I am under an obligation to buy from you." The brewer will reply, "You are under no such obligation," and thereupon all matters for litigation will be at an end, the tenant's mind will be set at rest, and everyone will be perfectly satisfied. But is it as simple as that? The hon. and learned Member (Mr. T. M. Healy) suggested that the brewer will not meet the tenant in that friendly spirit. But suppose he does? Suppose he is perfectly free, and says "No, there is no obligation existing between us. You are at liberty to buy where you like." Does that settle everything? Does it settle the question of the credits which are to be allowed? Does that settle the question of the duration of the loan which he may have? Does that settle any of the 101 suggestive methods by which the tenant is induced, or persuaded, or coerced into dealing with a particular person rather than anyone else in the same trade?
I admit the thing can only be partial, it can only go a certain way, but I do not confine myself to such a very simple case as that where the brewer says "You are under no obligation to buy." The tenant might say, "You have it in your power to turn me out next term if I do not buy from you," and the brewer might say, "You need not fear that." It does not go all the way, but it goes that far.
The hon. and learned Gentleman's defence is also not a complete one to the proposals of the Government. It is only a partial defence, and he hardly disguised from the Committee that he thought that the Government had better let the whole matter alone. I am trying to persuade him that the Government has not done nearly as much as he thinks they have. What he says is that the person who is alleged to have a hold over the other is to record that he has no such hold. But a man who has lent money cannot record that he will not call it in. He may record that he has no present intention of doing it, but he cannot bind himself under all circumstances. What trader is going to bind himself that his discounts and his credits will always be the same, and that no matter what the changes in his circumstances or in the circumstances of the trade, he will always allow the credit which he has been accustomed to give the customer? No man would be such a fool. No bank would make loans on those terms. No wholesale dealer or manufacturer would supply on such terms as those. What the hon. and learned Gentleman suggests that the presumed holder of the obligation should do is not practicable; and I am quite certain his business experience would be sufficient to convince him that in any other trade except this one, which is always supposed to have conditions wholly different from those in any other trade, such conditions would not be possible. I do not speak as a person who thinks the Government had better let the matter alone altogether, or, indeed, that they could let it alone. The hon. and learned Member (Mr. T. M. Healy) spoke as though all of us on these benches held a direct brief for the licensing trade, or had some different interest to represent from what he has. I suppose he is trying to represent the publican's interest, and so are we, who are trying to do justice as between man and man. I have no personal interest in the trade of any sort whatever. If your assumption is that this duty is going to be paid by the individuals engaged in the trade, it is of great importance that you should apportion it fairly between those individuals. What surprises me is that they have always held the doctrine that this was not a tax on the trade, but a tax upon the consumers of alcoholic liquor, and that accordingly the trade will recover the whole of it from the consumer. If they recover the whole of it from the consumer, what does it matter whether you take it out of one pocket or the other so long as the consumer is obliged to put back all that you have taken out? From that point of view, if the Government's contention about the tax, and the Prime Minister's advice to the trade, be accurate and feasible, these matters become of very little consequence; but if it be true that the licence holder cannot get it back from the consumer, it is of great consequence that the burden should be distributed among those who benefit by the licence. If, as has been suggested, the trade will not get the tax back from the consumer, the proposals of the Government, as this discussion has disclosed, are partial and ineffective.
I moved the Amendment for the purpose of making perfectly clear what the intention of the Government was. It appeared to me that the Clause does break contracts, for, according to the custom of the trade, where there is a tied house the licensee is under covenant to pay the licence. Under the provisions of the Bill you are making these enormous additions to the Licence Duties, and, as the hon. and learned Member for Louth (Mr. T. M. Healy) stated, they will fall on innocent parties. I perfectly agree that the brewer, where the house is tied, should pay part of these duties, but the Clause is so drawn that I do not see that it will obtain that object. I proposed to cut out the words "by any covenant, agreement, or undertaking, or is otherwise under any direct or indirect obligation of any kind." Having drawn the attention of this Committee to the language of the Clause, I have attained my object, and I do not wish to carry the Amendment to a Division. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I do not wish to move the Amendment, of which I have given, notice, to leave out the words "or indirect" ["or is otherwise under any direct or indirect obligation of any kind "].
I understood that we were to take the discussion on the word "indirect" on this Amendment.
I am in the hands of the Committee in regard to that.
I move the Amendment formally, for I really do not think that we have yet got to the bottom of this question at all. I shall endeavour to prove that to the Committee. In the first place, I should like to ask the Government—on whom do they mean that these duties are to fall? That is a fundamental question. In the earlier part of our discussions we were led to understand that any tax put on the trade could always be put on the consumer by the trade. I take it that that cannot be intended on this point.
Does that question really arise on the word "indirect"?
Yes, I think it does. I take the word "indirect," and I wish to know whether that covers the case of a man who has a free house and gets credit from a firm of brewers. If it does, I am afraid it will be very injurious to the licence holder. To me it seems that in the case of the tied house the shareholders of the brewery must pay, whatever clause you put in. They must pay the whole of the duty in the case of a public-house where the holder of the licence is merely their servant. They cannot throw it on the consumer.
There are two distinct classes of cases— the ordinary tenant, whether for a short period or not, and the manager of the tied house, who is the brewer's servant.
That really is a technical distinction. I think the man who is merely there for six months may be in the position, whatever you put in your Bill, of being dependent entirely on the brewer, leaving the brewer, if he can, to get the duty out of the public. I do not think the Clause is necessary, though I do not at all object to its being put in, but I am entirely against the general principle of the Clause if it means that you are going to throw the duty on the trade in improper proportions, leaving the trade, if they can, to get it out of the public. That is where the question of direct or indirect obligation comes in. If the public are going to pay, neither the licence holder nor the brewer are going to pay. I put aside the case where there is a direct covenant, and I must press the Government on this question of "indirect obligation." If the Government hold, and if the Commissioners are going to hold, that the man who has got credit from a brewer is under some obligation to him, the result must be that the credit of the publican must stop. At all events, it will be checked. I think it will be stopped. Take the case of what is called a free house. I take it that what is called a free house is not necessarily outside the provisions of this Clause at all. This or that manufacturer may have supplied the licence holder with beer, whisky, mineral waters, or tobacco. I want to know whether that man is to get the benefit of this Clause or not. I should say that if the result of getting that credit is to drive him to a particular manufacturer he should have the advantage of the Clause. But I am not sure that he will get the benefit of the Clause, and you may immediately drive him out of credit. That is the difficulty of all those attempts at interference in arrangements between man and man. You may give the licence holder of a nominally tied house, or a free house, a case to go to the Commissioners or a law court, and say, "I have received credit from this particular firm of brewers for years, I have neverbeen actually under obligation to them, but practically I have always dealt with them." The litigant may say further, "I think that gives me a title to relief under the Clause." If the courts decide that this is an indirect obligation, are you doing the licence holder and his kind a service, or are you not? I am entirely in favour of doing all that can be done to apportion the burden between those connected with the trade who benefit by the licence, leaving supply and demand to say whether the public will ultimately pay, but do not let us, under the guise of doing justice to the trade, do an injury to the licence holder. I am not sure that under the word "indirect" you are not doing a grave injury to certain classes of licence holders. I am not sure that you will not penalise them in connection with the giving of credit by wholesale men to retailers. I understand that the giving of credit by wholesale men to retailers is good for the retailer and for the general public, and that it helps in the working of our great industrial system. If I am right in that assumption then I am inclined to think that these words, instead of helping the small licence holder, will, in effect, deprive him of that credit by the help of which hitherto he has been able to carry on his business. I would, ask the Government if they have considered that point, and if they see any way of avoiding the danger, which I am afraid is a real one. We are all agreed as to what we want, but do not let us do what this House too often does when, with the idea of carrying out a certain object, we pass a clause which appears to carry out that object, but whose ultimate operation is really injurious to those whom it is intended to benefit.
The right hon. Gentleman has dealt with this matter in a narrow groove. He has put the case of a licence holder where there is an indirect obligation arising from the position of debtor and creditor. The right hon. Gentleman has asked, or rather dealt with, two questions which I shall avoid, because I think in the first place they are not relevant to this Amendment, and secondly because it is not competent to deal with the question as to whom these duties will fall upon. We are not here to discuss the question of whether they will fall on the publican on the one hand—
I quite admit that my reference to that matter may seem irrelevant, but I will tell the Committee why I referred to it. I think if the public are going to pay, it is relatively of small importance how we arrange the Clause, for we shall do no permanent harm to those in the trade.
The right hon. Gentleman says that we are now dealing with those interested in the trade, and that we may leave the law of supply and demand to determine whether ultimately the duties which are to be added will fall on the consumer. He raised the other big question whether it is good to have debtor and creditor at all. That is a very large question, upon which I do not propose to enter now at all, but I assume that in the ordinary case of the trader there is the relation of creditor and debtor. In the first place, it is essential to remember that in our discussion upon this Clause we are trying to deal with the case where the increased duty would be unduly burdened, and, therefore, unfair, between the two people—debtor and creditor. The case in which you have a great portion of the benefit accruing to the creditor and not to the debtor. In the ordinary case of creditor and debtor, where no advantage is gained, where there is no indirect advantage—the word indirect in this sense is constantly used—the position between the creditor and debtor will not be disturbed in the slightest degree. The case we are trying to deal with—and the right hon. Gentleman would not say that it is a case that we ought not to try to deal with—is that in which a man becomes a creditor in order to screw extra profit out of the trader. For instance, the case where a man does not try to get the tenant to pay up, but keeps the arrears against the tenant, thereby compelling him, by this sort of indirect means, to pay him more. If there were only the bonâ fide position of debt6r and creditor, without any lever of that kind being employed by reason of the position of the creditor, there would be no difficulty at all, because if in such case the tenant thinks he is not aggrieved, he-need not claim the reduction of the duty. He can agree with his landlord if he likes that there is to be no reduction. It is only in default of agreement that the Commissioners are to be called on. Therefore, so far as that is concerned, the ordinary position of debtor and creditor is not interfered with, except in so far as the creditor, by means of his position as creditor, seeks to get something out of the tenant which otherwise he will not get. Take, for instance, the ordinary case of free houses. Suppose that in the case of a free house-beer would be supplied at a certain figure, but that in the case of a man who is a brewer and is dealing with a tenant who is a licence holder and a debtor to the brewer he gets 36s. a barrel probably instead of 32s. a barrel for beer.
Six months' credit.
It is to deal with cases of that kind that we have put in these words.
Suppose the brewer in that case sells it to this man who is in his debt for the ordinary trade price, his advantage being that he has a customer—not that he gets more out of that customer than out of the general public, but in order to secure his customer. I understand that this is in order to get customers more or less bound to him by mutual obligations on both sides. If that is touched in this Clause, then I fear you are doing great injury to the trade.
I do not think that that kind of case would be touched at all. In such cases the Commissioners would not say that there should be any readjustment. That is the case which was raised by the hon. Member behind. We will discuss it when we come to it. I am very anxious to do what is right in the matter. I am not quite sure that these words will do it. But in answer to the case put by the right hon. Gentleman I do not think that any portion of the increased duty would fall upon the brewer if it was really for the sake of having the custom without any other advantage, and that he sells to the tenant at the ordinary price for which the tenant might get supplied elsewhere.
I think we all want the same thing, but we want to make clear the meaning of the Clause. If I agreed with the learned Solicitor-General as to what this Clause means as it stands I may say I should be very strongly opposed to including these words, because it seems to me if he is right that the Clause is a mere trap for the tenant. Take the simplest case of all—the case where the tenant becomes indebted to a landlord who is a brewer. According to the learned Gentleman, if there is a mere relation of debtor and creditor, this law does not operate, but if, as is the case suggested, the landlord becomes a creditor with the indirect purpose of putting pressure on his tenant—
To get an advantage for himself.
With a view to putting pressure on his tenant, not to withdraw his custom—is not that what you said?
I did not say that.
At all events, the hon. and learned Gentleman did say this: that it was only if the landlord gave credit with the purpose of obtaining some indirect advantage from the sales of liquor above the proper price, this Clause would operate. If that is the meaning of the Clause, see what an almost impossible duty you will impose upon the court or whoever has to construe it. They will have to dive into the minds of both landlord and tenant. They will have to consider how much the debt is and why the landlord gave credit, and was it to increase his profit on sales. How is the court to attribute some indirect motive of this kind? How much was the tenant frightened? Was he really induced by this to continue his custom? All these things will be subject to inquiry by a tribunal not accustomed to consider, I am happy to say, matters of that kind, and the result would be that in every case, I suppose, a tenant who owes his landlord anything would make a claim. First he would go to the Commissioners for their certificate, and that inquiry before the Commissioners would not determine the point at all. The Commissioners would determine the adjustment of the amount. Then there would have to be another inquiry, an action in some court of law for the recovery of the amount certified by the Commissioners, and on that the landlord or the brewer would try to show that there was no indirect purpose. It would be like an action on an award, with which we arc perfectly familiar. So you would have two actions before your conclusion could be come to, and in the end it would very likely happen that the court would hold that there was no indirect obligation, and the whole of this litigation and inquiry would go for nothing. I think that that would not only produce litigation but trouble for the tenant, and I would strongly object to those words if I thought that that was the effect of the Clause. I am of opinion that the words are very vague, and not apt for the purpose of conveying a legal meaning; but still, putting an interpretation on them, I still agree with the hon. Member below me that, notwithstanding the word "indirect," obligation means legal obligation. That the thing a tenant must show is a legal obligation of an indirect character, but still a legal obligation.
What is a legal obligation of an indirect character?
An excellent illustration was given by an hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Barnard)—the case of a brewer who lends money on interest with an express provision in the mortgage that if the tenant buys his liquor from the lender the rate of interest shall be reduced. I think that is a very fair example of what may be called indirect.
That is very direct.
It is not direct. The landlord agrees to give the tenant some benefit on certain conditions, and that is an indirect obligation. Putting the best construction you can on it the mere fact of indebtedness, coupled with the possibility of inducement, would not bring the tenant within this Clause. I do not think it necessary to pursue the subject further after the discussion we have had. I think that the view of the learned Solicitor-General is far too wide as to this Clause and the effect of it, and that it will only operate in cases where there is a real obligation, though indirect. Therefore, I did not think it necessary to discuss the matter further or to move an Amendment.
I cannot accept the suggestion that these words should be omitted. They have a very distinct value; whatever the amount of the value may be I doubt, but that they have some value in the interests of the trader I have not the smallest doubt. But the hon. and learned Member for Kingston (Mr. Cave) has raised a point full of substance in connection with this matter. With much that was said by the Leader of the Opposition we may agree, but in the end there will come a moment when the tenant thinks he is being wronged, and thinks he has a claim, under this Act, and he makes this claim. He makes this claim, in the first instance, to a gentleman who is not a lawyer. I take it he makes it behind the back of the brewer or the distiller. That must be so. I take it he would make it by affidavit, because the Commissioner will be in London. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue are in Somerset House, and the only way in which Scotch and Irish tenants could make a claim would be by affidavit. The hon. and learned Member for Kingston suggested that an affidavit was necessary, but of an ex parte kind, and he suggested that the Commissioners of Inland Revenue would act upon that. I venture to doubt that proposition, because I think that the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, if they were acting fairly, would say that this indirect motive, which is dealt with here, is a very indirect motive, and the fact of indirection at once attracts the idea of hearing the other side.
What I said is they would hear both sides and decide, but that would not settle the matter.
But the mere fact that the motive is indirect throws upon the Commissioners of Inland Revenue a far more severe duty, and, as I suggest, compels them to hear the person who is to be overweighted with these sums, which perhaps amounts to £200, £300, or £400. Therefore you will have two inquiries. In the absence of agreement you will have this inquiry before the Commissioner, and then if the Commissioner decides against the tenant he cannot go to law. Although the coercion may be of the most positive kind, the tenant is out in the cold the moment the Commissioner says, "I refuse to certify; this is too indirect." Curiously enough you are making the certificate of the Commissioner as to amount final in the brewer's favour, whereas if it is against the brewer and in favour of the tenant, the tenant has yet to litigate in a court of law. I respectfully submit that this word "indirect" necessarily involves the Government—as I trust the Government see—in the addition of some clause to the effect that where there is an indirect motive disclosed the certificate of the Commissioner should be final. The Solicitor-General said that it is true the word "obligation" is a word of legal character, and he added, "We have endeavoured to colour it with some suggestion of indefiniteness, some suggestion of indirect motive." My suggestion to the Government is that whenever the Commissioners can find an indirect motive, or an indirect obligation, this certificate in the tenant's favour should be final and binding upon the brewer, and that there should be no right of litigation on the part of the brewer in that case. That seems to me to be the only fair way. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition has moved the omission of these words. I could not support him in that, because the Clause would then read, "or is otherwise under any direct obligation of any kind." It there was a direct obligation it would be so patent that no Commissioner could refuse his certificate. That would also carry with it the corollary that it should not be subject to objection in a court of law. So that either way it appears to me that the Government will be better advised in leaving these words in than by their omission. I am sorry, however, that the dual system of litigation is going to be created. I think the method of recovering this tax ought to be "short, sharp, and decisive." Here is a heavy tax suddenly put upon a poor man. The poor man should have the right to resort at once to the Commissioner, and the Commissioner's decision should be final. I certainly support the retention of the words in the Clause.
Speaking for myself, I should not be able to support the Amendment to omit the words "or indirect," because it would involve the wording of this Clause in even more pitiable confusion than it is at present. It would read then, "Where the licence holder is bound by any covenant, agreement, or undertaking, or is otherwise under any direct obligation of any kind." The effect o£ leaving out the words "or indirect" would obviously leave a direct obligation, and the two together in that case would mean precisely the same thing. A covenant or agreement is a direct obligation. It must be assumed that they do net mean the same thing, and I am driven to the conclusion that the whole of this two hours' discussion which has taken place upon these two Lines would have been avoided if the Government had succeeded in giving such clear instructions to their draftsman as would have enabled him to avoid the clumsy tautology of this expression. What is the explanation which the Solicitor-General has given to these words "direct or indirect obligation?" On the whole, I am satisfied that the construction which the hon. and learned Gentleman places on these words is ill-founded. Obligation means a legal obligation, a legal bond. It has a well-ascertained legal meaning. What the Solicitor-General or the draftsman has done is to try and incorporate some shoddy journalism into an Act of Parliament. No judge and no statute would ever use the word "obligation" in the sense in which it has been employed by the Solicitor-General. The Solicitor-General asks: "What does an indirect obligation mean if it does not mean what I say?" That is exactly what would be argued in the Law Courts. When you use the expression "or indirect obligation" as meaning something more than a direct obligation, what does it mean? It would be quite easy to take other instances besides those given by the hon. and learned Gentleman below the Gangway. Suppose, for instance, a licence had been transferred and the original licence holder had been under tie to a firm of brewers. In that case when the licence was transferred it might well be that the tie being for five years, it would not change hands with the licence, and the man who originally had the licence might well find himself under a direct obligation to the brewer. Then there would be the new contract, the new licence holder, and this state of things would occur. As between the new licence holder and the firm of brewers there would be an obligation; it would not be an indirect obligation, but a direct obligation
Where lawyers differ laymen may have an opinion. After listening to the hon. and learned Gentleman, I have come to the conclusion that the two people who know when there is any direct or indirect obligation upon them are the licence holder and the brewer who has lent the money. These two people will know in their own minds whether or not there is an obligation existing between them. In my experience of life I have always found that it is a great thing to have a good moral case. A good moral case gives you courage to speak, to write, or to instruct your solicitor if necessary, but in 19 cases out of 20 such a case is never heard in the courts, because it is settled outside. There are a great many licence holders who are in a very poor financial position. A man may pay £100 or so for furniture and fittings, and that is all he has got. If he has to pay a largely increased duty which he cannot afford, and if someone else has to pay that duty according to this Clause, we have then to consider the case of the Official Receiver, when the licence holder has become bankrupt, which he very shortly would. The knowledge of the brewer that the Official Receiver would have the law at his back, and that he would have the licence holder as a witness against him, would operate towards reducing the brewer to pay the duty, or otherwise the court might be applied to.
I agree that the question is one of difficulty, nor do I disguise from the Committee that I looked with considerable misgiving to the result of these words, but unless a substitute can be found for them, they had better be left in, and therefore I beg to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment by leave withdrawn.
6.0 P.M.
Acting on the hint which the hon. and learned Gentleman threw out a moment or two ago, I propose to submit an Amendment in the earlier portion of the Clause. I propose, after the word "kind" ["obligation of any kind "] to insert the words "to pay for his licensed premises other than the ordinary rent, or." That would make the Clause read "Where the licence holder is bound by any covenant, agreement, or undertaking, or is otherwise under any direct or indirect obligation of any kind, to pay for his licensed premises other than the ordinary rent, or to obtain a supply of intoxicating liquor," and then would follow my next Amendment—"at other than ordinary market prices." These words, I think, would rake in the two elements which the hon. and learned Gentleman had in his mind, and they would protect the man in the event of his being rack rented just as they would in the event of his being charged the price over the ordinary market price. My desire is to keep the burden fair, but I do not think he is entitled to interest unless he is placed under some obligation. He cannot have it both ways. If he is going to buy his goods at the very lowest possible price he naturally must pay the whole of the Licence Duty. On the other hand, if he is to be rack rented or charged an extra price, then of course he ought to be put in a position in which he could get the matter settled. I am thinking more of Scotland in proposing these Amendments. In that country the public-houses are not owned by the brewers. In Glasgow the public-houses are owned by landlords who are not connected with the trade, but they invariably add something to the rent of a public-house. If the rent of an ordinary house were £100, it is very nearly certain that if it became a licensed house the rent would be £150. If a rack rent is being charged obviously some apportionment ought to take place between the licence holder and the landlord. I beg to move.
Obviously it is a very difficult matter, and I would suggest to cover it in this way by the words "or otherwise by way of payment of rent" instead of "the ordinary rate of rent."
I do not in the least care what the words are.
My suggestion is we should consider the words. We are substantially in agreement. I will communicate with him personally to see whether or not we could not get another form of words.
It will be very difficult to say when a rack rent is being paid. What happens is where a house is tied the brewer lets at a normal rent and gets his profit out of an extra charge on goods. The ordinary landlord always puts on something. You recognised that in the Licensing Bill, since compensation value was to be the difference between the normal rent and the rent which the premises would fetch if licensed. That has been recognised in the Act of 1904. The compensation levy in that Act was borne between the landlord and the tenant sometimes running up to 60 years. There are many tenants who have got 40, 50, or 60 years, and why not have a similar scale, or at all events, leave it to the Commissioners to say what is the proportion the landlord of a free house ought to pay? If you merely say if he has put on a rack rent you will be put to enormous difficulty. It will be assumed that the landlord puts on an extra rent where he has licensed premises to let.
With reference to the observations of the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Henderson), there is not as much difference between him and other Members as he would appear to think. He divided the cases we have to consider into the cases of the tenant who is tied to the brewer and the tenant of a free house rented direct from a landlord not in the trade. Surely there is another case, that of a double tenancy of the publican tenant tied to the brewer, and the brewer renting it from a landlord. In that case the landlord will have taken part of the monopoly value; that is the phrase used, or the licence value, or whatever you call it, from the brewer, and the brewer may have taken something more from the tenant either in rent or in goods. I do not know whether the Government have had that case in their minds in what they say. Clearly, in that case the brewer ought to have the same against his landlord as the free tenant would have against his landlord. As to the suggestion of the Solicitor-General, I understood he did not confine himself to those words, but his meaning was to turn upon whether the rent was an ordinary rent or not.
That is the suggestion.
What do you mean by an ordinary rent? I am not crticising the Government for the sake of criticising them, but I am really trying to get at the meaning of the words, to see whether they affect the case which both sides of the House have expressed the desire to meet. The ordinary rent of the public-house would be a rent which took into account the fact that it was a licensed house. My hon. Friend mentioned the case of a house which would let, say, to a baker for £100, but which, if licensed, would let for £150. In that case the ordinary rent of the house would be £150. I do not know what view the Solicitor-General takes of the legal construction of the words which he has suggested.
It means the additional rent which the landlord might endeavour to obtain.
That would be the ordinary rent for such a house, so that the words "ordinary rent" will not do.
I venture to suggest an experiment which I have been able to try myself, and which may possibly get us out of the difficulty. I happen to have been the owner of a public-house, and being desirous that there should be no pressure brought to bear on the tenant of the house, I gave him a fixed salary. It seems to me, if you really want to protect the tenant of the public-house, of which you are going to keep a register and particulars of which are to be given to a State Department, I cannot help thinking the experiment which is now being very extensively made by the Bishop of Chester and Lord Grey in a society with which they are connected might help us in this juncture. It seems to me if you insist upon a fixed minimum salary you will for the first time really protect the tenant against any pressure that may be brought to bear upon him, because he will always have that to fall back upon. Of course, at the same time, the amount of the rent which he paid should be known so that it may be a contract, and thus he will for the first time receive adequate protection. I do not see any other way in which you can thoroughly protect the tenant. It may be said that that will be undue interference as between the landlord and the tenant, but I do not think it would be any more so than what is proposed within the four corners of this Bill. I must say that listening to the speakers on both sides of the House, and particularly the hon. and learned Member for North Louth, one is minded of the old definition of Calvinism, that you cannot be good if you would, and it would do you no good if you could. I think there is a sort of pessimism which really makes anyone almost despair of anything being put in this Bill which would carry out the desire of everybody, or almost everybody, that the tenant should be treated on perfectly fair terms, and on terms by which he shall not be subject to this extreme pressure, which I have heard described by tenants of public-houses themselves as a pressure which means that either he must be selling the whole day long liquor from behind the bar or else that he cannot provide for himself and his wife and family. That is the kind of pressure we who have gone deeply into this question have come across when we have known intimately and personally public4iouse keepers, and have sympathised, as many of us have, with the hard case in which they find themselves with owners, who have not any personal dealings with them, but who have the strictest legal dealing with them, and care very little about any other. I do not for a moment mean to say that there are not many owners of breweries who deal perfectly fairly with their tenants, nor deny that they treat them just as any other landlord might deal fairly with a tenant. I do think, on the other hand, those cases in which fairness cannot be looked for or expected can only be dealt with in the way I venture to suggest, namely, that there should be the minimum salary, and that the rent should also appear in the contract, which will carry out what I believe we all most desire to see.
The Government do not mean to accept the words of my hon. Friend (Mr. Younger), and want time to consider it. I think that is a reasonable request, because, the more I consider the matter, the more difficult I think it is. My right hon. Friend (Mr. A. Chamberlain) has pointed out, and unanswerably pointed out, if you are going to give this relief as against the landlord of a tied house, then you must give it also to the brewer as against another landlord. In other words, if the brewer takes the house from an ordinary landlord, and then ties the tenant under him, there must be relief not merely to the occupant of the tied house, but also to the brewer. The great difficulty which the Government have to face brings in our old friend, "Who is going to pay this duty?" Clearly it would be very unfair to reduce the landlord's rent if the tax does not fall on the publican and brewer. A tax is suddenly put on to the monopoly value; the landlord gets some of the monopoly value, and therefore the landlord ought to bear some part of the tax. But if the tax is to be thrown on to the public by the brewer and the publican, it is quite clear that they ought to have no relief against the landlord. If the first incidence of this tax is upon the publican and the brewer, and remains upon them for a few months, and they appeal to the Commissioners, the Commissioners would say, "Certainly; you are paying the tax, and some of the relief ought to be got out of the landlord." But if they then raise the price of the beer and the whole tax is thrown on to the public, what remedy are you going to give the landlord? None of the tax is being paid by the brewer or the publican; the whole of it is being paid by the consumer of beer. The brewer and publican will, under false pretences, I do not say dishonest pretences, have got some relief out of the landlord. That case must be somehow dealt with. I hope the Government when considering this matter between now and Report, will remember that they have to deal with the landlord and the brewer, as well as with the landlord and the publican; and that, while they have every right, in my opinion, to take part of the rent from the landlord if the burden of this tax is falling upon the monopoly value, they have no right to take a penny from the landlord if the whole of this tax is thrown upon the public. In view of that plain principle of equity I hope they will frame their new provision so as to take account of both the alternatives between which at present they are unable to decide, namely, the alternative of the trade paying the tax, and the alternative of the public paying the tax. They sometimes say the one, and sometimes the other, according as it suits the particular provision before them. I hope, however, that in considering this matter they will look at both alternatives, and take care that in endeavouring to do away with one injustice they do not inflict another.
We must remember what this Clause proposes and what was the Amendment moved by the hon. Member for Ayr Burghs (Mr. Younger). We are not dealing with the free house at all, but with the tied house.
I beg your pardon; my hon. Friend's whole case was the Scotch case, where there are no tied houses.
If the right hon. Gentleman will consider the Amendment he will see that it dealt only with persons dealing in intoxicating liquor. This Clause only deals with tied houses, and only purports to deal with the incidence of the tax as between the people dealing in intoxicating liquor. It is in connection with that that I made a promise to consider the matter between now and Report.
I fully admit that the Solicitor-General has dealt frankly with the Committee. At the same time you cannot deny the justice of the observations of the Leader of the Opposition. The hon. Member for North Bucks (Mr. Verney) referred to my cynicism in this matter. It is not cynicism; it is experience.
I did not say cynicism, but pessimism.
My reply is the same. A lawyer comes into touch with all the bad cases that arise; he knows how Acts of Parliament have coaches-and-fours driven through them, and he knows how badly certain people have been hit. All my life I have been engaged in fighting the battle of the tenant against the landlord, and I am satisfied that this Clause is absolutely useless for the tenant. Supposing you make this Clause to apply only to every person who within three months of the passing of the Act says that he is a tied tenant; then, at all events, you would confine it to a definite class. Then sift that class, and if they establish their claim give them relief. The hon. Member for North Bucks was taking the case of the fair man. Legislation does not take note of the Christian at all; it deals only with the unfair man. That is what is always forgotten. We are legislating for the sinner, not for the just. We are legislating for the man who is going to do you in the eye. Personally, I think the Government are right in resisting this Amendment. I should oppose any attempt to whittle down the Clause, even by an eighth of an inch. It is not half wide enough, and my crime is that I say so. But small as it is, an effort is being made to whittle it down through a groundless misapprehension. Those who take the pessimistic view which I do have been asked to make suggestions. I have made my suggestions—let the Commissioners decide the matter without litigation; let their certificate be final; spare the tenant the expense of a lawsuit. I hope the Solicitor-General will not think that I am blaming him. I am doing nothing of the kind. His difficulty is that he is wrestling with the insoluble. He is trying to enable a particular class of persons who, because they are in an unprotected position, are to have this burden cast upon them, to recover the money against the brewer and distiller. The answer would be a notice to quit, a suggestion to raise the price of beer or whisky, or a threat to reduce their discount. All this Clause is, I will not use the word "moonshine," as that is objected to by the Solicitor-General, but it is a mere soap bubble. I freely admit that the Government are trying to do something; but are they doing their best? I do not think so. This Clause, as I understand it, is brought substantially from the Licensing Bill of last year, and I respectfully ask the Government to agree to nothing that will have the effect of weakening the Clause. The Leader of the Opposition asked why, if you are charging the publican with this extra duty, the landlord should then have to pay? I dealt with that on a previous occasion, and it would not be in order to deal with it now. But the Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Barnard), in an Amendment on the Paper, proposes a far bolder course than I then advocated. I only advocated it in the case where a tenant is bound to give up his licence. The hon. Member is going to advocate that the deduction should be as of right against the rent in every case. I believe the Government, by the course they are advocating here, are not aiding the tenant to escape from these onerous duties. It would be franker to say, "We cannot escape them; we can see no way out of the difficulty." You might propose Amendments until to-morrow morning, but as long as the tenant is at the mercy of the landlord, whether in the shape of rent, or of discount, or of anything else, that man will be the landlord's slave. I do not use the word offensively as against the good landlord, such as the hon. Member for North Bucks (Mr. Verney), but we are dealing all through with the men who try to act unfairly.
The hon. and learned Member (Mr. T. M. Healy) has missed the point of the Amendment, because his gaze is exclusively fixed on the Irish case where, possibly, it may not apply. This Amendment is intended to relieve the free tenant. The Government admit that their Amendment is intended to afford some relief only to the tied tenant. My hon. Friend (Mr. Younger) wants to find some relief for the free tenant in England as well as in Scotland.
On a point of Order. Can the hon. Member discuss free houses, seeing that the hon. Member who moved the Amendment asked leave to withdraw?
The Amendment was not withdrawn, and my hon. Friend has not asked leave to withdraw.
I understood that the hon. Member had asked leave to withdraw, and I was simply refraining from putting the Question until hon. Members ceased to speak upon the Amendment, so that leave to withdraw should not be refused. On the point of order, free houses do not come within this Clause at all, except in so far as some of them may be argued to come under its terms.
I did not ask leave to withdraw; I merely said that I was satisfied.
I think it is only fair to say that when an hon. Member seeks to withdraw an Amendment and the discussion goes on, we cannot be expected to allow the withdrawal.
Is not this Clause intended to apply entirely to tied houses? If so, is it not out of order to introduce an Amendment relating to free houses?
I was told that the hon. Member was going to withdraw the Amendment, but I did not put the Question, "That leave be given," because hon. Members rose to speak.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
moved to leave out the words "intoxicating liquor" ["to obtain a supply of intoxicating liquor from any person or persons "], and to insert the word "goods." This Amendment raises the question which I raised on an earlier Amendment. Then it was thought more convenient that the discussion should be taken later as a separate issue. The Solicitor-General has explained that the object of this Clause is that the burden shall be borne equitably, reasonably and fairly between the persons who benefit by the sale of liquor. The Solicitor-General confines it to the persons who benefit by the sale of liquor, and the Clause so defines it. But there are other persons who benefit by the licence. The men who have tied the house for mineral waters and for tobacco derive a part of the advantage —whatever it is—that is due to the possession of the licence. I ask the Government how can they defend the exclusion from the purview of the Clause of either party who equally derives a part of the benefit? In order that all may be treated alike in this matter, without favouritism, and with no special penalty for any particular class, I beg to move my Amendment.
I am not certain whether the right hon. Gentleman wishes us to take this Amendment seriously, or only wants to draw attention to the fact that we are only dealing with intoxicating liquor and not other goods, such as mineral waters or tobacco. This Clause deals, and is only intended to deal with the increased duties put upon those who deal in intoxicating liquors under the provisions of this Act. Therefore it will be enough for me to say that mineral waters and tobacco never entered our minds at all when we were considering this Clause. I submit it should not enter into the minds of the Committee in framing the Clause. Everybody who is interested in compensation cases knows that you never fix the compensation value of licensed houses by a reference to the mineral waters, or tobacco, or any other commodities sold upon the premises. We are here dealing only with the case of additional duty in respect, of the sale of intoxicating liquor. I submit that it would not be advisable to bring in these other smaller matters, and to insert the word "goods" instead of "intoxicating liquor."
If you accept this Amendment it will kill all the Amendments later on which propose to better divide the burden between the landlord and others. What benefit there may be in the Amendment of the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Barnard) that the landlord should pay a portion of this increased tax will foe doubtful, if in fact it can be shown that there had been no increased tax at all by reason of the articles being non-excisable.
Surely the seller of mineral waters has a very direct interest in the licence? It is well known that a great portion of intoxicating liquors would not be consumed by many without the additional mineral waters. [An Hon. MEMBER: "Soda water."] The mineral water manufacturer has undoubtedly an interest in the sale of intoxicating liquors, because he gets some of his own goods sold thereby, and his interest also in the licence where he has a tie gives a fine ready-made distributing channel, whereby he gets through his goods. The object of this Clause, that a portion of the duty should be paid by those whom the licence benefits, includes, undoubtedly, the person who has a tie, for the sale of those ether goods suggest an indirect interest in the licence. Therefore the latter ought to bear his fair proportion if that fact can be shown to the Commissioners. I cannot see how it is fair to give a tenant a claim upon one class of dealer to whom he is tied and not give him some claim against another class who have a substantial interest in the sales of the licensed premises.
I did not quite appreciate the objection of the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Healy). Is he certain that he is dealing with the right Amendment?
May I explain? Some of these Clauses are seeking that the increased burden should either be divided between the landlord and the tenant, or paid by the landlord, or paid by them both. We are seeking that because of the increased duty. There is no increased duty upon non-excisable liquors. How, then, can it be urged that any person should pay this duty when there is no result—when the sale is of commodities which are not taxed?
I think the flaw in the argument of the hon. and learned Member is that he loses sight of the fact that the Government are proposing a duty on the monopoly value of public-houses.
There is no licence to sell mineral waters.
Of course there is not, but I think the hon. and learned Member will see that my point is a sound point. There is no licence for the sale of mineral waters. That is perfectly true. But what the Government say they are doing is to get from the Treasury a part of the monopoly value conferred on the public-house by the licence. What this Clause proposes to do is to show where that monopoly value is not all in the possession of the tenant at the time, a sum to be paid to the Treasury shall be divided amongst the people sharing the monopoly value, in so far as they deal in excisable liquors. Why that limitation? Why confine it to people who deal in excisable liquors? The hon. and learned Gentleman says because the others are non-excisable. If there is any desire or ground for the tax at all, surely it ought to be shared by all those who have a part in the monopoly value? I do not think the Solicitor-General attempted to deny for one moment that as long as trade is carried on the mineral water manufacturer has a distinct share in the monopoly value. If he says that the same amount of mineral waters would be sold in the house without as with a licence, he is asserting what we must all feel is absurd. I think that the refusal of the Government to accept this Amendment makes their position not merely ridiculous, but very invidious. It shows their determination not merely to put a tax on a particular value where they find it, but to tax a particular trade, a particular interest against which they have vehement animosities, and whom they are seeking to punish for their political misdemeanours. I am not particularly concerned to make their Bill more consistent on their own theories, or more palatable to the parties concerned. If the Government say they will not accept the Amendment I will not press it.
Amendment by leave withdrawn.
proposed, after the word "liquor" ["a supply of intoxicating liquor"] and to insert the words "at other than ordinary market prices." I understand that the Government propose to accept this Amendment.
I think the words suggested are good, but are not the best. Might I suggest the Amendment this way, to leave out the words, "sum paid by him in respect of the duty on his licence as may be agreed upon" ["to recover as a debt due from any such person such part of any sum paid by him in respect of the duty on his licence as may be agreed upon, or in default of"], and insert these words, "increase of duty payable in respect of the licence occasioned by this Act."
I accept that.
This is a very serious inroad on the substance of the Clause. Surely it is weak enough already. This Clause, as originally proposed, gave the tenant something substantial—supposing he got it—supposing he was a successful litigant. It gave him a considerable matter of substance—that is to say, the duty was to be deducted in a given case. What is the given case? Where a man is bound by any "covenant, agreement, or undertaking." In other words, "bound" there means "coerce." You say to him: "You are the object of public interest. You have been terrorised my friend, and the law comes to your aid, and says—like a relieving angel — that the oppressor shall be dealt with." What does now the right hon. Gentleman and Solicitor-General say? He says, "No; you are only half and half a present tenant, and the Government are going to do the thing by halves. We will not allow you to deduct the whole of your duty "(which was the original proposal). The strange thing about this Amendment is this — that the Solicitor-General has accepted it, and it is the first Amendment he has accepted off his own bat. He has accepted this Amendment as against the tenant under the pressure that has been put upon him. Would it not be better to leave the matter over for Report? We are told there will be a number of considerations on the Report stage, which are not now before us. If the tied tenant is in the state which the Government contends, surely their original proposal was the equitable one? The hon. Member for Lincoln was about to read out, when he was stopped, a communication from the Licensed Victuallers' Association of Lincolnshire, saying that this Clause was not half strong enough. Does the hon. Member not see now that the Government proposed to cut down its-value and to limit the operations of the Section, and is there no one to say anything on behalf of the tenants? The hon. Member did hold out some ray of illumination, but now the light of the dark lantern has been shut down, and we are only going to have half the amount of light. I say the Government, as I apprehended they would by pressure from the Opposition side of the House, have minimised and attenuated this Clause. Either this evil of tied houses exists or it does not; the men are coerced or they are not. If they are coerced the relief they were getting is so casual and precarious that to cut it down further is most undesirable.
I should like to point out that the hon. and learned Member is really under a misapprehension. This Amendment makes clearer what is the intention of the Clause. What is it the Clause says? The Clause says what is to be paid by the brewer instead of by the tenant. It is such proportion of the duty as may be agreed upon between the panties or as the Commissioners may think just under the circumstances. Of course, when the master came up to be decided by the Commissioners, they would only take into account the increased duty.
Why?
Because there are a great number of duties not-increased at all by the Bill. Except in the case of the minimum all public-houses under £50 are not having their duties increased at all. They remain in the same position as they do to-day, and it is absurd to suggest that the law should interfere, and although the duty is in no way being raised, still, that in the bargains between the brewers and the tenants, which are in no way interfered with, the tenants should have the right of making the brewer pay the same duty which the tenant has been paying for the last 15 or 20 years. That is not the intention of the Clause, and if the claim was made to the Commissioners that the old duty should be taken from the shoulders of the tenant and transferred to those of the brewer they would say that is not the intention of the Clause, and the tenant must go on paying what he paid before. The only question that arises is that of the increased duty. That is the intention of the Clause, but as it is possible some people might feel under a misapprehension, and that some disagreement might take place between the brewers and their tenants, it was decided to accept an Amendment tantamount to that placed upon the Paper by the hon. Member for the Ayr Burghs.
In other words, you do not trust to the Commissioners. It is suggested now that the Commissioners would act unfairly. ["No, no."] Why not leave the discretion of the Commissioners unfettered? There may be preceding circumstances of these cases. Suppose a man, in contemplation of this Act, raised his tenant's rent, and made it twice what he paid before, would it not be a fair thing that the tenant should be entitled to the reduction? Am I to be told that the brewers and distillers are standing, with folded arms, awaiting this Bill, and doing nothing against their tenants? I venture to say all along the country every man owning tied houses has been considering the case, and in many oases, I venture to think, the rent has been raised already in anticipation of this duty. I put this point, and I suggest it is unanswerable. The only agreement which will be possible for the Commissioners to decide upon will be the agreements which are enforced after the passing of the Act. Let us suppose the Act passes on 1st December. You can only deal with the agreements which are in force on 1st December, and it may be before the Act came into force there had determinated a number of tenancies at three months' notice. That was the case I was contemplating, yet what have the Government done?
The brewer, who has already taken advantage of the passing of this Bill, and treated it as an Act, having regard to the Resolution of the House of Commons— because, remember, the great force in these Budget Resolutions which have the effect of law when they come into operation—the brewer will say to the tenant, "I must put upon you this new duty," and the Government, when that occasion will have arisen, will have deprived the Commissioners of the power of dealing with it; and the Government have done this thing, while at the same time they are professing the keenest interest on behalf of the oppressed tenants. Will the Commissioners take into account any agreement cancelled, broken, or withdrawn? If it be true that while these tied-house tenants hold as monthly or quarterly notices— [An Hon. MEMBER: "And 24 hours' notice "]— and 24 hours' notice—am I to he told that these agreements are not already determined and new agreements put in their places? Yet, with the acceptance of this Amendment, we shall only be dealing with agreements in existence and in operation when this Bill becomes an Act, and when the oppression has taken place, and when the brewers can laugh at your Clause. It seems to me a most extraordinary thing. I have been at this all the morning. I beg that the Government will agree to nothing that will attenuate this Clause, and I suggested that tremendous pressure would be put upon them, and now an hon. Member says that these tenants very often hold at 24 hours' notice. If that is so they are already deprived of the benefit they would get under this Act. The draftsman must have considered this matter. Someone can tell us what is the usual tenure of these tenants. I will not take a 24 hours' notice man, but there must be many cases of three-monthly tenancies, and now when this Act is passed, which was to do so much good for the tied house man the evil will have taken place, and instead of agreeing to leave the whole circumstances to the Commissioners, in whom you have so much faith, you have foreclosed by this Amendment the possibility of its application.
There is just one remark I wish to make on this Amendment. I hope the Government will not accept even substantially anything like the form of the second half of the Amendment.
We had really better leave this matter. We are talking about an Amendment which we have not got before us. This Amendment will be withdrawn, and later the Government Amendment can be moved.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
moved to leave out "recover as a debt due from" ["the licence holder shall be entitled to recover as a debt due from any such person such part of any sum paid by him in respect to the duty on his licence"], and to insert "deduct from any rent interest upon mortgage, payment for goods supplied, or other payments due to."
7.0 P.M.
The Amendment is one of a group of five which all hang together and give effect to one another. The effect of the Amendment is perfectly clear. It is to alter the arrangements about the relation of the particular parties to the Commissioners. As the Clause stands at the present moment, a. tied house tenant has a right by agreement to make a deduction, and, failing that, he will have a right of appeal to the Commissioners. Now I think there should be an obligation that a tied house tenant can make deduction, and that when he is called upon to pay money in October he should have a right to take a receipt and make deductions just as he was entitled to under the Act of 1904. I have listened with great care to the speeches of several hon. Members who are King's Counsel, and while it may be that one or other of them is right, the real position of the Clause is summed up by the Leader of the Opposition. He was in doubt as to whether the Clause would hurt. I do not think it would hurt, but I do not believe it is likely to achieve in any degree the benefit that some people suppose. I think it is perfectly self-evident that it can, practically speaking, be evaded; but, nevertheless, it is to be placed upon the Statute Book and carries a certain amount of influence, and it will finally result in the custom of the trade controlling nearly all these transactions. The Leader of the Opposition asks the question regarding the probable effect of the Clause, and he went on to point out that he rather dreaded that it might injure the credit of certain people and affect their relationship. As far as I understand it from a business point of view, there will be two classes of credit going on in connection with this trade. There will be the credit of persons who are lending money to the trader by reason of the trade he does with them. Supposing some of the banks—and it is the custom of some of them, as some of us know, to lend money to enable the people to really become tenants of the freehold—obviously the bank has no intention of getting any liquor trade, and, equally, if the brewers lend money, their general point of credit is perfectly well understood amongst all parties concerned, and I fancy, apart from any technical knowledge of the law, that if the tenant was given the right which I seek to secure by my Amendment, of taking the receipt to whoever has the tie and claiming the money back that will effect the necessary purpose. Some hon. Members have expressed fear of litigation. I do not think there will be much litigation. To put the tenant into the position of appealing to the Commissioners against the person who possesses the tie is to put him in a very unfortunate position. Many tenants would not feel inclined for reasons I need not mention, to appeal to if the Commissioners. I think it would be very much better to say that they should have the right, as the Act of 1904 gave them, of deduction, and if the person from whom they deducted the money disliked it they could go to the Commissioners and appeal. I think there would be very few appeals. It is perfectly understood by all the parties concerned that the brewer for the moment is the person who is going to pay. We had a report of the meeting of one of the largest London breweries published within the last month or six weeks, and I noticed that the chairman drew attention to the huge sum of money the brewery company would have to provide. The same remark was made in reference to one of the biggest breweries in the Midlands, and the claim to raise the price of beer in some places has been based upon the fact that the brewer knows he is going to pay. It would be more convenient and much fairer to lay down once for all in this Clause that the tenants are entitled to deduct the money from the persons possessing the tie who will be perfectly safeguarded by the right of appeal they will have to the Commissioners. The intention of my group of Amendments is to throw upon the other side the onus of the appeal. If you do not do that I am certain you are not really giving the tenant any of the advantages you assume. I will say no more except express the hope that the Government will sec their way to accept the general spirit of what I am urging. Perhaps my words are not the best or the most suitable for the purpose. The question is whether the essence of what I am arguing is acceptable to the Government or not?
I am not quite sure that I gather correctly the object my hon. Friend has in view in moving this Amendment. I think he intends that the whole of the increased duty should be deductable from any sum due from the tenant, allowing the adjustment to take place afterwards.
I understood that we were only dealing with the extra sum, and my contention was that the person who pays it shall be entitled to make the deduction, and if there is any dispute then of course the person from whom the money is taken can appeal.
In that sense I could not accept the Amendment. There are many difficulties in the way. We are imposing increased duties upon the licence holders, and they are liable. Ties of more than one nature will have to be considered. It would be impossible to allow the tenant to deduct the duty from any one person to whom he is tied. I read the Amendment of the hon. Member in quite a different sense. According to the framework of the Clause as it stands we give a right of recovery. I want to make one thing clear. Before anything can be done either by way of recovery or deduction or set-off, the adjustment must first take place. The burden must be distributed by the decision of the Commissioners. When that has once been done I have no objection, if the Committee think fit, to allow a deduction after that.
But the tenant will be out of pocket all the time.
In the whole course of my profession I have never advised anybody to go to law. I have advised them whether it is likely they may recover or may not. In order to avoid unnecessary litigation, I suggest an Amendment in this form: To retain the words "recover as a debt due from" and to add the words, "or deduct from any sum due for rent, interest upon mortgage, goods supplied, or other sums due to." I am bound to alter the phraseology of the hon. Member's Amendment, because you cannot deduct from a payment, you must deduct from a sum. I commend this to the Committee, in order to avoid putting the obligation on the tenant to recover.
I have some difficulty in seeing that the Solicitor-General is making any concession at all. The proposed Amendment appears to be to some extent against the interest of the tenant, and it limits his rights. How does the matter stand now? Under the Clause as I understand it, a tenant obtaining this relief, supposing he fails to agree with his brewer, will have to have recourse to the Commissioners. He will say, "I claim to be a tied tenant under this Clause, and I claim that you shall arbitrate in my case." The brewer will say, "I deny that you are a tied tenant," and the Commissioners will have to decide. If they agree that there is a tie they will make an adjustment of the duty. Thereupon the tenant has a right to go to law and recover. In that action it would be competent for the brewer to say, "There is no tie here; you are not within the class entitled to relief, and the Commissioners were wrong in giving you this relief." That can be done under the Clause as it stands, and the court will have to decide ultimately whether the tie exists or not. Under the Amendment suggested by the Solicitor-General the Commissioners will determine the tie and make the adjustment. Then, says the Solicitor-General, "instead of making the man sue let us give him a right to deduct." Of course, that would only be a right he would exercise at his peril, and the brewer could bring an action. Is that any more right than he has got at the present time? I doubt very much whether this is a concession at all. I am anxious to know whether the Solicitor-General agrees that it will be open to the brewer to defend the action on the ground that there is no tie to be determined by the court.
It appears to me that what the Government are doing is that they are slightly shifting the burden in favour of the tenant. I agree that they are not giving the tenant any new right. Let it not be supposed for a moment that the Solicitor-General is going one inch to meet the point raised by the hon. Member for Kidderminster, because that is not so. They still make the Commissioners the authority to decide first the tie and then the amount of the tie. What the hon. Member for Kidderminster wants to do is not so easy as he seems to think. He wants the tied tenant to be able to say, "I am a. tied tenant," and, asserting that, he wishes him to be able to deduct the amount from his rent. I think in that the hon. Member for Kidderminster is going a little too far. You must give the man against whom a claim is made the protection of a law court or an arbitration. What it really means is to allow a person who thinks he is aggrieved to say, "As I am a tied tenant I deduct from the amount my rent and let the landlord sue. "I do not think the Government are well advised in accepting that view, and you must allow the landlord some legal protection in this matter. I think this Amendment would go too far in saying the tenant should have this right of deduction. There will be disputes, and I think the Government are wise in proceeding cautiously in so nice and delicate a method. Let there be a decision by a tribunal, whether it be the Commissioners or a court of law. The hon. Member uses the word "rent." I would go further than that. I intend to argue later on that in the case of the tenant who is pinned to a lease and is bound to maintain it, it is unjust to require him to keep the licence up under more onerous conditions than when the lease was made. The Government are not acting unfairly in refusing to accept this Amendment in its present form.
It has been assumed once or twice on these benches that, in drafting this Clause, the Government contemplated that at some stage or other in the proceedings it should be possible to obtain the view of the High Court, and I want to know whether my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Clavell Salter) is right in the view he has put before the Committee that the means by which the view of the High Court will be ascertained will be by an action brought from the judgment of the Commissioners to recover the amount. So far as one can judge, that will be a little one-sided. The action, presumably, would only be brought in the ordinary course by the tenant against the brewer where the brewer had secured the award of the Commissioners. I imagine, unless an action was brought upon that award, there would be no appeal.
I think the hon. and learned Member for Basingstoke (Mr. Clavell Salter) is entitled to an answer. I say "Yes" to everything he said. I think he put it perfectly clearly. I agree with every word the hon. Member for Louth said—
The proudest moment of my life.
And one of the happiest moments of my life. I agreed with every word the hon. Member for Louth said until he foreshadowed the speech he is going to make on a subsequent Amendment.
I want the Committee for a moment to consider a point which I think arises on what the hon. and learned Member for Liverpool (Mr. F. E. Smith) said. At first sight I took exactly the same view as the Solicitor-General and the hon. and learned Member for Louth, that this was not a very important matter, but that it did make some concession to the tenant which it was perhaps worth his while to have, and was very reasonable. It was that he should be allowed to make this deduction from his payments instead of having to make his payments in full, and then recover the amount afterwards. What is going to happen, and how are you affecting the right of appeal of the two parties by that action? In the former case, the money was due to be paid to the landlord if the Commissioners found in his favour. It was, therefore, passable at any moment for the tenant, under those circumstances, to get a decision of a court of law on a decision of the Commissioners which was unfavourable to him. He had simply to refuse to make the payment the Commissioners had ordered him to make, and the landlord could not get payment except by going to a court of law. The tenant, therefore, could get a decision of a court of law on any finding of the Commissioners which was adverse to him. You now reverse the position. It is the landlord who will be able to get the decision of a court of law on any finding of the Commissioners adverse to him, and the tenant will have no opportunity of getting his case in the court if the finding is against him. If the finding is that there is no right to deduct, the tenant cannot get a decision of the court. I am not quite certain this is the change which is to the advantage of the tenant.
I think if this Amendment were accepted' the tenant would lose his right to go to the court. The words "recover as a debt due from" are to be omitted.
The hon. Member is mistaken. As the Amendment is proposed to be moved by the Government, those wards remain. If he has the right, as the Clause stands, he will, therefore, still have the right.
If that is so, my observation falls to the ground. I understand, in addition to that, he will have-the right to retain any amount he has in. his bands for rent.
The Bill says the tenant may recover this money as a debt due. If he may recover it, he may deduct it from any money due to him. That being so, the Bill, as it stood, covered the point also covered by the proposed Amendment. We are only adding words and giving nothing whatever to the tenant, but, as it seems to make the tenant happier, the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Barnard) happier, and the hon. and learned Member for Loath (Mr. T. M. Healy) happier, I think we should not further contest these perfectly harmless words.
I accept the Government Amendment, and beg to ask leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
moved, after the word "from" ["as a debt due from"], to insert the words "or deduct from any sum due for rent, interest upon mortgage, goods supplied, or other sum due to."
Do you want all these words? Would it not be enough to say," deduct from any sum due to "? What is the use of specifying certain particular kinds of sums?
I am content to put it in that simple form.
Question, "That the words 'or deduct from any sum due to' be there inserted," put, and agreed to.
An Amendment stood upon the Order Paper, in the name of Sir Maurice Levy, to insert after the word "person" ["recover as a debt due from any such person"] the following words, "the amount paid by the licence holder as Licence Duty in excess of the amount paid by him as Licence Duty prior to the passing of this Act, such person to whom the licence holder is bound shall not be entitled to recover from the licence holder directly or indirectly by increased rent, or price of articles supplied, or reduced discount, the amount of such extra Licence Duty paid by him in consequence of this Act."
I expect the latter part of my Amendment is out of order, but can I not move the first part?
There is another Amendment to that effect. The Government have promised to meet the point on line 20
I want to raise the point of putting the whole onus on to the brewer.
It does not raise anything more than the Government Amendment. I think the Government Amendment comes next.
moved to leave out the words "sum paid by him in respect of the duty on," and to insert instead thereof the words "increase of duty payable in respect of," and after the word "licence" ["his licence as may be agreed upon"] to insert the words "occasioned by this Act." I move this Amendment in pursuance of my promise to the hon. Member for Ayr Burghs (Mr. G. Younger).
I appeal to the Government not to make this Clause worse than it is. I cannot allow this Amendment to be accepted without a protest. The Clause has some value, but its value will be enormously cut down by this Amendment. It is now four months since the Bill was introduced. It has been read by the proprietor of every tied house in England. Is it likely they have not taken steps accordingly in order to put the whole of the prospective Licence Duty upon the existing tenant? I do not propose to argue it further, but I make my protest. I deplore the action of the Government, and my opinion is that when this Clause becomes law in another couple of months there will be practically nothing for it to operate upon.
I confess I do not assent to the view stated by the Chancellor of the Duchy that in the Clause as originally drafted the reference was only to the new Licence Duty introduced by this Act. I think, in construing this Finance Act according to the ordinary canons of legal construction, and taking it with earlier statutes dealing with similar subject matter, I should feel inclined to say the Licence Duty spoken of could not in any sense be limited to the duty of the present year. I am certainly encouraged in that view by the fact that the Government thought it worth their while to accept the Amendment moved by my hon. Friend, or, at least, to substitute for it an Amendment of their own. That is a legal point, but what matters a great deal is whether this is a wise limitation or not. I have a large number of tied tenants, and also a large number of brewers in my Constituency, and probably the communications I have received resemble those received by other hon. Gentlemen. One gets letters constantly from tied tenants and from the Licensed Victuallers' Association, laying stress on the importance of having some protection such as that contemplated by this Clause. The aid given them in this Clause is largely illusory, but, if you are going to whittle it down and say it only applies to the new duty, it has no value at all. I do not state at this moment whether the aid given to the tied tenant is well conceived or not, but, if it is well conceived, I cannot think of any reason in common-sense why it should be limited to the new Licence Duty and should not be extended to the old.
The hon. Member has just delivered a speech in the interests of his constituents which is of a most remarkable character. We have heard all through these discussions that this increase of the Licence Duties was so oppressive that the whole liquor trade was going to be ruined, and now we have been told practically that that increase is hardly worth going into. I should like to ask whether the hon. Member really agrees with the proposal that the Government should transfer from the tenant to the brewer the duties that are now being paid?
There is no question of transfer. We say that the provisions under this Clause for regulating and adjusting these duties between these parties ought to be applied. I do not say it is right or wrong. What I do say is, that if it is right to do it in relation to the new Licence Duty, it must be right to do it in relation to the old ones.
That is a remarkable doctrine. This Act proposes to impose upon licensed victuallers certain new taxes which it is alleged will constitute a heavy burden, and the Commissioners are asked to transfer so much of the burden as they think just to the brewer. But the hon. and learned Member says, "If you do that you must logically go back to the duties imposed in the year 1880 and paid ever since by the tenant." You are to go back on these bargains in the past and say that, in the future, the Commissioners are to have power to say that the whole Licence Duty whether increased or not is to be paid by the owners of tied houses. That is a most extraordinary doctrine.
I think the right hon. Gentleman is a little unreasonable. We ask him only to deal with agreements which had been made since the Budget was introduced. That covers the scope of my observation. We want to narrow it down to the case of agreements entered into since the Budget was introduced. I quite agree that the tenant sitting as a tenant under the Act of 1880 cannot escape his obligations. We say it is unjust that the Commissioners should be prevented considering any matter except that which arises as soon as the Budget becomes law. That point has not been answered at all by the right hon. Gentleman. It is a solid and a good point, and that has been admitted practically by the treatment of the remarks we have made. They have been met by silence, or by suggestions as to our motives. All I ask is that we should have the right to ransack transactions after the Budget was introduced. I think it is unjust, when we only make our protest for the purpose of showing the absurdities of the Bill as now drawn, that the argument used by us should be received either with silence or derision.
I do not want to make any comment on the statement of my hon. and learned Friend, but I think he is under a little misapprehension as to the operation of this Clause. This particular Licence Duty is a duty which has not yet become payable.
We are under no misapprehension whatever. We say that the brewer has taken time by the forelock. He has estimated what the amount is which he can fairly put on to his tenants' rent. If a quarterly tenancy is in existence it has been determined, and a new tenancy has been created under more onerous conditions. Why should not the Commissioners take that into account? This grievance has been pointed out, and we say that in the case of agreements made in the present year the Clause should be applicable, but the Government have absolutely ignored that point.
The point is not whether the agreement was made since the Act came into operation; it is a question of the Licence Duties imposed by the Bill.
That is one of the points the Commissioners will have to deal with. I think the hon. and learned Member for Louth is altogether wasting his energy on this occasion.
It is rather dangerous for a layman to enter into a discussion where learned lawyers disagree, but, assuming that the tenant under this Bill, after its passing, is under an agreement, and if the duty is recoverable against him, as it will be under the Act, will he, if he is turned out by his landlord at the present time, be able to claim that the Commissioners, under their powers after the passing of the Act, shall take cognisance of the fact that the new agreement has been made? I think the argument of the hon. Member for Louth is quite unanswerable. If these agreements are terminated now by the Bill, and many of them are held under 21 hours' notice, are the Commissioners bound to take cognisance of that fact or are they not? Will the brewers be able to shift the whole burden of these new taxes on to the tenant, or can the tenants claim, by virtue of this agreement, to be relieved because the agreement was made after the introduction of the Budget? This is a very complicated matter, but I think the hon. Member for Louth has put it quite clearly.
Question, "That the word 'sum' ['any sum paid by him in respect of the duty '] be omitted," put, and agreed to.
Question, after the word "licence" ["his licence as may be agreed upon"], to insert the words "occasioned by this Act," put, and agreed to.
I handed in my Amendment at the Table, and the object is to insert after the word "Commissioners" the words "subject to regulations made by the Treasury."
I move this Amendment for the purpose of obtaining some information from the Government in regard to the character of the Commission. At the present moment we are being governed more and more by Commission. I desire to gain a little information with regard to the powers and duties of these Commissioners from the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. At the present moment the Commissioners have an entirely free hand under this Clause. They are not governed by anything at all. They are not guided in any way, and there is no appeal whatsoever from their decision. The Clauses in this Finance Bill alter from hour to hour. I venture to ask whether it is the intention of the Government to add to this Clause the power of appeal, as they have done in regard to other clauses? I should like to say a few words with regard to my own idea why these words should be inserted in the Clause. At the present moment there is no guide for the action of the Commissioners. I have no doubt the right hon. Gentleman will say that these powers cover such a wide field that it would be impossible to lay down regulations; but, after all, Treasury Regulations are laid down for the purposes of procedure, and I think it is all-important that these Commissioners should be guided in matters of procedure with regard to this Clause. First of all, as I understand it, where there is an absolutely private agreement between the owner of the house and the tenant, the Commissioners are to be called upon to decide points connected with their agreement. But there is no provision for the expenses thereby entailed. I should like to know how these expenses are to be met. I think the Committee will agree with me when I say that this is an entirely new departure from the duties with which the Commissioners have already been entrusted. They are to be asked to interfere with the private transactions and agreements between two individuals — if there is a difference of opinion between those two individuals on any of the matters arising —if there is a difference of opinion between the brewer and his tenant. At present these difficulties are decided in the county court if the amount does not exceed £100, and if it exceeds £100 it must be decided in the High Court. But, under this Bill, the Commissioners are to be called in to decide these matters, but they are guided by nothing whatsoever. They are to be asked to give their own opinion. I think we are entitled to have some information from the Government as regards the methods of procedure, and I therefore beg to move my Amendment.
On a point of Order, Sir. Before you put that Amendment of my Noble Friend, I have an Amendment for the introduction after the word "Commissioners" of the words "of Inland Revenue." I should like to move those words, but I understand that my Noble Friend's Amendment would shut me out unless I moved it at once.
The right hon. Gentleman is entitled to move his Amendment if, and only if, the Noble Lord gives way. I understand the Noble Lord gives way.
moved, in Sub-section (1), after the word "Com- missioners" ["or in default of agreement determined by the Commissioners"], to insert the words, "of Inland Revenue."
I think this must be practically an oversight on the part of the Government. The Commissioners, where not otherwise named, are the Commissioners of Customs and Excise, and therefore, if this work is to be done by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, it would be necessary to show it in this place. In Sub-section (2), Clause 30, we have both the Commissioners named, and we asked why bring in two sets of Commissioners when one would do? And it was explained that the Commissioners of Customs and Excise were the people who did the machinery of collecting this duty, and the Commissioners of Inland Revenue were the people who, under the Licensing Act, had habitually to deal with these problems, which were dealt with in that Clause, that is, all the problems of value of licences. Here you have got exactly a cognate problem arising. Having arrived at the value of your licence, which is done by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, having assessed the amount of the tax, and that being again done by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, you now have to apportion the tax between the various interests concerned, and does the Government mean to say that the Commissioners of Customs and Excise, who have been merely collectors of information throughout the country for the purpose of providing it to the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, in order that they may assess the compensation, now for the first time the Commissioners of Customs and Excise come in as the judicial authority to apportion the tax? I can hardly believe that that is the intention, and I think that having allotted to the Inland Revenue the duty of both determining the value and assessing the tax it must be right to leave to the Inland Revenue also the duty of apportioning the tax among the various interests affected.
The right lion. Gentleman has correctly interpreted what is the purpose of the Clause, and the Commissioners of Customs and Excise might be considered to be the natural parties to deal with these questions relating to the liquor trade, because they are in daily touch with that trade, and have their officers throughout the country, who are accustomed to deal with these matters under the Act of 1904. One special function—a very special function—that of assessing the amount of compensation due to parties under Clause 2 of that Act, was entrusted to the Commissioners of Inland Revenue and in the previous Clause, while we leave to the Customs and Excise the collection of the information for making up the register, we do not think it necessary or desirable to take away from them a duty which was identical with that that they were compelled to perform under the Act of 1904. In this case there is no reason to depart from what would be the normal circumstances, namely, to leave the Commissioners of Customs and Excise, so to speak, as guardians of the liquor traffic. It might be argued, and argued with force, that the exceptional provision under the previous Clause giving powers to the Commissioners of Inland Revenue ought not to be maintained.
May I interrupt the right hon. Gentleman? Under the Compensation Act it is the Commissioners of Inland Revenue who do everything, and amongst their duties is the apportioning of compensation. This is exactly an analogous case as that of determining the apportionment of compensation. I think I am right in saying it goes to quarter sessions in the first instance.
The Commissioners of Inland Revenue are also Commissioners of Excise, and the functions of the Department have been transferred.
I do not say that you should think it necessary to amend the Compensation Act—the Act of 1904 and transfer the whole of the duties from the one Board to the other. That might be a very arguable thing. It is a big question, and I do not want to argue it. I want to confine myself to the much narrower point, that at the present time these duties are imposed upon the Inland Revenue, and I only want to put the specific point that ultimately the Commissioners of Inland Revenue should apportion the compensation as well as determine it. They determine the compensation under that Act, and might they not have the authority of this Bill to determine the value, and be the authority to apportion the tax, just as they are in the other Bill the authority to apportion the compensation?
The function of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, in respect of the Compensation Act of 1904, is really a survival of the duties that they performed when they were also Commissioners of Excise. Otherwise they would not have been chosen—the Customs and Excise in regard to one branch, and the Inland Revenue in regard to another. The promoters of the Act of 1904 allocated the duties of that Act to the Commissioners, and, as there were Commissioners of Inland Revenue, the functions were given to that Department. When the duties of the Department were reallocated it was found impracticable to transfer to the new Commissioners of Customs and Excise the duties previously performed under the Act of 1904 by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, and, because we did not wish to divide the compensation levy work, we left the position as it was. But it is undoubtedly an anomaly that the Commissioners of Inland Revenue should have to deal with these matters at all. The natural order would be that they should go to the Customs and Excise, and, when you are imposing a fresh duty on a Government Department, the natural course is to hand it to the Customs, because the Inland Revenue are only indirectly concerned in the liquor traffic at all. The matter, of course, is really one of administrative organisation, and does not raise any question of large public policy. It is not a question of the relation between the taxpayers and the Government; it is merely a question whether the taxpayers shall have relations with this branch of the Government Department or that branch. If, however, the right hon. Member attaches importance to the matter, and considers that the Commissioners of Inland Revenue are the parties who, on a general review of the case, ought to have been chosen for these functions, under this Clause, we will consider the matter again on Report.
I really think that in this case the Government are right. The new Department of Customs and Excise have now all the facilities to do the work, and they will make the inquiries necessary. Everybody who knows anything about them has perfect confidence in their integrity and fairness, and I think the right hon. Gentleman below me had forgotten the effect of the reorganisation and the new duties apportioned to them. So far as the trade is concerned, I think, they would have more confidence in dealing with the particular body mentioned in the Bill than they would have in the old Commissioners of Inland Revenue.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Then I will put the Noble Lord's Amendment.
I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
I have not put it.
moved, to leave out, at the end of Sub-section (1), the words, "to be just under the circumstances," and to insert, instead thereof, the words, "proportionate to the benefit obtained by such person from the licence."
I accepted the Amendment of my hon. and learned Friend earlier in the day. I think the words of the hon. and learned Member are better, inasmuch as they are clearer and more definite. They will be better in the interests of the public, and I think also they will give information to the Commissioners.
This would be putting the Commissioners in the position of a judge. What, however, I want to know from the Government is this. Supposing the Commissioners should find that £20 is to be the amount properly deducted, is that final, or can the tenant go to a court of law? Would it not be fairer, in the cases of small sums under £30, to say that the decision is final, except in very important cases?
The amount would always be final unless they went entirely outside of their jurisdiction.
Amendment agreed to.
moved, at the end of Subsection (1), to add the words, "but in any action for the recovery of such part of any sum paid as Licence Duty it may be pleaded that the amount claimed is not proportionate to the benefit obtained by the defendant from the licence, and the court shall give judgment for such sum only as shall appear to the court to be proportionate to the benefit obtained by the defendant from the licence."
I wish to move this Amendment because I think there is such a case where a brewer or wholesale dealer will be dissatisfied with the decision of the Commissioners. The effect of my Amendment will be to give an appeal to the court from the decision of the Commissioners. I will not say a word against the Commissioners, who, no doubt, at all times would do their very best, bat, with the best intentions in the world, they might make mistakes and cause dissatisfaction.
8.0 P.M.
I think this is a case where there should; most certainly be an appeal. I believe the Commissioners themselves would wish there should be an appeal, and I feel certain the brewers and the licence holders also wish there should be some court to which they could appeal. If the brewer considers himself very badly treated by the Commissioners there will always be a grievance and bad blood, whereas if there was a court to which the brewer could appeal, both sides would be more satisfied.
The Government cannot accept the Amendment, The position has been very clearly stated by the hon. Member (Mr. Clavell Salter) and it was assented to fully by me, as also, I think, every legal Member of the House. It cannot be right and proper that a court should decide on the amounts which are to be ascertained by the Commissioners. If they go outside their province—that is to say, if they decide there is a tie when there is no tie—that is a different matter, but we intend that their decision in a case which is properly within this Section shall be final, and not subject to any appeal.
What the hon. Member (Mr. Clavell Salter) did was not to prejudge in any way the merits of this Amendment, but really to express his opinion as to the effect of the Bill as at present drafted, and to that, as the Solicitor-General says, every legal Member agrees. But the point raised now is quite a different one. When you are dealing merely with the amount, ought there not to be an appeal on fact? We all agree that the appeal is safeguarded on points of law. It is not desirable in every small dispute which may arise that there should be an appeal from the Commissioners to the court, but there are many cases in which the amounts involved are very considerable, and I cannot for the life of me see, if it is right that you should be able to appeal on a pure point of law from a county court to a divisional court, very often on mere questions of amount, where no legal principle is involved, why, in an extreme case, which might go into four figures the Government should say, merely because it is a matter of amount, they will not give an appeal. Surely the whole question should be: Is the determination whether or not the payment is proportionate to the benefit obtained from the licence, an inquiry of such complexity as to be fairly comparable to other inquiries of fact on which it has been our common practice to give an appeal? I should have thought the simple method of dealing with it, which would prevent dissatisfaction, would be for the Government to adopt the course of fixing a limit, and saying that where the amount is small there is to be no appeal, but that above a certain amount there should be an appeal from the Commissioners to the court. If there were such a limit it might reasonably be put at a considerable figure. It would be considered a great hardship where the Commissioners were construing, as they are under this Clause, a quite new expression if, without any appeal at all, their decision was to be treated as final.
I hope the Government will adhere to their position. The Solicitor-General has shown that he was impressed by the argument, and has made a most valuable and useful statement. As I understand now, he says the decision of the Commissioners that there is a tie will be a final decision.
I said in a case properly coming within the operation of this Clause the decision of the Commissioners as to any question of amount is final, but if they purport to deal with a case saying there is a tie when there is in fact no tie, that is a matter in which they will be going outside their jurisdiction.
I think this appeal which we are urging upon the Government is valuable not only in cases of large amounts, but also in cases of small amounts. The small amounts are quite as important to small men as the large amounts are to men in a larger way of business, and there is no doubt this appeal is of great value, and not only in the cases where it is absolutely exercised, because there is about these decisions the possibility that they may be disputed and appealed against, and therefore they will be made with great care and consideration.
My objection to the Amendment is this, that if it is passed the appeal will be given to one side only. It is only the landlord or the brewer who can plead that the sum is not proportionate to the benefit under the licence, and by some over-sight, no doubt, a similar right of appeal is not given to the tenant. I suggest that the Amendment need not be pressed, but it might be considered whether there should be given to the other side, in cases where the amount is really considerable, say something like £250, a direct right of appeal against an award.
Perhaps on consideration the Government will allow an appeal in this case. If an appeal is justifiable in any part of the Bill it is justifiable on the lines which the hon. and learned Gentleman has put forward, and I hope my hon. Friend will go to a Division.
Question, "That those words be there added," put, and negatived.
Question proposed, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill."
The Clause seems to me to involve a very important principle of legislation. I do not for a moment wish it to be supposed that I want to prevent the object of the Clause as such, namely, that the Licence Duties should be apportioned between the brewer and the publican. If you put this duty upon the licence, it is quite clear that it should be apportioned between the different people who benefit. The Clause attempts to regulate by statute the effect of any given tax, and I think it will be shown that all such attempts are absolutely futile, and, therefore, that is an argument that the tax itself is a bad one. It has been shown very clearly by the hon. Member (Mr. T. M. Healy) that as a matter of fact this Clause can have very little effect, and that it is perfectly easy for anyone who wishes to get round it. They have the alternative either of putting up the price of the drink supplied to the tenant, or of raising his rent, and increasing the interest under any of the conditions in which he might be bound, by express covenant or otherwise, to the landlord. It is so easy got round that, as a matter of fact, it amounts to nothing. The hon. Member for Louth (Mr. T. M. Healy) indeed, in addresing various arguments to the House on this question, seemed, to me to have at the back of his mind the whole time the question of Irish land, where it was found that any arrangement between landlord and tenant could be defeated until you gave the tenant absolute security of tenure and fixed his rent. These two things in this case are absent, and therefore, of course, any brewer who wishes to drive a coach and four through the Clause will be able to do so. What does it lead to? It does not lead to the conclusion that you ought to give the tenant in this case fixity of tenure, or that you should fix his rent by a court. Such a proposal is ridiculous. It only shows that with a high Licence Duty it is absurd to suppose that, because it does not fall on the person on whom you wish it to fall, in imposing the duty it is the wish of the Government, in the case of tied houses at all events, that it should fall on the brewer. They cannot guarantee that by this Clause it will fall on the brewer. In a great many cases it will fall on the publican, and in a few cases it will fall on the public. Therefore it is grossly absurd to first of all put a high Licence Duty of this kind, and then try to regulate by statute on whom it is to fall. It surely must be almost an axiom of taxation that taxes are distributed, no matter where first imposed, according to economic laws. It does not matter what the Clause does, the economic laws which govern the actual, as distinct from the nominal, payment of the tax will hold good. It seems that it would have been far better, instead of having this proposal of a high Licence Duty, that you should have put the tax— if you are going to put it on the already heavily taxed licensed trade at all—on the article of consumption itself, when the probability is that the filtration of the tax through the various strata to the community will be fairer than if you put it on the publican in the first instance, as you are doing by this proposal.
There is another, to my mind, very grave disadvantage of this tax, and that is the effect it will have as between the tied house and the free house. It is perfectly obvious by this Clause that you are giving a great advantage to the tenant of the tied house, and it is equally obvious that the licensee of the free house will be in a very bad position as compared with his tied-house brother. I was under the impression that all temperance reformers were in favour of the free house as opposed to the tied house, and certainly it is my experience that so far as good conditions are concerned they are more likely to be found in the free house than in the tied house. Therefore, it is a great pity that by imposing such taxation as this in the first instance on the publican you should so encourage the tied house at the expense of the free house. It seems to me that it does not much matter whether this Clause is passed or not. I regard it as an absolutely useless, and indeed a. very foolish, endeavour to try by legislation to alter the effect of your taxes. I think if you want taxes to be other than they appear to be nominally, it is better to alter the tax than to try by legislation to alter their distribution.
I understand that under this Clause free houses are going to be made to pay, while the people in the tied houses are going to be let off. I was under the impression that the Government had always patted the holders of the free-house licences on the back, and said they were the people they wanted to encourage. As I understand the Clause the tied-house man will be let off from the tax, and in many cases the free-house man will be practically ruined if the Clause is carried. It certainly seems an extraordinary thing, after all the Government has said against the tied house and in favour of the free house, that they are now going to penalise the free-house people and let the tied-house people off altogether. They are going to drive the free houses into the hands of the brewers, because they will not be able to carry on as free houses. I hope the Solicitor-General will explain why the Government make this proposal. It appears to me also that this Clause will be very unfair to the brewer. According to the Government's own account they are going to make the brewer pay all this extra taxation on the tied houses. Therefore you are going to super-tax the brewer in this case very heavily, and you are going to let, the this Clause considerably. Surely, accord-you are going to be fair, and if the taxation is to be equal, you should put something, at all events, on foreign beer coming into the country. By compelling the brewer to pay instead of the publican you are super-taxiing the British brewer under this Clause considerably. Surely, according to your own Free Trade principles, if you super-tax the British brewer, you ought to put a countervailing Customs Duty on beer that comes from abroad. I think this is a Clause which the Government might very well leave out. If this Clause passes you are going to rub out the free houses. I know cases already where free houses have applied to be tied to breweries, because they say they cannot go on as free houses. I hope we shall hear something from the Solicitor-General on these two definite points.
I do not think my hon. Friend (Mr. Hunt) will hear anything from the Solicitor-General on either of these two points. He has touched upon a branch of this question to which there is absolutely no possibility of reply on the part of the Government in their present admitted state of ignorance as to the question on whom this tax is going to fall. The whole of the Clause goes on the theory that the tax will fall upon the licence holder in the first instance, and that some others, notably the brewer, ought to bear half the charge, inasumch as he benefits from the monopoly, which is the ground on which the whole taxation is based. This Clause, as we all know, is an attempt — I think not a very unsuccessful attempt — to provide machinery for that allocation. But the Government have to explain to us two things. The first is whether they contemplate that the ordinary trading relations of debtor and creditor between the wholesale manufacturer and the free house are going to constitute a tie within the meaning of this Act. We had a discussion on that, and I did not gather from the Solicitor-General any clear statement on this point. Take the case of a brewer who treated a free public-house in the same manner as a wholesale merchant, let us say, treats a draper's establishment in a country town in which credit is given,, and it is understood, tactily or otherwise, that in consequence of the credit being given the wholesale trade is to go to that particular firm. I did not gather from the learned Solicitor-General whether such a case was included in or excluded from the operation of this Clause. We are all agreed, if the result of the tie is that the wholesale article is sold at a higher price than the ordinary price, that that constitutes a tie. I do not understand from the learned Solicitor-General that the other tie, which is just as powerful but which did not issue in any rise of price, but only in the perpetuation of custom,, was in the view of the Government included in or excluded from the operation of the Clause. It may have been my fault. The Government may have made themselves perfectly clear to the House on that point, but I do not think that those clear ideas are embodied in the language of the Bill. Take the case of a free house in debt to a brewer. The brewer only charges that free house the market price of the beer. Nevertheless, the debt runs on, as very often is the case, month after month, and perhaps year after year, and the owner of that free house would never think of compelling the brewer to call up the debt by going to some other house; but there is no rise in the price of beer. If the question was put to an impartial person, "Is that a tied relation contemplated by this Clause or not?" he could not answer it.
I said clearly that such a case is not contemplated. In such a case the Commissioners would not put any of the additional duty upon the brewer.
I wonder whether that is right either in law or in equity. The owner of the free house has what you call the advantage of monopoly value. This monopoly value enables him to sell without competitors a particular commodity. People who benefit from that monopoly value are not merely the persons who sell, but the persons who buy the thing that is sold. In other words, the people who benefit from that monopoly are not merely in this case the free house, but the brewer who makes the wholesale article that is sold to the free house. Even though it may be sold at the market price, it is a great advantage to have the profits. Trade profits are not made out of values artificially raised. They are made out of natural values. It seems to me, if there is any truth in the doctrine of the Government, that there are two parties who benefit by the monopoly in so far as anybody benefits, namely, the owner of the free house, and the owner of the brewery, who, practically, has got the custom of that free house owing to this particular trade relation with him. Therefore, though I understand the policy of the Government would be distinctly to exclude that case, I frankly say that, as I read the Clause, I am not at all sure that a court of law would take the view of the Solicitor-General. At all events, he absolutely declined to put in any qualifying word to make clear that the avowed policy of the Government is to be embodied in the Bill. There is one other point to which I must call the attention of the learned Solicitor-General: This tax is imposed upon the licence holder, and the licence holder in certain cases has a remedy against the brewer, and, therefore, the first result of the tax would be that the licence holder pays, and after possibly some controversy, he forces the brewer—and, I think, perfectly rightly —so far, to share the burden. Suppose, then, the tax being now a tax on trade production issues in a rise in the price of beer. The result of a rise in the price of beer is that the public pays this tax and not either the licence holder or the brewer. What becomes, then, of all your partition between the two, if that result happens immediately, and I think the Prime Minister anticipates it will?
No.
Some of the speeches of the Prime Minister rather indicated that the price of beer would be raised.
I was speaking of the brewer.
It makes no difference to my argument. The point is: If this is a tax upon the trade, as it well may be— nobody can tell; the Government cannot tell; I do not pretend to have an opinion, upon it;—but if it be a tax on the trade, and that tax on the trade issues in an immediate rise in the price of beer, then there is nothing to be partitioned. There ought to be no appeal then from the licence holder against the brewer, because neither the licence holder nor the brewer really pay anything—it is the public who pay the whole tax. Therefore, it seems to me that the whole of this Clause —if I am right and if the tax is put upon the public—produces nothing but injustice, because it will give the licence holder an opportunity of appealing against a burden which does not fall on him. There is one other consequence of that which is referred to by my hon. Friend who has just sat down, on which I will not dwell, as I think it more or less outside the scope of the Clause; but, if it be true that the incidence of this tax is so uncertain that we do not know whether it is going to fall on the licence holder in the first place and on the brewer in the second place, or, on the other hand, on the public, then I think that the Government ought to take precautions in the former event to see that the foreign importer of beer does not gain anything from which his British brother is excluded. I think that the Government are good enough to make a concession on that point in consequence of some observations I made at a very early stage of the Bill. I do not propose to press this matter further now— I doubt whether it would be strictly in order; but, as my hon. Friend behind me has referred to it, I hope that the Government will be careful that they do take power in their Bill if they find that the tax wholly falls on the trade and not on the public, to have some machinery by which the foreign competitor of the brewer is going to be met by a duty which will prevent him having an unfair advantage over the home producer.
This Clause of the Bill seems to be in the exceptional and very fortunate position of having, for its main purpose, the approval of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition. The main purpose is that the Licence Duty imposed upon tied tenants should be in part borne by those who gain a benefit from the tie. The right hon. Gentleman stated two or three different grounds. In the first place, he said, "If you are making this arrangement with respect to the brewer who has an interest in the sales of a tied house, similarly you ought to make identical arrangements in the case of a brewer who makes a profit on the sales in a free house."
In certain circumstances.
He has the same benefit from the monopoly value attaching to that public-house. It is an outlet to his trade, and, therefore, he ought to be called upon to pay a portion of the Licence Duty imposed upon that free house.
Allow me to explain. It is the interests which he has secured by giving credit to that particular house.
It is the special case of a publican who is under on obligation to the brewer. Although he himself has a free house, and the brewer is not the owner of the house, yet he is under an obligation, because the brewer has given him goods on credit, or has lent him money. If the brewer, as a matter of fact, is able to get higher prices from the tenant than he would obtain in the open market, that of course is an advantage, in respect of which the Commissioners would allocate some proportionate amount to him of the Licence Duty, and consequently that case is met. If he does not sell his goods at a higher price, or to no greater advantage in that house than in any other house, then I cannot see that he gains, or that he is owner of any portion of the monopoly value of that house, any more than a boot manufacturer may be considered to participate in the profits that are gained from a boot shop which is a place of sale. The retail profits belong to the retailer who occupies the shop, and the wholesale profits belong to the manufacturer of the goods who supplies that boot shop; and if you were imposing a Licence Duty on boot shops, and giving them monopoly value, naturally that Licence Duty would be payable by the retailer. The right hon. Gentleman went on to say—"Does the Government assert that these taxes will not in the long run be borne by the public at large, or will they be borne by the trade? If they are to be borne by the public at large then there is no need of a clause of this character."
As the right hon. Gentleman is very well aware, there is nothing more difficult than to attempt to allocate the incidence of a particular tax to various parts of the community. I should be very rash to lay down any general rule or to say with respect to the whole of this tax or any particular portion of this tax that it would necessarily be borne by this party or by that. But in any case I cannot agree with the right hon. Gentleman that, if the public do pay this tax in the form of higher prices, this Clause is unnecessary. Take it from the point of view of the tied tenant. The hypothesis is that the brewer raises the price of his liquor and that the public pay the tax. Therefore, the right hon. Gentleman says, "This is a public tax, and we need not concern ourselves with the relationship between the tenant and the brewer." The tax-gatherer, however, does not go to members of the public and collect their halfpence as they pay for the liquor over the counter. The public in the long run may indirectly bear the burden, but the person who has to pay in hard cash to the exciseman or to the tax collector who goes to the particular public-house is the publican, and he is the only man. He is the licensee, and it will make all the difference in the world to him whether he is able legally to shift that burden or part of it to the shoulders of the person who is owner of the house or owner of the tie. The right hon. Gentleman's position seems to be this: The brewer charges a higher price to the publican and the publican charges a higher price to the public, but it makes no difference at all whether the publican is charged with the tax or whether the brewer is charged with the tax. I think if the right hon. Gentleman were to discuss the matter with any tied tenant he would very soon find that it makes all the difference in the world to the publican whether the law gives him the power to shift this burden or part of it on to the shoulders of the owner of the tie or whether it is to be borne by himself.
I cannot say that this Clause has been satisfactorily dealt with, and I hope it will be more satisfactorily dealt with when we come to the Report stage. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Herbert Samuel) stated perfectly truly that the main purpose of this Clause is generally approved on both sides of the House. With that I quite agree. Of course it would be an absurdity that a tied tenant should have a rebate of Licence Duty against a man who had received nothing but the ordinary wholesale profit on the articles supplied. That, of course, would be quite impossible. In reference to the tax falling upon the public at large, there we at once touch upon one of the most difficult features of this Budget. The Government has all along taken up the position that they must raise this particular revenue out of licences. They have got the fetish that this revenue must be raised out of licences, and that the sum so raised will have a totally different effect from a revenue raised out of the article. That is quite ridiculous. It will have a totally different incidence, I agree, in the first instance. The incidence of the tax will fall on the tied owner, but it will not be very long in that particular position. It will find its level, and in the ordinary way of a tax of that kind it will be paid somehow or other by the consumer. It must in this case be paid by the consumer, because this particular trade is not in a position to bear the tax. It is already taxed to death. Hon. Members opposite have an idea that it is not. They may take it from me that the trade is taxed to death, and the publican is taxed to death. [An HON. MEMBER: "How do they live?"] They are only existing, and their existence will not be particularly luxurious after this tax is imposed. The essential error throughout the whole of these Debates, and the essential error in the position of the Government, is in supposing that if you put the tax on the licence it will be borne by the publican, but that if you put it on the article it will be paid by the public. The position is perfectly ridiculous, and I think it is a very great misfortune to the public. It does not matter to me, for I happen to be largely a free trade brewer, that the Government have committed themselves to that position, and that they have raised their money by taxing the licence and not the article. You have attempted to raise money out of spirits, but you have gone too far, and you have practically ruined a very important and very necessary trade in Scotland. That is the only advantage they get out of that. They are already a million and a half to the bad, and with a million and a half which the Chancellor of the Exchequer wants there is something like three millions to get out of the next seven months, and I am quite sure they will do nothing of the kind.
The very fact that they have adopted this system has created very great inequalities in the trade itself. I suppose the Government has calculated upon that very fact in the hope that the competition from those who will not have to pay this tax may compel the unfortunate people who have to do so to sell their property. That may be an element in the Government's calculations, but it is rather a wicked one. Perhaps in some districts that result will be effected. I do not think though that it will happen in many cases. I do not think it will happen in the South. It may happen in the North, where the Scotch brewers are in competition with the English brewers, and where, of course, the Licence Duty will not be paid by the Free Trade Scotch brewer. I do not think that this Clause will work satisfactorily as I myself should like to see it work. I think there will be very great difficulties in connection with it. I know that the Royal Commission considered this question, and that the majority were anxious to deal with the difficulties, but they met with difficulties of all sorts, and it ended that the Royal Commission made no recommendation at all. They said that they did not propose to suggest any interference with the system, at least that is my recollection. I know that the difficulties have been found to be very great and almost insuperable, and I think the Clause, well-intentioned as it is, will cause a great deal of difficulty to the Commissioners of Customs and Excise, who will have to make these very intricate calculations which the Solicitor-General, I think, said any ordinary person could make, but which I am told will be a very difficult thing to do. We shall, I suppose, find out some way of doing it when the tax is imposed and the duty has got to be collected. I am sure of this, that while in some cases the results will be quite satisfactory, in others they will lead to litigation and trouble. Personally, I do not propose to provide myself against the taxes, I accept the statement of the position which the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition has made, and substantially in agreement with the Clause I believe as it will be finally amended on Report it will be considerably improved beyond the point which it has reached now.
I do not think we have heard in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Duchy any justification whatsoever for the insertion of this Clause. My belief is that the Clause has been inserted for the purpose of dealing a blow at the brewer. I think it is thinly veiled to injure the brewer, and that suggestion is borne out by the speeches of the colleagues of the right hon. Gentleman, who sit on the Front Bench, in the country. They strive very strenuously in this House to repudiate any suggestion of that kind. I think we are able to detect the sentiments of the Government from its provisions, but I do not think those objects will be carried out, because we know perfectly well, in any dealings between the brewer and the owner of the tied house, that everything is a matter of adjustment, and that the tax is adjusted in the form of higher or lower rent paid, and also in other matters between the brewer and the owner of the tied house. I am perfectly convinced of this, that whatever may happen with regard to the arrangement between the tied house and the brewer, that in the end the person who will pay is the member of the public at large. I think this should be a lesson to the Government, if they did not know it before, that it is impossible for them to lay down the actual individual on whom taxation will fall. The question I should like to ask the Government is this: Why they have decided suddenly to single out tied houses for what is, I believe, meant to be a concession? At one time there was nothing bad enough for tied houses, while the only effect of this legislation will be to make every single house in the country a, tied house. I do not think it can be denied by anyone that legislation of this sort must have the effect of dealing a blow, and a very serious blow at all free houses in the country, and I have every reason to know that in a very short time there will be hardly a free house existing in the whole country. I think the object of the Government could have been far more honestly obtained if they had decided to place a tax on the beer instead of endeavouring in this indirect manner to raise taxation. I do not know if it is proposed to divide against this Clause, and I can only say that I. for my part, should like very much to divide as a protest against the Government inserting this Clause.
I do not intend to take any part in the discussion upon the general bearing of this Clause, but as a lawyer I cannot sit here without entering my protest against an enactment relating to what the draftsman of this Bill, or the Government, or whoever is responsible, calls an "indirect obligation." So far as I know in my 30 years, in which I have had experience of the Bar, such an obligation as that has never been invented by any writers on law, and has certainly never been given effect to in any of the courts in which I have had the honour to practice, whether on the other side of the water or here, and I do not believe that any lawyer could suggest to any court, and this of course will have to be construed by the court, that there does exist such a thing known to the law as an "indirect obligation." The law knows nothing but obligation, and there is no necessity to call it direct or indirect. It is either obligation or it is not. If it is not an obligation the courts will not enforce it, and if it is an obligation it is not made any more so by putting these words, whether direct or indirect. I really think that it is almost a pity at this stage of our jurisprudence, and after the number of years' experience we have of statutes, and of the exposition of statutes in the court, that the Solicitor-General or those with whom he co-operates should have invented this fantastic phrase in our Acts of Parliament, and which he knows as well as I know has no meaning whatsoever. Certainly, so far as I am concerned, I should be very sorry, if I ever had to argue on this Section in a court of justice, if I should not be able to say that so far as I was concerned I had made my protest as a Member of this House of Commons against any such ridiculous phrase being put into an Act of Parliament.
I as a London Member, representing a division in London where a great number of breweries are situated, should like to add my word of protest against this Clause as it is now submitted to the Committee. This is another instance of proceeding to legislate by Budget. The object of this Clause has often been the object of private and ether legislation in this House, legislation which has never got very far in its progress towards becoming the law of the land. This Clause has, beyond doubt, been framed with the idea of satisfying some of the numerous sections of the Radical party. There seems to be an idea that the brewing trade can stand any amount of taxation that the Government choose to put upon it. The Committee must not forget the enormous and increasing amount of taxation, dating from 1880, which has been piled upon this trade; and an endeavour is now being made to throw upon it further onerous burdens such as it cannot possibly stand. It is all very well to talk about the tie. One would imagine that brewing was the only industry in which a tie is part of the trade itself. The milling trade is notoriously one in which the tie exists; but you do not have hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite attempting to throw taxation upon the milling trade. Oh, no: that might, perhaps, make their bread and milk slightly dearer. It is a sight the Solicitor-General would thoroughly enjoy to go into the tea-room between nine and eleven o'clock and see dozens of the party opposite sitting round tables lapping their bread and milk. The hon. Member for the Ayr Burghs (Mr. Younger) has been able to upset the whole of the Clause so far as Scotland is concerned by a concession which, we are told, the Government have made. I have seen very little concession. The whole of the so called concessions are admissions of faulty framing and faulty business methods. The Government have had to admit, in the face of arguments from this side, that their proposals were unworkable, and accordingly they have had to frame them on more businesslike and more workable lines. The indirect obligation to which the right hon. Member below me (Sir E. Carson) referred has not been explained. Possibly the Solicitor-General may remember an incident which occurred before the Royal Commission on Licensing Laws when Lord Peel was discussing this question of indirect obligations. One witness said there was no tie, no obligation at all, but that there was "an honourable understanding" to take the commodity from a particular brewer. Lord Peel asked him, "Supposing, for some reason or another, the man took his commodity for a short time from somebody else, what would that be?" The witness said he imagined that that would be a misunderstanding. That shows the impossibility of trying to legislate on the lines which the Government are following. There are indirect obligations which it is almost impossible to define. You may try to throw the taxation on to the brewers. Why not do it straight away, and done with it? You are anxious to smash and to rob them. Why not do it by straight means instead of by these crooked methods? The House would then know exactly where it is.
For the first time we have had an admission from the Government which goes somewhat beyond the present Debate. The Government by their speeches and by this Clause admit that under certain circumstances you can put the taxation of a commodity on the producer. We on this side have often argued that that is possible. In this Clause the Government wish to put the taxation for intoxicating liquor on the producer. That is an extremely valuable admission. It is a point we have often contended for. I think we may very well be satisfied to let the Debate rest there. The Government by this Clause have cut the ground from under their own theory of taxation, and we very much welcome the admission they have made.
Clause, as amended, agreed to.
CLAUSE 33.—(Reduction of Monopoly Value Payments.)
(1) Where it is shown to the Commissioners that the amount of any annual payments to be made, or of any capital sum which has been paid, in pursuance of conditions attached to the grant of a new on-licence for securing to the public monopoly value under Section four of the Licensing Act, 1904, exceeds the amount which should reasonably be required having regard to the increase in the duty on the licence under this Act, the Commissioners may, after giving the justices by whom the conditions have been attached to the licence an opportunity of reporting to them on the matter, reduce in such manner as they think just the amount of any payment to be so made, or in cases where a capital sum has been paid allow such a reduction from the duty to be paid for the licence as they think just, having regard to the decrease of the monopoly value owing to the increase of the duty on the licence.
(2) Any amount by which the duty on the licence is reduced under this Section shall be deducted, in accordance with directions of the Treasury, from the next payment made out of the local taxation account to the council of the county or county borough who have had the benefit of the original capital sum paid, and the amount to be paid into the local taxation account on account of the proceeds of the duties on the licences for the sale of intoxicating liquor shall be reduced accordingly.
9.0 P.M.
moved, in Subsection (1), after "paid" ["or of any capital sum which has been paid"] to insert the words "or of any other expenditure or any loss incurred by the applicant." The Committee will see that this Clause proposes to do bare justice to a class of persons to whom gross injustice would otherwise be done, namely, those licence holders who have bought and paid for their licences under the Act of 1904. If the State, after giving them these licences as being of a certain value, subject to a certain duty, were itself to diminish the value of those licences by increasing the duty, without giving the people any compensation, it would amount to a gross breach of faith. It is to meet that position of things that this Clause is introduced. It proposes that these people should have a certain amount of relief—I hope to deal with that point later—where they have purchased their licences by the payment of money. The point to which I wish to call attention is that the Clause is confined to those licence holders who have purchased their licences with money, either lump sums or annual payments, ignoring altogether those licence holder who have purchased their licences is money's worth by the surrender of old licences, or by submitting to additional onerous conditions. The purchase of a licence not merely by money, sometimes not at all by money, but by the surrender of other licences, is both an extremely common and an extremely beneficial practice.
I have in my band a paper with thirteen instances—not very frequent nowadays— of the granting of new licences since the Act of 1904. These were the conditions which were imposed in each of these cases: In the first case the payment of £5 a year and the surrender of an ale-house licence; in the next case the surrender of an ante 1869 beer-house, no money payment at all; in the third case the payment of £3,000 and the surrender of a licence: fourth, the payment of £400 forthwith and the surrender of an 1869 beer-house. The payment of £2,000 and the surrender of an ale-house licence comes next; then the payment of £20 and two beer-house licences to be surrendered before a certain date; the payment of £1,500 and the surrender of a beer-house licence and an ale-house licence. I come now to the first instance in this list of the payment of money alone. That was the payment of £4,000. The next case is the payment of £1,600 and the surrender of a beer-house licence; the payment of £400 and the surrender of a beer-house licence; the payment of £200 per annum and the surrender of a licence—that is the first instance of an annual payment—the payment of £1,100 (in three equal instalments) and the surrender of a licence. The last instance is the payment of £1,000. In the last case these onerous terms were altered by the confirming authority, who decreed that the applicant should have his licence for the payment of £750 and the surrender of another licence, the surrendered licence being taken as equivalent to £250.
In the thirteen instances I have given there are only two in which onerous covenants did not form a very large part of the consideration given. In several of them they formed the whole consideration. How will those very persons stand under this Sub-section? They will be entitled to this relief only in so far as they have paid money. Those who have paid little money, and perhaps surrendered valuable licences, will get a very small measure of relief. Those who have surrendered valuable licences and have paid no money will get no relief at all. Look at the case of two men who, under the Act of 1904, take new licences on the same day. One is called upon to pay £500; the other is called upon to surrender a licence valued at £500. Everyone will agree that the men give to the State an equal consideration for what they get. The man who has paid the £500 is entitled to relief. The man who has surrendered a licence worth £500 is excluded from benefit altogether. In the last case to which I referred where the confirming authority altered the terms, and said that the payment should be £750 in money, and the surrender of a licence in lieu of the payment of £1,000, the effect would be to reduce the right of the applicant to relief under this Sub-section. He would only be entitled to it in respect to the money paid. I cannot conceive that the Government can do anything less than accept this Amendment. I am not in love with the wording. I have had some difficulty in framing it. I daresay the wording can be improved; but I desire in proposing the change to provide for the man who has paid for his licence, and has given, value for it in meal or malt.
The hon. and learned Gentleman said that he was not in love with the form of his Amendment. I am not astonished to hear that from him, because anything more vague or more unsatisfactory than to insert after the definite words "annual payments" or "capital sum" the words "or any other expenditure or any loss incurred by the applicant" could not well be imagined. I cannot conceive what the hon. Member wants to cover by his words. We cannot accept his Amendment, and I will give shortly the reasons why. We are dealing, as the hon. and learned Gentleman has said, with cases since the passing of the Act of 1904. Sums of money which have been exacted by way of monopoly value from persons to whom new licences have been granted. These sums of money have passed into the Local Taxation Account. We do not propose in this Clause at all to deal with anything but the money paid. The hon. and learned Gentleman says there is no reason why you should not take into account the surrender of licences. He knows perfectly well, and other Members of the Committee know, how this surrender of licences comes about. Some benches of magistrates have dealt much more leniently with applications for new licences than others. One very ordinary method, both since 1904 and before, to get, so to speak, at the hearts of the licensing justices was to say: "We will shut up one, two, or three public-houses elsewhere." The experience of those who have had to do with these matters, I think, might be summed up in this way: that those licences could not be regarded as valuable licences. They were houses sometimes in the same locality, but very often far away. If in the same locality the transaction was more or less in the nature of a transfer. In that event it would be an argument against the hon. and learned Gentleman. In most cases it was only a desire to get at the leniency of the magistrate that the offer to shut up public-houses which were not required in other districts was made. It might be said that these public-houses could be shut up under other provisions of the Act of 1904. That is quite true, but in the ordinary course of things they would not be closed. The magistrates are often inclined to grant a licence where they otherwise would not where these not very valuable licences, existing in other parts of the licensing district, are offered in exchange. I have heard the offer made to give up one, to give up two, to give up three public-houses.
How are you going to value these old houses surrendered, say, in the year 1905? I have never known in the course of my experience an argument of this kind put forward: "This house is worth £500; therefore reduce the monopoly value from £2,000 to £1,500." The hon. Member for Ayr told me that it would be easy to value these houses. But the tenants' account books are destroyed, and I do not know how, in many cases, you can get at the particulars. In any event the Amendment of the hon. Gentleman would, I think, affect only a very small number of public-houses, say, in this country, for this Sub-section cannot apply to Scotland or Ireland.
Next they are few in number, they will be difficult to trace and difficult to value; as I said, that was not on the ground they were surrendered. No argument was made upon the valuable character of the surrender. It was rather in the way of saying we will give up these houses and: you will have a smaller number of houses in the same locality, and you have this additional advantage, that you can extinguish these houses without paying compensation value out of the compensation rate. That was the argument that was; used to the licensing justices. "We have got certain licences, we will give them up. There is no question of misconduct, and you will not have to pay compensation out of the compensation rate, and the public fund will thereby benefit. I submit that, for all practical purposes, we have done all we can do in connection with this Clause. It is brought forward as a measure of justice to those people who are compelled to give this value. I have no doubt we shall consider on subsequent proposals of the Clause whether the terms we have offered are reasonable and just, but we cannot extend the operations of the Clause so as to deal with these cases where surrender has taken place. This Clause deals with cases where money payment has been made.
I think it was somewhat amusing to hear the Solicitor-General referring to the vague and somewhat unsatisfactory nature of this Amendment. For anybody who has anything to say either with the drafting or the conduct of this Bill to reproach anyone for vagueness or uncertainty is rather amusing. It was hardly worth the right hon. Gentleman's while to deal with this Amendment in this way when he was going to give it an absolute refusal. He kenw what it meant, and if the Solicitor-General was sympathetic and was allowed a discretion he could easily get words to meet the views put forward by my hon. and learned Friend. I must say the conclusion of the Government on this matter is very extraordinary. They say that, having regard to the terms of the Act of 1904, and the terms that were exacted from holders of licences, it would be unfair to the people paying for new licences that they should be entirely burdened with this new taxation without some allowances being made. The Government admit that principle, and, therefore, they say to a man who has paid, say, a thousand pounds, "You are entitled to an abatement under this Section." But the Solicitor-General goes on and says, "While I admit the principle that if a man pays £1,000 he is entitled to get an abatement if, at the same time, upon the request of the magistrate, instead of paying £1,000, he extinguishes two or three or four licensed houses he will get nothing." How can the Government really stand over a position of that kind?
My hon. and learned Friend produced a case in which the monopoly value was fixed at £1,000, but was reduced to £750 and the extinguishing of a licence that was plainly valued for £250. Nothing could be more puerile than to come to this House and say, "We will allow for the money payment, but we will allow nothing for the house, which admittedly was worth something, and which we were compelled by the magistrate as a condition of granting the licence to extinguish before the new licence would be granted. That is a puerile position to take up, and it is not business. What are the objections of the Solicitor-General? "Oh," he says, "the offer to extinguish other licences is something to coax the magistrates." Does the Solicitor-General really and seriously say that a man throws away a thousand pounds worth of property to coax the magistrate? Are you going to talk of the administration of the law in this House as a question of coaxing the magistrate? I should like to hear the Solicitor-General go before a bench of magistrates, not in his position as Solicitor-General but as a poor, struggling counsel like myself, and say, "Gentlemen, or your worships," whichever you call them, I really forget, "I am prepared to pay what the Bench thinks proper, and in addition to that, with a view to coaxing you, I am prepared to surrender a number of houses." Why the thing is ludicrous. This whole thing is a matter of an Act of Parliament, enabling magistrates to make such conditions as they think proper. Instead of charging this amount of money for granting a licence to an hotel or whatever it may be, they think it far better in the administration of this Licensing Act, where you are going to set up a new licence, to make you extinguish two or three licences in that same district. On what principle the distinction is made between the payment of money and the extinction of those licences which is made a condition of an Act of Parliament is more than I can tell.
The next objection the Solicitor-General makes is, he says how are you to value these licences? The Solicitor-General knows perfectly well that ever since the passing of the Act of 1904—and we are only dealing with cases that arose since—the owner of these houses have been obliged by the Act of Parliament to pay to the Compensation Fund a share of what they are entitled to upon being extinguished. He knows that, and he knows perfectly well if these houses have been extinguished otherwise than by surrender the share of the compensation money would have to be paid to them. And yet he comes forward to this Committee and says these houses have really no value at all. The matter is absolutely absurd. They would have to be compensated if the licence was taken away, but if they are voluntarily surrendered we are told that they have no value. The duties cast upon the Commissioners under this Bill are far more difficult than any duties cast by this Amendment. This is how we stand. A man is obliged to surrender a house which admittedly would be entitled to compensation if the licence was taken away, and yet the Solicitor-General wants us to believe that it cannot be turned into a money payment so as to give compensation under this Bill. The position taken up by the Government is an absolutely impossible one, and if you are going to allow these claims you must allow something else in lieu of payment which can be reduced to payment. There is no difficulty about it. That principle which has been admitted by the Government themselves governs this Amendment, and the Government ought to reconsider this matter and try and do as much justice to the man who has paid £1,000 and voluntarily surrendered his licence as the man who has paid in cash for the grant of a new licence.
I understand the point put by the right hon. Gentleman is as follows. A man has applied for a new licence which may have a value of £1,000 under the Act of 1904, and an annual value of £150. The magistrates, if they wished, might say to him, "you shall have this licence if you will pay £150 to the local funds." Or they may say to him, "You have three houses with a monopoly value of £150. Instead of asking you to pay £150 in cash year by year, we ask you to surrender three old licences of an equivalent value." The right hon. Gentleman says if the first alternative is adopted you allow £150 a year as a set-off against the new licence, and if the second alternative is adopted you allow nothing. I submit to him that there is also the surrender of the Licence Duty, which would otherwise have been charged on the three licences which would be surrendered. If those three houses, instead of being suppressed, had remained they would have to pay the increased Licence Duties chargeable under this Bill, and year after year there would have come a certain sum to the State. That sum disappears, although the whole trade of those three suppressed houses goes ex hypothesi to another house, or to other houses in the district. [Cries of "No."] At any rate, no Licence Duties are being paid in respect of those houses. Therefore, I submit that the State by this transaction does lose by the loss of the Licence Duty on the three houses, and, therefore, this payment may be regarded in some degree as an equivalent.
The statement just made by the right hon. Gentleman is about the most extraordinary argument I have ever heard. I have the greatest respect for the ability of the right hon. Gentleman, but, if he is going to descend to this kind of thing, we shall have to give him up as a bad job. Surely those licences had their market value at the time?
No. They had no market value at the time.
May I point out that three or four years ago the present Government were not dealing with this question in this particular way, and I do not think they are entitled to assume that these houses would have existed to-day. They might have been compensated, and, therefore, I do not think you are entitled to take this as a set off. The Solicitor-General said it would be difficult to value these houses, but I can see no difficulty at all, because if the value cannot be proved I do not suppose it will be allowed. If the people who surrender those licences cannot prove they had a particular value before the Commissioners, if they cannot bring evidence to show what the value was or books to show the turnover, I suppose they will not be allowed for. Surely they ought to be entitled to prove their case. It makes no difference whether you pay money, or pay in kind, because in either case you fulfil your obligations, and you are equally entitled to get the same allowance for the one as for the other. I can conceive other conditions arising. I can conceive a state of things under which the site of a new house might be required by a public authority for a public improvement, and I think that would be covered by my hon. Friend's Amendment. In this case I think the Government is acting unduly unfair. We have heard a great deal about the surrender of licences, and that some of them are not worth anything. We had a great deal of evidence upon that point before the Royal Commission, which rather favoured this principle, and it showed that many of these licences had a substantial value. I do not doubt that there are many cases in which they have very little value, but that is a question of proof. If you cannot prove that they have some value you will not get any deduction. I think, however, you ought to give them a chance of proving the value.
This Clause deals with the case where the local authority has taken value for the monopoly value. These cases were omitted by the Government last autumn when they drew up their Licensing Bill. I ventured to bring the matter before the Government, and the Prime Minister immediately admitted that the case of post 1904 houses ought to be fairly met, and he brought in a new clause, which to a certain extent met the grievance. The monopoly value has been taken in one of three ways. In the first place it has been taken by the payment of a large sum of money, amounting sometimes to many thousands of pounds, and I know one case in which £9,000 was paid down. Secondly, by an annual payment; and thirdly by a payment which is provided for by the Amendment of my hon. and learned Friend., viz., the surrender of other licences as part of the consideration, which certainly has a money value. But that does not quite exhaust the case. I have got here a list of the houses granted since the Act of 1904, and there are other considerations besides those which I have mentioned which entered into the contract. Hours of business have been restricted. There is value in that. If the licensee cannot sell during long hours of the day there is less profit. There are several cases where bars and taps have been prohibited. There is a value in that. There are other cases where Sunday trading has been entirely abolished. There is surely a value in that. Yet the right hon. Gentleman suggests that these people who have given consideration wholly or partially in these ways are not entitled to any consideration. I am really astonished. Here are houses where the Government has exacted what has been called the monopoly value, and now the Government says: "We must exact that monopoly value by increasing the Licence Duties." What does that mean? It means they are demanding that monopoly value twice over. These licences were granted on the grounds of public policy, and because they were required, and either in money or kind the monopoly value has been exacted. Now the Government says: "We do not mind whether the monopoly value has been paid or not, we are going to have it again." The very clear case where consideration in kind, and not exactly in money has been given is met by the Amendment, and I am really astonished the Government have not accepted it. I am quite sure they have not thought this matter out. There is a money consideration in the surrender of licences, the restriction of hours of sale, the abolition of Sunday selling, and in the fact that bars and taps are not allowed, and these matters ought to be taken into account by the Government. I hope the Government will after all accept the Amendment.
I sincerely sympathise with the learned Solicitor-General in having been left here to defend an absolutely indefensible case. He has worked hard all the evening, and it really is very cruel that those who, I should have thought, were more primarily responsible for these proposals should be otherwise employed, and that he should be left to defend a case which I venture to say any audience would regard as absolutely indefensible. I notice the Benches opposite are not very closely packed, and I must say the hon. and learned Gentleman and his friends are well advised to keep them as thin as possible. The Government in this case have no defence for their conduct at all. I do not think the hon. Gentleman who has just come in (Mr. Walter Rea) was in the House when the case was originally made. I will remind him what, broadly speaking, is the case made for this Amendment. The Government base all their proposals for this tax upon the existence of the monopoly value. They say that monopoly value was the creation of the State, and the State ought to have control of it. They are then brought face to face with the fact that there are a certain number of licensed premises which have no monopoly value. Their monopoly value has, ex hypothesi, been extinguished. Their owners have had to pay an equivalent for that monopoly value already, and these licences, therefore, in my judgment, ought not to come under the tax at all. If the justification for the Government proposal has the smallest logical foundation, we ought not to be occupied in trying to make a Clause dealing with these particular licence holders watertight. We ought to exclude them from the purview of it. If it is a tax upon monopoly value, it ought not to be put on people who, ex hypothesi, have got no monopoly value. That is the case for seeing these people, at all events, having paid the full monopoly value, are not taxed again, as if they had monopoly value.
The Clause proposes some allowance in favour of that part of the monopoly value which has been paid in cash. My hon. and learned Friend who moved the Amendment pointed out that part of the value given for the monopoly had very often not taken the form of cash but of surrender of licences, alteration of premises, and so forth. It is not denied by the Government, and it cannot be denied by any impartial person, that part of the consideration given for this monopoly value is of that description, and is not adequately measured by the cash consideration given; and what my hon. Friend who moved the Amendment asks for, and all he asks for, is that the true value given for the monopoly shall be taken into account, and not merely that fraction of it which has been paid in cash. Is it possible to find an equitable answer to a contention so simple and so plainly just as that my hon. and learned Friend has put forward? Two Members of the Government have spoken in defence of this precious arrangement. The learned Solicitor-General, if I remember rightly, used only one argument. That was a practical one—one based not on equity but on expediency. He said it may be true other things besides cash have been given for the monopoly value, but you cannot put a valuation upon those other things. He says: "How can you value a public-house which has been pulled down?" I listened with amazement to an admission from a Member of his Majesty's Government that there is anything in the world which cannot be valued. What are the 500 gentlemen they are going to appoint worth if they cannot value a public-house which has been pulled down? The learned Solicitor-General was taking his holiday while his still more learned brother was fighting the Land Clauses in the earlier part of the Bill, and, therefore, he does not know—
I have not had a day's holiday.
My admiration for the Solicitor-General and his powers of endurance and his unfailing courtesy and good temper, if not always for his logic, is even higher than it was before, but, if the learned Solicitor-General was present during all the Debates we had on the Land Clauses of the Bill, will he really get up and tell us the Government think there is anything in the word connected with land and buildings which these 500 gentlemen are not capable of valuing?
I forget how many things they have to value under the Land Clauses, They have to consider what the value of the land Is without the buildings on it, and what the land was when our ancestors went about clothed in woad, or whatever it was. They have to make out the basis on which, in their opinion, the valuation should proceed. And then we are told by the hon. and learned Gentleman that it is beyond the omniscience of these Gentlemen to tell us what was the value of a public-house pulled down four years ago. I am sure they would not find the smallest difficulty in adding to their labours with regard to the Land Tax this very small Increment Duty which would be thrown upon them by an attempt—perhaps an ineffectual attempt—to do some justice to these people who, by general admission, have paid for the right to avoid these taxes altogether, and have paid for the right to avoid the monopoly tax. That was the argument put forward by the learned Solicitor-General. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster had another argument which was still more astonishing. He said it is quite true that the surrender of public-house licences was port of the consideration for the monopoly value of the new licence, but, he added, that if these houses had not been surrendered they would still have been in existence, and would now be liable to the duty. Therefore, in his opinion, the Government are losing a duty which they would have had if these houses had not been surrendered! I understand that the right hon. Gentleman, even on reflection, thinks that that is a good argument. I have one or two observations to make upon it. Does he really think, or is it the contention of the Government that the tax they are now putting on public-houses exhausts their whole value? If the tax does not do that, evidently the Government are not losing the whole amount that would have been taken away, and, therefore, even if the argument holds, surely we are justified in asking for an allowance in respect of that which would not have been taken, for the years which have elapsed during which these new taxes would not have been on these public-houses had they remained in existence. But there is another point, and that is what is just to the people who are paying this monopoly value. I understand the right hon. Gentleman regrets that these public-houses are not in existence, because he has not the opportunity of taxing them, but, on the other hand, temperance reformers are in favour of the extinction of public-houses, and I am utterly unable to understand the position of the right hon. Gentleman in that respect. We have to consider in taxing these houses not only what the Government expect to get out of them, but what is due to the people who have paid the full monopoly value. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor-General did not argue the justice of the case. He argued that it was impracticable. The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster took a different line.
I was not dealing with cases which are supposed to have actually happened; I was dealing entirely with the theoretical case laid before us toy the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University (Sir E. Carson).
That case was a practical case, but I have another case with which to deal, in which £1,000 was treated as the true amount to be paid for monopoly value for a new licence.
For how long?
It was a lump sum down.
For how long?
What does that matter?
It was only for seven years.
Is that the period?
Yes.
Whether it was for six or seven or seventy or seven hundred years, surely it does not matter. I may be wrong, but I put this argument to the Committee: One thousand pounds was settled as the payment for the monopoly value of a new licence. That £1,000 was reduced to £750 because two or three other public-house licences had been suppressed. That is a plain case, in which the magistrates reduced the cash payment and accepted an equivalent reduction in licences suppressed. You are going to take into your account the statement that this man paid £1,000. I defy anybody to make out that that is an equitable transaction. But I do not think that the Government are influenced by considerations of equity in this case. I think I have exhausted the arguments which have been put forward. I submit you are putting a gross injustice on people who have no voting power. If these people had been numerous they would have been treated in a very different way, and I have no doubt that, if we had produced all the cases we could have done, the Members of the Government would have been found tumbling over one another in making concessions and announcements on every platform. The Solicitor-General seems to think that that is a strong statement. But we have put forward arguments which deserve an answer, and I would ask will anyone pretend that they have received an answer? No, Sir, the equities of the case are plain, and the practical difficulties are insignificant, and I am as amazed now as I was half an hour ago that the Government did not at once intimate their intention of accepting the Amendment put forward in a most reasonable form by my hon. Friend.
I think the right hon. Gentleman was rather forgetting what took place in the year 1902 or 1903, when he hurled at us the charge that we were not dealing fairly and equitably because the number of people concerned were few and, therefore, did not consti- tute a large number of voters in this country. There is no foundation at all for any suggestion of that kind, and it comes, I think, with peculiarly bad grace from the Leader of the party which produced the Act of 1904, because their supporters, the brewers and publicans, on a celebrated deputation which was sent to a very high official, insisted, because they were their supporters in the country, on having that legislation passed. That is all I say with regard to that portion of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. It was not argument, and I do not say that my observation in answer to it is argument, but it was observation which called for the reply which I have made to it. Let me come to the part of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman which, avoiding political polemics, dealt with the particular Amendment, because, after all, that is our business to-day. The right hon. Gentleman is not so familiar with these cases as the right hon. Gentleman who moved the Amendment, or as I am, and, therefore, he takes his figures second-hand. He used the instance of the £1,000, which he says was reduced either by the justices or quarter sessions down to £780, because three licences were given up. That is very likely to be the case, but it does not at all follow that the full monopoly value was there exacted by the licensing justices, but I think it quite conceivable that in that case there was a sort of rebate. What I want to know is this, will the right hon. Gentleman tell me what was supposed to be the value of the three licences given up? It does not follow that the justices certified, and that they did not do so means nothing. What was the value of the licences given up? That is the difficulty in this case, and that is why we say that it is difficult or impracticable to deal with it. We say that these cases are so few and so difficult and impracticable that we cannot deal with them. Surely that is not an injustice. There is: no prevision in this Bill to say that a gentleman has to value a thing he has never seen.
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Has not the valuer, in order to ascertain site value, to deduct that part of the value which is due to a series of things which he cannot see and never has seen?
To get rid of interruption, I would ask whether it is fair to request anybody to put a value upon these so-called valuable licences which were surrendered? I would ask the right hon. Gentleman to consider the cases put by an hon. Gentleman who has a great interest in these questions. Here are things to value, the loss of a bar which never has even existed, the loss of a tap which never has been constructed, the loss of Sunday trade which has not been allowed or of some hours of business which the hon. Member says have been reduced, but they cannot have been reduced, as they could not apply to that particular case. These are old licences. Does the right hon. Gentleman say that he is able to answer questions as to the monopoly value for a house the hours of business of which were diminished from the ordinary hours to half a day, or as to the monopoly value exacted in respect of premises where the bar was prohibited? These are the cases put by the hon. Member behind him. It is impossible to value licences in such cases, and I make the statement again which I made at the beginning, that I have not heard of a single concrete case where the value of a single public-house which has been surrendered could be stated. We are dealing here justly and properly with those people who have been called upon to give up something in a business which has a monopoly value, and we are right in saying we will not go and investigate all these other matters when no case has been made showing that any real value has been given up.
I should like the Committee to have before them the actual facts of the case referred to by my learned Friend. It was a case in Monmouthshire, and the entry in the official book of licensing statistics is this: "Nature of the licence: Ale-house, annual; conditions of grant: payment of £l,000." That is the way it was laid down by the Licensing Bench. Then, of course, the matter went for confirmation to the county committee, who have power to vary the order, and this is the entry: "Confirmed with the following variation in the conditions: (1) A beerhouse licence, which has not already been the subject of reference in the Division, to be surrendered without compensation. (2) Monopoly value to be £750." Can anyone doubt what is the meaning of that entry? The committee reduced the monopoly value claimed by £250, but on the condition that the applicant should find, acquire and surrender any beer-house licence in the division which had not already been the subject of a reference. If it does not mean that it means a par- ticular beer-house licence which had not already been the subject of reference. In other words, the county committee said this: "We think it worth £250 to the public to get rid of a beer-house licence."
Does the hon. and learned Gentleman say he is justified in stating that on this entry?
Certainly. Everyone knows that beer-house licences are more difficult to get, and are compensated even on a higher scale than the ordinary full licence. The justices are very anxious to get rid of beer-houses, and they made it a condition that a beer-house should be surrendered, and if that were done they let off the applicant to the amount of £250, and of course without compensation for the beer-house. It is perfectly clear that this man was to bring in something worth £250 to the public, and for that consideration his monopoly value was reduced. It does not stop there. In the same book there are half a dozen cases of the same kind. In each case it is made a condition that a licensed house shall be surrendered. One is not without some knowledge of what that means. I have known many cases where, on an application for a new licence, the court or the bench said: "We think there are too many licences in this division already. If you will surrender one, two, or three licences, we do not care what it costs you, you shall have your new licence," and the man has gone and spent, in one case, £1,000 in buying an undesirable house. He gave that up without compensation at all. That man was exactly in the same position, and had the same claim, as if he had paid £1,000. It is true it did not go into the same fund. The monopoly value goes into the county fund, and the saving which he made to the public was a saving on the compensation fund. But it was a public benefit, because the effect was that the court had that sum more to spend on reducing licences. Two arguments are put forward against it.
The Chancellor of the Duchy said if a man gives up a beer-house or a licensed house we lose the Licence Duty on that, and that is sufficient return for the benefit which the man gives to the public. He answered himself, because he said when a beer-house or a licensed house is given up the trade goes to the other houses. But the result is to increase the annual value and the monopoly value of the other houses. Under this Bill you are taxing both the annual value and, in certain cases, the monopoly value, and therefore you get the benefit of that trade in one shape or another in duties on the other houses. The Solicitor-General said you cannot value a house that is given up, but you have, to begin with, the records. When a claim is made it is made by the man who has the information. It is his duty to make out his claim, and he will therefore furnish himself with all the facts of the case—the documents showing what he gave for the property which he gave up, what it cost him to acquire, or, if he did not acquire it in recent years, then what the value of it was. The hon. and learned Gentleman was bold enough to suggest that there is no case in which the duty is cast upon the valuers to value what they have not seen. I can refer to more than one Section where that duty is cast upon him. Take Clause 2, Subjection (4). That provides that where the owner of land proved that he has purchased the land within 20 years before 1909 you are to substitute for the site value of the land in 1909 the site value of the land 20 years ago. It is obvious that the valuer cannot have seen the land 20 years ago, yet he has to find out what was its value, and how much lie was to deduct for improvements existing 20 years ago, and what was the site value at that time. If a man could go through that process there could be no difficulty in going through the much simpler process of declaring, on facts easily ascertained, what was the value of a licensed house which is only given up to the public at some period within the last five years. I suggest that the case is wholly unanswered and unanswerable.
The hon. and learned Gentleman's case rests, to some extent, on a specific instance which he says proves the ease with which you can ascertain the value of a particular house when it is surrendered in part exchange for a new licence. He took the case of Monmouthshire, where the monopoly value of an annual ale house was estimated at £1,000 at first by the justices, and was confirmed with the variation that the monopoly value was £750, instead of £l,000, and that a certain house was to be surrendered in addition. He says that proves that that particular house was worth £250.
I did not say that.
Surely the hon. and learned Gentleman's argument was that for the purpose of this Amend- ment if you are to take into account the monopoly value of these premises, and the new licence we ought not to say really £750 but £1,000.
I said I should infer from that that the confirming authority thought it worth £250 for the public to have the house surrendered.
That is precisely what I said, that, in the view of the confirming authority, for the purpose of monopoly value the house surrendered was worth £250, and that it can be valued on that basis on the assumption that £750, the price of the licence as fixed by the confirming authority, was equal to the £1,000, the price of the licence as fixed by the licensing justices. The confirming authority, the quarter sessions, frequently vary the price fixed for monopoly value by the licensing justices.
They do not reduce it; they raise it sometimes.
On the very page opposite to the one where is the case that the hon. and learned Gentleman has referred to is that of an annual licence which was to be granted by the local justices for £400. It was confirmed, the monopoly value being £100, and it was to be in force for three years. That was a very considerable reduction. Then there are other cases, undoubtedly, in which the monopoly value has been increased, a payment of £100 fixed by the licensing authority being confirmed, and the monopoly value being increased to £150. There are other cases on the next page which have been similarly dealt with. It is perfectly clear that you cannot assume that the value of such licence can be arrived at by taking the cash sum fixed by the Licensing Authority, and deducting from it certain sums. These figures only show the absolute impossibility of valuing these things. There are such entries as "Billiard room not to be open to the public." Under the hon. Member's Amendment you would have to make a valuation in order to ascertain how much was to be deducted in respect of the billiard room not open to the public. There are dozens of minute conditions, such as "Premises to be closed one hour earlier at night," "No beer or spirits to be sold for consumption off the premises." It is perfectly impossible to value these things for the purposes of this Clause in view of the fact that the monoply value is only fixed for seven years.
The Committee have witnessed the effects of two very agile minds in attempting to defend a wholly indefensible position. What has the Chancellor of the Duchy just said in reply to the quite unanswerable contention advanced by two hon. Friends behind me? He says that sometimes the confirming authority vary the price, and sometimes reduce it, and he instanced a case in which instead of an annual licence, which, of course carries with it the immensely valuable right of compensation, a three years' licence was given. The Chancellor of the Duchy actually put that forward as an adequate reply to the instances given by my hon. Friend. The arguments used by the Solicitor-General were even, if I may say so, more contemptible. What did the hon. and learned Gentleman say with reference to the point made by my hon. Friend? My hon. Friend said that the only reason why the same degree of attention was not given to the complaints on this point was that the votes were few. No one who has listened to the Debate will dissent from that. The hon. and learned Gentleman said that it did not follow that the full monopoly value ever is, in fact, exacted by the justices, and that under the terms of the 1904 Act the monopoly value is paid for. Was such an argument ever heard before? The provisions of the 1904 Act are that when the justices grant a new licence they may exact the monopoly value. In many cases the justices have exacted the monopoly value. They have demanded a certain money payment, and the consideration for that has been expressed by them as monopoly value. The Solicitor-General says that it does not follow that the monopoly value has been asked for. Those who have followed the proceedings of the licensing justices know that, using the best expert advice which valuers have been able to give them, they have done their best to arrive at the full monopoly value. The Solicitor-General asked, "Can you tell us the value of the licence given up? Does it follow that the justices at the time they exacted this monopoly value knew what the value of the licence given up was?" They had the best expert advice as to the value of the licence that was surrendered, and there is no doubt that they arrived at a very reliable estimate of its value. The Solicitor-General contended that it is wholly impracticable to make valuations of this kind and to make deductions that are proper to be made where certain business proceedings are being surrendered. But the whole sub- stratum of the procedure under Clause 30 is based on the practicability of such deductions being made. If they are not practicable then Clause 30 is not worth the paper that it is written on. The Solicitor-General asks "are you to value things you have not seen?" and this in presence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who spent at least two months in proving the possibility of valuing ungotten minerals. The Solicitor-General asked for a concrete case of ascertaining the value of a licence surrendered. There is no difficulty in multiplying such instances. There was a case in Gloucester of an ale-house. It was an annual renewal.
There was some discussion apparently in court as to the price to be paid for the monopoly value. Ultimately it was settled that £400 was to be paid and there was to be an ante-1869 beer-house surrendered, and besides the beer-house another on-licence was surrendered in respect of other premises. Is anyone going to contend that the payment of £400 was not arrived at with regard to the fact that two other licences were being surrendered? Is there anyone who does not sit on the Treasury Bench who will contend that more than £400 would not have been exacted if these two licences were not being surrendered? Is there anyone not on the Treasury Bench who says that you cannot arrive approximately at the value of the two licences surrendered which were part of the consideration? Take another case, with which I am more familiar, a case at Bolton in Lancashire. It was the case of an annual ale-house, and here again there was considerable discussion at the time the licence was granted as to what might be the proper sum to exact from the grantee in consideration of it, because the neighbourhood was such that it was rightly supposed that the grant would be a valuable one. It was insisted that £1,500 should be paid, after considerably larger sums had been discussed in the course of the argument. Eventually it was compromised on the terms that £l,500 should be paid for the beer-house licence, and that a full beerhouse licence and a full ale-house licence should be surrendered. After considerable discussion as to the proper monopoly price, there was an abatement of the original proposal discussed between the parties, and discussed in admitted consideration of the circumstance that two licences were given up. Yet the Chancellor of the Duchy had the assurance to come here and say that no valuer could arrive at any approximation of the deduction. Let them go to Mr. Lumley and ask him, or go to any one of the valuers. The Government would have stood on consistent and defensible ground if they had said, "We make no deduction for monopoly value at all." They stand on ground that is neither consistent nor defensible, and which not one speaker on the other side of the House has made any attempt to defend, when they say, "We make an allowance for monopoly value, but we do not make allowance for mere concessions and payments on the part of the grantee, which would make the monopoly sum paid more than it would otherwise be."
I wish to state how the case appears to magistrates who are acting as the licensing authority. We all know that these applications are generally made where a new and populous district has grown up in consequence of the starting of new works, or something of that kind, and where there does not happen to be any licensed house at all. Of course, it is perfectly natural from the point of view of the trade that they should be anxious to open a house in the new district, where the population is increasing. In these circumstances, if the trade were to go to the justices and ask for a new licence, they know perfectly well that they would not get it. Therefore, and rightly from their point of view, in order to induce the magistrates to consider the possibility of granting a new licence, they offer to surrender a licence in a district where there are more licences than are required. But from the point of view of the licensing authority, the surrender of licences has nothing whatever to do with the question, and if a new licence is to be granted the case is dealt with entirely on its merits. When quarter sessions, as the court of appeal, value the property in a new licence the value of the cancelled licence has nothing whatever to do with the point in the minds of the magistrates who decide to grant the licence.
We have had a tremendous amount of eloquence and forensic skill in support of this Amendment, which really does not require any answer. You can always judge from the case put forward whether it is a good case or not, where it is a case put forward by men of skill, backed up by all the information of the interests concerned. We have listened to this Debate, and they have not put forward a single case to show that any single consideration has been given, in addition to the money, which had any value. It is quite true they have given licences which, from the point of view of the magistrates, it was a good thing to shut up, because they were supposed to be doing harm, but there has not been a shred of evidence to show that they were any good to those who gave them. I know that public-houses have been maintained for years and years at a loss in order that they might get some money out of them from fellow members of the trade. The mere fact that all this talent and all this knowledge has been addressing us for ever so long, and that they have not been able to put forward a single case to show that one sovereign's worth of value has been got out of their pockets in addition to the licence that has been paid for shows how futile all the eloquence has been.
I am both disappointed and surprised that this Amendment, especially after the Debate that has taken place, has not been accepted by the Government. When I put it down I thought no fair answer could be made to it, and in my opinion no sort of answer has been made. In regard to the observation of the hon. Member for Argyll (Mr. Ainsworth) that the value of the surrender licence does not concern the licensing justices, I entirely agree with what he has said. The money value does not, of course. The character of the increase and the public service rendered is what they think about. but it concerns the applicant. If he, as in the case referred to by my hon. and learned Friend, puts his hand in his pocket to the tune of a thousand pounds, and buys a house in order to surrender it, it concerns him, and it is a consideration given by him to the public in return for the licence which he is granted. If I may put aside the special argument of the Chancellor of the Duchy, which has been already dealt with, the only argument we have heard from the other side against this Amendment in the course of this long Debate is that these houses have no value, and that you cannot ascertain that value; and that it is imposssible to value certain other considerations such as the absence of a bar when there has been no bar, and Sunday trading when there has been none. That is the whole of the case that has been made.
And that the monopoly value is not affected.
Does not the Solicitor-General say that they would get the licence without a surrender?
That is not the point. The point is whether the surrender entered or not into the question of amount.
Whether it is money or money's worth. If those houses have no value we have often heard that valueless houses are kept on for the purpose of surrender. If it is so then no relief would be given. As to the observation that you cannot value a house that has disappeared, the answer is that you can, and that it is done every day. I am nearly sure I have myself, as has everyone in my profession, had to do with the valuing of a business and of premises after the business has disappeared, and after the premises have been pulled down. In the case of street widenings and other improvements, the ascertainment of value often takes place after the premises have disappeared. The only point made against me is that it would be difficult,
perhaps impossible, to value some onerous covenants such as those to which the Solicitor-General referred. The answer to that is: If they were not susceptible to valuation, there would be no case for compensation. To say that a man who has put his hand in his pocket and bought a licence to surrender it in order to buy a new licence is now to be subjected to these new duties without compensation is simply a gross breach of faith on the part of the State. It is only done because these people are weak. I regret exceedingly that the Government have not accepted so obviously just and modest an Amendment, and I sincerely trust that considerable attention will be paid to the point outside.
Question put, "That those words be there inserted."
The Committee divided: Ayes, 89; Noes, 179.
moved, in Sub-section (1), to leave out the word "may" and to insert the word "shall" ["the Commissioners may, after giving the justices by whom the conditions have been attached to the licence an opportunity of reporting to them on the matter, reduce in such manner as they think just the amount of any payment to be so made "].
I expect the Government will accept this Amendment. The effect of the Clause as it stands is that where a licensee has paid the monopoly value for his licence that may be taken into account if the Commissioners think fit, but not otherwise; I want to provide that it shall be taken into account.
I accept the Amendment.
Amendment agreed to.
moved, in Subsection (1), to leave out the words "in such manner as they think just."
This is the first of a series of Amendments which it will be, no doubt, conve- nient for the Committee to take together. It proposes that the Commissioners shall be required in every case to allow the amount of the increased duty and not to have a discretion to make such allowance as they please, or no allowance if they think fit. The Amendment would make the Clause run in this way. Where the Commissioners, after giving the justices an opportunity of reporting to them on the matter, reduce the amount of any payment to be so made by the amount of the additional Licence Duty imposed by this Act, or in case where a capital sum is paid allow reduction from the duty to be paid for the licence equal to the annual equivalent of the capital sum so paid. The Committee will see that the only relief proposed to be granted to the unfortunate persons who have purchased licences from the State, is that the Commissioners are empowered if they think fit to make some reduction of the Licence Duty. My contention is that it is the absolute right of the licensee, as between himself and the State, in these cases to receive back from the State the equivalent of what he has paid in the extra Licence Duty. I venture to say that the monopoly value of the premises must be diminished at least by the amount of the new Licence Duty to be imposed. It may perhaps further be diminished, but it must diminish it by that figure. You grant a man a licence with a certain Licence Duty, and then that licence remaining the same, and conferring precisely the same privilege it conferred before, you charge the man for the same privilege £50 a year more than he paid before, and that must reduce the monopoly value by £50 a year. If that is so, it follows that justice requires that that man shall be allowed £50 a year, and not that you shall be content by merely investing the Commissioners with power to allow him what they may think fit and proper. My hon. and learned Friend is going to move that there shall be an appeal to the Commissioners. If he is unsuccessful that is an additional reason why a rule should be laid down that the Commissioners should do justice in every case. I beg to move.
I understand that this is the first of a series of Amendments to be moved with the object of making it obligatory on the Commissioners to allow the whole of this duty. The hon. and learned Member said he wanted the Commissioners to do justice. So do we. They do not move in the matter until the monopoly value has been fixed. Where the monopoly value has been fixed as an annual payment they may reduce that payment, and there is nothing to say that they shall not reduce it by the full amount. The other case is where the capital sum is fixed, and there they can either reduce it or reduce the duty in respect of it. The amount, however, must be left to the discretion of the Commissioners, and we cannot draw a hard and fast rule within which they will be confined. The hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned an appeal in connection with this Clause. That point will be raised by a subsequent Amendment, and I will deal with it when it is brought forward.
Really the Government in refusing this Amendment are giving away the whole of the case for this tax. It has been recommended to us on the ground that this is a State monopoly and that the tax is a toll to be taken from those monopolists who are not traders in the ordinary sense, but traders protected from competition by unnatural restrictions, and therefore it is only fair that the profits which they get should pay toll to the community which grants them these special privileges. I understand that that is the whole argument, and that there is no other argument except that. Now my hon. Friend brings forward an Amendment making it compulsory on the Commissioners to take the Government defence of their own tax seriously, and treat it as a real justification for the tax and not to leave it to a discretion which is not only unfair, but is absolutely, as far as I can see without precedent. That is the way the Clause stands. My hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Clavell Salter) suggests that these people should not be taxed on monopoly value, and, rightly, because they have got no monopoly value. The monopoly value has gone in their case. Then why are they to have an extra tax put upon them? The hon. Gentleman must know that is the ground on which we support this Amendment. Why did he not deal with it in his reply? I am sure it was suggested in my hon. and learned Friend's argument, and, at all events, it seems to me evident. You are treating the trade now as if it was an exceptional trade. It is not an exceptional trade. These people are now situated like any other traders with no monopoly value. They get nothing from the State; they are just like traders in any other commodity. Very well, why do you tax them? You have not the smallest right to specially tax them. All my hon. Friend asks is that the principle of the Government should be embodied in the Government's Bill, and I do not understand why they refuse. The hon. and learned Gentleman said he could not grant it; but he did not give a single argument for not granting it, and the Bill is now open to the charge that it leaves an absolutely undirected, unfettered, and unguided discretion to these Commissioners, not telling them what is meant, but asking them out of their inner consciences to come to some conclusion as to what is meant. That is the first charge to which the Clause is open. Secondly, it is open to the charge that it does not carry out clearly and specifically the principles of the Government themselves. I do earnestly wish the learned Gentleman would tell us on what principle the Government think it right to tax an industry or a trader who has no monopoly, as if, in fact, he had a monopoly, and how he thinks it right to extend a tax, the whole justification of which is that it is a monopoly tax to those who, from the very nature of the case, and the very conditions by which they carry on their trade, have been deliberately deprived by the community of that monopoly other licence holders enjoy. That is the argument, and that has not been met at all.
I think it is as much as I can do to deal with the arguments of the hon. Gentlemen who move their Amendments. The argument put now by the right hon. Gentleman was not put by the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Mr. Clavell Salter). No one can say that the monopoly value fixed by the justices remains at the same sum. Supposing the justices had fixed it at £250 five years ago, you cannot say that this year that £250 represents necessarily the value of the monopoly enjoyed by the owner of the licensed premises. Take a big mining village. There is a public-house and a fine
hotel licensed in that village. The monopoly value is fixed at so-and-so with a sort of idea that the increase in the place will be at a certain rate. It is found the increase is much more rapid, and no one can say the real value of the monopoly is represented by the monopoly value fixed by the justices. That is one case. The other case is the capital value. What are you to do there? Are you to take from that every year until it has exhausted the amount of the increased duty? I do not know how it is to be done. These are matters which will have to be considered by the Commissioners. I have never said that the claims put forward by the right hon. Gentleman ought never to be allowed, but it is impossible to lay down hard and fast lines, as that may make it impossible for the Commissioners to do the justice which the right hon. Gentleman desires.
Question put, "That those words stand part of the Clause."
The Committee divided: Ayes, 182; Noes, 95.
moved, in Sub-section (1) to leave out the words "they think" ["in such manner as they think just"], and to insert the words "shall be."
This is a case where under the Bill the Commissioners, that is, the taxing authority, are to determine the amount of the tax and how much is to be taken from the maximum Licence Duty. You cannot leave it to the Government, that is, the taxing authority, without appeal, to say how much the tax is to be. I suggest that on the principles already conceded on other Amendments, there must be an appeal allowed to some independent authority against the decision of what is really the taxing authority. The sums involved are considerable. I have had two cases among others. One firm has written to the Chancellor of the Exchequer stating that their clients, at a general licensing meet- ing held at Chesterfield, in February, 1906, were granted for a provisional licence for a fully licensed public-house, subject to the payment of a monopoly value of £6,500. They ask whether under the proposed increase of duty they will be treated in the same way as those who have not paid any monopoly value, or whether they will receive some consideration for the large sum paid by them. The Chancellor of the Exchequer will have to answer by saying there will be such consideration if the Commissioners think fit to allow it. The other case is a letter from one of the well-known trust companies which carry on certain houses without regard to profit. This was a new licence under the 1904 Act. The term of the licence was V years, the monopoly value £2,500, and the licensees agreed to pay that charge on consideration that the Licence Duty was £40. Under the Finance Bill the duty will be half the annual value. The question is whether the licensee will, under Clause 33, get a rebate of say £110, or are there loopholes in the Clause which would enable the Commissioners arbitrarily to make a rebate of some lesser sum or even to allow no rebate at all. Of course, the answer is in the affirmative. Under the Clause as it stands, the Commissioners may allow a lesser sum or no rebate at all. I press the point, that the Commissioners, representing the Government, ought not to be the judges in the case. I do not care what appeal or impartial tribunal you substitute, but that decision ought not to be final, and the person taxed ought to have recourse to some other authority.
The cases which have to be determined by the Commissioners under this Clause are not likely to be very large in number. No doubt questions of some difficulty will arise. It is true also that there are very considerable sums involved here. I am inclined on behalf of the Government to accept the Amendment on one condition. I ought to protect myself by stating that the acceptance of the Amendment shall not in any sense be used in order to press the Government to give an appeal under Clause 32. I do not think there will be many appeals. Probably there will be none, but lest anyone should think himself hardly treated by not having the right of appeal I think we must accept the Amendment. I presume the appeal which the hon. and learned Gentleman wants is to the High Court.
I wish to ask the Solicitor-General whether he is aware of the fact that the Irish Party have given notice of an Amendment to reject the Clause. The reason why I ask the question is this, I understand that this matter has been very carefully considered by the Irish Members. A very important concession has been made by the Government as regards the new licences granted under the Act of 1904, and the hon. and learned member (Mr. Cave) has now succeeded in securing the right of appeal. The question I wish to ask the Solicitor-General is this: Does Clause 33 of this Bill apply to Ireland in any sense? I cannot conceive that it does, because the Act of 1904 does not apply to Ireland. You are giving the English new licences a very important concession, and all new licences granted in our country since 1902 must be in the same position as new licences granted in England under the Act of 1904, and there must be this appeal. I will sit down if I am told this: this Section does apply to Ireland.
No.
We are told that the section for the regulation, of which the Irish Party gave notice, does not apply to Ireland. My hon. Friend the Member for Newry (Mr. Mooney) has given notice to omit this entire section; but it is a section of concessions, a section by which the man who has got a new licence is to have an abatement of duty by reason of the fact that he is in a less strong position under the Act of 1904 than he would be if he had an absolutely new licence. I want you to apply the Amendment of the hon. and learned Gentleman above the Gangway, and to give us quoad the new licences granted under our Act of 1902 the same right as you are giving to Englishmen under the Act of 1904. Of course, we only exist to be taxed, and the English only exist to have concessions made to them. You are giving under this Clause every English licence holder who has taken the limited licence under the Act of 1904 a reduction of duty. But take the hotel-keeper under the Act of 1902 in Ireland. He cannot have a public bar, and he must provide accommodation for travellers to the extent of ten bedrooms. The deprivation of a public bar in itself is recognised in Mr. Gladstone's Act of 1880 as a ground for reduction of duty.
On a point of order, is the hon. Member in order in discussing an amendment of the licensing law in Ireland on an Amendment as to cases which affect England alone?
That begs the question. We were told that every one of these Licensing Clauses applied to Ireland. You will remember it was you, Sir, who brought out the fact that Clause 30, which we all supposed did not apply to Ireland, applies to the three Kingdoms, although, in fact, it refers in the same way to the Act of 1904.
I certainly do not see myself that this can apply to Ireland. I understand that it is an adjustment of the payment which has to be made, under the Act of 1904, for new licences. I understand that no such payment exists in Ireland. I am so unfamiliar with matters in Ireland that I am not sure on the point, but if this only applies to England I do not see how Ireland is affected.
That was our chief argument on Clause 30. You will find in that Clause that one of the things to be taken into account by the Commissioners is Section 2 of the Act of 1904, and we argued upon that that this Section could not apply to Ireland. "Oh!" said the hon. Gentleman, "the register is to apply to the whole country." Of course, if you tell me that in your opinion I am wrong, I will wait until the Sub-section is put, and then move a rider to the Sub-section providing that new licences granted under the Act of 1902 shall be entitled to the same rebate as if they were new licences granted under the Act of 1904. If that be your ruling I am quite content with it.
This section deals only with the amount—whether it be the capital or the annual sum—which has been reserved for monopoly value in England in cases where licences were granted under the Act of 1904. Where there is such a monopoly value the Commissioner can make a deduction on the sum, or a deduction in respect of the duty. There is no such thing in Ireland as the monopoly value which is spoken of in this Section. This Section cannot and does not apply to Ireland.
On Section (2) of Clause 30 it was specifically stated that the new valuation there is to apply to Ireland, but in this instance this Section cannot apply to Ireland.
The monopoly value, which does not exist in Ireland, is to be taken in Ireland as an ingredient for the purpose of valuation.
It is not.
Here is the Sub-section: "It shall be the duty of the Commissioners, as soon as may be, to prepare, and to keep corrected, a register as respects all fully licensed premises and beer-houses respectively of the amount which would be payable as compensation in respect of the premises under Subsection (1) of Section 2 of the Licensing Act, 1904."
Will the hon. and learned Gentleman read on?
"The premises were premises in respect of which compensation was payable under that Act, and of the sum which is to be treated for the purposes of this Act as the annual equivalent of that amount…" So you are going to treat in Ireland the monopoly value as being in existence for the purpose of valuation under Clause 30. My only request is this: If you are going to reduce the monopoly value in England as a ground for saying that they shall pay a less Licence Duty, then I say that persons in Ireland who hold equally a licence which is of less value than the licence granted previous to 1902 in the same way should have a reduction of their amount. For the moment, I am very glad of the acceptance by the Government of the Amendment of the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Cave), and when we come to the end of the Clause I trust I shall be allowed to move that the same reduction shall be granted to all persons who hold licences as allowed by the Act of 1902.
If the Amendment is accepted by the hon. and learned Gentleman only on condition that it shall not be used as an argument for granting a similar appeal under another clause, then I cannot accept the condition. We must keep ourselves free to use what arguments we like.
Question, "That the words 'they think' stand part of the Clause," put, and negatived.
Question, "That the words 'shall be' be there inserted," put and agreed to."
Amendments made: In Sub-section (1) leave out the words "they think" ["for the licence as they think just"] and insert the words "shall be."—[ Mr. Cave. ]
At the end of Sub-section (1) insert the words "but any decision of the Commissioners as to the reduction to be made under this provision shall be subject to the like appeal as that to which the determination by the Inland Revenue Commission of the amount to be paid for compensation under Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Licensing Act, 1904, is subject under that Act."—[ Mr. Cave. ]
moved to leave out Sub-section (2).
This Amendment is on behalf of the London County Council, but it applies toother local bodies all over the country. The Committee will remember that under a previous clause a reduction is made in the Licence Duties where payments in respect of monopoly value have been made by order of the magistrates under Sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Licensing Act of 1904. The money so paid has been paid over to the local authorities and spent during the last four years. The amount is not, perhaps, a very large sum all over the country compared with the very large amount of money which has been spent on the Budget this year, but at the same time it is a substantial amount. In London, for instance, in 1908, it amounted to £7,580. Under the proposals of this Sub-section any amount by which the licensees are given reductions in their payments in consequence of these payments for monopoly value, is to be deducted from the amounts paid to the Local Taxation Account, and handed over to the municipality. In other words, the State is going to take back from the municipalities money which they have already obtained under the Act of 1904 and which they have spent. The Solicitor-General shakes his head, but this Subsection is retrospective. The question has been placed before the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and in reply to a deputation which waited on him on 10th July last, the Chancellor said:— This is rather a question of policy. There are one or two districts in London, and I am afraid there is one in Wales, where the mere fact that the monopoly value of the new licences went in reduction of rates formed an inducement to the magistrates to grant new licences. It was thought desirable to deprive the local authorities of that inducement, and that is the reason, not because it amounts to anything, for it comes to a very small sum over the whole country, hut it was thought very undesirable that that additional inducement should be given to magistrates to grant new licences. There was one very bad case in Wales, I am sorry to say, where licences were granted, and huge sums of money paid, the real inducement being that the rates were being reduced by that means. It was thought desirable that the contribution should be Imperial, and not local, and that is the reason. The sum is not a very large one; the sum that goes to the Exchequer throughout the whole Kingdom is comparatively small; but the mischief must be an incredibly great one in many localities. It is very bard that local authorities in England should be penalised because the Chancellor of the Exchequer knows a very bad case in Wales. We ought not to be punished for Welsh iniquities. I understood that Wales was the centre of all the virtues. Again, though the Chancellor of the Exchequer says it is only a small amount, that is no reason why the local authorities, which have been so badly treated by the right hon. Gentleman in other ways, and suffer very heavily under this Budget, should actually have to repay money they have already spent. It is quite clear that this Clause will be retrospective, and that retrospective effect is the only effect it will have. It will have no effect at all as regards the future; therefore, the objection of the Chancellor of the Exchequer falls to the ground. This money having been collected and spent, it can have no influence on the morals of either magistrates or local authorities as regards the future. They will not be able to exact any sums of money in future in respect of monopoly value, because the whole of the monopoly value is taken under the new licences, and even if they did, it would be no use, because the money would be paid to the local authorities, and the next year the amount would be deducted. They will not take the trouble to pay over money which is to be withdrawn the following year. On these grounds I hope the Sub-section will be omitted. It is a piece of retrospective robbery, to which I feel sure the Chancellor of the Exchequer will not be a party.
This is a somewhat complicated matter, but I will endeavour to explain it briefly to the Committee. Under the Act of 1904 local authorities are required to make charges representing the monopoly value of new licences granted by them. These new payments go into the Local Taxation Fund, and go back to the local authorities. It was proposed in Clause 67 of this Bill that in future the payments should go to the Treasury. There are many disadvantages in local authorities profiting by what may amount in some cases to the sale of new licences. There are many objections to the present practice, into which I do not propose to enter now; they will properly arise on Clause 67. When these payments go to the Exchequer, the Exchequer will, of course, make the necessary arrangements as between the monopoly value payments en the one hand, and the Licence Duty on the other, in order to carry out the purposes of this Clause. That is quite simple. Now there comes in the question: What is to happen where the local authority, instead of charging an annual sum has charged a lump sum, a capital sum—some local authorities have charged sums of £2,000. £3,000, and £4,000—for what are ostensibly annual licences—for they cannot be annual licences, in fact, where there is the evident expectation of renewal in consequence of these large payments. What was clearly the intention of the framers of the Act of 1904 has been defeated. The question is: What is to occur in these particular cases in respect of the allowances to be made from the annual Licence Duty in respect of their monopoly value? Clearly those people who have found these large sums are to be entitled to a reduction in their Licence Duty? That is the purpose of the Clause. They will probably pay no Licence Duty. Have the Treasury to lose that sum for the benefit of the local authorities who have sold the licences for the figures given? That is a simple question. Where you have the local authority the licensing justices, who have carried out merely the intention of the Act of 1904, and have charged an annual sum, then the Treasury will not be the loser; but where a capital sum has been charged the Treasury will lose the whole of the Licence Duty from that house. It is thought that it is only fair and just that where the central authority loses any Licence Duty because the local authority charged a large capital sum, a corresponding deduction should be made, not from past, but future payments to that authority from the Local Taxation Account. The hon. Member speaking on behalf of the London County Council asks: "Why should London suffer for others?" The county of Glamorgan has been particularly conspicuous in this matter. Why, it is asked, should London, which has not been so conspicuous, suffer? London will not suffer. London has carried out this provision of the Act of 1904 in accordance with the intentions of the Act. I have here a list of new licences which have been granted in London. They are almost all annual, or for two or perhaps three years. There was one in 1905 granted for five years. It is now coming to an end. The only lump sum which has been received was £5,000 for the Anglo-French Exhibition, and that was really an annual payment, because the exhibition was licensed for one year. In those circumstances London will not suffer in any degree. The fears of the hon. Member are groundless. This Sub-section merely carries out what is plain justice as between the central and local authorities.
I cannot understand the explanation which has been given. It seems to me contrary to the principles of justice and right dealing. The result of the imposition of these new duties will be to affect the monopoly value of the licences referred to. But instead of the licence holder having his monopoly based upon a low licence, he has property for which he is paying an annual sum, or has paid a capital sum, based on a high licence.
The Government say they do not wish to see any injustice done, and they say to the licensee what we deprived you of by high licences we are going to return to you. But who is going to get the benefit of these high licences? The Government money is going into the pocket of the Treasury, and they say we will reimburse the licensee out of the pocket of the taxpayer and the municipality. I wish to protect the ratepayer. I think the Government are committing vicarious charity. They are going to pocket the high licences, and they are going to pay compensation to the sufferers in consequence of these high licences, by taking the money from the municipality and from the ratepayers. Those who are deprived of the increased Licence Duty are to be the persons who are to provide the compensation for what I would almost call the robbery committed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer upon the man who purchased the monopoly. I cannot conceive that that is a right principle.
The hon. Member is discussing what we have already passed in the first Sub-section. We are discussing not the application of the original capital sum, but where such capital sum has been paid an adjustment of an annual sum to correspond to it.
I venture to say that this Clause deals with the way in which the money is to be recouped. It is to be deducted from the next payment made to the local taxation account. I object to the recoupment being taken from the next payment to the local taxation account. I say the Government ought to pay the recoupment themselves, and that they are wrong to take it from the municipality. I do not question the fact that the sufferer should be recouped. What I do question is the right to take it out of the payment to local taxation account of the council of a county or county borough. The profit is going into the pocket of the Treasury, while the loss is to be borne by the municipality. I object to that. The municipality are deprived of any of the increased Licence Duty, and they are to recoup the sufferers. It is an extraordinary transaction that the Treasury should get the profits and place the losses on the ratepayers.
The hon. Member is not carrying out my ruling; he seems to be arguing upon the whole question. It is only where the capital sum is paid that this Sub-section applies, and that is the only point in order on the Sub-section.
I regret I did not keep within your ruling, but I object to the ratepayers paying instead of the Treasury. This Clause takes the payment to be made for compensation out of the Local Taxation Account, and I protest in the name of the ratepayers against the Government doing this extraordinary mean act of taking the profits and then throwing the burden for compensation upon the municipality.
The Chancellor of the Duchy says that this is of common daily occurence. It seems to me that it is an absolute injustice upon the ratepayers. This money has been raised in good faith and spent in good faith, and it is unjust to rake this matter up after two or three years have elapsed and ask present ratepayers to pay all this money from which they have enjoyed no benefit. The Chancellor of the Duchy said that London would not suffer owing to the fact that London charged it on the annual value and net on the capital basis. I do not think that my hon. Friend moved this Amendment from the point of view of London alone. He carefully stated that it was a matter of injustice to all local authorities. When the time comes we shall probably object strongly to Clause 67 as well. Many of us strongly resent the idea that licences have been granted by local justices from motives of cupidity regardless of the interests of the district. After all, the local authorities who get the benefit do not giant the licences, because they are granted by the justices. If the temperance argument used by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the deputation of the London County Council is sound, then the Government can well afford to drop this retrospective action. The Sub-section deals only with licences already granted. It is unworthy of the Government to inflict this injustice on local authorities, because they can afford to forego this small repayment to the Local Taxation Account out of the enormous sums they are going to get by these higher licence duties. The recovery from monopoly value is only to be allowed to balance the largely increased payment made direct to the State by the licence holders.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer practically stated that there was no money in this, and I am quite certain that there is no temperance in this Sub-section either. It is quite an unsound principle to throw the burden on the present ratepayers to repay all the money spent by their predecessors. The sound principle is for each year to pay its own burden. It is quite unjust to penalise the ratepayers of to-day because their predecessors trusted to Parliament not to go back on its own word. We hear every year the advantages of local option, and that each district should be in a position to restrict licences. In a district where the justices have thought fit to grant new licences and charge the monopoly value that district should be allowed to decide what is in its own interest. It is most unfair to fine ratepayers because the licensing justices choose to use their discretion. In former years it was not necessary to raise the full amount of local expenditure from the rates, and there is a strong feeling growing up that Imperial charges are being thrown on the local rates. There is a tendency to put more and more work on local authorities for Imperial services, and to make no grants in aid. Clauses such as this will do a great deal to encourage that opinion. If the Government wish to induce local authorities to look on this Bill with favour, and to accept the concessions they have made, they certainly ought to do away with this hardship of paying at the present time this monopoly value which has relieved the rates in the past. If they do that measure of justice, they will take away one of the strongest objections of the local authorities.
I think there is a great deal more fuss being made about this than necessary. I do not think there will probably be more than a dozen cases in the whole country that will really come under the description given. I understand you stereotype the present licence money which goes to the local authorities, and that in future you will give to each the equivalent of the amount they have hitherto been receiving. Are you going to deduct these sums from that portion of the Local Taxation Account belonging to the particular districts in which the particular licences have been granted, or are you going to take it from the whole Local Taxation Account?
The Clause says so—"Any amount by which the duty on the licence is reduced under this section shall be deducted, in accordance with directions of the Treasury, from the next payment made out of the Local Taxation Account to the council of the county or county borough who have had the benefit of the original capital sum paid."
The amount will be calculated and deducted from their parti- cular portion. There have not been half-a-dozen cases which have occurred in the South of England since the Act of 1904. Although it may be a point of principle, it does not affect many cases.
Question put, "That Sub-section (2) stand part of the Clause."
The Committee divided: Ayes, 157; Noes, 85.
Question put, "That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill."
I had intended to move a provision that, "In Ireland where any licence holder has caused any other licence to be extinguished, or has been required by the licensing authority to pay any sum or submit to any condition for the grant, transfer, or renewal of his licence, the Commissioners shall, in any reduction of the Licence Duty, take into account the circumstances under which such grant, transfer, or renewal was made." I think it extraordinary that the Government in this Clause should have entirely omitted the consideration of Ireland. Under the Act of 1902 a limited form of licence exists in Ireland, where a man cannot have a drinking bar and is obliged to provide accommodation for travellers. The Government do not take that into account, although such a man, having no bar, should pay a less sum than he otherwise would. When a man applies for the transfer of a licence the licensing justices say, "You have a seven-day licence. We will only give you a six-day licence." Or in Dublin they may say, "You have a seven-day licence, and you are entitled to keep open for two or three hours in the day, but you must never open for bonâ fide travellers." There are excursion days, and people come in in batches by train for processions and other things of that kind, and the licensing authority very justly say, "You must not open under these exceptional circumstances. But the licensing authority is not able to impose these conditions on one in 500 cases, because it is only when a man comes up for the renewal of his licence that these conditions can be imposed. Therefore side by side and in the same street you may have two or three licences subject to conditions and two or three licences absolutely free. It seems to me that that man is in an exactly analogous position to the case contemplated by the Government under this Clause. The Government draftsmen will not take the trouble, or do not want to put the Minister to the burden of having to learn the case of our country. I am not such a fool as to blame the Minister, but the draftsman ought to take these matters into account. Here you are legislating for England, and you say the English limited licence holder shall have an advantage. I say give me the same advantage for the Irish limited licence holder, and at once I am told it is not in order on the Clause. I think it most unjust that we should have to bring up these points when the Ministry ought to take them into account, just as yesterday we had to point out that there was no appeal given either to Ireland or Scotland, and the Ministry at once said they would deal with that in a new Clause. A private Member is charged with taking up the time of the House if he performs the duty which has not been discharged by the draftsman. All the licences under the Act of 1902 practically are cases in which a man has a limitation. He has not, to use the words of the Act, fully licensed premises. He cannot do as he pleases. That is one case. I saw the late Recorder of Dublin requiring a man to extinguish two licences, and he required the lodgment of £600 paid to the Clerk of the Crown to be kept, so to speak, in bond until he was ready to extinguish some other licence.
If you turn to the Select Committee on the Irish licensing question you will find that that Committee approved of the practice. The man who has paid for the licence this enormous amount finds himself in exactly the same position as the man who is under different conditions. He has extinguished a previous licence, and he has done something for the reduction of the liquor traffic, and yet that man is to be treated in the same spirit as the other licensee. I do think that it ought not to be necessary to bring these cases before the Government in this House. They ought to be advised of them by their own officers. I protest against this Clause on the ground that it is not adequate. I do not dispute that it does not apply to Ireland, but I contend that it ought to include Ireland. You are giving English licence holders an advantage. I do not say that the advantage I claim for Ireland is exactly of the same kind as you are giving in England, but I say that something analogous ought to be given. I do not say that the words I have proposed to insert would fit perfectly. I am only striving to get for my own country what you have given to your own. I think it is most unfortunate that these matters are not attended to by the Government draftsman.
This Clause does not apply to Ireland at all, and nobody knows that better than the hon. and learned Member for Louth (Mr. T. M. Healy). He has attempted to frame an Amendment for the purpose of including Ireland. I warned him that he could not frame one in order to do that, and if the hon. and learned Gentleman with his long experience in this House cannot do it, no one can do it. The truth of the matter is that the speech he has just made is not a House of Commons speech at all. For some reason or other he desires the views he has expressed to be known in some other quarter. From the beginning to the end of the discussion of this Clause there has been no Amendment suggested, and if the hon. and learned Member went into the Lobby to vote against the Clause he would not have more than one to follow him.
I am not at all satisfied with the response given by the Solicitor-General. I am greatly puzzled to find out where we stand in this matter. Why should not the Clause apply to Ireland? What is there to be found in the Section itself which excludes Ireland? I have considerable experience in the administration of the licensing laws in Ireland, and I was amazed when we came to Clause 30 of the Bill to be told that Subsection (2) was intended to apply to Ireland. Members of the Nationalist Party went home after Sub-section (1) had been passed under the delusion that they had obtained a marvellous concession for their country? We were told in the course of the Debate that Sub-section (2) of Section 30 is intended to apply to Ireland, although on the face of it it would seem not to apply, because it applies a principle of compensation hitherto unknown in that country, namely, the principle of compensation on the annual compensation value under the Act of 1904, which, admittedly, has no application to Ireland. But the Solicitor-General has told us that Sub-section (2) of Section 30 is intended to apply to Ireland. If that is so, why should the provisions of the Section now under discussion not apply? There is nothing in the terms of it to exclude Ireland. Since 1902 new licences can only be granted in Inland under special and exceptional conditions. The practice in Dublin has been, since 1902, to require any applicant for a new licence to lodge a sum of money, which is either applied to the extinction of an existing licence, or is kept in reserve by the licensing authority for the purpose of extinguishing licences when opportunity arises. That is precisely the system which I understand is in force with the licence holder in England.
No.
Then this Section is unmeaning, because wherever an applicant has been asked by the licensing authority to pay a sum of money on condition of getting a new licence, and such sum of money is in excess of the value of the licence he is getting, this Section takes power to refund to him either portion of the money that the licensing authority has called on him to advance or else recoup him by reducing his Licence Duty.
You are quite wrong. You omitted to read the words "annual payment for securing to the public the monopoly value under Section 4 of the Licensing Act, 1904." That could not by any possibility refer to Ireland, and nobody can pretend to think that it does.
That is not convincing in any shape or form, because those are precisely the words used in connection with the register to be created under Sub-section (2) of Section 30 which has already been passed by this House, and which we are told is to be applied in Ireland. I am not disputing that in the exact form and phraseology of this Section it may be said that the words used suggest that it is not applicable to Ireland. But exactly the same form and the same phraseology are to be found in Clause 30 which we have already passed, and which we are told, on the authority of the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite, is to be made applicable to Ireland. While I concede that the phraseology of the Subsection now under discussion is not prim â facie applicable to Ireland in the state of affairs existing there, nevertheless the phraseology is no more peculiar as regards Ireland than the phraseology of Clause 30. What I wish to emphasise is that the grievance from which it is alleged certain licence holders in England are suffering, or may suffer by reason of being called upon to pay an amount that is excessive, having regard to the new contemplated duty, is the very same grievance which exists in the case of Ireland, particularly in regard to licences granted since the Act of 1902. The hon. and learned Member for Louth has pointed out that in the case of these new licences granted since the Act of 1902, the applicant has been compelled either to extinguish an existing licence or lodge, with the licensing authority a sum of money to be applied by the authority to the extinguishing of a licence whenever an opportunity arose. It was the settled practice of the late Recorder, and it has been more or less adopted by his successor, on the occasion of the application for a new licence, to require the applicant, as a condition precedent to getting a new licence, that he should expend a large sum of money in extinguishing an existing licence or, if no such licence was available, to deposit a sum of money which could be used for the purpose of buying up any licence available in the market.
The condition of the new licence holder in Ireland since 1902 is precisely the same as that of the licence holder in England. If you consider that you require this Subsection to remedy the grievance of the licence holder in England, either by returning a portion of the money he advanced, or by relieving him of a portion of the new duty, I cannot for the life of me see why that should not be extended to Ireland in the case of persons who are in precisely the same position. I think we ought to have some more information as to what is the exact position of the new licence holders in Ireland. I confess if I were asked tomorrow to advise what their position is I should be completely at a loss. I do not think the publicans of Ireland will be content to accept the position of the hon. and learned Gentleman on the subject, I think they would prefer to get the opinion of lawyers acquainted with Irish procedure and practice, and I can say with perfect candour if, when this Bill became law, I were called upon to advise is to the position of the licence holders in Ireland under this Sub-section, I should be completely at a loss what opinion to give. The monopoly value, the cardinal principle of this Section, has been already determined by this House to be a principle in determining the value of the Licence Duty in Ireland. Therefore, I respectfully suggest to the Government that they ought to consider between this and the Report stage whether they cannot by some convenient words make the provisions of this Clause applicable to cases in Ireland identical with the cases in England. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that his pleasantries will not at all relieve the minds of the publicans as to their position.
I desire to make one observation upon the reply, if I may dignify it by that description for want of a better one, of the Solicitor-General to the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. T. M. Healy). It is perfectly true this Clause does not apply to Ireland, but when the Solicitor-General says that he is prepared to give advice to the clients of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Campbell) in Ireland on the Irish aspects of the Finance Bill, while no one can dispute his ability to advise anyone as to the laws of England and Wales, I do not think it in the least likely that any very large number in Ireland would be willing to pay that remuneration which he would require. I do not think he would dispute that himself. The Solicitor-General made a further observation in reference to the hon. and learned Member for Louth. He said that the observations made by him had not been directed to this House, Out had been directed to the country in Ireland. The hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. T. M. Healy), in the hearing of the whole House, has for a past two or three days waged a fight on this Bill which I think all Members in this House have watched with very great admiration indeed. To say-that the hon. and learned Member was addressing his arguments to the country is the one lapse from good humour the Solicitor-General has made, and I can only say that it was an unnecessary and grotesque discourtesy.
When we are engaged in discussing a taxing Bill I think personalities and imputations might be omitted. I never take into account the jealousies of Welsh Members. I never consider whether or not the hon. and learned Gentleman ought to be Chancellor of the Exchequer. I rejoice in his good fortune, and am delighted at his success. I often assisted the hon. Gentleman when he was a humble Member below the Gangway, and now that he has achieved a great and eminent position I approach him in a proper spirit. I submit that he is giving English licence holders under particular conditions a concession which I claim for my countrymen under analogous conditions. I quite agree that the Government have so framed this Clause that it is difficult to move as regards Ireland an absolutely relevant Amendment. But does that prevent me from complaining that you have so drafted the Clause that you have entirely omitted from your account a country which you yourselves say is over-taxed? Within the last twelve months licence holders in Dublin have been compelled, in order to satisfy the licensing authority, to spend hundreds of pounds on premises for which they have already paid thousands of pounds. When a man has been compelled by a public authority to pay a certain sum of money, such as under the Act of 1904 an English publican has been compelled to pay, why does not the Government give the same redress in Ireland as in England? Is it any answer to say, "We do not know anything about your country; you are jealous of one another. You should not be here when the rest have run away." If an English question were raised the Solicitor-General would say, "We will take it into account on the Report stage." What licence has he for saying that Ireland is not relevant to this Clause, and that of it no notice shall be taken? I have brought forward a case well worthy of consideration. Let the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General for Ireland get up. This ought
to be their job. Let them argue with me any question either of law or of practice. Neither of them would dare to meet me with impertinence. I have moved this Amendment; I will renew it as a new clause or on the Report stage; and if the Solicitor-General thinks he gains any advantage by these replies at this hour of the morning, we shall submit to his observations in the best frame of 'mind we can. But we will take the means, as far as in us lies, of paying back the spirit in which the observations have been addressed to us.
The hon. and learned Gentleman, in the speech that he has just made, is very unjust indeed. He says that when I was a Member below the Gangway that he assisted me—
I did not use the word "assisted."
Yes you did. [Several HON. MEMBEBS: "Yes."]
If I did, I was wrong.
If the hon. and learned Member brings forward at the proper time and place an Amendment dealing with the state of affairs in Ireland, he will see no unreadiness or unwillingness on my part to deal with it.
Question put, "That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill."
The Committee divided: Ayes, 141; Noes, 57.
Committee report Progress; to sit again to-morrow (Thursday).
ADJOURNMENT—Resolved, That this House do now adjourn—[ Mr. Joseph Pease. ]
Adjourned accordingly at Eleven minutes before One o'clock.