asked the President of the Local Government Board whether his attention had been drawn to the petty sessional court proceedings against the Duke of Northumberland in respect of insanitary cottages situated at Walbottle; whether he has had under his notice the mortality rate among the mining inhabitants of these premises; whether he could give the House the relative death rate from tubercular diseases in the cottages referred to and that of the rest of Walbottle township, also the rate for the Newburn sanitary area, excluding Walbottle; whether any inquiry had been held respecting the sanitary condition of this locality during recent years by inspectors of the Local Government Board; or whether he contemplated ordering such investigation at an early date?

I have seen some newspaper reports of these proceedings, and have observed the statements in them as to the rate of mortality in the premises concerned. I am not in a position to give the particulars asked for; but I am in communication with the urban district council on the subject to which the question relates.

Will the right hon. Gentleman forward me a copy of the more complete answer when he obtains the information?

Yes.

moved, in Sub-section (1), after the word "Act" ["made under this part of this Act,"] to insert the words "after estimates have been submitted showing the detailed expenditure under the scheme or schemes which it is proposed to aid."

I beg to second the Amendment.

I think there is no difference between us in any quarter of the House on the question of the desirability of the House of Commons keeping its control over the finances of the country. What we really have to consider in connection with this matter is whether or not any of the real control of Parliament is lost in the proposals contained in this Bill, and whether, if the Amendment were accepted it would be possible for the Commissioners to carry on the business entrusted to them in a businesslike fashion. The amount is limited to £500,000, and this Parliament gives sanction to further public money being given. It is intended that the money should be expended in the various ways we discussed yesterday. It would be impossible for any business body of men who have to deal with this matter to come to the House of Commons with estimates for all the schemes before they are approved, and when they are recommended by the Commissioners. Some of them will be small, and some big. I do not know of any similar case where estimates are necessarily laid before Parliament before grants can be made. At present grants of public money can be made for various purposes. I reminded the House yesterday that under the Light Railways Act of 1896 grants can be made by the Treasury up to £250,000. Grants are made by the Board of Agriculture in regard to horse breeding. In no case is an estimate necessarily laid before Parliament beforehand under a scheme for the expenditure of money. The control of Parliament in this matter will be retained. First of all we have the Commissioners looking after the expenditure in connection with the schemes they recommend. They must take each scheme into consideration, and the expenditure must be sanctioned by the Treasury. There is no doubt that there will be a check upon the expenditure from the fact that the Treasury will be responsible for it, and that they will know anybody who desires to do so can raise a question upon it in the House of Commons. Further, the Commissioners will have to make their annual report to Parliament, and I have no doubt that there will be opportunity for discussion on the matters which are dealt with in the Report. I agree that that is discussion, so to speak, after the money has been spent, but I think that in schemes of this kind it is unavoidable. I think we must be satisfied with the check which Parliament will have ex post facto, and the sense of responsibility which will be felt at the Treasury, that in respect of anything they may do they will have to face discussion in Parliament.

The hon. and learned Gentleman has told us that he is not aware of any case where a similar demand has been made. I would remind him that no such Bill as this has ever before been submitted to the House of Commons. If I understood the hon. and learned Gentleman rightly, he is of opinion that it is contemplated by the Mover of the Amendment that estimates should be submitted to Parliament for each scheme before it is sanctioned. I do not understand that to be the proposal in the Amendment at all. There is nothing in the Amendment to warrant the idea that that is contemplated by the Mover of the Amendment.

The point of the Amendment, as I understand it, is that an estimate should be submitted to the Treasury. If it is submitted to the Treasury, it will be possible for any Member of this House to ask a question concerning it, and in that way the control of Parliament can be preserved. There is no suggestion as to submitting estimates to Parliament, and having a discussion on every scheme.

The hon. and learned Gentleman admits that all these matters ought to be conducted in a thoroughly businesslike fashion. Is it a businesslike fashion to sanction large advances of money for particular schemes without having before you any estimates whatever of the cost they are likely to involve? That is the position with which we are confronted. We on this side of the House are a minority at present, and we must dc our best to submit to this, whether right or wrong. The decision must rest with the Government and hon. Gentlemen opposite.

I beg to move to leave out paragraph (b). I can scarcely hope that the Government will consider this Amendment more favourably than they did the previous one, but as it refers to an important subject, I wish to make a protest against what is proposed. The House will remember that there are three sources from which these funds may be derived, namely, the Estimates, the Consolidated Fund, and any moneys which the Development Board may get in repayment of advances, interest on loans, and so forth. I propose to leave out the words: "The sums issued out of the Consolidated Fund under this Section." Those sums amount to £500,000 a year. The Solicitor-General, in opposing the previous Amendment, said that the Commissioners need not submit estimates of the cost because they would have to face Parliamentary criticism. I deny that in toto. The £500,000 a year which is to come out of the Consolidated Fund will be effectively withdrawn from the control of Parliament except by the cumbrous method of an Address to the Crown. Everybody is aware of the excellent reasons why certain official salaries are on the Consolidated Fund. The salary of Mr. Speaker is on the Consolidated Fund simply to prevent the risk of capricious criticism which may be incurred when voting salaries on the ordinary Civil Service Estimates. For the same reason the salaries of the Lord Chancellor and the judges are on the Consolidated Fund. Now the Government say that this sum guaranteed under this Bill for the next five years is to be met out of the Consolidated Fund. The salaries of the Commissioners, as far as I can read it, will come out of the Consolidated Fund. On the Grand Committee the Government refused to give any guarantee whatever that the salaries of the Commissioners should be put on the Civil Service Estimates. This is repugnant to all the pledges which we heard a few years ago about Parliamentary control. It is no good saying one can move an Address to the Throne. It is only on the gravest occasions that this House has sanctioned that procedure. When this Amendment was refused upstairs the only argument put forward by the Chancellor of the Exchequer was, "We are going to appoint Commissioners, and the whole prospect of the Bill depends on these Commissioners being first-class men." That is true enough, but they say, "We will never get a good class of men to become Commissioners under this Bill unless they know that they have got money behind them." I thought that was a most inconclusive argument. What have these people got behind them? Five hundred thousand a year for five years. If that is going to be a solace to prospective candidates for prospective Commissionerships they must be very easily pleased. That sum is a mere drop in the bucket. They have got to deal with afforestation, co-operation, agriculture, reclamation and draining of land, and estuaries have now come in; and they have also got to deal with the construction and improvement of harbours and canals and the development and improvement of fisheries. They have also to attend to "any other purpose calculated to promote the economic development of the United Kingdom." If Clause 1 of the Bill is to be carried out it will not carry them over a single month, and probably not over a single week, and the Government ought to give some considered reason why they are withdrawing the guaranteed sum which Parliament provides from the Civil Service Estimates and placing it on the Consolidated Fund. There is no good in saying that putting it on the Consolidated Fund gives a better guarantee for the future than if it were put on the Civil Service Estimates. If this is a bonâ fide Bill, and if the objects are good, and as such as the country desires, no more guarantee is required than the fact that the objects of the Bill are good and are being approved of by Parliament, and public opinion may reasonably assume that Parliament will give its sanction if the money is placed on the Civil Service Estimates, just as we vote £30,000,000 or £40,000,000 for our Army or our Navy and £20,000,000 a year for education. It has never been suggested that the guarantee of the Consolidated Fund is required. Public opinion ensures in a far greater sense than the Consolidated Fund that these sums will be annually provided. I move the omission of the Sub-section in order to protest against the salaries of the Commissioners, and possibly of the annual expenditure being withdrawn from the control of Parliament, and I hope that the Solicitor-General will give a reply more satisfactory than that which we received in Grand Committee.

In reply to the observations with which the Noble Lord prefaced his speech, I hope that it will not be understood that I have suggested that loans or grants should be substituted. I am not going back on that portion of the Amendment. With regard to the observations of the hon. Baronet, nobody has any reason to suppose that the Treasury would sanction the expenditure for carrying out a scheme of this kind without an estimate being before them. The Sub-section which the Noble Lord seeks to omit only provides for payment into the Development Fund of the sums issued out of the Consolidated Fund under this Section in Clause 2. Sub-section (1) states what the Development Fund is to consist of. It consists of three heads of income, so to speak. First of all such sums as shall from time to time be provided by Parliament; then this fixed sum of £2,500,000 spread over five years; and then any further sum or accretions of the same. Unless provided by Parliament, these roust come out of the Consolidated Fund. The reason is very simple. In starting a national work of this kind, and in starting it by means of this body of Commissioners who are now to be created, there ought to be some certainty, so that they may proceed with the work in a businesslike way, that they would have a certain sum of money at their disposal. It is for this class of work, small enough in all conscience—only £2,500,000 over five years. When you consider the expenditure of other countries on similar work, I think that for a rich country such as this is, and is likely to continue to be, the sum put down as a fixed sum, so that the Commissioners may have no doubt about it when they set to work, is very small; but it is a guarantee that for the work which they are called to perform under this Act, whether Parliament makes further grants or not, they will have this sum of money to begin with.

My point about Parliamentary criticism is not met. Will the Government give a guarantee that this half-million shall be impinged on to the extent of two or three thousand pounds a year and reduced by that sum—I do not say in the Bill—in order that the salaries of the Commissioners may be placed upon the Civil Service Estimates? That is the essence of Parliamentary control, and if that is refused Parliamentary control disappears.

That is a big question which might be raised upon the clauses which provide for the appointment of the Commissioners, and if the Noble Lord withdraws now I will, when we come to it, make the few observations which I should like to make on that.

I very much regret that the Government have not accepted my Noble Friend's Amendment in this respect. The Government talk about this being a guarantee that the Commissioners will have £500,000 a year for five years. Of course, it is not so. It will necessarily depend each year on the intentions of Parliament whether or not that £500,000 is to be provided. It is an attempt to forestal the decision of Parliament in future, and it seems to me to be undesirable. If Parliament next year does nothing then there is to be no discussion as to the general policy in connection with the Development Fund, or about its administration in the year preceding. It seems to me to be thoroughly unsound finance, like so much of the finance of the present Government. It does not seem to me that you gain anything by what you propose, and I do think that it is open to the grave criticism passed upon it by my Noble Friend. Though I personally should very much regret the detailed criticism of schemes put forward by the Commissioners, because I think that discussion in Parliament, so far from diminishing expenditure, would certainly increase it under present conditions; yet I do think that a general discussion of the policy pursued in development matters is essential. Personally I do not see the advantage of making the Commissioners report to Parliament unless there are some means of discussing their proceedings on the Estimates, or in some other way.

I must confess that I do not think the Solicitor-General's reason for removing this sum from the Estimates is altogether sound. There are grave reasons why this £500,000 should not be withdrawn from the control of Parliament, and I think that those reasons are admitted to be valid in all quarters of the House. The Commissioners to be appointed under this Bill will find them- selves face to face with enormous problems for the development of the country. They may have before them any number of schemes for the study and advance of agriculture, for the reclamation and drainage of land, and various other proposals which would really require millions of money if they are to be properly carried out. We are told that it will be some consolation to the Commissioners, and fortify them in the discharge of their duties when they find that, at any rate, Parliament has placed at their disposal the sum of £500,000 a year for the next five years, which will enable them to go forth cheerfully to deal with these problems; but I submit that to withdraw this sum from the Estimates and put it on the Consolidated Fund, thus depriving the House of Commons of the opportunity of criticism, is a departure from proper constitutional practice.

I think that the concession which the hon. and learned Gentleman foreshadows is not a good one at all. What will be the effect of my Noble Friend's Amendment? It would not stop the Commissioners getting the £500,000 at all; and it would enable the House of Commons when the Estimates for the year come before it, to discuss the policy which had been pursued in the year in which the money had been

moved, at the end of paragraph (b), to insert the words: "(2) No advance shall be made by the Treasury in any year for purposes relating exclusively to England, Scotland, or Ireland which will exceed in the case of England eighty per cent., in the case of Scotland eleven per cent., and in the case of Ireland nine per cent., of the total amount advanced during that year under this Part of this Act."

While not in any way complaining of the observations made by the right hon. Gentleman with reference to some difference of opinion as to the statement supposed to have been made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I hope he will not expect me to enter into that question now. He was perfectly right in bringing that controversy forward as an argument in support of his proposal that this money should be voted in certain fixed proportions to England, Scotland, and Ireland respectively. Wales, in these matters, has never had anything like an equivalent grant, for educational purposes or otherwise. I make that statement, however, not as Solicitor-General, but as Member for Mid-Glamorgan. There is a great difference between the money here concerned and money such as educational grants. In the latter case it is regular annual expenditure, and when you have regular annual expenditure it has been considered right by Parliament to allocate the money in certain fixed proportions, although there has always been a controversy as to whether those proportions were fair as between the three portions of the United Kingdom. Here there is a great difference in the kind of work for which the money is required. One year you may have considerable expenditure in England, and the next a large expenditure in Ireland, with possibly none in England at all. The same thing may happen in regard to Scotland. It is nothing like regular annual expenditure for a fixed purpose. The discretion of the Commissioners in this important work would unquestionably be largely hampered if Parliament said to them that before recommending any scheme they must consider whether or not the Treasury would be likely to say that the respective proportions would be not complied with. The Government think it better to allow the Commissioners full discretion. It is almost impossible to have fixed proportions when you are dealing with expenditure for schemes of the kind here contemplated. I have no doubt that, as has been said over and over again, pressure will be brought by those who are interested in expenditure in one particular district, and those interested in expenditure in another. I hope, however, that the Commissioners will not succumb to pressure of that kind, but will consider the general interests of the United Kingdom as a whole in recommending schemes. This question does not divide Members according to strict party lines at all. The same proposal was brought forward in Committee by the right hon. Gentleman when, out of 40 Members present, eight voted for the Amendment and 32 against. That shows an enormous preponderance of opinion in favour of the course adopted in the Bill so far as the Committee was concerned. Of the eight Members who voted for the Amendment, five were Conservatives and three Liberals, six were Englishmen, and two Scotsmen, whereas the 32 included a certain number of Conservatives and representatives of all four nationalities. I submit that in this matter the House ought to come to the same conclusion as the Committee, and leave the Commissioners unfettered discretion in the allocation of this expenditure as between the various parts of the United Kingdom.

While we are indebted to the Solicitor-General for the statement he has made, personally I am not impressed by, or much interested in, his account of the proceedings before the Committee. My views about sending Bills of this kind to a Standing Committee are well known, and need not be repeated. The mere fact that the eight Members in favour of the Amendment included six Englishmen and two Scotsmen, whereas the 32 against the Amendment included all the Irishmen present is in itself significant. The Solicitor-General has ignored the real facts of the case with regard to this allocation of money. I do not suppose that my right hon. Friend would wish to adhere rigidly to the proportions set out in his Amendment, but he has taken the proportions adopted in 1888 by the late Lord Goschen and adhered to ever since. If it can be shown that the relative proportions are not fair, the necessary alterations can be made. It is the principle to-which we attach importance. The Solicitor-General is entirely mistaken in saying that this system has been adopted only when dealing with money voted annually for certain specific purposes. I was a Member of the Government who adopted the system, and I have been a Member of successive Governments who have followed it. The origin of the system was a precisely similar proposal as regards a sum of money as that which we are now considering. The State decided that certain public money should be applied to purpose which had hitherto been provided for by local funds. In that particular instance the proposal affected Great Britain alone. It was naturally urged by the Irish Members that if we were going to give this money out of public revenue in aid of what would otherwise have been local expenditure, an equivalent grant ought to be made to Ireland. From that time onwards, whenever money has been voted out of Imperial revenue in aid of local expenditure, if it has not been found desirable to effect the same reform in all parts of the United Kingdom, equivalent grants have been made. What are you proposing to do under this Bill? I am not talking about the machinery or the method, to both of which I have a strong objection, but to the financial proposals. You are doing exactly what Parliament has done before in regard to the distribution of burdens. You are simply asking the State to pay money which otherwise, if the work were done, would have to be paid by the local rates.

The Solicitor-General says that this Amendment would curtail the powers of the Commissioners. That is one way of looking at it. On the other hand, I believe it would be an enormous advantage to the Commissioners. Nothing has been more remarkable in the legislation of the present Government than the way in which Parliament has been invited to avoid the settlement of difficult and complicated questions by passing them over to a body of Commissioners charged with extraordinary powers, to whom is left the solution of problems which the Government itself is not prepared to face. Now, I said yesterday, when the Solicitor-General altered one of the Sub-sections of Clause 1 from "canals" to "inland navigation"—which I think everybody who has taken the trouble to study this Bill must admit to be true—that it was making the thing a farce if you are going to charge the Commissioners with these powers and not to give them the money necessary. I repeat that if you adopt my right hon. Friend's Amendment that you will be aiding rather than impeding the work of the Commissioners. What would be the result? That at the beginning of each year the Commissioners would know that there would be a certain sum available for the three Kingdoms. Not only would the Commissioners know this, but the local authorities and Government Departments upon whose initiative these grants will have to be made, would know, and they would, to the best of their ability, shape their applications to the money available. The Commissioners would be able to take the applications from each country, and deal with them according to the money available for each country. They would therefore be much more able to make good use of their money. The right hon. Gentleman has referred to the speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Waterford (Mr. John Redmond). What did the hon. and learned Gentleman say? He said that this money would be available for the drainage of the Bann and the Barrow. Hon. Members below the Gangway know what the cost of dealing with these rivers in even an elementary way would mean. We are told that the Leader of the Irish Nationalist party is quite confident this money is to be available for these two purposes. We are told also that all the local work of England, Scotland, and Wales is to be provided for out of the same fund. The Solicitor-General says that this can be easily settled by the Commissioners, who on earth are these Commissioners going to be, and where are they going to get their powers to enable them to arrive at these remarkable decisions? You are going to put before them alternative proposals—one, say, for Ireland for drainage, and one, say, for Scotland for some technical education scheme, and one for England for the improvement of rural transport, of which we heard so much last night. Just look at the variety of these things! They involve a totally different kind of consideration. They will vary in the amount which each will cost. And it is because Parliament cannot see its way out of these difficulties itself that it is leaving them to be solved by the Commissioners. There is another aspect of the case, and a very important one, to which I would call the attention of the Solicitor-General. We have never yet succeeded during our discussions on this Bill in ascertaining from the Government what power Parliament will have to review the proceedings of these Commissioners, and the expenditure of this money. So far as I can tell, on careful examination of the Bill, the only possible power Parliament will retain over the expenditure of the money is by raising the question on the annual Vote of the Treasury. According to what the Government said, the Treasury has apparently complete control, and therefore it may be possible on this Vote, which covers a whole multitude of subjects, for it to come in. £500,000 is to be voted for this work, and it has been so carefully arranged that it will not otherwise come under the review of Parliament. Therefore you are going to leave it to the Commissioners to decide, not only between the comparative advantages and disadvantages of different kinds of local work, but between the claims of the three countries, and to leave them this immense work without Parliamentary reference or control! Recent events in this House lead me, and many others, to believe that the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Waterford knew very well what he was talking about when he said that this money would go to Ireland. What is the latest evidence we have on the subject? It is to be found in the Debates on the Finance Bill. I appeal to the House—not to one side alone—to whom have the most generous concessions been made? Has it not been to the Irish Members? So it will be with the Commissioners! There is no doubt that you get a greater unanimity of opinion about any given work in Ireland than you do from any part of England or Scotland. I am not very much impressed by the 32 to 8 votes argument. But I am surprised that Englishmen and Scotsmen should be willing to walk so contentedly into this difficulty! Because I am satisfied when you come to the distribution of this £500,000 between the different countries that Ireland will be absolutely certain by unanimity of opinion, by concerted action, and greater power of pressing their case, to get the larger amount. I think, speaking with no disrespect to the Solicitor-General, that it is a profound misfortune that we are debarred from the principle laid down by a great Chancellor of the Exchequer, and followed by every Chancellor of the Exchequer; that we are asked to depart from this, and adopt an entirely new system which has never been adopted before by Parliament in dealing with these grants. And we are doing it at the invitation of the Solicitor-General alone, and not by either the Chancellor of the Exchequer or by a representative of the great Treasury Department which is specially concerned in this particular work. I believe that those who sit on this side of the House will feel that it is neither right nor proper that we should be asked to depart from this system laid down years ago, and followed since, and without, so far as I know, any reasonable complaint on the part of anybody.

Perhaps I may be allowed a word of reply. The right hon. Gentleman, of course, has had much greater experience than I have had in the application of moneys according to the equivalent grant system. But I remember the origin of it very well; I was a colleague of the right hon. Gentleman in the House. It is perfectly true that in making grants to relieve local taxation that the equivalent grant system has been adopted. But this is not that case at all. The most analogous to this are the cases where grants are made either by the Board of Agriculture or the Board of Trade for fisheries or for harbours; and these grants, so far as I am aware, have never—the right hon. Gentleman never said they were—been allocated according to this equivalent grant principle. The Government have said again and again that these grants were not a contribution to the local rates at all. We avoid, so far as we can, any relief to the local rates by any of these grants which we shall make under the provisions of this Bill.

That is not the point I raised. I was dealing with a totally different question. In moneys allocated in regard to any public expenditure in Great Britain and Ireland the money is given to the Department concerned and by them distributed. It is not given to a central body to distribute, as they think well, between the three countries. Money hitherto given to the Irish Government has been spent at the desire of the Irish Government, and could not be spent outside, and in the same way money distributed by the Board of Agriculture or the Board of Trade is money given to them for the purpose of distribution within Great Britain or Ireland. In each case the Central Department has control of the money which Parliament has said is available. In this particular case you are going to distribute the money without any guidance from Parliament.

Sums of money allocated for similar purposes have never, so far as I am aware, been allocated upon the equivalent grant principles. The right hon. Gentleman said that the Irish Members, by reason of their pertinacity and their persuasiveness, will obtain more than their full share of these grants. He was speaking as a right hon. Gentleman who has held office, and will again, I have no doubt, rather than as an Irish Member. I understand that he will be transplanted to more congenial soil before, to the loss of Ireland and to the gain of the other constituency, but I might point out to him the powers of the Irish Members cannot be exercised upon the Commissioners, however they may press their views upon the Government. These Commissioners will be perfectly independent in every possible way. The Treasury, no doubt, make the grants, and they cannot refuse what the Commissioners recommend, but the Treasury cannot make any grant where the Commissioners do not so recommend, so that, really, full control is vested in the Commissioners. The right hon. Gentleman was, in truth and in fact, thinking of the pressure that might be brought to bear in this House, and I daresay also the pressure of votes. As regards the concessions on the Finance Bill, they were made, not because of any pressure in this House, but because of the justice of the case.

On entering the House just now I found a leading Irish Member—in fact the Leader of an Irish party, who sits for an Irish constituency, and who obtained hospitality in Ireland at a very critical stage of his career—engaged in a furious tirade against the possibility of Ireland getting more than her fair share. That is a new doctrine in this House, and I do not think it will be very popular in South Dublin. Fortunately for himself, the right hon. Gentleman is going to take his departure, and that constituency will know him no more. The right hon. Gentleman's zeal to prevent Ireland getting more than her fair share under this new system appears to have outrun his discretion and his memory. He is entirely mistaken in his view that these proposals of the Government are against all precedent and against all well-established practice. That is absolutely untrue. This system of the proportionate grant is a very modern invention; it never was heard of until quite recently. I remember very well when the idea was first introduced by Lord Goschen. Up to that date no such thing was ever heard of in the finances of this House. What was the other branch of the right hon. Gentleman's argument? That it has been the unbroken practice ever since it was introduced by Lord Goschen—

No; I did not say that.

If that was not the argument of the right hon. Gentleman that that has been the practice ever since, what was the point of his argument? By far the strongest case in connection with local grants took place under the Agricultural Bating Act passed by the Tory Government. Was it on a proportion such as the right hon. Gentleman proposes in this case that that money was apportioned? Nothing of the sort. In regard to Ireland the principle was applied that each country should take according to its needs, with the result that Ireland, being an agricultural country, got a very large portion of it. That was the practice of the right hon. Gentleman's own Government long after Lord Goschen introduced the equivalent grant system. Under the Agricultural Bating Act and the principle of distribution adopted, the Irish landlords got about three times as much as they would have got under the equivalent grant system. I opposed that with all my might, but the principle was put in force and the Irish landlords got the benefit of it. Take another case. Attempts were made to apply the principle of the equivalent grants to the education grants made to Ireland, so that whenever a fresh grant was made to England Ireland was to get her equivalent on the very principle set forth in this Amendment. What was the result? The result was that Ireland was most disgracefully treated. We get the equivalent grant for one year, and then when the Estimates for English education went up by millions the Government forgot to increase our equivalent grant. We have again and again brought forward this grievance from which we have been suffering. This artificial system was put forward for one year, then it was dropped, and although the amounts voted for education rose in England increased enormously we got nothing whatever. It was a bad system and an unfair system, and was very seldom put in force. With regard to the fear entertained by the right hon. Gentleman that we shall get more than our share, I might point out that the Commissioners about to be appointed will most likely be all Englishmen, and that probably not more than one member of it will be an Irishman. So far from getting more than our fair share, our experience has always been, except in the case of old age pensions, that we always get less than our share. It sometimes suits Members of the Opposition to describe Irish Members with contempt and at other times to describe them as more than a match for the other 600 English and Scotch Members in the House. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Trinity College (Mr. J. H. Campbell) takes that view. So that if that is true no country was ever better served than Ireland is by her Nationalist party, since its 80 Members are more than a match for the rest of the House of Commons. If there is a word of truth in that—and of course there is not—the moral to be drawn from it is that the Nationalist party are the most powerful party that ever sat in any Parliament, and ought to obtain the support not only of their friends but also the support of the Member for Trinity College (Mr. J. H. Campbell). The only case recently in which Ireland has got more than her share is under the old age pensions scheme. I want to call attention to this subject because it has been continually thrown in our face. May I point out that no Irishman ever asked for old age pensions. The system was introduced by Englishmen on the demand of the Radicals and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham to suit the needs of this country. We did not clamour for old age pensions, therefore, it is not fair to throw it in our face that we are getting more than our share. It frequently happens that your system of taxation crushes the Irish people, although it looks fair, and now when you have given old age pensions in utter ignorance of the condition of our country you suddenly discover that unwittingly you have given us much more than you originally intended. That is the history of the old age pension system, and whilst we recognise that it is a great benefit, I am bound to say that if you had had the common-sense to offer us the money we could have made ten times better use of it, and we should have done ten times more good for Ireland. That is a fair example of the way this House, with the best intentions, through looking to what suits this country best very frequently wastes money. I rejoice that the Government have had sufficient sense not to listen to this Amendment for one moment, because it would be most unfair. You are going to trust this matter to thoroughly competent hands, and to an independent board, and surely they ought to be entrusted with full discretion to spend the money to the best advantage.

There seems to be, in this matter, a joint conspiracy on the Front Opposition Bench to leave Wales out. On the Committee upstairs we resisted this Amendment, because we thought it would be better to let the Commissioners frame their own schemes, and that all the money should be "pooled." As far as Wales is concerned, wherever we had an equivalent grant under the Goschen scheme we always used it fairly and squarely for legitimate development. Wales is the only part of the United Kingdom that used all the "whisky money" for education. There is not a single county in the whole of Wales that used the Goschen money to relieve local burdens, or for selfish interests, for they spent every penny of it on higher education and secondary schools, and if under this Bill we had a scheme from Wales I should be opposed to any political pressure being exercised upon the Commissioners. I rather fancy that the pressure will be brought by the joint action of county councils which are composed of both Liberals and Conservatives and Churchmen and Nonconformists. The county councils will say, "Here is a scheme for the development of the agricultural interests of Wales," and they would press it forward on that account. You could not do that under this Amendment, because Wales would be completely shut out, and Wales as a national entity would not be mentioned at all. An overwhelming majority on the Committee resolved that the whole of this money should be "pooled," and that the claims should come from England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales, and it was resolved that the Commissioners should act according to the merits of the respective schemes placed before them. That was the view of some hon. Gentlemen opposite—in fact, the Government made a concession to the Noble Lord opposite by appointing a Royal Commission instead of an Advisory Committee. In Wales we are quite satisfied to put our schemes before this independent body, believing that they will deal justly and fairly with the various needs of the Principality.

The speech which has just been made by the hon. Member for East Mayo has convinced me that the Amendment we are discussing is a necessary one. It is clear that if my right hon. Friend again seeks the suffrages of South Dublin his action to-day will be brought up against him. What better illustration could we have that pressure is going to be put; not upon the Commissioners, but upon the Government? The Solicitor-General said he had no doubt pressure would be brought upon the Commissioners by those who were interested in obtaining grants, and he said he hoped the Commissioners would resist any such pressure. The hon. Member for East Mayo said the Nationalist party were very powerful—

I did not say that. What I said was that from what had been said on this point the Opposition seemed to think ours was the most powerful party that ever existed in this House.

In this Parliament that is so, but I hope it will not be so in the next.

It will foe much more powerful in the next Parliament.

I am aware that hon. Members below the Gangway are thorough Parliamentarians. I believe that pressure will be put upon the Treasury not to sanction the schemes of the Commissioners. The Commissioners may say, "Very well; we think a certain amount of money should be given to England and Wales," and the Irish party will say, "Oh, if that is done there will be no money left for us." They will then go to the Treasury and say, "Do not you sanction this scheme." The result will be that the Treasury will not sanction the scheme, because they know what will happen if they do. The Commissioners may put forward a scheme for Scotland, and the same thing will happen. In process of time a scheme will go up for Ireland necessitating a large grant of money, and hon. Members below the Gangway will go to the Treasury and say, "This scheme is all right; you can sanction this," and the Treasury will sanction it. By that means hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway will have more than their share of the grant. It is because I do not want them to have that, and because I do not want pressure to be put upon the Government, that, if my right hon. Friend goes to a Division, I shall have the greatest pleasure in voting with him. There was in Committee a general consensus of opinion that the first thing to do was to establish, free from any pressure, or advance any particular interest, and it was for that reason that the Commission was set up. I am very much afraid the acceptance of his Amendment has rather dulled the antagonism of the Noble Lord the Member for Marylebone; but I cannot help feeling that the Commissioners are only human, and that the final power rests with the Treasury, and that the course I have outlined is as certain to be carried out as the fact that I am here addressing the House. I warn my Noble Lord that his Amendment is not far-reaching enough to outwit the astuteness of the Irish party. I therefore sincerely trust we shall show our desire to avoid any possibility of pressure being put upon a Government Department by adopting this Amendment. The hon. Member below the Gangway (Mr. Dillon) brought forward instances which he said showed it would be a mistake to maintain relative proportions throughout the Kingdom, and one of his instances was the Agricultural Rates Act. Ireland only received her proper proportion, but it happens that a larger proportion of Ireland is agricultural than England.

My point was that her proportion was not calculated on the figures of this Amendment.

Quite so, nor ought it to have been. That was a special grant for a special object, divided according to the proportion of agricultural land. Ireland happened to have a larger population, and she therefore got a larger share. That was a perfectly proper manner of proceeding, and has nothing whatever to do with the manner of proceeding in the present case. Any number of schemes—God knows how many—will be brought before the Commissioners, quite without regard to the question whether they benefit any other part of the United Kingdom. I hope we shall show, at any rate on this side of the House, that we are anxious there should be no pressure or any corrupt methods brought to bear upon the Treasury. I shall therefore, if my right hon. Friend divides, vote for the Amendment.

I am glad the hon. and learned Member has resisted the Amendment. I have risen merely to express my astonishment at the arguments which have been brought forward by the Unionist party, who want to draw this distinction between Ireland, Scotland, and England, and to separate the United Kingdom into three parts. If these arguments had been addressed to the House from these benches we should unquestionably have had the old nickname applied to us, and have been reminded that we were Separatists; but, coming from the Unionist party, it looks as if the old traditions of Unionism have been quite forgotten. Was not Ireland to be treated as a county? Nobody thinks Yorkshire or Lancashire is going to get too much. It is admitted that, if a larger need arises in Yorkshire or Lancashire, it should have the application of a suitable amount from this fund; but, if Ireland should happen to want rather more than some other part of the United Kingdom, then careful restrictions are to be imposed that equivalent money should be spent in other parts of the United Kingdom. Until you give Ireland leave to raise her own taxes and spend her own taxes upon her own people and needs, these difficulties will continually arise. Once let Ireland tax herself and spend the money upon her own needs and these difficulties will be solved; but so long as Ireland is part of the United Kingdom, it should be treated as part of the United Kingdom, and should have as strong a claim upon any fund of this nature as any other part of the United Kingdom.

Perhaps the House will permit me to say a few words in reply to the various observations made in the course of this Debate. The Solicitor-General, to my surprise, rather advocated opposition to my Amendment on this ground: Very little may be wanted in one year in one country, and nothing at all might be wanted for England during a single year. That was rather a curious argument to come from the Treasury Bench after all the speeches of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and his enthusiastic determination to provide funds year after year for English agriculture, and it gives rise to some very curious reflections. The Solicitor-General was also opposed to any restrictions on the powers of the Commissioners, but it is for the Government to determine matters of high policy, and to insert them in their own Bill, and what I call high policy is the policy which has now been adopted for a certain number of years in nearly all cases of this kind. One or two instances were cited to show the precedents I have quoted—break-downs altogether. The hon. Member for Mayo quoted the case of the Agricultural Rates Act, but my hon. Friend the Member for the City of London (Sir E. Banbury) answered that point, and I think I am right in saying that the money in that case—so far as Ireland is concerned—was distributed as nearly as possible in the proportion which I am advocating. Indeed, I believe Ireland got a little the best of it, as she generally does. Again, the hon. Member for East Mayo referred to the case of the old age pensions. I say that that has no analogy to the Amendment I am now moving, or to the circumstances which we are discussing. This Bill deals with a limited sum, but there was no limited sum in the case of the old age pensions, except that which was sufficient to fulfil the requirements of the Act. It is said that Ireland has got a great deal more than her share of those pensions. I know nothing about that. All I know is that in the case of Ireland old age pensions were required for a certain number of people who complied with certain conditions as to age and other matters, but that has nothing whatever to do with the Amendment I am now asking the House to ac- cept. One of the reasons which has been urged in support of this proposal is that there is reserved to Parliament no power whatever of discussing the question of how the money is distributed. No answer has been given to that by the Treasury Bench. It is of no use to tell us it can be discussed on the Treasury Vote. That opportunity would be quite inadequate for a question of this kind. Another objection urged is that it will lead to scrambles for the division of the spoil. This Amendment-would at least remove that objection. There would be no possibility of a scramble between the three countries each for their own share, for the distribution would be prescribed according to precedents which have constantly been adopted in past years. Then the hon. Member for East Mayo talked of the attitude adopted by my right hon. Friend the Member for South Dublin (Mr. Walter Long); he described it as extraordinary. I think the attitude of the hon. Member himself in one respect in this Debate is still more extraordinary, because one of the grounds on which he opposed my claims to support for this Amendment was based on the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Waterford (Mr. John Redmond)—the Leader of his own party. What did that hon. and learned Member say?

I did not hear it.

Then I will refresh the memory of the hon. Member and read it.

I do not think it would be regular to read that speech now.

But the hon. Member said he did not hear it.

It can hardly be necessary to repeat the speeches of all Members for the benefit of those who do not happen to hear them.

The hon. and learned Member for Waterford made a very important speech bearing on this question, which I wished to recall to the attention of the hon. Member for East Mayo. But in view of your ruling I will content myself by simply reminding him that it embodied one of the chief justifications I put forward in support of this Bill. I think it was very unfortunate the hon. Member for East Mayo did not hear it. It was desirable the House should be afforded some information as to the observations of the hon. and learned Member to the effect that he had positive assur- ances that enormous sums would be given out of the Development Fund under this Bill for Irish purposes during the present year. I may observe that the hon. Member for East Mayo, who was in the House when my right hon. Friend the Member for South Dublin commented on the great concessions to Ireland, had no reply to make. The hon. Member for the City of London (Sir F. Banbury) has conclusively shown how pressure may be brought to bear in

moved, in Sub-section (2), to leave out the word "five" ["the sum of five hundred thousand pounds"], and to insert instead thereof the word "one."

moved, at the end of Sub-section (2), to insert the words: "The Treasury may accept any gifts made to them for all or any of the purposes for which advances may be made under this Part of this Act and, subject to the terms of gift, apply them for the purposes of this Part of this Act in accordance with regulations made by the Treasury."

seconded the Amendment.

I accepted the substance of the Amendment in Committee, and now that it has been put in legal form I am pleased that an opportunity is given to people to direct their benevolence into this channel.

moved, in Subsection (4), after the word "may" ["as the Treasury may direct"], to insert the words "by Minute to be laid before Parliament."

moved, at the end of the Clause, to add: "(6) No advance shall be made to a public authority (other than a Government Department), university, college, institution, or association of persons, or company, unless such public authority, university, college, or association of persons, or company, is prepared to devote to the purpose for which the advance is made a sum of money out of its own funds equivalent to the advance."

I beg to second the Amendment. The Solicitor-General was not able to assent to our proposal that the advances under the Bill should be made by way of loan, and it would remove a great many of our difficulties if he would accept this Amendment. It needs very little argument to prove that it is sound on financial grounds, but I am certain it will prove in the future, as it has proved in the past, of very great assistance to local promoters of any proposed scheme that the grant should have this condition attached to it. By this means they would be able to induce that local help which is an essential condition of real success in such a scheme. If the Solicitor-General were able in any way to meet this he would do only what in practice will be found almost essential, and what it will be expedient to lay down as a general rule in an Act of Parliament applying to all cases.

I think the principle which has been enunciated by my hon. Friend (Mr. Cecil Harmsworth) in regard to local authorities is a perfectly sound one, speaking generally—that is to say, that there ought to be an effort made locally by the community itself in addition to the effort made by the State in regard to educational work. My hon. Friend is perfectly right in saying that there is no provision in this Bill expressly saying that a definite and specific sum should be contributed by a local authority, or by any of the institutions which are mentioned in the Bill and the Amendment. The Amendment is, as I think the hon. Member himself will admit, quite inapplicable to universities, and so forth. If they have no moneys already, how are you to expect them when making application for a grant to provide an equivalent sum? They cannot do that out of funds which they have not got. It would make an application nugatory if we were to say, when they came to us for assistance, "You cannot get this from the State unless you contribute some part of the money required." Nor do I think it would be right in every case to say that a public authority should contribute a half. The Commissioners may take the matter into consideration and apply the principle which my hon. Friend seeks to apply by the Amendment. Subsection (1) of Clause 1 says: "The Treasury may, upon the recommendation of the Development Commissioners appointed under this Act, make advances to a Government Department, or through a Government Department to a public authority, university, college, institution, or association of persons or company (not trading for profit), either by way of free grant or by way of loan, or partly in one way and partly in the other, and upon such terms and subject to such conditions as they may think fit," for certain specified purposes. The Commissioners, therefore, will have it fully in their power when recommending a scheme to recommend whether it should be carried out by money wholly granted by the Treasury or on condition that part of the expenditure should be contributed by the local authority. Even if they did not do that the Treasury themselves might say, "We will contribute so much, but we think that the local authority ought to come to the assistance of the State and make their fair contribution towards the necessary expenditure." I hope my hon. Friend will not press the Amendment.

In reply to the hon. and learned Gentleman, I would point out that Sub-section (1) of Clause 1 is no direction to the Commissioners in the way suggested by the hon. Member who moved the Amendment. I gathered that the hon. Member wished there had been some indication given to the Commissioners that in making a grant they should keep in view whether the body making the application is prepared to contribute a sum equivalent to the grant. I understood the hon. and learned Gentleman to say that it is not the intention of the Government that the Commissioners should make advances without considering this principle. But the intention of the Government goes for nothing unless it is put in the Bill. What we want is to have the intention of the Government expressed in the Bill. There is no reason why the direction should be made mandatory so long as there is something in the Bill to show that these facts are to be kept before the Commissioners. How are the Commissioners to know what the desire of Parliament is unless it is in the Bill? They will say, "We can only interpret the desire of the Parliament by what is in the Bill. There is nothing in the Bill as to the necessity of our asking these institutions or local authorities to provide part of the money." The hon. and learned Gentleman made what seemed to me a startling assumption. Does he really mean to say that universities and colleges have no funds?

No surplus funds to provide for the particular purposes for which they require aid.

I very much doubt that. There are, I believe, many colleges and educational institutions which have funds. I do not see where the word "surplus" comes in. If these institutions choose to extend the scope of their work they can use their own money, supplemented by the money of the State. I think the Amendment is a sound one.

I am sure the Solicitor-General feels that the principle of the Amendment is sound; but, having regard to the limited amount of time available for the business to be done, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

I beg to move to leave out, in Sub-section (1), the words "there shall be established a Commission consisting of," and to insert instead thereof the words "it shall be lawful for His Majesty and his successors, by warrant under the Sign Manual, to appoint."

I have put down this Amendment really with the intention of ascertaining what are the intentions of the Government as to the relationship of the Commissioners to the Treasury and to this House. What I want to know is whether this is merely an Advisory Committee to help the Treasury in the distribution of a large sum of public money. Is the business of this Committee to discharge the ungrateful task of refusing applications for grants while it cannot make a grant except with the concurrence of the Treasury? Is it to be a body which may say "No" but cannot say "Yes"? On the other hand, is it to be a body with the very great and serious responsibility of handling large sums of money for carrying out the purposes of the Bill? If it is to be in that position, there will be required men of ability and technical knowledge, men who are hard working and with complete devotion to the objects of the Commission, and not merely that, but they must be men free from political bias and above the mere suggestion of political bias. If it is only to be an Advisory Committee, I say that the whole construction of the Commission is wrong. You can get at all the objects you wish to get at with easier and more satisfactory working through the various Departments con- cerned, if you were to construct an inter-Departmental Committee on which the Board of Agriculture, the Board of Trade, the Board of Education, the Local Government Board, and the Treasury should be represented. In that Committee every Department could be heard, and they would be able to combine their resources of information, and finally advise the Treasury whether or not grants should be made. If it is to be really the great and important body which some of the operations indicated in the Bill suggest, then I think we must take measures to ensure its independence and its importance in the public esteem, and to make it what the public would expect from a body which has to spend money and fulfil the duties which are placed upon it by the Bill. I confess I cannot understand why the business of the road communications of the country should be separated from the other branches of economic development sketched out in the Bill, unless it is that this Government have a passion for creating new offices and new officials and for that purpose are making two bites of this gigantic cherry, and are creating one body for the communications in the country by means of roads and another body for all these purposes which are summed up in the Bill.

Under the Bill the Commissioners are appointed by Treasury minute. I do not in any way slight that method of appointment. Very important and distinguished personages, the Patronage Secretary and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury, are appointed in that way. But it makes them servants of the Treasury and capable of sitting in Parliament. It has been the practice with that great body whose functions are either judicial or administrative with a judicial character to appoint them during good behaviour, subject to the right of the Crown to remove them on an Address of the two Houses of Parliament. That is the case with all the judges and the recorders. It is the case with the paid members of the Charity Commission. It was the case with all the members of the Indian Council—I forget whether it is still the case with some members of that Council—and it is the position occupied by the Controller and Auditor-General and the Deputy Controller and Auditor-General. The status of the Commissioners is such that they may sit in the House of Commons; and, lastly, their numbers are capable of increasing in number on their own recommendation at the pleasure of the Treasury. I put it to the Government: If the functions of the Commission are what the Bill describes, if they are to dispose not merely of this half-million which is to be provided for the next five years, but of the millions which Parliament will have to find if the purposes of the Bill are to be carried out in anything like a comprehensive manner, and if it would probably be a good thing to be able to make orders for the compulsory acquisition of land, as they can do under the Bill, then they must be put in a position not merely of dignity, not merely of comparative independence of the Treasury, so that they cannot be moved in and out of office at the mere personal wish of the Commons and the Treasury for the time being, but they must be put in a position of complete independence of all suggestions of political influence. They must hold their office during good behaviour; they must be incapable of sitting in this House of Parliament, at any rate, and their number must be limited by the terms of the Act. My Amendment seeks to secure these things. The position of the Commissioners as appointed by the Minister is a much more dignified and important thing than if they were appointed by Treasury minute, and it would make them permanent. A man who has devoted ten years of his life to this business surely is capable, and would be prepared to go on.

Then, if you make them independent, you would exclude the paid Members certainly from sitting in the House. If the Government thought it desirable that they should be represented on this council it would be quite easy to make that consistent with my Amendment by providing one additional member appointed by the Treasury, who should hold office during pleasure, and that this one member, like the unpaid Charity Commissioner, might sit in this House. But, as a fact, this body of Commissioners will be so intimately connected with the Treasury that they might as well be, and would be, better represented by the Treasury in this House than the Board of Agriculture is by the hon. Member (Sir Edward Strachey), who represents it so admirably at the present time. I would urge the Government to make this body as independent of political influence as they can be. I would urge them to alter the character of the appointment, the tenure of the officers and their status, so as to exclude paid members, at any rate, from sitting in the House, because, whatever may be the intentions of the Government as to the character of the Commission, I think it will be impossible, as the Commission is now constituted, to prevent any member of the public from regarding it with suspicion. They cannot fail to surmise that influences are brought to bear upon the Treasury which may be reflected on the Commission which, as the Bill stands, are the mere creatures of the Treasury, and if that is so, and if influences can be brought to bear on the action of the Commission, I do not wish to forecast conclusions which would appear to be exaggerated, or which would shock my hearers, but there is no doubt that, with the money placed at the disposal of this Commission and the work which they have to do, and, it should be recollected, with the work which they are bound to undertake in localities having regard to the amount of the employment that is going on in the locality, it would be very difficult to keep them clear of the suspicion of influences; and it might happen that there would be an amount of political corruption on a scale which we have hardly realised since the days of the Government of Lord North. I regret I have not made provision in my Amendment for the purpose of having one Commissioner sitting in the House, but that, I think, could be done if the Government were prepared to look favourably on all, or even on half of the suggestions which I have made. I assure the Solicitor-General I am not speaking in any spirit of hostility, but with the serious desire that this great and important body should occupy the position in the public mind which, I believe, the Government would desire that it should.

The right hon. Baronet has introduced very serious words in his Amendment dealing with a very important matter in this Bill. Indeed it goes right down to the root of the usefulness of the measure. In a very lucid speech, such as we have every right to expect from one of his great authority on constitutional law and matters of the kind, he has gone not only into the first Amendment, but into the other Amendments quite properly in order to explain the whole of his scheme. I may be allowed to follow him in respect of dealing with the whole matter on these Amendments. In the first place a short history should be given of the alterations made in the Bill during its progress through Committee.

As we introduced our Bill the Treasury were permitted to deal with these matters upon the recommendation of an Advisory Committee, to be appointed by them, and the right hon. Baronet asked whether or not the body of Commissioners were to be like the Advisory Committee. It is not to be like the Advisory Committee. A change was made from the Advisory Committee to this body of Development Commissioners on the suggestion of the Noble Lord the Member for Marylebone (Lord R. Cecil). He and his very able colleagues on that Committee put forward their scheme on the very grounds which the right hon. Baronet says he has in view—in the first place, to give greater dignity, a better position, and more complete freedom from any pressure or any political influence than would have been secured by the appointment of an Advisory Committee. The considerations which were placed before the Government upstairs brought the Government to the conclusion that it would be better to alter the status of the body which was to advise the Treasury in making advances for these public purposes from that of an Advisory Committee to that of a body of Commissioners. Having said that much with regard to the history of the matter, I will deal with the questions put by the hon. Baronet in their order. I do not think his suggestion of a Departmental Committee would have done at all. Departmental Committees are only appointed ad hoc, and I do not think the right hon. Baronet would like to hand the powers conferred on the Commissioners to such a body. Several times in the course of his speech he spoke of the Commissioners as people who would have the spending of a great deal of money, the performance of very important duties, and who would have the disposal of many millions. They will not have the spending of any money at all. They only recommend a scheme for adoption by the Treasury. Their position is an administrative one, and it is not a judicial one in the sense in which that word is usually understood. They are to consider the matter coming before them as administrators, although they cannot spend the money, or, indeed, compel anybody else to spend the money granted for the purpose of carrying out the schemes they recommend. They are not judicial in the sense in which we apply that term to judges, or even to the Railway and Canal Commissioners. They are only quasi-judicial in this sense, that they must bring their judgment to bear fairly on all schemes which will come before them, and report upon them. Their position, therefore, is one of complete independence. The right hon. Baronet said they will be creatures of the Treasury, but they will in no sense be the creatures of that Department, except that their appointment rests with it. In no other sense can they be called the creatures of the Treasury, and the Treasury will have no control whatsoever over the Commissioners. The Treasury cannot take away from the Commissioners any application or scheme which any authority or responsible body may send to the Treasury. All schemes which may be sent in to the Department must go forth to the Commissioners. The Treasury cannot in the first instance prevent any scheme from going before this body of Commissioners for their independent consideration, and for their impartial recommendation. While they are recommending they will have nothing whatsoever to do with the Treasury.

The Treasury must send applications forward to the Government Departments which are concerned with the particular matters comprised in those applications, and the Government Departments have to report to the Commissioners what they think of the schemes. The Commissioners are as independent of the Government Departments, the Local Government Board, the Board of Trade, or other Department, as they will be of the Treasury. And they will be entirely independent of Parliament also. I concur with the right hon. Baronet that it would not be advisable that they should have anybody representing those Commissioners in Parliament. I agree with him that responsibility for the schemes to Parliament had better be the responsibility of the Treasury.

They can be Members of Parliament.

I am not at present dealing with that question. I was dealing with the point whether the Commissioners should be represented by someone in Parliament. I agree with the right hon. Baronet that the discussion of these schemes had better be on the Vote for the Salaries of the Treasury. The right hon. Gentleman objects to our proposal on three grounds. First of all, he objects to the tenure of the Commissioners, which is what is described as tenure at pleasure, and not tenure during good behaviour. The right hon. Gentleman gave some instances of the last kind of tenure. The tenure we propose is one by which they can continue in their office for ten years. It was thought better not to give them a tenure for life, or for any longer term than ten years. We have provided, in the event of certain contingencies, for retirement by rotation of one of the five Commissioners every two years, so that there will be reappointment or replacement of one of the Commissioners in that period for good and sufficient reason. I submit to the House of Commons that this is a proper tenure for people who have to do this class of work. They are in no sense in the position of judges. They are much more analogous to the body of Commissioners who are acting, under the Light Railways Act of 1896. That is an exact precedent. The Light Railway Commissioners cannot spend money; they can only recommend. "Recommend" is not quite an accurate term. They hold a public inquiry and give their certificate to the Board of Trade, and that Department may act on their own responsibility, and do act on their own responsibility, in adopting or refusing any schemes which may have been approved by the Light Railway Commissioners.

What is the tenure of the Light Railway Commissioners?

The tenure of the Light Railway Commissioners is precisely the tenure of the Commissioners under this Bill, with this exception, that the appointment is made by the Board of Trade and not by the Treasury.

For ten years?

No, not for ten years, but it is at pleasure, and their tenure is sure. There is another body of Commissioners under the London Government Act in the same position. On the other hand, the Railway and Canal Commissioners have a more stable tenure. They are appointed, I think, during good behaviour under the Sign Manual of the Crown. They, again, are much more nearly analogous to the judges than the Commissioners under this Bill; in fact, one of the members of the Railway and Canal Commission must be a judge of the High Court, and presides always at the meeting. There are two other Commissioners, of course, and their functions are very nearly purely judicial functions They have to decide matters under special Acts of Parliament. Under those circumstances, I think I have shown to the House that we have precedents favourable in this matter. Indeed, suppose we had no precedent, it is better to appoint these administrators in this way than it would be to place them in a position like that of the judges. I entirely agree with the right hon. Baronet it is a position of dignity, and that it ought to be absolutely independent of political influence. I say quite so, and I should think any one of those Commissioners would say to any Member of this House, or to anybody, "We have nothing to do with the question of politics here at all. If your county council would like to say that this scheme should be considered by us, we will consider it; but pressure from you we will not accept, and you have no right to subject us to that pressure." Fortunately we have in this country a very large number of persons of position and experience who are willing to serve the State in these non-political matters and willing to serve, as we very well know, without any payment at all merely for the honour and dignity of acting as great citizens of a great country. Our local government in this country is pure and free from political corruption. The right hon. Gentleman, in his illustrations, mentioned the time of Lord North, but we have advanced a great deal in these matters from those times, and there is no feeling of corruption abroad now as there was, unfortunately, in those days. In our administration of local government this country is freer from anything like political corruption, or any corruption, than almost any country in the world. The very object, I think, of adopting the proposals of the Noble Lord the Member for Marylebone (Lord R. Cecil) and his Friends by making this a body of Commissioners instead of a mere advisory committee under the Treasury, was to secure still further their absolute independence from any such influences as those which have been described.

In regard to their status, the right hon. Baronet said any of them might sit in the House of Commons. I am quite willing, if he will tell me it is necessary, to adopt one of the Amendments which provides that a member of these Commissioners may not sit. I should have thought myself it was not necessary. I have not looked into it particularly, but I thought it was an office of profit under the Crown. If the right hon. Gentleman thinks it is necessary, I am quite willing to accept his Amendment to provide, that no paid member of this Commission shall be a Member of the House of Commons at all. The only other matter dealt with by the right hon. Gentleman was the increase in the number. He objects to the increase upon the mere recommendation of the body themselves. This is a matter which requires to be explained a little. The Amendment which was moved to that effect was an Amendment by the Noble Lord the Member for Chorley (Lord Balcarres). It was not debated at any great length. I said there ought to be the possibility of increasing the number of the Commissioners. I have no great objection to accept the Amendment. The Amendment was accepted in that form. I am not enamoured of it myself at all. Upon this matter I am very anxious to ascertain the feelings of the Members of the House, as I have already ascertained the opinions of the right hon. Baronet who has just sat down. If there be any serious objection to the increase in the number of Commissioners upon their own recommendation subject to the sanction of the Treasury, I am quite willing to take up that Amendment. I may, therefore, now that this matter is allowed to remain open, be allowed to give my own opinion. My own opinion is that a body of Commissioners, consisting of five, who would have the right to appoint Advisory Committees, is a much better body than a body of an indeterminate number. And if it should appear that the duties devolving upon them under this Bill are greater and heavier than a body of five can properly perform, I do not think anything would be easier than to have the responsibility of Parliament to add to the number of the Commissioners. Those are my answers to the right hon. Gentleman. I have met him in reference to the position of a paid Member in his capacity to sit in the House of Commons. I rather gather those who are really taking an interest in this Bill will endeavour to revert to the number of five than to have any increase in the number. Under those circumstances I hope the House of Commons will come to the conclusion as the Committee did upstairs unanimously in this matter, that a body of Commissioners appointed, as we are appointing them here, would be a much better body for the purpose of carrying out their duties than an Advisory Committee.

I intervene because the motion of the right hon. Baronet will sweep away several Amendments, of which I have given notice, to the same effect. I am quite ready to admit the reasonableness of the action of the hon. and learned Member (Sir Samuel Evans). He has dealt very fairly with the question. I admit a very great improvement in the Bill was the substitution of this Commission for the Advisory Committees originally in the Bill, but the question is whether your Commission, even now as constituted, is strong enough for the burden you are about to place on it. I do not believe it is. I am quite certain that the needs of administration that will possibly and actually take place within a few years under this Bill will be vastly larger than most Members of the House at present recognise or realise. I am quite certain that the powers vested in these Commissioners will be of a kind very different from that which they were constituted to exercise. The hon. and learned Gentleman gave us some parallels for other Commissions similarly constituted, and he said that those only bear out the proposals of the present Bill. Amongst those was the question of tenure, and he said that the tenure of the Commissioners under this Bill is exactly the same as the tenure of the Light Railway Commissioners, but the point was admitted that that tenure was not only for ten years, according to the proposals of the present Bill, but for life No doubt all Civil servants and all appointments of the Crown are held during good behaviour. That does not mean that they are not, under all ordinary circumstances, held for the life of the holder. There are few professional men who could accept such a position on the understanding that it might come to an end in ten years. He would have lost his position in his profession, and he would have no other means of livelihood. What independence will he have if he is told that the renewal of his appointment depends on the Treasury, that is, on his acting in accordance with the views of the Minister of the day? The analogy which the Solicitor-General attempted to establish between the Light Railway Commissioners and this body entirely breaks down. We shall not put these Commissioners in a position of absolute independence of the Government of the day and of all political pressure unless we put them upon a similar footing to judges of the High Court, and that is what is involved in the Amendment before us and in subsequent Amendments of which I have given notice. The Solicitor-General says that these are quasi-judicial functions. Either they are judicial or they are not. It is no good telling a man that he is to act as a judge without any political bias, without being subject to the wishes of Ministers or parties, unless you put him in a position of perfect independence of all political parties by placing him in the same position as a judge of the High Court.

My hon. Friend recognises that a great safeguard has been introduced by the appointment of these Commissioners as an essential part of the machinery of the Bill. For my part, I think that that change has made a material difference in the danger of the Bill. Although I have great doubts whether the advantages which the Government hope for will really accrue from the Bill, I feel that the dangers of political corruption and so forth have been diminished to such an extent that the Bill has become comparatively innocuous. My hon. Friend expressed a doubt whether the Commissioners as designed in the Bill would be strong enough to resist the pressure of those who are anxious to share in these grants. I do not know that any machinery you could possibly devise would be perfect in that respect, but in my judgment the existence of these Commissioners with their power to refuse grants is an immense improvement on any system of making grants by a Department. In these matters we must consider past history. Too often in the past grants for public purposes have been made by Departments in obedience to political pressure—not on the merits, but to meet claims persistently put forward in the House of Commons. As to tenure, I should prefer to see the Commissioners invested with all the responsibility of judges of the High Court, not only because that would remove them still more from political pressure, but because it is important that you should get the very best men. You must make the position as attractive as possible to men of public spirit and high position in the estimation of their fellow-citizens. One of the great advantages of the position of a judge of the High Court is that he knows he cannot be removed unless he seriously misbehaves himself. For such appointments men are prepared to sacrifice positions of greater emoluments or more attractive to themselves personally, because they are satisfied that they will have an appointment which frees them from party considerations and the necessities of politicians in a different sphere. Although I shall certainly vote for an Amendment in the direction of a more permanent tenure, I think a ten years' appointment is a considerable security, especially as it may be renewed if the Commissioner performs the duties of his office satisfactorily. There have been suggestions that some such limit even in regard to judicial appointments would not be an unmixed evil. Personally, I should be sorry to see it, because I think that the position of an English judge is one of the finest things ever created by the ingenuity of man. At the same time, there are disadvantages even in that admirable arrangement. Therefore, although on the balance of advantages I think an appointment during good behaviour would be the best kind of tenure for these officials, if the House does not see fit to grant that I believe the appointment of Commissioners as now proposed is a great improvement on the Bill as originally introduced.

I rise to say a word or two in support of a limited appointment. Comparison has been made between these Commissioners and judges. In one essential respect the position is totally different. The judge is a salaried officer of the State. The Commissioners to be appointed, with the exception of one or possibly two, will be unsalaried. Surely that makes a very important difference. If we are to secure the best men for the position a limited appointment will prove a greater attraction than a life appointment. The Noble Lord the hon. Member for Marylebone says that ten years is a considerable slice cut of a man's life; but, judging from what was said by the Solicitor-General, it seems to be in the minds of the Government that the men to be appointed first will not be the men of rash ideas, but men somewhat advanced in years, experienced in public life. I can imagine a man like that advanced in years contemplating with more satisfaction the ten years than he would if he felt on accepting the appointment that he was taking it for the full term of his natural life.

The hon. Member who has just sat down seems to think that because a man is not to be paid that he would not like to accept an appointment for any length of time. May I point out that he can always resign his appointment. If we want to get independent men to exercise their independent judgment they must know that their tenure of office—long or short—for two years or for life—will not be dependent on the judgments that they may give.

What does the hon. Baronet mean by two years; the appointment under the Bill is for ten years.

The Commissioners are appointed for ten years, but at the end of two years one is to retire The person who is selected to retire is selected by the Treasury—

The order is selected by the Treasury; not the person.

It is exactly the same thing. The Treasury decides who is to retire. Alluding to my Noble Friend again, what I think was in his mind when the Amendment was drawn up was that there should be, if possible, some body superior to the Advisory Committee in the Bill. First of all my Noble Friend desired the Light Railways Commissioners. An Amendment to that effect was drawn up. But I think the Amendment of my right hon. Friend below me is a better scheme than the original one, and for that reason I shall vote for it.

I think it should be said from this side of the House that we appreciate the Government's open-minded-ness in the matter of the Amendment proposed by the Noble Lord on my right. The Committee certainly were grateful to the Government, and I think the House ought to be grateful to them now. My hon. Friend the Member for the University of Oxford (Sir W. Anson) and others have pointed out that this is ruining athwart the present system of administration by Departments. It is one of the inherent difficulties of the Bill. Whilst the principle of the Bill is accepted, it seems to me that you should crowd all this work that is being done by half a dozen Departments into one, and call it development work, and you must invent some new machinery to deal with it, for it is no longer possible to leave the work parcelled out among different Departments. If it is said that it will reduce some Departments to impotence, or take a great deal of work out of their hands—well, that is due to the Bill itself, and not to any machinery here invented. In criticising those Advisory Committees which have now to disappear, I do not think anybody will deny that this scheme is an enormous Improvement on those Advisory Committees. It has practically removed all that danger of political pressure, and even political corruption, which was most genuinely feared by many Members of this House on both sides. With regard to the independence of the body, I prefer a life tenure. But with a 10 years' tenure there are very few men who would not feel themselves tolerably secure. There is no doubt that this body of Commissioners in a very short space of time will secure a sort of Departmental tradition of their own, will build up their own rules, their own procedure and policy. And, as a matter of fact, it will be quite impossible for the Treasury—that is, the Government of the day—to materially interfere with what they are doing. If they are the sort of men that we expect will be appointed they would not for a moment tolerate any interference, and would resign rather than submit to it. There is some argument for having some of the Commissioners unpaid, for, without any aspersion upon paid men, a member is more ready if unpaid to resign if he considers himself affronted or slighted than if he has to perhaps think of his salary. I think the least happy part of the scheme is that which deals with rotation, which seems to be entirely unnecessary and cumbersome. It probably will mean nothing, and that the man will be re-appointed at the end of two years; but if it means nothing it is not worth putting in, and if it does mean retirement at the end of the first two years it is mischievous. I think the Government might well drop this part of their scheme without doing any harm.

I wish to say a few words as to the position taken up by the Noble Lord the Member for East Marylebone (Lord Robert Cecil). He has constituted himself since he entered this House a champion of political purity; he seems obsessed with the idea that political corruption is inseparable from any popular assembly, and he gave very bitter offence by a letter in "The Times," fearing that we were rapidly drifting in the direction of the corruption that prevailed in America. That was commented upon, and naturally commented upon, with very great bitterness in several American journals. Whilst I do not propose to offer any objection to the alterations introduced into this Bill, and, on the whole, I am rather disposed to think that the alteration that there should be independent Commissioners to distribute this money is for the better in every respect, and a great relief to Members of Parliament, I must protest in the most emphatic manner against the doctrine which appears to be continually championed: That publicity in an assembly like that is calculated to lead to corruption. I hold a totally different view, and I emphatically protest against this new doctrine that the granting of public money ought to be done in the dark by absolutely independent Commissioners withdrawn from public criticism.

There is nothing about being done in the dark—

The expression "done in the dark" may be a slight exaggeration, but I say withdrawn from public criticism. The Noble Lord and certain other speakers have been comparing, as if it was a fair analogy, the work of the judiciary to this work of the distribution of money. A more dangerous analogy could not be suggested. The judiciary here have nothing to do with the distribution of public money; their duties are of a different order. I join with the Noble Lord in his admiration of the judiciary of this country, which, I think, is one of the highest in the world. But to apply that principle, and to set up a tribunal which is to be as immune from public criticism as the judiciary of this country while doing a totally different class of work, would be doing a most dangerous thing, and one calculated in the highest degree to lend itself to corruption. I am in favour of independent Commissioners, but I am totally opposed to withdrawing the work of those Commissioners from the criticism of this House, because I am deeply convinced there is no better method ever devised by human ingenuity to protect the public against corruption than public criticism in a public representative assembly. Therefore, while I entirely agree with the change which provides that these moneys should be distributed by perfectly independent Commissioners, with powers over which we have no control, I think it would be a great advantage instead of a disadvantage that their conduct in distributing this money should be open to the criticism of every Member of this House.

I recognise fully the fair tone of the Debate, and I welcome the new concession, but I am sorry that in other respects I cannot accept the assurances of the Government. I regret very much the Government cannot see their way to placing the tenure of these Commissioners on the footing suggested in the Amendment. I cannot accept the analogy of the Light Railway Commissioners. The area of work over which these men's jurisdiction will extend is infinitely larger, and the amount of money which will come under their purview is enormous, and they will have the power of interfering with and overriding various Departments of the Government, which will put them into a very anomalous position as regards these Departments with which they will be brought into contact. I avoid saying they will spend the money, but it is nevertheless the case that these large sums cannot be spent without their

moved, in Sub-section (1), after the word "chairman," to leave out the words "The Treasury may, on the recommendation of the Commissioners, increase the number of the Commissioners to such number as they think fit."

moved, in Sub-section (2), to leave out the word "ten" ["the term of office of a Commissioner shall be ten years "] in order to insert "twenty."

There is no question of principle here, but we have decided that the appointment is not to be permanent, and at any rate we can say that 20 years is much nearer a permanency than 10 years. I hope, as we cannot make it permanent, the hon. Baronet will not think it necessary to divide.

moved, in Sub-section (2), to leave out the word "second" ["one Commissioner shall retire every second year"], and to insert instead thereof the word "tenth,"

seconded the Amendment. I am afraid the Amendment hardly carries out the wish of my hon. Friend, who, as I understand, desires that the rotation of two years should be abolished, and that the Commissioners should hold office for ten years without retiring at the end of the second year. I should have thought that was an improvement. I never quite understood the advantages of this rotary retirement every two years, and I rather hope the Government will be able to tell us they are not wedded to this particular form of appointment. I altogether disclaim the honour of being responsible for the Amendment in the Bill. I made a suggestion, and the Government adopted it and are responsible for it. I have no desire to pose as an apostle of purity, and I am not sure the hon. Member for East Mayo (Mr. Dillon) would desire to occupy the position himself. When I spoke of political corruption, I did not suggest there is any political corruption in this country. I said there is a certain tendency to put pressure upon Ministers of the Crown in order to obtain advantages of sectional interests, and even, sometimes, for constituencies and individuals. I could not put it anything like as high as the Chancellor of the Exchequer put it upstairs. He was extremely frank and forcible in the case he made. I have no desire to set myself up as a standard of purity in politics or anything else.

I have an open mind upon this matter, though in some respects, I think, the rotation would be useful. We are having a new body to perform new and fresh duties, and I see objections to the Amendment. We cannot, however, make the amendment because we have already passed the words: "One Commissioner shall retire." I will, however, gather the sense of the House upon the matter, if the House will permit it to stand as it is for the present.

If the Solicitor-General is prepared to strike out the whole reference to the rotary retirement and the hon. Baronet would withdraw his Amendment, there can be no objection to striking out those words. If the hon. Baronet insists on his Amendment, then, of course, we cannot go back.

I should like to ask whether the hon. Baronet is in order. The Commissioners are being appointed for ten years, so, if his Amendment were carried, there would be no retiring at all.

I am afraid I do not agree with my hon. Friend, and I am bound to say so. If there is any alteration, I think it would be better that the Commissioners should hold office during good behaviour.

I was about to appeal to the House to allow this matter to be dealt with elsewhere if on consideration we find it necessary. I think under the circumstances, this being experimental, I should personally vote for rotation, but if the words are allowed to stand I will communicate the views expressed to the Cabinet.

These Commissioners will have a very novel and difficult task, and I think new men should be brought in by degrees instead of changing the whole personnel at one time. In my opinion, rotation would be much better.

I ask leave to withdraw my Amendment on the understanding that the point will be seriously considered.

moved, in Sub-section (3), to omit the words "not more than two of."

moved, at the end of Subsection (3), to add the words: "NO Commissioner so paid shall be capable of sitting in the House of Commons during the tenure of his office."

I do not think that they are necessary. I will, however, look into the matter, and if requisite steps shall be taken to insert them.

I have been asked not to move my other Amendments, as it is desired to discuss some important matters arising on Part II. of the Bill. I wish it to be thoroughly understood that if I refrain from moving them it is not because I think they do not deserve discussion, but because I wish to facilitate Debate on other parts of the Bill. I hope the country will notice that an important Bill of this sort is being forced through the House in such a manner that it is quite impossible to discuss it. I make no complaint against the hon. and learned Gentleman, and I do not want to stand in the way of the convenience of this House. I only desired to enter my protest against the way the Bill is being forced through and to say I shall not move any more of the Amendments I have on the Paper.

moved to leave out Subsection (3).

I appeal to the hon. Gentleman not to press his Amendment. When the Commissioners were introduced in the Bill the Government were not particularly anxious to preserve the Advisory Committees, but a very strong feeling was expressed by many members of the Committee—Members representing both sides of the House—that this option should be given to the Com-missioners. In cases of special work, where the Commissioners have no particular information, the Advisory Committees might be exceedingly useful.

The hon. Gentleman seems to forget that the Development Commissioners were appointed in lieu of the Advisory Commissioners, and the Developing Commissioners have power to appoint others. All they want is someone to assist them in their work, and that is why this Advisory Committee is now reinserted in the Bill. Surely it is unnecessary to put this in here.

moved, at the end of Sub-section (3), to insert the following new Sub-section: "(4) The Commissioners may also frame schemes with respect to any of the matters for which advances may be made under this Part of this Act with a view to their adoption by a Government Department or other body or persons to whom an advance may be made."

seconded the Amendment.

I accept.

I very much hope the Government do not really mean to accept this Amendment. Surely it is a complete mistake that the Commissioners should be both a framing and a deciding body. I cannot think it is a good plan, and it must have the greatest objection when it comes to compulsorily taking the land. What would happen under this Amendment would be that the Commissioners would first frame a scheme working the compulsory taking of land. Then they would solemnly decide whether it was or was not right that the land should be compulsorily taken. That is putting them in the absolutely impossible position of being both litigants and judges. I do not think either that it would work well in practice, because the kind of man who would be very useful as a Commissioner to decide what ought to be done would not necessarily be at all the kind of man who would be useful in framing schemes. You want a man of imagination to frame schemes, but that quality is out of place in a man who has to decide whether or not a scheme should go forward.

May I join in the appeal of my Noble Friend. It is really putting the Commissioners in the position of being applicants to themselves.

It seems to me that the Amendment is a very useful one, because what we have to remember is that the Commissioners are not really judges in the ordinary sense of the term. A number of schemes will be put before them, and it may be that out of a great number of schemes, ranging over districts from one end of the country to another, they may be able to formulate some two or three which they may think very useful, but which have not been put before them and which will be the result of all the knowledge they have gained. All it means is that they may have the power, should the occasion arise, to take the initiative instead of waiting for a scheme to be put before them. I do submit that it would be most useful, having regard to the work they have to do.

There has been no reason offered by the Government why this Amendment should be accepted. The Amendment was submitted in the Committee upstairs, but it was not argued there, and it has not been argued here. There are a good many weighty reasons why it should not be accepted. It would appear that the Commissioners are to be empowered to draw up a scheme of their own which will override the scheme of the Government Department. I think that is putting the Commissioners in a false position in regard to the big Government Departments. Although that is not so objectionable in regard to bodies like universities, it is a wrong principle to say that when a Government Department put forward a scheme it may be set aside in favour of another drawn up by the Commissioners.

This Amendment was accepted in the Committee after the Noble Lord had said something like what he has said this afternoon. It is not really a very large modification of the Bill as it stands. You cannot prevent the Commissioners, even under the Bill, dealing with the various schemes which are sent to them by any body in the United Kingdom. It is absurd to say that the Commissioners cannot out of their information and expert knowledge manufacture better schemes than those which are brought before them. I do not think it would be possible to interpret the Act under other conditions. I think the Commissioners would have power under the Act as it stands to do what the Amendment proposes, but in order to make it clear we accept the Amendment of the hon. Gentleman.

I think the business of the Committee is to receive applications for advances of money to carry out schemes which are submitted to them. I agree with the Under-Secretary to the Home Department that the Commissioners may make suggestions for the modification of schemes. It is very desirable that they should do so, for presumably the Commissioners will be persons of large experience. The Amendment would give them initiative in these matters, and it would not only enable them to suggest modifications in regard to the schemes submitted to them, but it would enable them to cast their eyes over the whole Kingdom with reference to an enormous variety of subjects, and to make schemes for afforestation, waterways, light railways, or anything that might occur to their imagination. Surely it is not desirable that the Commissioners should have this large power of initiative conferred upon them. They should be limited to dealing with the applications made to them, with such powers as are inherent in them to suggest improvements in the schemes submitted to them. I was not a member of the Committee that dealt with this Bill, but I must confess that I am surprised to hear that a proposal so widely drawn was even considered. I am surprised also that the Amendment should be so lightly accepted by the Government at this hour of the Debate.

The Amendment was not only put upstairs in substance, but it was considered. The hon. Baronet is quite right in saying that it gives the Commissioners power of initiative if these words are added. They have the right no doubt to say that a scheme ought to be modified, but supposing a body put forward a scheme and would not accept the modification. It might be an excellent scheme when modified. Surely in that case it ought not to be impossible for the Commissioners to say that if the body proposing a scheme will not accept the modifications, they will propose one.

It is quite true that this Amendment would enable the Commissioners to frame schemes. I wish to ask a question on that point. Would there be any power under the first Clause of the Bill to enable the Commissioners to make advances to themselves in respect of a scheme which they frame, because unless they are able to do so a scheme framed by them would be a dead letter?

The Treasury have to make the advances, and a scheme made by the Development Commissioners would still have to obtain the sanction of the Treasury.

Yes, Sir, but under what wording in the first Clause would the Treasury be enabled to make advances to the Commissioners? It is upon the recommendation of the Commissioners that the Treasury may make advances to other people. Is there anything in the Clause which would enable the Development Commissioners to get an advance themselves in respect of a scheme which they had framed?

That is a question of law, or what may become law, and not a point of order.

On a point of Order. The advance would not be to the Development Commissioners. They would merely frame the scheme with the view to its adoption by a Government Department. The advance would be to the Government Department concerned.

I understand that the Commissioners would frame a scheme for adoption by a Government Department, and that the Commissioners would recommend the scheme to the Treasury.

The Commissioners can recommend a scheme of their own for the sanction of the Treasury

I understand that the Commissioners are to frame a scheme, and suggest its adoption by a Government Department. If they recommend a scheme, say, to the Board of Trade, I suppose that Board will consider it, and say whether they wish to adopt it. In the event of the Board of Trade agreeing to it, are the Commissioners to hear objections, make inquiries, and employ their inspectors with regard to it? The Commissioners frame a scheme and go to these persons and say, "Will you adopt it?" Either they do or do not. If they do, the same thing is to be gone through—these persons go to the Commissioners and ask leave to go on. The thing appears to me to be fantastic, and I cannot think that the Government have seriously considered what it may mean. Certainly it would entirely alter the position of the Commissioners, who will inevitably have numerous schemes brought before them. I can imagine that five men may think that a blend of two or three schemes may make a better scheme than any one of them. That will constantly be done under this arrangement. The Commissioners will proceed by way of blending schemes, and make a new scheme of their own. The moment that is done and the moment it is adopted by a Government Department, or any persons, the scheme, of course, will go through, because it will have the Commissioners behind it. It is putting the Commissioners into the position of an executive authority with regard to spending money. Of course, if the Commissioners make their own schemes, then, in fact, the whole of the administration of this money is put in their executive control. That may be right or it may be wrong; it is quite clear that it is a tremendous advance on the original proposal of the Bill.

It seems to me that the heads of Government Departments have already more than they can do. They have to sit here during the Session, and in other ways they are overworked. Here we are appointing Commissioners, men who are supposed to have some brains—and they will have brains for this particular work—and if we are going to forbid them to do anything except receive their salaries, I think it would be a stultification of the whole scheme.

moved to insert, as a new Sub-section:—

"(5) Before making any recommendation for an advance for the purpose of the improvement of rural transport the Commissioners shall consult with the Road Board."