asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he can state what will be the cost of valuing all the licensed premises in the United Kingdom and Ireland for the purpose of the new register proposed in Clause 44 of the Finance Bill; and by whom the cost of the valuation is to be defrayed?

The estimate made by the Prime Minister of the cost of the valuation is a comprehensive one. It included the cost of valuation of licensed premises as well as the cost of valuation for the Land Taxes. We are depending on the same staff for both.

Would the right hon. Gentleman answer the second part of the question?

Of course the cost of valuation will be defrayed out of funds provided by Parliament. It will be the same estimate for both.

May I ask a question about Business? I think there is some misunderstanding between us, but I am sure it can be cleared up. I understood that the Chancellor of the Exchequer was going to ask the leave of the House to make a financial statement to-day, which it has been promised, as to the effect of the changes in the Finance Bill, so that when he made that statement he might lay a White Paper before us.

I believed that after consultation it was understood that the convenient time to do that would be on the Motion for Adjournment. That would enable any questions to be put.

No doubt the misunderstanding was my fault. I need not say the arrangement is equally satisfactory, provided the Motion for Adjournment takes place at a reasonable time. I think it is evident that we cannot finish the Land Clauses to-day, and I hope the Chancellor of the Exchequer will be able to say that he does not, after the labours of the week, intend to keep us very late to-day.

I would be the last man to desire to sit late—I have had so much of it. But I should rather like to have some sort of idea of the view of the Opposition whether, supposing we failed to get the Land Clauses through to-night, it would be possible to get them either by the dinner-hour on Monday, or at what time. Otherwise we might sit a little later to-night. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman could give some assurance, so that we might rise fairly early, and I am perfectly certain everybody will be pleased if that is done.

The right hon. Gentleman knows how difficult it is to make anything in the nature of a pledge. Directly a pledge is given everybody has to see that it is going to be carried through absolutely to the letter. As the right hon. Gentleman and the House knows, a full share of the Debates of the last two or three days have been occupied by Gentlemen on the other side by some of the Amendments. I cannot myself imagine, and I do not think it is possible, that the Land Clauses should last over Monday. Personally, I cannot think so.

Perhaps there may be another opportunity of saying how far we will be able to go.

I am sure it can be done.

Under those circumstances, we ought to be able to adjourn by five or six o'clock, and then I can make my statement.

moved, in Subsection (1), to leave out the word "total" ["total value of land"], and to insert instead thereof the word "gross."

What exactly is aimed at by this Amendment?

I am not sure if the right hon. Gentleman is not himself responsible. He pointed out that the words "site value" defined so many different things that it was really confusing. I thought at the time there was a great deal in it. The draftsman considered it very carefully, and we have come to the conclusion that it would be better to make perfectly clear what the various site values are. There is no difference at all in substance. The same deductions are made and the same processes will be gone through by the valuers in order to ascertain what the taxable subject is.

It is merely a question of terminology.

Terminology.

moved, in Sub-section (2), after the word "the" ["the site value"], to insert the word "full."

This is a new term. Does it make any difference in substance?

No. It was pointed out that we had two entities, "site value" and "site value for the purposes of this Act." One is now called "full site value" and the other is called "assessable site value."

moved, in Sub-section (2), to leave out the word "buildings" ["any such buildings"], and to insert thereof the word "land."

In seconding the Amendment I seem to remember in the dim and distant past an Amendment moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr Burghs (Mr. G. Younger), touching upon this point, and I understood that the Government were going to give their kindly consideration to it on the Report stage.

If the hon. Member will look down the Paper he will find that later on we have an Amendment that where expenditure which may be incurred purely for agricultural purposes does improve the land as building land he would get the benefit. Obviously drains would be included.

Does the Amendment to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred cover the substance of this Amendment?

I would hardly like to say that. I think that this goes a little beyond what we could accept, but our Amendment covers all the cases that were put to us in Committee, and it amply redeems the pledge we gave.

moved to leave out from the beginning of Sub-section (3) to the word "and" ["and to any right of common"], and to insert instead thereof

I am not quite certain as to whether this proposal makes any change. Perhaps the Attorney-General will explain whether it does so or not.

I think it makes no change whatever. We are showing the meaning of the various definitions, but they will make no difference to the incidence of the tax; they do not alter it. These Amendments are simply to ensure that the various explanations which were given during the Committee stage shall be put into the Bill. "Total value" is the rent of the land, with hereditaments, as it stands, subject to certain restrictions and qualifications, which are preserved here and must be such as are approved. The Amendment is: "The total value of land means the gross value after deducting the amount by which the gross value would be diminished if the land were sold subject to any fixed charges and to any public rights of way or any public rights of user." As to the assessment of the site value, the total value is after making all deductions, which are set out in the definitions. We have already passed the "gross value": that is the value of the land, with the buildings upon it, and taking no account of restrictions. We have passed also the "full site value," which is the land without the buildings, and taking no account of restrictions. And now we come to the "total value," which is the land with the buildings on it, and taking account of restrictions. We come next to the "site value," which is the total value reduced by all the deductions which we provide. We have used so many expressions, like "gross value," "full site value," and others, that it was desirable to put those expressions into the Act. They are also useful in this respect, that they are directions to the valuer which he must obey, and they will assist the subject if he seeks to appeal from the valuer's determination. Otherwise, a valuer might say, "I fix the value at so and so," and the subject would have difficulty in appealing. By the Amendments inserted in the Bill the valuer has to make his valuation with all deductions. In that way the subject will be able to put his finger on the spot where he finds cause of complaint. They are, therefore, really drafting Amendments.

I understand that the valuer is to give a figure under each of those values. It might be that the total and the assessable value were the same thing, but he will have to set out a figure under each one of those separate values, so that the subject will be able to see at once where the valuer's valuation differs from his. Assuming that they are both agreed as to the market price of, say, £10,000, but that they differ as to the amount on which the tax ought to be levied, the subject will see at a glance, if I understand the Attorney-General, at each stage of those proceedings.

That will be the effect.

I do not rise to object to the Amendment, because I think it will make the Bill more complicated than it is, and I have no objection to the Bill being so complicated that it will make it very difficult to work. I should have thought it would have been much better to have left the Clause as it stood, instead of putting in all these provisoes, because it is quite evident that the valuer must, in valuing the land, take into account all the ordinary conditions, and this is one of them.

moved, in Sub-section (3), to leave out the word "where" ["the use of land where"], and to insert instead thereof, "entered into or made before the thirtieth day of April, nineteen hundred and nine, and to any covenant or agreement restricting the use of the land entered into or made on or after that date, if."

moved, in Sub-section (3), after the word "agreement" ["imposed by the covenant or agreement"], to insert the words "so entered into or made on or after that date."

moved, in Subsection (3), to leave out the words "is reasonably necessary" ["is reasonably necessary in the interests of the public"], and to insert instead thereof the words "was when imposed desirable."

This Amendment really raises the question of the manner in which the Commissioners are to exercise discretion as to the covenants. Covenants, owing to the concessions which the Government have just made, entered into before the passing of the Act, cannot be included, but I do not know what meaning the Government attach to those words. They give the Commissioners an enormous discretion in dealing with land, for instance, in the neighbourhood of great towns, such as that part of the City of Birmingham which is known as Edgbaston. The Courthope estate in Edgbaston has been developed for some generations on a settled plan, excluding from the land, or the greater portion of it, any public-houses, or practically excluding public-houses, factories, or shops. The result is that it is entirely a residential quarter, and I think that that serves undoubtedly the needs of the town, and that it is to its advantage to have a district of that kind. Is a matter of that kind to be left to the discretion of the Commissioners in regard to any restrictive covenants entered into after the passing of the Act? Is a Commissioner wholly unacquainted with the circumstances of Birmingham, and who does not hear on the subject any local representations, except from some party immediately interested, to settle what is in the interests of Birmingham and how Birmingham ought to be laid out? I think the Government take some credit to themselves for a Town Planning Bill, which was in another place, and which has come back to us, but has not yet been considered. There their object is to give the local authorities, as I understand, power to direct and settle the limits, as prescribed in the Bill, of what the planning of new districts in the neighbourhood of those towns should be. Here you give that power, not to a local authority, but to a Commissioner sitting in London, and the Commissioner has no interest in seeing that the town is developed in the best interests of the inhabitants. The Commissioner's interest is to put an end to the covenant which lessens the value of the land, and to hold that it is an unreasonable covenant and restricts the value of the land. That is not a personal interest, but it is his official interest. If he admits that the covenant is reasonable then he loses the tax. He is a Revenue official whose business is to get taxes where he can. I do not mean to say for a moment that the Inland Revenue officials, or any officials of the Government, have regard solely to the possibility of wringing the utmost farthing out of the taxpayer. I think they try to exercise their authority and powers reasonably. What I do suggest is that they are not really competent to judge of these cases, and that they are necessarily advised against what may be the interests of the community. The wording adopted by the Government appears to me to lend itself to misconception or misapplication. The Commissioners may say, "We are not considering Birmingham, as a whole, or greater Birmingham; we are regarding this particular piece of land. Here is an improvident landlord who has entered into restrictions which deprive his land of its highest economic use"—the highest economic use being interpreted to mean the use which will produce the greatest amount of revenue. Thereupon they dispute the covenants. An appeal appears to me to be absolutely necessary. If there is one matter more than another in which the taxing authority should not be also the deciding authority as to the reasonableness of covenants, it is this. Even with an appeal, the hardship on the subject might be very great. You cannot take a matter to the High Court for nothing. You must have the best advice, which is always very expensive. If, there being no appeal, the whole matter is left to the discretion of the Commissioners you may have the whole local opinion and knowledge overriden by Commissioners sitting in London, who, having no local knowledge themselves, are obliged to trust to an agent whom they send down. I do not think that either the rights of the landlord or the rights of the community, which, in such a case as I have named, are concerned even more than those of the, landlord, ought to be submitted to the uncontrolled discretion of the Commissioners in matters of this kind.

The words now being introduced do not in the slightest degree remove my objection to the Clause. It is a perfect absurdity to place in the hands of mere revenue officials the power of saying whether restrictions of this kind are to be allowed. The local representative of the revenue authorities is the man who will practically settle these matters, a gentleman who, after a few years at Somerset House devoted to Income Tax collection or exaction, goes to a locality for a brief period, perhaps four or five years, where he learns at the expense of the community a certain amount of valuation and other business, and then probably goes to a more important district. That is the kind of man who will have the responsibility of advising the Commissioners in these matters. Could there be anything more ridiculous? There is the local authority, who, surely, is the proper body to say whether or not the restrictions are reasonable and ought to be maintained. I wish the Attorney-General, when amending the Bill, had paid some attention to the criticisms made in Committee on this point. In my opinion the words now proposed do not improve the Clause in the least degree.

We are here discussing a somewhat limited Amendment, which substitutes words more favourable to the subject than those in the Bill. The general principle of the Clause the Government must now take as settled. When dealing with restrictions, which might be created on a scale that would practically nullify the provisions as to the tax, we must have some kind of check. As the Bill left the Committee the check was that the Commissioners should be entitled to disregard any diminution of value due to those restrictions if they thought the restrictions "reasonably necessary," The words "reasonably necessary" no doubt narrowed the discretion of the Commissioners in a sense adverse to the subject more than the words now proposed. Instead of finding the restrictions to be reasonably necessary, they have only to find that they were when imposed desirable. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Austen Chamberlain) referred to the discretion of the Commissioners. I think that point must be regarded as settled. The only question is what direction shall be given to that discretion. It is very favourable to the subject. The Commissioners are to allow the diminished value where they think the covenant is in the interests of the public—which in itself is a wide discretion—or desirable in view of the character and surroundings of the neighbourhood. I think that, that meets the case put by the right hon. Gentleman. Where, in view of the character and surroundings of a neighbourhood, the Commissioners thought it was desirable that a certain district should be confined to residential purposes, they would say, "We will not consider the interests of the public in the wider sense; we will regard only the interests of the neighbourhood." It is objected that there is no appeal. There is this House. The shadow of this House is always resting on every official and every Department, and I do not think you will find the executive any less amenable to that influence. The executive see what is the spirit of the Act, and they will be very anxious not to infringe it. I can scarcely conceive a case where, in view of these words, the Commissioners would insist upon applying the tax to property such as that described by the right hon. Gentleman.

moved, in Sub-section (3), to leave out the words "and the opinion of the Commissioners shall in this case be final and not subject to any appeal."

It was pressed.

The Amendment was, by leave, withdrawn by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Kingston on the assurance of the Secretary for War. I know, of course, what happened later on another Amendment, that there was the Closure and a Division. But my learned Friend withdrew his Amendment, and the House was satisfied at that time that something would be done. When you consider the amenities of the locality, the very last persons who ought to decide the questions involved are the Commissioners. The learned Attorney-General spoke of the shadow of this House being over the Executive, and as to their correct interpretation of the spirit of the Act. I think the shadow of the Executive is much moreover this House. And as to their interpreting the spirit of the Act, well, there is the Swansea case. It was certainly not interpreted by the Executive in the spirit of the Act.

I would suggest to the hon. and learned Gentleman that he might even now accept what was laid before him last night by my hon. Friend. I quite see these are not proper cases to go into the law courts. I believe they are cases neither for the Commissioners nor for the law courts. But I believe all my hon. Friends will be satisfied if the appeal is to the Referees and their decision may be final. They would consider matters in an impartial way, for I believe everyone agrees that the appointment of Referees, as now provided for by the Bill, is quite satisfactory. But it is necessary that these words should be left out.

I second this Amendment because, unlike the hon. Baronet the Member for the City of London (Sir F. Banbury), I want to see this Bill made as clear as possible. At present it is nothing of the sort. I am certainly not in favour of leaving the decision of important questions such as covenants, easements, etc., in regard to land to the Commissioners. Who are these Commissioners? Are they men accustomed to deal with questions of this sort? Are they to form a new Department? Have they any legal knowledge, or have they had any legal training? We ought—I have asked for it before—to have some idea of what their status will be, and from what body they will be selected. We might then have some confidence in them. I am absolutely surprised at the childlike faith some hon. Gentlemen seem to have in the Commissioners. The word "Commissioner" is a blessed word, and one to which they seem to attach great importance. People outside do not attach that great importance to them, but have the greatest fear of how they will deal with some of these matters. I quite agree that the Referees will be a body in whom, at any rate, we will have some confidence.

I do not rise to reargue the question, but only to correct a point of fact which we regard as important. The assertion has twice been made by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Sheffield (Mr. James Hope) that we promised to make an Amendment to the Bill on this point, and that we have not fulfilled our promise. That is not a fact. The whole of this Amendment moved by him was moved in Committee, also on Friday afternoon, and was fully discussed. The points that have been placed before us to-day were placed before us by many Members, including—with considerable force—the hon. Baronet opposite. There was no Closure, and the Committee decided by a large majority against the appeal. It is perfectly true that we promised before to consider whether it would not be desirable to have an appeal to such a body as the Local Government Board. That was advanced from the opposite side, and was immediately repudiated by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Dublin (Mr. Long), who thought it was quite inadvisable that the Local Government Board should be the body. After the fullest discussion we found, I think with the general agreement of the Committee, that there was no more suitable tribunal to decide the questions concerned than the Commissioners who were ultimately responsible.

I think, speaking subject to correction, that there is a difference in the position now and before as described by the hon. Gentleman. We did not at that time know exactly what the appeal was going to be. The Government had proposed to allow an appeal and gradually as the discussion went on the idea of the appeal widened. But what exactly was its scope we did not know, for the matter we were debating was changing its aspect day by day. Now we know what the appeal is. At that time it is perfectly true, as the hon. Gentleman reminded us, there was an admission from this side that there was a certain inconvenience in referring speculative matters of opinion for decision by a court of law, although, as I ventured to observe last night on a similar though different point, courts of law do as a matter of fact have to decide such speculative questions as between man and man, and citizen and citizen, on the private litigation which comes before them. Whether a covenant is reasonable or not is a matter that is often the subject of legislation, and so are many matters of trade, and the decisions of courts of law on these subjects are often more difficult to understand than upon any other they have to deal with. They often deal with these subjects, but I admit they are not an ideal body for dealing with them. On the last occasion when this subject was under discussion the Secretary of State for War, who was in charge, admitted that neither the Commissioners nor the courts of law were satisfactory tribunals to deal with this subject. On that occasion we had half convinced the Secretary of State for War, and having been half convinced he disappeared. Now we have to deal with the Under-Secretary to the Home Department.

I was present all through on the last occasion.

But was not half convinced, and though the hon. Gentleman will be half convinced when we have done with him to-day, on neither this nor the last occasion had we the advantage of the presence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Chancellor was fully through these Debates, and spoke several times.

Then he is like the Secretary of State for War—being half convinced, he remained away. I know the Chancellor is doing extremely hard work, and has had a strain upon him that can hardly be paralleled by anything that has fallen upon Ministers in recent times; but I must observe that never has there been a Finance Bill, or any other Bill, from the discussion of which the Minister in charge has been so often absent. I do not make that as a charge against the Chancellor, whose conduct has been admirable; but it renders it extremely difficult to deal with the matter, because of having to argue with different people at different times. I do not derogate from the position of the hon. Gentleman the Under-Secretary, or suggest for a moment he does not do his work admirably, but he has not the authority to deal with this matter that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or indeed any Cabinet Minister would have. If I convinced him now that our proposal was a reasonable one he could not accept it. We are dealing not with a plenipotentiary, but with somebody who only give the answer he has been told to give beforehand. I do not complain of the Chancellor, but I complain of the injustice it is to the House not to have any one upon the Government Bench with full powers to deal with this matter.

This matter does not stand now where it did when we raised it in Committee. Then we were discussing on the one side a proposal giving absolute discretion to the Commissioners, and on the other an appeal to the courts of law. We admitted that an appeal to the courts of law was not entirely satisfactory in our view. The via media suggested at that time was an appeal to the Local Government Board, and Members on both sides of the House, with the curious unanimity which had nothing to do with the character or abilities of the present President of the Board, decided that the Local Government Board was not the body to whose tender mercies they desired to entrust this matter. We do not ask now for an appeal to the Local Government Board, but we still maintain, as the Secretary for War admitted, there is great inconvenience in allowing the matter to be decided by the Commissioners, and we suggest now that the appeal should go to the Referee. The Attorney-General yesterday thought there was a great deal to be said for that suggestion. All he said against it was that it came upon him with surprise. There has been time since for considering the matter, and therefore I hope now that the Gentlemen representing the Government will take it upon themselves to accept this compromise as being reasonable and right, or else send for the Chancellor and ask him to come in and hear the arguments. We ought not to have an Amendment of this kind refused simply because the only Minister who has authority to accept it is not here to say "Yes."

I submit to the House that to introduce the Referee as the Court of Appeal and to ask his opinion instead of the Commissioners' is really only changing one person, whose opinion is in no way above the Commissioners for the Commissioners themselves. There is really nothing between the two. The Commissioners are just as likely to fulfil their duties as satisfactorily as the Referee.

I have no particular predeliction for a Referee, but I have no confidence whatever in the unrestricted powers of these bodies of Commissioners. I feel most strongly that in no part of the taxation under the Finance Bill should the taxpayer be deprived of the right of appeal ultimately to a court of law. I should like to remind the House of a case that occurred a few days ago, which shows how completely and quite bonâ fide in the case of the Revenue authorities the public can be mulcted in matters of this kind. For some years Messrs. Whiteley had to pay at the request of the Revenue authorities male servants' Licence Duty for the men in their employment. Some time ago some doubt arose as to whether that tax ought to have been paid or not. An action was brought, and the courts held that the money ought not to have been paid, but no refund was possible on the ground that the money was not paid under duress. If the Revenue Commissioners collected this tax there will be no duress, and the taxpayer will have to pay without being able to obtain any redress.

There is no part of the whole Bill under which it is more important to have an appeal than this. In a matter of this kind, where a man may be taxed upon a purely hypothetical value, it is more than ever necessary that there should be an appeal. I cannot see why there should not be an appeal in this matter. I do not know whether it is possible to move the Attorney-General on this point, but where you have these hypothetical difficulties arising in the future you will prevent people undertaking covenants of any sort or kind in connection with the amenities of a town. I think it is very necessary and desirable that the Government should meet us on this point.

The Attorney-General was in such a hurry to reply that he did not give us a chance of putting our arguments. Surely it is reasonable that we should have one system in this Bill, and that there should be some sort of consistency between the different parts of the Bill. We have long ago ceased to hope for any such consistency, but surely it is too much that on one page of the Bill we should find flagrant inconsistencies with regard to this question. In regard to the matters dealt with in Sub-section (3) the opinion of the Commissioners is to be final. The next Sub-section permits the Commissioners to allow certain deductions, and in paragraph (b) of Sub-section (4) it says "any sum which in the opinion of the Commissioners." Having pointed out all these inconsistencies surely it is very hard that we should be precluded by necessity from having any sufficient answer on these points simply because both representatives of the Government have exhausted their right to speak?

Even at this late stage of the proceedings, I hope the Government will see their way to make this small concession. Yesterday the Attorney-General was most sympathetic on this point, and he admitted that an appeal might be desirable in certain cases. I think he said these questions of fact to be settled by the Commissioners were so trivial that it would be a waste of time to go to a court of law, and I think he suggested that it would be a happy compromise to have one of these Referees as a final arbiter. One argument used by the Attorney-General struck me as being a somewhat unhappy one. He said that there was a great deal in what the Opposition had said on this point, but it should have been dealt with during the Committee stage of the Bill, and it could hardly be expected that the Government could consider it now. That may be the case, but it will be somewhat hard on the individuals who will have to suffer to tell them that if this matter had been raised at an earlier stage they might have got a substantial measure of justice. This is a fundamental question, although perhaps the principle will not affect a large number of people. The Commissioners, under the Bill as it now stands, will be the judges in their own case. On every rural bench of magistrates the justices who are interested in a case which comes before them retire from the bench, and it is one of the most fundamental principles of justice that a man interested should not be a judge in his own case. Under this Clause the taxing authority will be the judges in their own case.

I was surprised to hear the Attorney-General say that this question would not be in a better position if it was decided to refer it to a Referee. If that is so, why have the Government deliberately provided that a Referee shall hear an appeal under Clause 34? Is that observation warranted in fact? The Commissioners are the taxing authority, and they are, therefore, interested parties; as they are only human beings, their personal feelings must enter into the matter. They are also interested in making the revenue as large as possible, and it is perfectly clear that there ought to be an appeal of some kind from the decisions of the Commissioners. If you have an appeal to the Referees, they are an independent body. Clause 34 provides that the Referees shall be "Fellows of the Surveyors' Institution, or other persons having experience in the valuation of land." The rules under which they will act will be made by the Reference Committee, which consists of the highest judicial officers in the country. Surely the Attorney-General must have used his arguments in despair, because when they are probed into they are not warranted by the facts. I know it is not his will; he is utterly unable to deal with the matter. He has no power. Really the case has been left untouched, and we labour under a grievance because the Secretary of State for War many weeks ago distinctly intimated to us some way out of the difficulty, and now, when the time has arrived for finally determining the matter, he is no longer here and we have nobody here to carry out that promise. Therefore, I suppose the matter has got to go by the board.

It is obvious when operations begin with the valuations which will have to be conducted they will be of an extraordinarily intricate character; and, excellent as the Commissioners may in many respects be, I think there ought to be an appeal to the Referee. It is too much absolute power over such an extremely intricate and important valuation to entrust to any single representative of the Inland Revenue. When once the new proposals are in working order an appeal to a Referee may not be necessary; but I do think that in the first instance there ought to be such an appeal. There will be a want of confidence in the initial valuation unless that appeal to the Referee be given, because we may be sure that the Referee will be a person to whom confidence will be extended, whilst the number of the Commissioners must be so great that it is as yet uncertain what their character will be. It is simply handing ourselves bound hand and foot to the bureaucracy unless there is an appeal to the Referee. I have tried to give that the go-by wherever possible under this Bill. In dealing with these very intricate valuations leading questions in the first instance ought to be decided by persons in whom there is general confidence, and you have that confidence in the persons to be appointed as Referees. You could not possibly extend that confidence to the several hundred gentlemen who will act as Commissioners in the first instance under this scheme. I am quite sure the number of appeals will be limited, but there are some points which are left in a very uncertain condition in the Clause as it stands—such, for instance, as the question of field drains, which has been discussed to-day; and, in the first instance, I am clearly of opinion that we should not be asked to rely solely on any one of these Commissioners, but that there ought to be an appeal to a Referee.

I know the hon. and learned Gentleman can not speak again, but there is a general concensus of opinion on both sides of the House. [HON. MEMBERS: "NO."] Well, so far as vocal opinion exists it is all on one side. It is a perfectly simple point. You have on the one hand the Commissioners representing the tax collector, and on the other hand the individual representing the taxpayer; and the only answer given by the Attorney-General is that there is no advantage in bringing in a third party. That answer is obviously so incomplete and inexact that I am sure he would not wish to adhere to it. It cannot be pretended that it is a reasonable answer, because the Attorney-General used the words that the Referee is no better than the Commissioners.

No, I did not. I said it was purely a matter of opinion and discretion, and that the discretion of the Commissioners was as likely to be as good as that of the Referee.

The hon. and learned Gentleman cannot maintain that for a moment. It is not a question of whose opinion is best. It is not a question whether the Commissioners are as wise as the Referee. It is a question whether parties are to be allowed to be judges in their own case. When you call in a third party to decide between two individuals, you do not do so because he is wiser or because his abstract opinion is better than the persons between whom he has to adjudicate, but because he is an impartial, unbiassed individual who has no reason to do otherwise than weigh the thing fairly. Although his decision may be in favour of one party or the other, it is accepted because no one could say that he could in any possible way have any bias in the matter. It is not only necessary to have this appeal for the sake of justice, but for the sake of public credit as well. Surely it is just as much in the interests of the State which is exacting the tax as in the interests of the individual who is to pay the tax, that when there is a dispute, in a question such as this rather intricate and difficult matter, the State should not have the discredit for doing a thing it has not done. The Commissioners might give a perfectly fair decision, but I do not think it likely that a subject who felt himself aggrieved by that decision would consider it fair, and he would have an obvious case. He could say: "Here is a decision given against me; I consider it grossly unfair. It was made against me by a servant of the State which is exacting the tax." I am really ashamed of arguing such a point; it is so obvious. May I just state the issue to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, now he has come in? It is a question of an appeal from the Commissioners. It was debated in Committee and we decided against an appeal. It was argued, and no doubt with great force, that to take matters, some of which might be trivial, to a court of law, and involve very great expense, would be both unnecessary and undesirable. Therefore the Committee came to a decision against that appeal. Since that decision was come to it has been suggested that instead of taking the case to the courts of law a compromise might be effected, and the appeal might lie solely and only to the Referee, and that there would be little or no expense attached to that course. The case has been expressed on both sides of the House, and had the Chancellor of the Exchequer been here during this Debate I think he would have found that every speaker in this House has endorsed that opinion. The only answer that the Attorney-General has been able to give us is that he can see no advantage in bringing in a third party, whose opinion might be no better than the opinion of the Commissioners. The answer to that is that we do not set up a claim that the opinion of the Referee is any better than the opinion of the Commissioner. All we ask is that there should be an unbiased Referee to decide between the two in cases of dispute. That is absolutely necessary in the interests of the credit of the State for justice, and in the interests of the taxpayer also that he may obtain justice. The expense would be so small that I think everybody who has heard this Debate will agree that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would be doing what is best from every point of view if he accepted this suggestion and allowed appeal, not only to the courts of law, but to the Referee.

I join in the appeal to the Government on this matter. I see that Clause 33 deals with appeals generally, and it gives the right of appeal to an aggrieved person except as expressly provided in the Act. We get an exception at the end of Clause 25, now under discussion. I have not had the advantage of hearing the Attorney-General, but I should like to ask why the exception is put into this Clause. Why do we have the words "the opinion of the Commissioners shall in this case be final and not subject to any appeal"? I should very much like to know the reason for the appeal being denied in this particular case when in general terms it is granted under Clause 33. There must be a reason for the exception, and I have not heard any explanation. Anybody who knows what an appeal is must know that it is not a question whether one judge is better than another judge in a court of law, but a question of having a fresh and impartial mind on the point. The man who has had nothing to do with the case before has no preconceived opinion. His intellect and judgment may not be any better than the judg- ment of the person who has given his opinion before, but, at any rate, he has no preconceived idea, and is an impartial man. The person aggrieved has a right to that fresh opinion and judgment, and if he gets that opinion he goes away satisfied that justice has been done. It is for that reason I venture to appeal to the Government on this occasion to explain why this special exception is put in at the end of the Clause.

I have already said, and I have not altered my opinion, that the matter, which is purely one of discretion, might very well be left without being made the subject of any further proceedings. I think it is now agreed that there should be no appeal to the court of law. In turning to the Debate in Committee, the difference seems to have arisen as between the final decision of the Commissioners and an appeal to the court of law, and it was in that sense I dealt with the matter yesterday. The suggestion was thrown out that there might be appeal to the Referee. I said it was somewhat late in the day to make that suggestion, but it is not one which the Government need have any hesitancy in accepting if it is the will of the House. In view of the opinion expressed on both sides of the House, the Government will insert that there shall be some appeal. The Amendment now is to omit from "neighbourhood" to the end of the Clause. I propose to add the words, "shall in this case be subject to an appeal to the Referee, whose decision shall be final."

The Amendment proposed then had better be withdrawn and moved in the other form.

I move, in Sub-section (3), to leave out the words ["the opinion of the Commissioners shall be"] to the end of the Sub-section, and to insert instead thereof the words "subject to an appeal to the Referee, whose decision shall be final."

I am very glad that the Government have met us, as they have absolutely met us on this point, and I do not want to appear ungracious in treating any concession which the Government have made, but I do just wish to draw the attention of the House, and of the Government particularly, to the position in which we find ourselves. The suggestion which my hon. Friend fathered to-day was a little child which I produced yesterday on Clause 17, where the character of the discretion entrusted to the Commissioners was exactly similar to that which was entrusted to them in this Clause. I then suggested, for reasons which have now commended themselves to the Government, that whilst these matters were not matters for a court of law they were not of a character which should be left to the uncontrolled discretion of the Commissioners. Clause 17, Sub-section (3), says that the decision of the Commissioners in regard to questions arising under it shall be final and shall not be subject to any appeal. The questions there are as to what is reasonable access by the public to woodlands, parks, or gardens, whether the access is a public benefit, and whether circumstances render it probable that use by the public will continue. These questions are exactly parallel to those which arise under this Section. They are not suitable for a court of law, but they ought not to be left to the decision of a taxing or biassed authority to decide. We have, unfortunately, passed from that stage, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer was not here, and did not, as in this case, come in at the time and assent to an amending of the Clause. Therefore the two parts of the Bill are no longer in harmony one with another. We cannot go back on that decision here, but I hope when the Bill reaches another place the Government will restore harmony and introduce the necessary Amendment.

I do not think I can respond to the last appeal at any rate. I would rather recommit, but it is unnecessary. It is rather a different case. I can understand a Referee being a very good judge of a restrictive covenant, because you have always to consider the effect of restrictive covenants in cases of assessing the value of property, but when you come to the other question it is not a question of valuation at all.

It is not a question of value, but of the reasonableness of the covenant.

I know; but these covenants are covenants which have constantly to be considered by the authorities, but the other is purely a public question, which ought to be decided by a public authority. I do not think they are quite in the same position.

moved, in Sub-section (4), to leave out the words "The Commissioners shall allow as deductions from the site value of any land," and to insert instead thereof the words:—

I do not quite know what the meaning of these words which it is proposed to omit is, but I very much regret that it should be proposed to leave them out, because I like the words, "The Commissioners shall allow as deductions," and I think all those who are interested in this Bill will agree that where we have a clause practically and distinctly saying that the Commissioners shall do a certain thing it is something that they can understand, and fortifies them in giving power to that body. Therefore I very much regret that these words are to be left cut which say what the deductions are in order to arrive at the assessable site value of land. The deductions are so involved that I am quite sure the lay mind will have great difficulty in arriving at what is meant. It is also noticeable that if this Amendment is carried at the beginning of Sub-section (4), the two words, "The Commissioners," disappear. It is rather remarkable that for the first time we find a weakening of faith in the Commissioners on the part of the Government. They seem hitherto to have had absolute faith in them, but we have just listened to a weakening of faith on the part of the Government, and this is a further sign that they are still further weakening. Considering that the land is first of all to be valued by valuers, and then it is to come before Commissioners, I think the Government ought to hesitate before they leave out these words, "The Commissioners shall allow as deductions from the site value of any land." I do not quite know what the idea of the alteration is, and perhaps we shall have an explanation. Whatever that explanation is, I hope, before the House finally decides, the difference between the words will be fully explained.

I do not think the hon. Member has looked at the White Paper.

I have the White Paper.

Then, with great respect, I do not think he has read it.

I have read it.

Of course the Commissioners have put upon them the general duty of valuation, and all that we are doing is that we are re-arranging the Clause for the purpose of dividing into sub-sections the parts of a long and troublesome clause. It is merely for the sake of simplicity of statement, and when we give the assessable site value we do not mean to repeat that the Commissioners shall make deductions. We say the assessable site value shall be so and so, and there is no occasion to repeat the words as to the Commissioners allowing deductions.

moved, in paragraph (a), to leave out the word "directly" ["to be directly attributable"].

I beg to second the Amendment. The word "directly" does not seem to me to have any effect, except as limiting the discretion of the Commissioners. I believe the Chancellor of the Exchequer has considerable faith in the Commissioners, and I have also. I think the Commissioners will be men of common-sense, and will not go too wide in their attempt to discover value not really due to reasonable expenditure upon the development of an estate. But I particularly hope that the Government will be able to grant us some concession in this matter, because I think we really touch what is a danger-point in the whole of this part of the Bill. Of course the Garden City is perhaps the most salient instance of an association which actually produces what is commonly called unearned increment. It actually produces by its own operations, and mainly by indirect expenditure that value which is to be the subject of this tax. If the word "directly" is eliminated from this portion of the Bill it will affect not only garden cities, but all developing building estates. One must first of all premise that it will chiefly help those developing such estates, who approximate in their particular operations to the methods of the Garden City. It will not help the owner who sits down and spends nothing. The Amendment is to help the man who spends money on his estate, but who has to go somewhat outside ordinary business operations to attract people to a particular place. They all deserve consideration when they are doing work to encourage which is essentially one of the objects of this Bill. I hope we shall not have the answer given to us that the Garden City must be very lucky indeed if it has such an increment as will result in a taxation of £8,000. I say it is a substantial sum at any rate. The main proposition that we make is that in these cases this is not really a tax upon net increment, but upon gross increment. Of course, everyone who knows the operations of the association knows that their expenditure, I will not say mainly, but as regards one of the principal items, is expenditure which is entirely indirect in its nature. I cannot see why expenditure of a direct nature should be deducted and indirect not, provided both produce the value. The may be given that if the Clause were made too wide, the Commissioners would have all sorts of nonsensical claims made, but the Commissioners will be men of common-sense, and will disregard them. Lastly, I would express the hope that the argument will not be used that there must be hard cases. Of course, there must be hard cases, but this particular case is one that does not present any of the evils with which this portion of the Bill seeks to deal. What garden city is ever likely to hold land up or levy blackmail? The objects of the Garden City, as everyone knows, are consistent not only with the general principles of Liberalism, but with the very principles which this part of the Bill is meant to help. I believe thoroughly in the Land Clauses of the Budget; but, if it is pointed out to me by people who understand their business that this proposal is to be a machine not only to tear up the wheat with the tares, but, in a sense, to collect the wheat for destruction even more than the tares, I shall deeply regret that the Government put it forward. I do not lay particular stress on the omission of the word "directly." I shall be content to accept any form of Amendment which will protect value produced by the owner. I think that the word "reasonably" would be quite sufficient for my purpose, but I do think that to limit the discretion of the Commissioners by ruling out all indirect expenditure is likely to do harm to the principles which Liberals hold dear.

After listening carefully to both of my hon. Friends, I am not sure that even now I know what they mean. The hon. Member for North Dorset (Mr. Wills), in one part of his speech, spoke as if there was to be some great injustice inflicted on the Garden City. Then he said that these words made very little difference one way or another.

No. I think they will make a difference.

There I agree with him. I think they will make a very considerable difference, and it is for that reason that the Government must stand by them. I will tell the House why. As to the objects of the Garden City we are in complete agreement. I hope and believe that the movement will extend. I tell the hon. Member that nothing will extend garden cities more than this Budget. It will have a great effect, not merely in developing land for building, but in doing so on rational lines, which is the whole focus of the garden city movement. My hon. Friends have presented the case of one garden city. With the exception of the directors of Letchworth Garden City, the representatives of all the other garden cities concerned have expressed complete satisfaction with the concessions which the Government have made. What have the Government done to meet the case of the garden cities? They have, first of all, included in the Bill the admission that all the money spent in preparing land for development shall be deducted. They have also got in this very Clause an Amendment which provides that where "any part of the total value which is proved to the Commissioners to be directly attributable to the appropriation of any land or to the gift of any land by any person interested in the land for the purpose of streets, roads, paths, squares, gardens, or other open spaces for the use of the public"; that is to be taken into account. My hon. Friends never mentioned that. Then, in Clause 17, it is provided that Undeveloped Land Duty shall not be charged "on the site value of any land where it is shown to the Commissioners that the land is being kept free of buildings in pursuance of any definite scheme, whether framed before or after the passing of this Act, for the development of the area of which the land forms part, and that it is reasonably necessary in the interests of the public, or in view of the character of the surroundings or neighbourhood, that the land should be so kept free from buildings." Under that provision, if a whole area in the middle of a town is left unbuilt upon as part of the plan to give air space and to provide lungs for the locality, there will be exemption from the duty. We have introduced these substantial Amendments entirely to meet the case of the garden cities, and I want to put it to my hon. Friends that if we do not accept this Amendment, it is not because we have not gone out of our way to meet the case of the garden cities and safeguard their interests against anything like the nature of burdensome taxation.

One reason why we cannot accept the Amendment is that it would let in all kinds of expenditure, not only in their case, but in innumerable other cases, which are not justly attributable to any scheme of building development. We want to leave the word "directly" in the Bill to indicate to the courts when interpreting the Clause that there must be some direct connection between this expenditure and the actual development of the land. [An HON. MEMBER: "That is in the Bill."] We want it to remain in the Bill. It is of the first importance. I think my hon. Friends have grossly exaggerated the case. I do not believe that it will make the slightest difference to them to have the word "directly" included in the Clause, but it would make a difference in a large number of cases I know of. We discussed some of them yesterday. They are cases where there may be an expenditure, not merly for the purpose of land development, but for railways, docks, and other purposes. This would lead to the exemption of the whole of the building land in the neighbourhood of many towns and cities. He knows the danger of vague, obscure words and the necessity of making what the intention is absolutely clear. My hon. Friends, I believe, do not want to knock out the whole of these taxes. They believe in the Land Taxes, and sincerely support them; and yet when they want to knock out words which are deliberately put in and which are of essential importance in the construction of the machinery of this Land Tax I do not think they are acting consistently with their professions. And this is done purely in the interests of a body which is not really damnified.