I beg to move to leave out Clause 2. My reason for proposing the omission of the Clause is that this Bill is merely an extension of the Police Superannuation Act of 1890. This question has been before the House for years, and the police have been denied what most people believe to be a reasonable amendment of that measure. Even now it does not, in Scotland, put the police in the same position as the police in England.

Does the hon. Member's proposal increase the charge?

There is no charge on public funds at all.

May I call your attention to the principal Act? The charges are to be met out of the Pension Fund, and it is filled by contributions made by the police constables themselves out of their wages. These contributions are aggregated, and they eventually make the fund on which the pensions are drawn, though it is true there are certain contributions from the Exchequer.

The police contributions by the State are regulated and fixed by the Local Government Act of 1889, and cannot be increased. I do not think it would make any additional charge on the rates.

Surely, if the date is advanced, the charges must come into operation sooner.

Not unless the Bill proposes to increase the charges. The policeman would merely get the advantage a little sooner, and it would not necessarily add anything to the cost of maintaining the fund.

Where is the money coming from?

Out of the fund, which is not altered in any way.

There are contributions to the fund from various sources, including the rates, and, therefore, if you give the policeman the benefit of the fund sooner, you increase the call on the rates. You cannot on the Report stage deal with any increase in the rates.

My point is that it does not increase the rates.

And my point is that it does.

I beg to move to leave out the Clause. This is a Clause which frequently occurs in Acts of Parliament, but which always adds to the complexity of the Act. It is a Clause referring to another Act of Parliament, and stating that this Act shall be construed with the principal Act. I have been under considerable difficulty in understanding the Bill now before the House for consideration. It refers constantly to the principal Act, and that makes it exceedingly difficult to follow the nature of its provisions. It was some time before I realised what was the fund out of which the money is to be raised, a point which has just been before the House. It is also very important to know exactly who are the Police Authority. If you read the Bill you will find it has jurisdiction of the most extensive kind. I have, therefore, put down this Motion in order that the promoters should have an opportunity of explaining exactly what this Bill in connection with the principal Act does.

It is, as far as I can understand, a Bill merely to increase somewhat the pensions, allowances, and gratuities granted to constables in the police force, but there are provisions which are not quite clear. Clause 10, for example, specifies the cases in which a pension or an allowance becomes liable to be forfeited wholly or in part and permanently or temporarily, and the purport of it is not perfectly clear. In Clause 11 the references to the principal Act are incessant, and the effect of the Clause is not at all clear unless you have the principal Act in your hand. The principal Act itself has been the subject of some rather obscure Amendments by the Statute Law Revision Committee, and the Acts passed consequent on that Com- mittee's Report. These Amendments, by cutting out words which were necessary for its intelligent comprehension, have reduced the clauses to complete obscurity. I therefore hope the promoters will not object to giving us some account of the general purpose of the principal Act taken in conjunction with this amending Act, so that we may judge what is really the effect of the Act without going to the trouble of trying to construe the two together, which to the lay mind means devoting oneself to an impossible task. I do not know whether it would be possible, but it would be convenient, if clauses in other Acts referred to were printed as an appendix to the Bill. If that were done, the difficulty would be met. The promoters, no doubt, are familiar with their Bill and will be able to explain the difficult points which arise.

I shall have much pleasure in seconding the Amendment. I very strongly object to legislation by reference. It is scarcely excusable, I think, in the case of a Government Department, and in the case of a private Member's Bill it is still less excusable. Nowadays, if private Member's Bills pass, they have to do so after eleven o'clock, when the vast majority of Members have not the opportunity of discussing them or of knowing anything about them. The only opportunity they have is to read the Bill, and if in addition to reading the Bill they have to read all sorts of other Acts of Parliament, the result is that a large number of Members are asked after eleven o'clock to pass a Bill they do not understand. We ought at least to be able to understand what we are legislating about, and I hope the hon. Member for Dumbartonshire (Mr. Dundas White) will toe able to respond to the appeal of my Noble Friend. That is one of the reasons which induced me to support the Amendment, and I think it is a sufficient reason, but there is another reason. I really do not see any object in this particular Clause. It says the Police (Scotland) Act, 1890, is hereinafter referred to as the principal Act. Everybody knows that the Act before this was the principal Act. At the very commencement it says it is a Bill to amend the Police (Scotland) Act, 1890. Why, therefore, repeat the Act of 1890 as the principal Act later on in a clause all to itself? My Noble Friend says it would be a good thing if the whole of the clauses of other Acts referred to were printed in the Bill. I do not know whether he has read the Act of 1890?

My suggestion was that they should be printed and added as a sort of appendix corresponding to the Memorandum.

It would be a very long Memorandum. There are something like thirty or forty clauses in this Act. I read all these private Bills and my Noble Friend does not, and I do not wish, in addition to reading all the private Bills, to have to read anything else to which they may possibly refer. Therefore, although I disagree with that suggestion of my Noble Friend, I have much pleasure in seconding his Amendment.

I hope the Noble Lord will not press the Amendment.

My object is to give an opportunity for explanation.

As regards the particular form of words adopted, I think the Noble Lord will recognise that it is the general form in these cases.

But the fact that a thing has once been done in this House is not a good reason for always following the precedent. Nobody enforces that idea more strongly than hon. Members opposite.

But this form has obtained for many years even among the party opposite as regards "legislation by reference." I do not think that the observations of the hon. Baronet apply except in one case in this Bill. They may apply later on to a reference in Clause 12, but that I think is the only case. I hope the House will not accept this Amendment.

What I was anxious for was for the hon. Member to show what will be the effect of the words "shall be construed as one with the principal Act." As I understand it, the two Acts are to be read together as though they were one Act. I want to get at the general effect of the application of the two Acts taken together. The House ought to know what it is doing. The hon. Member, I believe, had no opportunity of making a speech on the Second Beading of the Bill, and, therefore, the majority of Members are in the same position as I was yesterday until I looked into the provisions and tried to find out how they would work together. I wanted the hon. Member to explain the Pension Fund. What fund is it out of which this money is to be paid? As I understand it, the construction of the principal Act depends on the clause we are now discussing.

I do not think that that matter can be gone into to-day. The Noble Lord must construe it for himself. He would not be bound by the construction put upon it by any other hon. Member. Hon. Members will construe the clauses along with each other, and each hon. Member must construe them as well as he can for himself.

Surely it is reasonable for the House to know before it makes a Pension Fund apply, which Fund is going to be made to apply.

The Noble Lord complained of the lack of opportunity for asking information on the Second Reading stage, but he had full opportunity of getting the information on the Committee upstairs.

I was not on that Committee.

I thought the Noble Lord was. At any rate, all the Members for Scotland interested in this Bill had full opportunity of discussing it upstairs, and so far as I remember this Clause was never challenged in any way. I appeal to the Noble Lord not to press this Motion. The Committee are rather proud of the fact that they passed this Bill through in about two hours without a division and almost without a single word of comment. If the hon. Baronet had been there it might have taken two and a quarter hours, but not more, for I am sure he would have been impressed with the business-like character of the Committee. I would appeal to the House that this is a small matter of Scottish opinion on which the decision of a practically Scottish Committee should be predominant. I hope that the new interest which the Noble Lord is taking in Scottish affairs will be helpful, but on this occasion I think he may fairly leave the Scottish Members to deal with the point. I wonder if the Noble Lord has any interest in another Bill which is coming on to-day, or are we to take it he is only anxious to see justice done to Scotland?

I beg to move to omit from Sub-section (1) the words, "if the police authority think fit."

This is one of the many instances where the police authority have control. It may be a very proper provision to a police constable who is serving in the Royal Naval Reserve or Army Reserve should have his period of service reckoned as approved service, but why should it depend on the choice of the individual police authority? No doubt that is a proper body to deal with matters of discipline, but this is a question of general policy, and the policy should be the same all over the country or you might have the service count in the case of the Glasgow police and not in the case of the Edinburgh police. The police should be the same all over the country, and therefore I suggest the matter is one of national significance, and has no local bearing whatever. I therefore move the omission of the words "if the police authority think fit." I want to have a uniform rule throughout the whole country.

I beg to second the Amendment. I quite agree with the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy that on this occasion Scottish Members were more or less unanimous in wishing to get the Bill passed. We differed on certain points, and I do not think we had a proper chance of discussing them. It would be impossible to discuss a Bill of this sort in two hours, and my hon. Friend knows that while there was a mechanical majority upstairs there is an even still greater mechanical majority here. As to this particular point, I think that it would be very hard on certain very good individuals in the police force who have served their country before in the Army or Navy, if because they are Reservists and are called upon by their country to serve on mobilisation and to go and fight they should suffer in regard to their pensions in respect of the time for which they are so called out and over which they have no control at all. It would be extremely hard upon them and upon their wives and families, and it is an invidious thing that a man who has served in the Army or Navy should be put in a worse position than the man who has not done so. For this reason I shall support the Amendment, and I cannot see why it should be a question for the police authority whether they think fit or not. It is a question of fact, and it is a question of the honour of the nation that we should not put a man in a worse position as regards pension because he has been called upon to fight again. I hope the promoters of this Bill will accept this Amendment, because it is made in perfectly good faith, and it is pre-eminently a fair thing to ask. It would only leave out a few words. It is a pity that although Scottish Members are unanimous on this measure more of them are not here It shows the enormous interest they take in the matter, that the first time we have a chance of discussing a Scottish measure the promoters are unfortunately not present. This Bill affords one example that the Scottish Members when acting together upstairs have been able to agree together, and I think we may act together in regard to other measures which are more necessary to Scotland. I support the Amendment.

I think that the case made out by my Noble Friend is a very good one, and I am very much impressed by the arguments which have been so ably and clearly laid before the House by the Noble Lord beside me (Marquess of Tullibardine). The hon. Gentleman, the Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir Henry Dalziel), tried to make out that the fact that this Bill went through the Committee stage in the Scotch Committee in two hours, was a reason why these words should be retained, but the fact is that it is drafted in such a slovenly manner because it went through in two hours.

All the distinguished colleagues of the hon. Member were on that Committee, and they would not have allowed it to go through if it was badly drafted.

I do not know who the hon. Member alludes to as my distinguished colleagues, but if he alludes to the right hon. Gentleman who leads the Opposition I do not think he was on the Committee. At all events I have never seen him on the Scottish Committee. As far as I am concerned I allowed this Bill to go through because I thought it was a good one, and it is a very great shock to me that, when I have allowed this Bill to go through the House, it is to be rushed through the Scottish Committee upstairs without due and proper consideration. There is only one objection that I have to the Amendment of my Noble Friend, and that is that this is a State matter. We are going to legislate that the local authority shall count the time which has been devoted to the service of the State in reckoning the pension, and the local authority is going to pay. The proper persons to do that, however, are the State, and they should pay that portion of the pension which has accrued from the fact that a certain amount of the time has been spent in their service. I feel quite certain that if I attempted to move an Amendment to that effect you, Sir, would rule me out of order, because on the Report stage no Amendment of that character can be moved. I should like, however, to point out to my Noble Friend that though an Amendment to that effect would be out of order, I think I am right in saying, that we can recommit the Bill before the Third Reading in order to put in an Amendment to that effect. Therefore, if this Amendment is agreed to, then I would suggest to my Noble Friend that he should move to recommit the Bill before we come to the Third Reading in order to put in an Amendment that the pension so earned should be paid by the State. I do not know whether that is in order, but I throw it out as a suggestion. If the Clause is allowed to remain as it is you may have the police of Dumbarton in one position and those of Sutherland in another, and what is more likely to foment discontent in the force? I feel that either these words must be left out or the Clause must be omitted altogether.

It would, I think, be well to leave discretion to the local authority. I, for one, believe in administration by that authority wherever possible, rather than by a Department. I think that the local authority is perfectly competent to decide matters of this kind. It must be remembered that local authorities in Scotland at the present moment are obliged to look with extreme suspicion upon measures for adding to the emoluments or improving the position of the police, not because the interests of the police do not hold the very foremost place in the minds of the local authorities but because, owing to the very small proportion paid by the State under the pay and clothing allowance, the burden of the force is now getting a very serious one in Scotland, and until this question is taken up and re-opened again, and until the State makes a fair contribution the attitude of the local authorities will be very suspicious towards measures of this kind, and I think it is well that the local authorities should have this discretion in this particular case. I think that is a good reason which may not be in the mind of some hon. Members who are now discussing the Bill. When the Noble Lord refers to any lack of interest shown by Scotch Members in the Bill I would say that those who are interested in the passage of the Bill might well have brought up their points in the earlier stage of the discussion, but I think the best way to show a real interest in the Bill is not to lend countenance to the extension of the discussion at this stage, seeing that the Scottish Members are practically agreed as to the necessity of its passing.

I brought up both these points on the Committee myself, and discussed them with the hon. Member.

I agree largely with the hon. Member, but I think there is a certain hardship, because, unfortunately, only a fixed sum is allocated for this purpose, and it is unfortunate that that should be used as an argument against placing the whole of the police in Scotland in exactly the same position. There are local authorities who are generous and others who are stingy—I have had experience of both—and I know that the pensions, as a general rule, are very narrowly looked at by many members of local authorities who see no chance of getting a pension themselves, and continually feel that they are being obliged, year after year, by the operation of Parliamentary laws, to provide pensions for other people. I do not think this is a matter which ought to be left to the local authorities to decide, for that reason, and also for the reason that it seems to me that the whole force in Scotland, particularly when you consider that there are frequent transfers from one force to another, should not be placed in precisely the same position in regard to pensions. I do not think that in serious circumstances, such as calling out the reserves, any local authority would desire to punish any of their Civil servants in consequence of their performing a duty to the country. I did not myself think of moving any Amendment of this kind. While I know in most cases they would be liberally and generously treated, in others they would probably not, and it seems unfair that there should be any disability of that kind resting upon any public servant. The question of the contribution by the Treasury is a very vexed one indeed and it ought to be put right. I am bound to admit that my own side is responsible for that arrangement—it appeared in the Bill of 1899—but I rather think the other side contributed to that mistake, and equal responsibility and blame, if there is blame in the matter, rests upon them, but I do not think that ought to be advanced as an argument. If the Noble Lord goes to a Division I shall certainly support him

I am just as anxious to promote the interests of economy as the hon. Member (Mr. Munro Ferguson) and the hon. Member (Mr. Younger), but I think it is very hard that this economy should be practised at the cost of so deserving a service as the police. The hon. Member (Mr. Munro Ferguson) spoke of this as a question between the Department and the local authorities, but it is really a question between this House and the local authorities. Ought the House to lay down a general rule with regard to these pensions, or ought they to leave it to the tender mercies of various local authorities? Of all questions as to which there ought to be certainty, even in the interests of economy itself, that of pensions is one. A pension is no use at all if it is uncertain. It does not increase the efficiency of the Service. It does not give him any more reason for eager service. No money can be so much wasted as the pension which is given at the end of a service by the chance mercy of some local authority. The man serving must know exactly what he is to expect. If he goes abroad or gives up his time to serve in His Majesty's Forces it ought to be known as a certainty, and not as a mere contingency, that this will be accepted as part of his regular service. There may be particular local authorities with fads of their own—we know that such things do exist in every part of the country—who will rather look with aversion upon any such service by a policeman and will resolve to punish him rather than reward him for giving up his time in such a way. This is no hindrance to the Bill. We are as anxious as hon. Member's opposite that the Bill should pass. It may easily pass if you have the ordinary feeling of compromise which is now in the air, I suppose, and yield to a reasonable argument such as this. I trust the Noble Lord will give us an opportunity of expressing our opinion by taking a Division on the Amendment.

Like other Scottish Members, I am open to the accusation no doubt that this question was pushed in Committee, but, as a new Member, it is one of those points which was not perhaps brought so particularly to my notice as it has been during this discussion. It would be no loss to the Bill if these words were dropped, and it would be a very great advantage. We are, I think, all agreed that a man who serves his country in the capacity of a soldier or in the Reserves should not be placed under any disability, and there is no reason to suppose that if these words are dropped out you would do anything more than assure to every man who so served his country that he will not be placed at that disadvantage. The hon. Member (Mr. Munro Ferguson) referred to the fact that it would be much better to leave these matters to the local authorities. My own opinion is that the local authorities can be trusted to a very large extent, but in the experience which I have had of local authorities I have often noticed that there is extraordinary difference in getting uniformity in dealing with matters even in various districts of the same county, and when that is the case, and when it is patent that we are not doing anything more in leaving out these words than putting it beyond dispute that a man in the Service who serves his country and is undoubtedly entitled to receive recognition of that service should I have it, I think on those grounds, if on no others, hon. Members might do well to drop them. I have taken a considerable interest in this question of the police. I certainly regard the police in Scotland as being placed at a disadvantage with those in the rest of the United Kingdom, and I am very strongly desirous to see this Bill passed and to see something done to better the position of the police in Scotland. I think the promoters of the Bill would do well to drop out these words in the interests of the police themselves.

I sympathise to a great extent with what has been said in support of the Amendment. The Noble Lord in moving it spoke of it as being a national and not a local matter. But when the hon. Baronet (Sir F. Banbury) rose to bless the Amendment, I am afraid he rather knocked a hole in it by pointing out that the contribution to the police and the police pensions was largely local. I think the contribution to the police, and particularly to the police pensions, is largely local, and to a great extent the local authorities must be allowed discretion. As regards the use of the discretion, the hon. Baronet took the instance of the police in the county I represent. Certainly in such a case, and in any other case, I should be in favour of a general rule, and I think I can say that every county in Scotland without exception would be in favour of that same general rule. But it is possible that particular circumstances in particular cases might arise in which they should still be allowed to exercise a modified discretion if it seemed good. It is on that account that I support the words in the Bill. I myself think that all our Scottish local authorities recognise that the discretion will always be exercised well and generously. I certainly would not be a party to the restriction of a power which I am certain would only be exercised in special cases. I would like to point out to hon. Gentlemen opposite that in framing this Bill the promoters have followed the exact lines of the Police Superannuation Act of 1906, which applies to England. If hon. Members will look at Section 4, Sub-section 1, of the English Act, they will see that the words in this Bill are in the precise form of that Subsection. It does seem to me that on the national principle to which the Noble Lord has referred there should be the same law for Scotland as for England, and I claim that the Scottish local authorities should be put in precisely the same position as the English local authorities were put in several years ago. In these circumstances I venture to say that, as this already is the law in England, it would be in the general interest if the Noble Lord would see his way to withdraw the Amendment.

The lion. Member opposite (Mr. Dundas White) referred to the fact that many special cases might arise, but he has not given the House any examples of the special cases which might arise.

I beg the hon. Gentleman's pardon. I did not intend to say that many special cases would arise. I only said it was conceivable that they would arise, and that for the purpose of dealing with them it was desirable these words should be retained.

The hon. Member used the words "special cases." I took them down when the words left his lips. I hope the Noble Lord will carry this Amendment to a Division. Perhaps it is hardly realised that reservists at the present time are under considerable disadvantages in connection with some of the police authorities. Perhaps hon. Members opposite think that they can absolutely trust the local police authorities. I suppose that of all police authorities the Metropolitan Police authority stands as high as any, and yet even there reservists suffer under considerable disadvantages as compared with other members of their community. The number of reservists in the Metropolitan Police is not only strictly limited, but it is kept at a very small number indeed, so that when reservists desire to find service in that force they are very much handicapped. It is perfectly clear, therefore, that if such an authority as the Metropolitan Police authority exercise their power against the interest of reservists, it might also be done by others. I and my Friends on this side of the House contend that those who have served in the Army or Navy have a special claim for employment in the police force. Surely it is not wise to give the wide latitude contained in the Bill.

At first I had considerable sympathy with the Amendment proposed by the Noble Lord (Lord H. Cecil), and as there seems to be some disposition on this side of the House to vote with him I get up to state the reasons why I cannot support the Amendment. I agree with the hon. Member for Dumbartonshire (Mr. Dundas White) that it is undesirable to take away the discretion from the local authority unless very good cause can be shown. I have not heard as yet during the course of the discussion any good cause why this discretion should be taken away from them, and I can conceive circumstances in which, if it were taken away, the position of the constable would be worsened rather than otherwise. If you leave it open for local authorities to pay a pension in respect of time served in the Navy or the Army, I think that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred probably the pension would be given. Therefore the question which remains is whether that would affect the chances of Reserve men being taken on as constables. If you put in the Bill a compulsory provision that when a man is called away from local service, and notwithstanding that he is not serving a local authority, he must get a pension for the time he is not serving the local authority, is it not probable that a local authority, having that in their mind, may prohibit in some way or another the employment of a man who has served in the Army or Navy? Therefore, if you pass the Amendment, you will probably in that way make the position of the Reserve man worse than it is now. I think that probably at present the Reserve man has a preference for being taken on as a constable by a local authority. I do not know, but I say that it is very likely that the methodical habits of a man trained in the Army or Navy may induce a local authority to engage him because these habits may be of service to him as a policeman. If you pass the Amendment, I think it is probable that the preference may be converted into, if not a prohibition of employment, at all events into a preference for the man who is not a reservist. I venture to suggest to the Noble Lord that there is something in that aspect of the matter. It is all very well to say that the man is called upon by a higher authority to go and serve in the Army or the Navy instead of the police force, and that therefore, inasmuch as he is serving the public in any case, he should not be prevented from getting his pension from the local authority. But, after all, if he is called away to serve in the Army or the Navy, is it not logical and just that the higher authority should pay him? It seems to me that is so, and, as a matter of fact, he is already paid. If a man is already in the Reserve I suppose it is very improbable that he will be called upon for service. He only gets a sort of retaining fee for a number of years on the chance of being called upon. It is reasonable, therefore, to say that in respect of the time he has served in the Regular Forces he has already been paid. If he has not been paid sufficiently, and if the Noble Lord will bring forward a Motion at the proper time that he should be paid sufficiently when called away, I can promise him whole-hearted support. In the meantime I favour the Bill as it is because I believe in leaving to the local authorities as much discretion as possible. I think the local authorities will take a generous view of things of this sort, and therefore I see no reason why I should vote for any Amendment of this character, which will put the police force of Scotland in a worse position than the police of England.

The hon. Member for the Blackfriars Division (Mr. Barnes), in his concluding observations, it seems to me, has argued inconsistently with the first part of his speech, because he says it might be better for the constable if we did not press this Amendment, as the pecuniary loss which might be involved might operate to prevent the local authority from engaging reserve men. If we are to suppose that the police authority have so little patriotic feeling that they would allow a consideration of that kind to handicap men of good character who are otherwise fit, how can we possibly trust them with this or any other discretion? To exclude altogether from the service those who have served their country in the Army or Navy simply because of a remote contingent expenditure that might fall upon a local authority would show that that body was too much out of touch with patriotic feeling to be trusted with discretion on this or any other matter. Therefore, I do not think that that argument can be maintained, nor do I think that what is indicated is in the least likely to come about. No doubt you can never tell whether any particular cantankerous

I. beg to move to leave out of paragraph (e) the words "the police authority consider to be," and insert "is," leaving the paragraph to read in this way: "If the grantee supplies to any person or publishes in a manner which is discreditable or improper."

The provision as it stands in the Bill leaves the police authority power to absolutely determine, as far as I understand it, whether a pension should be forfeited or not. It is for that authority to decide absolutely and without appeal whether any particular confidential information has been discreditably or improperly disclosed. That seems to me to be a very important power to put into the hands of the police authorities. It may be justifiable, but I cannot at all see the defence for it. The position of the pensioner is absolutely at the mercy of the police authority: they can say that anything which was indiscreet was a "discreditable" or "improper" disclosure, although the provision might not be applicable, at any rate to the degree necessary for procuring the forfeiture of the pension. It is an exceedingly serious and heavy penalty for what might be a mere act of indiscretion. Possibly it may be a defensible proceeding that the local authority should have absolute command over the pension of a man who has had long service in the police, but it does seem to put a very heavy burden on a policeman that if he is casually indiscreet in what he says in the course of some investigation, or in answers to questions, he should be held guilty of an indiscretion, and that thereupon the whole of his pension should be forfeited. I think that is rather harsh measures to deal out. I should have thought it was proper, if this matter must be at the discretion of some authority, that it should be a higher authority than the police authority who should have the decision of the matter, or else that it should be thrown upon the police authority to show that the disclosure was discreditable, while the constable should have the right to show the contrary. That is the nature of my Amendment as it stands. I hope the supporters of the Bill will give some explanation of the reason for inserting this very drastic provision in the measure, and that they will be able to justify what on the face of it seems to me a very hard and superfluous condition.

seconded the Amendment. I am not quite clear whether my Noble Friend thinks that this paragraph should be left out.

I only leave out the words "the police authority consider to be," leaving the sub-section to read: "if the grantee supplies to any person or publishes in a manner which is discreditable or improper," etc.

I am very glad of that, for I think some sort of power ought to be retained to prevent a police constable from publishing information which he might have obtained in the course of his employment when he was on actual service. Certainly I disagree altogether with the giving of power to the police authorities on their own initiative and without any appeal to any judicial authority to take away the pension of a police constable, earned by many years of service, because perhaps in some foolish moment he has done inadvertently something which he ought not to have done. This is another instance of the great powers which hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite seem to be willing to leave in the hands of officials and local authorities. Under this Bill we are giving increased advantage to the police in regard to superannuation. We do not give that increased advantage unless we think the police deserve it. Yet, when the House of Commons think that something of that sort ought to be done, it allows some small sub-section of a clause like this to be put in, which practically annuls all the advantages which the House is giving to this force. I do not say that the police authorities are likely to act in a tyrannical manner, or to take a dictatorial line, but we cannot always trust everybody; human nature, even human nature opposite, sometimes errs, and it is evident, I think, that we should not put the whole well-being of pensioners in the power of one particular authority after they have passed out of the jurisdiction of that authority. I do not know what line the hon. Member for Dumbartonshire is going to take, but I cannot conceive that he will resist this Amendment, the effect of which will be that where it is proposed that the pensions shall be forfeited it will have to be shown that the information was discreditably or improperly disclosed. I do not think that the sub-section as it stands, which makes the police authority the sole judge, can be supported by hon. Members opposite. I trust therefore that the Amendment will be accepted.

The promoters would hardly be justified in accepting this Amendment for various reasons. I know it would be beyond my task to convince the hon. Baronet (Sir F. Banbury), but I would point out that in Section 5 of the English Police Superannuation Act there are exactly the same words conferring exactly the same discretion on the English police authorities. Our position on that point is that we do not want to limit the discretion of the Scottish police authorities to a greater extent than the discretion of the English police authorities is limited. On the point as to who should be the judges, both in England and in Scotland, the police authorities are the only judges that have been suggested. Consequently it seems to me that the point of judgment must really be left to their discretion. There is another reason for which, and on account of the interests of the police themselves, it would be highly undesirable to accept this Amendment Assume that the Amendment was accepted and that the Bill thus amended became law, and that then there is some discreditable publication within the Section, under the circumstances the police authorities would have no alternative but to dismiss the man. The object of the Clause is to enable them to modify their action, and to deal wholly or in part with the pension. I think that that alternative, by way of discretion, should be given as it is in England, and that it should be reserved to the police authorities in fairness to the grantee.

This is not a question of dismissing a man, but of reducing or withdrawing his pension. This Clause is a very great advance on that in the English Act. In the English Act the grounds stated are if the man associates with thieves or refuses to give the police all the information and assistance in his power for the detection of crime and the detection of criminals, or if he carries on any business, occupation or employment which is illegal, or in which he has made use of the fact that he is in employment in the police. Those are very specific and very plain and flagrant cases, as to which there could be no great difficulty or doubt. When you come to decide what is "discreditable" and what is "improper" you enter on a very much wider field. It appears to me that while the authorities ought to have some discretion in the matter, there ought to be, as there is in certain instances, power of appeal given whenever you get on questions of opinion and not on questions of fact. My hon. Friend knows that in one case publication might be improper, and in another it might not. It would depend on what was published and on the circumstances, and all sorts of considerations, and therefore this is extending the powers enormously and very widely as against the individual. While I do not know that I should care to support my Noble Friend in taking out the words suggested in his Amendment, I should be very glad if the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Dundas White) would see some way of adding to this Clause a provision that under circumstances of this kind the man should have an appeal, because the question is not one of fact but of opinion.

I do not think that the Noble Lord is right in construing the Clause, or that he has thoroughly thought out the effect of his Amendment. As I understood his argument in favour of leaving out these words, it was based upon the opinion that the words, "which the police authority consider to be discreditable or improper," apply not only to the publication, but to the supply of the information as well. If the Noble Lord will look at the Clause he will see that there is a distinction drawn between the supplying of the information and the publication of the information in the words, "If the grantee supplies to any person or publishes in a manner…" Supposing the words "or publishes in a manner which the police authority consider to be discreditable or improper" are left out the Clause would then read: "If the grantee supplies to any person any information of a confidential nature.…" The Noble Lord will see that the word "which" qualifies the word "manner," and the discretion given to the police authority is only a discretion to say that they may consider the manner of publication to be discreditable or improper. It gives them no express discretion on the question whether any information which is supplied is information in respect of which there is improper conduct. I am not, of course, responsible for the words of the Clause, nor do I think the wording of the Clause particularly happy, but the mere omission of the words menti6ned in the Amendment hardly carries out the object the Noble Lord has in view.

I may be wrong, but I should have thought the words "in a manner" are meant to govern the whole Sub-section, and that it is a general expression intended to govern the whole of the disputable words in the Sub-section, and that, therefore, the police authority would have the discretion to determine what was discreditable or not. If the hon. Member's theory is right, I cannot quite understand how the Clause will operate. It cannot be directed against a constable shouting out in the street or in a disorderly way, but must be intended to prevent publication, and not, strictly speaking, the manner of publication.

The offence, as I understand it, is the breach of confidence in supplying confidential information; and it does not matter whether the manner of publication or the manner of supplying it is discreditable or not.

I agree. I presume, therefore, that the question for the police authority would be whether, taking the circumstances of the particular case into consideration, this sort of information ought to be published in this sort of way. There has recently been before the House a conspicuous case—the Anderson revelations—which would have raised this very point if a police officer had been concerned.

I am not against the Amendment of the Noble Lord. I merely pointed out the construction of the Clause.

I do not wish to put the House to the trouble of another Division. No doubt the Bill will go to another place, and I hope the hon. Member will consider whether the whole of this Sub-section might not be redrafted and made rather more workable.

moved to leave out paragraph (g).

This Sub-section imposes a restriction against policemen engaging in the business of a private detective after retiring from the police force. The proposal, on the face of it, seems to me rather difficult to defend. The business of a private detective may cover what is perfectly legitimate or it may cover what is highly illegitimate. It is often a business of a very discreditable character. You are really setting up here a sort of licensing authority for private detectives, and you are treating that business much in the same way as you treat the business of a licensed victualler. I think that is a somewhat objectionable proposal. You will have the police authorities always scrutinising the proceedings of a private detective, and saying whether or not the business is being conducted in a proper manner. All sorts of allegations might be made—allegations of blackmail, or highly injurious imputations on personal character, and the question might arise whether the licence of a private detective ought not to be withdrawn. I have always disliked the licensing laws, and have thought that free trade in liquor would be the true solution of many of the difficulties which face us in that matter. In my opinion, it would be undesirable to extend administrative control over this business. You are giving the local authorities an administrative control over the business of men who have been in the police force. That is a dangerous and, I should have thought, a novel proposal. It is in a different plane of thought from the provisions in the principal Act, which, for the most part, deal with plain matters of fact. I hope the hon. Member will consider whether he cannot omit these words.

I second the Amendment. There may be something behind the Sub-section of which we are not aware, but as I had not the advantage of serving on the Scottish Committee I should like to know why the Clause was put in. On the face of it, the case made out by my Noble Friend is almost unanswerable. A pension is given to a police officer for services rendered in a fit and proper way: the man has not been dismissed or censured, and all the rules have been observed. You do not say that such a man is not to engage in otter work. Many valuable servants are provided by retired police officers in receipt of pensions. But you now propose to say that though he may engage in other work, there is a par- ticular business into which he may not enter if the police authority prohibits him from so doing. My Noble Friend is not quite correct in referring to the police authority as the local authority. I understand that the police authority in Scotland, as in England, is a combination of the magistrate and the local authority. Therefore, the matter does not depend entirely on the local authority. If it did I should certainly be in favour of the Amendment. There is some reason to believe that this prohibition would be exercised with ordinary care and caution. But why should this power be given at all? Can the hon. Member bring forward a single case in which, if this power were not given, something might result which ought not to happen? Does he know any cases where abuses have arisen through police officers in receipt of pensions serving as private detectives? My Noble Friend says that many discreditable matters have occurred in the offices of private detectives. I have no acquaintance with private detectives; my Noble Friend apparently has. Of course, I do not mean with the discreditable occurrences to which he refers. No particular branch of employment will always be perfectly immaculate, but I do not know of any flagrant instance where private detectives who have been police officers have done something against the interests of the public. I am opposed to all this interference with a man's life. I do not think you ought, if you can possibly avoid it, to be continually setting up authorities, local or otherwise, to investigate the procedure of certain people. The hon. Member may be able to show that there are sound reasons for this provision, but unless he can I shall support my Noble Friend.

In the Sub-section there is the saving clause that "If there is in the opinion of the police authorities any reasonable ground." "Reasonable ground" is fully wide, and probably will be properly interpreted. I do not think there has been any complaint as to the working of the English Clause. If this Clause has not been working well in the English Act it was the duty of the hon. Baronet to let us know of it. Mention was made of flagrant cases.

I am sure my Noble Friend does not wish to misrepresent me. I did not bring up any flagrant case. I asked the hon. Gentleman opposite to bring up a flagrant case and then we should be convinced. I put it the same way to the Noble Lord.

I thought the flagrant case argument was used. The hon. Baronet the Member for the City stated that he did not know of any instance: "flagrant instance" were the exact words, which means he did not know of an instance.

No, no; not at all.

In any case, I do not think there has been any complaint since 1906 in regard to the similar Clause in the English Act, and I do not see why we should anticipate it with regard to Scotland. In any case, I think it will be easily understood that the business of a private detective should be carried on in a way which is conducive to the public welfare. If it is not carried on in such a manner the police, I think, are the proper people to deal with the matter. As to this particular Clause relating to police pensioners, the very best reason a man can have for doing what is right is that possibly he may lose that pension if he does not carry on his business in a proper manner. I have no doubt my hon. Friend has found some great flaw in what I have stated, and we shall hear it on the Amendment. I am sorry to say that whatever he says will not persuade me that this particular Amendment will conduce to the good of the Bill.

I should like to join the Noble Lord below in uttering my protest against this Amendment. I do not think it will be really accepted by a large number. In fact, I would propose myself, if it were possible, that the hon. Member should consider the propriety of not doing away with this restriction, but of making it very considerably severer. I should have liked him to leave out altogether the last few words in the Sub-section, and to make it impossible for a police officer in any sense to become a private detective. I think that of all occupations that of a private detective is one of the most unsavoury. It is not one which is in the interests of the public as a whole. It leads necessarily to suspicion and a disagreeable spirit, and to what may very easily become a very considerable interference with the ways of justice. Of all people most dangerous in the position of a private detective is the one who has been a constable, and who may be in receipt of a pension. Such a man can introduce himself into the inner circle of the police, and into their more intimate conversation. He learns distinctly from them what a great many other men could not learn. He is unduly aided in this what I call the unsavoury business of a private detective by having previously been a member of a police force. I shall be very glad if instead of accepting this Amendment the hon. Member would delete the last few words, and make the grantee who is a private detective absolutely shut out from those who hold police pensions.

Hon. Members who have spoken have expressed very fully the views of the promoters of this Bill. I can assure the hon. Baronet the Member for the City of London that there is no desire in any way to enable any person to do other than to earn an honest livelihood as a private detective. I am speaking of the Bill as it stands; but it has become a very serious matter, in view of the very discreditable character of much private detective work, if police reservists can embark upon it, and can use the experience and knowledge of police affairs which they have acquired in the service for the purpose of a private detective agency, and can get paid not only for their service, but in a sense for the experience they have won in the force. Therefore it seems to me very desirable that the police authorities should in such a case have discretion, and should, if the reservist is engaged on undesirable or private detective work, be able to say: "Very well, if you insist upon using your experience in this way then to some extent the pension shall be discontinued." That seems to be very reasonable. I do not want to refer unduly to the English Act of 1896. That Act contains precisely the same provision. For years that Act has worked well in England. I feel again that the Scottish police authorities ought to have exactly the same discretion as the English police authorities, and their discretion should not be in any way unduly narrowed. I quite appreciate the criticism of the Noble Lord on the Act of 1906, but I say this: it seems to me desirable that in the present Bill the powers of the police authorities in both countries should be placed on a par.

So far as I know there have been no complaints from the police in Scotland with regard to this particular Clause. It has reference only to some pensioner who wants to do what is wrong. I think hon. Members ought to be satisfied and not talk so much upon this Bill, about which probably they do not know much, seeing that they will have sufficient opportunity for talking upon other things about which they know something.

I am quite prepared to acknowledge the great courtesy of the hon. Member for Dumbarton. He has met us in a most conciliatory spirit, and I regret that the hon. Member for Sunderland should not have followed the excellent example which was set him. I do not like to press this Amendment against the sense of Scottish Members, but I think that hon. Members have not quite appreciated how strong the case for it is. There was one occasion when I myself was interested in private detective work. In connection with a certain election in which I was interested there was a suspicion that illegal practices had taken place in the constituency. I desired to make inquiries myself, and I went to a private detective firm for assistance. Let us suppose such a thing occurred in Scotland, and a private detective was employed in connection with some electioneering interest. We all know it is part of the regular business of private detectives to look into such cases and to help to get them up. The collection of evidence is indeed the very essence of election petitions, and for that purpose private detectives are employed. Supposing a private detective who had been a policeman was engaged upon an inquiry connected with a contested election, would he not be liable to reprisals in periods of great political heat from the police authorities who might be, and very likely would be, strong politicians? They might say there are these various ways of conducting these inquiries, and they might say the private detective conducted his inquiries in an improper manner. The police authorities might come down upon him and say: "We prohibit you from going on with this any longer." That is a sort of case it seems to me that might very easily happen. It would be a case where the police authorities, acting rightly or wrongly, were acting with bias. There is no more unsound policy than to give an administrative body control of any business. We are suffering here from exactly the same fault as under the Licensing Law. There is hesitation in people's minds in regard to something which is wrong to them and which ought to be put down by law, but which is allowed as a business. You ought to make up your mind in either case whether to allow the thing or to prohibit it. If you propose to allow this private detective business, let its course come under the ordinary provisions of business enterprise. If you propose to prohibit it, pass a penal law and put it down. Make this business illegal.

We do not say it is illegal, but we would prevent a detective acquiring knowledge which he would get as an ex-policeman which he could not otherwise get.

My hon. Friend's position is: You may be a private detective so long as you are incompetent, but the moment you have skill in the matter you ought to be prohibited by law. If you are to prohibit it by law, do so, and do not leave it to the police authorities to come down under the stimulus of political excitement to compel a man to give up his business or to forfeit his business. I protest against the Clause, but as my Friends are all against me, it is hardly worth while dividing upon it.

I beg to move to leave out Sub-section (1).

2.0 P.M.

I shall have to read a portion of the Act of 1890, in order to make clear what I want to do. I am sorry to have to do so, but this is the effect of legislation by reference. The Sub-section which I propose to omit is not clear unless the Act of 1890 is read in conjunction with it. The first part of Clause 25 of the Act of 1890 says that no person shall be appointed to any police force unless he has come to the age of twenty-five years. That, of course, is a very good condition, especially when there is a Superannuation Act, because you do not want to appoint a person who is so old that he immediately becomes eligible for a pension. Sub-section (2) of Section 25 says: "The limit of age in this Section before mentioned does not apply to the case of a person immediately transferred from another police force, or who has, in the immediately preceding three months served in His Majesty's Navy or Army, provided that such person when transferred or appointed shall not be more than thirty years of age." Unless my Amendment is accepted the word "thirty" will be left out and "forty-five" will be put in. I do not think that is the intention of hon. Gentlemen in charge of the Bill. Any person who has for three months previous to his election to the police force served in the Army or Navy, though he may be forty-four years eleven months old, may be appointed a police constable. I am told that before he would become entitled to a pension he would have to serve a certain number of years. That may be so, but surely it cannot be the intention of the promoters of the Bill to appoint people of forty-four years of age to be police constables. I am not quite certain what length of time a constable must serve to be entitled to a pension; but supposing he must serve twenty-five years, if you add twenty-five years to forty-five years you arrive at seventy, and I venture to say no ordinary police constable would be kept in the force until he is seventy. He would be no use at all, even in a law-abiding country like Scotland. I venture to say that forty-five years of age is much too old to appoint a person to serve as police constable. A police constable is required to be an active and energetic person with all his physical powers about him for the purpose of coping with breakers of the law. At the age of forty-five physical forces begin to deteriorate, and you cannot jump and run and do those things which can be done earlier in life. The Section which it is proposed to repeal is a good one, and ought not to be repealed, and I do not see why it should be repealed in a Bill dealing with superannuation. My hon. Friend (Mr. George Younger) tells me that it has no effect upon superannuation, but may I point out that the Section to be repealed deals with the transfer from one police force to another and with the enlistment of men who during three months preceding their enlistment have served in the Army or the Navy. When we are dealing with the question of superannuation why should we alter the age at which men may enter the force? I am told that this proposal is made in order to allow policemen to be transferred from one county to another, but this Bill goes beyond that, because it does not deal with the first part, namely, the transference of policemen from one county to another. It is said that it is advantageous that policemen should be transferred up to the age of forty-five from one force to the other. I am quite willing to listen to any arguments upon that point. I think I am right in stating that in Lanarkshire a man transferred at the age of forty-four and a half years to another county will be allowed to count the time he has served in Lanarkshire to enable him to get his pension in Dumbartonshire. A constable may have served fifteen years in the force in Lanarkshire, having entered at twenty-five years of age, and yet when transferred at that age to Dumbartonshire that county will have to pay the whole of his pension.

May I remind the hon. Baronet that whatever sum is due to the constable is transferred? The police pension fund is made up of a variety of contributions consisting of deductions from pay, Government Grants, and fines, and in circumstances such as the hon. Baronet has mentioned the contributions made to this fund by the constable would be transferred to the other county fund.

That does not deal with the other sums, which are really received from and ought to be earmarked for the county of Dumbartonshire and not for the county of Lanarkshire. What is the use of taking the policeman at the age of forty-five and starting him in a new police force? The Bill says this provision is not to apply in the case of the chief constable, but surely if this Clause is passed at all it should not be limited in this way. It cannot be a good thing to admit a man to the force at the age of forty-five in the first instance, as could be done under this Clause, if, during the three preceding months he had served in the Army or the Navy. I do not think it is a good thing to transfer a man of forty-five from one county force to another, and for these reasons I move the omission of this Subsection.

I desire to second the hon. Baronet's Amendment. It seems to me, on the face of it, that there is no reason why a policeman is fit to begin a new police career at forty-five years of age. The age of forty-five in most professions is considered to be an effectual bar against starting a new branch of your profession. In this case the policeman would not begin service in the new district until he was forty-five, when his physical vigour has aready begun to abate. I hope the hon. Member in charge of this Bill will explain the full bearing of this proposal. I should also like to know why the chief constable is to be dealt with differently? Why should there be a separate provision dealing with the chief constable? Whatever rule is applied to the chief constable should also apply to those of subordinate rank. This measure affords an illustration of the difficulty of interpreting a Bill by referring constantly to the principal Act. If the entire proposal had been set out it would have been much easier to understand.

I cannot agree with my hon. Friend's Amendment because I know there is a great desire that the age limit should be extended. There is no reason why a police constable, having nearly reached the age of forty-five, should not be transferred and promoted from one force to another. It may be quite true that a constable is not at his best at forty-five, but he has had all the experience and knowledge gained perhaps in a smaller force or in a country district, and if he desires to be transferred I think it is only reasonable that such opportunities should not be denied him on account of his age. The Noble Lord (Lord Hugh Cecil) says he does not see why there should be any difference in the treatment of a constable and the chief constable. May I point out that such a difference has always been made in the Act of Parliament. Under the original Act you could always appoint a chief constable up to the age of forty-five, and it stands to reason that the chief constable cannot be appointed until he has acquired the necessary knowledge, and it is proposed to extend that in this Clause. I do not think the obligation on the pension fund will prove a very serious matter. Undoubtedly where a constable, sergeant, or any other officer in the police force is transferred from one authority to another the responsibility of paying his pension will fall on the authority employing him when he attains the age at which he retires, but on transfer the contributions made to the pension fund by the former authority, together with the proportion of the Exchequer Grant, which is a very important matter, would be transferred to the pension fund of the new local authority, and therefore little or no contribution will be required from the rates in order to take up the burden of the pension at the end of the officer's term of service. I think that disposes of one of the arguments against the proposal advanced by the hon. Baronet. I know cases where transfers of this kind would be desirable and would not otherwise be able to be made, and I am bound to say I do not think any reason has been advanced to justify the hon. Member opposite (Mr. Dundas White) in making any alteration in the Bill, and I hope he will adhere to the Bill as it stands.

I should like to support what the hon. Member for the Ayr Burghs (Mr. George Younger) has said. The question, I think, is not quite understood by the hon. Member for the City of London (Sir F. Banbury) and by the Noble Lord (Lord Hugh Cecil). I speak subject to correction from the promoters of the Bill, but I do not think the age forty-five was put in for the general enlistment of constables. There are cases where it is desirable to bring in some specially good man for some specially good job, and he might be kept out if he were over the former age limit. A quartermaster in the Army might be very suitable for the position of police constable in some place where it was impossible to fill up the vacancy locally or where possibly new blood was wanted. It is intended for a case of that sort. I do not think anybody in the usual case would be particularly anxious to take constables for general work at forty-five. The local authority will probably be the best guardian as far as the limit is concerned, and in this particular case it might be left to their discretion.

Does the hon. Baronet wish to press his Amendment?

Yes, I should like some answer from the promoters.

I can assure the hon. Member there is no desire to raise the age generally. The idea is to increase the discretion of the local authorities with a view of getting good men under special circumstances. There is the case of the reservist. I know the hon. Member for the City may meet me by saying that their case is met under Section 25 of the principal Act, but in that Section there is a limitation, and we think that in their case that limitation should be extended and that the age of forty-five should apply to them. The second case is that just alluded to by the Noble Lord (Marquess of Tullibardine). A small town may want to add to its force an experienced man, but under the Act of 1890 he might possibly be excluded by the age limit. It seems very desirable that the age should be extended to forty-five, not for the general enlistment of constables, but in order that cases like that may be met for the general advantage of the force and the county as well.

The point the hon. Baronet took with reference to the pensions being a heavier burden on the county to which the police officers are transferred has been so fully dealt with by the hon. Member for the Ayr Burghs (Mr. G. Younger) that I do not think I need add anything to it except to say that even if things were not as my hon. Friend has pointed out, it would surely be a case for the police authority in the county the constable is leaving, the public authority in the county to which he is going, and himself, and, if they were agreed amongst themselves, I fail to see why they should not be allowed to exercise their discretion. I sympathise with what the Noble Lord (Lord Hugh Cecil) said about legislation by reference. I myself have protested again and again against legislation by reference, but I claim that this Bill contains the minimum of it. I can assure the Noble Lord that I should have been only too pleased to have done what I could to have got the section of the principal Act proposed to be dealt with printed as a White Paper memorandum to facilitate the discussion. I am afraid the promoters would not be justified in accepting the Amendment.

I am much obliged to the hon. Member for his clear explanation. My hon. Friend (Mr. G. Younger) told me the object was that a constable might be transferred from a small district to another, but that was not the whole object of the Clause. It provides for the enlistment of a man who is forty-five years of age, and that seems to me undesirable. I am as much in favour of the Army and Navy as anyone, but I do not see that three months in the Army or Navy makes one specially qualified for a post of this sort. I admit, however, that the hon. Gentleman opposite has to some extent convinced me by pointing out that the real object of this particular Section is to enable districts in Scotland who have not got very experienced men to obtain—in a quartermaster or somebody of that class—an experienced person to take up a responsible position. I think myself forty-five is rather too old an age, and that the hon. Member would have attained the same object if he had made it forty, but after the explanation which has been given I am quite willing to withdraw my Amendment.

I beg to move to leave out Sub-section (3).

The Sub-section deals with the chief constable. At present, as I understand, the age at which a chief constable is first appointed does not exceed forty-five, and the Bill proposes to alter that by providing that in the case of promotion or transfer of a person serving in the police force to the post of chief constable in the same or another police force the limit of age shall not exceed fifty-five years. I should like to know what is the object of altering the age limit of forty-five. As far as I know, it has worked well, and I see no reason why it should be increased to fifty-five. My hon. Friend (Mr. G. Younger) said chief constables did not gain their experience until they were forty-five years of age or over. May I remind my hon. Friend that Nelson was a post captain at twenty-one or twenty-two years of age, and that he had gained considerable experience before he was forty-five? Again, Napoleon long before that age had also gained a lot of experience, and if the two greatest commanders in the last 120 years—Napoleon on land, and Nelson on the sea—were able to gain this experience before they were forty-five years of age I really fail to see why even in Scotland such a person as a Scottish chief constable should not be able to gain experience before he attains thirty-five years of age, especially as I have always understood that quickness in learning was inherent in the Scottish disposition. There are a good many reasons for objecting to the age limit being increased to fifty-five. It has nothing to do with superannuation, and I really think that in an important position like that of chief constable a man should begin fairly young. After all, fifty-five is nearly the age at which Civil servants are expected to retire.

No, sixty-five.

I believe the average Civil servant retires at sixty years of age unless his superior officer considers it desirable that he should go on.

Does that apply to company directors?

No. I observed at the commencement of business that an hon. Gentleman who sat on the Front Government Bench moved for a Return asking information as to Civil servants over sixty-five years of age who still retained their position. Under the circumstances I beg to move this Amendment, and I shall be glad if the hon. Gentleman can give me clear reasons why it should not be adopted.

I beg to second this Amendment. The case for it is stronger than that advanced for the preceding Amendment. It can hardly be contended that a man at fifty-five years of age is in a position to begin anything fresh. I do not know why, under the circumstances, there should be any age limit at all. Why should we not allow the local authority, if it so desires, to appoint a man of any age. One does not see why these Amendments are introduced into a Bill which primarily does not deal with this subject at all.

I think the explanation is a very simple one. If the hon. Member had read the Clause more carefully he would have understood it. I am not concerned to go into the question of what Nelson or Napoleon did at a particular age. The real point is that this deals with secondary appointment. The idea is that in the case of first appointment the limit should be forty-five. But cases may occur where it might be desirable to transfer to another appointment under a neighbouring authority, and this Clause might prevent it.

I hope that the hon. Member in charge of the Bill will not give way. I have a case in mind at the present moment which would not be covered by the Amendment—the case of an inspector whom the local authority strongly desires to appoint as chief constable, but because he is fifty-six years of age he cannot be given that appointment. There probably are many similar cases. I think everybody is agreed that some extension of the age limit beyond forty-five is highly necessary.

This Clause is by no means irrelevant to the issues of the Bill, but the proposed Amendment has nothing to do with the age limit of first appointment; it has only to do with the age limit on subsequent transfer, and it certainly seems desirable to extend that age limit in view of the transfer of an officer to another appointment.

He cannot be appointed a chief constable.

And without this amendment of the law he could not be transferred after he was forty-five. The reasons for this Clause have been so fully put forward by the hon. Members who have spoken that it would be taking up the time of the House unduly if I were to go over them again. We think the age might have been put five years higher for a possible transfer, but, on the whole, it seems to me that the promoters of this Bill have taken a wise medium in adopting fifty-five years as the maximum age for transfer. There is, I can assure hon. Members, no desire on the part of the Scottish Office to select old men instead of young men, but it is at the same time desirable that where they want an experienced chief constable they shall not be unduly hampered by an extreme age limit. Under these circumstances, I hope the hon. Member will not persist in his Amendment.

I will withdraw my Amendment in deference to what the hon. Gentleman says, although I think from a large experience that fifty-five is too high. I think there is a tendency to employ people who are too old. At fifty-five years a man has passed his prime, and if you could make the age lower it would be better, especially in the case of the police force, where a man may be faced by all sorts of emergencies such as would not occur in the case of a Member of Parliament or any person in such a position as that.

I beg to move, in Sub-section (1), to leave out the word "sixty-five" ["on his attaining sixty-five years of age"], and to insert instead thereof the word "sixty."

This, I venture to think, is a very important Amendment. The Clause says, in effect, that in the case of every constable above the rank of inspector he may be retained in the service until he is seventy years of age. Surely the hon. Member cannot mean that. Let him realise what the duties are of a constable above the rank of inspector. Take the case of a serious riot. He has to consider what he may do. He has to keep his nerve in the presence of serious outbreaks, when stones and bottles and other weapons are being thrown, and a man who is very nearly seventy will have to decide what the police under his command are to do in a very difficult position and in a case of very serious emergency. The vast majority of men at that age lose the power of concentration and the power of concerted action which a young man of forty-five or forty is likely to have. I speak with considerable diffidence, but I believe that in the Army you do not give an important command to a colonel or general in his sixty-fifth or seventieth year. An hon. Friend behind me mentions Lord Roberts, and I really do not know what his age was when he went out to the Boer War, but the fact is that there is no single age which you can lay down which has not an exception to it. But you do not lay down in such a case as that, under an Act of Parliament, that people may be employed up to the age of seventy as you do here.

It is a very different thing in the case of a national emergency, when you find you have an exceptional man and he is allowed to come forward and take duty in the field in time of war, to the circumstances we are discussing. I think, moreover, in cases of national emergency it would be very much better if the gentleman who was sent out was under that age, but you cannot lay down a rule. You cannot say that it is a good thing to send a man of that age because there is one particular bright exception in which it is possible to do so. You have here to deal with ordinary circumstances and ordinary cases, and I venture to say that for a policeman to remain in the force until the age of seventy is absurd. Only a short time ago there was a strong movement on the part of the hon. Member for Sutherland (Mr. Morton) to reduce the age of His Majesty's judges. The hon. Member, I think, moved to reduce the age of judges to sixty, and said at that age they should retire. Surely he cannot be in favour of allowing a police officer to remain in the force until he is seventy. If a judge should be retired before he is seventy, so ought also a police constable, and the latter case is even a stronger one. I cannot see any reason for this proposal being brought forward. Perhaps the Lord Advocate can enlighten me, but I do not think it would apply to a great number of people because it only applies to officers above the rank of inspector. That being so, I can see no reason whatever for extending the age, as any alteration should be rather in the direction of reducing it. If my Amendment is accepted it will have the effect of making retirement compulsory at sixty, but give power for an extension to sixty-five. That is a reasonable Amendment which, I think, is likely to be of advantage to the service, and should therefore be accepted.

I wish to second the Amendment which has just been moved by the hon. Member for the City, chiefly because I think there is a good deal of humbug contained in this Clause, and that it is not really meant to apply. It might, I think, have been drafted more honestly. I do not by that wish to throw any reflection, but I think it might have been presented in a more straightforward manner. I think on this occasion the hon. Member for Leith Burghs (Mr. Munro Ferguson) will bear me out that I did mention this point in the Committee, for I have a lively recollection that there were many hon. Members who will no doubt live till ninety, but who were only then at the age of seventy, who were extremely indignant with me when I said that the active duties of a police constable were not likely to be carried out satisfactorily by a man, however estimable he might be, at the age of seventy. I know that there were some hon. Members on the Committee who had a different opinion. In the case of some of them I notice that they supported the limitation of the age of judges because they wanted more judges appointed, but in their own counties with regard to the police they are extremely careful as to what the age limit is to be. I am perfectly well aware that there are isolated cases—I could mention two or three in Scotland—in which holders of this office are over sixty-five years of age and are quite fit to discharge their duties. At the same time I think that by the time a man has got to sixty-five it is time, if he has done well and borne the heat and burden of the day, that he should be entitled to his pension and go. A particular man may be extremely good, but there are lots of men of sixty-five who would perform the duties of his office quite as well, and if we are to make one exception the Scottish Office will probably have to carry on all round. I believe that really the intention of the Bill is not to allow the holder of the office to stay on up to the age of seventy, but to take the odium off the members of local authorities so that they may be able to say to a chief constable: "We are doing what we can, we are trying to keep you on, but the Scottish Office will not do so," and it is in order that it may be done nicely so to speak. If you are going to do that it is sure to cause very much more friction than would happen if you had a fixed rule. The idea in future is that when we have a chief constable we shall say: "We are very sorry, we have recommended that you should be kept on, but the Scottish Office as usual will not have it." The Scottish Office is unpopular enough in many ways without trying to add gratuitously to its unpopularity. I do not see in the least why it should be made to do dirty work which it is perfectly unnecessary for it to do. It would be far better to have an age limit of sixty-five, as there are plenty of men under that age who could take up the job. It will be hard on one or two people who have done very well, but I think they themselves will see the force of the argument that it will be better that at sixty-five a man should be allowed to go on the pension list and another man should be allowed to take his place, otherwise it will be blocking promotion. Certainly in Scotland at the age of seventy chief constables are more likely to be less efficient than in England, the rigours of the climate being very much greater. Doing a police constable's work in a big county in the Highlands is by no means a light job, and the case is not likely to occur which is mentioned here.

I hope the hon. Gentleman in charge of the Bill will not give way on this point. He has chosen in the words of the Bill what is a common-sense arrangement for which there is plenty of precedent. The hon. Baronet (Sir F. Banbury) has adduced certain reasons, which all seem to me to be singularly inapplicable. If the rule had been laid down at the time, and Nelson had survived the battle of Trafalgar, he would have been ineligible for the position of chief constable. The instances the hon. Baronet gives told in an opposite direction from that in which he tried to apply them. To take a particular case, one of the most efficient heads of the Metropolitan Police in recent years, Sir Edward Bradford, was considerably over the age for years before London lost the benefit of his services. There are over and over again cases of men whom it is essential to keep in office in the interests of the public service. The hon. Member says there are exceptional cases, but why take away from yourselves the power of dealing with exceptional cases? Surely you can trust the police authorities and the Scottish Office to have some measure of common-sense and only to use their liberty in cases where it is essential in the public interest. There are two authorities which must coalesce in passing such a Resolution. Are we to believe that both of them would entirely lose their heads, and, in the interests of some old man, keep him long after he is fit for his work? It would be absurd to speak of these higher posts in the police as if they required a man to go about in all weathers and in all circumstances and arrest felons. The men you want at the head of a force are men of wide experience, with high powers of organisation, who can preserve discipline amongst those who are serving under them. We do not require them to possess those physical capacities in the highest degree which are required in their subordinates. The hon. Member in charge of the Bill has adopted the course which is universal in the Civil Service, that a man may retire at sixty, but in all ordinary circumstances he must retire at sixty-five. We are taking away from the years of labour at the earlier age; we are adding on university education and continuation schools so that a man is not supposed to begin the working years of his life until twenty-five or thirty, and as you extend that in an exaggerated form so hon. Members like the hon. Baronet (Sir F. Banbury) seek to cut off at the other end, so that the whole working period of a man's life will be some twenty or twenty-five years. A man of, say, sixty may still be capable of a little active work. The hon. Baronet himself has proved to-day that though beyond that sacred limit of age he possesses considerable power. The same rule should be applied as to the ordinary Civil Service.

To some extent the Amendment has been discussed as if it were a question of the extension of the age limit, in reply to the Amendment which we have been previously discussing, but this is not a case of the extension of an age limit. At present there is no fixed age limit, and the proposal here is a very reasonable proposal—to apply to constables above the rank of inspector the same age limit which prevails universally through the other branches of the Civil Service. That seems highly desirable. The hon. Baronet (Sir F. Banbury) spoke of men over seventy doing certain things as if it was a general rule. The additional extension of five years can only be made with the consent of the Secretary for Scotland, and would in fact never be made unless at that age the man was particularly able to perform his duties. The hon. Baronet spoke about Napoleon, Nelson, and various other people in order to emphasise his views. I would like to remind the hon. Baronet that a very distinguished man, being asked when he was eighty-nine years of age when a man was old, replied that he looked upon ninety as the proper age. But when he was ninety he considered that the proper time was ninety-one. I think this is a Clause which will assimilate the retiring age of these men throughout the Civil Service. Sixty-five is the age which is gener- ally accepted, and which we think should be generally accepted, but provision is made for the extra five years in special cases. In the circumstances, I hope the hon. Baronet will not press the Amendment.

In reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow and Aberdeen Universities (Sir H. Craik), I would point out that he has given away his whole case, because he says that a man after sixty may be capable of a little work. We do not want men over sixty who are capable of a little work. We want men under sixty who are capable of a great deal of work. The hon. Member said that I am still able to do a good deal of work. I may say that I am sixty this year. The hon. Gentleman opposite says that this provision is all right because the Secretary for Scotland would never do anything foolish. How does he know? Is he going to be Secretary for Scotland? I say that the Secretary for Scotland has done a good many foolish things in the past, and that he will probably do a good many in the future. Why should the Secretary for Scotland be brought in? My hon. Friend says that it is an excuse in order that the Secretary for Scotland may be able to say in the case of a chief constable who is sixty-five years of age, and who does not want to retire, that he may still be retained in office. I think that ought not to be allowed. My Noble Friend said, in his speech that he would be content it the age was left at sixty-five, and if the power enabling the Secretary for Scotland to extend the term of office another five years was omitted. I do not know whether hon. Gentlemen opposite would accept that alteration, but if they would I would be content to alter my Amendment in that direction. The hon. Member for Dumbartonshire (Mr. Dundas White) said that Lord Palmerston, when he was eighty-nine thought a man was old at ninety, and that when he was ninety he thought the age should be ninety-one. Unless I am very much mistaken Lord Palmerston died at the age of eighty-one. The hon. Gentleman opposite may have been able to be in communication with him ten years after he died. Generally the tendency of Scottish Members is to prefer to have old chief constables rather than young ones, and, therefore, I will not press my Amendment, although I do not think the arguments brought forward by the hon. Gentleman in this case were very convincing.

moved to add at the end of the paragraph the words: "Provided that no person shall be disqualified on account of receipt of Poor Law relief, notwithstanding any rule of law laid down by the High Court of Chancery to the contrary."

Before I proceed with my proposal, I wish to explain why I have been compelled to put down this Amendment. An Amendment was carried in Committee omitting the words "who have not during two years before appointment received Poor Law relief other than medical relief." It might seem strange that after that Amendment I should seek to move the words on the Paper. I am given to understand, however, that in spite of the omission of those words in Section 36 and elsewhere, the position is practically as it was, and that the Charity Commissioners, in considering applications for benefit under this and analogous schemes, are compelled to rule out anybody who has received Poor Law relief. That is limited in some cases to a year from the date of application. If that is the position, such cases as those to which I refer cannot possibly be considered unless words such as those I propose are included in the Bill.

Does the hon. Member move the Amendment as it stands on the Paper or in another form?

It was suggested that I should slightly alter the Amendment, but I have not heard whether that would meet the views of the Charity Commissioners or not. The present position was very clearly defined by the hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Allen), in answer to a question in reference to another scheme. The operative part of that question was—

'whether he is aware that the Return of Endowed Charities (County of Wilts), made by order of the House of Commons on 9th August, 1901, and which was ordered by the House to be printed on 20th February, 1905, contains the provisions of the scheme of 1891, which was in force prior to that which has recently been submitted to a meeting of the ratepayers of the ancient parish of Lavington, and to which they take exception, and that the receipt of Poor Law relief is not made a disqualification in the scheme of 1891, and that it does not appear that there was any such disqualification in the bequest under Alderman Dauntsey's will."

The answer was:—

"The scheme of 1891 was made under the Endowed Schools Acts, and did not affect the qualification of almspeople as prescribed in Alderman Dauntsey's will, which did not expressly disqualify persons in receipt of Poor Law relief. It has already been explained, however, that a rule of law laid down by the Court of Chancery disqualifies such persons, and that therefore the Commissioners consider that they would not be justified in removing the disqualifying provision from the new scheme. The rule can only be altered by legislation, as to the possibility of which I must refer the hon. Member to the Prime Minister."

That is rather expanded in a reply given on the same subject by the Charity Commissioners to a gentleman who asked for information with regard to this scheme. In that letter the following passage occurs:—

"I am also to refer to the case of Attorney-General v. Leaze, reported in W.N. (1881) 167, and "The Times" of December 13th. 1881, following a series of decisions dated from 1744 onwards."

That decision is one by Mr. Justice Kay and refers to a dispute about the parish of St. Luke's, Oripplegate. Referring to moneys left in trust for the poor, he said:—

"Such a trust it was well settled, was for such of the poor only as did not receive parish relief; that is, for those who took no part of the poor rate."

That seems perfectly clear. Therefore, although the position is very different from what it was in 1881 with regard to the relation between charitable bequests and Poor Law relief, there now being another great agency for the relief of old age, namely, old age pensions, the Charity Commissioners are sheltering themselves behind a decision of the High Court of Chancery, which stands behind the dead and gone benefactors and the very people who in many cases most need these benefactions. I do not mean to imply that there is anything underhanded in the action of the Charity Commissioners. I am given to understand that they would be very glad to be free of the obligation imposed by this decision. In the case of the charity in Wilts to which I referred, Alderman Dauntsey's will was 400 years old. The money was left 300 years before any modern Poor Law was thought of, yet we have a decision that people who have been in receipt of any relief from the Poor Law are not to benefit under that will.

Turning to the Bill now under consideration, I find in the Schedule bequests dated 1558 and 1584, while there are quite a number in the seventeenth century and still more in the eighteenth century. Yet money left for the benefit of the poor under those bequests is entirely prevented from being used to any extent for the benefit of persons who have received any relief from the Poor Law. I do not think we can possibly do justice to this question or consider it properly without some reference to the present Old Age Pensions Act. That Act was not in existence when these Chancery decisions were given. I think I will be justified in referring to the fact that only the other day, on 8th April, the Prime Minister in this House, in the Debate which took place on the Prevention of Destitution Bill, referred in a somewhat pointed manner to the effect of the Old Age Pensions Act. Perhaps I may give the House the actual words of the Prime Minister:—

"Old Age Pensions enormously mitigate, if they have not completely transformed the problem so far as it relates to old age. That large provision which both parties are now absolutely agreed ought to be maintained, and, indeed, developed it must be by the removal of the Poor Law disqualification, has, at any rate, if not solved, gone some way towards removing one of the most dangerous, if not one of the most urgent aspects of the case."

Therefore I hold, at any rate it seems to me to be quite out of the question, that we should allow ourselves to fasten a scheme of this kind—to be tied up, so to speak, by the decisions of a court of law at a time when this Old Age Pensions Act did not exist. It seems to me a strange thing that poverty, which is to be in 1910 no bar whatever to the receipt of an old age pension, shall be an absolute bar to a participation in this scheme which provides for not only pensions, but for that which is even more essential in many cases, lodgings. I made a reference just now to what the hon. Gentleman the Member for Stroud said when it was proposed by the Charity Commissioners, or by him on behalf of the Charity Commissioners, that I should slightly modify the form in which I have placed this Amendment on the Paper, and that if I do so it will meet their views. The suggested alteration is: "that provided that no person shall be disqualified on account of having received Poor Law relief prior to the time of his appointment, notwithstanding any rule of law laid down by the High Court of Chancery to the contrary."

So far as I am concerned, I am quite willing to accept that modification, because the only difference it makes relates to Clause 45 of this Bill, which provides that, "if people after having been appointed to an almshouse shall then"—possibly by some subterranean manner—"manage to get hold of Poor Law relief in addition to what they are receiving in the way of an old age pension from these charities that they shall be held to be disqualified." In putting that Amendment upon the Paper I noticed this Clause; but I did not propose any Amendment to that because I was satisfied, speaking roughly, that a man ought not to attempt to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. If he is accepting charity from the Charity Commissioners, or other charity existing in Norwich, he would, I felt, not care to try in a subterranean manner to get something out of the rates in addition. It does seem to me, however, that there should not be an absolute point of disqualification to an applicant who in every other respect may be perfectly suitable as a recipient of this charity simply because he is receiving Poor Law relief.

Before I absolutely conclude my remarks I should just like to look at the question from the other point of view. I am quite aware that there are arguments to be put forward on the other side, and I should like if possible to anticipate at least one or two of them. It may be said that if we are to allow people to get the benefit of this charity and other similar schemes—in which I am perhaps more directly interested myself—it may be used to relieve the ratepayers, and that that was never the intention, and is not the intention, under this scheme or any law as it exists to-day, and interpreted by the Court of Chancery. Section 52 of this Second Schedule expressly prohibits it, and Section 45, which I have already referred to, and which I have no objection to whatever, says: "That any pensioner who receives Poor Law relief shall be removed from the almshouses altogether."

That being so, I think that this question of these charities being used as a relief to the ratepayers is fairly well safeguarded. In addition, I think that now we have the Old Age Pensions Act it is impossible to draw the absolutely hard and fast lines that used to be drawn: "that you can have either Poor Law relief or something from the charity, which you like, but you cannot have both." That appears to have been the old principle. It seems to be perfectly obvious that all agencies that provide for the old age of the poor must loosen to some extent their rules on this point. You cannot draw any I hard and fast lines, and I think that the preponderance of advantage is very strongly in favour of giving the Charity Commissioners a certain amount of latitude as to whom they accept as pensioners in these cases. I personally should be perfectly satisfied to leave it to them to say whether or not a man or a woman who seeks poor relief has made any effort to provide for bad times himself, or whether, on the other hand, their poverty is due to misfortune at the very eleventh hour. In that connection I think we are well safeguarded, because this same Section 36 of the Second Schedule provides the test of good character, of long residence, etc., in the city of Norwich. Besides that it provides that ill-health, accident, or infirmity, rendering people wholly or in part unable to maintain themselves by their own assertions, are qualifications. The circumstances must be well known to the Commissioners who decide these cases, for the applicants must be resident in Norwich and be people of good character. They have to answer all these tests. In such a case I wish to absolutely free the hands of the Charity Commissioners, and let them say that this acceptance of poor relief has been due to misfortune, to a bad chance, and is not due to any fault of the person who applies, and therefore he is none the less qualified to receive the benefits of the charity. I may be also told in passing that if the House passes this Amendment we shall be altering the law in respect to this one particular scheme. I admit that that is so; it is a valid objection, but my answer is that I have already thrown out more than one suggestion that perhaps the law might be altered in respect, not only of this scheme, but all similar schemes, that may now be portion of the other dozen that the hon. Member for Stroud may have to present to the House. In a supplementary question on the same day, 11th April, I asked the hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. C. P. Allen) whether, in view of the Prime Minister's declaration that both parties are agreed on the removal of the Poor Law disqualification for old age pensions, he would use his influence with the Prime Minister to facilitate the passage of a short Bill to enable the Charity Commissioners to remove the Poor Law disqualification from this and other schemes for the administration of charity. The reply was that the hon. Member's influence with the Prime Minister would be small. I am afraid mine would be absolutely smaller, and therefore, as the Noble Lord the Member for Oxford (Lord Hugh Cecil) said just now in connection with another Bill, we must make a beginning somewhere. I desire to make a beginning on this the very first scheme of the Charity Commissioners that has come before the House since I had the honour of becoming a Member of it. I cannot influence any legislation that might be of a more general character, but there seems to me to be nothing incongruous in advocating probably a small instalment of justice to the very poorest people in removing this Poor Law disqualification in respect to the Norwich charity—a disqualification that we are assured on the authority of the Prime Minister will be removed in connection with old age pensions in the coming year. If I may be allowed to alter my Amendment by the addition of the few words I have just read, it will be acceptable, I think, to the Charity Commissioners, and I should be very glad to be allowed to move it in the altered form, which is: "Provided that no person shall be disqualified on account of having received Poor Law relief prior to the time of his appointment, notwithstanding any rule or law laid down by the High Courts of Justice to the contrary."

I ask the attention of the hon. Member while I point out to him I am afraid the Amendment at this stage would be worth nothing. Perhaps he will kindly follow me. If he looks at Clause 1 of the Bill he will see "The said scheme is hereby confirmed." What is the "said scheme"? The said scheme is the scheme referred to at the commencement, in the preamble, "Whereas the Charity Commissioners for England and Wales, in their report to His Majesty of their proceedings during the year one thousand nine hundred and nine, have reported that they have approved a scheme." That is the scheme which, under Clause 1, is confirmed, not the scheme with the addition which the hon. Member proposes. Therefore if the hon. Member were to add his Amendment it would be null and void, because it would not be confirmed by Parliament. The scheme confirmed by Parliament would be the scheme that passed the Charity Commissioners. Therefore the addition he proposes to make would be valueless. What I suggest to him is that in Clause 1, after the word "scheme," he should insert the words "as amended." Then the Clause would read: "The said scheme, as amended, is hereby confirmed," and if the House will agree to the Amendment, then, of course, when we reach page 19, line 41—(the end of paragraph 36)—the hon. Member can add the words. I will put the question in that form.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I intended to accept the Amendment of the hon. Member. I did not quite like it at first, as it opened up a large number of possibilities, but I accept it now.

Now I will put the hon. Member's Amendment to the Second Schedule.

I beg to move to leave out paragraph 55 of the Schedule:—

55. (Questions under Scheme.)—Any question as to the construction of this Scheme, or as to the regularity or the validity of any acts done or about to be done under this Scheme, shall be determined conclusively by the Charity Commissioners, upon such application made to them for the purpose as they think sufficient.

I am quite prepared to acknowledge that those interested in this matter have given it great attention and that the general outline of the schemes are, for all I know, quite satisfactory. The point which I wish to raise is one of far more constitutional importance than one relating merely to the City of Norwich. The scheme embodied in this Bill contains one more instance of a system which, in the words of a famous Resolution of this House, has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished: that is the practice of referring everything, legislative, judicial, administrative, to some of the Executive Departments of the Crown, making them omnipotent in their isolated bureaucracy. Let me read the Clause by which it is proposed to give certain definite limits to the powers of the Charity Commissioners. "Any question as to the construction of this scheme or as to the regularity or the validity of any acts done or about to be done under this scheme shall be determined conclusively by the Charity Commissioners upon such application made to them for the purpose as may be sufficient." Let the House observe that under the first Clause of the Bill the statutory powers of the High Courts of Justice and of the Charity Commissioners have already been secured, but something more must be done for the Charity Commissioners, something more than you are prepared to do in the case of the High Courts of Justice. You must not restrict them from stretching any charity whatever according to their discretion. I assert without fear of consequences that although this is power for which I daresay there may be precedent, and dangerous precedent, that this power is not in the interests of administration. I have no doubt that the Charity Commissioners are honest men anxious to do their duties on sound principles, but once you allow this uncontrolled, irresponsible power to increase, there is no saying what evil and injustice might not be done. More than that, I feel it is dangerous to constitutional principle. Are we to strip ourselves as a Parliament of the right to refer doubtful questions to the law courts, and then not be able to correct them in this Imperial Parliament? Are we to hand over one by one to the various Executive Departments of the Crown authority which is superior to that of the law courts, which is more elastic because it is less definite? This, I assert, is a danger, because it admits interference with that judicial authority of our courts upon which all our liberties rest. We know what the law courts are, and what their powers are, because they act upon tradition which has been built up by experience, constitutional wisdom, and the independent spirit of the Bar and local benches during centuries. In our law courts arguments are put forward on both sides by the most skilled experts, and nothing can alter the regularity of the procedure because the proceedings are conducted in full view of the public, and the judge must give his reason for his decision. In this way the evidence before the court is known to all the world, and the case is decided and tried by rules of law. How different is the case when you hand over this power. Here you hand over the whole of the rights of property, including the right of appeal, to a secret tribunal sitting we know not where, consisting of those we do not know, and proceeding upon rules which they lay down for themselves, receiving evidence from any source that seems to them suitable, and listening to evidence without the publicity given in a public court. Right hon. Gentlemen sitting on the Front Bench opposite may think they are assuming greater authority by these constant additions to the executive power, but that is not the case. These matters are not guided by them, but by some underling, and probably by an underling of an underling. In this way you are gradually divesting yourselves of an authority which you ought justly to exercise which belongs to this House and to courts of law.

What is this body to which we are handing over our traditional powers? One would imagine they would be modest in exercising such powers, and would be careful to keep within the four corners of the Statute. One would imagine they would be prudent even to timidity in not infringing the rights of the various claimants who will have to come before them. But what is the case with regard to this Department of the Government which now comes forward and boldly asks us to give powers so elastic and indefinite? What is its past judged by experience? I am not going to refer to any particular ease and I am not even going to discuss what may be the effect of the provision of this special scheme as regards Norwich. I do ask the House, before it passes a Clause like this, to consider what is the record of the Charity Commissioners, who come to us and ask for these extended powers. They run hard another Department of the Crown in their record before the law courts. A friend of mine stigmatised the Board of Education as "the home of lost causes and forsaken unbeliefs," but only last week two of His Majesty's judges made serious reflections upon the administrative capability of the Charity Commissioners. They were told by the Master of the Rolls and Lord Justice Farwell, in an action in the Court of Appeal, that their action astounded them. The Master of the Rolls said:—

"I cannot help expressing my astonishment that the Commissioners should have directed the payment out of the charity funds of £5,000 to the Bolingbroke Hospital without any scheme, and without even notice of intention to make such a payment. There has been no attempt to justify this."

The words of Lord Justice Farwell were stronger still:—

"I give the Commissioners credit for desiring to do their best, but it is of great importance that their conduct should be in accordance with law. It is contrary to principle that a testator's wishes should be set aside, and his bounty administered, not according to his wishes, but according to the view of the Commissioners.… There is not a shadow of excuse for this payment, and it is alarming to find that a Government office is capable of such a misapplication of funds committed to its care."

Is the House satisfied to entrust these dangerous powers to the very department of the Government which has been so stigmatised by His Majesty's judges? I am told that after all this is a small thing, and that it only relates to a few hundreds a year in one city. It is not a small thing that the broad principles on which our constitutional rights depend, and that the clear divisions between the executive, the judicial, and the legislative authority should be firmly maintained, and these, I contend, cannot be maintained if Parliament continues to depart from its own authority and to interfere in a dangerous way with the prerogatives of the Courts of Law and to constitute secret tribunals such as this Charity Commission, and to entrust them with powers as lavish as those contained in the Clause which I now move to omit. I am told that there are precedents. Possibly there are, but there has been far too much tendency of late years, and an increasing tendency, for this source of legislation. These precedents are dangerous and poisonous, and they ought to be cut out of our Statute Book. We can no longer trifle with this matter. We have over and over again remonstrated from these Benches against this tendency on the part of the present Government. Let us return the scheme with the omission of these Clauses to the unknown, obscure and irresponsible draftsman to revise. Let us tell the Commissioners that they are to act according to the powers already entrusted to them by statute, and if they have any doubt as to those powers—if any question arises as to the interpretation of them—the Law Courts are open to them, and they can go to them for a decision in the same way as other people. And if they consider that the verdict of the Law Courts presses somewhat hardly, or is inconvenient so far as practical working is concerned, then they may come to this House and ask for an alteration of the statute in some definite and distinct form, and not merely for a rough and ready way of cutting the Gordian knot. I may be told that it is expedient to grant these powers, and no doubt it is the fact that those who advise on these matters are ready to entrust such indefinite and unbounded powers in these cases to the Commissioners. It may be convenient in the sense of promoting what is expeditious, but in the long run expediency and expeditiousness are not always one and the same thing. It is not expedient to interfere with the straightforward action of our Executive Departments. They should not any more than any other class of citizens be free from the ordinary restraints of Statute; they should not be entrusted with powers so indefinite. The Charity Commissioners in this case may have acted wrongly: there may be some doubt as to the regularity and scope of their decision, and it will have to be decided whether they have acted without justification. Can any man in this House rise and defend this proposal? Can it be defended in the country when you go beyond this House? You may accept it in a bundle of a hundred clauses after twenty minutes' consideration by a Committee upstairs, but no one here has given any consideration to it whatever. Are you prepared to go on any platform and say these are the powers that we entrust to an Executive Department whose previous action is assailed in terms of unqualified condemnation by the very highest courts in the realm? I say, pass this scheme in all its essential particulars as regards the city of Norwich, but restrain these extravagant powers which are sought for in their own interests by the Charity Commissioners.

The insertion of this very provision affords another argument against the propriety of these Bills being dealt with as public instead of private measures. If they are dealt with as public Bills, does not the House see that they are arranged and drafted by and altogether relegated to the Charity Commissioners, and they, and not the local promoters of the measure, take care that their powers are extended to the very utmost limit. If this had been a private Bill promoted by private promoters of Norwich, do you think any reasonable man would have put in words so extensive and handing over powers so liberally and completely to the Charity Commissioners as this Clause does? No; I am convinced that this proposal is introduced by the Charity Commissioners in the interest of their own extended and unbounded authority. It is because they want to have one more precedent to refer to that they insert such provisions as those I am attacking in this Bill. I want hon. Members to consider this question carefully, not as a mere party one, nor as it relates to this particular Bill, but as a broad question of constitutional principle, and to ask themselves if they can defend it. I ask hon. Members in their own interests to look forward a few years when they are sitting here, and when it will become their turn to suffer from this exaggerated power which is being gathered into the hands of an executive department and form their own opinion. We object to it now, but then it will be their turn to do so, perhaps in more energetic terms. I ask them, therefore, without prejudice and without party feeling, to consider what they are doing and if there is not something in the argument I am raising. So little have I arranged this that I do not know if any Member will second this Motion, but if I can get anyone to do so, and to tell with me in the Lobby, I shall certainly carry this Amendment to a Division and take the opinion of the House upon it.

I rise to second the Amendment proposed by the hon. Member, and I believe that there are very few matters of more importance than that which is involved in the discussion of this subject. The real meaning of the provision as it stands is this, that everyone interested in this charity, either as recipient or administrator, has no longer the advantage of the protection of the law courts, which ought to be open to every subject of this realm. Surely there can be no reason whatever why in a case of this kind you should constitute the Charity Commissioners an irresponsible body, who themselves can conclusively determine the rights which arise under their scheme and in reference to which very difficult questions may arise in the future. If we look a little beneath the surface of a clause of this kind the context really comes to this point: Are you in the future in a matter of this sort to have the dictation of an irresponsible party, or are you to have the advantage which I say all subjects of the realm are entitled to of having the matter discussed and decided by well-known rules in the courts of law? In the early contests of our constitutional liberties the contest was between the aggressions of the Executive Government on the one side and the struggle of the subject to maintain his rights under the ordinary law upon the other. One of the earliest of our great charters says: "We are unwilling that the Executive should have a greater authority than it had in the past," because the whole principle of liberty in its true sense is that every subject should have the right of appeal to the courts of law against any aggressive action on the part of the Executive.

When we come to the particular question here it surely is more difficult to understand how a clause of this kind can be seriously proposed. We know that at present, under a rule ascertained by a large number of most important decisions, the control of the courts over the Charity Commissioners has been established to the extent that the Commissioners cannot go outside their legal powers. Of course within their legal powers the Charity Commissioners, as matters now stand, have full discretion, and what happened in the case to which the hon. Member who moved the Amendment referred was this. The courts held that the Charity Commissioners acted in a highly illegal manner, to the detriment of the rights to which certain parties were entitled under a particular trust deed. Take a case of that kind. Ought there not to be power in the courts of law to intervene in order to prevent an Executive Department like the Charity Commissioners acting in a highly illegal and improper manner? Why, in a scheme of this kind, is a right of that sort to be taken away? One knows perfectly well that the draft of this scheme is really the draft of the Charity Commissioners themselves. It comes from their office. Of course, as regards the general provisions of the scheme, it is in accordance with the regulations and with the wishes of the persons interested in the town of Norwich under these trust schemes and trust deeds, but the form of the draft is that of the Charity Commissioners. They have put the draft in such a form that they are to have absolute sovereignty and authority in the future, and that no one interested under the terms of this trust can have what he is entitled to as a right under the law as it stands—an application to the Courts to prevent the Charity Commissioners exceeding their statutory power. I appeal to the hon. Member for Norwich. He stated that the scheme was brought forward in accordance with the wishes of the people of Norwich, and he said in answer to my plea that local matters ought to have special consideration in this House. I want to know whether the people of Norwich, either those who are going to administer the trust or those who may be having benefits under it, desire that their right of appeal to the law courts, in order that the statutory powers may be properly carried out, should be abrogated and an irresponsible power of this kind given to a mere Executive Department?

I think no one can exaggerate what has been going on in recent years in the way of giving the control to irresponsible departments of matters which ought really to be regulated and decided by the law courts. Matters of trust are, above all others, matters in which the jurisdiction of the law courts ought not to be superseded. Trust questions raise technical matters of law and administration. Trusts of this character very often raise difficult points as regards those interested in the trusts, and as to whether they are improperly administered. In my opinion we ought to protest against the aggression of executive and official bodies which has taken place in recent years. I hope the hon. Member for Norwich, who must be familiar with the great legal difficulties arising in connection with the proper administration of these trusts, will get up and ask on behalf of the people of Norwich that they will not be deprived of the power of appeal to the law courts, which is the proper right of all the subjects of this realm. I beg to second the Amendment.

As an old Charity Commissioner perhaps I may be allowed to say a word in reply to the Mover and Seconder of the Amendment. I do not propose to answer the violent attack made by the Mover of the Amendment on the Charity Commissioners. It would not be in order for me to discuss that case this afternoon, but if it were, I should be very pleased indeed to deal with it, and I feel certain that I could satisfy the House and justify the action of the Commissioners in that case. The object of this Clause is for one reason only. It is to prevent the estates of charities being wasted in needless law suits. The hon. and learned Member who seconded the Amendment (Sir Alfred Cripps) knows that nothing is more lucra- tive for the legal profession than a good estate in which the costs of both sides are paid out of the estate funds.

I think the hon. Member will find that the cases in the courts in which the Charity Commissioners are interested are not numerous.

I know that cases where the costs of both parties are paid out of the estate are very lucrative indeed to the legal profession. The Charity Commissioners do not desire to encourage that class of ease in any shape or form. Two Charity Commissioners have always to be lawyers of ten years' standing, and therefore they ought to be able to decide cases which come before them where points of law are involved. I may point out that if at any time the Charity Commissioners do make a mistake their salaries are on the Estimates, and they can be attacked when the Vote is proposed. That, I think, is quite a sufficient answer to the statement that the general public have no means whatever of getting at the Charity Commissioners. They have just as much power of getting at the Charity Commissioners as at any other public department of the State. I sincerely hope, therefore, that the House will decline to consent to this Amendment, which is really put into the Bill with the object of preventing the charities being depleted by enormous law costs.

The defence to which we have just listened is the familiar defence of all bureaucrats. The claim is that bureaucracy stands above the law and knows better what is good for the people than the people do themselves, and that it is merely wasting time and money to obtain the decision of the tribunals of justice. No doubt the administration of the law is a costly thing, but on the whole it is very much better that you should have a certain expenditure of money and secure that justice is done than to leave matters of the utmost possible importance to the responsible decision of a public body. When we are told that this House has control of a public department it is obvious that people forget altogether that this House's control over a subject which does not excite very warm and general interest is of a most illusory character. We all know how Supply is conducted in this House. If an attack were made on the Charity Commissioners perhaps there would be a score of Members in the House and the Government Whips would be put on on the Division. But, as I am reminded, this Vote has not been discussed. It is not one of those things which are discussed year after year. But if there is a vote, if there is a Government majority at hand, everybody goes into the Lobby without knowing or caring to hear what the arguments on the subject are. How very different the procedure in a law court. There you have the matter argued by trained men. Every detail is inquired into, and you get the decision of an experienced and impartial tribunal. How far is this doctrine going to be pressed? Why should we require the security of the law courts at all for any purpose? Why should not the Local Government Board or the Board of Trade be entrusted with the supreme decision of all questions about property? In fact, why should not they publish a scheme altering the arrangement of your property? Very likely they know much better than individuals themselves how their property should be spent. Why is it necessary to have the interference of courts of law at all? The truth is Government departments love power. They love to have the chance given them to do things after their own fashion. But there is no greater danger to the rights of the subject than the growth of the power of public departments. No doubt this House is one great check on it. But this House is confessedly overworked. The House has not got the opportunity for dealing with minute points of administration, and is less and less able to discuss matters of this kind. Let us leave to the courts their proper jurisdiction. Let us give them the power, or rather leave them the inherent power which they have by the law of the land, of interfering between public departments and the individual, so that justice may be done and may prevail. The defence which has been made is altogether inadequate, and if my hon. Friend goes to a Division I shall support him.

My hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Sir Alfred Cripps) challenged me in regard to a matter on which I should like to say a word or two. I did not follow all my hon. Friend's arguments about the 200 Barons or the Constitutions of Clarendon. I do not quite understand what bearing that has on the subject. But when my hon. Friends rather challenged me with regard to the Clause itself, it seems to me there are many matters connected with charities which could be decided very much better under a Clause like this than by reference to the law courts, with the cost to all parties involved in taking that course. Speaking for myself I think it is a healthy sign that there should be such anxiety to give business to the courts of law, and I am glad to see that it is favoured by a learned lawyer as well as a layman; but I would respectfully suggest to the House that most of the matters which may arise on schemes like this—though I do not say questions may not possibly arise which would have to go to the law courts—on the whole would be better, both in the interests of the charities and of the poor, left to be disposed of under the administration of a scheme of this sort.

I wish to call attention to the particular form in which this unconstitutional power is attempted to be obtained from Parliament. It is not in the body of the Bill at all. The power which the Commissioners seek to obtain—it is admitted all round—is an extension of their existing Parliamentary powers, and it is a power which in this instance they give themselves. The scheme is their own; it is not the scheme of Parliament. They come before Parliament—I will not say in the hope—for I do not suppose they wish to keep anything back—but in order to get this proposal passed; but where you have a long and complicated schedule, and a large number of details, provisions are apt to escape observation, and they do not get the same attention which the operative part of the Bill itself obtains. Here we are going, if we pass this Bill, to sanction a course of action by the Charity Commissioners part of which is to increase their own general powers which have been given to them by Parliament. What is the only justification given by the hon. Member who represents the Charity Commissioners in this House? He said: "It is simply to save costs." Is that a reason for giving greater statutory powers to a body who, without going into concrete cases, have not, at all events, maintained a great record in the performance of those powers which they have

I think it will be perfectly clear to those who listened to the Mover and Seconder of the Amendment that there are very strong and weighty reasons why the Clause under consideration should be omitted from the Bill. Both the Bill and the Debate are very instructive to Members of this House—at least, as a new Member, I have found it particularly so. In the first place, we have apparently to deal with a Bill which is nominally a public Bill, but which is really a private Bill, and should have been introduced under the procedure peculiar to that class of Bill. There are various disadvantages apparently in dealing with a Bill of this character in this way. I think that this Debate has brought out in a very striking manner what those disadvantages and what the real dangers to the welfare of the community are. Apparently the Charity Commissioners, in the first instance, have under this procedure, to a certain extent, as it were, usurped the position of the Select Committee. At any rate, the House is asked, on the authority and recommendation of the representative of the Charity Commissioners and of the two hon. Members for Norwich, to accept the Bill. They apparently take the function which should properly be exercised by a Select Committee. Further than that, if this Clause is allowed, it will allocate to the Charity Commissioners the functions of the law courts in dealing with all questions arising in administration. On those grounds I think the House would be wise to insist on the deletion of this Clause, and I cordially support the Amendment that has been moved.