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Commons Chamber

Volume 18: debated on Monday 27 June 1910

House of Commons

Monday, June 27, 1910

The House met at a Quarter before Three of the clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

PRIVATE BUSINESS.

London County Council (Money) Bill,

Read the third time, and passed.

Thorne and District Water Bill [Lords],

Yorkshire Electric Power Bill [Lords],

Read the third time, and passed, with Amendments.

Great Grimsby Gas Bill [Lords],

Read a second time, and committed.

Local Government (Ireland) Provisional Orders (No. 4) Bill,

Read the third time, and passed.

Dunfermline and District Tramways (Extensions) Order Confirmation Bill, considered; an Amendment made.

Bill to be read the third time tomorrow.

Wemyss Tramways (Extensions) Order Confirmation Bill,

Read a second time, and ordered to be considered to-morrow.

Local Government Provisional Orders (No. 6) Bill,

Local Government Provisional Orders (No. 7) Bill,

Local Government Provisional Orders (No. 8) Bill,

Local Government Provisional Orders (No. 9) Bill,

Local Government Provisional Orders (No. 10) Bill,

Read a second time, and committed.

Local Government Provisional Order (No. 11) Bill,

Local Government Provisional Order (No. 12) Bill,

Second Reading deferred till Monday next.

Kingswood Water Bill,

Reported [Preamble not proved]; Report to lie upon the Table.

London County Council (Tramways and Improvements) Bill,

Reported, with Amendments [Title amended]; Report to lie upon the Table.

Message from the Lords:—

That they have agreed to—

Saint Just-in-Roseland Docks Bill, without Amendment.

That they have passed a Bill, intituled, "An Act to empower the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Citizens of the city of Leeds to provide omnibuses worked by electricity and to construct a street improvement; and for other purposes." —(Leeds Corporation Bill [ Lords ].)

Leeds Corporation Bill [Lords],

Read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

Land Tenure (East Africa).

asked the Undersecretary of State for the Colonies whether a Departmental Committee is considering changes in the system of land taxation in British East Africa; if so, of whom the Committee consists, who have been asked to give evidence before it, and when the Report is likely to be published?

A Committee, of which I am Chairman, consisting of four members of the Colonial Office, is considering certain questions connected with land tenure in East Africa. Formal evidence is not being taken by the Committee and no report of its proceedings will be published.

Have any representations come from East Africa expressing dissatisfaction with the present state of the law?

It is in connection with representations of various kinds both for and against that we are holding this entirely informal inquiry similar to many inquiries constantly held by Government offices. I cannot say more at present.

Will the House have an opportunity of discussing the Report of the Departmental Committee?

Yes, there will be the fullest opportunity for discussing everything when the particular Vote for the Minister comes up for discussion. That occasion arises next Wednesday. I think it would be a mistake for the hon. Member to cry out before he is hurt.

Church at Lagos.

asked if the church at Lagos, for which a considerable grant of public money was made, would be open under reasonable conditions to all Christian denominations, or if it would be reserved exclusively for Anglicans?

The Governor has been informed that it is inadvisable that any steps should be taken in connection with the consecration of the church which would prevent its use under reasonable conditions by members of all Christian denominations.

Putumayo Valley (Murder of Serrano and Gonzalez).

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether His Majesty's Government had yet received any information showing that David Serrano and Ildefonso Gonzalez have been murdered on the Putumayo Valley?

We are informed by the Colombian Government that Serrano and Gonzalez were both murdered, although we are not aware of the circumstances in which they met their death. The Colombian Government know nothing respecting the fate of their families.

Congo Free Trade Zones.

asked whether British traders may understand by the Congo grant of free-trade zones that they will receive the same treatment and consideration from the Belgian Government as will be extended to Belgians, and that they will be able to establish trading stations in the Congo free-trade zones as freely as a Belgian company?

This is the natural interpretation to be placed upon the decree issued by the Belgian Government, and is the only one in accord with Treaties.

Royal Naval Colleges (Zymotic Diseases).

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he will explain why in the official returns of zymotic diseases sent to Captain Christian, the head of the Royal Naval College at Osborne, the returns with regard to West Cowes are omitted; whether he is aware that in the official returns of East Cowes sent to Captain Christian measles, chicken-pox, whooping-cough, and German measles are not mentioned; has Captain Christian called the attention of the Admiralty to these omissions; and whether, in the interests of the general health of the college, he will take steps, to ensure that outbreaks of all such diseases in the neighbourhood of the college shall in future be reported to the head of the college?

I understand that it rests with the local authorities to decide whether their own statistics of notifiable diseases shall be included in the weekly returns issued by the Local Government Board. The answer to the second and third parts of the question is in the affirmative. As regards the last part of the question, it would not be possible for the Board of Admiralty to ensure that local authorities do more than fulfil their statutory obligations in the matter; but the Fleet Surgeon of the College is instructed to make private arrangements with the local medical practitioners for the interchange of information regarding cases of infectious disease.

H.M.S. "Gladiator" (Salvage Operations).

asked whether complaints had reached the Admiralty regarding the damage done to the outfall sewer at Norton, near Yarmouth, belonging to the Isle of Wight Rural District Council, by the salvage operations carried out at the time His Majesty's ship "Gladiator" was wrecked; whether the Admiralty had as yet taken any steps to ascertain the amount and the nature of the damage to the outfall; and whether, in view of the consequences likely to arise from such damage, he would give instructions for an immediate inquiry into the extent of the damage?

A communication on this subject has been received from the Isle of Wight Rural District Council, and inquiries are now being made into the matter.

I cannot say. The salvage company have been asked what light they can throw on the matter. It is impossible for me to make any statement as to when the decision will be arrived at.

Admiralty (Temporary Clerks).

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he could state how many temporary clerks were now engaged by the Admiralty; whether he was aware that some of these temporary clerks had been in the service of the Admiralty for nearly a quarter of a century; and whether, as temporary clerks were appointed by patronage, he would see that this growing practice was abated, and that future appointments would be confined to the holders of Civil Service certificates?

The numbers of the various grades of temporary clerks, writers, etc., employed in the Admiralty and at the naval yards at home, are as follows: Admiralty 341, Outports 737. The number of men who are still on the hired list after nearly twenty-five years' service is very small, and these men have remained on the hired list because they have failed to qualify by examination for established posts. The great majority of vacancies are now filled either by open competitive examination or by promotion from the grade of boy clerk and boy writer.

The term "temporary" applies to the status of a clerk and not to the period over which he is engaged.

Will the Admiralty consider the advisability of getting out a new dictionary?

German Battleships (Period of Building).

asked the dates upon which the German battleships "Nassau," "Westfalen," "Rheinland," and "Posen" were commissioned for trial and for service, respectively, with the fleet after final acceptance by the authorities; and how long these vessels have taken to build from the date of laying the keel to the date of commissioning for service with the fleet?

The following are the dates and times asked for:—

Commissioned for trials— "Nassau" October, 1909 "Westfalen" November, 1909 "Rheinland" April, 1910 "Posen" May, 1910

Joined the High Sea Fleet— "Nassau" & "West-falen" 3rd May, 1910 "Rheinland" & "Posen" Not yet joined

Time from laying keel to joining High Sea Fleet— "Nassau" & "West-falen" 33 months

Argentine Battleships.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he has any information as to the dates upon which the two Argentine battleships recently ordered in the United States were laid down; and when it is anticipated they will be completed?

The keel of one battleship was laid on 25th May last. The first ship is to be completed in January, 1912, the second ship in April, 1912.

Docking Accommodation, Gibraltar.

asked if it would be possible to dock the battleship cruisers "Lion" and "Princess Royal" at Gibraltar?

Is it not a fact that, in reply to a question put by the Admiralty, the authorities in Gibraltar have said that they find some difficulty in docking the "Princess Royal"?

Fever in the Royal Navy.

asked what was the number of cases and of deaths from Malta fever and simple continued fever respectively in the Navy at Malta for the year 1909?

There were eleven cases of Malta fever and sixty-nine simple continued fever. No deaths occurred.

Nominations for Naval Cadetships (Osborne).

asked the number of nominations for naval cadets for Osborne at the disposal of each member of the Cabinet?

There are no nominations for naval cadetships at Osborne. A limited number of special recommendations are placed in the hands of the Secretary of State for the Colonies for boys recommended from the Dominions and Colonies. No other member of the Cabinet has any special recommendation.

Short Service in Royal Navy.

asked if, it having been decided to continue the enlistment of short-service men in the Royal Navy, he will consider the advantages of some scheme, by extra pay or otherwise, under which these men should be picked or selected?

In reply to the hon. Gentleman, I can only say that it is not in contemplation to make any alteration in the conditions of entry.

Is the Admiralty satisfied with the present state of intelligence and physique of these short-service men?

Yes, Sir. We should not take them as short-service men unless we were satisfied.

National School Teachers (Ireland).

asked the Secretary to the Treasury what provision, if any, the Government propose to make for improving the condition of the national school teachers of Ireland as regards their salaries, promotion, and pensions; and whether, in view of the recommendation of the Commissioners of National Education that the grievances of the teachers as regards pensions should be inquired into, he will recommend the appointment of a Commission to investigate at once the conditions of salaries, promotions, and pensions of Irish national school teachers?

His Majesty's Government cannot under existing circumstances undertake to propose a further provision from public funds with a view to improving the salaries, prospects of promotion, and pensions of Irish National School teachers. I am not prepared to recommend the appointment of a Commission to inquire into the subject.

Is it a fact that, although these national school teachers have to contribute towards their pensions, the provision made for them in a number of cases is less than that made in ordinary cases under the Old Age Pensions Act?

I could not answer that either affirmatively or negatively without notice.

Has the right hon. Gentleman's attention been directed to the recommendation of the Commissioners on National Education in Ireland that the pension scheme for teachers in Ireland is so defective that in their opinion it is necessary for inquiry into it?

My notice has not been called to that particular recommendation. It has been brought to many other matters. All I can say is that it would involve great expense.

Might I ask the right hon. Gentleman if he has read the question which I addressed to him on the 17th inst., and which drew his attention to the recommendation of the Commissioners on National Education?

The question asks me what provision, if any, the Government proposes to make, and I have asserted that the Government do not propose to make any.

Prize Fights (Deaths in Ten Years).

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many deaths arising from prize fights at the National Sporting Club or similar institutions have been reported to the police for the past ten years?

Three deaths attributed to boxing contests have been reported to the Metropolitan Police during the last ten years. One of these contests was held at the National Sporting Club.

How do those statistics compare with the accidents arising from steeplechasing, hunting, and golf?

The hon. Member cannot expect me to provide him with an elaborate statistical return without notice.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether any prosecutions for manslaughter have followed upon these deaths?

North Wales Assizes.

asked the Home Secretary whether it is proposed to alter the assize circuit system; and to remove the North Wales Assizes from Ruthin to some town in England?

By the request of the Secretary of State for the Home Department I will answer this question. The Government are considering various plans suggested for the rearrangement of the circuit system, but no decision has yet been arrived at. Opportunity will be given for discussion in the House of any proposed alteration of assizes.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that there is a very strong feeling on this subject in other towns in North Wales beside Ruthin?

I am aware there is some objection, and it is for that reason I made the answer that there will be full opportunity for discussion.

East Dorset By-Election.

asked the Secretary for the Home Department whether his attention has been drawn to a poster which has been issued by the headquarters of the Conservative party, and posted in the Eastern Division of Dorsetshire, in which the Government flag is depicted as a red flag with a skull and crossbones upon it, and in which the supporters of the Government are described, amongst other things, as a mob of factions taught to shirk and steal but not to fight, and as hired betrayers of a noble trust, and in which the Irish electors are described as breeding treason at the Empire's core; and whether he proposes to take any steps to prevent a breach of the peace?

Sir, I have seen the poster in question, and it certainly seems to be of a full-blooded character. The electors of East Dorset have been exposed to a good deal of offensive language in the last few weeks, and I trust they have learned not to treat it too seriously, from whatever quarter it comes.

May I be allowed to pass the poster to the right hon. Gentleman? [Copy of poster handed to the Home Secretary.]

asked the Home Secretary if he is aware that, owing to apprehended intimidation and violence in East Dorset, the police authorities have recommended that the polling held at Heatherlands school at the recent General Election should be changed and take place at the Old Municipal Buildings, Branksome, at the coming by-election in order to secure better protection for those voting; and whether he is taking steps to ensure that in other parts of the constituency of East Dorset special care shall be taken to protect electors in view of the systematic and organised terrorism which has recently occurred in the division?

I have communicated with the Chief Constable of Dorset, who informs me that the police authorities did not recommend the removal of the polling station. He was not consulted in the matter, and does not know why the change referred to was made. He does not consider the change was necessary for the protection of voters. The Chief Constable also informs me that he knows of nothing that has taken place which justifies the reports of "systematic and organised terrorism" in East Dorset. I think I had better read to the House the actual terms of the Report:— I know of nothing that has taken place which justifies the reports of systematic and organised terrroism in East Dorset. The disorder which is complained of is that of the interruption of political meetings which are held in the streets in the Borough of Poole, and in a few cases the speakers have been driven off and have had to be protected by the police, in those cases very few blows have been struck, the disorder taking the form of pushing, shouting and booing. Since 18th June no complaints of any kind have been received by the police, although there is considerable excitement, and the usual cheering and booing. My superintendent at Poole informs me that he has considerable trouble in dealing with disorderly persons on account of the many respectable persons of both shades of political opinion who get into the crowd in the hope of seeing something of an exciting nature. This, to my mind, disproves the reports of terrorism. Nothing has happened of a serious nature beyond the breaking up of the meetings (held in the streets) of one of the political parties, which meetings the Poole Justices have decided are not lawful meetings, and therefore not entitled to the protection of the Public Meetings Act, 1908. So person has been injured, nor has any person complained of intimidation, or that he or she is in fear of violence. The police have endeavoured to exercise a wise discretion in dealing with the supporters of both political parties, and I do not think it can be said that their efforts have been anything but impartial. I have made adequate arrangements for the maintenance of good order, and I see no reason why this election should not pass off as peacefully as on previous occasions. I should like to say that both candidates and their agents have done all in their power to prevail upon their supporters not to resort to violence, or to disturb or annoy the opposite party. I should like to add I have personally visited the Borough of Poole and have moved about amongst the people unobserved. I have witnessed the meetings held by both parties on private ground and on the public highway, and I have no hesitation in saying that I saw nothing to which any person could take exception considering a political campaign is in progress.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that at this polling station at the last election there was undoubtedly a great deal of hostile terrorism, and that there are great chances of the same terrorism existing at this election, and is he aware that something like twenty meetings have been absolutely broken up and the speaker driven off the platform; further, in answer to the report of the Chief Constable, may I inquire if the right hon. Gentleman is aware that on the 14th the speakers at three meetings—Sea View, Albert Road, and Richmond Road—were severely hustled; that on 16th June, at a meeting at Victoria Road, Parkstone, the speakers were knocked about, and that on 18th June, at a meeting at the Pump Room—

How can the right hon. Gentleman be expected to be aware of all these things?

I should like to say, in reply to that part of the question which has been allowed, I think there is only one opinion in the House of Commons, and that is that the breaking up of the meetings should be repressed by law, and that the practice deserves the censure of every right-minded man.

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether, as far as he knows, the Lord Advocate is going again to Branksome?

Was the letter which has been read written before the unfortunate death that has taken place?

Can the right hon. Gentleman give the House any details of the unfortunate death of a Conservative labourer announced in to-day's papers as having taken place as the result of the election riots?

It is quite clear that that is a matter which will be the subject of legal proceedings of the gravest character, and by long custom it has not been thought proper to comment on matters coming within the purview of the courts.

Am I to understand that a speaker who addresses meetings in the public streets, provided he is not causing an obstruction, is not entitled to the protection of the police?

The hon. Gentleman knows that the maintenance of order is in the charge of the local authorities. I have read to the House the views of the Chief Constable who acts for the local authority, and I am not prepared to go beyond that at the present time. I have given the fullest information in my power.

Asylums (Pauper Patients).

asked the Home Secretary whether he is prepared to take steps for the deletion of the description pauper patients from the notices of death sent out from the asylums, as such a description may be hurtful to the feelings of the relatives at a time of distress and bereavement?

I have communicated with the Commissioners in Lunacy, and I do not think there will be any serious difficulty in making the change desired. The alteration of the form of notice will require the approval of the Lord Chancellor, and I am asking the Commissioners to submit the matter for his approval.

Police (Weekly Rest-Day) Bill.

asked whether the provisions of the Police (Weekly Rest-day) Bill, now before the House of Lords, apply to the police force of a borough which is not wholly paid for out of the rates of that borough, or whether an Order in Council will have to be issued in such a case?

The Bill, if it pass in its present form, may be adopted in any borough which has a separate police force by resolution of the police authority. In the absence of such a resolution it comes into force in county boroughs at the expiration of four years, in non-county boroughs if and when directed by Order in Council. In all boroughs a portion of the cost of the police is charged to the Exchequer Contribution Account.

Do I understand that a compulsory charge is laid upon county boroughs by Parliament, and that they have no option but to pay?

I am sure my hon. friend is quite familiar with the terms of the Bill, which set out much better than I can in answer to a question the purport of the Bill.

Belfast Factory Workers (Fines).

asked the Secretary for the Home Department whether his attention has been called to the dissatisfaction which exists amongst the mill and factory workers in Belfast in consequence of the operation of the system of fines for late attendance and other trivial offences which is being enforced by the employers; and whether he will direct the local factory inspectors to make representations on the system with a view to its mitigation or abolition?

Reports on the subject have been received from the factory inspectors, and inquiry into the matter is now proceeding.

Agricultural Research Work.

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Agriculture whether, before approving any applications to the Development Commissioners for Grants out of the Development Fund for the purposes of research, the Board will consider the desirability, in order to secure thoroughness of work and to prevent waste of public money, of allocating substantial Grants to existing institutions for investigation along special lines of research, e.g., to Rothamsted Experimental Station for investigation into soils and manures, to Cambridge University for experimental breeding of plants and animals, to Cirencester or Wye Agricultural College for the study of plant pathology, or to Swanley Horticultural College for investigations in reference to bees, rather than the distribution of Grants among numerous institutions and persons for the conduct by each on a small scale of research along several different channels?

The Board will keep the suggestion made by the hon. Member in view when preparing applications for advances from the Development Fund and when reporting upon such applications in conformity with Section 4 (1) of the Act.

Will the Board adopt the same principle when it is making application for a proportion of the funds?

Old Age Pension Appeals (Scotland).

asked the Lord Advocate if he will consider the desirability of expediting the consideration of appeals under The Old Age Pensions Act, 1908, by the Local Government Board for Scotland?

The Local Government Board have not, in my opinion, shown any want of expedition in dealing with appeal cases of which only 3 per cent, remained unsettled up to the end of May last. I shall be glad to do anything in my power to expedite any particular case which my hon. Friend may have in view.

asked the Lord Advocate if his attention has been directed to the fact that there are nine appeals against the decisions of the pension committee of Orkney which have been before the Local Government Board (Scotland) for over six months; and if, in view of the circumstances of the applicants, every effort will be made to deal with the different cases at an early date?

I am aware that the decision of the Local Government Board for Scotland on several appeals from Orkney has been delayed owing to the complicated and difficult nature of the questions that fell to be decided. In practically every case to which the hon. Member refers the Board have had to consider important questions of principle, on which they had to be guided by the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown, and the delay was unavoidable. The cases referred to have either been or are in course of being disposed of.

Local Government Board, Scotland (Report).

asked when the Report will be issued by the Local Government Board of Scotland; and whether adequate time will be allowed to Members for its consideration before the Scottish Estimates are taken?

I trust the Report will be in the hands of Members at an early date. Every effort will be made to meet the wish expressed in the latter portion of the question.

Congested Districts Board, Scotland (Report).

asked when the Report of the Congested Districts (Scotland) Board will be issued?

Scottish Fisheries (Protecting Cruisers).

asked the Lord Advocate how many of His Majesty's ships are detailed for the purposes of protecting Scotch fishermen against foreign trawlers coming within the statutory limit of the coast?

One of His Majesty's ships is at present available for the purpose mentioned, in addition to the five cruisers belonging to the Fishery Board of Scotland.

Companies Act (Shareholders' Liability).

asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will consider the question of introducing legislation to amend the Companies Acts in the direction of limiting, in the case of new companies, the amount of share capital which may be left uncalled, so that within twelve months of any issue of shares not less than one-half of the nominal value of the shares shall be called up, and the liability of the shareholders limited to an amount equal to the amount paid up on their share holding?

If and when further legislation is introduced to amend the Companies Act, I shall be glad to give the hon. Member's suggestions my careful consideration.

Is it the intention of the Board of Trade to introduce further legislation shortly?

If legislation to carry this out is promoted by a private Member will it receive the sympathetic consideration of the Board of Trade?

Labour Exchanges (Boys and Girls).

asked if the Labour Exchange work in connection with boys and girls is to be transferred to the education authorities, together with a Government Grant towards the cost?

There is no proposal to transfer to education authorities the work of the Labour Exchanges in connection with boys and girls, which will be carried out in accordance with the Special Rules recently issued by the Board of Trade, in consultation with the Board of Education. My hon. Friend will notice that Rule 6 contemplates the possibility of local education authorities obtaining and exercising statutory powers for the purpose of giving advice, information, and assistance to boys and girls with respect to the choice of employment. My right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Education has already stated that he is now considering, in consultation with me, the lines of legislation for the purpose of giving local education authorities in England and Wales powers for this purpose. It is contemplated that any such powers would be exercised in co-operation with, and not in substitution for, the work of the Labour Exchanges.

Railway Administration (Eyesight Testing).

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether the circumstances responsible for the Committee recently appointed to consider alterations in the method of testing the eyesight of persons entering the merchant service are also applicable to the railway service; and whether, having regard to the public service rendered by railway servants, he can extend the terms of reference of such Committee, so as to include the various and impracticable tests now enforced by railway companies, with a view of a uniform and practical test being adopted?

The sight tests in the mercantile marine are carried out by the Board of Trade, whereas in the railway service the responsibility rests with the companies. The circumstances are consequently not the same, and I do not think I could usefully extend the terms of reference to the Committee in the manner suggested by my hon. Friend. Any recommendations which may be made by the Committee will, no doubt, receive full consideration from the railway companies.

Will a separate Committee be appointed to deal with this question, seeing that some of the recommendations of the Royal Medical Society applied to railway servants as well as to the mercantile marine?

I suggest to the hon. Member, at all events, to wait until the Committee has reported, and thrown light on the matter; then I will consider his suggestion.

Mutiny on Steamship "Highland Monarch."

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been called to the mutiny of the Chinese crew employed on board the steamer "Highland Monarch," at Philadelphia, on 17th June, resulting in the death of four of the Chinamen; whether he has received any report of the case; and, if not, whether he will order an inquiry to be held at an early date into the cause of the mutiny and loss of life on a British ship?

I have hitherto received no report of the alleged mutiny on board the "Highland Monarch," at Philadelphia, but I am making inquiries, and will communicate the result to the hon. Member as soon as they are complete?

Sligo Labour Exchange.

asked the President of the Board of Trade if his attention had been called to the need that exists from the point of view of employers and workers for the establishment of a Labour Exchange branch in Sligo; and whether he can promise that an exchange to serve the province of Connaught will be opened in Sligo in the course of this year?

I regret that I can add nothing at present to the answers I have already given to the hon. Member on previous occasions in reply to similar questions.

Towyn Church Schools (Religious Instruction).

asked the President of the Board of Education whether he will reconsider his decision to refuse recognition of the Towyn Church schools from 30th June next, in view of the fact that the first intimation given by the Board of Education to this effect was given on 16th June last,, and in view of the fact that the Church of England parents in the district are desirous of petitioning the Board to continue recognition of the only school in the Towyn district where their children can receive religious instruction in accordance with the faith of their parents; and whether the Board of Education still requires trustees of a voluntary school to give eighteen months' notice before they can close their school?

With regard to the first part of the question, I do not think the date fixed for the school to be removed from the Annual Grant List will cause hardship to anyone concerned. The majority of the children concerned will merely return to the school in which they were being educated quite contentedly I believe, until about two months ago; the only qualified teacher in the school left without notice on 17th April; and all expenditure properly incurred by the managers will, of course, be met from the usual sources. I considered all the circumstances of the case before I came to my decision, which I cannot now review. With regard to the second part of the question, the Board still require security in the case of new voluntary schools that they shall not be closed without eighteen months' notice having been given to the local education authority and to the Board, but the requirement would not, of course, be pressed where no inconvenience would result from the earlier closure of such a school.

Do I understand that the right hon. Gentleman refuses to give an opportunity to parents to petition the Board of Education to continue religious education in this school?

My right hon. Friend has considered the whole circumstances, with the result I have stated.

Will the hon. Member answer my question—Do the Board of Education refuse—[Interruptions.]

Then I will ask the Prime Minister if he will put down the Education Estimate for as early date.

asked the President of the Board of Education, whether he proposes to sanction a scheme put forward by the Merionethshire education authority for enlarging the Towyn council school, at considerable expense to the ratepayers; and whether such enlargement is rendered necessary by the refusal of the Board of Education to continue recognition of the Towyn Church school, now attended by more than fifty children?

The Board recently approved plans for the improvement of the school premises, subject to certain modifications. The improvements include the provision of additional class-rooms, which are needed for purposes of organisation. The answer to the second part of the question is in the negative. The plans were under consideration before any question of closing the Towyn Church school arose, and quite irrespective of the Board's decision in that case. As the hon. Member has again referred to the number at present in attendance at the school, I must remind him that the Board are called upon to consider the average, not the maximum, attendance. The average attendance for the past two years has not been above twenty.

asked whether any religious instruction is given during compulsory school hours in the Towyn Council school; whether the religious syllabus, if any, of the Merionethshire education authority provides for imparting any instruction which is not in accordance with the faith of Church of England parents; and whether any Church of England parents have ever availed themselves of the conscience clause so as to withdraw their children during the period allocated to religious instruction by the time-table of the Towyn Council school?

I understand that religious instruction is given in all the council schools of the Merionethshire County Council according to a fixed syllabus. I am afraid I am not competent to answer the second part of the question, but I understand that a prominent local Churchman took a leading part in drawing up the syllabus. As regards the third part of the question, I have not heard of any withdrawal.

Does the hon. Member think that parents are not the best judges of what religious education is suitable for their children?

Is there any inspection of the religious instruction in the council school?

Telegraph Office (Langham).

asked the Postmaster-General if he can now state when the telegraph office at Langham, near Colchester, will be open for business?

As I informed the hon. Member on 14th April, there has been difficulty in obtaining wayleaves which I have not yet been able to overcome. The question is not being lost sight of, but I much regret that I am not yet in a position to fix a date for the opening of the office.

I should be very much obliged if the hon. Member would use his influence with the landowner who first asked for an extension of the telegraph line, and now refuses to give facilities for its construction.

FINANCE ACT,1909–10.

LAND VALUERS.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer how many of the valuers appointed under the recent Finance Act—namely, seventy-two permanently and 117 temporarily—were selected after examination by the Civil Service Commissioners?

SUPER-TAX RETURNS.

asked why, since the Super-tax is chargeable under Section 66 on the statutory income of the taxpayer and not on the actual income, the Commissioners are requiring a return of the rents receivable in contradistinction and in addition to the annual value of lands, tenements, and hereditaments.

As the hon. Member will see on reference to Direction ( b ) on page 2 of the form of Return attached to the Regulations, the information to be inserted is the rent or the annual value.

Why are the individual rents of cottages and allotments required under the form?

TRANSFER OF LAND (INCREMENT VALUE DUTY).

asked if the law costs which will on the transfer of land be occasioned by the extra work occasioned by the preparation of the documents and plans for the assessment of the increment value will fall on the vendor even in the case where no Increment Duty is found to be payable?

The incidence of any expenses incurred in connection with the presentation of an instrument for the purposes of Increment Value Duty, as required by the Finance (1909–10) Act, 1910, is a matter for the parties to the transaction.

INCREMENT DUTY (EXEMPTIONS).

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, when preparing the new Budget, he will consider the advisability of introducing a Clause exempting from the incidence of the new Increment Duties all conveyances of land where the consideration is of less value than £500, on the same grounds and subject to the same conditions as those on which such conveyances are exempt from the increased Stamp Duties, seeing that in this class of small conveyances the expense and delay necessary in obtaining the official certificate required before the completion of the sale will be out of all reasonable proportion to the amount of revenue which will actually be receivable by the Exchequer?

If the intention of my hon. Friend's proposal is, in cases of properties of small value, to obviate expense and delay in connection with the presentation of the conveyances for the purpose of being impressed with the stamp referred to in Section 4 (3) ( b ) of the Finance (1909–10) Act, 1910, my right hon. Friend does not think that there is any sufficient reason for the suggested exemption. The obtaining of the stamp in question does not entail any appreciable degree of either expense or delay. As my right hon. Friend informed the hon. Member for the Chelmsford Division on the 20th instant, documents deposited with the Inland Revenue for stamping are not retained in the great majority of cases for more than twenty-four hours.

Scottish Estimates.

asked the Prime Minister when the Scottish Estimates will be taken; and whether two days can be given for their consideration?

I find that the various Reports dealing with Scottish affairs have not as yet been published, but there will be no undue delay in fixing a day for the discussion of the Scottish Estimates.

Veto Resolutions Conference.

asked the Prime Minister whether he expects the conference between the two Front Benches on the relations between the two Houses of Parliament to report before the House rises for the summer; and whether, in the event of the conference arriving at any settlement, an Autumn Session will be held to give the House an opportunity of discussing the terms?

I think it would be premature for me at this stage to express any opinion as to the date at which we are likely to finish our discussions.

Will the right hon. Gentleman give an answer to the second part of the question?

Will the right hon. Gentleman take any steps to find out the opinion of the rank and file of the party?

asked whether it is intended to issue periodically official announcements from 10, Downing Street regarding the Conference that is discussing the constitutional position, and which is composed of himself, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, the senior Member for the City of London, the Member for East Worcestershire, Lord Crewe, Lord Lansdowne, and Lord Cawdor; and whether he can now say when the next official announcement will be made?

After each meeting has been held an official intimation is forthwith sent to the Press.

Indian Duties (Cigars and Cigarettes).

asked the Under-Secretary of State for India whether an Excise Duty is collected on cigars and cigarettes manufactured in India equivalent to the import duties on those articles?

The answer is in the negative.

Evicted Tenant (West Clare).

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland whether his attention has been called to the case of Thomas Hennessy, of Doonbeg, West Clare, who was formerly a tenant on the estate of Colonel R. Massey Studdert, but was evicted in March, 1904, for non-payment of rent; whether he is aware that four years ago Mr. Ryan, an inspector for the Estates Commissioners, visited the farm with the intention of effecting a settlement between Mr. Hennessy and the landlord, and also offered Mr. Hennessy a free Grant of £120 and a loan of £80 for building purposes; whether the negotiations fell through simply because Mr. Hennessy, who had lost cattle to a considerable value, was unable to find the purchasing price assessed; and whether steps can be now taken to reinstate Mr. Hennessy and give him reasonable assistance in stocking and building?

The Estates Commissioners received an application from Hennessy for reinstatement, and after inspection of his former holding intimated the price which they were prepared to advance for its purchase. Neither the landlord nor the evicted tenant was satisfied with the price, and the Commissioners could not therefore take any further action. The case cannot be dealt with under the Evicted Tenants Act, as the eviction took place since the passing of the Irish Land Act, 1903.

Old Age Pension Refused (County Roscommon).

asked the Chief Secretary if he will state why the Local Government Board have declined to grant a pension to Martin Gaffney, Altagowlan, Boyle, county Roscommon, on the grounds that he is not a British subject within the meaning of the Act, seeing that he has always maintained his wife and family during his absence from the country, and that for the last twelve years he has not been outside Ireland?

The claimant was held to have been disqualified by absence from the United Kingdon for eight years out of the period of twenty years mentioned in Section 2 of the Old Age Pensions Act.

Land Purchase (County Clare).

asked the Chief Secretary whether, in regard to the estate of Dr. Foley Brew, or of next-of-kin, Mrs. M. B. Lynch, of Cohey, Kilfenora, county Clare, a price had been fixed by the Estates Commissioners previously to the passing of the Irish Land Act, 1909; whether he is aware that there is a desire not only on the part of the prospective tenants, but also on the part of the owner, that the estate, which is untenanted, should be divided with as little delay as possible; and whether steps can be taken to expedite the matter?

The Estates Commissioners had not fixed a price for this estate prior to the passing of the Act of 1909. The Congested Districts Board have decided to continue the proceedings for the purchase of the property, which lies in a congested districts county, and will have it inspected at a very early date.

Dublin Dairy Farm Prosecution.

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland whether his attention has been drawn to the proceedings at the Drumcondra Petty Sessions on Friday, 27th May last, when the North Dublin Rural District Council prosecuted the manager of the Model Farm, Glasnevin, for having on 3rd May allowed a manure pit to be situated at such a distance from the cowsheds and dairy that it was rendered offensive and unhealthy, contrary to the provisions of the Dairy, Cowsheds, and Milk Shops (Ireland) Order, 1908; whether he is aware that the solicitor who appeared for the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction pleaded on behalf of the Department that the Department, being under the Crown, could not be prosecuted; and whether it is with the sanction of the President, Vice-President, or members of the Department that advantage is taken of the fact that the defendants were a Public Department under the Crown to contravene Orders made for the safety of the public in such cases?

I have nothing to add to my reply to the question on the same subject asked by the hon. and gallant Member for South Dublin on the 16th instant.

May I ask whether those present in court at the time took down the words as used in this question, and why did the right hon. Gentleman state to my hon. Friend beside me that no such ridiculous plea was put forward?

No plea was put forward of that ridiculous character by the orders and instructions of the Board.

Why did he state to my hon. Friend that it was not put forward by his instructions, but simply by the solicitor in charge of the case?

I did not know it was put forward by the solicitor then. I do not know it now.

Does the right hon. Gentleman ever go to Ireland and inquire into these matters?

Tenants near Seashore (Right to take Gravel).

asked the Chief Secretary if he will state on what grounds the Congested Districts Board seek to prevent tenants of holdings near the seashore in county Sligo from taking gravel from the shore for building and other purposes; whether he has authorised the proceedings taken by the Board against J. Meechan, of Liggan, Cloughbouley, county Sligo; and whether he can state that such proceedings will be stayed in view of the necessity which he and other tenants have of getting gravel for building and such purposes?

I understand that the shingle beach at the place referred to is the only protection for a considerable area of low-lying land on the Gethin estate, which must sooner or later be eaten away by the sea if people are allowed to remove the gravel. The Congested Districts Board have prosecuted Meechan for persisting in removing gravel. They have no intention of abandoning the prosecution.

Drunkenness in Dublin.

asked how many convictions for drunkenness there have been in the Dublin Metropolitan Police district for the periods between 1st May, 1908, and 30th April, 1909, and between 1st May, 1909, and 30th April, 1910, respectively?

There were 3,643 convictions for drunkenness in the Dublin Metropolitan Police district in the earlier and 3,157 in the later period.

Shooting Outrage (Kilmorrane).

asked the Chief Secretary if he has ascertained whether, prior to the two outrages upon Patrick Daly, who was in the first place shot at a month ago, and was subsequently found by a police patrol on the roadside near Kilmorrane riddled with pellets of No. 4 shot, a resolution was passed by the United Irish League calling upon Daly's mother to surrender her farm on the New-hall estates; and whether he will take steps to prevent the publication of such resolutions as being an incitement to a breach of the peace.

I have made inquiries, as I promised to do, and am informed by the police that so far as they can ascertain no such resolution was passed.

Foreign Trawlers (Irish Coast).

asked the Chief Secretary if he will state how many of His Majesty's ships are engaged in the task of endeavouring to keep foreign trawlers at the distance from the Irish coast prescribed by statute?

Two of His Majesty's ships are detailed by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty for the protection of Irish fisheries. The "Helga," belonging to the Department of Agriculture is also employed for this purpose, and the Congested Districts Board's steamer "Granuaile" gives some help.

Army Officers (House of Commons).

asked the Secretary of State for War, with regard to officers of the Regular Army who are on half-pay as Members of the House of Commons, whether he will state what will be their exact positions as regards seniority if they rejoin their regiments on full pay; and, if it is the case that they would lose seniority or return at the bottom of their rank, will he consider the advisability of altering these regulations, which constitute a hardship on officers who consented to stand for constituencies believing that they would be seconded for five years in accordance with regulations then in force and lose nothing in the way of seniority or promotion?

In accordance with paragraph 217 (2) of the King's Regulations 1908 an officer on reabsorption from half pay, on which he is placed as a Member of the House of Commons under the Warrant Issued by Army Order 252 of November, 1906, would be placed at the bottom of the list of his rank. The question is being reconsidered by the Army Council in the light of representations that have been made, but I can give no undertaking that the terms of the Warrant of 1906 will be altered.

Will not the maintenance of the warrant deter officers from trying to enter the House of Commons and therefore deprive us of the benefit of their experience?

I agree, and I think that is a misfortune. No one wishes less than myself to see officers absent who can give us valuable help. But on the other hand, I have to consider that if an officer is away five or six years from his regiment, it is scarcely right that he should go back suddenly to high command.

Will the right hon. Gentleman consider the placing of a time limit so that if an officer is away more than a certain time he should then go back to the bottom of his rank?

How can you lay down what the definite time is to be? Is anyone to come to the House of Commons for six or twelve months and then resign his seat?

Is an officer who is a Member of the House of Commons more out of touch with his regiment than those employed in other capacities, such as military attachés?

Those officers are seconded for Army purposes. That is a very different case.

Is it the object of the right hon. Gentleman or the Army Council to do what they can to prevent officers from entering the House of Commons?

No, my object is to keep them as closely in touch with their regiments as circumstances permit.

Why are officers who are allowed to go to Colonial Governments, and seconded, allowed to break a good many regulations, while Members of the House of Commons are not?

We cut that down to a minimum. I can assure the hon. and gallant Gentleman that there is no disposition to increase the number who go there, but some have to go.

Several other Members took and subscribed the Oath.

NEW MEMBER sworn,—Stephen Wilson Furness, esquire, for the Borough of the Hartlepools.

MINES ACCIDENTS (RESCUE AND AID).

I am asking leave to introduce a Bill which I think, in the strictest sense of the word, will be accepted as uncontroversial. A few days ago we had in this House a debate on accidents in coal mines, and the Home Secretary then promised that he would shortly introduce a measure which would make compulsory and universal the provision of rescue apparatus and training of rescue brigades. That promise was welcomed both by mine owners and by representatives of the miners in the House, and that promise we are now proceeding to redeem. Upon the general question I have only two remarks to make. The first is that in this legislation we are merely following the example of many of the great coal-mining countries, and especially Austria, France, Belgium, and most of the coal-mining States of Germany, which have already embodied it in their industrial law. The second is that in proposing Government action in this matter we make no criticism of, and we desire no interference with, the work which has been already done, and admirably done, both by individuals and by associations of the colliery owners of this country. In South Wales, in Lancashire, in Yorkshire, and in other districts much has been accomplished by the enterprise and patriotic efforts of mine owners in providing that which we now desire to make universal. The Howe-Bridge Station, in Lancashire, is probably one of the best-equipped rescue stations in the world. There, all the year round, bodies of men from various mines are engaged in being trained in an atmosphere made as near as possible artificially resembling the atmosphere of a coal mine after fire or an explosion. The Home Office has sent a model of that station to the International Exhibition at Brussels, where, I believe, it has attracted considerable interest and admiration, and we have no greater desire than to level up the general conditions to such conditions as this.

But I think legislation is necessary for two reasons. The first is that there are still large districts in which no rescue stations are provided easily accessible to the mines. The second is that in districts which are already provided with rescue stations only a proportion of the mine owners undertake the work and subscribe to the necessary funds, and it is obviously unfair that a limited body of men should undertake this duty. As is known by everyone, should a fire or an explosion occur in one of the non-subscribing mines, they would be morally compelled to lend their apparatus and to provide their rescue brigade. Therefore we propose in the general Order to level up all the mines to the level already attained by many of them. In the Bill, which is a simple one, we propose to proceed in a similar fashion to that in which we proceed in the regulation of explosives under the Coal Mines Act and in much of our industrial and factory legislation. We propose that the Secretary of State may by Order require such provision as is necessary to be made for all mines or any class of mines in regard to all or any of the following matters: The supply and maintenance of appliances for rescue work, the formation and training of rescue brigades, the supply and maintenance of ambulance appliances, and the training of men in ambulance work, as recommended by the Royal Commission which recently sat on Safety in Mines. The Order we hope to make will be made in consultation with a Committee which we propose to set, up, consisting of our own officials, with, as we hope, the representatives of both the masters and the men. It will be published in draft in the ordinary fashion, and objection may be taken for forty days after publication. It will then be confirmed, with or without alteration. It will lie for forty days on the Table of the House, and, if not challenged, it will then take the force of law. We hope to work in that Committee not only by the peaceful persuasion of our own mining inspectors, but also by any help that can be given to us by the present Association of Mine Owners, which in all parts of the country is engaged in the development of rescue work. We require every variety of information regarding rescue appliances. We recognise that much that has been done in this field of scientific development is tentative and experimental, and we greatly hope that the result of this universal provision will be to further scientific knowledge and to make it more useful in those most lamentable occurrences.

There was much discussion in the Debate to which I have referred as to whether or not the men in the recent most mournful accident at Whitehaven could have been saved if apparatus for artificial breathing had been obtainable easily instead of only some twenty-seven hours after the explosion took place. We desire by this Bill as speedily as may be to ensure that this apparatus shall be either present at the mine or at some central station within half an hour's distance by rapid motor from the mine, and that in the case of every mine in the United Kingdom a certain number of men from the mine familiar with its own working shall be trained at the rescue station. It is impossible to say with the material at our disposal whether that provision would or would not have enabled life to be saved at Whitehaven. Many of the facts about that fire or explosion are at present conjectural, but after consultation with the mining inspectors of the Home Office I have no hesitation in saying that if we consider the last half-dozen serious explosions or fires in recent years there is no doubt at all that not only could property have been protected, but human life could have been saved if the provisions of this Bill had been in operation. In these circumstances, as representing the Department entrusted with the safety of miners, we think we have no alternative but to submit this legislation to the House, and we hope it may command its unanimous support.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Masterman and Mr. Churchill. Presented accordingly, and read the first time. (To be read a second time upon Wednesday.)

SUPPLY.— [13th Allotted Day.]

ARMY ESTIMATES, 1910–11

[PROGRESS.]

Considered in Committee.

[Mr. EMMOTT in the Chair.]

(IN THE COMMITTEE.)

WAR OFFICE.

Motion made, and Question proposed:

"That a sum, not exceeding £429,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the expense of the War Office, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1911."

We have read a good deal in the Press and we shall no doubt hear a good deal in the course of this Debate on the subject of the Mediterranean Command, but I do not propose myself to dwell at any length upon that matter, important though it be, for the excellent reason that I have never been able to understand, and do not understand now, why the post of Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean was ever created. It has from the first seemed to me a mysterious plan. On the face of it we send one of our foremost soldiers to perform duties which must, by the necessity of the case, overlap the duties of other, but also important, soldiers, and in addition to that we place him in a position which brings him of necessity into very delicate relations upon political matters with our Consul-General in Egypt, and which brings, or may bring, him into delicate relations with the Governments of our self-governing Dominions. We have never yet had any explanation of that plan. It has always been mysterious, and so far it remains incomprehensible, and will do so until the Secretary of State for War speaks. The interest which a mystery evokes has been accentuated by the interest which a personality evokes. Everybody, when considering the Mediterranean Command, has had in his mind—I will not say at the back of his head, but in the very forefront of his intelligence—the fact that in Lord Kitchener we have not only a great soldier but a soldier with gifts for organisation which are truly rare, and -which are acknowledged not only by all his fellow-soldiers but throughout the world. All must deplore that such gifts for organisation should not find a place in our Army system at a time when everybody feels that organisation is that -which our Army system most demands. With these two observations, first on the mystery of the plan, and next upon the necessity, if it be a necessity, for using the gifts of that experienced man in the work of organisation, I express the hope that the Secretary of State, when he comes to deal with this recondite subject, will throw some light upon it.

Passing to other topics I am afraid I must ask the indulgence of the Committee and the patience of the Secretary of State for War, because it seems to me we ought, if we can, to make the best use of our opportunities. I do not remember the salary of the Secretary of State for War being put down for discussion in the month of June. We are generally occupied in other affairs, and my desire will be, so far as I can, to turn this opportunity to the best account. In the first place, I wish to ask the Secretary of State what progress has he made in the directions, the desirability of which he conceded generally, in principle, when we discussed the Army Estimates in March last? And the only other question which I shall attempt is to throw out diffidently some suggestions on a subject which he may agree with us in thinking deserve consideration before the Estimates of next year are framed. To my mind, by far the most important matter upon which we approached to agreement when we were discussing the Estimates introduced by the right hon. Gentleman was this: I think he assented when I did more than suggest, when, with all the power I could command, I put to him that it was most desirable that we should in respect of our land forces, as a whole, have, if not a principle, at any rate, a rule of thumb, which would be respected by both political parties, no matter who was in power. The rule of thumb, which I thought we might adopt with effect in respect of our land forces was this, namely, that we should maintain the existing standard of strength for each of the three organic parts of our land forces, and by the three organic parts of our land forces I mean our oversea army, our expeditionary forces maintained by a special Reserve, and our Territorial Forces. Those are the three organic parts of our land forces as at present systematised. If we accept, as we do until it fails, the system of the right hon. Gentleman, we ask that there shall be a minimum standard preserved for each one of those three organic component parts. That is to say, you are not to rob Peter to pay Paul. The argument by which I defend that, as a desideratum, is this: Our Army, as is well known, has to subserve various objects. The problem it has to solve is complicated. For that very reason, since we must have distinct branches for those three great purposes, it follows as a corollary that each one of those branches must be adequate for the purpose which it has to perform. For example, take the oversea army. It is no use to say that because you have got an expeditionary force of six divisions, therefore you are to bring troops back from this or that part of the Empire. With regard to our oversea army, it is assumed confidently—I do not mean with confidence as to the accuracy of the figures, but as to the necessity of maintaining those figures—that seventy-four Infantry battalions and fourteen Cavalry regiments is a minimum compatible with safety when you have to keep watch and ward over so extensive an area.

It is perfectly true there was a time when intelligent people said you could reduce the garrison of India. Nobody suggests that now. It is perfectly true there are men who say now you can reduce the garrison of South Africa. It may be so, but if you can reduce a garrison in one part of the Empire, then that garrison must go to another part of the Empire. You cannot reduce the total of your oversea Army when you have to guard so large a perimeter. It is analogous to the case of a besieged town if with a small garrison you have to defend a large perimeter. Although you may and must take troops from one quarter to another quarter, you cannot, except you do grave evil, diminish the total forces which guard that perimeter in detail. If that be true of the oversea Army, it is equally true of the expeditionary force. You must have six divisions of all arms and a division of Cavalry ready to go. If that be true of the expeditionary Force and of the Special Reserve to maintain it, it must be equally true of the Territorial Force, which must be of such numbers and with such training as to be able to release the expeditionary force at any moment when the destiny of our race demands that that force should go. If we can agree upon that I do not ask the Secretary for War to assent to more at this moment, but I say that his attitude now is the attitude which he observed last March. If we can have a rule of thumb under which each one of those three organic parts is to be kept at least to its existing minimum, then it only remains to see that each one of those parts shall have adequate training to enable it to perform the duties which it exists to discharge. The Secretary of State for War will not dissent if I add that a great deal of work has to be done, and probably a great deal more money has to be spent, before, certainly in the case of the Special Reserve and the Territorial Force, either of those two bodies will be adequately trained to perform the duties which they have to discharge. Those are broad grounds of policy. I introduce them because in my opinion it is only in the light of the view taken by this House, and, if possible, by both parties in this House, and applying broad questions of policy, that we can usefully discuss other matters which are subsidiary to that policy of what are the land forces which this nation should adopt as a whole.

I want now to address myself to matters which may by comparison be called matters of detail. In doing so, in order to make myself intelligible, and, I hope, for the convenience of the right hon. Gentleman, I will take each of those three organic parts of our land forces, and in respect to each one I will ask him, first, what progress has been made in the direction in respect of which we approached agreement in March, and also upon each one I will submit certain matters which I hope he will see his way to consider before he puts forward his Estimate to-day. Taking the first organic portion of our land forces, the oversea Army, in our Debates in March we said nothing about that. We were satisfied with it as it was, and I have only now in June to ask one question, to which I should like an answer, Who is responsible for the strength of the garrison in Egypt at this moment? The garrison in Egypt at this moment consists of a weak Infantry brigade and one regiment of Cavalry. Who is responsible for that apportionment of the amount of strength taken from our oversea Army to be placed in Egypt? Is the right hon. Gentleman? And is the Government satisfied with so weak a garrison for Egypt at this moment? That is all I have to say about our oversea Army. I proceed at once to the second organic part of our land forces, the expeditionary force. When we were discussing the statement of the Secretary of State for War earlier in the year, I think we nearly came to an agreement upon certain matters which we raised, and in respect of each one of which we were promised favourable consideration. The first was this. We asked the Secretary of State whether he considered that the establishment of Infantry battalions at home ought to be only 720 men rank and file. We urged, in the view pressed by us, that the total number of our Regular Army now was less than it was at the end of the South African War, although important bodies reported at that time that those numbers were not sufficient.

4.0 P.M.

We urged, on the ground merely of increasing the total number of Regulars, that a good way of doing it—and which will not come into collision with the right hon. Gentleman's principle—was to increase the establishment of the whole of his expeditionary battalions. We adduced other arguments. We pleaded that it is impossible to have what is called progressive training, on which so much stress is laid by military authorities, with a battalion of small size, owing to the men being detached for duties of one kind or another. You cannot train the first squadron, then the company, and then the battalion if the number of the battalion is standing at a low figure. We gave another reason. The Army Reserve now stands at over 130,000, which is in excess of the normal. If you increase the establishment of our expeditionary battalions you will create a Reserve at a greater rate, and that we consider to be a desirable object. We have also to bear in mind what will happen on mobilisation. A number of men, on account of age or inadequate training, are left behind and Reservists are brought in. If the establishment is only 720 there is too great an influx of new faces to make the establishment an efficient instrument on mobilisation. It works out at about half and half, and that is too great a proportion of new blood in a body which has to face the great needs and dangers of a campaign. Then we have heard that it is perhaps imprudent to train your battalion leaders or brigade leaders and leaders of divisions with their battalions smaller than they would have to handle on an outbreak of war. It is quite true that when you have been campaigning for some time all the bodies diminish in size; but the critical moment is at the outbreak of a campaign, and, therefore, it is wise that your Army leaders should, in time of peace, be practised with bodies of the size which they will have to handle at the most difficult moment of war—namely, its outbreak.

There is a good deal to be said about having symmetry of command throughout our Army. I do not believe the Secretary of State for War will defend his ideal of having an establishment of 720 for the Infantry battalions in the Army at Home, an establishment of 840 outside this, country, and a thousand, I think, in India. Let us try to aim at symmetry in this matter. On all those grounds we urge that there should be an increase of the establishment of the Home Infantry battalions. The Secretary of State for War met us with a mixture of verbal agreement and a suggestion of encouragement, which raised hope in our breasts. Now that some months have elapsed, has he made some progress in that direction, so that at any rate next year the establishment of the Home Infantry battalion will be increased? The next matter on which he aroused our expectations was in respect of the officers of the Army. Everybody knows that the supply of officers of the Army is one of the weakest links in our chain. We urge that it was impossible to expect to get officers if they—alone amongst all classes of public servants and those who are engaged in private enterprise—had to receive no increase in their pay, not only for twenty years, but I think for generations. The Secretary of State for War said he did not preclude the consideration of an increase in the pay of officers of the Army. We want to know whether he has considered it, and whether he is advancing any further in that direction? The third matter which we discussed in connection with this branch of our land forces was the question of horses. I do not know whether there was any approach to agreement upon that matter, except to this extent, that everybody either asserted or allowed that we have not got the horses now, and that the horses on our register are a sham, and calculated only to mislead the public. This question of horses is twofold. One aspect of it is to discover how many suitable horses there are in this country. It is upon that aspect that the Secretary of State for War usually speaks. He has had a horse census taken by the police. Our contention is that unless you have a classification of the horses which are needed, according to the purposes for which they are wanted, any census, any register is but another delusion. We do not believe that the police of this country, aided it may be by gentlemen already overworked, belonging to the county associations, can carry out any classification which may be necessary. The facts are these. For the expeditionary force—I am talking on that branch alone; I hardly dare to think of the horse question in respect of all the other branches of the Army—we have got 15,000 horses on the peace establishment, we have 23,000 registered, and we will require another 31,000 on mobilisation. It is of importance, and vital importance, as to the 23,000 horses now registered, and the 31,000 horses not yet registered, that the whole of those 54,000 horses should be classified by experts and not by policemen or by overworked members of the county associations.

That is done with every other army in the world. They have small committees, I think of three—a soldier, a veterinary surgeon, and the third an assessor. They go through the horses to see which are fitted for the particular jobs they have to perform. Unless that is done—I do not wish to use any excessive term—the police register is so much moonshine. Taking the police register such as it is, I should like to ask this question. Is there going to be a fresh register of horses next winter? Because, obviously, unless this work is done by experts who keep a controlling eye over the work which they have to perform, the register made by the police is absolutely valueless and a waste of time. Why, half the horses may have been sold out of the country. Unless there is such a classification, and unless it is kept up to date, then I am afraid we are not in a position to discover how many horses there are in this country which are suitable for the purposes which must be subserved should the expeditionary force be mobilised. That being so, we must be forgiven if we are still rather in a state of anxiety as to other separate branches of the horse question, namely, how are we to foster a good and secure horse supply in this country? We have never yet had any information leading us to a conclusion of the right hon. Gentleman that there are hundreds and thousands of horses over and above the needs of the Army. All that we hear, all that we see, leads us to believe that horses most suitable for military purposes are being bought in our markets and shipped for the military purposes of other countries. Believing that, and knowing, if we are right, that this is a danger to this country, we hold that something should be done to foster and secure our horse supply. I think nearly all those who have studied this subject have come, some of them regretfully, to the conclusion that you cannot have a number and the kind of horses that you want unless you are prepared in this country to pay the price and to buy at the age which obtain in the case of purchases made by foreign Powers for foreign armies; that is to say, you must buy your horses at the age of three years, and you must pay a price which will give a profit to the man who breeds the horse. I do not believe that that will involve any great additional public charge. I believe that you could buy a three-year-old suitable for your purposes at the price of £30. I think it would cost you £13 to keep that horse for a year, and when it was four years old its cost would be £43. That is somewhat more than we pay now, but it is not much more, and is it not worth while paying £43, not only for horses in the Army, but to maintain in this country that supply of horses, in the absence of which we might as well have no Army at all?

I have dealt now with three matters which we did discuss in March, in respect of the expeditionary force. I will now venture to open some fresh ground in that connection. I would ask the Secretary for War whether he and his advisers consider that ninety-nine mounted riflemen, taken from the Army Reserve, are a sufficient number of mounted men to act as protective cavalry for one of our divisions? I think the point is of some importance, and in order that the right hon. Gentleman may not misunderstand what I am about to say, I would like to make it clear that I am not talking of a Cavalry division. A Cavalry division is four brigades of Cavalry, which acts as strategical Cavalry in front and on the flanks of the Army, but detached altogether from that Army. That leaves to our expeditionary force what are called the protective Cavalry. As I understand, the ninety-nine mounted men are drawn from the Army Reserve for this protective Cavalry, what has happened? When we altered the size of our divisions to the Indian scale, when, instead of having a division of two brigades, we adopted divisions of three brigades, and when, at the same time, we increased the Artillery division, we never made any increase in the number of mounted men who were to act as protective Cavalry, We adopted the larger Indian division, and we added to the Artillery division, but we have made no corresponding increase in the number of mounted men or Cavalry divisions. In the Indian Army there is one Cavalry regiment to each of these big divisions, and there is one Cavalry regiment to each of the large divisions in every foreign army. We used to have a squadron with our small divisions, but now that the division is half as big again we have only got these men drawn from the Army Reserves. Under the old system—I am not arguing for the old system as against this one—when we had small divisions, and three of these divisions in an Army Corps, we had, for nine divisions of that size, corresponding to six of the larger size, equal to six Cavalry regiments.

It is perfectly true that the strategical Cavalry has been largely increased, but at the time people speak of you had two brigades acting independently, and now you have four. But that is a theory which has never been tested in war. Personally I agree with all military experts in the use of large bodies of strategical Cavalry, but you can carry a theory too far. Whilst you are carrying that out you ought not to cut away, as I think you have done, the protective Cavalry, and I think also, though in a minor degree, those larger bodies of Infantry. The right hon. Gentleman may say, "Yes, but where will you get them? Are you suggesting we ought to have more Cavalry?" I should like to suggest we should have more Cavalry. I do not do so on the principle that you cannot have too much of a good thing, but still we have not any great force of Cavalry in this country. I suppose, since I have said that we ought to have protective Cavalry for these divisions, that I must make some suggestion as to where they should come from. I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he still requires four Cavalry regiments in South Africa? If he does, then he will have to raise more Cavalry regiments in this country in order to provide for protective as well as strategical Cavalry for the expeditionary force. The same argument applies in respect of field companies of Engineers. When we had a smaller division we had two field companies, now when we have got a large division with three brigades I think we ought to have one field company of Engineers with each brigade. I agree with all those who have studied these matters and who consider that you ought to include Engineers with each one of, the brigades, or, in the case of Cavalry, a protective force, and that you ought to have an adequate proportional increase of mounted troops and Engineers' companies with the large divisions. I make one other suggestion in respect of the expeditionary force, and it is in the nature of a question. I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether there has been any trial of the new Vickers' machine gun. I understand that it is asserted to weigh only 26 lbs., whereas the service guns weigh 60 lbs. I know the right hon. Gentleman is aware of the great advantage it was in Manchuria to have light guns with campaigning troops, and so I ask whether this much lighter gun has been tried, and, if so, with what results?

I pass from the expeditionary force, and I come to the Special Reserve, which exists to maintain the expeditionary force during the first six months of active service. When we were discussing the Special Reserve in March last we had to criticise it. I do not suppose that anybody on this side of the House believes-that the Special Reserve, as at present constituted, can perform the duties that are allotted to it. The right hon. Gentleman himself more than admitted that something was wanting in respect of the seventy battalions of the line, the four battalions and the several ordinary battalions of the Special Reserve. He told us he had appointed a Departmental Committee to investigate into it. Will he tell us this afternoon whether that Committee has sat, and, if so, what is the result of the investigation? Besides those battalions, as the Secretary of State for War very well knows, there are twenty-seven Special Reserve battalions to whom he looks for garrisons in the Mediterranean stations in the event of the expeditionary force going abroad, besides all the other duties they have to perform. We urged earlier in the year that those battalions, with an establishment of little more than 560 men, had no reserve. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, when that was pointed out to him, said that he thought it very likely that the establishment of those battalions would be increased. Perhaps he will be able to tell us whether that likelihood is to become a certainty. We have pointed out that he looks to those battalions to supply the Mediterranean stations, and when they do not have a full establishment and no reserve obviously they could not perform those duties unless that establishment was increased in respect of the Special Reserve. I do not feel at all justified in making any suggestion, but I do say that I am expressing a sentiment very widely held through- out the country that more light is needed on the Special Reserve altogether. We do not know where we are, and each new departure of the right hon. Gentleman serves to foster in our minds—I do not call it suspicion—but an apprehension that in his eagerness for new schemes, and for getting newer schemes, he is always undertaking some new theory before he has made one of his old theories a solid block in the wall of our national defence.

We had the experiment of the right hon. Gentleman inaugurating the Special Reservists in his line battalions for the purpose of this year's manœuvres, but that is an experiment. It is no part of our solid continuous system of defence. He wanted people to see what a division is like with all the troops in it. When calling out the Reserve of what he says is the Special Reserve as an experiment, let us watch through a microscope to see what happens. Approving as we do, there are "buts" in this matter. Does he think that these men of the Special Reserve will have the physical fitness necessary to acquit themselves with credit, when they have to face the fatigue of army manœuvres, and manœuvres are no joke? Take those of last year. On the very first day several battalions marched twenty-five miles and some thirty miles—nay, they shed new lustre on our small British Army. Foreign attachés were amazed at the manner in which they performed those feats of endurance. Does anybody believe that men in the Special Reserve who have not had continuous company training, and battalion and divisional training, when called out in the Special Reserve will be able to march side by side with men who have been trained as men are trained for a prize fight or a walking competition? I do not think they will. I think they will break down, and I think you will destroy the new credit which is attached to the marching power of the British Army and to your manœuvres all round. Let us hope it may not be so. Am I right in understanding that in order to put men of the Special Reserve into line battalions for the manœuvres that the training of some battalions of the Special Reserve has been cancelled this year? I understood that this is the case, and if so are we not attempting to run before we walk? Is it not rushing beyond all the bounds of temerity in order to carry out an experiment? My arguments or series of questions are cumulative, and the point is this, that we ought to make good one part of our military scheme before we embark upon some new experiment which detracts from the chance of perfecting the old experiment almost before time has been given to carry it out. I will not say more about the Special Reserve.

I come now to the third organic branch of our land forces, in respect of which I would put the same question, namely, how far we have got in respect of matters touched upon in March, and then I will touch on some other matters of importance. When we were discussing the Territorial Force in March for the first time I understood from the Secretary of State that he was not quite satisfied with the Territorial Artillery. For years we have been saying that, granting as we do the splendid devotion of the men who go into that branch, it is impossible to make an Artillery in this way. We are still convinced, and confirmed in our conviction, that the plan which we suggested was the right one—that you ought to make more Regular Artillery than is needed for your expeditionary force in order that you might have a stiffening for your Territorial Force. Nothing that the right hon. Gentleman will say will shake us out of that belief. Therefore we welcomed earlier in the year some symptom of disquiet in his mind, and we want to know what, if anything, is going to be done to make our Artillery of the Territorial Force a reality, and thus to assist towards making that Force a reality? That Artillery is a sham. I pass from the question of the Artillery, with which everyone is familiar, and I come to the very important question of the recruiting for the Territorial Force. A year and a half ago, when we were discussing the Territorial Force, the right hon. Gentleman was able to come down to the House and say that there had been such a boom in recruiting that he was more sanguine than he had been at an earlier period. He went on to say that if there had not been that boom, the question of conscription or of national service in this country would have come nearer than it had ever come before. That was in March, last year. Even in last March, although nothing like the year before, the right hon. Gentleman said that he was within 10 per cent. of all he expected to get, and that you could not expect more than 90 per cent. Is not that a very specious way of putting the argument, when so many people believe, as I certainly do, that your establishment is a minimum, and not even large enough? The total works out at 315,408 men, and we are told that this is the mathematical number which would secure us in safety in certain contingencies, but then it is a minimum number. Even if there were 315,408 men, the right hon. Gentleman ought not to be satisfied, and ought not to ask us to be satisfied.

When the right hon. Gentleman says he is within 10 per cent, of the total, we say we are not satisfied with the establishment, and we say that 315,000 men is not enough. We have been told by those who are in a position to instruct us that we ought to have at least 100,000 men for local mobile defence, and another 100,000 for garrisons. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will tell me that that will be done by the Special Reserve. Just think of all that the Special Reserve has to do. It has to maintain the expeditionary force, defend garrisons on the Mediterranean, and mobilise for the second line, so that really you cannot get any more out of the Special Reserve. What you want is to get more men in it, and when properly trained, you want from your Territorial Force 300,000 men as a central force to crush or deter the theoretical raid of 70,000 men. Of course, if the raid is bigger, your theory crumbles to the dust. But taking the official estimate of a raid of 70,000 men, I maintain that 500,000 is the minimum number for your Territorial Force, compatible with safety. Do not tell us that you ought to be blessed because you do not expect to get more than 90 per cent, and you have got within 10 per cent, of that.

What I said was that you could never have your establishment perfectly full, for this reason. My expert advisers tell me that at best you can never get up the last man, and that you always have 3 per cent, or 5 per cent, sick; and what I said was that we were approaching the maximum that we could hope to get.

That argument is incompatible with the defence that the establishment is based on the fact that it is the exact number required. You cannot have it both ways. If it is true that you cannot come up to the establishment, then the establishment should be over the minimum demand that you yourselves lay down. And I think that that contention gains in strength if, as a number of people not on one side in politics believe, your minimum establishment is too low and ought to be 500,000 instead of 315,000. Since last March I have been credibly informed by gentlemen who have worked, and are working with the utmost zeal for the Territorial Force, that recruiting is not so good. They attribute that not to a temporary slump following a temporary boom, but to the fact that we seem to have reached the ultimate dead-level of the matter. The number hangs between 270,000 and 280,000, just where the old Volunteer strength used to hang. There seems to be something inherent in this nation, that under the existing system there are, as a normal, between 270,000 and 280,000 men who are ready to give up their holidays and their leisure to serve their country, when nobody else will make any sacrifice of the kind, and that there are no more. If that is true, we have to reconsider the whole situation. If it is true that the Territorial Force, after the enormous help it has received from willing hands and clever brains, cannot get beyond the normal strength of the old Volunteers, I think the right hon. Gentleman, no less than every other man who loves his country, will have to think again and try to discover some system which will give you either your minimum of 350,000, or the minimum which we think desirable, of between 400,000 and 500,000. The fact is, we have not got the number which the right hon. Gentleman has laid down as the minimum required, and not nearly all of these perform the minimum amount of training which he lays down. I have not the figures with me, but many thousands of the Territorial Force did not attend camp at all last year.

I was going to say 20,000, but I find that 23,000 did not attend camp at all last year. The maximum training under this scheme is fifteen days; the minimum is eight days. How many of the Infantry did fifteen days? Hardly any. How many did eight days? That is, eight days all together, because that is the point. You want simultaneous training. Eight days with a whole battalion is worth fifteen days of people dribbling into and out of camp. If you have not simultaneous training during your minimum number of days, to play at brigade drill, to meander about with divisions on Salisbury Plain, and to put up sham fights with three to one against Regulars, is all part of unconscious self-deception. It has no relation to any of the facts of war or to any of the probabilities of what would happen to people who did not prepare for war. You had better have four months initial training in a barrack square and make the best of the men who have had the beginning of a training, without allowing patriotic men to give up their leisure and to make monetary sacrifices, in order to drift in and drift out of camp, when they are never there altogether under the officers who would have to command them in time of war. We do not get the minimum number; we do not get the minimum training; we do not get simultaneous training. The best that can be said under these circumstances is that all work hard, and that the Secretary of State for War deserves our respect and gratitude for having given us something which is a great deal better than the old Volunteers, because the old Volunteers, or some of them, never went into camp except as a form of holiday, which they enjoyed. [AN HON. MEMBER: "No."] I am using too sweeping language, and I withdraw it altogether. But I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will agree that we had in the Volunteers a number of men whose principal concern were the social amenities of volunteering, coupled with a personal interest in rifle shooting. Rifle shooting is all very well, but it is not soldiering. It is an important, and, indeed, indispensable adjunct of soldiering, but it is not soldiering at all. A man who can shoot well at a target and win prizes may be no help, but some hindrance, to you when you have to move bodies of men twenty or twenty-five miles a day in relation to other bodies over intervening country. He becomes a danger if you believe that, because there are 270,000 people who can shoot, therefore you are safe. You are not safe; you are living in a fool's paradise. The right hon. Gentleman got rid of the idea that the existence of so many people in the country who could shoot well at a target meant safety.

Now I come to the new suggestions of the right hon. Gentleman, Since we discussed these matters last March the Secretary of State has launched no less than three Reserves for the Territorial Force. I have been approached by persons who know far more about these matters than I do, and they have pulled me in two different ways. Some of them have said. "Whatever you do, associate yourself and the Unionist party from the outset most cordially with these new Reserves for the Territorial Force. Others, who also have more knowledge of military matters than I can pretend to, have begged me forth- with not only to pour cold water upon them but to condemn the whole thing out of hand. That is the situation in which I find myself. I think we must consider these Reserves in the light of the circumstances I have just described under which they are launched. One must discriminate between them. They have been very well received in the Press. The House of Commons has not yet had an opportunity of discussing them. In the eulogies which have been passed upon them there has been somewhat indiscriminate praise of the idea of having a veteran Reserve. There has been a complete failure to draw a distinction between the three Reserves of the Territorial Force: first, the Reserve, supposed to be a real Reserve of the Territorial Force; secondly, the technical Reserve, of which I do not mean to say anything more; and thirdly, the veteran Reserve. The Order of 21st May is marked "Provisional," and my remarks also are provisional. But surely we must canvass this matter very closely and look at it not with animosity but with a very careful eye, and almost through a microscope, if we bear in mind the circumstances of the Territorial Force from which the right hon. Gentleman is trying to throw off a Reserve. In principle I conceive that the Territorial Force ought to have a Reserve. But is it possible to make a Reserve out of it so long as the Territorial Force is only what I have described it to be? If you had an expanding Territorial Force, if you had so many recruits coming in that you could turn them away, if you only kept in the Territorial Force the men who are ready to do their fifteen days in camp every year, and if the men were ready and able to fire all their rounds at the target and not in the air, something might be said for trying to throw off a Reserve from such a force; but, what, as I understand it, is being done, is this. You are superimposing upon a shrinking force a new body of men who will, put it as you please, either crush it or extract from it all that is good in it. The Committee will realise that personally I cannot for a moment admit that fifteen days in camp, even if every man was in camp fifteen days, is enough, or that four years of these fifteen days is enough, or that anything is enough until you have at least four months' initial training and some simultaneous service in the next three or four ensuing years. But for the sake of argument, and making the best of things as they are, I take the right hon. Gentleman's own specification of a fifteen days' scheme. Is it wise to try to have a Reserve until the Force is up to its establishment, and all the men do the whole of the minimum specification of training? If you pick out of the force the men who have done fifteen days in camp and have fired their rounds satisfactorily, whom have you left? You have the men who have done eight days or no days in camp. This Reserve is to be made up of men in the Territorial Force who have for four years done fifteen days in camp. I have shown that 23,000 men have not been in camp at all. The great bulk of the Infantry are not even being asked to go to camp for more than eight days. If you take into this Reserve 33 per cent, of the establishment, which is 41 per cent, of the force, what is left in the Territorial Force are men who have hardly been to camp at all, and men who have not fired their musketry courses under any proper conditions.

That is a fundamental criticism of this plan in its provisional state. I could go into detailed criticism, but that I wish to avoid. I will raise other points later if need be. The money arrangements for this scheme are totally inadequate. But we have now to decide whether it is wise to have a Reserve when the main body does not come up to the establishment and when the men in it are not trained even up to the very low minimum laid down. The right hon. Gentleman by this device is, I think, running a grave danger. He runs a danger of undoing his own work. I am afraid if he goes on creating this Reserve before he has made the Territorial Force a reality, he will invent again another sort of soldier. We have had too many sorts of soldiers. He will revive the "pot-hunting" Volunteer. Because these Reservists are not to be obliged to go to camp or to drill at all, and they are to be allowed a certain number of rounds of ammunition at the public expense. What sort of soldier or defence is that—the man who engages in target practice at the public expense, and is not subject to do a single day's duty in the whole course of the year, from 1st January until 31st December? That Reserve is, I am glad to think, provisional. I hope we shall hear more about it before any attempt is made to create it. I must say a word upon the Veteran Reserve. The idea of having corps of veterans in this country is certainly one which all must cordially accept. But is there not some confusion of thought revealed when the Veteran Reserve comes out in the same regulations with the Territorial Force Reserve, and when these veterans are looked to apparently to perform in some part the duties which are assigned to the Special Reserve, or to the Territorial Force, or to the new Territorial Force Reserve? If the Veteran Reserve is to be an honourable retreat and social distinction for men who have really served their country all will welcome it. But why should they cease to be veterans at the age of fifty? The two ideas are incompatible. The idea of turning them out of their retreat at the age of fifty suggests that you are looking to them to perform active service. What becomes of the idea of honourable retreat and the social distinction? Let us by all means say that every man who has faithfully served in the Army, the Territorial Force, or in any branch of the public service, shall at the end of his service with the Colours, and after his service in the real Reserve, be regarded as a veteran for the rest of his days, and elicit that respect and admiration which he deserves from his fellow countrymen. Do not, however, let us mix up the two things together.

In conclusion I would say that you cannot make a Reserve until the Territorial Force has had longer and simultaneous training. In that Reserve you should only have the men who have performed that training, and in the veterans you should only have the men who have both performed the first and the second—who have served right through the first engagement, and then through their Reserve engagement. I dread the multiplication of these paper schemes. We have one after another. As soon as one plan does not come up to the expectations of its author, another plan is launched. It is as if a man who failed to fill a cask because it had too many holes then said: "I will catch the leakage in a sieve." I must very rapidly mention, and only mention, another subject which I think deserves the attention of the right hon. Gentleman. The provision for buildings for the Territorial Force is altogether inadequate. There is a skimping, and perhaps a necessary skimping, which prevents that Force, such as it is, from being effective. Again, I, for my part, do not believe that you will ever have an Army properly shod if you give the men an allowance, and leave it to them to supply their own boots. The ordinary Englishman who goes into the Army has no more idea of what a pair of boots ought to be to march twenty miles in than he has of steering an aeroplane. Look at the boots they come to camp in. You must supply a standard boot. The same is true with regard to their shirts. Englishmen who have had fair chances in early life wear flannel shirts. But the people who go into the Territorial Force do not wear flannel shirts; they wear linen shirts. To make a man march in boots which he has chosen for himself throws him open to the chance of laming him for life. To make him wear a linen shirt is to doom him to die of pneumonia. To let him walk about in fancy-coloured socks is to incur on his behalf the risk of him having gangrene. In the Regular Army —in every Regular Army—the importance of the supply of boots, shirts, and socks is recognised as next to morale and discipline—and, of course, the food—as the things upon which their marching and fighting capacity depends. The mere allowance dealt out by harassed Secretaries of county associations is insufficient for the boots, shirts, and socks which are necessary, if the members of the Territorial Force are to enjoy average health. I would ask the right hon. Gentleman a question or two, first, whether the new sighting of the converted rifles give satisfaction? Many complaints have been made to me about them. I would also ask him whether he has heard complaints from the inspecting officers of the new Maxim equipment model, which does not ride on the horses nearly as well as the old one? I would ask him—and this is my last question—in respect to the Territorial Force, whether he will make specialists additional to the establishment? As things are now, at any rate in the Yeomanry Reserve you have, you have one Maxim—two Maxim guns—each with an officer. You have signallers with an officer. You have Scouts with an officer. All are excellent methods of specialism, though I think in attempting signalling we are asking for more than we can expect to get. If you take four or five of the shrewdest and keenest officers out of the regiment you are preventing that regiment from being adequately officered for its normal purposes. If you can get officers—and you can get them—to perform these special functions, then you ought to increase the establishment of the regiment by that number of officers. It is vital for the officers; it is also very important for the men. In respect of the men, no less than of the officers, I ask the right hon. Gentleman to make these specialists additional to the establishment. In putting this point I shall be very glad if any information can be given. We shall not reach our goal until the three organic powers of our land forces are each maintained at the minimum strength and until each is adequately trained in the duties which it expects to perform.

I should be ungrateful did I not begin by acknowledging cordially the friendly tone which has run through the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. He has made his criticisms, a good many of them very kindly. They are not altogether criticisms with which I find myself in agreement, but he has made them in a spirit and fashion which renders discussion of this kind of the highest utility. It is well that the programme of the Army for the year should be subjected to close scrutiny. If I may say so, I think it is fortunate that we have been able in this month to have an unusual amount of discussion of the state of affairs. I do not know how I shall best consult the convenience of the Committee in replying to the questions put to me by the right hon. Gentleman, but probably this will best be done by taking the points in their order and as shortly as I can, though this may take me some time. The first topic which the right hon. Gentleman alluded to was the Mediterranean Command. He asked me for some explanation of it. I have given it very simply in dealing with the Mediterranean Command as it is now in the Parliamentary Papers published the other day. In August last, at the Conference of the Oversea Dominions, certain conclusions were come to which made the situation somewhat clearer. The Dominions Overseas, through their representatives, agreed with us here that we should, as far as possible, endeavour to fashion the various Armies of the Empire on a single pattern — that in the form of service regulations, of training, of weapons, there should be as far as possible similarity of pattern, so that in case of necessity the different elements might form the component elements of a great unit. That was followed by the formal creation of the Imperial General Staff. A great deal of work which has been consequent upon the establishment of that Staff, the interchange of officers between the Dominions and the General Staff at home is going on, and there is no doubt that foundations have been laid—I do not say more—on which progress may be hoped for. But we are still at the beginning. There is one thing which is essential. It is very well that there should be co-operation between an Imperial General Staff and its branches all over the Empire. But you want something more. Just as the General Staff at home has had the advantage of an Inspector-General to inspect the forces and see that things are up to the standard which is required, so we require an Inspector-General of the Overseas Forces who can do the work adequately. Under the old arrangement Sir John French was charged with the duties not only of inspecting at home, but of inspecting abroad. He was very much overworked. He discussed the question with me of the separation of the work into the work of two Inspectors-General. It is not extravagant for two Inspectors-General. I believe the German Army has six Inspectors-General. We certainly require an Inspector-General for these new developments who will be able to give a great deal of his time to the work of inspecting overseas. Of course, he will not go to the self-governing Dominions unless they wish to have him. But a good deal of time has been spent in conference with the representatives of the Overseas Dominions, and I feel certain that the presence of an Inspector-General—of a soldier who, like Sir Ian Hamilton, has not only won great distinction in the field, but is known to have commanded Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders, as well as his own countrymen on the field of battle—will be an encouragement to those with whom he is brought in contact. As regards the duties of Sir Ian Hamilton, they will, of course, extend to not only such work as there may be in connection with self-governing Dominions, and the new organisation which is in progress, but to the very large body of British troops that are overseas—outside India. India looks after herself. There is a Commander-in-Chief there. He is really, in some measure, Inspector-General. But we have large bodies of troops in South Africa, Egypt, Gibraltar, and Malta, and in distant stations like the Mauritius, Bermuda, Hong Kong, and other places which I need not enumerate, which have to be inspected, which work of the new Inspector-General certainly will be work which will occupy a good deal of his time.

5.0 P.M.

But that is not all. Between the West of the Empire and the East there is a long line of communications. In the event of any military concentration having to take place we should have to be familiar with the patrolling of the great military highway between the East and the West, that chain of posts which we have, beginning with Gibraltar and extending through the Mediterranean to the East. We have three considerable bodies of troops at Gibraltar, Malta, and Egypt, not to mention Cyprus, and we have extensive arrangements which would have to be made for reliefs and for the use of that highway. Therefore for work which is of more than a mere spectorial kind it is necessary to give executive powers to someone if that highway is to be organised. There are questions on which the General Staff requires to be advised, and they can only be advised by somebody who is, at any rate, a good deal on the spot. Then the Inspector-General must be in contact with troops at some point, and as he cannot be with troops at home in the same way as a home Inspector-General, Malta is a convenient place for him to be in contact with those troops. His work will be the work laid down and defined carefully in the Memorandum which has been presented and laid on the Table of Parliament. The first five or six paragraphs of that Memorandum point out that his executive functions as Commander-in-Chief will be more than the functions of a mere inspector. He will have to deal with questions of strategy, defence, training, and tactics. The work of these great fortresses, administrative work, and the ordinary work of commanding the troops inland, will belong to the Commanders-in-Chief, where the command of those great forces has combined with it the position of Governor representing the Crown. The work of Sir Ian Hamilton will be to survey and to coordinate the different arrangements connected with strategy and defence all along that great highway; a unifying mind will be brought into operation in a way which has never been possible before, and the only difference between what has been done in the last three years and the present scheme is a difference to which I will at once allude. When I first discussed this matter some time ago we thought that the post of Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean was one which might well be combined with the High Commissionership conferring high civil distinctions and of the representation of the King on great occasions. When I came to talk this over with Sir Ian Hamilton, he himself was the first to suggest that the opportunity had come, particularly in the light of those Conferences last August, for making this post a purely military one, with the position of Inspector-General limited, so far as the command of the Mediterranean Station was concerned, to Malta, but discharging his functions free from what I may call civil duties. We therefore decided to abolish the position of High Commissioner in the Mediterranean, and to make the post a purely military one. Sir Ian Hamilton will, therefore, be Inspector-General, with the special duties of Commander-in-Chief of the great highway, to which I have referred. The work which he has to do will bring him to London for a considerable part of the year, and he will sit on the Defence Committee, and will be in close consultation with the General Staff. But for two or three months he will be in contact with troops pre-eminently desirable in the case of an Inspector-General in Malta, which will be the point from which he will discharge such duties as may have to be discharged at that time. Like every Inspector-General who does his work thoroughly, he will have a great deal of travelling to do, but we hope that, under this new arrangement, the Inspector-General will possess facilities not available under the old system. It is, perhaps, not immaterial that we can have an Inspector-General in this position with no additional cost, and Sir Ian Hamilton's appointment will not involve any extra cost.

When three or four years ago we reorganised the position in the Meriterranean, we found there a Major-General in charge of the administration, who seemed to us to be useless, and it was by the reorganisation of the staff in this and other points that the money was found for the Mediterranean Command. Matters have been going in that fashion ever since. By the arrangements which have been made now the cost of the combined offices of Inspector-General and Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean will not be more than was the cost under the system that has obtained up to now.

Five thousand pounds a year. I pass now to the next topic taken up by the right hon. Gentleman opposite. I entirely agree with him that we must settle what the component parts of our Army are, and we must see that each component part is kept up to its standard. We come to the oversea Army. The first question the right hon. Gentleman put was as to who is responsible for the apportionment of the establishment in Egypt. The answer to that is that within the last two or three years, we have somewhat increased the garrison in Egypt. The garrison in Egypt is adjusted in consultation with various authorities, and at the present time we are of opinion that it is sufficient. It must be remembered that there has been a certain amount of reorganisation. The Egyptian garrison now forms a component part of what is called the Seventh Division, a Division which can be brought together under arrangements that have been made. Only three days off, at Malta, there is a brigade which could reinforce it, and we have other arrangements under which the garrison in Egypt could be more rapidly reinforced than in the past. I have no reason to think that the garrison in Egypt is unsatisfactory at the present time.

I cannot give the figures, but it is a substantial increase since I came into office. I shall be able to inform the Committee of the details later on, but I am right in saying that the garrison has been increased within the last three years. The next question the right hon. Gentleman raised was whether it was sufficient or satisfactory that the establishment of the Infantry battalions at home, the battalions of the line, should be 720. Well, of course, the establishment is in one respect more satisfactory than it was in regard to the strength corresponding with the establishment. You have not only got your stength of 720 corresponding to the establishment, but owing to the wonderful work of the Army Medical Department and other forces of a moral and social kind, wastage is very much less than it was. The result is that an establishment of 720 does all the work that is requisite in finding drafts. The drafts question, which gave great difficulty some time ago, has disappeared. But there are other questions. I do not attach the same importance to larger numbers as does the right hon. Gentleman, but there is the question of the Reserve. That is a question which requires careful consideration. We are too apt in this country to act first and think afterwards. It is better to work out what the effect of your Reserve will be before you talk of adding to your establishment. At the present time the whole matter is under consideration, but I am not yet in a position to say whether it is necessary to increase the establishment of these battalions in order to preserve an adequate Reserve. That is a question which involves the most minute actuarial calculations. Those calculations are being made at the present time, and I hope in good time, before the next Estimates, to have made up my mind on that subject, and to be able to take action or not to take action according to the advice given me. But I quite agree that the question of the Reserve is one that wants very close watching. It is very true that our Reserve is not very high just now, but after a little' it will go up again; the shrinkage will be temporary. Nevertheless the Infantry Reserve is a matter which requires careful study and watching, and that study is being bestowed on it at the present time. Now I come to the question of the supply of officers. I do not say much about that, because we have got it under careful consideration, not so much in the matter of pay, which is a very big question, and will have to be considered, but in regard to the question at the root of the matter, namely, whether we can somehow relieve the burden of the cost of the education of candidates for the positions of officers of the British Army. The whole matter is under consideration at this moment, and it would be premature on my part to make any statement about it. The whole question of the modes of admission to the Army, of the training of officers, and of their education, is a subject which requires most close consideration. Now I come to the question of horses—the most controversial and, perhaps, the most difficult we have to deal with. So many experts have different plans for dealing with the horses question that I have come lately to congratulate myself on not being an expert and in knowing very little about horses, but I have given it the most earnest attention and have studied, I think, every scheme that has been brought forward. I would entreat the Committee to let us do one thing at a time, and the first thing is what we are doing, namely, to find out how many horses we want, and the second is how many horses there are in the country. Well, that has been done. I need not trouble the House with the figures in detail, but I have here the results of a careful analysis of the police census. Ex- cluding the horses under four years old and brood mares, there are available horses to the extent of over 1,600,000. These we have analysed into saddle horses, heavy draught, and light draught, and a small class of horses still used for farming purposes. Of course, I do not estimate that all these horses would be useful, and I write them down to a figure of, say, 500,000. What is the next 'step to be taken?

We have worked out the basis of this scheme which I explained to the Committee when the Estimates were before the House last March. We worked it out on the quotas which each county would be called upon to produce on mobilisation. These we have not published yet, because the time has not quite come to do so. Presently we shall communicate with the county associations and then will be the time to show the work that has been done by this Committee. It is no use discussing these things in the abstract, or on the lines of the working of what county associations will have to do before you know the number of horses to be operated upon, or the proportions to be required. Until you get that question in the concrete it is no use endeavouring to make anticipations or at all events to be confident that you will succeed in them. What we have to do is to put the problem to the county associations, and that we hope to do in the course of a very short time. The work has been going on very carefully, and we are now far on with it, and the only thing quite certain is that notwithstanding the great decline in the number of horses in use in this country, there are still three or four times as many horses suitable for Army purposes as will be necessary for mobilisation. Of course I do not forget that mobilisation is not the only thing. The question of wastage is a very serious matter, but still, the number of horses is such as to provide enough for that also. Therefore it is a question of organisation and working out, and until the problem is presented in the concrete it is impossible to pronounce definitely upon it.

When we come to the county associations we will consider with them whether our plan proposes to allow enough for the work, whether they require more veterinary assistance, and what is to be done to make the plan succeed in full. There is no desire to prevent the spending of public money so far as it is required, but my experience is that one is extremely apt to run away on a plan which involves the spending of national money far beyond what really would have been necessary if you had known what you were about when you started. Therefore I want to go very cautiously in this matter and not to spend public money until I know what I am about. I should like to add that my Noble Friend Lord Carrington has a plan of a scheme at the War Office on behalf of the Board of Agriculture, to which I think I alluded on a previous occasion. His scheme is for the purchase of three-year-old horses bred from registered mares and suitable stallions, and these three-year-olds will be purchased from farmers, the War Office taking them as they require them.

We have not got the scheme in existence yet, but it is obvious they must be purchased from the breeders. These are horses bred from mares and stallions which are the subject of public Grant, and therefore it would be obvious that they would be bought from the breeders.

The next question the right hon. Gentleman put to me was the question about Mounted Infantry and divisional Cavalry. I am not sure where he got his figure of ninety-nine mounted men. My information furnished me, and I have verified it, is that there are to be mounted brigades which are to consist of 1,500 men, and consequently that the protective mounted men with the divisional Cavalry, as it is commonly called, consists of two companies of Mounted Infantry each of about 150 men, making 300 in all; so I do not know where the right hon. Gentleman got his information from about the ninety-nine.

I did not invent the phrase "protective Cavalry." There is the new Cavalry, as the Committee knows, that operates far away from the Infantry, and then there is what is called the "Divisional" mounted troops.

In your expeditionary division, which is strategic, you are using twelve regiments—four brigades—and you have only two other line regiments in this country, and the regiment made out of the Household troops. What are your "Protected Cavalry," as the phrase is understood, and your Divisional Cavalry to come from? I believe the mounted brigades of which we heard are Protected Cavalry, and what I was asking was, What is Divisional Cavalry? I purposely avoided the phrase "Cavalry Divisions," the old expeditionary division was small. The small divisions were grouped into three in the army corps, and there was a regiment in each army corps. Therefore, there were two regiments to every three of the small divisions of the mounted force.

The screen Cavalry as distinguished from the strategic consists of two mounted brigades, each generally of 1,500 mounted men, and they are Cavalry and Mounted Infantry, and Horse Artillery. That is screen Cavalry. I have published all these things.

No. I am informed that it should be 300. I have expert advice upon the matter, and I gather my answer as right.

May I ask whether the divisional mounted troops are not all Mounted Infantry?

Oh, certainly, what is called the Divisional Cavalry is Mounted Infantry. That is the essential upon which the thing is worked out. That is how the matter stands, and the details of the organisation has been published. Then there was another point which the right hon. Gentleman raised. He said there should be more Engineers, but I am told that the field companies of Engineers to divisions are enough. Then there was another point which he presented, and that was the state of the Special Reserve and the work of the Departmental Committee.

The matter is receiving attention. As regards the Special Reserve, a Departmental Committee has been sitting for some time, and it has worked out a good many theories, which it would not be at this moment expedient to publish. There is still a great deal of that work to be done. There is no doubt that the Special Reserve men are men if very good quality; the men we have been training this year and last year point to that. Whether the form of the present organisation of the Special Reserve is the best or not remains to be seen. At present the Special Reserve consists of something like 550 of an establishment. Of course that is only the peace establishment. The war establishment will be very much more, something from 1,100 to 1,300 on mobilisation. Their function is to occupy stationary positions, and there, under the plans worked out by the General Staff, gave both trained drafts and protect the work. Of course there is another class of Special Reserve whose function is to work in the lines of the relief of communication and other matters.

What the Departmental Committee are considering is whether we cannot improve the organisation by drawing some sort of distinction between the two classes of Special Reserve work and adapting certain plans for their work. It would be premature to say anything at this moment. The Committee has not reported, and I am not in a position to say what their recommendations may be as regards the Special Reserve and other battalions for training this year.

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he means that the twenty-seven extra battalions are being investigated by the same Committee as the seventy-four?

Yes, we are investigating the Special Reserve as a whole, and the General Reserve of the Army. The Special Reserve is not for mobilisation; it is used to make up the wastage by drafts, and we are investigating the whole question.

The Artillery stand on quite a different footing. The Artillery Reserve is 5,000, and it has also got a Special Reserve of similar dimensions—I think the number is 6,000, and with that 6,000 and 5,000 the Artillery would be adequately mobilised for service.

Are we to understand that the Special Reserve is never to be mobilised in battalion in case of war, but is only to be drafted away to the field of battle to make up wastage?

That depends upon what you want the battalion for, and, as I said, we are considering whether certain battalions might not be fitted for mobilisation, going abroad and doing work upon the field, and whether other battalions might not have to be differently considered. All they will have to find will be drafts, and the question is whether differential treatment for these two purposes is necessary. I say nothing about it now, because it is under the consideration of the most expert Committee I could get together, which has to report to the Army Council. Then as to the Special Reserves joining in the big manœuvres to take place in August. It is quite probable that the men who will go there will have had their full six months' recruit training, and that several of them will not have had their annual training, so they are going to take their annual training in the manœuvres. They would have had about the same time if they had come out for their annual training in the ordinary way. We think this is the finest training to fit them up as Regulars, and the manœuvres are to be on the fullest organised scale.

With regard to the Territorial Force, my reports coming in show that the Territorial Artillery are making marvellous progress, and there is no good ground for being gloomy about them at all. They are doing well, and it remains to be seen to what standard of excellence they will attain. It is certainly not possible to make predictions about them a priori, Nobody's a priori views are to be relied upon as to how the Territorial Force will turn out. There is only one thing to do, and that is to assist in every possible way by watching, by care, and by building up the Force where it is deficient. It is impossible by any amount of prevision to estimate what the Territorial Force will be after three years if it goes on in the fashion it is going on at the present time.

The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the recruiting, and said it was bad. I have heard it is wonderful in some places, and bad in others. I have no reason to believe it is bad. On the other hand, I hear of places where it is abnormally good; but until we have the figures, which we shall have eight or ten days after 1st July, and until we get a survey of the whole field, we shall not know what is really its condition. I would remind the right hon. Gentleman it is not 80 per cent, of the establishment only that has been reached; it was nearly 90 per cent, last March, and the other figures, I think, were 89 and a fraction. What I did say then, and what I say again, is that you will never get up to the absolute figure of the establishment, because there always passes out of the Teritorial Force a certain number of people, and it takes a certain time for their places to be filled. My experts tell me that, even with ideal recruiting, there must be a small margin short of the establishment, and the only question is how close we can get to the establishment. We have got behind the Territorial Force a Reserve, and I cannot agree with the right hon. Gentleman that it was not safe to base a Reserve on the Territorial Force. To begin with, nobody who is not fitted ought to be recommended, and the associations only accepts on recommendation. There are plenty of men who are very good, and will continue very good with a certain amount of training, after having had four years' experience in the Territorial Force. The Reserve gives you a bank behind the Territorial Force on which you can draw for mobilisation up to the full establishment in the event of war breaking out, and to fill up the wastage of war.

The right hon. Gentleman said we ought to have 500,000. That may or it may not be. He also hinted that it would be an excellent thing if we could get these by four months' embodied training in time of peace, and he seemed to suggest that in order to secure them there should be some form of legal duty resting on the people. I should just like to take this opportunity of saying that I cannot agree with the right hon. Gentleman. Careful consideration of this question has convinced me that all schemes for mixing up a compulsory and a voluntary system in this country are doomed to failure. They are founded on a strategical misconception of the most extraordinary kind. Just see what our position is. We have settled our strategical basis. We live on an island, and the command of the sea is vital to us. If we have command of the sea, the trouble of an invasion assumes a different aspect than if we had not command of the sea. You cannot be invaded with the force by which you could be invaded if you had not command of the sea. The com- mand of the sea is our first strategical necessity, and the second strategical necessity, which is of almost equal importance, is that we should have a very large expeditionary Army. When people talk of the small Army of Great Britain I smile. The small Army of Great Britain of an expeditionary character is larger than the expeditionary armies of France and Germany put together. It is true that every man under these Continental systems is bound to serve oversea under the law of his country, but it is well known that for long expeditions these countries call upon volunteers, and they cannot get volunteers in anything like the same number that we are able to get them in this country where our genius and our system are quite different.

It is the essence of our system that we recruit a professional Army for oversea service which, because it is professional, enlists for a long service, and that we should get it on a voluntary system. We require 150,000 troops, and the wonder is we get them. I have inquired on the Continent, and they tell me there they could not hope to have the stream of recruits for long oversea service that takes place in this country where the whole arrangements are voluntary. That being so I hold to the conviction that the next necessity to our Fleet commanding the sea is our expeditionary Army—our Regular First Line. We must keep that up, and also the forces requisite for India. I for one am not disposed to run the risk of giving rise to the condition of things which obtains on the Continent, where you cannot get your recruits with anything like the facility or in anything like the numbers we get them here. That is all I say. It is impossible to mix a compulsory and a voluntary system. You can have the one, or you can have the other. You may have a splendid voluntary system and get your recruits, and you may have a compulsory system, but you must have it compulsory right through.

I am not arguing against the Continental system, because, if I were a German, I should think the Army should be raised on a compulsory basis. You could not get it large enough on any other footing. It is the same with France. Then I remember what they want these things for. They want them for their home defence and for operations over the frontier in a neighbouring country. Their wars are on a tremendous scale, but they are short. They could not keep a nation in arms mobilised for a long time. We may have to keep our Army mobilised for five years for expeditions oversea, and we can keep the largest army in the world mobilised over sea for that period. We are the centre of a great and scattered Empire, and it is because we are a sea Power and the centre of a great and scattered Empire that we have the kind of Army we have, and that that kind of First Line is necessary—a First Line which I think I have shown we can only rely upon getting on a voluntary basis. I should just as soon think of interfering with my jugular vein unnecessarily as I should of taking any steps to interfere unnecessarily with that system. I cannot be sure we can get it under any other system. Until I can be so sure I shall continue to believe the burden lies on the other side, who want to make this tremendous and sweeping change. That is the first reason why I am against this system of embodying men for four months compulsorily. My second is that the problem of getting officers is difficult enough at the present time, and how to get the body of officers—5.000 or 6,000—that would be required to train these recruits brought in by compulsion of the law passes my comprehension. They would have to be Regular officers; they would have to be got at enormous cost, and you would have the greatest difficulty in getting them at all. You would have something which would tend to destroy the supply of officers for your First Line if you attempted to succeed in the Second Line. That shows the difficulty of mixing a compulsory and voluntary system.

No other nation has solved this problem, and the desire to solve it is based upon a misconception of the strategical position of this country. What is it? It is that if we have the command of the sea all we require is a Home Defence Army just large enough to force the enemy to come in such a size that the Fleet can destroy it. If you have not command of the sea, then you must starve. If you can force the enemy to come in such size that the Fleet can destroy it then you are safe. What is that size? After a great deal of consideration, I think, by both Front Benches, acting on the advice they have had at their command, they have put it at 70,000. I doubt very much whether 70,000 men, horses, and guns could be brought over in face of a Navy commanding the sea. I rather think the force would have to be less.

Be that as it may, with the 70,000 to be dealt with our position does not appear to be a very bad one. In time of peace you will have the expeditionary force at home, the Special Reserve and the Territorial Force, in all about 600,000 men; and after the expeditionary force is withdrawn you will have the Territorial Forces embodied, trained and in training, which will give you 300,000. I therefore cannot see any advantage in resorting to what the right hon. Gentleman seems to suggest to be the proper course of providing for the compulsory training of 400,000 men instead of the present system. It would be expensive. It would be ruinous to our supply of officers and it would be ruinous to our recruiting for the expeditionary force, and, when you add to that the fact that it is based on the greatest misconception, then I say frankly to this Committee that, having considered the matter for four years, I have come to the conclusion which I have ventured to intimate, and I cordially and respectfully concur in the view arrived at by the Leaders of both parties in the House of Lords last year when they threw out the Bill brought in for that purpose.

I have few words to say about the Veteran Reserve, of which the right hon. Gentleman has spoken. First of all, we want to know how many Veteran Reservists there are in this country and then we shall be able to see what can be provided in the shape of the most appropriate organisation for them. Warriors' Clubs and other institutions may be instituted for those who have a higher aim—those who can do great service in stimulating the military spirit and system in this country—but in these matters we must proceed step by step. My right hon. Friend has referred to the equipment of the Territorial Force and has complained that the provision for buildings are quite inadequate. I think I have been hearing the same complaints as have reached the ears of the right hon. Gentleman. He seems to think that the War Office is held back by a parsimonious and stingy Treasury from providing proper headquarters. That is a complete misconception. When the Territorial Force was started we said we did not want to put our hands into the pockets of the Treasury too deeply, and we told the Territorials, "We will provide proper headquarters." But I was careful to say that we should confine ourselves to those things which were necessary for military life and that they must not expect luxuries. I have therefore been compelled to turn a deaf ear to appeals to build drill halls large enough for all kinds of purposes; to appeals for swimming baths and recreation rooms on a very large scale—matters which used to be covered by subscription under the old Volunteer system. Of course, I do not want to discourage voluntary subscriptions, but I would point out that these are things which cannot be provided out of Army Funds. They are not necessary for Army organisation, and if you take money out of the Estimates for them something else which is necessary will have to suffer. There is only a certain amount of expenditure which can be justified as necessary for the emergencies of the Service. We have had to deal with a good many people who hold other opinions. They have said, "It is necessary we should have these things on the scale we have suggested"; but our experts—our Engineer officers—have thought otherwise and have advised us what is actually necessary. There has no doubt been considerable delay in carrying out some of these works in consequence. May I point out that up to 23rd May last we have spent in capital expenditure on headquarter buildings £636,000, and we have under consideration a further outlay of £415,000, including provision for certain large ranges. A great part of that work has gone forward smoothly, but it also includes some of the items which have been in controversy and as to which people say we are starving the Territorial Force. On additional property held on lease, since the Territorial Forces started, we have spent upwards of £20,000 a year for ground rents, and we have already spent a further £60,000 in making good dilapidations. The great bulk of the work has been done, and what remains to be finished will I hope be completed in a comparatively short time. Besides that, we have made a recent addition to the Grant to the county associations to meet certain expenses, and we have also under consideration the question of increasing the salaries of the secretaries of the associations. There is also the question of ranges, with which considerable progress has been made. The difficulty, about ranges, I am sorry to say, is increasingly great in this country. But the War Office has been making a resolute attempt to deal with it. Presently we shall have a number of new ranges. There is a great range at Purfleet. It has been constructed at a cost of over £200,000, and it will assist very much the Metropolitan and the Essex corps. It will be completed towards the end of the year. Then there is a range near Birmingham, which has cost us £35,000, and which is ready for use. There are other ranges in Lancashire and Northumberland, which we have under consideration, in addition to smaller ranges, and, further than that, we have provided a number of miniature ranges.

That is an Artillery range, and in regard to that there have been certain legal delays which have led to arbitration. The general criticism of the right hon. Gentleman amounted to this: There is a great deal still to be done. Nobody knows that better than we do, but there has been substantial progress this year, and the end of the second stage is, I think, in sight. That is the stage for providing the Territorial Forces with headquarters. There will be a third stage, which will be to make good the many defects we have discovered, and which must be put right. But, on the whole, the organisation has grown, and we hope it will continue to grow. It is no use being too sanguine about reaching the point of perfection. You cannot do that until years have elapsed. The Territorial Force has been in existence for only a little over two years. It must have time to grow. The best thing to be done is to water it and to nurse it and not to pull the plant by the roots to see what progress has been made. I think we may congratulate ourselves on the fact that the creation of this Territorial Force has not been a party controversial matter. Men of different political opinions have been of one mind on the subejct, and I confess I think the argument of the right hon. Gentleman is but a further manifestation,, if it were wanted, of the fact that the nation is determined to go on with this national institution.

We had understood that the question of the Mediterranean Command would be discussed to-day at greater length than it has been as yet, but as it may still be the subject of further speaking I shall not attempt to anticipate the general discussion. I will only say that the defence given by my right hon. Friend, which is probably an adequate defence, would have stood more strongly before the public had it not been for the notorious fact that the difficulty about the present Overseas Command has grown step by step out of certain arrangements made to meet personal necessities. I think no one in this House, whatever his views, would desire to speak otherwise than with the highest respect for the Duke of Connaught, but the arrangements made at that time were largely personal, and depended upon his princely position as well as upon military considerations.

6.0 P.M.

Then afterwards, when the matter was discussed in this House very much across the Table, it was rather discussed as a question personally relating to Lord Kitchener, and on the ground of the merits, and it may be the demerits and defects of those who were named in connection with the post.

I cannot help thinking that these repeated changes in the status and the peculiarity of the circumstances of this command, declined first in the case of the Duke of Connaught, and then by Lord Kitchener, may to some extent prejudice it in the public mind. I cordially agree with the statement of my right hon. Friend, however, that the present holder of the post in its new form is a man who is likely to be acceptable to the great self-governing Dominions. He was a well known and popular commander in South Africa, and is well versed in Colonial soldiering, and that is a fact I think which will help in the direction of inducing the Dominions to take a more friendly view of that which at first sight might have offended some prejudices had the post been held by a man less well known than is the new Inspector-General in the Mediterranean. I should have thought so all the more clearly had it not been for a speech made in another place by one whose authority on the subject of the opinion entertained in the Dominions ought to rank very high. Lord Northcote showed some alarm after his experience in Australia as to the reception which this appointment might receive. The discussion on this subject to-day must be of a tentative character, but I may point out that the defence of this proposal given by the Secretary of State for War is not based upon two pages issued on this subject in previous years, but only upon a three-line paragraph recently published. I cannot mention this post without an allusion to the question of cost, not only in connection with it, but in connection with the Commands-in-Chief, and the Inspection, and the cost of the Headquarters Staff, and of the War Office. I shall not deal with this matter at length for two reasons. In the first place, it has been the subject of repeated promises which have been made ever since the Report of the Esher Committee, from both sides of the House, that the cost of the War Office would be diminished, and also that of Headquarters and other Staffs, and that the cost has not diminished. Another reason why I shall not deal with it at length is that a day has been set apart for a Debate on the Report of the Public Accounts Committee, who have so prominently and frequently dealt with it that if we discussed the matter now we might possibly anticipate what some hon. Member may desire to say upon that occasion. It may suffice here to say that the Report of the Public Accounts Committee contains a paragraph of tremendous strength and, although that paragraph alludes to the reorganisation of the War Office and of the Army Accounts Department, they still continue to express grave doubts as to the form of the Accounts. It also-refers back to the reports of 1908 and 1909, in which these promises were made, both with regard to a reduction of the cost of the Headquarters Staff and the administration of the Army.

I have always maintained that we had too big a body and too little a head in the Army, and now that we are getting a larger head and a smaller body I think we have got to be about normal. We have reduced the cost of the Accounts Department very considerably.

Yes, but we have yet to see whether the new Department is efficient. The Accounts Department is a weak spot in the opinion of many. I will not deal with the Report of the Public Accounts Committee on that subject. It is disagreeable reading for the Army, and the only reason I mention it to-day is because the question comes up in regard to the new creation of these high commands. I do not think the prospect which is held out to us of the head swelling more and more is one which we can regard with equanimity. The body, no doubt, requires a thinking brain, but the brain is not the only part of the head that swells, and I cannot but think there is room for careful watching of the cost, not only for what is called War Office and Headquarters' Staff expenditure, but in regard to staffs in other parts of the Army, whether at home or in the Mediterranean. The right hon. Gentleman opposite asked some other questions, and he, very naturally, did so. They have been asked very frequently, and will go on being asked, and have reference to the shortage of officers. He did not press the matter at any length, and the reply was neither very complete nor very satisfactory. I am not going to attempt, however, in the presence of others who are far more competent to deal with that branch of the subject than I can pretend to be—I am not going to attempt to reopen the old discussions, or to say the old things which were said before, and to which we know the ordinary answers, but there is one consideration which is, perhaps, not sufficiently borne in mind. In our Army we have a high proportion of regimental officers as compared with foreign armies. There are very strong and excellent reasons for having a high proportion, although we do not always get it, and the difficulty of getting officers, and, perhaps, the difficulty of keeping them, is increased by the fact that an enormous proportion of the officers in our Army are taken off from their proper duties and put on to perform other duties. You will find a great number of them detached from their regiments, or, being with their regiments, having their time taken up with useless formalities which do not exist in other armies. The right hon. Gentleman, by increasing the power of commanding officers in regard to sentences, is doing his best to decrease courts-martial, but the service on courts-martial is enormously greater in our Army than it is elsewhere in other armies.

In some of those other armies they have a small number of specialist officers who give their attention to such matters, but no army takes up the time of so many officers for so long upon this work as ours. Then there is the inspection of accounts and other matters which are unknown abroad, and I cannot help thinking that just as our blue jackets are much too valuable to be employed as gardeners, so are our Army officers much too valuable to be taken off their real work and employed upon details which they should not have to do, and in doing which they are employed much more in our Army than in others. The next point raised was as to the character of the Special Reserve, and I confess that the answer of my right hon. Friend reminded me painfully of our old Debates on the Territorial Army Bill, which he most successfully carried and which I most unsuccessfully opposed. It reminded me of those Debates because of our inability to obtain any real idea of what the real position and the future of the Militia was going to be, or whether they would remain here or go abroad. They were said to be going to be available to perform a number of services, and, indeed, whatever service was mentioned, they were said to be going to perform it, and after those Debates I confess I heard with a great deal of amusement to-day that the whole, or a great number, of the battalions of the Special Reserve were again to go into the melting-pot. It is a curious reminder of those long and, I am afraid, useless, Debates which we had upon the Militia Clauses of the Territorial Army Bill, that we find now that the whole thing is as unsettled as it was when the Debates began.

Then the right hon. Member complained of the composition and size of the famous expeditionary force, which, it will be remembered, was criticised by the Leader of the Opposition and others on the first day that it was mentioned here.

The right hon. Gentleman did not see how we could despatch so large an expeditionary force, properly equipped and with all its horses, but to-day we get a definite point, also an old friend in a new form—the question of Cavalry apart from the Army Cavalry—that is to say, brigade and divisional Cavalry. I do not understand what the answer was, but I know the document which was mentioned, which I have always insisted really meant that the Cavalry, other than the Strategic Cavalry of the Cavalry Division, was to be Mounted Infantry drawn from Infantry battalions. There was a point as to using a certain proportion of Yeomanry, but I did not see where the Cavalry came in and took their place. Their place was taken by Mounted Infantry—that is to say, not regular Mounted Infantry organised in any regiment, but Mounted Infantry drawn from different Infantry battalions. This was a scheme to which I have always been rigidly opposed, and while I do not go so far as the right hon. Gentleman opposite in asking for so large an expeditionary force, I am thoroughly with him that in any circumstances, whatever the size of the expeditionary force should be, it should be supplied with Cavalry in the ordinary sense of the word, or Mounted Infantry who are regular Mounted Infantry, and in that sense Cavalry—not merely Mounted Infantry drawn from infantry battalions, but trained as Mounted Infantry beforehand in time of peace. We chop and change not only as to questions with regard to matters like Cavalry and the expeditionary force, but we also change with regard to another matter which was mentioned here to-day almost as if it were fresh, although the right hon. Gentleman opposite knows the whole history of that question. He suggested that the time had now come when we ought to be able to withdraw some, if not the whole, of the Cavalry at present in South Africa. My right hon. Friend has always theoretically agreed that a self-governing Dominion, such as the South African Union has now become, has to provide for her own defence, and will be proud to do so like the others, and although we possess in South Africa responsibilities outside the four States which form the Union, yet Basutoland is not a country in which Cavalry could operate, although it is a great country for the supply of ponies and horses. It is not a country where Regular Cavalry regiments would be wanted, and I cordially support the suggestion that these Cavalry regiments should now be brought home. Unfortunately, last year the Under-Secretary for the Colonies gave one reason for keeping the troops, including the Cavalry, continuously in South Africa, and my right hon. Friend gave another, and I thought both were bad. Perhaps they were equally bad. Every Colony really contains a large number of persons who ardently desire the presence of Cavalry regiments in their midst. That demand always exists though it is somewhat artificial. My right hon. Friend harked back to the old heresy of troops in South Africa being definitely stationed there for use elsewhere. That was a doctrine which, when looked into by the House of Commons, was rejected by the great majority of the House, although it had many strong friends. The cost of keeping troops there alone is of course an element which must be taken into consideration—the enormous additional cost involved by keeping a force in South Africa as compared with keeping it at home. I think when we consider what we shall have to pay for our Navy in future years that is an overwhelming reason against keeping that body of troops in South Africa.

Not only have we chopped and changed about our Cavalry system, but in one other matter to which I must refer we have done the same. I mean what we call to-day light guns, which we were told the example of Manchuria had conclusively demonstrated to be necessary. Every other country has increased its mountain artillery steadily while we have virtually-abolished ours except in India where it is a native body, while, just as an afterthought, we kept some in South Africa. When we abolished them altogether at home the whole of the establishments in Monmouthshire were swept away, and the Militia, which co-operated with them, were also, of course, turned out of the Garrison Artillery. It shows how we chop and change, and if my right hon. Friend achieves the result of getting a more consecutive policy in matters of that kind I am sure he will be wise. But we cannot forget how we have chopped and changed in regard to the drill and instructions of our Cavalry and the principles of Cavalry work, and, as regards Mountain Artillery, while every other power was going on steadily in the direction of extending and improving its mountain battery system-There is one other matter which was referred to—the shortness of recruits for the Territorial Army. I will not go over the old story of the change from the improved Volunteers into the present Territorial Army system, but it is not fair to count, as against the old system and in favour of the new, the Yeomanry either as regards strength or efficiency, because they were more strong and as efficient before the Act was passed as they are now. They have nothing to do with the Territorial Army Act. They are nominally a portion of that Army, but they are the same as they were before the Act was passed. As regards the Artillery, I am not going to repeat what I have said before. The right hon. Gentleman did not sharply dissent from what was said by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, and, as far as I am concerned, I will not reopen that controversy. But as regards the Infantry, the worst point, as I foresaw, of the change from the more elastic Volunteer system to the more stiff imitation of the Regular system in the Territorial Infantry has been—I will not say everywhere but in many counties, because the system works differently in different places—that in large parts of the rural districts you have lost that admirable recruit, the rural Volunteer, and when people suggest that he was only a pot-hunting Volunteer, who worked for his shooting and his prizes, of course the man I mean did not. He was a really conscientious and patriotic Volunteer, and a better type of non-commissioned officer than was got out of these men it was impossible to find. That is, of course, one class of recruit, and a very superior type, properly to be attracted by a Territorial Army and not competing with the Regulars, as some Volunteer townsmen do, that you have lost by the new system, and whom you might have now in an improved version of the old one.

There is a little chaff perhaps on the subject of veterans in the Service. I suppose by the reply of the Secretary of State he meant it rather as an honour when he said he wished to raise the age above fifty than as a very effective contribution to the actual strength of the Infantry, the Artillery, or the Cavalry. But it would be easy to push the matter too far, because undoubtedly both in Germany and in France you can find examples of distinguished veterans who continue to serve at an extraordinary age. Bismarck will occur to anyone, being an active territorial officer up to his death, and I remember a distinguished Frenchman who is still living who twenty years ago was a lieutenant at 60, and when he appeared in the street in uniform people used to say he was very old for a territorial lieutenant. They do undoubtedly keep men at great ages, though they cannot be useful in any way, but it is very important in the case of a Volunteer Territorial Army to avoid everything which will savour of the ridiculous. If you allow men in a Volunteer Territorial Army to appear in their uniforms at an age at which they will be useless for service in the field you impart an element of ridicule which reduces them and puts them on a par with miniature rifle clubs and. all those little social bodies connected with prize shooting, which certainly prejudiced the Volunteer movement in the military mind, and which are discouraged in the new Territorial Army. One wounding feature in connection with the change from Volunteers to Territorials has been the confiscation for the benefit of other people of the drill halls with which many battalions have provided themselves with great public spirit. I never like joining in the attack on my right hon. Friend for not buying and building more drill halls, but in the arrangements to get rid of certain battalions they have in many cases plundered one locality of an adequate drill hall for the purpose of handing it over as a storehouse for another battalion which has a very good drill hall in its own place.

There is one question I should like to ask for the purpose of reassuring excitable and nervous people who are affected by violent statements in the Press. I assume that there is no shadow of foundation for recent mixed military and naval scares which have been set up in connection with all sorts of new inventions. It has been said that the whole manufacture of ammunition for the Army could be paralysed at any moment by the dropping of a small amount of fire on a single spot. I think there has been such a positive statement made—to my mind ridiculous—in a quarter so important, and backed by at least three considerable speakers on a great scientific occasion, that it is almost worth asking the Secretary of State to stamp on a rumour so absurd.

I think many of my Friends on this side of the House will join me in congratulating the right hon. Gentleman upon his statement in respect of what the War Office is doing as to the horse supply. It is somewhat difficult, of course, to understand what the intentions of the War Office are in regard to horses until we have further details of the scheme, but I think from the words the right hon. Gentleman let drop that we can congratulate him on making a great step in the right direction. I only ask his attention to one matter. As he well knows, every year in the Cavalry a large number of mares are dropped, some for one reason and some for another, and a good many of them are not too old to breed from and might be utilised, instead of being sold as they are for a very few pounds, by being farmed out to farmers and others and used to breed the right sort of horses that the Army requires.

I should like to allude to another point with respect to the expeditionary force which I do not think any speaker has yet touched upon, that is the supply of officers on mobilisation. I believe the number of officers required for the expeditionary force on mobilisation during the first six months would be something like 7,300, while the whole number of Regular officers actually serving in the country is only about 6,600;and in addition to this number, which was actually put down in a Paper issued, I think, last year, of 7,300, a large number of officers would also be required for the purpose of line communications, depots and other staff work and other purposes necessary for mobilisation. This is entirely exclusive of all the demands that would have to be met to supply officers for our troops oversea. India alone on mobilisation, would require at least 5,000 officers, and then a large supply of officers would also be required in our Colonies and elsewhere in order to complete mobilisation. I venture to say that the supply is totally inadequate, and I do hope that the right hon. Gentleman will be able to assure the House that there are officers available outside of the 1,800 officers in the Army Reserve. He has also, of course, the Special Reserve, but he has already told us that the Special Reserve is not to be utilised on mobilisation.

That is almost still more remarkable. If the right hon. Gentleman is going to take away the whole of the officers from the Special Reserve, is he going to leave them without officers? I can only judge from what the right hon. Gentleman has said that this does not apply to the officers of the Special Reserve.

A Special Reserve officer is different from an officer of the Special Reserve. We hope to use Special Reserve officers on mobilisation.

I agree that Special Reserve officers and officers of the Special Reserve are different, but I hope we shall have more information than we have yet received as to how these officers are to be utilised on mobilisation. I do think this matter of the expeditionary force, and especially the officering of it on mobilisation, is one of the most serious problems the right hon. Gentleman will have to deal with. I hope he will be able to assure the House that he has dealt with it, and that the supply of officers is adequate.

The right hon. Gentleman in his speech this afternoon informed the Committee that after the expeditionary force had left this country he still would have 300,000 men available. What provision has the right hon. Gentleman made for his garrisons? I know that when the Estimates were brought before the House in March last the right hon. Gentleman stated that the garrisons were included in the force available for meeting an invader. Therefore it appears that he intended, on the invasion of this country, to denude the garrisons and leave our ports, dockyards, and other important places entirely without a man to defend them. I should therefore like to ask the right hon. Gentleman if that is still his intention, or, if that is not his intention, how does he propose to produce the 300,000 men and also, in addition, the 160,000 to 170,000 required to garrison this country and Ireland? The right hon. Gentleman must remember that Ireland must be garrisoned as well as this country. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman, before this Debate is finished, will be able to satisfy the House that there is an adequate supply of Regular officers and also Regular officers of the junior ranks to fill up the expeditionary force on mobilisation.

I wish to draw the attention of the Committee to the new regulation under which officers on the active list of the Army are allowed to sit as Members of Parliament. From an answer given by the right hon. Gentleman at Question Time he showed himself thoroughly aware that there was a certain sense of grievance under which some hon. and gallant Members of the House are suffering, and he said the matter was still under consideration. As this is a matter which closely concerns the Membership of the House, I will trespass on the time of the Committee for a few minutes to put them in possession of the facts. Up to the election of 1906 any officer on the active list who chose to come into the House of Commons did so by surrendering his pay while maintaining Army rank. Two years ago a regulation came into force—and I regret that I did not draw attention to it at the time—providing that an officer who comes into the House of Commons should no longer maintain his rank, but that while drawing half-pay he should be put at the bottom of the rank at the time. That has the undoubted effect of saying to the officer who wishes to come into the House of Commons that he is not wanted. It places him in a position of losing all the back service which he may have to his credit, and if he ever discovers that he is not fitted for the House of Commons, or that he cannot afford to remain a Member, it makes him unable to go back and resume his profession with the same rank. This matter has got to be looked at from two points of view. One is the point of view of the House of Commons, and the other is the point of view of the Army. I think the Committee will agree with me that it is to the advantage of the House of Commons that there should be military Members here, and for choice that they should be men who come fresh from the exercise of their profession, who are able to give criticism of some value and who are able to a certain extent, and with due regard to discipline, to state th:3 views, grievances, and feelings of the Army. During the time I have had the honour of a seat in this House I do not think that the duties which ought to be fulfilled by military Members have been in any sense overstepped. I think the House is willing and anxious that that state of affairs should remain. The only question we have to consider now is the efficiency of the Army, which the right hon. Gentleman very properly referred to in the answer he gave at Question Time. I may remind the Committee that the period for which an officer might serve in this House without losing rank in the Army under the old rule was five years That is the period for which most staff appointments run, and it is one after which many officers return to their regiments after serving as adjutants of Volunteers, filling various appointments abroad, and many appointments which are more strictly military than service in the House of Commons. The question I wish to put to the right hon. Gentleman is whether we can suggest any further modification of the rule which would increase, or might be supposed to increase, the efficiency of the officer who comes for five years to the House of Commons. I personally see no drawback to their doing the same as officers of the Yeomanry or the Militia, and undergoing a period of training with their battalions if they happen to be at home. That period of training could be given during their service in the House of Commons, provided, of course, that that was compatable with the performance of their duties as a Member.

I should like also to ask the right hon. Gentleman to contrast the way in which naval officers are treated with the way in which military officers are treated. A naval officer does not lose his seniority by becoming a Member of this House, and he also goes on half pay. I may instance the case of the Noble Lord the Member for Portsmouth (Lord Charles Beresford) who is now sitting in the House for the fifth time to the satisfaction, I think, both of the Service to which he belongs and the House. I do not think the right hon. Gentleman opposite will get up and say that the periods during which the Noble Lord has served in the House have done anything to detract from his efficiency as a Naval officer. Therefore, I think what is done in the Navy in that respect should be done also in the Army. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will see his way to reconsider this regulation. I believe it is an entirely retrogade one and entirely opposed to the sentiments which were expressed three years ago when the right hon. Gentleman came to the Table of the House and said he wished to make the Army more identified with the nation. If there is one way that you can make the Army more identified with the nation, it is to allow members of it to sit in the House of Commons. Although there are many hon. Members fully equipped and able to give information on Army matters to the House, there must be certain things on which regimental officers just returned from duty must be better informed than anybody else, and I think it would be a pity if the House of Commons were to lose the assistance of those hon. and gallant Members. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will see his way to return to the rule of 1906 or some modification of it, and thereby relieve some of us from a certain sense of hardship. I see the Financial Secretary to the War Office (Mr. Mallet) in his place, and I should like to say a word as to the extraordinary effect of this regulation from the financial point of view. Up to 1908 military Members who sat in the House of Commons were perfectly content without any pay at all. Now, however, the Treasury is in such a beneficent mood that they have come forward and given us half-pay for doing nothing. Of course, hon. Members who have no wish to return to the Army are pleased with that beneficence, but I think some of us would willingly forego half-pay if we could return to the rule which obtained before 1908.

I do not wish to go into the grievance which the hon. and gallant Member (Captain Baring) has mentioned, but I think we all sympathise with what he has said. I wish to draw attention to a matter which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover (Mr. Wyndham) referred to in his speech, namely, the increase in the number of Infantry. I think those who have watched the Infantry training lately will all agree that it is not the want of numbers in the Infantry which gives cause for complaint, because, after all, the numbers could be filled up pretty easily. The real difficulty in the Reserve and in the Regular battalions is not as regards the number of men, but the men capable of training those who come up—commissioned and non-commissioned officers. The present number has been somewhat cut down through the wholesale alteration of the unit, depot, and the Special Reserve staff. That has been beneficial, no doubt, in some respects, but at present there is a difficulty in getting sufficient men as recruiting sergeants, and there is great stress both in the Regulars and the Reserves to get men as good instructors to train the Infantry. I think the one thing that is really required, both for Regular Infantry and for Reserves, is increased numbers, increased encouragement for non-commissioned officers, and also some means of overcoming the great difficulties of finding officers to fill up the regiments when mobilisation takes place. The hon. Baronet the Member for Marylebone (Sir Samuel Scott) pointed out that there was a shortage of officers in the Special Reserve. There is no doubt that if the establishment could be filled up there would be plenty of officers. Every special Reserve battalion has got twenty-one subalterns, five or six of these, or four certainly, would be drafted into the Regular battalion on regular mobilisation, and there still would be plenty of subalterns if we could only get the full establishment up. What I hope the Secretary of State for War will do is to devise some means of encouragement to get young men to become officers in the Regular Army, or to get sufficient training to be sent out with the Regular Army when the time of mobilisation does come.

There is one remark I wish to make on the question of the training, or, rather, the setting out of manœuvres of the Special Reserve. When the Special Reserve Regulations were brought in there was a great deal of objection taken to doing away with the old Militia. It was an understood form of bargain with the Gentlemen objecting that when the drafts were sent out in Special Reserve officers and men should be taken together. Now, as I understand, in these manœuvres—though I do not think any of the Regular regiments are overburdened with officers, and many of them might be let off manœuvres—yet in the Special Reserve the men have to be drawn and the officers left behind. I think of all the people in the world who would require manœuvres and would require to be taught what goes on in actual warfare it is the Reserve officer. I think they might certainly be allowed, even if they were not going with the men, to be attached in battalion and sent to country manœuvres at the same time as the men are. I know that some battalions object very strongly to the officers being left at home, and I hope that the Secretary of State for War will consider that point. It is one that does not concern me or my battalion, but it is a grievance which I have heard of. The right hon. Member for Dover made the point that the Reserve battalion would not be able to march. I have been for over thirty years in a Reserve battaion in the Militia in the old days, and one thing we never found any difficulty in was marching as well as any Regular battalion. It was the one thing that we could always do well after about a week's work in getting into condition. I believe that the less men have marched, the less strain they have put upon them, the more likely they are after a certain period to get into condition. It can be done after a week or two, and they are then able to walk long distances. I do not believe that manœvres ever helped a man permanently to walk. There is no doubt that a man who is not in condition, if he has not had a week or fortnight's training beforehand, cannot walk; but the man certainly who has had great hardship is less likely to be able to endure continual marching than the man who has lived a comparatively easy life and is put into training for it. I think that would be the experience of foreign armies as well as our own.

That is not the point. These special Reserves are not to have the annual training and not to join Army manœuvres.

I think the right hon. Gentleman is mistaken in that, because I understand that one of the battalions is going to have the three-weeks' training, and then they are going out for three weeks' manœuvres. The men have to do six weeks. I think that is the case with the Lincolnshire battalion, and I suppose it is also the case with the other battalions. But I think the one thing men do not require long practice at is learning to walk. Most of us have learned to walk tolerably, and once we get into condition we can always manage to get over that difficulty. One thing that is necessary for the Reserve is that they should have good men to train, and I might plead that in the case of Special Reserves we should have four weeks. With three weeks it is a desperate rush, and it is not sufficiently well done. I believe the six weeks' training, when they join at the depot, for recruits is more than is necessary. They get no company drill and no battalion drill They are simply taught the preliminary training. They really do want four weeks. I am quite sure all the Special Reserve battalions would be very much more efficient if they only had five weeks on joining and an extra week or six days for the training when they go out to annual training. On Salisbury Plain I noticed at once the difficulty, where they had not been taught company drill or battalion drill, and that difficulty existed for the first week or two. I think, therefore, it is very necessary to have this four weeks instead of three weeks, and I trust that the Committee of Inquiry, of which the Secretary of State for War has told us will look into this matter, and decide that that is so. I think that most of the general officers on Salisbury Plain would give their evidence in favour of four weeks, and I am quite sure that it would be a change in the right direction.

Allow me strongly to support the plea on behalf of the officers of His Majesty's Army who are now Members of this House, which was put forward by the hon. Member for Winchester (Captain Baring). I am sure that the only people who can possibly be aggrieved by reverting to the old conditions are the officers of the hon. Member's regiment, and when I was a soldier, though one or two or even more members of the regiment were also Members of the House of Commons, nobody grumbled that these men should go out and get their promotion the same as any other officer in the regiment, and I think it must discourage young officers who wish to get on in their profession from coming to the House and giving us the benefit of their experience if they are to be put down permanently at the bottom of the stage, and, even though they have given up their pay, are to have no opportunity outside this House of getting on in their profession. Therefore I do hope that the right hon. Gentleman will consider this question as he has done other subjects. The right hon. Gentleman made a very long and very illuminating speech. It was really in the nature of soothing syrup. Everything was the best of all in the best of all possible worlds. Everything was being considered carefully. Therefore the House of Commons was to wait and see what was going to turn up. That was the gist of the speech as far as I could make out. While we have been waiting to see what was going to turn up in the Special Reserve for two or three years, the old Militia has been done away with against the wishes of many hon. members of the last Parliament. They were 86,000 strong when the late Government went out of office. The right hon. Gentleman has replaced them by Special Reserves, which are 70,000 strong. Therefore we have lost at once by the change 15,000 men. Will anybody get up and say that the Special Reserve are better than the old Militia?

Yes. The men are stronger men and better men than the old Militia. I am speaking from experience.

The hon. Member says that he speaks from experience, and that is the exception that proves the rule. I have only heard of one Militia battalion refusing to go on foreign service, so that there is practically no difference as to foreign service between the Special Reserve and the old Militia. There we have a grave deficiency—I admit it existed in the case of the Militia as well—of 1,183 lieutenants in the Special Reserve. I need not labour the Special Reserve because the right hon. Gentleman will admit that it was in a very unsatisfactory state. If it were not so, would he have this Committee sitting to find new means of putting it upon a satisfactory footing? So far as I am informed, comparing the old Militia with the Special Reserve, we are not better off but worse off than we were. The right hon. Gentleman made one very important declaration; that is to say, he defined definitely and clearly his attitude in respect to compulsory service. That is very important, because I remember that in the first two or three years of the last Parliament the right hon. Gentleman flirted in a rather outrageous way with compulsory service. The right hon. Gentleman said, "If you do not accept this Bill of mine there is nothing left but compulsory service," and I do not blame the right hon. Gentleman for his attitude. I only wish to point out to the Committee that the right hon. Gentleman has now come down, rightly or wrongly, very definitely on the side of the fence which is opposed to compulsory service. I, personally, if I may say so, agree with him to a certain extent. I entirely admit that we are on a different footing absolutely from Continental nations. Compulsory service, as understood in France and Germany, is alien to our wishes, and, indeed, unnecessary for our needs, but I think that under certain circumstances the old Militia ballot, or something resembling it, might and ought to be revived if we cannot get the men in any other way. The right hon. Gentleman stated he thought one of the chief reasons against compulsory service was that it would interfere with recruiting for our Regular Army. The right hon. Gentleman may have good reasons for bringing forward that argument, but he gave no reasons. He simply stated that as a fact, and he did not say why. If you take the age for the Territorial Army some years later, say twenty, than what you take for the Regular Army, from seven teen to eighteen, I cannot see why there should be any diminution in the stream of recruits for the Regular Army if you had some form of compulsory service. I have the honour of being one of the backers of a Bill which was introduced within the last two years, and is going to be introduced again by the hon. Baronet the Member for Marylebone, which sought to revive in a certain form the old Militia ballot. That is to say, that if this House, in its wisdom, decides that 310,000 men are needed in the Territorial Forces, and that if that force cannot be got up to full strength by voluntary means, then it shall be in the power of the Government of the day, by means of a ballot, to recruit in each district up to the required number which has been allocated. What is there undemocratic in that? Surely, if the House of Commons, elected on a popular suffrage, says that a certain number of men are necessary, there is nothing undemocratic in the House of Commons saying that the Government should go to the people of the country and say, "As you have not come forward voluntarily, we j must insist on a certain number of you coming forward, chosen by ballot, to fill up the gap." If the Government say that 310,000 men are necessary to defend this country, surely there is no reason to refuse, on so-called democratic principles, to fill up the number by this method. I can see nothing undemocratic in it. It applies to all. It applies to the duke and to the coster. Surely if they decide that even 300,000 men—

The hon. Member had better wait until the Bill comes up, and he can then deal with the question.

7.0 P.M.

I was led into that matter by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War having dealt with it. I have developed ray argument as much as I wish, however. There is one subject of importance, though it is rather a side issue, which has been referred to, namely, the garrisoning of Egypt. For private reasons I had occasion to spend two or three months in Egypt, and I had the fortune to meet various military men. While it was not contended that the garrison of Egypt was seriously below its strength, if you take the total number of 5,000 or 6,000 men, yet it was seriously contended that, with the danger of unrest in Europe, and with the fact that there were no white troops between Cairo and Khartoum, in places where there are fanatical populations, the white inhabitants, in the event of riot and disorder in those centres, would only have the native police to defend them. I think, if the right hon. Gentleman will look into the subject, he will see that in the large railway and commercial centres between Cairo and Khartoum there are no white troops to defend the white inhabitants. It is true that if murders were committed they would be avenged within a week or ten days, but that would be very small compensation to the bereaved wives and children. I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman a question in regard to the new howitzers for the Army. Two years ago I was on Salisbury Plain and saw experiments with howitzers, and I know that they were then thought to be very satisfactory. That is two years ago, and yet I see, in the explanatory statement of the right hon. Gentleman issued in February of this year, that these howitzers will not be completed before the end of the present financial year; that is to say, practically another year from now, while the first delivery is not to take place until June. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will state the reason of this unexpected delay. Two years is a very long delay in the provision of howitzers, which are so extremely important to the Army. One word about the Territorial Force. I understand from the speeches of the Secretary for War and the right hon. Baronet (Sir C. Dilke) that recruiting for the Territorial Force is good in some places and bad in others, and that the number of the Territorial Force does not reach to the number of the old Volunteers and the Yeoman^—about 272,000 men, I think, is correct. I hear from a good many sources that a great danger is threatened to recruiting for the Territorial Force owing to the fact that, unfortunately, many employers of labour, especially in the Metropolitan districts, are beginning to refuse leave to men to attend the camp.

It is very easy to abuse employers for refusing; still, it does undoubtedly entail a great burden on employers who are asked to give leave to their men to go to camp. It is also very hard that patriotic employers, who have to send two or three Territorials to camp, should be penalised, while men who do not employ Territorials get off scot-free. There, again, you come to the question of compulsory service in order to make it equal all round. I do think that if the right hon. Gentleman will consider the possibility, not of calling out all the Territorials, or practically all the Territorials, in July and August, but allow them to come out from May to September for practice and training, there would be far less difficulty with employers than at the present moment. Remember that July and August for many employers are the heaviest months of the year. In those months the catering trade is very busy, all transport is great, and everything pertaining to holiday traffic keeps men employed. The training of the Territorials would be just as good if it took place with the brigades and with the artillery as with the big divisions.

The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head. I must say that when I was a soldier and attended manœuvres, the instruction, whatever it was, which I got from the manœuvres decreased with the size of the manœuvres; that is to say, if I went out for training I really learned something with a small body, if I went out with a battalion I learned a little, but if I went out for the ordinary manœuvres I learned nothing except walking along the hard, high road. I would put it to the right hon. Gentleman that he might look into the subject and see whether it is absolutely necessary that all the Territorials should come out at one time or whether their coming out might not be spread over six months. I think it would diminish the difficulty of employers, and incidentally recruits would be induced to join the Territorial Force.

If the right hon. Gentleman felt that he had any criticism on my part to meet he certainly took the right way to disarm it in the very clear declaration which he made to-day with regard to compulsory service. On that point I am entirely at issue with the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down. But I rose to support, with him, the protest which has been made from those benches and by the hon. and gallant Member for Winchester against the regulations in regard to officers who are elected Members of this House. It would seem indeed to every Member of this House, if he were not aware that the right hon. Gentleman can hold his own against all comers, that he was afraid of criticism, because there can be no doubt that the fresh blood imported into this House in the present Parliament has had a very vivifying effect on the Debates of this Assembly. I drew attention to that in the Debate we had before Easter, and I think it must have been patent to every Member of this House that these officers, who have done good service already in the House—unfortunately they sib mostly on one side; still, that is their misfortune, and not their fault—have come straight from service with their units, and they are able to speak with fresh experience, whilst those of us who have been in this House for a few years, and have been entirely separated from the Army, feel that cur experience has gradually become rather old, that we ourselves are becoming mere and more old fogies, and that we are certainly not of the same value to a Secretary for War like my right hon. Friend, who wishes to do his best for the Army, at the younger Members who have come into the House. Therefore I think it is most desirable that the Regulations, especially as to officers who serve in this House, should not be such as to impose disabilities upon them. I would go further than that. I am not a constitutional lawyer, but I have some idea of what is constitutional and what are the privileges of this House. I am not sure that, in putting these disabilities upon persons duly elected to serve in this House the right hon. Gentleman has not committed a breach of privilege of this House. At any rate, I should be very glad to hear from him when he replies that he will carefully consider the arguments that have been put to him, and so very well put to him, by the hon. Member for Winchester, and that he will not be afraid of any criticism that may come from those benches provided it comes from competent officers.

I desire to speak briefly in regard to the pay of the Army. No doubt the Secretary for War has done- a great deal for the organisation of the Territorial Forces, but besides the organisation on paper you must have the men with whom to organise the forces, and in that respect I am quite sure that whether the number of the Territorial Force be 315,408, or, as the right hon. Member (Mr. Wyndham) suggested, 500,000, the problem of raising that number would be impossible if you do not offer strong inducements to the men to join. One hon. Member suggested the revival of the Militia ballot, but for my part I consider that the best recruiter is the contented old soldier. If you have men in your Army who at the end of their period of service go away contented with their lot, and contented with their pension, it will mean a vast increase in recruiting throughout the country. The Secretary for War may go down to posterity with the praise of all men for what he has done in regard to the Territorial Force; at the same time, he may go down to posterity possibly as having worked the regular soldier in the Army rather more and paid him sometimes rather less. Under the late Government, the private soldier who had served a certain number of years and had attained a certain standard of proficiency got 7d. proficiency pay, but to-day, though the standard of proficiency is higher, only sixpence is paid. That is contrary to the usual practice in nearly every profession in the country. Apparently a man in the Army is to be worked harder and his pay in some cases is to be less. Another point I should like to raise is that the work of attaining to the standard of proficiency has been made certainly very much harder. I know of a battalion which the year before last had some 125 marksmen, and last year they had something like six. With this very sudden rise in the standard to be attained to get proficiency pay, many soldiers, who have worked a good many years, resented, and became disgusted because they thought the Government were trying to save a certain amount of money at the expense of the private soldier. That is not the way to get a contented mind and a good recruiter when he is going away. There should be a gradual system, so as to give the men a chance of drawing proficiency pay.

There is another point in connection with this matter. There are men who were drawing proficiency pay or Service pay as it is called before 30th September, 1906, at the rate of 7d. per day. When airy of those men wanted to re-engage for twelve or twenty-one years, what reward did they get for serving in the Army for many years? Those men are engaged for the extended purpose at 6d. per day, or Id. per day less than they had before reengaging. Surely those are men you wish to have in the Army, and they are men who do much to strengthen and to stiffen the rank and file. The number of those men eligible for proficiency pay is not very large, and the number amongst those who extend their service must be very few, so that it would cost the Government very little, at any rate, to give those who re-engage the rate of pay they had previously. As to the question of clothing, I do not think the new system under which the men are given a certain allowance instead of being given a regular issue of clothing is altogether satisfactory. Previously the men on joining received a free kit, and at the end of certain periods other garments were supplied, and they probably sufficed. Under the new system, which came into operation on 1st April, 1909, there is an allowance in lieu of that. I think that will probably result in some men attempting to make their garments last a great deal longer, and they will take the allowance instead of using it to obtain new clothing. That will put a heavy responsibility on the company commander. I hope that these points I have mentioned will receive favourable consideration from the Secretary of State for War.

I think some Members of the House will be a little disappointed that we did not hear more from the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War as to the scheme of a census of horses which he brought forward at an earlier stage. I quite admit it may be unfair to ask him to produce his scheme before it is really ready. At the same time he told us that the census was taken, and I should like to point out to him the danger of drawing any serious conclusions from that census. That is the result of experience of other hon. Members beside myself. I have a fairly handsome horse which goes into a mowing machine. Nobody consulted or asked me about the census when it was being taken, but I have reason to believe that that noble animal has gone down on the census as being fit for Army purposes. There must have been many such instances under the conditions under which the census was taken, and in which no effort was made to inquire as to age, soundness, or other qualifications. It must be a task of infinite difficulty to sift such a census, or to place any reliability upon it. The problem that we have to face is that the supply of light horses is decreasing. The advent of the motor cars and a few other things will no doubt tend to decrease that supply of light horses, which almost entirely exist for the sole purpose of hunting. Nobody practically breeds light horses except for hunting and a certain number for harness purposes. How are we going to increase the supply? There is no use in registration. How are we to prevent the decrease continuing and turn it into an increase? I am glad the Government have not adopted the very foolish and almost mad scheme which some people suggested of stopping the export of horses, and thereby killing the horse trade. No more ridiculous scheme has ever been suggested, because it is difficult to keep the breeding of light horses going on in this country, and if you did anything of that kind you would discourage the trade to a very serious extent. I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on resisting the strong proposals which I know have been made to him to adopt a system of that kind.

There is another thing which the Government are doing which is not sufficiently known, and if the people of the country knew more about it there would be a good deal better results. I only found out recently that the Government are prepared to give prizes at local shows where there is a chance of the exhibit of a sufficient number of horses fit for Army remounts or animals likely to suit. I am quite certain if the right hon. Gentleman would have a circular sent round to the committees of the various shows explaining the conditions and limitation as to price, quality, number of entries, etc., he would find that he would give a great deal of information, and that he would get a great deal of information. He would find out the districts where there was the best chance of obtaining a supply of horses, and he would give the farmer a chance of producing his animal direct to the Government. At present there is too much being done through third parties. I am quite certain the right hon. Gentleman wants to prevent that, and that he would rather deal direct. His difficulty is that the Government cannot spend, say, a whole afternoon in trying to settle the difference of a five-pound note in the price for a horse which, as everybody who is acquainted with the matter knows, is not an easy thing to do. If the horses were shown at local shows, the Government could buy if they were shown under certain conditions, and, in addition, they would find out where the best supply came from, instead of going to certain dealers and finding a certain supply ready made, without knowing exactly where they came from. At the same time, by doing so, the Government would be conferring a distinct benefit on the breeders of light horses in this country.

Another thing which the Government, I understand, contemplate doing is to show in various shows horses of the type they desire to have. That would be a most admirable thing, because there is no use in sending out pictures, and especially such as the combined efforts of the Board of Agriculture and the War Office have recently produced. I am quite sure that private owners would lend horses. I would be only too glad to lend any horse which they might think would be a good type as as Army horse to show at the local shows. That would encourage those who have the breeding of light horses to continue. The most difficult point is that of price. In the course of the Debate it has been stated you can buy a three-year-old for £30, presumably, I suppose, because a four-year-old costs £40, but I do not quite follow the reasoning. I think the right hon. Gentleman will find that the only way by which he can really encourage the breeding of light horses is to make it a profitable trade. I think he can give up the idea that a three-year-old can be obtained for £30. I do not believe a horse could be profitably bred for that sum. I am perfectly certain that the supply will not be increased or the decrease checked unless it is well known that you can breed light horses for profit. I know it is a platitude and that many people have suggested to the right hon. Gentleman to spend money, but I think he will find that that is the only way of checking the decrease, which is a serious matter at the present time. If you are going to get a supply of light horses suitable for the Army you must give something in the way of inducement, and a profitable margin is necessary to make the traders go on breeding.

I am sure the right hon. Gentleman has read the Report of the Horse Supply Committee of the Hunters' Improvement Society. I do hope that before the scheme is completed those who compile it will carefully study that very valuable Report, because it has been drawn up by men of very great experience, and some of the recommendations in it are most valuable, and especially those which deal with the retention and the means of making it easy to obtain the retention of more stallions and registered mares in this country than there are at present. They suggest that a sum of £50,000 should be spent, and when we compare that with the enormous amount spent by foreign nations I think the right hon. Gentleman will not be paying a very excessive price for the considerable results that may accrue from this scheme. At an earlier stage of this Session the right hon. Gentleman gave an undertaking that a simple drill book for Yeomen would foe provided. That would be a very great advantage and a very great help. It is at present necessary for the Yeoman to wade through the pages of the Cavalry drill book to find out his requirements. I hope that, if possible, a Yeomanry drill book will soon be issued, explaining as far as possible the real functions of the Yeomen of the Territorial Force. It is absolutely absurd to say that the Yeoman can be made what is called a Cavalry soldier. The sooner we do away with that idea the better. You can get a most valuable product—you can train a man to be a more or less efficient scout, an efficient horseman, and very likely efficient with his rifle, and if you can get the combination of those three you will get a very valuable and useful unit. Do not let us try to call him a Cavalry soldier, or set him to know the more elaborate drill which at present are contained in the Cavalry drill book.

Another small point, but one which would make a considerable difference to the comfort of the Yeomanry, is that they should be allowed, as soon as possible, to have the carbine buckets. The advantages arising there from are so obvious that I need not recapitulate them. I would also ask the right hon. Gentleman if it is not possible for him to reconsider his determination as to the length of training. I believe that it would be possible to get a large proportion of many Yeomanry regiments to come out for a week before the complete training began. If you could have even a week of extra training for a certain number of men you would start with some men who had had more training than others, and the whole lump would be leavened by those who had been trained more efficiently. I trust the right hon. Gentleman will find it possible to pay the expense of these camps and their extension. If he could see his way to encourage something in the nature of week-end camps, the musketry would be very much improved, even if the combined training were only for a few days. Further, I hope the right hon. Gentleman will be able to make it more easy for the Territorials associations to deal with the Army Council than it is at the present moment. In regard to matters of small detail there are constant complaints. The West Riding County Association have interviewed the right hon. Gentleman or his subordinates, and he knows that they have a considerable number of grievances to urge. There is a strong feeling on the part of a large number of county associations that they are not treated with sufficient confidence, and that in matters of detail they are not allowed a sufficiently free hand. There is a dangerous feeling that if that is the manner and the attitude to be adopted towards them by the Army Council it will not be worth their while to continue their work. There are on the associations men who have given the best work of their lives, and are prepared to go on doing so, to make the organisation a success. I think they are worthy of more encouragement than they are getting at the present time, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will see his way to bring about some improvement in that respect.

Several remarks have been made with reference to the Territorial Army as to which, perhaps, some practical knowledge from this side might be valuable. First, let me say with regard to the Militia Ballot Acts, about which people talk so glibly, that although those Acts are still on the Statute Book, before you can put them into operation you will have to remove the exemptions which make distinctions between classes, and also the Clause which permits a man who has been chosen to buy himself off. Turning to the speech of the right hon. Member for Dover, I am afraid the sources of information upon which the right hon. Gentleman relied are a little unreliable. He rather twitted the Secretary of State upon having produced new schemes while his old schemes were still unworked out. But the formation of the Reserve is a logical development of the scheme already in operation. Under the old Volunteer system it was long desired by many Volunteer officers to have some kind of Reserve. As soon as you had your new Territorial system such a Reserve became logically possible, and that logical possibility is now being carried out. As to any idea of sapping the present force, or of doing anything to deteriorate it, the right hon. Gentleman is labouring under an entire misapprehension. You can fill up your Reserve at once to 100,000 if you cared to admit all those men who are still fit for military service and have gone through the Volunteer system; but the Secretary of State and his advisers have very wisely confined the admission to the present Reserve to men who are now serving in the force, although they may have done a portion of their service in the old Volunteer force. They have to conform to certain somewhat severe conditions, such as having attended camps and so on, which makes the formation very slow and gradual but at the same time you get thoroughly good men who have experience of the present system. In some of the battalions that I know the number of men going into that Reserve is remarkably small owing to those conditions, which I think are perfectly wise.

The right hon. Member for Dover referred also to the establishment, which he said was a minimum. I do not think ha thoroughly understands how the Territorial establishment works. It is quite different from that of the Regular Army. Quite wisely again the Secretary of State and his advisers have fixed the establishment of a Territorial Infantry Company at over a thousand, because they know that you cannot always get quite up to the establishment, and that if you do not have a large establishment you will not have your companies full for the company officers to train. The result of that is that the company officers do now get large companies for training, owing to the fact that you can recruit nearly up to the thousand. When you are approaching that point the question always arises to the company officer, "Dare I recruit any more?" because if he oversteps the limit he may be surcharged by the association for incurring expenses to which he is not entitled. Therefore the establishment is not in any sense a minimum; it is certainly a maximum, and a very dangerous maximum when it is approached.

As to the number of the force at the present moment, I do not think Members quite realise what is going on. We are not yet through the transition period. The number now in the whole force is something like 270,000, the establishment being 312,000, and that number has been subject to an effiux which is much more rapid now than it will be when we have got rid of the transfers from the old Volunteer Force. A battalion with which I am acquainted lost 142 men during the year. Of those men, fifty-nine had served their time, thirty-eight had gone abroad, thirteen were struck off, thirteen resigned for business reasons, nine were transferred to other corps, eight left through ill-health, and two had bought themselves out. Thus 42 per cent, of those resignations were represented by men who had served their time under the old and the present system. A great many of the old transfers who stood by the different units while they were going through the critical period are now going out, and for a year or so there will be a considerable drain, although some of them, of course, have re-enlisted for another year. Therefore we have not yet reached the time when you can judge what is the efflux and the influx of the corps, so that the figures of the total number are at present a little misleading, and the criticisms based upon them are not quite correct.

There is one matter with regard to which I scarcely agree with the Secretary of State, and that is the question of headquarters. It is not a mere luxury. The Regular unit is recruited on quite a different principle from the Territorial unit. It is recruited on the principle that it is an occupation competing with other occupations, and that its rewards commend themselves to men of military instincts. The Territorial battalion has to commend itself to quite a different class of man—the man who has patriotic and national feelings, but who at the same time is giving up his leisure and energies, and in many cases a good deal of money, and who thinks he ought to have a place where he can meet his friends with similar desires. It is there that the headquarters come in. You will solve the difficulty of getting the Territorial Force properly constituted when you provide proper headquarters for the different units, in addition to proper ranges. A good deal of rather stinging criticism has been directed against the Territorial Force, but, after all, it is a mere question of the transition period. Get your rifle ranges, and you will have the musketry question solving itself. I should like also to urge that units should be allowed to have quarter-masters, and that funds should be provided by which they can pay them. Under the Territorial scheme these is still an enormous amount of accounting to be done. The value of the property of the headquarters is much more than in the case of Regular battalions. The Territorials have not to go on service like a Regular battalion; therefore there are many things in use for military purposes which cannot be provided for out of public funds. These have all to be taken care of, and it is only proper that there should be some man constantly present to look after them. You cannot put more on the adjutant. You want someone whom you can pay, and to whom you can look to have the thing properly done. That can be arranged for if a little more money is provided. I wish to confirm what the Secretary of State has said with regard to our being still in the transition period. Do not pull the plant up by its roots; give it time, and I have not the smallest doubt that the force which is gradually being evolved will become a really useful one, and a far better one than the old Volunteer Force.

The hon. Member opposite (Colonel Greig), who is a staunch defender of the Territorial system, says, "Get your ranges." That is what we have been trying to do for many years. I recollect that after the South African War we were told that the whole lesson of the war was that we should secure rifle ranges. In my own county we have been trying for years to get them, but we have received no assistance from the county association, and I have very little hope that we shall ever get much assistance in that way. A speaker on this side of the House said that he hoped and thought that the name of the right hon. Gentleman would go down to posterity in connection with the Territorial scheme. I have the greatest respect and admiration in many ways for the right hon. Gentleman. I think it is the common knowledge of everybody that he, out of many statesmen, has devoted all his great abilities to the Department over which he presides. I hope his name will not go down to posterity in connection with the Teritorial scheme, because I believe that Territorial scheme is doomed to failure. I feel on this subject really that there is only one thing which is of supreme importance: that is the question of voluntary against compulsory service. Do not let me for a moment be misunderstood. With regard to the troops in India, with regard to the defences of the Crown in other parts of the world, and with regard to expeditionary forces, I have no doubt whatever in my own mind that the present voluntary system is the right one. I have had some experience in these matters, I have served in India, Egypt, and other parts of the world. I am quite sure that the foreign form of service in any state or form, would not suit us in this country. The voluntary system is a perfectly right one for the troops in India and other foreign parts. Nothing else would suit. I know there have been people—and soldiers of distinction—who have condemned it, but the voluntary soldier is always better than the compulsory one. In regard to home defence and the home Army, it is a different matter altogether. Here, again, I claim to have had a certain amount of experience, because, having been a soldier, I have served with the auxiliary forces of the Crown both before and after the right hon. Gentleman introduced his scheme. We remember the scheme of the Secretary for War Lord Middleton. We remember the scorn with which the Foreign Army Corps were discussed in this House. For my part I always feel that it matters very little what you call them. You have the same problem ever before you; you have the same difficulties in regard to the auxiliary forces of the Crown. I cannot conceive why the people of this country generally have not come quicker to the idea that compulsory service would be a good thing, in the first place in the interests of the auxiliary forces themselves, and in the second place for the men of this country. I cannot profess myself to be a friend of the Territorial scheme. As far as my own experience is concerned as a commanding officer of an auxiliary regiment, I think I may say fairly that I have had no good out of the Territorial scheme at all. The Yeomanry under my command are a little bit different to the Infantry forces under the scheme, because the Yeomanry Force was already in existence before the right hon. Gentleman brought his scheme forward. We have, I think, succeeded in keeping our men together in spite of the right hon. Gentleman. All he did was to swoop down upon us, to give us less pay, and to ask for a different form of enlistment. It has been in spite of that that we have kept our regiment together. Again, so far as the local associations are concerned, the idea was perfectly sound—to bring into cooperation the local people, and to ask for their assistance in regard to the auxiliary forces. But as it has turned out, although the idea was sound itself, my county, at least, has derived very little advantage from it. The result, as I see it, has been that the War Office have made use of the local associations in order to shield themselves from the many requests which we have to make.

What man is there on either side in this House who can deny that he knows thousands of young men of the working classes, who, at an adult age, should be doing something—should, at any rate, have taken some steps—to train themselves to arms, in case they are called upon to use them! What man is there in this House who does not know scores of men of the better classes and of higher education who should certainly feel it their duty to become officers of the Auxiliary Forces of the Crown? We all of us know thousands of them. I am bound to say myself, as far as the Yeomanry is concerned, that, as a general rule, once a young man joins, and finds how pleasant it is, he is quite content to stay and serve. What objection can there be to some form of compulsory service which would attract both of these classes—the working classes and the higher classes? I have no doubt whatever as to the result. I will not weary the House by producing an elaborated scheme now. It should not be beyond the wit of man to produce something in the nature of depots in the country where men could be trained; the exemptions from that being permission to join either the Reserve, or the Yeomanry, or the Territorials. The result would be that we should have our ranks filled. I have contended over and over again that although the right hon. Gentleman may be successful in obtaining the men for the Territorial Army, he has a difficulty in getting the officers. The best officers that we get into our Auxiliary Forces are, very many of them, very busy men. Idlers are no use to us at all. We must obviously have men who have shown, by having an occupation of their own, that they are worth something. Once you make it compulsory, for however short a period, for a man to learn how to bear arms—I do not care whether it is three, or six, or twelve months—the difficulties of the situation would fade away. My own view of the matter is that the right hon. Gentleman has set himself a problem to solve which it is impossible to solve under existing circumstances. I have dealt with this matter before. I have also been bold enough to advocate compulsion in my own Constituency, and have found many supporters. I believe if hon. Members in their own constituencies would be bold enough to stand up and explain matters frankly that they would receive a great deal more support than they think. In these democratic days it is rather a fashionable policy to foster and pander to the working classes of this country. We are ready to do everything for them. We are ready to relieve their taxation. We are ready to take responsibility from them—the responsibility they ought to bear of their children both as to education and now, as I understand, in the matter of food. Let us ask them in return, first, for some of the younger period of their lives, to give up three, six, or twelve months, in order to learn how to bear arms, so that when the moment arrives—if it should arrive—when they are called upon in the defence of their country they will not be merely an armed rabble, but men competent to take their places in the field and to do their duty as Englishmen.

It has frequently been my duty, as representing a Constituency containing one of the largest Government ordnance factories, to call attention, both in this House and outside, to the attitude of the Army Council towards the employés of that place, and more especially to the attitude of those members of the Army Council under whose special jurisdiction the Royal Arsenal comes. But this evening for a few moments I would like to call attention to the attitude of the military members of the Army Council towards the officers and men of the Forces of the Crown. I think it does not require a very high standard of intelligence to see—I think everybody in this House and outside this House will agree with me in the statement—that if we are to have an Army, no matter whether it is a large or a small Army, whether we are militarists or anti-militarists, so long as we are called upon as a nation to pay a large annual bill for the maintenance of the Forces of the Crown, they should be efficient. I do not lay very much stress upon the term "efficient." I think probably the word "efficient" is the last refuge of the theoretical politician. But no matter what our general opinion, we may be all agreed that the Forces of the Crown, whatever they are, should be efficient. To be efficient they must be contented. To be contented we must have administration carried out in an impartial spirit. There are so many aspects of this matter with which we would like to deal. There is no want of matter; it is the selection of one subject which is the difficulty. Some larger questions have been touched upon this afternoon by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover and by the Secretary of State for War.

8.0 P.M.

They have alluded to our haphazard military policy. It may seem a strange thing that it has never yet been laid down by anybody, soldier or civilian, what is the task the British Army is called upon to perform, and so long as we have no ruling on that point our military policy must be of a haphazard sort. We might talk about the anomalous distribution of our forces, and I should like very much, if I had time, to say something on what I consider our very inadequate armaments. Compared with the foreign nations, we are behindhand in armaments and in military inventions of the day. But I turn from those rather entrancing subjects to one which, less attractive, is necessary to be dealt with for several reasons, and that is the administration under which our Army is carried on. It is a subject which strikes at the efficiency of the whole of our forces, and it is also a subject which does not lend itself very well to debate either in this House or outside of it; and we see very few articles in the public Press dealing directly with the administration of the Army. It is for that reason I wish to say a few words on the subject. I wish to deal more especially with administration as it refers to the officers of the forces than to administration as it refers to the enlisted men; not that I am not cognisant that there are many hardships from which the enlisted men and non-commissioned officers suffer. But their enlistment is for a short period—seven or eight years the majority of them—and any disabilities from which they suffer must be of a comparatively temporary nature, whilst those disabilities which are suffered by officers are suffered by men who go into the Army with a view of spending their whole life in it and making it a career. It does not seem that any Secretary of State for War has ever grasped the fact that we ought to have for officers in the Army a system of promotion by which the best men should always come to the front. I think that nobody, however biassed he may be on this subject, will disagree with that statement that there should be a simple system by which the best men should come to the front without partiality, favour, or affection. Look at our system of promotion as it is. We have a number of small lists for promotion—I think the exact number is 117—and each of those lists works in a watertight compartment, or almost so. We have promotion by selection—that is not favoured by the officers of the Army, and I think rightly so—but these small lists all work independently of one another. The consequence is that in some corps, in some Cavalry corps for instance, there are junior captains twenty-three and twenty four years of age, and in other corps we have subalterns grey-headed, or bald headed, such as, for instance, at the present time in the Royal Garrison Artillery. The time will come when those officers will have to retire through age, and the good may be pushed out when they come to the top of the tree just as well as the bad. Of course the ideal system would be a system such as that in America where every cadet who passes out of West Point is available for, and is able to take his place in, either the Cavalry, the Artillery, the Infantry, or the Engineers. I am sorry to say that our boys pass out from Sandhurst and from Woolwich with practically no knowledge of the other arms of the Service and a mere smattering of information about the arm of the Service to which they are about to be appointed. We cannot reach the ideal at the present time I know, but by grouping regiments we might approximate towards that ideal so that there should be a general list for promotion for the Army—a volunteer list. It would not be compulsory, but if when a man came to the top of his rank and was offered promotion outside his own corps and refused it he would then have no grievance. But if he was a keen soldier, anxious to get on, there is no reason why he should be delayed by this lack of promotion. There is another point on which I have also spoken in this House, another disability from which officers suffer, and that is the confidential report. I am aware that the confidential report is an absolute necessity in the Service. It would not be possible to carry on for six mouths without it, but I do say this, that no confidential report should be filed in the archives of the War Office until it has been signed by the officer to whom it refers. An instance came to my knowledge some time ago, before the South African War. There were two Cavalry regiments stationed in South Africa. No Inspector-Generals of Cavalry took the trouble to go to South Africa in those days and the annual inspection of this corps was carried out by an Infantry General. A very nice, rotund, amiable old gentleman came down to inspect one of the regiments, and he had jotted down in his notebook several very difficult manœuvres which he would ask the Cavalry officers to perform. One of the movements was a very difficult one. It was moving a whole regiment by trumpet sound at the gallop and bringing them up at a certain point. In the Cavalry you always align your troops behind their mark; in the Infantry you bring them shoulder to shoulder. But the Infantry general did not know this difference, and when the manœuvre had been very successfully carried out he went up to the officer who had performed this and said, "You just missed it." As a matter of fact he had not just missed it; he had done it very well, and the colonel of the regiment offered a few expostulatory remarks. The general was not to be told how to carry out his work, and he put something down in his notebook. It was thought the incident had been closed, hut this officer was an exceedingly good Cavalry officer, and he applied for several things after that. He was always told by the War Office, "No." No reason was given, and after seven years of waiting for some extra regimental employment, in disgust he threw up the Service. Then he went to the War Office, saw the military Secretary, and, as he had left the Service, he was allowed to see the report. There was a confidential report seven years old, in which it was stated, "Inefficient in drill." If the officer had seen that and had had to sign that report, such a mistake would never have occurred. But the whole of the officer's career was ruined simply on account of a confidential report which he had never seen. I do not say those instances are very frequent, but I do say that everything should be done to guard against the possibility of such a thing occurring. The officers of the Army are ill-paid; they are also ill-pensioned. Much is demanded of them; they are hard worked both mentally and physically, and they suffer from several disabilities. For instance, there is no appeal to the law of the land against the decision of the Army Council. This presses even more hardly upon the officer than upon the enlisted. If a man is awarded a punishment by his commanding officer which interferes with his pay even to a very small amount, he has some appeal to a court-martial. Although a court-martial is very rough-and-ready justice, still it is an appeal, a third opinion, a revising opinion, brought in to judge between the commanding officer and the man. But in the case of an officer there is no possibility of any such appeal, no matter what the decision may be. No matter whether his career is entirely ruined by a decision against an officer, yet there is no appeal against it to the higher military authorities. Another disability, and it is a right one, is that the officer at the present time is so hemmed around by regulations that he is unable to air his grievance—to state his case either in the Press or on the platform. This is quite right, but the result ii that the nation never hears of the things that happen, and it goes on very complacently, thinking that all is well. If people knew as much about the Army as I do they would know that all is not well. I had an opportunity of speaking in this House on the Army Estimates, and I called the attention of the House to some of those perennial and systematic grievances from which the officers of the Army suffer, and the few remarks I was able to make at that time produced such an enormous amount of letters to me that I was absolutely astounded to think that the discontent amongst officers, both retired and serving, is so great as I can assure this House it is. I was absolutely surprised at the result of that correspondence.

And it being a Quarter past Eight of the clock, and there being Private Business set down by direction of the Chairman of Ways and Means under Standing Order No. 8, further Proceeding was postponed without Question put.

CITY OF LONDON (TITHES AND RATES) BILL [Lords].

Order for Second Reading read.

Question, "That the Bill be now read a second time," put, and agreed to. Bill read a second time and committed.

ARMY ESTIMATES, 1910–11.

[PROGRESS.]

Considered in Committee.

Postponed Proceeding on Question, "That a sum not exceeding £429,000 be granted to His Majesty, to defray the expenses of the War Office, which will come in course of payment during the year ending 31st March, 1911."

Debate resumed.

When I was speaking upon the Army Estimates, I called the attention of the Committee to the condition of the contract which was made between the officer and the Government when he received his first commission, and I pointed out that although the officer was himself entirely unable to alter that contract even in a single letter, the military authorities took it upon themselves to alter the contract very frequently, and did alter it, and this statement applies to non-commissioned officers in the Army as well as commissioned officers. Only on Friday last I got a memorandum from a large body of non-commissioned officers pointing out the grievances from which they were suffering, and in that memorandum these words occur:— At present any contract with the Government cm be broken by circular letters to the War Office so that no soldier is certain of his future. Exactly the same grievance as I pointed out on another occasion. I should like again to draw the attention of the Committee to one recent instance in which a change in the old practice has been made. Only last year the warrant under which an officer of the age of forty-eight could retire when he was of a certain rank of pension was by a mere stroke of the pen broken by the Army Council, who increased the age from forty-eight to fifty. In that instance the Army Council broke faith with the officers of the Army, and with every man who was looking forward to his retirement, and they broke faith with every commissioned officer in the Army from the rank of second-lieutenant to that of captain and major when they altered that warrant. I pointed out that one of the grievances from which the officers of the Army suffer was that the military members of the Army Council are entirely out of touch with the needs of the Army. With one exception, there is not a single officer in the Army Council who has ever held even a subordinate command in war. What is the result? The result is that the military members of the Army Council, who are responsible for the administration of the Army in professional and technical details, have by slackness in administration destroyed or are destroying one of the greatest assets which the British Army ever had, and that is the regimental esprit de corps. This is the bedrock on which to build up the higher feeling which we call esprit de corps. Whether people wish to shut their eyes to it or not, they must confess that the Army is losing its esprit de corps, and it is the loss of that thing which has denuded our Army of officers and leaves us totally unable to send an expeditionary force out of this country without wholesale transfers from one port to another.

I may say in passing that I, as well as other officers of the Army, do appreciate most cordially the inclusion of the latest recruit in the Army Council, Major-General Dewar. He is a man of extremely broad views, of great experience in the Army, and a man whose counsel will, I hope, prevail among his colleagues. We make as a nation, and rightly so, increased demands upon our officers in the present day. We have made increased demands upon their mental faculties and physical activities, and what have we done for them in return? The pay, as some speakers have already pointed out, has been unchanged for generations; the purchasing power of the sovereign is not what it was many years ago. Emoluments from other professions have increased; the emoluments for the Army remain, not for the soldier, but for the officer, as they were almost at the beginning of the lat, century. I do not think the deficiency of pay is altogether responsible for the lack of candidates coming forward for commissions. The Army holds out certain professional and social attractions which do bring many men forward as candidates for the Army, and this question of pay might to a certain extent be got over if men had any certainty that after spending money to get into the Army their career was assured. I am sorry to say that is not the case at the present time. Frequently his career is cut short by an absolutely unwarranted decision of the Army Council or that other inimitable body which they call the Selection Board, acting, as they often do, in absolute ignorance of the facts, and grounding their decisions on what, I am sorry to say, but I say it advisedly, are confidential reports, often prompted, though one would hardly believe it, by professional jealousy It is a very serious state of things, to which I think it is the duty of anyone who knows it to call attention. It is very often necessary for the efficiency of the whole to sacrifice the part, and, if that were so in the Army, I should have very little to say about it, but the exact reverse is the case. By our system the good are very often eliminated, while the bad are very frequently retained, much to the impairing of the general efficiency of the Army.

I should like to give the Committee a few instances in support of my statement. I will take one instance of a captain, one of a colonel, and one of a general, just merely to show there are so many that you can select any rank you choose. The first instance which I should like to bring to the notice of the Committee is that of a system which expels from the Army a man like Captain Bryce Wilson, a very efficient officer, an energetic Cavalry servant, popular alike with his men and with his brother officers, and retains in his place an officer whose name I shall not mention, but who has been, and still continues to be, a military failure wherever he goes. The troops under his command were always discontented and frequently in open revolt. He was found so inefficient at the beginning of the South African War that he was almost immediately placed in civilian employment, and remained there till long after the conclusion of hostilities. What do you think of a system that expels from the Army a man like Colonel Caldwell, who was probably one of the best men who ever served on the General Staff at headquarters, and promotes over his head a man who had never any qualification for service on the General Staff or for any other service, except one, and that is a servile admiration of those above him? What do you think of a system that drives from the Army a man like General Freddy Benson, late of the 17th Lancers—a man who did excellently well as a soldier both in the field and in peace, and a man who never failed in anything he was asked to undertake, and promotes over his head an armchair soldier, whose name I shall not mention, though, no doubt, it will suggest itself to other Members?

May I ask the hon. and gallant Gentleman whether, when he speaks of the system expelling these gentlemen from the Army, he means only that they do not get the promotion to which in his view they are entitled?

I mean that when they came up for promotion they were senior to the officers promoted, and that therefore naturally they resigned their commissions. Those are just a few of the idiosyncrasies of the Selection Board. I wish the Selection Board would select with a view to the efficiency of the Service, and not with ulterior motives. Some years ago there were questions in this House and in the other House with regard to the extraordinary irregularity of promotion in the case where an Infantry officer was promoted major in the 1st Royal. The answers given in this House and in the other House by the representatives of the War Office were absolutely infantile. Why could they not tell the answer itself? Everybody in the Army knew the answer. Why were they afraid to say what the reason was? There is another irregularity in this case, because not very long after, being promoted out to India, this same officer, for the same reason, was taken off the Indian establishment, taken out of the Cavalry regiment in India, and whilst he had all the privileges of the promotion going on, he was brought back and given a snug billet in the Infantry Territorial Force in London.

We have all heard of the Woods case. I know nothing about it, and I hold no brief for Mr. Woods, but I have an idea that the authorities at the War Office have not heard the last of the Woods case. There is, however, a great difference between the Woods case and the other cases. In that case an inquiry was held, but in other cases where an inquiry has been demanded such as officers have a right to demand it has been denied. Anybody who knows these cases will easily see why the inquiry was granted in the case of Mr. Woods and denied in the other cases, which were, perhaps, more urgent. In that case the Army Council—and I wish it to be understood that when I speak of the Army Council I only refer to the military members of it—had taken no action. They had this trouble growing, and there was an application for a Court of Inquiry. That Court of Inquiry was granted by the Army Council, and held, because in that Court of Inquiry there was no possibility of any action of the Army Concil coming under consideration. They had taken no action. They had their inquiry, and they acted,—rightly or wrongly I do not know—upon the result of that inquiry. In other cases where inquiry is demanded and refused, it is always where the Army Council first takes action, and then refuses to grant an inquiry because they are afraid to face one. They are afraid that their own action may come under inquiry by the Board. There are many cases, but I will only instance one or two just to show that I have full reasons for my statement.

First of all, I should like to instance the case of Captain Bryce-Wilson, of the 5th Lancers, who was, without any warning or inquiry, or possibility of appeal, suddenly placed one morning on half-pay. He has been demanding an inquiry on this subject ever since. He is by the Regulations undoubtedly entitled to one, but his application has been invariably refused. Why? Because they know that the Court of Inquiry would take into consideration the action of the Army Council in placing this officer on half-pay. Captain Wilson is a, friend of mine. He was a brother officer of mine for many years in the old days. I have never had any sympathy with that feeling which is neither cowardice nor indulgence, but which, perhaps, is a combination of the two, and which says, "leave well" or "ill" alone—"let sleeping dogs lie." As long as I think, and I know, that Captain Bryce-Wilson is at the present moment suffering under an injustice so long will I do my very best to assist towards a solution of the question. While I was on the General Staff at headquarters, which I was until I was elected a. Member of this House, I did my best, as far as official means could go, to assist Captain Wilson, but when I was released from the shackles of officialdom the position entirely changed, and at Captain Wilson's request I drafted out a statement which contained the truth of the matter about the 5th Lancers, and this I sent to the Secretary for War, to the officer at present commanding the regiment, and also to the officer who rendered the reports on Captain Wilson—that is Major-General Scobell. I thought that by doing this I would have the opportunity of obtaining an inquiry into Captain Wilson's case, but, curiously enough, contrary to the King's Regulations, no move has been made, either by Major-General Scobell or by the Army Council. The only way in which I can benefit Captain Wilson, even indirectly, is, I am advised, to read that statement to the House. I have it typewritten, so that there may be no mistake and that I may not be led away by rhetorical exaggeration. It is as follows:— That Major-General H. J. Scobell, 512, Royal Irish Lancers, did render to your superior authority a confidential report or confidential reports of an officer v)r officers under his command, which report or reports contained wilful and deliberate misstatements of fact, thereby deceiving those in authority to whom the report or reports were rendered, and causing injustice to be done to one of the regiments under his command. Major-General Scobell is on his way home at the present moment from South Africa; he arrives in England at the end of this week, and I hope, when he sees the report of this in the paper, as I intend he shall do, he will appreciate the meaning of the words "wilful and deliberate misstatement of facts." I have tried to make it clear, and I hope he will turn up that paragraph in the King's Regulations which compels an officer in a case like this to refer the matter to his superior authority, the superior authority in this case being the Army Council. I hope sincerely that the Army Council will see that justice is done to Captain Wilson, and that penalties are meted out to those officers who deserve it.

I have one other instance, that of Lieutenant-Colonel Gavin, commanding one of the battalions of the 18th (Royal Irish) Regiment. He was some years ago in South Africa, and suddenly, without any warning, without any possibility of appeal, but simply by orders from home, was placed on half-pay and relieved of the command of the regiment. He asked and applied officially to see the report on which he had been judged, and I have here the official letter from the War Office, or rather a copy of it, stating that "it is not in the interests of the Service that these reports should be shown to Lieutenant-Colonel Gavin." He was undoubtedly entitled to see them before they were rendered; but he never did see them, and not only that but he was refused all possibility of admission to them after his application to see them. He came home, and it was not until the expiration of two years that he managed to get hold of the reports. He then found that he had been condemned principally on two occasions, one of which was not true, while the other had reference to an action which his General, as Brigadier, had actually commanded him to take. He never saw those reports, and Lieutenant-Colonal Gavin is still suffering under that disability. He is still asking for a court of inquiry; he is still waiting for justice at the hands of the Army Council.

Again there is the case of Major M. F. Gage, of the 5th Dragoon Guards. It was handed to me as I was coming into the House this afternoon, and it is a case which I sincerely hope the Secretary for War and the Army Council will inquire into. He had sixteen years' service; he went through the South African and Egyptian campaigns, and was passed for promotion, and then he was suddenly told that his services were no longer required. He is still asking why. He is still asking to be allowed to join the Yeomanry or Reserve, and he is still unable to do so. There are a great many more cases, but I do not wish to go into any more, and I have only brought forward these two haphazard cases to show that there are disabilities and injustices in our Army system. I do not say that the decision of the Army Council is wrong in every case, but I consider that they are wrong in a great many cases—so wrong that I say it is contrary to the very elements of primitive justice that it should be possible to have in this highly-organised Army of ours a system under which it is possible that a man should have his career entirely wrecked without warning, without inquiry, without often a knowledge of the action for which he is condemned, and without the possibility of an appeal. I do not think I shall appeal to this Committee in vain when I ask them to come to the conclusion that such a state of things ought to cease. I have thought it my duty, knowing as I do, after very long study of this subject during very many years' service in the Army, that these disabilities do exist, to draw the attention of the Committee to them. There is one man whom the Army looks upon very highly as an administrator and an officer, and I should be very glad if the reports and rumours which we see in the daily Press should become true, and that Lord Kitchener should be appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff. That is an appointment which is next to that which we used to call the Commander-in-Chief, and if we are not to do away with the Army Council and not to have a Commander-in-Chief, then let the man who would put a stop to these—I do not want to use too strong a word—who would put a stop to these deficiencies in our administrative system—let him be appointed to see that the administration of the Army is carried out impartially. I only wish to call the attention of the Committee to these few points and to show how utterly out of touch the members of the Army Council are with the rank and file and the regimental officer. I would ask for an assurance from the Secretary of State for War or his representative that some inquiry should be made into these cases which I have brought forward and that the possibility of others should not exist and that such mal-administration should not occur again in the Army.

I only ask leave to take up a very short time of the Committee to call attention to a question which was raised very early in the Debate by my hon. Friend the Member for Winchester and which I myself brought forward at Question Time. I refer, of course, to the regulations dealing with officers now serving in the Regular Army who happen to be also Members of the House. Under the regulations that existed before the recent change I may remind the Committe that an officer was allowed to be seconded to his regiment on coming into this House for five years or any lesser time during which time he received no pay, but on the other hand lost no advantages in his regiment, that is to say he went up in promotion and kept the same relative position in his rank as if he had been seconded for any other purpose. I ask why these regulations have been altered and perhaps my doing so may strike the Committee as rather curious as my request is rather an unusual one; because if it is acceded to instead of costing the country more and result in asking for more money it would have the reverse effect. My suggestion is that we should go back to the old system and receive no pay instead of receiving half pay as we do at present, or I would put it differently. I have no doubt that the Army Council and those in authority saw some good reason for the change in granting half-pay, but I would ask that an officer on being elected may be given the option of going on under the old system and being seconded without having any pay and losing no promotion or of receiving half-pay and of course losing the chance of promotion as the regulations are at present. We none of us ask, I think, to get any advantage both ways. Let me say just one word or two upon the effect of the new regulations and that is that they literally make it impossible for any officer to rejoin his regiment. There are many causes, and they apply to any rank. I have placed my case in regard to men of the rank of captain, in which there are more officers than in the rank of major. It might happen that a Member might come into this House nearly at the top of his rank, which would be captain, if he serves in this House and comes under these regulations, no matter how short that service may be, he has to go down to the bottom of his rank and come in under some very junior captains who are sometimes officers with only four or five years' service. That, in my humble opinion, constitutes such a hardship that it makes it quite impossible for the officer and those in higher command, up to colonel I might say—makes it quite impossible for them to return. I will quote from the Article 478 in reference to pay and promotion:— An officer on half pay who is fit for military service and who neglects that service when called back to duty shall be removed from the Army. I have not the slightest fault to find with that article, and I assume that officers who are Members of this House are included in it. If so, I am very glad that that should be so, and to think that we in this House may be called upon compulsorily to serve on active service, and I am sure that every other Member of this House who is an officer would cordially agree with me in that, but if that it so, why should those in authority have the power to order us back compulsorily while we are precluded from going back to serve voluntarily in our regiments? For the reasons I have pointed out to the Committee, our position on returning is made absolutely impossible. I have already referred to one of the advantages which would be derived if my suggestion were adopted, and that is one which should appeal to the Financial Secretary to the War Office and those who are in any way responsible for finance, that there would be a saving to the country, which, although comparatively small, would be of advantage. Still, to those who wish to be put upon the old system that would not matter, and I think there would be a fair number of officers who would prefer it at the present time, and who do not desire to give up the chance of ever being soldiers in His Majesty's Army again. Another reason is that we have heard a good deal in the Debate about the scarcity of officers in the Army. That has been admitted by the Secretary of State himself, and that being the case, surely it is hardly the time for bringing forward these new regulations which, instead of allowing officers to return as they could do before, has now exactly the same effect as making them definitely leave the Army before they think of taking up politics at all.

There is another suggestion which was made to me to-day by one of the officers interested in this subject, and with which I cordially agree. The Secretary of State referred to officers losing touch with their regiments, and with military training, and so forth, and said that was one of the reasons why the Army Council had seen fit to make this change. Why should not officers, although not in the Regular Army, be allowed to take some part in regimental duties? It would be impossible for them to do so regularly, but they could at any rate go back to their regiments on conditions which might be arranged for a fortnight, three weeks, or a month, either for ordinary duty or for manœuvres. This, especially as regards a great many of us in this House, would not be at all difficult for them, because many of them happen to belong to regiments quartered in the London district, and they could probably carry out those military duties which might be demanded of them, and which, I think, they would willingly do, without their interfering very much with their Parliamentary duties even as they do now in the case of the many Yeomanry officers who have to go away for a considerable period of training. I hope this Debate may lead us to expect something more than the very doubtful suggestion—it is not a promise—of the Secretary of State that the Army Council were reconsidering this question. I am very pleased that Members on both sides of the House have taken it up, and I am glad to think that opinions have been expressed—and I do not see how anyone could express any different opinion—in support of the suggestions I have made.

9.0 P.M.

An hon. Member on this side of the House expressed his hope that the Secretary of State would not base any calculations he might make about the horse supply of the country on the recent police census. I would most cordially endorse that opinion, for of late I have been trying to find out something as to how the police census has been taken. I am sorry to say that I own very few horses. I wish there were more. But the police have never approached me or asked a single word about my horses. I am certain if they asked my groom he, with the usual pride that his class take in the horses they look after, would have said they are the very best in England. But I think it would have been as well if the owner had been asked, because I should have been sorry to say that several of them are utterly unfitted for military purposes. However, if the number had been taken I am perfectly certain they would have all been put down as absolutely fit for military purposes. A friend of mine who had been approached by the police told me the constable asked him how many horses he had. He answered, "Two." The constable, at once wrote it down. He asked him why he was doing that, and the police- man told him he had to do it because he had to get the number of all the horses which might be useful for military purposes. My friend implored him not to include his two in the number, as one was a brood mare twenty-two years old and the other a pony that dragged the garden mower. These two horses I am certain are included in the census of horses for this country, and probably are included in the two millions that the right hon. Gentleman told us in March were available. A census taken on these lines can be of no value whatever. I would urge upon the right hon. Gentleman that some systematic way should be adopted of getting the number of horses which are available for military purposes.

While on the subject of horses I should like to mention the extraordinarily small number which are now allotted to any battery of Regular Artillery. When I first joined, some seventeen or eighteen years ago, we only had three waggons to a battery. Our only idea was to get into action as quickly as possible, generally in the open and across the open. The system of drill was wonderfully easy when you only had to get three waggons up into the firing line. I think it is generally recognised that in future an Artillery duel is bound to be fought largely at first from under cover. That involves a considerable strain on the horses, because one can no longer go straight; one must take advantage of what cover there is, and that means generally going a considerably long way round to get into action. Now, in addition to the difficulties there are of getting into action unseen, a battery of Regular Artillery is supposed to drill with nine waggons. A battery on the higher establishment is only allowed sixty-two horses. The most elementary arithmetician must know that if you have to have six horses in each gun team and in each waggon team, and that you altogether have fifteen such teams, the least you can drill a battery properly with is ninety draught horses, and the Government only gives us sixty-two. I know that the situation is eased sometimes, where two batteries are in the same place, by horses being lent by one battery to another, but that is a very unsatisfactory state of affairs, and it very often happens that the situation cannot be eased in that way, and they have to do the best they can with the few horses they have. It is unreasonable to ask men to train their batteries and expect them to reach a high state of efficiency if they are not given a sufficient number of horses. That point was raised in March by the hon. Member (Captain Cooper), and the Secretary of State made the reply that in no country was the peace establishment of horses kept up to the war establishment. I quite sympathise with that. One understands that that cannot be done. But no other country can stint and starve its batteries in such a way that they cannot turn out to carry out their most elementary drills owing to the want of horses.

Then with the horses of the Territorial Artillery, if they are to be made in any way a success they must be given more opportunities of having mounted drills. I have had some experience in the last three years of what Territorial Horse Artillery means, having been fortunate enough to be adjutant to the Honourable Artillery Company, and the money that is given for a Territorial Horse Artillery battery nothing like covers the amount it must expend if the battery is to be properly trained. The hon. Member for Leicester (Mr. Crawshay-Williams) in the Debate earlier in the year, said that the Territorial Horse Artillery actually was able to work with Infantry, and to work at the end of a fortnight with field artillery, and he did not see why at the end of six months it should not act as horse artillery. I am bound to say that having acquired his experience in the Regular Horse Artillery, his opinion is entitled to some respect. To a certain extent I agree with him. I think that at the end of six months training of a Territorial battery one might be able to turn out a very efficient unit. It is not now a question of drilling the battery; you want to train the drivers. There is a much worse time before them when they come to active service, and when they have to go day after day trekking with little rest and food, and when you have your teams pulled to pieces. I have had personal experience of that in South Africa. I took over a trek from Kimberley to Bloemfontein from an officer who was promoted, and he told me to be careful to watch one particular driver because he was under the impression that he was not driving the horses well, and that the team was being pulled to pieces in consequence. I watched him very carefully, and at the end of a few days I moved that man from the team, and I guarantee that the team went 50 per cent, better after he was out of it. That is the difficulty which will confront the Territorial Horse Artillery, and I think it is essential that they should have as much money given now as possible to train drivers in order that when they go down to camp they may be able to devote their time to really doing drill instead of having to spend a large amount of time in driving drill. If the Territorial Horse Artillery is to be a success, I think you must depend largely on the number of noncommissioned officers and the permanent staff.

In the battery with which I was fortunate enough to be associated, I had nothing to complain of. I had the best possible material, but I saw sent to other batteries men who in many cases were utterly unfitted for the positions they were sent to. This is not difficult to understand. With the present conditions of pay it appears to me that it is only those men who do not see any real chance of promotion before them who are willing to go to the Territorial Horse Artillery or the Field Artillery. As soon as they go to the Territorial Horse Artillery or the Field Artillery their pay is reduced. When Cavalry officers go to the Yeomanry their pay is not affected at all, or it is increased. When a quartermaster-sergeant goes to a Yeomanry regiment his pay is increased a shilling per day. In the case of those who go to the Territorial Horse Artillery we find the pay of a battery sergeant-major and a battery quartermaster-sergeant is reduced from 4s. 4d. to 3s. 9d., and in the case of the Field Artillery a sergeant-major has his pay reduced from 3s. 4d. to 3s. 2d. I think it will be seen that that is a real grievance, and that this system is likely to bar the best men from going to the Territorial Horse Artillery. I think they have another grievance. I cannot understand why it is when these men go down with their units to camp, their separation allowance does not start until the fifth day. In other cases the separation allowance starts on the first day. I think there is a real grievance in that. If the Territorial Horse Artillery or the Field Artillery is to be a success—and I hope it will be a success—I do not think it is likely to be so if the Government adopts such cheeseparing methods and will not pay the amount of money they are entitled to get.

The hon. Member for Woodbridge (Captain Peel) called attention to the grievance of the private soldier in regard to proficiency pay. I sincerely agree with him that that is a real grievance, and I would point out that the small amount of money involved hardly makes up for the large amount of discontent which exists, and the reflex action on recruiting which it produces. I should like to call attention to a grievance at the other end of the scale. It is a grievance with respect to the rank of substantive colonel. I am not speaking from a personal point of view on this matter. I think you will agree with me that the grievance is a real one. The rank of substantive colonel was originally started in December, 1906, and the idea of the rank, as I understood, was that any officer promoted to the rank of substantive colonel was sure of employment in the rank of colonel. Since that day a large number of officers have been promoted. I asked the right hon. Gentleman a question to-day as to how many officers of that rank had been employed, and the answer was that ninety-four had not been employed at all, and out of that number eleven had refused the appointments offered to them, which means that eighty-three officers have not received employment in the rank of colonel. That is a great hardship in this way. When an officer has been in command of a regiment and becomes eligible for appointment to the rank of substantive colonel, if he is not appointed to that rank he knows that he has no further chance of employment, and he goes at once on retired pay, where he gets £420 a year, whereas an officer who is promoted goes on half-pay and gets £300 a year. Therefore as long as he is unemployed he is at a disadvantage as compared with the man who is not promoted to that rank to the extent of £120 per year. Presumably the best officer of the two is the one who is promoted to the rank of substantive colonel, and his reward for being the best officer is to lose £120 a year. If he only lost that for one or two years he would have compensation in the fact that he is able to earn higher pension as colonel, but if he is not employed at all, and goes on retired pay, he has lost the advantage of the additional £120 a year. I think the right hon. Gentleman will agree that this is a real grievance. (These officers are mostly poor men, and many of them cannot afford to remain on half-pay waiting for employment which never comes. I might say a few words with regard to the Territorial Force, of which I have had much experience. The Force, in the opinion of many of the best judges, is too small for the requirements that it is intended to meet. In the event of the employment of the Territorial Force, a large number must be taken out for garrisons, and the numbers actually available for employment in the field would be comparatively small. The training is necessarily, I may say, inadequate. The difficulties of the circumstances in which the men enlist and the difficulties of the civil employment all tend to shorten the training, which really, compared with that of Regular troops, is distinctly inadequate. The smallness of the force and the inadequacy of the training are, however, things which are more or less unavoidable; but what is avoidable and should be remedied are the defects in the equipment of the Force.

The first question affecting the mounted part of it is the horse question, of which we have heard that in the Regular Army it is very pressing. If it is pressing in the Regulating Army, which will take away all the available horses, it is much more pressing in the Territorial Force. The same horses go out training after training, some of them three and four times in the year with different regiments. I have recognised one horse four times in the one year myself. There are men who are making a trade—I do not say there is any harm in their doing so—in buying up horses in the spring, letting them out to three or four regiments, and turning them out in the autumn. This is convenient for training purposes, but if the Territorial Force were to be mobilised we should not know whether they are going to have any horses or not. This is a pressing matter. There is no good training mounted troops or Horse Artillery if they are not able to be mounted when the crisis arrives. There are many minor points in equipment to which I think the right hon. Gentleman might give consideration. The Territorial officers and men are working very hard to make themselves efficient. They deserve the greatest credit for what they are doing. I think the least that can be done is to encourage them by giving them everything which they require in the way of equipment. In the Artillery the dial sights are not supplied to the Territorials.

I am very glad to hear it. I would like to call attention to a very serious defect in the Yeomanry. The yeoman at present is armed with a rifle, but has no other weapon. A few years ago he had a bayonet, but it has been removed, and now he has no weapon with which to strike a blow at an enemy. A rifle is a very useful weapon in broad daylight, but in the case of night attacks, surprises, and so on firing would be just as likely in the dark to damage one's own friends as the enemy, and the rule of all night work is the cold steel. I appeal to the right hon. Gentleman to have the question decided as to how the yeoman should be armed. A great many officers are against giving him a sword, for fear that he might proceed to ape Cavalry and become bad Cavalry. I cannot see myself why the yeoman should not be made a cavalryman except that he might not be expected to work in large bodies like the Cavalry; but he is expected to do all the other duties of Cavalry, and why he should not be armed with a sword I fail to see. You say you cannot from the Territorials produce a soldier who requires so much training as the Cavalry, but, at the same time, you proceed to make a far more highly trained branch of the Service in the Artillery. If you can produce an artilleryman—and the right hon. Gentleman expresses no grave doubts as to his Artillery—there is no doubt you can produce a cavalryman with the same training. But if the sword is not considered a suitable weapon for him; if, as some of the military authorities think, that to arm the yeoman with a sword will tend to make him go in for parade movements and sword exercise, and waste time over these things, then do not give him a sword, but give him a sword-bayonet, but give him some weapon that he can use mounted. There must be occasions on which a mounted man will want some weapon that he can use on a horse if you are really to give him the work of scouting in the sort of warfare we shall have to meet with if an invasion of this country takes place. Any fighting that takes place will not take place at Alder-shot or Salisbury Plain, but is most likely to take place in closed country, with lanes and hedges. Parties of scouts and reconnoitring parties going round corners must inevitably run against the enemies' scouts, and the party who is not armed with a weapon which they can use on horseback will have to leave the field open to the other side. It is a very serious question, and I hope it will be decided before long, and that the yeoman will be armed in some way which will enable him to defend himself at night time or in the case of sudden surprise.

I must apologise to several Members who are much more cognisant than I in matters relating to the Army for intervening very shortly in this Debate; but I think they will excuse me when I explain the circumstances, and will recognise the reasons for my intervention. I rise in a somewhat peculiar and delicate position, as the right hon. Gentleman knows I am employed in a subordinate capacity under him; but I cannot divest myself altogether of that freedom of criticism which belongs to me as a Member of Parliament. I wish to avoid causing, and I am quite sure that the right hon. Gentleman recognises that in years past I have avoided causing, any embarrassment, and I shall not enter upon any of the confidential questions which have to be dealt with by those with whom I meet before the right hon. Gentleman. I shall only detail facts and confine myself to broad principles as to which I am quite certain he will not resent my expressing my opinion. These questions, after all, about which I am going to speak are not matters of political difference, and it is quite possible for one on this side of the House, although a political opponent of the right hon. Gentleman, to exercise his proper rights as a Member of Parliament without infringing in the eyes of all Civil servants the loyalty that is due to him as presiding over the office in which I serve. I wish to deal with the very important question of the deficiency of the supply of officers in the Service. That is a question which everyone in the House will recognise as of supreme importance not to the Army only, but to the nation. In 1902 the attention of the public and of the War Minister became engaged upon this question. At that time a very important Commission—the Akers-Douglas Commission—was appointed to decide the lines on which we were to attempt to recruit the officers of our Army. The Commission laid down certain lines, and following it came the Advisory Board of the War Office, of which I was one of the original members, and which was intended to show on what general principles could be carried out the objects of the Akers-Douglas Commission. The Advisory Board was composed of men in the very highest position—other than myself, of course—in the educational world. There were men representing very great institutions from all parts of the Empire; there were men who held strong opinions developed during a lifetime of service in the cause of education. Every question of any magnitude we had to deal with necessarily led to a wide cleavage of opinion in that Board, and I do not think I was peculiar as a member of that body in frequently finding myself in a, minority, after a long discussion and a division. But after that Advisory Board had done its work there was appointed the Army Qualifying Board, which was to have executive power and carry into practical effect the decisions originally arrived at by the Akers-Douglas Commission and the Advisory Board. Of that Qualifying Board, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, I have been chairman since 1904. I have, with the other members of the Board, necessarily been brought into favourable circumstances for understanding the whole position of the matter. I am certain that whatever opinion we held with' regard to the decisions of the Advisory Board the Qualifying Board carried out with equal loyalty those with which they disagreed and those with which they agreed. The Qualifying Board have to select the examiners and fix a standard of examination for certificates. We have to examine very carefully all the papers sent to us, we have to make the whole financial and other arrangements for the examination, and, finally, we have to decide ultimately upon the fate of every candidate.

As regards confidence in the Qualifying Board, I have only to say—and we think it right that the country should know it, because we have been exposed to a great deal of criticism—that we have not during the whole six years had a single question which was decided by a majority vote. We have had different opinions and manifold discussions, but in no single case have we failed to arrive at a unanimous decision on any question that came before us during those years. That shows, I think, that we have at all events endeavoured to apply ourselves as practical men to the questions before us. I do not arrogate to the Board any special virtue on account of that fact, because we have not had to decide any great abstract question coming before the Board. We were dealing as practical men with the matters which came before us, and we saw the necessity for unanimity. I am here as a critic, but I must also remember that we are open to the criticisms not only of the public, but also to the more drastic and autocratic decision which we may meet with from the right hon. Gentleman himself. It is for him to say whether our duties have been carried out to his satisfaction. For myself and for all my colleagues—I do not wish to give their names, because it would bring upon them a load of very severe and troublesome correspondence—I can say that we have never taken part directly or indirectly by word or by letter to newspapers in any of the controversies which have arisen about our action. We have left that to the right hon. Gentleman to deal with. Let us see what were the objects set before us and what we endeavoured to do. The aim of the Advisory Board was that, if possible, we should select officers from those who were the approved pupils of approved schools and who had gained certificates, or higher certificates, on leaving. Let me remark what that means. It means that boys coming up for examination have not only reached the necessary intellectual standard, but that it is an attestation of character, of capacity, of general efficiency, and that he takes the examination, not as a matter for which he crams, with all its attendant evils, but that he takes in his time and as a part of the course of study at school.

That is the immense advantage gained, as the right hon. Gentleman agrees. These are the picked boys from the schools, and I myself hoped that by giving a free career to these boys we would adequately provide a high standard of officers in our Army. But unfortunately we were disappointed, as the right hon. Gentleman was disappointed, in the result. These boys did not come forward in sufficient numbers to meet the requirements of the Army. We had then to fall back on something more, a substitute, and that was done in accepting the qualifying examination for which we are responsible. I and my colleagues, as the Qualifying Board, are responsible for fixing the standard, but our agents carry out the work. I am quite prepared to admit that it may have defects, but we are not responsible, as the right hon. Gentleman will know, for the lines of the examination, and we are quite ready to consider any question he puts before us with regard to alterations in the present regulations. I myself think there are too many obligatory subjects—too many that must be passed, which may be a burden to the boy's mind and interfere with his general education, and which might be troublesome even to the more fairly intellectual and well trained boys. I would be very glad if, in consultation with the right hon. Gentleman, it were found possible to lower the number of these obligatory subjects, and if that were known through the country amongst the schools I think it would be very greatly welcomed. I think it would also be of advantage if the competitive element, which is a healthy element to a certain extent, were introduced into the examination, so that a boy could have the option of choosing a certain subject in which he thinks he is efficient, so that he might have the advantage in that subject, without being burdened by a large minimum of obligatory subjects. I am quite ready to believe that you can get some good candidates from the schools who would make good officers in the Army, on the recommendation of the school authorities themselves. There are many boys who possess character, physical fitness, and general competence all round which can be decided best by responsible school authorities in whose charge they have been. Those boys, though they may be very good and promising, and though they will ripen into good men and good officers, might not find that an examination is a suitable way of showing their abilities. If the right hon. Gentleman sees his way to consult us upon that I am sure he will find no impediment in any prejudices of the Board.

I am afraid, however, all these changes and examinations, and this is a point I want to place emphasis upon, will only touch the fringe of the question. Other suggestions are made, and amongst them the suggestion that we should give very lavish assistance in the training and education of these boys, and relieve their parents of the burden and the expense of that training. I am quite ready to admit that there may be some whose circumstances require that assistance, and who have sons who, if so assisted, would be valuable recruits to the officers of the Army. But I would not like that to be carried out too far or too generally. Depend upon it that that habit of fostering by State assistance the training to a profession, eventually, upon all economic laws, lowers the status of the profession in the long run. No one has a better experience of that than I have with regard to the training of elementary teachers. They have been injured eventually by the fact that they are coddled and fostered and paid for from the time they are 12 or 13 years of age. The result is that when they come ready to the market with the professional equipment they have got they secure worse positions and less pay because of the fact that they are State trained and State assisted from the earliest days in their career. You should beware of carrying out too far or too extensively any wide assistance to the training of our officers. Remember it is not the best parents, and it is not the best boys who will be attracted by such coddling. The best parent is he who is ready to make sacrifices, and who looks ahead and attempts to realise a great future for his son. What you want to do is to raise the ultimate prospect of the officer in the Army. Without that your attempts to meet the difficulty by altering the examination or by minor arrangements of reform are useless. Remember we are paying exactly the same rate to our officers just now, broadly speaking, as when the Coldstream Guards were embodied as the nucleus of a British Army in the days of Charles II. I do not think that that is a fair condition of things when we consider what is the position now.

It is not, recollect, the subaltern whose pay I want increased. A parent may readily help to support the subaltern in the earlier years of his professional career. It is no great burden for parents, many of whom are ready to put themselves under sacrifices of the severest kind during those early years. They do it in every career, and the subaltern is not worse paid than the ordinary man in other careers; but what is wanted is that after ten or twelve years of efficient and good work in the Army an officer should earn a living wage. Unless you make that change you will not attract to the Army the same class of men that you attract into the Indian Civil Service or the higher posts of the Home Civil Service. Open to the ambitious parent who is ready to make sacrifices in the assurance that those sacrifices shall in the long run have some reward, open to him the hope and prospect that the son can obtain to a competence in his profession, and you will attract far more than any minor alterations or reforms in your examinations or assistance in preliminary training that you can give. I would press that on the right hon. Gentleman. Remember the conditions have changed, the social attractions, the social consideration, the ease, the comfort, and the conditions of an Army career are not now what they were a generation ago. Army purchase, when it was abolished, cut the knot between the long purse and the Army, and, on the other hand, you must remember that the small landowner is a class which is becoming, more and more perhaps by recent legislation, unable to give that large supply of recruits to the officers which they formerly did. Nor do you give what is given in foreign countries —that prestige, that importance, that official recognition which is given, for instance, in the German army. That would not be suited to our social conditions. I am not arguing that it is, and I do not believe that it would be. But, remember, it is an attraction in those foreign countries against which you have nothing to set. You must set against that some inducement, and I urge the right hon. Gentleman to confer a great benefit on the Army, and through the Army on the Empire, by attempting to improve the supply of officers, which my own experience has told me is daily falling lower and lower, and to improve it by offering them a fair prospect of a competence, and a comfortable career for efficient service after an adequate number of years. I think these considerations, supported by the experience which I have had, are matters which ought to be brought before the notice of the Committee and the right hon. Gentlemen.

I think no one will deny that the Debate this afternoon and this evening has ranged over a sufficiently large number of subjects, and that the Army has been surveyed, so to speak, from China to Peru. I am not going to attempt to deal with more than one or two points that have been raised by Friends of mine on this side of the House. I have considerable sympathy with the views of my hon. Friend who has just spoken, although he may not be in entire sympathy with me. I was a member of the Akers-Douglas Commission to which he refers, and am possibly, partially at any rate, responsible for some of the trouble which has followed upon the recommendations of that Committee. Still I am very hopeful about the future, and I am not ashamed of the part which I have taken in those deliberations. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, in the course of his speech this afternoon, dealt in his usual optimistic way, and I suppose the Secretary of State for War ought to be optimistic, because if he is not he must indeed be a miserable individual—the right hon. Gentleman dealt with the prospect of the Territorial Force. I do not want to refer to criticisms which have been made again and again, not only by myself but by others, from this bench with regard to what we believe to be the weak point in that force, particularly in regard to the Territorial Artillery. I must point out that a considerable time has now gone by since the force was instituted, and with regard to the Artillery he is still only able to give us the comfortable assurance that all will be well some day if only the Territorial Artillery is left alone.

He said that there had been marked progress, that it was doing well, and that it remained to be seen what standard of excellence it would attain. He has told us that on many occasions. But we shall never know what practical standard of excellence the Territorial Artillery has attained until it is put to the real test of war, and I believe that we shall then find that the standard is one which will end in disaster, if the force has to cope with the Regular troops of a foreign Power. However, I have often dealt with that point, and I will not elaborate it to-night. The whole of the right hon. Gentleman's statement in regard to the future of the Territorial Force, and particularly its usefulness in the event of war, which, after all, in the last event, is the only thing for which it is being created, leaves me with the same sense of unreality. He said this afternoon that the Territorial Army itself, which is confessedly an untrained force, is to be reinforced by a Territorial Reserve, which may have had no training at all, behind which there is to be the Veteran Reserve, the duties of which are exceedingly vague.

They must have been through the Territorial Force, but we have seen that a good deal of the Territorial Force receive no training at all.

Possibly for eight days. From a military point of view the amount of efficiency which they may have arrived at by serving in the Territorial Force in the first place gradually evaporates, until you get beyond the Veteran Reserve, the reinforcement, which I confess I heard of this afternoon for the first time, of the warriors' clubs.

The warriors' clubs are simply social centres where old and young soldiers may meet together. They are not for fighting.

Then it hardly seems worth while to discuss them on the Army Estimates. After all, in the case of Germany, to which the right hon. Gentleman referred, there is the German regular army. There is no Territorial Force on which the German nation relies for its defence against invasion. The right hon. Gentleman told use to my astonishment, that our expeditionary force was greater than that of France and Germany put together. What does he mean by that? He admitted that the German conscript soldier has, if occasion arises, to serve beyond his own frontier. He would have to do so in case of national emergency. That is the kind of emergency with which we should have to deal in the unhappy event of a European war. Does the right hon. Gentleman suggest that the expeditionary force which we could send for Service in the Low Countries is greater than that which could be put in the field on the same ground by Germany and France? That is what the right hon. Gentleman said in the course of his speech. Of course, we know what he was really referring to—the kind of force which is required for service in China or in German West Africa. That is not a case of a real great emergency. If there were a real great emergency, the overseas force which could be produced by either of the great conscript armies would be immeasurably greater than anything we could produce in this country. To attempt any standard of comparison between them is surely ridiculous.

As the Island centre of a great Empire, we have to keep, and do keep, a far larger expeditionary force available for service for a long time than any other Power in the world.

I am talking about a real ultimate emergency in the case of war, and to suppose that our expeditionary force is really greater than the expeditionary force we might have to meet is absurd in the face of the well-known facts with regard to Continental armies and our own. The right hon. Gentleman says that these Continental armies can only be mobilised for a short time. I do not know why he says that. They have been mobilised in the past for such time as was necessary to bring a war to a successful conclusion. It is true that he says that wars are shorter than they used to be; but does he suggest that in the case of a struggle between this country and any great conscript country the latter would be unable to keep their force mobilised in the field as long as we could? They would be able to keep it in the field as long as was necessary, until war was brought to a conclusion. The whole of the strategic essay delivered by the right hon. Gentleman baffles criticism, because it does not seem to have any relation whatever with the realities of war. The right hon. Gentleman told us again that all we have to consider is a possible raid by 70,000 men. He said that 70,000 men could not come here because of the Navy. If we can count on that with absolute certainty, what is the use of the Territorial Army at all? He is raising it presumably for home defence; but if home defence is unnecessary, except by the Navy, surely his Territorial Army becomes a subject only for academic discussion.

I said that the function of a Territorial Force was to compel the enemy to come in such numbers that they could be intercepted by the Navy.

That opens up a fascinating vista of controversy. I do not think it is sufficient that this nation should rely entirely upon the Territorial Force having that peculiar effect upon foreign nations that they shall send just that particular force which can be intercepted by our Navy. That assumes a combination of circumstances in our favour which may not always be realised. But I do not want to say anything unnecessarily discouraging about the Territorial Force, which I have always frankly admitted I do not believe is a force capable of defending this country against invasion. After all, we have the Territorial Force, and, as the right hon. Gentleman and others have said, we have to make the best of it.

I want to deal more particularly with a point which has been mentioned more than once, but which was not adequately dealt with by the right hon. Gentleman in his reply, namely, the Mediterranean Command. Many of us have followed the fortunes of this new appointment from the first with considerable interest. In the other House Lord Crewe complained that the criticism directed against this appointment was of a belated character. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will not make that accusation against us here, because, from the very first, we have protested against the appointment. We have never had from the Government any satisfactory explanation of why it was instituted, or of what are the functions which the officer holding it will have to perform; and when we got a sort of explanation from the right hon. Gentleman this afternoon it was even more comic than one could possibly have anticipated. The right hon. Gentleman referred to the appointment. As he knows only too well, the appointment has been considerably varied since it was introduced to an admiring country. It has gone through many kaleidoscopic changes which are now frankly set forth in the White Paper which was issued the other day. I can only apply to this White Paper the language of "Alice in Wonder land." Following the appointment from its inception to its later stages it becomes "curiouser and curiouser." And really in its latest stage it seems even more indefensible than in the first place. What was the real history? The right hon. Gentleman rather gave us to believe this after noon that this appointment was originally instituted—that the original inception was the need for an officer to relieve the Inspector-General of the forces at home from the duty of inspecting the British forces overseas. It has gradually grown; but if the right hon. Gentleman will look back—

Well, that is the impression that would be derived particularly from the explanation the right hon. Gentleman gave us this afternoon.

I say the position of Inspector-General was a necessity which resulted from the conference of last August—a conference representative of the Overseas Dominions, which came to an agreement on these matters.

I understand the War Office has not yet come to any agreement with regard to the Overseas Dominions so far as the inspection of their forces by this officer is concerned. We were told in the other House that that matter had been definitely postponed until after the Colonial Conference of next year.

At the request of Canada Sir John French went out to inspect the forces there. At the request of Australia Lord Kitchener went there. We have no reason to doubt we shall have further requests from other portions of the Empire for the inspection of their troops. Of course, we shall send nobody unless he is invited.

There has been no suggestion in any of the Debates on this question that the War Office were going to attempt to force the services of this officer on the self-governing Dominions. That, of course, would be absurd. But a large portion of the justification for the appointment was that he will eventually perform these duties—as I have no doubt he will be invited to do. But there was nothing of that kind in the original appointment which was held for a time by His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught, and which he finally surrendered, refusing to hold it any longer because, I understand, he regarded it as a sinecure. The appointment was then offered to a distinguished officer, and was accepted in that very distinguished officer's absence from this country when he could not know the circumstances and when he was not able to acquaint himself as to the true inwardness of what it meant. As soon as he discovered what it meant he refused to take it up. The Government were then reduced to hawking this appointment about—like a builder trying to get rid of an undesirable property. They practically offered to change it in any way so as to make it acceptable.

Does the right hon. Gentleman suggest—[the rest of the sentence could not be heard.]

I have suggested nothing of the kind, but the Government offered this appointment to two distinguished field-marshals. They both refused to hold it. The Government had to try elsewhere. They had no luck with field-marshals. They had no luck anywhere with regard to official approval of this appointment. It has been condemned practically by every distinguished military authority that has expressed an opinion on it. In the Debate the other day in the other House, not only was it stated that the two field-marshals to whom I have referred had showed their disapproval in a practical manner, but Lord Grenfell got up and said, with his great knowledge of the Mediterranean and its command, that the appointment was quite unnecessary. It was condemned by Lord Cromer. Finally, the Army Council had to come down to the lower rank of Generals. I do not wish to make any criticism whatever on the action of the very distinguished officer, Sir Ian Hamilton in accepting this appointment. Apparently, with his well-known gallantry, lie agreed to step into the breach, at the bidding of his superior officers. Apparently he accepted the appointment without it being known even by the right hon. Gentleman himself as to the exact conditions. The right hon. Gentleman told me, in reply to a question last Friday, that he was not able to state what the salary of the position was, what were its allowances, its headquarters, or, in fact, any material information which would be necessary in regard to any appointment, however unimportant, and still more necessary in regard to an appointment of this character.

I wish very emphatically again to say that I said I was not in a position to give the information. I did not say that it had not been worked out.

Really I understood the right hon. Gentleman last Friday to say that the full details had not been fully considered; at any rate, that he had not yet got the approval of the financial authorities as to the salary and emoluments to be paid to this officer.

I have, however, I think, made out my case. I said I did not make any criticism as to the action of Sir Ian Hamilton. I am quite sure all of us recognise that Sir Ian Hamilton would have taken the position had no salary been attached to it. If the right hon. Gentleman really knew what the salary and emoluments were, where the headquarters were, and other details connected with this post, I think it was a want of courtesy on his part in refusing to supply them.

Well, the right hon. Gentleman has not been able to produce a single high military authority who is in favour of this particular appointment. No doubt he will tell us that the Army Council has approved it. That really is no answer. Everyone knows that the right hon. Gentleman himself is the Army Council. I cannot believe that he is in a position to produce the opinion of any independent high military authority in favour of this appointment, or, at any rate, any authority which would convince this House that this appointment was in any way necessary in the interests of the Service and in view of its course. Let us consider for a moment what the appointment is and what are its duties, because my objection to it—the ground of my criticism—is that the appointment is and has been from the first absolutely unnecessary. Even were it not unnecessary the officer filling the post is to be called upon to perform duties he cannot possibly perform. He is required to perform duties which must necesarily clash with each other. It might be possible on Military grounds to defend the necessity of having a Commander in-Chief in the Meditteranean. It might also be possible to defend the necessity of having an Inspector-General of Oversea Forces, but it does seem to me absolutely impossible to defend the amalgamation of those two offices. This has already been admitted in principle in the case of Inspector-General at home, Sir John French. It has been said, and said very truly, that because there is at any rate the possibility in the case of a great war that he might be called upon to assume supreme command of our chief Army, therefore it is not right that he should be away from this country on tours of inspection taking him far away from his headquarters and from the scene of his command, and that therefore he should be relieved of those particular duties of inspection which would take him away from, this country. That appears to me absolutely sound, but surely the argument would apply with equal force to the Commander-in-Chief who is to be stationed in the Meditteranean if he is to combine the role of Commander-in-Chief with the role if Inspector General of the Forces Overseas. The more his duties develop, as the right hon. Gentleman wishes them to develop, as Inspector-General, the wider the field which he has to supervise, the more invitations he receives from the self-governing Dominions to inspect their forces, ipso facto, the more he will be disabled from discharging his duties as Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. He would necessarily be taken away, and when one looks through the list of inspections which tie is called upon to make, even if the self-governing Dominions should not invite him to make inspections, it is obvious that it would be rendered inevitable that he would be called away from his command the greater portion of the year if those inspections are to be anything but of a most perfunctory, and almost impossible, character. We have not yet learned where his headquarters are. The right hon. Gentleman says that for a short portion of the year he is to be stationed at Malta, but, one asks, "Why is he to be stationed at Malta?" The right hon. Gentleman says that one of his principal duties will be to watch communications between East and West. What does that really mean? Malta is not on the natural line of communications between East and West. The great line of traffic between East and West does not pass through Malta. Malta, as a rule, is severely avoided by all the great steam ship lines. In any case, how can the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean watch this line of communications between East and West if he is away discharging his multifarious duties of Inspector-General of the Forces Overseas—away at Mauritius, Bermuda, Egypt, the Straits Settlement, West Africa, South Africa, East Africa, Central Africa, and almost every other portion of the civilised globe? Let us examine the two functions separately. First of all, the Commander- in-Chief in the Mediterranean. The right hon. Gentleman said it was very necessary for strategic and other reasons that there should be a Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. To use his own expression, he needs to be a Commander-in-Chief of the "great highway." But what is he to command? He is to command the small garisons at Malta, Cyprus, Egypt—although under what conditions he commands Egypt I do not know; I do not know what becomes of the Sirdar—

We all know that, but it is a little difficult for an inspector-general, another general, to go into a country inspecting troops which are stationed at any rate under the same flag without coming into some kind of friction with the officer who is on the spot. And what is going to be done in a case like Gibraltar, where the officer the right hon. Gentleman has himself just appointed is a senior in rank to Sir Ian Hamilton? And, again, in South Africa, where there is an officer senior in rank? There may be no difficulty, as the right hon. Gentleman says, but is there any necessity? You have in the whole of this Mediterranean command something like 17,000 British troops. They will have three commanders-in-chief. I am also informed they will have twelve generals. Seventeen thousand men, three commanders-in-chief, twelve generals! And they require this high official to command and inspect them all, and two of these officers, these commanders-in-chief, are senior to the officer who is to command and inspect them. We shall hear, no doubt, about this mysterious Seventh Division. Some of us are a little sceptical about the existence of this Seventh Division, but even if it does exist, or even if it is desirable that it should exist, surely the organisation of that division should be carried out by the Army Council and particularly by the Adjutant-General, the post which Sir Ian Hamilton has just vacated. As I understand it, one of this official's duties is to organise and command this Seventh Division. I think the right hon. Gentleman was justified in saying it was necessary that this officer should have a unifying mind. How can he possibly unify, how can he possibly weld into any sort of cohesion and effective fighting force, a number of isolated units which are scattered over a very large portion of the globe?

The individual units cannot realise that they belong to a division—a division which in time of war would have to take the field as a division commanded by its officer, it is equally impossible for them to prepare to fulfil their duties in that division unless they are going to neglect their duties in the stations where they are. How could they leave those stations in the case of a great war in order to form this phantom division? The right hon. Gentleman is very fond of building up paper schemes, but he has almost surpassed himself with regard to this Seventh Division. It really only exists on paper, and I do not believe it ever can exist anywhere but on paper, and he has set an impossible task to this distinguished officer in calling upon him to organise and command a separate division. Then there is the other function he has to perform—that of Inspector-General. That, I agree, is by itself much more defensible. The right hon. Gentleman put a very good case for the appointment of an Inspector-General overseas who should be a kind of assistant or colleague, on equal terms if necessary, with the Inspector-General of the Forces at home; but if he is merely to fulfil that role surely it would be better that his headquarters should be in this country. It is much easier to get from London to all these different places he has to inspect than it will be to get to them from Malta. There may be some doubt as to whether the kind of inspection he will be able to carry out in the time is going to add very much to the military efficiency of the forces. That is an open question, and I do not wish to dogmatise on the point. The right hon. Gentleman himself saw that it was impossible for this officer to carry out the very thorough and minute inspection which is referred to in paragraph 7 of the latest draft of his duties. It would be quite impossible to do that in all these different stations unless he gave up the whole of his time travelling about the British Empire. If he did that then the whole of the scheme about the command of the Mediterranean and the Seventh Division falls to the ground. There is a good deal that might be said upon this, question of inspection. It might be asked whether, in the case of some of the coaling stations where the garrisons consist mainly of Garrison Artillery and Royal Engineers, the Inspector-General, who is an Infantry officer, is to inspect and ascertain whether they are competent to perform their very technical and scientific duties; and, if so, what becomes of the Inspector-General of Artillery and Engineers who heretofore performed these duties. I consider their powers abroad, at any rate, will be unnecessary, and it seems to me that the right hon. Gentleman has some doubt as to the wisdom or the necessity of these inspections.

In April of the present Session, when I asked him some question with regard to this particular point, and whether the inspection of the troops in South Africa had been carried out by the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean, in the absence of Lord Kitchener, he replied, almost with heat, and certainly with virtuous indignation:— No; there has been no inspection of the troops in South Africa. It is quite unnecessary, because there is a capable and experienced officer there in the person of Lord Methuen. Is the Inspector-General then only to inspect forces not commanded by capable and experienced officers? The right hon. Gentleman said that it was unnecessary in South Africa, because Lord Methuen was a capable and experienced officer. Now he has appointed a general officer to go and inspect Lord Methuen, who was hitherto regarded as not requiring any inspection. I do not want to enumerate the places which the War Office have told off this unfortunate officer to inspect in the course of the year, in addition to holding his command as Chief of the Mediterranean, which, if he attempted, would take the whole of the year in travelling alone. With regard to the expenses, I think the right hon. Gentleman was well advised in not forming any estimate of what they would be. But that is not the end of the Inspector-General's duties by any means. He is in addition to sit upon the Defence Committee, and he is to be a member of the Selection Board which meets every month in London, and upon whose decision the fate of every senior officer who has a career before him depends. Of course, it is perfectly plain he cannot attend either the Defence Committee or the Selection Board; his name will be put upon documents, and will be used in connection with the decisions at which the Selection Board arrives, and he will be held responsible to a certain extent for decisions in which he has not been able to take part. That is not a fair position in which to place any officer. Then there is the final objection, which, I think, is a serious one at the present moment, namely that this appointment is really a scandalous waste of public money, and I am afraid it is only typical of that career of extravagance in regard to new appointments upon which the Government appears to have embarked. The right hon. Gentleman tried to suggest to us this afternoon, as he has done on more than one occasion previously, that there is no additional expenditure; but being pressed he admitted that the salary alone of the Commander-in-Chief is to be £5,000 a year. In addition to that there is to be a staff, and there is to be travelling allowances and expenses to himself and the staff, which means a very considerable sum. It is inconceivable that the expenses of this appointment can be less than £10,000 a year. The right hon. Gentleman says, "Oh, yes, but then we have reduced other things," but presumably those other things were reduced because, as he said, they were unnecessary and superfluous; and he might as well say that if the Government were to reinstate that high official the Master of the Buck Hounds, who drew a salary of £2,000 a year, they would not be causing any expense to the country because that large salary used to be paid, and they were only providing it, and there was really no increase in the public charge, as for him to say that to maintain this appointment at £10,000 a year is not costing the country anything at all because he has done away with certain other appointments absolutely unnecessary. There is an expense of anything between £5,000 and £10,000 a year for an appointment which no military authority of repute who has yet been produced has approved or commended. There is that one expense, and there is an opportunity for that economy which used in the past, at any rate, to be one of the watchwords of the Liberal policy.

I only wish to say this in conclusion with regard to this appointment: It appears to me to be absolutely indefensible, first of all on the ground of military efficiency; secondly, because the duties which have been detailed to this officer are absolutely incapable of being performed by any one individual, however efficient, however distinguished and however active; and, thirdly, because it is really a wanton waste of public money. The appointment is really a job almost unique in its character. Most jobs are perpetrated in the interest of some individual. This job is perpetrated in the interest of no individual who wants it, because nobody wants it; it is a job perpetrated mainly and entirely, so far as I can ascertain, in order to save the face of the Government. They committed themselves to this long list of duties which was rejected by the officer who in the first instance was called upon to perform them. They then revised the duties very slightly indeed. The distinguished officer who accepted the appointment evidently under a misapprehension, on learning what the duties were, refused to continue any longer. The Government then felt, in view apparently, of the attacks which had been made, it was absolutely necessary, in order to save their own face, that this appointment should be continued, and that an officer should be found to hold it. They have therefore insisted on maintaining this appointment. So far the right hon. Gentleman, or his colleagues in another place, have been unable to give any coherent or intelligible defence of this appointment, and it is because they have not succeeded in making any justification for it that I have opposed it from the first, and shall continue to oppose it by every means in my power.

I ask to be allowed to intervene, because I think I ought at once to say something in reply to the hon. Gentleman. I feel that what he has said he did not intend to say; but, whether he intended it or not, his speech forms a severe criticism not only upon me, but upon one whom I am here to defend—Sir Ian Hamilton—who has accepted the post.

The right hon. Gentleman has no justification whatever for suggesting that I attacked Sir Ian Hamilton. An officer of any rank who is called upon to perform a duty by any Secretary of State for War has to perform that duty.

Certainly not. Sir Ian Hamilton or any other officer is perfectly free to accept or decline a post, and to suggest that Sir Ian Hamilton would accept a post which is a scandalous waste of public money, which was nugatory, impossible, and absurd is to make—I know the right hon. Gentleman did not intend it, but in his zeal he has made—a serious reflection upon Sir Ian Hamilton. Sir Ian Hamilton is the last person in the world to take up any position he does not believe in. Every detail of the post was set up in consultation with Sir Ian. Some time ago I had the advantage of consulting both Lord Kitchener and Lord Roberts, and not only they, but every one agreed Sir Ian was the man of all others, who, by his contact with Colonial soldiers, by his distinction in war, and by his general characteristics, was a suitable person for the occupant for the post. He has taken up the post con amore and with his whole heart.

In one breath the hon. Member says the post is so important that no one man can fill it; in another he says there is nothing to do. He says, "You ought to have an Inspector-General, but the expense of maintaining the post and making the inspection will be very great—£10,000 a year!" I know this, that the salary of £5,000 a year is not an excessive amount when the ground that has to be covered is considered. The outlay which anybody holding the post has to incur is not only very great, but it cannot be compensated in salary. Does the hon. Gentleman say there ought to be no Inspector of Oversea Forces?

I said the opposite. I said it was absolutely impossible to combine the office with that of Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean.

Therefore, so far as the Inspector of Oversea Forces goes, I have no dispute with the hon. Member. Now we come to the position of Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. I explained very carefully, and indeed I read the terms of the Memorandum, to show that the duties of the Commander-in-Chief were strictly restricted to the supervision of all questions of strategy and training which occur in changes of position such as this. Sir Ian Hamilton's main duty will be the duty of inspection. He has got not only the Mediterranean, which in itself requires a considerable amount of inspection, but he has got South Africa. In South Africa he has to inspect under a Commander-in-Chief who is senior to himself, and he goes there therefore simply in his capacity of Inspector-General. There is nothing unusual in that. Sir Nevill Lyttelton is inspected by Sir John French, who is his junior in rank; and when you come to the case of Gibraltar it is perfectly true that General Hunter is senior to Sir Ian Hamilton in the rank of generals, but if the hon. Gentleman will only read Regulation 218 he cannot fail to see that this question of precedence is provided for.

Another point made by the hon. Gentleman was, "What a monstrous thing it is that General Ian Hamilton should figure on the Selection Board when he cannot be present at its meetings!" But the hon. Gentleman apparently has no idea of the way in which that Board is formed. The very essence of the Board is that the people who sit upon it should be men in contact with the officers over whom they have to exercise judgment, and from whom they have to make a selection. When the Duke of Connaught was Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean and High Commissioner he attended the meetings of the Selection Board when he was at home, and cases of promotion which involved names coming from places under his command in the Mediterranean, and which involved officers who were commanding those troops, were held back until the Selection Board could have the advantage of His Royal Highness's opinion. I may say the practice will be the same in the case of Sir Ian Hamilton. It has been one of the great disadvantages recently that on the Selection Board there was no one who knew personally the officers in the Mediterranean and who had any knowledge of them and their capabilities. One of the very purposes of Sir Ian Hamilton being on the Selection Board is that he may bring to bear his knowledge of the Mediterranean officers, and that every case may be taken when he is present. Again, as to the Defence Committee, those who know it are aware of the kind of question which will be reserved for the occasions on which he is there, and he will be there very frequently, I have no hesitation in saying that questions will be reserved for his opinion. We have reached a stage in the evolution of the English forces in which it is necessary to have an Inspector-General of the Overseas Forces. It is no longer possible for the work to be done by a single inspector, as the whole globe has to be considered. We have also recognised that no scientific soldier would have a chain of fortresses in the Mediterranean to Egypt, and that Seventh Division of which the right hon. Gentleman speaks lightly, although he would not speak lightly if he knew the work. It is no longer scientific soldiering to have these things detached and without the unifying influence of a commander-in-chief, although a commander-in-chief's functions may be in practice the work of supreme supervision in all the ordinary incidents of peace. The Seventh Division of which the hon. and gallant Gentleman spoke is a division which requires the attention of such a unifying authority. Great changes have been made by the establishment of such an authority. The establishment of the battalion has been brought up to 840 from a small establishment of from 700 to 800, which used to obtain. Amongst the Artillery we have introduced a Camel Corps to make the force in Egypt mobile. The whole matter has been considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence, and the arrangements which have been made are those which can only be best carried further when we have the advice and guidance of someone on the spot who is not only responsible, but in a position to exercise some effective authority. These are the reasons for which we think it right and necessary to add to the position of Inspector-General the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean. I quite agree that this appointment is a very different appointment in many respects to that of Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean under the Duke of Connaught. We have added, in consequence of certain circumstances, to the appointment that of Inspector-General, and we have taken the opportunity of combining them. I think I have shown that they can be combined. The whole matter has been worked out with all the care that we can bestow upon it, and, perhaps, the best testimony that the conclusions at which we have arrived are good is that they have received the acceptance of Sir Ian Hamilton, who will enter upon his work in the best interests of the country.

I do not see what is the use of the right hon. Gentleman talking about the component elements of a great unit when he has not got the great unit. I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he knows enough about it to deny that the Germans have got about a dozen dirigible balloons in which they travel at night, throwing explosive shells directed by guns. There was an account of these things not very long ago which appeared in a paper. The right hon. Gentleman said he would give £30 for three-year-old horses for the Army, The farmers cannot, do it under £40. If the right hon. Gentleman only gives £30 the foreigners will get the horses just as they have been getting: all the best of them, because in this great Free Trade country we cannot afford to give enough for them.

The right hon. Gentleman said that the Territorial Artillery is making marked progress. I am very glad to hear it, but it consists of obsolete guns, untrained men, and either no horses at all or untrained horses altogether. Whenever anyone goes to inspect the Territorial Artillery all the horses are borrowed from the Regular Artillery in the neighbourhood. The Territorial Artillery really is absolutely absurd. I remember reading in a strong Liberal paper in Wales that they got a lot of carthorses—fine fat carthorses they were, but so fine and fat that their belly-bands would not meet. These Welsh dobbins were having a capital time, and were smiling away at the other poor horses, who had to do double work. That, at all events, is-the account in the Welsh Radical paper. The right hon. Gentleman said it was impossible to estimate what the Territorial Force would be like in three years. I should think he is probably right, except that, as far as I can make out, it will be-quite useless to repel an invasion. I think at present there are 2,400 officers untrained in musketry, and somewhere about 100,000 men also untrained in musketry. What sort of use these men are going to foe if they were ever wanted I am altogether unable to say. I am very sorry to be obliged to tell the right hon. Gentleman so, but the fact is that the Territorial Forces are not only a futile absurdity but an admitted fraud, because they are used to deceive and humbug the people of this country into the belief that they really are a defence against invasion. All the great soldiers know perfectly well that it would be of no use at all to put these men against the trained troops of a foreign country.

Then the right hon. Gentleman is very hopeful about the Territorial Reserve. Will the right hon. Gentleman think how much use they would be with the sort of training they go through in the Territorial Force? Then we come to the Veteran Reserve. I do not know what the right hon. Gentleman thinks about them. I saw them the other day in London—a very fine body of men, with no uniform, no rifles, and no ammunition. The right hon. Gentleman may be very pleased with them and, indeed he has reason to be, for they did not cost him anything. They showed him what might be done if the same thing were done in all the counties of Great Britain, and if the right hon. Gentleman would provide them with some sort of organisation, uniform, and ammunition. After seeing them, I wrote at once to the Lord-Lieutenant of the county in which I live, and asked him if he could not get the right hon. Gentleman to do something in the way of providing equipment. The right hon. Gentleman told us that if we lost command of the sea we should be sure to be starved, no matter how big an Army we had. I think his legal mind must see that there is some fallacy in that. It must surely be true that if you have a couple of millions of fairly trained men you would be safe from invasion, and you could then loose your Fleet to hunt the enemy's Fleet. If you had your Fleet chained like a dog to your shores, what is going to happen to your food supply then? You would be starved if you had no Army to protect you against invasion, and if you could not loose your Fleet to hunt the enemy and protect your food supply. The right hon. Gentleman thinks we could send a larger expeditionary force abroad than anybody else. How many Germans were sent into France in 1870? There were 150,000 if I remember right. I suppose that was an expedition of some sort?

The right hon. Gentleman said that universal military training would prevent recruiting. Really that is another legal idea I cannot understand. Does he remember Colonel Pollock's experiment? He took 100 men and trained them. When they came to him only one man wanted to go into the Army, but when they were trained thirty men went in, and I believe they are in it still. That is absolutely against the right hon. Gentleman's theory. Although a man may not like the idea of military training to begin with, after he has been in for a little he, as a general rule, becomes very keen. It is the other way about altogether from what the right hon. Gentleman says. He says that we get the Army as large as it is on the voluntary system.

A great deal of that is due to the poverty caused by our Free Trade system. The right hon. Gentleman is inclined to smile at that. I think he knows very well that most of the men go in because they cannot get anything into their stomachs in any other way. The right hon. Gentleman is very certain we are only to have 70,000 men sent over here. I would remind him that not only is sea warfare very uncertain—it always has been in history—but Napolean said that in war it is always the unexpected that happens. The right hon. Gentleman would find it very awkward if the 70,000 men were multiplied by three. We are told that the Territorial Force must be watered, nurtured, and nursed, though I really do not know that that is what is generally done with military forces. But as it is quite a useless force, I do not see any good in nursing it. The right hon. Gentleman said he was more and more against compulsion, yet it was he who praised the directors of the Alliance Assurance Company for their coercion, and the people they coerced were the clerks, who are about the most helpless of all the classes of people in this country who join the Territorial Force. I may remind the right hon. Gentleman that although he is so much against universal military training, yet in the Republic of Switzerland it is proceeded with, with great advantage. There is a very good Army, and the people are all in favour of it. There is no militarism that naval men are so dreadfully afraid of. There is no patriotism by proxy, and they do not have strong men shouting when the little boys go to the war. That happened in the case of the South African War. I would ask the right hon. Gentleman one question. I do not quite see if the men of this country are not willing to learn to defend their country and their women and children whom the right hon. Gentleman is going to hire to do it for him. Somebody has got to do it. The right hon. Gentleman's organisation is very good, but we all know that his scheme is not a fair one, because the great majority of the Territorial Army are working men, earning from 15s. to £2 or £3 a week, and they have on occasions to give up the whole of their salary. Under this scheme you are letting off the rich and well-to-do altogether. It is not fair. Everybody ought to be on the same footing, and I quite understand the Labour Members not agreeing to it. Universal military training, on the other hand, is the most just and the most democratic system that ever has been invented or ever can be. Nearly the whole of the Continental nations have that system, and we shall never be safe until this country gets it. I would remind the House that under the right hon. Gentleman's scheme the huge majority of untrained civilians have practically purchased their fellow-countrymen's blood for cash. That is what it comes to—nothing else. They see men die while they are hiding under a white flag. We have had warning enough in all conscience from all sorts of people in foreign countries as well as from our own people. General Von der Goltz in 1900 said invasion was by no means impossible for a bold and enterprising Admiral, and they must not lose a single day in preparing. If the right hon. Gentleman got his full number, a great many of them would be required for garrison work—Lord Roberts put the number at 200,000—and that would leave very few men to defend us. Wellington and Napoleon and all the great leaders in war have said that this sort of troops should be employed in that manner, and, if that were done, we should have nothing like that number, even with the 70,000 which were said to be coming, if they come at all. The late Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, who was not a warlike person, in 1900 said it was the duty of every man to defend his country in time of national crisis. I do not think you could have a higher authority. And really that is what universal Military training means. I hold that it is not only the duty of every man to learn enough to be able to defend his country, but it is the duty of every woman to see that no man is allowed to shirk his first duty to his native land.

Everybody really knows that the real difficulty is that politicians on both sides, though to a certain extent more on the opposite side, do not show the same courage as some of the leaders of the Socialists do, and are afraid to tell people the truth. That applies even more to the right hon. Gentleman than the rest of his colleagues, because he is responsible for the defence of his country by land. Nothing has been written more clearly across the history of the world than the misery and bloodshed that has been caused when a nation has been rich and prosperous, and when men have refused to defend the riches and prosperity. It is also written on all the pages of history that a nation must always be ready for a sudden and unexpected war. We are not ready. Are we going to prepare in time, or are we going to leave it until it is too late? Is the right hon. Gentleman going to shut the door when the horse has been stolen? I am only venturing to say what all sorts and kinds of people in this country think—that we are in great danger of becoming, as the Foreign Secretary said, the conscript appenage of a foreign Power. I do appeal to the right hon. Gentleman to consider whether he is quite sure that the people of this country would not welcome universal military service if only the head politicians on both sides had the courage to ask them.

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolution to be reported.

And, it being Eleven of the clock, the Chairman left the Chair to make his Report to the House.

Resolution to be reported to-morrow (Tuesday); Committee to sit again tomorrow.

TRUSTS (SCOTLAND) BILL.

Read a second time, and committed to a Standing Committee.

Resolved, "That this House do now adjourn."—[ Master of Elibank. ]

Adjourned accordingly at Five minutes after Eleven o'clock.