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Commons Chamber

Volume 32: debated on Thursday 7 December 1911

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House Of Commons

Thursday, 7th December, 1911.

The House met at a Quarter before Three of the clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

Irish Reproductive Fund (County Tipperary)

Return ordered "showing in detail when and in what manner the money has been spent which was to the credit of the county Tipperary under the Irish Reproductive Loan Fund and was transferred to the Congested Districts Board by The Purchase of Land (Ireland) Act, 1891."—[ Mr. Condon.]

New Writ

For the county of Lanark (Govan Division), in the room of William Hunter, esquire, K.C., one of the Senators of His Majesty's College of Justice in Scotland.—[ Master of Elibank.]

Trade Reports (Annual Series)

Copy presented of the Diplomatic and Consular Report, Annual Series, No. 4823 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

Outdoor Relief (Departmental Committee)

Copy presented of the Memorandum on the Report of the Departmental Committee with respect to the Orders relating to the Administration of Outdoor Relief [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

National Insurance Bill

Part I—National Health Insurance

Copy presented of Memorandum explanatory of the Bill as passed by the House of Commons so far as relates to National Health Insurance [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

Diseases Of Animals Acts

Copy presented of Order, No. 8248, dated 29th November, 1911, entitled "The Southampton (Channel Islands Animals) Landing Place Order of 1911" [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.

Liverpool And Hong Kong Mail Service

Return presented, relative thereto [ordered 6th December; Mr. McKinnon Wood]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.

Papers laid upon the Table by the Clerk of the House:—

1. Adjournment Motions under Standing Order No. 10,

Return relative thereto [ordered 5th December; The Deputy Chairman]; to be printed.

2. Closure of Debate (Standing Order No. 26),

Return relative thereto [ordered 5th December; The Deputy Chairman]; to be printed.

3. Public Bills,

Return relative thereto [ordered 5th December; The Deputy Chairman]; to be printed.

4. Public Petitions,

Return relative thereto [ordered 5th December; The Deputy Chairman]; to be printed.

5. Select Committees,

Return relative thereto [ordered 5th December; The Deputy Chairman]; to be printed.

6. Standing Committees,

Return relative thereto [ordered 5th December; The Deputy Chairman]; to be printed.

7. Sittings of the House,

Return relative thereto [ordered 5th December; The Deputy Chairman]; to be printed.

8. Business of the House (Days Occupied by Government and by Private Members),

Return relative thereto [ordered 5th December; The Deputy Chairman]; to be printed.

9. Private Bills and Private Business,

Return relative thereto [ordered 5th December; The Deputy Chairman]; to be printed.

Oral Answers To Questions

Morocco (Secret Treaties)

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will lay upon the Table the text of the Secret Treaty of 1904 between France and Spain on the affairs of Morocco, also the texts of any other agreements between France and Spain referring to Morocco known to His Majesty's Government, together with the communications which passed between the Governments of France and Spain and His Majesty's Government in reference to these treaties?

I have already promised to lay before Parliament the Convention between France and Spain of 1904 with regard to Morocco, and I hope to do so shortly. I will also lay any agreements between France and Spain with regard to Morocco which the Governments of those two countries make public. I am not prepared to lay any further Papers at present.

asked whether the British Government has been asked to support the French Goevrnment in any negotiations with the Government of Spain having for their object to induce Spain to surrender any rights in Morocco guaranteed to her under the Secret Treaty of 1904, or any other treaty with the British Government; and, if so, what has been the reply of the British Government?

I can make no statement about actual or prospective negotiations between Franco and Spain. Whatever part His Majesty's Government may take in them will have due regard to the Agreements of 1904, in which all three countries are concerned.

Tripoli (French Exports)

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been called to the fact that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic has issued a circular forbidding all export of provisions across the frontier of Tunis into Tripoli, while a large trade is carried on from Tunis to Tripoli by sea in provisions for the Italian troops; whether any protests against this breach of neutrality or against any other breaches of neutrality have been received from the Government of Turkey; and, if so, whether he will lay them upon the Table of the House?

I have no knowledge of the circular in question, nor have the Ottoman Government made any representation to His Majesty's Government on this subject.

French And Dutch Colonies (Public Service)

asked whether the published regulations impose any restrictions based on racial considerations on the admission of candidiates for the public service in the French and Dutch Colonies in the East?

In accordance with the promise given to the hon. Member the day before yesterday, I am making inquiries of His Majesty's representatives at Paris and The Hague on the subject. There has not been time for a reply to be received.

Will the right hon. Gentleman communicate with me when the reply is received?

Russia And Persia

asked whether any communication has been received from the Russian Government suggesting a restoration of the ex-Shah of Persia?

asked whether an indemnity will be extorted from Persia by Russia for the cost of the advance of Russian soldiers to Teheran; if so, what the amount of that indemnity will be; and whether any indemnity is being demanded from Persia by Great Britain for the cost of the British military force now in Southern Persia?

The Russian demands were enumerated in the answer returned to the hon. Member for Burnley on the 4th instant. So far as I am aware, no specific sum has been named. The reply to the last point is in the negative.

asked whether the Persian Government, acting upon the advice of His Majesty's Government, agreed to the terms of the first Russian ultimatum on the understanding that fresh Russian troops would not be landed on Persian soil; whether an assurance to this effect was given by His Majesty's Government, and it was only in consequence of shortness of time that this assurance failed; whether the Persian Government were willing to discuss the terms of the second ultimatum if reasonable time were given; and whether His Majesty's Government made any representations to the Russian Government to ask that further time should be given?

The Persian Government were informed that we had every reason to believe that, if the terms of the first Russian ultimatum were complied with, the Russian troops would be withdrawn; and they were advised to act without loss of time; but no assurance was given. This was on the 20th of November. On the 21st of November the Persian. Government decided to comply with the demands. On the 23rd we were informed that the Treasury gendarmes could not be withdrawn for four or five days. The British Minister repeatedly urged that every day's delay lessened the chance of the withdrawal of the Russian troops. The demands were eventually complied with on the 24th. Meanwhile the Russian troops had landed in Persia; Mr. Shuster's attacks upon the Russian Government had been circulated in Persia; and the Russian Minister had been instructed to warn the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, when he proposed to pay the visit of apology, that the Russian Government would have to put forward further demands. The reply to the third question is that the Persian Government replied in this sense: Any statement of communications that have passed between the Russian Government and ourselves can be dealt with only in discussing the question as a whole, for which there will be opportunities here and in another place.

Is the right hon. Gentleman in a position to state on what evidence he made the statement that Mr. Shuster or the Persian Government was responsible for the circulation of the pamphlet?

asked whether the Russian troops are marching on Teheran, the capital of Persia; and how do His Majesty's Government reconcile the demands which they are to enforce upon the Persian Government—namely, that the Persian Government shall obtain the consent of Russia and Great Britain to the appointments of foreign advisers—with the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention safeguarding the independence of Persia as a sovereign State?

The Russian troops have left Enzeli, but have not reached Teheran. The demand in question involves no new departure in practice, but is in accordance with that which has been pursued at Teheran ever since the Agreement was signed.

Does His Majesty's Government consider that anything the Russian Government have done during the last few months has been a contravention of the spirit of the Anglo-Russian Agreement?

I must ask the hon. Member to leave general questions of that kind to be dealt with when I make the general statement which has been promised on the question as a whole, a statement which has been promised not only here, but in another place also.

Are we to take it that the British Government agree to the Russian demand for the instant dismissal of Mr. Shuster?

The answer I have just given applies to that. It is impossible to deal with these isolated questions piecemeal on a subject which is one of very serious and very grave importance.

Can the right hon. Gentleman kindly say when that statement, so often promised, will be made, and when the discussion on foreign affairs will be resumed?

I understand that so far as the House of Commons is concerned it will be one day next week. I am not sure that the Prime Minister has announced a day, but there is a day next week when the Debate on Foreign Affairs will be taken, which will afford an ample opportunity.

Can we be assured of a whole day for the Debate, or can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the Debate will be curtailed?

Army Aeroplanes

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether, in view of the fact that French aeroplane manufacturers are already so fully supplied with orders from their own and other Continental Governments that they cannot supply machines to the British Army in quantities within a reasonable time, he will take immediate steps to purchase machines from such British manufacturers as may prove their ability to turn out satisfactory aeroplanes?

Will the hon. Member kindly refer to the reply to the question put on this subject by the hon. Member for Taunton on the 28th November, to which there is nothing at present to add.

asked whether the French Army regulations provided that officers engaged in the aviation department were to be treated as on full war footing with, in the case of accident, similar allowances and pensions to themselves or their widows as they would receive if wounded or killed on active service; and whether such conditions also applied to the English aviation officers?

The suggestion contained in the question that French officers engaged in the aeronautical service are placed on a war footing, and that in case of injuries they or their wives receive pensions or allowances as if the injuries had been incurred on active service, is inaccurate. Their service is only regarded as active service for purposes of promotion. The conditions for our own aviation officers are not yet settled.

Will the right hon. Gentleman, having regard to both the danger and the necessity of this service, consider very seriously whether he cannot make an extra provision for these officers who are engaged in aviation?

Yes, certainly. Extra remuneration must be given. I have said, and I repeat, that I hope to be able to state the conditions very shortly.

asked how many effective aeroplanes are now owned by the War Department; how many of them are of English and French manufacture; and how many of each sort have been purchased since the 1st January, 1911?

There are twelve effective aeroplanes at present owned by the War Department, and three more are under reconstruction in the factory. Of these nine are of English and six of French manufacture. Seven aeroplanes of English and four of French manufacture have been purchased since 1st January, 1911.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the French Government has over 250 of these aeroplanes at the present moment?

I do not think that is a matter I can deal with by way of question and answer. I have said that I hope to make a further statement before long. I will make a statement.

Shall we have an opportunity of discussing the statement the right hon. Gentleman is going to make next week?

Next Session I should think we can fully discuss the arrangements proposed to be made.

Before the final arrangements are made will the House have an opportunity of discussing what is proposed?

That is a question which should be put to the Prime Minister or the Patronage Secretary.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether it is the intention of the War Office to make the grant of £75 to every officer who obtains his aviator's certificate, or whether this grant will only be given to those officers subsequently selected for aviation service; and whether it is his intention to attach every officer obtaining such certificate to the Air Battalion or only selected officers; and, if so, upon what basis in either case does he propose to make the selections?

The grant of £75 will be made only to those officers who are selected for aviation work and have a pilot's certificate, or on their obtaining a pilot's certificate. Every officer who has been so selected and has obtained a pilot's certificate will be attached to the Air Battalion for a further course before appointment as Army aviator. The original selection will be made on the recommendations of commanding and medical officers as to the suitability of the officer for aviation work.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that, in spite of the fact that the recent French military aviation trials have been for machines carrying three persons, the French Government have nevertheless since the trials placed large orders for high-speed single-seated machines; and whether he will, in preparing his test regulations, provide for trials for single-seated and two-seated machines as well as for those of larger and heavier type?

It is considered desirable to confine the competition tests to machines capable of carrying two persons. Single-seated machines will be dealt with later.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether, when he has ascertained the best type of machine by means of his cash prizes, he proposes to have it copied at the Army aircraft factory; and, if so, if he would state what is the size, number of men employed, and qualifications of such factory to turn out, say, 100 aeroplanes within the next six months?

The aircraft factory is not at present organised for doing more than experimental work and repairs to aeroplanes besides other aircraft work. The question as to how far, if at all, the factory should be used for construction of aeroplanes on the lines suggested is under consideration.

Do I understand that the factory is not to be used for the construction of aeroplanes and that orders have to be given to outside factories?

As I have stated elsewhere, the proposal is that the aircraft factory shall not undertake the manufacture of aeroplanes at present on a large scale. We shall have to obtain our aeroplanes from outside sources as regards the greater number.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether the latest production of the aircraft factory, namely, the balloon known as the "Delta," has burst every time it has been inflated before reaching a pressure which is regarded as giving a sufficient factor of safety for practical use; whether on the last, voyage of the airship "Gamma" to Salisbury Plain, the frame containing the crew and engine buckled in the course of the voyage; and, if so, whether he will lay before Parliament a full report on the working of such factory?

The "Delta" is not yet completed, and has not yet been inflated with gas. As is usual during manufacture portions of the dirigible have been tested in various ways, and when completed all portions will have a proper margin of safety. During the voyage of the "Gamma" on 22nd September the pitching of the vessel broke a stay wire in the fore end of the frame, and the two fore bays of the frame buckled, but no further damage resulted, although the continued pitching was severe. There is nothing in these cases to require any further report.

asked what use, in view of the adoption of aeroplanes by the War Office, is being made now or is likely to be made in the future of the non-dirigible balloons owned by the Government?

Are we to understand that we shall maintain and keep those that we have?

asked if the dirigible balloon "Beta" has been taken out of its shed at Aldershot on any occasion during the past six months, and if the men who are to navigate it have been on the Continent to study the management and handling of dirigibles; and, if not, how is it proposed that they should learn their work?

The "Beta" has been out on several occasions during the last six months, and the men who are to navigate her are learning their work by such practice. They have not been to the Continent to study the management and handling of dirigibles.

Would it not be very advantageous for them to go abroad to study for a bit as they are making almost daily ascents in Germany and France very successfully?

I cannot admit that there is this superiority in knowledge in foreign countries. We have certain advantages of our own which are not possessed by any foreign country.

Duke Of York's School (Chelsea Site)

asked what progress has been made with the structural alterations of the Duke of York's School, Chelsea; and when it is intended to demolish the wall facing the King's Road?

The structural alterations are proceeding rapidly. Two units are already in occupation of their new quarters, and a third will be able to move in shortly. All structural alterations should be completed in April next year, but some of the new subsidiary buildings will probably take a few months longer. It is intended to demolish the wall facing the King's Road in February next.

Provision Of A Pier (Ohermory)

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, whether the Congested Districts Board will take into favourable consideration the memorial forwarded by the fishermen requesting the provision of a pier or slip at Ohermory, in the parish of Cahirciveen; and whether, in view of the fact that fifty fishermen use this landing-place, where there are at present no facilities for hauling up their boats, the Board will act promptly in the matter?

This application will be considered by the Congested Districts Board.

Teaching Of Irish

asked whether any of the senior inspectors in the counties of Kerry, Donegal, Mayo, Galway, Clare, or Water-ford, in which the bilingual schools are situated, have a competent oral knowledge of Irish or are qualified to inspect bilingual schools through the medium of Irish as well as English; and whether either of the chief inspectors to whom reference is to be made, in accordance with the terms of the circular recently published in the Press, has a competent oral knowledge of Irish or is qualified to inspect bilingual schools through the medium of Irish as well as English?

The inspection of bilingual schools in the counties named is entrusted to inspectors who know Irish. There is at present only one chief inspector and neither he nor the senior inspectors in the counties named have the requisite knowledge of Irish. The inspector of Irish is also always available for the inspection of bilingual schools.

Belfast Corporation

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland if he will say why he stated at Skipton that the Belfast Corporation only employed one Roman Catholic and that he was a scavenger; whether he is aware that in fact the Belfast Corporation employ upwards of 900 Roman Catholics; and whether he will withdraw his statement?

I never made any such statement. As to the number of Roman Catholic tramwaymen, labourers, and scavengers, employed by the Belfast Corporation I have no knowledge, or means of knowledge, but I have no doubt there are several hundreds.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Belfast Corporation passed a resolution repudiating as wholly untruthful and without foundation the statement he made at Skipton, and the Catholic members of the council did not dissent from the resolution?

I think it is the fact that the Belfast Corporation passed some such resolution, but they never communicated with me beforehand to ask me whether I ever made such a statement, nor have they ever sent me a copy of the resolution.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I hold in my hand a newspaper report of his speech, practically verbatim?

A most respectable and reputable paper called the "Dublin Express."

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there are only nine salaried officials out of 437 employed by the Corporation of Belfast who are Catholics, and that their salaries are only, roughly, £700 out of a total of £68,700?

Do not the statistics prove beyond doubt that over £48,000 per annum is paid to Roman Catholic employés of the Belfast Corporation?

Will the right hon. Gentleman inform the House what method the Belfast Corporation has of finding out the religion of its employés?

Assault (Kilmacrennan, County Donegal)

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland if he is aware that on 2nd January last William Gallagher, a Protestant, of Tawney, Kilmacrennan, county Donegal, was followed by a mob of Hibernians from the village of Kilmacrennan and brutally beaten, being left unconscious upon the road, and that he has since been threatened with worse violence; and if he will state why, in these circumstances, the two men who were convicted of assault upon Gallagher have been released from prison before they had served half their sentences?

The police authorities inform me that this man was assaulted as stated in the question, but that he has not since been threatened as alleged. It would be contrary to practice to state the grounds which influenced the Lord Lieutenant in the exercise of the prerogative of mercy.

Boycotting (Bandon, County Cork)

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland if he is aware that a Protestant farmer named William Bryan, of Knocknacurra, Bandon, county Cork, and his family are boycotted because he refuses to give up the farm which has been occupied by Bryan and his father for twenty-two years, and which for the past six years has been vested in Bryan as a tenant purchaser under the Land Act of 1903; is he aware that the farm has been claimed under the Evicted Tenants Act by the son of a man who formerly held it as a herd on a grazing take, and the Estates Commissioners have declined to reinstate this man; is he aware that the Bryan's have to be protected by police controls; has he any information as to Roman Catholics holding evicted farms in the same neighbourhood being molested; and will he stale what action he proposes to take to protect the Bryan's from further annoyance?

The police authorities inform me that this man was for a time partially boycotted, for the reasons stated, but it has now almost entirely died out. I am aware that one Michael Flynn, a son of a former occupant, who held under a temporary letting, applied for reinstatement in the holding, but the Estates Commissioners decided that they could not reinstate him. The police are not aware of any other evicted farms in the neighbourhood. The police have afforded Bryan all the protection necessary, and will continue to do so.

Land Purchase (Ireland)

asked whether the Estates Commissioners have completed negotiations for the acquirement of the Foot estate at Blossomfort, county Cork, the owners having offered it for voluntary acquirement?

The Estates Commissioners have communicated to the owner an estimate of the amount which they would be prepared to advance for the purchase of the lands in question, but up to the present the owner has not instituted formal proceedings for their sale.

St Patrick's Training College, Drumcondra

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland whether he is aware that Mr. Thomas Larkin, after having passed in all other essential subjects in St. Patrick's Training College for Teachers, Drumcondra, was sent home in 1805, ostensibly for failure, without comment, in a practical teaching exercise of a few seconds' duration from Senior Inspector Stronge; whether he is aware that this senior inspector and the two junior inspectors under him quarrelled with this student's brother for teaching Irish in his school; and whether the secretary of the National Board and the principal of the said training college are entitled to refuse to tell this student any reason for his expulsion except what is to be inferred from the foregoing facts?

The Commissioners of National Education inform me that at the end of his first year of training this student failed in spelling, grammar, and practical teaching, and did not obtain the minimum number of marks necessary for a pass, and was therefore ineligible under the rules to return to the college for a second year's course. The Commissioners add that the senior inspector referred to, who died three years ago, was one of the most efficient men in their service.

Cork Post Office

asked whether the police authorities have made any arrests in connection with the outrage inflicted on the Cork postmaster by striking him with a stone some few days ago; and whether this gentleman has applied for and will receive special police protection in view of the afore-mentioned occurrence?

No arrests up to the present have been made in this case. The postmaster will receive all necessary police protection.

I am afraid I shall have to have notice of that. I have nothing whatever to do with the post office.

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland whether he is aware that posters were placed in prominent positions in Cork city on the 27th ult., stating that no Papist need apply for higher appointments in the Cork post office and drawing the attention of citizens to the fact that street preachers and freemasons were being placed over the heads of Catholics for superior appointments by anti-Catholic and imported English postmasters; whether the police have instituted any inquiries on the subject; and with what result?

The police authorities inform me that placards were posted as stated. The police have been unable to trace the parties responsible for the posting of them.

Labourers Acts (Ireland)

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland whether he is aware that in the rural district of Clonamakilty, county Cork, a number of agricultural labourers are not provided with sufficient house accommodation, and that, although the rural district council, with a view to remedy such insufficient house accommodation, made an improvement scheme under the Labourers Acts, 1883 to 1911, on 17th February, 1911, and presented a petition to the Local Government Board for Ireland on the 14th July last praying that an inquiry may be held into the improvement scheme, the Local Government Board have not since taken steps to hold such inquiry; and will he state what action he proposes to take in the matter?

The Local Government Board consider that in dealing with new schemes they must have due regard to the extent to which the Labourers Acts have already been put into operation by the councils which are applying for authority to provide additional labourers cottages. Three hundred and eighty-five cottages have already been authorised in this district, while the average per district in Munster is 342. The inquiry will be ordered as soon as practicable.

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland whether he is aware that the Kanturk Rural District Council have forwarded a petition to the Local Government Board praying that an inquiry may be held into an improvement scheme made by the council under the Labourers (Ireland) Acts; and, as the Local Government Board have not yet granted the inquiry, will he state the cause of the delay?

The scheme in this case was only lodged with the Local Government Board on the 11th November. As I have already stated the Local Government Board consider that in dealing with new schemes they must have due regard to the extent to which the Labourers Acts have already been put into operation by the councils which are applying for authority to provide additional labourers' cottages. Six hundred and forty-one cottages have already been authorised in this district, the average for the several districts in Munster being 342.

Congested Districts Board (Ireland)

asked what is the number of civil Bill processes issued under the county court jurisdiction in Ireland by or on behalf of the Congested Districts Board in each year since 1st January, 1906, for rent, possession of land, interest, trespass, money due, or other cause of action?

This information is not available, and no useful purpose would appear to be served by instituting the extensive inquiries necessary to obtain it.

Marquess Of Sligo's Estate (West Mayo)

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland whether, having regard to the repeated failures of the Marquess of Sligo to fulfil his promises to lodge the necessary maps and papers preparatory to a sale of his West Mayo estate to the Congested Districts Board, and to the recent seizures for rent of uneconomic holdings and the general unrest amongst the tenants, the Board will take immediate steps to acquire this congested estate?

I would refer the hon. Member to the reply to the question asked by him on this subject on the 13th November. Having regard to the extent of the estate no unreasonable delay has taken place, and when the necessary documents are lodged the Congested Districts Board will have a valuation made as soon as possible.

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland if he can state whether a force of Royal Irish Constabulary has been engaged during the past few days in assisting sheriff's bailiffs and bailiffs of the Marquess of Sligo in seizing cattle belonging to the tenants of uneconomic holdings on Lord Sligo's congested estate in West Mayo; and upon whose application and by whose orders were the police engaged in this work?

On the application of the sheriff of the county of Mayo four police were employed on the 5th instant in protecting a bailiff in the execution of county court decrees against two tenants on the estate referred to.

Crown Colonies

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he can give a statement showing how many of the Grown Colonies are self-supporting; and, in cases where they are not self-supporting, how the deficiencies are met?

My right hon. Friend does not think it necessary to issue such a statement, as the Colonial Services Vote (Class V. of the Estimates), together with the Appropriation Accounts presented by the Comptroller and Auditor-General, indicate clearly the Colonies that are not self-supporting, and the amount of the assistance which they receive by grants from Parliament. The other Colonies and Protectorates are, of course, self-supporting.

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he is aware that the accounts of the Colonial Office do not show the profit this country makes due to the mingled coinage circulating in these Colonies; and, if so, whether he will see that a statement is given indicating the profit?

If the facts are as stated by the hon. Member, I will represent to my right hon. Friend the desirability of having such a statement made.

Post Office Employés

asked the Prime Minister whether he is aware that his refusal to see a deputation of Post Office employés, following on the reply forwarded through the Postmaster-General to the National Joint Committee of Postal and Telegraph Associations that no Parliamentary inquiry into their grievances could take place till 1913, is resented as calculated to place an unfair strain on the loyalty of public servants; that mass meetings of Post Office employés held in different parts of the United Kingdom have condemned the reply of the Cabinet as a deliberate attempt to evade dealing with admitted grievances, such as casual and auxiliary labour, boy labour, excessive overtime, reduction of status of work, etc., and also at the same mass meetings the leaders of the men have had to combat resolutions favouring unconstitutional methods; and whether, in view of the growing indignation and the possible danger and inconvenience to public business, the Committee of inquiry can be appointed forthwith to sit concurrently with the Board of Trade inquiry into cost of living?

Before the right hon. Gentleman answers the question, may I ask if his attention has been called to a series of questions which have been addressed to the Postmaster-General on points relating to the inequality in postal rates of wages?

It is no part of the business of the Prime Minister, and would be, in my opinion, a bad precedent to receive deputations of the employés of a particular Government Department in regard to their conditions of service. The proper course is to apply to the Department concerned. I am aware that the associations of Post Office employés desire that an inquiry into their conditions of employment by a Select Committee of this House should be held at once. As the hon. Member is aware, an exhaustive inquiry by Select Committee was held so recently as the years 1906 and 1907, and the recommendations then made took effect on the 1st January, 1908. It is only the recent increase in the cost of living which could justify a further inquiry being held. However, in view of all the circumstances, the Government will give further and not unsympathetic consideration to the question whether the date of the inquiry cannot be somewhat accelerated.

Colonial Civil And Police Services

asked the Prime Minister whether, before the Colonial Office authorised changes in the regulations excluding specifically from the Civil and Police services in Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Federated Malay States all candidates who are not of pure European descent on both sides, the matter was specifically brought before the Cabinet and its consent obtained to a change which robs over three-quarters of the subjects of the Empire of rights previously enjoyed by them?

No, Sir. The qualifications required for officers of the Police and Cadet services in the places mentioned are a matter for the Secretary of State to decide.

I observe in his place the Prime Minister, to whom the question was addressed. I desire to ask him whether that reply means that the Cabinet accept no responsibility for this action of the Colonial Secretary?

The Cabinet accept responsibility for all the decisions of all the Ministers.

In view of that reply, may I ask whether it was not desirable before making new regulations which diminish the civil status of 350,000,000 of British subjects that the matter should be brought before the Cabinet in some form or other?

It seems tome to be a matter for the head of the Colonial Office for the time being.

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether the head of the Colonial Office has power by regulations to decree, say, that no Scotsman shall obtain admission to the Civil Service in these Colonies for which he is responsible, or to say that no one who is a member of the Church of England shall obtain admission?

There is no service in which Scotsmen are more largely represented than the Colonial service.

Outdoor Relief

asked the Prime Minister with reference to the proposed issue by the Local Government Board of a new order governing outdoor relief, whether, in view of the far-reaching changes which such order is calculated to bring about, he will arrange for the House to have an opportunity of discussing it before it is issued?

It is not anticipated that the order will bring about any far-reaching changes. Its main object is to consolidate and simplify the regulations at present governing out-relief and incidentally to facilitate its administration. As I stated on Monday, I cannot provide facilities for a discussion this Session.

Industrial Co-Partnership

asked the Prime Minister whether he will recommend the appointment of a Royal Commission to inquire how far the principle of co-partnership is applicable to any or all of the chief industries in this country?

I see no necessity for recommending a Royal Commission on the subject to which the Noble Lord refers.

British Dominions (Visits Of Selected Officers)

asked the Secretary of State to the Colonies if he will say how many visits of selected officers of the Civil Services of the Imperial Government and of the Overseas Dominions, for the purpose of acquiring better knowledge for both services with regard to questions affecting their respective Governments, have taken place or have been arranged since the Imperiail Conference of 1911?

One member of the staff of the Colonial Office has only recently returned from a service of a year on the staff of the Governor-General of Canada, and another is just returning from a service of over a year on the staff of the Governor-General of South Africa, while a third officer is now serving on the staff of the Governor-General of Australia. In the circumstances it has not been considered necessary to arrange for further special visits to the self-governing Dominions. I may add that Dr. C. A. Hoogetts, Medical Adviser to the Public Health Committee of the Commission of Conservation in Canada, and Dr. W. Perrin Norris, Director of Quarantine and Public Health for the Commonwealth of Australia, have visited this country and have been given all possible facilities in connection with their researches by the Departments of His Majesty's Government concerned.

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether it is intended to extend this system of visits, and also whether the Union of South Africa proposes to send one or more officials to this country for training similar to that referred to by the right hon. Gentleman.

I cannot answer in detail as to the last part of the question whether the Union of South Africa is sending officials to this country, but there is no change of policy., and we will welcome the exchange of visits. We have three Colonial officials in the service who have recently served in the Dominions.

South Africa (Steamship Service)

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether, in the event of the Dominion Government of South Africa establishing or contributing towards a line of steamships directly competitive with those now in existence, the British Government is under any contracts with the latter which will prevent its taking into consideraiton the claims of the former for equal treatment?

The existing mail contract expires in September, 1912. The Secretary of State is not aware of any other contract.

May I ask whether the Government will consider this matter when they take in hand the renewal of the contract?

Royal Navy (Assistant Naval Store Officers)

asked whether any conclusion has been come to as a result of the promised consideration by the Lords of the Admiralty of the position of assistant naval store officers?

The matter is still under consideration, but, as the hon. Member is no doubt aware, more than one Department is concerned, and the decision is not entirely in our hands.

May I ask whether the right hon. Gentleman is aware that exactly the same answer was given to me a year and a-half ago, and whether this long period of deep thought is likely to be fruitful?

The hon. Gentleman's recollection is at fault. My recollection is that a reply was given last April; that the matter was under consideration. It has been advanced a stage, but it is not entirely in our hands, as I think the hon. Gentleman will recognise.

Admiralty Contract (Fair-Wages Clause)

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, in connection with the alleged breach of the Fair-Wage Clause by Messrs. A. and J. Inglis, Point House, in the pay of their labourers, he is aware that the pay for labourers employed at Messrs. Denny's, Dumbarton, is 21s. 10d. a week; at Messrs. Brown's, Clydebank, from 19s. 1½d. to 20s. 3d.; at Messrs. Beardmore's, Dalmuir, 21s. 9d.; at Yarrows, Scotstoun, 20s. 3d.; at the London and Glasgow Yard, Govan, 19s. 1½d.; at the Fairfield Yard, Govan, 19s. to 20s. 3d.; and at Messrs. Scott's, Greenock, 20s. 3d.; and that Messrs. Inglis only pay labourers 16s. 10d. for a week of fifty-four hours; and whether he will have further inquiry made into this matter, and prevent any infraction of the Clause in question?

In view of the evidence which my hon. Friend now produces, I will have further inquiry made.

Royal Dockyards (Wages)

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether his attention has been drawn to a statement made by Mr. Arnold Hills, managing director of the Thames Ironworks Company, that the Government dockyards pay lower wages than any private yard; and, seeing that this statement is supported by the Board of Trade standard time rates of wages, whether he will consider the advisability of levelling up the rates of wages paid in the dockyards to those paid by private yards?

I have not seen the statement. If made, it is, to the best of my judgment, not in accordance with fact. In any case, the pay and conditions of service of the dockyard employés is annually the subject of consideration at the hearing of petitions.

Will the right hon. Gentleman say is the rate of wages to dockyard employés on the same basis as the rate of wages in private dockyards?

The question put to me was whether the wages were lower than in private yards. To the best of my knowledge that is not the fact, because in addition to pay there are other things taken into consideration. The hon. Gentleman knows that there are the forty-eight hours week, the fact that the establishment men are pensionable, and also other advantages.

Will the right hon. Gentleman say is it a fact that the wages paid in the dockyard are lower than the wages paid in a private yard? Is it a fact or is it not?

The question is whether it is true that the dockyard pay lower wages than the private yard, and I have said that to the best of my judgment that is not the fact.

Is it not a fact that taking into consideration wages, hours, and everything, the dockyard men are still paid lower?

I do not think so. In any case, as I have said, the question of payments is the subject annually of consideration.

Woolcombing (Danger Of Infection)

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is aware that a woman named Louisa Briggs recently contracted anthrax at the works of Messrs. Campbell and Harrison, one of the branches of Woolcombers, Limited, and has since died of the disease; if the dangerous wools which Mrs. Briggs had been combing prior to her illness had undergone the same precautions for the removal of dust and blood stains as would have been obligatory if the material had been dealt with in a sorting room by wool-sorters; and, if not, will he explain why not?

I have received a report on this case. It appears that all the dangerous wools in the combing of which the woman had been employed had in the processes of opening or sorting been treated over an exhaust for removal of dust and examined for blood stains. The wools had also subsequently been washed. The precaution of examining wool for blood stains is not obligatory under the regulations at present in any process, and in this and other respects the precautions taken went beyond what the regulations require.

Whist Drives

asked the Home Secretary whether the action of the police at Brockley in suppressing public whist drives has his sanction; and whether he intends to instruct the police to suppress these entertainments throughout the Metropolis?

I am informed that the police at Brockley have not taken any action of the nature indicated. What happened was that the police received an anonymous letter reporting that an illegal whist drive was about to take place at the parish hall, and they thought it right to show the letter to the vicar, who had let the hall for the day in question. The vicar put the matter before the churchwardens, who informed the parties concerned that the drive must not take place. There is no present intention to issue instructions for the general suppression of whist drives in the Metropolis.

A legal question of that kind should be addressed to the Attorney-General.

The right hon. Gentleman, being a lawyer all his life, might know the law?

Censorship Of Plays

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether his attention has been called to the recent refusal of a licence by the Lord Chamberlain's office of two short plays by Mr. Lawrence Cowen; whether he is aware that Mr. Cowen, before submitting the plays finally on 17th November, deleted certain lines to which the licenser of plays had taken exception; whether, notwithstanding this, a licence is still withheld; and whether the Government still adhere to their intention to take no action with regard to the existing arrangements respecting the dramatic censorship?

I am informed that the plays in question were submitted to the Lord Chamberlain, after certain alterations had been made in passages to which the Examiner of Plays had called special attention. On receiving the plays the Lord Chamberlain immediately forwarded them to the Advisory Board which unanimously advised that they should not be licensed. Licences were refused accordingly. I do not think that this incident shows any cause for action on the part of the Government.

Is it not the case that one of the plays to which a licence has been refused in this instance was simply one act out of a play which had already been licensed?

I am not aware whether the play has been licensed before, but, having had the misfortune to read the play, I should regret extremely if it had ever been licensed.

Taxation (Ireland)

asked the Secretary to the Treasury which is the more accurate method of calculating the excessive taxes taken from Ireland since the Act of Union, that adopted by the majority of the Financial Relations Commissioners, which gives a total of about £330,000,000, or that of deducting the whole Irish expenditure from the whole Irish revenue, which shows the excessive taxes since 1820 to amount to £329,521,970; according to what method does the Treasury keep account of the restitution to which Ireland is entitled; and to what sum does this amount, according to the Treasury account?

The hon. Member's question bristles with argumentative points, which I am afraid I cannot go into in the form of an answer to a question.

No. I cannot argue the question. The Government do not repudiate the findings of the Royal Commission.

Assurance Companies

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether the National United Assurance Society, Limited, and the United National Friendly Assurance Collecting Society are registered under the Assurance Act, 1909; if so, what steps, if any, were taken by the Board of Trade when requiring the former company to discontinue issuing policies to safeguard the rights of policy-holders transferred without their consent to the second of those companies; whether the shareholders illegally obtained were similarly transferred; whether he is aware that these small investors are now unable to recover their money from either company; and whether the Board of Trade continues passive while the same group of persons start several companies, evade the law by transferring their victims from one company to another under the same management, and then refuse to pay?

No companies or societies can be registered under the Assurance Companies Act, 1909. The National United Assurance Society, Limited, is registered under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act, 1893, and the United National Friendly Assurance Collecting Society is registered under the Friendly Societies Acts. Shareholders of the National United Assurance Society, Limited, could not be transferred to the United National Friendly Assurance Collecting Society, which is a society registered under the Friendly Societies Acts, and the policy-holders could not be transferred from one society to the other without their consent or an order of the Court. The Board of Trade have no control over contracts made by individual policyholders, nor have they any jurisdiction to compel a company to repay money which it has received.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the statement in this question is contained in a joint prospectus of these two companies, and whether those prospectuses are submitted to the Board of Trade?

I am not aware of that, but it would not alter the accuracy of the statement given in the answer.

Has not the Board of Trade always power to direct the attention of the Public Prosecutor to these matters?

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will ascertain and state the date of amalgamation of the Irish Provident Assurance Company and the London and Provincial Assurance Company; the dates and text of circulars previously issued by them representing that the amalgamation was already an accomplished fact; whether such representation was allowed by the Board of Trade; what security there is for the long-term house purchase bonds of the latter company which those circulars induced subscribers of the former company to take; what the present value of those bonds is; and whether he will have the transaction of those amalgamated companies investigated forthwith?

I have no official information as to the details of any arrangements which were entered into between the Irish Provident Assurance Company, Limited, and the London and Provincial Assurance Company, Limited, nor have I any means of ascertaining the dates on which individual policy holders transferred their contracts from one company to the other. The Board of Trade have no jurisdiction to allow or disallaw representations contained in circulars issued by a company. The returns which are required from the London and Provincial Assurance Company, Limited, in accordance with the provisions of the Assurance Companies Act, 1909, are at present under the consideration of the Board of Trade, and when those returns have been filed, they will be open to inspection and a copy must be sent by the company to any policy holder on his application. I do not think it would be proper for me to express an opinion as to the security for any class of bonds issued by the company or as to the value of those bonds. As the hon. Member has already been informed, the only power of the Board of Trade to investigate the affairs of the company is that contained in Section 109 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, which enables the Board of Trade to appoint one or more inspectors to investigate the affairs of the company on the application of members holding not less than one-tenth of the shares issued.

Has any Department of the Government power to prevent or to examine misleading circulars issued by companies?

Imports Into India

asked the President of the Board of Trade if the Board of Trade Returns of Imports into India discriminate between country of origin and country of shipment; and whether Continental goods shipped to India in British bottoms are described as imports from the United Kingdom?

The Trade and Navigation Returns of British India have hitherto shown imports according to the country of direct shipment to India. From 1907–8 a supplementary volume has been issued classifying them according to the country of consignment. It has now been decided that, with effect from 1911–12, the ordinary returns shall be prepared according to the latter system, and the supplementary volume discontinued. Under neither system is the nationality of the ship taken account of. The country of consignment is virtually the country of origin in all cases in which there has been no interruption of transit, though there may have been transhipment or transfer from one means of conveyance to another.

Insurance Company's Documents

asked whether it is with the knowledge and sanction of the President of the Board of Trade that officials of the Board of Trade examine companies' documents deposited in pursuance of Statue solely for technical correctness for purposes of filing, and without regard to the safety of the public which Parliament intended the filing to subserve; if he will ascertain and state whether the growing practice of the same set of persons running several kinds of insurance companies concurrently is in the public interest or ought to be checked by the Board or by Parliament, if necessary; whether the National Protector Insurance Company and the Law Integrity Insurance Company are run by members of the group who victimised people in Ireland through the Irish Provident Assurance Company; seeing that they have not published either their balance sheets or their revenue and expenditure accounts corresponding to their last annual report, whether he will state, from the copies of those documents lodged with the Board of Trade, the real as distinguished from the paper liabilities, and the real as distinguished from the paper assets, of those two concerns together or separately; and whether the Board has, and will exercise, power to require such companies to publish documents revealing their true financial condition?

If the hon. Member refers to the documents deposited with the Board of Trade in accordance with the requirements of the Assurance Companies Act, 1909, I may inform him that these documents are carefully examined by the officials of the Board of Trade with a view to insuring that they are accurate and complete. I am not aware that the practice of several insurance companies being controlled by one group of persons is increasing, and I do not consider it necessary to introduce legislation dealing with the subject. The directors of the National Protector Insurance Company, Limited, and the Law Integrity Insurance Company, Limited, are not the same as the late directors of the Irish Provident Assurance Company, Limited, although the managing director of the first two mentioned companies was chairman and managing director of the Irish Provident Assurance Company, Limited, about seven years ago. Returns under the Assurance Companies Act, 1909, have been lodged with the Board of Trade disclosing the financial position of the National Protector Insurance Company, Limited, and the Law Integrity Insurance Company, Limited, and when these returns have been examined and accepted by the Board they will be open to inspection; but I am not prepared to distinguish in an answer between what are referred to as real and paper assets and liabilities. I shall, however, be glad to send the hon. Member copies of the returns which have been lodged by the two companies as soon as they have been accepted by the Board of Trade, if he would like to have them.

I would like to have the documents. Will the hon. Gentleman, if he finds out that these documents are irregular, call the attention of the Public Prosecutor to them?

Labour Exchanges

asked whether bases of agreement have been attained with any of the Dominions for co-operation between the Labour Exchanges of the various countries?

As a result of the discussion at the recent Imperial Conference the Board of Trade are taking steps, in consultation with the Colonial Office, to ascertain the wishes of the Dominion Governments concerned in this matter, but no definite arrangements have yet been made.

Have replies been received in answer to the statements that have been sent to the Colonies?

The answer states that no definite arrangements have been made, and I presume, therefore, that replies have been received.

asked if the President of the Board of Trade is aware that on 24th April, the superintendent of the West Midland Labour Exchange Divisional Office informed the Social Service League in Oswestry that he would take an early opportunity of meeting the local secretaries, but has not seen them yet, and that the same official stated on 24th May that an Exchange would be opened in three months, which is not open yet; and if, in view of the inconvenience caused to the Social Service League in making their arrangements for the winter, he will take steps to carry out immediately the undertakings which have been given?

I understand that the Divisional Officer, in accordance with his promise of the 24th April, interviewed a representative of the Social Service League. I am, however, instructing him to arrange a further interview with them to explain the unexpected difficulties which have delayed the establishment of a Labour Exchange in Oswestry. I regret any inconvenience that may have been caused to the league by the delay.

Bridgwater (Telegraphic Facilities)

asked the Postmaster-General whether his attention has been called to a request from the Bridgwater Chamber of Commerce asking for an extension of the time for receiving and delivering telegrams at the head office, Bridgwater, from 8 p.m. until 10 p.m.; and whether he can see his way to grant this request, so as to put Bridgwater on the same footing in this respect as some other river-port towns, and also Taunton?

I cannot agree to keep the Bridgwater Office open till 10 p.m., but I am willing to arrange for the acceptance and delivery of telegrams up to 9.0 p.m., the present hour of closing.

New Zealand And Australia (New Cable)

asked whether the British Government has now given its consent to the construction of the proposed new cable by the Pacific Cable Board between New Zealand and Australia?

A Bill authorising the Pacific Cable Board to proceed with the laying of this cable has passed both Houses of Parliament and is now awaiting Royal Assent.

Anglo-South African Mails

asked what is the duration of the present contracts, if any, for the transport of letters and papers to South Africa?

The contract between the Government of the Union of South Africa and the Union-Castle Mail Steamship Company for the performance of the Anglo South African Mail Service expires on 30th September next.

Post Office Telephone Staff

asked the cause of the delay in publishing the proposed full classification of the telephone staff of the Post Office on transfer of the National Telephone Company's employés on 1st January next; and when the right hon. Gentleman expects to be in a position to make the classification known to the staff affected?

The cause of the delay is the magnitude and complexity of the task. The organisation of the company's staff is very different from that of the Post Office, and in order to carry out my undertaking that "the transferred officers will, as far as possible, be placed in the same classes as Post Office servants doing similar work," it is necessary to ascertain, as far as I can, the exact position and duties of the several classes of the company's servants, and in some cases even of individuals. I communicated the broad lines upon which the classification was proceeding to the Joint Board of Telephone Employés on the 30th ultimo. The detailed proposals are almost all now with the Treasury. They will be communicated to the Joint Board at the earliest possible date.

Does the right hon. Gentleman remember making a promise to discuss this matter with the representatives of the Joint Board before the end of the year; and, if so, is he making arrangements for that discussion?

In my communications with the Joint Board I am not sure whether the promise given was precisely in relation to the matter raised in this question in all its bearings, or some part of it. I should like to refresh my memory by reference to my exact words before giving a definite reply.

Is there any chance of its being completed before the House rises?

I hope so, certainly. It is now before the Treasury, and it is practically concluded as far as the Post Office is concerned.

New Cable Ship

asked when the additional cable ship will be ready for work, and how long it will be before the breaks to the cables at Tiree and elsewhere can be attended to?

I am about to invite tenders for the building of a new cable ship, but it will be some time before the ship can be ready. The Jura cable has been repaired, and, weather permitting, the repair of the Islay and Tiree cables will at once be taken in hand.

Will the right hon. Gentleman kindly bear in mind the extreme inconvenience to all kinds of business in those remote parts of the country caused by interruptions of communications, and will he increase the facilities for dealing with repairs?

Linlithgow Parish School Board

asked the Lord Advocate whether his attention has been called to the judgment of Sheriff MacLeod in a prosecution by the Linlithgow parish school board for failure to attend a continuation class conducted by the board; and whether he is prepared to amend the law so as to enable school boards to carry out the intention of the Education (Scotland) Act, 1908, and to enforce conformity to the school board by-laws in respect of continuation classes?

My attention has been called to the case in question. The Education (Scotland) Bill when it went before the Scottish Grand Committee contained a provision for inflicting a penalty upon the young person who contravened the by-laws, but after discussion that provision was struck out without a division, the Committee being apparently of opinion that the end desired could be obtained by the alternative procedure against the parents or the employers of the young person, which does not appear to have been resorted to in the present case. In view of all the circumstances, the Secretary for Scotland does not see his way to propose amending legislation at the present time.

Can the right hon. Gentleman give any explanation of the reason for this and many other similar cases which necessitated application to the Law Courts in order to clear up these slipshod methods of legislation.

The Committee came to the conclusion that the methods prescribed by the Bill were adequate.

Foot-And-Mouth Disease

asked the President of the Board of Agriculture whether the information which he has given to the House to the effect that in Russia 450,000 animals were attacked with foot-and-mouth disease in June last, that in Germany the disease existed on 33,707 premises at the end of October, that in Holland 4,391 outbreaks occurred in October, that in Belgium the disease existed on 1,069 sets of premises at the beginning of October, and that in France the disease was reported from 20,729 sets of premises in September, can be reduced to some common denominator of either outbreaks, cases, or premises, and preferably referable to about the same date, so as more accurately to compare like with like?

The statistics in question are those given in the official returns issued by the Governments of the various countries concerned. I do not see what steps I could take to secure their preparation on a uniform basis so as to enable a precise and accurate comparison of the figures to be made. The essential fact what I have to keep in view is that foot-and-mouth disease prevails extensively in all the countries named.

I beg to ask a question of which I have given private notice, namely, as to whether it is true that an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease has occurred at Yeovil, in Somersetshire, and whether the right hon. Gentleman can give any information?

We have just been informed that there are two or three cases of disease in Somerset which are suspected to be foot-and-mouth disease. The diagnosis is not completed, but the chief veterinary officer of the Board has been dispatched by the first train, and I hope to have his report very shortly, and I will communicate the information to the House.

Glebe And Manse Lands, Ireland

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he has given further consideration to the fact that clergymen of the Church of Ireland living in parish, glebe, or rectory, and Presbyterian ministers who live in manses in Ireland, are debarred from obtaining the relief granted to clergymen of the Church of England and ministers of the Established Church of Scotland by Section 19 of the Finance Act, 1907, because they have not the right to sublet their residences; and whether he will propose an Amendment to the Finance Bill to place unestablished clergymen in Ireland on an equality in this respect with the established clergy in Great Britain?

I have nothing to add to the reply given to the hon. Member by my right hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the Treasury on the 2nd ultimo.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say why these reverend gentlemen should be penalised because they are unable through any fault of their own to sublet their dwellings?

National Insurance Bill

Seamen's National Insurance Society

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in view of the fact that the Board of Trade shipowners and members of the society will be represented on the committee set up to administer the Seamen's National Insurance Society, he could allow the officers to be represented, if possible, by a representative of the Imperial Merchant Service Guild?

My right hon. Friend has already received a communication from the Imperial Merchant Service Guild on this subject, and has informed them that in preparing the scheme the Board will bear in mind the request of the Merchant Service Guild.

Medical Practices

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if the Government proposes to take any steps to compensate doctors for the loss many of them will suffer in the price obtainable for the sale of their practices owing to the working of the National Insurance Bill when it comes into operation?

I see no reason to suppose that the consequences anticipated by the hon. Member are likely to occur. On the contrary, the value of most medical practices, especially in industrial areas, must be increased by the operation of the Bill.

Opposition To The Bill

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he can state the total number of signatures, whether on petitions, letters, postcards, or telegrams, that have been received at the Treasury praying against certain portions of the National Insurance Bill being passed into law?

May I ask whether all these petitions are brought to the notice of the right hon. Gentleman?

Has the right hon. Gentleman noticed that most of those petitions come from the fair sex, and surely the gallantry of the Treasury would see that they would be considered?

What I have noticed is that a good many of them are in the same handwriting.

May I ask whether those petitions indicated any knowledge of the benefits of the Bill in respect of the particular parts against which they protested, and whether his Department will take steps to convey the knowledge to the petitioners?

I think that is very important. Certainly, the letters which I have received, protesting, display the grossest ignorance about the very elements of the Bill.

Is the Chancellor of the Exchequer aware that I have not received a single protest of any sort against the Bill?

Having regard to the serious accusation made with regard to those petitions, may I ask whether it would be possible for him to refer them from the Treasury to the Petitions Committee of this House for report?

That is exactly what I proposed to do until I observed that the petitioners took very good care to put them in the form of memorials, so that they could not be investigated.

Finance Act, 1909–10

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what is the usual period that is allowed to elapse between the receipt of a notice to appeal, under the Finance (1909–10) Act, 1910, and the appointment of a referee by the Land Values Reference Committee; and whether, in some cases, over six months has been allowed to pass without the appointment of a referee, and, if so, what is the reason for delay?

The period that is allowed to elapse between the receipt of a notice to appeal and the appointment of a referee by the Land Values Reference Committee varies considerably, and in some cases over six months have been allowed to pass without this appointment being made. The delay in such cases has been due to attempts either to arrive at an agreement without recourse to a referee or to avoid the trouble and expense of a multiplicity of appeals involving the same point.

May I ask whether he is aware that the impression prevails amongst solicitors and others concerned that this delay is for the purpose of enforcing the Commissioners own interpretation of the law before the real interpretation can be settled by the referee?

I very much regret to hear that there should be an impression of the kind, and if anything can be done to remove that impression I think it is very desirable. If the hon. and gallant Gentleman gives me any facts about it I shall certainly take steps to see that there shall be no justification for any impression of the kind.

Does not the right hon. Gentleman think that the immediate appointment of a referee is all that is required?

I think there is a good deal from the point of view of the Inland Revenue. After all you may have one case that would cover perhaps thousands, and in fact settle the same point. Possibly some of those cases have been postponed because similar cases have been disposed of already. Otherwise we might incur enormous expense not merely on the Treasury, but on the appellant as well. Whereas if the point is settled by one case the other cases will be disposed of.

That is exactly what I suggest, that if we get these cases settled by one referee the others would follow.

If the hon. and gallant Gentleman can point out to me that a point at issue of that kind has been delayed——

Then I shall certainly look into it and see that expedition shall prevail.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether his attention has been called to a circular to solicitors issued by the Board of Inland Revenue, dated November, 1911 [6351], relating to the Reversion Duty and the account required to be rendered for the purpose of the duty by Section 15 (1) of the Finance (1909–10) Act, 1910; and, if so, why the exceptions to the duty to deliver an account under the above Section 15 contained in Section 14 are not-set out in the circular as well as the Section which requires the valuation to be rendered?

The circular in question does not deal with the conditions which govern liability to or exemption from Reversion Duty, but merely calls the attention of solicitors to the obligation of lessors to render accounts in cases where Reversion Duty is in fact payable.

May I ask whether the right hon. Gentleman will alter the terms of the notice which says that failure to make returns is owing to ignorance of the provisions of the law, and sets out the provisions of the law in question on the back?

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this same circular makes no reference to the Revenue Act, although Section 15 is amended? That is a very serious matter.

Metropolitan Police Rate Bill

May I ask the Prime Minister a question of which I have given him private notice—namely, whether he can see his way to postpone the Second Reading of the Metropolitan Police Rate Bill, which is down for to-night, until next week, which would give us time to study the Bill, which we have only just seen in print?

Irish Newspapers

asked the name of the writer on whose authority the right hon. Gentleman stated that the Cork Free Press Company had not complied with the provisions of The Companies Act, 1908, which prescribe an annual meeting within a statutory period, and would he have any objection to the publication of the entire letter; is he aware that this company acted upon legal advice as to the date at which its meeting should be held; will he take care in future to communicate with the directors of the company attacked under cover of questions in this House, so that he may have a more complete view of the legal situation before making statements regarding them; and is he aware that the annual meeting of the Free Press Company was duly held last week, and that the resolutions were thereat unanimously approved by the shareholders?

My right hon. Friend has made no statement that the Cork Free Press Company, Limited, has not complied with the provisions of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908. I have no knowledge of the facts stated in the last part of the question other than that derived from the terms of the question.

The right hon. Gentleman, in his printed reply, said he had received a letter stating that this company had not complied with the provisions of the Act. I wish to know who sent that letter, and can the hon. Gentleman give the name of the writer?

That is a new question. The hon. Member's question on the Paper is: "If he will state the name of the writer on whose authority he stated that the Cork Free Press Company," etc. My right hon. Friend stated that he had received the letter, but that he did not endorse the statement.

I have asked for the name of the author of the letter to be stated. That is a plain question. And can this letter be laid before the House?

That is a new statement, and I must ask the hon. Member to put the question down.

I will put down the same question to-morrow I think I am entitled to an honest reply, which I have not got.

asked whether the Freeman's Journal Company, Limited, failed to appoint an auditor at its last annual meeting; have the Board of Trade been solicited by any shareholder to appoint an auditor because of such failure; and, if so, will the President of the Board of Trade state the name and status of the auditor nominated by the Board of Trade, the date of his appointment, and the nature of the remuneration?

The Freeman's Journal, Limited, did not appoint an auditor at its last annual general meeting, and on the application of a shareholder the Board of Trade, on the 13th June last, appointed Sir William Plender, the President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants, auditor of the company for the current year at the same fee as had been paid to previous auditors.

May I ask if Sir William Plender is the gentleman who was recently appointed by the Government a member of the Secret Financial Committee?

In consequence of the reply which I have received from the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade, on the Motion for Adjournment I will call attention to the action of the Government in respect of the "Freeman's Journal" and the Cork "Free Press."

Business Of The House

asked the Prime Minister if he will state whether, in the event of any measure being rejected by the House of Lords, he proposes to prolong this Session for a month from the time of such Bills being sent up from this House in order that such a rejection shall come within the Parliament Act?

The answer is in the negative, unless the House of Lords desire such a prolongation.

May I ask will the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister make his statement as to business?

On Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday of next week we will take the remaining stages of the Finance Bill.

Thursday will be given to a continuation of the Foreign Office Debate, and

On Friday the discussion of the appointment of Magistrates will take place.

During the week we shall also take the various stages of the other Orders upon the Paper, and any other Bills coming from the Lords with Amendments.

I should like to remind the House that the Secretary to the Admiralty has introduced a small Bill entitled the Naval Discipline (Dominion Naval Forces) Bill. This is a measure to give effect to a conclusion of the recent Imperial Conference with respect to the government and discipline of the naval forces of the self-governing Dominions and their relations to the Royal Navy and to one another.

Since I made my last statement, the Home Secretary informs me that he has found it necessary to introduce a Bill to extend the limit of rating to meet the charge of the Metroplitan Police, consequent upon the adoption of the one day's rest in seven and the increase in the pay of the police.

I have reason to believe that these will not be considered controversial measures, and I trust we may pass them into law before we rise, but, of course, we will place ourselves in communication with the various parties in the House in the usual manner.

Would the right hon. Gentleman say if No. 2 Order on today's Paper, Finance [Sinking Fund], will be taken in Committee and Report stages to-day and to-morrow respectively?

Has the right hon. Gentleman had an opportunity of considering the appeal that has been made to him for an opportunity to discuss the Brussels Sugar Convention?

There will be time for that on Thursday, in the Foreign Office Debate. In reply to the question of the Noble Lord, I understand that the Committee and Report stages must be taken before we enter upon the consideration of the Finance Bill. Therefore, if the Report stage is not taken to-morrow, it will be taken first thing on Monday.

Has the Prime Minister further considered the Resolution on the Paper relating to the employment of the police and the military in view of a coroner's inquest, which has been held since the last discussion in this House? Would it be possible to place some time at our disposal so that that matter might be made a little clearer than it was left by our discussion?

I do not see my way in view of the limited time at our disposal to give more time to this particular matter.

Does the right hon. Gentleman contemplate that there may be some waste of time required while this House is waiting for what happens in another place? In that event, would it be possible to give us that time for this discussion?

I am afraid that the time will be occupied by some of the smaller Bills to which I have referred But we will see how things develop.

Has the Prime Minister received and considered a memorial, widely signed in all quarters of the House, asking that the Employment of Children Act (1903) Amendment Bill might be considered this Session, and is it possible for him to yield to that request?

I should be very glad to do so, personally, and so would the Government; but I am sorry to say the measure is regarded as controversial in some quarters of the House.

Is the Prime Minister aware that the opposition to the Bill is confined almost to units, that the Member in whose name the Motion stands on the Paper has not been here for some time, and that certain Members who were opposed to the Bill are now in agreement with the promoters?

Knowing something of the habits and activities of the hon. Member in question, I am certain that he would turn up when the Bill came on.

Does the Prime Minister intend to take the Second Peace Conference (Conventions) Bill during this Session?

Presentation Of Bill

Housing Of The Working Classes Bill

"To provide for the better application and enforcement of the Housing of the Working Classes Acts," presented by Sir ARTHUR GRIFFITH-BOSCAWEN; supported by Mr. Frederick Edwin Smith, Mr. Astor, Mr. Montague Barlow, Mr. Charles Bathurst, Mr. Goulding, Mr. Guinness, Mr. Hills, Colonel Kyffin-Taylor, Mr. Harold Smith, Earl Winterton, and Viscount Wolmer; to be read a second time upon Monday next, and to be printed.

Naval Prize Bill

As amended (in the Standing Committee) further considered.

Clause 28—(Enforcement Of Orders Of International Prize Court)

The High Court and every Prize Court in a British Possession shall enforce within its jurisdiction all orders and decrees of the International Prize Court in appeals and cases transferred to the Court under this Part of this Act.

I beg to move, to leave out Clause 28. Although I cannot expect the Government to accept the Amendment in that form, yet I hope in the later and equally effective form which it takes in a subsequent Amendment of mine, it will receive acceptance at the hands of the Government. I must apologise to the House for the necessity upon my part of dealing with matters which are undoubtedly of a somewhat technical character. The question would really be very much better dealt with upstairs in Committee. To address on this subject a body of men who are unhappily not all lawyers, renders one's task extremely difficult, but I shall endeavour to state as shortly and as clearly as I can the propositions I advance in support of my Amendment. In doing so, I shall avoid all references except what is immediately pertinent to the Declaration of London. In common with many of my Friends on both sides of the House, I regard the Declaration of London as an impolitic measure, disadvantageous to the maritime and general commercial and naval interests of this country; but I shall not attempt to enter upon, nor would it be right for me to do so, those general grounds in support of my Amendment. It is a cardinal principle of the constitutional law of this country which has never received invasion, that the Crown cannot by a treaty interfere with the private rights of citizens, unless the sanction of Parliament is obtained to that treaty. That is a principle which not only has received the sanction of every jurist of authority, but has never been seriously assailed, and obviously it is a principle which must be regarded as reasonable. If the Crown could, by treaty with a foreign Power, impinge upon the rights of its own citizens, there would be an exaltation of the prerogative of the Crown which would override Parliament; and our settled laws, both common law and patent law, might be dispensed with at the will of the Crown through the machinery of a treaty.

4.0 P.M.

My charge in the first place against the Declaration of London is that it does by its provisions, both potentially and actually, interfere with the private rights of citizens. If I establish that proposition, I think the law officers of the Crown will agree with me that it is an unconstitutional proceeding that the provisions of that treaty should not have been laid before Parliament and the subject of them sanctioned. If that is conceded, as it must be for the very obvious reason which I have already stated, we come to consider the next point, which is in what way can the Government evade the responsibility of submitting to Parliament those matters in which the right of citizens are affected, and on which ex hypothesi the judgment of Parliament is requisite. The Government have done it in this Bill by Clause 28. By that Clause they assert that whatever the decree of the International Court may be, that, as a purely Ministerial function, the Municipal Court of this country, the Court of Admiralty, shall enforce such decree, order or judgment. So that whatever order, judgment, or decree may be brought by the Crown, or if not by the Crown, by any other vicarious authority, for enforcement by the High Court of this country against the interests of the private citizen, and contrary to our own municipal law—I emphasise that point—that decree, judgment, or order must be, as a purely Ministerial Act, enforced by the High Court of this country.

Suppose, ultra vires, the International Court makes a decree which affects the right of a private citizen in this country. The High Court of this country—that is, the Court of Admiralty—cannot go behind that decree. It cannot inquire whether or no it clashes or coincides with the municipal law of this country. It will be obliged to enforce that decree under the terms of the Clause. That has hitherto been uncontroverted, and I venture to think will be an uncontrovertable proposition. It may be asked when the Crown has made a treaty does not that treaty bind a State? It does not bind the private citizen in respect of his private rights. Supposing—I put the matter hypothetically—this International Court were, apart from this Clause with which I am dealing, to found a judgment or make a decree which prejudicially affected the interests of the private citizens of this country. The Courts of this country would not enforce it, and ought not to enforce it. I do not want to be too technical, but that matter was discussed in 1893—I agree at not very great length—before one of the most distinguished judges, whose personal friendship I had the honour to enjoy, the late Lord Herschell. The case is one with which my hon. and learned Friend is no doubt familiar. It was "Baird v. Walker," and was discussed by the Privy Council.

Lord Herschell laid down the proposition, which he suggested was an absolutely uncontroversial one, that the Crown could not by treaty interfere with private rights. He made a reservation, and a very proper reservation, in the case of a treaty of peace. Ex suprema lex it might very well be in the interests of the nation at large that it might be necessary in the case of a treaty of peace to interfere with the private rights of citizens. But, with that single exception, Lord Herschell laid it down authoritatively that it would be impossible, unconstitutional, and illegal for the Crown, by means of a treaty, to interfere with the private rights of the citizen. If I have made myself intelligible in what I may describe as the major proposition of my case, I come to examine whether, firstly, this treaty does actually, and, secondly, potentially, interfere with the rights of private citizens. I say it does. I will give one or two illustrations as to where the private rights of the citizen are interfered with. If the House interferes with the rights of private citizens, the particular matters upon which it so interferes ought to be submitted to the House for the House to consider whether it is right or wrong, desirable or undesirable, that the private rights of the citizen should be infringed upon. It is not enough by an omnibus Clause to say: "You shall enforce the decree of an International Tribunal." You must go a step further. You must say in what respect those private rights of the citizen are to be interfered with. My contention can be simplified, perhaps, to satiety, by illustrations.

I have expressed in this House, and also in the pages of Reviews and Journals, very strong opposition before to that article of the treaty, which alters the conditions under which conditional contraband is taken to an enemy's territories. I have submitted to this House and elsewhere that that is a very complete alteration in International law, with regard to conditional contraband and antithetical to the interests of this country. The municipal law of England has always said that you may convey conditional contraband to the enemy's territory; that is to say, a neutral may convey conditional contraband—for instance, foodstuffs—to an enemy's territory, so long as it does not convey it for the armed forces of the enemy or to a port of military or naval equipment. The alteration, I will not say the law, but the conventional alteration, made by my right hon. Friend says as regards a port that it shall be a place that may, according to its relevance, be "a base of supply." We have contended that that covers commercial ports like Hull, Liverpool, or Bristol. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a letter which he addressed to the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, admitted that it was impossible to predicate whether or no the International Court would take the view that a place like Liverpool, Bristol, or Hull was or was not "a base of supply." We stand, therefore, in this position: that one of our neutral vessels carrying corn, other foodstuffs, or any other article of conditional contraband to a commercial port of Germany or France which might be a belligerent, and not to a port of naval or military equipment, might be captured and condemned by the Municipal Courts of the nations. So far no great mischief has been done. So far we have not had a violation of the principles of International law which has hitherto obtained in this country, and we might appeal to diplomatic action to rectify that mischief.

Diplomatic action is suspended for a period of twelve years until notice is given to terminate the treaty. A British merchant ship has been seized upon the high seas, carrying, in accordance with the law of England as it is now and as it has ever been, innocuously conditional contraband to a commercial port—it has been seized and condemned by the Municipal Court of the belligerent country, and the only remedy afforded to the shipowner, the shipper, or the merchant is to appeal to the International Court. So far the treaty has made no inroad upon the rights of the private citizen. The aggrieved shipowner, shipper, or merchant carries his case to the International Court of Appeal. I make no comment whatever upon the ridiculous composition of the International Court. The International Court confirms the judgment of the Municipal Court of the belligerent. Still, no harm is done. The British merchant must lose his cargo, and the British shipowner must lose his ship. But the Court proceeds to do something more. It proceeds to do that which under present International law you cannot do, but which there is, I say, no power effectively to do. It can order the merchant who appeals to pay the costs of the trial, to pay what is called, I think, in the treaty, a tax for the maintenance of the Municipal Court which decided the case. The judgment of the International Court is then brought down to our High Court of Admiralty. The judges there are asked to execute this judgment, and make this unhappy British merchant pay the tax. The members of the High Court of Admiralty have before them some representative of the aggrieved shipowner or merchant. Counsel for the aggrieved shipowner or merchant says, "You are asked to enforce a law which is directly in conflict with the Prize Law of this country: you are asked to say that the ship is ex concesso, has gone into a commercial port, is liable to capture and condemnation, and you are asking to recognise the decisions of the International Court and to make a private citizen pay the cost of a proceeding upon a judgment which is wholly in conflict with the principle of British International law. The Court of Admiralty will say, it is bound to say, "We are not in a position to inquire into the matter; we are here merely to perform an administrative function under the terms of Clause 28," and a British merchantman must pay costs and also pay a tax, for I can call it by no other name, which is imposed by one important Clause in the Treaty of London. The result is that while a British merchantman at the present moment is absolutely free from all obligation to pay—he may lose his ship or he may lose his cargo, but he is not liable to pay costs by the laws of this country—yet under this Section he is to be compelled to pay such costs. I rely, not only upon my own judgment, but upon the judgment of many jurists in this and other countries when I say that that is an infringement of the rights of private citizens. You are imposing upon British merchants the necessity of obeying the orders of this Court without having an opportunity of defining any of the conditions on which a ship may be seized, and in doing that you are in conflict with well-established principles from the time of Stowell downwards to the Court of Admiralty. I will give another illustration; hon. Members who are not lawyers, but who may be shipowners, know the doctrine of salvage. I am stating the present law. Assuming we are a neutral Power, and that a British ship—that is to say, a neutral ship—is captured by the enemy on the ground that it is carrying contraband to a port of the enemy which the International Court regards as an unlawful operation on its part, and assume that that ship is recaptured by a British warship, the British warship is entitled to salvage, if that ship has been lawfully captured, but only in the event of its having been lawfully captured.

If this British ship was originally neutral, how could it be lawfully captured?

I am assuming that a British ship carrying contraband may be captured, and it may escape, or it may be rescued by a British ship; but perhaps it would be better to take a case where we are in a state of belligerency and of a ship being captured under these circumstances. I am obliged to my hon. Friend for his interruption. Supposing we are belligerents and that a ship has been captured by the enemy and that that ship has been recaptured by a British ship—and there are cases in which the question of recapture has been discussed in the Courts—then a man-of-war can proceed against a British merchant ship for salvage but it can only recover salvage in the event of the ship having been legally captured; that is to say, that the ship was going according to the principle of the International law to a port to which it ought not to go. But supposing according to the municipal law of this country that that ship was not going on an illegal voyage but was going on a perfectly legal voyage, then the doctrine of salvage does not apply and the salvor will not be entitled to salvage. What takes place then? The British Court says, "According to the principle of our law this ship was going upon a perfectly legal voyage and therefore you are not entitled to salvage," but, on the other hand, the International Prize Court holds that it was an illegal proceeding for the ship to have gone to this particular commercial port of a foreign country and thereupon the National Court is bound by the decision as it must be of the International Prize Court, and is bound to give salvage against a British merchant in respect of the saving of that ship. If I have made myself intelligible, hon. Members will agree with me that here is another invasion of the rights of private citizens. These are two illustrations; I could give many others, but I will only give one other, which probably is the most forcible of all.

This International Prize Court is not merely a Court to interpret judicial decisions made, or to administer the provisions of the Treaty of London, it is something more; it is a legislative body; because one of the provisions of the treaty is that if there is no provision in the treaty which provides for a case brought before it, the Court has to deal with the question according to general principles of justice and equity. What docs that mean? It means nothing less than this, that the Court is to be able to legislate itself. It is to be able to lay down general rules which it may record in accordance with the principles of justice and equity, and which the Admiralty Court of this country will be bound to enforce. Nay, more than that; it may vary and give decisions, not only contrary to the National law of this country, but the International law of every other civilised country. It is hypothetically true to say that it is within the power of the Court to give decisions absolutely in conflict with the law of nations and with all our preconceived notions and rules with regard to International law in relation to prizes. If a Court so does, it legislates, and it may inflict grievious wrong upon British subjects. This Court has no restraint put upon it except its own sense of right and wrong. The result is that the High Courts of Justice in this country may be compelled to execute the orders and judgments of the International Court which are in conflict with every principle of our law. I have endeavoured to put in intelligible form the proposition which I started with in the first instance, namely, that you are, contrary to sound, beneficent constitutional principle, interfering with the private rights of citizens and allowing these rights to be interfered with without seeking Parliamentary sanction.

Lord Herschell, in the judgment to which I have already referred, said that any such proposition that the rights of private citizens could be interfered with, without Parliamentary sanction, except in the possible exception of a Treaty of Peace, was wholly illegal. I think my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary might very well consider the desirability of finding some words which would meet the grave difficulty which I anticipate with regard to the possible results that may follow from the enforcement of this Clause. I do not conceal the fact that I regard the Treaty of London with the greatest hostility, but even if I regarded it with feelings of commendation, if I thought the general purpose and results of the treaty would be to the advantage of this country, I could not, as a constitutional lawyer, support the invasion of elementary principles of constitutional government in this country by this Government which may lead to the most extravagant and extraordinary results. I have not attempted to burden my arguments with efforts at exaggeration nor with any imaginary difficulties. I have dealt with two cases which must arise, and with one case which may arise, and I submit, unless we get an assurance from the Government that some mitigation of the obligations of this novel and extravagant doctrine is assented to by the Government it will be our duty to resist on constitutional ground and constitutional ground alone, the passing of Clause 28.

I beg leave to second this Amendment. The hon. and learned Member opposite has used sound arguments from the legal point of view why this Clause should be rejected. It has been pointed out very clearly that it would be specially objectionable when the decrees of the International Prize Courts clash with the hitherto accepted view of our own Prize Courts as laid down by the Prize Law. The objection seems to me to be that the liability to which we are throwing ourselves open by this Clause is, to a certain extent, an unknown one. We undertake to enforce the decrees of the International Prize Court even when those decrees are held, and have been held by us for generations, to be contrary to what we believe to be legal and right. There are many matters in which we in this country differ from other nations in respect to International law. There are matters in which we have maintained for centuries that a certain act is illegal, while some of the other signatories to this agreement maintain that those acts are legal. There is the question of the conversion of merchantmen upon which we have arrived at no sort of agreement. It is clear that even within the law as laid down by the Declaration of London we may be called upon to enforce decrees which we in this country have always maintained were illegitimate, and necessitated doing something which we believe to be illegal and wrong. Besides that we have also the fact that we may be called upon to enforce decrees on some matter about which we at present know nothing. The fact that the International Prize Court has to administer the law which is not declared and not laid down in the Declaration of London lays us open to a liability which we at the present moment must regard as unreasonable.

It is obvious that the International Prize Court may gradually make law for itself which is wholly incompatible with all the views we have contended for, and which we have always maintained were proper laws to guide international arrangements. There is the difficulty of matters extraneous to the Declaration of London, and I have an Amendment later which proposes to exclude from the jurisdiction, of the International Prize Court matters which are not definitely dealt with in the Declaration of London. This Clause is also objectionable because there is no provision by which we seek to enforce that other nations shall reciprocate and accept the same burdens which we accept under this agreement. We propose here to enforce the decrees of the International Prize Court quite irrespective of whether the other signatories to the Convention will also undertake to enforce those same decrees. [An HON. MEMBER: "No."] On the Committee stage I moved an Amendment which endeavoured to overcome this difficulty, and it sought to suggest that the Clause should be made subject to all the other signatories to the Convention undertaking to carry through legislation by which they would undertake the same responsibilities which we were undertaking. The answer of the Solicitor-General to that was that it would be quite possible for some small Power, by delay or other means, to prevent us carrying out the obligations which we now undertook; but it seems to me if an Amendment of that kind is unacceptable I do think it is most necessary that some Amendment should be accepted which would, at any rate, give effect to this undertaking of ours only as regards other nations who have undertaken a like responsibility towards ourselves. Otherwise it is quite obvious we may undertake to enforce the decrees of the Interntional Prize Court only for the benefit of some of the inhabitants of some country which country is at the same time refusing to enforce the decrees of that same International Prize Court for the benefit of British citizens. For these reasons I think this Clause has a great many objections, and it is justifiable to move its omission.

I am sure everyone will realise that my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Atherley - Jones) has spoken with great moderation and great learning, and I wish to assure him that the inability of the Government to accept his proposal does not proceed from any want of recognition of the tone and the temper in which he puts his arguments before the House. I must point out to my hon. and learned Friend and the hon. Gentleman who seconded this proposal that what they are really doing is asking this House, which has now reached the twenty-eighth Clause of this Bill on Report, to proceed upon the basis that it has not for the time being accepted as a principle an International Prize Court. Really, the whole thread and chain of reasons involved in the argument used by the hon. Member would be entirely relevant to the Second Reading discussion raising the point as to whether we were to have an International Prize Court or not, but if we are to have an International Prize Court, surely one consequence of that must be some machinery by which its decrees are not to be made mere waste paper in the different countries which they concern. The House will be good enough to observe that we have already entered upon Part III. of the Bill, which consists of a bundle of some seven Clauses. We have dealt with five of them, and we have two more to deal with. There are seven of them altogether, and the whole of Part III. is concerned with the International Prize Court. We have already had a discussion as to whether or not there should be an International Prize Court. I know that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Durham takes the view which he has always maintained with great ability and straightforwardness that there should not be an International Prize Court, and, so far, he is perfectly entitled to his view.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Sir R. Finlay) and others who have taken part in the earlier stages of this Debate have criticised the composition of an International Prize Court. They say, "That is all very well, but what we object to is the composition of this International Prize Court. That question we have already discussed, and while I am far from saying that the fact that we have discussed it and arrived at a conclusion upon it proves that it is right, it certainly proves that we cannot expect on Clause 28 to discuss the whole question all over again. Really, the question raised by my hon. and learned Friend is comparatively a narrow question, and I think I put the matter fairly when I say, it being granted for the purpose of the present discussion that there ought to be an International Prize Court, and that it should be composed, as this one is, having already passed the Clause which provides for our representatives upon that Prize Court, and having already enacted a Clause dealing with the payment of a contribution towards its expenses and arranging for the transfer of cases to it; having done all that upon that basis, are we really now going to say when the International Prize Court has given its decision the country involved in the matter is to have no machinery and refuse to produce any machinery by which we are going to carry out that decree. I submit that whatever may be the view of hon. Members on this large and important question which for the present purpose we must treat as having been disposed of, if the answer to this question is the answer which we must take up, we must take it for the present discussion that there is really no answer to the proposition that we must have some such Clause as this in the Bill. May I ask the House to turn for a moment to Article 9 of the Convention in which they will see that the parties to this Convention undertake as follows:—
"The contracting Powers undertake to submit in good faith to the decisions of the International Prize Court and to carry them out with the least possible delay."
It is partly because of that undertaking that some such Clause as this is proper and desirable, and if we in the British House of Commons refuse to put in our Naval Prize Bill such a provision as this, and at the same time render lip service to the establishment of this International Prize Court how does anybody suppose the other parties to this Convention are going to regard such a shifty position as that. My hon. and learned Friend will appreciate, whether that be so or not, that we have already passed Clauses 23 to 27, and unless we are going to discuss the same things over and over again on every Clause, I think we are entitled to say that Clause 28 should remain in the Bill. I will take the special instances which my hon. and learned Friend put forward as matters of special hardship, and deserving of special consideration. As I understand him, he says, that in view of the constitutional principle that the Crown by treaty ought not to give away the private rights of its own citizens, but ought to come to Parliament before it does so, he objects to this Clause. May I point out that this Clause has come to Parliament to that extent for that purpose, and it is just because some such Parliamentary sanction as this is needed that we are endeavouring to enact Clause 28. The ordinary practice of the Foreign Office is that before an agreement is entered into it should be ratified by Parliament.

My contention is that the matters upon which the rights of private citizens are interfered with should per se be the subject of discussion in Parliament, and you should not by a general provision put upon a Court of law the old obligation of enforcing the matters which have never been subject to Parliamentary sanction.

The practice which the Foreign Office has followed, not under one, but under all administrations, is that of refraining from ratifying an agreement until it has received sufficient Parliamentary sanction to put it into effect, and, until that is done, ratification does not take place. I hope my hon. and learned Friend is able to follow me for the moment, because I am anxious to do justice to one of the principal cases put forward by him by way of illustration. As I understood him he told the House that the effect of this Clause would be that the British subject might find himself as the result of being the loser before the International Prize Court condemned in costs before that Court, and that thereupon it would fall under this Clause to the High Court of this country or the Prize Court in any other part of the British Empire to enforce that order for costs. I understand from my hon. and learned Friend that I have correctly stated his intentions. This, if I may say so, with great respect to so learned an authority, is only one more illustration of the complete inability under which those who oppose this Convention seem to labour, to understand to what extent its real operation proceeds. Let me point out one instance. If a British subject is going to be a party in the International Prize Court, is this country going to be neutral or hostile? This country, if it is neutral, has got no Prize Court established of its own, and, therefore, the British subject is not appealing from this country's Prize Court at all. The hon. Gentleman spoke as though the British subject was going to be deprived of the benefit of International Prize law as understood and administered in this country. He cannot be deprived of anything of the kind, for the very single reason that if he appeals from the decision of a National Prize Court it certainly cannot be from a British Prize Court, because before there could be a British Prize Court this country must be at war, and then the British subject is not a neutral. Therefore, if he appeals at all, he does not appeal from a British Prize Court, but from a Foreign Prize Court, and, if he appeals from a Foreign Prize Court, he chooses to take the advantage, if he thinks it is an advantage, which this Declaration of London and the consequential legislation confer upon him. What is his position to-day? He is a British subject, the owner, it may be, of a British ship. He complains that ship has been sunk or captured by the forces of some foreign Power which is at war with some third Power. To-day the only refuge which he has, if he thinks he has been wrongly treated, is to go, not to an English Prize Court, but to the Prize Court which that enemy Power has set up. If, indeed, he has the exceptional good fortune of convincing that enemy Prize Court that the enemy is wrong, and he, the British subject, is right, then he gets his damages and away he goes. If he does not experience that satisfaction, then he is under no obligation to appeal, but, if he appeals, he appeals under the provisions of this Convention, Article 46, of which provides as follows:—

"Each party pays its own costs.
"The party against whom the Court decides bears, in addition, the costs of the trial, and also pays 1 per cent. of the value of the subject-matter of the case as a contribution to the general expenses of the International Court. The amount of these payments is fixed in the judgment of the Court.
"If the appeal is brought by an individual—
That is the case of my hon. and learned Friend,
"he will furnish the International Bureau with security to an amount fixed by the Court, for the purpose of guaranteeing the eventual fulfilment of the two obligations mentioned in the preceding paragraph."
The House will observe, therefore, this British subject, in whose interests my hon. and learned Friend I know is most candidly and most sincerely concerned, if he appeals is appealing not from a British Prize Court to some tribunal which is going to over- throw the law which he has hitherto enjoyed in his own domestic tribunal; he is not appealing from a place which administers what my hon. and learned Friend calls the municipal prize law in this country; he is appealing from a foreign tribunal. He either appeals or he does not. He does as he likes. If he does appeal, and if he loses and is condemned in costs, his security has to be lodged, there to pay those costs. Is there really any great injustice or unfairness in saying that a British subject who, up to date, has had to be content with the small mercies which a Foreign Prize Court gives him, if he chooses to go from a Foreign Prize Court to the International Prize Court, should go there with the responsibility of knowing, what every other litigant in the world knows, that, supposing he loses his appeal, and an order for costs is made against him, he ought to pay. How is he going to be made to pay? Is the International Prize Court going to have their own bailiff. Are they going to institute some new kind of International distress? Not at all. Under Article 9 the different parties agree in good faith to see the decrees of the International Prize Court are observed, and What we propose is what we expect every other Power concerned to see to, namely, that so far as their own subjects are concerned, if there be any cases—I find it very difficult to anticipate any such—which are not covered by the security given in Article 46, to which I have referred, then they shall see the decrees of the International Prize Court are carried out.

My hon. and learned Friend must not forgot the belligerent Government might also appeal in the not at all unusual circumstances of the Municipal Court having found in favour of the neutral individual.

I do not forget it at all. I took the instance my hon. and learned Friend gave as being the instance of the depravity and recklessness of those who advised the Government in this matter, and I pointed out to him it is not the fact that in the instance he gave the British subject is either being deprived of the protection of whatever is meant by the English Municipal Prize law, nor is it the fact that for that purpose such a Clause as this is needed, since in the nature of things he has given security for costs. So much for the neutral individual who appeals. There is another side. So far as British neutrals are concerned they can only appeal when this country is neutral, and whether they appeal from a foreign tribunal or not is entirely for them to choose. Take the other side. There are two parties to this litigation, and, though a British merchant may be on one side, a foreign Government may be on the other. That is exactly the injustice which my hon. and learned Friend thinks will follow if we endeavour to set up this principle of each country seeing the other party to the litigation pays those costs which the International Tribunal when it decides the appeal thinks proper. What is the other party to the litigation? The other party to the litigation is not a belligerent Government. I do not understand my hon. and learned Friend to suggest a belligerent Government would appeal?

I am very sorry my hon. and learned Friend should say that, because I really thought he had taken some trouble to study his subject. Would he be so good as to turn to the list of those persons who can appeal under Article 4? It really is a sad thing, when so much indignation has been exerted over the Declaration of London, that one of its principal opponents, speaking with special authority and great gravity and knowledge, should be under the impression that a belligerent Government could appeal to the International Prize Court. Article 4 provides that an appeal may be brought by three main kinds of persons: first, by a neutral Power. That is not a belligerent Government. Secondly, by a neutral individual. That is not a belligerent Government. Thirdly, by an individual subject or citizen of an enemy Power in a very limited number of cases mentioned. That is not a belligerent Government.

I am sure my hon. and learned Friend will not do me the injustice of misunderstanding me. The belligerent Power would really, as was pointed out in the discussion at the conference, be the effective appellant.

I am the last person to desire to do an injustice to my hon. and learned Friend, but for one who has such an admirable command of English his answer, which I did not invite him to make, was unfortunate. We are agreed then that all those who have spent five minutes in really considering this subject, instead of reading pamphlets about it, know that a belligerent Government cannot appeal. Therefore, if a belligerent Government comes before the International Prize Court it comes before that Court, not as an appellant, but as a respondent; that is to say, it has won in its own Court. The only other case we have to deal with is the case where in the National Prize Court the belligerent has won and the neutral individual who complains of the capture has lost. In that case it is the neutral individual or the neutral Government that appeals. Suppose the appeal is allowed and a decision is given different from the decision of the Court below, the belligerent Government succeeds. If the belligerent Government succeeds I should not have thought it very likely there would be any order for costs made against them. If, on the other hand, the belligerent Government does not succeed, but fails, is there really anything very improper in saying, "You, the belligerent Government, being one of the parties to this Treaty, and having agreed that the decision in your favour may be taken on appeal to an International Prize Court, must see to it that the decree of that International Prize Court is carried out? If you have got the ship give it up. If you have not, see compensation is paid in accordance with the order." Is there anything very wrong in that?

I have taken every case, so far as I can follow it, which arises under this Treaty. My hon. and learned Friend will agree with me that on examination his chief instance—the instance of the British subject being done out of his rights in the shape of municipal Prize Law—disappears; and, as regards the second case, we understand it was not the belligerent Government that appealed, but the belligerent, who was the respondent, and lost the appeal, and had therefore, quite properly, got to be made to hand over that which he wrongly detained. I trust I have shown to the House that really the case of my hon. and learned Friend is not a case which would stand on its merits. It is a case which can very easily be made, and very sincerely believed by those hon. Gentlemen who object to the whole tiling. Of course, if you do not want an International Prize Court, and if you are convinced the Declaration of London is a very bad thing, any stick will do to beat the Bill; but you could hardly have a weaker stick than the suggestion that, after we have passed Clauses 23 to 27, we should stultify the whole proceeding by refusing to pass Clause 28.

5.0 P.M.

I think the best possible proof that the case of the hon. and learned Member for North-West Durham (Mr. Atherley-Jones) was clearly put before the House is that persons of humble intellect like myself could understand his objection and why he wanted the Clause omitted from the Bill. My objection to this Clause is based upon the position of the Prize Courts in what are termed British possessions. I assume in my objection that we are and they are belligerent Powers and that it will be in the case of an appeal to the International Prize Court the appeal of one of the parties who, under Article 4, can appeal to that Court. I only make that observation in order to show to the House that I am not going to contravene any of the objections to which the Solicitor-General referred. If I may, I will try and make my case clear.

I will refer first to the terms of Clause 28,
"That every Prize Court in a British possession shall enforce within its jurisdiction all orders and decrees of the International Prize Court in appeals and cases transferred to the Court under this part of this Act."
The House is aware that Clause 3 provides for the setting up of these Prize Courts in British possessions. They are to be Vice-Admiralty or Colonial Courts of Admiralty within the meaning of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act of 1890. I turned up the Act of 1890 so as to be perfectly clear upon what sort of Court it is that under this Bill we are going to impose the obligation of enforcing a decree of the International Prize Court in British dominions which have no representative on it whatever. Clause 1 says,
"This Act may be cited as the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890."
Clause 2—the very forefront of the Bill—starts off with saying that,
"Every Court of Law in British possessions which is for the time being declared to be a Court of Admiralty or which if no such declaration is in force in the possession has therein original unlimited civil jurisdiction shall be a Court of Admiralty."
In Clause 6 it states what is the appeal that can be made against their decisions. Section (1) says,
"The appeal from a judgment of any Court in a British possession in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by this Act, either where there is as of right no local appeal or after a decision on local appeal, lies to Her Majesty the Queen in Council."
I want to make it perfectly clear what the position of these Courts is under the Act. I should like the House seriously to consider what is the position in the case of a Court which may be the highest Court in any of our dominions. I should like the House to consider what will be its position under the Naval Prize Bill. We must remember that in Clause 23, as it is drawn, no jurist from dominions, no matter how eminent, can possibly act as the representative of the British Empire on the International Prize Court. Clauses 25 and 26 provide for the appeals against the judgment of these Prize Courts to the International Court, and Clause 28 orders them to enforce the decrees of the International Prize Court. I will not attempt to deal with the phraseology of the Bill. I suppose it is the usual phraseology used. I do not want to refer at any length to the constitution of the International Prize Court, but I would just remind the House what is the position of those parts of the Empire which are called British possessions. We must remember in considering the enforcement of the decrees of this International Prize Court another fact. We are saying, for instance, that Canada, although Panama is worthy of having a deputy judge, shall not be represented even by a deputy judge on the International Prize Court. Again, Australia may not, while such places as Hayti and San Domingo may, be represented. I think this House ought to know that it is perfectly clear that in the Articles it is laid down that each of the Powers will do all they can to get the decrees of the International Prize Court enforced. I want to know why we, the largest Colonial Empire in the world, should be the first to impose what I regard as an ignominious condition on the different parts of our Empire. Are we quite sure that the other signatories of this Convention of London are going to follow suit, and that they will impose the same conditions on their Colonial Courts as we are asked to impose on our Colonial Courts?

I do not claim to speak with any knowledge of Admiralty affairs, but it will be agreed by all hon. Members that we have not only invited, but we have welcomed the co-operation of our dominions in the naval defence of the Empire. We are perfectly aware that Australia, New Zealand, and Canada are doing their best to co-operate with us in the naval defence of the Empire. From the nature of the geographical position of the dominions their navies will be at the other end of our great trade routes. Therefore it seems to me the greatest use of these navies will be, will be in helping us to do that which we are doing less well than any other of our naval obligations of looking after our British trade routes, and especially those which terminate in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. It is obvious that in any naval operation undertaken to assist this country when at war, the navies of the Dominions will naturally come in contact with the very questions which will have to be decided in the Prize Courts in British possessions. I will give one simple illustration. Take the case of a neutral merchantman laden or partly laden with some cargo which a Prize Court in Canada holds to be contraband, that decision means that it is a lawful prize of war. It is quite possible that the International Court may decide in an exactly opposite sense. But here, in this Clause, we say in effect that, although it may be the highest Court in the Dominions, although it may give a decision with which we are entirely in agreement, and which we believe ought to be agreed to by any Court so far as international law as it now stands is concerned, we say, although the appeal is to a Court on which they have no representative, yet the order of that Court is to be enforced within its jurisdiction, whatever the decision of the International Prize Court may be.

I ask the House to consider, in connection with Clause 28, not only the wording of the Clause, but its spirit and purpose. Is it likely to promote that sympathy between the Dominions of this country, of which Lord Haldane, speaking in another place, said, on the 18th May, "we are going to leave the British Empire to hold together by bonds of sympathy." Is it likely that this Clause will promote sympathy? Will the passing of such a Bill as this into an Act of Parliament assure the Dominions that the Imperial Parliament protects the interests of these great, growing nations. I also ask the House to consider what was the great cause of most of our troubles in the eighteenth century. Undoubtedly, so far as the North American Continent was concerned, it was the principle of taxation without representation. I say that that touches the pocket, it injures the pocket, it injures the sense of justice, but this clause injures the pride and honour of our great Dominions and destroys their confidence in the Imperial Parliament. The phraseology of the Clause may have been perfectly correct in 1890 so far as the term British possessions is concerned, but I do think that in conjunction with this mandatory Clause, which says that they must enforce the orders of an alien Court, it is an anachronism redolent of the stupid antagonism and air of superiority which caused so much disaster 150 years ago. Practically I consider that this Clause is an insult to our Dominions particularly, apart from any question of law, and I hope it will not be allowed to stain our Statute Book.

I entirely agree with what has fallen from the hon. Member who has just spoken as regards the operation of this Clause in its wider sense. I regard our Dominions as all important, and I only rise to reply to what has been said by the Solicitor-General. I do not disagree with what he said, but as a lawyer I want to be careful of the view I put forward. Clause 58 should be criticised. The hon. and learned Member for North-West Durham (Mr. Atherley-Jones) said, "you cannot alter the rights of individuals in this country merely by treaty." The Solicitor-General said he realised that this Bill has to get Statutory sanction or otherwise it could not be done merely under treaty rights. I think the Solicitor-General overlooked the real point of the argument, although perhaps in words he is right, in truth and in substance he is wrong. I think the hon. Member for North-West Durham was perfectly justified in saying it is really entirely out of court, and contrary to constitutional practice, to give general powers of this kind, which depend ultimately on what is done by the Court. If the Solicitor-General will look at Article 7 he will see that there is nothing to interfere with the rights of this country in the International Prize Court. The expression "International Law" in Article 7, I assume means the Declaration of London. If we want to go outside International law, as generally understood, is it to be a Court to do anything it likes? It merely says what the Court thinks to be right and equitable in any particular case. Although I am not going into the constitution of this Court, if we take a Court constituted like this Court will be, having more like the functions of partisan representatives, it is impossible to say that you ought to impose upon the subjects of this country, against their existing rights, what a Court of that kind, of its own free will, considers to be just and equitable. I understood that to be the gravamen of the charge made by the hon. and learned Member for North-West Durham (Mr. Atherley-Jones). It is an extremely important point. I do not deny that you must have some method of enforcing the decrees of the International Court. I am not going to deny that for one moment, but I think the hon. and learned Member's point, and the point I want to make is, that you ought to make that subject to the paramount right which the municipal prize law gives to the subjects of this country, and not only to the subjects of this country, but, as was pointed out by the last speaker, to the subjects of all our Dominions wherever situated. It is an entirely novel constitutional principle to put all these rights at the mere will and pleasure of an outside International Court, and then to say, as is said in Clause 28, that whatever the effect of that may be, the Courts here have no discretion whatever, but must enforce those decrees as a Ministerial and administrative duty.

I do not think any precedent can be found for any such Clause. I have looked some way back, and since the Papal jurisdiction was destroyed in this country I cannot find any analogy to a power of this kind being given at all. We have always resented any foreign jurisdiction in this country being applied merely in a ministerial and administrative manner. It is unconstitutional, as the hon. and learned Member for North-West Durham pointed out, on a very critical point indeed. May I show how it would operate? No one would be more desirous than the Solicitor-General, on a legal matter, to put the question quite clearly to the House, and I am sure he will believe that I desire to do the same, because we want to get at a truthful solution of the matter. I will take the two cases the Solicitor-General took. I assume that we are in the position of neutrals. It is perfectly true, as the Solicitor-General pointed out, that a decision will be given in the Court of a belligerent, and that it will give the decision against an English subject. Under the law as it exists, what is our position? That decision could not be enforced in any way in this country. Our real remedy has been, and I was going to say will be, dependent upon diplomatic action, and when diplomatic action has the British Fleet behind it, it has very often been a very strong remedy indeed. What is the change going to be? I assume that the neutral does not like the decision given against him in the belligerent Court, and that he appeals to the International Tribunal.

I pointed out that there was no obligation on him to appeal unless he chose, and if he appeals he knows from what decision he appeals.

I do not think that is an answer to the proposition I am going to put. I assume that feeling he has been wrongly treated and that he cannot rely on diplomatic action, he thinks the best chance is to appeal. I assume that he has the right to appeal, and that he does appeal, whether wisely or not, with the result that the decision is confirmed.

Is the hon. and learned Gentleman treating us as a belligerent or as a neutral?

I am assuming that the British subject is a neutral. I assume that he has appealed, and that the decision is given against him. What is the position? I agree with the Solicitor-General that there are not probably many cases in which the question would arise of enforcing the decision in this country, but it may arise and, of course, unless you have decisions of that kind, Clause 28 has no application at all. Let us consider, if a case does arise, what is the result? The Courts in this country would have to enforce against a subject of this country the principle of legal wrongs, a principle which has never hitherto been acknowledged in this country, the result always having been considered by us as a legal wrong. I ask the Solicitor-General what answer is there to that? It is a fair way to put the proposition. A neutral, and English subject, gets condemned in a foreign belligerent Court. He appeals to the Court of Appeal, and the decision is confirmed. What is the result? That, as against him, for the first time in the history of this country our Courts will, or may be, called upon to enforce a decree which, according to our own doctrines, is at once unjust and unrighteous. That is an entirely new position, and we ought to be protected against the possibility of a position of that kind I do not think what I have said can be controverted. I want to be careful in a matter of this kind not to exaggerate the position. It is of extreme importance in a Bill of this kind that our treaty rights should be properly respected, but nothing should be done that is inconsistent with the principle of law in this country that our Courts should not be called upon to enforce decrees and orders which, according to our view, are at once unjust and inequitable.

Will the hon. and learned Gentleman state, since he assures us that he wishes the International Court's decisions should be enforced, how they would be enforced unless they were enforced by the Courts of this country?

In a moment I will say what I think the limitations ought to be. When I say that I think they ought to be enforced, the Solicitor-General will recollect this, I did not say per fas or per nefas. I do not object to their being enforced if they are in accordance with our views. According to my view, and according to the view of the Solicitor-General, it is an extremely serious matter and of the very deepest import, either as regards our Prize Courts or as regards the Prize Courts in our dominions, to ask them to put in force the principles contrary to anything heretofore held in this country, and which, according to our view, are unjust and unfair. Let me take the other proposition the Solicitor-General dealt with. I do not want to controvert much that he has said, because a great deal of it was perfectly sound and right. I want to take the position where we are belligerents, and where as regards some other neutral the rights between the belligerent and the neutral are determined in the Courts of this country and, as so determined, give a certain decision as regards the rights of the neutral. I presume it will be given in the first instance in accordance with the principles we have always advocated and adhered to in our Courts. I assume that the neutral appeals against that, and that the appeal is allowed. Then, of course, the law as laid down by the appellate tribunal would have to be enforced in this country. That is absolutely clear. That would be the effect of this Clause. There, again, you might have exactly the same result, namely, that the Courts of this country, merely as a ministerial or administrative matter, would have to put in force the law which, according to our views, might be at once unjust and unfair. To my mind that is a very serious position, and it is a position which we ought very carefully to consider in dealing with what is a new code and a new procedure as regards International law.

Let me point out to the Solicitor-General how, in my view, a matter of this kind might be reasonably met. If we are to be met reasonably upon a matter of this kind, I think that on this side of the House we should do all we could to bring about a reasonable and proper solution. Is the Solicitor-General or any occupant of the Front Bench prepared to say this: that supposing a law which is sought to be enforced as an administrative Act in this country is inconsistent with the law we have considered to be just and fair, will he say that in these circumstances we are not be called upon to enforce it? That is where we come to the crux of the matter. I am not going into matters which would be properly matters for Second Reading or Third Reading. It appears to me that, given an International Court, and given a proper system of enforcing the decrees of that Court in this country, yet we ought to protect ourselves, our Courts and the Courts of our British Dominions—to which I attach great importance—from being put in the unenviable and almost impracticable position of being compelled, whether they wish it or not, to put in force against our subjects that which they think to be unfair and unjust. That is how we stand. That is the broad matter with which I want to deal, and it is with that broad matter that I think the argument of the Solicitor-General did not deal satisfactorily. I am not going into some of the questions which the hon. and learned Member for North-West Durham raised as regards municipal law and Prize Courts. It is sufficient for my purpose to deal with the prize laws. The rules dealing with the municipal laws are altogether different matters from the prize laws. I am taking our law as it is. I am taking a different decision by the International Tribunal, it being out of accord with our views as to what is fair and just. Are we, in these circumstances, to be called upon to enforce what we think is an inequitable thing? One of the reasons why I think this is of great importance—without going into the terms of the Declaration of London—is that it is the view of some of us that the effect of the Declaration will act harshly against neutrals. It has been a credit to our administration, although we have our interests as belligerents, that we have interpreted the law as regards neutrals more favourably to neutrals than has been the case in any other country. What will be the result, it having been our policy to do all we can to protect nentral trade? I go to the extent of thinking that as regards foodstuffs, neutral trade ought certainly to be protected absolutely. Heretofore we have gone in the direction of doing all we can to protect neutral trade. What would be the possible effect of a decree of the International Court? We should have to go against the whole of our liberal policy in the past in order to enforce what is, in our view, an unrighteous and reactionary law. I do not think there is any precedent for such a proposition I agree it is one of the difficulties of the case. It is not for me to deal with the difficulties which arise on a Bill of this kind, but it is a difficulty and, at any rate speaking for myself, without I can see in anything that is said that the difficulty is removed or satisfactorily explained I shall follow the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Atherley-Jones) into the Division Lobby if he goes to a Division upon this, not upon the grounds that there must be some power of enforcing decisions, but on the ground that it ought to be so safeguarded that our views of justice and right should not be superseded and, above all, that you shall not put the obligation upon our Courts to do what they think is wrong in principle and unjust to the subjects of this country.

Before the Debate proceeds further I think I ought to point out that hon. Members are not entitled, on the Motion to leave out the Clause, really to review the whole Bill. That is a matter for Third Reading. The discussion seems to be running on the proviso standing in the name of the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Atherley-Jones), but practically on a Motion to leave out the Clause the discussion ought, to run on the effect on the Bill of this Clause not being in—some reasons to show that the Bill would be workable without the Clause.

Would it be in order to go into these matters upon the Clause if the Government announced their intention not to accept any such Amendment as is lower down on the Paper?

It would be in order to deal with the matters raised in the Amendment, but, of course, they cannot be discussed a second time.

It is with great hesitation that I intervene in the Debate, which has been conducted by some of the most distinguished lawyers in the House, because I cannot pretend to deal with it in any degree from the point of view of a lawyer. But the proposition of the hon. and learned Gentleman (Sir A. Cripps) appeals to me in quite a different sense—not in the legal sense, but from the point of view of elementary fair ness. The proposition that is put before us by the hon. and learned Gentleman is that if we get a decision from the Inter national Prize Court, which agrees with our views of what is just and right, we are to accept it and enforce that decision; but he actually asked His Majesty's Government to declare that if that decision does not agree with our views of what is right and just, and what my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Atherley-Jones) called—and I was astonished at the phrase—municipal prize law—what he meant was British prize law——

I accept the correction. Possibly my hon. and learned Friend is right. What the Government is asked to say is that if the decision of the International Court agrees with the view of the British Government as to what is British law, then it is to be enforced; but if it does not agree with that view it is not to be enforced. Surely you cannot put that proposition before other nations without admitting that other nations will adopt the same principle; and if we appeal against the decision of a Russian Prize Court, as in the case of the "Oldhamia," which is still agitating Lancashire, where British subjects think they were wrongfully deprived of £60,000 worth of property in regard to which at the present moment they have no remedy whatever, and the International Court gave a decision which in Russia was not considered to be a proper decision, is Russia not to enforce the decision? The whole proposition renders utterly absurd the whole idea of an International Prize Court. I think that is the object of it. I do not think my hon. and learned Friend would deny that his object is to destroy the principle of an International Prize Court, of which he disapproves. But let him do it directly, and not by suggesting that the British Government should put an utterly preposterous proposition before other nations, the proposition that after we have gone to the Court of Appeal we should be judges in our own cause. Let me take the case of the hon. and learned Gentleman (Sir A. Cripps), that we are the belligerent interested. Does he say that if the Court of Appeal gives the case against us, we are not to take steps to enforce the decree of the Court, and that the British Government is not to give the remedy which the Court has decided they ought to give, nor to restore the property of the neutral if he has succeeded in his appeal? If, on the other hand, it is a question of a British neutral appealing to this Court, after all when you come to look at it as a business proposition what is the risk he runs? My hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Atherley-Jones) made a good deal of that. Take a case which appeals to me as a business man. I am a shipowner. My ship is taken and burnt like the "Oldhamia." I appeal. I lose. I cannot lose my ship. That has gone. My hon. and learned Friend seemed to think I stood to lose a great deal. I cannot find anything I am likely to lose. Of course I should have heard the opinion of lawyers on the point. I only throw this out as a plain business man. The only thing I think I can lose is costs. I might be cast in costs. I might have to pay that 1 per cent. Even that statement has to be modified, because the appellant has to give security for costs. Therefore the only thing that the British Court will have to recover from me will be the difference between the costs which the Court of Appeal says I must pay and the costs I paid into Court. Is it an unreasonable proposition that if we accept the Court of Appeal and a neutral foreigner appeals against us, if the Court decides against us we should obey the decree of the Court? Is it an unreasonable thing if a British subject chooses to appeal—because he need not appeal unless he likes—that he should pay the costs of the action he loses? I should be delighted if I were a litigant if I could do it on the lines of the hon. and learned Gentleman (Sir A. Cripps), that if the verdict is in my favour I will accept it, and if it is not I will reject it. But how you can expect any nation in its senses to agree to a Court of Appeal set up on those principles I fail to understand.

I wish to put before the Government the effect of this Clause 28 upon a question which was raised by the Foreign Secretary on the last discussion on this Bill as to the law laid down in the International Prize Court as to the conversion of merchantmen on the high seas into men-of-war. Everyone agrees that is one of the most important points which could possibly be raised for this country and it has been left open as no agreement could be arrived at so far as the Declaration of London is concerned. The answer made by the Foreign Secretary was, as I understood it, that this country would not, as a belligerent, recognise the law laid down by the International Prize Court on any appeal by a neutral which turned upon the conversion of a merchant vessel upon the high seas into a man-of-war. Just see how that contention is affected by this Clause. I take a case where two foreign Powers, I will call them A and B, are at war. Great Britain is a neutral. The British vessel is captured by a merchantman which was converted on the high seas belonging to A. The owner of the neutral vessel, in the Prize Court of the country whose converted merchantman captured the vessel, finds that his vessel is condemned on the ground that his objection to the validity of the capture, as being by a merchantman converted upon the high seas, is unsound. He afterwards appeals to the International Prize Court, which adopts the same view as to the validity of the conversion of a merchantman upon the high seas. We bind ourselves by Clause 28 to enforce that decision in our Dominions. I wish to ask the Foreign Secretary how in reference to that Clause we could possibly say that when in our turn we were the belligerents we were not bound by the principles of law established by the International Prize Court.

I will answer that point very shortly. I was dealing the other day with the statement that the decision of the International Prize Court might bind our action when we were a belligerent in dealing with a belligerent. I contended that it will not bind our action as belligerents in dealing with belligerents, and I adhere to that statement. We are belligerents and we are dealing with belligerents and the belligerents opposed to us choose to convert on the high seas. We retain, and we cannot be prevented by any decision of the International Prize Court dealing solely with questions between belligerents and neutrals from retaining, our liberty of action to deal with a belligerent, when we are a belligerent, as we please, and I cannot see how the question arises on this Clause, which deals with the High Court enforcing the decisions of the International Prize Court in British Dominions, nor how it can have any bearing on our action as belligerents against belligerents. When we are belligerents against belligerents obviously no question on Clause 28 would arise here at all.

The decision as to the conversion of a merchantman into a man-of-war proceeds on a principle of law. By Clause 28 we bind ourselves to enforce that decision in our dominions, and we do enforce it against a British subject the owner of a neutral vessel. How could we, when we come to be belligerents, say that we repudiate the principles of law upon which the decision which we had bound ourselves to enforce, and do enforce, is based, and say that because we are no longer belligerents we throw what is declared to be International law by the highest tribunal, that set up by this Court, to the winds?

I still fail entirely to comprehend the attitude of the Foreign Secretary. As the law stands at present if a merchantman is converted into an armed cruiser on the high sea and is capturing our ships——

I really cannot allow that matter to come further into the discussion. As a matter of question and answer I permitted it, but it now appears to be becoming the subject of Debate. It does not appear to be relevant in any way to the Clause.

I am quite content to leave the matter to the judgment of the House upon the statement of my right hon. Friend as contrasted with the statement of the Foreign Secretary. Now upon the general question, if I may summarise the way in which the matter occurs to me, it is this. Clause 28 compels all Prize Courts throughout the British Dominions to enforce every decision of the International Prize Court. What is that International Prize Court? It is a new Court, and what I may call an alien Court, not known in our jurisprudence. It is a new law which in many respects entirely conflicts with the existing law as declared by our Prize Courts. The next point I make is that new law must necessarily interfere with the private rights of British subjects as declared by our Prize Courts. The question is really in a nutshell. Can the Declaration of London, which is merely a treaty proposed to be ratified by Act of Parliament, but which has never come before Parliament, and which is never intended to come before Parliament, and I presume will never be sanctioned by Parliament when so ratified, be used to alter the private rights of British subjects? That is the real question. If you pass this Clause, you will enable this foreign Court to give decisions founded upon an alteration of private rights, and you will compel our Courts to give effect to these decisions. I venture to say that this Clause ought not to pass until a law dealing with our private rights has been sanctioned by Parliament. Therefore the Government are premature in asking us to pass this Clause. I understood the Solicitor-General to say, in answer to my hon. Friend—he will correct me if I am wrong—that the effect of the Declaration of London is to alter private rights which British citizens enjoy at present under the decisions of British Prize Courts.

That is the answer I have often heard a witness make when he does not wish to answer a question. I understood that in his speech the Solicitor-General did not controvert the proposition of my learned Friend—namely, that the Declaration of London does alter private rights which British subjects enjoy by virtue of the decisions of our Prize Courts. Nor has he controverted the proposition under constitutional law which my hon. Friend laid down, namely, that you cannot by treaty made in time of peace, and not sanctioned by Parliament, alter private rights. By this Clause you give effect to decisions of the Tribunal which is to administer the law by which private rights are affected and which is to administer the law contained in a treaty which has never been sanctioned by Parliament. If that be so, one conclusion necessarily follows, namely, that this Clause must be left out, because it violates constitutional usage and gives effect to a treaty which has not been sanctioned by Parliament. That is really the inherent effect of this Clause. If the Declaration of London had been brought before Parliament and sanctioned specifically by Parliament, then the objection to this Clause would have gone. The learned Solicitor-General, in effect, asked for the sanction of Parliament, and I hope I do not misrepresent his argument when I say that I understood him to state, "We are in effect asking the sanction of Parliament to an alteration in the law made by the Declaration of London." If I may say so, with profound respect to my hon. and learned Friend, I cannot imagine a more delusive argument. You do not do anything of the kind by the Clause. What you do is to give effect to the decisions, whatever they may be, but you do not say what law they are founded upon.

My hon. Friend has stated that if you want to alter these private rights of British subjects, you must come and ask for the sanction of Parliament to the terms of the treaty itself, in order that they may be considered one by one, and that we may know how far existing private rights, as laid down by our Courts, are interfered with, and if Parliament is of opinion that existing private rights declared by our Courts should be altered, then it is quite fair to ask Parliament to alter them. But if you do not come to Parliament for sanction, if you do not ask specifically for approval of the alteration proposed, then I say it is perfectly idle to come to this House and say, "We ask impliedly for an alteration of the law on which these decrees will be founded, because we are going to enforce the decrees." I say that would be an unconstitutional act. The true proceeding for us here is first to obtain the sanction of Parliament to the alteration of the law, and then ask the Courts to enforce the law. I wish to say a word as to the mode of the application of this Declaration of London as it affects Parliament. I venture to say that there is a good deal to be reconsidered as regards the exercise of the prerogative——

I really must enter another protest against this line of argument. It appears to me the hon. Member is not confining himself to the question now before the House.

I would only urge that the Government should consider what I have said, namely, that if they want our Courts to enforce these decrees founded upon a new law, it is their constitutional duty to put that new law before Parliament in order that Parliament may say whether they will sanction it or not.

As to the words "British possessions" in the Clause, I think it would have been better if the Government had used the words "British dominions." I cannot myself discriminate between British possessions and British dominions, but if there is any difference I have no doubt the Government would be willing to put in the word "dominions." The hon. Gentleman complained that great injury would be done to the Colonies by this provision. He must have forgotten that at the Colonial Conference this Bill and the Declaration of London were before the delegates representing the different Colonies, and that they agreed unanimously to accept this Convention made by the Government here, and also the necessary legislation to carry it out. Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his colleagues at that Conference offered no criticism of Canada's action in this respect.

If the delegates at that Conference had been the new Premier of Canada and some of his Ministers, they would have taken precisely the same view in regard to this matter as Sir Wilfrid Laurier did. Whether Section 28 does or does not affect Canada and the other Colonies in any way in being called upon to carry out the judgments of the International Court, they have no interests in a question of this kind separate from the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom has the onus of looking after the foreign affairs of the Empire. It has the onus and expense of defending the whole Empire as regards foreign nations. I know that in Canada—and I think it must be so in the other Colonies—the people are anxious not to be troubled in matters of this kind, and are quite prepared to accept loyally and to carry out any arrangement or convention or treaty that may be made by the United Kingdom with regard to a question of this kind. I feel certain that Canada when ordered by the International Court will carry out the decisions most loyally. There can be no possible injury whatever in doing so. At present the Colonies have an appeal to the Privy Council, and the Colonial Courts do not feel in any way put about by having their decisions reversed. Several speakers have referred to this International Court as an alien Court. It will be a Court constituted by Act of Parliament, and, having been so constituted, it will deal with affairs which affect the Empire. I am sure that every Colony will be most glad to carry out its decisions.

The divergence of opinion manifested during the Debate only demonstrates the impracticability of administering a Court of the character referred to here. The hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Martin) has given his opinion, as he was perfectly entitled to do, as to how this Court would be viewed in the Dominions overseas. For my own part, I must say that in a great, prosperous, and comparatively wealthy country like Canada, I think the proposal to establish a Court of this character, on which Great Britain will only have one representative in fifteen, and on which all the great Dominions overseas belonging to this country will have no representatives whatever, will be looked upon as somewhat anomalous.

Is the argument which the hon. Gentleman is advancing germane to the Amendment now before the House?

I think the hon. Gentleman was not in the House earlier in the discussion, when it was stated that we must take the Prize Court as having been constituted by the previous Clauses in the Bill. The only question raised by this Clause is the power of enforcing certain decisions.

6.0 P.M.

I was simply answering the argument advanced from the opposite side of the House. With regard to the orders authorising the enforcing of decrees of this Court, I submit that it is relevant to consider what would be the character of those decrees. What sort of jurisprudence are you to expect will be established in a Court of this character, in which fifteen jurisdictions will be represented, and in which each jurist probably will follow his own view of the law of his own country? This Clause seems to me to be the pith of the whole Bill, because without it the Bill would be ineffective.

That is exactly the point. The argument is, therefore, one that should be brought forward on the Third Reading.

I only wish to ask a question to see exactly where one does stand in regard to the argument? I understood that the Solicitor-General for the Government told us that you cannot by treaty alter private rights. Then we are told that our Courts are to enforce the decrees of the International Prize Court in this country, whether they are or are not consistent with the law of this country. How am I to know what that law is? We are told by the Government that you have got to infer what the law is from the decisions in force in the Courts of this country. It seems to me an astounding proposition to try to force on us to say: Here are laws which we have to submit to, which we have never made at all, or had any part in making. It is entirely done under the prerogative. We are not to know what they are. We are only to know them by their effects when they are enforced in the Courts of this country. That is a very back-handed way of getting to know what the law is. Where does the distinction come in? We know perfectly well that in the case of these treaties which do affect the rights of individuals, where duties have to be put on or taken off, you have to pass an Act of Parliament; and you also have to do so in the case of treaties of extradition. But in this case nothing of that kind is going to be done. You are left ex post facto, to the discovery of what the law is, to a knowledge of which by some hypothetical method you are supposed to have ascended if the case has not before been tried in the Courts, and in the last resort you are to have the decisions of this Court enforced in the Courts of our country. If that is really the doctrine it seems to me extraordinarily unsuited to the democratic conditions of the day, and that some time or other the prerogative will have to be limited by Statute more than it is at present.

If the hon. Member who has just spoken had looked at Article 7 of the Convention, which is appended to the Bill, he would see that it states quite clearly what the law is that the Court is to enforce, and that it has nothing at all to do with the Declaration of London, which is not mentioned in the Act from beginning to end. It says:—

"If a question of law to be decided is covered by a treaty in force between the belligerent captor and a Power which is itself, or the subject or citizen of which is, a party to the proceedings, the Court is governed by the provisions of the said treaty.
"In the absence of such provisions, the Court shall apply the rules of International law. If no generally recognised rule exists, the Court shall give judgment in accordance with the general principles of justice and equity."
One word more on the effect of the omission of this Clause which is the sole question before the House. Part III. constitutes an International Prize Court, and Section 28 gives power to enforce the orders of this Court. Omit that Section and you have no power of enforcing, except as specified in Section 29, which says:
"This Part of this Act shall apply only to such cases and during such period as may for the time being be directed by Order in Council, and His Majesty may by the same or any other Order in Council apply this Part of this Act subject to such conditions, exceptions, and qualifications as may be deemed expedient."
So even if you left out Clause 28 hon. Members opposite, if they assent to Clause 29, would propose that His Majesty in Council should have the power of carrying these out by specific regulations in these conditions. I may point out that Clause 29 has met a great many objections raised on the other side, because if the Government of this country, whichever party is in power, desires to reserve any of these questions upon which nothing has been said in the Declaration, or referred to, they can do so by putting into the Order in Council such qualifications and exceptions and conditions that the Order in Council shall apply to Part in as they like.

The observations of the last speaker show how misunderstood this Bill has been by hon. Members who have not looked into it carefully. The hon. Member does not understand apparently that the action of Article 7, which deals with a code of law, is the enforcing of an International law, and for that purpose the Declaration of London is gone into, in order to have what this, code of International law is. It is for the very reason of the uncertainty of the law to be enforced in this Court, that my hon. Friend moved his Amendment. What we say is do directly what you are really endeavouring to do indirectly. The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. McKinnon Wood) taunted the hon. Member for North-West Durham (Mr. Atherley-Jones) with the suggestion that this was an attempt by a side wind to defeat the purposes of the

Division No. 432.]

AYES.

[6.15 p.m.

Abraham, William (Dublin Harbour)Boland, John PlusClough, William
Acland, Francis DykeBooth, Frederick HandelClynes, John R.
Adamson, WilliamBowerman, Charles W.Collins, Godfrey P. (Greenock)
Agnew, Sir George WilliamBrady, Patrick JosephCollins, Stephen (Lambeth)
Ainsworth, John StirlingBrocklehurst, William B.Compton-Rickett, Rt. Hon. Sir J.
Alden, PercyBrunner, John F. L.Condon, Thomas Joseph
Allen, Arthur A. (Dumbarton)Bryce, John AnnanCowan, William Henry
Allen, Charles Peter (Stroud)Buckmaster, Stanley O.Crawshay-Williams, Eliot
Asquith, Rt. Hon. Herbert HenryBurke, E. Haviland-Crumley, Patrick
Baker, Harold T. (Accrington)Burns, Rt. Hon. JohnDavies, Timothy (Lincs., Louth)
Baker, Joseph Allen (Finsbury, E.)Burt, Rt. Hon. ThomasDavies, Sir W. Howell (Bristol, S.)
Baring, Sir Godfrey (Barnstaple)Buxton, Noel (Norfolk, N.)Dawes, James Arthur
Barlow, Sir John Emmott (Somerset)Buxton, Rt. Hon. S. C. (Poplar)Denman, Hon. Richard Douglas
Barton, WilliamCarr-Gomm, H. W.Devlin, Joseph
Beck, Arthur CecilCawley, H. T. (Lancs., Heywood)Dillon, John
Benn, W. W. (Tower Hamlets, St. Geo.)Chancellor, Henry GeorgeDoris, William
Bentham, George JacksonChapple, Dr. William AllenDuncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness)
Bethell, Sir John HenryChurchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S.Duncan, J. Hastings (York, Otley)
Birrell, Rt. Hon. AugustineClancy, John JosephEdwards, Clement (Glamorgan, E.)

Bill. That is not so. What we really point out is this, that if you want to do what you intend to do, and must do by this Clause 28, you ought to have the courage of your opinions, and do it directly, and say you are prepared to alter the private rights of citizens and persons who will be litigants in the International Court. That is what in effect you are doing by reason of the reflex action of this section upon the municipal law of this country. That is exactly why we object to this Clause. In carrying out the decrees of the International Court, those decrees must necessarily have a reflex effect upon the law of our country, and to the extent to which those decrees modify the law of our country to that extent our law, which obtains between citizens, will be modified and altered. We say rather than have that done indirectly by the enforcement of decrees that we do not know, founded on law that we do not know, let us have some statement which will make it plain to citizens that their rights are altered. We are giving authority to this Court to have its decrees enforced in our Courts. We are bringing in a new system of law, and new changes by the decisions of a new Court which must necessarily have a very wide and far reaching effect. It is because we complain of the operation of Clause 28 and say that it is not fully understood by persons who have not studied the Bill, and by I dare say a number of persons in our Colonies who have not fully appreciated the effect of it, that we say that without some modifications and limitations there ought not to be given any power to enforce the decree of the International Court, and that we ought in some way to safeguard our own municipal law.

Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Bill."

The House divided: Ayes, 212; Noes, 115.

Edwards, Enoch (Hanley)Lardner, James Carrige RusheRea, Walter Russell (Scarborough)
Edwards, John Hugh (Glamorgan, Mid.)Levy, Sir MauriceReddy, Michael
Elibank, Rt. Hon. Master ofLewis, John HerbertRedmond, John E. (Waterford)
Elverston, Sir HaroldLough, Rt. Hon. ThomasRedmond, William (Clare, E.)
Esslemont, George BirnieLundon, ThomasRendall, Athelstan
Falconer, JamesLyell, Charles HenryRichardson, Thomas (Whitehaven)
Ffrench, PeterLynch, Arthur AlfredRoberts, Charles H. (Lincoln)
France, Gerald AshburnerMacdonald, J. R. (Leicester)Robertson, Sir G. Scott (Bradford)
Furness, StephenMacdonald, J. M. (Falkirk Burghs)Robertson, John M. (Tyneside)
George, Rt. Hon. David LloydMacnamara, Rt. Hon. Dr. T. J.Robinson, Sidney
Gibson, Sir James PuckeringM'Callum, John M.Roch, Walter F. (Pembroke)
Gill, Alfred HenryM'Curdy, Charles AlbertRoche, Augustine (Louth)
Gladstone, W. G. C.McKenna, Rt. Hon. ReginaldRoe, Sir Thomas
Clanville, Harold JamesM'Laren, F. W. S. (Lincs., Spalding)Rowlands, James
Goddard, Sir Daniel FordM'Micking, Major GilbertRowntree, Arnold
Goldstone, FrankMarshall, Arthur HaroldRunciman, Rt. Hon. Walter
Greenwood, Granville G. (Peterborough)Martin, JosephSamuel, Rt. Hon. H. L. (Cleveland)
Greig, Colonel James WilliamMason, David M. (Coventry)Scanlan, Thomas
Grey, Rt. Hon. Sir EdwardMeehan, Francis E. (Leitrim, N.)Scott, A. MacCallum (Glas., Bridgeton)
Guest, Hon. Frederick E. (Dorset, E.)Meehan, Patrick A. (Queen's Co.)Seely, Col. Rt. Hon. J. E. B.
Hackett, JohnMenzies, Sir WalterSheehy, David
Hancock, John GeorgeMond, Sir Alfred M.Sherwell, Arthur James
Harcourt, Robert V. (Montrose)Montagu, Hon. E. S.Simon, Sir John Allsebrook
Harmsworth, Cecil (Luton, Beds.)Mooney, John J.Smith, Albert (Lancs., Clitheroe)
Harvey, T. E. (Leeds, West)Morrell, PhilipSmyth, Thomas F. (Leitrim, S.)
Harvey, W. E. (Derbyshire, N. E.)Morton, Alpheus CleophasSnowden, Philip
Haslam, James (Derbyshire)Munro, RobertSpicer, Sir Albert
Havelock-Allan, Sir HenryMurray, Capt. Hon. Arthur C.Stanley, Albert (Staffs, N. W.)
Hayden, John PatrickNannetti, Joseph P.Sutton, John E.
Hayward, EvanNolan, JosephTennant, Harold John
Helme, Norval WatsonNorton, Captain Cecil W.Thomas, Abel (Carmarthen, E.)
Henderson, Arthur (Durham)O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny)Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton)
Henderson, J. M. (Aberdeen, W.)O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.)Toulmin, Sir George
Henry, Sir CharlesO'Connor, T. P. (Liverpool)Ure, Rt. Hon. Alexander
Higham, John SharpO'Doherty, PhilipWadsworth, John
Hinds, JohnO'Dowd, JohnWalsh, Stephen (Lancs., Ince)
Hobhouse, Rt. Hon. Charles E. H.O'Grady, JamesWard, John (Stoke-upon-Trent)
Hodge, JohnO'Kelly, Edward P. (Wicklow, W.)Ward, W. Dudley (Southampton)
Holt, Richard DurningO'Shee, James JohnWardle, George J.
Hudson, WalterO'Sullivan, TimothyWason, Rt. Hon. E. (Clackmannan)
Isaacs, Rt. Hon. Sir RufusPalmer, Godfrey MarkWason, John Cathcart (Orkney)
John, Edward ThomasParker, James (Halifax)Webb, H.
Johnson, WilliamPearce, Robert (Staffs, Leek)Wedgwood, Josiah C.
Jones, Edgar R. (Merthyr Tydvil)Pearce, William (Limehouse)Whittaker, Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas P.
Jones, William (Carnarvonshire)Pirie, Duncan V.Wiles, Thomas
Jones, W. S. Glyn- (T. H'mts., Stepney)Pointer, JosephWilson, John (Durham, Mid)
Jowett, Frederick WilliamPollard, Sir George H.Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)
Keating, MatthewPonsonby, Arthur A. W. H.Wood, Rt. Hon. T. McKinnon (Glas.)
Kelly, EdwardPower, Patrick JosephYoxall, Sir James Henry
Kennedy, Vincent PaulPrice, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central)
King, Joseph (Somerset, North)Price, Sir Robert J. (Norfolk, E.)

TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—Mr. Illingworth and Mr. Gulland.

Lambert, George (Devon, Molton)Radford, George Heynes
Lansbury, GeorgeRaffan, Peter Wilson

NOES.

Anstruther-Gray, Major WilliamCripps, Sir Charles AlfredHorner, Andrew Long
Ashley, Wilfrid W.Denniss, E. R. B.Hume-Williams, William Ellis
Baird, John LawrenceEyres-Monsell, Bolton M.Hunt, Rowland
Balcarres, LordFaber, Captain W. V. (Hants, W.)Jardine, Ernest (Somerset, East)
Banbury, Sir Frederick GeorgeFalle, Bertram GodfrayJessel, Captain Herbert M.
Banner, John S. Harmood-Fell, ArthurKerry, Earl of
Beach, Hon. Michael Hugh HicksFinlay, Rt. Hon. Sir RobertKinloch-Cooke, Sir Clement
Beckett, Hon. W. GervaseFisher, Rt. Hon. W. HayesKirkwood, John H. M.
Benn, Arthur Shirley (Plymouth)Flannery, Sir J. FortescueKyffin-Taylor, G.
Benn, Ian Hamilton (Greenwich)Fletcher, John Samuel (Hampstead)Larmor, Sir J.
Bennett-Goldney, FrancisGardner, ErnestLonsdale, Sir John Brownlee
Bigland, AlfredGibbs, George AbrahamMacmaster, Donald
Boscawen, Sir Arthur S. T. Griffith-Gilmour, Captain JohnMcNeill, Ronald (Kent, St. Augustine)
Boyle, W. Lewis (Norfolk, Mid.)Gordon, John (Londonderry, South)Magnus, Sir Philip
Bridgeman, William CliveGrant, James AugustusMason, James F. (Windsor)
Bull, Sir William JamesGreene, W. R.Meysey-Thompson, E. C.
Burn, Colonel C. R.Guinness, Hon. Walter EdwardMildmay, Francis Bingham
Butcher, John GeorgeHall, D. B. (Isle of Wight)Neville, Reginald J. N.
Campbell, Rt. Hon. J. H. M.Hall, Fred (Dulwich)Newdegate, F. A.
Carlile, Sir Edward HildredHambro, Angus ValdemarNewman, John R. P.
Cassel, FelixHamilton, Lord C. J. (Kensington)O'Neill, Hon. A. E. B. (Antrim, Mid)
Cator, JohnHamilton, Marquess of (Londonderry)Orde-Powlett, Hon. W. G. A.
Cave, GeorgeHarris, Henry PercyParkes, Ebenezer
Chaloner, Col. R. G. W.Harrison-Broadley, H. B.Pease, Herbert Pike (Darlington)
Clive, Captain Percy ArcherHelmsley, ViscountPeel, Hon. W. R. W. (Taunton)
Coates, Major Sir Edward FeethamHerbert, Hon. A. (Somerset, S.)Pole-Carew, Sir R.
Cooper, Richard AshmoleHill, Sir Clement L. (Shrewsbury)Pollock, Ernest Murray
Craig, Captain James (Down, E.)Hills, John WallerPretyman, Ernest George
Craik, Sir HenryHoare, Samuel John GurneyPryce-Jones, Col. E.

Remnant, James FarquharsonSykes, Mark (Hull, Central)Willoughby, Major Hon. Claud
Roberts, S. (Sheffield, Ecclesall)Talbot, Lord EdmundWolmer, Viscount
Rolleston, Sir JohnTerrell, Henry (Gloucester)Wood, John (Stalybridge)
Rothschild, Lionel deThompson, Robert (Belfast, North)Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart-
Royds, EdmundTouche, George AlexanderYate, Col. C. E.
Samuel, Sir Harry (Norwood)Tryon, Capt. George ClementYerburgh, Robert
Sanders, Robert A.Valentia, ViscountYounger, Sir George
Sanderson, LancelotWard, A. S. (Herts, Watford)
Spear, Sir John WardWhite, Major G. D. (Lancs., Southport)

TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—Mr. Atherley-Jones and Mr. Peto.

Staveley-Hill, HenryWilliams, Col. R. (Dorset, W.)
Stewart, Gershom

I beg to move, at the end of the Clause, to add the words, "Provided that this Section shall not take effect until the other Powers mentioned in Article 15 of the Convention set out in the First Schedule to this Act have likewise made provision to secure within their several jurisdictions the enforcement of all orders and decrees of the said Court in the matter of appeals and transfers from the several Prize Courts."

The object of this Amendment is plain on the face of it. It is to secure that there shall be some reciprocity in enforcing the decrees of this International Prize Court. In other words, we should have to enforce decrees in favour of a Power that never intended and never has taken power to itself to enforce the decrees. I understand the Government may insert some Amendment in Clause 29 in order to meet this point, and I therefore only formally move the Amendment.

Of course, I entirely sympathise with and understand the object of the hon. and learned Member that if this Clause 28 is to be applied to Great Britain, some similar provision should be made in the other countries which ratify the Declaration of London. I think we have provided for that, and if the hon. and learned Gentleman thinks it advisable, I would suggest that he should add certain words to his Amendment, which would be more appropriate to Clause 20 than to this Clause. If the House looks at Section 29 they will see it provides that "this part of the Act should apply only to such cases and during such period as may for the time being be directed by Order in Council." It is provided that power should be given to the executive Government to see that provisions for enforcing the decrees of the International Prize Court are made in other countries as well as in this country. By Article 9 of the Convention "the contracting Powers undertake to submit in good faith to the decisions of the International Prize Court, and to carry them out with the least possible delay."

Any Power which ratifies the Prize Court Convention is bound by this Article 9. I think we secure all the objects which the hon. and learned Gentleman has in view.

I would point out that the Article referred to in the Convention is really of no good at all. What we want is to secure that the other contracting parties shall have a similar Clause in their legislation.

It is not necessary in all foreign countries to have that provision, because the procedure would be different in other countries. I do not, however, want to go into legal questions; it would depend upon the constitution of the Prize Court; but if the hon. and learned Gentleman is not satisfied with the explanation, I think we might meet his view by adding similar words with a similar object, and the words we suggest are that the parties referred to should be parties to the Convention. If we add those words to Clause 29, with some other slight modifications of the hon. Gentleman's proposal, the object he has in view, I think, would then be attained. Of course, the difficulty about the whole thing is this: I am afraid that even in the modified form I have suggested there would be a little difficulty as to who is to begin. Somebody must begin to ratify the Declaration. The ratifying of the Declaration, of course, does not carry out the decrees of the International Prize Court, and an Order in Council would be required. If foreign Powers do not provide for carrying out the decrees of the Prize Court, we should not like the Order in Council. The question arises, therefore, who is to begin.

I am much obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for his explanation, and as the matter is to be dealt with on Clause 29, I ask leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I have an Amendment on the Paper which I do not intend to move, after the decision given by the House on the first Amendment. The Amendment that I have on the Paper is, "Provided that such Courts shall not enforce any order or decree of the International Prize Court so far as such order or decree may be inconsistent with or contrary to the municipal prize law of Great Britain." I do not want to recapitulate the arguments which have been advanced, but I think it is very much to be regretted that you should give this Prize Court the power, in pursuance of the terms of a Treaty, to give judgments that may seriously affect the rights of private citizens. May I ask whether some provision could not be made in another place to meet my object?

Clause 29—(Application Of Part Iii)

This Part of this Act shall apply only to such cases and during such period as may for the time being be directed by Order in Council, and His Majesty may by the same or any other Order in Council apply this Part of this Act subject to such conditions, exceptions, and qualifications as may be deemed expedient.

I beg to move, at the end of the Clause, to add the words "But in no case shall it apply to matters or questions not definitely specified in the Declaration of London."

The object of the Amendment is really to get rid of the uncertainty which attaches to the words "equity and justice." We are told that this International Prize Court, under certain conditions, which the Declaration of London does not specify, is to adjudicate according to its own ideas of equity and justice, and I think we should limit the power of the International Court to such agreement as exists in the Declaration of London, and that it shall not be extended by the vague use of the words "equity and justice."

I rise to a point of Order. As it appears to me, I submit to you that this Amendment is out of order for this reason. The Bill begins with a Preamble which refers to the Convention which is in the Schedule. We have already started Part III. of the Bill. Under Clause 23, which provided "In the event of an International Prize Court being constituted in accordance with the said convention." The hon. Gentleman is now proposing to move that this International Prize Court shall not have the jurisdiction which the Convention assigns to it. Article 7 of the Convention states,

"In the absence of such provisions the Court shall apply the rules of International law. If no generally recognised rule exists the Court shall give judgment in accordance with the general principles of justice and equity."
The hon. Member is now moving in effect that the Court shall not have that portion of its jurisdiction. That is the basis on which the whole Bill proceeds, and we have already passed Clause 23.

I respectfully submit that the Amendment is in order. A proposal is made to the House to give effect to the Convention by the provisions under Part III. which we are now discussing. The House may refuse to give effect at all to the provisions of the Convention, and surely it is open to us to say we will give effect to the provisions of the Convention only partially, namely, where the Court has some guide by the Declaration of London.

I do not think it is open to the House to say we will accept this Declaration in part. We must take the whole of it or none, and as the Declaration contains these words: "The Court shall apply the rules of International law. If no generally recognised rule exists the Court shall give judgment in accordance with the general principle of justice and equity"—it is to be assumed that in confirming this Convention Parliament assents to everything contained in that Declaration.

Amendment made: At the end of the Clause insert the words "Provided that no such Order in Council shall be issued until the other Powers mentioned in Article 15 of the Convention set out in the First Schedule to this Act, if parties to the Convention, have made provision to secure within their several jurisdictions the enforcement of all orders and decrees of the said International Prize Court in the matter of appeals and transfers from the several Prize Courts."—[ Mr. Butcher.]

Part Iv

Prize Salvage And Prize Bounty

Prize Salvage.

Clause 30—(Salvage To Re-Captors Of British Ship Or Goods From Enemy)

Where any ship or goods belonging to any of His Majesty's subjects, after being taken as prize by the enemy, is or are retaken from the enemy by any of His Majesty's ships of war, the same shall be restored by decree of a Prize Court to the owner.

I beg to move to leave out the words "by decree of a Prize Court."

The Grand Committee came to the conclusion that what usually is known as prize salvage, that is to say the special reward which is decreed by a Prize Court to be given to a man-o'-war for the recapture from the enemy of a British merchantman, should cease to be so held. There was a long discussion in which opinion was very equally divided, and not by any means divided on party lines. The Government accept the view which the Committee entertained, that after such recapture the merchantman shall be handed back to the owner without a decree of the Prize Court. This is quite distinct from prize bounty, which is a reward given from the public funds to the officers and men of one of His Majesty's ships who have exerted themselves in capturing or destroying any armed ship of His Majesty's enemies. Of course, it also does not deal with prize money, which is the means by which in ancient times, and it may be to-day, the officers and men of the Navy take some direct interest in the proceeds of a prize, that is to say, a foreign merchantman which happened to be captured in the event of war. This is not a case of foreign merchantmen or foreign men-o'-war, but the recapture of a British merchantman which has, unfortunately, been captured.

I desire to ask whether the point as to whether salvage money should be paid or not is covered by this Amendment, because I have an Amendment subsequently, and if this Amendment raises the whole point perhaps it will be more convenient to take it now.

If the acceptance of the Amendment would prejudice the Amendment of the hon. Member he ought to say what he has to say now.

Although the Solicitor-General has made a very short speech he is really proposing to make a very great alteration in the law. My Amendment proposes to restore the Clause granting in certain cases this salvage money, and the Clause which was in the original Bill, and in favour of which the Government made a gallant fight in Committee upstairs. I do not know whether their efforts were exhausted by the gallantry of their fight because apparently they seem to wish to change their mind now and to accept their defeat. I think a Government ought never to accept defeat, and I wish to support the earlier or better mind of the Government which differed from their present position. There are one or two grounds why I am strongly in favour of retaining the old rule about salvage money. The first of those grounds is because of antiquity. Salvage money for recaptures is among the oldest codes of maritime law. You find it in the Consolato del Mare of those trading in the Western Mediterranean as early as the Eleventh Century. Those customs have been followed by Statutes, and one of the earliest Statutes in this country was that in the Commonwealth of 1648 by which one-eighth of the value in lieu of salvage was given on recapture. From that day to this there have been no less than thirteen of those Statutes which terminated with the end of the war for which they were passed. In 1864 a permanent Statute was passed, declaring that under certain circumstances this salvage money should be paid. The Clause I wish to restore to this Bill is the same Clause as was contained in the Bill of 1864.

So much for the antiquity of the custom, and if you wish to go from habit or custom to authority, I challenge hon. Members opposite to point to a single great authority on International law, which does not support the custom. The only difference really is as to the exact mode and standard by which the amount of money should be considered, and whether it should be on the value of the ship or the difficulty encountered by the sailors in trying to recover the ship. Under the Statute law of this country the property of the ship is not invested in the captor until it has been recaptured after it has been condemned in the Court of the other Power, while according to International law the vesting of the vessel in the captor takes place at an earlier period. Is there any reason on principle why this salvage money should not be paid?

I think there is none. It is argued, of course, on the other side by those who are against it that the Navy, in recapturing these merchant vessels, is simply doing its duty, and therefore it is not necessary that the men should be paid as they are only doing their duty. I am bound to say I think that argument applies as much to ordinary prize money, and as the Government are going to retain the one I think they ought to retain the other. I am in favour of both, and I think the reasons in favour of the payment of some reward are intensified as the years go on because the service of the Navy is enormously more risky and the dangers and difficulties with submarines, torpedoes, and the like, much greater than they were previously, and as the pay of the Navy, compared with the rise in prices, is not as adequate as it might be it ought, therefore, to be supplemented in other ways. I understand that some of the shipowners are strongly opposed to the payment of this salvage money. They say that as they contribute to the taxes they ought to pay no more if their great vessels are recaptured after they are taken. I think that that is rather a niggardly view, because, after all, in the capture of these vessels the Naval Service may have had a very tough time, the capture may have been effected with great difficulty, men may have lost their lives and others have been wounded, and, whatever view other people may take, I do not think it lies with those who have had their vessels saved and their whole value handed back to them to grudge the payment of money to, it may be, the widows of those who have fallen in the struggle. I hope, therefore, that no shipowner, at any rate, or representative of shipowners, will put forward a single argument against the payment of prize salvage money in these cases.

There is an even worse argument than that. They do not say so much, "We do not want to pay something," as "We do not want to pay so much." Vessels have enormously increased in size and their cargoes in value in the last twenty years; therefore it is suggested that one-eighth is too much. If a big vessel like the "Lusitania" or the "Mauretania" were captured, the idea of one-eighth of its value in prize-money would make one's mouth water. Still, you could put the argument on the other side just as forcibly. If a shipowner has been secured from the total loss of one of these great vessels he ought not to grudge paying a share of that which he has been saved by the efforts of His Majesty's Navy. I have retained in my proposal the precise wording of the Act of 1864, which also was approved by the Government. Moreover, the proportion happens to be the same as obtains in the laws of the United States, and no one will contend that the United States have not vessels as large as those which we possess. Therefore, as regards the amount of payment, I do not think the objection ought strongly to apply—more especially as under the Clause agreements for any less amount, if entered into, may be sanctioned by the Court. I need say nothing on the provisos of the Clause; they are perfectly clear and simple. Therefore, to sum up my argument, I ask the Government to restore this Clause on these general grounds: first, on the ground of immemorial custom; secondly, that authority is in favour of it; thirdly, that it obtains in the codes of all the great maritime Powers; and, fourthly, that it is fair and right, if you are going to maintain prize money, and in the interest of general policy, that some reward in these cases of recapture should be given to the men who, in order to effect the recapture, may have gone through very serious danger. Cases might be mentioned where prizes have been very easily recaptured. In such cases you have the Court, and you must assume ordinary common sense in the Court. Grants of money will not be allowed by the Court unless there has been a real struggle for the recapture or the vessel has been recaptured under serious circumstances.

This Amendment raises the whole question of whether we shall continue prize salvage. Clause 30, as it went to the Grand Committee, contained provisions for prize salvage in the case of the recapture of a merchant ship by a British ship of war. It was really a re-enactment for consolidation purposes of Section 40 of the Act of 1864. When my hon. Friend the Member for Hexham (Mr. Holt) moved to take out prize salvage, in which Motion he was successful, it was not a party matter, because he was supported by two Members whom I see opposite—the hon. Member for Brighton (Captain Tryon) and the hon. Member for Andover (Captain Faber). On that occasion I took the view that this was a domestic matter, entirely extraneous or certainly incidental to the main purpose of the Bill. We were bringing up this Clause, together with the Clauses dealing with prize money and prize bounty for consolidation purposes. There was no need to re-enact them. We could have left them in the Act of 1864, and gone on with this Bill apart from them, but, as a matter of public convenience they were put into this particular measure. Therefore I took the position that it was scarcely an occasion on which the Amendment should be made, and I urged that the Clause should be allowed to stand. The matter having been raised, the Committee proceeded, as they were entitled to do, to consider the whole policy of prize salvage. Under the Act of 1864 the position is that, if a merchant ship is captured and subsequently re-captured by a British ship of war, prize salvage is to be awarded. The position taken upstairs was that we all pay our taxes to provide the British Navy, part of whose duty it is—and it has always done it admirably—to protect British commerce; and the suggestion was that it was not fair to shipowners that they should be asked to pay over again, because all that the Navy has done is no more and no less than its duty. After a full discussion on the merits of the case from that point of view, my hon. Friend's Amendment was carried by fifteen to eleven, and he was supported, as I have said, by the hon. Member for Brighton and the hon. Member for Andover, who certainly cannot be suspected of doing anything to the detriment of the Navy or to injure the safety or prosperity of British commerce. I immediately placed the matter before the then First Lord, who is now Home Secretary, and the two questions of prize salvage and prize money were discussed at a meeting of the Board. It would not be true to say that the views on the question of the retention of prize salvage were absolutely identical, but I can say that the general view was that prize salvage in or prize salvage out really did not matter very much. There was no feeling strong enough, as far as they were concerned, to suggest that we should reinsert the proposal to award prize salvage.

I am relating what happened at the Board. It is some time ago. There was not a sufficiently strong feeling either way to justify us in asking for the reinsertion of the provision as to prize salvage. That is a perfectly fair description of what happened at the Board. The question of prize money is a different question altogether, and I shall have something to say about that later on.

When you supported the provision upstairs had not the Admiralty been consulted?

I cannot remember that this point was discussed with me prior to the Committee.

I defended it on the ground that we ought not to deal with a purely domestic matter in a Bill of this sort, when we were merely consolidating. A suggestion was made upstairs, I think rather humorously than otherwise, that you might have a naval officer so lost to a sense of duty that he might conceivably let a British ship be captured in order that he might recapture it.

I agree. I remember that it was laughed at, and perhaps it was not a serious suggestion. Having, as I say, ascertained to the best of our ability the general feeling of the Board of Admiralty on the question of prize salvage, we feel that on the whole it is a case where the verdict of the Committee, which was not arrived at by a party vote at all, might very well be allowed to stand.

7.0 P.M.

I entirely agree with the reason put forward by the Secretary to the Admiralty when defending in the Committee the retention of prize salvage. Apart from the question of the International Court, this is a consolidation Bill, and it is not an occasion on which a great change of this kind should be introduced. With regard to the suggestion that some members of the Navy might allow ships to be captured in order that they might have the honour of recapturing them, I cannot regard that except as a joke, and, I may say, a very bad one. I think prize salvage should be retained because it is just in itself. When such a conspicuous service has been rendered by one of His Majesty's ships as the recapture of a vessel, and he has got back that which otherwise would have been totally lost to him, the instinct of the British shipowner would be that some reward was due to those who had been engaged at the risk of their lives in rendering that conspicuous service. It is true it is their duty to do it, and they discharge their duty. Let me just put this case to the House, and ask them whether the shipowner would not feel rather small if, under the circumstances, salvage was not paid. A captain of one of His Majesty's ships cannot be doing two things at once. He has the opportunity of capturing a most valuable merchantman belonging to the enemy, or the opportunity of rescuing a British ship which has been captured by the enemy. With that sense of duty which has always animated the Navy before everything else, the captain of the British cruiser, doing that which seems to be most in discharge of his duty and in the interests of the country, saves the British ship, whilst the enemy's merchantman escapes. Thereby he loses for himself, and for his crew, a share of the prize money or bounty which they would have got. He has sacrificed the prize bounty in order to rescue the British ship. I do think, under those circumstances, that it would be a very mean thing indeed if the shipowner objected to the payment of prize salvage. I regard prize salvage as just in itself, I think to take it away would be a great mistake in the interests of shipowners and others, and I further most strongly agree with the Secretary of the Admiralty that a Consolidation Bill of this kind is not the occasion for the change.

It is all very well to say that a change in the law ought not to be made in a Consolidation Bill, but how on earth is a private Member to get any change in the law if he does not take the opportunities open to him? It must be perfectly obvious to everyone that if those private Members who object to prize salvage had waited till they had got an opportunity of bringing in a Bill and carrying it, that they might have waited 150 years. Therefore it is necessary to take the opportunity when we get it. I am very glad, too, that the Government have decided to support the decision of the Grand Committee. It would be an unfortunate thing for Grand Committee work if it was taken as a matter of course that the decisions of Grand Committee were going to be over ruled whenever some section of the House did not happen to like those decisions. It is quite clear you would not get hon. Members to give serious thought to the work of Grand Committee. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Taunton almost suggested that if the Government is defeated——

I did not understand the Government to say that they had decided to support——

Oh, no, no! We should oppose the reinsertion of prize salvage. We propose to leave the Clause as it came down from Grand Committee.

Another argument of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Taunton really strikes me as rather thin. He said he intended to support the original law on the ground of antiquity. That is an argument by which you can defend almost every conceivable abuse that ever existed on the face of the earth. That was the argument used to defend the old penal laws, when a man was hanged for stealing 5s. I object to the whole system of prize salvage. I object plainly and openly as a shipowner. It is not only a question for the shipowner. It is just as much a question for the merchant whose goods are carried on board. We, that is the shipowners and merchants, say that we pay our taxes in precisely the same manner as any other taxpayer in this country, and we are entitled, as having paid for them, to the use of His Majesty's armed forces to defend and rescue our property in precisely the same way as the property of other people is defended and rescued That is our case put on broad and general, and, as we conceive, grounds of justice.

No other class is asked to pay prize salvage. Supposing a hostile cruiser landed a force on a British island and took possession of that British island. Supposing the armed forces of the Crown subsequently drove the invaders off the island. Does anyone for a moment suggest that the owners of property on that island would be asked to pay a special contribution towards recovering the property that belonged to them? What is the difference between that position and the position of the shipowner? I cannot conceive any possible reason for making a difference between the owners of landed property, which is invaded by a hostile force and the owner of a ship which is also invaded by a hostile force. I remember very well, when the South African war was going on, some person suggested that the inhabitants of Kimberley ought to pay salvage. The Government of the day treated that proposal with very scant consideration. Yet that was precisely the same suggestion as is now being put forward. I would like to call the attention of the House to another point in this connection. If you put this obligation to pay prize salvage on the ship and the cargo, you increase the cost of carriage during a time of war. You are therefore necessarily, by increasing the premium of insurance, adding to the cost of using British ships to bring merchandise to this country in time of war, and that is the very thing that everybody is so anxious about. We are all anxious that British ships should be used as much as possible to feed this country in time of war. It seems to me an exceptionally foolish step to take under the circumstances to put unnecessary burdens on shipping and sea-borne commerce. We ought instead to keep as many off as we possibly can.

I do not want it to be understood for a moment that I suggest that any of us begrudge proper payment for the officers of the Navy. They ought to be properly paid for the work they do. But what on earth that has to do with the value of the prizes which they may recapture I cannot for the life of me conceive. Why a naval officer should receive a large sum for recapturing a vessel that has had on a prize crew for half an hour, when he gets nothing for a sanguinary engagement that perhaps has happened a little while before for saving the same vessel from capture, I cannot see. Let naval officers be paid the sum that Parliament thinks proper for services rendered during a time of war. I am quite sure that Parliament will meet such an application in no grudging spirit. But I strongly object to the pay of naval officers being made dependent on the haphazard as to whether or not they have been lucky in capturing or recapturing valuable merchantmen. I am very glad that the Government are standing by the Committee, and I shall certainly support them to the best of my ability.

I am one who supports the principle of prize money, and who has done his best in Grand Committee to retain prize money for the Navy. Furthermore, I am quite prepared to say that those officers and men who successfully take part in the recapture of British ships should be rewarded. I am not, however, able to see why the reward of those officers and men should fall upon the shipping industry, and not upon the whole community. The shipping industry is the one industry which, above all others, will deserve the support of the country in time of war. We want to do all we can to get our ships to go out to sea and to embark in trade in time of war, and to impose the task of rewarding the Navy on the shipping industry, and not on the whole country, is to my mind discouraging our merchantmen in time of war. I believe that this is a national interest. If rewards are to be given they should be given in the form of rewards from the nation, and not rewards from the particular industry concerned. After all, the shipping industry pay their taxes towards the upkeep of the Navy, and I do not see why this heavy burden should be put on them. I stand absolutely by what I said in Committee, and I am glad to see that the Government are now taking that view. I have only risen because I feel that as I took that line in Committee I am bound to get up and say so now.

This has been a very interesting discussion. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Taunton who moved the Amendment suggested that one of the reasons, the special reason, why he urged his Amendment, and that the suggestion of the Government should not be entertained, was that this particular form of prize money in naval engagements bad great antiquity. The mere age of it is sufficient to enable the hon. Member to justify its continued existence! I suggest that the conditions that prevail so far as the Navy and the mercantile marine are concerned in a naval war are entirety changed from the time when this principle was first instituted. There is another situation. I understand that naval strategy to-day is not a question of ships being in an equally good position for purposes of capture or recapture of the vessels of the enemy or our own. The protection of our commerce is a special class of work. The consequence is that the whole of the men who may be engaged in defending this country in our battleships will face the enemy in the battle line, and give their lives in defence of their country without any possible chance under present arrangements of getting any prize money. It is extremely doubtful whether they will get a pension for the widows and children that are left behind. Fast cruisers specially built will, I understand, be detailed for the class of work which we have under discussion. I am not distinguishing between prize bounty and I prize salvage. I am against either policy. Even if we are to take into account the suggestion of the hon. Member who defends prize salvage, it is only a certain class of ships as a rule that will enable them to take prizes of this description.

Therefore, it is merely enforcing an assumption that is so antiquated and ridiculous and so unfair that it should no longer continue. In Naval Debates in this House, when demands are made upon the British taxpayer for more money for the building of "Dreadnoughts" and other ships and for the upkeep of the personnel of the Navy, we are told that it is for the purpose of insurance for our oversea trade. Figures are sometimes quoted to show that it is only so much per cent. insurance on tonnage and merchandise. If this is a system of insurance which we establish, the shipowners have to pay with the rest of the citizens of the country for this insurance for their property, and to ask them to pay a particular duty under the circumstances suggested here seems to me to be one of the most ridiculous propositions that can be imagined. Take another state of things, where, for instance, military operations are being conducted. If soldiers capture a town and perhaps lose hundreds and thousands of lives, we do not dream of giving them prizes, neither do we in the case where a town has been captured by the enemy and recaptured by our soldiers do we dream of levying a special poundage rate upon the town and distributing it amongst the officers and soldiers engaged in the recapture. What justice is there in saying we are not prepared to protect the property of British citizens unless they specially pay for that protection?

I say so, and we are the best judges and not the men who are going to pocket the money. I think it would be an outrageous proposition that, in the case of ships belonging to the mercantile marine, lost perhaps because of the want of vigilance or culpable negligence and captured by the enemy, should be paid for in prize money if they are recaptured again, and that there should be demanded from our citizens a special toll because men had simply done their duty. I am glad to find that some Members on the other side of the House who have the welfare of the Navy at heart objected to such a proposition as well as Members upon this side. In the Committee upstairs, two Service Members of the Opposition voted against this proposition, believing it to be unfair and unjust. The most peculiar argument advanced in favour of it, was that put forward by the right hon. Gentleman (Sir B. Finlay) on the Front Bench opposite. He referred to a suggestion that an officer might through culpable negligence neglect to save a ship until an enemy's prize crew was put aboard, and might wait until then before capturing it in order to get the prize-money. He repudiated that, but he suggested where there was a chance of capturing an enemy's merchant ship, unless you had prize money for defending your own ship, an officer might let your ship go and take one of the enemy's instead, because he would get a prize for doing so. I was never taught logic, but I imagined the right hon. Gentleman's suggestion of what might happen in that case was even worse than the suggestion he was trying to repudiate in the other case.

The hon. Gentleman will forgive me. What I said was, that if the captain of a cruiser sacrificed a valuable merchantman belonging to the enemy and thereby gave up his chance of poundage in order to save the British ship, it was a right and proper thing that he should get a prize having sacrificed a good chance of making a lot of money in order to stand by a British ship.

I am not sure that that is not even worse than the other cases put by the right hon. Gentleman. I never heard it suggested if something was stolen and the police proceeded at the risk of their lives to recapture the property and did recapture it, that the man who owned the property was to have a levy imposed upon him to pay the policeman who had risked his life in getting it back. The fact is, I quite see, that the Government and the Admiralty when they came to consider this matter, being reasonable and straightforward men, saw that there was no possible justification for this suggestion.

I listened with some interest to the views of the shipowners as expressed by the hon. Member (Mr. Holt), and I am bound to say he entirely failed to convince me that when a shipowner loses his ship owing to its capture by an enemy, he is entitled, as a matter of right, to get back his valuable property without paying a penny for the recovery of it. That seems to me not consonant with the principle of justice. I should have thought that the shipowner himself would be only too happy to pay for such valuable service. Why should a British shipowner not do something of the kind for the men who at great exertion, and it may be at the risk of their lives, recover his property for him? I do not see why the shipowner should get off without paying anything at all. The hon. Member (Mr. Holt) said he did not like to disturb the decisions of the Committee. But there were only twenty-six Members in the Committee, of whom eleven voted one way and fifteen the other, and I entirely repudiate the idea that that decision is in any way binding upon the rest of the 670 Members of this House who were not present.

The hon. and learned Gentleman was a member of that Committee, but he did not take the trouble to attend.

I think that is a somewhat ungenerous suggestion of the hon. and learned Gentleman. I attended the Committee as often as I could, but on that particular occasion I was unfortunately unable to attend owing to professional duties. However, I will not go into that matter now. The hon. Member (Mr. Holt) seems to think he should pay nothing for getting back his ship because he says he pays taxes and is entitled to protection. So he is. We are all entitled to protection, but what the hon. Gentleman wants is to have some special benefit in the case of his particular trade and to get it for nothing. He does not want to pay anything special to the Navy any more than the rest of us, yet he expects to get this special protection without paying anything for it. The hon. Gentleman who spoke last (Mr. J. Ward) seemed to think there was something degrading in this kind of thing. I can only say it is the first time for some hundreds of years that that view was put forward by maritime representatives in this or even in any other country. I stand up for the interests of the British sailor. Hon. Gentlemen opposite stand up for the interests of the British shipowner. Where these interests conflict I shall always support the interests of the British sailor, and I hope the House will do the same. Let the House remember that this is not a new theory initiated by the House in the course of the last few years. It was advocated by every leader of maritime importance for the last 300 years, and it is part of the legislation of almost every maritime country in the world. The United States, France, Spain, Holland, and so on have had it, and only differ as to how much is to be paid for salvage. In some cases where a ship is captured by an enemy and remains for a certain time in possession of the enemy, the right of the owner is absolutely forfeited; and if that ship is recovered or recaptured, so far from the owner having any right to get it back, he has no right to it at all, and it becomes the right of the Navy. My hon. Friend the Solicitor-General will not deny that in some cases a ship is absolutely forfeited in many countries, but the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Holt) says, "No matter whether my ship is forfeited or not, I want to get it back for nothing." Let me say a word about the facts of our own country.

The provisions in this Bill in the Committee upstairs were the same provisions that appear in the 43 and 45 cap. George III. more than a hundred years ago, and they had remained unquestioned on the Statute Book ever since; and there were Acts of a similar nature a hundred or two hundred years previously to that. So far as I know, this right of prize salvage for the British Navy was never questioned or attacked until it was attacked in the Committee upstairs. No responsible British statesman was ever heard to object to British sailors having their salvage prize money. It has been reserved for the hon. Member for Hexham—who, in a Committee upstairs, consisting of twenty-six Members, brought forward this Amendment, which was carried by a majority of four—to ask this House to confirm that decision. I listened with some interest to the speech of the Secretary to the Admiralty, and I thought he was going to explain why the Committee had used all their energies to oppose the hon. Member for Hexham's proposal, whereas now they are using all their eloquence to support him. What is the reason alleged for this extraordinary change of front? The only reason the right hon. Gentleman gave for supporting the proposal was that it is the duty of the Navy to protect British commerce, and that therefore you must abolish prize salvage.

It is contended that in protecting British commerce and recapturing British ships, that the Navy is only doing its duty. It is the duty of Foreign countries to protect their commerce, and is every legislator in a Foreign country to be told that he has done something degrading because he has supported the view that the sailors who recapture ships should get prize money? I regret extremely that the Government should have changed their front for no reason which has been alleged or can be alleged, and I hope the House, on this occasion will refuse to reaffirm the decision come to by a small Committee by a majority of four, and reaffirm by its vote those principles which have animated every writer and statesman of eminence with regard to salvage money since time immemorial.

It is obvious that after all what is required in a matter of this kind is only a little common sense. I can suppose a case of this kind arising. We hear a good deal in this House occasionally about the shortages of the Navy. There might be a shipowner on the same side as the hon. Member opposite, and he might complain very strongly about the shortage in the Navy. War might take place and the hon. Member might have agitated for increasing the size of the Navy, and it might be because the Navy had not been kept up to the proper pitch that his ships were captured. If they are recaptured, then the shipowner is to be asked to pay extra because the Navy has not been kept up to the strength which he advocated. I think that is a position which nobody could get up and defend in this House, because you would be imposing a burden upon a man for the reason that the nation had not kept up the Navy to its proper strength. The hon. Member for Stoke seems to have aroused the wrath of the hon. Member for York (Mr. Butcher). It seems to me that you are proposing to treat the naval hero in the spirit of a flunkey. The men in the Navy should be paid a proper remuneration for carrying out their duties. I think every man in this House recognises that the men in the Navy are prepared and willing to carry their lives in their hands in defence of their country. I think we all recognise that. It may be that the men in the Navy deserve better wages and conditions, and I should be willing to vote in the same Lobby as any hon. Member opposite as soon as ever he desires to effect some improvement in the wages and conditions of the men engaged in the Navy.

This kind of vicarious reward is not the kind of thing the man in the Navy desires. What he wants is to have a permanency in his wages and his position, and he expects, and rightly expects, that, by the pay he receives he will be able to lead a reasonable life, and not depend upon any such reward as this, which he can only receive in time of war. The hon. Member for Stoke has referred to the case of the police, and he mentioned the great scene in the East-end of London in the Sydney Street affair. Here was a case where the men in the Metropolitan Police not only carried their lives in their hands, but a number of them lost their lives in the performance of their duties. If those men had recaptured what had been stolen, or if any policeman or detective succeeds in recovering stolen property, why should they be entitled to some special reward for having recovered that property? This seems quite a new doctrine to me. It is argued that this proposal should be adopted because it has been the custom with regard to the Navy, and has been in operation for hundreds of years. It does not appear to matter how foolish it may be, but because it has been carried on for hundreds of years, despite all reason and common sense and arguments, it is to be retained, although it has got by this time completely out of date. As the hon. Member for Hexham pointed out with very great force and strength, if ever there is a naval war it should be the business of this country to endeavour to allow the merchant seamen of this country and the ships to travel with the least conceivable risk. We hear a good deal about the importation of foodstuffs into this country in time of war, and we are told by some people, almost in a breathless state of excitement, that we might be starved into submission. By this proposal you are going to help the enemy to starve us into submission by putting an extra risk on those who endeavour to run the mercantile of this country. Such a proposal will not stand argument, and it is against all modern, up-to-date common sense. For this reason I support the Government.

As one who sat upstairs upon the Committee, and as one who took part in the gallant fight for this prize salvage, I regret that the Government has seen their way to run away from the proposition which they put before us upstairs. The discussion on the Committee was going on fairly well until somebody mentioned the "Lusitania," and it was stated that the reward in the case of such a vessel as one-eighth would be a very large sum of money indeed. I admit that in such a case it would represent a very large sum, but to withdraw the whole prize salvage and give nothing on that account seems to me to be a very strong step to take. The Court which would decide such matters is well able to take into consideration the risks attending the act of saving a ship, and I think it would be a mistake to lay down any definite percentage in regard to the prize money. It will not be denied that prize salvage tends to prevent the destruction of property. We are now dealing with young men who may be called upon to enter into all sorts of desperate enterprises, and to some extent a reward of this kind would encourage recruiting. I was very much struck with the ungenerous attitude which the hon. Member for Stoke took up towards the British seaman. He said a sailor was a sort of man who has a life of chance. In my opinion, to rob him of this little bit of luck is a most ungenerous thing. Hon. Members opposite are adopting a sort of highly moral tone in regard to salvage, but why do they not object to salvage in time of peace? The principle of reward for salvage at sea in time of peace is accepted, and why salvage in time of war should be struck out altogether in this way I fail to see.

The Secretary to the Admiralty said he submitted this case to the Board of Admiralty, but now the Government have got a new Board, and would it not be advisable to submit such a serious change to them? This shows what a very poor substitute a Standing Committee upstairs is to the House of Commons. At one moment the decision of the Committee is brushed on one side, and on another occasion it is accepted. I cannot see how the Government can justify their attitude in slating on one occasion that the decision of a Committee upstairs is final, and on another occasion that such a decision has no weight at all. I disagree with what the hon. Member for Hexham and the hon. Member for Barrow said. Underwriters, in making their return, will take into consideration all risks, and if our sailors in time of war are given prize salvage the rates of underwriting will be reduced. This proposal will establish a sporting chance, and the underwriters will consider that chance and accept lower premiums. I consider it a very regrettable thing that an Ancient right of the Navy should be cut out at a moment's notice owing to a snap Division upstairs, when the Government did all they could to get the Committee to come to an adverse decision to that which they arrived at. I still hope that with a new Board of Admiralty the Parliamentary Secretary may see his way not quite finally to accept this Clause. He does not look very happy about it. The Navy does not like its privileges encroached upon. I hope, therefore, he will see his way to give a Court some right of awarding salvage in time of war if ships are recovered by the efforts of our own Navy.

The hon. Member who has just sat down endeavoured to draw a distinction between salvage in time of peace and what he described as salvage in time of war, but he forgot that salvage in time of peace means payment for services rendered, and that what he described as salvage in time of war means that the State is doing something for the protection of the property of its citizens.

No; what I said was the fact that seamen get something for salving a ship increases their efforts to do it.

I do not think the hon. Gentleman has disproved the contrast I have drawn with respect to what he himself said. He also talked of desperate undertakings in naval warfare. Have not the Army desperate undertakings? You do not give any extra prize money to them. I cannot profess to be a naval expert, and I was rather surprised at the logic of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for York (Mr. Butcher). Suppose his house was burglariously entered and a great deal of valuable property was taken away, he would not be compelled to pay any prize money if his property was recovered by the police and restored to him. It appears to me that so far as capture at sea is concerned it ought to be in exactly the same category. We have a better case even than the police. There is the fire brigade who in this great city day in and day out and week in and week out are saving property. You never hear of them being paid for their services so far as the property is concerned. It does not appear to me because this question of prize money is an ancient thing that is any sound reason why it should be continued. The whole of the men in the Navy do not participate so far as prize money is concerned. If they all participated, there might be something to be said in its favour, but, as only certain sections receive it, it does not appear to me to be a right thing. If any proposal were made for making the Navy more attractive to seamen than it is to-day, no one would give such a proposal more hearty support than I would. If I might throw out a suggestion, I would say, let British vessels which have been captured by any enemy and recaptured by our Navy, if manned by foreigners, be the sole property so far as prize money is concerned of the Navy. That would cause a great many of our so-

Division No. 433.]

AYES.

[7.50 p.m.

Aitken, Sir William MaxEyres-Monsell, Bolton M.Pole-Carew, Sir R.
Anstruther-Gray, Major WilliamFell, ArthurPollock, Ernest Murray
Archer-Shee, Major MartinFinlay, Rt. Hon. Sir RobertPryce-Jones, Col. E. (M'tgom'y B'ghs)
Arkwright, John StanhopeFlannery, Sir J. FortescueRawlinson, John Frederick Peel
Ashley, W. W.Fletcher, John Samuel (Hampstead)Rawson, Colonel R. H.
Baird, J. L.Gardner, ErnestRemnant, James Farquharson
Balcarres, LordGibbs, G. A.Rolleston, Sir John
Barlow, Montague (Salford, South)Gilmour, Captain J.Rutherford, W. (Liverpool, W. Derby)
Beckett, Hon. GervaseGordon, John (Londonderry, South)Sanders, Robert A.
Benn, Arthur Shirley (Plymouth)Gretton, JohnSanderson, Lancelot
Bennett-Goldney, FrancisGuinness, Hon. W. E.Spear, Sir John Ward
Bentinck, Lord H. Cavendish-Hamilton, Lord C. J. (Kensington)Staveley-Hill, Henry
Bigland, AlfredHarris, Henry PercyStewart, Gershom
Boyle, W. L. (Norfolk, Mid.)Hill, Sir ClementTalbot, Lord Edmund
Bridgeman, W. CliveHorner, Andrew LongTerrell, Henry (Gloucester)
Burn, Colonel C. R.Houston, Robert PatersonThompson, Robert (Belfast, North)
Carlile, Sir Edward HildredJackson, Sir JohnValentia, Viscount
Cassel, FelixJardine, E. (Somerset, E.)Walker, Col. William Hall
Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)Kerry, Earl ofWheler, Granville C. H.
Cecil, Lord R. (Herts, Hitchin)Kinloch-Cooke, Sir ClementWhite, Major G. D. (Lancs., Southport)
Chaloner, Colonel R. G. W.Kirkwood, J. H. M.Williams, Col. R. (Dorset, W.)
Cooper, Richard AshmoleKyffin-Taylor, G.Wolmer, Viscount
Craig, Captain James (Down, E.)Lonsdale, Sir John BrownleeWood, John (Stalybridge)
Craig, Norman (Kent, Thanet)Lowe, Sir F. W. (Birm., Edgbaston)Worthington-Evans, L.
Croft, Henry PageMacmaster, DonaldWortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart-
Denniss, E. R. B.McNeill, Ronald (Kent, St. Augustine)Yate, Col. C. E.
Dixon, C. H.Mason, James F. (Windsor)
Doughty, Sir GeorgeParkes, Ebenezer

TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—Mr. Peel and Mr. Butcher,

Du Cross, Arthur PhilipPease, Herbert Pike (Darlington)
Duke, Henry EdwardPeto, Basil Edward

NOES.

Abraham, William (Dublin Harbour)Duncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness)Johnson, W.
Acland, Francis DykeDuncan, J. Hastings (York, Otley)Jones, William (Carnarvonshire)
Adamson, WilliamEdwards, Enoch (Hanley)Jones, W. S. Glyn- (Stepney)
Agnew, Sir George WilliamElibank, Rt. Hon. Master ofJowett, F. W.
Ainsworth, John StirlingFfrench, PeterKeating, M.
Alden, PercyFlavin, Michael JosephKellaway, Frederick George
Allen, Charles Peter (Stroud)Furness, StephenKelly, Edward
Baker, Joseph A. (Finsbury, E.)George, Rt. Hon. D. LloydLambert, George (Devon, S. Molton)
Barton, W.Gibson, Sir James PuckeringLardner, James Carrige Rushe
Beauchamp, Sir EdwardGill, A. H.Levy, Sir Maurice
Benn, W. (T. Hamlets, S. George)Gladstone, W. G. C.Lewis, John Herbert
Bentham, G. J.Glanville, H. J.Lundon, T.
Birrell, Rt. Hon. AugustineGoldston, FrankLynch, A. A.
Boland, John PiusGrey, Rt. Hon. Sir EdwardMacdonald, J. R. (Leicester)
Brocklehurst, W. B.Gulland, John WilliamMacdonald, J. M. (Falkirk Burghs)
Brunner, John F. L.Hackett, J.Macnamara, Rt. Hon. Dr. T. J.
Bryce, J. AnnanHancock, J. G.M'Callum, John M.
Burke, E. Haviland-Harcourt, Robert V. (Montrose)M'Laren, Hon. H. D. (Leics.)
Burns, Rt. Hon. JohnHarmsworth, Cecil (Luton, Beds.)M'Laren, Hon. F. W. S. (Lincs., Spalding)
Burt, Rt. Hon. ThomasHarvey, T. E. (Leeds, West)Marks, Sir George Croydon
Buxton, Rt. Hon. Sydney C. (Poplar)Harvey, W. E. (Derbyshire, N. E.)Mason, David M. (Coventry)
Carr-Gomm, H. W.Haslam, James (Derbyshire)Menzies, Sir Walter
Cawley, Sir Frederick (Prestwich)Havelock-Allan, Sir HenryMond, Sir Alfred M.
Chancellor, H. G.Hayden, John PatrickMorrell, Philip
Clancy, John JosephHayward, EvanMorton, Alpheus Cleophas
Clough, WilliamHelme, Norval WatsonMunro, R.
Clynes, J. R.Henderson, Arthur (Durham)Murray, Capt. Hon. A. C.
Collins, G. P. (Greenock)Henry, Sir CharlesNannetti, Joseph P.
Compton-Rickett, Rt. Hon. Sir J.Higham, John SharpNeilson, Francis
Condon, Thomas JosephHills, John WallerNolan, Joseph
Crawshay-Williams, EliotHinds, JohnO'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny)
Crumley, PatrickHodge, JohnO'Connor, John (Kildare, N.)
Davies, Timothy (Lincs., Louth)Holt, Richard DurningO'Doherty, Philip
Devlin, JosephHoward, Hon. GeoffreyO'Dowd, John
Dillon, JohnHudson, WalterO'Grady, James
Donelan, Captain A.Hughes, S. L.O'Kelly, Edward P. (Wicklow, W.)
Doris, WilliamJohn, Edward ThomasO'Shee, James John

patriotic shipowners to engage Britishers for the maiming of their ships.

Question put, "That the words 'by decree of a Prize Court' stand part of the Clause."

The House divided: Ayes, 87; Noes, 160.

O'Sullivan, TimothyRoche, Augustine (Louth)Ure, Rt. Hon. Alexander
Palmer, GodfreyRoe, Sir ThomasWadsworth, John
Parker, James (Halifax)Rowlands, JamesWalsh, Stephen (Lancs., Ince)
Pearce, Robert (Staffs, Leek)Rowntree, ArnoldWard, John (Stoke-upon-Trent)
Pearce, William (Limehouse)Samuel, Rt. Hon. H. L. (Cleveland)Wardle, George J.
Pirie, Duncan V.Seely, Col. Rt. Hon. J. E. B.Wedgwood, Josiah C.
Pollard, Sir George H.Sheeny, DavidWhite, J. (Glasgow, Tradeston)
Power, Patrick JosephSimon, Sir John AllsebrookWhittaker, Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas P.
Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central)Smith, Albert (Lancs., Clitheroe)Wiles, Thomas
Price, Sir Robert J. (Norfolk, E.)Smyth, Thomas F.Wilson, John (Durham, Mid)
Raffan, Peter WilsonStanley, Albert (Staffs, N.W.)Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)
Rea, Walter Russell (Scarborough)Sutton, John E.Wood, Rt. Hon. T. McKinnon (Glas.)
Reddy, M.Thomas, Abel (Carmarthen, E.)Young, William (Perth, East)
Redmond, John E. (Waterford)Thomas, James Henry (Derby)Yoxall, Sir James Henry
Roberts, Charles H. (Lincoln)Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton)
Robertson, Sir G. Scott (Bradford)Toulmin, Sir George

TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—Mr. Illingworth and Mr. Dudley Ward.

Robertson, J. M. (Tyneside)Tryon, Captain George Clement
Robinson, Sidney

Clause 31—(Permission To Re-Captured Ship To Proceed On Voyage And Postponement Of Proceedings)

(1) Where a ship belonging to any of His Majesty's subjects, after being taken as prize by the enemy, is retaken from the enemy by any of His Majesty's ships of war, she may, with the consent of the re-captors, prosecute her voyage, and it shall not be necessary for the re-captors to proceed to adjudication till her return to a port of His Majesty's dominions.

(2) The master or owner, or his agent, may, with the consent of the re-captors, unload and dispose of the goods on board the ship before adjudication.

(3) If the ship does not, within six months, return to a port of His Majesty's dominions, the re-captors may nevertheless institute proceedings against the ship or goods in the High Court, or in any Prize Court in a British possession, and the Court may thereupon award prize salvage as aforesaid to the re-captors, and may enforce payment thereof, either by warrant of arrest against the ship or goods, or in the same manner as a judgment of the Court in which the proceedings are instituted may be enforced.

Question, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill," put, and negatived.

Part Vi

Offences

Clause 37—(Offences By Captors)

A Prize Court, on proof of any offence against the law of nations, or against this Act, or any Act relating to naval discipline, or against any Order in Council or Royal proclamation, or of any breach of His Majesty's instructions relating to prize, or of any act of disobedience to the order of the Admiralty, or to the com- mand of a superior officer, committed by the captors in relation to any ship or goods taken as a prize, or in relation to any person on board any such ship, may, on condemnation, reserve the prize to His Majesty's disposal, notwithstanding any grant that may have been made by His Majesty in favour of captors.

I beg to move, to leave out the Clause.

8.0 P.M.

I wish to draw attention to the question of prize money as distinct from prize salvage. I am afraid the hon. Member for Taunton (Mr. Peel) may perhaps consider I am unduly rash in challenging the practice of prize money, because, if prize salvage is ancient, prize money is undoubtedly more so. Prize money at least goes back to the time of King John, and I think even earlier than that, because its apologist, Captain Hand, says it is the direct descendant of piracy. I am sure with that ancient origin it will have the fervent support of the hon. Member for Taunton. I think we are right on this Bill to raise the question of the continued existence of this practice in the Navy. It would, in fact, have been singularly foolish of us to have missed a chance of doing so. I entirely repudiate the idea that we are actuated in raising this question by any ungenerous spirit towards the Navy. There is no niggardliness in our attitude in the least. As a matter of fact, under this Bill in reference to prize bounty, we are giving the Navy more than it has at present. Under the Act of 1864 prize bounty was limited in a way which, I think, was objectionable. This Bill has taken occasion to remove the limit on prize bounty which can be given. Under Clause 32, in cases where an actual action has taken place, the money is given to the men for the capture of armed ships of the enemy in action. There we are taking powers under this Bill to give the Navy more than it is getting at the present time. If that is the case they are getting more in the one case, and I think we may fairly in the other case ask them to take less than, they are getting at the present time. I would like to briefly indicate the reasons why I venture to dissent from the existing system. I believe it is really bound up with an ancient system of naval warfare, the time for which has passed away. There was something to be said for it in the days of privateering. You can trace its history through the Armada, through the wars against the Dutch, and up to the time of the Napoleonic wars. In those days we encouraged small privateers to prey on the commerce of the enemy, and to drive their trade off the sea; and we allowed them to recoup themselves for their exertions at the expense of the enemy. But we do not require to do that in these days, and I believe there is really no defence for the present system except Admiralty conservatism and the traditions of Captain Marryats and others.

I object to the system altogether. I am in favour of the abolition of the right of capture altogether. I believe it would too a great advantage to Great Britain to get rid of the right of capture of private property, and it would be a great gain to the peace of the world if, in addition to abolishing the right of capture, we could also abolish the right to prize money. There is a strong case for getting rid of this ancient custom of the payment of prize money and prize salvage. Two great maritime nations have already taken steps in this direction. The first case to which I draw attention is that of Japan, which has abolished the system of prize money. It did so at the beginning of the Chinese War. It offered to China to abolish the right of capture altogether. But China did not seem to understand the proposition and Japan did not press it. But at the same time Japan did give up the custom of prize money, and they gave it up because they said that property was captured at sea for the sake of the country and not for the sake of private gain. Our point is that in naval war we do not wish to combine a system of naval operations with a system of commercial profit. We do not expect naval admirals engaged in the service of their country to take the opportunity to amass riches for themselves. I should regard it as an outrage and a reflection on the spirit of the Navy to suggest that it is necessary to keep up the system of prize money in order to induce the men to do their duty. I hope that they would do that in any case whether they got prize money or not. The experience of the Japanese Navy is that it does not require the retention of the custom of prize money to keep up the highest traditions of patriotism in the Navy.

The example of Japan was followed by the United States in 1899, and the Congressional record of the statement of the American Minister of Marine is to this effect: that he was able to abolish the custom, because the naval officers considered prize money a mere bagatelle. It amounted to so little that the naval officers were quite content it should be abolished. I think the hon. Member for Taunton (Mr. Peel) was entirely wrong when he said that naval opinion was in favour of maintaining these customs. When this matter was discussed at The Hague Conference there was an expression of willingness to give the custom up if we would do so. But when we raised this point in Committee upstairs we were met by an ingenious argument: we were told that it should be done, if at all, by international agreement. I have looked up what occurred at the time of The Hague Conference in 1897. There was a very friendly expression of opinion in favour of the abolition of prize money, but then the Admiralty took the view it should not be done by international agreement, but that it was a matter entirely of domestic arrangement. I venture to think that their attitude in the Committee upstairs was not very consistent. In our discussion there we were met by the Government with the suggestion that there should be at least a pooling arrangement in regard to the prize money. Amendments are down to a later Clause which suggest that that should be carried out. I am glad to say that the Government, in standing up for the abolition of prize money, and in suggesting a pooling arrangement has absolutely carried out the promise made to us upstairs. I am grateful for the fact that the Government has gone some way towards meeting us. I think the suggestions for pooling are a decided advantage. We may get rid of the absurdity of some third-class cruiser at no very great risk to itself picking up a liner by the mere accident of being in the path of that liner shortly after the declaration of war, and thereby securing for the officers and crew a prize worth probably a million of money.

A further point occurs to me, and that is that this enrichment of officers and crew would be at the expense of British underwriters. I repeat, I think that this suggestion for pooling private money is an advantage. After all, it is really undesirable that you should leave naval officers to obtain funds in this way, haphazard, by the mere chance that they are on some stations where prizes are to be got. In the past this system worked uncommonly badly, and naval records are full of con-plaints as to its working. The hon. Member for Stoke this evening suggested the kind of complaint which formerly arose—the complaint on the part of men engaged in actual fighting, who argued that they were not fairly treated as compared with the cruisers which were merely out for commercial profit. Biographies of great naval commanders are disfigured by sordid squabbles over the distributions of prize money. Complaints are to be found of the distributions being grossly unfair. There were frequent and constant complaints of this nature, and I think it would be well if the cause for them were to be got rid of for the future. There were complaints that commanders were not put on stations favourable to prize getting. These are the real grounds on which we object to this system. We do not think that naval commanders in a great national war ought to be allowed to conduct a pecuniary campaign on their own account. The system is thoroughy vicious, and we might well follow the spirit of Japanese patriotism and ask our officers and men to work for the sake of their country at large instead of looking to their own profit. I understand the attitude of the Government is going to be unfavourable to this Amendment, but, at all events, I think this Committee ought to put it on record that we do not accept this system of prize money at the present time. We acquiesce in it because this Bill contains many provisions which are of a valuable character. This is a long controversy. Sir Robert Walpole made his objections to the system in the eighteenth century, and there may come another time in the future when someone else will be able to get the House of Commons to abolish in its entirety this system against which we wish to put our protest on record to-night.

I beg to second the Amendment. I shall do so in a very few words, because the ground has been very efficiently covered by the Mover. The only justification of any sort or kind why prize money should be given at all, would be if there were an efficient pooling arrangement. Personally I think the pre- sent or the past system is utterly detestable. It is very much the same as the question of looting in a land war. My great objection to it is that it is so utterly unjust. That was pointed out quite truly with regard to the seamen. The people who in the past got the prize money were not those who fought energetically, but simply those who had the good luck to come across a prize. It was exactly the same in a land war. The advance troops who took a fort or a small town, and ran all the risks and suffered all the losses, they in the natural order of things had to push further on, while the troops who followed them were the troops who got the chance of looting. Unless you try to get some general pooling system as I have seen tried rather ineffectually, there is absolutely no justice at all in the arrangement. The only chance of anything like justice is in having a pooling arrangement, and even that almost invariably has failed in the small frontier wars in which I have taken part. The advanced troops do the fighting and go on. The troops that come afterwards do the looting and the concealing of the looting, and it is very hard indeed to get it out of them. Practically it cannot be done. I have a very strong feeling on this subject, indeed, if the matter goes to a Division I shall most certainly support the Amendment.

This Amendment raises the question of prize money, which I hold to be a very much more serious matter than that of prize salvage. The hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. C. Roberts) pointed out that prize money is a very ancient institution. I should say that it is as old as the Navy itself. Indeed, it received statutory sanction so far back as 1692, and there have been a great many other enactments since that time. The Act of 1864 contained a Clause providing for prize money, and it is that Clause we are now re-enacting in this consolidating Bill. Here again, I have to say that it has really no part in the giving of statutory effect to the Declaration of London. We are simply re-enacting and renewing the Clause of the Act of 1864. With regard to the merits of the case, which have been discussed to-night, and which were discussed in the Committee upstairs, it appears to be the fact that prize money was originally what I may call an alternative to the Press Gang. It was undoubtedly an inducement to recruiting in its early days. I could not stand here tonight and say that it is any longer an inducement to recruiting. That would not be true. But what I have to say to the House, and I hope the House will allow me to say it, is that it is certainly regarded to-day as one of the sailors' ancient and traditional rights and privileges, and unquestionably its abolition would be extremely unpopular in the Service. From my acquaintance with the facts I am bound to resist its abolition for all I am worth.

Although just now I said I did not think there was a very great deal in prize salvage, and I was therefore prepared to let that go, and I met my hon. Friend who was successful in Committee on that point, yet I cannot for a moment agree to the proposition that prize money should be abolished. Not only would it be unpopular in the Service, but it would be met—I know some of my hon. Friends do not mind that—by a demand for some equivalent in its place. My hon. Friends would say, very well, make a charge upon the public funds. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I recognise that. You have to face the fact that that at any rate would be a new charge upon the Treasury. Upstairs, in Grand Committee, it was proposed, as has been proposed to-night, that prize money should be abolished outright. I think if I interpreted rightly the opinion of the Committee—and I tried to do so on this and other matters, although I resisted this abolition as I am doing here—the great volume of opinion was then directed, as it has been directed to-night, rather against the method of distribution than the thing itself. I may say incidentally that it is not quite the fact that only the ship's company capturing the prize get the prize money. For a very long time there has been the principle of joint capture. The last Proclamation of 17th September, 1900, has a reference to ships or vessels being in sight of a prize and of the captor, under circumstances that cause intimidation to the prize and encouragement to the captor, being eligible to share as joint captors.

Therefore, it is not quite true to say that only those who capture the prize share in the prize money. The ship's company of those in sight of and who are in a position and under circumstances to cause intimidation to a prize also share in the money. Upstairs, in Grand Committee, there was a very strongly expressed opinion in favour of a more general distribution amongst the whole of those who might be taking part in the campaign, and it was pointed out, very forcibly I think, that the enormous growth in the value of a liner compared to the number of the ship's company of the possible captor made the present system of distribution an anachronism and an anomaly. If my memory serves me, we had the picture drawn of a small cruiser holding up a very valuable liner, the cruiser having a company of two or three hundred, and all more or less being made for life under these modern conditions. It is possible of course that a small cruiser detached for special service might do that, and the change in the value of a prize might make this method of distribution, in some circumstances, rather an anachronism. The view was expressed upstairs very strongly, and has been expressed to-night, that it could only be upon the condition that distribution must be more general and that all those participating in the campaign might possibly have a share in it, that prize money could be continued. And it was very strongly put upstairs that the men who had the hard knocks of the campaign should have a chance of getting some of the prizes as well as those who were perhaps more fortunate to be out on detached duty on the trade routes. I repeat, it is impossible not to sympathise with the proposition. I stated there, as I state now, that, in my opinion, for what it is worth, and after the Debate which has taken place amongst so many learned lawyers, I speak with great humility, I do not think the Act of 1864 would prevent by its terms the Admiralty if it thought fit to distribute prize money upon a more general scale, but there appeared to be some doubt about that.

The pledge I gave upstairs was that I would secure such emendation of the Clause as would leave, beyond all possibility of doubt, the right of the Admiralty in its discretion, if it thought desirable, to distribute the prize money if it were practicable on a pooling plan. I consulted the late Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who was associated with the Bill upstairs, and the Solicitor-General, and as the result I put down a number of Amendments which will leave the matter in this way, and I hope that, having done that, and having carried out, as I think, fully and entirely to pledge I gave, my hon. Friend will not desire to push the Amendment to a Division, and will leave it in the new form, that is to say, leave the discretion of the Admiralty unfettered. If the Admiralty consider a particular capture meritorious, it could, if it thought expedient, distribute the prize money as in the past. If, however, it thought that equity and expediency demanded the distribution of the pooled proceeds of prize money for all those engaged in a particular campaign, that course would be still open if it were practicable. I shall move immediately a series of Amendments which will bring that about. I do not think the discretion of the Board of Admiralty is fettered at present. I think, under the Act of 1864, they could, if they desired, provide for dispensation upon a pooled plan. However, I have made it quite certain that discretion shall not be fettered in that direction, and, as the matter will stand if the Amendments are adopted, the Admiralty's discretion would be entirely unfettered, either in a particular and meritorious case to make the distribution as at present, or if the other course were deemed to be most just and expedient, its hands would be entirely unfettered in the direction of a pooling arrangement.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: Leave out the words "in favour of captors."—[ Sir J. Simon.]

Clause 45—(Saving For Rights Of Crown; Effect Of Treaties, Etc)

Nothing in this Act shall—

  • (1) give to the officers and crew of any of His Majesty's ships of war any right or claim in or to any ship or goods taken as prize or the proceeds thereof, it being the intent of this Act that such officers and crews shall continue to take only such interest (if any) in the proceeds of prizes as may be from time to time granted to them by the Crown; or
  • (2) affect the operation of any existing treaty or convention with any foreign Power; or
  • (3) take away or abridge the power of the Crown to enter into any treaty or convention with any foreign Power containing any stipulation that may seem meet concerning any matter to which this Act relates; or
  • (4) take away, abridge, or control, further or otherwise than as expressly provided by this Act, any right, power, or prerogative of His Majesty the King in right of His Crown, or in right of His office of Admiralty, or any right or power of the Admiralty; or
  • (5) take away, abridge, or control further or otherwise than as expressly provided by this Act, the jurisdiction or authority of a Prize Court to take cognisance of and judicially proceed upon any capture, seizure, prize, or reprisal of any ship or goods, and to hear and determine the same, and, according to the course of Admiralty and the law of nations, to adjudge and condemn any ship or goods, or any other jurisdiction or authority of or exercisable by a Prize Court.
  • Amendments made: In Sub-section (1), leave out the word "such" ["such officers and crews shall continue to"].

    After the word "crews," insert the words "of His Majesty's ships of war, whether themselves concerned in the capture or not."

    Leave out the words "continue to."

    After the word "them" ["granted to them, by the Crown"], insert the words "or any of them."—[ Dr. Macnamara.]

    I beg to move, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day three months."

    This is a Bill of the very first importance, not only on account of the provisions of the Bill itself, but also from the fact that on the passing of the Bill depends the confirmation of the Declaration of London. It is also particularly important, because there is a very large body of opinion in the country—the opinion of men thoroughly competent to form an opinion in the matter—that in the framing of this Bill the Foreign Secretary has forgotten to give effect to the instructions which he gave to the delegates, instructions with which every man on this side of the House, at any rate, was absolutely agreed. In the instructions of the Foreign Secretary, in his letter of 1st December, 1908, he said:—
    "The delegates should be direful that if, unhappily, the Empire should be involved in war, it will not suffer if those legitimate rights of a belligerent State, which have been proved in the past to be essential to the successful assertion of the British sea power and to the defence of British independence, are preserved undiminished and placed beyond rightful challenge."
    As is well known, there is a large number of people, naval men and commercial men, who, after a close study of this Bill, are of opinion that if it becomes law the legitimate rights of Great Britain, which have been proved so essential to the successful maintenance of our sea power, will be very seriously prejudiced and diminished. By this Bill it is proposed to set up for the first time an International Prize Court—a Court, however, the functions of which will not be limited to the administration of existing laws and existing rules of International law, but which will have very considerable legislative power. When we are asked to establish this Court and to endow it with those great powers it is necessary to bear in mind two very important matters. In the first place, there is no more certain method of paralysing the efficiency of a fleet in time of war than by circumscribing its activity by a series of rules and regulations which will limit its effectiveness as against the enemy; and, in the next place, we must bear in mind that the delegates who will constitute this quasi-legislative body will be representatives of nations the interests of every one of which will be opposed in this matter to the interests of Great Britain. Great Britain to-day possesses unchallenged command of the sea. Again I should like to refer to this letter of the Foreign Secretary, where he emphasises the importance of our maintaining unimpaired and unchallenged command of the sea. Dealing with the question of blockade, he said:—
    "These questions are all closely connected, and the satisfactory solution of them is of extreme importance to a, State like Britain whose absolute dependence upon the possession of sea power for security makes it imperative for her to maintain intact the weapon of defence which the possibility of effectually blocading the enemy's coast places in possession of a nation having command of the sea."
    He emphasises the absolute necessity of Britain for her very existence possessing absolute command of the sea, and yet we are proposing by this Bill to hand over to the delegates of Foreign countries the power to make laws which will trammel our Fleet when endeavouring to maintain that unchallenged command of the sea. So long as we hold command of the sea, it is our interest that that sea power should be made and maintained as effective as possible. It is the interest of every other nation to minimise the effectiveness of that sea power. Every other nation is a possible enemy seeking, either alone or in combination with other nations, to wrest from us that command of the sea. Their interest is, therefore, to reduce the effectiveness of our supreme power at sea, whilst our interest, and not only our interest, but an absolute necessity to us, is to maintain unimpaired the supreme effec- tiveness of our one and only power, namely, the sea-power. Bearing these things in mind, let me ask the House to consider what it is that this Bill proposes to do. In the first place, it proposes to establish this Court, which shall have the power of overruling the decisions of our highest Court of Admiralty, the Privy Council. Not only will they be allowed to overrule that tribunal, but they will also have power—and I place great importance upon this—of making law which shall regulate our Fleet in time of war. It seems an extraordinary thing as a business proposition that we who may at any time find ourselves at war with any one of these Powers, or a combination of them, should entrust to those Powers who are a possible enemy the right of making laws which shall bind our Fleet when the crisis comes and we are engaged in war. Before I proceed to show that by this Bill we are giving this Court legislative powers, I should like, first of all, to call the attention of the House to the constitution of the Court. It is said:—
    "Provided this Court shall be composed of persons who are to be appointed by these various nations, and who must be jurists of known proficiency—"
    whatever that may mean—
    "in questions of International law, and of the highest moral reputation."
    When you look at the nations you find that you have, first of all, the great European Powers, Japan, and the United States, and then you have also a large number of the small States scattered throughout the world. You have, amongst others, Persia, or whatever part of Persia may hereafter be left by the present Government as an existing nation, which is to appoint one of these gentlemen. This tribunal so appointed will, I submit to the House, inevitably not be a tribunal of independent and impartial judges, but they will be men selected just as the various countries select their judges for their Supreme Prize Courts to-day. Will anybody suggest that the well-known "jurists of known proficiency" selected as the representatives of these various Powers will be in any way different from the well-known jurists of international proficiency who are selected by these various States from time to time to constitute their Supreme Courts in matters relating to prizes? How do they to-day select the gentlemen who are the judges of their Supreme Courts? I am not here speaking of the judges of Courts of first instance, but of the judges of the Supreme Courts, and for this purpose I will not take small nations.

    Let me take great European nations. How did Russia in the late war with Japan select her judges and her well-known jurists of tried proficiency who presided in her Supreme Court for prize purposes? We will just refer to what was said on this matter by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the 28th of June. Speaking of the Russian Courts he said this:—
    "The experience of recent wars has impressed upon the British Government the fact that in naval matters International law is in a state of chaos."
    Then he says that was the state when the war broke out:—
    "The Prize Courts of Russia were conducted not according to the British doctrines, but according to the regulations of the Russian Admiralty. If dissatisfied with the decision, the parties could appeal to the Prize Court in Russia, also administered according to the regulations of the Russian Admiralty."
    That is their Supreme Court. Is there any reason to believe that the judges who are sent to this International Court will be other than those who at present preside in the Supreme Court, and is it to be believed that they will, if they act in the Supreme Court under the direction of their Admiralty, act otherwise when they come to the International Court? Is it not perfectly manifest that when these judges assemble in the International Court they will act in exactly the same way, not as independent judges simply administering the law, but according to the directions of their respective Governments, and that the directions of their respective Governments, especially where they have to make laws, will be to make the law in such a way as will advantage the smaller maritime, the feeble maritime nations, to the disadvantage of England as the supreme maritime nation? That will be the constitution of this Court.

    What the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said of the Russian Supreme Court is applicable to the judges of the Supreme Court of every other nation, and particularly of the small nations not European nations. And we are therefore under this Bill going to entrust to a body of men composed of representatives of foreign countries, each one of whom will act on the instructions of his Admiralty or his Government, the making of the laws which will regulate the activities of our Fleet in time of action; and the interest of every one of those is adverse to the interest of England in such a time. It seems to me rank folly for England, which depends upon the efficiency and upon the supreme strength of her Fleet for her very existence, to hand over to any body of representatives of any nation in the world a power to make laws which will hamper that Fleet in time of war. I have said more than once that this Court is not only a Court of Law, but is a legislative assembly. I want just to make that good, and to show the House the extraordinary power which by this Bill will be given to that Court which is here constituted, not only to expound the law, not only to administer the law, but wherever they may think the law is deficient to make the law. In the first place, here I must speak for this purpose of the Declaration of London. This House knows that the Declaration of London was accompanied by the report of M. Renault, and we have been told by the Foreign Secretary, and, I think, also by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the report of M. Renault is to be regarded as an authentic authoritative report binding upon the Court. Now this Court will, therefore, have to administer the law as laid down in the Declaration of London as supplemented by M. Renault's report.

    For the purpose of making good my point, I want to take one concrete case, which will undoubtedly happen as soon as we are engaged in war, and by means of this case I want to show to the House exactly what would be the functions in determining that case of this International Court. Everybody knows that in a naval war the Navy that possesses an unlimited supply of Welsh steam coal has a greater advantage over one which is wanting in that supply. That was illustrated very plainly in the Russo-Japanese war. For if you read the reports of the Japanese Prize Courts, you will find that there were several instances there where the Japanese seized neutral ships carrying Welsh steam coal, although they were consigned to a neutral port, and that they seized them by the doctrine of continuous voyage, because they said that steam coal was so essential to a Navy that although those vessels were consigned to neutral ports it was perfectly manifest that it was intended to transport them to another port, to Vladivostock, which was the Russian naval base." Therefore the vessels were seized and condemned and the condemnation was supported in two or three cases by the Supreme Court in Japan. I only refer to that for the purpose of showing how essential it is for the Navy at all times to be possessed of an unlimited supply of Welsh steam coal. Bearing that in mind, I want the House to consider this concrete case. Supposing England were at war with a great European nation, take, for instance, just as an illustration, the supposition that we were at war with Germany; suppose in the course of that war a British cruiser was to meet in the English Channel a neutral vessel, say, a Danish vessel, laden with steam coal, bound for one of the Danish islands in close proximity to the naval port of Kiel. Her papers would be made out for a voyage to this island. The officer of the cruiser would board her, would examine her papers, and find that she had a cargo of Welsh steam coal bound for this island. He would know perfectly well that although the papers were made out bound for this island, the coal was bound for Kiel, and I may go further for the purpose of my argument, and even admit that supposing he was to ask the officer in command of this neutral vessel, "where is this coal going to?" the officer might very well say, and if he was a truthful man he would say "it is going to Kiel. I am taking it to this island, and there it will be transhipped into lighters, and taken to Kiel. It is intended for the German navy." Of course, under the existing law the cruiser would seize that vessel.

    9.0 P.M.

    Suppose, however, after this Bill were passed that the cruiser were to seize that vessel, and the vessel were condemned by our Courts, and the case were taken to the International Court of Appeal. What would be the position of the International Court then? I would like the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs to give attention to that point. Would that seizure be justified? The papers show that the ship is consigned to the Danish island, close to Kiel, and the cargo, conditional contraband, is steam coal, manifestly intended for the German fleet. Would that be justified? The International Court, when this came before them, would, of course, have to turn for an answer to the question to the Declaration of London, and the Danish shipowner would rely on Article 35. Coal is conditional contraband under the Declaration.
    "Conditional contraband is not liable to capture except when found on board a vessel bound for territory belonging to or occupied by the armed forces of the enemy, and when it is not to be discharged in a neutral port."
    So far we should be all right. Then the Article goes on—
    "The ship's papers are conclusive proof both as to the voyage on which the vessel is engaged and as to the port of discharge, unless she is found clearly out of her course and unable to give an adequate reason therefore."
    So the Court will have to say upon that, the seizure is wrong. She was, according to her papers, consigned to a Danish port. The vessel and the cargo and the ship's papers are conclusive proof both as to the destination of the ship and of the cargo. Then the English advocate would say, "Yes, that is all very well, but M. Renault's report has equal force with Article 35, and M. Renault, in his report, feels the absurdity of such a contention, and so he says:—
    "Search of a vessel may reveal facts which irrefutably prove that her destination, or the place where the goods are to be discharged, is incorrectly entered in the ship's papers. The commander of the cruiser is then free to judge of the circumstances, and capture the vessel or not according to his judgment."
    So you have the Article saying the ship's papers are to be conclusive proof, and M. Renault saying that something else shall be irrefutable proof to the contrary. By which is the Supreme Court to be bound? I would ask the representative of the Government to give an answer to that question. You have these two documents of equal validity and equal force, one of which says that the ship's papers are to be conclusive proof—we all know what conclusive proof means—and the other, which says that something else is to be irrefutable proof to the contrary. Under these circumstances, it is perfectly manifest that the International Court will have to say, "We cannot decide it under the Declaration of London, because the Declaration of London does not decide one way or another: one part says one thing and another part says the exact contrary." Therefore, they would have to go back to the Convention, and they would turn to Article 7. Let me read to the House how the matter would appear to this International Court under that Convention. Article 7 says:—
    "If a question of law to be decided is covered by a treaty in force between the belligerent captor and a Power which is itself, or the subject or citizen of which is, a party to the proceedings, the Court is governed by the provisions of the said treaty."
    In the case I have put you may take the Declaration of London and M. Renault's report on the treaty; you have the treaty, but it is inconclusive, because it is contradictory, upon the very point. Then Article 7 proceeds:—
    "In the absence of such provision, the Court shall apply the rules of International law."
    That is very important, because immediately we have got to apply the rules of International law we have to inquire what is the rule of International law upon this subject. I cannot do better for that purpose than turn to the report of the Secretary of State (Sir Edward Grey). The House will observe that the question here would be whether the doctrine of continuous voyage was to apply or not—whether we were entitled to say, "True, the vessel is consigned to this island in Denmark, but the real destination of the cargo is Kiel." That is the doctrine of continuous voyage. Turning then to the Foreign Secretary's instructions to the delegates, on page 25, he says this:—
    "The principle underlying the doctrine of continuous voyage is not of recent origin, and may be regarded as a recognised part of the law of nations."
    The doctrine of continuous voyage, ac cording to the Foreign Secretary, is a recognised part of the law of nations, and, in the first place, it is the law which the International Court will have, to apply. But the advocates on the other side would immediately say, that is all very well, but you have got M. Renault's Report to the contrary. The Court, therefore, will have this position, that they could not apply the doctrine of continuous voyage, and the Declaration of London does not tell them what to do. Then what are they to do? They are driven back to the last part of Article 7——
    "If no generally recognised rule exists, the Court shall give judgment in accordance with the general principles of justice and equity."
    What does that mean? That is what they are driven to in the case I have put, a vital case for the purposes of the British Navy. This International Court, the members of which, as I have pointed out, are under the instructions of their Government, may have interests hostile to ours. Yet they have to determine the case according to their ideas of the general principles of justice and equity. It is perfectly manifest, where British interests are concerned, that they would say at once that the principles of justice and equity prescribed that the doctrine of continuous voyage should be absolutely abrogated, and that, therefore, this capture was unlawful. It is perfectly manifest that you give them the power to make the law, because the moment they say the principles of justice and equity necessitate that the Court should adjudicate accordingly, it becomes International law from that time forth. That being so, you have the position that this Court, on this most important and vital matter, may make the law which shall regulate our naval operations in future. Just see what that means. It means that we might be at war with a foreign country, and that foreign country may find it essential to have a supply of Welsh steam coal. They are entitled to have the Welsh steam coal taken from Wales to their ports, and we cannot help it. That is the necessary effect of the Bill as it is at present. They will be entitled to ship their coal in a neutral bottom addressed to a neutral State. Our cruisers would know perfectly well that the vessel and cargo was bound to a foreign and hostile naval port, and we could not stop them, because their papers would be held to be conclusive. I do not say that is a most serious element to consider. That shows that in this Bill we are not merely setting up a Court for the purpose of administering recognised rules of law, but we are setting up a Court which shall have the power under such circumstances as those to make the law, and to bind us for all time by the law so made.

    Let me take another illustration of the same matter to emphasise the importance of being very very careful before we pass this Bill and endow this International Court with those great powers. Take the case, for instance, again, of war between England and a foreign Power, and let me take Germany as an illustration. We should probably proceed, as we have always in wars before, to blockade all the ports of our enemy. Under the law as it exists at present you have to give notice and declaration of blockade, and you must maintain an effective blockade, but you may capture a blockade runner wherever and whenever you can the moment she has run the blockade until she has arrived at her ultimate port of destination, and you may capture that blockade runner by any man-of-war belonging to England. Let me assume a blockade on a port or some ports in the Baltic Sea. Under the Declaration of London you have to specify beforehand the exact limits of your blockade, and you have to maintain that blockade efficient through those limits, If your blockade becomes inefficient within any area within those limits, the whole blockade is at an end, and you have got to start de novo, with a new declaration and a new notification, and you have to allow any neutral vessels in the port to come out, and to give reasonable time to them to come out before the blockade is again established. Let me consider a concrete case again. We have a squadron blockading a port in the Baltic. Those who have read naval history and the accounts of blockade running will know that blockade runners always operate either in dirty weather or at night. To-day, unlike the past, you cannot have what was known as a close blockade. The range of artillery and ordnance generally prevents that. The blockading squadron must be some distance out, and you have to establish a blockade between points A and B on the coast.

    In the night or in the fog a certain vessel tries to break the blockade and get through. Now, under this law, you have to capture those blockade runners by means of one of the blockade squadrons. You may have a fleet outside and they cannot capture the blockade runner. You must detach one or two or three of your squadron to capture it, and if you do not the blockade runner is entitled to escape. If you do you may be said to weaken your blockade, and it may be inefficient at a particular part at a, particular time and the blockade is at an end. What is your position? Take the case of an admiral in command of a blockade squadron. He may have another squadron cruising a1 hundred miles away, and he would be in wireless telegraphic communication with them, but he cannot make use of that, that is useless. The advantages of wireless telegraphy are denied to him; he cannot telegraph to the other squadron: "these vessels have run the blockade, stop them." He may have a squadron coming down to relieve him, but they cannot stop them. Nobody can stop the blockade runner, and he cannot stop the blockade runner unless he detaches one or more of the vessels forming the blockade squadron and send them out, and so weaken the blockade. The position is very much as would be the position in England if we were to pass a law that a burglar escaping from a house could only be captured by the policeman on that beat and no other, and that if he were to run after the burglar, then any number of burglars might come out. It is just as absurd as that.

    The point then is, what would be the decision of the International Court under those circumstances? We have the squadron blockading the port, we have the vessel which has penetrated the blockade, we have the cruiser some little distance off, and we telegraph to that cruiser to stop that blockade runner. What do the International Court do when the question arises, was that vessel properly stopped? Under the Declaration they may say one thing or the other, they may say that the cruiser was sufficiently near to form part of the blockading squadron or not, and just as they choose they can make the law, and say that the blockading squadron for this purpose shall be only those vessels which have in the past been part and parcel of the blockading squadron, and do not include any cruisers or other battleships which were standing a little way off to assist the blockading squadron. A far more important question may arise; supposing one or two or three of the blockading squadron were to be dispatched, the Court might then say, and, I venture to say—having regard to the composition of the delegates forming that Court—would say, that the moment we had sent one or two or three vessels from the blockading squadron after the blockade runner, that from that moment the limits of the blockade were reduced because the blockade must, of necessity, be rendered inefficient by the departure of any number of vessels from the squadron. It would depend upon the view they took of what was just and equitable as to what was the result of this action.

    "Whatever view they took, and again I wish to emphasise this point, that would be the law for the future. It is no use in saying that that would only mean the law in a particular case, and unless the decisions of this supreme Court are to be regarded as laying down the law for the future, then the Court is worse than useless, because the Court would be able to lay down one principle for one vessel and one nation, and a totally different principle for another vessel and another nation. That is another illustration of the way in which we are entrusting this Court with the power of making law which will regulate the activities of our Fleet at a critical moment. It is also an illustration of the way in which these laws when made will hamper and reduce almost to ineffectiveness great parts of our Fleet in time of war, when we want them to be most efficient. It is manifest that these matters must seriously prejudice the position of Great Britain as the supreme naval Power in time of war. I remember the Under - Secretary for Foreign Affairs saying on the Second Reading that there was nothing in this Bill which prejudiced us in time of war. I have put two cases, both showing most conclusively that we should be most seriously prejudiced. Can hon. Members conceive any greater prejudice to England, who has a monopoly of that most important commodity, Welsh steam coal, than that she should lose that monopoly, and have to allow a foreign nation at war with us to get as much of that coal as she pleased? Is it not a prejudice to our naval effectiveness that the law with regard to blockade is to depend upon and be made by potential enemies of Great Britain?

    What, by way of reply, is said as to the advantages which we get in return for the sacrifices we make? I have given only two instances, but I could go through the Declaration of London almost Clause by Clause and show how the spirit running through the whole document is to minimise the effectiveness of our sea power to the lowest possible degree. If the Government can show that, by entrusting this Court with these great powers, we in another direction are getting greater or equal advantages, I quite agree that there may be something to be said in favour of the proposal. But what are the advantages we are said to get? It is said that in time of war we shall be able to get our supply of food without fear of its being stopped. It is said that this International Court may do away with the principle of continuous voyage. If they do, you will be able to get your food in neutral bottoms to France or to any near port. It will come to that port without the possibility of being stopped, and you will be able to get it to England without difficulty. That was an argument used by the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. But he was answered in another connection by the First Lord of the Admiralty, who went into a long argument to show that in time of war the whole food supply of England must come in British bottoms. The law of absolute contraband has no application to British bottoms at all; it applies only to neutral bottoms.

    A great part of my argument was that in time of war, as in time of peace, the bulk of our food supply must come in British bottoms. There is no contradiction between the statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty and what I said.

    I never said there was a contradiction; I said that the right hon. Gentleman in one part of his speech referred to this. The First Lord of the Admiralty said:—

    "It is common ground that in time of peace 90 per cent of the foodstuffs which reach this country come in British ships. Only 10 percent is carried in foreign ships, which might be neutrals in time of war if the same proportions were maintained in time of war as in time of peace. Thus in any circumstances the Declaration of London could only affect 10 per cent. of the foodstuffs coming to this country, as the Declaration deals only with the relations between belligerents and neutrals." But in time of war, as a fact, a larger per- centage than 90 per cent would be brought in British ships, and I will explain very briefly why."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 29th June, 1911, col, 577]
    He then went into a long argument showing why in time of war neutral ships would not bring foodstuffs to England, and he concluded his argument by saying that substantially in time of war all the foodstuffs would come in British bottoms. If that is so, what good is the doctrine of continuous voyage to us? The doctrine has no application to British bottoms; it is only to neutral bottoms; and if none of our foodstuffs will come in neutral bottoms, what good is the doctrine of continuous voyage to us in time of war?

    The hon. Member a few minutes ago laid down for himself a very good rule with regard to the Third Reading of a Bill. I must remind him that he is not entitled to discuss details at length.

    I apologise. I have endeavoured to show, and I think I have established, that we should be very considerably prejudiced by the powers we are giving to the International Court by this Bill. I was dealing with the reply made to that, namely, that there are compensating advantages, and I was endeavouring to show that there was no substance in that claim. I am sorry to have to detain the House so long, but this is a matter of vital importance. It is not like the Insurance Bill, in regard to which if we make mistakes—and we are told we have made many mistakes in it—we can next year or the year after, when we find out the mistakes, rectify them by legislation in this House. If we make a mistake in passing this Bill to-night, that mistake will not appear and not be known until such a time as we are engaged in a great war. At that time, it may be when our resources are strained to the utmost, and we are struggling for our very existence; when our fate may possibly hang in the balance, it will be too late to rectify any mistake that we may make now. That mistake may and possibly would then just turn the balance against us. If hon. Members would only regard this Bill from a national point of view, and disabuse their minds at any rate to-night of the notion that this is a question of considerations of party or party interests; consider that it is one vital to our very existence, and think only of how fatal a mistake may be, I am certain that hon. Members who may have considered this matter very lightly and as one which may be rectified in the future, will realise that it is a vital matter. Tonight we must decide and decide for the last time, for we may never have an opportunity of rectifying any mistake we may make.

    I beg to second the Amendment. After the very long and exhaustive speech of my hon. Friend, I think I can very rapidly sum up in seconding my objection to this measure that we have before us. Of course, the House will understand that the Convention we are asked to support to-night is only one out of fourteen Conventions that were carried out by The Hague Conference in 1907. The activity of this Government has been very great in many ways, but I doubt if the country is sufficiently aware of its great Conventional activity. I am pretty certain if the country was to study in detail and thoroughly these fourteen Hague Conventions there would be a good deal more trouble in store for the Government than perhaps is in store for them now. I am not at all one of those who take the cynical view that some persons take in this matter, that after all it does not very much matter what Convention you have got, what rules of International law, because your sailors can entirely dispense with these matters in time of war. That is a profound mistake, a profound error. Every one must realise that hi the terms of that Convention and of this London Agreement instructions must be given to our naval officers. Those naval officers and the Admiralty will be bound by those conditions in times of war.

    The other general objection that I can dismiss in a word is this: that by assenting to this Convention, and thereby incidentally accepting the terms of the Declaration of London, we are largely limiting our right to diplomatic protest in time of war. I may refer to the very strong speech made by the late Leader of the Opposition when, on the Second Reading, he pointed out that this right of protest was not a light matter at all: it was a very great power that we possessed; for no country when at war with another could very lightly disregard the protests of a neutral Power. That power will be largely taken away. I am not sure that the Foreign Office are very sorry about that. There is that case of the "Oldhamia." The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury has referred to it. Wherever we have this question of naval prize brought forward, we have this case of the "Oldhamia," and the £60,000 that it cost the people of Manchester, as if the whole naval world, and naval considerations generally, turned upon the repayment of £60,000. I object to the Court, and I object to the law that it is going to administer. I am not going to go into that, or only incidentally, this evening.

    But I should like to deal very shortly with the conditions of the Court itself. If you are to have an International Court of this kind, dealing with matters of such moment, with matters which affect the interests of the nations, and must be keenly scanned when nations are at war, and passions are aroused, you must at least have a Court which commands supreme confidence. What are the conditions that should attach to a Court of this kind? First of all, it ought to be a small Court. Secondly, I think it ought to be composed of the highest and most able international jurists you can procure in the world. Thirdly, it must be, as far as possible, stable and permanent in its composition. The Court that we have got before us now fulfils none of those conditions. I know the Foreign Secretary, in arguing this matter, said, "Oh, yes, but you want an ideal Court, and ideals are not obtained in this world. This is the best Court that, under the circumstances, you can possibly get. If you are against this Court you are against any International Court whatever. You must accept our Court, or you will get nothing." I really cannot accept this set of Foreign Office syllogisms. I think we are entitled to say that perhaps had there been more vigour, more determination, in these negotiations, and not that acceptance which was shown by our representatives—under orders, of course—we might have secured, say, at least, a Court which would fulfil some of these conditions that I have laid down.

    First of all, the Court is a very large Court. It consists of fifteen judges. It is far too large to decide on questions of this character. It is based on the representative principle, not on the selective principle. We were told that it was based on the representative principle, not because that was a good principle for the Court, tout because you could not have a Court selected on any other principle. There have been democracies in the world which have chosen their judges by lot. I have not heard that those judges were superior to those selected in the ordinary way. If you are to have representation there should, I should have thought, be some observance of the relative importance and the relative stake those different Powers hold in the shipping world. We find that we who have half the shipping of the world have one judge out of fifteen, although our shipping is in the proportion of one to one. Some of the representation also is of a very extraordinary character. I will not go into it because when I referred to it before I was chastised by the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury for alluding to some of the smaller States in South America. That I pass them by. However, they are pretty well known. I only raise one question incidentally. I want to know why, on the representative principle, Abyssinia is left out. Abyssinia possesses great warriors. It has never been shown to me that Abyssinia does not contain great jurists. If you accept Hayti, why do you omit Liberia? Hayti, I believe, is largely inhabited by natives of Africa. So is Liberia. Why the people who are translated from Africa to Hayti are better able to sit as jurists than the natives of Africa on their own soil I am utterly unable to understand. So much for the representative authority of the Court. Can you secure really jurists of the highest eminence to command confidence if you have fifteen? I believe that is utterly impossible. The case is really worse in this, that, these smaller countries can select jurists not from their own people, but from other nations, so that there will be very great temptation on the part, of the larger nations to suggest who should be the jurist to put into this Court in order that some of the larger Powers may command the more votes. The Court is always fluctuating. The larger Powers, I agree, are represented by eight of the judges; the seven others are constantly changing. There can therefore be no continuity of judgment or policy in the Court, or at least in those members of it who are continually changing. The first nine are to be a quorum. It might happen; it is not impossible or unreasonable at all to suggest it, that on a division of opinion among the great Powers that the casting vote in that Court—they sit in secrecy when they come to their decision, so that it will never be known—that the casting vote in that Court will he given by one of those Powers which did not own a single ship, and had not got a navy at all.

    We are asked in a light-handed way to hand over the security of this country in time of war to a Court so curiously composed. I will not say anything again about the colour of the Court because the right hon. Gentleman opposite objects to it. All I say is this, I say nothing about the humbler and darker races. I accept them as my brothers, but I do not want to put them in the position of my judges. The Foreign Secretary says it will be an enormous advantage to us as neutrals in time of war—and that is what he lays stress upon—that we, as neutrals, shall have the right of appeal to the International Court, and the Foreign Office will not be put to the trouble of making protests if some of our vessels are seized in time of war. I agree that a great deal of trouble will be saved to the Foreign Office in time of war, but as regards our Courts they have always been far more favourable in their decisions than the Courts of the other great maritime nations, and our Courts have had enormous influence upon the decisions of other Courts. But when you get to the Declaration of London you will find that in many ways the rule as to the destruction of vessels and so on is far harder upon neutrals and the rights of neutrals than our Courts have been, and you have set the diminution of the rights of neutrals against the advantage which we should get because our ships will have the right of appeal to the International Court.

    I need not go into the fact that we will have in our Courts to enforce the decisions of this Court, even though they are administering a law opposed to the municipal law of this country, and even if they are opposed to the ideas of justice and equity which prevail in this country. It is one of the most astounding things about a bargain of this kind that you may have gone into it and made many sacrifices without getting compensating advantages, and anyone who reads the rules will see that we have again and again compromised to meet other Powers. I do not see that other Powers have compromised to meet us. Here is a bargain in which we have gone a great way to meet other Powers, but the most important point in regard to the conversion of merchant vessels into armed vessels on the high seas is not touched at all. The very reason this Court was set up was because it was contended it was useful to have a definite law for the Court to administer. That was the reason why the Conference was summoned to London, but now we find there is a great area entirely untouched by the Declaration of London left "to the justice and equity" of foreign countries. Is there anybody who looks at the way in which international treaties have been observed in the last twenty-five years in Europe who would have a high opinion of the justice and equity with which these treaties were observed and carried out? Of course the judges are people from the several countries, and are influenced by the ideas of justice and equity which prevail at the time in their own country. So much for the Court.

    I shall sum up what I have to say as to the law that is to be administered by saying that it sharpens my dislike to the Court set up. I believe under the law so administered we shall, as a great belligerent Power, be weakened. Extra burdens must be thrown upon our Navy relatively to the navies of other Powers, and our Navy must be weakened thereby. I am confident that our difficulties in time of war in getting foodstuffs and the necessaries of life to this country will be largely enhanced chiefly because of the vagueness in which some of the terms of the treaty are drawn, and because they are drawn on a basis that makes it impossible to conceive any port in this country from which foodstuffs might not be excluded by the captain of any cruiser who could give good and justifiable reasons that he was acting within the four corners of the Declaration of London. A danger of this kind is too tremendous to be faced lightly. In time of war, if the balance was going against, us, that balance might be tilted up under the Declaration of London to the destruction and even annihilation of our national life. We are told it would have a bad effect upon the prestige of this country if we rejected the Convention to which our representatives at the Foreign Office and otherwise have agreed before it came to us. That is a most astounding doctrine. You would suppose really that the Foreign Secretary was a member of the Holy Alliance and was sitting at the Conference at Verona in order to sign away in three or four sentences the liberties of the people.

    Everybody understands what Parliaments are, and it is absurd to say that the foreign Powers do not know that these Conferences are to be ratified by the Parliaments of the different countries, and that the Parliaments of the different countries will have a great deal to say to this Convention; they know that the making of treaties at these Conferences above their heads has no advantage. Therefore you cannot say our prestige will suffer. We must assume that in the Chancelleries of Europe there is knowledge of these things, and of what the rights of Parliament are. I do not think we ought to be asked to consider in this way the prestige of the country, and if we are to strike a balance between prestige and safety I would rather have safety; and if we are to strike a balance between safety and the prestige of the Government or the Foreign Office, again I say I would rather have safety. In this matter we must put aside national prejudice and party prejudice, and in my opinion, if we throw over this Convention we will have struck the best blow we have struck for many years for the safety of this country.

    I rise to support the Amendment moved by my hon. Friend. Being party to the establishment of the International Prize Court, and instructing our Courts to enforce the decrees of the International Prize Court, we acknowledge that we recognise the law of nations, and than we are willing to be bound by decrees accordingly. Unfortunately, by Article 7 of the First Schedule, we find that the International Prize Court is only to be governed by the rules or laws of nations when they are generally accepted. There are several rules that are not generally accepted by other countries as they are understood by us. Take, for instance, the question of the base of supply. Foodstuff is not in our acceptance of national law to be considered as contraband unless sent to a foreign hostile Government, or to a Government contractor, or to a port which is fortified, or the base for armed forces. The Foreign Secretary has stated that Liverpool, Glasgow, or Bristol would not be considered such ports, but that is not the way it is understood abroad. The French authorities consider a base any port in which an expedition got out from and to which an expedition would resort in case of need. The German authorities state that the whole area of the country is now a base on account of the railroads; therefore there is no agreement as to what a base is. Some people say that that is a matter of small importance, and that only a small part of our food will come in neutral vessels. The neutral vessel is bound to risk capture by the enemy, and what can a neutral Power do? Nothing except pursue the matter in the Admiralty Court, and then go to the International Prize Court and the neutral Power may there receive the full value. If an agreement is made one of the rules of Inter- national law as to what a base of supply is then the neutral Power could do as America did in the case of a violation of International law—that is, interdict all intercourse with England and France. France had then to rescind her decrees. Great Britain did not do so, and that led to the war of 1811. Neutrals in olden days were weak, but to-day we shall have strong neutrals, who will be able to enforce the rights of neutrals in future wars. I trust this Bill will not become law until it is generally recognised what is a base of supply by the countries which are signatories to the Convention.

    The question of a base of supply is the most serious that can present itself in connection with the matter now under consideration. It was stated during the early stage of the Debate that this question had come before the Colonial Conference, and that the Dominions overseas had no complaint whatever that they were not represented upon this Court. It was said they had gone very thoroughly into the matter in connection with the Declaration of London and the Prize Convention, and were perfectly satisfied with it. I think there is a good deal of misapprehension in regard to that matter. I notice in the report of the proceedings of the Conference that Sir Wilfrid Laurier asked: "Is there any definition of what is a base, or is it left to general interpretation?" and Sir Edward Grey replied: "There is no definition; the word base is the only definition." I am quite satisfied that that statement was not intentionally misleading, and that the right hon. Baronet never meant to keep out of view the fact that M. Renault submitted his views to the committee that drew up the articles, and that they were endorsed by that committee. I am quite sure that the right hon. Gentleman has left out of consideration the fact that the word "base" was interpreted by the committee and by M. Renault as "a place used as a base of operations or supply." That was the interpretation put upon it by the members of the Conference and by the reporter, M. Renault. It was therefore a serious omission to have failed to call the attention of the members of the Conference to this definition. The statement has been made in this House that in order to understand the Declaration of London we must take into account both the actual Convention and this report made by the committee. The attention of the Conference was not called to that. Taking them, both together, we find that the word "base" means "a base of operations or of supply." That is an enlargement of the original definition of what a base was understood to mean. At the same sitting the Prime Minister said:—

    "With reference to something Sir Edward Grey said I do not think it has been sufficiently noted that Article 34 is merely commentary upon and interpretative of Article 33. Article 33 is the governing article, and nothing is liable to capture as conditional contraband unless it is shown to be destined for the use of the armed forces or of a Government Department of the enemy."
    That is too restricted an interpretation of Articles 33 and 34 of the Convention. There is no doubt that the general terms of Article 33 express what the meaning is and it refers to contraband. When we come to Article 34, which is explanatory of Article 33, we find an enlargement of 33, and that enlargement is of the most serious character. Article 34 says:—
    "The destination referred to in Article 33 is presumed to exist if the goods are consigned to the enemy's authorities, or to a contractor established in the enemy's country, who as a matter of common knowledge supplies articles to this kind of enemy. A similar presumption arises if the goods are consigned to a fortified place belonging to the enemy or other place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy."
    The words quoted, "or other place serving as a base," are additions to the old interpretation of a base of operations. What do these words mean? The words are open for the construction that it refers to some port supplying things not merely required for actual warfare, but for the revictualling of the garrison, and therefore cargoes directed to another place serving the purpose of supplying the garrison. This is an enlargement of our responsibility, and one which this country should not willingly submit to. Why was an enlargement of the old understanding of what constituted a base of operations or a "fortified" place permitted by the introduction of such ominous and far-reaching alternative words as "other place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy"? That might mean London, or Bristol or Liverpool.

    So much for the word "base." Suppose a conflict arises between this country and some other country, or between some individual in this country and some other litigant, either personal or national, and these words came up for construction in the International Prize Court; what will be the interpretation put upon them? I have great respect for the opinion of the Lord Chancellor, but it would not be the interpretation of the Lord Chancellor or of any English judge; it would be the interpretation of the International Court as a whole, and that Court would not be guided by our decisions. They might find these words broad enough to include a commercial port as a "base of supplies," and possibly every commercial port in this country might be open to come within that interpretation.

    10.0 P.M.

    Probably, although hon. Members in this House are supposed to have very wide knowledge, they are not all aware of the difference that prevails in the construction of contracts and the rules of evidence in foreign Courts as compared with our own Courts, and it is most important that matters to be determined by the International Prize Court should be on the lines and rules which prevail in this country. Different rules prevail abroad, and we must expect the members of the International Prize Court will naturally be affected with the ideas prevailing in their own Courts. I find in Article 42 of this Convention the following:—
    "The Court takes into consideration in arriving at its decision all the facts, evidence, and verbal statements."
    No one in this country ever asks to have verbal statements included, but in foreign countries they are included. Not many years ago a celebrated trial took place in France, where an officer (Dreyfus) was tried for treason. At the trial of that case man after man went into the box and gave verbal statements, of course on oath, practicaly in the form of speeches. That sort of evidence was received, and the case was adjudged on it. There is no doubt that in foreign countries that method prevails, and it would be extremely dangerous for us to trust to decisions which might be obtained under such circumstances. There is another point to which I wish to draw the attention of the House. How can you expect any uniformity of idea in a judicial body in which the judges are drawn from so many sources and brought up under so many different systems?

    An hon. Gentleman said to-day that they were, for instance, quite familiar in Canada and in the Colonies with decisions of that kind, that they had become accustomed to them through their appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. He failed to remember that in the first place the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is a British Court that administers justice in accordance with judicial decisions in this country. He also omitted to take into consideration the fact that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in deciding the cases that come before them, decides them according to the law of the country from which the appeal comes. They hear counsel from that country explaining what the law is in that country, and they give their decisions under circumstances which are perfectly natural, and which are entirely different from those under which such a decision as we might expect to receive would be given in what would practically be a foreign Court, because, with one representative in a Court of nine or fifteen, what would be the influence of this country as against so many trained in Continental ideas? I do not say they would not wish to do us justice. I do not think that for a moment, but in undertaking to submit disputes in which this country, or the individuals of this country, are interested to a tribunal of that character, we are in a far more unsafe condition than by trusting to negotiations with foreign countries and the power of our own great Navy. It is not the care of this great nation to obtain decisions on other than absolutely just grounds, but notwithstanding that it is a great advantage to the country to feel there is a power behind us by which we can enforce justice if it cannot otherwise be obtained. It will be in the recollection of the House that one of the precepts of Nelson was that—
    "A powerful Fleet was the most efficient negotiator in Europe."
    It has been so in the past, and I have no doubt it will be so in the future. I do not wish to detain the House any longer. I thank it for its patient hearing. If we are to obtain this Bill on the terms set forth in this Convention, I fear we are paying too high a price.

    Under this Bill the maritime rights of Great Britain will be greatly forfeited, and their maritime powers will also, to a great extent, be destroyed. It will also, and perhaps this is the most serious thing of all, expose our population to a very great risk of starvation in time of war. So far as any ordinary person can judge, all foodstuffs, except nuts, coming to this country will be liable to be captured or sunk. The only safeguard, according to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, is the opinion of somebody. He did not say of whom. I conclude it will be the opinion of the captain of the enemy's man-of-war. The right hon. Gentleman, in answer to a question by the hon. Member for Blackpool (Mr. Ashley), in relation to three ports named, Bristol, Liverpool, and Hartlepool, said that whether foodstuffs coming there would be liable to capture or to be sunk was a matter of opinion. It was one which would be decided when the time came, and they could not be expected to answer the question now. I submit you could not have anything more unsatisfactory than that according to the statement of the Government themselves. You have no safety whatever under this Bill. The Naval Prize Bill will also authorise the creation of an International Prize Court, which Court will make and administer a new law of nations that will certainly militate against the United Kingdom as a great naval power and in favour of the great military powers of the Continent. Although the United Kingdom owns about one-half of the merchant shipping of the world, we are only to have one judge out of fifteen in this International Court. I want hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House to consider the composition of this Court. There are forty-six States which will name judges and deputy-judges. Look at the States! Even the advocates of this Bill must see the absolute absurdity of the proposal. There are some like Switzerland and Luxembourg which have no sea frontier and no navy, and know nothing whatever about naval law. Then there is Salvador and Siam. These are countries very unlikely to have any jurists who know anything about naval law. I do not see how they can know anything about maritime law. There are, too, places like Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua and San Domingo. These are States which have failed to meet their obligations to their creditors, yet each of them is going to have an equal vote of one judge to one judge representing the British Empire.

    Look at San Domingo. It consists of 18,000 square miles with a population of under 600,000—less than that of the city of Glasgow. That one little part of an island is going to have the same voting power as the British Empire. This Republic of San Domingo has its customs, temporarily at all events, administered by officials of the United States. The United States helps it to keep the peace and of course it is entirely under its influence. Then there is the Black Republic of Hayti, with a very small population, usually in a state of revolution, and that is the sort of State that this Government is going to give an equal vote to that granted to the British Empire, while our great Dominions of Canada, Australia, South Africa, and India are to have no vote at all. The Court is to sit in private; its proceedings are to remain for ever secret. I really think it is a most extraordinary thing that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for Foreign Affairs should have tried to pass a Bill of this sort. If he or anybody else had proposed such a Bill 100 years ago he would either have been impeached for treason or sent to an asylum for criminal lunatics. This Bill will compel the submission to the International Prize Court of the decisions of British Prize Courts and of Sis Majesty the King in Council, although those decisions in the past have always been final and conclusive. That is surely an enormous change. We are really putting ourselves under the power of an alien Court in a foreign country.

    There is another point to be remembered. The effect of this Bill will be to subordinate every act of every British officer to the judgment of this alien Court. If this Bill is passed it will for the first time bind Great Britain to submit and enforce throughout the British Dominions every order and every decree of this International alien Court. The opinions of the leading chambers of commerce and of the shipping companies are almost all dead against this Bill. So, too, are the leading naval and military opinions. An enemy with a good chance of starving us into surrender would naturally not hesitate for a moment to take the risk of whatever decision the International Court might make after the war was over, and after they had won by starving us into surrender. Remember this, no neutral Power would be able to remonstrate when its ships bringing food to our people were either sunk or captured, because they would have signed and ratified this Declaration of London, and, necessarily, they would have to wait for the decision of this International Prize Court. The effect of the Declaration would be to prevent great nations like America from protesting when their ships which carried our foodstuffs were sunk or captured. There is not the least doubt that an enemy would take very good care to demand a sufficiently high indemnity so as to make quite sure that it would cover any sum the International Prize Court might award against her. I do not quite see what use the decision of that Court would be to us after we had been starved into surrender. After all that would have brought about the end of the British Empire and if we got any money afterwards it would do us no real good. This Bill has never been submitted to the British and Irish peoples, and I therefore think it ought to be opposed to the very utmost, because it increases the danger of starvation. It increases it enormously in time of war, and it is most distinctly adverse to the great interests of our people and of our country as the greatest naval Power. I hope if there are any hon. Gentlemen left on the other side of the House who put their country and their Empire before their party they will go into the Lobby with the Opposition for the preservation of the British people and of the British flag.

    I have not endeavoured to catch your eye sooner, Sir, because I have been waiting to hear what the hon. Members opposite thought about this Bill. It is quite clear that we are met in a conspiracy of silence, and that the hon. Gentlemen are not here to express their views or the views of their constituents in this matter, but to vote. In these circumstances I desire, very briefly, to state the reasons why I hope that this Bill will be rejected by the House. My reasons are three. In the first place, I think the Court which this Bill proposes to establish is a thoroughly bad Court. In the second place, I think that on one matter of vital importance to this country, the conversion of merchantmen on the high seas into armed cruisers, this Court, such as it is, has no guidance whatever from any code of International law. In the third place, I think that the code, where it exists in the Declaration of London, which is also a matter of enormous importance to Great Britain, is of the most objectionable character. I desire to say a few words in regard to each of these three objections, which I feel very strongly. In the first place, is this a satisfactory Court? Is there any hon. Member, I care not in what part of the House he sits, who can get up and tell us that he believes that it is a well-constituted Court? I do not believe that any hon. Gentleman would make that statement. I believe there is but one feeling about it in the country; I believe we should find, if it were possible to ascertain it, that there is but one feeling about it in the recesses of the minds of hon. Members in this House. This is a Court of fifteen. One of the fifteen, seven are to be nominated by a number of smaller States. I am not going through their names again; they have been mentioned several times to the House, and the mere recital of their names is enough to show that the balance will rest in this so-called Court with the nominees of a number of States who certainly will not command the confidence of the world. The most critical questions will come before this Court, questions on which our national prosperity, our national existence, depends. Does anyone suppose, with a Court of fifteen, eight being members representing the great Powers and seven representing the miscellaneous Slates that have been so often referred to, that the real business of deciding and settling what votes shall be given will be done in Court as the result of a serious consideration of the arguments? How much lobbying will there be? How much will be settled in conference, and even if all the representatives of all the Powers were all of the highest integrity, is it not certain that there will be a great atmosphere of suspicion as to what means may have been used to settle their wavering opinion as to the vote they shall give. And that is the Court to which you propose to confide the destinies of this country. In this Court of fifteen Great Britain is to have one representative. One in fifteen. Was there ever a more outrageous proposal? Great Britain with maritime interests equal to those of all the rest of the world combined is to have one vote in fifteen. It is not a Court. It is a contrivance for voting Great Britain down. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. McKinnon Wood) stated on a previous occasion that the desire of the Government was to get an assembly which would represent all the nations of the world. That was a very erroneous principle. If you want to have decisions with any authority which will command any respect you do not want to have a sort of Parliament representing all the world. You want to have a small assembly in which you are to have jurists of repute whose opinion will command respect. This unhappy assembly, which is nicknamed a Court, will not command respect. Its decisions will be regarded as of infinitely less authority than the decisions of our own Privy Council which it is empowered to reverse.

    In the second place, this Court is to be at liberty to decide, according to its own pleasure, according to its view of the general principles of justice and equity, without any guidance from any code of law agreed upon between the nations affected, on one matter which is vital to this country. Can there be imagined any point in which we are more interested than the question of the conversion of merchantmen on the high seas into armed cruisers of a hostile Power? The most elementary principles of International law require that such conversion shall take place only within the territorial waters of the Power which the vessel will represent on the high seas. We endeavoured to arrive at an agreement on this point. We found that our views were hopelessly divergent, and no agreement whatever as to the conditions under which conversion might take place was arrived at, and yet we rush into this Convention leaving it to this Court, composed without any guidance upon the point, to decide at its pleasure as to whether such conversion is lawful or not. That is an act of madness. Just consider what the effect upon our commerce would be in time of war. Vessels go out as merchantmen from different ports, and when they are on the high seas the captain produces a commission and reads it to the crew, guns are brought up from the hold and mounted, and then you have a cruiser standing in mid-ocean to prey upon our commerce; and that is what you propose to permit by the establishment of this International High Court. The motto of the Government has been, "We must have a Convention at any cost. Better a bad and ruinous Convention than no Convention at all." I say better ten thousand times that we had broken off these negotiations as soon as we found the right to convert on the high seas was insisted upon by some European Powers. The Foreign Secretary, I know, says that we have always reserved the right not to be bound as belligerents by any decision which the International High Court might arrive at on this point of conversion. The Foreign Secretary is deluding himself. Questions may come before the International High Court time after time on appeals brought by neutrals. We have undertaken by the Article which we passed when on the Report stage to enforce decisions given by the High Court in this country on that point. You have a long series of decisions of that kind to which, it may be, we are not parties in any way. In many cases British subjects may be parties, and decisions may have been given on appeals brought by British subjects, and yet the Foreign Secretary says we shall be in no way affected by principles of law laid down in these decisions. I venture to say that the Foreign Secretary is completely mistaken on that point.

    I certainly understood from the manner in which the Foreign Secretary expresed himself when this Bill was under Debate on the 3rd November, that he had had communications with foreign Powers, and had intimated to them the position which His Majesty's Government took up on this point. But about a week afterwards—I thing it was on the 9th November—a question was put by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for York (Mr. Butcher) as to what communications had passed with foreign Powers on this subject, and the answer was that no communications on the point had passed, and what the Foreign Secretary was relying upon was the terms of the Convention itself, and the absence of any declaration that we shall be bound on the question of conversion. The special Convention with regard to the conversion of cruisers consists of a series of the most absolute trivialities and of the statement that on the one vital point no agreement had been arrived at. What is the use of supposing and endeavouring to make the country believe—what is the use of persuading oneself that we shall not be affected as belligerents? Of course we shall be affected as belligerents. We have established an International Prize Court to settle International law, and it is idle to say that if the decisions given by that Court legalise the conversion of merchantmen into cruisers on the high seas we shall have our hands free to say that that is an illegal proceeding. In the third place, I say that where we have a Code it is of the most unsatisfactory character to be administered by such a tribunal as that.

    I shall only touch upon three points, each of them of capital importance. The first is our food supply in time of war, the second is the sinking of neutral prizes, and the third is the provisions as to blockade. With regard to our food supply in time of war that, of course, is dealt with under the head of "Conditional Contraband," and Article 34, which deals with this subject, is one of the most unsatisfactory Articles from the point of view of the interests of this country that could possibly be drawn up. It was dictated textually by Germany, and accepted with hardly any discussion except upon one minor point of drafting at the conference. That Article is said to be of little consequence, because we are assured by the Foreign Secretary that the bulk of our food supply in time of war would be brought in British vessels, just as it is in time of peace. The figure given was 90 per cent. in British vessels in time of peace and 10 per cent. in foreign vessels. I think that there is some exaggeration in the figures; but really I am not concerned to dispute about the precise percentage. We are asked to believe that in time of war that percentage would still hold; that the proportion between British vessels and foreign vessels bringing corn to this country would be the same. I think that everyone knows that the immediate effect of war would be a great increase in the proportion of neutral bottoms bringing food supplies to this country. It really hardly requires argument. It is elementary. The very first principles of business would lead to our vessels being supplanted to a great extent by neutral bottoms bringing corn to this country in time of war. Of what use is it for the Foreign Secretary to tell us that, after all, we need not trouble about the vague defective drafting of Article 34 because it would affect only a small percentage of neutral vessels. I say that the percentage will not be small, and that it is of vital importance to this country to give every encouragement to a large increase of supplies of corn in time of war by neutral bottoms.

    The second point under this head is with reference to the provisions for the sinking of neutral prizes. That depends on an Article which was proposed by Russia and was adopted textually by our Government. That Article denotes a relapse into what may fairly be called the methods of barbarism. It is a monstrous thing that a cruiser should, under such conditions as are defined in the Declaration of London, have the right to sink neutral prizes, on the plea, forsooth, that not to sink them would interfere with the success of her operations. Her operations are to destroy our commerce, and no doubt they would be hampered if she were under the necessity of doing what she is bound to do, bringing them into Court. In the third place, I say that this Court will have to construe provisions of a very vague nature, which tend to hamper the operations of our Navy in time of war. The most valuable weapon we have had has been the weapon of blockade. The right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary told us in the last Debate that the naval experts of the Government approved of this provision with reference to the efficiency of the Navy. I would like further information on that point. I should very much like to know the grounds on which the Government were so advised. Why, this Declaration, which this Court will have to construe, provides that the operations of the blockading squadron by way of capture are only to be within what is called the area of operations. Was there ever a vaguer phrase used in any instrument? How narrow it is you will see when the question comes before an International High Court, when it is of vital importance to our enemies to have a decision adverse to the interests of this country as a great naval Power.

    Our doctrine as to the law of blockade has been simple and sensible, that if an effective blockade was established any vessel trying to break that blockade might be captured, wherever she was. Now, the capture is not to be good unless it is "within the area of operations." What is the area of operations? How narrowly will that be circumscribed by our floating balance of seven representatives of minor countries. I believe this Convention is disastrous to us as a neutral Power, and quite as disastrous to us as a belligerent. And there is one last observation I should desire to make: This Bill provides that there shall be an appeal from our own Supreme Prize Court to the International Prize Court, which this Bill proposes to establish. Our Supreme Court has hitherto been the King in Council. It was felt, I suppose, that it would be indecent to give an appeal from the King in Council to the fifteen gentlemen who are to form this International Prize Court, and so our Government by this Convention, and by this Bill to carry out the Convention, are to convert the King in Council into a Supreme Prize Court, consisting, if you please, of the very members of the Privy Council—of the Judicial Committee—who would advise the King in Council, when constituted a Supreme Court, of Appeal in matters of prize. And that is done merely to give an appeal from our own Supreme Prize Court to the International Prize Court. What is the case with the United States of America? It was pointed out, when this Convention had been proceeded with a long way, when, I think, it was drawn up—though I am glad to say not ratified, and I hope it never will be ratified—it was pointed out by the United States that they did not allow any appeal from an order of their Supreme Court to any other Court whatever. Accordingly, this difficulty, which at first seemed very formidable, was dealt with in the form of a protocol, so that they got round it, not by allowing an appeal—an appeal is to be allowed in Great Britain but not in the United States—but by allowing that the United States might bring a fresh action in the International Prize Court, so that the Supreme Court of the United States will be at liberty to go its own way. On the decision of the International Prize Court in the independent action it is proposed that the United States, if the case arises, should be liable to pay compensation. I say with great respect to His Majesty's Government that that is a position in which we, as a Supreme Court, ought not to have been put. A question was put to the Financial Secretary to the Treasury on this point, and I refreshed my memory as to his answer. His answer was that it was much more advantageous to have an appeal from the Supreme Prize Court than to have the machinery of independent action before the International Prize Court. I think, after all, that something was due to the dignity of our Court, the King in Council, and to the unrivalled reputation which our Court has established in matters of prize. And, forsooth, we have undertaken, if this Bill ever becomes law, to meekly enforce on British subjects within our dominions the decisions of that International High Court. I regard both these Conventions, and the Bill intended to carry them out in order to establish a High Court, as a sacrifice of the interests of this country as the great naval Power of the world to the interests of the great military Powers of the Continent. I think it is a most calamitous step the Government have taken, and I hope they will have the courage even yet to draw back.

    Mr. McKINNON WOOD rose——

    I appeal to hon. Members opposite for a little courtesy. My right hon. Friend throughout has given special attention to this question, and I am quite——

    My right hon. Friend has, I am sure, shown no lack of ability or knowledge on this subject.

    My responsibility, of course, I admit, but I think it would be for the advantage of the House and the Debate. [HON. MEMBERS: "NO, no."] If it is desired after my right hon. Friend speaks that I should make clear my own responsibility or supplement what I have said, I am perfectly willing.

    As the first speaker on this side of the House, I think I might at least have been allowed the courtesy of a hearing. It is only two minutes ago since the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for St. Andrews University was complaining that no one had spoken from this side of the House. I do not see how that complaint and the action of the Gentlemen behind him can square with one another. I do not think the Opposition can complain that we have not given them their full share of the time this evening. They have got the whole of the time on Third Reading up to this very moment. There is one reason why it is necessary I should speak, and that reason was the remark of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Gloucester (Mr. H. Terrell). He quoted me as having uttered words of disrespect with regard to foreign judges, which, when I was Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, it would have been exceedingly improper for me to say, and which, as a Member of this Huose even in an unofficial position, I should be the last to dream of using. I must express my regret that he should have absolutely misrepresented me and then should have made use of such an argument about foreign judges. He made me say something about Russian judges, the correction of which he himself supplied when he read the words I used, which were no reflection upon Russian judges.

    The only reflection I made as to his reflection on Russian judges was a quotation from the OFFICIAL REPORT of his own speech.

    The hon. and learned Gentleman seems to forget that the OFFICIAL REPORT will correct that statement to-morrow morning. He said that I had said the Russian judges would not carry on the work properly. I do not remember his exact phrase, but that was the effect of it. Then he quoted a phrase of mine in which I said that the Russian Prize Court administers the regulations of the Russian Admiralty—which is a very different statement, and no reflection at all on the Russian judges. All through this Debate, even in a mouth where one would not have expected it—that of the right hon. and learned Member for St. Andrew's University (Sir R. Finlay)—we have had the same scoffing reflection upon foreign judges. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has rebuked me for saying on a previous occasion that behind this opposition there was opposition to an International Prize Court. It has been proved again to-day. The hon. and learned Member for Gloucester introduced a little variety into the Debate. At least his arguments were entirely different from those upon which Members on his own side have hitherto relied. His argument was that we were handing over to the delegates of foreign countries power to make laws interfering with our command of the sea. His argument was that this Court would interfere with the powers of belligerents; that the whole tendency of the Declaration of London was to limit belligerent Powers. That is not the argument we have listened to before. It is not the argument of the right hon. and learned Member for St. Andrew's University. What are the points of which he complains? His two points are the conversion of merchantmen and the sinking of neutrals.

    And blockade. Very well. He said that it was the interest of other nations to minimise naval power. That was the argument of the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester. How did he support that? By two points. By a statement about blockade, and by a statement about Welsh coal. I do not propose to follow the hon. and learned Gentleman in the particular illustrations which he used, but I would point out that he was not justified in saying that Great Britain would lose her monopoly of the supply of Welsh coal, and that that coal would be exported in time of war to belligerent foreign nations without let or hindrance. That this instrument somehow takes away from Great Britain her command of Welsh coal—I am at a loss to understand what the hon. and learned Member could have meant by that. Any power we have to regulate the export of Welsh coal is not interfered with by the Declaration of London. The argument seems to me to fall to the ground. I do not think I need attach much importance to that. Both the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester and the right hon. and learned Member for St. Andrew's University attached great importance to the question of blockade. I will quote in evidence against them the hon. Member for Evesham (Mr. Eyres-Monsell), who, I believe, has had naval experience. He wrote a pamphlet in which he denounced the Declaration of London, but in which he admitted with the greatest frankness that Great Britain had her own way about blockade.

    I will take it at "mainly." How is that consistent with the argument of the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester? The Admiralty think they have their own way about blockade. They have widened the power of blockade. The narrowing Continental notions have been given up. The doctrine that you had to give a ship individual notice—the French doctrine—has been given up. The area of operations under modern conditions, with modern ironclads, is a very wide area of operations. I cannot at all agree with the hon. and learned Member for St. Andrew's University upon that point, and the Admiralty do not agree with him. In regard to blockade, we have substantially got our own view established against the Continental view. I say again, as I said on the Second Reading, no one has given a reasonable proof or a sound argument to show that in any respect the belligerent powers of this country are in the least degree weakened by these agreements. Then you have the question of foodstuffs. Here again the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Gloucester, who moved the rejection of the Bill, threw away the arguments of the Imperial Maritime League. He agreed with arguments which he attributed to the First Lord of the Admiralty, but which I took the liberty of putting forward on the Second Reading, that to talk about starvation in time, of war as the hon. Gentleman the Member for Shropshire did, as being dependent upon these agreements, is a perfect absurdity. Admiral Sir Cyperias Bridge, in a very able paper, has pointed out that in time of war it will be impracticable for us to bring as much of our food in neutral vessels as we do in time of peace. If that is the case, that we can only bring some 90 per cent. in time of peace, surely the question of our adequate supply of food in time of war will not depend upon paper agreements. It will depend, as we say it must depend, upon a strong British Navy. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Taunton thought that this Declaration was far harder on neutrals than the present practice. It is attacked from inconsistent points of views. One moment we are told that it gives up belligerent rights; another that it is hard upon neutrals.

    The hon. Gentleman the Member for Plymouth had a very ingenious argument. He said that this question of "base of supply" was a very vital question. I should agree, if I could at all believe that the interpretation given to it by the opponents of the Declaration had any foundation in fact, that it would be a very serious objection. I think hon. Members might give even this Government credit for believing that if they thought that foreign nations interpreted it in the fantastic way in which it is interpreted by the Imperial Maritime League, they would have nothing to do with ratifying a Declaration that involved so serious a limitation of our right to import foodstuffs and other articles of conditional contraband. We do not for a moment believe that other nations take that fantastic view.

    Yes; we know that that view has been accepted by some of the great Powers. [HON. MEMBERS: "Some?" and "Name!"] What does this interpretation mean? It means that the whole of the Clauses in Declaration of London dealing with conditional contraband are a farce and a fraud—nothing less. If every port is a base of supply then all these conditions are ridiculous. What was the authority on which my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth supported his contention1? It was on the authority of a French jurist named General Jomini. When did that gentleman flourish? One hundred years ago! He was a distinguished French military authority, but what he knew of naval law I do not know. He was a general under Napoleon the Great. But what reason is there to suppose that because that Gentleman held a certain view about the military interpretation of a "base of supply," that an Article that deals with that question in the twentieth century indicates the same interpretation? That is the most extraordinary argument I ever heard. I do not think that general can be regarded as a great authority on modern naval and national affairs. The hon. Member (Mr. Hunt) in the course of his speech, chiefly selected from leaflets issued by the Maritime League—I detected their flavour—told us San Domingo was to have equal representation with Great Britain.

    That explanation would have somewhat mitigated the blunders of his arguments if he had given it at the time. San Domingo never has a judge. San Domingo, once in six years, has a deputy-judge, who only acts if the other judge is absent. I do not know what proportion that makes, but it does not mean equality. [HON. MEMBERS: "What other judge?"] The most serious and weighty argument advanced was that of the right hon. Gentleman (Sir R. Finlay). He complained there had been a conspiracy of silence, which, by the way, his hon. Friends a while ago seemed reluctant to allow to be broken. Why should we not be silent for the most part? We had a two days' discussion on the Second Reading, and we discussed exactly the same points then as we are discussing to-night. We had Committee stage which lasted some two or three days, and we had a day and a-half's discussion on Report. One of the chief arguments of the right hon. and learned Member is that it is a bad Court, His idea of a Court would be one consisting of four or five distinguished jurists. How are you to get such a Court selected? Which of the great countries is going to pass the self-denying ordinance of saying, "We will not select a judge"? Would any two countries agree to do that? You cannot deal with this matter as if it had not been discussed carefully by Conferences made up of the Great Powers. These Conferences of the Great Powers felt that they must give representation to the smaller Powers, and I pointed out before that some of the smaller Powers have produced most admirable jurists of great and world-wide reputation. What were the right hon. and learned Gentleman's complaints? They were three. The first was as to blockade. We have got rid of the restricted idea of blockade, and we have got the wider British idea. His two next points were the sinking of neutral prizes and the conversion of merchantmen on the high seas. What is the object of restricting the sinking of neutral prizes? It is to safeguard the rights of neutrals to prevent the sinking of neutral prizes. What is the charge of the right hon. Gentleman? It is that we are committing the destinies of this country to a Court. We are not giving up a single belligerent right. If prizes are to be sunk it is a bad thing for the neutral that is sunk, but it does not diminish the belligerent rights of anybody, but rather tends to increase them. As to the conversion of merchantmen, I have heard more about this than any other subject. Upon this I will say two things. First of all, why does the right hon. Gentleman forget that that is a thing that may happen now without the Declaration of London, and without any Prize Court Convention? Why does he pass over as being of no importance the fact that these great Powers have declared that they maintain that right, and if a war broke out tomorrow those Powers would exercise that right? How is that any charge against this agreement? If it is a case of converting merchantmen on the high seas or anywhere else, that is no limitation of our belligerent rights, and we can do it and do it as quickly as all the rest of the world put together. Two things may happen. My right hon. Friend has said that as a belligerent we are not bound on a question upon which there has been no agreement. The worst that can happen might be that a neutral might be sunk by a foreign converted merchantman, and the Court might decide that she had been Improperly sunk. That does not affect our belligerent rights. Supposing the Court decides that merchantmen ought not to be converted on the high seas, what follows? Our view has prevailed, and we have got our own way. Supposing the Court decides the other way? Nothing can diminish our belligerent rights. If that is International law we can do it as well as other people, and not an argument has been brought forward to show that we have lost one jot or tittle of our rights as a great naval Power.

    The right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down has made a debating reply to the various points put by my hon. Friends. That is the usual practice in this House, and the usual treatment meted out from the Government Bench. But the question which we have to decide to-night is one which cannot very conveniently or easily be handled in accordance with the ordinary practice of this House. On the one hand we have to-night, as the Commons of England, to give the sanction of our Parliament to a great international agreement affecting the practice in times of war overseas. That is a huge moral responsibility which rests upon us. Upon the other hand, the question which we have to decide bristles with technicalities with which this House as a whole is totally incompetent to deal, and which I as an individual am not competent to deal with. What are we to do? I think we ought to try—above all if the Foreign Secretary will give us his guidance before we come to a vote—to see if there are not certain broad considerations underlying these technicalities which we can all appreciate, and which can be stated in terms to which, I think, no one will take exception, although they may arrive at opposite conclusions from the same premises. The first consideration is that we have been for a hundred years the greatest maritime Power in the world. That is not disputed. The second is that the present Prime Minister claims we are still to occupy that position. He has said our naval supremacy is unchallenged, and must never be challenged—so the moral obligation rests upon us now. The third consideration which I think we ought to take into account is that during the whole of the hundred years during which we have beyond contest been the chief naval Power we have held certain views. We have held, during all that time, when we were in a better position, and therefore in a more responsible position, than any other Power, that food should not be contraband of war. We have held during that time that neutrals ought not to be sunk. We have maintained during all that time that privateering in any shape or form, open or covert, ought not to be allowed. That has been a view held by this country for a hundred years, dictated over a hundred years with a great measure of success, and we have been in a position to exercise a great moral influence over all other nations because that was our view and because we were the greatest maritime Power.

    We go into conference with other Powers to urge again those three views. Those who represent us are told to urge that food shall not be contraband. They are told to urge that neutrals shall not be sunk. They are told, if they can, to get a decision that private vessels shall not be turned into ships of war during the process of the campaign. On the first two points we meet with no success, and the third point is not taken into consideration. Those are general considerations which underlie all the technicalities. They cannot be disputed. Therefore, what we have to decide is whether, as we still intend both parties being agreed to keep the supremacy of the sea, we can best enforce those views in the future by sticking to the standard we have held up, or by lowering that standard in order to get a wider world-sanction for a lower standard. That is the question before the house. I agree it is a question upon which any two men may hold opposite views, but with the experiences of the past, and with the hope of the future, I trust this House will not take upon itself the grave moral responsibility, whilst it still represents the greatest sea Power in the world, of lowering the standard we have held up for 100 years on those three points. That food should not be contraband of war, that neutrals should not be sunk, and that private ships should not be turned into ships of war. I have put as simply as I can the question as it appears to me. I own that two courses may be taken, but I do feel this—that, if we are belligerents, the course, we on this side advocate will be to our advantage and also to the advantage of all the neutrals in the world.

    The case we have to consider principally is the case in which we are belligerents; not because we are actuated by any selfish motive, but because it so happens that when we are belligerents our interests coincide with those of all the neutrals of the world. Therefore, both in self-defence and because we can hold up the standard of humanity in war, it seems to me this House will be guilty of levity if it rushes in first to sanction an International agreement which no other Power is at present prepared to sign.

    I willingly respond to the appeal of the right hon. Gentleman and to the desire which I understand has been expressed by other hon. Members behind him, that I should say something at the close of this Debate. But I have very little new to say. The hon. Member for Glasgow University did me, I think, an injustice by giving the impression that by not speaking I was in some way disclaiming responsibility. I have nothing new to say. I have already accepted the responsibility. I have been over the whole ground covered in previous Debates in this House. But I think perhaps it is desirable I should go as shortly as I can over one or two of the general principles which underlie this question. I will begin by saying that I think hon. Members on the other side of the House have vastly exaggerated the importance of the issues at stake. They must surely all feel that we on this side of the House did not take this up as a party question; it was not to make party capital that we went into the Hague Conference. Had we felt as they do about the issues involved we should not have entered into this Conference at all. It is overstating the case enormously to say, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for St. Andrews (Sir R. Finlay) has said, that we are putting the destinies of this country by this Convention into the hands of an International Court. What is being put into the hands of the International Court is the decision on cases which arise between belligerents and neutrals. Does anybody believe that our destinies depend on such a decision? I would not for one moment submit to an International Court any question of our rights in dealing with belligerents, but when it comes to a question between belligerents and neutrals it is a very different matter.

    I will explain to the House exactly what I think we stand to lose, and what we stand to gain. In my opinion we stand to gain infinitely more than we can possibly lose. That point I will endeavour to make good. First let me say a word about the composition of the Court. Of course, you will never in such a matter as this get anything but a compromise. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of five as being a suitable number. You will never get the world at large to agree to so small a number as that. When the right hon. Gentleman was arguing for five he even criticised the sort of jurists that might be appointed by some of the great Powers. I have no doubt the most perfect Court would be one not of five but of three to be appointed entirely by this country. I have only to state that for everybody to see that it is out of the question; so in a lesser degree a Court of five, to be drawn from five great Powers and possibly from fewer, would also be out of the question for international agreement.

    Their share in appointing I would be so infinitesimally small that they would consider that they were not represented. Reference has been made to some of the countries. What have they got? Not a judge, not a share of a judge, but one-sixth of a deputy-judge! To fine the Court down to the small number of five would not give every Power a representative, but every great Power accepted the proposal that they should have only one representative on this Court. The United States willingly accepted only one representative on the Court. What they did stand out for was that the great Powers should have a majority, and the great Powers have got a majority upon the Court. It may seem strange to the House that we have only one representative, but what sort of case is going to come before this Court? The cases which now come before the Prize Court of a belligerent We stand a better chance of justice before this Court on which neutrals must have an enormous majority—there can only be two or three belligerents at most, and some fifteen countries are represented on the Court—we stand an infinitely better chance of getting redress for our neutral merchant vessels which we may consider to have been unfairly treated by a belligerent than we have now in a Court of a belligerent, in which not only we have no representatives, but no neutral power has a representative, and in which the composition of the Court consists entirely of the subjects of the belligerents who are trying the case. In that case there must be an enormous gain when we are neutrals. But the right hon and learned Gentleman opposite (Sir R. Finlay) may say on this point, and quite fairly, "Yes, but we are not bound by the decision of a belligerent enemy's Court, and we should be bound to enforce the decision of the International Prize Court." On that let me ob serve that theoretically we are not bound by the decision of the enemy belligerent's Court in dealing with our neutral vessels. Theoretically, he will not admit an appeal from his decision.

    Theoretically, we are, of course, entitled to go to war whenever we like over the decision of the belligerent Court. As a matter of fact in practice we do not. What happened in the case of the Russo-Japanese war? The Russian Government sank one or two British vessels. Let me say that a large number of the cases have come before the Russian belligerent Court since. In some cases they were awarded compensation and we heard no more about them. In other cases they were not, and the decisions are not satisfactory. But what redress have we? Take the case of the ships that were sunk. It was when the right hon. Gentlemen opposite were in office. The Russian Government sank one or two British merchant ships. If you were going to act you must have acted then. You must have said you were not going to stand this. You knew that your chance of redress in the belligerent's Prize Court was small, and you must have intervened by force at the time. They did not intervene by force, and I think that they were quite right not to intervene by force. The temptation or the desire not to go to war will always in these cases overmaster what seems a comparatively small cause that is in dispute between you and another power. But if you do not go to war when blood is hot and the moment the thing is done, you may be quite sure you are not going to war months or years afterwards in cold blood, and after the decision of the Prize Court of the enemy is known. As a matter of fact you do accept those decisions in practice, and if you have an International Prize Court, in that way, and in that way only, will you in practice get redress. It is said we shall be bound by the decisions of the International Prize Court and that they may be unsatisfactory.

    Here I will point out what I think we stand to lose and what I think we stand to gain. What we stand to lose is not something that will affect the destinies of this country materially. If we are a belligerent how are we going to be concerned in the International Prize Court? We capture, we will say, a neutral vessel, because if we capture a belligerent vessel it will not come before the Prize Court at all. There is no appeal to it from what we may do with regard to an enemy. If we capture a neutral vessel trying to break the blockade or carrying contraband, that case must go before our own Prize Court in the first instance. That takes some time. The neutral may, if the decision of our own Prize Court is unsatisfactory, appeal to the International Prize Court. That further will take some time. Long before it gets to the International Prize Court the war will be over. It is possible that if we are engaged in a great war, and we take action against neutral commerce, we may, some time after the war is over, have to pay rather more in compensation to neutrals than would have been awarded by our own Prize Court. That risk, I admit, we run, but the amount of difference in what we may have to pay in compensation to neutral ships, between what the International Prize Court award and what our own Prize Court award, must be an infinitesimal drop in the millions which the war would have cost, and it cannot affect the destinies of the country or the conduct of the war.

    Some hon. Member opposite said what would the decision of the International Prize Court be two or three years hence. What restraining effect would it have on the operations of a belligerent? I admit exceedingly little. To belligerents engaged in spending half a million a day or more on the war the question of a few thousands more or less to pay in compensation to neutrals a year hence would be very little. Certainly it would not affect the destinies of this country. That actually is the risk we run in agreeing to this Court of Arbitration. What do we stand to gain? We stand to gain, and we, being the greatest owners of neutral merchant shipping in the world, stand to gain more than any other Power. We stand to lose less, because, our share of the neutral shipping being so great and the share of the other Powers so small, the amount of interference we shall have to exercise with neutral shipping when we are at war is less than that which any other Power is likely to exercise.

    When we are not at war our interests in the fair treatment of neutral shipping is greater than that of any other Power—as great as that, I should think, as the whole of the rest of the world put together. We stand to gain by the considerable difference that there may be between the decision of the Prize Courts of a belligerent and the decision of the International Prize Court. I admit the International Prize Court might award more in the case of neutrals than a British Prize Court, but I think it was stated just now that our Prize Courts are more liberal in their awards with regard to neutrals than are the Prize Courts of Continental countries. If that be so, the difference between what we should get from the Prize Court of a Continental belligerent and that which we might obtain from the International Prize Court, is presumably greater than anything that we should stand to lose in our own Courts. That really, I believe, is a fair statement of the balance of loss and gain that there may be as regards the International Prize Court. I now come to the point whether the safety of this country is likely to be endangered when we are at war. The hon. Member (Mr. Hunt) really drives one to despair on this question. He argued the point again to-night. He puts it to me in questions about once a week all founded on the assumption that there exists to-day some guarantees for the freedom of food supplies coming into this country if we are at war which are going to be destroyed by the Declaration of London. There are no guarantees whatever to-day. The whole thing is chaos.

    I did not put it on that assumption at all. I put it to him over and over again whether there was a single port in this country which he could guarantee neutral vessels could come to carrying food supplies without the danger of being captured or sunk. I have got no answer.

    The hon. Member, I see now is not conscious of his own assumption on which he is proceeding. He asks whether there is any port which we can say is at present guaranteed for the free entry of corn and would be a base of supply. [An HON. MEMBER: "With the Declaration of London."] No, now when there is no Declaration of London. It is not ratified now. [An HON. MEMBER: "And never will be."]

    There is no misunderstanding. The question is whether there will be a single port which will be safe in time of war.

    Yes, Sir, but if the hon. Member will allow me to develop his argument as well as my own, he will see that I do not do him any injustice. I told him the other day, in reply to a question, that there would be more guarantees under the Declaration of London than at the present time, because there are none now. If there were guarantees and safeguards now keeping our ports open, by all means compare the guarantees you will get under the Declaration of London with those you have to-day, and see which are the greater. At the present moment there are no guarantees whatever, and even if there are none under the Declaration of London you are no worse off than you are to-day. Somebody on the other side asked, How shall we know what the law will be under the Prize Court Convention? How do you know what the law is now? It is scattered about among the decisions of Prize Courts in countries all over the world. It is chaos at the present time. There will be some order, some definition, some more accurate knowledge of what the law is to be after this Convention. I have heard it argued that the thing would be vague under the Declaration of London or the Convention. It is worse than vague now. You know definitely that other countries have claimed the right to declare all food contraband, and have done so in past years. They may do it again.

    The other day apprehension was expressed as regards the interference that Turkey might exercise with regard to grain. She might declare it contraband of war under the consideration that she had not ratified the Declaration of London. There came some statement or some understanding that, although the Declaration of London was not ratified, it would be regarded as a standard to be applied, and that, therefore, grain would not be treated as contraband, and would only be liable to seizure if it came by certain routes. I have never contended that we should rely upon that as a guarantee for keeping our ports open. What I have urged, and on that I defend my action in regard to the International Prize Court Convention, is that you have no guarantee at the present time, and that under the Declaration of London there are certain definitions. If food is to be declared absolute contraband, so that all food coming to any commercial port is to be stopped by a belligerent, the belligerent can only do that by driving a coach and four through what is the plain meaning of the Declaration of London. I admit he may do it, but do not say that, having put the Declaration of London there, having given these definitions, and having put him in a position that he has to drive a coach and four through it, it is easier for him than at the present time. If we had been putting forward the Declaration of London as a reason for dispensing with cruisers for protecting our own food supplies, as a reason why we should diminish expenditure, on the Navy, which may be required to protect corn coming to this country, as a means for reducing the Navy Estimates, there would be force in the argument of hon. Members opposite. They might then use the argument that a coach and four had been driven through the Declaration, and that it was only a paper safeguard at the best, but we have stated throughout that we do not put it forward as a satisfactory substitute on so grave a subject as our own right to protect food coming to this country.

    It is quite obvious to anybody who has studied the figures that we cannot be supplied in this country in time of war by neutral ships. We must be able to keep the sea free for British ships in time of war, and if we can keep it free for one flag we can keep it free for all. I come to one other point—whether our rights as belligerents are restricted. I take the case of blockade. That really is the important question, and the important gain which we have made as belligerents under the agreement. The Continental doctrine held by many or most Continental countries was that the right of blockade was a very narrow and restricted right. You were to make your line in front of a port, and unless a vessel tried to break through that line, a neutral vessel, you were not entitled to interfere with that vessel. Our doctrine was different. It was that we ought not to be, and will not be, bound by a mere line drawn just outside a port. What we claim is the right not merely to a line, but to interfere with any vessel which comes within the area of operations. We wanted the vague, indefinite term. We want to be able, especially in these days when vessels are so swift, in these days of steam, to have it the area of operations, and not a line. We should have gone on to claim that whether there had been a Convention or not, but we got the British view accepted. We got area of operations instead of definite line. We should have acted on it whether we got this view accepted or not, but having got it accepted it is a great gain.

    Some hon. Member just now said, "Depend upon it in modern wars that protests of neutrals are becoming more and more formidable." I think that there is considerable truth in that. I think that it is increasingly desirable, if we are to exercise our right of blockade according to our own ideas, that we should not be confronted by the protest of a number of combined neutrals. As long as you had no agreement, and as long as other Powers held to this doctrine of the narrow line, we ran the risk that if we, in time of war, to bring our enemy down, acted upon the extended idea of an area of operations, we might have had first one neutral and then another entering his protest, and might have got a formidable combination of neutrals against us. We have got them to accept the British doctrine, and by doing that we have diminished, if we are again at war, and very materially sensibly diminished, the chance of neutrals attempting to interfere with the British view and British practice with regard to the right of blockade. This is a most valuable gain.

    One more point as to the conversion of merchantmen on the high seas. Why was there no agreement? Because to-day, Convention or no Convention, there are nations who claim, and state that they will do it, and claim the right to do it in time of war. That you are confronted with to-day. We have always said that we shall under those circumstances deal with those vessels converted on the high seas as we think fit. Even so, now, by Convention, they are not allowed to act as privateers. If they are converted on the high seas they must come under the same rules, and both commander and officers must be from the navy of the other country. They are not privateers in the old sense. But we say they have no right to be converted on the high seas to-day. We retain our rights to deal with them as we think fit, if we are at war. If we are at war no case will come before the International Prize Court. It is true if we are neutrals and a merchantman converted on the high seas seizes one of our vessels which is a neutral that neutral vessel may bring the case before the International Prize Court and may fail to get redress and may have to pay costs. But after all, all that the International Prize Court can possibly have decided upon will have been that it is not positively immoral in their opinion for a merchantman converted on the high seas to interfere with a neutral. I state again we shall not recognise the decision of the International Prize Court as to what may be done with regard to neutrals as restricting us in our right of doing what we think proper or with dealing not with neutrals but with belligerents.

    We have been anxious in this Convention to take one step forward in arbitration, and we have selected, or, rather we selected with other Powers of course, a certain class of cases which may arise

    Division No. 434.]

    AYES.

    [11.40 p.m.

    Abraham, William (Dublin Harbour)Beck, Arthur CecilBurns, Rt. Hon. John
    Acland, Francis DykeBenn, W. W. (T. H'mts., St. George)Burt, Rt. Hon. Thomas
    Adamson, WilliamBentham, G. J.Cawley, Sir Frederick (Prestwich)
    Addison, Dr. C.Birrell, Rt. Hon. AugustineCawley, H. T. (Lancs., Heywood)
    Agnew, Sir George WilliamBoland, John PiusChancellor, Henry George
    Alien, Arthur A. (Dumbarton)Booth, Frederick HandelChapple, Dr. William Allen
    Allen, Charles Peter (Stroud)Bowerman, C. W.Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S.
    Baker, Joseph Allen (Finsbury, E.)Brocklehurst, William B.Clancy, John Joseph
    Baring, Sir Godfrey (Barnstaple)Brunner, John F. L.Clough, William
    Barlow, Sir John Emmott (Somerset)Bryce, J. AnnanClynes, John R.
    Barton, WilliamBurke, E. Haviland-Condon, Thomas Joseph

    between a belligerent and a neutral, but which cannot really affect the destiny of any country. It must be a matter of comparatively small importance, compared with national destiny. We have signed that Convention; other Powers were not dragged into it reluctantly by us; they were anxious to sign and ratify the Convention. All we ask for is not that we shall be compelled to act upon it if we find the conditions unsatisfactory, but that Parliament should pass legislation which would enable us to ratify if we think fit. Of course, without that legislation we cannot ratify, and the thing could not be enforced. All we ask for is enabling legislation to enable us to put this in force.

    We have preserved a considerable latitude of power under the Orders in Council if other nations who signed the Convention decline to ratify it. If they do not pass the legislation necessary to enable them to put it in force as we do, even then, though the Bill may have become law, our hands will be free, with regard to Orders in Council, to deal with cases of that kind. The Act does not come into operation until the Orders are made, and if we find that the other Powers are not going to put themselves in a position to ratify the Convention, that they are not going to put themselves in a position to comply with its terms and its conditions, the mere fact that Parliament has passed this Bill still leaves us perfectly free to deal as we like with Orders in Council. If other Powers hang back, and if they show any disposition not to pass legislation themselves or not to ratify the Convention, the House may trust that His Majesty's Government will under those circumstances not take any step to ratify the Convention or issue Orders in Council that would place us at a disadvantage with other Powers.

    Question put, "That the word 'now' stand part of the question."

    The House divided: Ayes, 172; Noes, 125.

    Cowan, W. H.Holt, Richard DurningPrice, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central)
    Craig, Herbert J. (Tynemouth)Howard, Hon. GeoffreyPrice, Sir Robert J. (Norfolk, E.)
    Crawshay-Williams, EliotHudson, WalterRadford, George Heynes
    Crumley, PatrickHughes, Spencer LeighRaffan, Peter Wilson
    Dalziel, Sir James H. (Kirkcaldy)Isaacs, Rt. Hon. Sir RufusRea, Walter Russell (Scarborough)
    Davies, Timothy (Lincs. Louth)John, Edward ThomasReddy, Michael
    Dawes, James ArthurJohnson, W.Redmond, John E. (Waterford)
    Denman, Hon. R. D.Jones, Edgar (Merthyr Tydvil)Rendall, Athelstan
    Devlin, JosephJones, William (Carnarvonshire)Richardson, Albion (Peckham)
    Dillon, JohnJones, W. S. Glyn- (T. H'mts, Stepney)Roberts, Charles H. (Lincoln)
    Doris, WilliamJowett, Frederick WilliamRobertson, Sir G. Scott (Bradford)
    Duncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness)Keating, MatthewRobertson, John M. (Tyneside)
    Duncan, J. Hastings (York, Otley)Kelly, EdwardRobinson, Sidney
    Edwards, Enoch (Hanley)King, JosephRoe, Sir Thomas
    Edwards, John Hugh (Glamorgan, Mid)Lambert, George (Devon, S. Molton)Rose, Sir Charles Day
    Elibank, Rt. Hon. Master ofLardner, James Carrige RusheRowlands, James
    Elverston, Sir HaroldLevy, Sir MauriceRowntree, Arnold
    Esslemont, George BirnieLewis, John HerbertSamuel, Rt. Hon. H. L. (Cleveland)
    Ffrench, PeterLundon, ThomasSamuel, S. M. (Whitechapel)
    Furness, StephenLynch, Arthur AlfredScanlan, Thomas
    George, Rt. Hon. David LloydMacdonald, J. R. (Leicester)Scott, A. MacCallum (Glas., Bridgeton)
    Gibson, Sir James PuckeringMacdonald, J. M. (Falkirk Burghs)Seely, Col. Rt. Hon. J. E. B.
    Gill, Alfred HenryMaclean, DonaldSimon, Sir John Allsebrook
    Gladstone, W. G. C.Macnamara, Rt. Hon. Dr. T. J.Smith, Albert (Lancs., Clitheroe)
    Glanville, Harold JamesMcKenna, Rt. Hon. ReginaldStanley, Albert (Staffs, N.W.)
    Goddard, Sir Daniel FordMarshall, Arthur HaroldSutton, John E.
    Goldstone, FrankMason, David M. (Coventry)Tennant, Harold John
    Greenwood, Granville G. (Peterborough)Meehan, Patrick A. (Queens Co.)Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton)
    Grey, Rt. Hon. Sir EdwardMontagu, Hon. E. S.Toulmin, Sir George
    Guest, Hon. Frederick E. (Dorset, E.)Mooney, John J.Ure, Rt. Hon. Alexander
    Gwynn, Stephen Lucius (Galway)Munro, RobertWadsworth, J.
    Hackett, JohnMurray, Captain Hon. Arthur C.Walsh, Stephen (Lancs., Ince)
    Hancock, J. G.Nannetti, Joseph P.Ward, John (Stoke-upon-Trent)
    Harcourt, Robert V. (Montrose)Neilson, FrancisWard, W. Dudley (Southampton)
    Harmsworth, Cecil (Luton, Beds.)Nolan JosephWason, Rt. Hon. E. (Clackmannan)
    Harvey, T. E. (Leeds, W.)Nugent, Sir Walter RichardWebb, H.
    Harvey, W. E. (Derbyshire, N. E.)O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny)White, J. Dundas (Glasgow, Tradeston)
    Haslam, James (Derbyshire)O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.)Whitehouse, John Howard
    Havelock-Allan, Sir HenryO'Doherty, PhilipWiles, Thomas
    Hayden, John PatrickO'Dowd, JohnWilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)
    Hayward, EvanO'Kelly, Edward P. (Wicklow, W.)Wood, Rt. Hon. T. McKinnon (Glas.)
    Helme, Norval WatsonO'Shee, James JohnYoung, William (Perthshire, E.)
    Henderson, Arthur (Durham)O'Sullivan, TimothyYoxall, Sir James Henry
    Henry, Sir CharlesParker, James (Halifax)
    Higham, John SharpPearce, Robert (Staffs, Leek)
    Hinds, JohnPointer, Joseph

    TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—Mr. Illingworth and Mr. Gulland.

    Hobhouse, Rt. Hon. Charles E. H.Pollard, Sir George H.
    Hodge, JohnPower, Patrick Joseph

    NOES.

    Aitken, Sir William MaxClive, Captain Percy ArcherHorne, William E. (Surrey, Guildford)
    Anstruther-Gray, Major WilliamCoates, Major Sir Edward FeethamHorner, Andrew Long
    Archer-Shee, Major M.Cooper, Richard AshmoleHouston, Robert Paterson
    Arkwright, John StanhopeCourthope, George LoydHunt, Rowland
    Ashley, Wilfrid W.Craig, Captain James (Down, E.)Ingleby, Holcombe
    Astor, WaldorfCraig, Norman (Kent, Thanet)Jackson, Sir John
    Baird, J. L.Craik, Sir HenryJessel, Captain Herbert M.
    Balcarres,. LordCroft, Henry PageKinloch-Cooke, Sir Clement
    Banbury, Sir Frederick GeorgeDalziel, Davison (Brixton)Kirkwood, John H. M.
    Banner, John S. HarmoodDenniss, E. R. B.Kyffin-Taylor, G.
    Barlow, Montague (Salford, South)Dixon, Charles HarveyLarmor, Sir J.
    Bathurst, Charles (Wilts, Wilton)Doughty, Sir GeorgeLowe, Sir F. W. (Birm., Edgbaston)
    Beach, Hon. Michael Hugh HicksDu Cros, Arthur PhilipMacmaster, Donald
    Beckett, Hon. GervaseDuke, Henry EdwardM'Neill, Ronald (Kent, St. Augustine)
    Benn, Arthur Shirley (Plymouth)Faber, Captain W. V. (Hants, W.)Magnus, Sir Philip
    Benn, Ion Hamilton (Greenwich)Fell, ArthurMason, James F. (Windsor)
    Bennett-Goldney, FrancisFinlay, Rt. Hon. Sir RobertMorrison-Bell, Major A. C. (Honiton)
    Bentinck, Lord Henry Cavendish-Flannery, Sir J. FortescueNewdegate, F. A.
    Bigland, AlfredGibbs, George AbrahamNewman, John R. P.
    Boyle, W. Lewis (Norfolk, Mid)Gilmour, Captain J.O'Neill, Hon. A. E. B. (Antrim, Mid)
    Bridgeman, William CliveGordon, John (Londonderry, South)Orde-Powlett, Hon. W. G. A.
    Bull, Sir William JamesGrant, J. A.Paget, Almeric Hugh
    Burn, Colonel C. R.Greene, Walter RaymondPeel, Captain R. F. (Woodbridge)
    Butcher, John GeorgeGretton, JohnPeel, Hon. W. R. W. (Taunton)
    Carlile, Sir Edward HildredGuinness, Hon. Walter EdwardPeto, Basil Edward
    Cassel, FelixHall, D. B. (Isle of Wight)Pole-Carew, Sir R.
    Castlereagh, ViscountHall, Fred (Dulwich)Pollock, Ernest Murray
    Cave, GeorgeHambro, Angus ValdemarPryce-Jones, Col. E.
    Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)Hamilton, Lord C. J. (Kensington)Ratcliff, R. F.
    Cecil, Lord Hugh (Oxford University)Helmsley, ViscountRoberts, S. (Sheffield, Ecclesall)
    Cecil, Lord R. (Herts, Hitchin)Hill, Sir Clement L.Rothschild, Lionel D.
    Chaloner, Col. R. G. W.Hoare, Samuel John GurneyRutherford, Watson (L'pool, W. Derby)
    Chaplin, Rt. Hon. HenryHope, James Fitzalan (Sheffield)Salter, Arthur Clavell

    Samuel, Sir Harry (Norwood)Terrell, Henry (Gloucester)Willoughby, Major Hon. Claud
    Sanders, Robert ArthurThompson, Robert (Belfast, North)Wolmer, Viscount
    Sanderson, LancelotTouche, George AlexanderWood, John (stalybridge)
    Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.)Tryon, Captain George ClementWorthington-Evans, L.
    Spear, Sir John WardValentia, ViscountWyndham, Rt. Hon. George
    Staveley-Hill, HenryWalker, Col. William HallYate, Col. C. E.
    Steel-Maitland, A. D.Ward, A. S. (Herts, Watford)
    Stewart, GershomWarde, Col. C. E. (Kent, Mid)

    TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—Mr. Pike Pease and Mr. Eyres-Monsell.

    Sykes, Mark (Hull, Central)Wheler, Granville C. H.
    Talbot, Lord EdmundWhite, Major G. D. (Lancs., Southport)

    Main question put, and agreed to.

    Bill read the third time, and passed.

    Finance Sinking Fund

    Considered in Committee.

    (IN THE COMMITTEE.)

    [Mr. WHITLEY in the Chair.]

    Motion made, and question proposed, "That for the purposes of any Act of the present Session relating to finance it is expedient that the old Sinking Fund for the financial year ending the thirty-first day of March, nineteen hundred and eleven, may be applied—

  • (a) to the extent of one million five hundred thousand pounds for the purpose of the development fund under the Development and Road Improvement Funds Act, 1909; and
  • (b) to the extent of one million five hundred thousand pounds for the purpose of the provision of sanatoria and other institutions for the treatment of tuberculosis or such other diseases as the Local Government Board, with the approval of the Treasury, may appoint; and
  • (c) to the extent of two hundred and fifty thousand pounds for the purpose of an advance to the Government of the East Africa Protectorate;
  • and that such an advance may be made by the Treasury."—[ Mr. Lloyd George.]

    It is now ten minutes to twelve on 7th December, and we are about to pass a financial Resolution on which to found one of the Clauses of the Budget. In the days of the great Chancellors of the Exchequer, such as Mr. Pitt, Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Disraeli, and others, all the financial Resolutions on which the Budget was founded were taken in April. It is a novel experience that at this hour, after an exhausting day in the House, we should be asked to pass such a Resolution. The Chancellor of the Exchequer is a man of great ability and resource. Why, when at a somewhat belated period in the summer the Resolutions on which the Budget was to be founded were taken, was this Resolution omitted? The result of this Resolution is that about £3,500,000 are taken from the old Sinking Fund and diverted to other purposes, the merits or demerits of which I will not argue. No notice of the Resolution is to be obtained in the Vote Office, and unless you can get the information from one of the clerks you do not in the least know what you are to be asked to do with the Budget at ten minutes to twelve o'clock on December 7th! When the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer was in opposition his invective was great upon the want of system that was practised by concealing from the House of Commons the subject matter of what was to be discussed. There was no one in those days more angry with the then Conservative Government for perpetuating this system than the right hon. Gentleman. Now it is the right hon. Gentleman who comes down and asks us, at this late hour, to assist in the destruction of the finances of the country.

    I have provided myself with a Paper, dated 11th May, 1911, issued by the late Financial Secretary to the Treasury. I find on page 40 that the Old Sinking Fund with which we are now dealing, has never been touched since the years 1897–8–9. In 1897 the surplus revenue amounted to £4,200,000. This was set apart to be applied by the Treasury for Naval Works, that is, for the defence of the country. In 1898 £2,473,000 was set aside by the Treasury and military works. In 1899 £2,000,000, was set aside for public works and offices. Never since then has any attempt been made to tamper with the old Sinking Fund. Two years ago the right hon. Gentleman brought in a Clause in his Budget, or stated in his Budget statement that he was going to do so, to tamper with the old Sinking Fund, but the outcry in the City and other places was so great that the right hon. Gentleman did not persist with the Clause. Here at the last moment so to speak, of the dying year, this attempt is being made to alter the old Sinking Fund. In the year 1898, the annual expenditure was £102,000,000, and the average price of Consols was, according to "Whitaker's Almanack," over 112. At the present moment the annual expenditure is £182,000,000, and the price of Consols by this evening's paper is, not over 112, but 76¾. And this is the moment that the right hon. Gentleman chooses to take three and a quarter millions, I think it is—and I apologise if I am wrong in my figures, but I cannot see through a piece of wood, and I do not think I am overstating the case—from the old Sinking Fund. That is not all, because the new Sinking Fund is also being tampered with. The new Sinking Fund was instituted in 1875 by Sir Stafford Northcote, and the sum set aside for the service of the debt was £28,000,000.

    I have here a Paper issued by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, showing that the sum set aside for the service of this debt for the year 1911–12 is to be £24,500,000. If you take that sum from £28,000,000 you will find that the new Sinking Fund is reduced by a sum equal to £3,500,000, and therefore the Sinking Fund is being tampered with to the extent of £7,000,000. That is not all. We remember the attempt made earlier in the year to induce the railway companies to postpone their payment of Income Tax from March to the 2nd or 3rd of April, but the railway companies, being honourable people, refused for the most part to comply with the request made to them. I think I am correct in saying that had they acceded to the request to postpone payment a sum of about a half a million which should have been given to the old Sinking Fund on the 31st March, 1911, would have been postponed and pushed into this year and spent upon other matters. Let us consider for a moment irrespective of finance. What was the object the House had in ordaining that where there was a surplus over expenditure in any given year it should be spent in the reduction of debt? The object is very clear. There is no particular advantage to be gained in any Department by under-estimating their revenue and over-estimating their expenditure if the surplus is to go to the payment of debt. But if it is not obliged to go to the payment of debt, and can be used for other purposes, it is perfectly clear that any unscrupulous Minister could conspire with the Chancellor of the Exchequer or some other person in high authority upon the Front Bench, and say, "We will overestimate our expenditure and under-estimate our revenue, and we will apply the surplus to a certain object which we do not want to put upon the Estimates to come before Parliament." It was for that reason that Parliament many years ago decreed that when there was a surplus it should be devoted to the extinction of debt. Now we are changing all that. Not so many years ago there were great statesmen sitting on the Treasury Bench who took the view which I am taking at the present moment. I am sorry the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Rossendale is not here, because I am sure he would be interested to know that on the 13th of April, 1899, Sir William Harcourt said:—
    "That the time of the largest revenue and the greatest prosperity from a financial point of view which this country has probably ever known should be the occasion chosen for what I can only call a repudiation of the obligations under which this country has placed itself with regard to the extinction of debt, is I confess one of the most serious and I will call it one of the most disastrous proposals that has ever been made."
    That was Sir William Harcourt's view when Consols were 111, and now they are at 76½. Our expenditure was then about 70 per cent. less than it is at the present moment, and of course the burden of debt was very much less. Sir William Harcourt goes on to say:—
    "It is true that there are times when through exceptional burdens the Sinking Fund has been suspended to meet the extreme necessity of the hour."
    There is an extreme necessity at the present moment.
    "That I think is a very legitimate transaction, but the permanent reduction of the Sinking Fund is a different thing and is fatal to the whole system of finance. The Chancellor of the Exchequer asks are we to benefit the people of the future, but what is the Government's policy doing to these people? Every day you are increasing the liabilities of this country to an extent which you cannot measure and which you are only commencing. You are issuing scrip which they will have to redeem. It is your posterity who will have to bear the enormous burdens of these great liabilities which you are every month creating."
    I ask the House if these words are not applicable to the present moment, and whether hon. Members ought not, in view of the serious danger pointed out by a great Liberal financier of tampering with the Sinking Fund, to hesitate about doing the same thing when things are very much more dangerous than they were then. Sir William Harcourt proceeded:—
    "The right hon. Gentleman has muddled away his income by not redeeming debt, I have always held that this provision is one of the greatest sources of strength to the British nation, which gives you credit and character abroad."
    You have not much credit abroad now.
    "When we come to discuss the question I shall ask the House to consider what course was taken by Mr. Gladstone. They treated with scorn the idea that when the British Empire was called upon to make provision against a scare then existing of war they should have to resort to extraordinary measures regarding the debt, and when these passages are recalled to the recollection of the House I think it will be ashamed of this financial degeneracy."
    I never admired Sir William Harcourt more than when I read these speeches, seeing that what he prophesied has come to pass in these days of financial degeneracy. It is not necessary at this late hour to read more extracts, although I have a great number here. Nearly everybody who sat on the Front Ministerial Bench at that time contributed to the Debate; indeed, I made a contribution myself, and in case it should be the intention of the right hon. Gentleman to quote it I will do so myself. I should not like to give him the trouble at this late hour of ransacking the pages of the "Official Debates" for it.

    I said at that particular time when Consols were 113, and when there was a great attack made upon Sir Michael Hicks-Beach for redeeming debt at over par, when he had been told that Consols were going up to 120—people then did not think we were going to have a Radical Government—that it was a great mistake to redeem debt above par, and that under the circumstances there was very considerable justification for Sir Michael in reducing the amount of the debt which at that time stood at about 585 millions sterling.

    I have here too a little passage from a speech by the right hon. the Member for North Islington (Mr. Lough), a great financial economist at that time. I remember saying when the credit of the country was so good there was no very great necessity for redeeming debt. I adhere to that statement.

    But the credit of the country is not good now. The debt has increased very much and so too has the expenditure, and what the right hon. Gentleman ought to do is to follow the example, if I may say so, of a wise spendthrift. If he is a wise man he will say, "I will not for the future continue to spend so much annually. I will not for the future continue to draw upon my capital. I will set aside something annually to reduce my debt and knock a reasonable amount annually off my expenditure." I could have enlarged on this subject for a considerable time but as an hon. Member below the gangway, to judge from his interruptions, seems converted by my speech, I will say no more than to express a hope that he will have sufficient strength to support me in the lobby. We have, unfortunately, only three days next week to consider the remaining stages of the Budget—one day for Committee—one for Report and one for the Third Reading, and out of these three days time will have to be found for the Report stage of this Resolution unless it is taken to-morrow. I have felt it my duty under these circumstances to enter this protest. I am afraid I shall not have time to repeat it in better language and at greater length on Monday because there will then be so many other things to take up the time of the House. I believe the right hon. Gentleman has some faint glimmerings of economy in his composition: I judge that from certain actions of his when I have sat beside him at dinner or when he takes wine in the City. On those occasions I have always judged him to be an apostle of economy. I hope that on this occasion he will see the errors of his ways, and even at this last moment withdraw his Resolution, or at least undertake next year to make up the amount which he is now going to take. This is an extremely important matter. The credit of the country is of importance to everybody, and it is far more important to hon. Gentlemen below the gangway opposite than it is to people who are better off in this world's goods. To the latter it may only mean the taking away or a diminution of certain surplus luxuries.

    The hon. Gentleman has his £400 a year. It may be nothing to him at the present moment, but to a very large number of people it would seem a very considerable income. There are large numbers who have invested the savings of their lives in the banks of this country, whose funds are invested in these very securities. If you depreciate the securities you cause loss to these people. I defy anyone who has any knowledge of the City to get up and contradict that. It is because I feel strongly on this matter that I have ventured to say these few words, and I trust that in the interests of the country they will bear good fruit.

    The hon. Baronet has complained that we are bringing this Resolution before the House of Commons at a very late period of the year. That we are doing so is not the fault of the Government. It was my earnest wish, and it was the wish of the Government, to dispose of the Finance Bill before we separated in August, and it was at the urgent request of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite that we postponed it until the Autumn Session. The hon. Member for the Tewkesbury Division (Mr. Hicks Beach) shakes his head in contradiction but I repeat that it was with very great reluctance that I consented to postpone it at the urgent request of hon. and right hon Gentlemen opposite. There was no proposal to guillotine. We were entirely in the hands of the House, and if it desired a week or a fortnight there was no method by which we proposed to prevent it. The Bill was postponed till now entirely to meet the convenience of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite. Having done it at their request I do not think it lies in the mouth of the hon. Gentleman to complain that we are disposing of this in December instead of in August. [An HON. MEMBER: "Why not in April?"] For the simple reason that we were discussing this Resolution at the end of May But that is not the point. The question put to me, why are we discussing it in December? My reply is because the Opposition asked us to postpone it from August.

    Did any Member of the Opposition ask for this Resolution to be postponed to this stage?

    That is a totally different point. I am dealing with the question why we are discussing it now instead of earlier in the year. The hon. Baronet has put one or two other questions to me. He complains that the Government have not followed the precedents of Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Disraeli and have not put this Clause on the Paper. But Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Disraeli never did put these motions down on the Paper, they were always read from the Chair. I was the first Chancellor of the Exchequer who ever departed from precedent and gave printed notice of the Resolution to be read out to the House. That was done in the year 1909 for the first time. Every other Chancellor of the Exchequer generally moved the Resolutions, and they were read from the Chair for the first time.

    I agree to that. The right hon. Gentleman has misunderstood me. What I said was that Mr. Disraeli and Mr. Gladstone brought in their Budgets in April and passed them in Juno. They did not put them off till this time of the year. My other point was that when the- right hon. Gentleman was in Opposition he was very angry at these Resolutions not being printed, and I pointed out that this Resolution has not been printed.

    I have a recollection of my having complained of it. If I did complain, at any rate I have the satisfaction of knowing that the complaint I made in Opposition was rectified when I got into office. That is more than generally happens with Members of the Opposition when they get on this side of the House, and I am not so sure that someone will not be making similar complaints about the hon. Baronet when he is sitting on this bench. The hon. Baronet says that I criticised the Government of that day very severely with regard to the Sinking Fund. My recollection is that I got very little sympathy from him at that time, even with regard to the Sinking Fund. He was astute enough to know that there was an awkward and inconvenient speech of his, but with his usual adroitness he preferred to give a summary of it to the Committee to quoting it. On the other hand I prefer the actual words the hon. Baronet used on that occasion.

    The very occasion the hon. Baronet referred to when Sir William Harcourt complained of the action of the Government in raiding the then Sinking Fund. He then said:

    "At the present moment our National Debt is £634,000,000, while our population is nearly 40,000,000."
    Now the population has gone up to 45,000,000.
    "Therefore it is impossible to say that the National Debt does in any way press hardly upon the people of this country. What good purpose does the National Debt serve? It provides a safe investment for the savings of the people. Undoubtedly the only drawback to my mind to the provision made by the last Chancellor of the Exchequer on this side of the House for reducing the interest on the National Debt was that it caused a rise in second-rate securities."
    If the hon. Baronet looks at that speech he will sea that he was arguing in favour of a National Debt, and he seemed to think it was a good thing in itself. That is the line he took then, although now he has a very belated admiration for Sir William Harcourt's speech. It is rather unfortunate that that admiration took something like ten years to mature. Let me tell the hon. Baronet another thing. He complains that he really does not know what this Resolution is. I think he did. He knows perfectly well that every item in this Resolution has been printed in this Bill since the 22nd May. I stated in my Budget speech what this money was to be spent upon. What are the purposes? I ask the hon. Baronet if there is any one of them to which he objects.

    I will tell him. There is £1,500,000 to be spent for the purposes of development. The hon. Baronet seems to think that the money to be spent on the agricultural development of this country would be wasted. I do not think that is the view of the agricultural Members in this House. There is £1,500,000 for the purposes of assisting in the building of sanatoria. The hon. Baronet approves of that. The third is the advancing of £250,000 for the purpose of aiding the development of our East African Protectorate. I think he agrees with that. So far as the three purposes are concerned, I think he and most hon. Gentlemen on that side of the House would agree with the purposes.

    Then I think I can claim the support of most hon. Members on his own side in spending money for the purpose of agricultural development. The hon. Baronet says what he objects to is not so much the purposes as the fact that the money is taken out of the old Sinking Fund. Let us put it as a matter of business. If you do not take it out of the old Sinking Fund you will have to borrow it for this purpose, because it is capital expenditure. What on earth would be the good of paying £3,500,000 into the old Sinking Fund, and then borrowing a sufficient sum of money for these purposes, having the money in your own hands. [An HON. MEMBER: "Taxes."] You would not use taxes for the purpose of capital expenditure. That is not done in any business enterprise.

    Does the hon. Baronet really mean to say capital expenditure could legitimately be put on the revenue of the year?

    I do not say it, but the whole of the party opposite said it on the Naval and Military Works Loan.

    They are not at all analogous cases. In that case you were ostensibly borrowing money for capital expenditure, but really borrowing it for the recurrent expenses of the year. You do not raise £1,500,000 every year for the purpose of building sanatoria. It is true as far as development is concerned there is a sum of £400,000 a year put down for capital expenditure, but there is a proportion of that which is in itself capital expenditure. For instance, if you buy land, that is capital expenditure, and you have something which represents it still there—namely, the land. In no business do you treat the purchase of land as if it were an annual expenditure, and therefore it is a capital expenditure. Either you would have to borrow this money or take it out of the Old Sinking Fund. We happen to have £3,500,000 in our hands, and instead of borrowing we have used it for the purpose of these capital expenses. The hon. Baronet has entered into the whole question of Consols and depreciation. He said that they did not foresee that there was going to be a Radical Government. I do not think anyone foresaw that there was going to be an enterprise which would add £150,000,000 to the National Debt. I do not think at that time they quite foresaw what the effect was of introducing Colonial securities into the market. But we have had that over and over again this year. We have had two or three Debates upon it, and I have no doubt we shall have the same Debate on the Third Reading. It is a matter of very considerable importance. These are considerations which we have always got to take into account. As far as Consols are concerned what difference did it make whether you took it out of the old Sinking Fund or went to the market and borrowed it. In my judgement it would have had a much more disturbing effect on the market if you borrowed these sums in driblets. That is the one thing which disturbs the market. It is the one thing which has the most injurious effect on any item of expenditure incurred by the late Government. In another item of expenditure which I did not change it had a very disastrous effect on the stock market, namely, the recurrent borrowing of Irish land stock. That is the effect when you have to go constantly to the market, and when you do not come to the end of your borrowing. That disturbs the market, and the disturbance would be much greater if we had to borrow £1,500,000 for sanatoria, £1,500,000 for development, and £250,000 for our East African Protectorate. I say it is a much more businesslike proposition that, having £3,500,000 to spare, we should get it out of the Old Sinking Fund rather than go to the market to borrow the money from time to time.

    I think there is one point which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has forgotten to explain in connection with this Resolution. If he looks at the Schedule of the Bill he will find that a provision in a previous enactment which is now to be repealed is Section 2, Subsection (2), of the Development and Road Improvement Funds Act of 1909. That Sub-section says:—

    "There shall be charged on, and issued out of, the Consolidated Fund, or the growing produce thereof, in the year ending the thirty-first day of March, nineteen hundred and eleven, and in each of the next succeeding four years, the sum of five hundred thousand pounds."
    What does that Sub-section mean? It means that out of the revenues of 1910, 1911, 1912, and so on, the sum of £500,000 was to be taken for the purposes of the Development Fund. What is the right hon. Gentleman now doing? He proposes to repeal that Sub-section, and instead of paying for expenditure out of the revenue of the year, he is paying it out of a capital sum which ought to be given to the reduction of debt. The right hon. Gentleman has given no explanation to the House why he is doing that. That is one of the chief reasons which induced my hon. Friend (Sir F. Banbury) to bring the matter to the notice of the House. It is ridiculous for the right hon Gentleman to say that he is doing exactly the same thing as former Governments did. He is not. He is directly repealing by a sidewind the definite operation of his own Act which was passed in 1909, and he is attempting to do it in the early hours of the morning without offering any explanation at all.

    Does the hon. I Gentleman suggest that I have never explained to the House what I propose to do? I certainly explained at very great length on the First Reading what was proposed to be done, and not only then but in a subsequent discussion.

    What I really meant was that the right hon. Gentleman has not given a single word of explanation about it to-night. I think it is a very important matter. I had forgotten what the right hon. Gentleman said on former occasions. I really do not think it is fair to the House to pass this Resolution tonight without giving some proper explanation of what is actually being done in the way of repealing by a sidewind a definite provision in an Act of Parliament.

    Allusion has been made in this Debate to irrelevant remarks, and I wish to make reference to one of them. The hon. Baronet, the Member for the City of London, in quite a playful manner, I admit, made reference to our receiving £400 a year, and considering the way in which that observation was received, and, as I think, vulgarly cheered by his friends behind him, I am entitled to offer some protest against the endeavour to associate merely the Labour members with the payment. It was not money which brought us into this House, a thing which cannot be said of some of the hon. Gentlemen on the other side. [HON. MEMBERS: "Name."] It is not money which keeps us here. I think I may also draw attention to the few instances which have been made public in which hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House have endeavoured to publicly dispose of the salaries they have received.

    The hon. Member has made his protest. He is entitled to do that, but not to carry the matter further.

    I regret that these remarks are made inside this House, and even more frequently outside.

    I just want to make an observation on this very important matter, with regard to the manner in which it has been brought forward. We have not complained that this Resolution was not taken in August. The complaint that the right hon. Gentleman referred to, that we had requested that it should stand over, was made in August, when we were threatened with the Budget, and it was felt on this side that there was not sufficient opportunity then to discuss it. The right hon. Gentleman has given no reply whatever to the complaint which has been made from these benches that the Budget was not dealt with and concluded in May or June at the outside. It is no answer to us to say that we asked him in August to put it off until the autumn. That is no reply to our legitimate complaint that the whole matter was not dealt 'With in June. What is the real reason for the Old Sinking Fund? I have taken the trouble to look up to see how this, was made one of the standing rules of our constitution, and I find that the reason was in order to stop dishonest finance. The words used were those exact words. The intention was to put it out of the power of any Government to indulge in dishonest finance, and dishonest finance as then defined was over-estimating the amount of the expenditure, and under-estimating the revenue in order that the Government of the day might be placed in a position of having considerable funds at their disposal which they could use as they liked without the authority of Parliament. What has been done? The country has been deliberately over-taxed either by the ignorant or dishonest finance of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. If it was not intended dishonestly to create an artificial surplus, then, of course, it arises from his incompetence; but in any case the position to-night that we have got to deal with is that three and a half millions were taken out of the pockets of the taxpayers more than the expenditure of the particular year warranted. How was that done? It was by enormous taxes upon spirits which were sprung upon the country, and which disturbed a very large number of industries. The effect of that was that the Chancellor of the Exchequer got this three and a half millions. What is the rule of our constitution which has been acted upon, with the exception of the three years referred to, for very very many years? It is that whenever a Chancellor of the Exchequer does that, automatically that sum of money which is called the Old Sinking Fund, is obliged to be used for the extinction of debt. If the law had been carried out, that three and a half millions would have been expended in taking off the market that amount of Consols at a profit of 25 per cent., or perhaps a little less, because the price would have risen and to-day we should probably have had Consols at 80 or a little over, instead of at 76¾. I venture to raise my protest against this kind of procedure and I think we are entitled in the House of Commons to do so. I do not think there is any more disquieting fact with regard to the position of this country to day than the price of Consols. It is a terrible thing to think about. It is a menace to the savings banks. It has been a terrible loss to hundreds of concerns, to banks, to financial corporations, to commercial undertakings which have honestly invested portions of their revenue and profits in reserves in the credit of the country. I could give the Chancellor of the Exchequer illustrations—he knows them as well as I do—of the numerous well-founded and well-managed undertakings which have lost large sums of money and some of which have been ruined in this way. What is the excuse? The excuse we have had from the Chancellor of the Exchequer is one of the flimsiest and most fallacious ever made in this House. It is that if the right hon. Gentleman had done what he ought to have done with this money—paid off Consols—he would have had to come to the House now and get authority to borrow an equivalent amount for these three purposes. That is no excuse. If the right hon. Gentleman had come to the House in that way we should have had an opportunity of saying whether the country should be taxed to pay for these various purposes, and we should have had an opportunity of debating all these points in a proper manner. But we are deprived of the proper opportunity by the Chancellor bringing forward this astonishing proposition. Therefore I think we are entitled, whatever may be the date, and however late in the day it may be, to express in the strongest possible language our disapproval, as business men acting in the interests of the country, of the course the Chancellor of the Exchequer has followed.

    Will the sums reappear on any kind of Estimate in any kind of way? Very often there is what is known as a token vote, and I suggest that sums of this kind ought to be represented by a token vote, so that the House may know the expenditure they are committed to. I also wish to ask why this Resolution was not passed before the Bill was set up?

    As to the first of these questions, these items will not appear again as an Estimate. The hon. Member for Birkenhead has suggested that no opportunity had been given to the House to consider this question. But I think he could not seriously have meant that. The three objects for which this money is to be spent are sanatoria, the development fund, and colonial expenditure. They are all matters that have been explained to the House, and were discussed in the month of May.

    May I be allowed to say that the right hon. Gentleman slightly misrepresents me there. I did not say that those particular objects had not been discussed. What I said was that we had not had an opportunity of discussing them in the same way that we would have had if they had been put on the Estimates, if there had been a proper Bill brought in to borrow this particular money or they had been put on the Estimates of the year.

    The hon. Member also spoke about this being dishonest finance. Surely that language is rather strong. The hon. Baronet, the Member for the City of London, referred to one or two occasions upon which the same procedure had been adopted by the Government of which the hon. Member for Birkenhead and the hon. Baronet for the City of London were supporters. I believe on one occasion which has been mentioned the hon. Baronet supported this particular procedure. I have looked at the figures to which he referred. There was the case of 1895–1896, when the present Lord St. Aldwyn was Chancellor of the Exchequer. In that year there was a surplus for the Old Sinking Fund of £4,210,000, of which £3,800,000 or more was used in identically the same manner for Naval Works Act expenditure, that left £375,000 which might have been left in the Old Sinking Fund, but it was diverted also. So nothing was left of £4,210,000.

    I am glad the condemnation of the hon. Member for Birkenhead is wholesale and impartial. Then in 1896 nearly 2½ millions might have been used in this way. It was all used for Military Works. Then in the next year, 1897–1898, 2½ millions was used for Public Buildings. Now I find when I examine the five years when there was a surplus for the Old Sinking Fund of the Government, that the hon. Member supported, that out of nearly twelve millions that might have been used for Old Sinking Fund, over 8½ millions were diverted in this way. That is 74 per cent. of the total surplus, whereas during the five years under the present Government the total amount diverted was only 20 per cent. Therefore if we are talking about dishonesty we know where the greater crime lies.

    Another point I want to make, and it is this: Surely the question is how much money is used for the reduction of liabilities and the paying off of debt. That surely is an important consideration. The hon. Member does not think that of any importance. I think the House generally will think otherwise.

    I find we have paid off £68,000,000 of debt. In the first three years of this Government over £42,000,000 went to repay capital liabilities, and in the next three years £26,000,000, and there is a sum of about £10,000,000 coming this year. I want to make this point: that in no year of the late Unionist Government was any such sum of money set aside for that purpose—I think the largest amount was about £7,000,000. So that if you look at it from the point of view of precedent I do not think the hon. Member can make a very good case; and if you look at it from the point of view of repayment of debt he makes a still worse case. I think his criticism rather fails. I will not keep the House longer at this hour of the night. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has already dealt with the matter fully, and I have answered the questions addressed to me by the hon. Member for Sheffield.

    That is just what the right hon. Gentleman has not done. I want to ask him why this Resolution was not passed before the Bill was set up. The usual rule in a Finance Bill or kindred Bill is to found it upon certain resolutions. My other question was about the token vote. I gather there will be no token vote; therefore we lose entire control of three and a-half millions contained in this Resolution. Parliament will have nothing more to say about it. I suppose the only possible check there will be is that about two years hence the Public Accounts Committee may have something to say to it. There will not be any guarantee whatever even that it will necessarily be spent for the purpose mentioned, since it does not pass through any Appropriation Act at all.

    May I point out that there is a Clause in the Bill—Clause 8—which deals with these amounts, and which the hon. Baronet has been good enough to promise that he will discuss on the Third Reading of the Bill.

    On a point of Procedure. I understand that one and a-half millions is to be spent on sanatoria. Will Clause 8 of this Bill provide the House of Commons with the only opportunity it will get for discussing the method of structure and the character of these buildings? Normally, I understand—I remember several cases—a taken vote is put upon the Estimates—£10, £2—in order to give the House of Commons a chance of discussing it. Members in all parts of the House know what acute controversy there is as to the right style of consumption sanatorium. Under present conditions it will only be on Monday afternoon that the House of Commons will be able to discuss these problems. Surely that is wrong? It is upon the technical structure of these buildings that their value may depend.

    I have twice tried to answer them. It is not in accordance with precedent to put down an estimate if the matter is dealt with in this way. There has been an opportunity of discussing sanatoria on the Insurance Bill, and of course it will be open to the House to discuss the question on Clause 8 of this Bill.

    But there are no figures given. We have not the remotest idea whether it is to be £10 or £40 a bed. No plans have been prepared.

    That figure could not be given if we did bring in an estimate. The Noble Lord cannot think that we could give an estimate of, say, £10 a bed, before the matter has been considered by the insurance committees and so on. We are not in a position to do that.

    Of course the House would not wish me to press it further. This money will be spent, £9 out of £10, in the next financial year. There is no occasion for the Estimates to be presented in the month of April or May. It may be presented as a Supplementary Estimate in the month of March, 1913. Of course we have no Estimates yet, because the Commissioners have only just been appointed. It is clearly impossible that they should devise a scheme at this stage. Therefore we cannot possibly discuss it on Monday next. I submit this is a matter on which the House of Commons should express an opinion. Otherwise you are going to take one of the most critical features of the whole of the Insurance Bill entirely out of the purview of Parliament.

    I should like to support the appeal made by the Noble Lord. In Edinburgh, where there is a very large medical school, I know very great interest is being taken in this question of the expenditure of money for this particular purpose at this moment. Considering the reduction in the death rate from tuberculosis in late years, many think it would be inadvisable to spend an enormous amount of money on these buildings. Edinburgh was the first city in which notification of tuberculosis was established, and I am sure the subject is one worthy of the consideration of the House. I therefore gladly support the appeal of the Noble Lord.

    The point I want to make arises out of what has been said by the Noble Lord (Lord Balcarres). In 1896, when a sum was taken from the Old Sinking Fund for barracks, it was held by hon. Members opposite that it was a wrong thing to do because it was not a recurrent expenditure. We have now been told that this million and a-half for sanatoria is capital expenditure and that therefore it is legitimate to take it from the Old Sinking Fund. We were told there was to be great elasticity as to how this money for sanatoria was to be spent, that it was not necessarily to be spent on granite buildings of a permanent character, that it might be used for preventive measures and other things of that kind. I want to know if that is so. If we are not confined to spending it on permanent buildings I want to know how this million and a-half can be regarded as capital expenditure or a proper subject for which to take money from the Sinking Fund. Then the Chancellor of the Exchequer mentioned a million and a-half for development—that that also should be regarded as capital expenditure. I think there would not be a single Member of the House who would not agree that a great deal of the expenditure from the Development Fund should not be regarded as capital expenditure at all from a business point of view. Much of it would be that kind of expenditure which, in business practice, you would write off in three years. Therefore the only item that could be legitimately regarded as capital expenditure is the quarter of a million for East Africa, and as I am not familiar with the way in which that is to be spent I will make the Chancellor of the Exchequer a present of it. As regards the other three millions, I do not think any case at all has been made out for regarding that as capital expenditure. As the Chancellor of the Exchequer has now come into the House I may as well repeat what I have said, that there is no evidence that the money for sanatoria is going to be spent on permanent buildings, and if that is so there is no case for taking it out of the Sinking Fund as capital expenditure.

    We have arrived at an important matter of principle. If there is one thing which this House is losing more than another it is control over expenditure. The Budget is drawn up with that very object—so that the House should have the least possible control over expenditure. A vast sum is now to be taken from the Sinking Fund in order to be devoted to certain purposes. One of these purposes is the erection of sanatoria, but what do we know of the details of that expenditure? The Government, I take it, are not going to hand this money over to the local authorities with their eyes shut. There must be some regulations, and the Government will be responsible for the way that money is allotted. Are we to hand over the entire control of this vast sum of money, and the whole of the great question of the prevention of consumption to the absolutely undivided control and discretion of the Government? That is entirely opposed to every constitutional principle, and I, for one, shall raise my voice in the strongest protest against it. I wish to allude to one point made by the Noble Lord on the Front Bench (Lord Balcarres). He proposed that we should have an undertaking from the Government that there should be a total Vote put down in order that this matter may be discussed in the old constitutional way by Members of this House. The Government have taken a course which is unusual in these cases, and that course is going to take everything out of the hands of the House of Commons. The only way we can have a proper and reasonable opportunity for discussion is by putting the total Vote down. I want to urge on the Government that they should give an undertaking that this will be done, and that the matter can be raised either on the Estimates of the year or on a Supplementary Estimate.

    I have to apologise to the House for making a second speech on the Resolution, but I understand a suggestion has been made by the Noble Lord opposite (Lord Balcarres) which I think is a reasonable one. The difficulty he finds is that there will be no opportunity of discussing the method of expenditure or the distribution of the money to be spent on sanatoria. First of all there is the method of discussing the Clause in the Bill when we come to it. We also discussed sanatoria at very considerable length on the Insurance Bill. A whole evening was devoted to the discussion of sanatoria, and the Debate did not come to an end until eight or nine o'clock. We also rearranged the "guillotine" in such a way that the second sanatoria Clause should come on first—that it should come on in another compartment so that there should be another discussion upon it. So the sanatoria part of the Bill was very thoroughly discussed. The question now raised by the Noble Lord is a very important one—that is, as to how the method of expenditure is to be debated in the future. It can be debated on the salary of the Minister who is responsible for the distribution. That is the only method provided by the House of Commons for discussing a matter of this kind. The distribution will be by the Local Government Board with the sanction of the Treasury. I take it it can be discussed on the Treasury Vote, on the Commissioners' Vote, or on the Local Government Board Vote—three separate opportunities of discussing the method of distribution.

    Will the House of Commons be provided with an estimate of how it is proposed to spend that money? If so, it will be immaterial whether we discuss it on the Treasury Vote or the Local Government Board Vote. What we want to know is, will the technical, scientific methods be discussed—where the hospitals should be, and all the rest of it?

    It is not so much a question of the Estimate: it is rather a question of the method of distribution. There will be a mapping out with regard to sanatoria, and a planting of one here and one in another place. I have no doubt at all that my right hon. Friend the President of the Local Government Board will explain to the House of Commons, after full consideration, the method he proposes to adopt for the distribution of the money. He will adopt some policy after consultation. I think it would be premature just now to debate that, and I am sure that if my right hon. Friend were here he would not undertake to lay down any principle upon which he would distribute the money. It is a question which requires the most careful consideration that the Commissioners and the Local Government Board can give to it. It would be the worst thing in the world to ask the Government at this stage to commit itself, and I think the first thing that they will have to do is to consult medical experts in this matter.

    The President of the Local Government Board said we might debate the matter next Monday.

    I am perfectly certain that my right hon. Friend did not invite the House of Commons to discuss something which he could not have possibly made up his own mind with regard to, and cannot until he has had full consultation with all his advisers, and with the Commissioners. A good deal will depend upon local effort. The idea laid down in the discussion was that the money was there very largely to encourage local effort. No one could have thought that the one and a half millions would cover the whole ground, and that all the sanatoria necessary could be provided for that amount. The hon. Member for Rutland (Mr. John Gretton) expressed apprehension that it will be withdrawn from the control of the House of Commons. But it can be discussed upon salaries upon three separate Votes at least.

    I must really intervene. One of the rules of the Committee is that when a particular question is pertinent to a particular Vote, it cannot be discussed also on other votes. I have no doubt the matter can be discussed on one of the three, but not on all of the three.

    I am very glad to hear that; but it will be a consolation for the hon. Gentleman to know that he has an option, and can choose any one of three opportunities.

    No, it will have to be decided which of the three is really responsible in the matter, and a Department or Minister will, of course, be responsible.

    Then the hon. Gentleman will be assured at any rate that on the particular Vote there will be full opportunity to discuss the matter, and, if the Opposition desire to discuss it, an opportunity is always afforded by putting down the particular Vote upon which the Debate naturally arises.

    I make no apology for saying a word or two upon this important matter. My hon. Friend has had no reply whatever to the question he has put three times. I presume that the right hon. Gentleman was unable to give it. I think we are driven to that conclusion. We have been told by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that sanatoria have already been discussed. The only thing I know about sanatoria is that it is a benefit. We have had sanatoria benefit banged into us from that side of the House until we are sick of hearing of sanatorium benefit. I am one of those persons who do not want any sanatorium benefit. I should be very sorry indeed to find myself in any danger of wanting it. But what we have not had from the right hon. Gentleman, and what I presume we are not going to get, and what it is the intention of the Government to prevent us getting, is this, we are not going to have provided estimates with details of how the money is going to be spent, placed before us in such a way as they would have to be placed before us if it was upon the Estimates. We object to being simply told that upon some appropriate occasion the matter will arise on the salary of some Minister whose salary no one wants to cut down. The only opportunity we shall have will be to criticise the management of the funds by that right hon. Gentleman. That will not give us an opportunity of eliciting the opinion of this House in Committee upon the exact proposals of the Government with regard to the expenditure of public money. That is what we demand, and we have been asking the Chancellor of the Exchequer to put down a token vote or to give us an assurance of some description that we shall have this privilege of discussing and of going into the merits of the expenditure of this public money, which at present we are being done out of. There is another thing we have been done out of, another privilege, and it is this, we shall be deprived by dealing with the matter in this way, of an opportunity of understanding and of being informed about surpluses. Suppose that this 1½ millions is not expended in sanatoria, suppose that it is not expended at all, suppose that there is something of it left over, then if it was in the Estimates in the proper manner we should see that amount again on the Consolidated Fund Bill and should be able to discuss the matter and have some account of the surplus. But we are not going to have any account of the surplus, and the only time we may hear about it will be in some belated report of the Public Accounts Committee. This is not the way to treat the House of Commons. It is all very fine for the right hon. Gentleman to stump the country and come to the House and bang the table about his sanatorium benefit. But sanatorium benefit is not the answer we want. We want to know what sanatorium benefit. I should like to know whether it is intended to erect granite buildings or mere temporary structures which, when thoroughly impregnated with tuberculosis, can be burnt. That is a very important matter, and I am going to be deprived of my opportunity of debating it. I think that the House of Commons is not being treated with honesty or with fairness, and I protest against this attempt to get sanatorium benefit or any other benefit in this illegitimate manner at this stage of the Session and at this hour of the morning,

    Division No. 435.]

    AYES.

    [1.15 a.m.

    Acland, Francis DykeCraig, Herbert J. (Tynemouth)Goldstone, Frank
    Adamson, WilliamCrawshay-Williams, EliotGuest, Hon. Frederick E. (Dorset, E.)
    Allen, A. A. (Dumbartonshire)Crumley, PatrickGwynn, Stenhen Lucius (Galway)
    Allen, Charles Peter (Stroud)Davies, Timothy (Lincs., Louth)Hackett, John
    Barton, WilliamDawes, James ArthurHancock, John George
    Benn, W. W. (Tower Hamlets, St. Geo.)Denman, Hon. R. D.Harmsworth, Cecil (Luton, Beds.)
    Bentham, G. J.Devlin, JosephHavelock-Allan, Sir Henry
    Boland, John PiusDoris, WilliamHayden, John Patrick
    Booth, Frederick HandelDuncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness)Henry, Sir Charles
    Bowerman, C. W.Elibank, Rt. Hon. Master ofHigham, John Sharp
    Brunner, John F. L.Elverston, Sir HaroldHoward, Hon. Geoffrey
    Bryce, J. AnnanFfrench, PeterHunter, William (Lanark, Govan)
    Cawley, Harold T. (Heywood)Furness, StephenJohn, Edward Thomas
    Chapple, Dr. William AllenGeorge, Rt. Hon. D. LloydJohnson, W.
    Clough, WilliamGibson, Sir James PuckeringJones, William (Carnarvonshire)
    Clynes, John R.Gill, A. H.Jones, W. S. Glyn- (T. H'mts, Stepney)
    Condon, Thomas JosephGladstone, W. G. C.Keating, Matthew

    by depriving the House of Commons for all time of any opportunity of discussing the manner in which this money is intended to be spent. I say it is dishonest finance, and I am not manufacturing the expression myself, and that it is dishonest finance which the present Liberal Government are repeating. It is no answer to say that you did it—that the party you are supporting did it. If it is dishonest, it is dishonest now. And it is all the more dishonest now, because they ought to know better. I have a great respect for the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs, but on this occasion I am ashamed of him. I for one will not allow this matter to pass; even if I had only one supporter I would challenge it in the Division Lobby.

    May I have an answer to my question? Why was not this Resolution proposed before the Bill was set up—at the same time as the Income Tax and other Resolutions?

    The position is this. All these Resolutions were Resolutions upon which the Bill was founded and without which it could not be produced. This is a Resolution that simply deals with one of the Clauses in Committee, and it is usual to take it just before you get into Committee.

    Would the Chancellor of the Exchequer be good enough to let me know what is the answer to the point I endeavoured to put before him? The expenditure on sanatoria is left, as he says, entirely a matter to be settled in the future—the way it is to be spent, the sort of structures that are to be erected. How is it that he knows it will be a capital expenditure?

    Question put.

    The House divided: Ayes, 99; Noes, 58.

    Kelly, EdwardNolan, JosephScanlan, Thomas
    King, JosephNugent, Sir Walter RichardSeely, Col. Rt. Hon. J. E. B.
    Lambert, George (Devon, S. Molton)O'Connor. John (Kildare, N.)Simon, Sir John Allsebrook
    Lardner, James Carrige RusheO'Doherty, PhilipSmith, Albert (Lancs., Clitheroe)
    Levy, Sir MauriceO'Kelly, Edward P. (Wicklow, W.)Stanley, Albert (Staffs, N. W.)
    Lewis, John HerbertO'Shee, James JohnSutton, John E.
    Lundon, ThomasO'Sullivan, TimothyTennant, Harold John
    Macdonald, J. R. (Leicester)Parker, James (Halifax)Toulmin, Sir George
    Maclean, DonaldPearce, Robert (Staffs, Leek)Ure, Rt. Hon Alexander
    Macnamara, Rt. Hon. Dr. T. J.Pointer, JosephWard, W. Dudley (Southampton)
    McKenna, Rt. Hon. ReginaldPrice, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central)White, J. Dundas (Glas., Tradeston)
    Marshall, Arthur HaroldRaffan, Peter WilsonWiles, Thomas
    Meehan, Patrick A. (Queen's Co.)Reddy, MichaelWilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)
    Montagu, Hon. E. S.Roberts, Charles H. (Lincoln)Wood, Rt. Hon. T. McKinnon (Glasgow)
    Munro, RobertRobertson, John M. (Tyneside)
    Nannetti, Joseph P.Robinson, Sidney

    TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—Mr. Illingworth and Mr. Gulland.

    Neilson, FrancisSamuel, Rt. Hon. H. L. (Cleveland)

    NOES.

    Archer-Shee, Major M.Dixon, Charles HarveyPollock, Ernest Murray
    Ashley, Wilfrid W.Denniss, E. R. B.Pryce-Jones, Colonel E.
    Balcarres, LordGibbs, George AbrahamSanders, Robert Arfthur
    Banner, John S. Harmood-Gilmour, Captain JohnScott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.)
    Barlow, Montague (Salford, S.)Gordon, John (Londonderry, South)Staveley-Hill, Henry (Staffordshire)
    Bathurst, Charles (Wilts, Wilton)Greene, Walter RaymondStewart, Gershom
    Beach, Hon. Michael Hugh HicksGretton, JohnSykes, Mark (Hull, Central)
    Benn, Ion Hamilton (Greenwich)Hamilton, Lord C. J. (Kensington)Talbot, Lord Edmund
    Bennett-Goldney, FrancisHoare, Samuel John GurneyTouche, George Alexander
    Bigland, AlfredHope, James Fitzalan (Sheffield)Valentia, Viscount
    Boyle, W. Lewis (Norfolk, Mid)Horne, Edgar (Surrey, Guildford)Ward, A. S. (Herts, Watford)
    Bridgeman, William CliveHorner, Andrew LongWhite, Major G. D. (Lancs., Southport)
    Carlile, Sir Edward HildredHunt, RowlandWilliams, Col. R. (Dorset, W.)
    Cassel, FelixKyffin-Taylor, G.Willoughby, Major Hon. Claud
    Cecil, Lord R. (Herts, Hitchin)Larmor, Sir J.Wolmer, Viscount
    Chaloner, Col. R. G. W.Macmaster, DonaldWood, John (Stalybridge)
    Cooper, Richard AshmoleM'Neill, Ronald (Kent, St. Augustine)
    Courthope, George LoydMason, James F. (Windsor)

    TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—Sir Frederick Banbury and Mr. Watson

    Craig, Captain James (Down, E.)Newman, John R. P.
    Craig, Norman (Kent, Thanet)O'Neill, Hon. A. E. B. (Antrim, Mid)Rutherford.
    Eyres-Monsell, Bolton M.Peto, Basil Edward

    Merchant Shipping (Stevedores And Trimmers) (No 2) Bill

    Lords Amendments considered.

    Lords Amendment: In Clause 1, Subsection (1), leave out the words "the United Kingdom," and insert instead thereof the words "England or Ireland."

    Question proposed, "That this House do agree with the Lords in the said Amendment."

    May I ask for some explanation of this, and why only England and Ireland are included? Where does Scotland come in?

    I cannot answer for Wales, but I can for Scotland. The reason is that by the common law of Scotland we have an infinitely better remedy than any remedy provided by an English statute.

    Is there no one to reply to the very important question put by the hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Booth)?

    With regard to the question of Wales, I may point out that the expression "England" includes Wales.

    Question put, and agreed to.

    Other Lords Amendments considered, and agreed to.

    Lunacy Bill Lords

    As amended, considered.

    These Amendments were inserted in another place, and if they have been accepted by the Government there, I think, we might be satisfied.

    This Bill was received with satisfaction by all parties in the other House, and I trust it will be received with equal satisfaction by all parties in this House.

    Bill read the third time, and passed.

    Whereupon Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER, pursuant to the order of the House of 24th October, proposed the Question, "That this House do now adjourn."

    Question put, and agreed to.

    Adjourned accordingly at twenty-five minutes after One a.m., Friday, 8th December.