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Commons Chamber

Volume 58: debated on Tuesday 24 February 1914

House of Commons

Tuesday, February 24, 1914

The House met at a Quarter before Three of the clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

HOUSING OF THE WORKING CLASSES.

I beg to present a petition from the Town Commissioners of Kilke, West Clare, Ireland, in favour of the provision of financial and to assist municipal authorities to carry out schemes for the better housing of the working classes in cities and towns of Ireland.

PRIVATE BUSINESS.

Private Bills (Standing Orders not previously inquired into complied with),—MR. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in the case of the following Bills, referred on the Second Reading thereof, the Standing Orders not previously inquired into, and which are applicable thereto, have been complied with, namely:—

Kidsgrove Gas Bill.

Clergy Mutual Assurance Society Bill.

Ordered, That the Bills be read a second time.

Private Bills (Standing Orders applicable thereto complied with),—Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in the case of the following Bill, introduced pursuant to the provisions of The Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1899, the Standing Orders which are applicable thereto have been complied with, namely:—

Glasgow Corporation (Celluloid) Bill.

Middlesbrough Corporation Bill (by Order),

Northwich Urban District Council Bill (by Order),

Weymouth and Melcombe Regis Corporation Bill (by Order),

Second Reading deferred till Friday.

Fishguard and Rosslare Railways and Harbours Bill (by Order),

Second Reading deferred till To-morrow.

Great Western Railway Bill (by Order),

Second Reading deferred till Friday.

Taff Vale Railway Bill (by Order),

Second Reading deferred till To-morrow.

NATIONAL DEBT (MILITARY SAVINGS BANKS).

Account presented of the Gross Amount of all Moneys received and paid by the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt on account of the Fund for Military Savings Banks, from 19th September, 1845, to 5th January, 1914 [by Act]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 122.]

GREENWICH HOSPITAL AND TRAVERS' FOUNDATION.

Accounts presented for the year ended 31st March, 1913, with the report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General thereon [by Act]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 123.]

RICHMOND BRIDGE.

Paper laid upon the Table by the Clerk to the House:—Account of the Commissioners of Richmond Bridge for the year 1913 [by Act].

FOREIGN TRADE AND COMMERCE.

Accounts ordered, "relating to the Trade and Commerce of certain Foreign countries and British possessions for each month of 1914."—[ Mr. Burns. ]

DOLLAR IN THE EAST.

Copy ordered, "of Treasury Minute, dated the 14th day of October, 1913, with regard to the mode of issuing the Dollar in the East."—[ Mr. Montagu. ]

Return presented, relative thereto [ordered 24th February; Mr. Montagu ]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 124.]

MESSAGE FROM THE LORDS.

That they communicate that they have come to the following Resolution, to which they desire the concurrence of this House, namely: That a contribution to party funds should not be a consideration to a Minister when he recommends any name for an honour to His Majesty; and that it is desirable that effectual measures should be taken in order to assure the nation that governments, from whatever political party they are drawn, will act according to this rule.

STANDING COMMITTEES (CHAIRMEN'S PANEL).

Sir Daniel Goddard reported from the Committee of Selection,—That they had selected the following eight Members to be the Chairmen's Panel, and to serve as Chairmen of the four Standing Committees appointed under Standing Order No. 47: Sir David Brynmor Jones, Mr. Stuart-Wortley, Mr. Eugene Wason, Mr. John William Wilson, Mr. T. P. O'Connor, Mr. Arthur Stanley, Mr. Arthur Henderson, and Sir Arthur Griffith-Boscawen.

UNOPPOSED BILL COMMITTEES (PANEL).

Sir Daniel Goddard further reported from the Committee,—That they had selected the following seven Members to be the panel to serve on Unopposed Bill Committees under Standing Order No. 109: Sir David Brynmor Jones, Sir William Beale, Sir Frederick Cawley, Mr. Hills, Mr. Mooney, Mr. Staveley-Hill, Mr. George Roberts, and Lord Robert Cecil.

PRIVATE LEGISLATION PROCEDURE (SCOTLAND) ACT, 1899.

Sir Daniel Goddard further reported from the Committee,—That, in pursuance of the provisions of The Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1899, they had selected the following fifteen Members to form the Parliamentary Panel of Members of this House to act as Commissioners: Marquess of Tullibardine, Mr. Mackinder, Mr. Harry Hope, Viscount Dairymple, Mr. Wilkie, Sir John Dewar, Sir John M'Callum, Mr. Price, Mr. Sutherland, Major Anstruther-Gray, Sir Henry Craik, Mr. John Deans Hope, Mr. Pirie, Mr. Morton, and Mr. Esslemont.

APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS UNDER PARLIAMENT ACT, 1911.

Sir Daniel Goddard further reported from the Committee,—That, in pursuance of Clause 1, Sub-section (3), of The Parliament Act, 1911, they had appointed Mr. Stuart-Wortley and Mr. John William Wilson from the Chairmen's Panel, with whom Mr. Speaker shall consult, if practicable, before giving his certificate to a Money Bill.

SCOTTISH STANDING COMMITTEE.

Sir Daniel Goddard further reported from the Committee,—That the following Members representing Scottish Constituencies are appointed to serve on the Standing Committee for the consideration of all Public Bills relating exclusively to Scotland and committed to a Standing Committee: Mr. Adamson, the Lord Advocate, Mr. Ainsworth, Mr. Acland Allen, Major Anstruther-Gray, Sir Robert Balfour, Mr. Barnes, Sir John Barran, Sir William Beale, Mr. Bryce, Captain Campbell, Dr. Chapple, Mr. Churchill, Mr. Clyde, Mr. Godfrey Collins, Mr. Cowan, Sir Henry Craik, Viscount Dalrymple, Sir Henry Dalziel, Sir John Dewar, Mr. Scott Dickson, Mr. Esslemont, Mr. Falconer, Sir Robert Finlay, Captain Gilmour, Mr. Gladstone, Colonel Greig, Mr. Gulland, Mr. Robert Harcourt, Mr. Leicester Harmsworth, Mr. John Henderson, Mr. James Hogge, Mr. Holmes, Mr. Harry Hope, Mr. John Deans Hope, Major Hope, Sir John Jardine, Mr. Lyell, Mr. Murray Macdonald, Mr. Mackinder, Mr. Maclean, Mr. Macpherson, Sir John M'Callum, Major M'Micking, Mr. Millar, Mr. Molteno, Mr. Morton, Captain Murray, Mr. Pratt, Mr. Pirie, Mr. Ponsonby, Mr. Price, the Prime Minister, Mr. Pringle, Mr. M'Callum Scott, Mr. Sutherland, Mr. Tennant, Marquess of Tullibardine, Captain Waring, Mr. Cathcart Wason, Mr. Eugene Wason, Mr. Watson, Mr. Watt, Mr. Dundas White, Mr. Whitehouse, Mr. Whyte, Mr. Wilkie, Sir Archibald Williamson, Mr. M'Kinnon Wood, Mr. William Young, and Sir George Younger.

Sir Daniel Goddard further reported from the Committee,—That they had nominated Standing Committee A as the Committee on which Government Bills shall not have precedence.

Sir Daniel Goddard further reported from the Committee,—That they had nominated the following Members to serve on the three Standing Committees for the consideration of all Public Bills, not relating exclusively to Scotland, which may be committed to a Standing Committee:—

STANDING COMMITTEE A.

Sir George Agnew, Mr. Armitage, Mr. Attorney-General, Mr. Allen Baker, Sir Randolf Baker, Mr. Baldwin, Mr. Barlow, Mr. Barnston, Lord Henry Cavendish-Bentinck, Mr. Boland, Mr. Brace, Mr. Brunner, Mr. Burgoyno, Mr. Carr-Gomm, Mr. Cator, Mr. Cecil, Lord Hugh Cecil, Mr. Chancellor, Dr. Chappie, Mr. Clough, Mr. Godfrey Collins, Sir Edwin Cornwall, Mr. Cotton, Mr. Ernest Craig, Mr. Crooks, Mr. Devlin, Mr. Scott Dickson, Mr. John Hugh Edwards,. Mr. Esslemont, Mr. Fell, Mr. Fitzgibbon, Mr. Glazebrook, Mr. Goulding, Mr. Fred Hall (Normanton), Mr. Hamersley, Mr. Herbert, Mr. Edgar Jones, Mr. John, Mr. Kelly, Mr. Knight, Sir Joseph Larmor, Mr. Hugh Law, Sir Maurice Levy, Mr. Herbert Lewis, Mr. MacCaw, Mr. MacVeagh, Mr. Martin, Mr. Chiozza Money, Captain Morrison-Bell, Mr. Needham, Mr. Newdegate, Sir Walter Nugent, Sir George Scott Robertson, Earl of Ronaldshay, Mr. Rothschild, Mr. Runciman, Mr. Harold Smith, Mr. Stanier, Mr. George Thorne, Mr. William Thome, Mr. Touche, Mr. John Ward, Captain Waring, Colonel Weston, Mr. John Wilson, Sir Mathew Wilson, and Viscount Wolmer.

STANDING COMMITTEE B.

Mr. Astor, Sir Frederick Banbury, Mr. Hicks Beach, Mr. Bennett-Goldney, Mr. Bigland, Mr. Brady, Mr. Campion, Viscount Castlereagh, Mr. Cowan, Mr. Charles Craig, Mr. David Davies, Mr. Ellis Davies, Mr. Dawes, Sir Harold Elverston, Mr. Ferens, Mr. Grant, Mr. Gretton, Mr. Hancock, Mr. Harris, Mr. William Harvey, Mr. Lewis Haslam, Mr. Hayden, Mr. Hayward, Viscount Helmsley, Mr. Higham, Mr. Hills, Mr. Hoare, Major Hope, Mr. Hunt, Mr. Ernest Jardine, Captain Jessel, Mr. Glyn-Jones, Mr. Joyce, Mr. Vincent Kennedy, Sir Clement Kinloch-Cooke, Mr. Lardner, Mr. Lane-Fox, Mr. Lawson, Mr. Leath, Viscount Lewisham, Sir Francis Lowe, Sir John M'Callum, Mr. Secretary M'Kenna, Mr. Malcolm, Mr. Mooney, Mr. Nannetti, Mr. Nuttall, Mr. O'Grady, Mr. Palmer, Mr. Price, Mr. Primrose, Mr. John Robertson, Mr. Walter Roch, Mr. Rowlands, Mr. Albert Smith, Mr. Solicitor-General, Mr. Steel-Maitland, Mr. Theodore Taylor, Mr. James Thomas, Mr. Cathcart Wason, Mr. Watt, Mr. Wheler, Mr. Patrick White, Mr. Wiles, Mr. Penry Williams, Mr. Tyson Wilson, and Mr. Edward Wood.

STANDING COMMITTEE C.

Dr. Addison, Mr. Ainsworth, Sir William Aitken, Mr. Alden, Mr. Beckett, Mr. Hamilton Benn, Mr. Black, Mr. Blair, Mr. William Boyle, Mr. Burns, Mr. Noel Buxton, Sir William Byles, Sir Frederick Cawley, Captain Clay, Mr. Norman Craig, Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Du Pré, Dr. Esmonde, Sir James Fortescue Flannery, Mr. Ernest Gardner, Mr. Gilhooly, Mr. Ellis Griffith, Mr. Walter Guinness, Mr. Fred Hall (Dulwich), Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Robert Harcourt, Mr. Harmood-Banner, Mr. Hazleton, Sir Ivor Herbert, Mr. Hinds, Mr. Holt, Mr. Hudson, Mr. Haydn Jones, Mr. Towyn Jones, Mr. Keating, Mr. Lynch, Sir Philip Magnus, Mr. Henry M'Laren, Mr. Swift MacNeill, Mr. Millar, Sir Alfred Mond, Mr. Newman, Mr. Newton, Mr. Nield, Mr. Nolan, Mr. Ogden, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, Mr. Parkes, Mr. William Pearce, Mr. Pointer, Mr. Radford, Mr. Remnant, Mr. Richardson, Sir John Rolleston, Mr. Jonathan Samuel, Mr. Scanlan, Sir John Spear, Mr. Alan Sykes, Mr. John Taylor, Lord Alexander Thynne, Mr. Trevelyan, Captain Tryon, Sir Joseph Walton, Sir Courtenay Warner, Mr. Dundas White, Mr. Stanley Wilson, and Earl Winterton.

Reports to lie upon the Table.

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

Persia.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will state within what approximate period it is contemplated the Swedish gendarmerie will be able to pacify the Luristan district in Persia; and whether the Persian Government will take into consideration the loss of time entailed in the survey of the Muhamra-Khoramabad railway by the disturbances in Luristan and prolong the period of the concession accordingly, and will grant compensation for the extra expense involved?

I cannot say more about the restoration of order than I said the other day. As regards the second part, there is no reason to believe that the Persian Government will not readily admit the claim for an extension of time for the option in question. The question of expenses incurred for the survey is to form the subject of subsequent arrangement with the Persian Government.

asked whether the right hon. Gentleman can give any information as to the number of Russian troops now in Northern Persia; whether any have recently been withdrawn; and whether any further withdrawal of these troops may be expected?

The total number of Russian troops in Northern Persia is, according to my latest information, 14,200 men. There has thus been a reduction of 3,300 men since the date of the last question asked by the hon. Member on 8th July. The answer to the third part of the question is in the affirmative, the "Official Messenger" of St. Petersburg having published an official communiqué on 13th January to the effect that orders had been issued for the withdrawal from Kasvin of the whole column sent there during the period of unrest (some 2,390 men) with the exception of four sotnias to be left at Kasvin, and one sotnia at Resht, and one at Kergenrud.

May we take it then that the undertaking given by the Russian Government in 1911 that all the Russian expeditionary force will be ultimately withdrawn from Northern Persia when order has been restored still holds good?

asked whether the right hon. Gentleman's attention has been called to the situation that has been created in the province of Azerbaijan, in Persia, by the action of the Acting Governor, Shuja-ed-Dowth, who, relying on the support of Russian Cossacks, refuses to recognise the authority of the present Shah and the central Government at Teheran, and has taken over the collection of the revenues of the province for his own use; and whether, having regard to the fact that it was in consequence of the action taken by the Russian Government, with the full support of His Majesty's Government, in December, 1911, that this man became Governor of the province, and his continuance in that office has long been illegal, His Majesty's Government will now use their influence to secure the appointment of a new Governor, and thus establish throughout Persia the authority of the constitutional Government?

The latest information in my possession does not corroborate the attitude attributed to Shuja-ed-Dowleh by the hon. Member for Burnley as regards disposal of the revenue, and I do not think it would be either desirable or practicable for us to intervene to depose one Governor and get another appointed.

Is it not a fact that this Governor, Shuja-ed-Dowleh, only holds his position by the support of the two Powers, and that he has long ago been superseded by the Government at Teheran?

My hon. Friend says in his question that he was appointed "with the full support of His Majesty's Government." I do not believe that was so, and I cannot think what my hon. Friend refers to.

May I ask if the province of Azerbaijan has accepted the invitation of the Government of Persia to elect representatives to the new Mejliss?

San Francisco Exhibition.

asked whether the right hon. Gentleman can lay upon the Table of the House any correspondence that has-passed between him and the British Ambassador at Washington relative to the participation of this nation in the San Francisco Exhibition of 1915; whether the question of expense has determined the decision not to co-operate; whether he has been made aware of the importance attached to this matter, not only in San-Francisco, but throughout the Republic; whether copies of the prominent American newspapers dealing with the subject have come under his notice; whether he has carefully weighed against the pecuniary consideration the advantage of American good will; and whether he proposes even now to take steps to retrieve the position?

I cannot usefully add anything to the statements made in the House last August, and to the answer given by the Prime Minister on the 12th of this month to the hon. Member for Plymouth, to the effect that His Majesty's Government have recently reconsidered the matter, and regret that they do not feel able to modify their previous decision.

Is the right hon. Gentleman fully aware of the immense importance of the good will of the United States, as for instance, in this present affair of Mexico?

I am very much aware of it, and we attach the greatest importance to the good will of the United States in the matter. I hope in all large questions of policy we have made it quite apparent that we do attach that importance to it, but I cannot think the same importance attaches to the question of participation in this particular exhibition.

If the right hon. Gentleman attaches so much importance to the good will of the United States, why does lie not take better means to cultivate it?

asked the Prime Minister whether the decision is irrevocable that Great Britain and Ireland will not be represented officially at the San Francisco Exhibition of 1915?

As I stated a short time ago, His Majesty's Government have recently reconsidered this matter, and see no reason to modify their previous decision.

Will official encouragement and facilities be given by the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade to those who are organising exhibits by private enterprise?

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies the names of the British Dominions participating in the San Francisco Exhibition of 1915, with a short account of the status they claim, the flags they intend to fly, and the outlay they will incur, whether the representatives of the Dominions have consulted him in the matter; whether they have desired that Great Britain and Ireland should be represented; if so, what was the nature of his reply; and whether his activities in the matter are at an end?

Canada will participate and New Zealand, and, I understand, in some degree Australia,, but not South Africa. I forwarded the invitation of the United States Government to the self-governing Dominions in May, 1912, and have been in communication with them ever since, but I am not informed of what they propose to do in detail. Some of them have applied for information at different times as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government, but none of them have expressed a desire that we should reconsider our decision.

Is the right hon Gentleman's attitude due to the Dominions correctly represented by writing "Secretary of State" with two capital "S's," and "Dominion" with a small "d"?

Arms Traffic (Jibuti).

asked whether any negotiations have been entered into with, the French Government for the restriction of the traffic in arms through the port of Jibuti?

His Majesty's Govern-have been in communication with the French Government from time to time ore the subject of the introduction of arms into East Africa through Jibuti, and I understand that the issue of new regulations for the control of the trade in French. Somaliland is now under consideration.

Sitapur Trial.

asked the Undersecretary of State for India what steps, if any, the Secretary of State has taken to inquire into the operation of the law in respect of appeals against acquittals, as illustrated by the recent Sitapur case, in which two men who had been acquitted by the Court which tried their case were afterwards condemned to death and hanged by the Order of a Court which had neither the accused nor the accusers before it, which considered no evidence other than the record of the Court below, and did not in fact try the case at all; and whether, in view of the frequent occurrence of cases of this kind in recent years, he will see that the law is altered without unnecessary delay?

I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply given to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Donegal on the 17th February, to which I have nothing to add.

What steps are being taken to investigate this matter, and could the Under-Secretary amplify it in any way?

I do not think I can usefully add anything which is not contained in the answer referred to.

"Daily Zamindar" (Lahore).

asked the Under-secretary whether his attention had been called to the recent suppression of an Indian newspaper of large circulation and wide repute, known as the "Daily Zamindar," of Lahore; whether he has read the three articles, dated 19th, 20th, and 21st November, in respect of which the declaration of forfeiture was made; and whether, in view of the fact that those articles contained no expression of seditious views and no incitement what ever to violence or disorder, he will direct a further inquiry into this matter?

The Secretary of State has seen the articles. The Punjab Government in making the declaration in question stated that in its opinion the articles were likely to excite disaffection and racial hatred. The editor has the right to appeal to the High Court against the forfeiture, and the Secretary of State will await the result of any action he may take before considering the matter further.

Will the hon. Gentleman say whether there is anything treasonable in any of these articles for which an editor in this country could be punished?

As the question may be subject to appeal, I do not think I can answer that question.

Has my hon. Friend read the articles himself, and will he say whether there was anything but fair comment upon some Government officials?

It would be most undesirable for me to express any opinion on the subject.

Burma (Provision of University).

asked what progress, if any, was made in the year 1913 with the scheme for providing a university for the province of Burma; and how the matter stands at present?

A scheme has been formulated by the Government of Burma, and is now under discussion between that Government and the Government of India.

Indian Press Act, 1910.

asked whether the Secretary of State has considered the judgment of the Chief Justice of Bengal in the Macedonia pamphlet case; and whether the Government of India proposes to amend the provisions of the Indian Press Act, 1910?

The answer to the first part of the question is "Yes''; to the second part, "No."

asked the Under-Secretary of State for India whether his attention has been called to the dissatisfaction that has been aroused by the proceedings taken under the Indian Press Act, 1910, under which over twenty newspapers and nearly 800 other publications have been suppressed; whether the right of appeal to the civil courts, which was introduced to prevent any abuse of this law by the executive authority, has been shown in practice to be practically worthless, and that in the opinion of the Chief Justice of Bengal the task imposed upon an applicant to the courts, who must show that his pamphlet does not contain words which fall within the all-comprehensive provisions of the Act, is an almost hopeless task; and whether the Secretary of State will consider the desirability of recommending such an alteration of the law as, while leaving to the Government all necessary power to deal with incitements to sedition and disorder, would provide some effective safeguard of the independence of the Press?

The hon. Member is, I think, extending to all action taken under the Act certain remarks which the Chief Justice of Bengal made with regard to action taken under Section 12. The Secretary of State, after careful consideration of the recent debate in the Governor-General's Legislative Council, holds that the powers of appeal provided in the Act may suffice to supply a remedy against arbitrary administration.

Is my hon. Friend aware that at the Moslem Congress recently held the president, in his presidential address, said that the effect of the Act was to prevent even well-established Indian newspapers of long standing expressing their views, and will he reconsider his attitude with regard to an amendment of the Act?

BRITISH ARMY.

TERRITORIAL FORCE.

asked the Secretary of State for War (1) if he will give the Returns relative to the numbers of officers and men in the Territorial Force on 1st August, 1913, 1st September, 1913, 1st October, 1913, 1st November, 1913, 1st December, 1913, and 1st January, 1914; and what were the numbers of the force at the corresponding dates twelve months previously; and (2) if he will give the latest Returns relative to the numbers of officers and men of the Territorial Force; what were the numbers at the corresponding period last year; what is the increase or decline shown; and by how many the present numbers fall below the establishment?

The answer to this and the next question involves a long string of figures, and the hon. Gentleman will therefore perhaps permit me to circulate it with the Votes.—[ See Written Answers this date. ]

Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will be able to say whether he is taking any practical steps to deal with the shortage?

Will the right hon. Gentleman also include in the answer what he considers is the lowest margin of safety in numbers?

I could hardly say that in reply to a question which asks for a Return. I could hardly enter into controversial matters of that kind.

In view of the fact that the right hon. Gentleman has been asked the question a great many times, could he tell us when he will be able to give an answer?

I am asked for certain figures, which I am very anxious to give, and the question of what it is expedient or wise to do is not one which I have been asked.

RESERVE.

asked the Secretary of State for War whether he can make any statement as to the reducing of the payments exacted in the case of men leaving the Army Reserve to join the Navy?

This proposal is still under consideration, and I am not yet in a position to give a definite reply to the question.

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman when he will be able to give any information? The question concerns a considerable number of men. I asked about the matter some months ago, and the right hon. Gentleman then gave me practically the same answer.

I can only say that it is still under consideration. It is not a matter which we can settle at once. There is a great deal to be said on both sides.

asked the Secretary of State for War if he will now introduce the system of weekly payment of Army Reservists through the agency of the Post Office, in the same manner as old age pensions are paid, in place of the present quarterly payments, in consideration of the fact that these larger payments of £2 5s. quarterly have proved by experience to be bad for the interests of the men and for the good name of the Army generally?

For reasons stated to the House on previous occasions I do not, find myself able to make this change.

WASTAGE.

asked what is the annual wastage, reckoned in percentages, of men enlisted in each year in the armies of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, and assessed under the following heads: died, invalided, discharged for misconduct, discharged as unlikely to become efficient soldiers, struck off as deserters?

All the information asked for is not available. It has been necessary to put the answer to the question into the form of a table and, as this cannot conveniently be read out, perhaps I may be permitted to circulate it with the Votes. [ See Written Answers this date ]

OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS (GARDIFF UNIVERSITY).

asked the Secretary of State for War whether he has received any application for the establishment of an officers' training corps for the Cardiff University; and, if so, in what state the matter is?

The application referred to was received, but provision has not been made in this year's Estimates for the formation of a contingent at Cardiff University College.

Captain Gonne.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether Captain Gonne was arrested and lodged in Lewes gaol on the 13th December, 1913, at the suit of the Inland Revenue Department, and released on Monday the 15th December; and whether any mistake had been made in issuing the warrant for this arrest or, if not, whether the release was ordered because the tax claimed had been paid; and, if so, by whom?

The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. Captain Gonne was arrested in due course of law, and his release was ordered because the amount due from him had been paid. The person by whom the payment was made has not disclosed his identity.

Dog Licences.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, considering that farmers are exempted from payment of dog licences in respect of dogs used by them in connection with their occupation and that no such exemption is conceded to butchers using dogs for the purposes of their trade, he will consider the possibility of extending such exemption to the latter class?

This is a matter which primarily concerns the local authorities, to whom the proceeds of these licence duties go in relief of local taxation, but, as at present advised, my right hon. Friend fears that he cannot undertake to give favourable consideration to the change suggested in the question.

If the hon. Gentleman has any representations to make, I am sure my right hon. Friend will be glad to consider them.

NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT.

MEDICAL BENEFIT.

asked whether the amount accruing in respect of insured persons who have not chosen a doctor, and have not been assigned to any doctor on the panel, falls to be paid to the doctors who have joined the panel; and why such amount has not been distributed accordingly by the London Insurance Committee?

As regards the first part of the question, I may refer the hon. Member to my reply to the hon. Member for West Renfrewshire on the 20th instant. With regard to the second part of the question, my right hon. Friend understands that the matter of the distribution of funds is receiving the attention of the London Insurance Committee.

Can the hon. Gentleman not say how soon this question, which has now been before the Committee for a long time, will be settled?

SICKNESS BENEFIT.

asked whether certain members of the county of Worcester Insurance Committee recently held an inquiry into an alleged shortage of doctors in Cradley; whether the inquiry disclosed excessive sickness; and whether the doctors alleged at the inquiry that some approved societies, to help themselves out of the difficulty of inevitable insolvency, were refusing to give sickness benefit for certain diseases, a list of which had been made out, and included gout and bronchitis; and, seeing that the societies' members are thereby necessarily suffering, whether the Government propose to make a grant to the societies concerned, so that the members may obtain their rights, and the fears of insolvency with levies or decreased benefits may be removed?

The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative; as regards the second and third parts, the subcommittee referred to reported that they had no means of confirming the allegations and expressed no opinion upon them. The remaining part of the question does not, therefore, arise.

Will the hon. Gentleman make inquiry as to whether members who have paid their full contributions are getting the full benefits to which they are entitled?

If the hon. Member will put that question down, I will be glad to answer it.

Could the hon. Gentleman say whether we shall get an answer before the next by-election?

INSURANCE AGENTS.

asked whether, in view of the fact that insurance agents have done a great deal of work for the Government in explaining the National Insurance Act to the public and in administering it, and are at the present moment complaining of poor remuneration, whilst nevertheless it is impossible for their societies properly to increase their remuneration owing to the small allowance provided by the Insurance Commissioners for administration expenses, the Government will make some further allowance for the purpose?

The Commissioners are un-able to accept the suggestion in the latter part of the question. As my right hon. Friend has frequently stated, they have no power to interfere in the rates of remuneration paid to agents for such work as they do for the National Insurance Act in addition to their normal work, as this is a matter to be settled between themselves and the societies employing them.

Is my hon. Friend aware that one of the largest approved societies connected with industrial insurance has recently increased the remuneration of its agents, and that it is now before the governing bodies of the others whether they should follow that example?

APPROVED SOCIETIES (DEFICIENCIES).

asked the Prime Minister whether he has received any reports as to the probability of deficiencies at the first valuation of approved societies, which deficiencies will entail levies on or reduced benefits for the members; and, if so, will he give a day for the discussion of the subject?

I have no personal knowledge of the subject, but I understand that any information at present available is necessarily so incomplete as to preclude the possibility of accurate inferences or reliable judgments being based on it. In reply to the second part of the question, I understand that the matter may be discussed to-morrow night.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that almost every day in the Press there are statements by officials of friendly societies that deficiencies will probably occur at the first valuation?

Would the right hon. Gentleman inquire of the National Insurance Commissioners whether they have not already realised that at least 100 societies are about to go into deficiencies, and that they have called upon them to make claims on their reserve funds?

INVESTMENTS (NATIONAL DEBT COMMISSIONERS).

asked what are the securities which have been bought with the fifteen million pounds invested by the Insurance Commissioners through the National Debt Commissioners, and the rate of interest earned on the investment?

The hon. Member will be able to obtain the information for which he asks from the statutory annual return of the securities held by the National Debt Commissioners, which I hope to lay very shortly.

CALEDONIAN RAILWAY COMPANY.

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been called to the action of the Caledonian Railway Company, who, when the National Insurance Act came into operation, refused to comply with Part II. of the Act, and declined to accept unemployment books from the joiners, plumbers, slaters, painters, and glaziers employed by the company; whether he is aware that the company on the 9th instant posted a notice at their works informing the workmen in the above trades that it had been decided that they must become insured under Part II. of the Act, that they must procure unemployment books forthwith, and that they must pay up all arrears from the time the Act came into operation at the rate of 2s. 6d. per fortnight; whether he can state who decided that these men should come under the provisions of the Act; and whether they can be compelled to pay up all the arrears from the time the Act came into operation, or whether they should only pay contributions from the date the decision was given that they came under the Act?

The Caledonian Railway Company disputed their liability to pay contributions under Part II. of the National Insurance Act in respect of the classes of workmen referred to by my hon. Friend, and after lengthy correspondence application was finally made to the Umpire for a specific decision, which was communicated to the company on the 16th May last, and was to the effect that contributions were payable in respect of the classes of workmen in question. The points raised in the last part of my hon. Friend's question are not free from difficulty, and I cannot say more at the present moment than that I am giving them careful consideration.

PAYMENT OF BENEFITS (POSTAGE).

asked the Secretary to the Treasury whether he is aware that insured persons being members of approved societies (without local branches authorised to pay benefits directly) have frequently to incur charges amounting to 3d. or 4d. in postage before they can obtain the sums they are entitled to under the Act; and whether steps can be taken by the Insurance Commissioners to remove this hardship and also to obviate the delay in payment of benefits which frequently arises in such cases?

Apart from circumstances of exceptional difficulty, which might in a particular case involve correspondence, my right hon. Friend knows of no reason why insured persons should incur such charges as are referred to in the question. Ordinarily the cost of posting benefit is payable by the society as part of the expenses of administering the benefit.

MEETINGS ON LICENSED PREMISES.

asked whether a day will be given to discuss the Regulation of the National Insurance Commissioners prohibiting the holding of meetings of members of friendly societies which are approved societies under the Act on licensed premises?

As I have previously stated, in answer to similar questions, no regulation has been laid before the House. I have therefore nothing to add to my former replies.

Will the hon. Gentleman see that no regulation conies into force until the House has had a full opportunity of debating the question?

Does the hon. Gentleman think a discussion after eleven o'clock is a full discussion? Cannot he arrange that the House shall discuss this in the daytime.

Fertilisers and Feeding Stuffs Act, 1906.

asked the Secretary for Scotland whether the Board of Agriculture has appointed a chief agricultural analyst, under Section 2 (1) of the Fertilisers and Feeding Stuffs Act, 1906; how many county councils and burgh councils have appointed official agricultural analysts under that Act; ands where none has been appointed, who performs the duties such officials were intended to fulfil?

In October, 1912, the Board of Agriculture for Scotland appointed Mr. James Johnstone Dobbie, D.Sc, LL.D., F.R.S., to be Chief Agricultural Analyst for Scotland under the Fertilisers and Feeding Stuffs Act. Every county council in Scotland and nine town councils have appointed official agricultural analysts. In burghs where a town council has not appointed or concurred in appointing an official agricultural analyst it is provided by No. 1 of the Fertilisers and Feeding Stuffs (General) Regulations, 1907, that the duties of such an official shall be performed by the analyst for the county within which the burgh is situated or with which it has the longest common boundary.

Lobster Fishing.

asked the Secretary for Scotland whether there is a regulation of one of his many Departments appointing a close time for lobster fishing; if so, what is that close time; if during the close season lobsters are openly displayed for sale throughout the whole of Scotland without any interference on the part of his Department; and will he see that, in view of the fact that the law-abiding suffer loss by this practice, in future any close season will be rigorously enforced?

An Act of 1735, proceeding on an assumption which scientific opinion does not now support, established a close time from 1st June to 1st September. I am informed that it has not been enforced for many years, and that there is no evidence of any desire for its revival. In the circumstances I am not prepared to take action in the matter.

It is not an Order but an Act, and it does not apply to Scotland alone.

Small Holdings.

asked the Secretary for Scotland whether the Board of Agriculture recently put forward a scheme for constituting four new holdings on the farm of Ichvachan, Taynuilt; whether the scheme was withdrawn on the sale of the estate; and, if so, why was this course adopted?

I would refer the Noble Lord to the reply given to the hon. Member for the College Division of Glasgow on this subject last Tuesday.

Was not the scheme to all intents and purposes drawn up before the sale took place, and was it not withdrawn only when the purchase took place? Was not the purchaser an ex-Liberal M.P.?

All the information is given in the previous reply. I do not know whether the purchaser was an ex-Liberal M.P. It is quite likely he was. I believe the purchaser was not unwilling, and that a settlement by agreement may still be arrived at.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware the agent of his Department was supposed to be closely associated with the agent of the purchaser?

No sub-commissioner was concerned. Nobody had any influence at all. It was merely a question of the cost of the holding.

Is it not the Crown Agent for Scotland who is referred to by the hon. Member opposite?

I received information to that effect from the hon. Baronet the other day. I was not aware.

asked whether, in the case of Eoligary, Barra, the farm was tenanted by a working farmer called Macgillivray; whether half this farm was divided into small holdings by the Congested Districts Board and a promise given that it would not be further sub-divided; whether Macgillivray therefore bought the balance and worked it, but now, although it is his all, the Land Court have ordered it to be subdivided into small holdings, and have rejected Macgillivray's plea that it was his home farm on the grounds that having no tenants he could have no home farm?

Messrs. W. and M. Macgillivray are occupying owners of the farm and estate of Eoligary, which they held as tenants of Lady Cathcart, together with the lands of Grean, Cleat and Ardveenish, up to 1901, when the said lands were sold to the Congested Districts Board for division among Barra cottars, while the Macgillivrays bought the farm of Eoligary (about 3,318 acres in area). I am informed that the Congested Districts Board gave no undertaking as suggested. The Board of Agriculture have applied for 831 acres of the farm for new holdings, and the Land Court, while repelling the plea that Eoligary is a home farm, have not given a decision as stated in the question.

asked how-many small holdings have been established in the county of Perth since the Small Landholders (Scotland) Act, 1911, came into force; whether the Board of Agriculture has any schemes for land settlement in the county under consideration; and whether any of them are likely to mature at an early date?

One new holding is actually occupied, and the work of settling applicants on four other holdings in respect of which the Land Court recently granted a compulsory order is now proceeding. In addition, schemes for the establishment of twenty-four holdings will probably mature in the near future.

How many existing small holdings have been dealt with in the county of Perth?

asked the President of the Board of Agriculture if he is aware that a number of applicants for small holdings, members of the Porthcawl Small Holdings Association, have failed absolutely to secure land for small holdings after waiting for years; whether land in Glamorganshire intended for small holdings by the Glamorgan County Council has been let, or is proposed to be let, to tenants at present farming extensive areas; whether the sanction of the Board of Agriculture has been sought to dispose of land in Glamorganshire intended for small holdings in this manner; whether the Board of Agriculture has sanctioned, or proposes to sanction, any such scheme; and, inasmuch as the Porthcawl smallholders have had no provision made for them, what action the Board of Agriculture propose to take without delay to secure for the members of the Porthcawl Smallholders Association the small holdings they have applied to the authorities for?

It is the case that no land has yet been let to the Porthcawl Society, and that certain land acquired by the county council in the district has been let to other applicants, but the Board are informed by the council that all the tenants have stated in writing that the total area of land held by each of them does not exceed 50 acres. A scheme dealing with the land has been submitted by the county council, but before confirm- ing it the Board propose to hold a local inquiry into all the circumstances of the case.

Board of Agriculture and Laud Court (Scotland).

asked what was the total amount of salary paid to the members of the Board of Agriculture and of the Land Court, respectively, from 1st April to 31st December, 1912; and what was the total expenditure, less salaries, travelling, and maintenance of officials, upon small holdings of the above two bodies during the period named?

The total amounts of salaries for the period stated were:—For members of the Board of Agriculture, £2,400; and for the members of the Land Court, £5,100. It is not possible to state the expenditure upon small holdings for this reason, among others, that the amount of compensation to landlords is not yet settled.

asked the amount of travelling allowance and maintenance paid to officials or employés of the Board of Agriculture or Land Court in connection with small holdings from the 31st December, 1912, to 31st December, 1913; and the amount of the fair rental adjudicated upon?

The amount of such expenditure for that time by the Board of Agriculture was £3,364 16s. 11d., and by the Land Court (including members and staff) was £2,409 7s. 5d. As to the second part of the question, I would refer the Noble Lord to the answer which I gave to the question by the Noble Lord on 18th February.

Might not a very large amount of the expenditure be saved if local people were employed?

I agree, and I have promised to try and save some of the expenditure. That is the object of the amending Bill to the Small Land Holders (Scotland) Act introduced by one of my hon. Friends, and I hope it will have that result.

asked the amount of travelling allowance and maintenance paid to the officials and employés of the Board of Agriculture and Land Court in connection with small holdings from 1st April to 31st December, 1912?

The amount of such expenditure for that time by the Board of Agriculture was £1,440 16s. 10d., and by the Land Court (including members and staff) was £1,469 10s. 3d.

Does this mean that upwards of £8,000 has since been expended for travelling alone?

Has this, expense not been largely increased by difficulties encountered in dealing with various landowners with whom the Scottish Board of Agriculture has been in communication with regard to small holdings?

I do not think the travelling expenses have been increased by that alone. The compensation may, and has been, increased. As a matter of fact it is greatly for the convenience of farmers that these hearings should be held locally, and that involves extra expense.

Has not a great part of the expense been incurred in visiting holdings and reconsidering the rents?

Yes, a considerable part has been incurred in revaluing the farms in accordance with the Statute.

Land Settlement Schemes (Scotland).

asked whether the abandonment of any of the six schemes of land settlement which the Board of Agriculture for Scotland have found impracticable was due to the excessive demands for compensation of the landowners concerned?

asked the names of the landowners with whom the Board of Agriculture for Scotland was in negotiation in the six schemes for land settlement in Scotland which have been abandoned, and the acreage involved in each case?

In view of my answer to the previous question, I presume that my hon. Friend will not press this question.

Home Rule (Scotland).

asked the Secretary for Scotland when he proposes to fulfil the pledge given by him at Edinburgh on the 8th November, 1913, that the Government would draft and introduce a Bill according self-government to Scotland; and whether, in view of the introduction during this Session, of a Bill by the lion. Member for Ross and Cromarty for the better government of Scotland, he will take advantage of the opportunity by the Government taking up the Bill officially, or at least by co-operating with the said hon. Member in its drafting?

I am afraid the Government cannot give any pledge to deal with this question during the current Session.

Does the right hon. Gentleman admit having given the pledge referred to in this question at Edinburgh?

There is no allegation in the question that I gave a pledge that the matter would be dealt with this Session. The pledge I gave was that a Government Department would introduce a Bill.

Did not the right hon. Gentleman co-operate with the hon. Member for East Edinburgh in drafting the Small Landholders Amendment Bill which has been introduced into the House? Did not his Department co-operate with a private Member—myself—in drafting a Temperance Bill? Can he not see his way to co-operate with the hon. Member for Ross and Cromarty in drafting a self-government Bill for Scotland, so that we may know where we are?

Cannot the right hon. Gentleman take it upon himself? As Ireland is going to be discussed for three hours to-night, I shall ask for half an hour for Scotland on the Adjournment.

Railway Rates (Carriage of Milk).

asked the President of the Board of Agriculture if he is aware of any cases where railway companies are charging more than the legal increased rates on milk; and if he can see his way to promising any reform which will lead to any reduction of this increased rate in view of the fact that the milk trade is already penalised by freight rates?

My right hon. Friend has asked me to answer this question. I am not aware of any cases in which the rates on milk exceed the legal maxima. Within those maxima railway companies are free to increase their rates, subject to the obligation to justify the increase, if challenged, before the Railway and Canal Commission. As I informed the hon. Member for the Lewes Division yesterday, the railway companies, alter conference with representatives of the milk traders, have issued a modified scale of charges to come into force next month.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that where the extra expense amounts to a fraction of a penny, that fraction is swollen into a penny in the increased rates?

That particular aspect of the question is being considered by the authorities concerned.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the proposed modified scale of charges is in many cases four times that which is justified by the railway company's expenditure?

Foot-and-Mouth Disease.

asked the President of the Board of Agriculture whether any fresh outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease have occurred in the county of Durham or elsewhere in Great Britain; and what precautions are being taken against the spread of the disease?

There are no further developments in connection with the Durham and Worcestershire outbreaks, but I regret to state that two fresh separate outbreaks have been confirmed in cowsheds within the city of Liverpool. In the first case nine out of thirteen animals on the premises were found to be affected, and in the second case two out of ten. All the animals on both premises have been slaughtered, and the usual restrictions were at once enforced, and inquiries are being made as to the possible sources of the outbreaks. Every precaution is being taken to prevent the possibility of further spread of the disease.

Did these two cases occur in the city of Liverpool or in Birkenhead, and are the usual restrictions imposed on the movement of live stock in the neighbourhood?

The two cases referred to. arose in the city of Liverpool and the usual restrictions were at once enforced.

Is there reason to think any of these cases of disease are due to fodder imported from abroad, and, if so, will steps be taken to stop the importation?

Letters Addressed in Irish.

asked the Postmaster-General whether instructions have been issued to post-offices in Ireland to refuse letters addressed in Irish; and, if so, whether there are thousands of people in Ireland to whom Irish is the native language and who know English only imperfectly or not at all; and whether he will make arrangements so that letters addressed in Irish may be duly distributed?

No recent instructions have been issued on this subject. It has long been the rule that a parcel or registered letter addressed in characters other than those in ordinary use in the United Kingdom shall not be accepted. If any letter or small article which need not be handed over the counter is found in the post addressed in Irish (whether in Irish characters or not), it is sent to Dublin, unless the address for which it is intended can be ascertained at the office at which it is found.

Is it a fact that all parcels addressed in Irish to people in Ireland have been refused by the Post Office?

Can the hon. Gentleman say how many hon. Members below the Gangway have an elementary knowledge of the Irish alphabet?

Daylight Saving Bill.

asked the Prime Minister whether he intends to introduce and pass into law the Daylight Saving Bill during the present Session?

I fear the Government cannot undertake to deal with this matter.

Will the right hon. Gentleman afford facilities to the private Member's Bill which has been introduced already?

Public Postal Facilities.

asked the Postmaster-General whether he will consider the desirability of making arrangements to afford the public postal facilities at all sub-offices where other business is carried on during the hours of closing under the Shops Act; and whether the inconvenience to the public of being unable to buy post-age stamps before or after closing hours could be mitigated by the provision of automatic or penny-in-the-slot machines placed in such positions as to be always accessible to purchasers?

There is no power to keep open for post office business during the statutory weekly half-holiday a non-telegraph sub-post office carried on in a shop unless it can be certified that the exigencies of the postal service require that post office business should be transacted during the period in question. If the hon. Member has any particular case in mind, I shall be glad to have inquiry made as to the circumstances. I am considering the desirability of installing automatic stamp-vending machines outside post offices, but some time must elapse before a decision can be reached.

Scottish Post Office (Classification).

asked the Postmaster-General whether he has received any requests from the Scottish Post Office (including Dundee) as to the abolition of the separate standard of classification for Scotland, whereby a number of offices were placed on a lower scale than they should have been; and when does he intend to put the decision of the Holt Committee in this respect into operation, and thereby remove one of the grievances of Scotland?

The question of adjusting the classification of Scottish offices for the scales of pay of indoor force in accordance with the Holt Committee's recommendation is under consideration, and I hope that it may be possible to make an announcement on the subject shortly.

Coal Mines (Regulation) Acts Amendment Bill.

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department upon which day and date he proposes to introduce his promised amending Bill to the Coal Mines (Regulation) Acts?

The Bill will be introduced shortly, but I am unable at present to give the date.

Unprotected Hat-pins.

asked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been called to regulations recently enforced in France and Germany forbidding the use in public places of unprotected hat-pins; and whether, having regard to the number of serious accidents which have resulted in this country from the use of unprotected hat-pins, he will take such steps, by legislation or otherwise, as may be necessary to protect the public from a serious and growing danger?

The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. With regard to the second part, I have no power to make any regulations in the matter, and I am afraid that I cannot undertake to introduce legislation; but, if the practice can be shown to be a public; danger, the local authorities might deal with it under their power of making bylaws for good rule and government. In the case of tramcars, by-laws might be made under the Tramways Act, 1870.

Will the right hon. Gentleman see that women do not get the vote until they have voluntarily adopted this protection?

Inebriates Bill.

asked the Home Secretary whether the Government intend to reintroduce and pass into law this Session the Bill to consolidate and amend the law relating to inebriates?

This Bill was introduced and read a first time last Wednesday, and has been circulated to the House. The Second Reading will be taken as soon as possible.

Non-payment of Fines (Imprisonment).

asked the Home Secretary to what extent the number of offenders under the age of twenty-one, imprisoned in default of paying fines, has been reduced since the despatch of the Home Office circular upon the subject to the magistrates in 1910?

The exact information asked for could only be ascertained after laborious search at all the prisons, but the following figures, giving the total number of prisoners received on conviction, under the age of twenty-one in each of the last three years, show that a satisfactory decrease has taken place: 11,500, 9,200, 8,700. All but a small percentage of these prisoners were sentenced to terms not exceeding one month.

Jubaland (Military Operations).

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he has any information to give the House as to military operations in the Jubaland Province of British East Africa?

The Marshan tribe in the extreme North-East district of the Protectorate have by their persistently aggressive attitude towards the adjoining tribes created great unrest, and, on the strong recommendation of the Governor, I have authorised steps to be taken for their disarmament. The present position is somewhat obscure, and I am awaiting further information for which I have asked.

Importation of Plumage (Prohibition) Bill.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he has received petitions in favour of immediate legislation dealing with imported plumage through all or any of the Prime Ministers of the States of Australia?

I have received several representations from various societies and institutions in Australia urging His Majesty's Government to pass the Importation of Plumage (Prohibition) Bill.

The obvious channel would be the Governor, not the Prime Minister. I forget the channel through which they reached me.

ROYAL NAVY.

MANŒUVRES.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if there are to be any naval manœuvres this year; and, if so, between what dates?

asked the right hon. Gentleman (1) the date when the naval manœuvres for this year will take place; and, if it has been decided that no manœuvres are to take place, the reasons that have led the Admiralty to come to that conclusion; and (2) whether he has ascertained if foreign Governments are proposing this year to abandon their naval manœuvres; and, if he has not already done so, will he make the necessary inquiries and give the information to the House?

It has been decided to substitute this year a test mobilisation of the Third Fleet instead of the Grand Manœuvres. This is a more necessary test, and there is a considerable saving in expense. All the ordinary naval manœuvres and exercises will take place as usual. I will make a further reference to this subject in introducing the Estimates. The practice of foreign countries does not appear to have any direct bearing upon the question.

Does the right hon. Gentleman consider it will be necessary to sacrifice the training of the personnel to the exigencies of construction or the Treasury?

Can we be told what is the exact expense saved by this change of procedure?

I think there would be no objection to that at the proper time. I hope to make a further statement on the subject in introducing the Estimates, but I think I can give some very general estimate of the kind the hon. Gentleman desires.

Would it be convenient to the right hon. Gentleman to say now when he proposes to introduce the Navy Estimates?

Questions relating to the business of the House should be addressed to the Prime Minister.

DETACHABLE BUOYS (SUBMARINES).

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he has any record in his office regarding the detachable buoys used in the Russian Navy for the purpose of locating a submarine unable to rise to the surface by her own resources; whether he is aware that the position of the submarine "Minoga," sunk off Libau about three years ago, was located by means of a detachable buoy, that the fate of the crew hung in the balance for nine hours, at the end of which time the submarine was raised and the crew and officers, numbering sixteen hands in all, were saved; and, if he has not the information respecting the apparatus, will he open up negotiations with the naval authorities in Russia, so that, at any rate, in 1914 the British Admiralty may be placed in the same position with regard to the possession of detachable buoys for locating a sunken submarine as were the Russian Navy in 1911?

The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. All the particulars of the accident referred to by the hon. Member are known at the Admiralty, and have been carefully studied. It is not possible to argue these technical points at Question Time, and, indeed, in the necessary conditions of Parliamentary Debate, it would be difficult at any time. The Admiralty opinion is that the circumstances of the "Minoga" accident afford no support to the case in favour of detachable buoys, but, indeed, tell in a contrary direction.

Will the right hon. Gentleman answer that part of my question in which I ask whether or not what was essential to the Russian Navy in 1911 is not regarded as essential to the British Navy in 1914?

No. I think our Naval experience entitles us to be our own judges of what is best.

Will the right hon. Gentleman consider the desirability of attaching the hon. Member as a buoy to one of the submarines?

Income Tax Collectors.

asked the Secretary to the Treasury whether a tax on incomes was first assessed in these countries as a temporary impost or war tax, the collectors appointed temporarily, holding office for one year only; and, if so, whether, seeing that the Income Tax since 1853 has established itself as a permanent source of revenue, he will consider the advisability of improving the status of the collectors by granting them continuity of employment, superannuation, and regular payment of remuneration?

The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. This matter has received full consideration and no change in the existing arrangements is, in my opinion, called for.

Wiltshire and Berkshire Canal.

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that the Swindon Corporation propose to introduce a Bill for the abandonment of the Wiltshire and Berkshire Canal; and will he say whether the Board of Trade intend to take any steps to prevent the further dilapidation and abandonment of such waterways as exist in this country, particularly in view of the extended use of motor traction for conveyance of goods on canals?

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the canal in question is derelict, and that it passes through a crowded part of Swindon, and the public health authority has long desired to put an end to the nuisance caused by it?

Is the hon. Member entitled to make an argumentative and ex parte statement before I ask my question, and, if so, am I entitled to quote all the resolutions of the Wiltshire County Council, borough councils, and district councils who are in favour of opposing this measure?

There has been no traffic on this canal for several years past, and it was stated in the Report of the Royal Commission on Canals that the banks are dilapidated, and that its stagnant condition makes it offensive to the people of Swindon and Abingdon. The opposition to the closing of the canal is understood to proceed mostly from the adjoining landowners, who are not satisfied with the proposals of the Bill relating to the continuance of a water supply for agricultural purposes. This is a matter which will, no doubt, receive due consideration by any Committees to which the Bill may be referred.

Mr. Larkin (Prosecution).

asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland on whose advice the prosecution of Mr. Larkin for sedition, incitement to riot, and conspiracy was abandoned; whether he was aware of the grounds for these charges before the prosecution was commenced; and if his attention has been called to the remarks of Mr. Justice Kenny, in opening the Dublin Assizes in December last, as to the action taken in the matter?

Mr. Larkin made two speeches of a criminal character—one on the 26th and the other on the 29th August, 1913. In connection with the first speech, proceedings were taken against him in the Dublin Police Court, and he was charged with four other persons, who, on that occasion, made speeches of a similar but milder and less criminal character. They were returned for trial on the charges of sedition and inciting to riot, and gave undertakings not to repeat the offence and to be of good behaviour; and all of them kept their word except Mr. Larkin, who, on the 29th August, made another speech of a still more criminal character. It was in respect of this latter speech that he was made amenable and tried in October, 1913. He was convicted on the first count of the indictment for speaking with a seditious intention, but the jury acquitted him on the other counts of having spoken with the intention of inciting to riot, and with the intention of inciting to pillage and rob the shops. In all the circumstances of the case, it was considered undesirable to continue the proceedings in the case of the first speech, which was of a less criminal character, and a nolle prosequi was accordingly entered on behalf of the Crown. The answer to the second and third paragraphs are in the affirmative.

Did the right hon. Gentleman take into consideration the result of the Reading election?

Is it a fact that the Chief Secretary and Attorney-General for Ireland both threatened to resign if he were let out?

How is it that the right hon. Gentleman (Sir E. Carson) has not been prosecuted for inciting to riot?

Royal Irish Constabulary.

asked what are the salaries, allowances, expenses, mileage, etc., paid to the various grades of officers in the Royal Irish Constabulary?

The various rates of salaries, pay, and allowances of officers of the Royal Irish Constabulary are fully set forth in the annual Estimates presented to Parliament, to which I would refer the hon. Member. I am forwarding to the hon. Member a statement showing the rates of subsistence allowance and travelling expenses payable to the various grades of the force.

asked the Chief Secretary whether he is aware that a feeling of general dissatisfaction prevails amongst pensioners over the management of the Royal Irish Pension Superannuation Fund; and, if so, whether, in view of the general demand of pensioners for the winding up of that fund, he will consider the advisability of taking steps to have it wound up?

I have received a number of memorials from past and present subscribers to the Constabulary Force Fund praying that the fund be wound up. As I have already stated, this fund was created by Statute for the benefit of widows and orphans of subscribers, and ought not to be diverted from that purpose unless it can be shown that owing to change of circumstances the original trusts cannot properly be executed.

Railway Rates.

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been called to the opinion recently expressed by the chairman of the Great Eastern Railway Company, at the half-yearly meeting of its shareholders, to the effect that it was unwise for railway companies to impose upon agricultural produce the additional 4 per cent, levied as from last July upon other merchandise; and, if so, whether, in view of the deterrent effect upon agricultural enterprise throughout the country caused by the imposition of this fresh burden, the Board of Trade will put pressure upon the railway companies to reduce their rates upon such produce to their former level?

I have seen a report of the statement to which the hon. Member refers. The trade has its legal remedy if it regards the increase of rates as unreasonable, and I do not think the Board of Trade can usefully take any action in the direction suggested.

Do the right hon. Gentleman and his Department share the views expressed in this respect of the Noble Lord (Lord Claud Hamilton)?

If I am asked personally, I think of all the commodities that railways carry the last one that they should charge excessive rates for is milk.

Will the right hon. Gentleman give sympathetic attention to this matter, in view of the utterances of the Chancellor of the Exchequer?

This has already received, and will continue to receive, sympathetic attention.

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is now able to communicate the reply of the railway companies to the Milk Trades' Committee with reference to the increase in railway rates?

I must refer the hon. Member to the reply which I gave yesterday to the hon. Member for the Lewes Division.

Labour Exchanges (Staff Remuneration).

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he has received applications from the officers at the Labour Exchanges for increased remuneration on account of the extra work and responsibility thrown upon them in connection with the payment of unemployment benefit through the Exchanges?

Representations have been received from managers of Exchanges and from clerks in the Labour Exchange and Unemployment Insurance service as to their salaries and conditions of service. As regards both classes of officers, considerable improvements were effected on the introduction of unemployment insurance, and further improvements have recently been authorised by the Treasury.

Machine-Skimmed Condensed Milk.

asked the President of the Local Government Board whether he intends to issue an Order, under the Public Health (Regulations as to Food) Act, 1907, regulating the sale of machine-skimmed condensed milk, or whether he will take any other action to give effect to the recommendations contained in Dr. Coutts' Report to the Local Government Board on the use of condensed milks as infanta foods in August, 1911?

The question of making regulations on the subject referred to is now under consideration, but I am not yet in a position to make a statement on the matter.

New Hebrides.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been called to the organisation of public indignation meetings in Australia to protest against the alleged partial cession of the New Hebrides to France; whether there is any foundation for the disquiet amongst those in Australasia most interested in the islands; and whether, in view of the growing dissatisfaction with the Condominium, and the distrust arising in the delay in the negotiations for reform, he will state the nature and the stage of the communications with the French Government on the subject?

There is no question of cession of the New Hebrides, and, therefore, no foundation for the disquiet to which the hon. Member refers. As stated in this House on the 12th instant, the question of the steps to be taken for the improvement of the Condominium administration is receiving the earnest consideration both of His Majesty's Government and of the French Government, but at this stage I cannot usefully make any fuller statement.

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman if he is keeping in touch with Colonial opinion in the negotiations with the French Government?

I understand that the Government of Australia has been in communication with the Secretary for the Colonies, and these communications have, of course, been brought under the consideration of the Foreign Office.

Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether the question of the New Hebrides has been mentioned in the negotiations pending in regard to the new Treaty about to be made between France and this country?

I refer to the Treaty to be made between France and this country.

WRECK OF SCHOONER "MEXICO."

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he has any information to give the House with reference to the wreck of the three-masted schooner "Mexico," on one of the Kuragh Islands, off the coast of Wexford, and what has become of the crew; also if he has any information respecting the Fethard lifeboat and crew that met with such a terrible disaster in their courageous endeavour to rescue the crew of the ill-fated vessel?

I have not yet received any official report which would enable me to give the House any information with regard to this casualty beyond that which has appeared in the newspapers. I am very glad, however, to have this opportunity of stating how highly the Board of Trade appreciate the gallantry and devotion displayed by the crew of the Fethard lifeboat in attempting to rescue those on board the Norwegian schooner, under conditions of great difficulty and danger, and how deeply they deplore the sad loss of valuable lives which has occurred.

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman if he is aware that the crew of the lifeboat were all poor fishermen, and whether the Government has any fund at its disposal from which assistance could be given to the wives and families of those who lost their lives in a brave attempt to save the lives of others, and also whether any reward will be given to the survivors for their bravery?

The whole of the sad circumstances in connection with this unfortunate event will naturally be discussed both by the Department and the National Lifeboat Association, and there is no doubt that the usual course will be taken with regard to the dependents of those brave fellows. I trust that their appeal will be sympathetically received by all concerned.

SCOTTISH HOUSING COMMISSION.

May I ask the Secretary for Scotland whether he can tell us when the Report of the Scottish Housing Commission will be presented?

I have received a telegram to the effect that there is a considerable amount of evidence still to be taken. It is, therefore, impossible to state when the Report will be presented.

MEXICO (DEATH OF MR. BENTON).

May I ask the Foreign Secretary if he has any further information with regard to the fate of Mr. Benton and two other Englishmen?

I have no further information yet, but I will read to the House what has passed since yesterday. His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington was yesterday informed by telegraph of the feeling created by Benton's death and of the report that two other Englishmen are missing. He was instructed to inform the United States Government that His Majesty's Government consider it essential that a British Consul should visit the spot to supply the most adequate report possible-regarding Benton's death and the Englishmen missing, and to ask them, as His Majesty's Government have no means of communicating with Villa, to instruct their Consul to inform Villa and to request an assurance that the British Consul should not be interfered with. Sir C. Spring Rice reports that he has instructed Mr. Percival to proceed at once from Galveston to EI Paso to make inquiries, and has also telegraphed the text of a communication which he has received from the United States Government, and which runs as follows:— State Department desire to advise the British Embassy that instructions have been sent heretofore to the American Consul at Juarez to make a most searching inquiry into the circumstances attending the death of Benton at that place. Consul has been directed to make every effort to secure exhumation and examination of the body of the deceased, to take statements of any and all witnesses whom he can find, and to employ in his investigation medical and legal assistance as far as may be desirable. He is to do everything in his power to elicit the facts.

The right hon. Gentleman, I take it, does not know whether any reply to that last communication has yet been received by the United States Government?

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.

May I ask the Prime Minister what business will be taken tomorrow and on Thursday?

To-morrow we shall take the Supplementary Vote for the War Office, and, if that be finished early, shall go on with the Supplementary Civil Service Votes. If that be not done, we shall take the Supplementary Civil Service Votes on Thursday.

NEW MEMBER SWORN.

William O'Brien, esquire, for the Borough of Cork.

NOTICES OF MOTION.

CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER'S STATEMENTS.

To call attention upon this day two weeks to recent statements of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and to Move a Resolution.—[ Sir John Randles. ]

Notice of Motion in similar terms was given by Sir J. D. Rees.

NAVAL WARFARE.

To call attention on this day fortnight to the right of capture of private property at sea in naval warfare, and to Move a Resolution.—[ Mr. Hudson. ]

BILLS PRESENTED.

SHOPS ACT (1911) AMENDMENT BILL.

"To amend the Shops Act (1911) in respect of the closing of barbers' shops on Sundays in South Wales and Monmouthshire." Presented by Mr. KEIR HARDIE; supported by Mr. Brace, Mr. Richards, and Mr. John Williams; to be read a second time upon Friday, 13th March, and to be printed. [Bill 70.]

DOCKING OF HORSES BILL.

"To prohibit the docking of horses, subject to qualifications." Presented by Sir JOHN ROLLESTON; supported by Mr. Butcher, Lord Henry Bentinck, Mr. Snowden, Sir William Bull, Mr. Chancellor, Mr. George Greenwood, Mr. Walter Guinness, and Mr. Crooks; to be read a second tinge upon Tuesday, 7th April, and to be printed. [Bill 71.]

TEMPERANCE (WALES) BILL.

I beg leave to move "That leave be given to introduce a Bill to promote temperance in Wales and Monmouthshire by conferring on the electors in prescribed areas control over the grant and renewal of licences; by amending the law relating to Sunday closing and clubs; and by other provisions incidental thereto."

In asking leave to introduce this Bill, I do not think it necessary to apologise for taking up a few minutes in putting before the House the position of affairs with regard to this question. I have been in the House a great number of years, and may claim that I have not intervened unduly in Debates, but I think it my duty to bring this question, as it is expressed in this Bill, before the attention of the House. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the provisions of this Bill. The Bill is on the lines of the Scottish Temperance Act which was passed last Session. Its main object is to give to Wales and Monmouthshire the same powers in regard to the control of licences as have been conferred upon Scotland, to amend the Welsh Sunday Closing Act, and to extend its provisions in accordance with the unanimous recommendations of two Royal Commissions. The foundation upon which this Bill rests is the advanced opinion of Wales upon the temperance question. I have one or two facts to show to the House how advanced opinion in Wales is upon this point. There is, first, the evidence on the Parliamentary side of the question.

For more than thirty years the Parliamentary representation of Wales in this House has been emphatically in favour of the principle of the Bill. In 1881 the Welsh Sunday Closing Act was passed. That Act has undoubtedly benefited the people of Wales. It was tested by the Royal Commission which sat in 1881. That Royal Commission recommended unanimously certain amendments. These amendments have been incorporated in the Bill, and the House will not deem it egotistical on my part if I reveal the fact that upon twenty-two occasions I have introduced this amending Bill to the House of Commons without a single break. But even the few hours required for passing this Bill have not been found available. I remember that in the Session of 1891, and in the Session of 1893, the Welsh Local Veto Bill passed its Second Reading in this House. On the first occasion only one Welsh Member voted against it, and on the second occasion there were only two. I may also remind the House that in the year 1908, the Government, in its Licensing Bill, introduced special Clauses relating to Wales. If that Bill had passed, Wales, so far as licensing is concerned, would have been master in its own house. Before I conclude, I would like to recall to the House the evidence in support of this Bill, giving to Wales and Monmouthshire popular control in regard to licences, which lies outside the House of Commons and political conditions. First, for the last twenty-five or thirty years public authorities in Wales, from the county council down to the parish council, have passed resolutions from time to time in support of the principle of the Bill. If you were to search the whole of the United Kingdom through and through you would not find any case where temperance, sentiment, and conviction are so closely associated with public life and administration as in Wales.

I cannot refrain from mentioning another fact, a fact of the greatest significance and importance, namely, the determined support of the women of Wales which lies behind this Bill. Lastly, I might remind the House that it has also behind it the unchanging support of the religious denominations of the country. In conclusion, what is the situation in regard to this Bill? For thirty-five years or more Wales has returned to this House, at ten General Elections, overwhelming majorities of Members in support of the principle of this Bill. Transfer the conditions to England; try to imagine the English electorate sending, through ten General Elections, a majority of ten to one Members in favour of a particular measure! Is it conceivable that such a measure would not be dealt with? Our thoughts at this time are naturally occupied with the Irish question, and, in conclusion, I would say this: We, in Wales, see in the coming solution of the Irish question the opening of the way, through a similar measure of devolution for ns, to the realisation of our legitimate aspirations so far as local affairs are concerned. I hope that the Government will give us facilities to enable us to pass this Bill into law. Comparisons are invidious, but I may say this: That however strongly Scotland was in favour of the Bill which was passed last Session, the feeling in Wales is just as strong in support of this measure, and in a matter of this kind, which we believe to be closely identified with the social and moral growth of the people, we think what has been given to Scotland ought not to be denied to Wales.

As the hon. Member has introduced this Bill under the Ten Minutes' Rule, and not in the ordinary way behind the Speaker's Chair, I think it only right, as he has said that there is a large measure of support in the Principality for this Bill, to say that there is also a considerable amount of opposition, particularly in Monmouthshire. It is not the custom of this House to oppose the introduction of a Bill for First Reading, and, therefore, I shall reserve what I have to say on the subject for Second Reading, but I do not like it to be thought that this Bill is to be introduced without some opposition.

On a point of Order. Is it the practice to allow hon. Members to make speeches on the introduction of a Bill under the Ten Minutes' Rule?

The Rule says that short speeches are permitted from those who are in favour of the Bill and those who are opposed to it. I thought when the hon. Gentleman rose that he was going to say that he was opposed to it.

The hon. Member cannot have it both ways. If he is opposing the Bill, he can show that by his vote when I put the Question, but if he does not intend to do that, he ought to remain silent.

Is it not the custom, Sir, in this House for an hon. Member opposing a Bill to make a short speech, but not necessarily to put the House to the trouble of dividing without adequate debate? That is the course I wish to adopt, and while opposed to the Bill, I do not wish to trouble the House to divide on this occasion, because we will have a Division on the Second Reading of the Bill. That is a point of Order, and I should like your ruling, Sir, upon it.

The Standing Order in regard to Motions for leave to bring in Bills states:—

"If such Motions be opposed, Mr. Speaker, after permitting, if he thinks fit, a brief explanatory statement from the Member who moves and from the

Member who opposes any such Motion respectively, may, without further debate, put the Question."

Question put.

The House divided: Ayes, 216; Noes, 96.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Sir Herbert Roberts, Mr. Ellis Davies, Mr. David Davies, Mr. Hugh Edwards, Mr. John, Mr. Robinson, and Mr. Richards. Presented accordingly, and read the first time; to be read a second time upon Monday, 23rd March, and to be printed. [Bill 72.]

SUPPLY.

CIVIL SERVICES (SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES, 1913–14).

Considered in Committee.

[Mr. WHITLEY in the Chair.]

Class V.—COLONIAL SERVICES.—SOMALILAND.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £35,358, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1914J for sundry Colonial Services, including certain Grants-in-Aid."

May I direct the attention of the Committee to affairs in Somaliland, a subject which has occupied the attention of hon. Members during a number of years. In those Debates I have taken part, and I have watched during the passing years events in Somaliland. I regret to say that this country and Members of this House are ignorant of the exact state of affairs in Somaliland at the present moment. We have a Blue Book which brings information up to October of last year. Since then Parliament has not been sitting, and, no Papers having been issued, we are ignorant—except what we see in the public Press—of exactly what is the position in Somaliland. I and hon. Friends of mine who are well acquainted with Somaliland, mean to ask this afternoon exactly what that position is. We mean to ask if the Colonial Secretary can relieve our minds, not only regarding the present state of things, but as to the events from which the present state of things are, we believe, the consequence. So far as the public Press is concerned, we learn that there is marauding, raiding, fighting, lawlessness and disorder; that peaceable tribes upon British territory are being assailed by marauding parties, and the Mullah's people from over the Italian Somaliland border and from over the Abyssinian border, and throughout the whole area where, at any rate, until the middle of last year in June we had been enabled to extend our influence in so far as to secure some sort of order, there is now, I will not say absolute disorder, because I do not know, but so far as the reports of the Press are concerned, there is much disorder and there is a lack of that control which at any rate existed while the Camel Corps, commanded by the late Mr. Corfield, was operating so successfully, so far as Burao in one direction, and Hargeisa in another. The other day in the House of Commons the Colonial Secretary stated, when my hon. Friend the Member for South Manchester (Mr. Glazebrook) asked a question as to the reoccupation of Hargeisa— No, Sir. Hargeisa is in the interior of the Protectorate at a distance of some hundred odd miles from the Government headquarters, and its re-occupation would be a departure from the policy of withdrawal from the interior which His Majesty's Government adopted after most careful consideration. I propose to question carefully that matter of the withdrawal, because upon it hangs the whole case. In order to show that I think the Government are not carrying out the policy which they themselves laid down in 1910, I will ask permission to indicate, very briefly indeed, what the different policies were. In 1884 we took over Somaliland for strategic purposes. It was handed over to the Indian Government for control, and in 1889 the administration of it was handed over to the Foreign Office. At that date there were disturbances of a very serious kind, but up to that time there had been comparative peace, and we were able to exercise our influence and control without serious disaster. The Mullah appeared on the scene, and then a different policy had to be pursued. I am not going to say that the policy of the late Government was one that was beyond criticism. I think myself, as I have stated before in this House, that the policy of this Government is indeterminate, and the policy of the last Government was vacillating and fluctuating; but I will say this, that the policy of the late Government was a vastly firmer policy than the policy pursued by the present Government. From 1899 until 1905 we have, at any rate, if we were unable to demolish the Mullah and capture him, a firm policy. It was expensive; it was a policy of sending expeditions which failed to capture the country, but what those expeditions did do was to establish in the minds of the natives and of the friendlies a very wholesome respect for British influence and British power. I venture to say to this House that Mr. Cordeaux wan recalled from Somaliland because his policy was a firm policy, and a policy of advance which coincided with the policy as suggested by the military commandants, Colonel Gough and Colonel Hannygton. I come to the point when the late Government decided to preserve three positions upon the Red Sea with small garrisons and to arm and organise the tribes, so that, and I beg the Committee to notice this, after a time they might be able to withdraw entirely from any intervention, save that of influence, to the coast. That policy was clearly laid down by Lord Lansdowne in another place, and also by Lord Crewe. I beg the attention of the Committee to the statement made by Lord Crewe, and to ask if the present Government has carried out the policy laid down by Lord Crewe. That policy was:— His Majesty's Government propose to evacuate the interior and limit British occupation to the holding of two or three important towns on the coast, it being understood, however, that the evacuation is not to be carried out unless and until the friendly tribes can reasonably be said to be in a position to hold their own against the Mullah. That is the crux of the whole thing. I shall have something later on to say about the death of Mr. Corfield; but whatever may be said about that, one thing is certain, and that is, that the present position is not that which was laid down by Lord Crewe. When Lord Crewe laid down that policy the Government immediately withdrew, arming the tribes, and leaving the tribes to themselves in 1910. It was immediately found what we all knew would happen, and what we prophesied would happen, namely, that the condition of the natives without some control over them would be worse if they had arms than before they had them. General Manning, in speaking of this evacuation, said:— I have no doubt that for some time fear of a common enemy will be lost sight of in the adjustment of affairs arising from inter-tribal jealousies and distrust which our administration has so long repressed. How long this phase will last it is not possible to predict, but it is reasonable to expect that the rumours of possible raids from outside will eventually steady the situation. He had previously stated in one of his dispatches that disorder was bound to occur and to remain for a very considerable time. The present Government in 1910 withdrew to the coast; they armed the tribes, and the effect of that arming was disastrous. Then they entered upon a policy which I am bound to say I very heartily commend, and I have no doubt Friends of mine in this House also will heartily commend it, and that is, the formation of the Camel Corps. The formation of a Camel Corps was recommended by the late Government. Lord Percy, in 1910, in a speech in this House, laid down the policy. He clearly stated that we would continue to defend the tribes, and not merely to exercise influence over them, until those tribes were able to take care of themselves. At that time Sir Robert Reid, now Lord Loreburn, said:— Does the Noble Lord mean that in future this country is both to undertake their protection and to defend the tribes by arms, or are they to defend themselves? Lord Percy replied, that he could not say what action in each individual ease future Governments might think it advisable to adopt, but the Government did not repudiate the general obligations into which they had entered with the tribes of Somaliland. What were those general obligations? They were explained by Lord Crowe who, speaking in another place on April 7th, 1910, slated, in reply to Lord Lansdowne, that it was the intention of the Government to organise the tribes there, and to project them until they were in a position to defend themselves. If the Colonial Secretary is willing to accept that as the interpretation of the Government's policy, we have a right now to ask whether that policy has been carried out. I do not think I have stated it unfairly. That brings me to the moment in last year, when this country was startled and this House was startled by the announcement that there had been a disaster in Somaliland. I try to choose my words in this matter carefully, because I know how easy it is to make extravagant statements. I sometimes think one is too careful, but I venture to say this: When some of my friends spoke about dealing with this matter, I advised great care, because I know on foreign affairs and Colonial affairs one should speak temperately. I spent several days in analysing the Blue Book and reading the reports of those who were responsible for affairs in Somaliland in the middle of last year, and I have come to this conclusion, and I say it deliberately, that whatever may be said, and much may be said, of the splendid courage, skill and ability, shown by those who fight in Somaliland for the honour of the flag, and to preserve our position there; I have only words of condemnation for the action of the Government through the Colonial Secretary at that critical time. Let mo analyse the situation. The Camel Corps had proved successful; there had been called from West Africa a most competent, skilled official, Mr. Corfield. He was asked for by the Commissioner of Somaliland, and he came there having had great experience. He had been in Somaliland before, and he took command of the 150 Camel Corps, well mounted, well disciplined, as was thought, and for several months from the beginning of 1913 until the middle of August, there was nothing that came from the right hon. Gentleman on the Front Bench opposite, and from the Commissioner of Somaliland but laudation and praise. I come to the period immediately before the disaster. I have marked here, and I have cut out from the Report, a series of paragraphs which are contained ill the Reports of the Commissioner, and also paragraphs cut from the replies of the right hon. Gentleman. I find that from 25th December, 1912, there is nothing but praise of the activity of the Camel Corps and the success which had been achieved. On 25bh December, 1912, and 11th January, 1913, the Commissioner spoke of the success which had been attained by the Camel Corps, a success which had such an influence on the friendlies and put fear into the hearts of the Mullah's men. At the very beginning these are the words used:— The operation, as will be seen from the enclosed report, has been completely successful, and I think that credit is due to Mr. Corfield for the manner in which it was carried out. That is exactly the kind of thing that was laid throughout the months that followed until the month of August. On 21st January the Colonial Secretary said:— I concur entirely with you in thinking that credit is due to Mr. Corfield for the manner in which the operations were carried out. On the 8th February there is another dispatch praising the Camel Corps. Again, on 25th April, the Camel Corps is commended. Again, on 24th May, the Commissioner states:— I am glad to be able to state that his (Mr. Corfied's) work appears to have been, completely succesful.… Although inflamed latterly by tribal feelings, the people of the west offered a genuine welcome to the Camel Corps, as implying the return of British authority, and they gave no indication, as in fact they have never in the past shown any sign, of being ill-disposed towards the Government.… I again wish to record my appreciation of the excellent work done by Mr. Corfield in the western part of the Protectorate, work which. I trust, may be lasting in its effects. To this the Colonial Secretary replied:— I have noted with much satisfaction the successful results of Mr. Corfield's action in the western district of the Somaliland Protectorate. That is the last before the disaster. There is a series of complimentary reports on the part of the Commissioner and a series of compliments on the part of the Colonial Secretary. I refuse to call what happened a disaster. I say unhesitatingly that, if there was a disaster, it occurred after the fighting, and not before. The real disaster occurred when the Camel Corps was escorted down from Burao to the coast, having at the same time 130 of the Indian contingent and a support of 300 troops from Aden. There is the point at which the disaster to British prestige began. Does any member of the Committee think that there was a loss to British prestige when 109 men, many of whom had deserted, leaving perhaps a balance of 80, with a Maxim gun which was put out of action after three rounds had been fired, not only kept at bay, but repulsed, from 1,200 to 1,500 of the Mullh's riflemen, killing probably between 300 and 400? The Commissioner puts it at "200 at least," but I am told that 377 were counted. They had their leader killed, and he was succeeded by that most gallant and intrepid man, Mr. Dunn, whose services cannot be overestimated and have not been recognised. As a consequence of the fight the Mullah fled with his cattle—so far that the scouts brought word that there was not the least chance of his coming back to take the offensive again. With 36 men killed, the Camel Corps, under the gallant Mr. Dunn, in perfect order, did not retreat, but withdrew to Burao, meeting on the way Mr. Archer, the Acting-Commissioner, who had gallantly gone out with a small escort to help them. Here, I believe with all my heart, it was that the blow to British prestige was dealt, when that Camel Corps, depleted as it was, went down to the coast, instead of remaining at the place where it could have done, with the assistance of the Indian contingent and the troops sent from Aden. It was absolutely necessary that they should have stayed to preserve the prestige and influence of British power in the place where they had shown British courage and British gallantry. But orders were given to withdraw. With what result? Since that day to this there has been nothing except disaster, so far as we? can gather from the reports in the Press and from private individuals. Only yesterday the Colonial Secretary stated that" 859 refugees were being cared for at Berbera itself. What does that mean] It means that out of thousands perhaps who were killed, and thousands who are refugees in the interior, 850 have been able to find their way to the coast to get succour.

It would be folly for me or any member of this Committee to say that Mr. Corfield did not exceed his instructions. The instructions were definite enough in one way. They were definite to this extent, that he was not to engage the enemy in any very considerable number. But I would have the Committee know that they did not say that he was not to engage the enemy at all. He was not to engage the enemy in any very considerable number; and that, in truth, was a policy of wisdom. But every military commander knows that he must interpret his instructions according to the immediate necessities of the situation. If that were not so, there would be no column in Trafalgar Square. If that were not so, the history of Omdurman would have been different, because there a general, acting absolutely without instructions, took upon himself initiative at a moment when the fortunes of the day were at stake, and turned the tide of battle in favour of the British. Captain Corfield is not here to speak for himself. I venture to say that if Captain Corfield had lived after that action, the Minute which the Colonial Secretary wrote upon the death would not have been written—at any rate, without further explanation. It may be that the Colonial Secretary has something to reveal. I say that we have a right to judge Mr. Corfield and his acts according to these published Papers, and these published Papers only, for others have been commended upon the reports in these Papers, and he has been condemned without a chance of making his own report. The Colonial Secretary says:— It is evident that the whole responsibility for this ill-advised and disastrous action must rest with the late Mr. Corfield. He has paid the penalty with his life, and I have no desire to dwell on this aspect of the matter. That is the Minute which comes upon the death of a man who died with his face to the enemy, who had for months proved himself one of the most efficient officers who ever stepped in Somaliland or ever represented the British Crown. Not one gentle word was spoken by the Colonial Secretary for a man who, if he did make a mistake, paid for it with his life—a man who had brought the tide of the battle to such a point that the enemy retreated before the wave. I have spoken strongly, but if I had to think it over again I would say exactly the same. I say that that Minute was callous; it was ungenerous; it lacked that consideration which men in high position, for whom other men work, generally grant to those who have either failed or succeeded, I am not at all sure that Mr. Corfield made a mistake in doing what he did. I would draw the attention of the Committee to this fact: There was a pony section belonging to the expedition. Mark you, the whole body of the Camel Corps was sent out, not to scout, but to fight! It is suggested that they were sent out not to scout. Just imagine this interpretation of the position' The whole strength of the Camel Corps were sent out to scout for the enemy. On teeing the enemy, the whole body of troops, which the country had come to respect, in the presence of scores of hundreds of natives who had been deprived of their property, retires in the face of the enemy.

That is what the Colonial Secretary would have us believe—that the whole body were sent out to scout, and were to come back to report. The pony section also were sent to scout. They were the real scouts. They were ahead of the Camel Corps; they came back and reported that they had been in action and had fired 100 rounds of ammunition per man. This matter needs consideration; indeed, it needs defence. The Camel Corps were there for one thing or another. They were in the presence of the enemy, which had achieved what it wanted, namely, loot of cattle. The enemy was retreating into its own country. What did Mr. Corfield do? His object was to cut across the line of retreat with his maxim gun and trained Camel Corps. Captain Summers and Mr. Dunn, in their reports, both say that the Mullah's men discovered the: Camel Corps before the Camel Corps had reached the point for which Mr. Corfield was making, namely, a point clear of the thick brush, in the open, where the maxim would have had full play. One of those unhappy things which occur to every military commander occurred to Mr. Corfield—that was that within ten minutes' march of the point of vantage which he had chosen the enemy came on him. They came on him too soon, but not too soon to prevent a few British officers with a handful of natives establishing that which has been established throughout the Empire ever since we took responsibility throughout the world—that is, when the time comes of the clash of arms that ten black men and the one British officer are equal to 100 black men under a savage or tribal officer of any kind. I am coming to the end of my charge or attack upon the Government—if hon. Members are pleased to call it so. I want to say this: that it is due this afternoon to the Colonial Secretary to answer one or two questions. I will put them to him. I would like to know whether Mr. Byatt, the Commissioner, approved of the condemnation of Mr. Corfield, who had been engaged in strengthening the position by offensive work on the part of the Camel Corps? I want just at this point to draw the attention of the Committee to this: The Government were for resting on the coast. They found that was impossible, and that they must send out the Camel Corps to prevent absolute chaos in the Protectorate. The Colonial Secretary said that the corps must not go fifty miles beyond the coast. Why did the Camel Corps go further than fifty miles beyond the coast? Because it proved itself at fifty miles. It went to Burao, that is seventy miles, and then it went thirty miles beyond Burao with the assent of the Commissioner, and with the assent of the right hon. Gentleman opposite. That is to say, instead of fifty miles from the coast, the Camel Corps was over one hundred miles from the coast. It was down near the border of Italian Somaliland. Is that the policy of the Government?

The policy of the Government was to stay within fifty miles of the coast, but Mr. Corfield had made the country so secure, and had shown his Camel Corps so successful in preserving order, that, with the assent of the Colonial Secretary—I have the assent given here in almost his last despatch—he was allowed to go 100 miles front the coast. Mr. Corfield and Mr. Dunn—who had at Hargeisa had done excellent work before he rejoined the Camel Corps at Burao—were able to report to the Government of this country that they need not fear for their prestige in the House of Commons or in this country; that order was being preserved, that tribal differences were being settled, and that the Government could report to the House of Commons that the policy of the (Government was successful. Then the fight occurs, and the ill-advised event—as the Colonial Secretary calls it—came, and the politically disastrous withdrawal from Burao occurred. Who was responsible for that politically disastrous withdrawal from Burao? Not Mr. Corfield. I venture to say that if Mr. Corfield had been alive, that he, with his Camel Corps, an Indian contingent 130 strong, and 300 troops from Aden, would have stayed there till the Camel Corps had been reconstituted to its proper strength. It was absolutely essential to my mind that where the Camel Corps had made its forward base, that there British influence and British prestige should have been maintained at any cost. The responsibility cannot be thrown upon the Commissioner. The responsibility rests with this Government. What was being done in the interior. I do not know what was being done in the interior. No one in this country knows, except a few private individuals who have been out there. Those reports come from France, Italy, and Abyssinia. I have, I think, made this at least clear, that this Government by its policy, has not maintained the position of Mr. Gladstone, for it must be remembered that it was a Liberal Prime Minister who for strategic reasons took over Somaliland. It was a Liberal Prime Minister who laid this down:— The British Government is desirous of maintaining and strengthening relations of peace and friendship with the tribes, and in compliance with their wish undertake to extend to them and the territories under their authority and jurisdiction the gracious favour and protection of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress. To this I will add that it was laid down by another Prime Minister—I refer to the present occupant of the post—in April, 1903, that— It is perfectly true that the undertakings deliberately given by this country to savage or semi-savage tribes under our protection must be rigidly, honourably, and even scrupulously observed, and it is immaterial what Government is in office at the time. That is the policy that the right hon. Gentleman laid down. Since August, 1913, there has been chaos in the heart of Somaliland. The Government withdrew from the Coast first in 1910, utterly repudiating their obligations under treaty. Finding that impossible, they again advanced with the help of the man they now condemn, and who restored there British prestige. That man falling at the post of duty, in steps the political adviser to advise retreat. That is a political with- drawal that is supported by the right hon. Gentleman the Colonial Secretary. That is the position in which we are to-day, with no knowledge except that which the Colonial Secretary may give us this afternoon. Whatever knowledge or information the right hon. Gentleman gives us, one thing remains clear—that a dead man has been blamed for what he did not do, and that there has begun again a reign of chaos in the heart of Somaliland because of the political withdrawal, when the troops could have strengthened our position there. Because of this I have spoken as strongly as I have this afternoon, and I have spoken, I believe, with the full sympathy of all those who care for the due and proper treatment of public servants. I regret that the representative of one of the greatest offices of the Government should have permitted himself to send so cold-blooded and so unhappy a Minute to the Commissioner without knowing, as he could not have known at the time, the actual facts of the case which led Mr. Corfield to act as he did.

5.0 P.M.

I beg to Move to reduce the Vote by £100. I would ask the indulgence of the House in addressing them on this subject, because not only have I taken the deepest interest in Somaliland, but I have also had the opportunity recently of travelling, not in British Somaliland—because we are not allowed to go there—but in Abyssinian Somaliland. I was on the borders of British Somaliland during last August, September, and October. I therefore have had a certain opportunity of seeing, to some little extent, the condition of affairs in that country. I got a good deal of information from the natives of all classes, and also from my own servants and followers, who were, all of them, members of the various British tribes residing around Berbera, and who came out to meet us. In speaking this afternoon, I should like to say that in nothing I say do I wish to reflect in any way on the officials in the country at the present time. I think we have in British Somaliland an excessively capable lot of officials. Their difficulty has been in carrying out the hopelessly contradictory policy of the present Government in the last six or seven years in regard to the Mullah and other matters. First of all, in 1908 the Mullah actually proclaimed himself as an open enemy of the British Government. At that time we were holding, in military occupation, a chain of posts from Hargeisa to Burao. In 1909 we had blockaded the Wassargeti Coast in order to cut off the Mullah supplies. At the same time the Mullah was definitely thrown over from Mecca. He was told in an open letter that he was no longer a prophet, this letter being sent by the heads of the Mahomedan religion, who said that he was a mere brigand. The effect of that open letter was immense. At that time Mr. Cordeaux, who was then Acting-Commissioner of Somaliland, said:— The Mullah's organisation depends for its very existence on movement and activity. The view I have held all along and which I still hold is that if met by a bold and unswerving front it will go back. That was the position. The Government decided on their first withdrawal. They sent the Sirdar, Sir R. Wyngate, and also General Manning, to withdraw to the Coast entirely, and to remove the military occupation of the interior. General Manning said in 1909:— I do not hesitate to say that withdrawal in face of an actively hostile Mullah would be disastrous, not only to our tribes, but also to our prestige throughout North-East of Africa. That has happened, and has sent down our prestige, done us harm, and worked ruin through the whole of the North-East. Anybody who has any knowledge of the facts knows that perfectly well. It has sent down our prestige with the friendly tribes. At that time a statement was made by the then Colonial Secretary, who is now the Secretary for War, who said—and this is rather different to the Blue Book—that Sir William Manning was confident of the position for the present, but (said the Colonial Secretary) no man would prophesy as to the future. He said that was the fact that the position in Somaliland was now more peaceful than it had been any time in the last five or six years. The friendly natives were armed. That policy has been a complete failure. Somaliland was closed to travellers from this country. The officials were withdrawn to the Coast, and only the line to Berbera held. We have had brief Debates in this House. There was, two years ago, a brief Debate initiated by the hon. Member for South Manchester, who had been in Abyssinian Somaliland. I want the House, too, to notice this statement. He said:— I am happy to assure him that the whole of my information leads me to believe that there is doing serious whatever in the situation in the interior of Somaliland. That was on 21st January, 1913. Now we have the Blue Book. When the Colonial Secretary made that statement he had in his possession the report written by the Chief Commissioner, Mr. Byatt, on the 13th April, 1912, only six months before, which I would recommend hon. Members to read. I will only quote one portion of it:— The above instances are merely a few of many that will serve to show that anarchy is rapidly spreading over the country, with the prospect under the present system of becoming permanent. The policy now in operation has disappointed expectations. It has been given full and complete trial, and already it is leading to a steady diminution of Government prestiges and promises, a worse condition of affairs in the future than in the present. I ask the House to bear in mind the statement of the Colonial Secretary, having that in his mind. Does he think the House was fairly treated by the Government or was he putting everything before the House when he concealed the real state of affairs in Somaliland? I asked the Colonial Secretary in a question whether he was thinking of reoccupying Hargeisa. The Colonial Secretary said that it was 120 miles from the line and it was not the policy of the Government to reoccupy it. Then, a few months afterwards, on the 20th March, fifty of the Camel Corps were actually at Hargeisa, with the approval of the right hon. Gentleman, because he was informed early in April, and from that until June he made no adverse comment, except that he wished to see the Camel Corps reunited, and not separated into two parties. There we have the policy of the Government. First of all we have the total withdrawal—incidentally they talked about offering a subsidiary, which the official stated would be extremely foolish—then formation of the Camel Corps, the creating and pushing out, as they were bound to push out, in order to bring back some state of order to the friendly tribes from Berbera. But that was done with only 150 men. The Colonial Secretary, by his own very orders, now admits how wrong the situation of the Camel Corps was. The same thing will go on again, and undoubtedly the Camel Corps will have to be doubled if you are to bring back any peace to that country. I do not propose to enter into the details of the battle of Dul Madola and the succeeding movements made by the Government. I should only like to say from the information I received that it was the opinion of the Somalies that I came across that Mr. Corfield was the most capable man in the country; they trusted him implicitly. A certain prominent Abyssinian stated to me that if you had six men like Mr. Corfield in Somaliland, you could rule that country quite without any further trouble. He was the most capable man the country ever had. He suffered from being hopelessly tied up, and from contradictory orders, and from not being allowed to use his own judgment, and on the occasion when he did use it he was thrown over, or his memory was blackened by statements made about him. I deeply regret it. I think it is a very bad precedent for the future of our dealings with our officials abroad.

I come now to a matter I know something about. I admit that a great deal of my information is hearsay, and is derived from native sources, and I cannot guarantee it. I have been trying to find out what is the present state of the refugees after the retreat to Berbera as a result of the giving up of the positions which we held in the interior. My information is that shortly after that date something like 1,000 men, women and children—largely destitute women and children—came down to Berbera. The Somalies are purely a pastoral people, and their worldly goods are few, except for their camel and sheep. They have been raided from time to time by the Mullah and Dervishes. They have been in a state of absolute destitution, and they came down, something like thousands of them, or, at any rate, a great quantity of them to Berbera, and were put, as far as I can find out, on a sandy strip on a narrow neck outside the town. They had no rations, except for a certain amount of rice, not the ordinary ration for Somalies, because when they worked for the Government they get a pound of rice and a half a pound of dates. The Committee will notice that as regards relief works, the Secretary of State says:— It is impossible for me to give detailed instructions, but, in view of the policy of His Majesty's Government, it should be confined to the relief of immediate necessity until the people resume their ordinary life. How can they resume their ordinary life, if no protection from the British Government is given them? They have no flocks and herds left, and what can they do? Are they to go back and try and raid and fight among the friendly tribes, otherwise they must starve? These men and women and children were left there for a time, and then comes the question to which I ask hon. Members to give very careful attention. Some hon. Members opposite may remember something about Chinese slavery and indentured labour, to which they objected so much in South Africa. I venture to tell the Committee what is actually happening in Somaliland. I got an answer from the Colonial Secretary yesterday, in which he stated:— With my sanction a party of Somali natives, consisting of 255 men, 93 women, and 57 minors, was engaged in October last by the Coast Labour Society, East Africa Protectorate, for work in the coast plantations of East Africa. The period of engagement is one year. Wages Rs.8 a month for adult males, Rs.5 a month for females and minors. Quarters, medical attendance, and food on a prescribed scale, provided free. Labourers are not to be separated from their families or dependents. The agreement may be renewed on the same terms for a further period not exceeding one year. On expiration of the agreement the labourer is to be returned to Somaliland if either he, or the Governor of the East Africa Protectorate, or the Commissioner of Somaliland, desires it, and is to be provided with sufficient food for the journey. I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman what has happened since to these South African refugees. The reports are that they had considerable trouble with these men from their lack of knowledge as to how to deal with them. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will give us some account of his latest experiment in indentured labour as hon. Gentlemen opposite have such a dislike to indentured labour in South Africa. The whole state of the interior has become such that, whereas fifteen years ago it was possible for English trade purposes for travellers to go into the interior, it is now entirely closed to them. The whole of the interior from Burao right up to the Hinterland, right up behind British Somaliland, and a long way into Abyssinian Somaliland, the whole of the country has lapsed into a state of barbarism where no white man can now travel. I challenge the right hon. Gentleman to say that he will give permission to any man to travel in Somaliland up to the Burao line, up to Uganda, up to the Nile. The whole of the country has lapsed, owing to the foolish policy of the Government, into a state of absolute barbarism. Only a month ago the whole of the country I was in has been closed by the Abyssinian. The Mullah has lapsed into something not much better than a brigand chief. I believe a strong mounted column of 900 or 1,000 men would succeed in dealing with the Mullah before long. He has run short of ammunition. He sent two men to the Abyssinian Government to endeavour to procure ammunition, but the last I heard of these two was that they were lying in an Abyssinian gaol. The Mullah has endeavoured to ally himself with neighbouring chiefs, but how far he has been successful I do not know.

I believe the Mullah is in a broken position. I challenge the right hon. Gentleman with withholding from the House, or misstating information which the House has a right to receive, and I charge him with allowing a state of affairs with regard to those friendly natives and refugees to exist in Berbera which is a disgrace to the British Empire. In order to save a few paltry pounds, he has given little food and no assistance to save these men. Contrast that with the action of the Foreign Secretary, who gave £5,000 to refugees in Albania the other day, for which we had but the slightest responsibility. In Somaliland you allow these men, women and children to starve and, in order to save a few paltry pounds, you do nothing for them. Finally, I charge the Government with having, as the results of their policy for the last five years in Somaliland, definitely harmed and injured our whole position. In that country there has been raids going on, and there has been continuous fighting between North Somaliland and the Abyssinian tribes, and my charge is that the Government has entirely failed in its duties and responsibilities in Somaliland.

I will say at once in reply to the hon. Member, that I have no ill reports as regards Somali labour from the localities to which they have gone.

I will make the fullest inquiries, and I will give the House and the hon. Member any information I get. The wages of eight rupees a month were recommended by the Commissioner in Somaliland, and are the usual wages paid to Somalis there, and they are the average wages, I believe, which they get in the East African Protectorate. It must be remembered that those wages are in addition to food, free lodging, and medical attendance. It must also be remembered that the wives and children are also paid wages, so that the earnings of the family unit are considerably more than they appear. Before I deal with Somaliland I would like to deal with the case of Mr. Corfield as it has been put to the House. It is an extremely painful matter to me and his former com- rades. I have all along since the action of Dul Madoba was fought been anxious to save Mr. Corfield's memory from censure which he has undoubtedly incurred. No one knows that better than the Leader of the Opposition, and I wish he had been here to-day to confirm it. After the action at Dul Madoba I read every day to the House the telegrams as they came describing the results of the action and the situations as they were on that day. I received a telegram on the evening of the 11th of August which at the request of the Leader of the Opposition at the end of Questions on the 12th of August I read to the House. Hon. Members will find this telegram of the 11th of August in the Blue Book, on page 38, which I read to the House on the 12th, and if they will look in the middle of that telegram they will find these words from the Acting Commissioner:— I feel it my duty, however, to say that the commandant of Camel Corps was gravely indiscreet in his action in following and engaging Dervishes in face of all instructions, and also against military advice given by Summers. I read that telegram almost as soon as I had received it, but if hon. Members will look in the OFFICIAL REPORT they will find that I omitted to read the sentence of censure upon Mr. Corfield which I have just read to the House. As soon as I had finished reading the telegram I showed the Leader of the Opposition the passage I had omitted, and I said I had done so deliberately, because I was anxious as long as possible, and altogether if possible, to save Mr. Corfield from the censure which he had undoubtedly incurred. Later on I was asked by the right hon. Gentleman to lay Papers on the whole situation which had eventuated from the action of Dul Madoba, and I laid those Papers, I think, in the middle of September or the beginning of October. The Acting Commissioner's dispatch of the 1st of September, which will be found on pages 45, 46, and 47, was received by me on the 1st of September. In that dispatch the Acting Commissioner says:— It is with the most profound regret that I should have had to lay to the charge of a dead man and a gallant officer that he acted in a hazardous manner, without a full sense of his responsibilities. I have considered it my duty, however, to place before you a perfectly candid and frank statement of the whole occurrence. A rash act has involved the Government of the Protectorate in a severe set-back, and, under the circumstances, in a politically disastrous withdrawal from Burao. For this Mr. Corfield, who had previously done such excellent work, has paid the penalty with his life. It can only be said that he allowed his attribute of great personal bravery and the complete confidence he had in the men under his command to outweigh his better judgment. The action of Dul Madoba should never have been fought. I accepted the Acting-Commissioner's statement of the case, and in my dispatch of the 5th of September I used almost his precise words I said:— It is evident that the whole responsibility for this ill-advised and disastrous action must rest with the late Mr. Corfield. He has paid the penalty with his life, and I have no desire to dwell on this aspect of the matter. But I am compelled, if only in justice to the other officers concerned, to record my opinion that the disaster is due to his complete disregard of the instructions issued by His Majesty's Government, by Mr. Byatt, and by yourself. When the Papers were asked for by the Opposition I felt that I could not suppress the various censures and warnings which had been given to Mr. Corfield, or it would otherwise have appeared as if the permanent staff of the Colonial Office, Mr. Byatt, Mr. Archer, Captain Summers, and Mr. Dunn had all been guilty of deliberate disobedience to orders. That was a course, which would have been impossibly unjust to these equally gallant and efficient men. It has been suggested that I censured Mr. Corfield in this dispatch in order to screen myself. I do not say it was suggested by the hon. Baronet opposite, but it has been suggested in the Press which supports him. I had nothing from which to screen myself. The more the facts were published, the more clearly it was seen that I had no responsibility for the departure from the policy which was laid down by His Majesty's Government.

I am speaking of the policy which was laid down as to the functions of the Camel Corps. I took no notice of the attacks made on myself all through August in the Press, attacks made, no doubt, in consequence of my having omitted that passage of the telegram which I read to the House. It was said that I had been reversing the policy of evacuation; that I was waging unofficial war against the Mullah; that I had challenged the Mullah with 150 men, which it was said was an astounding example of war on the cheap. [An HON. MEMBER: "Who said that?" and "Daily News."] Most of these quotations are from the "Pall Mall Gazette," the "Observer," the "Morning Post," and the "Standard." It was said that my folly may yet cost us dear; that I was carrying out a new policy by stealth; and that I was trying to hold a province with a corporal's guard. I made no reply. If I had read Mr. Archer's telegram to the House, the whole edifice of this charge would have crumbled in anticipation in the dust. When the official telegrams and dispatches had to be published in the Blue Book, then quite a different question arose as to the reputation of others, and as to the statement of the true facts in relation to these occurrences. Now, in relation to these matters, I will ask the House to allow me to take them quite briefly through the history and the objects of the formation of the Camel Corps. I shall ask them to consider what the instructions to the Camel Corps were. It is perfectly well known that it was never intended to attack or operate against the Mullah. If I had intended that, I should have better deserved the epithet of "mad" than the Mullah. It was intended solely for the policing of the friendly tribes, and to stop the inter-tribal looting, which had been very rife up to that time. I propose to show the House Mr. Corfield's knowledge of the instructions laid down for the conduct of the Camel Corps. The hon. Baronet drew attention to the praise given to Mr. Corfield by the Commissioner and myself on many occasions. In every case he was praised for the success of the Camel Corps in the purposes for which it had been instituted, namely, for policing and dealing with the friendlies, and not for operations against the Mullah.

Was the Camel Corps forbidden to protect the friendlies against depredations on the part of the Mullah's men?

I am going to give the whole of the orders issued to the Camel Corps. If hon. Members will turn to page 5 of the Blue Book they will find the original recommendation of Mr. Byatt of April, 1912, in which he said:— There is still one expedient which might be tried, but it would have to be tried without undue delay. This is the maintenance on the coast of a small mobile striking force which could be used to maintain order by coercion within a radius of fifty miles or so of Berbera, and to keep the main roads clear. It should consist of a Camel Corps of natives of the country not less than seventy strong. What I granted when the expedition was authorised was a force of 150. Of this force it was said:— In patrolling the immediate hinterland it would make for peace among the coastal tribes, It had nothing to do with the Dervishes and it was altogether experimental. On pages 12 and 13 hon. Members will find Mr. Byatt's views as to the object of the Camel Corps. He said:— The state of anarchy and internecine warfare among the friendly tribes which led me to propose the formation of a Camel Corps to patrol the immediate hinterland still exists, and has, in fact, become accentuated. Later on he says:— The urgent necessity of the moment is to restore among the friendlies, if either diplomacy or compulsion can effect it, a condition of peace and mutual understanding, without which it is hopeless to attempt to unite them against a common danger from outside. On pages 15 and 17 will be found Mr. Byatt's instructions to Mr. Corfield:— At this juncture I think it advisable to repeat to you what has already been expressed in conversations regarding the status of the Constabulary and the nature of the duties which it will be required to carry out. … The creation of the Corps does not in any way imply a reversal of the accepted policy of coastal concentration, and there is no intention of occupying permanent posts in the interior. The fundamental reason for the raising of the Corps is the necessity, which two and a half years' of lawlessness have clearly demonstrated, to keep open the trade routes for caravans visiting the coast, and also to put an end to that constant internal warfare among the friendlies which renders them incapable of resisting aggression from the outside; and it is with these main objects that the Constabulary will be used … The Constabulary, therefore, will not assume a political character, but is to be regarded as a striking force which may be used to repress disorder and to insist on compliance with any decision arrived at in Berbera. You will receive instructions from me in each instance where coercion seems to offer the only solution of a difficulty.

Yes. The next sentence is:— At the same time I must allow you to exercise your discretion in matters of less gravity, such, for instance, as the looting of a caravan reported to you as having recently occurred within reasonable distance of your camp of the moment. I will follow that by this sentence ending the instructions to Mr. Corfield:— There is not any present prospect of your encountering Dervish raiders, but should you receive news of the near presence of any considerable force you would carefully avoid being attacked or surrounded, and would at once retire on the coast. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]

You may think the instructions wrong, but I am not discussing them. [HON. MEMBERS: "We are."] I am asking the House to consider the instructions given to Mr. Corfield. In January, 1913, Mr. Byatt suggested a move against a small Dervish party, but he did not suggest it to Mr. Corfield, because Mr. Byatt knew that that was contrary to the purpose for which the Camel Corps had been formed. He suggested it to me by dispatch, and it will be found on page 20. He said:— I believe that if the camelry were to move at once to the Ain it would attract a large body of friendlies, and could, without difficulty, defeat and drive out the small Dervish parties now there. But the Corps was not raised for this purpose, and I feel that my discretionary power does not justify me in using it for this object without your expressed consent. He added a little later that the Camel Corps must in any case shortly proceed to Sheikh and Burao, to deal with local troubles in those districts and to open the road to caravan traffic. My reply to that suggestion by Mr. Archer is to be found on page 21. I said:— I am unable to give my approval to the suggestion that the Camel Corps should proceed at once to the spot with a view to engaging with the small Dervish parties now there. Such an arrangement would be contrary to the policy of His Majesty's Government in withdrawing from active participation in affairs in the interior of the Protectorate and confining the scope of the administration to the coast towns and the friendly tribes in the neighbourhood of the coast. It would also be foreign to the principles laid down as to the duties of the Camel Corps, which were intended to be confined to the maintenance of order by coercion within a radius of fifty miles or so of Berbera and to keeping the main roads clear.

Will you read the next paragraph? "I have no desire to confine it, etc."

With regard to the alternative course proposed in paragraph 8 of your dispatch, I have no desire to confine within too close a radius the activities of the Camel Corps, and I am ready to leave to your discretion the question how far they should be allowed to proceed in the direction of Ber, provided that, as you propose, their advance is definitely limited, although I am inclined to share your doubt as to whether the results of such a demonstration would be altogether useful. This dispatch of mine, as we know from a dispatch on page 44, was communicated by Mr. Byatt to Mr. Corfield. Then, in a dispatch on page 22, I was informed that there had been a recrudescence of tribal fighting amongst the Habr Toljaala, and that the Camel Corps would move slowly from Sheikh to Burao, where its presence was necessary, Mr. Corfield having received instructions that they were to maintain a close watch on events to the south-east, while not proceeding into any danger zone should the presence of a large Dervish force be reported. On page 36 hon. Members will find a warning and something like an implied censure on Mr. Corfield for the action he had taken at that time, a censure by the Acting-Commissioner. The Acting Commissioner said that there had been an approach of a party of Dervish horse, accompanied by footmen, and he forwarded to me a memorandum which he had addressed to Mr. Corfield on the subject of his action in moving out to the assistance of the Ararsama. The Acting-Commissioner added:— The warning seems necessary, in view of the very explicit instructions which have been issued regarding the employment of the Camel Constabulary as a fighting unit. This was the warning addressed by Mr. Archer to Mr. Corfield on 23rd June:— I cannot pass over the incident without drawing your attention to the explicit nature of the instructions conveyed to you from time to time on the subject of confining Camel Corps operations to the immediate vicinity of Burao (in the Nogal direction), with Ber as an extreme limit for occasional patrols. You are personally aware, moreover, that the Secretary of State has expressly disapproved of the suggestion of employing the Camel Corps against small Dervish parties, even where danger was little and success more or less assured, on the grounds that such measures were entirely foreign to the duties of the Constabulary, as well as contrary to Government policy; and there is no discretionary power of any sort en this subject allowed. I cannot, therefore, impress upon you too strongly the necessity of abiding strictly by this decision. Admittedly it does not make your position easy, but this is inevitable at the present juncture; and the principle must be realised that we do not, and cannot, as at present constituted, assume responsibility for the defence of the outlying 'jilibs' at tunes of threatened Dervish attack. On the other hand, the (presence of the Camel Corps at Burao does provide for our tribes a good rallying point in the face of small Dervish raiding parties; while there is no reason to anticipate at the present, time any Dervish advance on such a scale as would necessitate your falling back from this point, which, as you are aware, is the tenour of your instructions in the face of grave and imminent danger. Then the last extract with which I need trouble the Committee is Mr. Archer's dispatch giving the account of the action at Dul Madoba on p. 44. Mr. Archer had ordered a strong reconnaissance by the Camel Corps in the direction of Ber, the reconnaissance being the sending of the whole Camel Corps there, but it was a reconnaissance, and stated to be so. Captain Summers was to accompany the force and to advise Mr. Archer later on the military situation before he decided on future action. Mr. Archer said:— Had the commandant at this juncture fallen back and reported to me on the situation, a valuable service would have been rendered, even though some risk had been incurred. My standing orders to him, communicated to you as an enclosure to my despatch of the 23rd of June, and duly approved by your despatch of the 18th of July, gave, as you are aware, no discretionary powers whatsoever in the matter of engaging the Dervishes, or even proceeding on these extended patrols, and, as regards this, clearly defined the position of the Constabulary. Moreover, there is a record in this office that copy of your despatch of the 24th of January was duly forwarded by Mr. Byatt to the commandant for his perusal and guidance. Contrary to orders, however, the commandant decided to engage the Dervishes, and to place his force in such a position as to intercept on the morrow their line of retreat with their stock into the Ain. I need scarcely comment on the hazardous nature of such an undertaking with the force at his disposal. In fairness to Captain Summers, also, it must be recorded that he made a grave representation to Mr. Corfield as to the rashness (in his opinion) of his decision, from both a political as well as from a military point of view.

Would the right hon. Gentleman read what it says at the top of the page?

Now, upon that very morning, I had been listening in durbar for four hours to the representations of the friendlies—representations to the effect that, unless Government would come to their assistance and protect them with an adequate force, their annihilation at the hands of the Dervishes would be complete within a year or two. I have now reason to know that that very morning when Mr. Corfield started on this reconnaissance he was again warned by Mr. Archer, in the presence of Captain Summers, not- to attack or to engage the Dervishes, and that he gave an undertaking to that effect.

On page 49 will be found Captain Summers' report. He says:— The pony section had now returned to the main body, confirming the report of their action with the Dervishes and further reporting that the Dervishes were encamped at Idoweina with over 2,000 footmen, all armed with rifles, 150 horsemen, and very large quantities of looted stock. Captain Summers goes on:— In view of the instructions of His Majesty's Acting-Commissioner, I strongly advised him to content himself with making a reconnaisance of the Dervish encampment, holding his camels in readiness for withdrawal on Burao, and leaving behind him patrols to give him early information of the Dervishes' movements at dawn; and I told him that, with the force at his disposal, he had, in my opinion, no prospect of carrying out a successful action against the Dervishes. He was, however, clearly determined to operate against them. Those are the essential Papers. I adopted the Acting-Commissioner's words about Mr. Corfield in order to show him and to show his colleagues in Somaliland that they were not suspected of disloyalty. When these Papers were published, it was discovered by all those interested in the matter that there had been no change of policy, and that only one officer had exceeded or disobeyed his orders. His disobedience, unfortunately, resulted in the loss of his own and other lives; but the instructions which were issued to Mr. Corfield and to the Camel Corps are absolutely and abundantly clear. I am sorry that this part of the Debate has been forced upon me and has compelled me to give these convincing proofs of Mr. Corfield's disobedience, because he was a brave and a gallant and a capable man. Irrespective of whatever views we may hold of the final error, we must all deeply deplore, as I do, his loss. I think I am bound to say that his friends have ill-served his fame—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"]—by trying to prove that his disobedience was a long formed and deliberate intention.

The right hon. Gentleman speaks of myself and Mr. Corfield's friends. I may say that I have never met one of Mr. Corfield's friends; and, on the contrary, I advised friends of mine to be careful of saying anything until they were sure of their ground. My attack, if it is to be called an attack, was made upon the dispatches of the Colonial Secretary himself and of the Acting-Commissioner.

I quite understand that. I referred to his friends who have been, as they think, doing their best for the memory of Mr. Corfield in the Press of this country, and I certainly hope still to be able to believe that Mr. Corfield's action was not the result of a long, deliberate intention to disobey orders. [HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw!"] I have nothing to withdraw. That is a statement made in the daily papers. [HON. MEMBERS: "By whom?"] By Mr. Corfield's own friends. [HON. MEMBERS: "Name!"] I will give the names later. I do not recall them at this moment. It was made by Mr. Corfield's friends or relatives, who have published letters to bear out this imputation. As the result of this some people have been preaching disobedience to orders as an ideal of Imperial virtue. [HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw!"]

I can supply all the names as soon as I can get at the files of the "Morning Post." I think it would be a bad day for this country if such a pernicious doctrine as that were to sink into the Army, the Navy, or the Civil Service. Now I will turn to a less painful part of the Somaliland subject, and deal with the situation as we find it there to-day. After the action at Dul Madoba it was quite clear that a new situation had been created in Somaliland, and I at once directed an increase of the Camel Corps from 150 to 300, which would account for the amount of the Supplementary Estimate which we are considering to-day. The temporary evacuation of Burao was, I believe, necessary, and so it was thought by those on the spot, in order to reform our forces and to recruit more men for the Camel Corps, and to provide against accidents and dangers there which seemed likely at that moment.

I never heard the slightest suggestion that they did not. It would never have occurred to me to put such a question to officers as to whether they agreed with the orders of their superiors. It is not true, as stated in the Press, that the Mullah has a force at Burao at the present time. Burao is held by our friendlies, and a certain number of scouts who keep us informed of the movements there. After the action at Dul Madoba a few Dervish horse visited Bulhar and burnt some deserted huts. That is the only incident which can have accounted for the statement subsequently made. The nearest Dervish post is not at all strong; it is at Shimberberris, at the mouth of the Ain Valley, which runs across that part of Somaliland. A new situation arose after Dul Madoba, with which I was compelled to deal. The effect of this small Dervish outpost has been to cut off the friendly tribes from the grazing lands which are essential to them in the dry season, although not at other times. They are not cut off by the size of the Dervish post, but by the moral effect produced upon them. Since Dul Madoba many of them have undoubtedly lost nerve and courage, and they require from us, I think quite naturally, both moral and material support. They must have the Ain Valley, and if they have no support from us they must make terms with the Dervishes and join the Mullah. That is not only undesirable, but it is an impossible result, and I had to consider what steps I should take to prevent it. I think hon. Members who have studied Somaliland, and who know the country, will agree with me that occupation of the whole interior is undesirable, and that an expedition against the Mullah would be a costly folly now, as it has proved to be by experience in the past, The late Government always held this view with regard to expeditions. Lord Cranborne, speaking in this House in 1903, said:— It is not intended by the British Government—and it never was intended—to extend our effective administration far into the interior … The Foreign Office were to be eminently commended when they shrank from oversetting the established policy hitherto of governing the coast and merely having relations with the interior so far as trade rendered it necessary. Mr. Brodrick, when Secretary for War, in this House said:— We have no intention of administering the country in which we now are or of attempting to hold the country. Our policy is to keep the coast line and to maintain our protection of the tribes. We are not going to send a large, fresh expedition to pursue the, Mullah. And the hon. Member for Blackpool (Mr. Ashley) who is also well acquainted with this country, said, in 1909, that he condemned his own Government of 1897 to 1904, for their conduct of operations, and expressed the opinion that it was wise to have one or two posts only to afford some sort of protection to the tribes under our care. Then the hon. and gallant Member for Winchester (Major Baring), who probably knows more than any of us about Somaliland, and who, I believe, is a personal acquaintance, if not friendly with the Mullah, in 1910, in this House, suggested that a medium between an expedition and coastal concentration was what was wanted. If the Government held certain posts, from which they would have influence over tribal matters, our hold in Somaliland would be much more satisfactory. That is almost precisely what I propose to do. I do not propose to the House any extended occupation of the interior; I certainly do not propose any expedition against the Mullah, I intend to occupy Burao, which is about eighty miles from the coast as a base for our Camel Corps and to occupy Sheikh, a post half way between Berbera and Burao; it is about 5,000 feet above the sea, it is a hill station, an extremely healthy place, which may well serve as a sanatorium for Somaliland and Aden. It is on the caravan route, but it is unsuited, by its elevation, to camels, and is too distant to control the grazing of the Ain Valley. Our presence at Burao with the Camel Corps will provide that moral and material support to the friendlies which will give them courage and opportunity to graze in the Ain Valley. In the presence of the Camel Corps at Burao there will be no danger to the friendly tribes from the Dervish outpost at the mouth of the Ain Valley, if indeed it remains there. Speaking of the outpost I may venture an opinion that the Dervishes will very likely retire from it towards Bobotle or the Haroun, although I quite realise the danger of prophesying anything in relation to Somaliland. The ordinary Estimates for Somaliland for 1914–15, which unfortunately have not yet been printed, and are not before the House, but as to which I can give some explanation, will show exactly what it is hoped to do. I may state, for the convenience and information of the House, that I am going to increase the Camel Corps from its present strength of 300 to either 400 or 500, whichever number is thought most suitable by people in the locality.

It is their limit. It is suggested that the number should be raised to 400 or 500. This Camel Corps is going to be based on Burao. I am going to increase the Indian contingent from 200 to 400. Four hundred is the number that happens to be there at present, because we had emergency help from Aden after Dul Madoba.

They are Indian Regulars. We have already 200 in Somaliland, and have had for many years. It is the force usually used for these purposes. The forts at Sheikh and Burao will be repaired and strengthened. One hundred of the Indian contingents will be stationed at Sheikh, and 150 at Burao. The recurrent cost of this permanent defence force in the year 1913–14 will be £32,800. That really only covers the increase in the Camel Corps that was made after Dul Madoba. The normal ordinary Estimate for 1914–15 will be presented almost immediately. It shows that the recurrent cost of this permanent force will amount to £58,000. Of course, there will be some necessary additions for the initial expenses of the new Service, such as the purchase of camels, saddlery, transport, and so on. It is rash, no doubt, to promise anything like finality at any time in Somaliland. Some hon. Members, no doubt, will think that I have done, and am doing, too little; others will think I have done too much. I can only say that I have done all that the men on the spot think desirable or necessary, and they do not doubt the efficiency and success of the preparations which I have made. The instructions given to Sir William Manning have been quoted. They were that the evacuation was not to be carried out unless the friendly tribes were in a position to hold their own against the Mullah. They were then; they are not now.

That is a matter of opinion; perhaps the hon. Member will allow me the luxury of expressing my opinion.

I beg the right hon. Gentleman's pardon. I thought he was stating it as a fact; but if he states it as his opinion, I accept it as an opinion.

I never venture to say anything in this House as a fact because I know it will be contradicted immediately. The changed situation in Somaliland has made necessary an adjustment of the dispositions which I have just described.

What is the change the right hon. Gentleman refers to? Why is protection more necessary now than a year ago?

Because the circumstances have completely changed during the last twelve months, and hon. Members who are well acquinted with Somaliland will be able to instruct the hon. Gentleman's mind on these points. In 1909 the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London (Mr. Balfour), when he was Leader of the Opposition, suggested that the Government should find some means of communication less elaborate than a light railway, which, he said, would use up water like a traction engine and consume more than it conveyed. We propose to try and do that by means of the Camel Corps, which fulfils those postulates. It is weary work waiting for dead men's shoes. The Committee will remember that the Mullah is an old man; he is in an advanced state of dropsy; he is physically immovable and incapable of leading the Dervishes in any of their forays. There is no probable or possible successor to him, and since he was excommunicated from Mecca, in 1899, he has been left enfeebled—a robber, but not a prophet. I believe with a little patience and endurance we may yet see Somaliland a comparatively peaceful country. But we shall not bring that about if we start out with an expedition against the Dervishes. It was said by the "Times" some years ago that the conflict between ourselves and the Mullah would be like a fight between a lion and a swallow. We tried it before, and found it a costly failure. Lord Cranborne said, when the Expedition of 1899 was being fitted out, that the Mullah elected to retire, and so the expedition was cancelled. He probably would do the same thing again. At all events, I cannot advise this House to undertake a great expedition against the Mullah, but I am confident that I can commend our present proposal to the Committee as sufficient for all our present needs.

Before this Debate proceeds further, I wish to say that the right hon. Gentleman has put me in some little difficulty. I think it was unavoidable, but he did lay before the House certain matters which are more properly pertinent to the main Vote, and he said that the charges he mentioned will come on the main Vote. I do not wish to put any difficulty in the way of the discussion, but if I may make a suggestion to the Committee, it is that we shall devote ourselves in discussing this Supplementary Vote more to what has happened during the last six months, than to matters which we can review again when the new Vote comes up.

May I submit to you, Mr. Whitley, that the question of what has happened during the last six months, in the opinion of many of us on this side of the Committee, turns entirely upon the previous statements of the Government in their Instructions, and that it is impossible with any degree of usefulness to discuss the affairs of the last six months unless we are allowed to go further back?

I think the speeches already delivered have indicated that I do not propose to prevent hon. Members going into those matters.

May I point out that it is quite possible that the Vote to which you have referred may come in the Votes which are closured, and we may have no opportunity of debating the matter? The whole Opposition feel very strongly on this point, and I hope you will allow us all possible latitude.

I would point out that, of course, the new Estimates for Somaliland will be discussed on the day the Colonial Office Vote is taken, later in the Session.

I have already indicated that I do not propose to restrict hon. Members.

6.0 P.M.

I must first admit that I agree very largely with many things that have been said by the Colonial Secretary, but I think he is defending himself rather against charges that have not been made by any responsible person. In the paragraph he read out, he is accused of doing too much. We rather accuse him of doing too little. I hope he will not think that I am confusing the two great points with regard to Somaliland if I go back some distance into its history, although not so far as other hon. Members have gone, and if I take simultaneously the two problems—the friendly tribes fighting among themselves, and the problem of the Mullah in the South-East. He must recognise they are absolutely distinct problems. I had the advantage of being in the country before the evacuation, and I was a great deal on the border of it afterwards. Before the evacuation, which was completed in March, 1910, though the tribes had their feuds among themselves—feuds originating in cattle raiding, followed by bloodshed and war—they had been accustomed to live side by side, confident that the Government would spoil the sport of raiding by inflicting a fine which could be recovered at Court. Therefore, they lived side by side in comparative peace up to the time of the evacuation. Then the centre of authority was removed, a state of anarchy immediately prevailed, and the ancient feuds sprang up again, a state of things we may possibly see nearer home. Following on the history, we find that the state of disorder becomes so impossible that something has to be done. Mr. Byatt, the Commissioner, sends in four recommendations, the chief of which, the formation of the Camel Corps, is adopted. We thoroughly agree that the Camel Corps was necessary. I admit that the instructions were, as the Colonial Secretary says, that the Camel Corps was to be formed for the purpose of keeping order in our Protectorate, but we do not hold that those ought to have been the instructions—we hold that protection should be given in the Protectorate. Possibly that force may not be adequate. Then it is your duty to find a larger one.

While affairs are getting worse and worse among our friendly tribes, the other problem, that of the Mullah, advanced one more step, by a raid on the Dolbahanta tribe in February, 1912, as a result of which a large number of the Dolbahanta became destitute refugees. We must remember that the Dolbahanta tribe is one of the friendly tribes who have taken our side in previous conflicts with the Mullah. I admit that the Camel Corps was not formed for the purpose of protecting them against the Mullah, but it was formed very shortly after, that date, and was ready by December, 1912. I happened to be on the Abyssinian border and to take the news of the formation of the Camel Corps to the Habr Awal and various other tribes in that neighbourhood. They welcomed the formation of the Camel Corps as showing a tendency on the part of the British Government to return, but the thing they welcomed far more was the name of Corfield Sahib. As men came into the camp, a dozen or two following their Chief, and were told the news that Corfield Sahib was coming back, we heard a great shout go up, and men would gallop out and spread the news throughout the whole of the neighbourhood. They all had the utmost confidence in him. For instance, there was my own headman, who acted as interpreter to Mr. Corfield when he was in the country before. With an admiration which was almost worship of him, my headman suggested throwing up all his wages and going at once to join Mr. Corfield. He went, and perhaps hon. Members may have noticed that it is stated in the Blue Book that he was found dead beside him after the action. I am only giving these instances to show the prestige there was in Mr. Corfield's name.

The first success of the Camel Corps—in fact, the only action of any importance they had to fight—was on 21st December, 1912, against certain sections of the Habr Yunis, who had been raiding other friendly tribes inside our Protectorate. The result of that action was that the fines which had been inflicted on various tribes who had been raiding were duly paid, and camels and cattle looted from the Abyssinians over the border were given back, and order was re-established throughout the West. Mandera and Hargeisa were in turn occupied. I will give an instance of the attitude of the Colonial Secretary. He denied that he intended to reoccupy Hargeisa, but it was reoccupied with his knowledge within two months, and, I believe, remained occupied by two sections of the Camel Corps for about five months. The Colonial Secretary realised the necessity of the occupation, but I think he was afraid of certain groups of Gentlemen sitting on that side of the Committee, whose tendency has always been to draw back. [Interruption.]

On a point of Order. Is an old Member of this House to be insulted without reason?

On the 3rd January comes the Report of the Commissioner, which appears in the Blue Book, telling of the Mullah's overtures to the remainder of the Dolbahanta tribe in the Ain Valley. The Mullah has a very clear grasp of the situation in Somaliland, and says that they have been severely punished for allegiance to an infidel Government, which affords them no real protection. The Government in turn urged the remainder of the Dolbahanta to take active measures. I think the words used are:— To encourage them or put heart into them. We see rather a cynical remark in the same Report to the effect that:— There is a wide belief that the Government intends to ensure their safety. An astonishing thing for ignorant natives living within our Protectorate to believe. The Commissioner, Mr. Byatt, like any other Englishman in that part of the country, wishes to help them, but he says he dare not do so without the express consent of the Colonial Secretary, which consent was refused. It was decided to carry cut a policy that I can only call cowardly in the extreme, by which the Camel Corps were not to help the Dolbahanta. They were to move slowly in that direction to give the impression that they were going to help. They were to move to Sheikh, and then to Burao—in the words of the Blue Book, "to encourage or put heart into" the Dolbahanta to attack the men representing the Mullah. It was a deliberate attempt to make them believe they were going to get all the assistance to which they were entitled, but which the Government never intended to give. The Mullah's atrocities at that time were increasing—there were atrocities and mutilations upon our friendly tribes. The Camel Corps reached Burao. There they had to deal with certain small matters, with various tribes. Mr. Corfield went out, and, according to the Blue Book, succeeded practically without any action at all, in saving certain stock. After that came the first reprimand for exceeding his instructions. There was one small portion of the dispatch of 23rd June, 1913, which was not read out by the Colonial Secretary, in which the Acting-Commissioner, Mr. Archer, says he cannot attempt to disguise the difficulty of the situation in which Mr. Corfield would be placed, should necessity arise, to withhold support in the face of a Dervish raid.

Imagine the situation in which a man like Mr. Corfield would be placed. On one side he would have instructions from the Colonial Secretary, given in obedience or subservience to some Members of his own party in this House, and, on the other side, his country's honour and his own. He is the man who pacified the West, the man on whom the Somali had learned still more to rely. He was the man whose name was greater in many parts of Somaliland than the name of the British Government itself. He is encouraged by the Government to give cartridges even, but not support to the Dolbahanta tribe, and heart to attack the Dervishes. Is it possible to imagine a more cowardly policy—to be ready to give moral support and to give even cartridges and to urge your friendly tribe who fought for you in the past, to attack the Mullah and then to take flight to the coast? If a cowardly policy of that kind was to be followed, the mistake of the Colonial Office was to put a brave man in to take charge of that policy. It is a mistake which was made on possibly a greater occasion, namely, the occasion of the evacuation of the Sudan. There the cowardly policy had been determined upon of withdrawal, and a man was chosen and sent out to carry out that policy. When he got there he realised that it was not consistent with the honour of his country or of himself, and he remained and died at his post. That was General Gordon. This case is very closely parallel. Mr. Corfield's instructions may have been definite, but let us examine the position in which he finds himself on the eve of the battle of Dul Madoba. A Dervish raid with 2,200 man had taken place, and it was reported that five Somali friendly tribes had been looted, and their camels and their stock had been driven off. The camel and stock of a Somali tribe are not only their wealth, but their wherewithal of existence. It is even quoted by the Acting-Commissioner:— This must inevitably cause almost unprecedented destitution. Then comes the reconnaissance in force. Mr. Corfield and the Camel Corps set out to find the Mullah's men. They had no instructions to fight, I admit. On the way out to the spot where the battle took place Mr. Corfield and the Camel Corps repeatedly met refugees, a large number of wounded men coming back from the action. One hundred riflemen and 200 spearmen joined the Camel Corps. I admit that they turned out to be of no use afterwards. Can you imagine what an appeal all these men must have made to Mr. Corfield, representing the British power, when they were faced with absolute destitution, when they looked upon Mr. Corfield to be the greatest man in the country, and when the Camel Corps had established a reputation from there to Abyssinia, where it was certainly the strongest force in the country? His instructions, if exactly carried out, would have amounted to giving cartridges and encouraging them to attack these 2,000 raiders. Is it possible for any man of Mr. Corfield's character to have obeyed instructions at that juncture? He had no time to appeal for further orders. The instructions had been definite, I admit, but could he refuse help to the Dalbahanta? He took the only possible course. He got across the line of retreat of the raiding party, and then took place the battle.

We resent most strongly that battle being called a disaster. Let me go into the figures of it. There were only about eighty men on our side, after the want of discipline and the want of bravery of thirty-one of the Camel Corps who took flight. About eighty men actually killed about 400 Dervishes. Look at the numbers in comparison with what is estimated to be the entire force at the disposal of the Mullah at the time! Of course, estimates of this kind must be rough, but the Mullah was estimated to have 4,000 fighting men. Mr. Corfield, with his officers and eighty men, actually left dead on the field one man in every ten that the Mullah had, for half the Mullah's entire force were supposed to have been in the battle. They were badly shaken, and it was reported by a Dervish who was captured afterwards that some of the men came back from the fight actually in tears, utterly broken down and incapable of further fighting. Then 400 dead must have meant a large proportion of wounded as well. Mr. Corfield in his last fight taught the Mullah a lesson which would have kept our friendly tribes from his raids for years. The disaster took place next day. I do not cast any aspersion on Mr. Archer. Mr. Archer has shown himself to be a brave man already. The mere fact of his going out with twenty of his escort and a few casual friendlies to assist the Camel Corps against what he imagined were overwhelming odds proved his bravery. By the time he arrived there the Dervishes had fled, but the act was an extremely brave one, and there can be no reflection on his character at all. Nevertheless he ordered that retreat, carrying out the policy which runs the whole way through this Blue Book. He rightly interpreted the orders which would have been given, if there had been an opportunity for it, by the Colonial Secretary—so much so that it is even admitted in the Blue Book. He expressed unreserved approval of the action of Mr. Archer—that is to say, of the retreat from Burao.

In the second part of his speech the Colonial Secretary, saying he was going to reoccupy Burao, talks about the moral support of the presence of our people there Was it not greater at that moment than it can ever be in the future? It turned what had been a gallant victory to what is known in England as the Camel Corps Disaster. The Mullah's prestige has gone up enormously. I have heard subsequent reports—equally unreliable, I admit—that he is supposed to have 8,000 men now—the remainder of the Dalbahanti. The force are only natives, but the fact remains that he must have gained in prestige enormously by the fact that we took flight after the action, acknowledging that we were beaten. Would it be possible that a man like Mr. Corfield could have taken flight from Burao? It was not even the safest course. There are enough men there to hold Burao. Anyone who knows the Somali character would know that he would only want to get back with his loot, drive the camels and stock before him to get home, especially after a shocking defeat as he had sustained. But the difference of risk between holding Burao and having a long strung out line of retreat through thick bush is enormous. If any possibility of attack could take place you laid yourselves open to that attack by marching in a line about ten miles long, protected by 130 men or thereabouts, down a narrow road with thick bush on either side. It was the most dangerous course to adopt, besides being fatal in every possible way. Though Mr. Corfield may have disregarded instructions, I think now is the time to admit that he was right in doing so. There are occasions when the only honourable course is to disregard instructions, and one of them is when people rely upon our protection. If the only accusation against Mr. Corfield is that he did not regard orders which had been given to him, and which he knew to be against the honour of his country, I think history will justify him in having died fighting for the men you had betrayed.

We have listened to two attacks upon the Colonial Secretary from two very different points of view. There is the attack which is made by the hon. Gentleman who opened the discussion, an attack which was based upon a warm and generous sentiment of admiration for a brave and gallant British officer who died fighting at his post. It was an attack in which the personal element predominated. I share the admiration of the hon. Baronet for the gallantry and courage and devotion and spirit of this officer who died fighting against overwhelming odds. But I think the hon. Gentleman has done him an ill service by basing his case upon what can only be regarded by those who know the facts as a travesty of the whole situation. The other attack which has been made very strongly by the hon. Member (Mr. Glaze-brook) was not based upon that episode, and not based upon any belief that this officer had been carrying out his instructions and had been basely deserted by this Government after carrying out his instructions. It was an attack which was based upon a broad general attack upon the policy which the Government was endeavouring to enforce in Somaliland. This episode has been called a disaster, and hon. Members opposite protest against it being called a disaster. I think the word "disaster" is there used in two senses. There is a sense, certainly, in which it was not a disaster. It was a gallant fight against overwhelming odds—a fight which did not result in annihilation to the weaker side. But in view of the fact that this episode was brought upon us by the wilful and deliberate disregard of express, definite, and emphasised instructions, and in view of the political effect which that episode might have, not only in Somaliland, but in other parts of the Empire, it may be regarded as a disaster, and in apportioning blame for that disaster, I think the first question that we have got to ask ourselves is: Why was the Camel Corps organised, and for what object was it intended? There is an impression—a false impression, which was shared by the hon. Member for Gravesend, who opened the discussion—that the Camel Corps was in some way or other directed against the Mullah.

I think it is in my recollection that the hon. Member rose in his place and interrupted the Colonial Secretary by asking in specific words—Was it not intended to protect the friendlies against the Mullah? I have no desire to go beyond what the hon. Member himself says. There has been a prevalent belief that this Camel Corps was organised against the Mullah, and that this defeat which it incurred was a defeat of the avowed purpose of the Camel Corps, and of the avowed policy of the Government. Nothing could be further from the truth, as was shown by the hon. Member opposite (Mr. Glazebrook). It was organised against the so-called friendlies, and it was entirely directed, and expressly stated to be so directed, against the so-called friendlies.

If there is any doubt about that, I will quote passages from the Blue Book, but before doing so I want to make one point. Many hon. Members opposite have talked as if this disaster—which did not occur in pursuit of the Government's policy, but which resulted from defiance, disregard, and disobedience of express orders—were a new thing in the history of Somaliland, and as if there were not greater disasters which had occurred in Somaliland before when hon. Members opposite were sitting on this side of the House—disasters which occurred in pursuit of the policy of the then Government. I think there were three separate occasions upon which a British force sent out, not with a mere 150 Cavalry, but consisting of thousands, was not only defeated by the Mullah, but driven in confusion to the coast, with its officers slain, over 100 men wounded, and with its guns captured. These were events which occurred in pursuance of the policy of hon. Members opposite, and the change of policy, the vital decision which resulted in the change of policy, was come to by hon. Members who now sit on the Front Bench opposite. I have here a report of a Debate in this House on 8th March, 1905. In a speech in that Debate the tender-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Earl Percy) described the various policies which could have been adopted, and referred to the disaster which had resulted from that which the Government then adopted. He outlined to the House the three main policies open to the Government originally, and stated that they chose the one which they thought would involve the least expense. He said they might have undertaken the whole expense of administering the interior themselves. No one had suggested that they should adopt that policy; they might have armed the tribes to enable them to defend themselves against the Mullah, or they might adopt the policy which the Government did adopt, of restricting the area of our administrative responsibility, and wherever it became necessary to undertake the defence of the tribes to do so by means of a punitive expedition. The policy of the party opposite was the policy of punitive expeditions. Earl Percy continued:— As a matter of fact, the policy of punitive expeditions had proved in this case, as it had proved over and over again on the Indian frontier, the most extravagant policy which we could possibly pursue. It was not recognised when the Treaties were concluded in 1886; but the Government had now come to the conclusion—a conclusion which he thought had been pressed upon them by all sections of the House—that the wisest and most prudent policy to pursue in the future was to limit our administrative responsibility as far as we possibly could to the coast line. But there was a corollary to that policy, and that was that we should arm the tribes and organise them so as to be in a position to defend themselves in the event of any future emergency, such as that with which they had been recently confronted.

Will the hon. Gentleman allow me to call his attention to a speech in the same Debate in which the Under-Secretary proposed to raise a Camel Corps of 300 to protect the tribes?

If that is relevant, I am quite glad that it should have been mentioned. There we had fairly laid down by the Conservative Government that the policy in the Protectorate should be the policy of concentrating upon the coast, leaving the interior to the defence of the friendlies, and arming the friendlies. All that has since occurred has followed naturally from that decision. The decision of the Government in 1910 to evacuate the interior, to withdraw the military force, and to concentrate entirely on the three towns on the coast, followed directly from the policy which had been laid down by hon. Gentlemen opposite. I agree that in many respects it was a disastrous policy that we should have armed the so-called friendlies and incited them against the Mullah who had defeated us, and whom we were not able to bring to order ourselves. It was a disastrous policy that we should arm the tribes for the purpose of carrying out a policy we did not care to undertake the expense of carrying out ourselves. The result is made perfectly clear in the Blue Book dealing with the latest episode. We find there that the tribes, instead of using the rifles provided by the Government against the Mullah, who had shown himself on previous occasions so well able to take care of himself, used them against one another, and against our own trade caravans from the coast. I find in the dispatches descriptions of the situation which arose immediately after our withdrawal from the interior. These dispatches give accounts of the inter-tribal fighting which was going on. A memorandum by the Commissioner on the political situation in Somaliland in April, 1912, contains the following:— During the autumn of 1910 disorder had broken out also in other directions. The Aidegalla tribe, in the west, had split and engaged in a desultory civil war, which is not yet extinct. The eastern came into not infrequent collision with the western Habr Yunis; the Dolbahanta and Habr Toljaala sections had quarrelled and fought among themselves; and the Mijjertein, who, under Omar Doreh, had been strongly armed by the Government, had developed into general freebooters. By January, 1911, fighting, with a very large number of casualties, had occurred between the Habr Yunis and the coastal Habr Awal, to the great disadvantage of the latter. There is no word here about the Mullah. The complaints which arose from the trading community at Berbera were not complaints against the Mullah, but against the friendlies, who were raiding their caravans and destroying commerce in the country. What wag the effect of this state of affairs? The effect is described by the Acting-Commissioner in a dispatch dated 19th August, 1913:— I do not see any good purpose in concealing the fact that during this period it is estimated that about one-third of the male population of the friendly tribes of this Protectorate was exterminated in inter-tribal fighting. It was because of this state of affairs that the Camel Corps was organised against the friendlies—a statement which the hon. Member for Gravesend was inclined to laugh at a little while ago. The Camel Corps was organised as a constabulary for the definite purpose of maintaining order among the friendlies. In the very proposal made for the Camel Corps it was stated, first of all:— There is still one expedient which might be tried, but it would have to be tried without undue delay. This is the maintenance on the coast of a small mobile striking force, which could be used to maintain order by coercion within a radius of fifty miles or so of Berbera, and to keep the main roads clear. That was the proposal before the Camel Corps was raised. When it was raised definite instructions were issued to Mr. Corfield, the commander. These instructions contain this very definite instruction:— There is not any present prospect of your encountering Dervish laiders, but should you receive news of the near presence of any considerable force, you would carefully avoid being attacked or surrounded, and would at once retire on the coast. For this reason I intend that for some little time to come you should not form a temporary base more than fifty miles—a day's march—from the coast. Subsequent movements will be dictated by developments, and you will obtain my assent to any proposal to move into a fresh grazing camp. You must assume that the constabulary is part of the force available in Berbera, and that it is based on Berbera, occupying temporary camps in the interior for purposes of convenience. The Camel Corps was organised as a police force for the purpose of keeping order among the friendlies, and not for action in any circumstances against the Mullah, and instructions to that effect were given definitely to the commander of the Camel Corps at the very beginning. But I find that the Commissioner in Somaliland proposed that on one definite occasion the camel force should be used against the Dervish force, at any rate, that it should advance in the direction of the Dervish force in the Ain Valley. He was conscious that that was contrary to the purpose for which the force was organised, and he wrote to the Colonial Secretary saying that he could not do so unless he was expressly authorised to do so by the Colonial Secretary. In response the Colonial Secretary said:— I regret that I am unable to give any approval to the suggestion that the Camel Corps should proceed at once to the spot with a view to engaging with the small Dervish parties now there. Such an arrangement would be contrary to the policy of His Majesty's Government in withdrawing from active participation in affairs in the interior of the Protectorate and confining the scope of the administration to the coast towns and the friendly tribes in the neighbourhood of the coast. It would also be foreign to the principles laid down as to the duties of the Camel Corps, which were intended to be confined to the maintenance of order by coercion within a radius of fifty miles or so of Berbera, and to keeping the main roads clear. There was no ground for ambiguity on the part of the Government or its officers, or on the part of anyone in this House. But I admit, and I am sorry to admit, that there was ground for ambiguity on the part of the Somalis and of the Mullah, himself, and on the part of the Dervishes. Indeed, I am afraid we cannot escape from the conclusion that it was part of the policy of the Government to allow the Somalis and the Dervishes to think that this force was directed, not against the friendlies, but against the Mullah. In the instructions which were issued to Mr. Corfield there is a definite avowal of this purpose. It is said:— There is a widespread idea among the Somalis that the Government is about to revive the status quo and to reoccupy the former posts in the interior. No harm is done at the moment by this belief. And again it is stated:— It is important to avoid giving the impression that the Corps exists for the purpose of making war on the friendlies; they must understand that it exists solely to give them protection and assistance.

I am afraid that the hon. Member has not been following my remarks with the attention which they deserve. The point I was trying to make was that the Government had made it perfectly clear in its dispatches to the Government of the Protectorate, and the officers who were engaged in carrying out its policy, that this force was to be directed against the friendlies for the purpose of suppressing disorder among the friendlies—stopping them looting caravans and raiding one another. I said that there was no room for ambiguity on the part of the officers, but that there was ground for ambiguity on the part of the friendlies themselves and on the part of the Mullah, and I could not acquit the Government of the charge of having deliberately and intentionally for political purposes—that is, for the purposes of the Protectorate policy—encouraged that belief among the friendlies and among the Dervishes. In his instructions to Mr. Corfield his attention was called to this ambiguity, and it was pointed out to him that the Somalis might believe that this force was directed against the Mullah, and that no harm was done at the moment by such belief. It was also said:— It is important to avoid giving the impression that the Corps exists for the purpose of making war on the friendlies; they must understand that it exists solely to give them protection and assistance. The Government had the intention of creating this opinion among the friendlies: Any idea to the contrary might foster a combination of sections for the purpose of resistance. That any resistance will be met with is highly improbable, and owing to deep dissensions the probability of combination is exceedingly remote; but the possibility must be borne in mind. If any ambiguity did exist in the mind of Mr. Corfield, in spite of these instructions, it must have been removed by the very definite reprimand which was administered to him on previous occasions when he went beyond his instructions. The hon. Member who originated the discussion said that from December, 1912, until August, 1913, when this fatal event occurred, there was nothing but praise for Mr. Corfield.

June was two months before this fatal episode occurred. In June Mr. Gorfield did exceed his instructions. He was reprimanded.

You will dismiss for the first offence without a reprimand! I note the policy of the hon. Member.

I am endeavouring to treat it in all seriousness. It was rumoured that the Dervishes were raiding about thirty miles from. Burao. Mr. Corfield moved out with the whole Camel Corps. He approached the spot where the Dervishes were reported to be. He found only about twelve horsemen there. He incurred no undue risk. He did not engage in any hostilities, but he returned after having done that. That was thought to be an infringement of his instructions. On his return the Acting-Commissioner addressed to him a warning:— I cannot pass over the incident without drawing your attention to the explicit nature of the instructions conveyed to you from time to time on the subject of confining Camel Corps' operations to the immediate vicinity of Burao (in the Nogal direction), with Ber as an extreme limit for occasional patrols. You are personally aware, moreover, that the Secretary of State has expressly disapproved of the suggestion of employing the Camel Corps against small Dervish parties, even where danger was little and success more or less assured, on the grounds that such measures were entirely foreign to the duties of the Constabulary as well as contrary to Government policy; and there is no discretionary power of any sort on this subject allowed.

The speech of the hon. Member has already occupied some time in this Debate, and if questions are asked it would only tend to prolong the speech. Hon. Members had better wait for their own turn.

7.0 P.M.

I will take that hint and be as brief as I can. There were clear and definite instructions that the Camel Corps was not directed against the Mullah or the Dervishes. It was solely for police and constabulary work among the friendlies. Within two months of this fatal episode, under exactly similar conditions, it was reported that the Dervishes were raiding somewhere about the same place, about thirty miles south-east of Burao. Mr. Corfield was sent out by the Acting-Commissioner with definite instructions to make a reconnaissance, and that he was not to engage, but to return and report. Some doubt has been cast upon the nature of the instructions as to whether a discretion was not allowed. In the report of Mr. Summers, the officer of the Indian contingent, there is a definite statement as to what the instructions were:— He was instructed, under all circumstances, to refrain from committing himself to an engagement with any considerable force of Dervishes. Should the Dervishes prove to be present in large numbers, he was to attempt to gain information of their movements and withdraw to Burao. He ascertained that the Dervishes were present in large numbers; there were over 2,000 of them. He came to the decision that with his 150 men he would engage this force of 2,000 Dervishes. Not only would he engage them, but that he would outflank them, get behind them, place himself across their lines ready to engage them there. So clear was it that he was acting in defiance of his instructions that Mr. Summers addressed a remonstrance to him. He said:— In view of the instructions of His Majesty's Acting-Commissioner, I strongly advised him to content himself with making a reconnaissance of the Dervish encampments, holding his camels in readiness for withdrawal on Burao, and leaving behind him patrols to give him early information of the Dervishes' movements at dawn; and I told him that, with the force at his disposal, he had, in my opinion, no prospect of carrying out a successful action against the Dervishes. In spite of his instructions, in spite of his reprimand, in spite of the remonstrance addressed to him by the Indian officer who was accompanying him and who took the consequences and went into action and behaved most gallantly, and came out wounded in three places, he determined to defy the Government and defy its policy and to carry out this policy of his own. It is true that he sent back a letter at the last moment stating what it was he intended to do when there was no time for him to get a reply or to be recalled. This engagement was not the result of the Government policy; it was a Jameson raid; it was similar even in the letter which was sent when there was no chance of a reply being received, and no recall was possible. I quite appreciate the difficulties, which have been emphasised, in which this young and gallant officer found himself. He did not like to desert the friendlies; he did not like to leave them at the mercy of the Dervishes, for that was the policy which he was sent out to carry out, and he just laid down a policy for himself in defiance of the policy of His Majesty's Government. It is now suggested that the disaster really took place because the Government did not reverse its policy. Why should the Government reverse its policy because of an episode which had nothing to do with the Government's policy? Is it suggested that when any officer takes upon himself to disobey his instructions to carry out another policy, and thereby incur disaster, thereupon the Government of the day is bound to change or reverse its policy? I submit that there was no ground for asking that the Government should change its policy. Therefore, I am unable to understand the change of policy which is now announced. The Government seems to be going back to a half-and-half policy.

As a matter of fact, in questions of this kind, there are only two policies to be followed—either going in with an armed force to occupy the country and accepting full responsibility for administering it as a British Colony or British Protectorate or the other policy of withdrawing altogether, as we have done from Afghanistan. Why has the Government, with regard to the Mullah, not pursued the same policy as it followed in regard to the Ameer of Afghanistan? That is what I am unable to understand. The right hon. Gentleman made an able defence of his policy, but he wound up that defence with the climax of abandoning it. Hon. Members have paid a tribute to the young officer who died. Is there no admiration for the Mullah? Hon. Members may laugh at this man who is now suffering from illness, but will they remember that he is the only potentate alive to-day who has four times defeated the British Army, and who has for fifteen years maintained himself against the might of the British Empire. He is one of the great men whom Africa has produced: a great military leader, a great statesman. Hon. Members laugh. I am afraid they have not informed themselves very much about the history of this gentleman, who is called the "Mad Mullah." I find that he is curiously paralleled by many hon. Members who sit on the opposite benches. [An HON. MEMBER: "A great statesman."] I admit that some hon. Gentlemen opposite may become that despite the suspicion with which they receive my admission. The Mullah is a university man. He has travelled widely—travelled in two Continents, which is perhaps more than many hon. Members opposite have done. He attended the University at Mecca, and he was there chiefly interested in theological subjects. He returned to his country after attending the University at Mecca, and he married well. His wife's people had a place in the country, and in these respects his condition is exactly parallel to that of some Noble Lords and hon. Members opposite. I find that he attached himself to a sect, and he preached that there should be more regularity in prayer, stricter attention to forms of religion, and abstinence from intoxicating liquor.

He quickly obtained through his marriage connections great influence over the Dolbahanta tribe, and he established a native power in the interior. He settled disputes among the tribes, and kept them from raiding each other, thus maintaining law and order. What happened was that this native chief, a man of genius, a military leader of ability, a man who not only had military gifts but gifts of statesmanship, tried to exercise something of the great power of religion, which is always powerful everywhere, in setting up a strong and stable native State in the interior. This was a policy which was contrary to the policy favoured by many advocates of the forward policy; and from the moment it appeared that he was building up his native State, systematic attempts were made to break his power and destroy his influence. We tried, first of all, by sending expeditions against him, but he beat them back one by one. Three time he beat back the armies sent against him. Then we started the policy of arming the friendlies and inciting them to fight him and break up his power. But he even held out against that; and, after ten years, this man, who was then young and strong, who is now described as suffering from dropsy and unable to be moved from place to place, this man whom we dare not fight ourselves, this man for whose shoes we are waiting—dead men's shoes, to which the Secretary of State referred—is made the subject of laughter and contumely. Why was it, when we saw growing up in the interior of that country, with which we are connected, a native and organised State, that we immediately tried to break its power, leaving the country in desolation, or, if I may so describe it, leaving it, like ripe fruit, to be ready to our grasp at a later stage? Why is it that we did not try to make terms with the Mullah, as we had done successfully in the case of Afghanistan? The policy which we pursued in Afghanistan is the policy that we should have followed with this great leader of men amongst the Somalis; a policy which ought to have been pursued ten years ago, and during all this time. I am against, entirely against, the half-and-half change of policy announced to-night by the Secretary of State.

There is one qualification of the Mullah which the hon. Gentleman has imitated, and that is that he does a lot of talking, and is able to make interminable speeches. I think that is a fair weapon in party warfare; but this is a great Imperial question which is being deliberately dragged down to the party arena, and the hon. Gentleman thinks it is a perfectly fair weapon to use to prevent other people from talking at all. But the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State knows quite well that we on this side of the House feel very strongly on the subject, and we do desire to talk upon it.

I have had nothing whatever to do with the conduct of the Debate. I had not the remotest idea who was going to speak on either side, and I have not made the slightest approach to anybody.

The right hon. Gentleman is singularly fortunate. There are two points in this discussion. There is, in the first place, the affair of Mr. Corfield, and there is, in the second place, the question of policy to be pursued in Somaliland. We are accustomed to see Members of the Government standing at that box and expressing regret for having been found out in what they call an error of judgment, and on this occasion it has been followed by buckets of whitewash, coming from behind the right hon. Gentleman in such a manner that they must have very nearly drowned him. I wish to say that nothing in the reprehensible things we have complained about in connection with Ministers has been more disgraceful than the publication in the Blue Book of the report censuring Mr. Corfield. The right hon. Gentleman allowed it to be known that we had better not attack him on account of Mr. Corfield. If he thinks that anything he can say can do the slightest damage to Mr. Corfield he is entirely wrong. I have said that Ministers are in the habit of expressing regret for errors that are found out—errors of judgment. This was not an error of judgment; it was an error of instinct. We have a right to claim that anyone in the position of the right hon. Gentleman, having under despotic authority the fate of thousands of our subjects who are not represented in any Assembly, having under his orders hundreds of brave men who are bearing in the outlying portions of the Empire the white man's burden, should have and display the instincts of an Englishman. Anything more grossly unjust, anything more disloyal, anything more ungenerous, anything less in accordance with the traditions of the Empire, than the publication of that dispatch, censuring a dead man who died because he was carrying out an impossible policy, has not occured since I have been in this House.

What happened? I do not for one moment question the right of Mr. Archer to send that report. Mr. Archer is a young officer. He had got to report to his chief what are considered to be the salient features of what has occurred; but I do say that the publication of that report was a monstrous piece of injustice to the memory of Mr. Corfield. Does anybody question it? What was the necessity for publishing that report? Let me, first of all, endeavour to prove that the whole of the state of affairs in Somaliland, which lead to the formation of the Camel Corps, was due solely and entirely to the policy the Government carried out without consulting this House, and in defiance of the advice obtained from every single officer and man of influence, with the single exception of Sir William Manning. If you are going to put the experience of Sir William Manning against that of Captain Cordeaux, you have not consulted the records of both of them. Let me say with regard to the speech of the hon. Member who tried to prove that our predecessors on this side, when in office, were responsible for the policy adopted in Somaliland, let me tell him that he is entirely wrong, and that he cannot substantiate that statement. On the contrary, our policy in Somaliland—I do not say it was the best one, and I have always criticised it—terminated with the battle in 1904, in which the Mullah was severely defeated, with the result that in the following year, 1905, an arrangement was come to with the Italians so that peace was established between ourselves, the Mullah, and the Italians, and that peace lasted until 1908. It has been said that we armed the tribes. We did nothing of the kind—

Will the hon. Gentleman allow me to read the speech of—[HON. MEMBERS: "NO, no!"]

There is no question of a speech, or of what was suggested as possible. It is what we did. Some hon. Members seem to think that the world is ruled by words, despatches, or instructions, or other futile things. They forget the fact that there are occasions when men are required, and they were required in Somaliland. That remark seems to amuse the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. K. Harcourt). Let him go out and see if it is not the case, and let him and other people see whether they could rely on instructions or on their own intelligence. It is very easy for armchair politicians to sit at home here and say what ought to be done and what ought not to have been done. I should like to take half a dozen of them out to Somaliland and give them charge of a district, and they would then realise what I once heard a distinguished Governor of Aden say with regard to Somaliland. It was in 1899, and there was a discussion about what was the policy to be pursued in Somaliland. This very distinguished officer said, "You cannot rule Somaliland with three Sahibs and inkpots," to which a man who had been there said, "You could rule Somaliland with one Sahib if you took away his inkpot." Some hon. Members seem to think that the Empire is floating in ink, while ink has nearly stifled this Empire for many years.

I desire to say a word or two with regard to the treatment of Mr. Corfield. What is the allegation? It is that he disregarded his instructions. Have you ever heard of Nelson? Did he disregard his instructions? If he had not, we should not be in the position in which we are to-day. You say that he was rash—so were you. The difference was this: You were rash with the fate and lives in Somaliland, while you Englishmen lived here in safety, guarded by policemen, not against the attacks of men, but of women. That was your position, and that is what you risked, while he risked his own life. Those are the issues. If anybody who takes that risk is to be blamed subsequently in this miscalled Imperial Parliament, then you will not find our services full of the kind of men that are necessary if the Empire is going to be run. The man who is not prepared to take a risk of any kind and will rush to the right hon. Gentleman or any other armchair politician to ask, "What am I to do?"—that man is no good in the Empire. Keep him in London, in your office, and do not send him to do harm to our prestige, discredit to our name, and to allow the murder of thousands of men entrusted to his care. They are no good. The memory of Richard Corfield will take care of itself. He lies buried in an unmarked grave in British Somaliland, but a statue will be erected to him in Berbera as honourable as any in the world. That is the answer to the contemptible aspersions on the character of this man. Then the right hon. Gentleman himself had' threatened to expose something which was not known about him; that is the rumour that was going about of Richard Corfield, that he had a very strong attack to make. We heard the attack to-day. He read out pages of the Blue Book, which, as he said, cynically, might be read by any of us if we took an interest in the matter.

We take a very much wider interest than the right hon. Gentleman and his Friends, because we believe that in your treatment of Somaliland you show what is your appreciation of the greater question of the treatment of the native races for whom we are responsible. It shows also what is your idea of the policy which ought to be pursued with regard to our prestige in Africa. Hon. Members who have not had the good fortune to be employed there directly cheer when the word "prestige" is mentioned. I can well understand that they do not follow what we mean by prestige. It is not some swash-buckling jingo idea that an Englishman, because he is an Englishman, must always be treated with great deference and respect. That is not the idea. Prestige is the only thing which enables us with absolutely inadequate-armed forces to hold millions of acres, and to control hundreds of thousands of natives in Africa. Whether we like it or whether we do not, we have undertaken the responsibility of ruling those men. We went there in 1884, and we have remained there ever since. In taking over the government of a country, such as Somaliland or any other country, in an elementary condition of civilisation, you destroy the existing method of government, and you destroy and remove every means of maintaining order in that country by the very fact of your going there and taking over the government. That is what was done in Somaliland. Not only did we do that, but we made definite treaties in 1886, 1887 and 1885 with the natives, undertaking to protect them. We made a treaty with the French in 1888, defining the limits of our spheres, and we made a treaty with the Italians in 1894, and with the Abyssinians in 1897.

So that from every point of view our responsibility for Somaliland is absolutely undeniable, and is one we cannot get out of by saying it is very expensive, and that it is such an expensive place that we are going to leave them to stew in their own juice, unless we are prepared as a consequence from the Sudan to the Mombasa, or through Abyssinia and French and Italian Somaliland and Zululand, to have the report spread and confirmed that we are no longer able to maintain government in Somaliland, and that we are a people that can be despised and can be ignored. That is the risk that you are running and deliberately running. Let me say there never was a policy less justified than the policy which led to the disastrous condition of affairs which we have seen in Somaliland up till the Camel Corps. Let me refer also to the Blue Book of 1910. It was decided in the beginning of 1909 to adopt a policy of partial and temporary military occupation. That was the clear and Liberal policy adopted by the Government, that they were going to occupy Burao. They ordered up reinforcements to the number of 1,500, and they were going to undertake that temporary occupation. Then five weeks after that policy had been adopted, the Government telegraphed as follows, to the Commissioner on the 12th March, 1909:— The cost of transport required to maintain troops in present position is so great that His Majesty's Government must reconsider the whole question of their policy in Somaliland. That is the definite reason assigned—the cost of transport. I note that in one year there was spent £90,000 on extra military expenditure, and another year £30,000 odd. It is not said what the extra cost in this case would have been. Let me remind the House of this: that this very Government which gave as their sole reason that they could not find the money, and that they had decided to abandon Somaliland and give it Home Rule, this very Government two years later, almost to a day, voted a quarter of a million of money to pay the Members of this House. How did they find the money for that? [An HON. MEMBER: "How much do you get?"] And a very few months after that they pledged the credit of this country without asking it and, as they said, against its will, for an absolutely unlimited liability in order that they might stump the constituencies with a bribe of 9d. for 4d., for votes. There is plenty of money going when there are votes, but no money for Somaliland, where the people have no votes. That is the gist of the policy of the Government, and that is what makes it such an ignoble one. It is not too strong to call it that. That is the policy which was adopted, and what was the result? Against the advice of Captain Cordeaux and against the advice of Colonel Gough, who warned them of every single thing that has occurred, they decided to scuttle out of Somaliland, as they scuttled out of the Sudan, and the result was very similar. In the Sudan, during the period they enjoyed Home Rule, which was the policy of the political predecessors of the present Government, it is reckoned that the population was reduced from eight million to two million. Five million people were killed, murdered, or slaughtered, the country was turned into chaos and hell, owing to the policy of the then Government. Anybody who has read the first four pages of the Blue Book recently issued, will see what was the result of conferring Home Rule on Somaliland. They will see that the Acting-Commissioner said, talking of the good work that the Camel Corps had done:— I do not see that any good purpose would be served in concealing the fact that during the period "— that is, during Home Rule— it is estimated that one-third of the whole population of the friendly tribes in this Protectorate was exterminated in inter-tribal fighting. What a, fine record! These are the successors of the men who were proud to think that we were running an Empire in which people could say, whether black or white, Ciris Britannicus sum. It is rather a disgrace to be one now. That has been their record. They were warned in the most explicit terms what would be the effect of their policy. They ignored and disregarded that warning, and, having introduced a policy which led to a complete state of chaos, they now, if you please, revert to the policy recommended by Captain Cordeaux, the policy which they said they would not adopt, because they could not afford it, and because they wanted money to bribe the electorate, and so on. Now they have adopted that policy.

It is rather late in the day; you are not going to bring to life again one-third of the male population of Somahland. Let me invite the attention of hon. Members whose humanitarian instincts are always stirred, and who come down to this House with almost hysterical sobs whenever anything occurs in Armenia, Greece, Macedonia, or any other of those countries where, not the British Government, but another Government is responsible for law and order. Down they come to the House; they plaster the Paper with their letters, and so forth, insisting that His Majesty's Government should intervene on behalf of these poor people. But what happens in this case? Look at the number of Members present. Yet we are dealing with people who are just as much British subjects as they are. But they have no sympathy with them. There is no party capital to be made out of them. Nobody cares for the Somali. That may be the view of hon. Members opposite; but if that is their view, you cannot run the Empire on those lines. There are signs that the Empire is in a bad way to-day. These constant doses of whitewash, to which Ministers have to submit, are a bad sign. The absolute apathy shown towards these Imperial questions is a bad sign. But we have been through bad times in the past, and we may come out of this if right hon. Gentlemen opposite are, as I hope, a passing infliction. They will, I suppose, most of them, float gracefully up the corridor to that happy haven were all democratic plutocrats aspire to sit, and we lesser mortals will be favoured with the opportunity of admiring them in solemn and somewhat somnolent grandeur on the red benches. That will be a great relief to the country. Meanwhile they have to carry on the Government.

The Debate is getting wider and wider. Rather wider advantage is being taken of my endeavour to give a certain amount of liberty. Hon. Members must keep somewhat more closely to the Supplementary Estimate.

I would respectfully draw your attention to the fact that a Supplementary Estimate is the only occasion that we get for discussing this question of the Protectorates. During the five years I have been in the House we have only had the occasion of the Estimates or Supplementary Estimate or Motions for Adjournment of discussing this important question. We endeavoured to raise the question by an Amendment to the Address, when it might have been treated in its wider aspects, but we were not successful. I respectfully hope that we may be allowed to treat it as a broad Imperial question from the Imperial aspect, and not be confined to the narrower party aspect in which my predecessors have endeavoured to put it.

I have allowed very great latitude. The hon. Member was discussing the general virtues or iniquities of His Majesty's Government.

The special iniquities of various Members of His Majesty's Government I find it difficult to extricate from the general mass; it is for that reason, I admit, I was betrayed into a rather wider sphere. In conclusion, I would remind the right hon. Gentleman of what was said by Mr. Burke, when, speaking in this House on the subject of American Taxation, he said:— They never had any kind of system, right or wrong, but only invented occasionally some miserable tale for the day in order that they might meanly sneak out of the difficulty into which they have proudly strutted. That describes the policy of the present Government.

No one that I have heard has ever made any charge or allegation against the bravery of Mr. Corfield. Certainly the statement that the Secretary of State made charges against either the character or the courage of Mr. Corfield is absolutely without foundation. The Secretary of State, who spoke under a great deal of provocation, made the statement that Mr. Corfield had disobeyed instructions, and this statement was received with vehement and even angry denials from this side of the House. But the very next Member who spoke from these benches openly avowed that Mr. Corfield had disobeyed his clear instructions, and he gloried in the fact. All the eulogies that have been poured out on Mr. Corfield, including that of the last speaker, were on the ground that he had disobeyed his instructions, which were the instructions of a base and despicable Government. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Evidently I am correctly stating the position of the Opposition. They gloried in the fact that Mr. Corfield, being a gallant Englishman—as he undoubtedly was, and no one has ever attempted to deny it—disobeyed his instructions, and defeated the policy of a decrepit and anti-Imperialist Government. That is all that the Colonial Secretary has ever charged against him. It is a very serious matter, if hon. Members above the Gangway frankly avow it and glory in it. The hon. Member who spoke last (Mr. Baird) said that you cannot possibly run any of the Dependencies of the Empire upon instructions by armchair politicians, that "men on the spot" must have absolute discretion, without any regard to the policy of the Government or the directions of this House, to administer the affairs of the Colonies as they think fit.

What I think I said was that you cannot tie down people in countries like Somaliland in that way.

I think the hon. Member's words had a very much wider meaning than that. There was never any controversy in this country as to Mr. Corfield's gallantry and bravery. The only criticism I have ever seen was that his bravery was so great that it may have overcome his discretion. But some of his friends started a controversy in the "Morning Post," which went on for weeks, the whole purport of which was that he had disobeyed instructions, that he had a policy of his own which he successfully maintained against the policy of the Government endorsed by this House in 1910, and that he was perfectly right in doing so. A letter of the late Mr. Corfield was published in the Press at the time, from which a passage was quoted by the Imperialist "Morning Post," in which Mr. Corfield spoke of the "late weak policy of the Government." So much for Mr. Corfield, whose death everybody deplores. I think it is a pity that Members on this side should take the responsibility of inciting gallant men to sacrifice their lives in this way. After all, bravery is very fine to talk about in the abstract, but that is a very dangerous line to take. If you are to draw the moral that because Admiral Nelson once disobeyed orders with glorious results every officer in the Army or Navy should disobey orders whenever he pleases or whenever he chooses to lose confidence in his commanding officer or his official superiors, I say you are proposing a doctrine which, if it were acted on, would very soon put an end to all discipline and efficiency in the Army or Navy.

I have intervened in the Debate because I desire to take the first opportunity of complaining that the Government have undoubtedly wholly reversed the policy which they announced to the House in 1910. I accept in the fullest degree the statement of the hon. Member (Mr. Baird) that the Government have adopted the policy of Mr. Corfield and the Assistant-Commissioner in Somaliland, who set themselves, of deliberate purpose, to force the hands of the Government, and, in spite of the decision of this House, to get back to the old policy of occupying posts in the interior of Somaliland. I hope that we shall have another opportunity of discussing these matters when we can go into the whole question. I might refer to the Debates which took place on 3rd March and 6th April, 1910, when I moved a reduction for the purpose of protesting, as I have been protesting for twelve years, against the policy of the occupation of the interior of Somaliland. The first Lord of the Admiralty, in an impassioned speech on 3rd March, declared that the Government had arrived at the conclusion that the whole policy for ten years had been a great mistake, and they had decided to return to the old policy followed when Somaliland was under the control of the Indian Office. The policy was defined in clear and categorical language as being the occupation of three towns on the coast. and the absolute and final withdrawal from the interior of Somaliland. On 6th April the Under-Secretary for the Colonies amplified and emphasised that policy. Many hon. Members will remember that he ridiculed the occupation of Burao especially. He described Burao as a miserable collection of mud hovels, and declared that Burao would be evacuated permanently, and that Berbera would be the only position occupied. For once in my life I accept unreservedly the description given of this whole transaction in a leader in the "Times" on 13th August, 1913, when, commenting on the recent disaster in Somaliland, the "Times" made this remarkable statement:— The first question which the Government will have to answer about the fighting in Somaliland is why a disastrously small force, inviting disaster, was at Idoweina at all. The Camel Corps were at least thirty miles south of Burao, and Burao is 140 miles from the coast. In January, 1910, the Government decided to evacuate the interior of Somaliland, and to hold only two or three points on the coast—Berbera and, possibly, Gerla and Burao. By the end of the following March the evacuation was reported to be complete. In April the question of Somaliland was debated in the House, when Colonel Seely, the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, was at some pains to explain why the Ministry had resolved on this policy. Here is what the right hon. Gentleman said:— I will ask any hon. Member who takes an interest in military strategical questions, is it a wise plan for a country which depends, so much upon prestige, as we of necessity do, to have 200 or 300 men, 140 miles from the sea, all alone in the midst of the people of Somaliland, who, at any moment, might, though I do not think they will, adopt a hostile attitude? We," said the "Times," "are so much in agreement with this policy that we support, without reserve, the Government's new policy. We would not have supported that if we had had the slightest idea that this policy of keeping isolated forces in the interior of the country was to be maintained. That is the "Times" newspaper on the policy of the Government. It will be, I think, within the recollection of hon. Members that last August the Colonial Secretary read out telegrams announcing the disaster outside Burao. I immediately asked him how it came to pass that the Camel Corps was 100 miles from the coast. The right hon. Gentleman said that he was totally, unable to say why the Corps was at Dul Madoba until he got further information. At a later date, on 14th August, 1913, this question was raised again, and I asked the right hon. Gentleman a question:— Mr. Dillon: Will the right hon. Gentleman include Papers going back for the last six months or a year, and will he explain why the Camel Corps was at Dul Madoba? Mr. Harcourt: I am utterly unable to explain why the Camel Corps was at Burao until I get further information. It appears now from the published Papers that the right hon. Gentleman had for a long period known that the Camel Corps was at Burao, and beyond.

I was afraid that that particular misprint would be quoted. I said that I was not aware that the Camel Corps was beyond Burao. I tried to cor- rect the discrepency in the original inaccurate report.

It was a very unfortunate misprint, and certainly my recollection was that I heard the statement that the right hon. Gentleman did not know, because it was in reply to a specific question that I put as to why the Camel Corps was beyond Burao. Three years before the Government had announced this change of policy, and there was no single newspaper in the country which put a different interpretation upon the announcement that was made on three successive occasions in the House that the policy of maintaining posts in the interior of Somaliland had been definitely abandoned, and that the decision had been come to to retire to the coast. All I have got to say is this: I think the Government in allowing their hands to be forced by these gentlemen on the spot in Somaliland have adopted the worst possible policy. One policy that might, according to some, have been worked, and which, perhaps, was largely supported, would have been to go in and conquer the country, though I think that would have been most cruel. It has been tried in the past with disastrous results. Another policy would be the policy which was announced to the House three years ago; definitely announced to the House and approved by the House, and that was to withdraw permanently to the coast and resume the old position which for years was successfully carried on when Somaliland was under the administration of the Indian Government. An HON. MEMBER: "What about the Mullah?"] The Mullah in those days was a most respectable man.

Does the hon. Gentleman, when the Blue Book says that the result of that policy was the loss of one-third of the native population, consider that that is a successful policy?

The reason for that is extremely simple. Doubtless the hon. Member will recognise—I am trying to bring my remarks to a close, and I do not want to go into side issues, for I hope we shall have another opportunity of discussing this matter—that the reason was that the British Government armed the native tribes. If hon. Members will look up the Debate to which I have referred they will see that the First Lord of the Admiralty pointed out that, while you were engaged in protecting friendly tribes you often found the friendly tribes that you were protecting 100 miles in the interior of the country fighting some other tribe. The result of arming the tribes was that they made it the one object and amusement of their lives not to defend themselves, but as most deadly weapons had been placed in their hands, instead of going against the Mullah they set to work to raid and slaughter each other. It was not the Mullah; it was the friendly tribes who killed each other. There was one observation made by the hon. Member below who knows Somaliland—and I accept his statement—that at present Somaliland is practically impossible for any Englishman or European to travel in. That is a nice state of things after all the operations in Somaliland! Before you commenced these operations, before you interfered with Somaliland at all, beyond occupying Berbera, hunters and travellers could go freely through Somaliland. The result of ten years of British operation in Somaliland is that an hon. Member says that it is relapsing into barbarism. That is not a very triumphant indication of the operations of successive Governments. [HON. MEMBERS: "The present Government."] I have been here in this House and we have been debating Somaliland for fourteen years.

I think the Noble Lord is usually on the side of the enemies of his country. I have been here all these years, and while I have not been to Somaliland, I have picked up a good deal of knowledge on the subject, and I say that the state of Somaliland has been bad all these years—ever since you first attacked the Mullah. I believed myself, and still believe, that the Mullah was anxious to make peace with England. You have not allowed him to do so. The men on the spot took it into their heads that he was a dangerous man, and you would not make peace with him. I believe that if you had given the Mullah £1,000 a year you would have saved this country millions of money, and Somaliland would now have been peaceful and safe for travellers. But I rose mainly for the purpose of protesting in some little way against the action of the Government, without the consent or knowledge of the House, wholly reversing the policy which they announced to the House a few years ago.

I propose to make my remarks short, but there is one point to which I should like to draw attention, one that has not had really much stress laid upon it to-day. That is in regard to the right hon. Gentleman's censure of Mr. Corfield will have on other officers and upon the traditions of the service. I know the right hon. Gentleman said the other day with great solemnity that it would be possible to smash a part of the British Empire in a single Debate. I suppose that is the part to which he referred, and the matter in his speech to-day was to show us how he would do it. Because so far as one can judge, not having studied the Somaliland question very closely, Mr. Corfield, according to the Blue Book, was given an impossible task. He achieved impossibilities—and lost his life—with the result, I think, that only because he lost his life he was censured. I think it must be admitted that if Mr. Corfield had lived, instead of being censured, if he had come with the news of a big victory—that he won with his death—that the right hon. Gentleman would have preened himself on the great achievement that had been gained by 100 of his Constabulary against 2,000 hostile rifles. It is the effect of this Minute of the right hon. Gentleman on one of these vital portions of the Empire that I am concerned about. It is not censuring only Mr. Corfield; it is censuring Wolfe, or Clive, or Nicholson, or Gordon, or anyone who has not only been prepared to give his life, but also his reputation for his nation.

The Empire, as the right hon. Gentleman said the other day, is bound together by a slender thread. One of those slender threads is the traditions that young officers still dare to show initiative and dare to show independence when crises arise. If they live, and have done what you dislike, punish them. If they die, and they have conscientiously done their duty, I say that they should not be censured. It is just such men as Mr. Corfield we want; men of a similar character, perhaps, to Sir Richard Burton, who it may be difficult for the red-tapists to handle, but when the time of difficulty arrives it is they who handle your Empire for you. It seems to me that as things stand at present, that we hold Egypt, Cyprus and India only because people in the past have done just the sort of thing that Mr. Corfield did, and we shall only go on holding them because we have got men prepared to do what Mr. Corfield did. If the temper of the Minute becomes the spirit of the Empire, well, it will be very nice! We shall have officials safe and precise, with one eye on their pension and no eye on Westminster Abbey. You will have people who will have more consideration for any old woman in an office than they will have for the best interests of the Empire. In the end you will remove Nelson from Trafalgar Square and put up Admiral Byng in his place. Our position at the present moment is to say to any ambitious man, any bold young man who wants a life of adventure, and who is just the sort of man you want in these wild, savage countries: "Do not go; go to Bagota, or Mexico, or somewhere else, and work for a company, but do not come and work for us because we want safe and easy men, who write elegant, peaceful dispatches." If you get these men it will not be very long before your fifty men in Cyprus—I think we have only fifty there—will be thrown into the sea. You will lose the Soudan in a day, and have India in a blaze from one end to the other. I have no doubt that the dispatches recording these disastrous events will be elegant in diction, as will be the Minutes which report them to this House. Lastly, I do submit to the right hon. Gentleman that in his speech to-day in what he said about Mr. Corfield, that he gave hope and encouragement to every fanatic and every revolutionary from Zanzibar to Aden, and from Aden right away to Calcutta, because in the censure on Mr. Corfield, a dead man, they will see the weakening of one of the vital forces of the Empire whose end it is their desire to compass.

8.0 P.M.

We have listened in this Debate to speeches made by the right hon. Gentleman and others, and I certainly think we must come to the conclusion that the record of our recent administration in Somaliland is one of the most disastrous chapters of failure in the whole of our Colonial history. Twenty-five years ago we made ourselves responsible for this Protectorate. We concluded certain definite treaties with the chieftains of the country; treaties which no doubt involved responsibilities which were perhaps heavier than we realised at the time. Military operations had to be carried on for a considerable period of years with varying success in that extremely difficult country. The result of all of it was that great progress was made in the pacification of the country, very largely owing to the splendid administrative work which was carried out by Captain Cordeaux, who was Commissioner, and who withdrew, I think, when this Government came into power. The Colonial Secretary at that time paid a tribute of respect and admiration to the work of Mr. Cordeaux, but when it came to following the policy which that gentleman advised with all his experience, the predecessor of the right hon. Gentleman opposite and his friends decided to take exactly the opposite course, and embarked on the disastrous policy of evacuation. I think that was the beginning of the whole trouble. By that disastrous retreat to the coast, which was carried out under most discreditable circumstances, we broke our pledges to the natives; we deliberately sacrificed the accumulated results of those military operations which took place at the expenditure of £3,000,000 or £4,000,000 of public money, and, what was more serious than all, we inflicted a most damaging blow upon British prestige in that part of Africa. The political result of that policy was, as was pointed out by the hon. Member for Rugby, that, while still nominally responsible for the protection of those who lived as our loyal subjects in the interior, in reality our practical administration only extended to the towns lying along the sea coast. That is to say, as he put it we had granted Home Rule and the blessings of self-government to the interior of the country with exclusion of the towns along the coast line. Before leaving them, we assured those who composed the loyal population of Somaliland that they had nothing whatever to fear under the new system which was being set up We explained to them they were still under the protection of the Union Jack, and that British supremacy in the whole of that country would remain unrestricted and unimpaired. The Mullah became more satisfactory, I believe, in his action at that time, and did nothing to hinder our retreat, but rather to accelerate the evacuation of British troops. After that evacuation had been completed, the Mullah began to harass those who were our allies in the country. That part of the country came completely under his control, and although the Government were anxious to prevent that action, the condition of the country became so bad that we were unable to do so. That was the time the constabulary were established. They were established as a small force to operate in the interior of the country. No doubt it was a very necessary step to take. We have heard a lot about the duties of that force. The duties of that force, I admit, were for the policing of the country and the settling of disputes and quarrels between the tribes in the interior. They were not, we understand, to be used in. operations against the Mullah, I suppose some arrangements having been come to with the Mullah that he was not to interfere with their operations.

The instructions given at that time to the Camel Corps were, as pointed out many times during this Debate, really impossible to carry out. I would like to point out to the right hon. Gentleman that these orders to which so much importance is attached now were issued in December, 1912, when the conditions were entirely different from those which prevail now, and when this disaster or reverse actually took place. The tenth order to which very much attention has been directed, if carried out by Mr. Corfield, would mean that immediately he came into contact, or imagined he was coming into contact, he should at once march some eighty or ninety miles from inland to the coast, which, according to the instructions issued in December, 1912, it would have been perfectly impossible to carry out. As was pointed out, the right hon. Gentleman's attitude towards the conduct of the constabulary, so long as his plan was successful, was one of admiration. In the remarks he made on 21st January last year, he emphasised the success which the Corps had obtained, and he enumerated the losses they inflicted upon the enemy, and he got, I remember quite well, in this House, a deal of credit from the fact that his plan and policy had been successful. Contrast that with the attitude adopted by the right hon. Gentleman after the engagement of 1913. In the previous period the Camel Corps had been moving all about the country. In December, 1912, we have it in the Blue Book, that they were carrying on operations at a place called Mandera, with the complete approval of the right hon. Gentleman. In January, 1913, the Camel Corps had its headquarters at Burao, as shown from the Report of 6th March, and I think it is rather remarkable in view of that information which was conveyed to the right hon. Gentleman in March as to the position of the headquarters of the Camel Corps that he should have then thought it necessary after the disaster took place to dispatch a telegram inquiring why the force was in that district, because he had the information months before why that force had been in that district, and, as a matter of fact, I think since the 17th of January of that year. Why did he then immediately after the disaster send off that telegram inquiring why the force was in that particular district? Having done that, I do not think it can be a surprise that a certain number of people regarded that as the first step in the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman. to shift responsibility from his shoulders on to the shoulders of somebody else.

Later on, on the 5th of September, the right hon. Gentleman authorised that unfortunate dispatch which has been quoted with the reference to the late Mr. Corfield. I agree, and nothing the right hon. Gentleman has told us this afternoon has altered my opinion, that he adopted a most ungenerous line in defence of his own policy. Here was an officer placed in a position of the greatest difficulty, far away in the interior of Somaliland, who, to the best of his ability, and with undaunted courage, was trying to the best of his ability to restore the prestige of our country and to give some courage to the disheartened and despairing population. So far as he failed there has been an attempt to magnify his failure, but in the disaster there was, of course, no discredit to him or those other gallant men who laid down their lives in that distant corner of the Empire. Such discredit as there is must be laid at the door of the right hon. Gentleman himself, who was not unwilling to share in the honours and success of his policy, but proceeds, as I think, with ungenerous haste, to shift the responsibility of failure upon the military man of the day.

One question I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman is this: Is he sure of his facts in the account he gave us as to the age of the Mullah and his description of the man as decrepit and immovable from dropsy, and so on? My information is that he is a man about fifty years of age, just the age when Mohamed commenced his real fighting career. I should like the right hon. Gentleman to verify that statement as to the age and the fighting capacity of the Mullah.

I shall certainly verify his age. As to his immobility, I think there is no doubt.

The right hon. Gentleman has given us a small idea of what his policy is to be in Somaliland. As to his past policy, of course we challenge that entirely. We challenge the policy of withdrawal as a most mistaken one, and we challenge the policy of the instructions as to the conduct of the Camel Corps as a mistaken one. The right hon. Gentleman proposes to raise the Camel Corps to 500. With that I entirely agree. I only say in addition that we ought to have another 500 local Infantry raised there. He said he was going to raise the Indian Regulars from 200 to 400. These Regulars are absolutely useless as a protection against raids on camel and sheep. They cannot move rapidly about the country for want of water, provisions and transport.

They are only useful for garrisoning forts. The policy outlined is right, but it will require the absolute co-operation of the tribes, and without that co-operation I think the policy must fail. We must have a proper tribal organisation. The Tribal Intelligence Department has failed. We want good men to organise the tribes and to get them to act together. We ought to support the tribes with local levies raised in the country. I entirely agree with what has been said about poor Corfield, and I say this: That I have every hope that long after the right hon. Gen-

tleman and his dispatch regarding Corfield has been forgotten, the monument raised to the memory of Corfield at Berbera will remain as an encouragement to British officers in future that those who give their lives for their country will not be forgotten by their countrymen at home.

There is one other point: Corfield is dead; Dunn is alive. He has been awarded a police medal. By all means give a police medal to every man who fought through that engagement, but to give a police medal only to the man who brought the men out is not sufficient, and although he may not be qualified for the D.S.O. I ask the right hon. Gentleman to recommend him for some other decoration if he can possibly do so. Dunn's conduct throughout is deserving of the very highest praise. He brought the men out in great difficulties, and he showed great courage himself. Dunn and the Camel Corps came victorious off the field, and I think he ought to be recommended for something more than he has got. I am delighted to think that Burao is going to be reoccupied.

rose in his place, and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put."

Question put, "That the Question be now put."

The Committee divided: Ayes, 294; Noes, 169.

Question put accordingly, "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £35.258, be granted for the said Service.

The Committee divided: Ayes, 170; Noes, 295.

claimed "That the Original Question be now put."

It being after a quarter past Eight of the clock, further proceeding was postponed without Question put, pursuant to Standing Order No. 4.

GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND BILL.

I beg to move, That this House considers that it is imperative, in the interests of public peace, that the Prime Minister should without delay submit to the House his proposals for the alteration of the Government of Ireland Bill. This is a matter which has excited, and will excite, very considerable feeling. Personally, I shall endeavour to state my case as moderately as I can, but my moderation will not, I trust, be taken as an indication that I do not feel exceedingly strongly. The Government of Ireland Bill proposes to place Ireland, now in a position of absolute equality in the United Kingdom, in a position of inferiority; to-put her in a subordinate position—at any rate, on paper—and to ask a proud people to accept this position and bring about thereby lasting contentment and peace. I would rather give absolute independence to Ireland—keeping control of her foreign policy—than accept this Bill, which is to place her in a position she cannot, and will not, accept, except as a jumping-off ground to ask for more and for further concessions. To my mind there is no more ridiculous proposition than that because a majority, real or supposed, in Ireland asks for Home Rule, therefore Home Rule should be granted. To break up our Constitution—the Constitution of these islands—there must be a majority, not in one particular place, but in the United Kingdom and Ireland. We did not as a nation undertake the various conquests of Ireland to lay down our government at the demand of a relatively small and disloyal faction, and in, addition to pay them, as this Bill proposes to pay them, to undertake the government themselves. We have put our hands to the plough, and we have no intention of turning back. We are in Ireland, and Ireland is equally a part of us with Scotland and with Wales—we are in Ireland for the good of Ireland. We propose to remain there, and to keep her in the Union.

Perhaps it was not a model of courteous action on the part of the leader of a great party, or what was once a great party with a great Parliamentary record, to say to the leader of the strongest party in this House, "Wait and see." But at that time no particular harm was done. Now, delay is very dangerous, and the patience of many strong men is being strained to the breaking point. It is when we consider this Bill that every man, every honest man, is affrighted. When we turn to the period when this Government came into power, and remember what was said by the then Chief Secretary for Ireland—that Ireland never was so peaceful, never so prosperous, never so free from crime—and when we look at her now, after this Government have tried their hands for eight years, we see the proof of the old saying, that it is the weak people of this world, and not the strong, who do the harm. Has the Government the courage to face the position of its own making today? This Government represents what was once a great party—a party whose boast it was that it was of the people and for the people. Will the Government now, even at the eleventh hour, set up the old principles of Liberalism which it is violating and tramping upon. The Premier has attempted to prove that he has a mandate for Home Rule by quoting speeches and extracts from the election addresses of our leaders, rather than from those of the leaders of his own party.

What an argument! What a travesty of argument! It is useful only to show the exceedingly tight place into which this old Parliamentary hand has been driven. If the Premier thinks he has a mandate for Home Rule, he cannot say, and no one can pretend that he has a mandate for this preposterous Bill which he has forced through the House, and which he seeks to force on the country by methods akin to the methods of barbarism—the methods of a barbarous State like Costa Rica. And if he has a mandate for this Bill, which I personally look upon as a very gross injustice to Ireland, still less has he a mandate to coerce any part of Ireland—to coerce Ulster, to force her out of the Parliament she has chosen, and out of the United Kingdom, of which she is so great an ornament—to seek to force her, at the point of the bayonet, into a Parliament which she despises and repudiates; and that after a long and bitter experience of the men she would have to work with, men whose protestations of friendship she distrusts, whose very acquaintance she declines, and whose proposals, if they are proposals of the disloyal, she, and not she alone, will fight against, and will win that light. It is imperative that the Premier should tell us at the earliest possible opportunity—and that, is now—his new suggestions, proposals, or alterations, whatever he may wish to call them. It seems to me we are in the position, as a kingdom, of children playing with matches in a powder magazine. We are courting a hideous disaster the magnitude of which no man can measure and no man can gauge. The right hon. Gentleman who sits on our Front Bench delivered a marvellous speech the other day beside which almost all the other speeches I have listened to in this House became ineffective and commonplace. He impressed this House and this country with his earnestness, his conviction, his eloquence, and, above all, with his restraint. The right hon. Gentleman has now, and has had for some time the most difficult task of restraining the natural indignation and the passions of a brave, intelligent, loyal, and God-fearing people. Fortunately for us that people has absolute confidence and trust in him, but, even so, there is a point beyond which even human affection, human trust and human patience cannot safely be tried, and no attempt has been made on the Benches opposite or in the country to assist him. On the contrary, no single opportunity for insult has been allowed to pass—insult to him as leader of the cause, insult to the men, to their arms, to their drill, to their preparations to defend the right, and to their determination to remain in the United Kingdom and in this Parliament. If ever Ulster despairs of British justice a conflagration will ensue such as will devastate all Ireland, and possibly not Ireland alone. It will cause untold misery and ruin; it will put the clock of civilisation back fifty years at the least, and it will involve a reconquest of Ireland. It may possibly be true that the Union was carried by bribery—

The bribery of a few debased creatures who sold their principles for peerages, but will history relate that this break-up of the Union was not attempted by sheer unabashed and naked bribery—the bribery of a great party, or what was once a great party, by the bribery of office and all that that means and entails, of which we have heard a good deal recently. The sands, I say, are running out, and running out very fast. The time at the Premier's disposal is very short. His personal responsibility is very great. If the betrayed Ulstermen come to Downing Street they will not come bearing gifts, and they will not leave without accomplishing the object of their visit. [HON. MEMBEBS: "What is it?"] It appears to me, as a humble Member, that there are three ways only of ending this trouble. The first is to drop the Bill, the second is the exclusion of Ulster, and the third is an appeal to the country. No other plan has any chance of success. For myself there are only two plans, the first and the last, for I, for one, could not and will not be a party to the exclusion of Ulster. That, to my mind, would involve the betrayal of the rest of loyal Ireland. I am pledged against Home Rule in any shape or form. How could I even assist in giving Home Rule to the three provinces of Ireland where the Protestants and loyalists are less able to help themselves and to make themselves feared and respected? Ulster is the only province which can, and which, with God's help, will look after herself and look after her people. This could not be peace. Burke speaks of a "regicide's peace." This would be a suicide peace, and I would rather see war—yes, what Mulvaney asked for—"bloody war, north, east, south, and west," as such a war must be—than a disgraceful peace.

There remains an appeal to the country. Why not, if you Liberals are sincere and honest? You must have a General Election within the year. If you have it now, on this great question, you will regain at least some of the respect you have lost, some of the respect which was once the possession of your party, and you will avoid what I believe will be an appalling catastrophe. You can avoid this catastrophe by a step which you should be only too glad, too ready, and too proud to take—that is, if any of your protestations as to believing in the voice of the people are anything but a base deception of the people. On the other hand, you possibly let go of office, of salary, of patronage, and the rest, for eight or ten months sooner than you wish. I wish I could pledge the party to which I belong to indemnify you if you so wish. It would be worth the cost. If not, you must pass your Bill, a Bill you admit to be imperfect, and admit should be altered and amended. You must pass it through this House, and must seek to force it on Ulster and coerce her—you, the Liberal party—if she declines to accept, your base-born law. How do you propose to do this? You know that if you attempt it the loyalists of Ulster will have the whole force and strength of the Unionists of this country behind them. You know it, because our leader has warned you in so many words. I should like to hear him assure the Services that if in your blindness you seek to employ those Services to coerce the Protestants and the loyalists, and to fire on their own folk and their own flag—I should like to hear him assure them that those who decline to obey such impossible, unjust, and disloyal orders shall, so soon as we regain power, be indemnified by us, be reinstated in their positions and their pensions, and receive the loyal thanks of the Parliament of this country. There are hundreds, I should say thousands, of officers and men who will have to consider, on the one hand, their pay and their pensions, and, on the other, their position in a fighting force. That consideration should be made easy for them, and their positions, their pay, and their pensions should be guaranteed by us. [HON. MEMBERS: "Bribery!"] If you will not appeal to the people, then go your way. Go it headlong down your particular steep place. I know no word will stop you. I know that no counsel will restrain you, and that fear alone will not have any effect upon you. Go your way, and get your reward. You shall get it, and you shall find it in the words of your Foreign Secretary—the reward of disaster, death, and damnation.

9.0 P.M.

The governing point of the whole Motion centres on the word delay. That is the point to which I wish to draw the attention of the House, the danger of the long protracted delay that has attended on this particular question. I believe myself that a physician administering to the necessities of a patient will find that in one thing one particular remedy is good, but if we observe the physician for every case and for every disease always administering the same one remedy, we lose faith in him as a physician and we wonder whether he is a legitimate practitioner or no. But the trouble has been, in my opinion, through these long drawn-out years that we have had one remedy applied, not once or twice, but continuously right through, no matter what the disease of the body politic has been—the remedy of "Wait and see." I do not think that the pupils of Do-the-Boys Hall ever had with greater regularity and persistency the brimstone and treacle treatment than we have had the wait and see treatment, and I think it is well worth while, even at this late hour, that delays should cease, and that we should get to know something about the remedy for what we all believe to be the very serious condition of the body politic, especially in relation to Ireland. We are labouring under trouble that arises very largely in consequence of the Parliament Act. The Parliament Act itself is wait and see in excelsis. We must parry our minds back to the genesis of this. In 1906 Ireland was prosperous and growing in contentment, and the same state of affairs lasted until 1910, and it was only after the Budget Election of 1910, when the life of the Government was hanging on a thread, when we were waiting, and the Budget was hung up from day to day and week to week before arrangements were made by which men who did not like the Budget, men who if left to themselves would probably have voted against the Budget, but who, for certain very well understood and, from their point of view, quite legitimate reasons, sacrificed what they thought to be the lesser to secure the greater, and ever since that arrangement, by which the Government retains its political life, we have been waiting and seeing, and waiting to see a state of affairs to arrive that the United Kingdom has not known for many, many generations past.

Ireland itself is in a very different state to-day from its state when the Government found it and took it over from their predecessors. We hear sometimes words of peace, words which are intended to smooth out and make the way easier; but even so recently as within the last week or two we have been reading, not certainly, I am quite sure, by the will of the Member for the City, of espionage in Waterford, where men who attend the services of a church for the purpose of prayer are watched and their names published in the local paper to bring damage to their material interests as tradesmen and citizens of that place. If we read the speeches which were antecedent to the election in Cork, we should find that only second to the dislike of Ulster is the dislike of Cork for the prospect of being placed under what they call the Molly Maguires. The Society of Hibernians presents as great a terror to the people of Cork, perhaps, as to the people of Belfast; but, at any rate, the condition of Ireland is such that there are armed men in Ulster, men ostensibly drilling for certain purposes. The Government is trifling almost with that movement, prohibiting the importation of arms but doing nothing much besides, for there is no strong man about the place to guide and direct. A strong man, even if his policy is entirely repugnant, commands a certain respect. What respect have the people of Ireland to-day for their Government? When all this long-drawn-out story, which is a torture to many of our fellow subjects, has been running, and they have witnessed what they have thought to be the huckstering of their rights, of their liberties, and of their very birthright, how can we be surprised if the condition of affairs is very unhappy, and that we may well look for some considered proposal which shall put an end to this unhappy state of affairs. When this story began we could not see the effect; it was to remote. Through the Sessions of Parliament, the Bill that was discussed may have seemed to be remote. The Debates themselves lacked reality and actuality; they seemed to be almost sham Debates. They almost seemed to be in another world. But it was the business of statesmen to forsee whereunto this would grow, and the time is ripening now when hard facts have to be faced, and when we have a very difficult, a very serious, and what may be a very disastrous position to deal with; so I think we are doing nothing but our duty in asking that the Prime Minister, without any further delay whatever, having acquiesced in the common consent of all that this Bill, as we now have it, should be altered, at any rate in some respects, whether it be by what are called concessions or guarantees, or exclusion, or anything else, whatever the remedy is, do let us know what it is. Let us put an end to this state of affairs which is doing the country harm, and which is disastrous to many of our best citizens.

It was the fashion a while ago for hon. Gentlemen on the other side to regard the people of Ulster as ignorant people who only needed to be told what was good for them, and it was thought that as soon as they understood it they would welcome it. That day has gone. Then we had the time when they were content to describe it as "bluff." It was said that Ulster was bluffing, and that we need not take much notice. It was all bluff, and things would right themselves. That time has gone. Now, perhaps, we are told that there are a lot of fanatics in Ulster—a kind of mad men who would rush to death without rhyme or reason. That stage will also pass, and it will be found that these are sane men, basing themselves upon an intelligent appreciation of hard facts, fortified by all the best qualities of generations of free men. If it so be that the Prime Minister to-night can tell us that he will attempt to win Ulster, and will tell us what his proposals are, a great sigh of relief will go up. But if he is not going to do that, men will know what they have to face, and they will prepare themselves accordingly, and the task will not be done in a hurry. If the Government are going to win Ulster, let us know how they are going to win her. Surely they have a plan. Surely they are not bluffing. They should have a plan, a well-considered scheme, matured during the weeks, the months, and the years that have gone by since their life was hanging on a thread. I wish that we may have it to-night. If we do not have it soon, I think I may continue the metaphor in a stronger form and say that, instead of hanging on a thread, their life will be hanging on a rope. That will be the result. If they would only ask what the electors would value their political lives at, the answer might be, "The value of a rope." It is because they thoroughly appreciate that fact that the remedy we suggest is disregarded—the remedy of going to the people who have a right to say what shall be done in this scheme, and asking them at a General Election what they really want done. If that was done, and if the electors say, "Take Ulster," then we have got to set about taking it. If the electors are willing and wishful that Ulster should be won, let us set about winning Ulster. Rut if the electors say, "We are tired of this prolonged torture of the people of Ulster, and desire to see a termination of this state of affairs," make way, and let us have men strong in will who will strive to heal and to bind and not yield.

I am very glad that the fortunes of the ballot have been favourable to this Motion, as I think its discussion, brief as that dis- cussion must necessarily be, may perhaps lead to the dispersion of some clouds and mists which seem at the present moment to obscure the political atmosphere. A fortnight ago, on the first night of the Session, I indicated in plain language what was and what would be the attitude of the Government in response to the grave appeal to men of all parties which was contained in the Speech from the Throne. I do not think that either the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down or the Mover addressed one single word of his speech to the Motion before the House, and they are not singular in this respect. They have strangely misconceived the attitude of the Government—I mean the attitude of the Government and the party the Government represents. They seem to think that we here are to be likened to a beleaguered garrison, driven under stress of warfare into an untenable position——[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—Yes, the right hon. Gentleman opposite thinks so—with failing supplies, with exhausted ammunition, and with shaken nerves, and that it is for them, the minority of this House, to dictate the terms of capitulation, or to determine whether we are to be allowed to surrender with or without the honours of war. That is a singular inversion, or rather perversion, of the actual situation. What are the real facts? The Government of Ireland Bill has been carried through this House in two successive Sessions with undiminished majorities. We believe in the measure, amended, as we think it has been, in the process of Parliamentary discussion.

My appeal was not addressed to the right hon. Gentleman. It was addressed to the right hon. Gentleman who is sitting beside him. I only asked him to restrain himself.

The right hon. Gentleman is singularly unfortunate, for my right hon. Friend had made a remark. I had made none. Perhaps the Prime Minister will say in what respect he desires me to accept his advice?

If I was mistaken, I apologise to the right hon. Gentle- man. I was going to say we still consider, and we have not changed our opinion in the very least degree, that the Government of Ireland Bill is a sound and a statesmanlike measure—[An HON. MEMBER: "It is dead."]—which at the same time satisfies a national demand and provides ample securities for the rights and liberties of minorities. It is not only a misconception, but it is a deliberate misrepresentation of the language which I used on the first night of the Session, to say that any suggestions which we may put forward in the direction of peace are an admission on our part that the Bill as it stands is bad or unjust; nor is there any indication, so far as I can see, that it is so regarded by public opinion outside.

When the Parliament Act was under discussion I argued frequently that the delay of two years and three Sessions, which it interposes between the first approval of a Bill by the House of Commons and its final passage into law, would be found an absolute security not only against precipitate legislation, but against legislation in regard to which opinion outside, as developed by time and by discussion, showed itself hostile to the original decision of the House of Commons. No fair-minded observer can say that that has been the case with reference to this Bill. [An HON. MEMBER: "Masterman."] I am going to give my reasons for saying that. I pointed out on the first night of the Session that the by-elections during the Recess, though, as the right hon. Gentleman pointed out, they involved on balance a loss to the Government of two seats, showed an increase instead of a decrease in the aggregate of votes for the Home Rule candidates. Since then, during the last week, we have had three more election contests. In the one case, and the only case, in which there was what I may call a fair-and-square contest between a Liberal candidate and a Tory candidate, the Unionist majority was substantially reduced. In the two other cases where there were three-cornered contests, the Liberal and Labour candidate—[An HON. MEMBER: "All Home Rulers."]—I quite agree that while the Labour candidates on many points were quite as hostile to the Government as their Tory opponents, they were united and indeed strong in their support of Home Rule—but the Liberal candidate and the Labour candidate polled in each of these constituencies a considerable majority of the total electorate. I say that it is idle in face of these facts to contend that there is any indications of a set of British electoral opinion in a direction adverse to Home Rule. Incidentally, I may add that these elections show that in the General Election which is so constantly demanded by the party opposite, Home Rule, however much they might like to make it the chief issue—and I am not disputing their desire to do so—would not be the decisive or even dominant factor.

The truth is, and it is perfectly true, that the average British elector in regard to this matter is neither excited nor anxious. He has made up his mind that Home Rule has got to come. [HON. MEMBERS: "NO!"] He believes with a reasonable amount of give and take the obstacles that stand in its way may be surmounted, and meantime, he is much more interested in the future conduct of his own domestic policy. I see, therefore, neither from the Parliamentary nor from the electoral point of view, any reason on our part to supplicate for a truce, and still less to hoist the white flag of surrender.

If, then, His Majesty's Government take on themselves, as they have done, the responsibility of initiating proposals which may lead to a peaceful settlement, it is not because we feel in any sense driven to abandon the proposals which we have put forward, and which this House has passed through twice, and still less is it because we are disposed to concede to the menace of physical force what we would not concede to policy. I have never said—and the right hon. and learned Gentleman (Sir E. Carson), who has been present at all these Debates, I am sure will not contradict what I am going to say—I have never from the very first moment that the Bill came before this House, said a word disparaging either the intensity or the sincerity of the feeling in Ulster.

I never have, for the very good reason that I have never had any such feeling of disparagement. I have never said it, and I do not say it now. I have a clear conscience on this matter. You may search my speeches in vain to find one word or phrase which, I will not say is insulting, but which is not respectful and sympathetic to the people of Ulster.

What was the use of proposing specific concessions—call those concessions by whatever term you like to use—when we are told, as we were told over and over again in the plainest possible terms, that no concession of any sort or kind, not even the total and permanent exclusion of Ulster, would in the least degree mitigate the hostility of opponents to Home Rule? I am not misrepresenting what took place, The facts are recorded in the journals and annals of the House. What, then, is the alteration in the position now? It is this. So at least it seems to us who sit on these benches, and who have the primary responsibility. After all that has been said and written, both on one side and upon the other, during the months of the autumn and the winter, we have been led not to doubt the wisdom or justice of the proposals that were laid before Parliament, and we have been led to entertain the hope that it may be found possible to avoid the double risk of civil disappointment and turmoil on one side and national disappointment arid despair on the other by some concerted and agreed attempt at a specific settlement. That is the whole length, and breadth, and depth of the change. I said on the first night of the Session that we wanted peace, not—though that, I agree, is most important—to avert anything in the nature of forcible resistence, but that we might secure for any new departure made in Irish government such an atmosphere and such conditions as would give it from the first a real, and a fruitful, and a lasting chance.

With that end in view, and solely with that end in view, as I said then and repeat now, as the price of peace so understood, the Government are prepared to make suggestions which, as they hope, without a sacrifice of principles either upon one side or upon the other, may open the road to an agreed settlement. This Motion demands that we should produce our suggestion without delay. If by delay is meant anything in the nature of deliberate procrastination, nothing is or can be further from our intentions. We have no interest of any sort or kind in what are called dilatory tactics; but, on the other hand, we do think it to be of the highest importance that our proposals should be put forward under such conditions that from the first they can be fully and clearly explained, and by this House promptly and adequately discussed. Those conditions, as everyone acquainted with the law and practice of Parliament is aware, cannot be satisfied at this stage of the Session until the necessary financial business that has to be done before the 31st March has been got through. That has to be done. We do not desire, and we do not contemplate, and never have contemplated, any further delay. The Irish Bill can then, before the Easter Recess, be again presented for Second Reading, and that appears to us to be the proper occasion for the presentation of our suggestions, and for their consideration by this House. I am well aware—no one knows it better—that such a situation makes exceptional, even though they be inevitable, demands upon the patience of the House, upon the patience of our supporters quite as much as upon the patience of our opponents—upon the patience of those who view, who are naturally inclined to view, with dislike and suspicion anything that even looks like a momentary lowering of the flag, as well as of those, I am afraid—there are some on the benches, I see, opposite—who suspect the sincerity of our intentions, or, at any rate, demand that they should be brought to an immediate test.

To those hon. Friends who sit behind us here, I say, if any such assurance is needed—I do not think it is needed—that we are not going at the eleventh hour to betray a great cause. To those who sit opposite, and who do not entertain either of the views to which I have referred, I say that we cannot allow ourselves to be brow-beaten or buffeted into a course which in our judgment will not promote, but will embarrass the purpose which men of all parties ought at such a moment to keep in view. Was it that purpose? I have explained it already—the purpose which I say that men of all parties ought at such a moment to keep in view. That purpose is, in my judgment, to base Irish self-government if it can be done, upon a foundation of consent and good will. For my part I have not said I hope, and I will not willingly say a word that would make that task more difficult to pursue or more impossible to achieve.

In substance, the speech to which we have just listened is exactly the speech which I expected. It shows that the right hon. Gentleman is pursuing a policy which has made his Administrations famous. He is still drifting. Every now and then he shows an inclination to take hold of the rudder of the ship for the navigation of which he is responsible, but whenever he feels the wind of hostile criticism whistling about his head, the habit which has become second nature asserts itself—he drops the rudder, and allows the ship to drift at the will of wind or tide. In substance, the speech is what I expected, but in form it is different. The right hon. Gentleman showed by referring to it that he had read the Speech from the Throne, but if we had judged by what I may call the utterly trivial nature of the speech which he delivered to us now, one would have thought that he had never seen it. Just think of what the argument of the right hon. Gentleman was. He tells us that the three by-elections give no indication of hostility to Home Rule. What is the argument? It is this: "The country is quite evidently hostile to us, but it loves our policy." If the right hon. Gentleman really wished to know what was the real effect of those elections he had only to be present in this House when the Members took their seats and to watch the hangdog looks of that small number of his supporters who had the courage to show themselves. Why even take his own arguments. He says the country is apathetic, and does he really say that he has the right to force through a Bill which will be resisted by force when all he has behind him is the apathy of the electorate. I do think the occasion deserves to be more seriously treated than it was treated by the Prime Minister.

The object of the Motion which we are now considering is to convince, if we can, the House and the country that the policy of drift has become dangerous, and may be disastrous. Let the House consider what the position is. For two years the population of Protestant Ulster has been engaged night and day in drilling, in arming, in organising themselves for the avowed purpose of resisting the action of the Government. Such a state of things cannot continue without creating a feeling of excitement which is all the stronger because it is restrained. In such circumstances, everybody knows some accident entirely unforeseen might produce an explosion the effect of which no one could see the end. Only the other day, as an illustration of the danger, I was informed and I am told it has appeared in the Press, a number of policemen visited one of the volunteer camps in Ulster, and asked to see their arms. They came, fortunately, in numbers so small that they were politely told to go and mind their own business, and they went, but if they had come in force sufficient to suggest that they had meant to enforce their demand, then undoubtedly a collision would have taken place then, of which no one could foresee what would be the end. But the danger is fully recognised by the Government themselves. In the autumn, in at least one speech, and, I think, in two, the Foreign Secretary alluded to the danger. He spoke of fanatical outbursts, and of the danger of an outbreak of disorder, and he said, "We shall, of course, put it down." That suggested something which is not pleasant to think of. It showed that the Government had that contingency clearly in their minds, and it showed, I fear, that they had got into such a condition that they looked to that as a possible method of escape, and that they thought it possible that the people of Ulster might put themselves in the wrong, and that then they might put them down without alienating the sympathy of the people. If there is such a view in the minds of the Government, or of any Member of the Government, anything more abominable it is impossible to imagine.

At all events, they will admit that the danger is real. Evidence reaches me every day, and I am sure it comes with even greater certainty to the Government, that in the rest of Ireland a feeling of unrest is growing up, and which is becoming daily more serious. An indication of it was given to me to-day by an hon. Friend of the action of constituents of the hon. Gentleman who leads the Nationalist party. There was to be a service of prayer of peace. Anywhere, except in Ireland, one would have thought that was harmless, but by those constituents of the hon. Member it was regarded as an offence, and steps were taken to mark those who were there, and to indicate them. But it is not only so in Ireland. In my belief, and I intend to dwell on this because I do not think I did so before, the position in Great Britain is scarcely less serious than it is in Ireland. [Laughter.] I shall give my reasons, and perhaps when I have done so, the hon. Gentlemen who laugh will change their minds. For the first time for more than two hundred and fifty years, one of the great political parties in this country has solemnly declared that it will assist Ulster in resisting by force what the Government mean to do. [HON. MEMBERS: "Shame."] The party which has given that declaration—I am going to speak quite frankly about it—the party which has made that declaration is, as it happens, the largest party in this House, and when you are teaching us to divide the United Kingdom into nationalities it is well to remember that that party has a majority of more than thirty of the representatives of England, the nationality which comprises three-fourths of the population, and raises more than three-fourths of the revenue of the United Kingdom. Whatever hon. Gentlemen opposite may think, I consider that that is serious.

We have heard a great deal about the incitement to lawlessness what that means. I admit every word of it. It has been in no degree exaggerated. On the contrary, in my belief, whatever happens now, however favourable the event may be, the fact that the Government have been arrested in their course by the knowledge that they will be resisted by force has struck a blow at constitutional government which will leave its effect for many a long year to come. I say that right hon. Gentlemen on that bench do not differ from me as to the seriousness of the situation; they do differ as to the responsibility. That is the sole question: on whom does the responsibility rest? That is a question which, if they get the chance, will be decided by the people of this country now; and if you succeed in preventing a reference to the people, and the calamities which we dread come in consequence, on the answer to that question the verdict of history will depend. I am not afraid of that verdict. Never have political parties in this country faced each other on an issue clearer or more serious. Your contention is that you have authority for what you propose to do. You claim that you are a constitutional Government, carrying out your functions in a legitimate way, and that you have a right to demand the obedience of all loyal subjects. That is your opinion. We take a different view. In the words of the late Lord Salisbury:— The title, both of Kings and of Parliaments, to the obedience of their subjects is that Kings and Parliaments should observe the fundamental understanding of the compact by which they rule. We hold that by attempting to drive a great community out of the Union, after you have deprived them—and deprived them by methods of which you ought to be ashamed—of the right of appeal to their countrymen, you have broken that compact, you are exceeding the powers which have been entrusted to you by the nation, and all loyal subjects are in duty bound, not to obey, but to resist. That is a plain issue. Which of us is right? You have, at all events, not shown by your action that you are very confident that you are in the right. Do you suppose that any Government of sane men would have allowed this organisation in Ulster to grow up year after year if they thought they had the right to put it down? And in the Debate on the first two days of the Session nothing seemed to me more utterly amazing than the reception which was given to the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Dublin University (Sir E. Carson) by the two Members of the Government who spoke after him. They became almost lyrical in praise of that speech. That showed, I admit, some generosity of mind. But it shows something else. What was the nature of that speech? It was a clear declaration, in the plainest language, that if you go on he will raise the standard of resistance against you. If you are right, then, instead of falling on his neck and gushing over him, you should have held him up to reprobation as one of the worst of criminals. [Laughter.] You may laugh, but surely that is true. What greater crime can any man commit than to risk the lives of others in a rebellion which you say is unjustified. You yourselves, I think, are not very confident of the justice of your cause. Conscience has made cowards of you.

That is the position in Great Britain. It is all very well for the right hon. Gentleman to use smooth words about the desire of peace. If words would have helped us, we have had plenty of them. The Government have shown that words have no effect upon them. They have taught us, by the treatment which they have given to Ulster, that arguments based on reason and justice are directed to deaf ears. For two years the people of Ulster have urged their claims upon them, in season and out of season. The Government have turned a deaf ear to them, and treated them with contempt. The justice of their cause is not greater to-day than it was when the Members for Ulster wrote a letter to the Prime Minister pointing out what the effect of his policy would be. He put it, I suppose, in the waste-paper basket. He is listening now; but why? Not because of the justice of the claims of Ulster, but because of the way by which he knows those claims will be enforced. They have taught us a lesson. For us to represent the Unionism of Great Britain, what is the best hope of peace? It is not by reciprocating words which mean nothing; it is by convincing the Government that we are in earnest as they are convinced now that Ulster is in earnest. When they realise that—I have not an exalted opinion of them, but they are not fools, and they know that without the express sanction of the people they cannot force through a policy which is actively opposed by more than half the nation. So long, therefore, as they are drifting; so long as we do not know what they mean to do, the clear duty of the whole of the Unionist party in this House and out of it is to use any means, so long as we think they will be effective, to make it impossible for them to commit what we believe to be a great crime.

10.0 P.M

In conditions such as I have described—I do not think the conditions are exaggerated—if the Prime Minister has any proposals to make which will bring peace, or which he even thinks will bring peace, is it not a folly and a crime to delay the production of them? What is the ground given for the delay? It was given again to-night. In a crisis like this the financial business must be done first! It is quite true, and I recognise it, that the right hon. Gentleman must have the right to explain his proposals as well as to produce them. Why not? But are the rules of this House so rigid, and is the common sense of the Members of this House so lacking, that for a purpose like this we could not give him the time to enable him to make his explanation? Every section of this House—I, for the Opposition, say it—we shall facilitate your financial business and give you every opportunity of taking up and making your statement to us. But you do not need to depend upon us. What a farce it is! [An HON. MEMBER: "What about obstruction yesterday?"] Yes, but he did not promise his proposal then. What a farce it is. The right hon. Gentleman has closured financial business before; why could he not closure it again? That reason is not meant for a reason. It is an excuse, and the fact that he could make such an excuse is proof, I am afraid, that there is not much sincerity in his professions. To make it is an insult to the intelligence of the House. On the first day of the Session, to which he has referred so often, the Prime Minister told us that it would be inexcusable to delay for the sake of gaining time, or in the hope that something would turn up. He told us that. And at the very same time one of his colleagues, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, told us that that was precisely what the Government was doing! [An HON. MEMBER: "NO."] I beg your pardon, he did. He said the six weeks delay was necessary because now we were met together something might happen which would bring about a settlement. That is precisely what the right hon. Gentleman has himself been doing for months. Not that he wished to do it. He cannot, I suppose, help himself. He knows perfectly well that he can secure peace at any moment without any regard to the Opposition by taking one of two courses. If he has proposals to make which, though they may not satisfy Ulster, and would convince the people of this country that Ulster is in the wrong, then all that is necessary is to table those proposals and, at the same time, promise that they will not be enforced till he has received the sanction of the people of this country. Why not? If he is afraid of a General Election for any reason, for the sake of his Parliament Act, or anything else, let him submit the whole, question by itself directly to the electors, and we shall abide by the result. That is a course so simple, and I should have thought so inevitable, that it is difficult to understand why the right hon. Gentleman does not adopt it. Does he really maintain that he is right in the face of this opposition to force through a Home Rule Bill unless he is sure that the people of this country are behind him? If he is sure, why not put it to the test and end all their trouble? If he does not do so, it is for one reason, and one reason only: that is, because he knows that the verdict of the country would be against him. But he can secure peace in another way, and in that way also may be independent of the Opposition. He can secure it by excluding that part of Ireland which is determined to offer resistance. It would not satisfy him, but he is not in the fighting line. Every-' one knows that it is Ulster that threatens armed resistance. If you satisfy Ulster armed resistance will stop. With that question the right hon. Gentleman has been playing for four months at least. More than four months ago, at Ladybank, he made a speech which was carefully worded, as I believed then and believe now, to suggest the exclusion of Ulster. One of his colleagues, the right hon. Gentleman who sits beside him (Mr. Churchill), who we were told by the Press, had just left him, made a speech definitely suggesting that solution, and it was never contradicted by the Prime Minister. He came up to the fence, looked as if he were going to jump it, and shied! We had the speech at Leeds, like the speech to-night; going back again completely to the position of docility to the Nationalist leader. On the first night of the Session the same thing happened. He came up to the fence once more. On this occasion I think everyone in the House thought he would jump. I did, for one. He shied again. A Minister cannot play fast and loose with a great question like this. In that Debate both the Prime Minister and the Irish Secretary clearly showed that so far as the Government are concerned they are prepared to exclude Ulster. They showed it.

The Prime Minister said he would do anything for the sake of peace which was not against the fundamental principles of the Bill, and he admitted that exclusion was not against. The Chief Secretary did the same thing. He pointed to us and said: "You talk of exclusion. Well, that means the inclusion of three-quarters of Ireland." It is quite evident they were willing to take that course for the sake of peace. After that, after such declarations, for the Government to make any other proposal to Ulster, any proposal of Home Rule within Home Rule, whatever the condition, if it be accompanied by suggesting that it is to be carried without the express sanction of the people, such a declaration would be regarded by Ulster, and ought to be regarded by Ulster, simply as a declaration for war. Now, what does it mean? It means simply this—that the people of Ulster in that case would say, and say with truth, "This great injustice is inflicted upon us, not by a majority of our fellow countrymen, not even by the British Government—it is to be inflicted upon us at the dictation of the masters of the British Government." We know the difficulties of the right hon. Gentleman quite well—almost as well as he knows them himself. It is not merely that these hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway have over him the power of life and death—I think now, in the bog in which he finds himself, he would be glad to find any honourable means of escape— it is not that, but another consideration, and one which does the Government greater credit. For eight years these hon. Gentlemen have loyally supported him. For four years they have kept the Government in office, not only by constant attendance, which has saved them on many a Division, but by the sacrifice of what they believe to be the interests of Ireland. They have paid their price; they expect, and with some reason, their reward. This, then, is the message of peace which the right hon. Gentleman sends to Ulster: We have incurred a debt of honour, and you, the people of Ulster, are the price by which alone we can redeem that debt. That is the position, and everyone in the House knows it is the position. Does not the right hon. Gentleman realise even yet that though the Nationalist vote may save this Government from defeat, it cannot save the country from disaster, nor can it save him from dishonour. He holds in his hands alone the issue of peace or war. Surely the time for trifling has gone. If he means war, if he agrees with his supporters who put down these Amendments, as his speech seemed to indicate, but he changed—if he means war, then the sooner we and the country know it the better. If, on the other hand, as I believe, he still hopes for peace, why this blowing hot and cold? Why this constant halting between two opinions? Why cannot he say what he means? In my belief, whether I am right or wrong, this country to-day, not from any intentional weakness on the part of the Government, but from weakness which will not face the actual facts, is in face of a graver danger than that with which we were threatened when Lord Chatham, in connection with the American war, used the words with which I shall now close:— I wish, my Lords, not to lose a day in this urgent, pressing crisis. One hour now lost in allaying the ferment in America may produce years of calamity. I will knock at the door of this sleeping and confounded Ministry, and will rouse them to a sense of their impending danger. Chatham knocked in vain—I hope the result will be different now.

I listened to the-speech of the Prime Minister, as I always do, with profound respect, and with every allowance. I do wish, if being an Irishman, it is possible for me, to avoid entering into the arena of party controversy, which I daresay quite naturally figured so largely in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition. My colleagues and myself have the mis- fortune, for the moment at all events, to be more or less in conflict with the party machine of every party in this House. That is no reason, perhaps quite the contrary, why by and by we should not bring the bulk of sensible, non-official Members of all parties into agreement with us. The course, unpopular as it has been, and as I dare say still is that we have taken, and the essential principle we have held out for in the last ten years is that Ireland has no quarrel with either of the British Parties. Both of them, in their time, have done splendid work for Ireland, and our whole aim, humbly, has been to endeavour to combine them both in endeavouring to complete the work which will bring honour and glory to both of them, and which is not proper in the sphere of party warfare. I do not wish to criticise harshly the Prime Minister for pleading to-night for more time—I do not wish at all to criticise his proposals "with one vital reservation. We are ready to support the Government in any concession, and the more generous and far-reaching the concessions the more willing we are to support them.

I want to avoid expressing, except as mildly as I can, our disappointment that these proposals have been delayed so long, and if negotiations there were to be at all, perhaps the worst way has been taken of bringing them to a happy issue. If I do not to-night lay more emphasis upon that part of the obstruction to a settlement by consent, which unquestionably has come from powerful parts of the Opposition in this House, it is because the Government now recognise that what we respectfully pressed upon them again and again in this House for the last two years, that this Bill as it stands does not contain any substantial attraction, and that it is the duty of the Government to take the initiative. They have taken in a certain sense the initiative as to these negotiations. I have said already that I am afraid they have done so in a way that is least calculated to make these negotiations successful. I do not blame the Prime Minister personally. I believe intensely his declaration of to-night that he does not intend to betray the national policy. I believe throughout these transactions the right hon. Gentleman has had as great liberty of action as he has broad-mindedness. Our view of this situation not only now but all along, for the past ten years, is the view which, if I may presume respectfully to say so, was ex- pressed in more exalted language in the recent historic speech from the Throne. In that speech His Majesty said:— "In a matter in which the hopes and the fears of so many of My subjects are keenly concerned, and which unless handled now with foresight, judgment, and in the spirit of mutual concession, threatens grave future difficulties, it is My most earnest wish that the good will and co-operation of men of all parties and creeds may heal dissension and tag the foundations of a lasting settlement." I am afraid that not very much has been done by party men on either side of this House or the other House to give practical effect to that solemn adjuration. What was wanted was not words but deeds, and we have had nothing but words. The first practical step towards coining in the direction indicated in the King's Speech, was taken six months ago by Lord Lore-burn, one of the most respected of Liberal Ministers, and one of the best tried Home Rulers. We believe that that proposal of Lord Loreburn six months ago for a peace conference ought to have been frankly closed with by his own colleagues in the Ministry. We believe that they ought to-have immediately summoned a peace conference, and an unconditional peace conference, and they ought to have gone into that conference with their minds made up for large and generous concessions. And then, if the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Trinity College and the Ulster party had proved to be hopelessly intractable, then they ought to have published their own terms to the world, and they ought manfully to have appealed to the people for their verdict upon those terms either by way of a Referendum or a General Election. If they had taken that course they would have prevented any interference with the progress of their other measures under the Parliament Act. And if their appeal had been successful six months ago, I believe the chances would have been at least ten to one that it would have been successful now. I notice that the hon. Member for East Mayo (Mr. Dillon) is absolutely confident still that it will be successful. He stated, in York I think it was, on Saturday night, that he was absolutely confident that if a General Election were fought to-morrow, and could be fought on Home Rule, it would sweep the country. I should think that is a very convincing argument for an immediate Referendum, which, if I understood the speech of the Leader of the Opposition just now, the Opposition would not attempt to obstruct.

If the appeal, either by a Referendum or through a General Election, had been successful, the Government would have accomplished two results of supreme importance. In the first place, they would have detached the English Unionist party from any policy of civil war in Ulster, and we know that is the beginning and the ending of civil war, and they would have furnished themselves with the authority which I am sorry I must agree with the Leader of the Opposition they do not possess of the people of this country to gently but firmly enforce the law against all comers, whether the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University (Sir E. Carson) or anyone else. Nothing of the kind has been done. I dare say there is not much use in crying over spilt milk, but there is some use in trying to prevent that which remains from being spilt. I am quite aware that the Government were not entirely their own masters. No, none of us are in this perverse world, not even the hon. Gentleman whom their leaders follow. But we cannot forget—it would be idle to forget—what the course of events has been. The moment Lord Loreburn's proposal was published "we had declarations from the leaders of the party which sits behind me that "Conference; there must be none," except upon the condition that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University should throw up the sponge beforehand, and should enter the conference as a Home Ruler. Next the official organ of the hon. and learned Member for Waterford (Mr. John Redmond) in Dublin, the "Freeman's Journal," boasted that his party and certain elements of the Radical party had succeeded in giving the coup de grace to Lord Loreburn's proposal of an unconditional peace conference; and, finally, we had the order, "Full steam ahead into the harbour."

If I understand rightly, that unfortunate condition has now been withdrawn, and the Government have consented to make an offer without imposing any preliminary condition whatever on the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Trinity College. But they have taken the course rather late, and in a way that is open to two criticisms. In the first place, six invaluable months have been lost; six months during which preparations for armed rebellion in Ulster have been going on unmolested and with every possible encouragement. In the second place, instead of having, what Lord Loreburn suggested, a friendly gathering of a dozen responsible representative men around the council table—the best of all ways of softening asperities and getting at the best side of men—we have nothing in the way of conferences. We have only had certain assignations with the Leader of the Opposition, the fact being that neither the Prime Minister nor the Leader of the Opposition is an Irishman, and neither has any first-hand knowledge of Ireland at all.

We are told that the whole question is, some weeks hence, to be thrown into conflict for a general party battle in this House, and I am afraid it is not too much to say that the worst side, and not the best side, of everybody is likely to be shown. This is one of those emergencies in which, in the words of a great Englishman, the truest wisdom and the highest expediency is to tell the truth and shame the devil. I dare say the harm is now done, but I would humbly press on the Government that, whatever proposals they may be contemplating—and I am one of those who have been cast into the outer darkness—I do not complain in the least of that, for I am not entitled to any personal consideration from the Government, or any other party in this House—I would earnestly beg of the Government to bear in mind that the more sweeping and the more lavish the concessions they make, both for the purpose of satisfying the reasonable fears of Protestants in Ireland and of federalising their Bill, the better it will be for Ireland and for their chances of carrying the measure through. We have never criticised without being prepared with counter-suggestions of our own. Even if I were permitted to do so, however, I would not enter to-night on our own peace proposals. We have laid them before this House on more than one occasion, and I will merely say that I have an unshaken belief that if the concessions we have suggested, or any tantamount to them, were offered with all the authority of the Government, they would carry all before them, if not in this House, at any rate in the country, and would convince all sensible people that this Bill, if so amended, would, instead of doing wrong to the Protestants of Ireland, prove the biggest blessing that could be conferred on them. We have no bigoted fondness for any suggestion of our own. We are ready for any concessions that would make the Protestant minority in Ireland an invulnerable power; that would make them the governing power, because, after all, the Northern and the Southern minority might easily become the majority. At all events, I say it here deliberately, that I know of no body of Irish Nationalists that could succeed in defeating such concessions, if they would purchase the goodwill of our Protestant fellow-countrymen.

There is only one point more upon which I wish to say a word, and I commend it above all other things to the Prime Minister and the deliberations of the Cabinet, if their deliberations are not yet completed. I think there is less necessity for dwelling upon it to-night than there would undoubtedly have been eight or ten days ago. I lament that we have not heard some reassuring words from the Prime Minister upon the subject. If we are to have Ireland a nation, I implore him do not stultify yourself and us by giving us three-fourths of a nation, and lopping off its right hand. Do not, for the sake of keeping this Bill alive, destroy the only reason for its existence. Do not begin the rending asunder of the country again as it was rent asunder 200 years ago. Do not begin by shutting up two Belfasts—which are really the secret of the whole of this trouble—shutting them up in the same narrow compound, shutting them up, as it were, in the same sack, and forcing them to fly at one another's throats, and to revive the old animosities and passions. On the contrary, I ask the Prime Minister to take the risk of it, to make the two Belfasts feel the healing influence of the generous and inspiring atmosphere of common interests and common patriotism which, believe me, is every year more and more permeating the country. It is quite intelligible to me that certain Gentlemen above the Gangway should coquette with this notion of the exclusion of Ulster, with the knowledge that it is the one concession they will not get. I say respectfully that I can conceive no other motive why any one body of men, English or Irish, Protestant or Catholic, Munstermen or Ulstermen, could entertain a proposal which, so far from leading to the peace or the unification of Ireland, would for generations produce results as evil as if you were to attempt the confiscation of Ulster.

It would be equally hateful to all Irishmen, Catholic and Protestant. The whole thing is so absolutely insane as a peace of statesmanship, that I really apologise to the House for dwelling upon it, although unquestionably certain more than doubtful utterances emitted during the Debate on the King's Speech, both from the front Treasury Bench, and those behind them, make it absolutely necessary that we should make our position perfectly plain. At all events, I for one will not shirk the duty of declaring as plainly and clearly as words can do it that, tragic beyond words as would be any shipwreck of the present unparalleled opportunity for a genuine and permanent reconciliation between these countries, if we were forced to choose between the loss of this Bill and consenting to the exclusion of Ulster or any part of Ulster, under any disguise or makeshift whatever, hard and bitter though the choice would be, Irishmen of my way of thinking will prefer to go out into the wilderness again and even if it cannot be in our lifetime, to hand down to other men in other times, if it must be so, the duty of vindicating a cause which, believe me, will haunt you as long as your Empire remains an Empire.

Mr. HOLT rose—

I understand my hon. Friend is going to move an Amendment. I have to submit that I have given you to-day an Amendment which takes priority of the one on the Paper in the hon. Member's name.

I hope I may ask the indulgence of the House to address a few words to-day as a perfectly ordinary common-place Englishman, to endeavour to put before the House what I believe to be the views of ordinary Liberal supporters of the Government. I and my hon. Friends sitting around me listened with the greatest indignation to the speech made by the leader of the Opposition. I do not think it would have been possible to make a much more discreditable speech. If the position is anything like as serious as he told us in his judgment it was, no person of his acuteness could possibly have made the speech he did unless he had deliberately intended to shut the door to all friendly negotiations and had deliberately intended and desired the catastrophe of civil war. That speech was based throughout on two themes, that the whole Front Bench and the whole of the hon. Gentlemen who support them were, first of all, cowards, and, secondly, dishonest. If that is really the opinion of hon. Members opposite, if they believe that we are cowardly and dishonest, of course, accommodation is quite impossible. It is quite impossible that any set of men with the least bit of spirit could be induced to come into agreement on the basis that they must be cowards and must be dishonest. We, after all, have, I believe as much courage as hon. Members opposite, and we are as sincere. We are not going to doubt their sincerity, but we must ask them respectfully to give us credit for an equal amount of sincerity. I placed an Amendment upon the Paper, and my reason for doing so was that it is very doubtful whether hon. Members sitting on the Back Benches will have an opportunity of making their voices heard, and we wish to express, by the means open to us, on broad lines our opinion on this crisis. We have supported the Government of Ireland Bill because it is the actual expression of the policy of self-government for Ireland, which most of us have supported for very nearly thirty years, and most of us believe it to be for the advantage of Ireland, for the advantage of Great Britain, and for the advantage of the whole Empire. That is our honest and sincere conviction, and if hon. Gentlemen wish to get any further in the government of this country, they must give us credit for this honest conviction. They are perfectly entitled to say that we are utterly wrong and mistaken, but nothing can be done if they insist that we are dishonest. We have as much sincerity as anybody on the benches opposite. That being so, we attach the greatest possible importance to the passage of that Bill into law. We emphasise in our Amendment—which I am not going to move—the necessity for the Government of Ireland Bill. We are not indisposed in this House to accept alterations in the Bill which may make it more acceptable to the people of Ulster, but on the main principles of the measure we are united, and we should be untrue to ourselves, and to every political opinion we have expressed in the past, if we hesitated to pass it into law.

I come now to the second point to which reference is made in the Resolution before the House—the peace of Ireland. I am not unfriendly to the people of Ulster. I admit that I know very little about Ireland. I have scarcely ever been there, but I happen to have very considerable commercial relations with the town of Belfast. One of the most prominent Unionists in Belfast, who is against this Bill, is a personal friend of my own, and I no more doubt his sincerity than I doubt my own. I give the Protestants of Ulster as much credit for honesty as I claim for myself. I am entitled to doubt their judgment and wisdom, just as they are entitled to doubt mine. Let us look at this question and see what is really the danger to the peace of Ireland. It appears to consist in this, that a number, probably a very large number, of the citizens of Ulster have armed themselves with the encouragement of right hon. Gentlemen opposite, they have worked themselves up into a state of mad fury, and they may apparently, on the slightest provocation, such as being visited by a large number of policemen, commence murders and outrages, and attacks upon these policemen. That is what we have been told on the best authority is the state of mind of the inhabitants of Ulster. I should like to know what hon. Members opposite would have said if the leaders of a trade union during a strike had told us, "We are now in the same state of mind." What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.

If right hon. Gentlemen think it right to encourage their friends in Ulster to prepare for murderous assaults on policemen because they resent their appearance, how are we to blame people in a state of excitement, not less artificial, if they prepare for murders of policemen, if the visits of policemen happen to be inconvenient. That is the danger of civil war. That is the danger of Ulster at the present time. The danger is that persons shall be worked up for political purposes into a state of mind to commit murderous outrages. We are told that there is to be a civil war. I think that if the hon. Member who moved this Resolution had had the advantage of hearing his leader's speech first, he might have included the whole United Kingdom in his threat, because, as I understand it, is contemplated that the civil war shall break out in England, too. Then the right hon. Gentleman went further than civil war. He told us that he would stop at no means which he thought likely to be efficient. Any means! Would murdering the Prime Minister be part of it? [An HON. MEMBER: "They would do that, too."] The right hon. Gentleman's words clearly cover that. I take it that he did really mean that. [HON. MEMBERS: "Propose your Amendment."] What about this threat of civil war? What is it all about?

There is nothing in this Bill which will do the slightest injury to any person. The most that can be said of this Bill is that it will set up a state of affairs under which it is possible that a majority in Ireland may oppress the minority. The minority could not be oppressed as an immediate result of the Bill. I submit to the House that to talk of civil war, the most appalling calamity which you can possibly conceive, to destroy your Empire, to have friend shooting friend and brother fighting against brother, to talk of that before any person has been injured, because a measure is going to be passed which may conceivably, contrary to the expectation and the belief of its promoters, do an injury, is most disgraceful and wicked. I am certain of one thing. Whatever may be said about mandates, hon. Gentlemen opposite have got no mandate for civil war. If they are going to fight an election the issue we will fight it on is whether hon. Gentlemen have a mandate for destroying the country or not. We are not going to give way to threats of violence. If we give way to one set of gentlemen why not to another? And why not to another then? It would be the destruction of civilisation in this country if we listened to threats of civil war. If that be the argument, then we had better face it at once. I do not believe myself, however sincere we think them, that hon. Gentlemen will really raise the issue which they propose, or that if they do they will get any sort of support among the people of England. We are going to proceed with this policy; we are going to pass the Bill into Jaw under the Parliament Act., The hon. Member who seconded the Resolution let the cat out of the bag, because he told us plainly that the whole trouble arose from the Parliament Act. We know that what it really all means is that hon. Gentlemen opposite wish to destroy the Parliament Act. They wish to put us back into the position from which we have rescued ourselves, which was that a Liberal majority in this House had not the same power as a Conservative majority. The present position is one which we mean to maintain at whatever cost. If hon. Members wish to live under a peaceful constitution in this country they will have to recognise that we are honest, that we are not cowards and that we intend to have the same rights in the State as they have themselves.

I beg to move as an Amendment to leave out all after the word "That," and to insert instead thereof, the words, In view of the Prime Minister's stated intention of submitting suggestions for the better solution of the difficulties attending the passage of the Government of Ireland Bill, this House awaits with confidence such proposals, and trusts that they may lead to the peace and contentment of Ireland, and to the permanent settlement of the problem of the extension of national self-government. Unlike the hon. Gentleman who has just spoken, I move an Amendment. If this House has any respect for itself and this great country, I think it will admit that the Amendment I move is better than that standing on the Paper in the name of the hon. Member (Mr. Holt). Every Member of Parliament and every citizen of this country ought to have in view the special words of charity which were contained in the Gracious Speech from the Throne. The efforts of this House ought to be directed to the permanent settlement of this great question. I venture to say, echoing the words of the hon. Member for Cork (Mr. W. O'Brien), that the only possible settlement that can retain any element of permanency is one by consent. At the present moment there are two proud sections of the Irish people at serious variance with each other, and naturally neither party will admit defeat. The only way for statesmen to deal with the situation, therefore, is to act so that neither party may feel that their ideals are shattered, and to build up by wise diplomacy a national ideal in which both those great parties can act. I go further. I look upon this question not only as an Irish question alone, but as an Imperial question, and again I echo the words of the hon. Member for Cork when he said that the real solution of the question would be a federalising Bill in the interests of the United Kingdom and the Empire as a whole. I confess that with great regret I do take a different view from some of my colleagues on this side of the House, and I take a much more serious view of the state of affairs in the North of Ireland than some of my hon. Friends do. I really believe that at the present moment the leaders of the Ulster party are exercising a restraining influence on the inhabitants of the district. It is not for me at this present moment to argue or reason about the state of affairs that has arisen. It is sufficient for the House to know that what has been described in the Press, and otherwise, represents, according to my belief, the real facts. You are dealing to a large extent with a not very highly educated working class and agricultural population, to whom beliefs are a question of life and death. I think the House ought to put aside for a moment to a large extent all ideas as to the leaders themselves, and concentrate attention upon the people who are led by those leaders. It is for them that I am pleading at the

present moment, and I feel sure that the House will respect its dignity in every way if it passes the Amendment which I put before it.

I beg to second the Amendment.

Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

The House divided: Ayes, 238; Noes, 311.

Proposed words added.

Main Question, as amended, put—

"That, in view of the Prime Minister's stated intention of submitting suggestions for the better solution of the difficulties attending the passage of the Government of Ireland Bill, this House awaits with confidence such proposals, and trusts that they may lead to the peace and contentment of Ireland and to the permanent settlement of the problem of the extension of national self-government."

It being after Eleven of the clock, and objection being taken to further proceeding, the Debate stood Adjourned.

SUPPLY.

CIVIL SERVICES (SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES).

Postponed Proceeding resumed.

Motion made and Question proposed, "That the Resolution be reported."

It is impossible to hear what has been put from the Chair, Mr. Maclean, and the attendant has just shouted "Who goes home?"

The question is that I report the Resolution to which the House has already agreed.

And, it being after Eleven of the clock, and objection being taken to further Proceeding, the Chairman left the Chair to make his Report to the House.

Resolution to be reported To-morrow (Wednesday); Committee to sit again Tomorrow.

HOUSE OF COMMONS (KITCHEN AND REFRESHMENT ROOMS).

Ordered, That a Select Committee be appointed to control the arrangements for the Kitchen and Refreshment Rooms in the department of the Serjeant-at-Arms attending this House:

Ordered, That the Committee do consist of Seventeen Members:

Committee accordingly nominated of Mr. Agg-Gardner, Mr. Bentham, Mr. Fen-wick, Mr. Rupert Gwynne, Viscount Helmsley, Major Henderson, Sir Ivor Herbert, Mr. Howard, Colonel Lockwood, Sir John Lonsdale, Sir Henry Norman, Mr. Patrick O'Brien, Mr. William Redmond, Mr. Augustine Roche, Sir Harry Samuel, Mr. Albert Smith, and Mr. Watt.

Ordered, That the Committee have power to send for persons, papers, and records:

Ordered, That Three be the quorum.—[ Mr. Illingworth. ]

PUBLICATIONS AND DEBATES REPORTS.

Ordered, That a Select Committee be appointed to assist Mr. Speaker in the arrangements for the Official Report of Debates, and to inquiry into the expenditure on Stationery and Printing for this House and the public service generally.

Committee accordingly nominated of Mr. Charles Bathurst, Mr. Bowerman, Mr. Godfrey Collins, Major Guest, Mr. Godfrey Locker-Lampson, Mr. Macmaster, Mr. MacVeagh, Mr. Walter Rea, Mr. William Redmond, Sir George Toulmin, and Mr. Wheler.

Ordered, That the Committee have power to send for persons, papers, and records.

Ordered, that Three be the quorum.—[ Mr. Illingworth. ]

The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.

HOME RULE (SCOTLAND).

I am sorry to have to trouble the House at this hour, but, as usual, a question put to the Scottish Secretary today requires a little further elucidation. I put to him a question, and also some supplementary questions, which gave him every chance of making the position of the Government clear on a matter of very great importance to Scotland, but it was left as vague as possible. Last November the right hon. Gentleman made a speech at Edinburgh in which he announced a great Government pronouncement on Scottish Home Rule. He admitted, in answer to my question to-day, that he did give a pledge that the Government would draft a Bill for the better government of Scotland. He now says, of course, that he did not pledge himself that the Government would pass the Bill this Session. Does he propose now to take advantage of the Bill introduced by the hon. Member for Ross and Cromarty by co-operating with the hon. Member and allowing the people of Scotland to know what the Government's ideas are on Scottish Home Rule? I think this is an exceptional opportunity, and I cannot understand the right hon. Gentleman's reluctance, if he is genuine and sincere in his desire to advance Scottish Home Rule. I asked in a supplementary question to-day whether he would not co-operate with my hon. Friend the Member for Ross and Cromarty in this matter, and he replied, "I have no authority to give any pledge of that kind." Surely if the Secretary for Scotland is really anxious to put before the Scottish nation the views of the Government on Scottish Home Rule, he would get the authority of the Prime Minister to do so. He replies that he has not the authority, but let him get it, and co-operate in this matter with the Member for Ross and Cromarty. Some years ago I had the privilege of introducing a temperance measure for Scotland, and his Department was only too anxious to co-operate in the drafting of that measure, and they took it up in Committee in order that the people of Scotland might know what was at the back of the mind of the Government. Here is a similar opportunity for the Government. There ought to be a special inducement in this; the right hon. Gentleman is an honorary vice-president of the Scottish Home Rule Council. In describing this meeting at Edinburgh a well-known Scottish Home Ruler moved an amendment to the special resolution, asking that a definite statement of the Government's views on the question be placed before the Scottish people. That amendment was carried unanimously, as was the resolution, by that great meeting. Therefore that is a special reason why the right hon. Gentleman should give a definite statement on this matter. The right hon. Gentleman goes on to say that much more can be done to advance the cause of Scottish Home Rule by local organisation. That is a document for which he is responsible. He is one of the Vice-Presidents of the Association. If he does not agree with that resolution why does he not resign? Many people not far from his constituency would be only too delighted if he did resign, for if there is one constituency in Scotland where he cannot show his face it is that one. I have shown that if the right hon. Gentleman is sincere he ought to take the action I have suggested and let the Scottish people know the reason their votes are being asked for, and not let them sell their votes for a mess of pottage. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will clear up the situation and fall in with my suggestion that he should co-operate with the hon. Member for Ross and Cromarty in drafting that measure. I do not say that it can be passed this year, but at least he might co-operate with him in drafting it. Who knows that the Government will be in power next Session? Let him take advantage of it this Session.

I do not know what ground there is for my hon. Friend exciting himself. His statement about my constituency was unwarranted, but I do not propose to enter into those personal matters, He informs me that I am a vice-president of the council, and therefore responsible for the report. There are many experienced Members on the other side of the House, and I should like to appeal to the hon. Baronet (Sir G. Younger) if he holds himself responsible for every word of every society of which he is a subscriber, or supporter, or sympathiser? But the particular sentence which the hon. Member quoted is one with which I heartily agree. I have no fault to find with it, and I make myself thoroughly responsible for it. In fact, it is what I recommended when I made a speech on the subject in Edinburgh. It is what I think my hon. Friend would be well employed in carrying out instead of making attacks upon those who are sympathisers. I am not aware that there is any difference of opinion between my hon. Friend and myself. I should be very sorry to say I agree with all of my hon. Friend's opinions, because that would be a rash statement; but, as far as I have heard them expressed, I have no fault to find with them. I think he might have given me the credit of having performed the elementary duty of a Minister in a matter of this sort, and of having consulted with the Prime Minister on the subject. Of course, properly, the question should have been addressed to the Prime Minister. He it is who decides what business is to be taken, and not any of his colleagues. But I have answered the question because the hon. Member referred to a pledge given by me. He did not allege that the pledge had been broken. He did not allege for a moment that I gave any promise that the Government would introduce a Bill this Session. There are occasions where a private Bill, having a special preference in point of time, or having attained a certain stage in the proceedings of the House, may be taken up by a Government because it has that advantage, but there is no such advantage in the case of this Bill, and I am bound to say, on the authority of the Prime Minister, that the Government do not see their way to deal with it this Session.

I have no authority to make any statement upon the matter. Both my hon. Friends have had long experience of this House, and they both know perfectly well that questions as to the business of the House are questions for which the Prime Minister is responsible, and which should be addressed to him. Under these circumstances, I think I have answered the only material point in the speech of the hon. Member. I do not think it is at all necessary for me to enter into extraneous matters.

Will the right hon. Gentleman use his influence with the hon. Member for Ross and Cromarty (Mr. Macpherson) to save the time of the House by not bringing forward his Bill at all? We had a demonstration last year intended to show that the hon. Member for East Aberdeen (Mr. Cowan) and other hon. Members opposite were consistent in their support of Home Rule policy generally. Surely that is enough for the purpose. We had better wait until we see what is going to happen to the Home Rule Bill for Ireland before we trouble to debate a Bill on the subject of Home Rule for Scotland. It is absolutely unnecessary, and I do not think it is sincere, except on the part of the hon. Member and one or two others who are sincere Home Rulers. I am afraid it is a matter of expediency with the Secretary for Scotland. No doubt he quite properly thinks that if you pass a measure of Home Rule for Scotland you must in some way meet the views of the various other constituent parts of the United Kingdom. I do not know that he made any very strong declaration in Edinburgh. I do not remember that he gave any specific pledge that the Bill would be brought in, certainly in the present Session. I am glad that he is not going to give the advantage of his Department to the hon. Member for Ross and Cromarty, who proposes to bring in this Bill with about the same chance of success on a Friday as the hon. Member for Aberdeen enjoyed last year.

I am bound to say in regard to the remarks just made, I am in perfect sympathy. I do not, however, wish to associate myself with the personal remarks made in reference to the Secretary for Scotland, which I thought rather weakened the case put forward by my hon. Friend. Last year the Prime Minister gave a definite pledge that a Member of the Cabinet would go to Scotland and state the position of the Government on Scotch Home Rule. The right hon. Gentleman was selected as that Minister to convey the policy of the Government to the people of Scotland. At that great mass meeting he stated that the policy of Home Rule for Scotland was the policy of the Cabinet. Now we hear that there is no hope this Session, and he holds cut no hope for next Session.

I did not say anything of the kind. I said it was a question which must be addressed to the Prime Minister, and the hon. Gentleman knows that is the only reply I could have given.

I do not agree with the right hon. Gentleman. I still adhere to what I said, that the right hon. Gentleman in plain English language gives us no hope and no sympathy either. Is that true?

It is not true. I have no power to give the pledge, as the hon. Gentleman knows.

What I meant was that the right hon. Gentleman gives us no hope. He does not say, "I will do everything I can to bring the Bill on, and I will use all my persuasive powers and my position as Secretary of State for Scotland, and I will not dismiss the idea and hope that the Bill will come on." He does not give us one ray of hope, and I say it is straining the allegiance of Scottish Home Rulers a good deal when he conies down to a meeting and gives every hope that there is some expectation well grounded that the Government are going to do something with regard to this matter, and now nothing is going to be done in the present Parliament. It is far better to tell the people of Scotland we can hold out no hope whatever that we shall deal with the question this Parliament. That would be a much more satisfactory position.

I think note should be taken of the remarkable avowal by the hon. Baronet (Sir George Younger) that if the Irish Home Rule Bill is passed we shall then be compelled to go on to a Federal measure of the same kind for Scotland.

I never said anything of the kind. I only said that some hon. Members, including the Secretary for Scotland, thought it was a necessary part of that operation.

I apparently gave the hon. Baronet credit for more intelligence than he is willing to avow. It must be obvious to anyone that if we establish Home Rule in Ireland we shall be compelled afterwards to go on and bring the other organisations of the United Kingdom into line and establish a federal system there. I was one of those who heard the pledge given by the Secretary for Scotland at the meeting in Edinburgh, that the Government intended to draft a Bill to give Home Rule to Scotland. That was what we had a right to expect, and a pledge with which we were satisfied. I did not expect to get any further declaration of policy at the present time, indeed, it is not necessary, because this question does not now depend on any declaration of the Government, it depends upon the logic of events. If Home Rule is carried for Ireland, I am convinced there will be an agitation in this country that will be irresistible for the extension of Home Rule all round.

It being Half-past Eleven of the clock, MR. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at Half after Eleven o'clock.