House of Commons
Tuesday, March 17, 1914
Private Business
Private Bills [ Lords ] (Standing Orders not previously inquired into complied with),—Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in the case of the following Bill, originating in the Lords, and referred on the First Reading thereof, the Standing Orders not previously inquired into, which are applicable, have been complied with, namely:—
Wesleyan and General Assurance Society Bill [ Lords ].
Ordered, That the Bill be read a second time.
Private Bills [ Lords ] (Petition for additional Provision) (Standing Orders not complied with),—Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in the case of the Petition for additional Provision in the following Bill, originating in the Lords, the Standing Orders have not been complied with, namely:—
Hightown Gas and Electricity Bill [ Lords ].
Ordered, That the Report be referred to the Select Committee on Standing Orders.
Crystal Palace Bill,
As amended, considered, to be read the third time.
City of London (Various Powers) Bill (by Order),
Second Reading deferred till Tuesday next, at a quarter-past Eight of the clock.
Glasgow Corporation (Celluloid) Bill (by Order),
Second Reading deferred till Wednesday, 25th March, at a quarter-past Eight of the clock.
Land Drainage Provisional Order Bill,
Read a second time and committed.
Manchester Corporation Bill,
Copy presented of Report of the Attorney-General on the Bill [pursuant to Standing Order 175a]; referred to the Committee on the Bill.
Navy
Copy presented of Annual Accounts of the Royal Navy Torpedo Factory, Greenock, for the year 1912–13, together with the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General thereon [by Act]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 150.]
Annual Accounts presented for 1912–13 of Shipbuilding and Dockyard Transactions, etc.; with Report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General thereon [by Act]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 151.]
National Insurance Act
Copy presented of Provisional Special Order, dated 7th March, 1914, made by the National Health Insurance Joint Committee and the Irish Insurance Commissioners, acting jointly, entitled the National Health Insurance (Subsidiary Employments) (Ireland) Provisional Order, 1914 (No. 1) [by Act]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 152.]
National Debt Annuities
Account presented of the Gross Amount of all Bank Annuities and any Annuities for terms of years transferred, and of all Sums of Money paid to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, and the Gross Amount of Annuities for Lives and for terms of years, etc., granted within the year ended 5th January, 1914 [by Act]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 153.]
Tropical Diseases Research Fund
Copy presented of Report of the Advisory Committee for the Tropical Diseases Research Fund for the year 1913 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
Destructive Insects and Pests Acts, 1877 and 1907
Copies presented of Orders numbered D. I. P. 85–91, respectively, issued during March, 1914, declaring certain areas described in the Schedules thereto to be infected with Wart disease of potatoes and to be infected areas for the purpose of the Wart Disease of Potatoes (Infected Areas) Order of 1914 [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
Shops Act, 1912
Copies presented of Closing Orders made by the undermentioned Local Authorities, and confirmed by the Secretary of State for the Home Department:—
County of Durham (Urban District of Bishop Auckland);
Boroughs of Devonport, Maldon, and Leigh;
Urban Districts of Willesden, Rowley Regis, and Heath Town
[by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
Metropolitan Cattle Market
Account presented of Moneys received and paid by the Chamberlain of the City of London for the year 1913, also an Account of Extraordinary Works executed, other than General Repairs, for the same period [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
Trade Boards
Copy presented of Regulations, dated 16th March, 1914 made by the Board of Trade under Section 11 of The Trade Boards Act, 1909, with respect to the constitution and proceedings of the Trade Board for Machine-made Lace and Net Finishing, other than the finishing of the product of Plain Net machines but including the finishing of hair nets, veilings, and quillings, whether made on Plain Net or other machines [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
Board of Education
Copy presented of Regulations under which Grants in respect of the medical inspection and medical treatment of children attending Public Elementary Schools and the medical treatment and care of children attending certain special schools in England and Wales will be made by the Board of Education during the year ending 31st March, 1915 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
Congested Districts Board (Ireland)
Copy presented of Twenty-first Report of the Congested Districts Board for Ireland for the period 1st April, 1912, to the 31st March, 1913, with reference to subsequent transactions and with Accounts for the year ended 31st March, 1913 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
Emigration Statistics (Ireland)
Copy presented of Emigration Statistics of Ireland for the year 1913 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
Intermediate Education (Ireland)
Copy presented of Examiners' Rules [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
Copy presented of Rules and Schedule containing the Programme of Examinations for 1915 [by Act]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 154.]
Public Revenue (Interception)
Return ordered "of amounts of all Public Revenue derived from taxes levied by Parliament and from any other sources which are not paid into His Majesty's Exchequer for the years 1911–12, 1912–13. 1913–14 (estimated), with the totals in each case (in continuation of Parliamentary Paper, No. 11, of Session 1913)."—[ Mr. Lees Smith. ]
Oral Answers to Questions
Questions
Japan (Arrest of Mr. Pooley)
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can give the latest information with regard to Mr. Pooley, who is being subjected to examination by a secret court of inquiry in Japan; whether he is aware that Mr. Pooley was arrested without any charge being formulated against him and placed, in the depth of winter, in an unheated cell; that domiciliary visits were made at Mr. Pooley's house and the house of his private solicitor; and that his wife was summoned and hastily interrogated; and whether any remonstrance has been made by our Ambassador against such treatment of a British journalist?
According to the statement made in the Japanese Chamber by the Minister of Justice, Mr. Pooley was arrested on a charge of purchasing stolen goods and of blackmail. He was still in custody on 10th March and being examined (in secret) before a preliminary Civil Tribunal. It is stated that he has applied for bail but that his application has not been granted. He has made no complaint of any sort since his arrest to either His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo or to His Majesty's Consul-General in Yokohama, in whose consular district Tokyo lies. We have no information that Mr. Pooley is being otherwise than properly treated in prison and in the absence of any complaint from him or his counsel who, I understand, have liberty of access to him, His Majesty's Government have no reason for making any remonstrance to the Japanese Government. I may add that noticing that Mr. Pooley's room was stated to be unheated the Ambassador asked that inquiries might be made and this defect remedied.
India (French Possessions)
asked whether any readjustment or exchange of territory is being negotiated with France in respect of French possessions in India?
No negotiations are actually in progress, and to that extent the answer to the hon. Member's question is in the negative. On the other hand, we have verbally indicated a desire to discuss and find some means of adjusting with the French Government the difficulties that arise from the neighbourhood of the French colonies and of British possessions.
Messrs Vickers (Russian Contract)
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can give any information as to the part taken by Messrs. Vickers in the recent formation of the Russian Artillery Works Company, which is engaged in establishing works near Tzaritzin, on the Volga, for the production of artillery and artillery ammunition for the use of the Russian Government; whether Messrs. Vickers hold a large proportion of the shares of this company; whether they are under a contract to build and equip the works of the company and to co-operate for a period of fifteen years in the conduct of the business of the company; whether Messrs. Vickers have agreed to place their entire knowledge of the technics of the work and all patents, improvements, etc., in their possession at the disposal of the Russian company; and whether, in view of the fact that Messrs. Vickers are one of the five chief firms who contract with His Majesty's Government for the construction of armaments, the action they have taken in the formation of this Russian company has his sanction and consent?
The only information I have on this subject is from a Russian newspaper, which states that Messrs. Vickers, Maxim and Company are closely connected with the "Society of Artillery Factories" at Tzaritzin, who have concluded a contract with the Russian Government to supply armaments until the 1st of January, 1926.
Can the right hon. Gentleman tell me whether the other facts stated in the question are substantially correct?
No, Sir. I really know nothing whatever about the matter. I have had no communication at all on the subject. The hon. Member's question on the Paper and what has appeared in the Press is absolutely all I know.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether it is the policy of His Majesty's Government to encourage or discourage the action of contractors in arming other Powers?
On that general question I gave an answer last week, which completely answers the question the hon. Member has now put.
Will not the right hon. Gentleman inquire of Messrs. Vickers whether these facts are true?
I do not see what reason I have for making an inquiry, or on what ground I could inquire. The moment you begin to inquire about these matters you assume, in some sense, responsibility for them.
Does the right hon. Gentleman think this is really the best way of strengthening the defences of the Indian Empire?
We cannot undertake to supervise the operations of British firms applying for contracts abroad, unless there appears to be some special reason or ground for interfering which is brought to our notice.
Mexico
asked whether the Government of the French Republic, while placing the fullest confidence in the Cabinet of Washington has dispatched the French cruiser "Condé" to Vera Cruz in order to ensure the effectual protection of French nationals in Mexico; and whether His Majesty's Government, in the same circumstances, proposes to take similar steps for the protection of the lives and property of British subjects?
The French cruiser "Condé" was sent to Mexican waters last October. The British Fourth Cruiser Squadron has had its headquarters in Mexican waters for some time past, and Mexican ports are constantly being visited. For instance, a few day ago the "Hermione" was at Tampico and the "Essex" on the way to Vera Cruz from Galveston.
Have these ships instructions to protect the "lives nnd properties of British subjects?
The object of the ships being in these waters is that they should give, when it is necessary and so far as they can, protection to British lives and property.
Have they such instructions?
The instructions to the Admiral in command are to do what he can to give protection to British lives and property in emergency.
Lushai Hills (Conditions of Labour)
asked the Under-secretary of State for India whether any recent report has been received on the conditions of labour in the Lushai Hills; and, if not, whether he can state the probable date at which a report may be expected?
A report is expected before the end of this month.
Religious Endowments (India)
asked whether the Government of India proposes to legislate in view to terminating the loss by continued mismanagement and misappropriation of religious endowments?
The Government of India are at present investigating the subject.
Does the hon. Gentleman know how many years they have been investigating the matter?
Indian Army
asked what compensation it is proposed to pay to Cavalry officers of the Indian Army, who, though otherwise qualified, will be debarred from being appointed as commandants of their regiments by paragraph II. of the recent Indian Army Order, No. 690, which reduces the age limit for such appointments to forty-eight years?
I would refer the hon. Member to the answer given on the 17th February. The Secretary of State has ascertained from the Government of India that they are considering the representations of certain officers respecting the new rules, and will shortly address him on the subject.
Will my hon. Friend say what sort of compensation they are likely to get?
No, Sir. I must await the Report which we are expecting to receive.
When will my hon. Friend be able to tell us what the compensation is?
There shall be no delay when we have heard from the Government of India.
Is the question of compensation being considered?
Yes. I think it is being considered.
Cocaine Traffic (India)
asked the Under-Secretary of State for India whether his attention has been called to the growth of the cocaine traffic in India; whether he is aware that considerable quantities of the drug are imported from Germany; and whether negotiations will be opened with the German Government with a view to the prevention of the present illicit trade?
The Secretary of State is aware of the facts as stated. He is afraid that any international arrangements for the suppression of the illicit traffic in cocaine must await the ratification and coming into force of the Hague Opium Convention. His Majesty's Govern- ment are doing all they can to secure the general and early adoption of the Convention.
Has the Opium Convention yet been signed?
It has been signed, I think, but it has not yet been ratified. I believe we may hope it will be ratified at a very early date.
Will the hon. Gentleman bear in mind the amount of cocaine that is now going into China imported from Great Britain, and cut it off at the source, if possible?
I think legislation is actually being considered and framed with a view to carrying out the provisions of The Hague Opium Convention.
Consumption of Liquor (India)
asked which of the provinces contributed to the increased revenue of £453,800 from Excise shown in the revised Estimate for 1913–14; what the amount of such increase was in each of the provinces; what is the basis upon which the further estimated increase of £241,800 in 1914–15 is calculated; whether a substantial increase has, without a break, been annually shown in the Returns during the last twenty years; and whether the Government of India can hold out any hope that a reduction in the consumption of liquor will be secured in the near future?
The increase in 1913–14 occurred chiefly in Bengal and Madras. Until the text of the Financial Statement arrives I am unable to give the figures for each province or to state precisely the grounds on which the several provinces base their expectations of revenue in the coming year. I am aware of the increase of Excise revenue referred to, and with regard to the last part of the question, I would refer my hon. Friend to the speech of the Viceroy in Calcutta in December last as indicating the anticipation of the Government of India.
British Army
Camp Equipment (Cadets)
asked the Secretary of State for War whether he will in future include palliasses in the camp equipment provided by the War Office for the annual training of cadet units?
I would refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply given to the hon. Member for the Montgomery District Division on the 3rd July, 1912.
Does that mean that provision will be made for these palliasses or will not?
I would refer the hon. Member to the reply. It is a difficult question. We are anxious to help as much as we can, but I cannot go beyond the statement I then made.
ManœUvres
asked what part, if any, of the Forest of Dean will be included in the area of this year's Army manœuvres?
The manœuvre area includes the northern extremity of the forest— i.e., that portion which lies between Lea and the Roman Road.
asked whether the two Divisions of the Cavalry Brigade in Ireland which took part in the manœuvres last year could not muster more than 12,000 men; whether in some regiments the physical appearance of the men was unsatisfactory; whether battalions were brought out from 300 to 500 strong, and other arms to match; whether the manœuvres took place before the trooping season; and whether the effect of the trooping season is to deplete the ranks at Home of mature men and to increase the number of immature boys unfit for active service?
The number stated in the first part of the question is, approximately, correct, but the suggestion that the physical appearance of the men was unsatisfactory is not borne out by any reports rendered to the Army Council. These reports, on the contrary, testify to the soldierly bearing and good spirits of the troops in trying circumstances due to the inclemency of the weather. The condition of the troops stationed in Ireland does not differ materially from that of troops quartered elsewhere in the United Kingdom, and I must express my astonishment that the hon. and gallant Gentleman should seek, by means of suggestions such as are contained in this question, to disparage and belittle the British soldier, to whom he owes so much.
Has the right hon. Gentleman's attention been drawn to a report of the military correspondent of the "Times" on 20th September last?
I have stated the report which I have received from the military authorities. It is on those reports that I rely, and they testify unanimously to the excellent bearing and behaviour of the troops in Ireland.
38th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery
asked if the 38th Brigade of Royal Field Artillery, now stationed at Fermoy and Waterford and under orders to proceed to Kildare, is being trained as Mounted Infantry?
The brigade in question is being trained as Field Artillery. Some mounted work with rifles was done during individual training in order to vary the work and give out-of-door training during the winter.
Confidential Reports
asked whether an officer is entitled to see all the confidential reports in regard to his efficiency made by the officer commanding his battalion?
The regulations now prescribe that the annual confidential reports rendered by commanding officers on the officers under their command shall in all cases be communicated to the officers concerned.
Troops in Ireland
asked whether the number of batteries of Horse and Field Artillery, regiments of Cavalry, and battalions of Infantry of the Regular Army, stationed in Ireland, amount to twenty-four batteries of Artillery, three regiments of Cavalry, twenty battalions of Infantry, and, if so, whether they are distributed as detailed on pages 29 and 30 of the Monthly Army List, published for the current month; and whether any other units of Horse and Field Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry, in addition to the depots are now stationed in Ireland which are not shown in that Army List?
The pages of the current Monthly Army List to which the hon. and gallant Gentleman refers show correctly the units of Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry now stationed in Ireland.
Married Strength
asked the Secretary of State for War when he will be in a position to make definite proposals with regard to the increased permission to marry in the service and to the extension of privileges to the wives of soldiers, who are now regarded as married off the strength; and what the approximate cost of such proposals will amount to?
I am not at present able to add anything to what I stated in Debate on the 12th instant.
asked the Secretary of State for War whether, seeing that married officers are compelled to incur large personal expense when frequently changed from one station to another, owing to the Government allowance for the carriage of their baggage or household furniture being often limited to a few shillings, and always wholly in adequate to defray this necessary expenditure, he will take steps to ensure the repayment to such officers of their full out-of-pocket expenses if proved to be reasonable and inevitable, as in the case of Civil servants when moved from one locality to another in the execution of their public duties?
I am prepared to consider whether the existing scale is inadequate, but at the same time I would point out in this connection that a large sum has been placed on the Estimates of the coming year for the benefit of officers.
Special Reserve of Officers (Lieut. Foot)
asked why Lieutenant H. W. Foot was removed from the Special Reserve of Officers in September last; and why no reason was given to him for his removal?
Lieutenant Foot was removed for disregard of authority in re-publishing a pamphlet, after he had been censured in regard to it. The official letter calling for Lieutenant Foot's explanation stated clearly what was the offence.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the War Office gave him leave to publish the pamphlet, and that it would not have been published if he had not had leave?
No, the exact contrary is the case.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that Lieutenant Foot has got War Office leave to publish it?
No. I should be glad to remove the misapprehension. Lieutenant Foot applied for leave to publish the book, of which only a portion was submitted to the War Office. When the book was published it was found that it contained a very strong attack on the Admiralty, with which, of course, the War Office had nothing to do, of which they had seen nothing before. They therefore told this officer through the ordinary channels that this attack on the Admiralty was wrong, and the book should not be republished in that form. Nevertheless the officer, for reasons that I do not know, did republish the book and was therefore removed.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that Lieutenant Foot first asked the Admiralty about the book, and was told to apply to the War Office for leave to publish?
No, I can assure the hon. Member that he has got hold of the wrong end of the story. I shall be glad to send him the whole correspondence, which will show that the facts I have stated are accurate in every particular.
Royal Army Flying Corps
asked whether the aeroplane B E 204 had been repaired; and, if so, when?
The last repair to this machine was carried out in February of this year.
asked when was the aeroplane B E 204 built; and when was it last overhauled apart from the examination supposed to take place before each flight?
This machine was handed over to the Military Wing on 28th June, 1912. It was sent back to the Royal Aircraft Factory for complete overhaul on 26th July, 1913, and handed back to the Military Wing on the 19th September following.
How old was the machine?
I have given it when it was handed over to the Military Wing in the first instance as 28th June, 1912, but it was completely overhauled on 26th July, 1913. I understand there is some interest in this matter, and it might really be better if we dealt with the whole question on an early opportunity, when it can be raised in Debate and properly explained.
When will the right hon. Gentleman be in a position to give a full report to the House?
I am most anxious to make a statement on the subject on the first possible day. I understand such an occasion will arise on the Report of the Army Votes. In fact, I have had notice from the hon. Member (Mr. Joynson-Hicks) that he wishes to raise the question. I am anxious to have an opportunity of making a full statement on the subject.
Staff College (Additional Pay)
asked the Secretary of State for War if he will state the reason why officers of the Royal Horse Artillery, Royal Garrison Artillery, RoyaL Engineers, Foot Guards and Army Service Corps on joining the Staff College forfeit the whole of the additional pay drawn by other officers of those arms of the Service; and whether, seeing that it is not in the interests of the Service that those who are specially selected to undergo a two years' course of study in the higher branches of their profession, so as to be fitted for the higher staff appointments and commands, should at the same time suffer a substantial loss of income, he will take steps forthwith to alter this practice?
This additional pay has from the beginning been granted on condition that officers are doing the regimental duties for which it is granted. I take note of the hon. Gentleman's suggestion, but I cannot promise to alter the practice forthwith.
Does not this practice put a discount upon special ability and self improvement?
I would rather say the pay was given for doing duty, and when the duty was not being performed pay was not given.
Army Ordnance Department (Temporary Labour
asked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that an order has been posted in the Army Ordnance Department at Weedon to the effect that no temporary labour will be required after 31st March; is he aware that thirty men will be unemployed by this order, many of whom have removed their homes to Weedon under the impression that, as in the past, there would always be a percentage of temporary men attached to the establishment; is he aware that there is ample work and prospects of more, and that most of these men are ex-soldiers; and will he reconsider this order with a view to continuing these men in employment?
I am having inquiries made to find out if it is possible to avoid dismissing these men, and I will let the hon. Gentleman know when I have obtained further information.
Ex-Soldiers (Employment) (Railway Companies)
asked the Secretary of State for War whether he will obtain from the railway companies mentioned on pages 22 and 23 of the General Annual Report of the British Army the percentages of vacancies filled by ex-soldiers in each company, as is shown in the case of police forces in the same Report; and whether he will ask for separate figures for the Northern Counties (Ireland) branch of the Midland Railway?
The Committee presided over by Sir M. Nathan have applied to the railway companies for a large amount of information and statistics, and although, as I previously stated, the hon. and gallant Member's suggestion will be kept in mind, I do not think it would be reasonable now in addition to ask for further statistics in respect of back periods.
Is there not a large number of figures in the possession of the Committee in which such an important matter as the percentage of ex-service men employed is not included?
I shall be glad to send the hon. Member any figures which he wishes to have if he will let me know, but he will understand that the railway companies of this country are supplying a great mass of information, and it is a little hard on them to ask them to go into back periods in detail.
asked the Secretary of State for War whether he will ask the Great Southern and Western Railway of Ireland to explain its figures given on page 23 of the General Annual Report of the British Army, by which it would appear that, although the company gave employment to 497 and 639 ex-soldiers during the years ending 30th September, 1911 and 1912, respectively, it had only 318 and 427 ex-soldiers, respectively, in its service on those two dates?
I do not think that inquiry would add anything to what I stated, in reply to the hon. and gallant Member, on the 13th instant.
Questions
Income Tax (Appeals)
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer (1) the amount of legal costs incurred by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue in respect of Part I. of the Finance (1910–10) Act, 1910, and its amending Acts, up to the 31st December, 1913; and (2) the amount of money obtained by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue for costs and expenses from taxpayers who have been unsuccessful in their appeals against the Commissioners under Part I. of the Finance (1909–10) Act, 1910?
The total legal costs incurred by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue up to the date named amount to £10,739 7s. 5d., and the costs and expenses received by them in connection with appeals under Part I. of the Act amount to £1,360 4s. 1d.
Murder of Inspector Ghose (India)
asked whether the Secretary of State has noticed the acquittal in the High Court of Calcutta of the student Roy who was charged with the murder of Inspector Ghose; and whether the Government of India has under consideration the desirability of introducing some changes into the law relating to juries in British India?
The accused has been acquitted on the charges of the murders of Inspector Ghose and of a person in the crowd; but the jury were divided on the charges of abetting the murder of the Inspector and of committing culpable homicide not amounting to murder in the case of the other person, and on the latter counts the judge directed a new trial to take place. The question of altering the law does not seem to arise.
National Insurance Act
Domestic Servants
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that the provisions of the German national insurance scheme as they apply to domestic servants have already broken down; that the Prussian Government is about to insure such servants as a separate class on a basis which regards the real risk of illness and so reduces the cost of insurance, and acknowledges that the rates applicable to other employés do not apply to them as they do not live out and find themselves; and what steps the Government propose to take in the same direction, in view of the effect upon employers and employés of the provisions in this behalf of the National Insurance Act?
The National Insurance Acts provide fully for securing a choice between additional benefits and a reduction of contributions to members of approved societies which show a surplus on valuation through the superior health of their members or for any other cause.
Is it not the case as stated that the present scheme is unfair to domestic servants, and is not the German experience very much in point?
I do not think it is true to say that the present scheme is unfair to domestic servants.
Sickness Benefit
asked (1) whether the amount of the Government actuaries' estimate of the sum to be expended in sickness benefit by approved societies is in respect of women 2s. 2d. per quarter and in respect of men 3s. 3d. per quarter; and whether there is any margin beyond these amounts in the contributions; and (2) what is the Government actuaries' estimate of the cost of maternity benefit per annum per 100 male members and per 100 female members of approved societies; and whether, in addition to such estimate, there is any margin?
The figures referred to in the first question represent an approximate estimate of the cost of sickness benefit and maternity benefit and include the provision for additional cost represented by the margin in the original actuarial calculations. It should be understood that these are general average rates in arriving at which any abnormalities of age distribution and marriage status are disregarded, as also is the variation of claims with reference to the particular time of the year.
Does the hon. Gentleman say that there is no actual margin beyond that?
I said it included provision for additional cost.
Drug Fund
asked what are the names of the insurance committees in Lancashire which expect a deficiency in the drug fund, and which met at Blackburn on the 6th instant in order to consider the question of the payment of the panel chemists' accounts and to make representations to the Insurance Commissioners; and whether the representations they have made can be laid before the House?
My right hon. Friend understands that the conference decided that it would be premature to make any representations to the Commissioners on the subject of deficiencies until the provisions of the Regulations with regard to scrutiny and surcharging had been put into operation and it had been ascertained whether there was in fact any deficiency. No representations have been received by the Commissioners from the conference.
Can the hon. Gentleman say when it will be decided whether there is a deficiency or not?
The answer to that question will depend when the account between the committee and the chemists is made up.
When will that be?
I cannot say. That is a matter for the committee.
Reduction of Benefits
asked the hon. Member for St. George's-in-the-East, as representing the Insurance Commissioners, whether, in view of the fact that the regulations dealing with the reduction of benefits to insured persons through arrears were approved by the advisory committee so long ago as 20th January, and that particulars of the scheme have been discussed at public meetings and in the Press, this House may now be informed of the details of the matter?
Regulations made under Section 8 of the National Insurance Act, 1913, will be laid before the House in a few days.
Medical Cards
asked whether a Grant from public funds has been promised to certain insurance committees in order to meet their expenditure in connection with the recent issue of medical cards; and, if so, when particulars of the Grant will be laid before the House?
The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative. The second part does not therefore arise.
Residential Institutional Treatment
asked whether any insurance committees, in order to provide residential institutional treatment for the insured persons resident within their own areas, have contracted with persons or local authorities in other areas for the provision of such treatment; and, if so, how many committees have done this?
I am much afraid I can add nothing to the reply which I gave to a similar question by the hon. Member yesterday.
Unemployment Benefit
asked the hon. Member for St. George's-in-the-East whether his attention has been called to the hardship involved in unemployed workmen in rural districts, residing several miles from the local office, being required to sign the register three times a week if the distance be from three and under five miles, twice a week if over five miles and under eight miles, and once a week if the distance be over eight miles; and whether, considering that in many cases these requirements involve railway travelling necessitating an expenditure of as much or more than 2s. a week, he will call the attention of the Commissioners to the desirability of arranging for the registers being signed at local post offices, or for some other arrangements being made which shall obviate the hardship referred to?
My hon. Friend has asked me to reply to this question. The rules with regard to signature of the unemployed register in proof of unemployment under Part II. of the National Insurance Act are not quite accurately stated in the question. A workman residing between three and five miles from the nearest local office of the unemployment fund is required to sign on alternate days; and a workman residing between five and eight miles from the nearest local office is required to sign once a week only. In the case of men residing at a distance of more than eight miles no signature is required, and a certificate of unemployment is accepted in lieu of signature. These rules were framed after careful consideration of the rules of the principal trade unions in the insured trades, to which they conform substantially. If, however, my hon. Friend will give me particulars as to any cases in which they appear to him to cause hardship I will consider whether any modification is necessary.
Panel Doctors (Country Areas)
asked what steps the Insurance Commissioners propose to take to provide medical attendance by panel doctors in country places which are at present without resident medical practitioners and to which doctors from a distance object to come?
The arrangements for medical benefit provide that the doctors on the panel for any area are collectively responsible for the medical attendance of all insured persons in that area. If my hon. Friend has in mind the circumstances of any particular district, I shall be glad to make inquiries.
Questions
Medical Service, St. Kilda
asked the Secretary for Scotland what steps the Local Government Board are taking to meet the need for medical service on St. Kilda?
I am informed that the Highlands and Islands (Medical Service) Board have decided to send a fully qualified nurse to St. Kilda as a temporary and experimental measure. The nurse has now been engaged, and she will be sent to the island as soon as arrangements can be made for her to reside there.
Island of Lewis (Uig Cottars)
asked the Secretary for Scotland whether he is aware that nineteen landless cottars from the neighbourhood of Reaf, in the parish of Uig, in the island of Lewis, are having proceedings for interdict taken against them for having seized part of the farm of Reaf; whether it is the fact that these men have repeatedly petitioned the proprietor, the Congested District Board, and the Board of Agriculture for land without effect; whether the proprietor is willing to treat with the Government for the sale of the farm outright; and whether, in those circumstances, something can be done to avoid the law being put in force against these men?
The answers to the first and second parts of the question are in the affirmative. The rental of the farm of Reaf is below that limit which would enable the Board to take it compulsorily for small holdings. The answer to the last part of the question is in the negative.
May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether these men have been asking the Board of Agriculture to pay attention to that farm, and whether, in view of the fact that they are law-abiding citizens, he will see that particular attention is paid to the farm?
I may say that we have no right to do so. The Statute bars us from doing so.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether he received any communication regarding these particular circumstances a month ago, and if so, whether any reply was then made?
I really do not understand the question.
May I ask the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Hogge) why he has not taken any steps whatever to provide for this case in the Bill he has introduced?
On account of the unsatisfactory answer, I beg to give notice that I will raise this subject on the Adjournment to-night.
asked whether applications have been received for holdings on the farm of Ardeoil, in the parish of Uig, island of Lewis; what steps, if any, have been taken to inspect the farm; and whether it is the immediate intention of the Board of Agriculture to fulfil the promises they have made to the applicants?
The reply to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. Th farm was inspected and negotiations are in progress with the proprietor with a view to arranging for its subdivision.
Fishery Board, Scotland
asked what proportion of the Fishery Board have practical experience of sea fisheries; whether demands are being made by fishermen for the appointment of a greater number of practical men; and what steps it is proposed to take in the matter?
I am not very clear as to the meaning which my hon. Friend attaches to the words "practical experience of sea fisheries," but a majority of the members of the Fishery Board are closely acquainted with the working conditions of the fisheries. A resolution urging the appointment to the Board of a practical fisherman, when an opportunity occurred, was sent to me about a year ago, and will fall to be considered when the period for the reconstitution of the Board arrives.
Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether an ironmonger is still looking after the fisheries of Scotland?
County and Burgh Councils, Scotland
asked the Secretary for Scotland whether he proposes to introduce for Scotland a measure similar to the County and Borough Councils (Qualification) (No. 2) Bill, introduced by the President of the Local Government Board?
I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply which I gave last Thursday to a question on the same subject by the hon. Member for East Edinburgh?
Will the Bill be introduced early so that it will have a chance of passing this Session?
So far as I know, it is a non-controversial question.
Mental Deficiency, Scotland (Appoint ments)
asked the Secretary for Scotland whether all the appointments under the Mental Deficiency (Scotland) Act have now been made; whether any woman besides Dr. Kate Fraser has received a salaried appointment; and whether Dr. Kate Fraser's salary is fixed at the same figure as the salary or salaries paid to men for the same kind of duties under the Act?
On the assumption that my hon. Friend does not refer to clerical appointments, the answer to his question is as follows: All the appointments which it is in contemplation to make for the time being have now been filled. There have been only three new appointments, and Dr. Kate Fraser is the only woman, being one of the two new Deputy-Commissioners. Dr. Fraser's initial salary will be the same as that of the other Deputy-Commissioners, who will, however, ultimately attain a higher maximum.
Lochbroom, Ross-shire (Small Holdings)
asked whether, and when, applications have been received from suitable applicants for holdings on the farm of Inverlaul, Lochbroom, Rossshire; and what steps, if any, the Board of Agriculture have taken to satisfy the applicants?
Suitable applications were received in 1912–13. The farm has been inspected and a scheme for its sub-division is under consideration.
Milngavie School Case
asked the Secretary for Scotland whether he is aware that Thomas Watson, of Milngavie, Stirlingshire, an industrious working man, was sentenced to a fine of £5 5s., or sixty days' imprisonment, for sending his children to school in a verminous condition; that he is now in prison because unable to pay the fine; and that the impossibility of a working man finding so large a sum as £5 5s. in practice makes such a sentence equivalent to imprisonment without the option of a fine; and whether he will take steps to mitigate this sentence?
I am informed that the penalty referred to by my hon. Friend was imposed on Watson in the Sheriff Court, Dumbartonshire, on the 3rd instant, on his being convicted of neglect of his children, such neglect having occurred while he was on probation in respect of a similar offence. The maximum penalty for the offence in question is a fine not exceeding £25, or, alternatively, or in default of payment of such fine, or in addition thereto imprisonment for any term not exceeding six months, and in the circumstances I see no sufficient reason for interference with the sentence.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether this man was given an opportunity of paying by instalments, and is it not the case that the Secretary for Scotland has recommended magistrates in such cases to give prisoners an opportunity of paying in that way?
I cannot answer that question. I would point out that the man was on probation, having committed a similar offence.
Is some other person looking after the children while the man is away, and if not, what is happening to them now?
Government of Ireland Bill
asked (1) if the Irish Parliament in Dublin will be able to differentiate as to the rate of either Death Duties or Income Tax in regard to property in the included portion which may belong to residents in the excluded portion of Ireland; and (2) if, in the event of the exclusion of certain Ulster counties from the Government of Ireland Bill, the excluded counties will be free to appoint, with the sanction of the Imperial Parliament, their own magistrates and judiciary?
In reply to these questions, I can add nothing to what my right hon. Friend stated yesterday.
Merchant Shipping Bill
asked the Prime Minister when he intends to take the Second Reading of the Merchant Shipping Bill; and when the Merchant Shipping Bill, making provision for carrying an adequate number of officers and engineers on Home-trade and foreign-going ships, which was promised by the President of the Board of Trade on the 16th July last, will be introduced?
My right hon. Friend can make no statement as regards the first part of the question. As regards the second, he hopes that a Bill will be introduced this Session.
Honours (Party Funds)
asked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been called to a Message from the Lords to this House, received on the 24th February, to the effect that they desire the concurrence of this House to a Resolution that a contribution to party funds should not be a consideration to a Minister when he recommends any name for an honour to His Majesty; and that it is desirable that effectual measures should be taken in order to assure the nation that Governments, from whatever political party they are drawn, will act according to this rule; and whether the Government intend to make any proposal to this House on the subject?
The attention of the Government has been called to this Resolution, and, as was explained in another place by the Lord Privy Seal, they are in agreement with its purport. But they are not prepared to make any proposal to the House on the subject.
May I ask whether the Government would be prepared to publish a list of subscribers to the party funds?
Perhaps the the hon. Gentleman had better address that question to his own side.
National Defences (First Sea Lord)
asked the Prime Minister if the repudiation by the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty of the warning given by him some time ago, as to the danger of relying on the Fleet for the protection of the country from invasion, was communicated to him as the result of correspondence or conversation between either himself or the First Lord of the Admiralty and the First Sea Lord, or if it was made without any such communications passing; if the withdrawal of the warning was unqualified in its terms; and, if not, if he will state the circumstances and terms of the withdrawal?
Sir, the substance of the communication made to the Prime Minister by the First Sea Lord upon his own initiative was given to the House in my reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Wisbech on the 4th instant.
May I ask whether anyone instructed the First Sea Lord to say that he did not mean what he did say?
That is a very discourteous and unworthy question coming from any quarter of the House, and would deserve strong reprobation. I am content merely to draw the attention of the House to it.
May I repeat the question to the right hon. Gentleman?
I should like the hon. Member to put the question down on the Paper and let me edit it.
Government Contracts
asked the Prime Minister whether he can make any statement as to the inquiry which has been undertaken regarding the possibility of arranging the times and seasons when Government contracts are given out with a view to minimising the fluctuations of employment?
My right hon. Friend hopes to be able to make an announcement shortly.
Nigeria, Gold Coast, and Sierra Leone (Concessions)
asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will say what is the total area over which Messrs. Lever Brothers and their associated firms have been granted concessions up to the present time in Nigeria, the Gold Coast, and Sierra Leone, respectively; and whether any further applications are at present under consideration?
The only area over which concessions have actually been granted to Messrs. Lever, or any firm known to be associated with them, is one of, approximately, 311 square miles in Sierra Leone, particulars of which have already been given to Parliament in Command Paper 6561. I have telegraphed inquiring as to tins progress made with the applications of Messrs. Lever and Messrs. McIver for similar concessions in the Gold Coast. I am not aware that any negotiations for concessions in Nigeria are now pending.
Am I to understand that applications in reference to Nigeria and the Gold Coast have been refused by the Government?
As I said, I have telegraphed for information as to the progress made with the applications for concessions on the Gold Coast, and I am not aware of any negotiations now proceeding in Nigeria.
House of Commons (Ventilation)
asked the hon. Member for St. George's-in-the East, as representing the First Commissioner of Works, if he will state whether he has had an electrical instrument erected on one of the back bench pillars in the Chamber on the Government side; is this instrument operating during the sittings of the House; and will he say what is its nature and anticipated effect?
The instrument to which the hon. Member refers has been placed there in connection with experiments on the ventilation of the Chamber. It is in operation during sittings of the House, but its action has no effect on Members in any part of the House.
Small Arms Importation
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been called to the increase in the importation of parts of small arms, in 1910 1,140 cwts., 1912 12,330 cwts.; whether he can say what number of barrels for sporting guns would be represented by these figures; arid whether he will take steps to see that in future barrels imported in the tube state are kept separate in the returns from barrels in a more advanced state of manufacture, or fitted to actions, and that the number as well as the weight and value of these parts of small arms should be recorded in future?
The figures quoted by the hon. Member represent the imports from Germany only; the imports from all sources amounted to 13,300 cwts. in 1910, and 30,200 cwts. in 1912. These figures include imports of barrels, no separate records of these being available. The question of the separate collection of statistics of the imports of barrels in the tube state and of barrels in a more advanced stage of manufacture will be referred to the Interdepartmental Committee, which meets every autumn to consider proposals for alterations in the official Trade Returns. An attempt was made in 1908 to secure some part of the information desired by raising a new heading for "Tubes to be made into barrels of firearms" in the official import list, but this step has failed to effect its object, as the entries under this heading have been practically nil. If the hon. Member can furnish me with any suggestion as to a suitable heading, I will see that it is carefully considered.
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been called to the fact that the Gun-barrel Proof Act of 1868 is applicable only to England and Wales; and whether he proposes to introduce legislation to extend its provisions to Scotland and Ireland, so that it may be universally applicable in the United Kingdom?
I am aware that the Act in question (except in regard to certain special provisions) only extends to England and Wales. I see no objection in principle to the extension of its provisions to Scotland and Ireland, but I am not in a position to promise the introduction of a Government measure for effecting this object during the present Session.
Liability of Carriers
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been drawn to the present powers of carriers by sea, by means of conditions on bills of lading or other documents, to contract themselves out of all liability for damage, destruction, or loss of goods carried by them, however such damage, destruction, or loss may have arisen; and whether he contemplates introducing any legislation to limit such powers, similar to the legislation already in force in the Commonwealth of Australia and the United States of America?
This is a very difficult and complicated question, on which there is a good deal to be said on both sides. As at present advised, I do not propose to introduce legislation to deal with it.
Collective Marks
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been drawn to a resolution unanimously passed at the annual meeting of the Associated Chambers, held in London on the 11th instant, calling upon His Majesty's Government to take action in the direction of giving effect to the principle adopted at the Washington Conference of the International Association for the protection of industrial property, namely, the protection of marks of communities, known as collective marks; and what action His Majesty's Government propose to take in the matter?
I have seen a copy of the resolution. The principle referred to therein is already adopted in the United Kingdom, and is dealt with by Section 62 of the Trade Marks Act, 1905, of which I am sending the hon. Member a copy.
British Manufactures (Exports)
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he can give the value of the produce and manufactures of the United Kingdom consigned to the United States, France, Germany, Holland; and Belgium, respectively, in 1913; the percentage of wholly or mainly manufactured goods in each case; and the same information as regards goods exported to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa in the year 1913?
I will have particulars of the value of the exports of the produce and manufactures of the United Kingdom to each of the destinations specified printed in the Votes, but separate particulars of the exports of manufactured goods thereto will not be available until early in May.—[ See, Written Answers this day. ]
Poor Law Institution Order
asked the President of the Local Government Board whether before the 1st of April, the date fixed for the coming into operation of the Poor Law Institution Order, by a supplementary Order, or otherwise, he will provide that the number of inmates to be admitted in each workhouse and ward shall be fixed by such Order and limited; and will he make an amending Order, securing that the number shall be fixed in institutional wards, provided hereafter, and also forbidding guardians to admit into the institution or any ward of the same, or retain therein a larger number of inmates than that fixed by the Local Government Board?
No such general limitation of the numbers of inmates has hitherto been fixed by the Local Government Board, and I do not think there is any immediate necessity for fixing a limit in all cases. If, however, in any particular case it is desirable, either to secure proper classification of inmates or to prevent overcrowding, that such limitation should be imposed, the new Order reserves to the Board ample powers which in such an event they will certainly use. No amending Order appears to be needed.
Have the Local Government Board jurisdiction in reference to the number of inmates?
They can, if they wish, make an Order limiting the number of inmates in a particular institution or part of an institution.
Tuberculous Persons
asked how many local authorities have intimated to the Board that they were prepared to treat tuberculous persons who are other than insured persons or dependents under the Grant promised by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in a letter to Mr. Hobhouse dated 31st July, 1912; and the names of these authorities?
One hundred and fifteen councils have submitted to the Local Government Board schemes for providing treatment for persons suffering from tuberculosis. In every case the scheme either expressly provides for the treatment of non-insured persons, as well as insured, or makes no distinction between insured and non-insured persons. I will send the hon. Member a list of these councils.
Is the County of London included?
Negotiations are now proceeding on that matter, and I should be glad if the hon. Member would give me notice.
Milk Analysis
asked how many sanitary authorities in England and Wales have taken samples of milk offered for sale to the public for the purpose of analysing during 1913 or any convenient period; and how many authorities have not done so?
In the year 1912, which is the latest year for which complete information is at present available, samples of milk were taken for analysis by every local authority under the Sale of Food and Drugs Acts. The number of samples of milk and cream taken during the year was 52,501. Detailed particulars are given in the Annual Report of the Local Government Board for 1912–13.
Poor Law Officers
asked the President of the Local Government Board whether he has received a Return, compiled by the National Association of Poor Law Officers, showing that largely the indoor subordinate staff of Poor Law union institutions are on duty from 75 to 80 hours per week of seven days; if so, whether any consideration has been given to the matter; and whether he proposes taking any action?
The Local Government Board have not received a copy of the Return referred to. If in any particular case it is shown that officers of a board of guardians are overworked, the Department would not fail to communicate with the guardians on the subject.
Secondary Education Grants
asked the Secretary to the Treasury if he will state what are the Grants from the Treasury for secondary education in England, Scotland, and Wales, respectively; what is the cost of administration and inspection in each country and by whom is it borne; and what is the Treasury Grant to Ireland for secondary education?
I regret that I am unable to supply the hon. Member with the comparative figures for which he asks as to Grants for secondary education and cost of administration and inspection.
British Museum
asked the Secretary to the Treasury if it is the intention of the authorities to move some of the most priceless of our national collections from the upper floor of the old buildings of the British Museum to the ground floor gallery of the new building; if he is aware that the lower windows of the ground floor gallery of the British Museum are virtually unprotected from without; and whether any precautions and what are to be taken to prevent their being broken by stones or other missiles?
It is proposed to move some of the collections in the Museum from the upper floor of the old building to a gallery in the new building, of which the floor is twelve feet above the street level. The front of the building will be protected by police.
asked the Secretary to the Treasury if he is aware that occasions have arisen within recent times when it has been found expedient to shut the great iron gates of the courtyard of the British Museum in order to safeguard its treasure from mob violence; if he is aware that this precaution had to be taken, with the concurrence of the police, only a few years ago; and if he will say whether similar precautions can be taken to protect the windows of the main front of the new buildings, as well as the contents of the cases in close proximity to these windows?
The only occasion within recent times on which the gates were closed was on 15th October, 1908, when admission was refused to a procession of unemployed workmen. Similar precautions cannot be taken at the back of the building, since the museum is not there separated by a wide courtyard from the street.
asked who authorised the installation of heavy machinery immediately underneath one of the principal exhibition galleries of the British Museum; who approved that such work should be carried out in this particular place; and what steps are being taken to remedy the error which has been made?
No heavy machinery has been installed immediately under any of the Exhibition galleries.
Is the hon. Gentleman aware that great damage has been done to unique and valuable objects of mosaic jewellery work?
The question on the Paper referred to heavy machinery. I made inquiries about that and find that the state of affairs suggested in the question did not exist. If the hon. Member will put down a further question I will make inquiries.
asked the Secretary to the Treasury if his attention has been called to the defective planning and waste of exhibition space in the galleries of the new buildings of the British Museum; and if he will ascertain how many square feet of the superficial area of these galleries is rendered unavailable for exhibition purposes by iron radiators and by the screening, such as the recently added false backing to the print cases in the upper gallery and by the thirty-six square plaster columns in the lower gallery?
As I have already stated in answer to questions on this subject, the architect who designed and planned the extension to the British Museum was selected by His Majesty's Government in 1904 from a panel of some of the most eminent architects of the day. The First Commissioner cannot admit that the planning is defective. The plans have throughout been submitted to and approved by the trustees of the British Museum.
If the plans were not defective, why has a large hole had to be cut in one of the principal floors in order to insert a staircase?
Another staircase was found to be desirable, and the plan was accordingly modified.
asked the Secretary to the Treasury if he will give the total width of the lower gallery in the new buildings of the British Museum; whether he will say if there was any reason why the floor above was not supported upon steel girders running the whole width of the gallery; if he will ascertain the reason why this was not done; if he will give the diameter of the thirty-six square plaster columns obstructing the gallery; if he will say whether the principal officers of the Museum or the Office of Works were shown any drawings of these columns, as well as their positions on the plans, before they were built; if so, whether he will say if these columns were approved and sanctioned by the Office of Works or by any committee appointed by the trustees; and if he will ascertain the names of the persons to whom these drawings were submitted and by whom they were approved?
(1) The width of the lower gallery is 48 feet. (2 and 3) Very wide and heavy steel girders would have been necessary, decreasing the height of the gallery. (4) The size of the pillars is 3 feet square. (5) Drawings were shown to the trustees of the Museum and to the Office of Works. (6) The columns were approved and sanctioned by all the authorities concerned.
asked the Secretary to the Treasury whether the long gallery at the top of the new building of the British Museum is now to be used for the display of the particular collection for which it was originally intended?
Yes, Sir.
In view of the dissatisfaction existing regarding the present extension of the museum, will the hon. Gentleman give an undertaking that in future any extension made will be after competition with competing plans?
No such undertaking could be given without notice.
asked the Secretary to the Treasury if he will ascertain whether the Office of Works or a committee, and, if the latter, what committee, sanctioned the style of architecture adopted for the main staircase and each of the great galleries in the new buildings of the British Museum; if he will say whether the Office of Works or a committee either examined the drawings or approved the order of architecture of the interiors, if any, including the details of the capitals of the black columns in close proximity to the elevator on the uppermost floor; and whether the Office of Works or such committee had any knowledge before they were built that they would be out of keeping with the well-known classic features of the old building, and thus add to the incongruities of the new?
The First Commissioner would remind the hon. Member that the building has been designed by an architect of great eminence specially chosen.
asked the Secretary to the Treasury if he will say whether the walls and ceiling of the main black-and-white staircase in the new building of the British Museum are intended to remain permanently covered all over with gold wash, or whether these walls are to be used for exhibition purposes like the walls of the main staircase in the old building; and will he ascertain whether it is proposed to add a central feature of any archæological or artistic interest between the two terminals of the low white marble walls on the main landing of the principal staircase of the new building, or whether the present iron radiator, now occupying this position of importance, is a permanent fixture?
The present intention is that the gold wash shall not be permanent. The radiator is a permanent fixture, and was designed for its purpose. Statuary will be placed in certain positions on the staircase.
asked the Secretary to the Treasury when the error of fixing the radiators along the main walls of the upper gallery of the new buildings of the British Museum so as to interfere with the wall space was pointed out, and it was suggested that the heating apparatus might have been carried under the floor towards the centre of the rooms, it was the building authority or the Office of Works which made representations that such a plan was impossible owing to the difficulty and danger of cutting into the ferro-concrete floor; and if this floor has since had a great slice cut out of it for the purposes of a forgotten staircase?
The alternative method was not pointed out nor considered. The method adopted of carrying heating supplies in the walls is most satisfactory. The floor was cut through in connection with the provision of a staircase which was not contemplated when the original plans were prepared.
asked the Secretary to the Treasury whether the iron radiators which have been placed in the embrasures of the windows of the galleries of the new building of the British Museum will prevent exhibition cases for small objects requiring a strong light from being fitted in such valuable spaces, as has been done at the Louvre and other museums; and will he give the dimensions of the largest radiator in the new building and its approaches?
The radiators will not prevent cases being fitted so as to obtain the best light. The largest radiator is 4 ft. 10 in. long, 39 in. high, and 9 in. wide.
:With all due deference may I ask whether his figures are quite correct?
I cannot pretend to measure the radiators personally, but I am told that is the size.
Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will inquire again?
asked the Secretary to the Treasury why the superficial area of the great gallery on the ground floor of the new building of the British Museum has been so much curtailed by the insertion of the thirty-six square plaster columns ranged along both sides of the gallery at a certain distance from the walls; is he aware that these columns not only impede the light but cast undesirable shadows in the direction of some of the best spaces left for exhibition purposes; and can he say whether any plans have been prepared for the removal of these obstructions?
The columns are part of the structure of the building and their removal is impossible. They were in the original plans. There appears to be no ground for the statement that undesirable shadows are cast.
Licensed Victuallers (Accounts)
asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if his attention has been drawn to the various public statements which have been made by the different chairmen of the licensing justices to the effect that the recent circular letter issued by the Home Office, relative to the keeping of new and additional books of accounts by licensed victuallers, is virtually the equivalent of a Departmental Order; and, as various chairmen of the licensing justices have publicly given expression to their assumption that the paragraph in the above letter recommending that the keeping of proper books of account of the takings and out-goings up to date shall be regarded as an essential item in the proper management of licensed premises must be construed as meaning that, if this recommendation is not strictly complied with, the omission in future must be counted as a disqualification of grave prejudice to the licensed victualler, as no statutory justification for such a penalty exists, will he take the necessary steps to rectify the misconstruction upon which the different chairmen have based their assumption?
I cannot help thinking that the hon. Member has been misinformed as to the terms of the circular, of which I shall be glad to send him a copy. It showed plainly on the face of it that it did not convey any Departmental Order; and it referred to the keeping of proper books, not of "new and additional" books. I can find nothing in the circular which could give ground for the misconception mentioned in the question.
Suffragists (Arrest of Mrs. Pankhurst)
asked the Home Secretary whether he will explain why police were sent from London to arrest Mrs. Pankhurst in Glasgow; and whether she was roughly handled by the police?
Police officers were sent from London in order to identify Mrs. Pankhurst. I am informed that she was not roughly handled by the police, but, when she refused to walk, she was carried carefully.
Was she arrested by police from London or by local police? The right hon. Gentleman said that they were sent for identification.
She was arrested by the Glasgow police.
Are not the Glasgow police under the control of the authority for which women have votes, and did not that authority pass resolutions in favour of Women Suffrage?
It is hardly for me to answer any question as to the government of Scotland.
Deportations from South Africa
asked the Home Secretary if the William Livingstone, against whom a summons was issued by the Clerkenwell magistrate, on the 10th March, for drunkenness in Hampstead Road, has recently been exported to this country from South Africa; if, after being charged, he failed to surrender to his bail; if the summonses were granted privately on the application of the police; and if this procedure is usual in such cases; and, if not, what were the circumstances which called for special consideration to the defendant in this instance?
So far as I am aware, the identity of the person summoned is correctly stated by the hon. Member; it is a fact that he failed to surrender to his bail, and accordingly summonses in respect of the original charge and for the forfeiture of his recognisances were applied for in open Court and were issued. It has not yet been possible to serve the summonses. The procedure usual in such cases was followed.
Will steps be taken to issue a summons against this gentleman?
The difficulty is to find the gentleman. I have no doubt a summons will be served as soon as he is found.
Is it not the fact that his address is well known in Aberdeen, and that a summons might be issued there?
I am not aware of that fact.
Mr. C. E. Fenner (Extradition)
asked the Home Secretary whether he can now state if there is any probability of the extradition from France of Mr. C. E. Fenner by the end of March?
I cannot say. The necessary documents relating to the various charges upon which Mr. Fenner's extradition is sought have now been completed and forwarded to Paris. The matter is, therefore, in the hands of the French Government.
Can the right hon. Gentleman explain what has been the cause of the rather phenomenal delay in this case?
If the hon. Member will put down a further question on the point I will make inquiry. I have no personal knowledge.
Heytesbury Charity
asked the right hon. Member for the Stroud Division, as representing the Charity Commissioners, whether he will obtain and supply a copy of the accounts of the Heytesbury Charity for the past three years; whether he can say what is the annual income from land in the parishes of Urchfont, Chirton, and Great Cheverell, and what is the amount expended in charity in these parishes and the number of persons resident in these parishes who have been accommodated in the Heytesbury almshouses during the past twenty years; and whether the Charity Commissioners will hold an inquiry into the administration of this charity, and particularly as to the rents charged to small holders on the estate and the policy adopted towards them?
The accounts of Heytesbury Hospital are open to the inspection of all persons at the office of the Commissioners, and any person may obtain copies at a small fee which is settled by Statute. The income of the hospital from land in the parishes of Urchfont and Chirton for the year ending Michaelmas, 1912, was £2,692. It does not appear from the accounts that the hospital has any land in the parish of Great Cheverell. No part of the income of the hospital is applicable in the parishes of Urchfont, Chirton, or Great Cheverell. The Commissioners have no information as to the number of persons resident in the parishes of Urchfont, Chirton, and Great Cheverell who have been accommodated in the hospital during the past twenty years. The Commissioners would be prepared to hold an inquiry with a view to a scheme for the application of any increase of income of the charity, but it is not within their province to direct the policy of the trustees in the letting of their land.
asked the Member for the Stroud Division, as representing the Charity Commissioners, whether he is aware that the trustees of the Heytesbury Charity are the owners of land in the parishes of Urchfont and Chirton, Wiltshire, which has been for many years cultivated by small holders; whether the policy of the trustees of turning small holders out of their holdings and adding their holdings to larger farms is sanctioned by the Charity Commissioners, and in particular whether he will inquire into the case of William Alexander, under notice to quit his small holding at Michaelmas next, which has been continuously cultivated and improved by him for the past ten years; and whether he will see that the Charity Commissioners exercise their authority to prevent this and future acts of this kind being committed?
In the course of the general inquiry into the charities of Wiltshire it appeared that in 1903 part of the land owned by the trustees of Heytesbury Hospital, in the parishes of Urchfont and Chirton, was let in small holdings and allotments. It is the duty of the trustees to let their property to the best advantage of the charity. The Commissioners have no authority to interfere with the policy of the trustees in the management of their estates, so long as they act in accordance with their trusts and with the general law. The Commissioners will inquire into the facts of the case of William Alexander.
Am I to understand that the Charity Commissioners have no power whatever to see that justice in this case is done to small holders?
No, Sir; with the best intentions in the world, all the Charity Commissioners can do is to see that the trustees carry out the law in the best interests of the trusts.
Post Office Wages (Stoke-on-Trent)
asked the Postmaster-General whether he is aware that, though the cost of living has admittedly increased in Stoke-on-Trent, according to the recent Board of Trade Return, by 13 per cent0., the index number of that district in the Post Office Return has dropped from 92 to 85; and whether there has been any change in his Department's basis of calculation which has produced a result so opposite to the facts?
The hon. Member appears to be under a misapprehension. The index number 85 which appears in the recent Board of Trade Return (Cd. 6955) is comparable with the figure 83 published in the previous Board of Trade Return for 1905 (Cd. 3864), and not with the Post Office index number 92, which is calculated on a different basis. A later Post Office index number is not yet available.
asked the Postmaster-General whether the wages of the outdoor staff for the district of Stoke-on-Trent has remained practically stationary for the last eighteen years; and whether he will consider a revision of this classification in face of the admitted rise in the cost of living?
In various respects the scales of pay have been considerably improved for postmen at Stoke-on-Trent, although their maximum pay has not been appreciably altered in the past eighteen years, except as regards the postmen employed on rural duties, whose maximum pay has increased by 25 per cent. in that period. The case of Stoke-on-Trent will be considered in connection with the general revision of outdoor classification which is about to be undertaken in accordance with the recommendations of the recent Select Committee on Post Office Servants.
Postal Revenue (Private Guarantee)
asked the Postmaster-General if he will state under what conditions he is prepared to accept offers of private individuals to guarantee the Government against loss of postal revenue?
It is not the practice of the Post Office to accept guarantees from private individuals against loss of revenue except in connection with minor extensions of inland postal, telegraph, or telephone services. The Regulations on the subject depend on the nature of the case and are too varied to be briefly summarised. If the hon. Member will furnish me with particulars of any case in which he is interested, I will acquaint him with the Regulations applicable to it.
Board of Education (Museum Articles)
asked the President of the Board of Education whether the Board or the President possesses any power to part with any article belonging to any museum under the administration of the Board, or whether Parliamentary sanction must be obtained before the alienation of any such article?
The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative, subject to any special provisions or conditions affecting special articles; and to the second part of the question, in the negative.
School Dental Treatment
asked the President of the Board of Education if he will state how many local education authorities have established school clinics limited to treatment of dental defects; and what proportion such clinics constitute of the total number established?
The number of local education authorities who have established school clinics limited to treatment of dental defects is seventeen. The number of these clinics is twenty-nine. There are about 200 school clinics of all kinds.
Elementary Schools (Supplementary Teachers)
asked the President of the Board of Education if the Board have decided to extend the time beyond July of the present year, during which existing supplementary teachers in elementary schools will be recognised; if so, for how long and under what conditions will such recognition continue?
The answer is in the affirmative. The conditions are stated in Circular 836, which was issued last week. I am sending a copy to the hon. Member.
Royal Navy
Oil Fuel
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether there is existing now, or ever has existed, any contract with the Mexican Eagle Company for the supply of oil for the Navy; and if so, over what period of time do the provisions of the contract extend?
I stated to the House in July last that Mexico was one of the countries from which part of our supplies would be obtained. I regret that I am unable to give details of contracts.
Has the company still got a contract running?
Yes; I said so in my statement in July.
asked whether any steps have been taken, or are now in contemplation, to carry out the policy he indicated last July of acquiring, on behalf of the Admiralty, at least a proportion of the oil-fields of the world?
The policy of acquiring a source of oil supply, as well as of developing home resources, has been continually present to my mind as an alternative to the purchase of oil by contract.
Will the right hon. Gentleman say if he has got any further in the matter?
No, I will not.
asked whether any reference was made to Parliament before the designs for the five battleships of the Queen Elizabeth class and the sixteen light cruisers of the Arethusa class were passed, which provided for the use of oil only; and, if this was the case, why so important a step was taken without any reference to Parliament?
The designs of His Majesty's ships are settled upon the responsibility of the Board of Admiralty, and Parliament has always hitherto upheld that practice.
Will the right hon. Gentleman answer my question, and say why Parliament was not consulted before this great alteration?
It is not usual to consult the House of Commons as to the designs of His Majesty's ships. The House of Commons approves or disapproves afterwards of the general policy of the Board of Admiralty and the Government responsible for it.
Has there been any alteration in the invariable practice?
No—on the contrary.
Is it usual to make so great a change from coal to oil?
Many great and important changes in materiel have been made and have not been made known for many months afterwards.
asked if he will state what firm or firms at the present time hold certificates for the supply of oil for the Navy?
For reasons which I have on several occasions explained to the House, I do not think it desirable in the public interests to publish details of the nature referred to.
Will the right hon. Gentleman see that I do not ask for the details. I ask the names of the firms, and does he not think it is very desirable, in view of the rumours which have got about, that the House should not be kept in ignorance, at any rate, of the names of the firms?
I know nothing of rumours that have got about. If the hon. Member has any charges to make, plenty of opportunity will be afforded to him to do so.
What am I to do if he will not give us the details?
I am quite prepared to take rumours and lies at their proper value.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware there is no precedent for withholding the names?
On the contrary, I am proceeding strictly in accordance with the regular practice of which the House has approved.
asked what is the estimated amount of oil per year required in time of peace for a torpedo boat, a light cruiser, and a battle cruiser, respectively, burning oil only, in active commission?
No, Sir. These are confidential matters, and I cannot depart from the regular practice which the House has approved in regard to them.
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether it is his intention to continue indefinitely to keep the Reports of the Royal Commission on Oil secret?
Yes, Sir, for the reasons which I have stated, both the reports and the evidence must remain secret. I will, however, circulate with the Votes a minute which I have received from the chairman of the Royal Commission, to which I referred in moving the Supplementary Estimate.—[ See Written Answers this date. ]
Can the right hon. Gentleman say what reason there is for keeping secret indefinitely the Report of the Royal Commission?
Certainly. The Royal Commission was appointed for a particular purpose—for the purpose of securing confidential information for the Admiralty or for the War Office—and obviously such a Report should be treated as confidential.
When that Commission was set up was it stated that it would be a confidential secret inquiry?
Maltese Shipwrights
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he can say why the provisions contained in Circular Letter No. 4, dated 15th January, 1913, have not been observed in the case of Maltese non-continuous service shipwrights; whether he is aware that these men are desirous of being in continuous service; and, if this cannot be allowed, will he see that the recent rise of pay and position granted to naval shipwrights are given to these men?
The Circular Letter in question applies only to continuous and general service shipwrights. As I indicated in the answer which I gave the hon. Member on the 25th March last, non-continuous service shipwright ratings are entered under a temporary engagement, and it is not considered that they have a claim to be placed on the same footing as continuous service men, whose conditions of service are different.
Joiners
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he can see his way to put joiners in the Royal Navy on an equal footing as regards pay and rating with the shipwright class?
I am afraid not. The rates of pay were carefully considered at the recent revision.
Skilled Labourers
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he will give the number of skilled labourers who have been placed upon the establishment in the Works Departments at the several Royal yards respectively?
No workmen in the Works Department in the dockyards have at present been placed upon the establishfent, but 150 established posts have been allocated to that Department for the present financial year. It is contemplated to make further additions to the establishment in 1914–15. In those additions the Works Department will share.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say when the Admiralty propose to begin to put these men on the establishment?
We have allocated 150 places for the Works Department this year, but there will be some difficulty, as many of the men are beyond the age for establishment, and we have to try to make special provision.
Land Purchase (Ireland)
asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland whether he is aware that the tenants on the estate of the late Sir Rowland Blennerhassett, who purchased their holdings under the Ashbourne Act, have put in their claim for turbary at Owengarry, near Beaufort, county Kerry; and can he state whether steps will be taken to allocate them the necessary share of the turbary on what is known as the second plot?
The Estates Commissioners inform me that the turbary on the Blennerhassett estate, which is now for sale under the Land Purchase Acts, is being dealt with, and in its allotment the applications of the tenants who purchased their holdings under the Ashbourne Act will be considered.
asked the Chief Secretary whether he will have inquiry made into the claim for reinstatement made by Jeremiah Gallivan, an evicted tenant, whose holding was at Fermoyle, on the Sugrue estate, near Cahirciveen; and can he state when the claim will be dealt with?
As the hon. Member has already been informed, the Estates Commissioners have inquired into and considered Jeremiah Gallivan's application for reinstatement in a holding formerly occupied by him on the Sugrue estate, county Kerry, and now in the possession of his nephew, and have decided to take no action in the matter.
Government of Ireland Bill
Vote of Censure
I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) upon what day the Motion which stands in my name will be taken?
My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister is of opinion that the sooner it is taken the better, and I understand he suggested Thursday to the right hon. Gentleman, and I believe arrangements have been made accordingly.
May I ask when Votes A and I of the Navy will be taken?
I understand they will have to be taken—by arrangement, of course—either late on Thursday or on Friday. That will be a matter of arrangement.
Do I understand my right hon. Friend to mean that Estimates of 51½ millions are to be passed through this House on two half-days' Debate?
The question of more time must be seriously considered.
Of course we, the Opposition, did give an undertaking that if the Irish question were considered earlier we would do our best to facilitate Supply. We shall, of course, abide by that, but we hope that the Government will realise that another day must be given later to make up for the loss of time.
I understand that arrangements have been made for an extra day for the discussion of the Navy Estimates later on, but, of course, the money must be voted in time in order to get the Bill through by 31st March.
I want to know if these arrangements which are made between the two Front Benches are to be regarded as binding on the whole House?
Will my right hon. Friend say whether it would not be possible to arrange that the extra day should be given before the Votes are taken—a discussion after the Votes will be very little use?
I regret very much that that would be impossible, because the Consolidated Fund Bill has to be through by a certain date. If it were possible we should do so, but I think it is intended that there should be a day, the day taken by this Debate, set aside for the purpose of discussing the Navy Estimates. We have to make this arrangement in order to meet the challenge of the Opposition.
Would it not be better to give Monday for the Vote of Censure and Thursday for these Votes?
I do not think my hon. Friend would be better off, because that would be the Report stage. A day has got to be taken off before the 31st March on the discussion of Estimates, and the only way we can possibly meet that is by giving a day after. That is the best arrangement we can make to meet the challenge made by the right hon. Gentleman.
May I ask whether care will be taken, when the day is given, so that the House or Committee will be permitted to discuss the Estimates as a whole?
Certainly. I understand that whatever discussion might take place on Thursday on the Navy Estimates will take place on the day which will be allocated for the purpose—of course, by leave of the Chair.
Will the right hon. Gentleman say when the Government intend to take the bloodshed referred to by the First Lord?
Will the right hon. Gentleman see that this extra day is not allowed to conflict with the day usually set apart for Vote 8?
I understand that this will be an extra day altogether.
Does the right hon. Gentleman intend to suspend the Eleven o'clock Rule on Thursday?
We have had no suggestion of that. Subject to that, I do not think it is intended to do so.
British Empire (Trade Relations)
To call attention upon this day two weeks to the trade relations of the British Empire, and to move a Resolution.—[ Mr. Page Croft. ]
Rights of British Citizens
To call attention upon this day two weeks to the rights of British citizens within the Empire, and to move a Resolution.—[ Mr. T. Richardson. ]
Orders of the Day
Notices of Motion
Unemployment
To call attention upon this day two weeks to the inadequacy of the existing provision for dealing with the problem of unemployment, and to move a Resolution.—[ Mr. T. E. Harvey. ]
Bills Presented
Pawning Industrial Tools Bill
"To amend the Law relating to the pawning of tools, instruments, or appliances used in connection with any trade or handicraft." Presented by Mr. TYSON WILSON; supported by Mr. Bowerman, Mr. Clynes, Mr. Gill, Mr. Parker, Mr. Albert Smith, and Mr. Stephen Walsh; to be read a second time upon Wednesday, 25th March, and to be printed. [Bill 123.]
Hotels (Ireland) Bill
"To remove certain disabilities and restrictions attaching to hotels in the boroughs of Cork, Limerick, Waterford, and Kilkenny." Presented by Mr. JOYCE; supported by Mr. Patrick O'Brien, Mr. Sheehy, Mr. MacVeagh, Mr. O'Shee, Mr. Murphy, and Mr. Brady; to be read a second time upon Wednesday, 25th March, and to be printed. [Bill 124.]
Sewers (Exemption from Rating) Bill
"To exempt the underground Sewers of local authorities from rating." Presented by Sir JOHN HARMOOD-BANNER; supported by Sir Thomas Roe, Mr. Middlebrook, Lord Alexander Thynne, Sir Luke White, Mr. Hamar Greenwood, Mr. Leslie Scott, Mr. T. P. O'Connor, Mr. Bowerman, Sir William Bull, Mr. Montague Barlow, and Mr. Nield; to be read a second time upon Tuesday next, and to be printed. [Bill 125.]
Patents and Designs Bill
"To amend Section ninety-one of the Patents and Designs Act, 1907." Presented by Mr. JOHN ROBERTSON; to be read a second time upon Monday next, and to be printed. [Bill 126.]
Prevention of Unemployment Bill
"To establish a Minister of Labour, to make provision for the prevention of Unemployment, to provide for the proper treatment of unemployed persons; and for other purposes connected therewith." Presented by Mr. KEIR HARDIE; supported by Mr. Barnes, Mr. Arthur Henderson, Mr. O'Grady, Mr. Wardle, Mr. Tyson Wilson, Mr. Crooks, and Mr. William Thorne; to be read a second time upon Friday, 17th April, and to be printed. [Bill 127.]
Supply
Navy Estimates, 1914–15
Order for Committee read.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
Mr. Churchill's Statement
4.0 P.M.
These are the largest Estimates for naval expense ever presented to the House, but I hope the House will not think it necessary on that account that I should introduce them in the longest speech ever delivered. On the contrary, I think I might almost say that those who delight in great naval expenditure should take deeds for words, and that those who deplore it should be glad that as little as possible should be said about it. It has also to be borne in mind that, except in one respect to which I shall refer later, there is no change in the policy adopted two years ago. That policy and the standards and programmes which give effect to it have been repeatedly explained in the utmost detail to the House. I myself made long speeches on the subject in March and July, 1912, and in March and July, 1913, and only recently upon the Supplementary Estimates I entered very fully into some of the financial aspects. I do not wish to cover the whole ground again; therefore I will do my best not to make an undue strain upon the patience of the House. I propose, first of all, to explain to what the increases are due, and to deal primarily with the financial aspects of naval policy. Secondly, I shall proceed to examine some of the principal causes which are at work, and to show how the increases either arise out of past decisions or are consequential upon standards which Parliament has approved. In this connection I shall deal with three principal causes of increase, namely, oil, air, and personnel. In the third place, I will come to materiel, the new programme, and a few miscellaneous questions either connected therewith or disconnected with any other large topic or head into which my subject is divided. In the next place I will examine the standards of new construction which we are pursuing. This will lead me to the position in the Mediterranean and also to the position in the Pacific, and to the Imperial aspects of naval policy. Finally, I will deal with the general question in so far as it affects this country and our interests as a whole. That is a considerable programme.
Let me first enumerate and explain the causes of increase, leaving the justification to a later stage. The published Estimates show a comparison of these new Estimates for 1914–15 with both the original and the final Estimates of the preceding year. But what we really ought to judge by is not the particular increase over last year, but the whole of the great expansion which has taken place during my tenure of office. I propose, therefore, to subject the Estimates for this year to a more searching and more informing test than a mere comparison with last year's Estimates, and to look back over the whole period for which I have been responsible. I am going to compare the year 1914–15 with the year 1911–12, which was the last year for which my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary was responsible. There are various ways in which one may test naval expenditure. You may present and examine it in the laborious and detailed manner in which Parliament has ordered the Estimates to be prepared under the different Votes. You may examine it by dividing recurring from non-recurring expenditure, or capital expenditure from expenditure which should be defrayed out of income. You may examine it by dividing the expenditure to which we are absolutely committed, irrespective of any new decisions that may be taken by the House, from such portions of expenditure as depend upon decisions yet to be taken. But I think that the truest dichotomy will be to divide new construction, by which I mean the building and arming of ships under Votes 8 and 9, from maintenance, by which I mean all other charges. First, as to maintenance: In three years there has been an increase of £6,250,000, apart from new construction. The bulk of this arises from three causes: £2,140,000 is accounted for by pay, wages, and victuals; that is to say, by more men and more pay—increases of wages at dockyards, and increases in the cost of victuals, and the fact that there are more men on our list. The second cause is £1,500,000 for oil reserves—an increase this year over 1911. That is capital expenditure. We have in return a marketable, commercial asset which it is no exaggeration to say could be realised in a reasonable period of time for what it has cost us. The third cause is Air Service, which is an entirely new service, practically non-existent three years ago, and for which no less than £900,000 is included in the Estimates of the the new year. That makes a total, under the three heads, of £4,500,000, leaving £1,750,000 only for all the needs of a larger Fleet, more costly ships, and the whole scientific development of the Naval Service.
Let us look at this in another way. I am going to subject this great increase to examination from another point of view. Omit for a moment the capital charge for oil reserves, £1,500,000. Omit the Air Service, £900,000, which is entirely novel; £3,750,000 increase remains. The whole of this increase is automatic in the true sense of the word, or else it is proportionate to the larger and more powerful Fleet we are forced to keep in being. First of all, in the three years, non-effective charges, pensions, and so forth, which are entirely uncontrolled, have increased by £225,000; insurance has been added at a cost of £100,000; the increases of pay and wages, without any reference to numbers, amount to £850,000; the increase of men, apart from the increases of pay, amounts to £975,000. There is an increase in fuel consumption of £600,000, which is mainly due to prices, but also due in a large measure to the fact that we have 50 per cent. more horse-power in the Fleet to-day than we had three years ago. Whereas three years ago we had 4,478,000 horse-power in the Fleets, we have now a comparable figure of 6,712,000. The expense of ammunition has increased by £700,000: that is because there are many more guns in the Fleet to-day, and they are larger and more powerful than they were three years ago. All the other are miscellaneous services—an immense category—which may be comprised within the figure of £300,000, making a total of £3,750,000. This added to the charge for the oil reserves, and the charge for the Air Service expenditure, totals £6,250,000. I should just like to say this on these figures: it may be estimated that the figures for 1914–15 are affected by the increase in prices to the extent of nearly £1,500,000—that is to say, the same services that we are asking the money for now could have been obtained in 1911–12 for something like £1,500,000 less.
There cannot be much argument about the automatic increases, but it is a fair question to ask: Why is it necessary to have this larger and more costly Fleet? The scale of our Fleet, and the cost of its maintenance depend first, on the number, and secondly, on the character of the ships maintained in the various grades of commission. The number of ships maintained in commission is proportionate to what other Powers do. I have frequently explained the new Fleet organisation to the House. We are seeking to complete eight battle squadrons by the time the next strongest naval Power has completed five. Battle cruisers would be additional in both cases, and there would be the proper proportion of cruisers and flotillas. Ships on foreign stations do not, of course, come into this calculation, which affects only the Home Fleet of this country, and the next strongest naval Power. The standards of establishment are reasonable and moderate, and I was very glad to see that the Grand Admiral Von Tirpitz has taken occasion to say that they are. Quite recently in the debates of this year in the Reichstag he also said:— have therefore postponed the completion of the fourth squadron—the Gibraltar Squadron—which remains during the year at four ships.
Might I put a question to the right hon. Gentleman? He said "at the end of the financial year." Does he mean to say the year we are now in or the year 1914–15?
The year 1914–15. I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman for his interruption. When I talk of this financial year, I am looking forward to the year on which we are now entering, and which is the subject of our debate today. Every delay, accidental or deliberate, on the part of the next strongest naval Power in the development of its enormous fleet organisation will be matched by us. We shall only complete our organisation as it is needed, and in proportion as it is needed. When completed, apart from the battle cruisers on both sides and ancillary vessels of the fleet—which I do not refer to because, though it would be quite easy to do so, it would add much to the complexity of the argument—apart from the battle cruisers our organisation when completed will yield thirty-three battleships in full commission to twenty-five, and sixteen battleships in reserve to an equal number. Then, as a make-weight, we have the Second Fleet of sixteen battleships all manned on mobilisation with the regular active service ratings, against which there is no corresponding organisation in the German Navy. No one can say that this is an extreme or excessive provision on our part. On the other hand, we consider it adequate. So much for numbers. I am dealing with the scale of the Fleet, and why it is necessary that the scale of the Fleet should be increased.
I now come to the character of these ships. The character was settled by what was decided more than three years ago. Admiralty finance is governed by earlier decisions to an extent which is certainly not appreciated out of doors. During my predecessor's tenure of office he built or ordered sixteen super-"Dreadnoughts," mounting 152 13.5 guns and aggregating 632,000 horse-power. Not one of these vessels was maintained in the Estimates of 1911–12. All will have to be maintained before the end of the coming financial year. There is very little relief at this juncture to be obtained by striking off old ships at one end of the Fleet as new ships join at the other end; first of all, because of the increased establishment which is needed to keep pace with the increasing development of the German Navy, and secondly, because it costs far more to maintain the vast, complicated, modern ships each carrying ten 13.5 guns than it used to cost to maintain the old simple low-power vessels carrying only four 12-inch guns. My predecessor had to maintain in full commission in the year 1911–12 a maximum of sixteen "Dreadnoughts." I have to provide in the present year for thirty-three, many of which are much larger and more costly to maintain than the units of 1911. Of these ships there were, in 1911, four battle cruisers—which is the most expensive class of all—to two German battle cruisers. In the present year we have to provide for nine battle cruisers to five German battle cruisers. The maintenance of these five new battle cruisers alone, under all Votes, including non-effective Votes, may be calculated at no less than £850,000 a year. These ships have been built. They are, we believe, the best in the world. They are not the biggest in the world, as is sometimes ignorantly stated. They represent an enormous capital outlay, and they have to be maintained. They have got to have their proper complement of officers and men. They must be supplied with the fuel and ammunition necessary for their training, and with all the stores required by modern ships. These stores are of extraordinary variety and complexity. The ships must be supplied with scientific appliances, with delicate instruments of all kind, with range-finders, fire-control apparatus, and wireless telegraphy. All these various needs must be supplied, in full, and thoroughly supplied, and it is utterly impossible to avoid heavy fresh charges unless we are to abandon the standard of high efficiency on which the safety of this country depends.
The present Board of Admiralty associate themselves fully with the decisions of their predecessors which we regard in every respect as wise and foreseeing and vitally necessary to the Naval Services. All these decisions have been approved by the House of Commons, and we are bound to meet the cost involved in the maintenance of ships which Parliament has ordered to be built. I should be quite ready myself to accept responsibility for past decisions if it were open to me to do so. I do not shelter myself in the slightest degree; but if I am personally criticised for the great increase which has taken place in the cost of maintenance, and if it is represented that it is all due to my reckless extravagance and megalomania, then I should point out that, except for one flotilla of a few small cruisers, no ships for whose design I have been responsible come under the Estimates of the coming year. So much for maintenance. Now, still pursuing my three years' comparison, I come to new construction. Seventeen million five hundred and sixty-six thousand pounds was provided in 1911–12 by my right hon. Friend the present Home Secretary for new construction under Votes 8 and 9. I estimate that £18,373,000 will be earned by the contractors this year—that is to say, there is an increase on this head, in addition to the increase I have referred to under maintenance, of £800,000. But although my predecessor claimed £17,500,000 to discharge his liability in 1911–12, only £15,000,000 actually accrued for payments, and the whole liability—the whole residue of liability—rolled forward and spread itself over the succeeding years. If the £17,500,000 in 1911 had been earned, when it ought to have been earned, and was expected to be earned, the new construction Vote of 1914–15 would not be £800,000 more than the Vote of 1911–12, but would, on the contrary, show an actual diminution. That fact, so little recognised in many of our discussions which have taken place, leads me to make a retrogression into the general aspects of Naval finance.
All ships of war affect the finances of three or four years. It is therefore clear that the House would be well advised, as I indicated when speaking on the Supplementary Estimates, to pay great attention every year to the amount of the new commitments. The figures of new programmes are published in the Estimates of each year, and anyone can see what they are. I have improved upon the practice this year by giving the figures, not only for new construction in Vote 8, but by adding the figures in Vote 9 for armaments. Once a new programme has been assented to by the House it has to be paid for as instalments fall due, and no means exist, as I have already explained, short of leaving the ships rusting and rotting on the stocks and paying compensation to the contractors, to prevent the charges falling due. Another important figure to which the House should look is the amount of money actually earned by contractors during the year in discharge of outstanding liabilities under all current programmes, three or four of which current programmes—and in the coming year five of which—are running at the same time From the total amount earned by the contractors in any year or series of years, and the amount of the new commitments in the same succession of years, a very good view can be obtained of the general dimensions of future Naval Estimates so far as new construction Votes are concerned, and apart from any new excursion into policy. I would apply these methods to the Estimates of the last five years—that is, to the whole period of naval expansion forced upon us since 1909 by the growth and development of the German naval power.
When my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary succeeded Lord Tweedmouth, the outstanding liability of the Navy under Votes 8 and 9, under all the programmes, was approximately £10,250,000. That was the dead-weight liability at the moment. My right hon. Friend during the three years he was responsible obtained Parliamentary authority for nearly £53,000,000 of additional new commitments. He provided in the Estimates of every year all the contractors were able to earn; indeed, he provided more than they were able to earn—there was no question of shirking his responsibility—he provided more than the contractors were, in fact, able to earn; and as I explained, owing to the coal strike and other causes, I surrendered nearly £2,000,000 to the Treasury at the close of the financial year 1911–12. But although everything was done by my right hon. Friend which could be done to keep pace year by year with the liability incurred, and although the House of Commons in all cases provided the necessary funds as they were earned, the additional and outstanding liability during the three years I am speaking of exceeded by nearly £13,000,000 the amount actually earned by the contractors, and when I succeeded to the Admiralty, instead of a legacy of £10,250,000 which my right hon. Friend had taken over from Lord Tweedmouth, I succeeded to a legacy of £23,500,000 of outstanding new commitments for naval construction.
In the year 1912–13 the House of Commons ordered new commitments of £17,500,000. I estimated that the contractors would earn, under all programmes, £17,250,000. The effect of the coal strike and the subsequent pressure of work and labour scarcity prevented the contractors earning more than £16,000,000, and the year 1913–14 started with naval liabilities all authorised by the House of Commons and bound to mature very quickly, of upwards of £24,500,000. But the new programme of 1913–14, which Parliament also approved, involved a new commitment of £18,750,000. It struck me as very remarkable that no Member in any part of the House, in the Debates, commented at all upon that great new figure. The progress made in the year was very good, and instead of earning £1,000,000 less, as in the previous year, or £2,000,000 less as they had done the year before, the contractors earned, as I explained to the House, £1,000,000 more, which the House has met by a Supplementary Estimate, making a total for the year of £17,360,000, reduction of total liabilities, against an addition on new commitments in that year of £18,750,000. Therefore, there will be outstanding at the end of this financial year, 1913, in spite of the Supplementary Estimate that has been voted, approximately, £26,000,000 worth of liabilities on account of new construction under Votes 8 and 9. I think it is much better that the Committee should face all these facts, and that I should explain clearly, not only all the statistics, but the dynamics of naval finance.
From a study of the trade and labour prospects, so far as they bear upon Admiralty work, I am advised there is a strong probability of very good progress being made next year in all the shipyards, and it is my duty, therefore, to ask Parliament for even a larger sum to pay for the execution of existing contracts this year than has been provided for in the Estimates, both original and Supplementary, of this year 1913–14. Experience shows that if there is a decline in trade, and if work in the shipyards gets slack, the contractors concentrate more and more upon Government work in their hands, and while keeping strictly within the limits of their contract—they can get no more than the House of Commons sanctions—they earn their instalments with greater punctuality, and ships delayed from previous years are eventually completed and all the money must be paid in respect of them. An exceptional number of vessels will be finished next year. That is due to the working of natural forces, uncontrolled forces, once the expenditure is sanctioned by this House and the work ordered.
The House does not sanction the time. It does not say that the work has to be done in a certain time.
The times at which the ships are begun are the latest dates which enable them to be completed by the time they are required, and the dates of the beginning of ships are indicated clearly from the amounts taken for them in the first year of their commencement. Once a ship is begun, its construction proceeds at a regular normal rate, which is the rate designed to produce the highest economy in construction. It is a practice long approved by the House of Commons, and that date is marked down and fixed in the contracts which are signed when the ship is begun, and the contractors have a right to adhere to their contracts. The difficulty in the past has been that they have fallen behind with the execution of their contracts, and the House is certainly responsible for the time in which ships are built, because the House does not wish the ships laid down until the last possible moment when they will be needed, and that moment is indicated by the amounts taken in the first instalment. I said that an exceptional number of vessels will finish in the new year, and that that is due to uncontrollable forces and not to acceleration or speeding up, or any new departure in policy. If the contractors earn, in the next year, the sum they are expected to earn, it means that a great mass of shipbuilding will, under existing contracts, be available in the shipyards, and will be a set off against any slackness of employment in other directions, and will act as a valuable counterpoise and corrective in one of the most sensitive portions of the labour market.
The House will follow these important figures which give a guide to the future. The outstanding liability up to the close of this year for new construction under Votes 8 and 9 is £26,069,000; the new programme of commitments, for which we ask the sanction of the House of Commons, is £14,817,000. Therefore, the total liability will be £40,886,000. The money taken in the Estimates for new construction under all programmes in reduction of this total liability is £18,373,000. The liability remaining at the end of the year will, therefore, be £22,512,000, and the reduction of total liabilities during the year, which will be first for five years in which there has been a reduction, will not be less than £3,557,000. The prospect, therefore, for 1915–16 is distinctly more favourable than that which now confronts us. [Interruption.] I am giving my hon. Friend reasons, and if reasons have good sense and are based on facts, if they are woven together in proper texture of argument, there is no reason why, unless they are upset, they should not be accepted. The prospect of 1915–16 is distinctly more favourable than that which now confronts us. I have taken a full Estimate this year. I do not expect that it will be exceeded. Last year I said it would very likely be exceeded, and this year I say I do not think it will be exceeded. If it is exceeded, it will further improve the prospect of 1915–16. If, on the other hand, the contractors do not earn the money provided, then the 1915–16 Estimate will be burdened to that additional extent, and it will be reasonable to keep the surrendered sum, whatever it is, in Exchequer balances, to meet in the latter year the identical charges for which it is now provided.
Let us see what other favourable features are likely to affect 1915–16. First of all, of course, there is a reduction in outstanding liability—that is to say, excess of money provided over the new commitments, which is, of course, the greatest of all the hopeful causes. That expressed in other words means that arrears have been worked off. In the next place, the oil reserve reaches its maximum burden in the Votes for this year. The brunt of this enormous exertion has been borne, and relief in that respect may be anticipated in the future. Vote 9—that is the Vote for armaments and ammunition—also reaches a higher figure in these Estimates than it is likely to reach next year. The reserves of ammunition are full, and we have now only to hold a position which is thoroughly satisfactory. These are, I think, substantial reasons for expecting relief. On the other hand, there are, of course, some factors which tell in the opposite direction. In 1915–16 there will have to be more men and more officers. The regular growth of the automatic and non-effective services will continue. The maturing of incremental scales of pay, the working out of pension schemes sanctioned years ago by Parliament, cannot and ought not to be arrested. There are always new services and new contingencies which crop up. Still surveying the whole situation, I think it reasonable to predict that in the absence of any new departure in policy the Estimates for 1915 should be substantially lower than those of this year. If I were to go any further I should be attempting to do what none of my predecessors have ever been asked or attempted to do, namely, to budget for a year in advance. I can only say I give my forecast under all proper reserve, and that the strictest economy will be practised without detriment to anything that is vital to the Naval Services. That is what I have to say on the general financial aspect. I am now going to come to closer quarters with the three main causes of increase to which I referred a few moments ago—oil, air, and personnel. Then I will come to the new programme, and after that to the standards. First of all, oil, which the hon. Member below the Gangway takes such a keen interest in.
And about which he has not got much information.
I am going to give him all the information which is in my power to give. It is only my care for other interests than those which are particular to any Minister, Government or party, which has forced me to decline to give him information which on other grounds I should be very happy to supply to the House. I dealt, in my statement on the Supplementary Estimate, with my responsibilities on this important matter. I pointed out that for every ton of oil which was required this year for consumption or reserve on account of any vessel built by me, five tons are required for vessels built before my time. Throughout, in regard to oil, I have acted on the authority and advice of the highest experts whose services I have been able to obtain, and the designs of all ships have been settled according to regular practice by the Board of Admiralty, as a whole, at its formal sittings. The advantages of oil were very fully explained by me to the House towards the end of last Session, but I have the authority of the Chairman of the Royal Commission on Fuel and Engines to state that the evidence taken by the Commissioners shows that the adoption of oil and oil engines will increase very greatly the advantages attaching to the use of oil as a substitute for coal in steam raising.
You said oil engines.
I am dealing now with the burning of oil under the boilers in the ordinary way, but of course the advantages are greater in the case of oil engines. The Chairman of the Royal Commission goes on to state the advantages. He says:—
"There is no doubt that, with otherwise similar warships, the one that burns only oil possesses a large excess of speed over that which burns only coal, and even exhibits superiority in this respect over that which burns coal and oil."
The radius of action when using oil in place of coal is increased at least 40 per cent. for the same weight of fuel.
The use of oil enables a fleet to re-fuel at sea with great facility. With coal this is impracticable, except under very favourable weather conditions.
The special advantage to the British Fleet of not being forced to leave its fighting position in order to refuel need not be enlarged upon. The strength of the British Fleet is thereby increased by at least 25 per cent. (while not adding that percentage of strength to the enemy's fleet), as so large a proportion of the coal-burning ships have to be absent re-fuelling. This also leads to a large unnecessary expenditure of fuel going to and returning from the coaling base, and additional wear and tear of machinery.
Oil bunkers can be replenished with great rapidity and without interfering with the fighting efficiency of the ship, and a few men suffice for the work. On the other hand the operation of coaling is lengthy and laborious, necessitating the exertions of the whole of the crew; with the result that the men are physically exhausted by the operation and the ship is rendered for a time unfit to fight. The use of oil is also attended by the saving of the large amount of labour involved in coal-trimming and stoking, as well as in the removal of ashes, clinkers, and soot when coal is burned, and by a reduction in the stokehold of some 55 per cent.
Oil gives the great advantage, as compared with coal, of admitting of a very rapid increase of steam production and of eliminating variations of steam pressure due to the necessity for the cleaning of coal-burning furnaces.
In a coal-burning ship, after part of the coal has been used, the ship cannot attain her full power without taking men from the guns to trim the coal, whereas the oil is delivered to the furnaces with continuous facility until the whole has been consumed; moreover, oil can be stowed in some spare spaces in a ship from which it would be quite impracticable to bring coal to the furnaces, with the certainty of still further increasing radius of action.
The use of oil fuel instead of coal makes it possible in every type of war vessel to produce a ship which will fulfil given conditions of speed, armament, etc., on lesser dimensions and at smaller cost. Further than this, the great advantages which liquid fuel presents in the problem of naval design make it possible to obtain vessels of very high speed in relation to their dimensions, which would be wholly impracticable if coal were retained as the sole fuel."
Those are some of the reasons which have been furnished to me by the Chairman of the Royal Commission, and which he informs me are assented to unanimously by the whole of the Commission. There is one other which I will add which has been brought into prominence by the manœuvres this year. The great dangers to which ships of war will be subjected from submarines will not be in the open sea, but when they are returning to their harbour for fuel. They may be waited for by submarines when coming in or going out of their harbour and suffer fatal injury. The coal ships will have to go to fixed stations and to regular harbours to coal, but oil-burning battleships, of which we have only five at present, will be able to fuel at sea in many cases, and in other cases to fuel behind any shelter without ever going to any fixed point. Consequently, these vital units on which such enormous sums of money have been spent will enjoy comparative immunity from this great and new danger, to which all large vessels are being increasingly subjected. I also pointed out to the House that the light cruisers and the fast battleships of the 1912 programme were built with special reference to our war needs and tactical requirements, and that we could not have built ships to answer the requisite needs if we had adhered to coal and had not been prepared to take the step of adopting oil only. The immense burden of building up the oil reserve out of income has been borne, and it has fallen on my shoulders to bear that burden. Oil in great quantities has been purchased and is in this country, and large quantities will reach us during the period covered by the new Estimates. Let me repeat that oil is a marketable, commercial asset, and it is an abuse of language to call it expenditure or consumption in the ordinary sense of those words.
Has coal no value as a commodity?
I do not think the hon. Member quite follows my point. In connection with the oil reserve we have to build up in these few years out of income the whole of the storage. Those great tanks and pipe lines, which connect them and deliver the oil at the jetty to ships of all kinds—that is a capital charge, which once it has been done will not recur upon the Estimates.
Is that included in the £1,500,000?
Yes, that is included in the £1,500,000 of this year. Then there are fourteen oil-tank vessels which we have, built and building, at a cost, spread over a number of years, of approximately £1,400,000. These oil-tank vessels are highly remunerative in themselves. We have got four at present delivered, one of which has already, during the high rates which have prevailed during the last two years, earned a very great part of its whole original cost, and, if we had had our fleets of oil tankers earlier, there is no doubt whatever that we could have pre- sented a very satisfactory balance sheet on that account. These three items—the oil, the oil tanks, and the oil-tank steamers—together in these Estimates make an addition over those of 1911 of £1,500,000, and all that is devoted to the oil reserve.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the oil tanks and steamers are included in that £1,500,000?
The oil reserve has cost a great deal more than £1,500,000, but £1,500,000 is taken in this year's Estimates for the oil reserve, and I am including in that £1,500,000 all moneys required for oil, all moneys required for oil tanks, and all moneys required for carrying on the construction of the oil-tank steamers.
Is that the amount of the increase?
That is the increase over any money taken in 1911, but, if my hon. Friend will look at 1911 he will see that there was no very large sum taken in that year, practically nothing.
Will the right hon. Gentleman say definitely what the sum actually is, and not merely what the increase is?
Perhaps I may be permitted to put my argument in my own way. £1,500,000 is the sum taken this year for further building up of the oil reserve. This great exertion has been made. There is no difficulty in obtaining oil, none whatever; the difficulty is to get it at a good price, and we must look to sources which are independent of existing combinations, and also to the development of the home production of oil, both from shale, and later on, as we believe it will be possible, from coal. When internal combustion becomes a realised fact—of course, it has lagged on the road in the last two years, but when it becomes a realised fact—all the advantages which have been described with regard to oil will be very greatly increased, and every ton of oil will do three or four times as much work as is now possible. Meanwhile, the principle on which we are proceeding is this: Oil will be used as the sole fuel for small craft and for light cruisers of the "Arethusa" type, and for capital ships of exceptional speed. For all the rest and for the line of battle, coal will continue to remain the motive power. I now come to air. I cannot help feeling a special interest in the Air Service, because it has come into full activity during my tenure. When I came to the Admiralty two and a half years ago there were four aeroplanes and five pilots. We now have 103 aeroplanes, including five that have not passed through their trials, but which I count in my total—
Can the right hon. Gentleman say how many of those are seaplanes?
Of which sixty-two are seaplanes; and we have 120 regular pilots and twenty officers who have taken their Aero Club certificates in addition. Five seaplane stations have been established along the coast and are being rapidly equipped. Two others are under construction. The land has been bought already. Sheds for the machines, quarters, appliances, slipways, and all the original plant have to be provided at once, and the expenditure has been very heavy. Ample arrangements for the housing and care of machines, and for the comfort of the officers and men have in this service a direct relation to safety of life. Then the personnel of the new service has had to be created. There are now 125 officers and 500 men in the Air Service, and by the end of the year the numbers may reach 180 officers and 1,400 or 1,500 men. This new service is thoroughly naval in spirit and character, but, at the same time, it contains, and must contain, a large element of civilians, both officers and mechanics. This is indispensable to its proper development. We cannot spare an unlimited number of naval officers and naval ratings. The mixture of these elements, the naval and civilian, the adjustment of the difficulties inseparable from the earlier phases of a vigorous growth, the proper contact with the Naval Service on the one hand, and with the Military Wing on the other, have created a number of intricate problems to which I have given the closest personal attention, and which, I believe, have now reached a good solution. The seaplane has a great future before it. Although it is still in its experimental stage, we cannot doubt that it will play an effective part in military and naval arrangements. We are without doubt—in number, in quality, and in experience—far in front of any other country in seaplane work. Money will be required for the development of this service in the next few years, but the results will ultimately be remunerative in other directions.
The following are some of the functions which seaplanes and aeroplanes on the Naval Wing are expected to discharge: First, scouting at sea, either from the land or from a seaplane ship. A seaplane ship is provided in the Estimates—that is to say, a special vessel which will take a number of these seaplanes out with the Fleet and enable them to reconnoitre from a moving base. The advantages which a seaplane has in scouting over the sea, as compared with an aeroplane scouting over the land, are obvious. The aeroplane is continually passing over woods and covered places from which fire may be brought to bear upon it by surprise, and it must go close, or comparatively close, to the ground to detect fully the movements of the troops it is observing; but out at sea, if the weather is clear, the enemy's fleet can be discerned many miles before its guns can be brought to bear upon the watching seaplane. Therefore it is clear that a very large field of activity is open to the seaplane in this direction. In the second place, they will be extremely useful for watching the coast. As the Committee knows, we rely for the security of our East Coast from raids very largely upon the patrol flotillas, which are grouped together at strategic points, and held intact in strong force at those points, and which can be summoned and directed to any point where an attempted landing is being made. No assistance can be more valuable than the assistance rendered by areoplanes and seaplanes in bringing this information, in regard to which time is vital, to the bases where the patrol flotillas are held in readiness. Of course, the heavy seaplanes which we are developing now will carry formidable explosives, which could be dropped on to transports and disturb the landing even before the patrol flotillas could arrive. The seaplanes fly by night as well as by day in ordinary weather. They carry wireless telegraphy, which enables them to signal 120 miles effectually, and they have quite recently even been able to receive a message while in the air.
In the third place, the seaplanes and aeroplanes will be of great value for the defence of vulnerable points. Oil tanks, magazines, docks, workshops, power houses, all these nerve centres of naval power have in the last few years been exposed to the indefinite menace of aerial attacks. Passive defence against such an attack is perfectly hopeless and endless. You would have to roof in the world to be quite sure. Something may be done, and something has been done, by the provision of guns which fire upwards, and by searchlights which train throughout the entire arc, but the only real security upon which sound military principles will rely is that you should be master of your own air. Nor is this unduly difficult. The war aeroplane flying in its own country, unhampered by floats, and close to its base, must be a far more efficient fightjng instrument than any similar craft that could come across the seas. When it comes to manœuvring or carrying a gun or bombs the home aeroplane will have decided advantages over the intruder. With the Military Wing, with which great progress had been made, we are already in a position of effective strength, and any hostile aircraft, airships or aeroplanes, which reached our coast during the coming year would be promptly attacked in superior force by a swarm of very formidable hornets. This is the true military protection of vulnerable points. There are other important functions on which I am not prepared to dwell at present, but I have said enough to show the importance of this new service and to justify, or at any rate to excuse, the expenditure which is involved in it. I dealt with airships on the Supplementary Estimates. We have, built and building and ordered, fifteen airships, of which ten are large vessels, or medium-sized vessels, of over 45 miles an hour speed. Later in the Session I will, if the House will view it kindly, bring half a dozen of these vessels for a cruise over the House of Commons—if it would shock the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Molteno) he would not be forced to look at it—in order to remove the doubts which lurk in some breasts as to the existence of aircraft in the possession either of the Naval or Military Wing.
Shall we be permitted to ride in them?
5.0 P.M.
I will consider an application from the hon. Gentleman. I must avow my belief in the future of the aeroplane, but it is undoubtedly true that the airship has a much greater radius of action, for forty-eight hours' radius of action is within the compass of the modern ship. They have a much greater carrying power, and they can work much more efficiently at night. The Airship section is developing very effectively. We have a thoroughly good personnel of officers and men together, and the Airship section will form in principle the second stage; in the life of an aeroplane officer, and afford a prospect of a longer career in the Flying Corps than would be possible if he were confined only to flying aeroplanes, because there is no doubt that they fall exclusively in the province of youth. I mean that the work of flying aeroplanes requires very young men. The loss of life during 1913 in the Naval Wing has been limited to three officers, of whom only one was killed in flying a naval aeroplane. One hundred and thirty-one thousand miles were flown in all weathers, mostly across country, but of course we must expect a certain proportion of accidents in the air, and as your airships and aeroplanes extend their action outwards, as they will do this year and next year, some losses must also be expected from other causes than those we have had to reckon with hitherto. Although the machines get better every month, they also fly in more dangerous winds. Still, I am satisfied that no unnecessary risks are run. The officers are very handy, and are for the most part trained mechanics, and, like their submarine comrades, and their comrades in the Military Wing, they are very proud to have the honour of serving their country in time of peace in so conspicuous a fashion.
I have dealt with oil and air. I come now to the increase in officers and men—the general increase in the personnel. The maximum reached in 1911 was 133,715. We have now got 146,000 men. Recruiting this year has been in every way satisfactory. Not only have we got the full numbers which were authorised, but we have got the proper proportion in almost every rank and rating in spite of good trade, and we have had to raise the standard in order not to overshoot the numbers authorised by Parliament. We were 2,000 deficient on the approved numbers at the beginning of the year. That has been made up, and the additional 5,000 sanctioned by Parliament has also been attained. I now ask for a further increase of 5,000 men for 1914–15, raising the total to 151,000 men at the end of the year. That is a figure greater than was borne on the list of the Royal Navy in the climax of the Napoleonic wars. Thus in the three years' period under review, 17,285 men will have been added to the Fleet. In the same period the German increase has been 18,581. I may be asked what is the necessity for the additional 5,000 men for which we are now asking, as compared with the German increase for this year of 6,210. We can at this moment man fully our whole Fleet on mobilisation. There is no shortage of any kind. If war breaks out to-morrow, every ship can be sent to sea with its approved complement. This was also true of the Fleet which existed this time last year. I shall be asked what is the reason for this new increase. It is required not for the War Fleet of to-day, but for the War Fleet of 1916–17, and it will take till then to train the seamen.
We know what the fleet of the next strongest Power will be in these years. We know what our own War Fleet will be and ought to be, and what its duties are at Home and abroad. We know what old ships it will be necessary and worth while to keep on the list, and what new ships are coming on for manning. We know accurately how many men they will require. In this connection I should like to point out that increased complements are needed for the ships on account of the large batteries of 6-inch guns with which the latest units are provided; also on account of the increase in the range of the torpedo, which needs a great number of skilled ratings to attend to it, and of the scientific development of fire control. There is also the increase to which I have referred as due to the new requirements of the Air Service. Lastly, as we know, in 1920, under the German Naval Law, Germany will have 108,000 men in the Navy, and that figure is being reached by increments of about 6,000 a year. I do not wish to prejudge the future, but, while this continues, it is obvious that a large increase will be required from us. Above all, we must not act too late. We must not have the ships ready without men to man them, and in these circumstances we ask authority from Parliament to raise an additional 5,000 men this year. I am perfectly frank with the Committee. This involves a new and continuous charge of about £400,000 per year, which, if it is necessary, must be faced. There will be no difficulty in obtaining the men, and if that were the only result of the increased pay and the improved conditions which have marked the administration of the last few years, the House would have no reason to regret the expense involved. But it is interesting—and I turn aside for one moment in order to refer to it—it is interesting to notice how the increased pay given to the sailors has been spent. I was told at the time by many people that giving sailors more pay would only mean that they would spend more on intoxicants and on pleasures ashore.
Who said so?
I have a right to talk about "some people" without giving an exhaustive category of their names. I am only showing how unfounded their fears were. We, of course, have a considerable knowledge of how sailors spend their money in consequence of the great system of allotments for their families which takes place through the Admiralty. The increase in the number of allotments of officers and men, mainly in favour of their wives and families, has been remarkable since the increase of pay. The number of allotments in force has grown from 58,800 on the 1st January, 1912, to 60,200 on the 31st December, 1913, and 70,000 at the end of last month. That is a very remarkable fact. Equally satisfactory is the increase in the average amount of allotments during these years. At the beginning of 1906 the average monthly rate of allotment by seamen and Marines to their wives and families was 30s. By 1912 it had risen to 42s. 7d., and it is now 43s. 5d per month. There are clear indications—and it is a fact that the House will be pleased to know, because it reflects the greatest credit on the character of the men who man our Fleet—there are clear indications that the recent increase in the pay of the men has resulted in direct substantial advantage to their dependants. When the National Insurance Act came into operation on the 15th July, 1912, 122,000 men serving in the Navy were eligible for insurance. On the 30th December, 1912, the number insured was 113,000. That number has now risen to 123,400, which is a very satisfactory increase, making allowance for the increased number in the Fleet. About 65 per cent. of the men who had the option of refusing the benefits of the Act have elected to be insured.
Most of this increase of 5,000 men for which I am asking will be made up by recruiting boys to be trained as seamen. The Training Squadron at Queenstown has proved a great success in every way, the conditions there being most suitable both for the health and moral welfare of the large numbers of boys who are now quartered there. I have had my attention directed during the year just passed to one important omission in the system of our training service, namely, that there was no way by which the success which attended a boy in his period at the training establishment had a continuous effect when he joined the Navy as a man. You have a very elaborate and careful system of selection in the training service. Great pains are taken to pick out the best boys and use them for positions of responsibility over their fellows, but then when they go to sea as men they are all thrown indiscriminately into the ordinary work and routine of the Service, and nothing gained in the training service stands them in good stead. That is very disheartening to youthful ambition, the cultivation of which is a precious thing. We have arranged—I will not trouble the House with details—a system whereby the good records and advancement of boys in the training service will be of continued value in their after careers, as well as having certain immediate results.
We have decided to substitute this year for the grand manœuvres—not, of course, for the numberless exercises the Fleet is always carrying out—a general mobilisation of the Third Fleet. We are calling up the whole of the Royal Fleet Reserve for a period of eleven days, and those who come up for that period will be excused training next year, and will receive £1 bounty in addition to their regular pay. We have had a most admirable response. 10,170 men, seamen and bluejackets, and 1,409 Marines are required to man the ships of the Third Fleet. We have already, in the few days our circular has been out, received replies from 10,334 men volunteers and from 3,321 Marines. I think that reflects great credit on the spirit of the Reserve generally, and also reflects credit upon the employers, who must have generously facilitated this operation all over the country. I hereby extend to them the thanks of the Admiralty. This test is one of the most important that could possibly be made, and it is really surprising to me that it has never been undertaken before. The cost, including the bounty of £1, will be about £50,000. Having no grand manœuvres yields a saving of £230,000, so there is a net saving on the substitution of £180,000.
I must now tell the House—I am sorry to make such a demand on their patience—of the measures taken to increase the number of officers. That is our greatest difficulty, because the expansion of the Fleet has taken place more rapidly than it is possible to train officers, and we have had to adopt several special measures. In regard to officers we here look forward to the War Fleet of 1920. That is a very great effort of the imagination, but as officers take so long to train, you are bound to make your plans as far in advance as you can. It will give the House an idea of the scale on which German naval developement is being planned if I say that 440 cadets are received this year into the German naval colleges, as against 225 received into Osborne for the British Navy. This, I think, is a very significant state of affairs. An effective increase in the numbers who pass through Osborne and Dartmouth is, of course, necessary, and action has been taken to render that possible. In addition, the following measures have been and will be adopted. We have engaged sixty supplementary lieutenants from the Royal Naval Reserve already, and before the end of 1914 that number will have reached one hundred.
How long is the engagement?
I cannot say off-hand, but it is for the regular term. I have not the term with me, but if the Noble Lord will put down a question I will tell him. We have instituted a new system of special entry of cadets of seventeen or eighteen years of age—that is to say, after they have been to school. Forty-one of those are now training on board the "Highflyer," and the reports are extremely good. They are of a more mature age than the Osborne and Dartmouth Cadets, and assimilate the instruction with very great rapidity. We anticipate that by 1920 we shall have at least 200 lieutenants from this source. Then the system of promotion from the lower deck is proceeding steadily. In order to provide officers for deck duties thirteen mates promoted from the lower deck are now at sea, and we have had very satisfactory reports from the Fleet about them. Thirty-one are going through courses of instruction, so that there will be forty-four of them who will have received tuition by July, 1914; twenty-two more are qualifying, and thirty-five more will be qualified by the 31st March, 1915, or a total of one hundred and one promotions from the lower deck within the period of three years. That process will continue. Then we have instituted quite recently the rank of what are called "mates E"—that is to say, mates engineering. The first batch of ten have already been selected, and we are working at present to have fifty mates promoted from the engine-room to commissioned rank by March, 1918. My right hon. Friend the Financial Secretary will deal further with this important subject of promotion from the lower deck when the Amendment which stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Glamorganshire (Mr. Hugh Edwards) is discussed in the course of these Debates. The direct entry of Marine lieutenants which was found necessary in 1911 has been continued, and forty-four lieutenants had been obtained from that source; two have been promoted from the ranks, and the facilities for promotion from the ranks are open in the Marines as elsewhere. From these additional sources, quite apart from the supply yielded from the colleges, we anticipate to receive by 1920 between 800 and 900 additional lieutenants, and we shall need them all.
One of the most important things in dealing with the executive list of the Navy is to maintain a proper flow of promotion. The Goschen Committee set up as its ideal that 43 per cent. of the lieutenants coming on the list in any one year should ultimately reach the rank of commanders. That is a modest ambition for a man who gives his whole life to the Service. But the numbers have fallen greatly below that, and although the lists of promotion have, during the last year, been nearly doubled, it is necessary that every effort should be made to maintain a steady flow and to prevent the junior ranks from being blocked by the senior ranks. It is very curious in comparing the Army and Navy to see how very different are their systems of promotion. In the Army much care is shown for the young officers, and anyone who really devotes himself wholeheartedly to his profession has an extremely good chance of rising to the rank of field-officer. On the other hand, the Army deal with their senior officers with very great severity, and put them on the retired list in a rigorous and drastic manner. The Navy, on the other hand, subject the younger officers to the most severe system of selection in the junior ranks, and, as I have shown, the majority of lieutenants never reach the rank of commander. But once an officer reaches the position of captain, his progress becomes practically automatic and, subject only to the fact that the First Lord may or may not employ him, and that his non-employment for a certain period entails retirement, he would advance automatically up all the grades of the flag list. Without attempting to revolutionise these methods, which are consecrated by time and which certainly had not been impugned by the results, we do propose to introduce forthwith a series of regulations for the accelerated retirement of senior officers. At present the periods of non-service leading to compulsory retirement are: For admirals and vice-admirals, five years; for rear-admirals, three and a half years, or five years as rear-admiral and captain combined; and for captains and commanders, three years. Experience has shown that these periods are too long, and the result of allowing a flag officer to remain on the list unemployed for as much as five years leads to the presence on the list of a considerable number of officers whom the Admiralty cannot employ. They remain on the list and bar promotion of very suitable men.
It is therefore proposed to reduce the periods of non-service leading to retirement to three years for admirals and vice-admirals, to two and a half years for rear-admirals, and to two years for captains and commanders. It can safely be said that no officer unemployed for any of the periods stated has a chance of being further employed, but if an exceptional case were to arise it could be dealt with by special Order in Council. A further new Regulation is that rear-admirals who have not hoisted their flags at sea should be retired on promotion to vice-admiral. This will ensure that all vice-admirals shall have commanded at sea. In order to give a greater selection on the rear-admiral's list, it is proposed to retire captains on promotion to rear-admirals if the Board of Admiralty decide not to employ them further. These Regulations will apply to all officers who have proved to be unfit for employment as flag officers, either professionally or from age or from reasons of ill-health. The decision in each case will be arrived at after full consideration by the Board of Admiralty on the merits of the officer and the reports of flag officers under whom he has served. We are also instituting a new rank, that of lieutenant-commander. At present there is no new rank at all between the young sub-lieutenant who gets his commission as a lieutenant at twenty-one, and the lieutenant who is promoted to commander perhaps ten or twelve years later. Such a great gap as that ought not to be unbroken by a definite change in title. The present arrangement is that at eight years an extra half stripe is mounted by the lieutenant, and he then ranks with a major in the Army, and the sentry presents arms to him instead of shouldering arms. We think this should be further consolidated by the institution of a definite title, and we propose that all lieutenants of eight years standing shall be called lieutenant-commanders. I may explain that lieutenants under eight years' service in command of vessels, torpedo boats, or destroyers, will be called "lieutenants in command," and not "lieutenant and commander" as is the present practice. That will prevent confusion.
Now I come to matériel. The new programme is in every respect normal—four battleships, four cruisers, twelve destroyers, a large number of submarines, the usual subsidiary craft, and the seaplane ship. Three of the battleships will be in principle "Royal Sovereigns," completing, with the five now under construction, another homogeneous squadron of eight vessels. The fourth battleship will be a faster vessel of the "Queen Elizabeth" type, and will burn oil only. All these ships will be armed with 15-inch guns And a heavy and numerous anti-torpedo boat armament, and the new anti-aircraft weapon will be carried on all of them. They will contain all the improvements which the naval science of the year has justified, and will be in every way the most perfect specimens of our naval architecture. They involve no striking departure from the conclusions reached two years ago, and no new steps towards the gigantic. More than that, I should not now be asked to say. There is one point connected with the new system on which I must enlarge. One of the most important decisions that the Admiralty have had to take for many years was the advance from the 13.5 gun to the 15-inch gun. Two years ago we knew that other countries had already decided, and had actually begun in some cases, to adopt a number of more powerful weapons than we possessed in the 13.5 gun. In the "Queen Elizabeth" type we wished also to have exceptional speed without any loss of gun power or protection, or undue increase in displacement. We had thus to give up one of the five turrets to find room for the extra boiler power, and, in order to maintain our gun power, we had to increase the calibre of the guns. Thus we had eight 15-in. guns instead of ten 13.5 guns.
There is no great difference in cost involved in this. But what is remarkable is that while other countries were debating and experimenting we acted. We ordered the whole of the 15-inch guns for the ships of the 1912–13 programme without ever making a trial gun. We trusted entirely to British naval science in marine artillery, and to the excellence of our gun-making system, and to the quality of British workmanship. When the first of these 15-inch guns was tried a year ago it yielded ballistic results which vindicated, with what is to the lay mind marvellous exactitude, the minutest calculations of the designer. It is the best gun we have ever had. It reproduces all the virtues of the 13.5-inch gun on a larger scale, and it is the most accurate gun at all ranges that we have ever had, and as it is never pressed to its full compass by the explosive charge, it will be an exceptionally long-lived gun. Its power may be measured by the fact that whereas the 13.5-inch gun hurls a 1,400 lb. projectile, a 15-inch gun discharges a projectile of nearly a ton in weight, and can hurl this immense mass of metal ten or twelve miles. That is to say, there has been an increase of rather more than 30 per cent.—I am purposely vague on this point—in the weight of the projectile for an addition of one and a half inch to the calibre. This increase in the capacity of the shell produces results in far greater proportion in its explosive power, and the high explosive charge which the 15-inch gun can carry through and detonate inside the thickest armour afloat is very nearly half as large again in the 15-inch gun as was the charge in the 13.5. If imitation is the sincerest flattery we have a right to be gratified, because apparently the design and armament of the "Queen Elizabeth" and the "Royal Sovereign" have commended themselves so much to the most enterprising naval nations that they are adopting them themselves. But owing to the trust which we were able to place in our artillery science, we shall have ten ships armed with this weapon by the time any other naval Power has two.
I have one consoling observation to make for those who eye the monster ship with disfavour. The offensive power of modern battleships is out of all proportion to their defensive power. Never was the disproportion so marked. If you want to make a true picture in your mind of a battle between great modern ironclad ships you must not think of it as if it were two men in armour striking at each other with heavy swords. It is more like battle between two egg-shells striking each other with hammers. In the light of that illustration, the awful importance of good gunnery must come home to us. The importance of hitting first, and hitting hardest and keeping on hitting, and the necessity of spending money on arriving at the highest possible efficiency in that respect, really needs no clearer proof. But the fact also, I think, suggests doubts as to whether this form of warfare between these enormous ships is not now approaching its culminating phase. The cruiser design of the year is still under consideration, and a further statement will be made by me in July on Vote 8 in general terms.
Small cruisers?
The cruiser design. I am not talking of battleships. The destroyer problem is very interesting at the present time. The destroyer has two functions. Its first function is to destroy the enemy's torpedo craft by gunfire in its own waters. Its second function is the attack by the torpedo on the heavy ships of the enemy. Last year I explained how light cruisers were cutting in on one province of the destroyer, namely, its function in gunnery, and how submarines were cutting in on its torpedo functions. All these tendencies continue, and the North Sea, on account of its size, is less favourable than the Channel was to the effective operations of destroyers. The light cruiser is the true destroyer of torpedo craft in the North Sea. She goes out and stays out in all weathers, and her battery is such that it is instantly decisive against a destroyer. A reduced destroyer programme must be viewed in relation to the abnormal light cruiser programmes of the last two years, when, I may remind the House, we built sixteen cruisers to the German four; but then, of course, the Germans build heavier cruisers than we have been building lately. But then, again, our cruisers must be considered in relation to our armoured cruisers, in which we have a great superiority. So much for cruisers.
The submarine programme of the year is large enough in view of our effective lead in this type of vessel, but further effort will be required in the near future on account of what is going on elsewhere. £1,150,000 is taken for submarines, and the House very properly does not desire to know how many craft will be built for that money. That would unduly reveal the design. We are increasingly convinced of the power of the submarine and the decisive part which this weapon, aided perhaps in some respects by the seaplane, may play in the naval warfare of the future. It is sufficient at the moment to say that the whole system of naval architecture, and the methods of computing naval strength, are brought under review by the ever-growing power, radius, and seaworthiness of the submarine, and by the increasing range and accuracy of its fatal torpedoes. The personal element counts for much in this service, and we are lucky. Frequently in all weathers, in deep water, far out at sea, with no attendant vessel, submarine flotillas exercise with audacity against a swiftly moving fleet or squadron. A certain amount of risk is unavoidable if the captains are to acquire the necessary practical experience. Since I have been in office nine officers and thirty-seven men have perished in submarines. The peace risks of the submarine service approximate more nearly to war risks than in any other branch. It is the most dangerous service in time of peace, and I am bound to say I should not be surprised if it turned out to be the safest service in time of war. Such are the conditions under which this formidable engine is developed. We have at present 268 officers and 3,000 men all thoroughly trained in the submarine service. The destroyer flotillas are at present maintained upon an establishment of eighty destroyers in the First Fleet, which will be reached before the end of the year, and an equal number in the patrol flotilla. I may remind the House that patrol flotillas are all manned with active service ratings in time of war. They have no Reservists at present, and the complements which they have on board are sufficient to enable them to put to sea at once. They could not keep the sea for a long time with their reduced complements, but they can perfectly well discharge their functions for a few days before taking on their balance crews—they are therefore counted as instantly ready for sea. The steady influx of new boats makes it necessary to degrade older vessels continually, and we are now considering a scheme of establishing reserve flotillas to correspond with the Third Fleet, which will be filled in part with Reservists who have recently served in the flotillas, when mobilised. We are using every effort to reduce to the narrowest limits compatible with efficiency the oil consumption of the flotilla while we are building up a reserve, and an intricate system has been devised by the flotilla officers, with the approval of the Board, which has effected a considerable saving. All use of oil-burning destroyers for tenders during torpedo practice, and other ancillary purposes connected with the Battle Fleet, has been stopped, and eight coal-burning destroyers are attached to the Battle Fleet for the subsidiary duties. The flotillas are for the present in the highest state of efficiency, and a remarkable advance in their gunnery and torpedo practice has marked the last two years.
There are three minor points connected with matériel to which I must briefly refer. I have had to take on the Votes £198,000 approximately for changing the electric turrets of the "Invincible." It was reported, after prolonged examination, that this ship could not fire her guns if she went into action with any degree of certainty, and that the electric mountings would break down under the test to which they were subjected. In these circumstances I thought it my duty, although the expense was a heavy one, and it is not a kind of expense one gets much credit for, to have hydraulic mountings prepared, so that this vessel should be properly equipped. We cannot go counting ships as our Fleet strength available for battle at a moment's notice unless we can say they are able to go into action in every respect. The House will expect me to say a word on the arming of merchant ships. Much misconception has arisen on this subject, and it has proved a stumbling block to many. Forty ships have been armed so far with two 4.7 guns apiece, and by the end of 1914–15 seventy ships will have been so armed. They are armed solely for defensive purposes. The guns are mounted in the stern and can only fire on a pursuer. Vessels so armed have nothing in common with merchant vessels taken over by the Admiralty and converted into commissioned auxiliary cruisers, nor are these vessels privateers or commerce-destroyers in any sense. They are exclusively ships which carry food to this country. They are not allowed to fight with any ships of war. Enemies' ships of war will be dealt with by the Navy, and the instructions to these armed merchant vessels will direct them to surrender if overtaken by ships of war. They are, however, thoroughly capable of self-defence against an enemy's armed merchantman. The fact of their being so armed will probably prove an effective deterrent to the depredations of armed merchantmen and an effective protection for these ships and for the vital supplies that they carry. No ships have been armed except those directly connected with the food supply of Great Britain, and the sole reason is that they should be armed against the enemy's ships.
How could they defend themselves if attacked on the bows?
6.0 P.M.
I must not go into these complicated questions of tactics upon which I am no authority. It might, of course, occur to the captain to turn the ship round. This is not the time to argue the question of the capture or immunity of private property at sea. I would remind the House that the decision to uphold the present practice was taken by the Cabinet of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, of which I was not a Member. The question has been recently considered by the present Cabinet, and no decision has been taken to change the policy. There is no reason to suppose that a torpedo boat less would be built by any foreign Power if such a change were made by us. There is one matter in which our practice should undergo alteration. The Board of Admiralty have decided to recommend to the Government the abolition of Prize Money. There is a strong feeling among naval officers that the private enrichment of individuals by acts of warfare is not compatible with the highest conception of the naval and military profession. It has been abolished in regard to the Army, and I believe that it is in accordance with the best naval opinion that similar steps should be taken in regard to the Navy. The question of issuing some grant or bounty to the sailors during the course of a war is under consideration, and it is one which should receive the attention of the Treasury. I have dealt with finance, oil, air, personnel, matériel, and a variety of small questions connected therewith.
I come now to the central problem of our standard. Formerly we have followed the two-Power standard—that is to say, 10 per cent. over the two next strongest Powers. Now that standard has become quite meaningless. The two next strongest Powers, if you take the whole world, would be Germany and the United States, and if you left out the United States, as common sense would dictate, the two next strongest Powers would be Germany and France, which is not a very helpful or reasonable standard to adopt. As a matter of fact, in 1914–15 we shall be conforming to both these tests, absurd and unreasonable though they be. It would not be in the naval interest to base our strength on foundations from which common sense recoils. The 60 per cent. standard was adopted by the Admiralty in 1908 or 1909, and it was announced publicly by me two years ago. That is a building standard of new construction only, and it refers to capital ships only. For cruisers we follow a 100 per cent. standard, and have been for many years. There are other standards for other classes. The 60 per cent. standard was described by me as follows:— year, while the editor of the "National Review," in a comparatively lucid interval, announces that nothing less than sixteen "Dreadnoughts" will save the Board of Admiralty from the traitor's doom. All this should be taken for what it is worth. The Admiralty have no need and no intention to enter into such a controversy. We have not merely stated our standard, but we have declared our programme. Programmes supersede standards, and actual figures are better than percentages. Two years ago I gave the whole series of programmes to the House which we considered necessary. They were 4, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, as against German construction 2, 3, 2, 2, 3, 2. Parliament approved of the principle of that request. That is what we ask for now—no more, no less. That is the Admiralty interpretation of the 60 per cent standard. It takes into consideration all the disputable factors and makes all the necessary allowance for older ships declining in value. It has been carefully safeguarded so as not to tie the hands of this country in future, and to provide for the unforeseen. Since then we have had the "New Zealand" made available for Home service, the "Malaya" presented to us without conditions, and we have had the talk about the Canadian ships, but our programmes have remained unaltered in spite of these additions.
We have now reached the third of these programmes, and when we consider that British shipbuilding is necessarily dependent on what other people do, it will be seen that three years is a long way to look ahead, and certainly a long way to look ahead successfully. I should not hesitate to admit that we were wrong if we had changed our minds, or to say that new steps must be taken if new circumstances had arisen, but after a full survey of the whole situation at home and abroad we consider that four ships are enough for the programme of this year, and we ask the House to affirm the proposals I submitted in my first year of responsibility for this Department. In March, 1912, speaking in the name of the Government and the Admiralty, I said:— Canadian ships, which were additional to these declared programmes, so urgently necessary that an extra British provision, at any rate of a temporary character, must be made to cover the period until they are forthcoming. Upon the general question of these ships and their propriety, and the need for Canada in common with the other Dominions of the Crown, to take an effective part in the defence of the Empire, there is nothing more to be said. The Admiralty view was expounded in the Canadian Memorandum of 1912. To that we adhere, and the facts there adduced have been strengthened rather than weakened by the passage of time. They constitute an absolute justification for Canadian action, and for prompt Canadian action. But besides this general cause there is a more particular reason. In July, 1912, four months after my March statement, the Cabinet having made a new and searching examination of the Mediterranean problem, decided that a British battle squadron should be maintained in that sea, and that we could not afford to leave our interests there indefinitely to the care of powerful cruisers, or battle-cruiser squadrons and flotillas. The Admiralty were then charged with the duty of forming a line of battle in the Mediterranean towards the end of 1915. This was foreshadowed to the House in general terms by the Prime Minister. I do not propose to enter into the reasons which led the Government, with, I think, the general approval of Parliament, to this conclusion. Some of them lie outside the sphere of pure strategy and belong to the domain of State policy. The principal reason was and is that we should remain the independent guardians of our own important and long-established interests in the Mediterranean, and should not incur any exceptional obligations in any direction. The force of such a consideration must be freely admitted. Full effect may be given to it by the Admiralty, providing the necessary margin of safety is maintained in the decisive and vital theatre. In accordance with that policy, we propose to place in the Mediterranean by the end of 1915 a battle squadron based on Malta of eight battleships, six at least of which will be "Dreadnoughts" or "Lord Nelsons," and to substitute this force for the four battle-cruisers that are now stationed there. This will make our force in the Mediterranean by the end of 1915 consist of eight battleships, four large armoured cruisers, four light cruisers of the "Town," class, and sixteen destroyers of the "Beagle" type, which have already gone out, and are a great increase on the force of the previous flotilla. That we consider to be an adequate representation of our strength for all purposes in the Mediterranean during that year.
In order to do this and at the same time to maintain our indispensable margin in Home waters it was necessary that the three Canadian ships should be laid down in the June of last year, or that the completion of three of our own ships of the 1913–14 programme should be hastened by beginning them eight or nine months earlier than was originally proposed. The failure of the Canadian Naval Aid Bill, on which we had counted, obliged us to adopt the second expedient, which was duly announced to Parliament and accepted by the House of Commons, and the Committee has since voted £437,000. With the acceleration of these ships, it will be possible, without impairing our necessary strength at home, to form and maintain a battle squadron in the Mediterranean from the latter part of 1915 to the middle of 1916. We now know, however, that owing to the adverse majority in the Canadian Senate, the Canadian Government will be unable to renew the Naval Aid Bill in the present session, and therefore no Canadian ships will be begun this year. In these circumstances it is necessary for us to repeat, though on a smaller scale, the course that was adopted, last year, and to begin two ships of the 1914 programme at the earliest possible moment so as to have them ready in the third quarter of 1916. Orders to this effect will be given as soon as the House has approved of these Estimates. The tenders are all ready to send out, and the money is taken and included in the Estimates of the year. Additional expenditure from this cause may be estimated at about half a million.
I shall be asked why two ships are sufficient this year, whereas three were required to be accelerated last year. Here is the reason: We are in a better position this year than we were last year. As the total number of our ships increases within the limits of the 60 per cent. standard—I am not going beyond that—so do the numbers available for whole world service. Although the proportion remains the same, a larger number can be spared. During the past year we have, by the unaided exertion of the British taxpayer, improved our margin available for whole world service by one ship, and that improvement will, under the existing programme within the limit of the 60 per cent. standard, be repeated in 1915. If, therefore, in that year any further delay should take place on the part of Canada, the position in the Mediterranean will, as far as we now see, be maintained by the acceleration of only one ship. There are, however, good prospects that the unfortunate deadlock which has arisen in Canada upon this Navy question will be relieved, and that in one way or another, or by one party or the other, or, best of all, by the joint action of both parties, Canada will be able to take some share in her own naval defence and in the common defence of the Empire. After all, Canada is a very great and wealthy community, with interests ever spreading more widely over the surface of the globe. She ought to make some provision for her own naval defence. If she were annexed to the United States of America she would no doubt contribute taxation to the upkeep of the United States navy. If she were independent, she would no doubt have to make provision at least equal to that which is made by the most powerful South American States. Her destiny is in her own hands. I do not wonder that Canadians of every party feel that it is not in accordance with the dignity and status of the Dominion to depend entirely upon the exertions of the British taxpayers, many of whom are much less well off than the average Canadian.
I have left the most important part of my remarks to the end, and though I have spoken at considerable length it would not be right for me to curtail the observations which I hope to address to the House. I now turn to the Pacific, and the aspects of naval policy connected with the great Dominions there. The safety of Australia and New Zealand is secured by the naval power, and the alliances based on the naval power, of Great Britain. No European State would, or could, invade or conquer New Zealand or Australia unless the British Navy had been destroyed. The same naval power of Great Britain in European waters also protects New Zealand and Australia from any present danger from Japan. While Japan is allied to Great Britain, and while Great Britain possesses a sufficient margin of naval superiority, Japan is safe from attack by sea from the great fleets of Europe. In no other way in the years that lie immediately before us can Japan protect herself from danger of European interference. It would appear that the reasons which have led Japan to contract and renew the alliance will grow stronger with time. The growth of European interests in China and the general development of European navies on a scale greater than Japan can afford to imitate will lead her increasingly to rely on that sure protection which British naval supremacy can so easily afford. The obligations of Great Britain to Japan under the alliance are not limited to preventing an armada being dispatched from European waters to alter suddenly the balance of naval strength in the China Sea. We are bound to maintain in these waters a force superior to any other European Power, and consequently any danger to Japan arising from a gradual increase of European squadrons in the Far East is also provided against.
The Naval Agreement of 1909 with the Dominions had as its central principle the idea that we should keep in the Pacific and Indian Oceans double the force of the Australian Fleet unit. We are doing more than that. We are not doing it in the same types. We are keeping the new battle cruisers at Home, where alone they will meet their equals, and we have placed on the China and on the Indian stations the two battleships, "Swiftsure" and "Triumph," and other armoured cruisers, which are quite sufficient for the work they will have to do, and which are not only an equivalent, but are an improvement upon the mere duplication of the Australian Fleet unit. I mention that because suggestions have been made that we have not given full effect to the 1909 Agreement. I maintain that, exercising the discretion of the Admiralty as to the class and disposition of the ships, we have given, and are giving, full effect to it. The alliance with Japan has now been renewed up to 1921, with the full concurrence of the Overseas Dominions. It is not to be expected that even after that date Japan will have less need of that powerful friend at the other end of the world, which will continue to be the first naval power.
Quite apart from the good sense and moderation for which the Japanese Government have become renowned, and quite apart from the great services mutually rendered, and the advantages derived by both Powers from the alliance, there is a strong continuing bond of interest between them on both sides. It is this bond that is the true and effective protection for the safety of Australia and New Zealand, and to this bond depends entirely on the maintenance of British naval supremacy. If the British Fleet were defeated in the North Sea, all the dangers which it now wards off from the Australasian Dominions would be let loose. If the victorious European Power desired any territorial expansion or naval stations in the Pacific, there would be no forces which Australia and New Zealand could command which could effectively prevent it. If Japan chose to indulge in ambitions of empire or colonisation in the Southern Pacific, she would be no loser so far as the European situation was concerned. But we should have lost at a stroke the means both of making our friendship serviceable and our hostility effective. There are no means by which, in the next ten or twelve years, Australia and New Zealand can expect to maintain themselves single-handed. If the power of Great Britain were shattered on the sea, the only course of the five millions of white men in the Pacific would be to seek the protection of the United States. From this point of view the profound wisdom of the policy hitherto adopted by New Zealand can be appreciated.
In giving a splendid ship to strengthen the British Navy at a decisive point, where-ever that point may be, according to the best principles of naval strategy, the Dominion of New Zealand have provided in the most effective way alike for their own and for the common security. No greater insight into political and strategical points has ever been shown by a community hitherto unversed in military matters. The situation in the Pacific will be absolutely regulated by the decision in European waters. Two or three Australian and New Zealand "Dreadnoughts," if brought into line in the decisive theatre, might turn the scale and make victory not merely certain but complete. The same two or three "Dreadnoughts" in Australian waters would be useless the day after the defeat of the British Navy in Home waters. Their existence would only serve to prolong the agony without altering the course of events. Their effectiveness would have been destroyed by events which had taken place on the other side of the globe, just as surely as if they had been sunk in the battle. The Admiralty are bound to uphold and proclaim the broad principles of unity in command and in strategic conceptions, and of concentration in the decisive theatre, and for the decisive event. That is our duty, and we are bound to give that advice in a military and strategic sense. The Dominions are perfectly free. The matter rests entirely in their hands, and the Admiralty's responsibility ceases when the facts have been placed plainly before Ministers, and those to whom they are responsible. It is recognised, however, that time will be required before the principles of naval strategy are applied to their fullest extent in the Dominions, and that in the interval arrangements must be made to develop as far as possible their local naval establishments. The Dominions want to have their own ships under their own control, cruising in their own waters and based on their own ports. They want to have something they can see, and touch, and take pride in, with feelings of ownership and control. These feelings, although unrecognised by military truth, are natural. They are real facts which will govern events.
It is easily understood that the difficulties of enlisting the active co-operation of the Dominions in naval defence by means of ships they rarely see, and which are absorbed in the great fleets of Britain at the other end of the world, are at present insuperable. The Admiralty have, therefore, co-operated loyally and to the best of their ability in the development of the Australian fleet unit. We regard the effort which the Australian Commonwealth is making as heroic, and we will leave nothing undone to make it a complete success. A thoroughly sound arrangement has been made between the Admiralty and the Government relating to the use of the Commonwealth fleet in war. We realise the importance of creating a naval sentiment in the Dominions, and of creating the reserves of personnel which are so valuable, and the local naval establishments which are essential to the full mobility and employment of the Imperial Fleet. It is with the object of combining sound military principles with local aspirations that the design of the Imperial squadron has been conceived. The principle in policy of the Imperial squadron may be compared to a number of farmers each of whom has the ordinary instruments of agriculture on his farm, but who combine together to buy a steam plough and steam thresher, of which each, in turn, according to his needs, can have the use. There should be developed severally in Canadian, Australasian, and South African waters a naval establishment with docks, defences, and repairing plant, which would enable the Imperial squadron, or any division of the British Fleet which might be detached, to operate in each theatre for a prolonged period.
Side by side with this there should be developed in each of these three theatres, so far as may be necessary, and allowing for local conditions, the local defence flotillas, both destroyers and submarines, for the purpose of both defending their bases and establishments, and of operatting in conjunction with the Imperial Squadron when it arrives. Great ships move easily and swiftly about the world, but small craft are, by their nature, localised, and can only traverse the ocean with difficulty and effort. Thirdly, the Dominions should locally maintain the light cruisers necessary, not for fighting battle fleets, but for commerce protection in their own waters, and these cruisers would also combine with the Imperial Squadron or detachment of the British Fleet, when it arrives, to make the Fleet complete in all respects. In this way a true distinction will be made between the services which are essentially local, and those which are necessarily of general Imperial character. The Dominions will be afforded that individual local development which is necessary to arouse and maintain a keen naval interest, and to procure from them the sacrifices necessary for the maintenance or development of their naval power, while at the same time, by sending any capital ships they may have or acquire to the Imperial Squadron, they will create a really strong and effective naval force—not one or two ships isolated on particular stations—which will be able to move rapidly and freely about the world, bringing aid in sufficient strength wherever it may be needed in time of war. That is the right policy which it is my duty to proclaim on an occasion like this, and towards which we believe that future developments will gradually and naturally tend.
I thank the House for the patience with which they have listened to me. No survey, let me say in conclusion, of British Naval expenditure, and no controversy arising out of it, can be confined to our naval strength. It must also have regard to our military resources compared with the resources of all other European States that are building navies. In 1913, when the five great Powers of Europe have increased their naval expenditure by more than £50,000,000 a year, and greater increases are still being made, the British Army, owing to causes which have been fully explained, has actually diminished in numbers. We must take that into consideration when we judge the size of the Naval Estimates. Our naval standards, and the programmes which give effect to them, must also be examined in relation not only to Germany but to the rest of the world. We must begin by recognising how different is the part played by our Navy from that of the navies of every other country. Alone among the great modern States, we can neither defend the soil upon which we live nor subsist upon its produce. Our whole Regular Army is liable to be ordered abroad for the defence of India. The food of our people, the raw material of our industries, the commerce which constitutes our wealth, have to be protected as they traverse thousands of miles of sea and ocean from every quarter of the globe. Here we must consider the disparity of risks and stakes between us and other naval Powers. Defeat to Germany at sea means nothing but loss of the ships sunk or damaged in battle. Behind the German "Dreadnoughts" stand four and a half million soldiers, and a narrow sea-front bristling with fortresses and batteries. Nothing we could do, after a naval victory, could affect the safety or freedom of a single German hamlet.
Behind the British line of battle are the long, lightly-defended stretches of the East Coast, our endless trade routes and food routes, our small Army and our vast peaceful population, with their immense possessions. The burden of responsibility laid upon the British Navy is heavy, and its weight increases year by year. All the world is building ships of the greatest power, training officers and men, creating arsenals, and laying broad and deep the foundations of future permanent naval development and expansion. In every country powerful interests and huge industries are growing up, which will render any check or cessation in the growth of navies increasingly difficult as time goes by. Besides the Great Powers, there are many small States who are buying or building great ships of war, and whose vessels may, by purchase, by some diplomatic combination or by duress, be brought into the line against us. None of these Powers need, like us, navies to defend their actual independence or safety. They build them so as to play a part in the world's affairs. It is sport to them. It is life and death to us. These possibilities were described by Lord Crewe in the House of Lords last year. It is not suggested that the whole world will turn upon us, or that our preparations should contemplate such a monstrous contingency. By a sober and modest conduct, by a skilful diplomacy, we can in part disarm and in part divide the elements of potential danger. But two things have to be considered; First, that our diplomacy depends in great part for its effectiveness upon our naval position, and that our naval strength is the one great balancing force which we can contribute to our own safety and to the peace of the world. Secondly, we are not a young people with a blank record and a scanty inheritance. We have won for ourselves, in times when other powerful nations were paralysed by barbarism or internal war, an exceptional share of the wealth and traffic of the world.
We have got all we want in territory, but our claim to be left in undisputed enjoyment of vast and splendid possessions, largely acquired by war and largely maintained by force, is one which often seems less reasonable to others than to us. Further, we have intervened regularly, as it was our duty to do, and as we could not help doing, in the affairs of Europe and of the world, and great advantage to European peace has resulted, even in this last year, from our interference. We have responsibilities in many quarters to-day. We are far from being detached from the problems of Europe. We have passed through a year of continuous anxiety, and, although His Majesty's Government believe the foundations of peace among the Great Powers have been strengthened, yet the causes which might lead to a general war have not been removed and often remind us of their presence. There has not been the slightest abatement of naval and military preparation. On the contrary, we are witnessing this year increases of expenditure by Continental Powers in armaments beyond all previous experience. The world is armed as it was never armed before. Every suggestion or arrest or limitation has so far been ineffectual. From time to time awkward things happen, and situations occur which make it necessary that the naval force at our immediate disposal, now in this quarter, now in that, should be rapidly counted up. On such occasions the responsibilities which rest on the Admiralty come home with brutal reality to those who are responsible, and unless our naval strength were solidly, amply, and unswervingly maintained, the Government could not feel that they were doing their duty to the country.
The right hon. Gentleman in his long and interesting speech has covered, as usual, a great deal of ground; in fact, I am not sure that he has not covered on this occasion more ground not only than I ever remember, but certainly more than I can possibly attempt to follow him upon in the time allowed to me, and within the limits of the patience of the House. I wish, therefore, to be as brief as I can in dealing with the right hon. Gentleman's speech, and I find that the more easy because, in my view, the true situation is much too grave for us to be contented to obscure it with details. The right hon. Gentleman dealt, as was necessary, with a very large number of details. He began with a sort of preamble or financial comparison between the expenditure of this year and previous years, and that portion of his remarks were perfectly openly addressed to his Friends who sit behind him and was in the nature of an apology. But in my position I am not interested in the views of the Members who sit behind the right hon. Gentleman, and it is not for me to apologise to them. I do not propose to follow him at all in the early portion of his speech. As he proceeded, I must confess that I experienced a growing sense of disappointment that, amidst all this mass of detail with which he dealt, and very properly, dealt, he seemed to have forgotten the fundamental policies which he himself has laid down on behalf of the Government in past years, and to which he and the-Government have pledged themselves irretrievably. Whilst I admit that details are important, I propose, as far as I am concerned this afternoon, to postpone what I wish to say about those details till the further discussion of Votes A and I, and to concentrate upon what seems to me the most serious and striking aspect of these Estimates, and that is the complete and unaccountable failure of the right hon. Gentleman to keep the precise and oft-repeatd pledges which he has given both to the House of Commons and to the Empire. That is a serious charge to make against the Government, seeing that it is the safety of the Empire that is at stake, but I venture to say that I can prove it up to the hilt. Here I feel bound to protest against the suggestion which has been made in some quarters that we should refrain from attack or adverse criticism upon the right hon. Gentleman, because these Estimates are supposed to indicate that he has emerged semi-victorious, at any rate, from his recent contests with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and that he has done as well as could be expected under the circumstances. That irresistibly reminds me of the celebrated admonition that used to be chalked up in Western concert rooms, "Do not shoot at the man at the piano; he is doing his best." The right hon. Gentleman may be doing his best, but I demur to the suggestion that he has had any super-human difficulties to contend with. He knows perfectly well that any shooting that has come from his own side has only been blank cartridge. He no doubt has had to pretend to take it seriously out of politeness to those of his Friends who sit behind him, but I am quite unwilling to believe that the perfectly futile opposition which he has received from that quarter can have deflected his course for an instant. He knows that in this sham fight with the reduction of armaments section he holds all the keys to the position, and that he is bound to win. I have watched this kind of opposition even more years than he has, and I know that whilst the reductionists sometimes threaten and sometimes even go to the extent of saying that they are going to vote against the Government, when it comes to the point, although they may bark they never, never bite, and they only vote if they are perfectly certain that their votes are going to be ineffective. If there was the slightest suspicion that by their votes they would succeed in reducing the Estimates, why, they would vanish like the wedding guests of the Scripture or like the snows of yesterday.
Because you are insincere.
I really do not intend to take up that interruption. I must say that under those circumstances I do not think the right hon. Gentleman really has any excuse whatever for having failed to keep his pledges in regard to policies which he has himself laid down, and there is no reason why we on this side, should refrain from insisting that those pledges should be performed. The fact that the Estimates of this year show a nominal increase of £2,750,000, really has very little to do with the case, because, as the right hon. Gentleman himself pointed out to-day, this increase is mainly due, either to the rise in prices, or, still more, to past commitments with regard to programmes which have already been approved, and have in fact been delayed. He shows an increase of £2,750,000 but, on the other hand, he shows a startling decrease in the new programme of construction which is provided for the strengthening of the Navy. He said truly enough just now before he sat down, that the expansion of the Navy must continue as the contraction of our Army proceeds. That is a feature which I was very glad to hear him acknowledge. It is a very serious feature, this continual reduction of our military forces, and it could only be excused, and personally I do not think it can, if it were balanced by a corresponding increase in our naval strength. As far as this great increase in expenditure to which he refers is concerned, I find that during the last ten years taking national defence as a whole, our expenditure has only increased by £7,000,000. During that same period our national expenditure has increased by nearly £50,000,000.
You decreased it by £5,000,000.
I am not going into the question of one party or the other; I am stating what is the actual fact that during the past ten years I believe the increase on expenditure for national defence has only been some £7,000,000.
made an observation which was inaudible.
I do not want to enter into a controversy about that. I want to come at once to the serious point of formulating the definite charges which I make against the right hon. Gentleman and the Government. I want to do so as briefly and clearly as I can, and in order that these charges shall carry weight, I intend to base them absolutely and entirely upon the considered statements of the right hon. Gentleman himself or Members of the Government speaking for the Government, and upon their own oft-repeated pledges. At this point I wish to emphasise the fact upon which I have been challenged by the right hon. Gentleman in previous years, that it is not the busi- ness of the Opposition at this stage to lay down an alternative programme of naval construction or an alternative naval policy by which our sea supremacy should be maintained. But, having said that, I say it is our business and it is our duty to insist that the Government shall, at any rate, keep the pledges which it has itself made, and shall at least live up to that programme which it has declared to be the minimum compatible with security. I therefore come to what I may call the broken pledges of the Government under three heads. The first head deals with the general standard of strength, the second with regard to the position in the Mediterranean, and the third with regard to the Canadian ships and contributions from the Dominions. I will take the general standard of strength first. I am surprised to hear the standard which has been known as the 60 per cent. standard, but which was coupled with very material qualifications by the right hon. Gentleman when he introduced it, called just now by him a "building standard." I would venture to remind him that it is something a good deal more than a building standard. It is a standard of strength to be actually maintained in commissioned ships of the "Dreadnought" class. The right hon. Gentleman laid down only a year ago with regard to this standard:— have no other reliable sources of information. First of all, with regard to the spring, or say the summer of this year, the right hon. Gentleman furnished a Return to my Noble Friend who sits behind me, in January of last year, in which he showed what will be the available strength in ships of the "Dreadnought" class on the 1st of April, 1914. That Return showed that Great Britain would have twenty-nine ships of that class, although, as a matter of fact, I think there would be twenty-eight, because the "Benbow" is not completed, and Germany would have twenty-one. That is as to the immediate future. A 50 per cent. increase over twenty-one means a total of thirty-two.
On the right hon. Gentleman's own showing, and, indeed, the facts are not disputed, we have now twenty-eight, and therefore at the present moment or in the next few months, on the 50 per cent. standard, the right hon. Gentleman is three ships short, and on a 60 per cent. standard he is five ships short. In the spring of 1915—and again I take his own official statement in his Memorandum to the Canadian Government—he told the Canadian Government that in Home waters, in the spring of 1915, Great Britain would have thirty-one ships of the ''Dreadnought" class against Germany's twenty-three. Fifty per cent. additional to twenty-three makes not thirty-one, but thirty-five. Therefore, in the spring of next year, according to his own statement, in Home waters he would be no less than four ships short of its own declared standard. We come to the spring and summer of 1916, the latest date to which I wish to refer, because it is the date which is directly affected by these Estimates, and at that time Great Britain will have thirty-nine ships of the "Dreadnought" class, or forty including the "New Zealand," and Germany will have twenty-six. Sixty per cent. over twenty-six gives a total of forty-two, so that again, at that date, the right hon. Gentleman's provision will be at least two ships short. I have taken these figures, which I hope will be the only ones I shall have to give to the House, from the right hon. Gentleman's own statements, and I think I am justified in saying therefore that in this matter, judging him by his own standard, he has failed to produce the force which he himself declared to be necessary. I am not going to argue at length the old controversy as to whether "Lord Nelson's" should or should not be included.
You decided it in that sense; we did not.
The right hon. Gentleman says that I had decided it. I do not think it is a matter that I can decide. But when the right hon. Gentleman is asked to furnish to Parliament an official return of ships of the "Dreadnought'' type, and, in making that return, he leaves out the "Lord Nelson's," and puts a footnote "The 'Australia' and two 'Lord Nelson's' have been omitted," I think I am justified in omitting them also.
It is true that they were omitted from ships of the "Dreadnought" type, but the "Lord Nelson's" have always counted for purposes of the 60 per cent. standard.
They have counted in the recent calculations of the right hon. Gentleman.
From the very first days when the 60 per cent. standard was adopted—five years ago.
I am unable to accept that statement.
It is absolutely true.
It has been, I am aware, a bone of controversy for a long time. Why did not the right hon. Gentleman include them in his own return of "Dreadnought" ships?
They are not "Dreadnoughts."
Because they are not "Dreadnoughts?'' They are dialectical "Dreadnoughts." They are very useful in these Debates when the Government are in a hole about the provision of strength. I do not want to go into technical details, beyond saying that ships which were designed previous to the "Dreadnought," which are some three knots slower than our earliest "Dreadnoughts," and therefore cannot manœuvre with them in homogeneous squadrons, are not, and should not, be counted, and have not been counted in the official return. In regard to the standard of strength, I have shown that the Government has failed to maintain the standard which it has itself laid down. The right hon. Gentleman says that programmes should supersede standards. But facts supersede programmes, and I have given the facts as taken from the official returns. We do not accept the 60 per cent. standard, even if it were maintained, as being adequate. We never have from the start; we have never considered it to be adequate.
What do you consider adequate?
It is not our business to lay down a standard.
Is it less than a 60 per cent. standard, or more?
It is more. But it is not our business to lay down a standard until we have to assume responsibility. I would remind the right hon. Gentleman, when he is figuring in these decimal points, that he told us on 26th March last year that small margins of safety mean a vigilance in Naval ports little removed from a state of war. Yet, as I think I have shown, even these small margins have not been maintained. We are in a difficulty in regard to this matter owing to the fact that the Government has set up a standard only in ships of the "Dreadnought" class, and they form by no means the only important essentials of a fighting fleet. It has always been admitted that in smaller craft we should maintain an even larger margin. The right hon. Gentleman said that it has been the practice of the Admiralty to maintain a larger standard in the smaller types of ships. It is, therefore, with great regret that we see this year in these smaller types a great reduction even upon last year. There are no large cruisers; there is a reduction of 50 per cent. in the light cruiser programme, and of 40 per cent. in the destroyer programme; and whilst we are all waiting with interest for the great development in submarines at which the right hon. Gentleman hinted, we get little comfort from the Estimates with regard to them, because we do not find that this reduction in the provision of other smaller craft is counter-balanced by any substantial increase in the amount of money provided for submarines. On the contrary, the amount provided is very slightly more than last year. I believe it cannot be denied that upon this class of craft we have spent less, in the last five years than has been spent by Germany.
I hope to deal with other points arising out of the programme—Air Service, oil personnel, and matters of that kind—when we come to Votes A and 1. I want to continue to concentrate my remarks this afternoon upon the Government's broken pledges. I now come to the second point in regard to which I think the Government has failed to keep the undertaking which it has given to the House—that is, in regard to the Mediterranean. The right hon. Gentleman, in the latter part of his speech, held out some prospect that the matter was going to be seriously considered by the Government, and that a Fleet of some strength was to be established in the Mediterranean in the near future. But when he told us that that Fleet was to consist of four "Dreadnoughts" and two "Lord Nelsons" at a time when the Fleets of Italy and Austria would contain at least ten "Dreadnoughts" and three vessels of a class which are admittedly equal to the "Lord Nelsons," I say that that is making a totally inadequate provision for maintaining our prestige and interests in that sea.
Is it the policy of the party opposite that we should maintain in the Mediterranean a strength equal to that of Italy and Austria combined?
I have never suggested that we should, nor is it, I would repeat, our business to lay down a policy. But it is not excessive to suggest that the British strength in those waters should at any rate be equal to a one-Power standard. At the period when this Fleet is to be in the Mediterranean it is admitted that the Italian Fleet, which is the stronger of the two, will have six vessels of the "Dreadnought" class, against which the right hon. Gentleman is proposing to put four "Dreadnoughts" and two "Lord Nelsons."
And two other battleships.
Against those you put the pre-"Dreadnoughts" of the Italian Fleet. I say that, in view of its vital strategic interest to us—this is not merely a question of enhancing our prestige, it is a question of vital interest, of protecting our route to India, our position in Egypt, our great trade routes in the Mediterranean, and our food supply, a large portion of which comes along that route—whatever else the provision the Government is proposing to make may be, it is not in any sense of the word keeping the pledge which was solemnly given to the House of Commons and to the country by the Colonial Secretary only two years ago. It has been often quoted, but I feel bound to call the attention of hon. Members to it again. The Colonial Secretary stated:
"We shall maintain our position in the Mediterranean, both on land and on sea, to as full an extent as we have ever done in the past, and in so doing we shall depend upon no alliance or understanding, actual or implied, but upon our own forces."
That was a deliberate statement of policy put forward by the Government two years ago. Does anyone say that the importance of our position in the Mediterranean has lessened since that declaration was made? Yet our relative naval and military strength in the Mediterranean continues steadily to dwindle. It would not be in order on this occasion to discuss the military garrisons. I will only say that since the present Government came into office the garrisons at Malta and Gibraltar have both been reduced by 25 per cent.
Our naval strength has increased, having regard to the modern type of ships.
In the Mediterranean? Does the right hon. Gentleman say that, relatively speaking, our naval strength is greater than it was when the present Government came into office? If so, it is the most surprising statement that I have ever heard, and one which I think it would be quite impossible for the right hon. Gentleman to substantiate. Our naval and military strength there has steadily dwindled. The only thing the right hon. Gentleman has done recently is to adopt the device of sending temporarily a squadron, detaching it from Home waters, in order to show the flag in the Mediterranean. But that squadron forms an integral part of the 50 per cent. margin of superiority which he has said was to be maintained at all times in Home waters. It is quite impossible to count it twice. The right hon. Gentleman is in this dilemma: If we have an adequate showing of strength, such as we had last winter in the Mediterranean, we fall below the standard of security necessary for the North Sea—
No, we do not.
7.0 P.M.
Will the right hon. Gentleman, at any rate, allow me to proceed with my speech? He made many statements with which I profoundly disagreed, but I did not interrupt him at every moment. On the other hand, if the 50 per cent. standard in "Dreadnought" ships—because that is the standard which the right hon. Gentleman himself laid down—is maintained in the North Sea, the Mediterranean is virtually abandoned. That is the position there. It is perfectly clear, with regard to this question of the Mediterranean alone, that we are a whole squadron of battleships short, and in addition we are short of ships for what is called the Imperial patrol. I do not think it can be doubted in this matter that, whatever makeshifts may be adopted by the Admiralty, the Government has completely failed to carry out the precise pledges given by the Colonial Secretary on its behalf two years ago. That is the second point in my indictment.
I now come to the third and last point in regard to the Government's pledges—that is in regard to the three Canadian ships and the other contributions from the Dominions. This is a very grave matter, because it affects the relations between this country and the Colonies. At the same time I altogether dissent from the view that it would be at all wise or possible, in the best interests either of Great Britain or of the Dominions, to pass over it in silence. On the contrary, I think it is in the interests, both of this country and of Canada, that the position should be made perfectly plain. I will deal, first of all, with the Canadian ships. I may recall to the House, as the matter is in dispute, what are the repeated assurances given by the right hon. Gentleman. On 31st March of last year, dealing with this question of the Canadian ships, and speaking, first of all, as to what he called "the reality of the need of the three Canadian vessels," the right hon. Gentleman said:— ment now would be equivalent to declaring that the Canadian offer was unnecessary, and even provocative, and that we in this country, as a matter of fact, incited Canada to take action by describing to her a state of affairs which had no foundation in fact. If words mean anything the Government is irretrievably pledged to provide those three ships in the absence of the Canadian assistance. If, of course, Canada is able, if the political situation there is so adjusted that Canada is able to fulfil the offer later, well and good. Meantime, we have got to have the ships, according to the Admiralty's own statement. If we are to have them by the date which we were told is necessary they have got to be begun immediately—if, indeed, it is not already too late to get them by the date mentioned. I will recall to the attention of the House another statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty with regard to this point, contained in a Memorandum which he issued. He said:— of 1916, and they are going to allow it to remain open for five or six months from that date. In a kind of half-hearted recognition of the danger, which they themselves described, they are going to accelerate two ships of this year's ordinary programme—two ships which, I assume, cannot possibly be ready, even begun early, as they are going to be, before October or November, 1916. Therefore, this will not at all cover that period of the second and third quarters of 1916, which the right hon. Gentleman himself told us last year was a particularly disadvantageous time for our margin to fall below that fixed.
They will be ready in the third quarter.
All I can say is that in that case the right hon. Gentleman will be performing an unparalleled feat in building battleships considerably under two years, whilst the average of the whole of the "Dreadnoughts" we have built in the last seven or eight years has been over twenty-seven months.
Thirty months.
That is really a very interesting point. Does the right hon. Gentleman tell us that these ships are going to be laid down at once?
They will be ordered.
I venture to say that "laid down" is a movable feast, and I say that those ships cannot be completed with any kind of reasonable probability before October, 1916. My contention is that the Government plan only partially staves off the evil day for another six months. We shall get two ships in 1916 that we otherwise would not have got until February or March, 1917—that is all! What is the effect upon the Parliamentary position, which I think is of some importance to Members of this House? By the time we arrive at next November, the value of the whole of these accelerations will have completely evaporated. The gap will once more recur. We shall have ordered and accelerated every single ship that has been sanctioned by Parliament under any programme of any sort or kind, and the only way in which the gap can then be dealt with will be by the Admiralty coming down to this House in a special Autumn Session—if one has not otherwise been called—and introducing entirely new Estimates and a new programme of construction. The alternative is to allow this gap, which creates a position of danger, to continue indefinitely until Parliament meets again. I do not know really what the right hon. Gentleman may have in his mind; he may perhaps not feel absolutely certain that he himself will be responsible for the naval policy of this country by the time we reach November of this year: it may be the policy of the Government to leave a situation, in all matters of finance, in as embarrassing a condition as possible for their successors. At any rate, it will be under this policy of acceleration, the possibilities of which are now exhausted, which will make it impossible for the Government to fill the gap unless a new programme of construction is presented to Parliament in October or November of the present year.
That is not a situation which Members of this House can regard with any enthusiasm. Though the right hon. Gentleman may be a very skilful dialectician, there is one thing that even he cannot do, and that is that under no circumstances and by no means can he ever make four ships into seven. As we were told, these three Canadian ships would be absolutely essential to the security of the Empire in the spring of 1915, I come back to my point: which is that it is the duty of the Government to see that they are laid down at once. Unless they do that they will have broken another of the specific pledges which they have given to the House of Commons. This promise should be kept not merely because these ships are vitally necessary for the defence of the Empire, but also because it is of the utmost importance that in these matters we should keep faith with the Dominions. I reminded the House just now of the statement of the right hon. Gentleman that under no circumstances would the Home Government fail in its duty to the Overseas Dominions. We all know that it is not the fault of the-Canadian Government that they have not been able to make provision for these ships. That is no reason why we should fail in our duty. I spoke of these because in other minor matters the Government have failed to keep their pledges in regard to those Dominions which have provided capital ships to strengthen the Imperial Fleet. The Government count those ships in its own 60 per cent. standard of strength, although they were given on the express understanding that they would not be so counted. I was amazed just now to hear the right hon. Gentleman, speaking about the "Malaya," saying that it would be included—
Never!
The right hon. Gentleman did not say so! I am distinctly within the recollection of the House, and the right hon. Gentleman said that the "Malaya" would be included in the 60 per cent.
What I said was that the "Malaya" would never be included in any calculation of the 60 per cent. standard, nor would it ever be included in any fixed programme which I gave to the House.
I certainly then most completely misunderstood the right hon. Gentleman. Perhaps, when he sees the OFFICIAL REPORT to-morrow, he will see that there is some justification for my misapprehension; but I gladly accept his statement at once, for the last thing I should wish to do would be to convict the Government of any breach of understanding with one of our Dominions. At any rate, we know that these ships, that the whole of these Dominion contributions, were to increase the margin of safety which should be available for the whole of the Empire. It is a fatal mistake, as in the case of the "New Zealand," in anyway to take advantage of their generosity by counting those ships in, because it is quite clear, as the right hon. Gentleman has pointed out in the eloquent concluding passage of his speech, that we shall more and more need the help of our Dominions in the future if the position of the Empire is to be maintained. It is of the utmost importance that we shall not allow their new-born enthusiasm in this matter to be chilled at the outset. Certainly this is no time in dealing with them, to absorb their spontaneous contributions into that standard of naval strength, which we have stated we are going to maintain ourselves, and which, as a matter of fact, we are not maintaining at the present time. It is the more important because it is the new policy of the Government—we have it in the right hon. Gentleman's own words—to inspire the Dominions
"to make exertions for their own security, and to preserve, restore or increase the world-wide mobility of the Imperial Fleet."
And if we are going to do that I venture to say we must do what President Wilson called "the large thing" in dealing with them, and we must not allow suspicion to grow up in the minds of our fellow citizens in the Dominions that we are going to seek their help in order to save our own pockets. I am afraid I have detained the House already at considerable length, but I have had to follow a speech also of some length, and it is very difficult to compress what one wishes to say within very narrow limits. But I venture to say that the actual facts which I have adduced based upon official returns and statements, prove, I think, that the Government has unaccountably failed to keep its precise pledges. I say that with the sincerest regret, because apart from the fact that it is our naval strength that is affected, I am always anxious to keep the Navy out of politics, and the facts appear to me to be beyond question. I cannot add usefully to the very striking picture that the right hon. Gentleman gave us in his peroration of the growing perils that surround us in the present state of the world. One does not need to be either a pessimist or a scaremonger, and I am perfectly well aware I am suspected of being both.
What about the scare in 1909?
If it was not for 1909 and the action we then took we should be in an even more deplorable position than we are to-day. One does not need to be either a pessimist or a scaremonger—I hope hon. Gentlemen opposite will not call the First Lord either of these wicked names, but he used exactly the same illustration that I bring forth—to see that whilst we alone of all the nations in the world are reducing our defensive forces, all the others—at any rate all the important nations in Europe—are increasing theirs with feverish and sinister haste. Why are they doing so? I confess in many cases I do not understand. I doubt even if they always understand why they are doing it, but the fact remains, and it is clear that this process of piling up armaments in Europe cannot be indefinitely extended without a disastrous explosion. Meanwhile we alone of all the great Powers are perpetually wringing our hands in public over this burden of armaments, a burden that we are able to bear infinitely better than any other nation in the world, and we are encouraging doubts as to our determination to maintain our sea supremacy. And we do this in the most exasperating way by alternating boasting and whining, and we confuse and irritate friends and foes alike by our algebraic formulæ of strength which never work out the same, and by our neat but shifty arithmetic. I do not think arithmetic or algebra will ever determine the fate of nations. If the right hon. Gentleman will only give up these formulæ, which are apparently clear to nobody—because I have honestly tried to understand them and work them out, but they never work out the same—and if he would adopt a clear and plain policy that the whole world could understand, and stick to it, I venture to say we should not be subject to those recurring scares and constant humiliations. In the concluding passages of his speech of two years ago, the right hon. Gentleman said this:—
"On behalf of the Admiralty I shall ask for nothing that is not necessary, and I have asked for nothing that I have not got."
If the right hon. Gentleman were in his place now I should like to address a question to him. In his absence I shall address it to the right, hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty: Is the First Lord able to say to-day that the Admiralty have not asked for anything which they have not got? I am justified in asking that because I claim they are short of their own standard. The right hon. Gentleman went out of his way two years ago to say that he had asked for nothing that he had not got. I venture to say we are entitled to ask today, Is he prepared to make the same statement in this House now? I venture to say he cannot do so. If he said he had we would want to know on what grounds he had spontaneously, and of his own free will, arrived at the conclusion which led him to cancel the pledges and statements he made last year. Of course, as we know must be the case, after what took place in the Cabinet, the Admiralty have not got what they asked, and therefore we can only deduce that the minimum compatible with security has not been secured by these Estimates, and I should like to know by what process of reasoning, or honour, can the right hon. Gentleman and the Admiralty accept that disastrous condition of affairs. It is not surprising, in view of this fact, and the array of broken pledges, which I think I have demonstrated, that we should have lost faith in the policy of the right hon. Gentleman and the Admiralty—a policy which he told us in the grandiloquent language of which he is such a master, only two years ago, he would coolly and inflexibly pursue, but which we find, as events have shown, so far from being coolly and inflexibly pursued, has been flexibly twisted and coolly explained away.
The hon. Gentleman has rather taunted those of us, who have always asked for reason in our expenditure, because we have ventured to criticise Estimates which we could not follow, and have always asked that we should be convinced by reason and judgment, and that we should wisely Vote the money which we are asked to spend. We, at any rate, have been entirely consistent in the course of policy we pursue in this House. The hon. Gentleman has said he feared he would be taken for a pessimist and a scaremonger. I regret to say that exactly fits the impression I have of him from statements he has made in this House. I remember the hon. Gentleman said he was so alarmed in regard to the condition of this country that he could not sleep.
I think the hon. Gentleman has misunderstood what I said. I went much further than that. I said I never slept well since the present Government came into Office.
At any rate, on that-occasion he declared he was unable to sleep, so much was he alarmed. I do not think the question of personal fears should enter into our Debates. But in regard to being a scaremonger, I greatly fear that that description fits the hon. Gentleman. I remember he took part in the Debate in 1909, when the German scare was on, and here is what was then said by one of the hon. Gentleman's admirers, not by a member of the "Suicide Club," as he calls us. I read the description of the Debate in which he took part:—
"The Machiavellian cunning o the dastard Germans was held up to us as a sword of Damocles, suspended above our national existence, and the whole scene was staged in atmosphere of serious and vivid apprehension that could only be justified by a fear of immediate international complications.…The Debate which followed was unique—the Hansard of that day contains a great medley of palpable misstatements and ridiculous false calculation that has ever before burdened a similar number of pages. The Opposition, preforce took the three Ministers at their word and rubbed the situation in with healthy and permissible vigour. The game developed apace and the novel feature of discovering 'years of the greatest danger' entered into the problem."
Does the hon. Gentleman suggest that we should not take the Minister's word on that occasion?
I am not suggesting anything of the kind. I am showing what he represented to be the state of things, and I am saying that he made statements that cannot be supported. He tells us that there was the greatest danger, and that that was a critical moment, though the hon. Gentleman had no proof for it. The description goes on:— have taken their courage in their hands, and have determined to put an end to this gigantic expenditure which threatens to ruin their country. We are seeking trouble putting everybody right, dominating the Pacific, and other things, and, really, there is very little need for further explanation for these great Estimates. It would be no surprise whatever to me if, on the lines laid down in the speech of the First Lord to-day, we ultimately have Estimates of £70,000,000 or £80,000,000 or even £100,000,000 for the Navy. I listened to the right hon. Gentleman's speech for two or three hours, and when he came to the concluding portion of it, he was not easy to follow, nor was his intention clear. With regard to the right hon. Gentleman's allusion to the Canadian question, I was exceedingly sorry to hear him lecture Canada upon her duty to herself. I have never made any secret of the fact that I think the right hon. Gentleman made a mistake there. His attempt to lecture the Colonies is very unwise, and his effort to capture Canada for Imperial purposes was also very unwise, because it has raised all the old spirit which fought against a centralised system and which resulted in giving self-government to the Colonies.
The right hon. Gentleman's idea is a contribution from Canada to be managed by us in a manner in which they have no say away from their own shores. If the system adopted in the case of Australia and New Zealand is perfectly legitimate, why is it not legitimate in the case of Canada. We know the enormous difficulties which have been raised in Canada. A very strong feeling has been created there which has prevented any action being taken, and I regret the language of the right hon. Gentleman in regard to Canada. It is impossible to follow the First Lord in all the details he has given us. I wish to enter a protest against the position in which we find ourselves in regard to the Navy Estimates. We are quite unable to ascertain what has been done, and we are quite in the dark. We have to depend on the First Lord's statement in order to ascertain what committals we have been led into, and what expenditure is being entailed by them. I will give a specific instance of how we are committed to enormous new costs without any forecast of what they are likely to be, and without any Estimate of what the new policy may involve. We have been committed without being informed to most important and serious expenditure in regard to the battleships of the 1913–14 programme. It was never announced in regard to those battleships that they were to be all oil ships. That decision was come to without the knowledge of Parliament, and we are only informed of this fact after the event. We have never had a forecast or Estimate for that expenditure, and even now we are only able to drag out some of the costs into which we have been plunged. We hear that oil is responsible for an increase of £1,500,000 this year. Is that to be the end of it? Certainly not; and there is no likelihood of that being the end of it, in fact, it is only the beginning. That is the Estimate to-day. We see already in the Estimate oil storage accommodation and machinery connected with it, a sum of £1,290,000, of which there appears in these Estimates £345,000, and we have still to raise the balance of that sum. That is in addition to the £1,500,000 you are already paying in the Estimates this year for oil. That is an illustration of the serious committal into which this country is being led without any means of us knowing where it is going, or what it is going to cost.
The right hon. Gentleman promised to give us a figure including all these items, but he has not done so. He has told us that certain figures give us £1,500,000, but that does not include all he promised. I will take another case, the arming of merchantmen. That is a matter which has never been discussed in this House, and no Estimate has been given before. A little more light has been thrown upon the subject to-day, but in the Estimates, voluminous as they are, there is not a single item by which you can trace what has been done in regard to the arming of merchantmen. The only reference is that you are going to train officers to manage these guns. What does that policy mean? Are we going to arm all our merchantmen? We have 2,340 merchant ships on our foreign trade, and if you reckon two guns on each, that means nearly 4,700 guns. Perhaps the House will be interested to hear that on all our light cruisers there are only 570 guns of this calibre; so that we are to supply eight times that number for the merchant ships of this country. What is going to be the cost and the effect of that? The suggestion that these guns are only for defence is ridiculous. That fact was brought out when an hon. Member stated that they could only fire aft. What will happen if they are attacked on the bow? The whole thing is absurd. There is another item of which there is no trace whatever in the Estimates, and that is the cost of aircraft. You cannot put your finger on a single-item in this matter, and we are entirely dependent on the First Lord's statement. He has told us of the amount of those committals last year, which, by the way, were incurred without the consent of Parliament last July, and he is again committing us to an enormous amount for aircraft, no mention of which can be found in the Estimates, and we have to depend entirely upon his statement for our information. He has told us that aircraft is going to cost £300,000 more than last year. The whole thing is shrouded in mystery, and it should be the first duty of the Admiralty to place before us clear accounts by which we can follow the process of this expenditure.
The hon. Member will find that these Estimates include the item he has alluded to under new construction.
8.0 P.M.
At any rate, I have not been able to find it. We have been taunted by the light hon. Gentleman because we did not draw attention to the gigantic Estimate for new construction last year, which included everything. Whatever we might have done with regard to new construction, we have had no control whatever over the item of £900,000 for aircraft. We had no indication whatever in regard to oil fuel, which is responsible for £1,500,000, and we had no indication of the expenditure in regard to the arming of merchant ships, and certainly no clue to the question of acceleration. All those items were undertaken without the authority of Parliament, and we have been committed to this enormous expenditure. When the right hon. Gentleman taunts us with not having noticed this, and says that we have no right to protest, he seems to have forgotten all these items, and he is quite incorrect, because he has done all these things without our knowledge or consent. The right hon. Gentleman himself has told us that you can get no knowledge from these Estimates, for he said:— what is being done in regard to the expenditure. The First Lord has spoken of the increase in the Estimates while he has been in his present office. There was the great panic of 1909, which we now know was not justified, when all the provision was made for the building of eight battleships and we were told, "We want eight and we won't wait." Two years afterwards the First Lord told us we could have a reduction in Navy expenditure, but no sooner had the right hon. Gentleman succeeded the Home Secretary, than in the very first year for which he was responsible, instead of the reduction for which we were looking, we had an increase of £2,661,000. In the next year the original Estimates, together with the Supplementary Estimates, show the further increase of £3,733,000. and the following year—that is this year—the increase is £2,740,000, or a total increase in the three years during which the right hon. Gentleman has been in office of £9,135,000. For this gigantic increase in our naval expenditure various reasons have been given, and I have been looking them up. I have looked up the speeches on this point of hon. Members on both sides of the House. The late First Lord of the Admiralty gave us the only reason—that is, the German bogey. That reason is disappearing very fast now. The Foreign Secretary told us the reason was the increase of the armies of other Powers.
Then I go to the other side of the House, and I find that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London (Mr. Balfour) told us that it was the German bogey, and nothing else whatever. The German bogey was the sole cause of these enormous Naval Estimates. The reason given recently in the Recess by the hon. Member for Fareham (Mr. Lee) was the most extraordinary of all. He is reported to have said that there was to be civil war in this country, and that, if there was civil war, of course this country would be in a very weak position to resist a foreign Power. Talk of the Suicide Club; this does sound very much like suicide! As they wanted to have their civil war, we were to have a very powerful Navy to hold the ring. The present First Lord of the Admiralty also gave the German bogey, but that, as I said just now, is losing its force—it has been trotted out so often—and he has now a new reason for these great Estimates. It is our whole world requirements. It was as if the whole world were preying upon our ships, and we had protests brought to us to protect them. We must have a Navy equal to our whole world requirements, as if the requirement was not to meet the enemy where he is. You do not require to go all over the world. There are certain centres, of course, where you can meet the enemy. Those are all the different reasons that have been given, and it is perfectly clear that very few of them agree. The majority favour the German bogey.
Look at the position which the German bogey occupies to-day, and compare it with the position it occupied in 1909! In the Naval Memorandum sent to Canada under the auspices of the present First Lord the great cause of the increase put forward was the building of Germany. How do we stand m regard to the building of Germany? The First Lord has to-day referred to the speech of Vice-Admiral Von Tirpitz. He remarked, in the course of that speech, that the German Naval Estimates in the last five years had only increased by a sum of £2,750,000, and that the British Estimates had increased in the same period by £10,800,000. To that must be added £2,500,000 in the Supplementary Estimates making £13,300,000. We must add another £2,750,000 now, making a total of £16,000,000 by which the British Estimates have been increased in the same period as the German Estimates have increased by £2,750,000. Let us look at it in another light. The German Estimates for 1913–14 amount to £23,650,000, whilst our Estimates amount to £51,500,000, considerably more than twice as much as the German Estimates. The German Navy Law of 1912 provided for a decrease in the German Estimates in 1917. The German Estimates are to be only £22,651,000 in 1917, and, according to the First Lord in his Memorandum, they are only to increase to £23,000,000 in 1920. Where are the Germans going to get the money to have this great fleet against which we are to take these enormous precautions? What justification is there for these enormous Estimates? According to the "Navy League Annual," the estimated annual cost in the existing Estimates of the upkeep of the twenty-one German battleships is £853,000, which amounts to an average of £41,000 a year each. How can the Germans keep their battleships instantly ready for battle on £41,000 a year? What do our battleships cost? The older ones cost £130,000 a year each. What do the ships of the "Princess Mary" class cost? They cost £169,000 a year each. Can the Germans keep this mighty fleet instantly ready for battle on £41,000 a year when it costs us £130,000 a year each for the older class of battleship, and £169,000 a year each for the later type of battleship? How do the Germans do it? We have usually supposed that we get greater value for our money than the Germans in naval expenditure.
We have had a return of the expenditure of all the Powers of Europe on their navies. Taking the latest return, that of August of last year, we find that we have laid down tonnage which, when completed, will amount in the last five years, to 802,000 tons of new shipping. If we look at the German total, we find that in the first four years of that period it amounts to 377,000 tons, and if we add for 1913–14 the same amount as for 1912–13, and in all probability it will be less because the Estimates are actually less, we get a total of 447,000 tons, or just about half the tonnage which we have laid down in the last five years. Then take the amount we spend on personnel and maintenance. We, in our Estimates for 1913–14, are spending £27,000,000, while Germany is spending £11,000,000, or two and a-half times as much. I want to know what is the German danger against which we have to spend these gigantic sums? How does it in practice exist? I have here a very excellent statement on the part of the "Navy League Annual," which I take it would not exaggerate things in our favour, and which would not put matters against themselves. It says, in regard to the German scare:— than twenty years of age and 6,000 tons and upwards displacement. We have 62 ships, and Germany has 33. Our tonnage is 1,035,000, and the German tonnage is 518,000. We, therefore, in battleship tonnage are exactly double Germany. Let us take the cruisers. We turn first to armoured cruisers of less than fifteen years of age, with a displacement of at least 6,000 tons. The number of units in our case is 34, and in the case of the German fleet 8. The tonnage in our ease is 406,000, and in the case of the German fleet 82,000. I understood the hon. Member for Fareham to say that the position ought to be regarded from the cruiser point of view. I think we may regard that as extraordinarily satisfactory. We are more than four times the strength of the Germans. If we take account of the other ships, it is very much the same. We have of protected cruisers of less than fifteen years of age and with over 2,000 tons displacement 33, and the Germans have 30. Our tonnage is 131,000, and theirs is 103,000. We have 68 submarines, and they have 18. Then with regard to personnel we have 146,000, and they have 70,000. I think that very conclusively shows that the Germans, at any rate, are not anywhere near, as a whole, even the 60 per cent., but that we are greatly in excess of the 60 per cent., and have more like a margin of between 100 and 120 per cent. over the German strength.
I was struck by the speech of the Foreign Secretary the other day at Manchester. He admitted that we had a responsibility for forcing the pace by building the first "Dreadnought," and he said that we were open to some criticism on that ground. The First Lord of the Admiralty has also admitted that if all the "Dreadnoughts" were suddenly destroyed we should be much stronger than we are to-day. I think that is a very severe commentary on the building of the first ''Dreadnought." If that be so, why do we continue to build these enormous ships which out-"Dreadnought" the "Dreadnought." There is no necessity for it, but we constantly force the pace. I ask why we should continue in that course? In order that the House may realise how gigantic and stupendous is the difference between the ships in the case of the "Dreadnought" and the latest type of battleship, let me read this description of the "Emperor of India," because this does give the comparison:— naval defence, she will be content with a Fleet stationed at Gibraltar. It would be too distant. Not a single Dominion accepts the idea. It is purely in the right hon. Gentleman's brain. It is one of those ideas which, when you treat them practically, vanish like snow on a spring day. I should have liked, if time permitted, to have spoken on the subject of scrapping an immense number of ships. We scrapped 130 vessels in 1904, many of which had not been built many years. Since then we have scrapped another 123 ships, aggregating a total value of £26,000,000. and I submit that it is a serious matter that we should be piling up material at such a rate that we cannot manage it, and have to throw it on the scrap heap. I regret that I have not been able, for reasons already stated, to deal with the figures which the right hon. Gentleman has laid before us.
I entirely agree with the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down as to the lack of policy and clear explanation on the part of the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty. He has altered his standard and his policy so often that the whole House and the country are now in a state of confusion. We do not know what we are building up to, or what we are building for. The hon. Member who last spoke made a comparison between this country's Naval force and that of Germany. I respectfully submit to him that he was not quite fair in so doing. Any calculation or comparison of forces as between the two countries should not be on the basis of tons, or guns, or numbers of men, but on the amount of work that the respective fleets have to do. In an excellent peroration the First Lord of the Admiralty showed distinctly how immense our responsibilities are, how we are really responsible for one quarter of the inhabitants of this globe, how our frontiers cannot be compared with the rest of the world, how we have to consider our trade routes, our food supply and our raw material, and how all that rests on our being supreme at sea. The hon. Member should remember it is nothing like that in the case of Germany. I would suggest to him that he should put down on a piece of paper what we are responsible for, what the most confirmed Radical will admit we are responsible for, whether he agrees that we should be or not, and if he will also put down on the piece of paper what Germany is responsible for, he will see that her power in regard to her fleet is enormously in front of ours. The hon. Member also referred to the question of expenditure, but he should bear in mind that the German Naval Estimates are made out on quite different lines to the English Naval Estimates. We put everything in our Estimates, even our Works Bill, which represents a very large sum, but the Germans have their Works Bill in quite another Estimate altogether. It is not in their Naval Estimate at all. Then the hon. Member came to the question of the upkeep of the ships. The German Estimate has very little in it. We have, as the hon. Member knows, a large and increasing charge for pensions. You cannot compare the two in any way, and, certainly, you cannot compare them in the way the hon. Member has suggested.
The difference as between £41,000 and £130,000, making allowance for all these factors, which I quite acknowledge, is still too great.
I do not think, if the hon. Gentleman worked it out, he would find the difference was so excessive, as we put enormously more into our Estimates than do the Germans. I respectfully submit the hon. Member has gone on quite wrong lines in this particular matter. On one other point I am thoroughly agreed with him, and that is as to what the First Lord of the Admiralty said with regard to Canada. I rather deplore that reference. I do not think we should in any way whatever, either by hint or by suggestion, state to the Colonies what we think they should do. It is a great mistake. I am sure it will not do any good, and I am afraid it will do a great deal of harm if once the Dominions, those other great nations which they have become, think we are laying down the law to thorn as to what they should subscribe or build in reference in helping defence as a whole. What the right hon. Gentleman said to-day regarding what they should do to defend the Mother Country I very much deplore. There are one or two other points to which I wish to draw attention in the right hon. Gentleman's speech. I dare say the House noticed that he very seldom spoke about the Board of Admiralty. If we have a Board of Admiralty it should be properly recognised, but the right hon. Gentleman is always talking about his ships, and what he did. It was a continual case of "I," which is altogether wrong. We should feel far more confident if we knew it was the Board of Admiralty, and if the "I's" did not come in so often, especially in view of the right hon. Gentleman's career, because he has been equally violent both ways. He has been quite as violent against expenditure on the Navy as he now is in favour of it. In fact, his whole political life has been of a most variegated nature. I wish he was here. I do not like saying these things in his absence.
I wanted to tell him that he is regarded as a traitor by us. In 1904, when things looked black for our party, and he was on the political battlefield—the "stricken battlefield," as I have heard it called—he went straight over to the enemy—I do not know whether he did that for the benefit of his own party or for his own benefit. However, we call him a traitor. Now may I refer to the "Suicide Club," or the Little Navy party? He headed that party in 1909, and his language very often was both violent and vulgar. The present expenditure of money which is now so enormous, and which will increase, is the result of the line which the right hon. Gentleman took in 1909, which was the critical year, and has been proved to be the critical year, because if we had then had a proper programme, if we had had a business programme suitable to the requirements of the Empire, with the Dominions represented, and both sides of the House as well, the Naval Estimates this year would not have been more than £42,000,000, or £45,000,000. No doubt we should have had to spend a big sum at once, but it would all have been paid off by now, and we should have had command of the sea once more. We should not now have been wrangling as to whether we ought to have two or three battleships more than another Power. We should have been supreme everywhere, and at a much cheaper cost than now, and when hon. Gentlemen opposite ask the reason for all this expense, I reply that it is because you do not put down your money at the moment it is wanted, with the result that you have to pay double afterwards in the vain endeavour to get into the position which you should have already occupied.
It being a Quarter-past Eight of the clock, further Proceeding was postponed without Question put, pursuant to Standing Order No. 4.
Imperial Defences
I beg to move, "That this House is not satisfied that the provision now made for our naval and military defence against invasion is adequate; and further, that this House considers that, in order to enable it to deal satisfactorily with the Navy and Army Estimates for the coming year, it should be forthwith informed of the conclusions arrived at by the Committee of Imperial Defence on their recent re-examination of the problem of defence against invasion."
If a justification were needed for bringing forward this Motion, it may be found in a speech recently delivered by the Prime Minister to a deputation which waited upon him. He said:— the answer they gave was 70,000 men. But on that occasion the Committee came to the conclusion that in the then state of our naval defences such a number could not possibly land on our shores, and therefore it became unnecessary to consider whether or not our Home defences could deal with 70,000 men.
So matters went on for a while. Then, in 1907, the Committee of Imperial Defence entered upon a new examination of the problem, in view of the new facts and changes that had taken place. When the Prime Minister told this House in 1909 of the conclusions the Committee had arrived at during the preceding year, it turned out that the conditions of the problem had altered in the most material way. It was still assumed that no enemy would attempt to invade these shores with a force of less than 70,000, but it was no longer assumed that it was impossible for 70,000 men to land; on the contrary, the Committee considered the possibility of the landing of a force of that size and the possibility, it may be, although I am not quite sure about this, of dealing with it. The conclusions arrived at by that Committee, as announced by the Prime Minister to the House of Commons, may be summarised as follows: They said, in the first place, that whatever be the military force at Home it is essential to our existence that we should hold command of the sea, and hold it against any reasonably possible combination of Powers. Their second conclusion was that, granting that we possessed that adequate naval supremacy, we must, to ensure safety, have a force for Home defence capable of dealing with an invading force of 70,000. What are the questions before us to-day? I conceive they are two. In the first place, Are we perfectly certain—because in a matter of this moment we cannot venture to gamble upon probabilities—that our naval supremacy is such that, without interfering "with the mobility of the Fleet, not more than 70,000 men can land on these shores? The second question is, Are we certain that our Home defences, after sending out an Expeditionary Force of 162,000 men, are sufficient to garrison our fortresses at Home and to deal with 70,000 invaders?
Let me assume, although perhaps it is a large assumption, that the answers to both those questions in 1908 would have been in the affirmative, although I am bound to say that no decision of the Committee to that effect was announced to the House, and I do not know whether they dealt with it. Making that assumption, now we have to ask ourselves, Are we certain that those questions can be answered in the affirmative to-day? I notice that there is down on the Paper in the name of my colleague in the representation of York (Mr. Rowntree) an Amendment referring to a better international atmosphere, and other matters of that sort. We are all in favour of the betterment of the conditions of the people of this country; we are all in favour of better international relations, and, so far as possible, of international arbitration; but what we have to do is to look at the facts as they present themselves to us to-day, and we should, I conceive, as trustees for the nation, be guilty of criminal negligence if we were, in the hope of some future possible ameliorations, to refuse or neglect to make adequate provision for the safety—indeed, I would say, for the very existence—of the nation. Therefore, I put this question: Is it certain that not more than 70,000 men can be landed on these shores? I find it difficult, if not impossible, to feel any such certainty. We had some naval manœuvres last year. There was no official report as to those manœuvres, probably quite rightly so, for doubtless they contained confidential matters which it would be improper to disclose; but a part of the veil was lifted, and these manœuvres showed that, at any rate, there was a possibility of a very large force being landed upon these shores, and that even though the defending force was in considerably larger strength than the invading force. But that is not all. Since 1908 the conditions have largely altered for the worse so far as we are concerned. In the first place, there has been a great increase in the navies of Germany, of Austria, and of Italy. The duties of our Navy have been largely increased, and the relative naval superiority of this country in the North Sea, for the purpose of resisting invasion, is much less than it was in 1908 when the Committee last considered the question.
There is another matter which should not be lost sight of. There has in the last few years been a very large increase in the size and the number and the speed of the German mercantile marine. Some figures on the subject were given only yesterday, and it appears to-day that Germany possesses 2,019 merchant steamers of over 100 tons burden, with a gross tonnage of 4,700,000 tons, and there is reason to believe that there is in German ports at any moment a sufficient mercantile marine to transport to this country, if they can do so in safety, a very large invading force indeed. But that is not all. Since 1908 the conditions of naval warfare have undergone a very considerable modification, owing partly to the march of science, partly to the continuous and, indeed, relentless progress of invention in engines of destruction. You have to-day submarines of greater efficiency and of longer range. You have seen an enormous advance in the science and in the practice of aviation, and it is impossible for us to put a limit to that advance. Again, you have to-day a very great progress in the science of wireless telegraphy. I fully admit that some of these changes may operate in favour of defence as well as of attack, but, in view of these changes which I have referred to, and of the facts as they exist today, it is difficult to say that it is not far easier for a foreign force to evade our Navy than it was in 1908. If these be the facts, we want, upon this branch of the question, some assurance from the Government that they are satisfied—and I hope they will give their reasons for it—that it is quite impossible for a larger force than 70,000 men to evade our Navy—and I am assuming that we maintain our supremacy at sea—and to land a force on these shores.
I now pass to the second question. Let me assume that only 70,000 men can land. Are we certain that our Home Army, after the Expeditionary Force has gone out, can deal with these 70,000? Let us not forget what emerged in the course of discussion in the last two days as regards our Regular Army and our Special Reserve. We find that our Regular Army at Home is short by some 13,000 men, and the Secretary for War told us, in what I think was a very significant admission, that there was in our Regular Army a large number of immature youths. Then what about the Special Reserve. The old Militia has gone, and a most effective force it proved itself to be when it was last called upon for action. Instead of that we have the Special Reserve, and even with the diminished establishment which now exists in the Special Reserve, there is a shortage of some 14,000 men, and a very large number of officers. The Secretary for War says 400, but I believe if it is examined into it will be more like 1,000 or 1,100. What is the result of this? To my mind the result is that after the Expeditionary Force has gone out, you cannot rely upon the Regular Army alone, and upon the Special Reserve for the defence of our shores. That is the view of the Prime Minister himself, because, speaking to the deputation the other day, he said:—
But that shortage of numbers is not the gravest aspect of the question. What is far more grave and important is the training of the Territorial Force. When Lord Haldane first instituted this force, he gave some optimistic forecast that they would be allowed six months for the purpose of training, which, indeed, he admitted would be necessary before they could be brought to face the picked troops of the Continent in action. Upon that I will only make two comments. Does anyone suppose that a possible enemy is going to give us six months for the training of these Territorials? Of course, the thing is ridiculous. Further, it would be absolutely disastrous if a war broke out that we should be compelled to hold up the whole or a large part of our Expeditionary Force in order to give our Territorials time to get into training. I will ask the Government to reassure us on that point, because it is of the utmost importance if we are to take an adequate part in any war which might break out. If we are going to hold up our Expeditionary Force or part of it for six months, the whole war might be over, or, at any rate, the fortune of the war might have so turned that the sending out of our Expeditionary Force might be no longer of any value. Therefore I ask the Government to give us this assurance, that our Home defences are sufficient to allow of our Expeditionary Force going out in their full numbers on the first occasion on which they are called upon to go out, and that after that force has gone out, the force left at home will be sufficient in training to meet an invading force. I am afraid if you take the opinion of soldiers—and, after all, I do not know whose opinion you are going to take unless you take the opinion of your most expert and trusted soldiers—they will tell you that the present training of the Territorials is gravely deficient and imperfect. In the-deputation to the Prime Minister, Lord Roberts and Sir Evelyn Wood—and if they do not know, I do not know who would—told the Prime Minister most positively that the Territorials were insufficiently trained, and that it was impossible under the present system to train officers or men sufficiently to manœuvre under the fire of an enemy, and Lord Roberts went further, and said that even if the present numbers were doubled or trebled they would be of no use to fight against trained troops with their present training. We have had certain light thrown on this matter by the Secretary of War himself. Last year there was a Debate in this House with respect to national service upon a Bill introduced by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Wells division of Somerset. The Secretary for War referring to the subject of invasion said:—
The second branch of the Resolution; asserts that we should be informed of the conclusions arrived at by the Committee of Defence last year. The Prime Minister told us nearly a month ago that the Committee of Defence had almost completed their task, and that they were unanimously agreed on their Report. I do submit to the House that that being so, we ought to be informed before we vote these Estimates what work the Navy and the Army have to do respectively. We ought to be told what are the opinions of the expert advisers of the Government on that question. In 1909 the Prime Minister urged upon the House the great importance of co-ordinating the work of the Navy and the Army. He pointed out that that lay within the peculiar province of the Committee of Defence. The late Sir Charles Dilke in 1905 strongly urged on the Government of the day the necessity for submitting the conclusions of the Committee of Defence before the Army and Navy Estimates of the year were submitted. That seems to be good commonsense. It may be said that the practice was not followed in 1905 or 1909. That is perfectly true, but it is no reason why we should adopt a similar perverse practice to-day. I am not one of those who think that because you have done a wrong thing twice, it becomes right when you do it a third time. That is especially true in connection with Army and Navy policy, and, therefore, I put it to the Government—here is information which it is really essential the House should be placed in possession of before it votes the Estimates of the year. We are asked to vote an enormous expenditure for the Navy and Army—I do not say too much—and I think it is only reasonable that before we vote that expenditure we should be given all the information which will enable us to decide how best to apply that expenditure for the security and safety of the nation.
9.0 P.M.
In rising to second the Motion, I assure the House that I in no sense wish to make personal attacks upon the right hon. Gentlemen opposite. I rather wish to give them some opportunity of furnishing us with a little of the result of that clear thinking about which the late Secretary of State for War (Viscount Haldane) spoke so much, and of which we have had so very little since. To the country generally—I am talking of the great mass of people who are impartial observers, and who are perfectly ready to support any reasonable demands on the part either of the Admiralty or the War Office, not only out of their pockets, but also by way of service, if they feel that these demands are really necessary—to these people, I think, it appears that the Admiralty in some respects, and cer- tainly the War Office, have not been perfectly frank. I believe it is the want of frankness on the part of those responsible in this House for these Services that is, in the first place, causing the lack of interest in our National defences at present. I think, also on the other hand, that it is apt to be the cause of those scares which are so detrimental to good feeling between this country and other parts of Europe. It is obvious that we cannot ask official secrets, and I would be the last person to do so, but I think hon. Gentlemen on the Front Bench opposite will agree with me that whenever there is a difficult question put, we always find it is an official secret which cannot be answered, although probably the man asking it knows the answer perfectly well. I am not speaking in any party sense. I am the last person in the world to wish to make party capital out of the question of National defence, and I would beg hon. Members opposite when they go on public platforms in the country not to make, as they are apt sometimes to do, the question of National defence a party question, because I can1 imagine nothing would be more mischievous.
It is surely for our military and naval advisers, if they are worth their salt, to tell those in authority in this House what they think should be the form of service, and how many troops are necessary, and I think it is the duty of Ministers in this House to tell the country perfectly, frankly and fearlessly what is the result of their talks with the experts. At the same time, that does not mean that they are bound to follow them in the least. One thing they ought to do is to tell the country. The Prime Minister, referring to-National defence, said it was a common interest of all parties which should be-beyond the range of party controversy.
Let us take the situation to-day and in 1908. In expressing these views I am only giving my own, but, after all, they are views which I have formed after study of the question. I have studied military matters to a certain extent, and I have been moving among military men, not only in this country, but abroad, and therefore one does come to know in that way what is the general idea. When I speak of situations possible, actual or problematical, I wish hon. Members to understand that we are by no means scaremongers on this side, nor do we wish to-threaten other nations. In military matters it is necessary to consider things as you might find them. It is not a question of an enemy—France, Germany or Russia. The military authorities have to look upon everybody as a possible enemy under certain circumstances. It is their job to solve the problem, wherever it may come from, whether Germany, America, or France. Germany does exactly the same thing as we do. I should be the last person to quarrel with Germany for preparing for an eventuality, which we all hope will never take place, and they would absolutely despise us if we did not do the same. Preparations for eventualities are not a threat against a country. It must also be remembered that the whole system of modern war is inverted as compared with what it used to be. All the nations of Europe may be said at present to be at war in one sense. In the old days when they went to war the country which won the big battles in the beginning did not bring the other country to its knees until it had utterly starved it out. Nowadays, what came afterwards then is really going on now. All the countries are, one might say, trying to bankrupt each other with regard to the creation of armaments. When the war does come it will be quick, sharp, and decisive.
Let me now take the problem of the North Sea. I am not taking it as a German question, but as a military one, and because probably it is the most difficult one before us. If the Admiralty can assure us on this question how much more easily can we be assured on all the other questions we have to take up and consider. To understand the problem we must remember that in the old days of our splendid isolation, as it was called, our policy was as it is now, to support the balance of power of Europe so that no country should become so strong as to be a menace to the peace of Europe. So long as we kept ourselves, roughly, twice as strong as any possible opponent by sea, our own sea supremacy was not really seriously menaced, and did not put any undue strain upon this country. These days in which we live are perfectly different. They are days of co-operations and trusts, and exactly as we see syndicalism, trade unionism, federated labour and federated employers in this country, so we see these great coalitions of armed nations on the Continent joined together for the purposes of offence and defence, and so strong that if any one of those groups knocked out the next strongest group we should be at the mercy not of one nation which we could tackle, but of practically half the Continent of Europe. This is a contingency which we should hardly be likely to be able to face alone. It is, therefore, wisdom on our part to support, not only morally, but actually, the weaker group on the Continent if by so doing we can maintain the balance of power which will make the balance so even that it will be absolute folly on the part of any group to start hostilities, because the groups would be so evenly balanced that it would not be worth the while of any group to take the risk. We may have agreements to this effect, written or understood, and if we have made such it is quite possible that if we break our agreement with any of these Powers with whom we may have made agreement, and they find that our word is not worth having, we shall again be called "perfidious Albion," and rather than go on with the struggle you might actually see the weaker group join with a big coalition and become a member of a strong coalition, the whole force of which might be against us. That is one of the reasons why we must keep our word, so that we shall not be isolated against the whole of Europe.
When Lord Haldane first instituted the Territorial Force, he made it deliberately to an establishment of 300,000 men. His information at that time was that the maximum raid that could take place in this country was about 10,000 men, and that it probably would be divided up into about two raids of about 5,000 each. Things are very different now. We have it on the word of the Prime Minister, and we know that in 1908 it was pointed out, that it is quite possible for a raid of 70,000 men to come to this country. It was officially admitted by the Admiralty and the War Office, and it was again admitted by the Prime Minister in effect the other day. At that time, remember, there were no submarines in Germany. I do not pretend to be a sailor, but it seems to me that this is the problem as it appears. Germany is entirely changed now. Our Fleets at that time could be based on the south of England, and if Germany made a raid, that raid had to be what I might call a long distance raid of at least 450 miles, which would probably take place on the coast of Fife or somewhere like that, and they might be forced further north, and they would not dare to come further south because of our fleets in the South. The situation to-day is absolutely different. Germany has got a large air force which is much superior to ours, and a large fleet of light craft on the sea, and also over thirty submarines. The North Sea, as far as I can see, will be perfectly unlivable for big ships. There is no question at all of making a raid upon Germany. We certainly have submarines, but meantime their eyes are their aircraft and their light craft on the sea. If their aircraft are swept away or unable to go in the air, then their eyes have gone away to a certain extent, but I do believe that it might be probable that their light aircraft could show the way for a sudden raid which would actually land in certain circumstances in this country.
Our big ships cannot show their noses, any more than the German ships can, in the North Sea and in order to get at their battle stations they will have to go a journey of something like 1,400 miles, starting from their present basis, round the coast and along the west side of Britain. The German raid, on the contrary, is bound to take the shortest line it possibly can, and would be about 250 miles nearer on the south-east coast of England. Their distance is reduced to 250 miles in certain circumstances, while our distance is increased by an enormous amount. The thing is: Can Germany do it? We are told that in certain circumstances it can do it. I accept that. The next thing is: Will she risk it? That is for her to decide. Can she risk attempting it? We must be prepared. We have got to remember that the celebrated German General Brokardt von Schellendorf said that he could quite conceive circumstances in which Germany would be willing to lose her whole fleet in order that her military force might attain their objective. We have got to consider what those circumstances are. The circumstances appear to me to be that our Expeditionary Force has to land in another country in a way that will ensure success at the very beginning. Our Expeditionary Force, which would be able to make the whole difference between success and loss for France within fourteen days of war, would be really worth three times its value if successfully landed at the beginning. The force remaining in this country would be under a very great risk, because such an Expeditionary Force could be sent here as would gain enormous advantages for Germany elsewhere. Germany's battalions are a hundred stronger than ever they were before, and in these days of rapid mobilisation, when the distance is merely 240 miles, troops could be here almost before the declaration of war, so quickly could they be transported nowadays. That is the Naval situation.
What is the military situation! It is this: The establishment of the Territorial Force is 315,000; their actual strength is 251,000, and of these 196,000 are trained or efficient. Will the right hon. Gentleman, tell us if this force has not 300,000 men which Lord Haldane said was supposed to be sufficient to keep off a raid of 10,000 men? Now are we in the least likely to see that force, which is considerably reduced from 300,000, to keep off a possible raid of 70,000 men. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will tell us how he is going to dispose of this force, and give us some idea of how he is going to use it. So far, it is scattered from John O'Groats to Land's End, and I do not see how it can be mobilised in time to be really effective as a force ready to deal with a raid of that magnitude. I want to know the state of the central force, and who is to be the general in charge of it. The right hon. Gentleman laughs. Is it not time that we should know who the generals are to be; is it not time that they should be training their own staffs and the men. The right hon. Gentleman saw the staffs of officers of the Army in South Africa, and what occurred there, and we shall see exactly the same thing on mobilisation here, more especially when the best of our soldiers are away with the Regular forces.
We want to know if it is the intention to release the Expeditionary Force. If it is not to go away at all, then the whole problem is altered, but, so far as we know, the Expeditionary Force is to go away. We want to know what is the present training strength of the men left behind, how many will be available for mobile purposes as Regulars, and how many of them are required as refills for the Expeditionary Force. Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us what is the strength of the Special Reserve? He cannot, surely, rely upon that force, because it is 13,000 under strength now, and what remains of it is chiefly for purposes of refills for the Army abroad and for garrison duty. He tells us that the 13,000 shortage is to be made up from the National Reserve, and he gives us a low age for those who may be considered capable of efficient service. Did not the right hon. Gentleman tell us that these men of the National Reserve, many of them, undergo no training of any kind whatsoever, that they are scattered all over the place, that they are not fixed up into units, and that many of them are the real Reserve upon which the Territorial Forces are counting? The average age he gives is quite misleading as to how many are old and how many are young. I should not be surprised if, when dealing with the older section of the National Reserve, in which are some of the Crimean heroes, he lumped them with the Boy Scouts, and gave us an average of eighteen years. There are many other problems we have got to think about. The right hon. Gentleman should remember what he said outside that our troops may be required elsewhere, and that in our weakest moment attacks might possibly come from outside. The more we increase the strength of our own country, the more satisfactory will be the state of its defences generally. We want to know, also, what arrangements are being made for the defence of our ports beyond the use of submarines. We were told not long ago or I read in one of the newspapers, that the Admiralty were going to take over the defence of our ports. Are they going to do so? And, if so, with what troops are they going to do it? Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us how many men will be required for the defence of our ports? I am sure the sailors will be very glad to know, for they could then work out in their own minds how many Marines are required elsewhere. I must say I have the greatest suspicion of the Admiralty when they undertake shore jobs. Of course they are very anxious for the defence of Britain, but their soul is not on the soil of England, but on the seas. They look upon anything for the efficiency of the Navy at sea as justifiable, even if it depreciates our efficiency on land. At one port which was taken charge over by the Navy they put in, slightly altered, 9.2 guns, Mark VIII., which were originally made for gunpowder and not for cordite; and that is the sort of armament the Navy put in when they took charge of that port. We know perfectly well that it is far better to leave the Army to its legitimate work and the Navy to its own duties. If they do not want to take over this work, why should they not undertake the defence of the great railways towards the coaling districts, which would relieve the Army immensely. What really happens is that the Secretary of State for War goes across to the Admiralty very often, puffed out with the lustre of his office, and full of the importance which naturally every Secretary of State possesses, and full of money, to see the First Lord of the Admiralty and the First Sea Lord, and, when he gets there, they ride absolute rings round him, and he goes back, still full of importance, but with a little less lustre, and without a single penny in his pocket. I beg to second the Motion.
It is with some diffidence and difficulty I rise to take part in this discussion, because I am neither a military or a Navy man. I am a peace man, and therefore I want to try and put another view before the House with regard to this Resolution. The last speaker said that they are quite prepared to pay if the demands are necessary. That is to say, he is quite prepared—that is, that the taxpayers are quite prepared—to pay any increased taxes which are required to meet the demands of the country, either in expenditure upon the Army or the Navy. We shall wait and see, when in a few weeks, when the Budget is laid before us, whether the hon. Members opposite are prepared to support the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he must increase the taxation this year. We know that in the past, when he has proposed to tax those most able to pay, we have had a certain amount of opposition from the other side with regard to the payment of those taxes. The hon. Member also discussed the question of invasion. There are several of you who were in the House in 1905. when we had a most important speech delivered in the month of May of that year by the then Prime Minister, the present Member for the City of London (Mr. Balfour). In that speech he discussed the whole question of the invasion of this country. He was then discussing not as to Germany, but the probability of an invasion by France. [An HON. MEMBER: "That was nine years ago."] It is a very short time ago. Now we have shifted our ground from a question of invasion by France to invasion by Germany. In that speech the right hon. Gentleman pointed out that it would require at least 280,000 tons of shipping to carry the 70,000 men required to invade this country. He also stated definitely that the Committee of Defence, of which he was chairman, had gone into the matter thoroughly, and into every point of it, and that there was no sane man in this world who would undertake such an enterprise.
I said that that was perfectly true, and that it was watered down to probably 10,000 men, and since then the Committee of Defence have issued a second Report in which they say it is possible under certain circumstances.
We have not seen the Report of the Committee of Defence.
There was a second Report of the Committee of Defence in 1908, when they admitted the possibility of a raid of 70,000 men.
We know quite well that the late Prime Minister argued this matter very fully in a most important speech, and in fact, it is a speech which I think every man should read. He was very much complimented on it at the time, and especially by the then Leader of the Opposition, the late Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. We have always got in every period some country that is going to invade us, and we have never yet been invaded, and it is essential that we should make preparations against invasion—we are all agreed on that point. This Resolution states that the present provision of the Estimates are not adequate. This year we are providing for the Navy alone twenty million pounds more than what hon. Members opposite provided when they were last in office. This is a point I wish to discuss. When hon. Members opposite were in office they had to consider the financial position of this country. They had to consider whether the nation could stand this increased expenditure year by year. It is a very remarkable thing that, if you trace right back to 1884, when the late Mr. Stead raised a scare through the "Pall Mall Gazette," when the Government came forward with a very large additional expenditure, raising in two years the excess expenditure by eight millions sterling, and I am not speaking of Army expenditure, that since the eighties, right up to the time when the late Government left office, you will find that every time that the Conservative party was in power they reduced the Navy Estimates, and when they have been out of office they have been clamouring for a large addition to naval expenditure. That is the history of our Navy, as I shall show in a few minutes. In 1884 there was a great naval scare, and the Government increased the expenditure up to sixteen millions in 1886, and by 1887–8 that expenditure was reduced to £12,476,000, the Conservative party having come into power in 1886. It is hardly credible now in these days of extravagance in these matters that the late Lord Randolph Churchill resigned his office not because of the naval expenditure, because he induced the then First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord George Hamilton to reduce the naval expenditure by £700,000, but the reason why he resigned as Chancellor of the Exchequer was because the Army expenditure was increased by £300,000 only. That was in 1886. Between 1886–7 and 1903–4, when Mr. Gladstone resigned owing to the naval expenditure, the expenditure upon the Navy increased by only £1,732,000. So that every time when a Liberal Government is in power we have these large demands for increased expenditure, but when the Conservatives are in power we do not make these great demands, and consequently there is not the great increase in naval and military expenditure. I was a Member of the House in the years 1895–6–7. We had a Chancellor of the Exchequer who was very keen, the present Lord St. Aldwyn. In 1897–8 the naval expenditure was reduced by £1,320,000. Therefore, in every period of Conservative Government we have had a reduction of naval expenditure. In 1905 we had the most serious reduction in the history of the Navy.
The hon. Member for Fareham (Mr. A. Lee) takes a very active part in our present Debates. I dare say he will speak presently, and demand increased expenditure. He was a Member of the Government in 1905. In that year the Government had to consider their position, and, having considered it, they reduced the Navy Estimates by £3,500,000. I have read the whole of the Debate on that occasion. They reduced the Estimates because they wanted to reduce the Tea Duty, which they did, from eightpence to sixpence per pound. Hon Members will find the reason given by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer—that they had made enormous savings by reducing the Navy Votes by no less than £3,500,000. That reduction was defended in the House of Lords by Lord Selborne, the First Lord of the Admiralty. What did he say? He stated that the financial security of this country was quite as essential as the efficiency of the Navy. That was the reason that he gave in favour of the reduction. The Conservative Government resigned in the latter part of 1905. Lord Cawdor, who was then First Lord of the Admiralty, made a very important statement in his Memorandum of that year [C. 2791, November 30th, 1905]. That Memorandum was in connection with the last Estimates prepared by the Conservative Government before they went out of office. Lord Cawdor reduced the Navy Estimates by a further £1,520,000, making a total reduction in the last two years of the Conservative Government of no less than £5,020,000. Lord Cawdor stated:— above the amount left by the Conservative party in 1905 no less a sum than £72,000,000. Still we have hon. Members opposite crying for more. I say that there is another side to this question, and a very serious side. I appeal to business men. I appeal to hon. Members on the opposite side to go down to their constituents and put these matters before them. We have been living in prosperous times. The expenditure of this country has been going up by leaps and bounds. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Yes, I quite admit it. But it is not the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has been responsible for a certain amount of it on the social side, and that I do not think hon. Members on the opposite side will object to. It is to my mind very essential expenditure, for it will tend to build up the people, and make the national health stronger. But what the nation does object to is a very large expenditure such as this. The people object to this largely increased demand made year by year upon the resources of the country for naval and military expenditure.
No.
Well, I know the hon. Member for York represents a military town, but that town also has its peace character. Doubtless some of those there desire a larger expenditure upon military matters. I, however, was speaking of the general commercial towns of the country. In these there is a general desire for a decrease of this naval and military expenditure. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] I say there is. We have had chambers of commerce in differents parts of the country making demands upon the Government in connection with this matter, and we have had all sorts of associations condemning this large expenditure. There is a very severe struggle ahead, after our recent prosperous years, for a very large number of our business men, though I am bound to say that since this Government came into power every man who is earning £2,000 a year and under is paying less in taxation than he did in 1905–6. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] I make that statement. I assert that position. Still, I say there is a great demand upon our business men and men of small means, who are pressed by the local authorities in towns where the rates are 9s. and 10s. in the £. Many men in these places are struggling hard to pay their way. Politicians do not often consider that side of the question. They look upon the matter from the point of view of glory, and what they can get out of these things in the way of party advantage.
I therefore warn hon. Gentlemen opposite that if they come back to power they would have to consider all this expenditure, and they would have to consider this suggested increase of taxation. They are anxious at present to place the responsibility for it on this side of the House. If they manage to do this, they will at once go down to the country and say that, "These men (meaning the Liberal party) have been extravagant; they have been lavish in their expenditure." At the same time hon. Members come here and claim that this expenditure should be increased year by year. I say, after thirty years' experience in local government work, that if at any time I took upon myself in a local council to favour any increased expenditure I have, I think, always been man enough to face that responsibility before the ratepayers. I say to hon. Members opposite that if they come here and urge that these Estimates should be increased they should take a like responsibility in the country. We are spending this year upon the Navy and Army £80,000,000—£20,000,000 above what hon. Gentlemen opposite left it, and it is increasing at the rule of £5,000,000 yearly. Yet they come here and demand more. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] That is the Motion—that the present expenditure is inadequate. I say that hon. Members opposite ought to be men enough to go down to their constituents and say, "We have brought pressure to bear upon the Government; we are responsible for this increased expenditure on the part of the Government, and we are prepared to pay." When the Chancellor of the Exchequer deals with his Budget I trust that, he will place any extra expenditure of this kind upon the shoulders of the men who are best able to bear it. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Meantime, do not cry out.
We are not crying out.
I want hon. Members to remember this. I have sat and listened to Debates of this sort. There is an hon. Member opposite from one of the Lancashire Divisions who pleaded last year to the Government to give a larger Grant to local authorities in easement of their rates in the way of contributions to main roads, education, and other things. How can the Government make such Grants to local authorities when the expenditure is going up by leaps and bounds every year? I ask hon. Members to consider this question in all its seriousness. I believe we are spending more than we are entitled to on the Navy and Army, and, therefore, I hope this Motion will be defeated.
May I claim that indulgence which is always accorded to a Member when he speaks for the first time? I welcome this opportunity of speaking on the Motion, which is so closely connected with questions in which I take a deep and personal interest. I do not intend to follow the hon. Member who has just spoken. He said he was neither a military nor a naval advocate, but a man of peace. So are we all on this side of the House—men of peace—and it is because we desire peace that we are anxious to see that our defences are put in such a condition that there is little or no danger of the invasion of this country. We also desire our supremacy on the sea to be such that we may keep the peace of the world. In the absence of the Report of the Imperial Committee of Defence we car only assume as a basis for argument, as regards our military forces, that they should at least accord with the establishment which we fought for on the Estimates. My hon. Friend the Member for Rugby brought forward a Motion last week in which he drew attention to the shortage of our military forces. He asked the Government if they would give the reason for it, and their concrete proposals for dealing with this shortage. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Colonel Seely) made a very short reply on this point. He said: "There is no shortage, in fact, there is a surplus," which is a conclusive reply. He said: "Let me deal with these supposed shortages in the Regular Army." I listened to nearly every speech which was made on the Army Estimates, and I am yet far from understanding what steps are to be taken to meet the alarming shortage which has occurred in the Territorial Force at the present time. I do not think that anyone can take seriously the suggestions of the right hon. Gentleman opposite that the Territorial Force is to be made up by the strength from the National Reserve. The National Reserve, from their lack of equipment, arms, accoutrements, and their lack of modern training, are obviously unfitted to take their place in the Territorial Force. As my hon. Friend the Member for York has quoted the Prime Minister's statement that the bulk of the defence must fall upon the Territorial Force, I propose to devote most of my remarks to-night to that force. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Preston was the only speaker who make any remark at all with regard to the Territorial Force in this House, and none of the criticisms he brought forward have been answered by the right hon. Gentleman opposite. I do not wish to approach this question in any spirit of hostile criticism, but rather with the sincere desire to place any knowledge I may have gained as a member of a County Association and as a member of the Territorial Force at the service of the House with the sole object of increasing the efficiency and the betterment of that force.
In all the speeches the right hon. Gentleman opposite has made, there has been certainly a spirit of optimism, which is somewhat, I believe, characteristic of the Front Bench, and although that may be a comfort to himself, it is not very comforting to the people who know the actual facts. You cannot get away from the fact that the force at the present moment is some 60,000 short of establishment. The responsibility for this force, as for any force under the War office, naturally rests with the Secretary of State for War, and I should like to pay a tribute to the way in which he meets all requests made from any County Association with the one proviso, "So long as it does not cost too much money." Unlike other branches of the Army, the Territorial Force is dependent for its numbers to a very large extent on the work of the County Associations, and if it were not for the co-operation of the County Associations the whole organisation of the Territorial Force must necessarily fall to the ground. The Prime Minister and the Secretary for War have very handsomely acknowledged the work of the County Associations, and I think it is recognised by hon. Gentlemen opposite as well that the County Associations do not work in any party spirit at all. They do their work entirely in a non-party spirit, and hon. Gentlemen opposite will naturally recognise that at least 80 per cent. of the members of County Associations belong to the party to which I belong. We recognise if that force is to be in a position to carry out the duties assigned to it it must answer in the affirmative at least three questions. Firstly, is the organisation a good organisation? Secondly, are the numbers sufficient? And thirdly, is the force sufficient and efficient to carry out its duties?
With regard to the organisation of the force, I say, without hesitation, that the organisation is excellent, and I should like to pay tribute to the Secretary for War who inaugurated this method. He has inaugurated an organisation which, whatever the future may hold, will do for any force, however raised, under whatever conditions of service; but with regard to numbers and efficiency, I am afraid, we cannot be equally satisfied. It is, to my mind, impossible to divorce the two. It is useless to have sufficient numbers unless you have efficiency, and to-day the position undoubtedly is we neither have got the numbers nor have we got efficiency. The Secretary for State himself is not at all hopeful about the numbers, nor is he very hopeful about the future, as his speeches show. He has recognised, I think, the difficulties with which the County Associations are faced, and I believe, as a result of the deputation which waited upon him from the Council of the County Associations, he has brought forward a proposal in this year's Estimates in order to give a bonus of what he calls "the round pound" to every Territorial who completes fifteen days in camp. I should like to make one remark about this bonus. I want to ask him by what process of reason he has differentiated in this matter? Why give 30s., for instance, to Cavalry, and only 20s. to every other unit? It is well known that the Cavalry and Yeomanry—I say nothing against them—are up to strength, and the units not up to strength are to get less encouragement. I know I may be told it is the equitation Grant they had originally, but, if it is an equitation Grant, then, is it also to be given to the other mounted units of the Territorial Force? I may mention the unit I belong to myself—that is, the Horse Artillery. Surely, if anyone wants to ride and have an equitation Grant, not only will they have to ride but to drive as well, and not only will they have to clean one horse but two. With regard to this question of bonus which the right hon. Gentleman is proposing in this year's Estimates for the Territorial Force, I am afraid it is not going to solve the difficulty in the least. The men will be very glad to have it, but it is not going to deal with the real question at the root of the difficulties.
The right hon. Gentleman the other day sent us round a circular letter in which he suggested that we should use the surplus funds at our disposal—very few of us have surplus funds—in order to recover the strength of the force, and to provide additional social and other advantages for the force. I do not think it is a voluntary force at all if you have to persuade, by considerations such as those, men to come and join. My own experience is that the men are only too anxious and willing to come out for the whole of their fifteen days to camp, if they fan get away. That is the whole trouble. I believe thousands more would join if the force were encouraged by employers throughout the country. I do not wish to say a word against employers as a class. The First Lord of the Admiralty told us this afternoon how the employers were encouraging the Fleet Reserve to get away for mobilisation this year. As a class employers are generally entirely patriotic, but there are employers who are not patriotic and will not have a Territorial in their service. The consequence is that the employer who is a patriotic man and encourages Territorials in his service has to suffer for his patriotism, while the man who will not have a Territorial profits from the patriotism of the other employers. That is a system which has to be fought, as it is very unfair to the patriotic employer. It is very difficult for him to come out because of the unpopularity incurred amongst those with whom they have to work. It is very often the case when a man goes out to camp, his work has to be done by other men who are left behind, and they get no extra remuneration for it, and when those men come back from camp they are not exactly popular with their mates.
The greatest difficulty of all is the question of limited liability companies. There is not the same sympathy nowadays between the managers of those companies and the men as there used to be when they were private employers. The consequence is that to-day the men employed by limited liability companies do not get the opportunities they used to get in the olden days, because it would be no excuse for the manager to say that he had been obliged to reduce the dividend because he had let off a number of men to do their annual training. Lack of opportunity is the greatest difficulty we have to face, and this could be overcome by encouraging those employers who have a certain percentage of men in their employ whom they always allow to go out for the full fifteen days' training. The small employer is often penalised to a very unfair degree for the patriotism he shows in letting two or perhaps three of his men go to the annual training. There are many ways in which the right hon. Gentleman could encourage the Territorials by adopting some such methods as I have suggested, for this would greatly encourage the force, and you would increase both the numbers and the efficiency, because you would have the men out for fifteen days' training. I am afraid some of us would not be satisfied even then, because we recognise and it is admitted by every military expert who understands this problem that there are certain branches of the Territorial Service in which it is absolutely impossible to acquire anything like efficiency during the fifteen days' training. I refer more particularly to the Artillery, which is a highly technical branch, and it is acknowledged by every Artilleryman that it takes three years to train a driver, and yet we are supposed to take the men out for fifteen days and turn them out as expert drivers.
The right hon. Gentleman says that the reports he receives from the inspecting officers are entirely satisfactory. It may be that the officers suffer somewhat from a feeling of relief that the Territorial units are as good as they are, and not as bad as they think they must be. The members of the Territorial Army do not want compliments paid to them, but a conviction that they are properly equipped and ready for mobilisation and ready to take their place to carry out the duty for which they have been raised. This Motion is a most important one, and to a very large extent revolves round the question of the Territorial Force. I think this force is now on its trial, and next year will prove whether it is going to be a failure or a success. We have had five years working of it now, and I do not think anyone is satisfied with its numbers, and certainly no one is satisfied with its efficiency. I believe a greater success could be made of the force if it were properly encouraged than has ever been made of any voluntary force in the past. The Government should inquire into the causes, and take steps to remove the anomalies which exist and the in- equalities of the burden of service which undoubtedly he heavily upon individuals. If the War Office does not do that, there is a danger, which I hope will not materialise, that those who have worked for I five years for this Force to make it efficient will get disheartened at fighting against odds to secure efficiency, and not only to secure efficiency but to bring the Territorial Force up to the numbers which the right hon. Gentleman considers requisite for the safety and security of the country.
I am sure we shall all be ready to congratulate the hon. and gallant Member opposite upon the eloquent speech he has just delivered. I am sure we all recognise in him, and the party opposite will recognise, that he is a distinct acquisition to their ranks, because he is one who has a thorough grasp of the subject. I congratulate the hon. and gallant Member upon taking rather a more hopeful view of certain portions of His Majesty's Forces than some hon. Members around him. The hon. Member for West Perthshire (the Marquess of Tullibardine) whose remarks both here and outside—
As the hon. Member opposite was not in the House when I was speaking, is he entitled to criticise my speech?
The Noble Lord himself is asking a question which is out of order.
Is the hon. Member entitled to make remarks about a speech delivered when he was not in the House?
10.0 P.M.
I beg the hon. Member's pardon, for I was here the whole of the time the Noble Lord was speaking. Perhaps I may be allowed to say a word or two upon the Territorial question which has been introduced by the hon. Member opposite. The Territorial Associations have been spoken of as if they were entirely run by those who differed from those who sit on this side of the House in politics. I am glad to say that from the very first the spirit displayed by these associations has been one in which party politics and everything else of that sort has been put entirely aside. Those associations are composed of men drawn from all ranks. They include the landed gentry, Labour Members, Territorial colonels, and business men, and all of them from the first have done their very best to make their associations successful, and they have done it. Let us carry back our minds to the time when this system was first started. What was the first attack made upon it. It was said that the associations were going to prove a failure. Those associations are to-day, in the opinion of all men whose opinion is worth anything, a thorough success, and that has been due to the fact that they have worked together irrespective of political considerations of every kind. The hon. Member opposite has spoken of the Territorials from four points of view, namely, organisation, equipment, efficiency, and numbers. I am delighted to hear that he thinks the organisation is excellent, and even if certain sections of the community desire to introduce compulsory service, in order to put the finishing touches to a system of Army defence, they will have to build it upon the foundation of the Territorial system. With regard to equipment, what do we find. Here is what a very valuable exponent of public opinion, the "Daily Telegraph,'' says in the weekly compendium of Territorial notes:— Commons on 25th February, 1907, he expressed the hope—and this is the foundation for all these figments and illusions which we hear spread about the country—that that may be the result of the boom year. What is the solid result? You take now under your Territorial system just as many recruits as you did under your Volunteer system, and we may anticipate that within a reasonable time there will be a large accession of recruits, because, in my belief we have reached the time when the disparagers have been beaten, and they know it. I do not say that Lord Roberts has disparaged the force, but he has given a considerable impetus to this campaign, and he says in the introduction to his "Campaign Speeches" recently published:— burdens on this country in the defence of the Empire are, in a sense, far less than they were at any other time of our history.
It is not as if one country alone were increasing their forces. You have only to look at the list. When Germany increases hers, France increases hers, and Russia also increases hers. We are told in the papers to-day that Russia is increasing hers by something like half a million of men. That is going on all over the world, and it makes a very considerable difference to our problem of defence. You may set them off, one against the other. We are not going to stand alone if ever we have to fight.
I do not think the hon. Member appreciates the point. When he speaks of the Empire being so much better organised, and he quotes the case of Australia, I would ask him to remember that we are discussing the question of invasion, and I would invite him to say how he supposes Australia is going to help us in that event?
I say it would make a very great difference to us. Suppose we were invaded by a near neighbour, it would make a great difference to us if we knew that Australia was able to look after her own interests, and it wouid enable us to concentrate at Home both our military and our naval forces. It would make the whole difference in the world; it is the very A B C of the problem we are considering. Our Colonies are now doing their share and the result of that is that at least at Home we can have a feeling of more confidence that our forces will not be dissipated all over the world when it is needed that they should concentrate at Home in order to defeat our enemies. A better statement of the position of our country as regards defence against invasion has never been made than was made by the First Lord of the Admiralty in April, 1910, and no appreciable alteration in the position has taken place since then, There were three main propositions he said upon which the Government relied to show that our military forces were not inadequate for the primary and immediate needs of the Empire. In the first place, no sudden descent could be made on these islands by any force with which our Regular and Territorial troops could not easily deal. Secondly, no descent, and consequently no sudden descent, not in small numbers could be made at all pro- vided we maintained the unquestioned supremacy of the sea. Thirdly, the whole of the Regular Army would not, and could not, be sent out of the country until that supremacy had been established and they would not be sent out of the country until the Territorial Army had been trained and was qualified to take the place of the Regular troops. He also added that it would be open to the Government in a moment of a great crisis to run greater risks if they thought circumstances justified it. Those were general principles with which all parties in the House agreed. Why, then, should we get into such a state of excitement with regard to an invasion now? Suppose the enemy did succeed in landing 70,000 troops on these shores, I do not think they would have a happy time, even if we had only a few Regular troops and a few Territorials and other resources at our disposal. Hon. Members opposite seem to assume that the country would be absolutely denuded of every Regular soldier, that the Territorial troops would be absolutely useless and that until they had had their six months' training they would be worth nothing.
That is another curious hallucination on the part of hon. Members opposite. [An HON. MEMBER: "Haldane said it."] I do not want to hurt the feelings of hon. Members opposite, but we have been told ad nauseam during recent months that a particular force has been trained in a particular portion of these islands, and that it is so fit and so well organised—this has been stated by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Strand Division in this House and by Lord Curzon elsewhere—that it is fit to meet the best troops that can be brought against it. We have been told that. Now our troops are not Continental troops, which are merely trained for two years, but the troops which would be brought against this force would be Regular troops, trained in this country on what, as compared with the Continental system, is a long service system. If the statement of hon. Members opposite is true, will anybody tell me that the Territorial Force, with its training in open daylight, its equipment, its organisation, its regular officers, most of them active service men, is not quite as fit a force, and if the force to which those hon. Gentlemen have referred, is fit to meet the best troops in the world, is not the Territorial Force in the same position? It must be one thing or the other. Hon. Members opposite cannot, have it both ways—they cannot use one argument one day and another the next day. My own belief is that the Territorial Force, as it now is, led largely by officers of the Regular Army, would make a very good show indeed—not so good, perhaps, as Regular troops—but I am perfectly certain that Regular officers, who give their opinion, not because they happen to be in command, but because they are officers of His Majesty, and speak what they believe to be true, are quite right when they say it is excellent in material and equipment, and will make a very good fighting force. I only want to add, looking at our system of defence here in this country at the present time, it is organised on a proper and sane system, and if only public opinion would favour it a little more, and would give it the encouragement it needs and deserves, instead of disparaging and depreciating it and sneering at the optimism of the Secretary for War, it would be realised that it is the best asset we have at the present time.
The hon. and gallant Member who last spoke has been good enough to give us his views as to the scheme of defence proper for this country. I hope he will not think me guilty of discourtesy if I say that we are on this occasion much more interested in the scheme of defence prepared by the Committee of Imperial Defence. I think my two hon. Friends were perfectly justified in moving and seconding this Motion, to the second part of which I wish especially to address myself. It regrets the fact that the Government have not been able, or have not seen fit, to acquaint the House with the decision of the Imperial Defence Committee before the House is called upon to discuss the Naval and Military Estimates of the year. We all regret that the Prime Minister is absent to-night, through indisposition, not only on account of the cause, but because we had hoped that possibly he might be able to take advantage of this opportunity to lift the veil a little more than he did the other day, in view of the fact that, according to his own statement, the Report of the Imperial Defence Committee on the invasion problem has already been unanimously agreed. I hope, in the few remarks I have to make, I may carry the whole House with me in regard to this point. Everyone must agree that it is a topsy-turvy arrangement, not to put it more strongly, that we should have a system of discussing, first, the details of each Service separately before we have any opportunity of discussing the whole question of defence policy. Nothing, surely, from a purely business point of view, quite apart from politics, could be more futile or ridiculous than that. After all the size and strength both of our Navy and Army, and our scheme of defence, and everything else, must depend in the first place to a very large extent upon our international relations, both present and future. One would have thought, therefore, that the Order of Procedure, which would have been adopted in this House would have been to begin this series of discussions by debating our foreign relations, and, for that purpose, the first Vote should be the Foreign Office Vote. Having disposed of that, and having got some idea of the international situation, I venture to suggest we should next discuss the Vote for the Imperial Defence Committee.
The Prime Minister, speaking on behalf of the Committee of Imperial Defence, should tell us what are the general conclusions with regard to defence as a whole to which the Committee has come. We should then get some idea of what is our scheme of defence, and what relative parts in it are played by the Navy and the Army. Having done that, we might very well go on to the Navy Estimates, and then to the Army Estimates, and discuss the details of those Services. Instead of that, under our present system we reverse that procedure. First, we have the details of the Army; then we get into another watertight compartment and take the details of the Navy; then we probably take the Foreign Office and our foreign relations; and then, possibly and only per-chance, at some late period of the Session, we take the Vote for the Committee of Imperial Defence, upon which we are told what our Army and Navy are for. I do not think anyone will disagree with my view that that is really a topsy-turvey arrangement. Everyone must recognise that the Navy and Army are absolutely interdependent in any national scheme of defence, yet the provision for the Army and Navy is considered separately in the Cabinet, and the Services are then discussed separately in! the House of Commons. It is absolutely out of Order, under the Rules of the House, when discussing the Army Estimates to refer to the Navy, or when discussing the Navy Estimates to refer to the Army. You, Sir, in the Chair, discharging your duty under the Rules of the House, would at once rule out a speaker if, in dealing with either of these two great Departments, he ventured for a moment even to hint by any argument that they were interdependent. It is almost impossible for absurdity to go any further.
The first essential in any proper discussion of this very grave matter of our National defence is that we should be first informed what is the standard of strength, both for our Navy and Army, that is considered necessary by this highest tribunal, the Committee of Imperial Delence. How can we discuss the question whether our Home defence preparations are adequate until we know what is needed for Home defence, and what is needed for our Overseas' requirements. Look at the state of confusion to which we were reduced the other day during the Army Debate owing to the fact that the Secretary for War was not authorised to announce in advance the decision of the Committee of Imperial Defence. He was not even able to tell us whether the whole of our Expeditionary Force, which he claimed was ready to go, would, as a matter of fact, be allowed to go at a moment's notice if the strategic requirements of the Empire demanded it. That is really a ridiculous situation. I do not know whether the First Lord of the Admiralty will be in a position to-night to give us any of these conclusions of the Committee of Imperial Defence. I rather gather from his gesture that he will not. At any rate, I hope he will allow me to press this point on him, and that he will consider it on behalf of the Government—it is too late now this year—but in future years, if the Government are responsible for our Debates, that they will put the thing in proper order, that if it is impossible after the Foreign Office Vote to give us the Vote on the Imperial Defence Committee, in order that we should get a general discussion on the whole defence problem, I ask that some endeavour should be made to arrive at some arrangement by agreement between the two sides of the House, of course, with the consent of the Chair, that there should be a joint Debate on moving the Speaker out of the Chair on the Navy and Army Estimates, instead of two separate Debates on going out of the Chair first on the Navy, and then on the Army Estimates. If we could take the time for these two Debates lumped together, and have a Debate moving the Speaker out of the Chair on the Navy and Army Estimates, so that we could discuss these two subjects together, and that it would be in order to refer to the whole problem of national defence, I think we should have, at any rate, a much more intelligent basis for our subsequent discussions of detail. In making this proposal, which I make in the interests of all people in the House who are interested in the question, which has no relation to any of our party controversies, I am putting it forward not as a matter about which we can really have any great difference of opinion, but as a matter simply of common sense.
The House has certainly listened to a very interesting and agreeable Debate which, if it has advanced over a wide field and touched upon many subjects of deep interest, has thrown some light on everything that it has touched. The hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Butcher) has placed the House under a debt for having selected so interesting and discursive a topic for our Tuesday evening Debate. The Noble Lord (Marquess of Tullibardine) also made an interesting speech, but he certainly asked a great number of questions. A desire to acquire information is always praiseworthy, but if the questions of the Noble Lord were to be answered effectively it would require from the Prime Minister, who is the only person who could answer them, a speech at least as long as that which I have already inflicted upon the House this afternoon, and when that speech was concluded there would be very few secrets belonging to the Admiralty or to the War Office which would not have been fully laid before the public and the House of Commons. It is very easy in the course of a few minutes' discussion to raise a great number of points connected with our military and naval arrangements to answer which would involve a very great deal of care and thought, and nothing is more easy than to string together a few disconnected arguments on these subjects and create an impression either of extreme optimism or of extreme despondency, according to the taste. For instance, my Noble Friend (Marquess of Tullibardine) referred in very uncomplimentary terms to the defences of Cromarty. Cromarty has been taken over for defence by the Admiralty. The only interests at Cromarty are purely naval interests, and when the discussion took place as to its defence, a certain scale was decided upon as necessary. The Admiralty were of opinion that they could fulfil that scale of defence much cheaper, on account of the plant they had at their disposal, and other advantages, and could execute the 'work much quicker than the military authorities could do. We have provided a naval base there, which is more powerful than the scale that had been approved, because we had guns in our possession, and we have employed heavier guns which have bigger smashing power, and which would do greater detriment to hostile ships than the guns which would have fulfilled the necessary scale of defence. We have also effected a very large saving of money by the fact that we have used a great many existing appliances and works which are in the highest pitch of efficiency. The guns which are actually mounted have not merely the protection of earthworks, but of barbettes, and all the convenience arising therefrom. By what might be regarded as a marvellous and creditable evolution of fortification, the work on this secondary and subsidiary naval base has actually been achieved within a space of twelve months from the cutting of the first sod. I do not think there is any reason to make unfavourable comments upon that—far from it. Great credit is due to all who have taken part in it. Not only have we had what is necessary done in equipping guns, but there has also been a substantial saving in cost.
The hon. Member for Reading made a speech which was justly praised by my hon. Friend behind me, and which was marked throughout by knowledge of the subject and great moderation in the expression of his views. But the hon. Member used a phrase to which I must refer. He said he had noticed a tendency on the part of the Government to shield themselves behind the Committee of Imperial Defence. I do not think that is just. I do not think it is true to say that this Government, or that the late Government, for the matter of that, have shielded themselves behind the Committee of Imperial Defence. You hear the opinions of the Committee of Imperial Defence very rarely quoted, and when they are quoted they are always quoted as the opinions expressed by the Committee of Imperial Defence and endorsed by the Cabinet. The hon. Gentleman who spoke from the Front Opposition Bench (Mr. Lee) would apparently exalt the Committee of Imperial Defence into a position which, I think, its founders—the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London, the present Prime Minister, and most of us who sit on this side—would certainly not agree to. He spoke of it as the highest tribunal, and he talked of its decisions. The Committee of Imperial Defence does not make decisions It makes recommendations to the Cabinet, which takes decisions and submits them when necessary to Parliament. It would be a great misfortune if an attempt were made to raise the Committee of Imperial Defence beyond the limits in which their work is extraordinarily efficient. The Cabinet is righly careful to safeguard its own power, and the harmony which prevails between the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Cabinet is due to the fact that half the Cabinet are Members of that Committee.
In this extremely interesting Debate the problem around which discussion has ranged has been mainly the defence of this country from oversea attack. It is evident to anyone who has studied the subject that there is a number of new factors which have arisen during the last six or seven years which require close and searching attention on the part of the responsible authority. Some of them have been mentioned this evening. The Noble Lord referred to the submarine and to aircraft, and I think that he referred also to wireless telegraphy; and so did the hon. Member for York. These are three comparatively new factors which enter into the problem. But it must not be assumed that these factors are unfavourable to us. The submarine, for instance, tells against the invader. Whoever wants to transport large bodies of troops across the sea cannot feel that the problem has been rendered easier by the great development of the submarine. No doubt there are other applications of submarines, but, for the purpose of this Motion, the main subject which we have been discussing to-night, the submarines must count far more, if I may use an expression which I am told is sometimes used on the Stock Exchange, as a bull point. The other two factors—aircraft and wireless telegraphy—clearly tell in favour of the stronger fleet. Both of them will result in the obtaining of information, and the stronger fleet is the fleet which needs information, and which can certainly achieve its object with information. It may be the hope of the weaker fleet to elude, but it is the aim of the stronger fleet to find and bring back. For those purposes everything which tends to make the transmission of information more perfect, and the finding of the enemies' ships more sure, must be counted as favourable to the Power possessing the strongest fleet. Therefore those new factors, though I entirely agree with their great importance, are not of a character to increase the despondency which in some quarters has become a point of honour.
I was referring to airships in conjunction with submarines, and not with regard to the big fleets.
Of course, where airships come into play, in offensive operations against another country, the aircraft of that country also come into play, and the warfare of the air will proceed as an independent aspect of this disagreeable process. The aircraft will fight among themselves, and the best and strongest aircraft will beat down and destroy the others. And the nearer you are to your own coast, your own base, the more advantages your aircraft will have in dealing with intruding or invading aircraft. So I do not think that that meets the point to which I was referring. On the other hand, I cannot doubt that the change of the strategic front which has taken place has not improved our position. In the 100 years of antagonism against France, the whole of the South Coast and the southern part of the East Coast, from Sheerness right round to Queenstown and Berehaven, has been converted into a line of defended harbours and naval bases, and great torpedo-proof ports. Anyone who has the geography in mind can easily pass them in review. From Chatham to Dover, from Dover to Portsmouth, from Portsmouth to Portland, from Portland to Plymouth, from Plymouth to Falmouth, from Falmouth to Queenstown and from Queenstown to Berehaven, with a lot of small places in between, everywhere practically has been fortified, mid in the neighbourhood of these great arsenals, are the military bases behind them, the great camps at Aldershot, Salisbury Plain, and the Curragh, all readily accessible in support of the front. Of late years, without the slightest question of hostility, the course of events has shifted our front to the East Coast, and the arrangements which we have on the East Coast have not yet reached anything like that state of development which has been obtained over long periods of years, along the Southern front. That means some expense on our Estimates, and requires a good deal of attention from the military and naval authorities. All these matters are receiving, and have received, the attention of the Invasion Committee during this long inquiry. The naval manœuvres have yielded lessons of very great importance, which have been carefully studied and digested by the Invasion Committee. When fragmentary accounts of those complicated operations, which proceed on an official basis, and are only directed to the elucidation of particular points, appear in the newspapers, highly coloured, and very often supplied from extremely uninstructed sources, it is rather dangerous to draw sweeping and final conclusions from them.
There is nothing so sham, as has been well said, as a sham fight. When you take the war-heads off the torpedoes, and put no shots in the guns, it is a much more comfortable operation to move transports armed to carry 6,000 or 7,000 men, about waters infested with torpedo craft and armed vessels, and persons are quite prepared to run that risk with a great deal more composure than they would do if there was present what would cause the destruction of a larger number of human beings than were killed in the great struggles of Gravelotte or Sedan. The Noble Lord said that no ship would dare show its nose in the North Sea. It is his expression, not mine. But he must remember that the North Sea, when all is said and done, is rather a large place. I would therefore deprecate any attempt to draw a hard and fast conclusion from anything that may have leaked out in the newspapers about the naval manœuvres. The whole of the facts laid before the Invasion Committee have been taken into consideration by them. Broadly speaking, the two-pronged fork with which we hold back pessimism on these subjects is either that the Expeditionary Force is in this country or it has gone. If it is here, then no surprise embarkation set on foot from a foreign country could, without ample warning, possibly be large enough to effect any useful purpose on land. It would be annihilated by the armed forces of this country. If the Expeditionary Force is gone, and long before it has gone, the Fleet would have been fully mobilised and in its war state, and then the possibility of any substantially hostile force getting through is reduced to dimensions which are extremely exiguous. All these questions, I say, have been the subject of our inquiries during the last year. And what has been the doctrine which the Admiralty have always developed and always adhered to during the whole of that period, and not only during those inquiries but long before? It is this: We have said that in order that our naval defence shall be fully effective, there must be sufficient military force in this country to make it necessary for an invader to come in such large numbers that he will offer a target to the Navy, and certainly would be intercepted if he embarked. That is the solid position which we have always taken up and from which we have never deviated at all. It could not be better put than it was put to me by that brilliant naval commander, Sir Arthur Wilson, who said that for the Navy to have to guard this country without any military forces of any kind in this country would be like playing an international football match without a goalkeeper. That is the position we have always taken up, and do take up. I ask you, Sir, is it not rather unfair, when these things are quite well known to all who have studied the question, to try to misrepresent the views, and traduce the character of the professional advisers of the Government and of the Admiralty when they put forward those views with complete consistency and in accordance with the authority of their profession? What happened in the case of the First Sea Lord to whom reference has been made—
I hope the right hon. Gentleman does not think—
I am not referring to the hon. Gentleman. I know he has not associated himself in any way with the statements which have been made in various, quarters, and I am very glad to see that the Front Bench opposite have lent no countenance to the disreputable statements which have been made on this subject.
Mr. BUTCHER rose—
Does the hon. Gentleman rise to a point of Order?
Yes; I want to know who are the persons who made those disreputable statements?
That is hardly a point of Order.
Being the first opportunity that I have had in Debate of indicating the consistency of the First Sea Lord in regard to the very subject, namely, the safety of this country from complete attack which is the topic of the Motion, I propose, with your permission, to address myself for a very few moments to that. It has been very much referred to—
On a point of Order. May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he is referring to us. [HON. MEMBERS: "Chair!"] May I ask whether the right hon. Gentleman is referring to me, and if so—
I think the right hon. Gentleman was not referring to any person in particular. It was to certain statements made outside, the House.
Sir R. POLE-CAREW rose—
I am satisfied the First Lord of the Admiralty is going to deal with the question as it arises out of the current Debate.
I was not referring to the hon. and gallant Member, but I do propose with your permission, to point out to the House exactly what took place in regard to the statement of the First Sea Lord. Prince Louis of Battenberg read the documents which were furnished by the National Service League before their deputation to the Prime Minister, and he saw the use made of his name there, and which he did not agree with, and on his own initiative he sent a memorandum to the Prime Minister, the substance of which I gave to the House in answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Wisbech (Mr. Neil Primrose). In that statement he clearly set forth the same doctrine that he put forth in his speech at the Union Jack Club a year before, and the same doctrine to which on all occasions, publicly and privately, the Admiralty, under many Naval Boards, have consistently adhered. Is it not rather unfair—here, if I may, I refer to the hon. and gallant Member, who has been a soldier, mid knows how much men in the Services, who have not the opportunity to speak for themselves, feel remarks of this kind—is it not rather unfair for him to say that the First Sea Lord went back upon his word? I say that that was a most insulting and unfair remark.
I only ask that the right hon. Gentleman should give me five minutes in which to reply.
As to that, I will do the best I can to complete my remarks. I venture to think it a pity that individual members of the Board of Admiralty should be singled out for this kind of offensive attack just because they happen to be serving under a Liberal Government. There is very good feeling at present between the Army and the Navy. The two Services are working very well together, but it will do nothing but harm if the Navy think that chiefs whom they honour and respect are to be subjected to most offensive personal attacks of this character directed against them by the ex-military men who have gone into politics. [HON. MEMBERS: "Rats!" "Speak for yourself!" Why did you leave the Army?"]
I am anxious to give the hon. and gallant Gentleman an opportunity to reply. I hope hon. Members will allow the First Lord to proceed.
May we ask that the right hon. Gentleman should not gratuitously insult hon. Members on this side?
I have nearly finished. I wish to give the hon. and gallant Gentleman the five minutes for which he has asked. If I am not interrupted, I shall give it. If I am interrupted—[HON. MEMBERS: "Go on!"] Perhaps hon. Members will allow me she liberty of debate to which I am entitled. If they—[HON. MEMBERS: "Go on!"] I shall not go on any quicker than I intend to. The discussion and consideration of this matter by the Invasion Committee were exhaustive and exhausting. Numerous and prolonged sittings have been held during the whole of the year. The documentary work has been of a most laborious description, and it was not possible to hurry the deliberations of the Committee. The Report has now been completed. It was finally agreed to only about a fortnight ago; it has not yet been signed; a number of minor points are still under revision and amendment. It would have been quite impossible to have completed that Report in time for the Debate on the Committee of Imperial Defence Vote before the Navy and Army Estimates of the year came on. On the other hand, you cannot delay those Estimates. We must have the necessary money to maintain the public services. Therefore the course we have adopted is the only one which has been physically possible. We quite agree with the doctrine put forward by the hon. Mem- ber on the Front Opposition Bench, that you ought to begin the discussion on naval and military matters in each year with a discussion on some Vote which enables the whole policy of the Government, and the combined working of the two Services, to be discussed, and which enables general principles to be disentangled from the general mass of detail, which overlies the whole of the Debates on these topics. That is common ground between the two parties. This year it would have been foolish to have a Debate on the Committee of Imperial Defence without the Report, and as the Report is not ready, the best that can be done is to have the Debate on a day later in the Session. The Prime Minister desires me to say upon this subject that he will give a day for the discussion of the Vote in which the money for the Committee of Imperial Defence is taken, which would enable all these matters to be raised, and he will take advantage of that by making a full statement to Parliament, which will embody in a complete and considered form the conclusions which the Imperial Defence Committee have decided after very long and laborious examination.
As the right hon. Gentleman said when he rose, this Debate has been most interesting, and conducted in a very fair and impartial manner; if anybody has altered the tone of the Debate it is the right hon. Gentleman himself. He has made a violent attack upon me for something which I said the other day in speaking on the Army Estimates. The right hon. Gentleman was not himself in the House, and therefore does not, at least, I imagine, know exactly what was going on. We were asking the Secretary of State for War whether or not he intended to take the whole of his imaginary Expeditionary Force out of the country at the outbreak of war. For some reason, best known to himself, he declined to tell us. But he gave us the impression, which I believe is well-founded, that it was impossible, and would be impossible, for him to do so. In attempting to show that to the House, I mentioned the fact that the First Sea Lord, some little time ago, made a speech at the Union Jack Club, in which he said:—
"There were people who went about and said that if war came, the Fleet alone was capable enough of preventing anyone invading the shores of this island kingdom. There can be no more foolish or mischievous statement. The Fleet alone could not do it, and the presence"—
I hope the right hon. Gentleman will mark this:—
"and the presence of a sufficient trained professional Army in this island, at all times, was quite as necessary as the other Arm of the service."
I believe that was a speech publicly made by a public man, and when the First Lord of the Admiralty came down to this House a few days ago, and practically told us that the interpretation, which I say the whole of this House, and any reasonable man, would put upon that, was not correct, then I say either the First Lord of the Admiralty was not telling us what was the fact, or else the First Sea Lord had what I called gone back upon his word or changed his mind; and if there is any difference between going back upon your word and changing your mind in this case, be it so. I have known right hon. Gentlemen on the Front Bench opposite who have changed their minds and gone back upon their words, and I think, at any rate, in their case, the terms were synonymous. Now that is sufficient for the First Lord of the Admiralty. I did not intend to speak about myself to-night. I did intend to take a humble part in the Debate to which I listened with interest; but as I have been attacked in this way, I wish to say one more word. I asked the Secretary of State for War a question to-day of a perfectly harmless nature, and with a desire to ascertain whether the troops in this country are fit for active service or not, and I received a reply from the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War, which I consider to be of an offensive nature quite unnecessary and entirely unworthy of his office—I am not saying unworthy of himself, but of his office. I go further, and say that the right hon. Gentleman took advantage of the position he holds in answering that question to make an offensive remark to me which he knew I was unable to answer. To me it is perfectly immaterial; it only shows me that the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War are worthy to sit upon the same bench with the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Question put.
The House divided: Ayes, 190; Noes, 290.
Division No. 50.] AYES. [11.0 p.m. Agg-Gardner, James Tynte Craig, Norman (Kent, Thanet) Harrison-Broadley, H. B. Amery, L. C. M. S. Craik, Sir Henry Helmsley, Viscount Anson, Rt. Hon. Sir William R. Crichton-Stuart, Lord Ninian Henderson, Sir A. (St. Geo., Han. Sq.) Anstruther-Gray, Major William Croft, H. P. Herbert, Hon. A. (Somerset, S.) Archer-Shee, Major M. Dalrymple, Viscount Hewins, William Albert Samuel Ashley, W. W. Denison-Pender, J. C. Hibbert, Sir Henry F. Astor, Waldorf Denniss, E. R. B. Hickman, Colonel Thomas E. Baird, J. L. Dickson, Rt. Hon. C. Scott Hoare, S. J. G. Baldwin, Stanley Duncannon, Viscount Hope, James Fitzalan (Sheffield) Banbury, Sir Frederick George Du Pre, W. Baring Hope, Major J. A. (Midlothian) Banner, Sir John S. Harmood- Eyres-Monsell, Bolton M. Horne, E. (Surrey, Guildford) Baring, Maj. Hon. Guy V. (Winchester) Faber, George Denison (Clapham) Hume-Williams, William Ellis Barlow, Montague (Salford, South) Faber, Captain W. V. (Hants, W.) Hunt, Rowland Barnston, Harry Falle, B. G. Hunter, Sir C. R. Bathurst, Hon. A. B. (Glouc., E.) Fell, Arthur Ingleby, Holcombe Bathurst, Charles (Wilts, Wilton) Finlay, Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Joynson-Hicks, William Beckett, Hon. Gervase Fitzroy, Hon. Edward A. Kerry, Earl of Benn, Arthur Shirley (Plymouth) Flannery, Sir J. Fortescue Keswick, Henry Benn, Ion Hamilton (Greenwich) Forster, Henry William Kinloch-Cooke, Sir Clement Bennett-Goldney, Francis Gardner, Ernest Larmor, Sir J. Bentinck, Lord H. Cavendish- Gastrell, Major W. Houghton Law, Rt. Hon. A. Bonar (Bootle) Beresford, Lord C. Gibbs, G. A. Lawson, Hon. H. (T. H'mts, Mile End Blair, Reginald Gilmour, Captain John Lee, Arthur Hamilton Boles, Lieut.-Colonel Dennis Fortescue Glazebrook, Captain Philip K. Lewisham, Viscount Boyle, William (Norfolk, Mid) Goldman, C. S. Lloyd, George Ambrose (Stafford, W.) Boyton, James Goldsmith, Frank Lloyd, George Butler (Shrewsbury) Brassey, H. Leonard Campbell Gordon, Hon. John Edward (Brighton) Locker-Lampson, G. (Salisbury) Bridgeman, W. Clive Grant, J. A. Locker-Lampson, O. (Ramsey) Burn, Colonel C. R. Greene, W. R. Lockwood, Rt. Hon. Lieut.-Col. A. R. Campion, W. R. Gretton, John Long, Rt. Hon. Walter Carlile, Sir Edward Hildred Guinness, Hon. Rupert (Essex, S.E.) Lyttelton, Hon. J. C. Cassel, Felix Guinness, Hon. W. E. (Bury S. Edmunds) Mackinder, Halford J. Cator, John Gwynne, R. S. (Sussex, Eastbourne) Macmaster, Donald Cautley, H. S. Haddock, George Bahr M'Calmont, Major Robert C. A. Cave, George Hall, D, B. (Isle of Wight) M'Neill, Ronald (Kent, St. Augustine's) Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor) Hall, Frederick (Dulwich) Mason, James F. (Windsor) Cecil, Lord Hugh (Oxford University) Hall, Marshall (L'pool, E. Toxteth) Meysey-Thompson, E. C. Cecil, Lord R. (Herts, Hitchin) Hambro, Angus Valdemar Middlemore, John Throgmorton Chaloner, Colonel R. G. W. Hamersley, Alfred St. George Mills, Hon Charles Thomas Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J. A. (Worc'r.) Hamilton, C. G. C. (Ches., Altrincham) Morrison-Bell, Capt. E. F. (Ashburton) Clay, Captain H. H. Spender Hamilton, Lord C. J. (Kensington, S.) Morrison-Bell, Major A. C. (Honiton) Coates, Major Sir Edward Feetham Hardy, Rt. Hon. Laurence Mount, William Arthur Courthope, George Loyd Harris, Henry Percy Neville, Reginald J. N. Newman, John R. P. Rutherford, Watson (L'pool, W. Derby) Tryon, Captain George Clement Newton, Harry Kottingham Salter, Arthur Clavell Valentia, Viscount Nicholson, William G. (Petersfield) Samuel, Samuel (Wandsworth) Walker, Col. William Hall Norton-Griffiths, J. Sanders, Robert Arthur Warde, Col. C. E. (Kent, Mid) O'Neill, Hon. A. E. B. (Antrim, Mid) Sanderson, Lancelot Weston, Colonel J. W. Orde-Powlett, Hon. W. G. A. Sandys, G. J. Wheler, Granville C. H. Paget, Almeric Hugh Sassoon, Sir Philip White, Major G. D. (Lancs, Southport) Parker, Sir Gilbert (Gravesend) Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.) Willoughby, Major Hon. Claud Parkes, Ebenezer Smith, Rt. Hon. F. E. (L'p'l, Walton) Wilson, A. Stanley (Yorks, E.R.) Peel, Lieut.-Colonel R. F. Spear, Sir John Ward Wilson, Captain Leslie O. (Reading) Perkins, Walter F. Stanier, Beville Wilson, Maj. Sir M. (Bethnal Green, S. W.) Peto, Basil Edward Stanley, Hon. Arthur (Ormskirk) Wood, Hon. E. F. L. (Yorks, Ripon) Pole-Carew, Sir R. Stanley, Hon. G. F. (Preston) Wood, John (Stalybridge) Pollock, Ernest Murray Stewart, Gershom Worthington Evans, L. Pretyman, Ernest George Sykes, Alan John (Ches., Knutsford) Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart- Pryce-Jones, Colonel E. Sykes, Sir Mark (Hull, Central) Yate, Colonel C. E. Quilter, Sir William Eley C. Talbot, Lord E. Yerburgh, Robert A. Ratcliff, R. F. Terrell, G. (Wilts, N.W.) Younger, Sir George Rawson, Colonel Richard H. Terrell, Henry (Gloucester) Rees, Sir J. D. Tobin, Alfred Aspinall TELLERS FOR THE AYES. —Mr.—Mr. Rothschild, Lionel de Touche, George Alexander Butcher and Marquess of Tullibardine. Royds, Edmund
NOES. Abraham, William (Dublin, Harbour) Delany, William Higham, John Sharp Acland, Francis Dyke Denman, Hon. R. D. Hinds, John Adamson, William Devlin, Joseph Hobhouse, Rt. Hon. Charles E. H. Addison, Dr. C. Dewar, Sir J. A. Hodge, John Agnew, Sir George William Dickinson, Rt. Hon. Willoughby H. Hogge, James Myles Alden, Percy Dillon, John Holmes, Daniel Turner Allen, Arthur Acland (Dumbartonshire) Donelan, Captain A. Holt, Richard D. Allen, Rt. Hon. Charles P. (Stroud) Doris, William Horne, C. Silvester (Ipswich) Armitage, Robert Duffy, William J. Hudson, Walter Arnold, Sydney Duncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness) Illingworth, Percy H. Baker, Joseph Allen (Finsbury, E.) Edwards, Clement (Glamorgan, E.) Jardine, Sir J. (Roxburgh) Baring, Sir Godfrey (Barnstaple) Edwards, Sir Francis (Radnor) John, Edward Thomas Barlow, Sir John Emmott (Somerset) Edwards, John Hugh (Glamorgan, Mid) Johnson, W. Barnes, George N. Elverston, Sir Harold Jones, Edgar (Merthyr Tydvil) Barran, Rowland Hurst (Leeds, N.) Esmonde, Dr. John (Tipperary, N.) Jones, H. Haydn (Merioneth) Beale, Sir William Phipson Esmonde, Sir Thomas (Wexford, N.) Jones, J. Towyn (Carmarthen, East) Beauchamp, Sir Edward Essex, Sir Richard Walter Jones, William S. Glyn- (Stepney) Beck, Arthur Cecil Falconer, James Jowett, Frederick William Benn, W. W. (Tower Hamlets, S. Geo.) Farrell, James Patrick Joyce, Michael Bentham, George Jackson Fenwick, Rt. Hon. Charles Kellaway, Frederick George Birrell, Rt. Hon. Augustine Ferens, Rt. Hon. Thomas Robinson Kelly, Edward Black, Arthur W. Firench, Peter Kennedy, Vincent Paul Boland, John Pius Field, William Kenyon, Barnet Booth, Frederick Handel Fiennes, Hon. Eustace Edward Kilbride, Denis Bowerman, C. W. Fitzgibbon, John Lambert, Rt. Hon. G. (Devon, S. Molton) Boyle, Daniel (Mayo, North) Flavin, Michael Joseph Lambert, Richard (Wilts, Cricklade) Brace, William France, Gerald Ashburner Lardner, James C. R. Brady, P. J. Furness, Sir Stephen Wilson Law, Hugh A. (Donegal, West) Brunner, J. F. L. Gelder, Sir William Alfred Lawson, Sir W. (Cumb'rld, Cockerm'th) Bryce, J. Annan George, Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd Levy, Sir Maurice Burns, Rt. Hon. John Gill, A. H. Lewis, Rt. Hon. John Herbert Burt, Rt. Hon. Thomas Gladstone, W. G. C. Lough, Rt. Hon. Thomas Buxton, Noel (Norfolk, North) Glanville, H. J. Low, Sir F. (Norwich) Byles, Sir William Pollard Goddard, Sir Daniel Ford Lundon, T. Carr-Gomm, H. W. Goldstone, Frank Lyell, Charles Henry Cawley, H. T. (Heywood) Greenwood, Hamar (Sunderland) Lynch, A. A. Chancellor, H. G. Greig, Colonel J. W. Macdonald, J. Ramsay (Leicester) Chapple, Dr. William Allen Grey, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Macdonald, J. M. (Falkirk Burghs) Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S. Guest, Hon. Major C. H. C. (Pembroke) McGhee, Richard Clancy, John J. Guest, Hon. Frederick E. (Dorset, E.) Maclean, Donald Clough, William Gulland, John William Macnamara, Rt Hon. Dr. T. J. Clynes, John R. Gwynn, Stephen Lucius (Galway) MacNeill, J. G. Swift (Donegal, South) Collins, Godfrey P. (Greenock) Hackett, J. Macpherson, James Ian Collins, Sir Stephen (Lambeth) Hancock, John George MacVeagh, Jeremiah Compton-Rickett, Rt. Hon. Sir J. Harcourt, Rt. Hon. Lewis (Rossendale) M'Callum, Sir John M. Condon, Thomas Joseph Harcourt, Robert V. (Montrose) M'Kean, John Cornwall, Sir Edwin A. Hardie, J. Keir M'Laren, Hon. F.W.S. (Lincs., Spalding) Cory, Sir Clifford John Harmsworth, Cecil (Luton, Beds) M'Micking, Major Gilbert Cotton, William Francis Harvey, A. G. C. (Rochdale) Markham, Sir Arthur Basil Cowan, W. H. Harvey, T. E. (Leeds, W.) Marshall, Arthur Harold Craig, Herbert J. (Tynemouth) Havelock-Allan, Sir Henry Mason, David M. (Coventry) Crooks, William Hayden, John Patrick Meehan, Francis E. (Leitrim, N.) Crumley, Patrick Hayward, Evan Meehan, Patrick J. (Queen's Co., Leix) Cullinan, John Hazleton, Richard Middlebrook, William Dalziel, Rt. Hon. Sir. J. H. (Kirkcaldy) Helme, Sir Norval Watson Millar, James Duncan Davies, Ellis William (Eifion) Henderson, Arthur (Durham) Molloy, Michael Davies, Timothy (Lincs, Louth) Henderson, J. M. (Aberdeen, W.) Molteno, Percy Alport Davies, Sir W. Howell (Bristol, S.) Henry, Sir Charles Mond, Rt. Hon. Sir Alfred Dawes, J. A. Hewart, Gordon Money, L. G. Chiozza Mooney, J. J. Pointer, Joseph Swann, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles E. Morgan, George Hay Ponsonby, Arthur A. W. H. Taylor, Thomas (Bolton) Morrell, Philip Pratt, J. W. Tennant, Harold John Morison, Hector Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central) Thomas, James Henry Morton, Alpheus Cleophas Price, Sir R. J. (Norfolk, E.) Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton) Muldoon, John Primrose, Hon. Neil James Thorne, William (West Ham) Munro, Rt. Hon. Robert Pringle, William M. R. Toulmin, Sir George Murphy, Martin J. Radford, G. H. Verney, Sir Harry Murray, Captain Hon. Arthur C. Raphael, Sir Herbert H. Walsh, Stephen (Lancs, Ince) Nannetti, Joseph P. Rea, Rt. Hon. Russell (South Shields) Ward, John (Stoke-upon-Trent) Needham, Christopher T. Rea, Walter Russell (Scarborough) Wardle, George J. Neilson, Francis Reddy, M. Waring, Walter Nolan, Joseph Redmond, John E. (Waterford) Warner, Sir Thomas Courtenay Norman, Sir Henry Redmond, William Archer (Tyrone, E.) Wason, Rt. Hon. E. (Clackmannan) Norton, Captain Cecil W. Richardson, Thomas (Whitehaven) Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney) Nugent, Sir Walter Richard Roberts, Charles H. (Lincoln) Watt, Henry Anderson Nuttall, Harry Roberts, Sir J. H. (Denbighs) Webb, H. O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny) Robertson, J. M. (Tyneside) White, J. Dundas (Glasgow, Tradeston) O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.) Robinson, Sidney White, Sir Luke (Yorks, E.R.) O'Connor, T. P. (Liverpool) Roch, Walter F. (Pembroke) White, Patrick (Meath, North) O'Doherty, Philip Roche, Augustine (Louth) Whittaker, Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas P. O'Donnell, Thomas Roe, Sir Thomas Whyte, A. F. (Perth) O'Dowd, John Rowlands, James Wiles, Thomas O'Kelly, Edward P. (Wicklow, W.) Rowntree, Arnold Williams, Aneurin (Durham, N.W.) O'Kelly, James (Roscommon, N.) Runciman, Rt. Hon. Walter Williams, Penry (Middlesbrough) O'Malley, William Russell, Rt. Hon. Thomas W. Williamson, Sir Archibald O'Neill, Dr. Charles (Armagh, S.) Samuel, J. (Stockton-on-Tees) Wilson, John (Durham, Mid) O'Shaughnessy, P. J. Scanlan, Thomas Wilson, Rt. Hon. J. W. (Worcs., N.) O'Shee, James John Seely, Rt. Hon. Colonel J. E. B. Wilson, W, T. (Westhoughton) O'Sullivan, Timothy Sheehy, David Winfrey, Sir Richard Outhwaite, R. L. Sherwell, Arthur James Wing, Thomas Edward Palmer, Godfrey Mark Simon, Rt. Hon. Sir John Allsebrook Wood, Rt. Hon. T. McKinnon (Glasgow) Parker, James (Halifax) Smith, Albert (Lancs, Clitheroe) Yeo, Alfred William Parry, Thomas H. Smith, H. B. L. (Northampton) Young, W. (Perthshire, E.) Pearce, Robert (Staffs, Leek) Smyth, Thomas F. (Leitrim) Yoxall, Sir James Henry Pease, Rt. Hon. Joseph A. (Rotherham) Soames, Arthur Wellesley Philipps, Colonel Ivor (Southampton) Spicer, Rt. Hon. Sir Albert TELLERS FOR THE NOES. —Mr.—Mr. Phillips, John (Longford, S.) Strauss, Edward A. (Southwark, West) Wm. Jones and Mr. Geoffrey Howard. Pirie, Duncan V. Sutton, John E.
Supply
Navy Estimates, 1914–15
Postponed Proceeding resumed on Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair (for Committee of Supply on the Navy Estimates)."
Question again proposed.
It being after Eleven of the clock, and objection being taken to further Proceeding, the Debate stood adjourned.
Debate to be resumed to-morrow (Wednesday).
The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.
Foot-And-Mouth Disease
I beg to move "That this House do now adjourn."
I beg to ask the Vice-President of the De- partment of Agriculture, Ireland, a question of which I have given him private notice, namely: Whether he can make any statement as regards the export of sheep from Scotland to Ireland, and with regard to foot-and-mouth disease?
Yes, Sir, an Order has been issued to-night, to come into operation on Friday, opening the Ulster and western ports for Scottish sheep. There will probably be some inspection and licences.
I beg to thank the right hon. Gentleman for the trouble he has taken.
Does that only apply to sheep?
At present, yes.
Question put, and agreed to.
Adjourned at Fourteen minutes after Eleven of the clock.