House of Commons
Wednesday, March 18, 1914
Private Business
Private Bills [ Lords ] (Petition for additional Provision) (Standing Orders not complied with),—Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in the case of the Petition for additional Provision in the following Bill, originating in the Lords, the Standing Orders have not been complied with, namely:—
Hull and Barnsley Railway Bill [ Lords ].
Ordered, That the Report be referred to the Select Committee on Standing Orders.
Sheffield Corporation Bill.
To be read a second time To-morrow.
Metropolitan and Great Northern Railway Companies Bill (by Order),
Second Reading deferred till Friday.
Railways Abandonment,
Copy presented of Report by the Board of Trade respecting the Alexandra (Newport and South Wales) Docks arid Railway Bill, and the objects thereof [presented pursuant to Standing Order 158 b ]; referred to the Committee on the Bill.
Cardiff Railway (Compounding of Tonnage Rates) Bill,
Reported, without Amendment; Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.
Kidsgrove Gas Bill,
Reported, with Amendments; Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.
Local Taxation (Departmental Committee)
Copy presented of Final Report of the Departmental Committee on Local. Taxation, England and Wales [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
Copy presented of Appendices to Final Report (England and Wales) of the Departmental Committee on Local Taxation. Part I. Minutes of Evidence. Part II. Memoranda submitted by Witnesses. Part III. Memoranda other than those submitted by Witnesses [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
Trade Reports (Annual Series)
Copy presented of Diplomatic and Consular Reports, Annual Series, No. 5259 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
Standing Committees (Chairmen's Panel)
Mr. Stuart-Wortley reported from the Chairmen's Panel; That they had appointed Mr. Arthur Henderson to act as Chairman of the Standing Committee on Scittish Bills (in respect of the Small Landholders (Scotland) Act (1911) Amendment Bill).
Report to lie upon the Table.
Selection (Standing Committees)
Sir Daniel Goddard reported from the Committee of Selection; That they had added to Standing Committee C the following Member (in respect of the Elementary Education (Defective and Epileptic Children) Bill): Mr. Goldsmith.
Report to lie upon the Table.
Oral Answers to Questions
Royal Navy
South Ferry Naval Base
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether it is the intention of Messrs. Easton and Gibbs, contractors, at South Queen's Ferry Naval Base, to employ only Dutchmen on the works; and whether, in order to better safeguard official secrets, he will consider the desirability that British workmen should be employed on this Admiralty contract?
The employment of about fifty Dutchmen on a portion of the dredging and reclamation work was only approved after the contractor had satisfied the Admiralty that all reasonable alternatives for employing British labour had been exhausted, and that serious delay and loss would otherwise occur in the completion of the work. No official secrets can be learnt by those engaged in these dredging operations.
Fourth Battle Squadron
asked what is the strength in battleships of the Fourth Battle Squadron based on Gibraltar at the present moment?
Four battleships are based on Gibraltar at present.
New Zealand Battleships
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty (1) whether the New Zealand battleship is inside the standard of sixteen to ten; and (2) whether he will give the House the number of battle cruisers and armoured cruisers which, in the opinion of the Government, is sufficient to support British interests in the Mediterranean during the years 1913 and 1914; and will he say what will be the strength in battleships of the "Dreadnought" class in the navies of Austria-Hungary and Italy in 1915?
I have nothing to add to the full statement I made to the House yesterday.
Is it not the fact that the New Zealand ship was given to this country not for the purpose of being used solely in European waters?
No, the New Zealand ship was given to this country for general service wherever the interests of the Empire require it.
Did not the right hon. Gentleman receive a message from the New Zealand Government saying that that is not the case?
Before the "New Zealand" was posted to the Home Fleet the New Zealand Government expressed their agreement with the course proposed.
Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that what I refer to is a recent message from the New Zealand Government?
Royal Marines
asked is the number of Royal Marines borne on the 3rd March, 1913, and on the 10th March,1914?
The number of Royal Marines borne on the 3rd March, 1913, were:—
Eastern Fleet
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty what steps, if any, have been taken by the Imperial Government to carry out the arrangements made with the Commonwealth of Australia and the Dominion of New Zealand in 1909; whether he has received from the Commonwealth Government and the Government of New Zealand any communication deprecating that the arrangements entered into by the Imperial Government in 1909 have not been carried out; and what, if any, steps it is proposed to take to make good the undertaking given?
The spirit of the arrangement made in 1909 was that the Admiralty should maintain an Eastern Fleet of double the strength of the Australian Fleet unit. Broadly speaking, this has been done, although the anticipations of 1909 have not been fulfilled as regards types of ships. Inquiries on the subject have been received both from Australia and New Zealand, and explanations have been given. The future development of British naval policy in the Pacific and the Far East must undoubtedly form the subject matter of further discussion with the Dominions interested. Papers will shortly be laid touching upon the question.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say when that discussion will take place?
No.
Has the right hon. Gentleman not received a message both from Australia and New Zealand respecting a conference to discuss these matters? Will the right hon. Gentleman kindly answer?
Will the hon. Gentleman kindly put down a question?
Sunday Duty
asked if Sunday is observed as a rest-day in the Navy, apart from absolutely essential duties; if men called upon to work on that day have some other day given them for rest and recreation; or if, as regards ships in commission, the lower deck ratings work practically a seven-day week?
The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. As regards the second part of the question, the necessary work is divided amongst the various officers and men as far as possible. I cannot see what good purpose is served by the insinuation in the third part of the question, which is entirely incorrect.
If that is entirely incorrect, may I ask for a correct reply to the last part of the question?
Submarines (Floating Buoys)
asked if any experiments are being made with Mr. Calvert's suggestion that floating buoys should be carried on submarines with telephones and wire attachment to the interior of the submarine, so that in the event of an accident the crew can communicate with the salvors by means of this buoy?
I must refer the hon. Member to the reply I gave to the hon. Member for Tonbridge on Monday last.
Is that particular point under consideration?
Yes, almost every day. I think we have received several hundreds of suggestions of which this particular one was repeated numerous times.
Cruisers (Great Britain and Germany)
asked how many protected and unarmoured cruisers have been completed for the British and German Navies, respectively, from 1906 on wards; and how many in the same period have been removed from the effective list?
The numbers of protected and unarmoured cruisers completed from 1906 onwards are:—
Is it satisfactory to the right hon. Gentleman that while we have reduced this class of cruiser by twenty-two Germany has increased hers by ten, making a difference of thirty-two-against us?
The aspect of affairs, as the hon. Member is well aware, would not have been nearly so satisfactory if I had not added the last portion of my answer which was not called for in hon. Member's question—the number of ships under construction in both countries.
Torpedo Boat Destroyers
asked how many torpedo boat destroyers have been completed for the British and German Navies, respectively, from 1906 onwards; and how many in the same period have been removed from the effective list?
The numbers of torpedo boat destroyers completed from 1906 onwards are:—
Personnel, 1913–14
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the basis adopted for estimating the number of the personnel in 1913–14 differs from that of previous years; if so, what the number of petty officers and men of the seamen and stoker classes, respectively, would be, and the total strength of the personnel, if the method of reckoning had been the same as in previous years?
There was a change of system, which I explained in Debate, and in my answer to the hon. Member for Devonport on 21st April last. Vote "A" for 1913–14 shows the maximum number to be reached by the 31st March, 1914, namely, 146,000. In previous years it showed the average number borne throughout the year, which is only of importance for estimating their pay. This average for 1913–14 would be about 142,500. The actual strength of seamen, including boys, on the 31st March next will be approximately 54,400, and of stokers 39,400.
Blockade of Hodeidah
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what were the limits of the blockade of Hodeidah during the war between Italy and Turkey?
The hon. Member will find the exact particulars which he requires in the notices published in the "London Gazette" of 23rd January, 1912, and 9th April, 1912. They were, in the first notice of 23rd January, which covered Hodeidah, as follows:—"The Italian Government has notified the establishment of a blockade from the 22nd instant (January, 1912) by Italian ships of war, of the Ottoman Red Sea coast between latitude 15deg. 11min. and latitude 14deg. 30min.from Rasisa, north of Hodeidah, to Rasgoulaifac to the south."
May I ask the hon. Gentleman whether he will give the distances from shore to sea?
What I have read gives that information, and the subsequent notice, which I have not read, extends the notice I have read.
Questions
Portuguese West Africa (Arrest of Mr. Bowskill)
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has received any answer with reference to his communications to the British and Portuguese authorities as to the place and procedure for the trial of Mr. Bowskill?
In a note addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Lisbon by the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs his Excellency said, "that in regard to the trial of Mr. Bowskill and the place where it will be held, His Majesty's Government may rest assured that the Portuguese Government will take care, as is their duty, that all formalities will be observed in order to guarantee full justice. Should military officers be included in the tribunal, the guarantees of a fair trial will be in no way lessened thereby. The sittings of the tribunal will be public, and the British Consul can therefore be present at them." This information was contained in a telegram received on the 17th instant from His Majesty's Minister at Lisbon. Meanwhile the Acting British Consul at Boma has stated that he will repeat his attempt to reach San Salvador as soon as possible. He is in close touch with His Majesty's Consul at Loanda.
Will Mr. Bowskill have legal assistance, in addition to the British Consul being able to attend?
I said that the law in regard to the trial includes the provision of legal assistance for an accused person. We are assured that the proper thing will be done in this case.
Will legal assistance be available?
We have made representations that the trial should be at a place where all proper assistance will be available.?
Nairobi (Public Buildings)
asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether the Government of East Africa has altered the sites of certain of its public buildings at Nairobi, after publishing them on official plans and thereby inducing settlers to build in the vicinity at enhanced rates of tenancy: whether complaints have been made of this procedure; whether the Government proposes to makes redress in resultant cases of admitted hardship; and whether, in the interests of public confidence in official town planning, he will cause the practice to be discontinued?
The hon. Member's question refers no doubt to the site of the Law Courts at Nairobi. The site originally approved by the Governor was criticised by the unofficial community on the ground of inconvenience, and an alternative site was chosen by the late Commissioner of Lands, and was marked by him on published plans. Neither the site nor the publication were approved by the late Governor, who, in view of the representations of the Chief Justice, decided, after inquiring into possible cases of hardship, to revert to the original site. Subsequently he agreed to hold the matter over for further consideration, but refused to commit himself as to the final choice. A third site has since been selected, and is accepted as satisfactory by all sections of the community. I have recently received a complaint as to the abandonment of the second site, but on the information in my possession I am unable to admit that any case for redress exists.
Berbera (Dervish Raid)
asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he has any information with regard to a Dervish raid upon Berbera; and whether he can state to the House what steps the Colonial Office has taken to protect the British subjects and tribes men friendly to Great Britain in Berbera and district?
A descent was made on Berbera on the night of the 12th by a party of about forty Dervish horse, who fired into the town and immediately withdrew. Two Somali townsmen were wounded, but no other material damage was done in the town. It appears that the force was an independent one, and not a detachment of a larger Dervish force. I am confident that the Acting Commissioner will take suitable steps for the protection of Berbera and district.
I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he has any information as to the character of the telegraph agency engaged at Aden? We have habitually grossly exaggerated accounts of these occurrences in the British Press.
It is not for me to criticise the correspondence that appears in the Press.
May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether the posts at Sheikh and Burou have now been reoccupied, and what is the strength of the garrison at Berbera?
According to my information there is not the slightest foundation for this ludicrous statement.
Can the right hon. Gentleman not give a more definite answer to the last part of my question?
No, Sir, I cannot.
British Army
Royal Engineers Works Department, Dover
asked whether about I twenty men, many of long service, in the direct employ of the Royal Engineers works department at Dover, are to be discharged; and, if so, whether the intention is that work formerly done by direct employment is in future to be given out to contract?
The answer, on both points, is that the question is still under consideration. The notices given have been suspended.
asked the Secretary of State for War whether he intends to discharge the various staffs engaged on the War Office buildings in garrison towns, such as carpenters, bricklayers, plumbers, painters, fitters, labourers, etc., most of whom are Service men who are employed directly by the War Office on repairs and some on construction work, and to let all such work to the contractor; and, if so, will he reconsider the matter in the interest of the directly employed men?
It has been decided, for reasons of economy and administration, that at certain stations, in the new triennial contracts for works services, all jobbing work under £100 shall be performed by the contractor. On other work there is power in the contract to employ men directly. I am inquiring as to the effect of this in relation to discharges.
May I ask the hon. Gentleman if he will be good enough to receive a deputation from the men? Some of these men have been employed more than twenty years, and now they will be thrown on the mercy of the world if you discharge them?
I have stated in my reply that I am going carefully into the question of the discharges. The amount of labour will be exactly the same. There will be no diminution of that.
Will the hon. Gentleman say that he will consult all other Members whose constituents are interested in similar questions?
Certainly, I will be glad to consider any representation made by any Member who represents any place interested.
Will the hon. Gentleman receive a deputation from the men?
Yes, I will, certainly, if there is a desire that a deputation should be received.
Will the hon. Gentleman have the notices withdrawn for the present?
Are we to understand that these long service men are to be discharged and thrown on the mercy of the contractor? These old soldiers were promised these jobs on their original enlistment. Now, in the latter part of their lives, they are to be thrown out. The contractor will not take them on.
I will be glad to discuss this matter with the hon. Gentleman.
Will the hon. Gentleman say that he will have the notices suspended until this matter has been discussed?
I cannot say across the floor of the House that this will be done, but, as I have said, we are considering the whole matter.
Lodging Allowance (Aldershot Command)
asked what is the total amount paid for lodging allowance in the Aldershot command to warrant officers, non - commissioned officers, and men, during the past five years?
To give this figure would require a re-examination of the vouchers of the accounts for five years past. This would involve prolonged labour, and I trust therefore that my hon. Friend will not press for the information.
Vaccination
asked the Secretary of State for War whether the recognition of conscientious objection to vaccination by members of His Majesty's Territorial Forces has led to any pronounced prevalence of small-pox amongst them; and, if not, will he give orders for also respecting conscientious objection on the part of recruits for and members of the Regular Forces?
No information is available as to the prevalence, or otherwise, of small-pox throughout the year amongst Territorial soldiers. No cases, however, so far as is known, have occurred during the camp period. Regular soldiers contract on enlistment to undergo vaccination or re-vaccination.
asked why it was found necessary to perform 4,806 primary vaccinations on the children of soldiers in 1912, seeing that only 2,747 such operations were carried out in 1911?
The figures given in the Report on the health of the Array for 1912 include the Army abroad as well as at home. Previously only those for the United Kingdom were given. The figure for 1912 corresponding to that for 1911, as stated in the question, is 2,826.
Canteen Irregularities (Quartermaster Harlowe Martin)
asked the Secretary of State for War, whether his attention has been called to the case of hon. Lieutenant and Quartermaster George Harlowe Martin, who took his life at Devizes barracks, on the 11th instant, and to the bumming up of the coroner at the inquest, to the effect that the deceased officer's mind was unhinged, or at any rate disturbed, by inn having been recalled from Gibraltar, four months ago, to report himself at Knights-bridge barracks, where the defendants in the Canteen Inquiry were confined, and kept at the depot where he had no work to keep him employed, whilst he had a wife and four children dependent upon him at Gibraltar; will he say whether any charges were preferred against him during the whole of this time; whether there are any non-commissioned officers now at the depôt under similar conditions; and whether he will take steps to see that the charges, if any, are formulated forthwith, or that the officers in question are exonerated and permitted to rejoin their battalions?
Lieutenant and Quartermaster Martin was ordered home from Gibraltar in connection with the Canteen irregularities. During the consideration of the case he was attached to a unit in London in order that he might be available if his presence was required. He was never under arrest. With regard to the other parts of the question I would refer the hon. Gentleman to the answer given on Monday to a question on this subject put by the hon. and learned Member for the Isle of Thanet.
Is the hon. Gentleman aware that, this soldier was sent home from Gibraltar, and told to report himself to the commanding officer of the 3rd battalion of Grenadier Guards for the purpose of bring placed under arrest; and is he aware that he was never placed under arrest, that no charge whatsoever was made against him, but that he was allowed to have a suspicion hanging over him for four months without ever being informed why he was sent home?
I must refer the hon. Member to the answer given by my right hon. Friend on a similar point before.
Is the hon. Member aware that this is not an isolated case?
Will the hon. Member say whether another officer who has been ordered home from India will have his case looked into at once, so that he will not be in the same position of having no charge brought against him during four months?
I am afraid that I cannot add anything to the answer. If the hon. Member will put down a question it will be answered.
I beg to give notice that I shall call attention to this matter on Tuesday evening on the Adjournment, or the hon. Member (Mr. Peto) on whose behalf I asked the question will do so.
Territorial Force
asked whether, taking into consideration that the work and duties whilst in camp of gunners of horse batteries of the Territorial Force are of a character equally exacting as that of the Yeomen, he will grant to the gunners the same allowance as to the Yeomen, namely, 30s. for full fifteen days' attendance in camp?
Until the present time the Yeomanry who attended camp for eight days received a special allowance of £1, known as the Equitation Bounty, members of horse batteries receiving nothing. For the future the former will receive 30s. and the latter £1.
Royal Flying Corps
asked how many flying, apart from administrative, officers there are in the five effective squadrons of the Royal Flying Corps, Military Wing?
There are seventy-five officers in these squadrons, of whom all are flying officers, and none are engaged on administrative work alone.
asked the history of BE 204, upon which Captain Allen and Lieutenant Burroughs were killed, stating what previous mishaps it has had and when it has been repaired, and when inspected other than by officers of the squadron?
I would refer the hon. Gentleman to the replies given yesterday to questions put by the hon. Member for the Ludlow Division, and to the undertaking which my right hon. Friend then gave to supplement his answers by a full statement on the first possible day.
I beg to give notice that I will raise this question on the Army Votes on Monday.
asked the number of officer fliers on the 1st March, 1914; of that number how many were on active service; how many in the Reserve and Special Reserve; and of the number on active service how many hold non-flying posts or have not flown since the 1st January, 1914?
The total number of officers actively employed in the Reserve, under training and awaiting courses, is 197.
asked how many machines of the FE 2 type, upon which Mr. Haynes was killed at Wittering, are in the possession of the Royal Flying Corps or in course of construction?
The answer is, None.
asked how much of the £1,000,000 in the Army Estimates for aviation is for the Central Flying School, for the Royal Aircraft Factory, for the actual squadrons, and for head quarters administration, respectively?
The approximate figures are:—
asked whether seniority and promotion in the Royal Flying Corps go by Army rank or corps rank—that is to say, whether a captain in the Army, who has just taken his flying certificate, coming to-day into the Royal Flying Corps, would take rank there above officers junior to him in the Army who have been working in the corps for, say, two years?
In each grade of the Military Wing officers rank according to their seniority—permanent or temporary— in the Army. Promotion to higher grades in the wing is by selection.
asked whether there is only one ex-civilian in Course V. of the Central Flying School for the Military Wing and more than half the Naval Wing there are ex-civilians; and, if so, what is the reason?
asked whether, in view of the shortage of officers in the Regular Army, the War Office is encouraging or discouraging civilian pilots from joining the military wing for continuous service?
As stated, only one ex-civilian is attending Course V. The reason is that the majority of the civilian applicants for commissions in the Military Wing desire Reserve service only, whereas, until the Military Wing has been brought up to strength, it is necessary to restrict attendance almost entirely to officers who are prepared to undertake continuous service. Eight ex-civilians will attend the next course.
Has the hon Gentleman any figures to show that the majority of civilians desire Reserve service and not continuous service?
I cannot give any figures.
asked how many of the Reserve officers of the Royal Flying Corps are Army officers who qualified for the Reserve but who have done no flying since and who have never formed part of an active squadron; and how many are civilians who have been recommended for continuous service but are not yet absorbed?
The answer to the first part of the question is four, and to the second part one. The officer in question will shortly be posted to the Military Wing.
asked how many of the civilian officers who were selected by the War Office for Course IV. at the Central Flying School, and recommended thence for continuous service, are still unabsorbed, and what is the reason?
Of the two ex-civilian officers recommended for continuous service from the Central Flying School, one was posted to the Military Wing and one to the Reserve. The latter will shortly be posted to the Military Wing.
Lancashire Territorial Association
asked the figures of recruiting and also of discharges in the East Lancashire Territorial Association for the last two years amongst the non-commissioned officers and men, and for each month of the present year; and whether it is possible to take further steps to make the Force better known, and to increase the numbers for recruiting the Territorials in East Lancashire?
The answer to the first part of this question contains a long list I of figures which, with the hon. Gentle-man's permission, I will circulate with the Votes. In answer to the last part of the question, special efforts to stimulate recruiting have recently been made by the county association with, a very gratifying measure of success.—[ See Written Answers this date. ]
Quartermaster Vacancies
asked whether, if a commanding officer recommends a warrant officer or non-commissioned officer for appointment to a vacancy for quartermaster in the battalion under his command, and that recommendation is endorsed by the officer in charge of records, there commendation will be given effect to?
On the occurrence of a vacancy in a regiment all the candidates who have been recommended by their commanding officers are considered, and the best man is selected.
In view of the great value which is placed on the personal responsibility of the commanding officer, is it not desirable that he should have a light of veto in the selection of a man for this vacancy?
That consideration, of course, counts for a great deal, but it must not exclude all other considerations.
Can the hon. Gentleman assure us that the commanding officer will at all events have some voice?
The commanding officer's opinion naturally counts for a great deal when the matter comes up for decision.
Finance (India)
asked the Under-Secretary for India the total amount, if any, of gold bills and transfers payable in London sold by the Government of India in exchange for rupees in India during the last twelve months, and if the price was ever lower than a fraction over 15 rupees for the sovereign; and the total amount of council bills and transfers sold by the India Office during the same period against rupees payable in India, and if the price was ever low or than a fraction under 15 rupees for the sovereign?
No sterling bills or transfers payable in London have been sold during the past twelve months. The amount of bills and transfers on India sold during that period has been, in round figures, 4,585½ lakhs of rupee, realising £30,700,600. The lowest price was 1s. 3–16d. per rupee, for bills.
asked the total amount of metallic gold held by the Government of India in London in the Paper Currency Reserve and in the Gold Standard Reserve; what is approximately the loss to Indian revenues annually calculated on the basis of the present holdings, by the policy of not investing these reserves even upon the security of the highest class of particularised scrip and in the form of short loans; and if it is the intention of the Government of India to increase still further these liquid gold reserves in view of the heavy loss in which they already involve the Indian taxpayer?
The total amount of gold now held in the two reserves in London is £10,420,000. At the rate of interest earned in the past year by the interest-bearing portion of the Gold Standard Reserve, £10,420,000 would earn £350,361 per annum. But of the gold in question £6,100,000, which is part of the Paper Currency Reserve, could not, under the existing Indian Currency Law, be held otherwise than in metallic form. It was decided in 1912 to increase the amount of gold in the Gold Standard Reserve up to £5,000,000. The question whether, and by how much, it shall be further increased is under consideration with reference to the recommendations made on the subject by the Royal Commission on Indian Finance and Currency.
Is it conceivable that in a severe financial crisis in London Indian gold would be employed for the purposes of the Bank of England on the plea that thereby the interests of India would be saved great danger?
No. I think that it is not conceivable that these reserves belonging to India would be used except in the interests of India-herself.
Famine (United Provinces)
asked what the condition of the United Provinces is as regards famine; is it anticipated that the loss of the spring harvest and of cattle will be heavy; and what steps are being taken to counteract the possible general distress?
I regret to say that the autumn crops were deficient owing to short rainfall in the southern and western parts of the United Provinces and that a serious shortage in the more valuable spring crops is apprehended, though the situation has improved by recent falls of rain in a good many districts. Distress is anticipated over about one-quarter of the area of the province, and relief operations are already being actively prosecuted in four districts in the south-west, containing a population of two and a quarter millions, where 57,000 persons are reported to be on relief works, and 73,000 in receipt of gratuitous relief. Fodder crops have suffered especially, and serious loss of cattle is anticipated. The steps taken by the Government include liberal suspensions of revenue, distribution of gratuitous relief to the aged, the young and the infirm, an enlarged programme of ordinary public works, and the opening of other works under the regulations of the Relief Code.
Is any large proportion of the extension of the plague considered to have been the result of this scarcity?
I do not think that any connection can be traced. The plague returns in the United Provinces are worse than they were last year, but better than the year before, when there was no famine.
Increment Value Duty
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether owners of fixed plant and machinery are held to be liable to Increment Value Duty when they sell such plant and machinery at a price which is, in the opinion of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, higher than the open market value?
The sale of fixed plant and machinery, apart from land, does not create an occasion for collection of Increment Value Duty.
Have there been no such cases?
Certainly not, apart from the land.
What is the position when it is sold with the land?
It is part and parcel of the property. There can be no increment in the value of the machinery. It must be in the value of the land.
Petrol Tax
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will say why commercial travellers, using motor cars for the purpose of carrying out the duties of their business, are not allowed the same abatement on their petrol as is granted to medical men in the like circumstances?
All users of trade motors are entitled to a rebate of half the duty on their petrol under the conditions specified in the 5th Schedule to the Finance (1909–10) Act, 1910, and commercial travellers in common with other traders are eligible for this rebate.
National Insurance Act
Sickness Benefit
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he can state what was the amount paid under the National Insurance Act by employers, by employed, and by the State up to the 31st of last December; if he can say what was paid out in sick and other benefits; how much was paid to doctors and. chemists; how much was paid in administering the Act and collecting the money up to the same date; and how much money was in hand at the same date?
I would refer the hon. Member to the replies given to the Noble Lord the Member for South Nottingham on the 18th February, and to my hon. Friend the Member for North Westmeath on the 2nd instant.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if the deduction of a sum of £1 3s. 6d. for health insurance from the payment of £9 received by a mercantile apprentice named Prichard in respect of a voyage of twenty-three months' duration was made under the provisions of the National Insurance Act; if so, under what Section; by whom the deduction was made; and if Prichard received any and, if so, what benefits in respect of such contributions, which represent such a large percentage of his wages?
It is not possible to state precisely the amount of the employed contributor's share of the contributions without information as to the exact dates on which the voyage began and ended. The special provisions applicable to the contributions of foreign-going seamen (including apprentices) are contained in Section 48 (2) of the National Insurance Act, 1911. The deductions were presumably made by the employer, who has the same right of recovering the employed contributor's share of the contributions from wages as other employers. I have no information on the point referred to in the last part of the question, but it is of course always possible under any system of insurance to select cases in which over a given period premiums have been paid without any benefits being received.
May I ask the right hon. Gentleman if he agrees that, in these circumstances, a man who has paid his premiums should be without any chance of getting benefit therefrom?
Not without any chance of receiving benefit, but that he is not actually receiving benefit.
How is it possible that a man at sea twenty-three mouths can have a panel doctor allocated to him, and how can he get medical attendance?
If the hon. Member reads Section 48 of the Act he will see that medical attendance is not given at sea; it is given under the Merchant Shipping Act.
Questions
Phthisis
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether his attention has been called to the fact that, according to a return obtained by the St. Pancras guardians, there are twenty-one insured persons suffering from phthisis in the St. Pancras workhouse infirmary; and whether the Government will introduce amending legislation to enable the ratepayers to be recouped the expenditure in such cases?
My right hon. Friend has no information in regard to the first part of the question, and I am unable to make any statement as to the second part.
Will the hon. Gentleman allow me to furnish him with a copy of the Return referred to in the question, and will the Government take immediate steps to remedy the double injustice of leaving the insured person to receive the benefits for which he has paid at the Poor Law office, at the expense of the ratepayers?
I shall be happy to receive any information the hon. Gentleman likes to furnish as to future legislation. I can make no statement; and as to injustice, when the insured person comes out of the workhouse he will draw his money from the approved society.
Is it not a fact that only five persons applied for sanatorium benefit, and that those in the workhouse infirmary were there because they were destitute and not on account of any failure of the National Insurance Act?
I am glad to learn that. I have simply taken the statement dealt with in the question of the hon. and learned Member.
Mount Vernon Hospital
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he has received the resolution passed at a public meeting held in Hampstead Town Hall on 10th March, presided over by the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland, which protested against the use of the Mount Vernon Hospital for the vivisection of animals; and will he state what action he proposes to take in the matter?
My right hon. Friend has not seen the resolution referred to in the question, and the Chairman of the Joint Committee has not yet received from the Committee their scheme of research work to be undertaken at the place mentioned, so that he is not yet in a position to consider any matters that might be included in such a scheme.
asked whether the Medical Research Committee under the National Insurance Act has acquired Mount Vernon Hospital, Hampstead; and, if so, whether this hospital is to be used solely for the reception and treatment of tuberculosis patients, or is also to be used for purposes of experimental research, including experiments on living animals?
The answer to the first paragraph of the question is in the affirmative. As to the second paragraph, I cannot yet add anything to the reply I have just given on the same point to the hon. Member for Haggerston.
May I ask if this general insurance fund money is being used for vivisection research?
Under the Act there is a Parliamentary Grant for the purpose of research work.
Is it allowed for vivisection work?
In my answer I stated that the Research Committee has not yet prepared a scheme.
Friendly Societies (Meeting Places)
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware of the number of friendly societies who have protested against the Regulations rest riding the places of meeting of friendly societies; and whether he still proposes to enforce the Regulations?
asked whether, in view of the discontent among friendly societies created by the proposed Regulation compelling all approved societies to discontinue meeting at licensed premises, it has been withdrawn?
A proposal to restrict the use of licensed premises by approved societies in England at the end of five years was recently discussed by the Advisory Committee, but no Regulations have been made or laid before Parlia- ment, and no question of withdrawing them therefore arises. As my right hon. Friend has repeatedly stated, no Regulations will in any case be made without previous consultation with societies.
May I ask whether the societies in Wales were consulted before this Regulation was made?
Certainly. On the Advisory Board the Welsh societies have very large representation.
May I ask whether there is any intention of reconsidering the Regulation?
I can only state the facts. I cannot say that we are precluded for ever from making any Regulation.
Is it not the fact that nearly every approved society has protested against this proposal?
Some protests have been received?
Will he say that he will withdraw the proposed Regulation.
A proposed Regulation does not exist.
Panel Chemists
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is taking any, and, if so, what steps to deal with the case of the chemists in Manchester and district; whether they have ever been paid in full for their services under the National Insurance Act, Part I.; whether during 1913 they received in monthly payments never more than 66 per cent. of the total fees due, and in December last as low a percentage as 28 per cent.; whether the deficiency is now £16,000; whether the Commissioners have refused to supply any more money; and whether it is proposed to make good the deficiency from any other source?
My right hon. Friend has nothing to add to the full replies given to many similar questions on this subject.
May I ask whether the money due to these chemists is not a national obligation?
In the answers to which I have referred, I have stated that we are trying to ascertain whether money is due to the chemists.
Homœopathic Treatment
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he has been able to take into consideration the case of insured persons, under Part I. of the National Insurance Act, who desire to have homœopathic treatment when there is no homoeopathic doctor on the panel of the district; and whether he can make any provision for such cases?
It is open to an insured person who desires the services of a homœopathic doctor not on the panel to apply to the insurance committee for leave to make his own arrangements for the purpose.
Deposit Contributors
asked whether the National Insurance Commissioners require production of probate of the will of a deposit contributor before paying out the four-sevenths of the sum to his credit at the date of his death in the event of his not having signed a nomination; and whether in view of the statement on the deposit contributor's card to the effect that if no nomination is made it will be paid to the person entitled to his goods, the Commissioners will dispense with probate the cost of obtaining which exceeds the amount to the credit of the account?
In the absence of a nomination by a deposit contributor the Commissioners are required to make any payment due on death in accordance with the provisions of Section 56 to 61 of the Friendly Societies Act, 1896, as adapted. They are not enabled by these provisions to dispense with the production of probate where a will has been made. If, however, a contributor dies intestate and a grant of letters of administration is not obtained, payment is made to next of kin.
Will the hon. Gentleman have the deposit contributors' cards corrected, so that they may know that their money is to be forfeited unless they go to the expense of probate?
No; the deposit contributor's card states that the money will be paid to a nominee, and urges the deposit contributor to make a nomination.
Will the right hon. Gentleman look at the cards on which are set out that, "If no nomination is made it will be paid to the person entitled to his goods," and can he not see that the representatives of these people are allowed to get the money?
The hon. Gentleman had better put that question down.
It is on the Paper.
Jurymen (Insurance Cards)
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if his attention has been called to the case of a juryman who, after serving for nine clays at Lewes assizes this month, applied to Mr. Justice Bray to have his national health insurance card stamped; and will he say who is responsible in such cases for the employer's contribution and for the work man's contribution?
Service on a jury is the performance of a public duty, and is not employment within the meaning of the Act.
Are we to take it that a man serving on a jury has to forfeit benefits, if there are any benefits, under the Insurance Act during such time as he is serving on a jury?
The question whether jurymen should be paid or not is a totally different question, and has nothing to do with the Act.
Maternity Benefit
asked why Mr. Edward Shipsides, of 46, Suez Street, Basford, Nottingham, who has paid insurance tax since the National Insurance Act has been enforced, received 15s. 4d. maternity benefit instead of 30s. on the occasion of his wife being confined of twins?
I am afraid I can only refer the hon. Member to the section of the National Insurance Act, 1911, mentioned in my reply on the 6th instant, under which the insured person in question has received full payment to which he is entitled.
Can the hon. Gentleman say whether the benefits were halved because the babes were doubled?
The insured person's own contributions amounted to a guinea, and he received in cash 38s. 3d., as well as medical and sanatorium benefit.
But 30s. is due for one baby.
If I bring to the notice of the hon. Gentleman a case where a deposit contributor received only thirteen pence when his wife presented him with twins, will he do what he can to get the other 28s. 11d.?
Land Valuation
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that the valuation department are demanding formal objection, stating the ground of the objection and the amendment desired, in respect of valuations affected by Mr. Justice Scrutton's recent judgment; and whether, seeing that this demand is in direct contradiction to the announced intention of the Government, he will give instructions which will prevent these demands being made and which will ensure an extension of the time for objection, whether applied for or not, from the date of the recent. judgment up to the date when the proper interpretation of the law is finally settled?
No, Sir. Instructions have been given that provisional valuations of agricultural land affected by the judgment should remain open for the present, and that Mr. Justice Scrutton's decision should be carried to appeal, and if there is any such case in which such a demand has been made it must have been done in error. Further directions to guard against this possibility are now being issued.
To all the valuation officers?
Yes.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say, if the judgment remains, whether the valuation will vary according to the time when in summer the grass is growing and in winter when it does not?
The hon. Member must give notice of that question.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that the total value of the property of Mr. Thomas Benson, of Richmond, Yorkshire, who died in October, 1909, was sworn by his executors in the Estate Duty affidavit at £451 odd, of which £347 was the value of cottage property; that the Commissioners of Inland Revenue refused to accept the executors' valuation of the cottage property, and under threat of legal proceedings compelled them to accept the Commissioners' valuation of £715 and to pay additional duty amounting to £13 14s. 10d.; whether he is aware that this duty having been paid by the executors the property was afterwards sold for only £295; that when the executors asked that their original valuation of £347, being more than the sale price realised, should be substituted for the Commissioners' valuation of £715, and the duty refunded the Commissioners replied that they would only reduce the valuation to £540; and whether, in view of these circumstances and of the property of the beneficiary, he will give directions that the estate shall not be put to the expense of an appeal, but the executors' valuation adopted and the duty refunded?
The facts as stated in the first part of the question are correct, the sum of £715 not having been objected to as a provisional valuation. For Death Duty purposes the reduction to £540 has appeared to the Commissioners the greatest that it was possible to make by the light of the further information afforded by the sale. I may point out that this sale took place some years after the death, and that in the interval the property had deteriorated and a notice of alterations and improvements required under the Housing and Town Planning Act had not been complied with. In the circumstances I do not see my way to give the directions suggested by the hon. Member.
Is not the valuation of the executors confirmed by sale a better test?
I do not think the hon. Gentleman listened to the latter part of the answer.
I heard the answer, and I beg to give notice that I will refer to the matter on the Adjournment.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether his attention has been called to a demand made for Increment Value Duty from a widow at Tam-worth living in a house, the annual value of which is less than £16, owing to the fact that she sold the minerals under the house for £5 14s. and had not placed any value on such minerals on Form IV.; and whether, having regard to the small value of her property and her narrow means, he will direct the Commissioners of Inland Revenue to withdraw the claim for Increment Value Duty.
I am informed that the facts are as stated in the first part of the question, but that an application to be allowed to amend Form IV. in respect of the statement as to minerals has just been received by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue who will give it consideration.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer, if he is aware that Dean Farm, Stourmouth, Kent, having been sold in 1913 for £5,450, being £1,800 for the mineral and £3,650 for the surface value, the provisional valuation was subsequently served placing the value of the property at only £3,050, and that the Commissioners of Inland Revenue have notified that a claim of some £360 for Increment Value Duty will be made, being 20 per cent. on the value of the minerals, on the ground that no return was made on Form IV. of the value of the minerals; whether he is aware that the owner of the property is a widow, that the purchase money is practically- her only source of income, and that the combined sale price of minerals and surface is less by £3,150 than the price paid for the property by her father between the years 1866 and 1868; and whether he will direct the Commissioners of Inland Revenue to allow her now to make a return of the value of the minerals.
I am aware of the circumstances alluded to by the hon. Member, but pending the decision on a similar case about to come before the Courts, I see no reason to give the directions suggested.
May I ask whether the right hon. Gentleman thinks it fair that a widow should be mulcted more than a year's income on a sale which has resulted in a loss of £3,150, and whether he will take steps soon to end or mend this rotten Act?
Has a person not a legal right to make a return of minerals at any time?
That is a question of law of which notice should be given.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, in the case of Walker v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, the Commissioners will now give an undertaking that they will pay the costs in the House of Lords of all parties, together with any Increment Value Duty which may be found to be due from Mrs. Walker, seeing that she was successful both before the Referee and the Court of Session and the value of the house, in respect of which the demand is made, only amounts to £650; whether, in all cases where demands for duty are made against widows and persons of small means, the Commissioners of Inland Revenue will undertake not to press for costs in the event of their being successful in their demands for duty; and whether they will further undertake that should the subject taxed be successful in the Court of first instance, the Commissioners will not appeal to the highest Courts without first giving an undertaking to pay the costs of all parties whatever may be the decision, when points of principle are at issue?
The Commismissioners if successful in their appeal will pay the reasonable costs in the House of Lords of all parties but will not be able to waive any Increment Value Duty which may be found to be due. I cannot give the undertaking suggested by the hon. Baronet in regard to future cases that may arise but any occasion seeming to call for special consideration shall certainly receive it.
May I ask whether the question as it appears on the Paper is not in Very much the same form as the statement in the House.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that the property in Glasgow of Widow Ellen Toye and A. Cassidy, having been sold in April, 1912, for £1,200. the provisional valuation was made in March, 1913. placing the value of the property at £478 only, and that a claim of £138 for Increment Value Duty has been made on the ground that the property was sold for more than it was worth; whether he is aware that out of the purchase money had to be paid off a mortgage for £1,000, which with arrears of interest and costs practically swallowed up the whole purchase price; and whether he will direct the Commissioners of Inland Revenue to abandon the claim for duty and pay the ladies' costs of appeal to the Referee?
I have made careful inquiry into this case and am informed that the mortgage, for £1,000 referred to was secured not only on the property in question but on another property also, worth £600, and was cleared off two years before the sale in 1912. The valuation and assessment of duty would appear to be correct.
Government of Ireland Bill
Exclusion of Ulster
asked the Prime Minister (1) if the Royal Irish Constabulary during the time that certain districts in Ulster are excluded from the Government of Ireland Bill will be interchangeable with officers of that force in the rest of Ireland; and if officers of the Royal Irish Constabulary will have any option as to the part of Ireland in which they may prefer to serve; and (2) if the excluded part of Ireland will be under the Lord Lieutenant resident in Dublin, or if a new officer will be appointed over the excluded part, or if the excluded part will be without any Viceroy at all?
asked the Prime Minister whether he is aware that, should his proposal with regard to the exclusion of certain counties in Ulster be acccepted by Parliament and result in the exclusion of the four north-eastern counties from the scope of the Government of Ireland Bill, the Catholics in the included portion of Ireland, numbering, according to the Census Return of 1911, 2,949,187, will be represented in the Dublin Parliament by 118 Members, with an average population of 24,993 per constituency, while the non-Catholic minority, numbering 435,943, will in the event of the representation of counties Fermanagh and Tyrone remaining unchanged and of their obtaining four seats in the multi-Member constituencies of Dublin City and County be represented by six Members with an average population of 72,657 per constituency; and whether he is prepared to make any proposal to deal with this matter?
I must refer hon. Members to the statement which my right hon. Friend made on Monday last, to which he has nothing to add.
May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether, in the event of the Opposition not being in a position to accept the concessions offered by the Government as a final settlement, those concessions will be withdrawn, and we shall fall back upon the original Bill?
Does the right hon. Gentleman consider the state of affairs referred to in my question is fair to the minority in Ireland?
I really can add nothing to the answer given by the Prime Minister.
Federal Self-Government
asked the Prime Minister if any scheme has yet been prepared providing for the extension of federal self-government to other parts of the United Kingdom than Ireland; and, if so, whether such scheme provides for similar local powers to be granted to those conferred by the Government of Ireland Bill?
Any proposals which the Government may have to make on this subject will be explained when they are introduced. I cannot anticipate that statement.
Irish Parliament (First Meeting)
asked the Prime Minister whether the appointed day as defined in Clause 1 of the Government of Ireland Bill, and the day of the first meeting of the Irish Parliament as mentioned in the Return showing proposals in connection with the Government of Ireland Bill, are synonymous terms; and, if not, from which day will date the six years at the expiration of which the control of the Royal Irish Constabulary will come under the Irish Executive?
Under the Government of Ireland Bill different days may be appointed for the different purposes mentioned, but the appointed day in Clause 1 of the Bill will for practical purposes be the same day, or very nearly the same day, as the day of the first meeting of the Irish Parliament.
Referendum
asked the Prime Minister whether, before endeavouring to ascertain whether the principle for a settlement of the Home Rule question, which he has recently adumbrated, is acceptable to a majority in both Houses of Parliament, he will ascertain by means of a Referendum whether the principle is acceptable to a majority of the electorate?
The answer is in the negative.
Questions
Easter Holidays
asked the Prime Minister if he can make any statement as to the date and duration of the Easter holidays?
We shall probably ask the House to reassemble on the Tuesday after Easter, but I cannot yet say whether the Motion for the Adjournment will be taken on the Wednesday or the Thursday.
May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he means the Tuesday after Easter week?
The Tuesday in Easter week.
Suffragist Outrages
asked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been called to the statement of the chairman of the London Sessions that the maximum penalty for defacing works of art is six months' imprisonment, but that if a window is broken the penalty may be as much as eighteen months; and whether the Government will propose legislation to meet this state of affairs?
The Prime Minister has asked me to reply to this question. The answer is in the affirmative. I hope to have an early opportunity of amending the law in this direction.
asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the complaints as to the suitability of the new wing of the British Museum and the closing of the National Gallery, while the Victoria and Albert Museum remains open, and the various semi-responsible or irresponsible bodies which have the care of our national art treasures, he will consider the advisability of creating the First Commissioner of Works Minister of Fine Arts, and handing over to him all the national museums and galleries?
I am afraid I do not see my way to accept the hon. Member's suggestion.
asked the Prime. Minister whether he has yet received any statement from the director or keeper or trustees of the National Gallery as to the possibility of repairing the Rokeby Velasquez and as to the steps that they desire taken to prevent the recurrence of a similar outrage; and whether a Supplementary Estimate will be presenterd to this House for the repair of the damaged picture and the provision of a more adequate staff of attendants?
I understand that it is hoped that it will be found possible to repair the Rokeby Velasquez. As stated in my right hon. Friend's answer on this subject on Monday last, the question of the adequacy of the measures for protecting the pictures in the National Gallery is under consideration.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say exactly where the damage has been done?
asked the Prime Minister if he will say when the National Gallery will be open to the public; whether the Government have any authority to close the gallery or to open it if closed; and whether it can be conditionally opened to persons applying for and receiving special permits?
The date for reopening the National Gallery or a part of it to the public is still under consideration of the National Gallery Board. The Government has no authority to close or open the gallery. The suggestion in the last part of the hon. Member's question has been considered, but was not thought feasible.
Has the right hon. Gentleman read a paragraph in the "Times" this morning stating that the National Gallery will be reopened in a short time?
I did not read it.
Real Property Bill
asked the Prime Minister if the Real Property Bill providing for the conversion into freehold of all land of copyhold and customary tenure, which was introduced by the Lord Chancellor in the House of Lords last Session, will be reintroduced in either House this Session; and whether, in view of the many disadvantages of such tenures, and of the deterrent effect upon high farming of heriots, fines, and other incidents thereof, he will take steps to secure the passage into law of such a measure without delay?
The Lord Chancellor proposes to reintroduce this Bill in the House of Lords this Session, and I hope it may pass into law.
Imperial and Local Taxation
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the Report of the Departmental Committee on Imperial and Local Taxation has now been signed; and whether it will be published Within a few days?
The Report has been signed and will be published as soon as possible.
Will any recommendation referring to the Scottish position be made in the Report?
I do not think we can consider that point yet.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that no evidence has been taken as yet from Scotland, and when it is proposed to hear witnesses?
I think the Scottish Members may wish to consider whether they would like to defer the matter until evidence has been taken in regard to Scotland.
Why is it that Scottish Members have always got to wait?
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether it is his intention to submit his proposals for further Imperial Grants to the local authorities in respect of education, roads and such local services as lunatic asylums in the form of a Bill; if so, whether that Bill will be introduced at the same time as the Financial Bill; and whether such Grants will only become operative if that Bill is passed into law during the present Session of Parliament?
I must ask the right hon. Gentleman to await my Budget statement.
Civil Service (Superannuation Acts)
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether it is the intention of the Government to reintroduce in the present Session the Bill to amend the Superannuation Acts; and whether in such Bill the principle that service with the Colours ought to count for pension in the case of ex-soldiers and ex-sailors joining the Civil Service will be recognised?
It is proposed to introduce a Bill for the purpose of making certain minor amendments in the Superannuation Acts, but it is not intended to propose an alteration of the law in the direction suggested in the last part of the question.
Will the right hon. Gentleman take into consideration the very strong feeling which exists on both sides that Colour service should be taken into account?
I shall certainly consider the suggestion.
Forest of Dean (Workmen's Cottages)
asked the President of the Board of Agriculture how many years' purchase of the net annual rental did the Board of Agriculture, with the authority of the Treasury, ask for the site for workmen's cottages in the Forest of Dean, mentioned in a recent question?
I presume that this question relates to the sites for cottages referred to in an answer which I gave on the 17th February to a question put by the hon. Member for South Wiltshire. None of those sites have at any time been let, and therefore there was no net annual rental to form a basis for arriving at the price asked.
Is it not a fact that this land for which the Government were trying to obtain £240 per acre has never produced either rents or profits to the Crown?
I informed the hon. Gentleman in February last that we have offered this land from £47 to £60 per acre, and it has been used for a totally different purpose than building purposes.
Is it not the fact that the right hon. Gentleman has declined to allow the working miners of the forest to have it at less than £240 the previous charge?
No, Sir, that is not the fact. I have made large offers to local authorities and public utility societies in the Forest. I have acted strictly within the limit of the powers given to me by the Crown Lands Act.
Is it not the fact that the right hon. Gentleman denied those privileges to the working miners?
No, Sir, I have not denied them to the working miners. I have shown both to the working miners and the local authorities how they can take full advantage of them, and both local authorities are now considering offers which I have made.
Am I to understand that this was derelict land?
No, Sir.
Crown Copyholders
asked whether, when a copyholder from the Crown is desirous of enfranchising his holding, the Office of Woods and Forests requires a preliminary fee of three guineas; and whether in a recent case the office replied that incidents of tenure, valued according to the scale of the Board of Agriculture at a capital value of £4 17s. 11½d., could be enfranchised at a cost of £150 9s. 10d., of which stewards' fees amounted to £15 3s. 6d.?
I have been unable to identify the case to which the hon. Member refers as one that concerns the Commissioners of Woods. It is usual for the Commissioners on receiving an application to enfranchise to obtain an undertaking to pay a small sum for the charges of the surveyor whom they have to consult before stating terms for enfranchisement. This is done because in the absence of a special agreement, a copyhold tenant in a Crown manor cannot be compelled to enfranchise.
Does the right hon. Gentleman consider thirty years' purchase a fair figure?
Agricultural Holdings
asked what was the number of agricultural holdings of twenty acres in extent and under in England and Wales in the years 1900, 1905, and 1910, respectively; and the number of such holdings of 100 acres and under, and those above 100 acres in the same year?
I regret that I cannot give statistics of agricultural holdings of the particular size mentioned in the question. I am writing to the hon. Gentleman on the subject.
Swine Fever (Treatment)
asked the President of the Board of Agriculture if he will state how many practical experiments in the treatment of swine with serum for the extermination of swine fever have been arranged by the Board, and where are they being carried out?
One experiment has been begun up to the present, and others are in contemplation; over a hundred swine have received injections of serum and are now under observation. It is inadvisable at present to disclose the whereabouts of the premises where the experiment is being made, but the results will be published in due course.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say on how many farms, if he can get them, he proposes to make these experiments?
I cannot make any further statement at present.
When does the right hon. Gentleman hope to publish the results?
We have made very little progress so far. It will be some time before the veterinary surgeons are able to arrive at any conclusions.
Tuberculin (Manufacture)
asked whether the Board of Agriculture propose to take into their own hands the manufacture of tuberculin to be used in this country, in order to get a standard quality?
I will consider the hon. Member's suggestion, but as at present advised, I doubt whether it is either necessary or practicable.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there are many different sorts of tuberculin being experimented with?
I am quite aware of that. It is well known what is the standard quality and where it may be obtained.
Stock Inoculation
asked the President of the Board of Agriculture whether he will say how many county councils in England and Wales are giving donations towards the schemes arranged by the Board for the inoculation of stock against epizootic abortion; and if he can give the sums given either as donations or subscriptions to the committees carrying the work through?
The vaccine prepared by the Board is issued to individuals who are prepared to carry out experiments under the necessary conditions and to committees of farmers who agree to arrange for the conduct of experiments. The Board have no particulars of financial support obtained by local committees. They understand, however, that in two counties grants have been made from local funds, and if the hon. Member desires to obtain first-hand information on the matter I shall be happy to send him the addresses of the secretaries concerned.
Foot-and-Month Disease
asked the President of the Board of Agriculture whether he is aware that, while the importation of live cattle, sheep, and swine from Ireland is prohibited, carcases, hides, brocks, and offals are imported as general cargo, and live poultry is also freely imported; whether these hides, etc., have been disinfected before shipment; whether any steps have been taken to disinfect the vessels in which such cargo has been carried; and whether he is aware that the risk of foot-and-mouth disease being introduced into this country by means of infection from such cargo is greater than it would be in the case of fat stock imported solely from areas in Ireland which are free from the disease, and slaughtered at the port of entry, where the cattle, and every portion of them, would be under the supervision of a staff of the Board's own officials?
The question of restricting the importation from Ireland of the agricultural products named by my hon. Friend has been carefully considered by the Board, who have decided that the risk of introducing foot-and-mouth disease by these means is not sufficient to justify any action on their part. The importation of live animals is a very different question. When, as at present, large areas in Ireland are affected with the disease, and no one can say with certainty, until all recent movements have been traced, that any district has escaped infection, it is necessary, as much in the interests of Ireland as of Great Britain, that the usual aggregation of animals at the ports for shipment should be suspended until the outlook is more settled.
Is not the risk of infection as great in the case of hides imported from infected areas as it is in the case of cattle imported from areas not known to be infected, and slaughtered at the port of entry under the supervision of the Board's own officers?
It is very difficult to assess the exact degree of infection in the matter of hides, but we do not allow live animals to be imported.
Can the right hon. Gentleman explain what is a "brock"?
asked the President of the Board of Agriculture if his attention has been drawn to the case of a recent outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease on a farm in Germany in which, after the strictest investigation by the authorities, it was conclusively proved that the outbreak was due to the feeding of the affected animals with hay which was gathered in 1911 from a field where diseased animals were grazing, and which had ever since remained in stack upon the farm premises; whether his expert advisers admit the possibility of such prolonged retention of the germs of this disease in hay, straw, or other inanimate material; and, if so, whether any of the recent outbreaks in the United Kingdom may be attributable to a like cause?
I am making inquiry into the case to which the hon. Gentleman refers, and shall be glad if he can give me any particulars beyond the very bald statement which appears in the January issue of the German Veterinary Journal. With regard to the second and third parts of the question, the veterinary advisers of the Board are prepared to consider without prejudice any evidence which may be available in regard to such matters.
Cattle-Testing Station, Pirbright
asked if the building and equipment of the Government cattle-testing station at Pirbright are now complete; how many officials will be employed at the station; what qualifications will they possess; when will the cattle, either for tuberculin testing or red-water immunisation, be admitted to the station; and what will be the terms charged for admission?
The testing station is now ready for the reception of animals and has already received a consignment. Full particulars will be published within the next few days for the information of agriculturists. The station is in charge of one of the Board's general inspectors, who is well qualified by experience of farming and the management of stock. The number of veterinary officers in attendance may vary from time to time according to requirements.
Is the station already prepared to receive stock?
Yes; it has already received one consignment.
Raphael Cartoons
asked the hon. Member for St. George's-in-the-East, as representing the First Commissioner of Works, whether he will consider entering into negotiations with the authorities of the South Kensington Museum with a view to having the Raphael cartoons, which were lent to the Museum in 1865, restored to Hampton Court; whether, if this can be arranged, he will undertake that provision shall be made at Hampton Court for their being properly exposed to view, either in the gallery built by Sir Christopher Wren to hold them, and where they originally were placed, or elsewhere; and that adequate provision shall be made to guard them against risk by fire?
The First Commissioner will give this question his careful consideration, and he will communicate with the hon. and gallant Member as soon as he has had an opportunity of consulting the various authorities interested in this matter.
Orders of the Day
Business of the House
I beg to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer a question of which I have given him private notice, namely: What opportunity in addition to the two half-days this week will be given for the discussion of the Navy Estimates and the many important issues raised by the First Lord's statement; what question will be before the House when the discussion takes place; and will it be possible for a reduction to be moved?
The Navy Votes on the Paper to-day will be put down for Monday, and the whole of that day will be available for their discussion in the usual way. The Report stage of those Votes and of the Army Votes will be taken on Tuesday.
On behalf of those who are interested in the Army, may I ask whether the half-day taken away from the Army Votes will be subsequently restored?
Unfortunately, as the hon. Gentleman knows, one day has to he taken away for the Vote of Censure, and these are the best arrangements we can make under the circumstances.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Secretary of State for War has promised to make on the Report stage a very important statement with regard to aviation? Under these circumstances can he have the Army Votes put first on Tuesday?
I will consider that.
Is it not a fact that the Secretary of State promised us yesterday a whole day for the Report stage of the Army Votes? There is a serious controversy with regard to aviation which can only be raised on the Report stage.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Memorandum of the Oil Fuel Commission, promised by the First Lord, is not yet available for the use of Members in the Vote Office, although what purports to be a copy of it has appeared in the public Press?
It certainly should have been available. I will make inquiries in the proper quarters. I greatly regret the appearance in the public Press, before it is in the hands of Members, of any document which has been circulated to the House.
:I may point out that the document was circulated this morning, as the hon. Member will see if he looks at the Official Papers circulated.
Then I apologise. I may say, however, that I asked for it at the Vote Office, and was told that it had not been circulated.
The hon. Member will find it in the Votes and Proceedings.
Can the Chairman of Ways and Means say what action it is proposed to take with reference to the private Bill down for to-morrow?
I propose to move the Adjournment of that Bill until Thursday of next week, at. 8.15.
Notices of Motion
Divorce
To call attention upon this day two weeks to the Report of the Royal Commission on Divorce, and to move a Resolution.—[ Mr. France ].
Rights of British Citizens
To call attention upon this day two weeks to the rights of British citizens within the Empire, and to move a Resolution.—[ Mr. Goldstone. ]
Wick Election
To call attention upon this day two weeks to circumstances attending the Wick Election, and to move a Resolution. —[ Captain Craig. ]
Bills Presented
Public Health (Sewers and Drains) Bill
"To amend the Public Health Acts with respect to Sewers and Drains." Presented by Mr. GEORGE THORNE; supported by Sir Thomas Roe, Sir Charles Nicholson, Sir John Harmood-Banner, and Lord Alexander Thynne; to be read a second time upon Tuesday, 31st March, and to be printed. [Bill 128.]
Borough Funds Bill
"To amend the Borough Funds Acts, 1872 and 1903." Presented by Mr. GEORGE THORNE; supported by Sir John Harmood-Banner, Mr. Middlebrook, and Lord Alexander Thynne; to be read a second time upon Tuesday, 31st March, and to be printed. [Bill 129.]
Unemployment Bill
"To establish a Minister of Labour, to make provision for the prevention and treatment of Unemployment, and for other purposes connected therewith." Presented by Mr. ROBERT HARCOURT; supported by Mr. Chiozza Money; to be read a second time upon Monday next, and to be printed. [Bill 130.]
Labour (Minimum Conditions) Bill
"To provide for minimum rates of wages and maximum hours of Labour, and to regulate the conditions of Labour." Presented by Mr. BARNES; supported by Mr. Brace, Mr. Gill, Mr. Snowden, and Mr. George Roberts; to be read a second time upon Wednesday, 22nd April, and to be printed. [Bill 131.]
Supply
Navy Estimates, 1914–15
Postponed Proceeding resumed on Question, "That MR. SPEAKER do now leave the Chair (for Committee of Supply on Navy Estimates)."
Question again proposed. Debate resumed.
When my arguments were interrupted by the Rules of the House yesterday I was endeavouring to show that the present position in regard to the shortage of ships was mainly due to the action taken by the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty in 1909. I do not see the First Lord in his place, but I suppose he will be here in a while. I informed him that in 1904 we regarded him as a political traitor when he left our ranks and deserted to the enemy. I also said that the Little Navy Party which he led with extreme ability in 1909 now regard him as a political traitor because he has deserted them. He sees, I suppose, that he will get more votes by having the Navy strong than he will by having a weak Navy. I must cite one illustration in support of what I say. In October, 1909, he said, at Dundee, that we (the Little Navy Party) are—
What the House wants to know, or, rather, what the public wants to know, and what this House should desire to know, and ought to know, is how the First Lord intends to make the Fleet strong enough to face the increased responsibilities that he pointed out last night through the critical period which he also pointed out is coming in the near future. We want to know how he is going to redeem his pledges—which I will refer to directly. He made a most clever and interesting speech of two and a half hours in length. There was in it an immense amount of very valuable information, but it all touched details; it did not touch the crucial point of how strong the Fleet is going to be! What is the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord going to do to make the Fleet strong enough? He never touched that point in the whole of his speech. Near the end only did he devote five minutes to that aspect. We wondered when he was going to stop. It was like a stage army, very numerous and going round and round. The House got perfectly giddy, and did not know where they were at all. As one of the right hon. Gentleman's own supporters on the Back Bench pointed out: They did not know where they were, they were more confused than ever in regard to standard and policy, in which observation I quite agree. The strength of the Fleet depends upon Votes 8 and 9—that is the Construction and Armament Votes. The whole strength of the Fleet depends upon these. What is the First Lord going to do? He did not tell us yesterday. What is he going to do with regard to Votes 8 and 9 for that critical time that he pointed out, with other nations increasing their naval forces and our responsibilities at the same time are increasing all over the world? What has the right hon. Gentleman clone? He has reduced Votes 8 and 9 by £4,000,000, excluding the Air Service. He has cut down the battleships from seven to four. He has cut down the light cruisers from eight to four. He has cut down the destroyers from sixteen to twelve. He is trusting, so far as we can make out, to submarines and the Air Service. These are very valuable, no doubt, but are unproved. They are theoretical. We are trusting to them; if they fail they will put us in a very false and dangerous position. There is, I admit, some additional expenditure on submarines, but we do not know what it is. There was another point. The First Lord cited the Grand Admiral Von Tirpitz. What has the Grand Admiral Von Tirpitz to do with it? What does it matter whether or not he is satisfied with our programme? The right hon. Gentleman had much better leave Germany alone, as I have said in this House twenty times, and allow Germany to carry out what she thinks necessary for her defence, and let us carry out what we think necessary for our defence. What were the First Lord's promises? I do not know why he is not in the House. I do not think it is either civil to the House or to myself, who was in this House before he was born, and who was fighting for reform on the lower deck and trying to get men made officers in 1874, when he was at the business end of a feeding bottle.
My right hon. Friend, I may tell the Noble Lord, has been detained, but he will be here in a moment.
4.0 P.M.
I hope the right hon. Gentleman will repeat to the First Lord everything I said, because I do not think it fair to myself or to the First Lord that I should use strong language about hint in his absence.
I repeated very carefully last night what the Noble Lord said about the First Lord.
That is why he ran away.
I wish now to refer to his pledges and promises. When reviewing the critical period two years ago what was it he said was necessary? He said we must have 50 per cent. margin over Germany in Home waters; we must have five battleships with the Imperial squadron, to be composed of the three Canadian ships, one "Malaya," and one "New Zealand"; and he said that he was determined on this point that we must have a Fleet for the Mediterranean. What did he say about that? He said that the whole fate of this Empire depends. And let it be remembered that the First Lord is continually altering his standards. Let me give some of his standards. There was the 60 per cent. standard and the 50 per cent. standard; there was the Imperial squadron standard; there was the Mediterranean standard; and there was the two to one standard. What we want to know is, whether the relations of the Imperial requirements, and of the responsibility of our Empire as a whole are based upon these standards, and what relation have these standards to the Imperial requirements of the Empire? Take our position on the 1st April, 1914, as answered by a Return for which I asked the First Lord, and in which he gave the names and numbers of the ships. He said by the 1st April, 1914, Great Britain is to have twenty-nine, Germany twenty-one, Italy four, and Austria three. These are the common standards, twenty-nine to twenty-eight. We shall not have twenty-nine, because the "Benbow" cannot possibly be ready in time. Even if we had twenty-nine we should have to take four out of the Mediterranean, in order to get the 50 per cent. margin which he says is necessary as against Germany. That really leaves us with twenty-five to twenty-one as against Germany alone in Home waters, and this after the First Lord's declaration that you have got to subtract 25 to 30 per cent. for repairs and maintenance, which places us, and would place us, in a very weak position at any "average moment" with regard to the other naval powers' "selected moments."
I come on to the 1st April, 1915. Great Britain is to have thirty-five, he says now thirty-three; Germany is to have twenty-three, Italy six, and Austria four. That makes the proportion thirty-three to thirty-three even, but then we should have to bring four ships out of the Mediterranean, in order to make up the 50 per cent. he says is necessary in Home waters. We get 50 per cent. in Home waters by 1915, you have to withdraw the four, or rather, I think, three, ships in the Mediterranean to get that 50 per cent. The First Lord referred to the position in the Pacific, and showed our responsibilities and dangers there. He did not tell us how we were to meet them. He knows perfectly well that when the Panama Canal is opened the strategic position on the face of the globe will be entirely altered. It will not be a very long time before it is altered, and he is taking no steps to meet our responsibilities in that direction. Let me turn to the Imperial squadron. Take the three Canadians, one Malay, one New Zealand. The First Lord said that they were absolutely necessary for the minimum of defence of our Empire by the middle of 1916, and unless he gets these three Canadian ships, either through the generosity of Canada or builds them himself, as he said he was going to, he can never have more than two ships over the 50 per cent. necessary for Home waters, and only that by withdrawing warships out of the Mediterranean. It leaves him exactly two over for the Imperial squadron, and for what he calls world-wide defence and to provide for the Mediterranean squadron. I want to point out to the First Lord that what we want are plain facts. We are perfectly as well able as the First Lord or any hon. Gentleman to see whether his statements carry out the requirements. We are counting on the ships and the numbers, and I defy him by any ingenuity of arithmetic to make out that I am wrong. I again repeat that to have 50 per cent., which he said is necessary in Home waters, as against one Power only until he gets these Canadian ships, he has only two ships left for our Imperial squadron and world-wide defence and to provide for the Mediterranean squadron.
What is the Mediterranean? It is our most important route, it is our most important trade route, and it is the route to India with its teeming millions, and it is the road to Egypt. Sixty-seven per cent. of our food supplies comes through the Mediterranean, and we have absolutely reduced the garrisons in Egypt, Gibraltar, and Malta at a time when we reduced the Fleet. I say this is a very grave and critical position if we went to war. These places should have been made stronger instead of being reduced. I ask the First Lord: Are we going to trust to France to defend us in the Mediterranean? That is a very definite question. If we are, what are we to give France in return? It has come out quite lately that we have not got an Expeditionary Force that we could send way to France if France needed it. The Secretary of State for War would not answer that question, and we know—everybody knows—we could not afford to send that Expeditionary Force away if England and France were engaged in a war against someone else. I say that is a very dangerous position. We are metaphorically to sell our friends. They are to look after our enormous interests in the Mediterranean because we cannot have a Fleet there. What are we going to do for France? It may be very disagreeable, but we are liable with these ententes and alliances. When we had command of the sea and trusted to our own right hands we wanted no ententes and alliances, and the British Fleet was a factor for peace. Now we have ententes and alliances, with our enormous interests all over the world. By the spring of 1917, in order to carry out his own promises and pledges, and to meet the difficulties which nobody could have shown more clearly than the First Lord, we shall be nine heavy ships short, that is, three heavy ships short in the Imperial squadron, and six ships short in what I should say is the least we should have in the Mediterranean. This is according to his own statements.
I should say the least we should have in the Mediterranean is eight "Dreadnoughts," having regard to the enormous increase in the shipbuilding Vote of Italy and Austria. I never thought the First Lord's standard was sufficient. I do not think any of the Unionist party think it is sufficient. We are only asking for what he himself said he would build, but has made no provision for so doing. He says that six ships would make what the Foreign Secretary called "a respectable Fleet" in the Mediterranean. What did he tell us last night? His rhetorical skill is unbounded: it always leaves you in puzzled amazement. He said, for the Mediterranean, he wanted eight battleships—four armoured cruisers and four light cruisers and sixteen destroyers. He cannot have them there in 1915 if he maintains his 50 per cent. of superiority in Home waters. It will be the same as before; the First Lord, in his wisdom, deserted the Mediterranean some time ago. Public opinion rose, and he had to send the ships back there. He promised that four battleships would be there in the winter; one went out, and for months and months there were only two, and at this moment there are only three. It will be the same again; the ships cannot be in two places at one time. If he maintains his 50 per cent. at home he cannot send these ships to the Mediterranean, for the simple reason that they are not to be had. I should like to refer to the "Invincible." I was glad to see the First Lord did recognise the need for dealing with the extraordinary—and if I should be in order, Mr. Speaker, in saying so I would add—and mendacious statement of his predecessor.
I think that the word erroneous would be better.
I should like to say then, the most erroneous statements of his predecessor. If war broke out, the Admiralty would have to take every officer and man out of the "Invincible," because you would have to use the helm to train the guns. I never saw anything so wicked as to keep that ship in commission. May I say that in 1917, by the First Lord's showing, Italy can have ten "Dreadnoughts" and Austria seventeen? That is why I say the least we ought to have is eight "Dreadnoughts" for the Mediterranean, which we have not got and cannot get. I shall be told, as I was told about the Austrian and Italian programmes when they were first projected, by the Prime Minister as well as the First Lord, that we have nothing to do with paper ships, with hypothetical ships. Yes, but these hypothetical ships are now on the water, and some of them in commission. What we wanted to do was to take the ships that were projected, and have ships ready by the time these ships were launched. We did not do it. The Naval Estimates ran up to £51,500,000, although you reduced your constructive Vote by £4,000,000, and reduced the ordinary programme, as I have said, by eleven ships. The First Lord has never explained by what date he expects to work up to the standard he laid down. He has laid a standard down, but we want to know how he is going to do it, and this House ought to demand that. If he says things are as critical as we agree they are, if he says such standards are necessary, he has no right to desert these standards without telling us why he has done that, because he is jeopardising the Empire.
He will probably do what he did this time—bring in a Supplementary Estimate—and the Little Navy party would be delighted. That Supplementary Estimate will be to make up what he said was necessary, but as to which he took no steps to see that it was carried out. People think that the Supplementary Estimates accelerate ships. The First Lord said it was only a temporary Admiralty measure; but the First Lord did not tell the House this, that the acceleration of the ships had not yet overtaken his arrears! As a matter of fact, we are two or three months behind, on an average, and may I point out that acceleration does not put down new keels? If you want six ships at a certain date, acceleration may put three of them nearer that date, but it does not provide you with six ships. It is the greatest fraud on the public that ever was, this acceleration. If you want certain ships by a certain date, you want certain keels laid down for these certain ships. Accelerating the keels already laid down does not provide the ships necessary.
As a matter of fact we are, on the average, two or three months behind. The dockyards are very well up to date, but the private yards are a great deal behind. The "Thunderer" is delayed sixty days; the "Lion," forty-five days; the "Yarmouth," 160 days. The delivery of guns, shells, cordite, practice shot, is in some cases from three to eleven months late. I am making all these statements, and my statements hold the field until the First Lord can get up and deny them and say I am wrong and point out where I am wrong. As far as acceleration goes the progress of construction has not kept pace with his programme of dates, and I think, and very many other people think, that programme gives a dangerously low margin. It is curious that some of the Tory Press put in their issues that "the right hon. Gentleman has done well to obtain what he has, and that it is a victory for the right hon. Gentleman." May I say I consider that a mad sort of philosophy? I will show why. There is no such waste you can possibly conceive as devoting so many millions on a service, when the fact of these millions being too short to produce real efficiency when the service is called on, results in this, that you might as well have thrown those millions into the sea.
As I have said before, I can understand Gentlemen who say we do not want a Navy at all. [HON. MEMBERS: "Who are they?"] Where are these Gentlemen? The hon. Member for Salford (Sir W. Bytes) would be very glad to see no Navy. A bluejacket or a linesman is like a red rag to him; he cannot bear the idea of a soldier or a sailor. But they are necessary, and my point is that it is a waste if you spend large sums of money on a service which cannot carry on its duties when it comes to war; and its being unable to tarry on its duties may result in the loss of the Empire. There is no waste so extraordinary as such waste, and I say it is very incorrect to say the right hon. Gentleman must be supported. He has not done well to obtain what he has, if he has not done enough to carry out his own programme and to put us in the position of being able to face a critical situation. The main point is the constructive Vote, and I say he has deserted the standard and rendered our position more obscure and foggy than it was before, in which I have the support of hon. Gentlemen opposite. He has broken his pledges and his promises, though nobody sees more clearly the dangers ahead. I am so sorry I am boring the right hon. Gentleman. We, on this side of the House, saw distinctly right down his throat just now. I say his Estimates are totally insufficient for what he told us, and the country was absolutely necessary for our defence. There was another very suspicious point which I suppose was made for the Little Navy party below the Gangway. Did the House notice the right hon. Gentleman said that in 1915–16 there was a great possibility of decrease? We know that gag. I remember when the right hon. Gentleman's predecessor turned to the Little Navy party and said there was one satisfactory thing in all this—that we had reached the "zenith" of our Naval expenditure. He was backed up by the Prime Minister in terms that almost brought the tears to, my eyes. I got up and warned the House that Naval expenditure would increase by leaps and bounds until we had a proper programme—not a party programme, not a programme for votes, but a programme for adequate Imperial defence as a whole. The right hon. Gentleman knows just as well as I do that this period of zenith is a long way off. The Estimates will be increased next year; there will probably be a Supplementary Vote. You will have a panic the year after, whoever is in power, probably produced by the Little Navy party, but you have got to pay for your defence, and as long as you treat it like this—tentatively, in a scrappy, scratchy manner—you will go on paying a great deal more than you need in the vain endeavour to provide those defences, which you could have provided at a cheaper rate if you had used ordinary common foresight.
I have done with construction. I turn to the important point of personnel. I have always said in this House that you may have guns, boilers, ships, as you like, but that the human element is what you, want most, and that that element must be treated fairly and must be adequately trained. I have said that in this House, and I am sorry to have to say it to the right hon. Gentleman. He has been grossly rude to me on one or two occasions, but I have never been angry with him. I have treated his rudeness with some pity, tinged perhaps with a little contempt. I have repeatedly called attention to this question of the men—to the fact that we were short of men. Has not the Navy been joining men in the last three years, and does not that show I was right? We are making frantic efforts to join men. The first-term men are leaving by hundreds. The First Lord of the Admiralty will never tell me, and dare not tell me, how many are leaving. These men are twelve years' men, worth their weight in solid gold in war, and they are leaving by hundreds. Why are they leaving and declining to reengage? A great number are joining the Reserve, and that is an excellent thing. But you cannot make up in value by joining boys and ordinary seamen in replacement of these men, who are worth anything to retain.
It is a popular delusion to say that sea power depends on ships; it depends on men and officers and their training. Why are these men going? We are shorthanded. We are doing an enormous lot of overwork in many ships, but the pay is too low. The First Lord of the Admiralty, to his credit be it said, has increased the pay a little, and he told us it was only an instalment. I want to know when we are going to get the next instalment, and that should be one of the first things we should get, because we want contentment and happiness and fair dealing for the lower deck. It is more necessary than anything else. We want to know when the next instalment is coining. Then there are the Coastguards, who got no increase of pay, and who have had to pay increased prices for provisions and slops. I turn for a moment to the officers. There is a shortage of these. The First Lord of the Admiralty was honest enough to tell us the shortage existed, and that it would exist to a serious and dangerous extent in the near future. Is it not a splendid illustration of the success of that education scheme which so many of us in the Service said was a failure? It is a failure. It has failed to produce the number of officers required, though that was one of the principal reasons it was initiated. Fancy what will happen if there is war in the near future! We shall have Osborne officers, supplementary officers, public school entries, lower deck commissions, two types of Marine officers, and two types of engineer officers. Which one of those is right? It is a makeshift to get by every means conceivable enough officers in your service if you suddenly go to war. It shows that the scheme of 1904 was a bad and rotten scheme, and that it has failed.
The real reason of the beginning of it was to get rid of the engineer officers. The engineer officers may have wanted too much. I think that in many cases they only wanted that which was fair, but, whether they did or did not, the engineer officers of that day were brutally treated, and were not treated according to the agreement of the Admiralty. Engineer commanders now have not got the pay promised them by circular. They are 6s. short of what they ought to have. The policy was to get rid of them at any price-and any cost, and the cost will be very great to the State. It takes a man the whole of his lifetime to be an admiral, to know his duty, his administrative responsibilities, how to fight a ship, and how to lead a fleet. There is an enormous amount of work of that character, and many of them do not arrive at much when they get to it. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] That is perfectly true. It takes a man long to be an engineer-admiral, to look after the machinery of the Fleet, even devoting himself to that and to nothing else. The idea that you are going to scoop them all up in one is absurd. Why do not you bring the parson and the doctor in? You might just as well. The First Lord of the Admiralty said that he is going to join up 5,000 men. He has to join 14,000 to get that number, because of the wastage owing to the men on pension, to ill-health and sickness, and to the enormous number of first-term men who are leaving the Service. What is the result of that? I wanted it done three or four years ago. The First Lord knows perfectly well that it takes five or six years to train these men. The result of this enormous number of men joining now does away with the efficiency of the Fleet to an enormous extent, because it means that your ships are filled with -half-trained men. The right hon. Gentleman cannot join more—I am sure that he would if he could—because he has no place to put them. The schools are full, and he will not commission enough ships to take them all as he ought to do, He ought to join more men and officers, commission another Fleet, and let them train themselves at sea. Anyway, he is joining an abnormal number of men and officers, and that shows that we were very short.
On Saturday the right hon. Gentleman said "law and order must prevail at all risks and costs." I want him to take that motto home. He knows perfectly well that he was introducing methods and practices in the Navy which were fatal to discipline and fatal to the morale of the Service—so much so, that the Sea Lords threatened to resign if he went on as he was doing. I think that has put an effectual stopper on him. I am not at all against the First Lord going about. I think it is a very good thing. It is much better that he should go and see for himself—he is a man of considerable ability—and not sit at his desk and listen to reports. I do not, know whether it is wise to fly, but I do not suppose that he will ever get so near heaven again as he did when he was up in the air. But, without making any joke about it, I do wish that the First Lord would remember that he has none of that experience necessary, that he would not interfere in questions connected with the discipline and the morale of the Fleet, and that he would not, as I once described it, "carry on as he has no right to carry on." Let him go about and see as much as he call; I am entirely in favour of that; but do not let him do anything, as he has done, to interfere with the discipline and morale of the Service. I hope that he has got a severe check, and that on that account he will not do it again.
I want to refer to oil. It will be observed that the First Lord never said a word about oil in his statement—this most important and most necessary adjunct to the Fleet. He has jumbled up in the Estimates all fuel—oil, coal, and everything else. It ought to be separated. The House ought to know. There is nothing whatever to hurt what they call the public interest. There is nothing whatever to affect the public interest in knowing how much coal and how much oil we have got. This House should know what they are spending on it. I perfectly agree with the First Lord that perhaps you do not want the whole world to know where it is stored and how much of it is to be in ships, but the House should know how much we have got and what it has cost. What a clever Way the First Lord has got round this! He Says that "it is possible to conduct the whole movements of the present Fleet for three years, including the manœuvres, without bringing another ton of oil into the country." Let the House observe this. There are 166 ships built, building, and projected to burn oil only. Of those, 62 are not yet completed, but they are very nearly completed. There are in what he calls the present Fleet 104 vessels which burn oil alone. He has five ships which will burn at least 20,000 tons a year in their ordinary manœuvres and their ordinary work.
What is all this quibbling about the oil? If his words are true and he can do that, why is he neglecting the training in squadrons. It is not a question of saving money. It is a question of saving oil. He has not got it now, and he certainly is not going to get it in the near future. The coastal destroyers, 40 of them, have only skeleton crews. Other squadrons, the Torpedo-boat Destroyer Squadrons, have been laid up since 26th October, 1913, except for a day or two. The first order was that they were only to go out one day a week. The next order was one day a fortnight, and the next was not to go out without definite orders from the Admiralty, and those definite orders have never arrived. This is most important. If we go to war, the first brunt of a campaign will fall upon the torpedo-boat destroyers. They may settle the issue as to the success of a campaign in its initial stage, but they can only do that by being continually at sea. A torpedo-boat officer, an old friend of mine, sitting on the bench below, will support me. You ought at least to have these vessels out four days a week to enable them to maintain their distance, to make a sudden dart without collision, to have the sharp eye and the continual readiness of resource which is only got by practice. They are laid up altogether now in whole squadrons. Why? Because the right hon. Gentleman wants to have the oil for the sixty-two new vessels that are coming on very shortly. You can keep the big battleships in harbour three months, and it is not so bad for the officers and men. You can have your boats out and double down the decks and do all sorts of things to work the men because there is room, but in these vessels with sixty and eighty men there is no more room than half that table, with the result that nothing can be done when they are laid up. That disturbs the morale; it affects their discipline; it affects their health, and it is altogether wrong. Whatever happens, he ought to keep these boats going, because on them will fall the first brunt of war, and, if they are not ready and efficiently trained at sea, you cannot exercise the men in the most valuable, the most irksome and onerous duties that would be thrown on these squadrons in time of war.
He is not going to have manœuvres this year, but I cannot believe that he ordered it to be put in the Press that there is nothing to learn. We might really almost believe anything of the right hon. Gentleman, because you never know where to get him. He is very violent on a subject one year and he is equally against it the next year, but I can hardly believe that he said there was nothing to learn. I can assure the House, as commanding fleets for many years, that you cannot undertake one single manœuvre, even an officer watch manœuvres, where you may have different ships, different turning angles, different quartermasters and different officers, without the Admiral and every body in the Fleet learning something. There is a great deal of harm in telling the House a lot of things which fog the mind, so that you do not know where you are, north, south, east or west. The First Lord said:—
You are absolutely wrong.
The right hon. Gentleman has told me that before, but it has always turned out that I have been absolutely right and he has been absolutely wrong. The right hon. Gentleman will not tell us the price of the oil. I can give it to him. I am speaking of the best oil, and its freight, or the percentage you must allow for the ships built for the Admiralty, whichever way you take it. The price is about 80s. per ton; in some cases it is more. They cannot, however get it for that. Coal is at 15s. or 18s. per ton put in the bunkers. We as a nation are dependent on our command of the sea, and on the efficiency and the readiness of our Fleet, and yet we are asked to trust all that to what I have already called in this House a gigantic gamble in oil fuel, which we cannot produce, and which we cannot guard, because the oil routes are quite different from the trade routes, and we have not sufficient ships to guard the trade routes. We are trusting to this gamble which the House of Commons knew nothing whatever about, and which it never approved in any way whatever. Let me turn again once more to the question of Supply. The Report of the Commission has been referred to. Is that Commission going to sit till Domesday? This House ought to know how long it is going to sit, and what is its Report. It is a most important question. I do not, know who it was who built the "oil only" burning ships, but I think it was the right hon. Gentleman's predecessor. Whoever it was, however, the Admiralty had no right to lay down the ships until they had a million tons of oil stored in this country. What did the Commissioners say?— I repeat what I said last year on the oil question, that the building of these five "Queen Elizabeth's" and of an extra number of oil-burning ships is a dangerous experiment and gigantic gamble that might bring grave danger to this country in a sudden emergency. We have to provide a large amount of oil, and we cannot do it except by stopping the manœuvres. Remember more has to come. There are sixty-two ships to be provided for, and I forgot also the "L" class of T.B.D.'s They have all got their new torpedoes and their new guns, but we have not been able to try them because we have not the oil. I say the public should demand to know where the oil is coming from, and where it is going to be stored. It need not be told about the amount, but the Government should give the information I suggest and stop all this nonsense which is talked of "its not being in the public interest." We have got a serious difficulty now in obtaining oil from Mexico, and we might experience the same difficulty in other countries. I pointed out last year we had got 100,000 tons of oil from Roumania, but directly the Balkan war broke out that supply was stopped immediately, and the same thing might happen in other places. There might be a question of one of the routes by means of which we are supplied with oil being cut off.
I have finished my remarks. I would like to say at once that I want to know what the Unionists are going to do. Are they going to agree to a programme which is not carried out—a programme that the First Lord of the Admiralty said was necessary for our defence, but which he is meeting in no way whatever? He shirked the subject in his great speech of two and a haif hours—at any rate, he only devoted three minutes to it—and I want to know are the Unionists going to agree to an ineffective programme which will run this country into danger in two or three years' time, and will infallibly increase enormously the Naval Estimates, as it has done already, because you will not grasp the question at the right moment, and put down enough money at the right time. You only fiddle with it and quibble about it. I have got a solution for you.
:What is it?
My solution is this: Those who read the First Lord's peroration will find that nothing better could better show the danger of the in- crease of the power of foreign countries, and how our lives and existence absolutely depend upon our being supreme at sea. What I suggest is this: We should have at once an Imperial Committee. We should put on it the best men on both sides of the House. We should have a few experts, not too many, and we should also get the best men possible from the Dominions. This Committee should make out a real businesslike scheme of Imperial defence as a whole. It should say what we want, why we want it, what it will cost, and what it is necessary to attain. I believe that, until we do that we shall go on with this haphazard sort of life as we do now from year to year. Remember, that men like myself cannot prove our case. It cannot be proved unless we go to war. We can only raise what hon. Members call "scares." I venture to assert, however, that no hon. Member will get up on that side and say that these scares have not been subsequently justified either by what foreign countries have done, or by an increase of our responsibilities in our Dominions. We ought to be businesslike. My suggestion would take away from the subject all party aspects, and would ensure its being treated not merely as a national question, but as an Imperial one. Believe me, I say from my heart that I honestly believe, if we go on as we are doing, we are risking the lives of our people and the maintenance of our immense Empire.
I beg to move to leave out from the word "that" to the end of the Question, in order to add instead thereof the words, "in the opinion of this House, the selection of officers for the Navy should be on a wider and more democratic basis, and that provision should also be made for a more rapid Promotion from the Lower Ratings to the Executive Rank."
The fortunes of the ballot have furnished me with an opportunity of drawing attention to a long-standing grievance amongst the men of the lower deck, although I readily recognise that there are men on both sides of the House much better qualified that I am to draw attention to it. We are all ready to give assent to the broad principle that personal merit should, in every sphere, come up to the top. We are all ready, also, at all times, to endorse Napoleon's famous dictum, that every private soldier should be made to feel that he carries a marshal's baton in his knapsack. As a mere theory these sentiments carry ready assent, but it is in their application that failure comes. We are ready to vaunt the glory and greatness of the Navy, and to speak of it as our first and last line of defence, but at the same time we are too apt to think of the Navy in terms of ships rather than in terms of men. I was very glad to hear the Noble Lord the Member for Portsmouth (Lord C. Beresford) pay a tribute to the human element in the Navy, to hear him declare that, after all, it is the human element we want. I was glad he shattered the delusion that the security of the country depends upon ships rather than on men. I think he did well to pay that splendid tribute to the men. After all, it is well for us to remember that our "Dreadnoughts," our destroyers, and our submarines represent, at best, an inert mass of iron apart from the skill, daring, and heroism incarnated in the men who mind them. Important as is the machine, equipped though it may be with the most ingenious appliances, in the last resort it is the nerve of the man behind the machine that really counts and determines destiny. But while we are prepared to admit the importance and supremacy of the human element, this outstanding fact remains, that in the British Navy you have, as in the British Army, wealth marking the main avenues to promotion and distinction. I have been reading a pamphlet issued by the Admiralty. I do not know whether the Noble Lord has ever seen it. It is entitled "How to Get On in the Royal Navy."
No, I have not seen it.
5.0 P.M.
Probably the Noble Lord did not need it in the days of his youth. According to this pamphlet, there are four qualities which a boy needs to develop in order to get on in the Navy. They are character, intelligence, health, and education, and the pamphlet goes on to say that of all these the most important is character. We are told that in the training service the boy has every chance, of smartening up. I notice that in this pamphlet there is no reference to the chance of the boy getting on and of his securing real promotion. A man's brains cannot do much for him in the Navy unless he keeps his body in general health, and I venture to think the Noble Lord will agree with me when I say that, even if he keeps in general health and maintains both his brains and his body at the highest point of efficiency, unless he has had the advantage of being a cadet, his chance of promotion are very small indeed. The pamphlet goes on to say that in order to rise to the top of his profession the boy has to find out all that there is to know about his job. The first aim and ambition of every intelligent boy must be, it continues, to do the best he can for himself, and to rise as high as possible and as soon as possible. I should like to ask the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty how high and how soon the ordinary boy can rise in the British Navy, and how long it will take him, if he carries out these instructions, before he can hope to get to the top, as marked out in this pamphlet? Everybody agrees that the path which leads to a commission in the Navy begins with a cadetship. When it is remembered that a cadetship involves an expenditure of £500 or £600, it will be seen that these cadets must necessarily be recruited almost exclusively from the homes of the well-to-do. I remember that on the occasion of the Coronation a friend of mine was standing in Whitehall watching the Royal procession, when the right hon. Gentleman who is now President of the Board of Trade, but who was at the time President of the Local Government Board, came down Whitehall in his full uniform as a Privy Councillor. As he walked down, with becoming modesty, an American who happened to be in the crowd spotted him, and said, guess he's one of the British admirals." My friend remarked, "No, he is not an admiral—that is Mr. John Burns," and the Yankee said," Well, judging from his uniform, his bearing, his deportment, and certainly his hat, I should have guessed he was an admiral." Yet the fact remains that had the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade chosen the Navy in preference to politics as the arena for the exercise of his innate gifts he would never have risen to the position of the Noble Lord who has just sat down. The most the right hon. Gentleman could have done would have been to become a warrant officer. Then he would have been pensioned, and would have spent his remaining years in making statistical returns of the number of buttons used in the British Navy. I have been reading something of the way in which cadets are trained for the Navy. There is no chance for these boys from the lower deck to get to the top. They must, if they wish to get promotion or distinction in the Navy, begin as cadets. How are cadets trained for the Navy, and how do they spend their time? I have here a very interesting article on that point. The Noble Lord opposite (Lord C. Beresford) in his leisure moments has been writing his autobiography, and most interesting it is. In one instalment of his autobiography he tells us something of his early experiences on the ship on which he received his training, and this is what he says:—
"Captain Houston Stewart—"
That is the captain of the ship on which the Noble Lord served—
"used to fish from the stern gallery when the ship was at anchor. He tied his line to the rail, and went back into his cabin, returning every few minutes to see if he had a fish. Beneath the stern gallery opened the ports of the gun-room, and, with a hooked stick, I drew in his line, attached a Yarmouth bloater to the hook, dropped it in again, and when the captain came to feel his line, I jerked it. He hauled it up in a hurry, to find it red-herring on the end. He instantly sent for all the midshipmen, and, for some reason or other, he picked me out at once."
That is interesting for more than one reason. It is interesting as showing the splendid training our cadets receive for the great naval warfare about which we have heard so much, and it is also interesting as showing how these habits cling to a person. The Noble Lord to-day has been dropping red herrings into the Mediterranean Sea. [An HON. MEMBER: "Bloaters."] If the Noble Lord thinks that we do not take his naval scares as seriously as we ought to, it is because we feel that he has got into the habit of attaching bloaters at the end of the line. The First Lord of the Admiralty has promised on more than one occasion that he would deal with the question of promotion from the lower decks. Two years ago he said:—
"Twenty commissions as acting mates have already been given. Another batch of twenty will be selected almost immediately, and we expect that in the next three years mom than one hundred seamen, marines and other naval ratings will, by their merits, have won their promotion and epaulettes."
I should like to know from the Financial Secretary how many have won promotion since that date? On one occasion the First Lord said: —
"Everyone acquainted with the Navy must have been struck with the extraordinarily high qualities of discipline and intelligence which ire displayed by the best class of warrant officers. These are the days when the Navy, which is a great national service, should be opened more broadly to the nation as a whole."
Something has been done by the Admiralty in one direction. I notice that already they are drawing men from the public schools. There was a time when a cadet had to enter either Osborne or Dartmouth, but now a departure has been made. Sir Alfred Ewing, the Director of Naval Education, has said:—
"The decision of the Admiralty to increase the supply of naval officers by admitting as cadets boys who have completed their secondary education, whose age is accordingly about eighteen, is a new departure, and one that brings the supply of officers for the Royal Navy into direct relation with the public schools."
They have broken new ground, and what I want to know is why cannot the Admiralty do something for the poor? Why not establish bursaries at Osborne and Dartmouth? You have removed the pressure at Osborne and Dartmouth; why not give them bursaries and scholarships and thereby give them a chance of promotion? It has been done in the realms of education. One Senior Wrangler was a poor lad from Whitechapel, who by means of bursaries and scholarships had worked his way up to the university and gained the distinction of Senior Wrangler. If he had chosen the Navy he could never have had this chance, because financial considerations would have stepped in and barred his way to promotion. Reform is required in one or two ways, first of all—and I lay great importance on this, and I hope to secure the assent of the Noble Lord—the ban of social caste must be removed altogether. That is a very important point. In this pamphlet, "How to Get On in the Navy," I came across a most significant sentence, which I do not like at all. It reads:—
"Acting mates will become mates, and will be appointed to seagoing ships, where they will rank with sub-lieutenants but will mess ill the ward-room."
I think that is grossly unfair. You say to these men, "If you have merit you shall go up, but when you have done so you must not sit with the other mates: you must dine elsewhere."
May I interrupt the hon. Member in order to correct a mistake? The ward-room is the senior mess. Sub-lieutenants will be in the gun-room. Therefore these men will mess above where they would be.
I am extremely grateful to the Noble Lord for that information. I never had the honour of going over a warship, except on the occasion we went down to see the Fleet, when I noticed that the men on board were very chary of Members who sit below the Gangway on the Ministerial side of the House. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] That was my experience. I hope that the next time I go, I may be in the company of the Noble Lord, and then shall know what the wardroom is. One other point to which I draw attention is that candidates for commission rank must not be more than thirty-two years of age.
That is Mates E.
Exactly. I, for one, protest against a stipulation of that kind, for thirty-two is much too low a limit of age. A short time ago the medical profession startled the country by promulgating the dictum that men are too old at forty, but now we have this restriction of too old at thirty-two. Supposing that restriction of age were applied to the Treasury Bench, how many men of Cabinet rank are there below the age of thirty-two? You require as much nerve, brain, and sagacity in the Navy as you do in work of this kind. The age of thirty-two should be raised, and I appeal to the First Lord and to the Financial Secretary to see what can be done on that point. Very few of these men are promoted. I think I am right, perhaps the Noble Lord or my right hon. Friend will correct me if I am wrong, when I say that the promotions in the Navy are extremely meagre. The men do not get promotion. They ask for bread and are given a stone; they ask for promotion and are given these green pamphlets. Whenever they do secure promotion on the deck, they are at once relegated to positions on land, and are sent again and again to coastguard stations. Social contrasts come in again and again and thwart the promotion of these men. I say to the Admiralty that with what measure they mete out promotions from the lower decks, it will be meted out to them again.
Thousands of pounds have been spent on advertising the Army in these days, but the best advertisement the Army ever had was the romantic military career of the late Sir Hector Macdonald, a man who from lowly conditions of birth and circumstances of environment reached a high position in the Army, and when he did so, men up and down the land pointed to him, and scores and hundreds of men were brought into the Army by the glamour of his career. I appeal to the First Lord and to the Financial Secretary to do something in this direction. The First Lord, in spite of what the Noble Lord opposite has said about him, has been near heaven and probably will be again. The Noble Lord is more anxious about his going up than his going down. We are not anxious when the First Lord goes up, because we are accustomed to his flights—we are much more anxious when he takes submarine expeditions. Yesterday the First Lord gave to House another demonstration of the versatility and resourcefulness which we regard as the essence of his genius as a statesman and administrator. One can pay him no higher tribute than to say that reared though he was in the panoply of luxury, he is essentially democratic in spirit, in sympathy, in sentiment and in outlook. I appeal to the Department to broaden the basis of selection in the choice of officers and to make merit rather than money the main avenue into the Service. If I may take an illustration from my own country of Wales, I should say we have been able to do something of this kind. The principal of one of our national colleges is the son of a policeman, and the chief inspector of Wales is the son of an agricultural labourer, while several Chairs in the Welsh University are filled by men who once toiled as colliers in our coal fields. If in Wales we can throw the highest positions in our educational system open to merit, genius, and ability, I fait to see why the Admiralty cannot do, the same in a service which has been described as life and death to us. I read in one of the naval periodicals the other day that whenever men of the lower deck are asked what would happen when war breaks out on the sea they are accustomed to say, "We shall get there right enough." No one will deny the force of that declaration, but if war were to break out—and I am sure the Noble Lord would bemoan that fact as much as any of us on this side—one thing is certain. It is the men who are on the lower deck who would be found in the forefront of peril. They would be in the zone of fire ready to lay down their lives in their country's service. The avenues of promotion should be made as easy and as accessible to them as will be the zone of danger in the day of trial and of battle. Let not the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues forget that in the stress of battle, when the naval resources of this country are put to the test, an abundance of good red blood will be as essential as any amount of blue blood.
I beg to second the Amendment. I think the thanks of the House are due to the hon. Member for availing himself of the opportunity open to him of presenting the Navy in a new light, so to speak, and viewed from a new angle. We discuss the Navy here from, year to year as to its size and as to its, equipment, and sometimes as to its disposition, but very seldom in regard to its men, and more seldom still in regard to its officers—that is to say, more seldom still in regard to the men who handle and control these vast machines which now cost the country over £50,000,000 a year. That is the main reason why the Admiralty have been able to build up a system of caste in the Navy, and why that system of caste has been built up with impunity under the shadow of what are supposed to be democratic institutions. Apart from the trifling modifications of the last year or two, the naval officer is a man who has been drawn from a small, and one might almost say an infinitesimal section of the community. The executive officer of the navy is a man who has been trained from his early youth, partly at the expense of his parents and partly at the expense of the community. The definition of naval officer has a very important bearing upon my argument. The future officer goes to Osborne at about thirteen years of age. He stays there for two years, and then goes to Dartmouth, where he stays another two years. Then, if my memory serves me right, he goes to sea—partly at sea and partly on shore—for two years, which brings him to nineteen when he goes out in to the Service, and those men may be called the upper crust or caste of the Navy. The question arises, From what section of the community do these persons come? And that resolves itself into the very simple inquiry as to who can pay the fees required to send them to Osborne and Dartmouth? That question resolves itself largely into a question of exclusion. I heard the hon. Member (Mr. Hamar Greenwood) discussing last week the question of the officers in the Army, and he talked a good deal about the democratic character of the Army in New Zealand. At all events, that hardly applies here, because each one of these boys going to Osborne has to pay £75 per year for five years. I have stated that so often that it has come to be like a recitation, and my only excuse for stating it again is that the conditions remain exactly as they have been for the eight years during which I have been in the House. I well know that when this scheme was inaugurated ten years ago it received the determined hostility of the late Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and of Lord Lochie; therefore, I assume the scheme which was then inaugurated had not the sanction of the present Members of the Government when they were in Opposition. These folks have to pay £130 per year in round figures during the five years they are at Osborne and Dartmouth, because, in addition to the £75, there is a lot of money to be spent in kit and various things. Therefore, the question arises, Who can pay £130 per year per boy from thirteen years of age onward until they begin to earn? The answer to that question gives you the answer to the question from what section of the community these people are drawn.
The hon. Member (Mr. Hamar Greenwood) last week said the two brightest officers in the New Zealand Army were the sons of a policeman and a butcher. You may rule out butchers and policemen and people of that sort from the officering of our British Navy. You may, in fact, rule out the whole working-class population of this country from any share in the control of the British Navy. You may even rule out the whole shopkeeping class, although we have been called a nation of shopkeepers. You might almost rule out the small manufacturing class, from which, as I understand, the present Prime Minister sprang. We come to the well-to-do. In order to give definiteness to my argument I am going to fix upon a figure below which no one can send a son to Osborne, and that figure is £700 a year. The question arises, How many are there with £700 a year? I have looked up the references, and I have looked up the book of the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Chiozza Money), and I think, according to all the authorities, the number of persons in receipt of £700 a year in this country is somewhere about 260,000. You may multiply that by five to get the number of the population, and that gives you about 1,250,000. Therefore we reach this conclusion, that about 3 per cent. of the community supply all the officers to the Navy and the Army and the Civil Service in any jobs which are worth picking up at all. All the plums of the public service of all descriptions go to that microscopic section of the community.
I said that the definition of the officer had an important bearing upon my argument. Who is the officer of the Navy? In the young days of the Noble Lord (Lord C. Beresford) the Navy officer was a man who walked the bridge and had charge of the fighting tackle, and, generally speaking, he was the gold braid man in Contradistinction to the man in charge of the machinery, which did not figure so Much in the Navy at that time, but the Navy, like other things, has changed, and with the development of electricity and hydraulics, and all sorts of things, it consists of boxes of mechanism from one end to the other, and therefore the engineer has become a more important personage on board a ship and in the Navy generally. Ten years ago the engineer was a sort of tweenie who was not exactly an officer, nor did he belong to the community of the lower deck, but he had began to feel his own importance as a man in the Navy, and inasmuch as he was not reckoned as an officer and had not full control of his own department, he was always making complaints to the powers that be, and therefore the powers that be settled his complaint in a way which is characteristic of the powers that be when they come to deal with people of that sort. They dealt with them by shunting him out of the Navy altogether. A scheme was inaugurated ten years ago, called the Selborne scheme, which added the engineering officer into the executive rank of officers, and therefore the engineering officer has now to be trained at Osborne and Dartmouth along with the superior person who went there before him, and that has had the effect of doubling the number of executive officers—I am assuming the number of engineers is the same as the others; at all events the executive rank of the old style is now added to by the engineering officer, and you are trying to get double the number from that small section of the community. You have still a large number, of course, of the old engineering officers left, because sufficient time has not elapsed to get rid of him, but he has been gradually elbowed out, and when this scheme is in full operation, if it ever comes into full operation, the old engineering officer will be' out of the Navy altogether, and you will have then the engineering staff officer as well as the other men who has gone through Osborne and Dartmouth, and somehow or other has found that golden key.
There is not only that, but during the last few years, we have been adding to the Navy very much faster than the ratio of increase of population When I came here the Navy consisted of 123,000 men. This year provision is made for 151,000 men, and I suppose we are in sight of a Navy of 160,000, or possibly more, when the ships which are now on the stocks fall to be manned. So that as compared with ten years ago we are now drawing from that small section of the community from two to three times as many men for the Navy officers. I do not think I am doing any injustice to the well-to-do when I say that they have not, at all events, a monopoly of brains in this country. I do not say they are any worse or any better than other people, but my experience has convinced me that we are pretty well all of a muchness, and that therefore in proportion as the Admiralty respond to the appeal that has been made to them by hon. Friend by widening the basis of selection to that extent, it is reasonable to suppose that you might have a greater degree of efficiency in the Navy than now. I am making no charges, but, at all events, if you imagine that brain power in the community is the same all round, and if you increase the area from which you are going to select, it is reasonable to suppose that you are going to have more efficient men. I am willing to admit that there have been some slight improvements made during the past few years, and I wish to say a word regarding them, for, although I welcome them on the whole, it seems to me that they do not go nearly far enough, and not one of them has any bearing on the general scheme of things. That general scheme seems to me to be dependent on the maintenance of the Osborne and Dartmouth system. I have heard of Commander Lyne, who was promoted at forty-four years of age to be commander, and it has been said that if he has been fortunate enough to become a commander at that age, others may do the same. It only shows that a man may creep into promotion of that sort just as it is possible for a man to creep into Heaven through the eye of a needle. That does not take us very far. It shows that one man may come up from the ranks after a great deal of trouble.
I find on this year's Estimates provision made for fifteen engineering lieutenants. Last year there were eighteen, so that so far as engineering lieutenants are concerned, they are getting a sort of Irishman's rise. The total number of the engineering staff in the Navy is 5,495, and, as my hon. Friend has just pointed out, promotion really does not amount to much, because when they are promoted to be lieutenants they are often deprived of the opportunity of doing real actual sea service. They are poked away on shore appointments to inspect machinery or something of that sort, and I believe I am right in saying that not one of these fifteen engineering lieutenants is at present at sea. The hon. Gentleman may have better opportunities than I have of seeing whether that is true or not. Moreover, these men are close upon fifty years of age before they become engineering lieutenants, and it may be said that when they become engineering lieutenants they have reached the top of their career. They get promotion which deprives them of doing actual service at sea, for the reason I have mentioned. Take the class of mates and what has been done for them. That is one of the best moves I have heard of in recent years, because it does give an opportunity to the younger man. It gives him an opportunity, so to speak, of submitting himself to further education, and generally equipping himself in such a way as to admit of further promotion in after life. But, after all, what does it amount to? It is infinitesimally small, and that is what I complain of. The First Lord told us yesterday that there were only thirteen of the mates actually at sea up till now, and I have to say that, so far as this is concerned, it ought to be speeded up. These mates ought to be increased in number very considerably. Then there is the man entered at eighteen to nineteen from the public schools. There, again, I have nothing but commendation to offer as to what has been done, except that it seems to me to be far too slow.
I come now to Mates E., and here I am going to say that the Admiralty are carrying out a sort of petty classification. Where are Mates E. drawn from? Practically speaking, they will be drawn from the class known as boy artificers. Why has that boy-artificer class been started? I think it is with the obvious intention of shunting the engineering operative from the Navy, and getting rid of his trade unionism, and all that appertains to civil life. I have shown how the lumping in of the old engineering officer with the executive officer of old time has had, or is having, the effect of shunting out the old engineering officer. I believe that at the bottom this boy artificer is designed to have the same effect. It is from the boy artificer class that Mates E. of the future must necessarily be drawn. You put the age at thirty-two. As a general principle, I am glad you are promoting men at such an age as will leave them opportunities of further promotion, but in regard to this particular matter you have gone a little too far. The boy artificer enters at about sixteen years of age, and you make it a condition that a man shall be thirty-two years of age and shall have eight years' service. Therefore, the boy artificer is clearly well inside that period of eight years. There is nothing to prevent him going ahead, especially having regard to the fact that he is trained at the Government expense, and therefore in a position to pass the academic test. Compare him with the man who joins from the civil life of the community. Take the engineering officer; he joins, on the average, at the age of twenty-three years—not under, but rather over. You have an eight years' time limit, as well as a thirty-two years of age qualification. What is going to happen? The artificer is at least thirty-one years of age before he can qualify at all, and probably he cannot qualify. Therefore, these posts of Mates E. will be monopolised by the boy-artificer class. Where do you draw him from Outside of Devonport, Chatham, and Portsmouth, you take him from the secondary schools. Something is done in the way of easement of the condition so far as boys in these three ports are concerned, but outside of these ports the condition for entering the boy-artificer class is that they conic from a secondary school, and, if my memory serves me right, it is a condition that he shall have been in a secondary school two years. That is an unnecessary bar against boys of the working class of this country.
I do not object to an educational bar. Make it as high as you like. Make it so high and severe that you will get the best and brightest boys in the working-class ranks. That is one thing, but it is another thing to make it a test that the boy shall have been at a secondary school. There are only a few working people who can send their boys to secondary schools. I think it is one of the finest phases of the working class of this country that many of them sacrifice comforts which they might enjoy in order to send their sons to secondary schools. They cannot all do it. It is absolutely impossible for a man with 30s. to 40s. a week to send his boy to a secondary school. Therefore, this petty bar as to a boy being drawn from a secondary school is an unnecessary bar and limitation against the boys of the working people of this country obtaining jobs they might otherwise take. It seems to me that it has been shown that there is a condition of things in the Navy—and I suppose it always has been so more or less in the Navy—fraught with danger. It is controlled by a select and exclusive few, and it seems to me that we ought to rectify this. I think, at the present time, this condition of things is giving added rower to wealth, and the effect also is to give, if not inefficiency, at all events less efficiency than we might have. I shall wind up with three suggestions: First of all, I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that the entry for Mates E. should be extended to the age of thirty-five. Assuming that an artificer joins at twenty-three, that would be twelve years for him—four years of a margin over the eight years' service which is the present qualification. He will even then be at a disadvantage so far as the boy artificer class is concerned, because the boy artificer would have been in the Service sixteen years, and would, therefore, have an advantage as compared with the engineer joining from engineering or other workshops. Therefore, in order to give the artificer the same avenue of promotion, I suggest that the age limit should be extended from thirty-two to thirty-five years of age. Then in regard to taking men from the school at eighteen or nineteen years of age I have nothing at all to say against it. I believe that forty-one are in training, and I hope the time will come soon when there will be a larger addition of those people, because it is taking them from the civil community at a later age in life, and bringing the Navy into more direct contact with civil life. I hope the number will be considerably increased, and that there will be absolutely no bar put in the way except that of fitness on the part of these young men entering the Service.
The last thing I wish to say—and I think it is the most important—is that the fees at Osborne and Dartmouth are at present prohibitive, except for that small section who can find £130 per year for a boy. The right, hon. Gentleman and his predecessor, and everybody who has spoken for the Admiralty during the last eight years while I have been in this House, have fully admitted that these fees are too large. What is the good of an admission unless something is done? From the very first year I was here I have been calling attention to this matter, and the late Lord Lochee admitted that the fees were too high. He appealed to gentlemen in this House to suggest to him means by which the fees might be reduced. I think either he or somebody, at all events, made the suggestion that the hat should go round for those who have not got the money. About that time provision was made for a reduced fee of £40 for the sons of officers.
That is all very well so far as it goes, but it does not go very far. It keeps the thing still within the officer class, and with all due deference to that class, I see no reason why this should not be extended outside. Bursaries have been suggested by my hon. Friend. I do not want the bursaries. It seems to me that by bursaries you will get young people in their teens who appear from examinations to be prodigies. But I have seen a lot of these prodigies, and, as a rule, they do not turn out trumps in after life. I do not want any of them in the Navy. Moreover, the boy who is most likely to go through an examination of an academic sort is not likely to be the boy who has got sufficient devil in him to be a naval officer. Therefore I do not think that that is a very satisfactory solution. I am told that there is a further proposal to which effect may be given this year: that is to reduce the fee to those who can show that they are not in a position to pay. That is to say, that if there are boys who pass certain scholastic examinations, and an examination before an examining authority, and if it can be shown that their parents cannot find sufficient money, then if the parents make a declaration to that effect, the boys can be sent in at a reduced fee. That again has no attraction for me, because it will set up a distinction as between one boy and another, and, even if it does not do that, it imposes an obligation on the parent to make a declaration of his poverty, which seems to me to be very undesirable. If this scheme is going on; therefore, I condemn it hip and thigh, I believe it, will result in inefficiency, because you are taking up a boy and requiring from him more than you can possibly get, that he should show himself an engineer, an admiral, or both, as circumstances may determine. Therefore I do not believe in the scheme at all. But, if you are going to continue this scheme of common entrance through Osborne and Dartmouth, the natural and proper corollary to maintaining that scheme is to reduce those fees so that you can make a selection from the widest possible area over the whole community, and get the best brains in the community.
My hon. Friends have raised a very interesting question and have made very interesting speeches full of feeling and full of eloquence on this subject. It would ill become me, the son myself of a non-commissioned officer, that I should be other than glad to have this subject discussed by this House. I feel bound to say at once that whatever time and evolution may bring in their train, I do not think the present average naval officer can be very much improved upon. It is due that I should say that. He is skilfully chosen when he is very young to follow a profession upon which he himself is very keen. He is from the first anxious to treat his calling very seriously, and his training is certainly designed nowadays to give him his heart's desire. At every stage the present naval officer is a professional man, just as much as the doctor or the lawyer, and as a rule his parents are not very rich people. I think that both my hon. Friends are under some slight misapprehension as to that. As a matter of interest, the other day I had taken out for me the occupations of the fathers of the entrants into naval cadetships during the past five years. The total number was 1,200. Out of the 1,200 the highest number was 181, sons of Army officers. Sons of officers in the Royal Navy and Royal Marines were 107. The law accounts for 123, medicine for 99, the clergy for 66, merchants 56, the Civil Service 54—and I doubt if all those fathers have got £700 a year—the Stock Exchange 40, and civil engineers 31, and 138 boys were sons of parents with no profession. The remaining 305 I find fall into some 66 categories comprising professions so various as those of peer, Member of Parliament, analyst, surveyor, dentist, tea-planter, calico - printer, typefounder, builder, goldsmith, editor, sculptor, artist, professor of music, meat and cattle salesman, and technical exhibition expert. I have not exhausted my category, but those are typical cases. That is not exactly, after all, what my hon. Friend the Member for Blackfriars would call an infinitesimal section of the community.
It is quite certain that the naval cadet does not go into the Navy for the sake of something to do, though he gets a great deal to do as soon as he gets into it. The days of the Noble Lord fishing for Yarmouth bloaters were a long time ago. I do not think that there is much opportunity for that sort of thing to-day. A boy goes into the Navy because of his passion for the life of a sailor under the White Ensign. Theoretically, any British citizen can send his boy up for entry as a candidate for a cadetship in the Royal Navy; hut, of course, my hon. Friend the Member for Blackfriars is quite right when he says that the fee charged restricts the area of selection very seriously. I have never denied that. Now in the past the fee was £75 a year for the four years at Osborne or Dartmouth, and £50 a year for parental allowance during the three years on the training cruiser and as a midshipman. That makes £450. And you might fairly add another £100 for various charges on the parent or guardian up to the close of a midshipman's career—that is, £550 roughly. My hon. Friend says that the position remains just as it was three years ago. He is a little wrong there. In the past, as he properly said, the sons of Army officers, Navy officers, and Civil officials of the Admiralty were admitted up to a maximum of 10 per cent, of each entry for £40 instead of £75. Now my hon. Friend the Mover suggested the bursary system as an alternative to this. I agree with my hon. Friend the Seconder that if the bursary system means that these little lads should be crammed, as they were, then I am strongly opposed to it. Of course, it all depends on how it is administered. If the bursary system is adopted, the boy is likely to be exposed to cramming. I do not believe in the crammer in any event, and least of all at the early age at which these boys join the Navy. We have effectually killed that by our interview system, and our method of admitting these boys to cadetships. I do not want to see the crammer coming back. But we have recently done this: We have recently extended the reduced fee of £40. Up to a maximum of 10 per cent. of the entry it is reserved, as before, for the sons of officers in the Army and Navy and Civil servants in the Admiralty, and from that point up to a maximum of 25 per cent., the £40 payment would be open to the general public, whose circumstances appear to justify that. I do suggest that that is a considerable step in the direction which the hon. Member has advocated.
May I point out that there is the objection that it would create a poverty bar as between the boys?
6.0 P.M.
Some would pay£75 and some £40. There is not the slightest reason why other boys should know. Broadly speaking, after the boys are qualified and are, so far as that is concerned, open to admission, it would be for the parents to make application, and it would be for the Board of Admiralty to say whether the circumstances were such as to entitle them to send the boy for a £40 fee; and I cannot understand why the boys at Osborne should know anything about it. That is going a step along the lines advocated by my hon. Friend. I do not doubt that the extension of the lower fee to a maximum of 25 per cent. of the entries will widen the area of selection. I agree that in the past that area has been much too restricted, but I repeat, also, that, notwithstanding all this, our system has undoubtedly secured for us a first-class naval officer. There it is. Starting out with this passionate desire to enter the Navy, the naval officer's life purpose is disciplined and developed by the training which he receives, and it is no more than truth to say that, whatever our views may be as to the system of selection or the area from which they are got, in the average naval officer to-day you have the last word in enthusiasm, shaped and seasoned by scientific professional training. We are all very proud of the naval officer. I feel bound to say that; it is a matter on which I feel deeply. It. is not, therefore—I say this quite honestly—because of the failure of your recruiting methods in the past to give you a really first-class naval officer, that I turn to the question raised by my hon. Friends of promotion from the ranks. The fact is that the world is moving on, and is carrying us along with it. For the last forty-three years we have been compelling the working classes to send their children to the common school, and in the class-rooms of the common schools a new ideal has been inevitably inspired, and a new outlook inevitably imparted. I daresay that is a fact upon which we do not perhaps sufficiently ponder in these times. One result must be that you are bound in all departments of the Public Service, and in the interests of the Public Service, frankly to admit and generously to provide for the claim that, no matter how humble or rude his extraction, the boy of parts shall have open to him the highest rank in his calling. That must be accepted by men of all parties, though, I daresay, differences of opinion may well arise as to the measure of caution and circumspection necessary in the process of applying the principle. If you do not admit that principle, or if you admit it too grudgingly, you will, as time goes on, increasingly deprive the State of valuable and, may be, brilliant service. You will damp ardour, discourage enthusiasm, and repress ambition.
But, of course, having said all this, which I deeply feel, I agree that, in this matter especially, we need to move very cautiously, and with the closest circumspection. Your process of adaption must have sensitive regard to the condition and characteristic of this great Service. You must remember that you are not reforming this system as the result of any failure on its part to carry out and discharge the functions expected of it. Quite otherwise. I think this system, or at any rate the product of it, is as good to-day probably as it ever will be. You are simply adapting your methods of promoting to commissioned rank in order to meet the legitimate aspirations of those whose qualities and whose worth entitle them to hold the King's Commission. In doing this, I suggest that you will need to remember that in handing the King's Commission to a man from the ranks it will be necessary to provide him with such financial remuneration as to enable him without undue hardship to carry out, the duties of his new office, and will enable him to look forward to a reasonable retiring allowance at the close of his service. I should like to say this further: Being who I am, I have watched this matter with an eye of close and keen sympathy all my life, and I am convinced, and I am glad to find my hon. Friend the Member for Blackfriars generally agrees with me, except in one case to which he referred, that if the policy of promotion from the ranks is really to have a fair chance, and become an established and recognised feature in our schemes for the organisation of disciplined forces, then the promotions must be made while the men are yet young. As to the old plan of raising a man from the ranks towards the close of his term of service, it is not, in my opinion, the best plan.
As my hon. Friend the Mover and Seconder admitted, we have in the last few months taken some steps in the direction they desire. I think very long steps. In 1912 we announced that we proposed to select up to a total of one hundred, possibly more, young warrant officers and petty officers for promotion to commissioned rank. After a period of training they would be confirmed as mates, and go to sea with the relative rank of sub-lieutenant. They will receive a gratuity of £50 for uniform outfit; they will mess in the ward room and receive a mess allowance of 2s. a day, with 8s. a day pay. They will be eligible to be promoted to the rank of lieutenant after two to three years' service as acting-mate and mate. Here again there will be an outfit gratuity of £50 on promotion to the rank of lieutenant. As lieutenants these officers will be considered on their merits, and under the regulations applicable to commissioned rank, for promotion to commander, and, it may be, higher rank. They will be on the same footing as ex-cadet lieutenants in respect of pay, retirement, and retired pay. The present position of that scheme is this: Thirteen mates are now serving at sea, and, so far as the reports have come in, they are doing admirably. Of course, as anybody who is acquainted with the Service must know, the naval officers have in every way given the right hand of good fellowship and good comradeship to the new officers, and these men have fallen into social life of the ward room in the readiest manner, which is a tribute not only to them, but to their brother officers.
My hon. Friend the Member for Black-friars asks why we cannot speed that up. Let me tell him exactly how the matter stands. Twenty-two acting-mates will finish all their courses next month and will then go to sea. Nine acting-mates are at Greenwich, doing their course of training there; and twenty-two of the candidates are undergoing their preliminary courses at Portsmouth. This brings the total up to sixty-six, and a further batch will be under training in the summer. So much for the promotion of the warrant officer. Then, again, following this, we have now extended the opportunity of promotion to the Royal Marines. Two commissions will be granted every year to selected warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the Royal Marines. On selection they will be given the rank of acting-Royal Marine gunner, and after undergoing courses in gunnery and torpedo, they will proceed to the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, for instruction in military and other subjects. On passing a qualifying examination, they will be granted the rank of second-lieutenant of the Royal Marine, and will be appointed to a Headquarters Division, where they will join the officers' mess, and will receive a gratuity of £100 for uniform outfit, and £10 for mess entrance and subscriptions. Their pay will then be ten shillings a day. After a, period of further instruction in military subjects and of service afloat, they will be eligible for promotion to lieutenants, and will then come under all the existing regulations for the corps as regards their future career. The first two candidates were selected last year, and are now undergoing instruction at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich. Of course, in addition to the grant of commissions, which I have just outlined, any warrant officer, non-commissioned officer or man of the Royal Navy will, as before, be eligible for the grant of a combatant-commission for specially meritorious service or distinguished war service. Then we have just established a new rank for the engineer branch, which was particularly referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for Blackfriars. We shall select these men for promotion from the artificer-engineers, the chief E.R.A.'s and the E.R.A.'s. The number is at present limited to fifty, and spread over five years from the present time.
Those chosen will be given the rank of acting mates E., and will proceed to the Royal Naval College for six months, followed by six months at the Royal Naval Engineering College, Devonport. Their pay will be eight shillings a day, and two shillings messing allowance. Examinations will follow, and acting-mates E., who pass successfully, will he confirmed, receive a gratuity of £50 for uniform outfit, and go to sea. The time served as mate E., in which position the relative rank will be that of sub-lieutenant, will depend on the results of the examinations, but the minimum period of service as acting-mate E. and mate E. before promotion to engineer-lieutenant will be two years. On promotion to engineer-lieutenant there will also be a gratuity of £50 for uniform. My hon. Friend the Member for Blackfriars said that we had made the maximum age thirty-two, and that we ought to have made it thirty-five. I cannot give my hon. Friend an undertaking about that, but it shall be represented to the Board. Then my hon. Friend said that we ought not to require that it should be necessary that a boy should have gone to a secondary school.
May I point out that I only desired that young officers who come front civil life should be on the same terms as others in the Navy, and therefore I suggested that thirty-two would apply all round.
My hon. Friend suggests that we ought not to insist that the boy artificer shall have gone to a secondary school, and he would appear to suggest that there is an endeavour to set up a sort of class distinction by using the words "secondary school." The boy has to go one year either to a secondary school or a higher elementary school, and there is nothing in the class and character of the higher elementary school to which objection can be raised, and it is necessary that the boy should have one year at such a school.
A night school.
I am not quite sure about that. The only reason we have is to get that twelve months' education beyond the standards of the elementary schools; otherwise we do not think the boys would be sufficiently equipped to take this up. These promotions to commissioned ranks represent recent changes of policy. I very much doubt whether my hon. Friend is aware of it, but I am entitled to point out that for a long time past, in certain cases, such promotion has been open to certain ratings. Warrant officers have, of course, for fifty years and more been eligible for promotion to lieutenant for special acts of gallantry and daring. There is one so promoted now on the active list. Since 1903 warrant officers have been eligible up to a maximum of a hundred for the various branches of the Service affected—that is to say, executive, signal, telegraphists, carpenter, and engineer—for similar promotion to the rank of lieutenant for long and zealous services. There are now ninety-three warrant officers so promoted for long and zealous service on the active list. It has been my great pleasure to meet several of those officers from time to time, and I desire to say that they represent a fine, faithful type, and if ever lifelong devotion to duty, cheerful and consistent subjection to discipline, and deep attachment to the Service merited promotion, that promotion has been fully earned in the case of those gentlemen. There is another form of promotion with which I think my hon. Friends are not familiar, and that is promotion from warrant rank to commissioned warrant rank. That promotion has been introduced from time to time in recent years in various branches of the Service. In 1912 promotion from warrant rank to commissioned warrant rank, where such existed, was made general—subject, of course, to good service—after fifteen years' service in the warrant rank. Let me compare the figures of the commissioned warrant officers ten years ago and now. Then there were sixty-three chief gunners, and there are now 189; and then there were thirty-five chief boatswains and chief signal boatswains, and there are now 121; and then there were twenty-two chief carpenters, and now there are sixty-seven; and then there were thirty-six chief artificer-engineers, and now there are 143. There are also four chief schoolmasters, making a grand total of 524 commissioned warrants as opposed to 156 ten years ago. That commissioned warrant rank may be described as something between the warrant officer and the commissioned officer.
Can they go higher than that?
They are eligible for the rank, or relative rank, of lieutenant on retiring, but that is not promotion of the kind which the hon. Member has in mind. I have fully described what we have already done in the direction desired by my hon. Friend. I do not suppose for a moment that this represents the last word upon this topic. I hope my hon. Friends will be satisfied with the excellent ventilation they have given to this very interesting subject, and I trust I may appeal to the Mover to ask leave to withdraw his Amendment, so that we may proceed with the Motion that you, Mr. Speaker, do now leave the Chair.
Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question," put, and agreed to.
Main Question proposed. Debate resumed.
I do not propose to follow the First Lord of the Admiralty and the speakers who have taken part in the Debate on the other side at any very great length into the details and intricacies of the speeches they have made. I might be prepared to admit, if one were to grant the principles on which these Estimates are based, that there might be very little ground for criticism or for attack except in matters of minor detail. I rise for the purpose of challenging those principles on which the Estimates are based and challenging the present naval policy of the Government. The First Lord of the Admiralty, as a Member of a Liberal Government, has presented to the House of Commons Navy Estimates asking for a Vote of more than £51,000,000. I cannot enter into the feelings and the views of Radical Members who sit on this side, but I cannot imagine that they listened with any great measure of satisfaction to the speech of the First Lord yesterday in spite of those distinguishing qualities which have been described as lucidity and rhetoric. If they have any regard for the future of the party with which they are associated, I think they must regard with a considerable amount of dismay these Naval Estimates piling up by millions year by year, and perhaps at times they may be inclined to put to themselves the question whether the acquisition by the Liberal party of the First Lord of the Admiralty has been a valuable asset to that party. My view is that the First Lord of the Admiralty in the position which he occupies at present is a danger to the safety of the country and a menace to the peace of the world. I said that I do not intend to deal with his speech in any very great detail, but there are one or two outstanding features in that speech to which I do want to make some reference. The First Lord of the Admiralty said that in the programme of ship construction which he has now submitted to the House he was adhering to the standard laid down two years ago. I doubt if there be in this House any two Members who would give the same interpretation of the standard to which our naval policy is supposed to conform at the present time.
The First Lord in his speech yesterday gave us not one standard, but a large number of standards. It is quite true that in 1912 he departed from what had hitherto been regarded as the standard — namely, the two-Power standard—and he substituted for it a standard which he described as sixteen to ten against the next strongest naval Power. No sooner had he laid down that standard than he began to break it. At the time he laid that down nothing had been said about the intention of Canada to build three ships. No sooner had the First Lord announced that standard to the House than he appears to have gone round the Empire touting to the Dependencies and the Colonies to build ships and to present them to the Imperial Navy. We had the offer of Canada to add three ships, and there was no declaration from the First Lord in connection with those ships that they were to be taken into account in calculating the standard of sixteen to ten. Then when the Canadian offer was withdrawn, he made that an excuse for departing from the standard which a few months before he had laid down. The hon. Gentleman opposite says we are not building up to it now. With the 1912 revision of the German Navy Law of 1907, the First Lord has adopted a new programme of two to one for additional German ships. That gives us this result, that in 1917 Germany would have fourteen, and Great Britain twenty-five. The hon. Gentleman opposite says we are not building up to the sixteen to ten standard. What would that give us in 1917? As a matter of fact there is set up a new and a higher standard. On the sixteen to ten standard our figure would be not twenty-five but just under twenty-three, and taking that figure of twenty-three we are building two ships in excess of the sixteen to ten standard.
Will the hon. Gentleman allow me—
No. The hon. Member appealed to the First Lord yesterday to be permitted to make his statement in his own way. There was no reason at all in my opinion upon those figures to build a fifth ship last year, and if the programme of this year is reduced from four to two we shall still be within the sixteen to ten standard. I do not want to go into the point, which other Members are better qualified than I am to raise, as to our superiority in ships and equipment below the "Dreadnought" class, but it is not only there we have superiority over the next strongest European Power, but also in the character and capacity of our "Dreadnoughts." The broadside fire of our "Dreadnoughts," and I can give the figures if necessary, is very considerably higher than the broadside fire of the Germans. Therefore, taking all those facts into consideration, I submit that the declaration set out in the challenge that the First Lord has departed from the standard that he laid down two years ago is completely substantiated. But yesterday we had, as I have said, a new policy and a new standard put before us. The Canadian ships and ships which may be provided by other Colonies are not to be counted in calculating the 16 to 10 standard. If there was one feature of the speech of the First Lord yesterday which I think was more regrettable than another, it was the provocative and patronising tone in which he referred to Canada, and, in a lesser degree, to other Colonies. The First Lord of the Admiralty has visions of Imperial responsibilities, and of an Imperial Navy to meet them. He looks forward to a time when every Colony will have a naval base and dockyards for the building and equipment of vessels of the Imperial Fleet. In his vision the First Lord of the Admiralty sees a British "Dreadnought" on every wave of the four oceans, and aeroplanes are as thick as locusts were in Egypt. That, in all seriousness, is the policy submitted to this House yesterday. In addition to that, we are to have an enormous increase in the Mediterranean Squadron. As I understand it, the number of "Dreadnoughts," apart from vessels of a smaller capacity, in the Mediterranean is to be increased from three to eight. Why should this be necessary? What is the menace in the Mediterranean? Against whom are we to increase our squadron there? It will be said, of course, against Italy, against Austria, against a combination of the two. We have an understanding with France. Is that to be of no advantage to us? I take it, from the speech of the Noble Lord (Lord C. Beresford) this afternoon, that our alliance with France involves that we should do all the paying and bear all the sacrifice, while they should reap all the advantage. [An HON. MEMBER "No."] Yes. What did the Noble Lord say? He referred to the condition of our Regular Army, and to the shortage of numbers in the Territorial Force. What was to be the price that we, according to the Noble Lord, were to pay for this understanding with France? That we were to send art Expeditionary Force to the Continent to the assistance of France, if it were necessary.
What I said was this: I asked whether we are going to hand over to France the whole of our responsibilities in the Mediterranean. If we are, what are we going to give France in return?
I do not think I misrepresented the Noble Lord. After the statement of the First Lord yesterday, there was no need for the Noble Lord to put the question whether we are going to hand over to France the whole of our responsibilities in the Mediterranean, as the First Lord told us that the number of "Dreadnoughts" is to be considerably increased, in addition to there being a very large increase in ships of other classes. Therefore, this is the point of the Noble Lord. I think it is a great assumption, certainly one that would not be endorsed by members of the party with which I am associated, nor, I think I may say, by a large number of Members on this side of the House, that we are under any obligation to send an Expeditionary Force to the assistance of France in any circumstances. If that be part of the under standing with France, I think the conditions of the understanding will need to be revised. Now we are to have this Imperial Fleet, and we are to have a very large addition to the Mediterranean Fleet —an addition, mark you, the end of which no man can see. If we are to put all these vessels on the blue waters of the Mediterranean, how will Italy and Austria regard that action? We know that the result will be an increase in their shipbuilding, and, according to the statement of policy made by the First Lord yesterday, a further increase in our strength in the Mediterranean. Where is the process going to stop? An increase in our Fleet in the North Sea, an Imperial Fleet, a Mediterranean Fleet. If the House of Commons is going to endorse this policy, it is not a £51,000,000 Navy Budget that they will be discussing in half a dozen years, but a £100,000,000 Budget.
It is the theory of the House of Commons, in regard to naval matters, that we do not vote continuous programmes: we vote the money only for the yearly programme. But the First Lord of the Admiralty, in his speech yesterday, assumed over and over again that the House of Commons was committed to a policy which was going to run for a considerable number of years. We protest altogether against that. I warn Members of the House who disapprove of this new policy that in supporting this Vote they are, according to-the First Lord of the Admiralty, endorsing the extensive departure that he foreshadowed yesterday. I submit that it is folly in the present circumstances of naval architecture, shall I say, or equipment, to build as we are doing. In my support in this connection I may quote the First Lord himself. Only last week, in answer to a question, he stated that in the last few years ships which had cost £26,000,000 had been scrapped. The authority I wish to quote is the statement of the First. Lord himself two years ago: — the development of submarines is likely to revolutionise the methods of naval warfare. In one of the weekly reviews a week or two ago there appeared a remarkable article upon this point, from which I would like to read two or three sentences. The apparently very well-informed writer said:—
The first year for which the present Government were responsible for the Estimates—1906–7—the naval expenditure stood at, roughly, £31,000,000. The House is now asked to vote £51,000,000. I want to put this question to Radical Members. If the statement had been made ten years ago that nine years of Liberal government would add £20,000,000 to naval expenditure, is there a Radical Member or a Radical in the country who would not have said that the man who made such a statement was mad? I can well remember the time when a Tory Chancellor of the Exchequer resigned office rather than be responsible for providing £13,000,000 per year for naval expenditure. We now have the son of that Tory Minister, practically without apologising to the House—nay, glorying in the magnitude of the Estimates—proposing, in the name of a Liberal Government, an expenditure of more than £51,000,000. During ten years of office Tory recklessness only raised the naval expenditure by £14,000,000. I do not know what they might do if the turn of the tide should bring them to power once more, but judging from the speech of the hon. Member for Fareham yesterday, and the speech of the Noble Lord and gallant Admiral this afternoon, it would not be a budget of £50,000,000 or £70,000,000, but one of £100,000,000 or more. I wish when responsible Members opposite speak on this question they would be a little more definite. For instance, I wish they would tell us what size of Fleet in the North Sea would satisfy them. I wish they would say what size of Fleet in the Mediterranean would enable them to sleep comfortably at night. I wish they would tell us what size of Fleet they think necessary adequately to protect our great Imperial obligations? They leave us in the dark in these matters, and we can only conjecture. My conjecture is that in that day when the hon. Member for Fareham combines in himself —as he is quite capable of doing—the joint office of First Lord of the Admiralty and Secretary of State for War we shall see a Budget for naval and military expenditure larger than the sum total of the Budget that the Chancellor of the Exchequer will be submitting to this House in the course of a few weeks.
I remember Sir William Harcourt's great Budget of about twenty years ago. We looked to the additional revenue that was to accrue from that Budget as a means of financing long-delayed schemes of social reform. What happened? Not a penny of public advantage has come from the new taxes that were then levied. Four years ago we were fighting in defence of the Budget proposed by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer. Why? We were fighting for this new taxation, not that it might be spent upon "Dreadnoughts"; not that it might go as increased profit into the pockets of armament firms. We supported the Budget because we believer" that the additional revenue was going to be devoted to deal with problems of old age, poverty, unemployment, the education question, better housing, and the like. To sum up the whole question, the increase in naval expenditure has absorbed practically all the additional revenue which has come from the taxation imposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer some years ago. What about the First Lord of the Admiralty Two years ago he assumed that the Budget had been devised and a General Election had been fought upon it; that a constitutional crisis had arisen, solely that additional money might be provided for him to spend in extending the Navy. What did the right hon. Gentleman say?— enabled you to attempt something in the way of better housing, better education, and so on, for our people. As a matter of fact, we are the most heavily taxed nation for war purposes in Europe. The only comparative figures I have been able to obtain are for 1912. In that year the expenditure upon the Army and Navy in the United Kingdom worked out at just under 32s. per head. The next highest country is France, with 24s. 7d.; then conies Germany, with 17s. 8d. But even the £51,000,000 odd which we are asked to spend upon the Navy during the coming year is not the only cost of the Navy. By the expenditure of this money you are withdrawing labour from remunerative and far more productive employment. To that extent there is a loss in the real wealth of the nation. The First Lord of the Admiralty talked yesterday, when he was dealing with the labour problem, as though it was a good thing for the community to spend money in the employment of labour for battleships. From the economic point of view, and I would add, from the point of view of social economy, it would be just as wise, well, and profitable for the community to spend the same amount of money to employ the same labour to make fireworks and let them off.
7.0 P.M.
What are the obstacles in the way of a substantial reduction of this expenditure? Why is it mounting up? The Governments—not only our own Government, but the Governments of all the European nations—profess to deplore it. The only speech I have heard upon the question by a responsible Minister in recent years who did not deplore it and who did not make an appeal for a better understanding between the nations of Europe was the First Lord of the Admiralty yesterday. The only thing in which he appeared to glory was that even the smaller nations of Europe were now getting a mania for a fleet and were trying to emulate the example set them by the great nations of Europe. What, in spite of these conditions, is the obstacle in the way of a better understanding? Lord Welby, who has held the highest and most responsible position as a permanent Civil servant in this country, who was at the head of the Treasury, who is a man of world-wide reputation in matters of financial knowledge, and a man of sterling probity, was speaking on this question a few weeks ago, and he said:— armament firms. Sir Charles MacLaren, at the annual meeting of John Brown and Co., of which he is chairman, said:— time will not be very soon forgotten. A cry went up: "We want eight, and we won't wait"; and they did not wait, and then the contingent ships were laid down, and they got the work. These are the very men who had been using this means to induce the public to spend money.
I find from the Navy League Annual, that before this scare the amount of private contract for new construction was £7,000,000. The year 1910–11 was the first year of the new programme, and in that year private contracts went up by £4,500,000, but there was no more work given to the Government dockyards, it all went to private contractors of the armament ring who forced the Government into this expenditure. I remember my hon. Friend the Member for Woolwich (Mr. Crooks) pleading with the then First Lord of the Admiralty for sonic work for Woolwich. Hon. Members smile at that, but there you have the painful illustration of how this system incidentally makes a man do a thing which he and his party utterly abhored. But the First Lord would give no part of the additional -work to Woolwich. It all went to increase the profits and the dividends of these private firms. What do I find on examination of the balance sheets of the firms which constitute the armament ring. I find in the year before the scare Messrs. Vickers' profits amounting to £424,000. Two years after that they were nearly double that amount. Every year since the success of their intrigue their profits have gone up—£474,000, £544,000, £745,000, £872,000. The precise figures of their profits for the last twelve months are not yet obtainable, but they show another addition, so that their profits are increased by £500,000 a year as a result of the success of the scare they engineered four years ago. Now what are the other component parts of this ring? Let us take Armstrong. That is the other firm in this ring of which the First Lord of the Admiralty spoke very affectionately some time ago. He said that the relations of the Admiralty with Vickers and another large firm in the trade are far more cordial than the ordinary relations of business. That might be one reason why the representative of these firms was received in audience at a Cabinet Council. In the year of the scare Armstrong's profits amounted to £429,000. They went on mounting up until last year, 1912, they had risen to £777,000 with an increase in dividend. Another firm, Messrs. Beardmore, shows on examination of their profits exactly the same thing. In 1909 their profits were £72,000; in 1911 they were three times that sum—£201,000.
I have spoken of the armament ring. What is that ring? It is a combination of four, or five—strictly speaking—of the principal firms engaged in this trade. Patriotism is not one of the distinguishing features of the trade methods of this great combine. For instance, I find Messrs. Vickers have works at Barrow, Sheffield, Birmingham, but they do not confine themselves to this country. They have a yard in Placentia de las Arenas, in Spain; they have another place in Spezia, in Italy. They are evidently taking time by the forelock. They anticipate the promise of a Mediterranean Squadron. It is no wonder that I find the shares of Vickers, Armstrong and Co., Cammell, Laird and Co., went up on the Stock Exchange after the report of the First Lord's speech. They have also an interest in the Whitehead Torpedo Factory in Fiume, in Austria-Hungary, and it is against Austria we are asked to lay down this Fleet in the Mediterranean. And, again, as' the newspapers have reminded us so much in the last week or two, they have a place on the Volga, in Russia; indeed, they have two. They have also a shipyard in South America, and in anticipation of the development of the Canadian Navy, they have laid down works in Montreal. Another component part of the trust was there before them, and John Brown and Co. have what is going to be the largest shipyard in the world in New Brunswick.
I said patriotism is not a distinguishing characteristic of the methods of these firms. As a matter of fact, these firms are not English. Their management is international and their shareholders are international. For instance, I find on examination of the share lists of Messrs. Vickers that they have shareholders living in Italy, Japan, Russia, Brazil, Canada, Australia, China, Spain, and Chili; and, after all, I think we are entitled to say that these men are true internationals. Now I ask again what is this armament ring? It comprises Vickers-Armstrong, John Brown, Cammell-Laird—the Coventry Ordnance Works in a subsidiary firm. Vickers, for instance, not only own works directly, but they are large controllers of the Wolseley Tool and Motor Company and the Electric and Ordnance Accessories Company. Messrs. Vickers not only own the business with which their name is associated, but they own a quarter of the shares of Whitehead and Co.'s torpedo manufacture; and Whitehead and Co. torpedo manufacturers also have a large factory in Austria building torpedoes to destroy the ships that Vickers are building now. So the shareholders of the armament ring can look forward with equanimity to whatever happens. It is no matter to them whether it is an Austrian ship or a German ship, or a British ship that sinks, they can throw up their hats and shout, "More ships, more profits, higher dividends." John Brown and Co. have a great works at Sheffield with which their name is associated, they have a great shipping yard on the Clyde bank, and they have over seven-eighths of the shares of Thomas Firth and Sons, Limited, and half the shares in the Coventry Ordnance Works.
But I may add that after the Mulliner incident this company changed their managing director. After the exposure of the means by which he succeeded in engineering the naval scare of 1909 the Government came to the conclusion he was not the man who ought to be retained as managing director of the firm with which the Government had contracts, therefore Mr. Mulliner was discharged, and there was appointed in his place an Admiral of the Fleet, with a salary of £7,000 a year and seven years' engagement. John Brown are also associated with Beardmore; they interchanged two directors with Palmer's Shipbuilding Company and Projectile Company, and they have one director, in common with Hadfield Foundry, Limited, and with Cammell-Laird and Co., so that when you touch one of the firms of this ring you touch the others. You do not know, to use the words of the coster song, "Which is which, and which is the other." I come now to the shareholders. I find the trustee for the debenture holders in Vickers is Lord Sandhurst, who, at the present time, occupies the position of Lord Chamberlain. I find that the Member for the Hallam Division of Sheffield (the Rt. Hon. Stuart-Wortley), who rose so promptly in the Debate the other day—when the First Lord of the Admiralty had suggested the possibility of getting armour plate from abroad—in order to point out that there were great firms in this country who had been encouraged by the expectation of Government work to lay down expensive plant. He practically said it would be a breach of faith on the part of the Govern- ment to take away from these people the expectations they had been given. The right hon. Gentleman is a debenture trustee for Vickers, and he is also debenture trustee for Cammell, Laird and Co.
Now who are the shareholders? It would be too long for me to give more than a very short selection from the list, but I find that hon. Members in this House are very largely concerned; indeed, it would be impossible to throw a stone on the Benches opposite without hitting a Member who is a shareholder in one or other of these firms. [MINISTERIAL cheers.] I am sorry for the sudden hilarity of my hon. Friends, for the shareholders in these armament firms are not confined to Unionist Members. I find that the bishops are very well represented. Among the shareholders in Armstrong's I find the name of an hon. Member opposite as the holder of 5,000 shares. The Member for Armagh (Sir J. Lonsdale), who asked seven questions in five weeks in 1909—the scare year—as to when orders for gun-mountings would be placed. The hon. Member. for Osgoldcross Division of Yorkshire (Sir J. C. Rickett)—I congratulate him on his election last week as hon. President of the Free Church Council—is the great Imperialist. I have often seen his portrait in the Jingo Press as that of a man who placed patriotism and Empire before all considerations of sordid selfishness. I find that he is the holder of 3,200 shares in John Brown's, and2,100shares in CammellLaird's. Another of the Members for Sheffield figures in practically every list, as he figures in every debate of this House when there is a possibility of more money being spent on arms and ships. I refer to the Member for the Eccleshall Division (Mr. S. Roberts). He is a shareholder in John Brown's, a director of Cammell-Laird's, also debenture trustee of the Fairfield Company, and a shareholder in the Coventry Ordnance Works.
It would hardly be fair to ignore the Liberals altogether. I find that a director of Palmer's is Lord Aberconway, and that a Liberal Member of this House is one of his co-directors, the Member for the Bosworth Division of Leicester (Mr. H. D. McLaren). I spoke of the "internationalism" of this, and I find the shareholders in Cammell-Laird include a considerable number of names with which I am not familiar. Another shareholder in Cammell-Laird is the representative of the Northern Division of Manchester (Sir C. E. Swann). I want to say one or two words about the Harvey Trust, which was formed a few years ago, and which represented, I think, the most up to date and complete form of capitalist. organisation the world has ever seen. Its internationalism was complete. It was formed for the purpose of working certain rights in the manufacture of armour plate, and it combined together the interests in Britain of Vickers, Armstrong's, Beardmore's, John Brown's, Fairfield, Cammell-Laird, the Projectile Company, Palmers, and Hadfields-Coventry, of half a dozen of the leading firms in the United States, of firms in France, Italy, and Germany (Krupps). The directors were representatives of Beardmore's, John Brown's, Armstrong's, Vickers, Cammell-Laird's, the French Steel Company, Schneider's, and others.
I find in the list of shareholders here the name of the present Colonial Secretary, and the name of the present Postmaster General also figures as a shareholder in one of the component firms, Armstrongs. I said something about the cosmopolitan character of the shareholders' list. Of course, in such a combination as the Harvey Steel Trust, it is only to be expected that. a large number of foreign names would appear. I referred a moment or two back to the case of the Admiral of the Fleet, who had been appointed managing director of one of these undertakings. That is not the only instance in which men have been taken from the service of the Crown and placed directly in influential positions under this armament ring. There is, of course, a reason for it. I will not give it in my own words, but in those of a representative trade organ. There is a paper called "Arms and Explosives," devoted to the interests of the armament trade, and in September last this paper wrote—and I ask the special attention of the House to the quotation—because it puts the matter far more clearly than I could do:— on 10 per cent., putting an equal amount to the reserve fund, is most affecting. Sir Andrew Noble, of the Royal Artillery, joined Armstrong's in its early days. He is now chairman. There are other cases. I come to what I think will be admitted as the most serious of these transfers, the case of Sir George Murray, who succeeded Lord Welby as Permanent Secretary of the Treasury, a position of great responsibility. Nothing can be more disastrous for the financial reputation of this country than that there should be a suspicion—I do not put it any higher—of the strict probity of men who are in the position of permanent head of this great Department. One cannot avoid suspicion being expressed in some quarters when a highly-placed public servant takes his pension and immediately after takes his seat upon a board having the closest business relation with the Government. Why did he go to the board of Armstrong's'? He is not an engineering expert; he is not a naval expert. I add, in the words of "Arms and Explosives," "He knows the ropes. He keeps in touch with his old comrades. He can smooth away any inconveniences." I will not, as this paper does, characterise it as corruption.
Then we have she case of Rear-Admiral Ottley, Naval Attaché to Russia, Japan, France, United States, and Italy—so that he will "know the ropes" on both sides. He was Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and he went from a position like this, a responsible adviser of the Government on these important matters, to be the director of a firm winch is making huge profits out of Government contracts. This was the man of whom "Excubitor" said, when he was writing his articles on the Navy, that he "acquired, as Attaché, an intimate insight into the naval methods of foreign Powers. From all sources, home and foreign, facts, figures, deductions, and suggestions are continually passing into the Naval Intelligence Department at Whitehall." Now we are arming against Italy, and this man, ex-secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, director of Armstrong, Whitworth and Co., is also a director of Armstrong's Italian firm, Armstrong-Pozzuoli, on the Italian coast. How can it be possible that naval secrets can be retained? Armstrong, Whitworth and Co., of Newcastle and of Italy, are in possession of the most confidential facts in relation to the doings of both the Italian Government and the British Government, and it would require a great amount of business probity to prevent them disclosing the facts from the one branch of the firm to the other.
Now turn to Vickers. Lord Sandhurst, who is the debenture trustee, was Under-Secretary for War in 1886 and from 1892 to 1895 in a Liberal Government. Then we come to a very interesting personality, Sir Lieutenant Trevor Dawson. He is managing-director of Vickers, lately acting as their superintendent of ordnance, and he is, of course, specially connected with their works at Spezia, Italy. These men must have had the gift of prophecy and foresight. They must have known years ago that statements such as the one made by the First Lord would be made in this House. He is a director also of a steel foundry in Japan, so that, whether Japan be an ally of this country or not, they are going to be all right. He is also on the board of William Beardmore and Co. Yet the Navy talk about tendering for contracts! How can you get a tender from Vickers? You are getting it from Armstrong, Whitworth and Co., and from William Beardmore and Co. The whole thing is a farce. I need not go through the list. There are dozens of them. There is not, as a matter of fact, a single large firm doing contract work for the Government which has not either upon its hoard or in its service a man who has been in the service of the Government and who knows the ropes, and who, in the words of that extract front "Arms and Explosives," is likely to be able to gain that various information which will be useful. I may just say a word about Hadfield's Steel Foundry. They have a very distinguished major-general upon their staff, Major-General Brackenbury. He was Director of Military Intelligence 1886–91, and he was a member of the Council of the Viceroy of India. He was President of the Ordnance Committee, 1896–9, at the War Office; Director of Ordnance, 1899–1904; and is a Vice-President of the National Service League.
Yesterday the Nobel Trust decided to call in some hundreds of thousands worth of unsubscribed capital. Vickers, too, have announced that they are going to increase their share capital by £1,000,000. Why? The First Lord told us yesterday that their general trade had declined, and that they expected to be able to accelerate Government work on account of the greater scarcity of other kinds of work. Why, at a time like this, when, judging by the evi- dence, one would think that we ere near the beginning of a period of trade depression, should these companies increase their capital by millions? They are just beginning now preparations for another scare which will mature in two or three years' time, and, if I have the opportunity of speaking in this place two or three years hence, I shall be able to repeat the facts and the instances associated with the previous scare down to the minutest detail. Now, I said that the late First Lord stated that the relations between the Government and this armament ring were more cordial than the ordinary relations of business. They are, indeed, and the Government have, during the last few years, brought forward evidence that they do appreciate the patriotic services these firms render to the Departments. One of the first acts of this Liberal Government was to ennoble Mr. Pirrie, of Harland and Wolff, and he is a Debenture trustee of the Coventry Ordnance and John Brown and Company. You cannot touch one without touching the other.
The ordinary man would never suspect that the great shipbuilding firm of Harland and Wolff had very much interest in armaments. All the ordinary man knows about Harland and Wolff is that it has built some of the great Atlantic liners. He was made a peer. Mr. Hadfield, the chairman of a very successful company which for a great many years has never paid less than 20 per cent., was knighted in 1908. Lieut. Trevor Dawson, of Vickers, and of other firms in the ring, was made a knight in 1909. I may pass over the baronetcy which was given to the late Lord Furness, afterwards followed by a peerage. Sir Charles MacLaren, chairman of one of the ring, was, as we know, ennobled. There are others. There is the case of Lord Glenconner, who combines the positions of chairman of the Tharsis Sulphur and Copper Company and an influential shareholder in Nobels, with that of the High Commissioner of the Kirk of Scotland. I want to speak now with particular referrence to Italy and Austria, because it is against Italy and Austria that we are asked to equip the Mediterranean Fleet. I have already referred to the fact that Vickers have works in association with the Vickers-Terni Company in Italy. They are also interested in Whitehead's Torpedo Works at Fiume, in Hungary. The Vickers-Terni seem to be to Italy what Vickers is to Great Britain. The "Engineer" newspaper says they are not to be considered as a private company, but as a national institution working for national aims. The "Navy League Annual" for 1911 had this very illuminating paragraph: 1907, and it appears that there had been complaints that he had not been getting sufficient orders from the Admiralty and from the War Office for Sheffield, and he was being compared with his predecessor to his own disadvantage in this respect. This is what he said in a public speech in his constituency:—
We have been told by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that this is the most favourable moment in the last twenty years for doing this. When we opened our newspapers last New Year's morning and read his New Year's message to the nation, some of us hoped, and were for a moment inclined to believe, that the present Chan- cellor of the Exchequer was at last going to have the courage of the late Lord Randolph Churchill. But we have been disappointed. What did he say?— themselves. The workers of the world have no animosities; they have no jealousies; they have no diverse interests. All they want is freedom to work and the right to enjoy the fruits of their labour. I say again we echo, in the same sentiments as our comrades in the French Parliament and the German Reichstag, our determination to do what we can to change national opinion and national ideas upon this question, and I do not despair of our doing so. The dawn conies slow—how slow!—but it does come, and I believe that out of the chaos and strife that now prevail there are rising brighter and better times, when nation will no more lift up its hand against nation, and when all the people of the earth will realise that of all the great, priceless blessings of humanity. the greatest of all is peace.
The hon. Gentleman who has just sat down has devoted a considerable portion of a very long speech to a bitter personal attack on many individuals—an attack concentrated on armament firms, and Vickers and Co. were specially singled out for attack. Vickers and Co.'s works are in Barrow, and the hon. Gentleman the Member for Barrow-in-Furness, when the Supplementary Estimates were before this House last week, voted with alacrity for those Estimates. I think the hon. Member for Blackburn might try to teach what is his view of his duty to his colleague who sits beside him on those benches before he lectures the House. The first and the last part of his speech was a kind of Utopian dream when war should be no more, and when no more preparation for war is necessary. I pause to wonder, if the hon. Gentleman had had his way, what nation would now be making Utopia of this country of ours. I cannot follow the hon. Gentleman in any details of his speech, firstly, because there is no time, and, secondly, because we must leave the Coalition to settle their own differences, and especially that interesting speculation raised by the hon. Gentleman as to what was the precise attitude of the First Lord of the Admiralty to the Liberal Party. The hon. Member for Blackburn wasted a considerable amount of fury on the Estimates that we have before us because they total £51,000,000. The First Lord of the Admiralty spent a long time yesterday in explaining to this House that over the great amount of those Estimates we had already lost control, as we had voted for them. He told us that they were purely mechanical and automatic. What I want to point out to the House is this: The Estimates are big, but the programme that we are asked to discuss, the programme which is to safeguard the interests of the Navy and of this country, is a very small one. On Votes 8 and 9 there is actually a reduction from last year of £4,000,000. What is the actual programme we are asked to discuss to-day? Four battleships, four small cruisers, and twelve destroyers. I assert that that is a miserably inadequate programme.
On what basis has the First Lord brought forward that programme? Is it on the basis of what the Board of Admiralty and the right hon. Gentleman consider necessary for the safety of this country? Is it the minimum which will allow the right hon. Gentleman to remain at the head of affairs at the Admiralty? Or is it the maximum that the Chancellor of the Exchequer will allow the right hon. Gentleman to have for this year? It is apparent that what always occurs when the Government opposite present Estimates to this House has occurred here: the Estimates which they present are not brought forward with a single eye to the supremacy of this country, but they mean there has been a compromise. There has always been a compromise on these Estimates, a compromise in which the Navy is bound to suffer. This year the Little Navy Party or, as I understand they prefer to be called, the Reduction of Armaments Group—[An HON. MEMBER: "The Suicide Club."]—got a responsible Gentleman to lead them in the person of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the world had the instructive sight of two high Ministers of the Crown engaged in open controversy over the needs of the Navy. It must have brought joy to the heart of competing nations as it showed vital dissensions in the Cabinet itself. The country I hope will now realise that the Navy, which is the foundation of that mighty structure called the British Empire, is by these Estimates being tampered with, and is being frittered away. And why? In order to avoid an open break which would prevent a united Cabinet pressing forward in their congenial task of destruction.
8.0 P.M.
I do not want to say much about the big ships. I think they have had their due share in these discussions. But I do want to say a word or two about standards, and I approach this subject from the point of view of the ordinary taxpayer who has to supply the money. I think he should have some way of reckoning for himself whether this money is being wisely spent. He should know the manner in which it is being spent. But today he has no such means, and that is proved by every Debate in this House. Long arguments are brought forward, varying in amount and in size, as to what standard is being used, and to-day the means of calculation for the ordinary uninformed man in this country are practically non-existent. The right hon. Gentleman keeps on changing his standard. In March, 1912, we had a 60 per cent, standard. He found he could not maintain it. In July, 1912, he lumps together all the "pre-Dreadnoughts" and the "Dreadnoughts," but he found, making the necessary deductions for a selected moment as against the average moment, that even then he could not maintain his standard. In March of last year he again altered his standard, and adopted a minute sub-division of "pre-Dreadnoughts," "Dreadnoughts" and "super-Dreadnoughts," designed to baffle the most assiduous student of naval affairs. The right hon. Gentleman has introduced these varying standards for two reasons: first, they were designed to mystify the ordinary individual and so create that apathy upon which the right hon. Gentleman to-day depends so much; and, secondly, because he has absolutely failed to preserve what he himself said was necessary for the safety of this country. This was brought out last year, when the right hon. Gentleman went to the extreme length of adding five ships that ought not to have been added, and which were not added previously, in order to prove that he had the 60 per cent. We can compare these Navy Estimates to the yearly balance-sheet of the National Insurance of this Government. The right hon. Gentleman has put assets into this balance-sheet which do not exist. If he had done that in any business outside this House, he would have come within the cachets of the law in respect of a fraudulent balance-sheet.
I now turn to the question of oil, which is the most serious problem he has to face at the present moment. I do not think that the country, and I am not sure the some hon. Members here realise the momentous innovation of the building of the "Queen Elizabeth" class. A lot of people in the country do not realise that she burns oil only, and that unless we have that oil, then the "Queen Elizabeth" class is so much scrap iron in her use as a naval unit. Yesterday the right hon. Gentleman delivered a panygeric in favour of oil. Of course, judging between coal and oil, if there were nothing else to consider, there is no question as to the superiority of oil. Everybody knows that. But there are other and very important considerations. While the efficiency of oil, as compared with coal, is five to three, the price is four to one. Secondly, there is the very grave danger of relying on sea-borne fuel for an Island Fleet. I say that the right hon. Gentleman had no right whatever to set the pace in the building of ships which burn oil only. There was no need for it. No other country has them except America, which has the oil at her doors. In doing this the right hon. Gentleman is rendering obsolescent one of our greatest assets, namely, the enormous advantage that we have in the large amount of Welsh coal in this country. If oil is so good, why go back? One of the reasons the right hon. Gentleman adduced last year would not deceive a naval kindergarten. The truth is that the right hon. Gentleman precipitated the nation into this without due thought and without looking forward. I believe the folly of it has been realised today. The proof of that is that we are practically building no more, or only one more big ship to burn oil only.
The most important and most serious part of the oil problem is the question of reserve. The right hon. Gentleman said that we have three years' peace requirements. That is, in a way, a very misleading statement, because three years' peace requirements depend on how much oil you are burning. If evaporation is the only thing to be taken into consideration, then we have oil for a very large number of years in time of peace. But at the present moment the right hon. Gentleman knows as well as I do that there is hardly any oil being burned in the British Fleet, and that the destroyers are remaining in their harbours and not going out to do the proper work they ought to do in order to keep efficient for work in war time. I want to ask the right hon. Gentleman a question as to the war supply. The right hon. Gentleman used language which led the country to believe, as I have seen from most newspapers, that we had in this country one year's war supply of oil. I do not know whether he meant to convey that im- pression. He has shown a great deal of reticence on this subject. One can appreciate reticence when it is designed to hide from other countries something we are doing, but it is a very different matter when it is designed, as I believe it is designed, to hide from this country something we are not doing. It is not difficult to obtain a rough estimate of the oil reserves the right hon. Gentleman has got. It is comparatively simple to calculate how much oil the Fleet would require in time of war, while, on the other hand, there are many people in this country who think they can estimate with considerable accuracy how much oil the right hon. Gentleman has got in the country. If the combination of these two calculations is accurate, or anything like accurate, it discloses a most alarming and disquieting state of affairs. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman would like to remove these fears. I will give him a chance to contradict these fears that a great many people do entertain by giving him the result of my rough calculations. My estimate is that for one year's war supply the Fleet would require anything from one and a quarter to two million tons of oil—say, from one and a half to two million tons. It is suggested, by people who might know, that the right hon. Gentleman has not got half a million tons of oil in this country, which would give an allowance on the best complexion we can put on the matter, of only four months' oil reserves in this country. I should welcome this opportunity if the right hon. Gentleman can assure me that I am entirely wrong in these calculations. Can he say now, on behalf of himself and on behalf of the Board of Admiralty, that he has got, as he gave us or tried to give us the impression that he had got one year's supply of oil in this country?
I never said anything of the kind. Will you quote my words?
Has he got nine months? Has he got six months?
I have not the slightest intention of being cross-examined by the hon. Gentleman. I have said it is not in the public interest to disclose the amount of oil reserve. He should know better than to try and cross-examine me.
If the right hon. Gentleman had the supply of oil he would not be slow in letting us know the fact. He is obviously afraid, and he does not dare to burn oil in this country in peace time. The real reason why the manœuvres have been stopped this year is because of the lack of oil, while destroyers that ought to be practising are lying idle. I maintain that this is a most serious state of affairs. The House has not been treated fairly, and we ought to demand a much fuller explanation of the true and whole history of this oil question. I wanted to speak very much on the subject of men, but I will go, and I must do it very shortly, to the subject of small craft. When the right hon. Gentleman introduced his illusive 60 per cent, standard for "Dreadnoughts" he said we should have a larger standard for small ships. I do not think anybody would consider that on the outbreak of war the North Sea would be a very healthy locality for great battleships. They are open to sudden and swift attacks from on the sea, under the sea, and from the air, and the chances and probabilities are that the first stages of an action in a naval war would be fought out by the smaller craft—by destroyers, submarines and airships. I have only time to take the figures and cannot adduce any arguments. Since the Government have been in office they have reduced the superiority of our destroyers by 200 per cent.; they have brought them down so low that at the present moment Germany has more destroyers in commission than we have. The right hon. Gentleman told us himself that the numbers are sixty-nine to seventy-seven.
indicated dissent.
I cannot argue the point, because I have not time, but the right hon. Gentleman will admit that in destroyers capable of sustained work in the North Sea we have very narrow margin of superiority indeed.
No.
It is perfectly true.
It is not true.
By reducing them in this way the right hon. Gentleman takes upon himself a very serious responsibility. As to submarines, we have been told, or asked, not to speak about them, but my information shows, and I should like to be assured on this point, that in the latest type of submarines, the type that is really useful, Germany has at least an equality with us in submarines built, building and projected. In airships it is the same thing. I cannot speak about them, but we are in a hopeless position in that regard. To sum up, as to the promise that the right hon. Gentleman made to us of the high standard of 60 per cent., we have a slight margin in destroyers, we have a doubtful margin in submarines, and we have a huge disadvantage in airships. We are short of money, we are short of oil, and the right hon. Gentleman has broken nearly every pledge he made. We trusted him and he has failed us, and he has shown that his horizon, as well as that of the Government, is bounded by the Parliament Act, and that the Radical Government once more has proved that it cannot be trusted to adequaely safeguard the defences of this country.
Main Question put, and agreed to.
Supply: Navy Estimates, 1914–15
Considered in Committee.
[Mr. WHITLEY in the Chair.]
Motion made and Question proposed, "That 151,000 officers, seamen, and boys be employed for the Sea and Coastguard Services for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1915, including 18,700 Royal Marines.
It being a Quarter-past Eight of the clock, further Proceeding was postponed without Question put, pursuant to Standing Order No. 4.
Mediterranean (Political and Strategic Position)
I beg to move, "That, in the opinion of this House, the strategic and political situation now obtaining in the Mediterranean calls for increased vigilance and independence on the part of His Majesty's Ministers, and demands the provision of an adequate available naval force for the protection of the route to India and for other services of the Empire in that sea."
After two years' experience in this House I have come to the conclusion that hon. Gentlemen like my Friend and myself who speak from these Back Benches are really not modest enough when we talk about foreign affairs. We are exhorted to believe that our words are going to have a world-shaking effect, and we lend an ear to these flatteries. I do not think it is what we say that matters so much. It is what the right hon. Gentleman opposite says that is important, and that is why he so often says so very little. My speech is going to be embalmed in the OFFICIAL REPORT, and his words will fly to the other end of the world. I should like to make one thing quite clear, that I am speaking for myself and not for my party. The Foreign Secretary knows that in each successive crisis the Unionist party has supported him solidly. They have always put their country before their party, and tonight I am not intending any attack upon his policy. All I am anxious to do is to put forward some criticisms of the situation as a good many people see it. For instance, let me take one criticism. We should like to see rather more generous reciprocity in the loyalty that we have given our neighbours on the Continent, and to-night also I am not going to try to be very unreasonable, and it would be very unfair if I did. I am not going to try and saddle the right hon. Gentleman with the responsibility of everything that goes wrong in the countries which are the countries of our friends. I will not saddle him with the treatment of political prisoners in Portugal or with the actions of the Russian Consul on some frontier. All I will say is that we regret that Russia either cannot or will not control her distant Executives. I am glad we have an opportunity for this Debate, for the other day I read a letter of Lord Cromer's, in which he said that our own unhappy quarrels and our own miserable divisions had drawn down a dark blind upon foreign affairs, and when this nightmare situation is ended here, it is possible that we may find our position very different, and. our prestige very different in the rest of the world.
What a good number of us feel is that if there is an element of weakness in our attitude, it is because we have, at all events in the Mediterranean, a week Fleet. You cannot have a strong policy unless you have a strong Fleet. If you have a strong Fleet you can do what you want to do. If you have not got a strong Fleet you have to do what other people want you to do, or, at all events, you acquiesce in what they want. Be friends with France. Be friends with all the world if you can, but you must rely upon yourself. We do not want a Fleet for any aggressive purpose. We do not want to use it any more than you would use a fire brigade aggressively. But we mean the Fleet to protect our Empire, to keep our position in Europe, and in all circumstances to guarantee the food supply of the people of these islands. The Mediterranean is the wedding of our Imperial and our foreign interests. It is the marriage ring of the Empire. It is as important to us as the Adriatic was to Venice, for it is by the Mediterranean that we feed London and that we hold India. In past crises which have occurred, our position in that sea was unassailed because it was unassailable. If you take those very critical years, 1881 and 1882, we were not challenged, and again, all through the Boer war we were not assailed, for the facts and the reasons I have given. Is that the position now? I do not think it is, and I do not think the First Lord of the Admiralty would maintain that it was. Even if he did, his own figures would stand in judgment against him. I admit that, after reading his speech, I have modified some of the things I proposed to say about him tonight, but the fact remains that he has not dealt with the past, and he has not dealt, I think, adequately with the present situation. He has spoken of a golden future. The right hon. Gentleman is a most remarkable person. He reminds me in a lot of ways of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, but there is one difference. If I am right these two were the antithesis of each other.
But there is one quality which the First Lord of the Admiralty has, and that runs through every action and every transaction, and that is the quality of courage. He is courageous when he says a thing is black, and he is courageous when later on he says the same thing is incandescent white. He is courageous when he is an inclusionist and when he is an exclusionist, and when he is a heptarchist, but he is most courageous of all—I am a brave man but I take off my hat to him—when he makes a proposition such as the proposition that he made of a naval holiday. He brought that forward as a, concession on the part of England to Germany; it was really asking for an absolutely impossible concession from Germany. One has only to read Lord Newton's life of Lord Lyons to see what happened years ago. If one followed that very interesting correspondence between Lord Clarendon, Count Bismarck, Lord Lyons, Lord Augustus Loftus, and others, one would find that the same proposal was made in 1870, and upon that occasion it was to be a military and not a naval holiday. It fell through for the reason that similar proposals always will fall through, that nations if they are going to insure themselves with an Army and a Navy, will not consent to do anything less than pay the full premium. But if the First Lord had made the suggestion of having a European holiday, that might have received some support. Simply a German holiday was impossible, and the godfather of all the pacifists of Germany could not possibly have accepted the proposal, because Germany could not for a fraction of a moment consent to have her building standard regulated alone by our building standard, because Germany after all has a very formidable neighbour to her East and another formidable neighbour to her South, and if she consented to stop building, it is quite certain that these two countries would be equally considerate? The First Lord's road to peace was by inviting his opponents to commit suicide through euthanasia, and I am not surprised that they did not accept it. Now we are in the position of having a rather melancholy half-holiday all to ourselves in the Mediterranean. When the Mediterranean was first abandoned it caused a very great outcry, and there were some servants of the Crown in peculiarly responsible positions who protested in the most forcible way that they could protest. The position, I admit, is not so now, and I hope it is a position which is going to improve. The First Lord's speech had this effect: It enabled the ordinary man in the street to visualise the European situation.
What is the European situation? It is that we have two groups in Europe. We have Germany, Austria and Italy. With reference to Germany, we all know that there have been friction and difficulties in the past, but we are glad to think that those difficulties and that friction are being smoothed over, and that our relations are better. We hope and believe in this country that a seed of friendship has been planted between the two peoples, and that that seed in its own good time will come to flower Take the case of Austria. Austria is confronted with a whole swarm of problems, varying from the size of gnats to elephantine proportions. Italy is in-intent, and rightly intent, upon developing her own resources. Italy is a loyal but not an enthusiastic or aggressive ally. The other group is France, Russia, and England, and, if you examine late history, you find part of the policy of part of that group—I will not mince my words—has been nothing but a panorama of aggression. Turkey has been, and still is, threatened; a great part of Persia has been occupied; vast territories of China are coming under foreign influence. With regard to France, everyone must be glad that ancient disputes have been forgotten. We welcome the fact that the traffic in arms in the Persian Gulf has been suppressed. While we welcome that great evidence of good will, I think at the same time we must regret that the traffic does continue at many places in Africa, and is responsible for such tragedies as the death of Mr. Corfield in Somaliland, which we discussed the other day. In this group I put England last, and I am not sorry that she should be last, for the Russian policy towards weak people has not been one that is quite consonant with the traditions of England. It is a curious group. There is too much limited liability about the entente. It refers so much more to Europe than to Asia. There are many people who do not at all dissent from our foreign policy, and who appreciate the fact that, besides there being a sunny side to this bargain, there is also a shadow side. These people would be very anxious to see an entente, if it is a veal entente, but what they are rather afraid of is that it may degenerate into a liaison. These people also would say, "The advantages, as we see them, are negative; the disadvantages are positive." But they would go on to add, "We are quite prepared to admit that the invisible advantages may outweigh in importance the visible disadvantages."
One of the advantages which we are told we owe to the entente is that Europe did not go to war during the past year. If that is so, it conferred an inestimable benefit on Europe, and on England in particular. One of the other factors was the very obvious one that no Great Power in Europe wanted war. Another factor was the personality of the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary, who certainly deserved to have won the Victoria Cross of peace. At the end where are we? We have come to a temporary and unsatisfactory settlement—unsatisfactory because Slavonic aspirations are still unsatisfied. As to great territories in China, the Russian appetite is still unimpaired, and Russian policy is not altered. What we feel is that if you have an understanding between Great Britain and Russia, and if that understanding is carried out in the spirit in which it is entered into by the high contracting parties, then it is an excellent thing for both countries, and an asset to Europe and to Asia; but if that contract is not carried out in that spirit, if it becomes unreal, then it holds in it, like everything that is unreal, seeds of great danger. It is an unhappy coincidence that there is not a single neighbour of Russia, which is not strong, that is not in a state of panic and almost turmoil—whether it be Sweden, in Europe, or Persia, in Asia—that they are not going to be attacked by Russia. The one country is going through a constitutional crisis which threatens the greatest results, and it cannot be denied that Russian frontier officials do radiate strife and turmoil. Any of Cook's tourists know what a Russian official did. I think it did not reflect the attitude either of Russia or the Concert of Europe, but it was one of the motive powers in producing that war.
Take the case of Persia. We are told that things are improved there, and we are glad to hear it, for a more wretched picture I cannot imagine than the position of Persia, where you have a poor and harassed people united only in one thing—the desire to remain independent against an absolutely ruthless political machine. Take Armenia. Both the Armenians and the Turks desire to see that great province reformed. They have asked for British advisers, and British administrators with plenary power. The Turks desire to see that, because they know that only through reform is there any road to their salvation. They have no men and no money, because Russia is against their having men and money. They are told to go on with reform. They are told to make bricks without straw. That does not seem to me a very clean weapon, or a satisfactory precedent, because it may be used against other countries later on. Can you wonder then that the spectacle, viewed through their Asiatic eyes, presents Europe not in the position she professes to be in, but as a professional poisoner. There is another factor which should not be forgotten. A great deal of the resentment in India comes from injudicious utterances which have not come from one party alone in this country. There is only one speech to which I wish to make reference, and which is not in that category, and that was the speech of the Prime Minister about Adrianople. That speech was delivered at the moment of extreme crisis and tension, and when Europe was in a state of austere bewilderment, and no statesman could foresee the developments that might arise from that situation. But of this I am convinced, that the speech was the warning of a friend and not the threat of an enemy. I am glad to say that I was able to persuade many of my Moslem friends of that. The Moslem in these days, wherever he lives, whether it be in the depths of the desert, in the Hinterland of Aden, or on the North-West frontier, is aware of the calamities that have befallen his spiritual kindred, and in his mind he associates England with the part which Europe has played against the Moslem. He never hears that the Foreign Secretary was, to the best of my knowledge, the only foreign secretary who did protest against outrages in Macedonia. He has absolutely no knowledge that Great Britain gave £5,000 in relief for Moslems and Catholics in Albania. What he says is this: "The policy of Europe is expediency. The highest ideal of Europe is loot, and England is putty in the Slav and granite to the Moslem." And this last question of the islands in the Mediterranean is going to confirm him in all those opinions.
Dealing with this very difficult question. I should say that in the first place I should very much like to see a generous constitution given to those islands, and I have no doubt that if the Sublime Porte were invited to take this course, they would accept it willingly. There are the islands that dominate the Dardanelles. Through the Dardanelles comes a great portion of our food supply. Those islands are to be left to Turkey, and not to be given to Greece, and the obvious inference is that England has agreed to that decision because it docs not wish to take any risk with regard to her own food supply. That may not be the case, but there is the inference. Then there are the islands which dominate Smyrna and Asia Minor. Those are to be taken from Turkey and given to Greece. The inference is that the risk which we repudiate for ourselves we are ready to inflct upon Turkey. In reference to these islands, Chios and Mitylene, it cannot possibly be maintained that geographically they are Greek islands, any more than it can be maintained that the Isle of Wight is a French island, or that the Frisian Islands are British. I quite agree that they are inhabited by Christians and Greeks. After all, Smyrna is very largely a Greek town, and you do not want to give that to the Greeks. Alexandria is largely a Greek town, and, if you come to London, you will find Greek Street in Soho. In all this Balkan settlement you have practically taken one basis of settlement. That basis has not been ethnological. It has been strategic, and has been a basis of propinquity. Salonica is mainly Moslem and Jewish, but it has been given to Greece. Large tracts of Albania have been given to Servia. Why make this one exception? By doing it you are going to create a new Macedonia in Asia Minor.
One brings the name of the Sovereign into these discussions with great reluctance, but His Majesty the King of Greece, who the other day took the title of King Constantine I., is contemplating a change in the numeral, and it has been discussed in the Greek Parliament whether he should not call himself Constantine XIV. It is a long jump from one to fourteen. Constantine XIII. died in Constantinople in 1453. The addition of that numeral XIV. to King Constantine's name implies quite clearly that Greek eyes are turned to Constantinople, and that the annexation of the Eastern Empire is contemplated by the Greeks. If those islands are given to the Greeks, Europe will be endorsing the Greek view about her right to the heritage of the Greek Empire. I think that one of Lord Beaconsfield's strong reasons why England should not too warmly support Greece was because her eyes were turned upon Constantinople. If you do this, you will set up a Greek fortress upon a very weak Turkish frontier, and if you believe that this is going to be the conclusion of peace I venture to prophesy that it is only going to be the beginning of a new war. I will not labour this any further. My chief and first argument is the map. One has only to look at the map to look at the harbour at. Mitylene, to see the actual geographical position of the island, and to remember the difficulty, the trouble and hatred that exist in Macedonia, to see that you are going to establish there n, centre for a Hellenic propaganda on the Turkish shore. I should like to see Greece compensated. I think that she can and ought to be compensated; but I must also ask the House to remember the great prize which she has won in the last war. She has won an area as great, as her own kingdom. Under the magic of that wizard, Mr. Venizolos, she is like a nation rejuvenated and reincarnated, and I think her friends only pray that she should not share that stubborn vanity that brought about the downfall of Bulgaria.
The loss of those islands to Turkey is mortal peril. Their possession by Greece is not going to make the blood flow more quickly in the veins of the Greek people. All these accumulated disasters have produced in India a feeling that I do not believe is realised in this country, a feeling of most acute bitterness and criticism, and I would even go so far as to say hostility, in a people who are naturally sentimental, and the great majority of whom desire to be loyal. When one says that I know that one is at once accused of being sentimental. I plead guilty, because I do not see that you can have cynical patriotism. In an Empire like ours you have to do sums in sentiment. You have to be as calculating in your sympathies as you are mathematical with your "Dreadnoughts." There are two associations with which the right hon. Gentleman has had to deal. One is Europe and the other is the Empire. In my opinion, the latter is the more important association. It is very well, as a great many of us do, to talk about the brotherhood of man and the federation of Europe. Those are dreams; they may one day come true; I hope they will. I hope that they will bear the best of all fruit, but they are not for to-day. To-day we have one question—that is, justice in the British Empire. You have there Indians who are smarting under the very great humiliation which they have suffered in South Africa, also smarting under a sense of accumulated grievances. If the right hon. Gentleman can give us an assurance to-night that their interests will not be overlooked and that their feelings will not be hurt, I would feel less ashamed than otherwise I should be for having trespassed so long upon the attention of the House.
I beg to second the Motion.
I have no desire to say anything that would in any way tend to embarrass or impede the action of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. But I feel it is necessary to draw attention to a situation which contains the germs, I think one may say without exaggeration, of future peril. Of course, in considering a question like that of our Mediterranean policy, one has to steer between Scylla and Charybdis. One has on one side to remember that temporary arrangements may be very convenient for the moment, but may entail on future generations great anxiety and great injury. There was, for example, the question of the frontiers of the Balkan States, settled some thirty years or more ago, which produced grave calamity to the generation that came after. On the other hand, one is bound to admit that one can show too much foresight. In fact, if people go in for foresight, so to speak, and specialise in foresight, something comes along like the Suez Canal and stultifies their wisest prophecies. But I think nothing I shall say, in seconding this Resolution, will refer to anything but certain tendencies that I think must produce inevitable results, because one can see the results now almost in process of formation under one's eye. Of course, one is quite ready to admit that the Mediterranean is a very difficult place.
A place that has an intense civilisation on the one hand, and pre-economic and mediaeval conditions on the other; with the north coast, covered with nations desirous of making a name in history, confronting the south coast, dotted with subject people, whose history is now behind them, is naturally a difficult place, having all these jarring and cosmopolitan factors, When one remembers that the Mediterranean must be a place where violent passions naturally exist, that we may pass from the Syndicalists of Barcelona and Marseilles to the scholastic passions still in full blast on Mount Athos with just as much reality to-day as in the fourth century, and running through them the primitive violence of Islam, one has there, I am sure, all the makings of a very pretty situation. Then one is met by the fact that two or three of the Great Powers are turning their eyes towards the sea. Austria, with her contracted littoral, must naturally take great interest in the command of the sea. Russia must naturally feel impelled to have a footing in warm water. Italy has now new possessions and new responsibilities. Added to that, the Mediterranean has been the scene now for over two years of constant war, which has only given place to apparently a very precarious peace. It seems almost the spite of fate that a country like England, a common-sense, commercial, unromantic country like England, should have its lot cast in a place so volcanic and particularly romantic. It is very much like a retired English merchant being suddenly cast for a part in transpontine melodrama. But in our case we cannot get out of this complicated region, for, as my hon. Friend pointed out, it is the route of our com- merce, and we must keep a force in the Mediterranean equal to our obligations. I do not want to enter into any technical argument as to the weight of broadsides of British ships compared with the weight of broadsides of the warships which won the battle of the Nile. I do not want to institute comparisons of that kind.
But I submit that, comparing the present with the latter part of the nineteenth century, our proportion of force in the Mediterranean, even taking the changes in the diplomatic situation, has diminshed, while our obligations have not diminshed, though I do not say that they have increased they are practically the same. As the proportion of our force has diminished there has been a certain evaporation of our prestige, and with the evaporation or reduction in British prestige in the Mediterranean I am sure there has been also reduced one of the great influences for peace in that region, because we of all people have no desire to see the Mediterranean in a state of constant war. I submit that if the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is to control the conditions which exist there, he must have behind him, as the First Lord of the Admiralty said yesterday in very eloquent terms, an adequate force. I will not define exactly what that force should be in ships, but I submit that our force in the Mediterranean should be sufficient to keep our prestige at the same level as it was in the latter part of the nineteenth century. That is the test which should be applied. Your strategic dispositions in the Mediterranean are a system of minute and very small garrisons indeed, and rightly small, and they must have a useful fleet to cover their communications. I would not suggest in any case that you should increase the Mediterranean garrisons by a single man, because if you introduce more soldiers it would naturally be a cause of suspicion.
But our ships in the Mediterranean without soldiers cannot cause suspicion, because obviously the Mediterranean is surrounded by land Powers, and people have been told, and the phrase is historic, that the British Fleet cannot, go across the Taurus or any other mountain. I submit that we should in all circumstances, in peace or in war, have the disposal of a force available for the Mediterranean. Of course, I recognise that this would cause increased expenditure upon the Navy, but that the things I wish to say to-night are with the object of showing that an increase of expenditure on the Fleet, in order to provide in peace or in war a sufficient force to maintain our prestige in the Mediterranean, is justified and inevitable. Regarding the Mediterranean, there are two factors which are obviously of intense importance. One of enormous benefit to the cause of our present security is the entente with France; and the other, the incohesive condition of the Ottoman Empire, I submit contains the germs of our peril in the future. In speaking of the entente, I would point out that it is not between two Governments, but between two nations, two great democracies who desire to remain in abiding peace. That is a very great thing. I think that is the soul entente. That is the real essence of the entente. It is not so much an arrangement as an impulse between two peoples which could not be hastened until certain jealousies had gone, but when they had disappeared could not be prevented. The entente to us in the Mediterranean means an immense amount. It immediately wipes out the whole of the Riviera and almost the whole of the North African coast entirely out of any hostile calculations whatever, but I think it would be carrying the entente too far if it was suggested that it meant that France and England should shoulder each other's responsibilities. It is no mere bargain that France gives us Mediterranean support in return for an Expeditionary Force into the Low Countries, as some writers have suggested. It is something wider and deeper. It means friendship under all circumstances, and co-operation in the event of wanton attack or injustice with regard to both parties.
9.0 P.M.
That is the advantageous side of our situation in the Mediterranean; but, on the other hand, in the case of the Ottoman Empire, I think we are approaching a grave and real danger. In the Ottoman Empire now, I think, we see a country approaching the crisis which precedes the dissolution of even the most tenacious invalid. I know that in 1852 the Emperor Nicholas spoke of the "sick man," and I believe that in the sixteenth century Queen Elizabeth's Ambassador said that things could not go on much longer. Now, I think the Ottoman Empire, although it has been through many dangerous periods, has two things affecting it which never affected it before, even at its worst. In the one case it has modern finance to cope with, and in the other case it has received a moral shaking from which it would be difficult to recover, and that is from the events of the last five or six years since the Constitution. No matter what discontented Indian lawyers may say about Islamism, there is no doubt that the Caliphate does not carry the prestige in the Ottoman Empire which it did a few years ago. I know that fanaticism has been used in the Turkish Empire for claiming sympathy from abroad or as a bogey in its own dominions. In the last few years as a vital force it has undergone a severe strain; but that was the force which carried the Arab, the Kurd, and the Turk together. The result in all that loss of prestige of the Caliphate and the terrible strain of war, and the fact that the Turkish peasant in Anatolia, ground between the upper millstone of taxation on the one hand and military service on the other, is fainting away under the load; with the loss of self-respect after the defeats, the disastrous entanglement of Adrianople and the Armenian question demanding redress, and the two islands ceded to Greece threatening the Smyrna district with the same troubles of the bands, the atrocity and the counter-atrocity, the assassination and counter-assassination, all the horrors of the Balkan States; now apparently has two jumping-off points in the Asiatic dominions, and the fact that Basra provinces are now almost sunk in anarchy, those are enough to break an Empire down. There are worse. No sooner was the war over than a flock of cosmopolitan harpies swooped down on that wretched country, and now are preparing in the most legitimate way to rob the inhabitants under the guise of introducing them to the benefits of civilisation. I know that we all hold up our hands in horror at the atrocities perpetrated by Orientals, but it is not so often that we hold them up with regard to the atrocities which are perpetrated by concessionnaires in very much the same way. The Turkish Government, I know, have been accused of being corrupt. I venture to submit it has not been for want of encouragement from Europeans that the Turks have been corrupt. Whether it was the ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid, or the military party that succeeded him, or whoever has held office, has known precisely that for every new folly there has been always money forthcoming in order to get that country deeper and deeper into the financial muddle. The sinister—and I think that it is not going too far to use that word—effect of European financiers on Turkey has had more to do with the misgovernment than any Turk, young or old.
It is some comfort to know that, because the poorest beggar in Turkey and the most ignorant man there knows that Great Britain as a nation, and as a Government, has had nothing to do with those financial intrigues; that is the reason why still that unhappy people look to us with hope. I we consider the financial aspect of the case, not only the financial aspect of the Balkan war, but the whole aspect. There was the first war, then the peace of Europe was secured, and eventually, owing to the way it had been secured, the second war broke out, more bloody and more fatal than the first, leaving new hatreds and new feuds. When the second war had subsided, then began the scramble of the concessionnaires. There was the advance to Adrianople, a most disastrous thing for Turkey. The money was forthcoming from Europe which made that advance possible. That was just the same policy as the Baghdad Railway policy, the policy of the financiers who managed to get the Baghdad Railway concession, a concession which I personally feel robs the inhabitants of their rights to their own soil, and which is guaranteed by the taxation of a people who have hardly got a rag to their backs. The Baghdad Railway, with its guarantee and its construction company and its largesse, is only typical of railway concessions in the Ottoman Empire, with the honourable exception of a few, amongst them being the British company, which has no guarantee whatever. The Ottoman Empire is shaken, and the cosmopolitan financier is now staking the land into spheres of interest. An Empire may survive disaster, but it cannot survive exploitation. A country like Turkey, without Factory Acts, without any legislative capacity, without understanding what the economics of Europe mean, and at the same time rich, is a lamb for the slaughter, and it is ready to be taken. One can see what inevitably must happen: the spheres of interest are staked out, then the con-cessionnaires begin their work, the taxes are engulfed by concessions, and then someone is killed, and something goes wrong, and the moment is ripe, and the spheres of interest must inevitably become territory.
To a humanitarian it is an evil thing to see European finance unchecked developing a country where there is no proper Government to look after things, and where it means the enslavement of the people. I dare say you will see sweating, and drink, and vice, and all those things, and no Government and no organisation whatever to control them. It is a very different thing seeing Turkey developed by concessionnaires and seeing Egypt developed by companies under the iron hand of an absolutely incorruptible Government. There is no comparison between the two. But it is not from the humanitarian point of view that I speak of this exploitation of the Ottoman Empire. It is because of the intimate effect which it must have on our strategical position, if the Ottoman Empire fades away, first into spheres of interest and then into territory—and I think the shades will run very quickly from one into the other. I do not want to leave the Mediterranean except for one instant, and that is to say that the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire must entail the disappearance even of the shadow of the Persian Empire. Then the curtain rolls up, disclosing to us a very extraordinary scene—a European frontier in Persia; a European frontier, either a little inland or on the sea, in the Persian Gulf; a European frontier on the Sinai Peninsula; and a European frontier in Tripoli. If that ever comes about, I cannot see how this Empire can continue. For those who come after us it will not be a question of Estimates, or of increased taxation. One may take a 60 per cent, standard on the sea, but that cannot be combined with a 60 per cent, standard on land as well. For that reason the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire in this way must be the first step to the disappearance of our own.
Returning to the question of the entente, the entente is a real, deep, and tremendous fact. But there is a danger to the entente. I submit that if it is possible for the entente between ourselves and France to be endangered, it is by the policy of French financiers in the Near East, who have obtained the protection of the French Government. The object? of the French people and of the British people are identical. French interest and our own are identical. Yet I feel that the policy of French financiers will produce eventually the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which would be a frightful disaster to us. Take the situation in this particular way. On or about 13th July the advance of the Turks on Adrianople commenced. On the 22nd July the Prime Minister made at Birmingham a very definite speech, condemning that advance for reasons with which I, personally, entirely agree. On the 21st, in return for a further extension of the Ottoman Regie concession, Turkey was promised an advance or loan of £1,500,000. If that had not been done, I am certain that the advance on Adrianople could not have been carried out. The advance on Adrianople was carried out, and then Turkey was in the toils. Very soon afterwards, in December, a group came forward with their £4,500,000, and got a concession for the Dardanelles-Smyrna Railway with a guarantee, and the Jerusalem tramways and electric light without a guarantee. That money had to go to buy a Brazilian "Dreadnought," because the Adrianople policy cut off the sympathy of the Concert, and Greece had to be reckoned with. So we have the Brazilian "Dreadnought," and Turkey is further and further in the toils.
Then we get the proposed loan arranged with the French Government for something over £20,000,000. One does not know exactly how much it is, but I think I am safe in saying £20,000,000, which is to come out some time in April or May. In order to get this, there are concessions which I cannot help feeling are more brazen and more fatal than any I have ever seen. There is the existing French railway—I do not like to call it French; it is merely a cosmopolitan group of financiers; I do not see why they should be called French. The existing railways in Syria meander for miles to avoid legitimate profits in order to extort a guarantee. Alongside these railways you can see the merchants' merchandise and the peasants' produce rotting, because the railway people do not trouble to warehouse the stuff or to shift it. They have got their guarantee, and they do not care. These concessions, which have been extracted from Turkey in return for this loan, on the showing of the French Prime Minister, mean a monopoly of all Syrian transit; and, further, a native Press is to be subventioned practically in the interests of these particular monopolies. One knows what the defence of this sort of thing is—that all nations have to do it, that they have to protect their interests. But in practice, loans, kilometric guarantees, monopolies, and a financed native press, must, whether the financiers desire it or not, pave the way to annexation. I very much regret that the French Minister stated on the 23rd December—I quote from the "Times" of 26th December:— entente. The British people did not stand by the French people at Agadir to fill the pockets of financiers whose names are unknown outside Constantinople or the Paris Bourse. The assurances of our diplomatists cannot mean that we desired or intended that Syria should fall into the hands of a trust to be exploited to the very end—
I hope the hon. Member will put the true construction on what the hon. Baronet has quoted. Those particular assurances that were given had not any reference whatever to these concessions. They had reference to statements which had appeared previously that there were British agents travelling in Syria who were encouraging the population to look to a British annexation of Syria, or, at any rate, to a very large British political design. I contradicted these statements immediately, saying that we had no design of that kind. My contradiction had reference solely to these movements, and not to any concessions of the kind referred to, of which I did not even know at the time.
I very much welcome what the right hon. Gentleman has said. Indeed, I had put in my notes that I presumed that what the right hon. Gentleman has now said was the true construction.
I am obliged to the hon. Member for having given me the opportunity to remove that misunderstanding.
At the same time, in France apparently the construction put upon the statement that we took no political interest in the country seemed to be that we did not mind what happened to the inhabitants at all. Particularly does one regret that this should happen, and that French financiers should be responsible for this kind of thing, because the entente is a great thing for the peace of Europe. Both nations should be jealous of it. The cause of civilisation depends upon it. Personally, I think that this constant exploitation of Turkey by one of the Powers in the entente must end sooner or later by putting the entente in danger and bringing about an unpleasant situation. I should like to lay just one other consideration before the right hon. Gentleman. His is a name to conjure with in Europe. I entreat him to take into consideration the financial position which has developed in the Ottoman Empire. It is not too late for Great Britain, France, and Russia, the triple entente —and the more solid it is, the better—to adopt a policy of absolute co-operation in the reform of the Ottoman Empire, entirely divorced from any idea of exploitation. Let these Powers divorce themselves from the exploitation. Great Britain has nothing to do with it. Let her prevail upon these Governments to divorce themselves from the financial efforts that may cause the defeat of this degeneration of the Empire. If the three Powers but sink their territorial ambitions in the spheres of interest that fall to them, I am certain that the future is safe. Even supposing the Ottoman Empire fails! Supposing that the Central Government fails! There are the seeds of native States which exist in the provinces of the Ottoman Empire at the present moment which could be made into independent States. If the worst comes to the worst, there are Armenians, Arabs, and Kurds who only wish to be left in peace to develop the country. It is the duty of the entente, I submit, to defend these people now from the possible tyranny of the concessionaire as it was to defend them from the old tyranny of the sword. If the triple entente can adopt a policy of good government, with, let it be clearly understood, no financial bias, the difficult problems of the Mediterranean grow simple. A population will develop in these areas peaceful, and of great benefit to the world at large. Large markets will be opened up and future generations will be spared many possible causes of anxiety. A great step will be taken towards freeing the Concert of Europe from the shackles of the financial organisations, which no one who has studied international politics at all can fail, indeed, to see frustrating the movements of the Concert as a whole at every turn.
Before I put the Question to the House I should like to ask the hon. Members who bring forward Motions of this kind in future to indicate a little more clearly the scope of the subject that it is proposed to bring before the House. I say that in the interests of other hon. Members who may wish to discuss the matter, and, of course, particularly in the interest of the Minister who may have answer.
I cannot help feeling grateful for the words that you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, have just put from the Chair in regard to the extent of this Debate. I frankly admit, in the few words I mean to address to the House, that I have no view of treating the matter so widely or so fully as the Mover and Seconder of the Resolution. I look rather to the second part of this Resolution, as to the provision of an adequate Naval force for the protection of the route to India. With the Mover of the Resolution I am bound to agree in the importance he attached to the strategic position of the Mediterranean. He first mentioned the importance of the food supply of this country which comes from Eastern Europe. Then he turned to debate that part of the Resolution which deals with the prestige of this country in the East. On these two points I wish to make a few remarks. Firstly, as to the food supply of this country, I admit that it now very largely depends upon the trade which comes through the Mediterranean Sea. In fact, at the present moment, I think this country is dependent for four-fifths of its food supply to that imported from abroad, and of that total 50 per cent, comes through the Mediterranean. Clearly any alteration, or any danger to our position in the Mediterranean, must largely affect the food supply of this country. That is the more so when we realise that the food supply of this country does not at some parts of the year exceed six or eight weeks' supply in our ports.
It is almost a truism to speak of the importance of the Mediterranean in regard to our communications with the East. That importance is slightly exaggerated by those who desire to strengthen our position in the Mediterranean in regard to our possessions in Egypt, for those possessions could be reinforced from India, in the event of trouble, without the transports having to pass through the Mediterranean. It is Malta which is of vital importance to this country. It has often been said that the Mediterranean is of immense importance to us in the event of war and Imperial mobilisation. There, again, I think undue prominence has sometimes been put to this question of the Mediterranean, for any assistance that might come to this country in a time of stress, could as easily come from our Dominions in Australasia and at the Cape, as it could through the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea. I am bound to admit that the question of our political prestige in the Mediterranean is one which cannot be overlooked by His Majesty Government. I believe myself—and here I must agree largely with the Seconder of this Resolution—that the entente in the Mediterranean is a very great factor to the peace of Europe, and particularly to the peace of Southern Europe. I believe that if anything should happen to derange this entente with France we should find that all the Powers of Southern Europe would come very much more under the domination of the Triple Alliance. For the sake of the peace of Europe it is far better that the grouping of the Powers should remain as it at the present time. That is all the more necessary from the point of actual occurrences in a time of European war. If we were to detach a large force from England or from the main theatre of war, which undoubtedly is Northern Europe as far as we are concerned, by every ship that we increase the Fleet in the Mediterranean and by every regiment that we send from that which is available for the Expeditionary Force, we should, pro tanto, be reducing our chances of success if the crisis came. I think that many of the appeals that have been made that the forces of the Mediterranean should be increased are due somewhat to a misconception of that fundamental question. The Seconder of this Resolution did not advocate, and definitely said so, any increase in the garrison of the Mediterranean, and if that was the principle on which he based his argument, I believe he would equally say the same with regard to the Fleet. [HON. MEMBERS: "No, no!"] I shall try to prove to hon. Members if I can the danger of our detaching too large a portion of our Fleet from the North of Europe down to the Mediterranean. I think we have at the present time a squadron based on Malta of four battleships.
Three.
One is, I think, at home for repairs, but it is a ship that belongs to that squadron, and is therefore part of the disposition of His Majesty's Government in regard to the protection of the Mediterranean, and although I admit that the squadron now based on Malta is not of a strength possibly to meet the combined forces of the Austrian and Italian fleets, I cannot imagine a situation in which we should not be able to send ships from the North of Europe, down to the Mediterranean, if Germany was in any way hostile to ourselves. If Germany were hostile to us in the North of Europe, our ships would, of course, have to stay in the North of Europe, and in a case like that, I think we surely should be able to count on the assistance of the entente in the Mediterranean to equalise and give us a very strong1 preponderance of forces in these seas. From the statement made by the First Lord of the Admiralty yesterday, I understand that this force, which at the present moment is based upon Malta, is producing a superiority at the present time in the North Sea. An increase of the Fleet in the Mediterranean will take place at the end of 1915, or the beginning of 1916. There again, if one looks at the figures—and I do not propose to weary the House with figures, especially after the long Debates on the Naval Estimates—the "Dreadnought" strength, or pre-"Dreadnought" strength when these eight ships are sent to the Mediterranean and based upon Malta, it will in no way jeopardise our position in the North Sea. I should like to point out that the Mediterranean situation is absolutely and entirely dependent upon decisive action that takes place in the North of Europe. [HON. MEMBERS: "No, no!"] It may be that a temporary reverse of abandonment of the Mediterranean might take place under very serious conditions, but if success follows the action of the British Fleet in Southern Europe, there is not the slightest doubt that in a short space of time the command of the Mediterranean would again pass into the hands of the entente, or the ships we might send there.
There are two or three criticisms I should like to make with regard to the policy of His Majesty's Government in the Mediterranean, while absolutely agreeing with the general strategic policy employed, namely, to keep the bulk of their forces in the North Sea. I cannot help thinking that it is faulty strategy to place a squadron at Gibraltar. It is a half-way house between the two theatres—the primary theatre of the North Sea, and the secondary theatre of the Mediterranean. I believe there is very considerable danger in the event of war breaking out—and we all know how suddenly it comes, especially naval warfare—to know they have a Fleet base at Gibraltar which is neither in one theatre or the other. I should be glad to see it placed in a strategic centre which is to protect our own coast. Another criticism is the actual defence of Malta and Egypt. I believe that if the defences of Malta and Egypt were brought up to such a point that they were absolutely immune from attack by coup de main, we need not be in the least afraid of the strategic situation in the Mediterranean. The military forces at present there are, I believe, adequate for the defence they have to deal with, but we do most certainly need far stronger submarine defences for Malta to Gibraltar than we have at the present time, because defences could be placed there with great ease, and would not take away men who are kept available for war from the Expeditionary Force, and we should be able to make these strategic centres absolutely safe and immune from attack. If these two points—one, the faulty strategy with regard to the sea base at Gibraltar, and secondly, the placing of more real defences which were foreshadowed by the First Lord, but still delayed—were remedied I believe, from the strategic point of view, or military success, we need not be afraid of the situation in the Mediterranean Sea.
No one who listened to the speeches of the Proposer and Seconder of this Resolution could do other than admire the moderation with which they put forward their arguments and the deep knowledge they showed in support of their case. We, in this House, I think, are rather too apt, in our desire to keep anything that touches upon foreign affairs out of the arena of party politics, to err on the side of avoiding certain features of our national well-being which it is so essential should frequently come up in our Debates. To-night the ballot has provided an opportunity of discussing that which I think, to everyone in this House, has always been a matter of great importance, that is, our position in the Mediterranean Sea. I was very glad to note from the speech of my hon. Friend, and, indeed, from the speech to which we have just listened from the hon. Member opposite, the interest they have displayed in the naval situation, and it is to that particular side that I desire, in the few moments that I shall trouble the House, to direct my attention. I noticed that the Mover of the Resolution in his remarks made reference to the offer of the First Lord, whom I am glad to see an his place, whereby it was suggested that Germany and ourselves should reduce our naval expenditure. It seems to me that reference to that offer was extremely proper in a Debate such as this. This has a very vast bearing, indeed, upon our prestige with other Powers, and if we are going to lose prestige I submit the place where we are likely first of all to notice that loss is round the shores of the Mediterranean. I desire for a minute to refer to the opinions of a distinguished Frenchman and German in regard to the offer of the First Lord. I have here a book by Mr. Charles Bost, a Deputy for Paris. It is a book upon the naval policy for Europe, and in it we get this remarkable statement—this is a very free translation:—
Gentleman has offered us in the Mediterranean. Here is his statement:—
The armoured cruisers were infinitely more powerful, ship for ship, than other foreign Army cruisers or than any of the four he proposes to send with the battle squadron. In 1905 the French danger was disappearing. It arose owing to the possible combination of her people with that of Russia, and the Russo-Japanese war had taken place. We had four protected cruisers and forty destroyers. I come to 1907, the year following the victory of the Liberal Government at the polls. What is the situation? They reduced our battle squadron by two. We had six of the "Formidable" type in the Mediterranean, four armoured cruisers and four protected cruisers. I do not like going into these minutiae, but it is essential. We had exactly the same number of cruisers as we had in 1905, but they were all the same type of vessel—between four and five thousand tons—and one had a displacement of 1,830 tons. She has been swept up in it as entirely without value. In addition we had twelve destroyers, instead of the forty. I come right away from the Fleet, which was quite a formidable force, to 1911. What has happened in that space of four years? We have still six battleships in the Mediterranean. But what are they? The "Triumph" and the "Swiftsure," and four of the "Duncan" type. I hope the House will forgive my pointing out the main difference between the "Duncan" type and the "Formdiable" lies in this, that the "Duncan" type had a lesser armour belt than those carried by modern cruisers. Yesterday we were given the situation as it will be presented at the end of 1915. Upon what does the right hon. Gentleman base his hope of being able to send out a third battle squadron of eight vessels, six of the "Dreadnought" or "Lord Nelson" type, and two others. I wonder 'whether the right hon. Gentleman will be able1 to tell us this evening what "Dreadnoughts" he proposes to send out there?
No.
I think it would be astonishingly difficult for him to tell us upon what he bases his hopes of sending them there1. I believed he aid he would send them there in the third quarter of 1915, because he then will have the three ships which were accelerated to meet the lack of the Canadian units ready for use in Home waters. These three ships were laid down late in November last year.
They are vessels of infinitely greater displacement than any that have yet been built in the course of two years, and the right hon. Gentleman is not going to stand up in his place and guarantee that even one will be ready for the pennant by November, 1915. If he is still going to keep to his word and send out four ships of the "Dreadnought" type to the Mediterranean, obviously, if we have no vessels to replace them in the North Sea, we are going to rob our strength in Metropolitan waters. This requires a detailed answer. But let us assume that the right hon. Gentleman is going to send them out. He has eight ships—six "Dreadnoughts" and two of the "Lord Nelson" type. We know it is not the policy of the Government to have in the Mediterranean a squadron capable of taking on the combined fleets of Austria and Italy, but at all events let us see what the Fleet he intends to send out there will have to be capable of coping with in this particular sea. In the case of the Austrian fleet, you have three ships of a type which are comparable with our "Dreadnoughts." Austria has two "Dreadnoughts" in commission at the present time, and two others will be in commission not later than March next year—that is, she has four "Dreadnoughts," three ships of the "Lord Nelson" type, and behind it, in addition, a squadron consisting of comparatively modern ships, six good battleships, and one armoured cruiser. We have eight battleships, of two of which we do not know the type, two are "Lord Nelsons," and four "Dreadnoughts." The right hon. Gentleman tells us that that squadron is adequate, if necessary, to face the Austrian fleet. But what about the Italian fleet, which has two "Dreadnoughts" in commission, two others nearly finished, only awaiting their final equipment, and two more which will be ready by the end of this year, or the beginning of next; while behind that fleet is a squadron of six armoured cruisers and ten battleships. We have eight battleships and four armoured cruisers. When one looks carefully into the whole situation, I cannot but think it is not fair for the right hon. Gentleman to come down here and, in a way of which he is an absolute past-master, sweep away our fears, and in a speech, in the style of a magnificent magazine article, try to convince the country that the steps he is taking to maintain our position in one of the very centres of political organisa- tions—in the Mediterranean are the correct steps. I do not think it is fair that we on this side should give him in the future, as we have done in the past, in a desire to keep the Navy out of the political arena, that support upon which he depends in carrying his Estimates.
I take it it was a great surprise to Members of this House who have taken an interest in the question of Armenia for some years, to have that question raised to-night in connection with a Resolution which seems, on the face of it, to deal with other matters. But, as it has been raised, I feel bound to address an appeal to the right hon. Baronet the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to give us such assurances as may be in his power to-night that the question of Armenia is making real and substantial progress. The hon. Gentle man opposite who seconded this Motion suggested that the end of the Turkish Empire might be followed, in his opinion, by the end of our Empire—
Only under certain conditions.
I thought it was suggested that a necessary result of the breaking up of the Turkish Empire and its territory falling into the hand of con cessionnaires would be that our Empire would also come to an end.
It was only on the hypothesis that Turkey was divided up amongst the European Powers.
I can see no reasonable justification for such an opinion, and I am glad to think that none of my hon. Friends, who have been associated with me in this matter for a long time, are in any way so pessimistic. At the same time I think that those who have taken an interest in the question of reforming the Turkish Empire, both in Europe and in Asia—and, of course, now it is chiefly an Asiatic question—realise, as I believe the Governments of Europe realise, that much depends upon the question whether Turkey will be able to reform herself, and especially to reform her Asiatic dominions, which are practically all that is left to her. Everybody realies that, unless such reforms can be brought about, very grave European dangers must arise. Therefore we are all anxious to see these reforms in Armenia and in her Asiatic territories generally to which the hon. Gentleman has referred. I am one of those who do not believe that it is the duty of this country to be playing the knight errant and seeking all over the world for things to reform. But when you come to Armenia and Turkish territory generally you have the fact that we are under very definite and solemn Treaty obligations towards the people of those countries. At the time of the Cyprus Convention, and at other times, we received very solid advantages, and we entered into very serious responsibilities which make it a moral obligation upon us to see that what can be done for the good government of Armenia shall be done. I am not suggesting that there can, under any circumstances, be any talk of war on our part in this matter, because I know it is often said that while we are trying to bring about these reforms we are opposing any increase of armaments in our own country. We must, therefore, clear our minds of the supposition that anybody suggests, at this time of day, that England should use any military force for the promotion of reforms in Armenia. But there is a vast deal that can be done by financial and diplomatic pressure, and I hope we may rely upon our Government doing everything that can be done in that way. We all know that there have recently been very important negotiations going on between the great Powers, and notably between Russia and Germany, on behalf of the Great Powers, and Turkey, for the promotion of reforms in Armenia. I venture to say, and it is not my own opinion merely, for I do not set up my opinion as of any value in this matter, but it is the opinion of leading Armenians themselves, and of those who have the most intimate acquaintance with Armenia, that the only possible hope for reform in that country is the use of European agents to control the administration of the government of the country. Those European agents must also have adequate power. Without it they will simply be impotent. They will be liable to be overruled by the administration in Constantinople, and any reforms will simply suffer the fate that has befallen all attempts to reform European Turkey, whether through European agents or through any other agents.
We did hope that there would be a distinct European control in those provinces. I do not know whether there is any possibility of hoping that now. If all one sees in the newspapers is true, then I am afraid it is almost too late to hope for that; but it is certain, even if there is not direct control by actual agents of European Governments, that unless there is very extensive control by European Governors appointed there and receiving, at any rate, the moral support of the Great Powers of Europe, there is nothing to hope in the way of reform in Armenia, any more than there has been in any other of the provinces which were at the mercy of the Pashas. We all know that if reform does not come in Armenia there is only one fate for that country, and that is absorption by Russia. I do not pretend to think that would be any danger to this country, but I do say that the Powers are agreed, and I believe everyone is agreed, that if the reform can be brought about by Turkey itself through the use of European agents it would be infinitely better. I know from my own knowledge that it will be far more in accordance with the views of the Armenian people themselves. The Armenian leaders do not desire that their country should cease to be part of the Ottoman Empire, but they do insist that good government should be established in the country, and that they should be delivered from the horrible state in which they have lived for so many generations, in which they are living at the present moment, and in which there is no safety for honour, property, or life in those districts. I do hope very sincerely that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will be able to give us a certain amount of reassurance on this matter.
10.0 P.M.
I shall not attempt to follow the hon. Member who has just sat down in his remarks upon Armenia, for I think that is about as foreign to our discussion on the Mediterranean change as almost any subject could be. I think that what the hon. Member for Pembroke (Major Guest) said with regard to the Mediterranean is in itself an extraordinary good example of how dangerous it is to begin to alter and juggle with well-tried and experienced standards of naval strength in the Mediterranean or the North Sea. We were actually told by him that as we had abandoned the Mediterranean to resume our course and influence in the Mediterranean would be to endanger our position in the North Sea. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham reminded me just before I got up that history itself shows that argument to be fairly false. It was actually the diversion of our ships in 1871 to relieve Gibraltar which caused our naval weakness in the Atlantic, and lead indirectly to the fall of Yorktown. He himself announced just the reverse. If we are to maintain our Indian communications, and food supplies in the Mediterranean, we are thereby pro tanto weakening our European striking force in the North Sea. He also said that he could not possibly imagine any circumstances in which our position could possibly be in danger in the Mediterranean. He thought that our garrisons were sufficiently strong to look after their own particular interests. I was in the House, I think, when Lord Haldane defended the weakness of Malta and Gibraltar on the ground that it was not any use having them strong, because, after all, if yon did not hold the command of the Mediterranean, no amount of garrison strength could possibly hope to hold Malta and Gibraltar, and, if you had got the naval strength, then it was superfluous to have any garrison in them at all. Now we are asked to ring the changes on the opposite tack, and we are told quite happily by the hon. Member that he has no fear whatever that any attack could possibly be made upon them. May I suggest to him the kind of situation which would render our position to-day in the Mediterranean very difficult. We are bound, in dealing with all questions of foreign affairs and naval strength, to judge of the two great organisations of power in friendly rivalry, as we hope they will always remain—the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. It has never been really suggested that the most potent form of attack on the part of the Triple Alliance, if they wished to attack the Triple Entente, would be a direct attack. On the contrary, it is constantly suggested by the most eminent German publicists and others that indirect attack would possibly be the most wounding and damaging to us and to the entente generally.
The First Lord of the Admiralty to-day talked very happily of the rosy hopes of two or three years hence, as he always does, ignoring the present. If, for example, an attack were made to-day by the Triple Alliance upon Malta, or still more powerfully next year, how would he meet that attack, now that he has abandoned our naval strength in the Mediter- ranean Sea, because such ships as are there now are merely detailed from the North Seal We could not detach a single ship to assist any position which was in difficulty in the Mediterranean without weakening our strength in the North Sea, and bringing it below that standard which he himself has suggested is necessary. Are we to allow, as has been actually suggested to-night, any one of our great positions in the Mediterranean to go by the board in the hope that a North Sea action will be so successful that later on we can recover our lost position in the Mediterranean? Have ideas of strategy, of defence, and of our position and morale in the Mediterranean sunk so far in the last six years that we have to abandon the whole idea of defence because the result of an action in the North Sea might be sufficiently successful to make it possible for us some day to go back to the Mediterranean? I think it is a ludicrous statement and suggestion, and absolutely unworthy of the greatest Eastern Power, and the greatest Power which feeds itself largely from the Black Sea.
I would ask the House to remember that in the last ten years, at any rate, the position in the Mediterranean has altered immensely. I am not referring to naval standard of strength. If anybody had suggested ten years ago that all the islands, or a very large number of the islands which are now in doubted hands, and whose future fate is not at all clear, were to be redistributed between other Powers, and if, added to that, we had thought that there might be a German coaling station on the coast of Syria, we should have felt very differently with regard to our naval defence. That and the whole of the position in regard to Russia has materially altered the question of the Mediterranean for us. If you add to that fact the consideration that now three of the great European Powers have divided their armies, some large portion of them being in Africa and some portion in Europe, it will be recognised at once that a Mediterranean force which was independent of those Powers would have twice the striking power in the Mediterranean than it ever had before. If we had maintained the same standard of strength in the Mediterranean as we had in the past, we should have twice or three times the influence, because the Power that could strike between Africa and Europe and divide the Powers of Europe would be a greater factor in their considerations than another Power. That is the moment when we choose to abandon the Mediterranean and to take refuge in the arguments of the hon. Member for Pembroke. As to my hon. Friends who moved and seconded the Resolution, I sympathise with most of the things they said, and with all they said with regard to the Ottoman Dominion and our policy in regard thereto, but I noticed that both of them made, to a certain extent, some hostile criticism of the entente such as it is to-day. One of them made very strong references to Russia, and to the policy of aggrandisement. I think the strong term used was—
The Debate has ranged over one of the most enormous fields I have ever heard covered by any Debate. If I were to take the whole time up till eleven o'clock, which I do not intend to do, it would be impossible for me to deal with both branches of the question that have been raised upon it, namely, the naval position in the Mediterranean, and the large question of foreign policy. Although I do not propose to attempt to cover the whole field, I would say at once about the Debate generally and the way in which it was introduced to the House, that the Government have no complaint whatever to make of the tone in which it has been introduced. The speeches of the Mover and Seconder, though I disagree with some things they said and cannot endorse other things, were obviously speeches coming from such a genuine personal interest in the questions they raised and were yet so free from all egotism as to be entirely free of all personal interest. They were made with such knowledge and understanding that it was a real pleasure to listen to them, whether one agreed with their points or not. After all, this is private Members' time, and it is a great advantage, in a Debate so uncontroversial in tone in regard to foreign policy as this Debate has been, for the Government to listen to speeches which obviously were inspired not by party feeling, but by genuine interest and an individual point of view.
I especially welcome what the hon. Member who has just sat down has said on the subject of the present groupings of the Powers. The good understandings which have existed and which exist be-between ourselves and France and Russia have undoubtedly, during the last troublous times, contributed to the peace of Europe. The hon. Member who moved this Motion was good enough to say some very flattering things about my personality. He attributed too much to my personality. What was essential, I think, and has proved to be essential to the peace of Europe during the troublous times of the last two years, has been the existing grouping of the Powers, and the part which in those groups was played by the different Powers to preserve the peace, and which they could not have played so successfully if they had not belonged to those particular groups. That has made for peace. He would be a very bold man who would be prepared to say that had the political relationships between the Great Powers been other than what they were, and had they not been as they have been, the result would have been that the great Powers of Europe would not have come through those troublous times as peacefully as they have. We remain attached to those good understandings. We consider that they make for peace, and that they make for the mutual advantage of ourselves and the other Powers. The hon. Member who moved the Motion spoke of the sunshine and shadow attaching to the ententes. The shadow, I think, was the time before those ententes existed— the times from 1880 to 1905—when there were continual excursions and alarums as to war between this country and one or other of the countries with which we are now on particularly good terms. That was the real shadow. The hon. Member who seconded the Motion said very rightly that one of the things upon which he looked with satisfaction in our good understandings with France and Russia was the burying of the hatchet. I like to think that is true. I like to remember that the hatchet once was not buried, but that the hatchet is now buried and very completely out of sight. We intend to maintain these good understandings. We believe they make for peace. But the fact that they make for peace between us in matters which mutually concern us, the fact that we are diplomatically on terms of confidence or intimacy, does not mean that each of the Powers between whom the entente exists is to be held responsible for everything which the other does in matters which concern its own interests. There is a tendency, not in the House as a whole, but now and again in some parts of the House, to make out that because we have a sufficiently good understanding or good relations with another Power in matters in which we have mutual interests, therefore, we are to be held responsible and have a particular right to criticise everything which that other Power does in every part of the world in which we ourselves are not specially concerned. If ententes meant that each of us was to be o responsible in that way for each of the actions of the other, it would be an intolerable nuisance, and both Powers would oppose it. We never have thought of pressing it to that point. I will take the question of Syria.
The hon. Member (Sir Mark Sykes) referred to something I had said about Syria, disclaiming political ambitions of our own with regard to Syria, which he said had been quoted in the French Chamber. As far as I recollect this quotation, it was perfectly accurate, and the quotation made in the French Chamber was a quotation of something I had said, and I adhere to that entirely. The reason of its being said was not that we were engaged in any discussion as to whether the Asiatic provinces of Turkey were to be divided into separate spheres of action. The reason for it being said was that at that particular time there had been statements which had received somewhat wide circulation in the French Press that there were British agents travelling in Syria engaged in fomenting a political agitation, the object of which was that Syria should become a British possession, in other words fomenting a political agitation in Syria to further British political interests and that we were engaged in pegging out in Syria a sort of sphere for ourselves. There was no truth whatever in those statements. They did not only represent the facts, but they did not represent our own policy in any way, and I gave the most unqualified denial to them. France, of course, has had for years past certain economic interests to consider in the form of railways, and for us to have embarked on a policy of trying to convert Syria into a British sphere of interest would no doubt have been an unfriendly policy towards existing French economic interests. But more than that, this course attributed to us would have been still more unfriendly to Turkey itself, and for that reason I gave it the most unqualified denial. But of course it does not follow that because we ourselves have no political ambitions in a particular place, or because we ourselves are not applying or have no intention of applying for special concessions in a particular part of the world, therefore we are responsible for concessions which are given to other people. As a matter of fact about the particular concessions in Syria of which the hon. Member opposite spoke I have not even enough knowledge to be able to endorse or reply to his criticism, and it follows from that naturally that I have no responsibility for it. Take that instance as regards Syria. I have nothing to correct in what I am reported to have said in regard to it, but I have given an explanation as to exactly what it meant. I will pass very lightly over the question of naval strength in the Mediterranean, because really it must be a sort of continuation of the Debate on the Naval Estimates, which again is to be continued subsequently, and can be dealt with fully and adequately then, if it has not already been dealt with, whereas the questions of foreign policy which have been raised obviously cannot be dealt with in a continuation of the Debate on the1 Navy Estimates. I will only on the question of Naval strength remind the House that the First Lord of the Admiralty has already stated that from the end of 1915 we are going to have a force of twelve large armoured ships—eight battleships and four armoured cruisers—with smaller vessels in the Mediterranean. Whatever other criticisms there may be to be made upon that, it cannot fairly be called abandoning the Mediterranean, because it is a very considerable force. But on the naval question generally I would say first of all, as, indeed, one of the hon. Members admitted, that you cannot have an excessive standard of naval strength everywhere. You cannot lay down such a standard for the Mediterranean by itself, that we should keep in the Mediterranean a force superior to all the other foreign ships in the Mediterranean—Austrian, French and Italian. You cannot do that; and if you cannot do that, what standard are you going to keep up? Your standard, obviously, must be a standard which would be equal to any probable combination you will be likely to have to meet. That is the first observation. The second observation I have to make is that it follows from that it is not true to state as an absolute unqualified truth that your naval strength is dependent upon foreign policy. Obviously the other side is true. Your foreign policy must depend very largely on your naval strength. If you are going to have an absolute standard superior to all the other European navies put together, it is clear that your foreign policy is comparatively simple. Supposing you find yourself at any given moment in such an unfortunate diplomatic situation that the whole of Europe is combined against you at once, you are still going to be able to defend yourself then. If you are not in that position, and if you are not going to have that kind of standard, your Foreign Secretary must adjust your foreign policy so that you will not at any given moment have combined against you navies which you are unequal to meet. I only make those remarks because I have so often heard it said that armaments depend upon policy. I think one must now and then assert what is at least as true on the other side, that policy must have some relation to armaments. I do not mean by that that it is necessary that we should get into diplomatic entanglements, or go the length of making our position absolutely dependent upon hard and fast alliances which may entail upon us hard and fast obligations, and which would make us lower our strength to such a point that we should depend, not merely upon a sane and progressive foreign policy, and a cordial foreign policy towards some foreign Powers, but that we should depend absolutely for things which are vital to ourselves, not upon our strength, but upon support being forthcoming at some particular moment from foreign Powers. But it must be borne in mind when the House deals with the question of foreign policy that you must have naval strength in mind, and that the House must expect that the Government of the day will preserve relations, and will continue to preserve relations, with the other Powers of Europe which will make it perfectly clear that we are not drifting into the position of having a possible combination of Powers which is greater than our own naval strength.
As to some of the questions of foreign policy which were raised, there are one or two of them I must put aside, because I cannot very well bring them within the terms of the Motion. It is a little difficult to get Persia within the four corners of the Motion, but if I were to spend a little time over it I might get an indirect case. China is still more remote. Sweden is also remote. I put those on one side and I concentrate on one point—our policy with regard to Turkey. Our policy with regard to Turkey is, now that the war is over, to use all our diplomatic influence to see that the integrity of the Turkish dominions is preserved. There is no financial boycott of Turkey at present. The hon. Member who moved the Motion spoke of the financial boycott. There never will be a financial boycott as far as we are concerned. Among other reasons, the Government in this country cannot boycott financially any other country because they do not control the finance of other countries. But the hon. Member who seconded the Motion spoke not of a financial boycott, but of a very large loan to which were set out some desirable conditions. That is not quite the same as a financial boycott. All that I can say is that we cannot go and press British financiers to lend money to Turkey because, in the first place, if it would not pay them, they would not listen to us, and they would decide for themselves whether it was going to be a good financial operation; and in the next place, we should incur a responsibility towards them if we had pressed them, and that we cannot do. If Turkey wants to borrow money, the British financiers must decide for themselves whether it is a financial operation in which in its commercial aspect they would desire to engage. But this I will say, that we have had a most explicit assurance from the Turkish Government during the last few weeks that they desire to put their own house in order, that they have no aggressive designs, in the sense of intending to rip up the peace again, and engage in a war of revanche in Europe, I believe that those assurances represent the real mind and intention of the present I Turkish Government. Therefore, as far as we are concerned, we, see no political objection why people who wish to lend money at the present moment for commercial reasons should not do so. That, I hope, disposes of the idea of financial boycott.
I never intended to suggest that England had boycotted Turkey financially.
I understood that, but, of course, the hon. Member who sits next to him and seconded the Motion, spoke of a very large loan which is not a British loan, but which really did apply to the same quarter as the hon. Member was thinking of when he used the words "financial boycott." The Turkish Government is aware that reforms are necessary to preserve the integrity of its Asiatic possessions. I cannot, any more than my hon. Friend behind me, go this evening into a detailed statement as regards Armenia, but the reform scheme for Armenia has advanced to this stage, now that I believe it has the consent of all European Powers, which is an essential matter, as well as that of the Turkish Government. I trust that very soon it will take concrete form, and when it does take concrete shape, and I am able to state to the House, what exactly the reforms consist of, which are the result of agreement between Turkey and the other Powers, I hope that it will be borne in mind that it is much more important to have a scheme of reform, under which, say, the Turkish Government takes two European inspectors, and employs them in vilayets in Armenia, and which has the good will of the Turkish Government, than to get a reform scheme which on paper looks much better, but which has not got the good will of the Turkish Government, because a reform scheme which has not got the good will of the Turkish Government is one which is only going to be operative in proportion to the force behind it, and the continuous pressure behind it, not on the part of one or two Powers, but of all the Powers of Europe. The reform scheme which has been arranged between the Powers of Europe, which has this good will of the Turkish Government, is a scheme which really is going to operate, and in this case I believe that the scheme when produced will be found, not only to be more satisfactory on paper than was expected, but that it will be one that has the good will of the Turkish Government, which is in a sense their scheme as well as the scheme of the European Powers, and which will at least be founded upon the fact that the present Turkish Government have realised how much they lost in Europe by bad Government in Macedonia, and in the territory if which they have now been deprived, and how essential it is that they should apply in their Asiatic affairs the lessons which they have learned in European Turkey. Therefore, we take it that the reforms must start with Turkish good will. I am glad to have the opportunity of explaining what has taken place with regard to the Ægean Islands. There is really nothing at which Mahomedan feeling ought to take offence because of the part we have played in the settlement which has taken place. The hon. Member who moved the Resolution called attention more particularly—and I was very grateful to him for doing so—to one or two things we have done which show that we are sensitive about Mahomedan feeling, because of the natural sympathy which everyone in this House ought to have with the legitimate sentiments and feelings of the vast number of Mahomedans who are subject to the Crown. The hon. Member who moved the Resolution said that we alone had protested and made representations with regard to the treatment of the Mahomedan minorities in some of those territories. We certainly have done that; how far other countries have done so, I cannot say, and I do not know that we were the only country, but we certainly did that on more than one occasion while the war was going on. The hon. Member referred to the fact that we were alone in making a Grant of money to Albania to relieve the distress which great affected the Mahomedans in Albania. In that case I believe it is true. Then, when we come to the question of the islands, I think the hon. Member who moved the Motion overlooked one point, which is that we have had to bear in mind the strategic effect which changes with regard to the Ægean Islands might have upon the Mediterranean. It is very germane to the terms of his Motion to consider the strategic effect which changes in the Ægean Islands might have upon the Mediterranean. We have borne that strategic position in mind, and we have used cur influence and got an agreement amongst the Powers that, whatever else may happen with regard to the Ægean Islands, none of those islands shall be permanently kept or maintained by any one of the Great Powers. We, of course, had in mind the strategic position, and we did not wish any changes to take place which in mind the strategic position. When we come to consider the settlement of the islands, I think the settlement ought to be considered as a whole. The hon. Member spoke as if the only thing involved was the handing over of these two islands, Mitylene and Khios, to Greece. That is not the real thing: that is not the way to put it. It was not a question of the islands being handed over to Greece, but of taking them away from Greece after Greece had taken the islands, which were largely Greek. Certain districts of Epirus have been taken away from Greece and are in the course of being given to Albania, which will be to a very large extent a Mahomedan State. I think Mahomedan feeling ought to be considered in that sense, and what we have done does not show any anti-Ma-homedan bias. I am speaking of the settlement, for which all the, Powers were responsible, and for which we are no more responsible than any other, and for which we are responsible as being in agreement with the other Powers.
With regard to the islands in Italian occupation the Powers were to decide, when the islands had been restored, what the destination of those islands would be. The Powers have decided that those islands are to go to Turkey, and that is not anti-Mahomedan. Then it has been decided that the island of Tenedos and the other, because they are so strategically important to Turkey, are not to remain with Greece, but are to revert to Turkey again. That shows consideration for Turkish and Mahomedan interests. After it has been decided by the Powers that the islands of Mitylene and Khios are not to be taken from Greece, it is not fair to quote that as an instance of an anti-Mahomedan decision of the Powers without remembering that it is merely part of a decision which I have divided into four parts of which two are decisions favourable to Turkey and the third shows no anti-Mahomedan bias and one is in favour of Albania. Where Mahomedan interests have to be considered they ought to be taken into account, and it is a great mistake to look at the question of these islands of Mitylene and Khios as if they were the only things, without bearing in mind that they are part of a settlement, and considered in relation to the other parts of the settlement as a whole. They do not show any anti-Turkish or anti-Mahomedan bias. The hon. Member who moved the Motion admitted that the islands of Mitylene and Khios are in the main Greek, and with regard to inhabitants, that is a strong prima facie case for being under Greek rule, but why did he urge they should not be under Greek rule? It was because, he said, they were so strategically important to Turkey. They are strategically important to Turkey, and it is precisely because if they were used in an offensive sense against Turkey that the Powers have laid down that the islands must be neutralised and are not to be fortified, and that Greece is not to make use of them in a sense hostile to Turkey, and that Greece is to take precautions to see that they are not made a nuisance to Turkey from the point of view of smuggling. We have taken as much interest as any Power in seeing that those conditions should be imposed with regard to Mitylene and Khios. I think it was the hon. Member who seconded who prophesied that all sorts of trouble would happen to Turkey, and that the possession of these islands by Greece would be a menace to Turkey in consequence of the use to which they would be put by Greece.
Positive stipulations were introduced, which Greece has willingly accepted and which ought to safeguard Turkey against any such use being made of these particular islands, and I will say this, and it shall be the last word I say on this question this evening: The prophecies which have been made with regard to the possession of these islands, the unfavourable prophecies as to them being used as a centre of smuggling, as a centre of political agitation, and that they are being fortified and likely to become a base hostile to Turkey, and are being wholly administered in a sense offensive to Turkish interests—I say at once, not only is that entirely contrary to the intentions of the parties to this settlement, but stipulations have been introduced into the settlement to guard against that, and I believe not only with regard to this Government, but any future British Government, if that turned out to be so in the future, our sympathy would be on the side of whatever measures would be suggested to secure that the possession of those islands by Greece shall be one which ensures the welfare of the population no doubt in the sense of a homogeneous population under a homogeneous Government, and which also ensures that they are not used in a sense offensive to Turkey. I trust that if any of these prophecies seem likely to be realised, the Powers who have been parties to the settlement will intervene to see that the evils which are now prophesied do not occur, but that Turkey shall be protected against the consequences which the Powers did not intend to flow from the settlement at which they have arrived and against which they have taken precautions by the stipulations which they have induced Greece to accept in the settlement.
I share the astonishment of the right hon. Gentleman at the almost infinite capacity of this Resolution. As my hon. Friends developed their arguments in the most interesting speeches to which we have listened, I was somewhat reminded of the conjuror who produces from a hat miscellaneous articles which are not usually associated with that article of wear. It was obviously quite impossible for even the Foreign Secretary, with all the weight that he carries in this House and in Europe, to attempt to cover the whole of the ground. He had to confess that it was impossible within the limits of the time available to cover both aspects of this question, even as it affects the Mediterranean, and he dealt, very naturally, mainly with the diplomatic aspect. I propose in the few minutes that I shall speak to deal mainly with the other aspect of the question, the naval aspect, because I cannot endorse the suggestion made by the Foreign Secretary that the naval policy of the Government in regard to the Mediterranean had been fully and adequately dealt with during the recent Debate on the Navy Estimates. The right hon. Gentleman added that he did not hear that Debate. If he had done, I think he would have shared my view that the subject, so far from being adequately dealt with, was only dealt with in the most perfunctory fashion in a very few words by the First Lord of the Admiralty, and that the assurances given were of the most fragmentary and unsatisfactory character. The hon. Member for Pembroke (Major Guest), in a speech earlier this evening, put forward a somewhat novel theory. He suggested that it was hardly worth while for us to maintain our position in the Mediterranean by either naval or military strategy, because as long as we were supreme in the North Sea, having "mopped up" any possible opposition there, we could go down and maintain our position in the Mediterranean. If that argument is carried to its logical conclusion, it is obviously superfluous to maintain any force at all in the Mediterranean. The garrisons at Malta and Gibraltar might be sent home, the exiguous Fleet which is now allotted to the Mediterranean could be withdrawn, and it is merely inviting disaster to leave forces there which are too weak to carry out the duties that they might have to perform.
I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman that at the present stage of naval development in the world, it would be impossible for us to aspire to have a complete naval command of every sea, nor do I think it has been suggested from this side of the House that our Fleet in the Mediterranean ought always to be maintained at a two-Power standard. But I think the right hon. Gentleman himself laid it down on a previous occasion that we ought to maintain a one-Power standard in the Mediterranean. I do not want to father that statement upon him if he did not make it, but I have a recollection that at one time he said that. I venture to say that that is the very mini mum which could be of any conceivable use, because if we have not a fleet which is as strong as any other single fleet in the Mediterranean it is perfectly useless. A fleet which is so weak as to be unable in the case of war to compete successfully with even one possible enemy is no good. After all, the combinations which can possibly take place are very few. My hon.
Friend the Member for Hull, who seconded the Resolution, spoke with great appreciation of the value of the entente. I am sure that we all agree with what he said. But it is folly for us to suppose that we can rely upon our friendship with France or Russia for the maintenance of our position in the Mediterranean. It is quite true that France may have a formidable fleet in those waters. It is also quite true that that fleet—every ship of it—would, in a certain contingency be absolutely employed in maintaining communications between Algeria and France. The advantage that we get from the entente in the Mediterranean is not the positive advantage of any assistance that it might bring to us in a naval sense; it is a negative advantage. We no longer have to consider the French fleet as a possible factor against us in that region in the case of war. It is wrong, however, to suppose that we can count upon the naval assistance of the French in the Mediterranean in the event of a European war. I would remind the House that a very interesting statement in regard to this matter appeared only the other day in the "Westminster Gazette." That paper in a leading article dealt with this subject, and the argument was elaborated that in order to save us from Continental militarism— quid pro quo in the shape of military assistance on the Continent. Whether we shall do that or not I do not propose to discuss to-night; but it is clear from the Debate the other day that the plans of the Government in regard to the possible employment of our Expeditionary Force on the Continent have undergone a great change since last year. The argument put forward by the "Westminster Gazette" disposes at once of the favourite excuse put forward by hon. Members on the other side who are in favour of the reduction of our armaments that we could count upon French assistance in those waters. It further, I contend, establishes an overwhelming case for our establishment of a. Mediterranean Fleet, and for carrying out fully the pledge given by the Colonial Secretary in regard to our position in those waters. In this new grouping of the Powers we have further anxieties in a naval sense in the Mediterranean, for there now has to be considered the rapidly growing fleets of Italy and Austria. We do not, of course, contemplate any differences of opinion with either of these countries. We are on the most friendly relations with both of them. We cannot, though, ignore the fact that they are both in the Triple Alliance. In the event of strife between the Triple Alliance and the Dual Alliance we cannot assume that because Italy and Austria are our friends in a general sense that their fleets can be absolutely ignored, and because of the present position in the Mediterranean, that we can afford to leave our Possessions there—Malta, Gibraltar, Egypt, the route to India, the trade routes, etc.—absolutely dependent upon the good will of those two Powers which are bound together in the operations of the Triple Alliance. There was a very significant statement published only a short time ago by Count Von Reventlow, the greatest and best known naval publicist in Germany, with regard to this very point. His argument is, I venture to say, sound. He wrote an article for the benefit of the Italians, and he said:— in the most perfunctory manner in the course of his speech yesterday. I do think what he proposes to do, even if he was able, which he will not be, when the time comes, to send down to the Mediterranean a Fleet which would be manifestly inferior to the fleets of either Italy or Austria, and which would not be merely up to the one-Power standard in the sense of being able to deal with the strongest single-Power in the Mediterranean, but would be inferior in strength to the Austrian fleet, the second naval Power in these waters, would be simply making a present of that squadron to the enemy in the event of war, and it would be far more legitimate in those circumstances to send no fleet at all. I repeat again that the Government's naval policy in the Mediterranean appears to us to be absolutely inexplicable on strategic grounds, and still more so in view of the very precise pledge to which we have referred in previous Debates, and which has been quoted again to-night. The Government, through the Colonial Secretary, announced formally to the world they were going to maintain their position in the Mediterranean to as full an extent as they have ever done. I only wish to say this, and it is my last word, that it is my opinion that these arrogant boasts which you make on the one hand, followed by these feeble surrenders of our position shortly afterwards, have done more to encourage the growth of competitive armaments than any other cause.
In view of the answer which, in some points, has proved satisfactory, I beg the leave of the House to withdraw my Resolution.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
Slate Quarries and Slate Mines (Minimum Wage) Bill
Order for Second Reading read.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."
This is a Bill which the hon. Gentleman who moved it has not explained to the House. Fortuately, I have provided myself with a copy of it, and therefore I may be able to learn from reading the Bill, what the provisions of it are. The Bill says on the outside of it, that it is to provide for the establishment of Boards for fixing a minimum wage for workers in slate quarries and slate mines, and incidental matters. I do not know what grounds the hon. Member has for moving a Bill which will enact that a minimum wage shall be established in slate quarries and slate mines. I always myself have had a very great objection to the principle of establishing a minimum wage for adult male labour. I do not know whether, at the present moment, I have sufficient time in which to go into all the arguments upon which my objections are founded, but I think I might put them very shortly. They are these: It may be well, I think it is, to provide for the State to regulate hours of labour. I do not know about the wages. I can quite see it is fair, in the case of children and, to a certain extent, women, on the ground that they are not able to look after themselves. But adult male labour in this country, at the present moment, is certainly well capable of looking after itself. In fact, I do not know anybody, unless it is the association to which my hon. and learned Friends belong, the Association of the Bar, so capable of looking after themselves as ordinary male adult labour. I see certain hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway who are connected with labour. I do not think they will deny that the facts I have advanced are perfectly correct.
Supply
Navy Estimates, 1914–15
Considered in Committee.
Postponed Proceeding resumed on Question. "That 151,000 officers, seamen, and boys be employed for the Sea and Coastguard Services for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1915, including 18,700 Royal Marines."
Committee report progress; to sit again to-morrow (Thursday).
The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.
Valuation of Property
I beg to move, "That this House do now adjourn."
11.0 P.M.
I wish to bring before the House a few cases of hardship arising in connection with the valuation and assessment of duty on small property under the Finance (1909–10) Act, 1910, commonly called the People's Budget. My object in referring to these matters is to make it clear to the House in what respects small property owners have been harassed in the practical working of the People's Budget. Hon. Gentlemen on the other side, I know, are under the impression that we have exaggerated that matter. They think there is no cause for the alarm which has been occasioned, and I propose this evening to bring two or three cases before the House to show in a practical way the cause which owners of small property have for being alarmed. It has occasioned the withdrawal by them of capital from land, and is causing the disappearance, I may say, of the small investor in house property.
The cases I am about to quote have all been mentioned in questions addressed to the Chancellor of the Exchequer this afternoon. The first is a case from Richmond, in Yorkshire. There was a man, Thomas Benson, who died in 1899, leaving property of the total value of £451. Of that £347 was the value of cottage property. He was a thrifty man who had invested the whole of his savings in cottage property. The rest of his estate consisted merely of cash, furniture, and an investment in a building society. On his death the executors carried in these accounts to Somerset House, valuing the whole property at £451, £347 being given as the value of the cottage property. That valuation was objected to by the new Valuation Department of the Chancellor o£ the Exchequer, which is costing, under the Estimates for the present year, £800,000. That Department placed a value on the cottage property of £715, more than double the value sworn to by the executors. They were threatened with legal proceedings if they did not accept that valuation, and, under threat, they were forced to accept it and to pay a sum of between £13 and £14 additional duty. Three years later they sold the property by public auction, and instead of fetching £715—the value placed upon it by the new valuation department—it realised only £295. The executors thereupon applied to Somerset House for a return of the excess duty paid under threat of legal proceedings. A new valuation was made by Somerset House, and the value was reduced to £540—nearly double the value which it fetched at public auction. The executors offered to pay duty on £347—the value they themselves had placed on the property, and I should have thought they would have been fully justified in offering to pay duty only on the price which the property fetched. That is the position at the present time. Somerset House declines to reduce the valuation below £540. I addressed a question to the Chancellor of the Exchequer this afternoon, and he replied that he saw no reason to reopen the matter. He said that the property had deteriorated in value. That is quite true, it had deteriorated from £347, the value placed on it by the executors, to £295, but not from £715, the valuation of the Government Department. That is the position at the present time. This property was left to the widow. Most men when they die leave their property to their widows, but if a man thinks he is going to leave in store for his widow and children the troubles that seem to be in store for them now, it will be no wonder if this class of persons withdraw their money from this form of investment. So much for that case.
I have three other cases to mention, and I do not wish to dwell on them longer than is necessary. The second case was also mentioned at Question time, It was the case of a widow at Tamworth. She bought—a few years ago—a small cottage and small garden under the value of £16 a year. She was requested to send in a Form IV. She did not know how to fill it in, and she did not consult her solicitor, but she filled it in to the best of her ability and sent the form in. Last year—in 1913— it was found that there was mineral under the cottage, and a neighbouring colliery company offered her £5 14s. for the purchases of the minerals. This she gladly accepted, thinking it would all go into her pocket. Last month, however, the local valuation officer seat her in a claim for 20 per cent. Increment Duty on the £5 14s. on the ground she had not included it in her statement on Form IV. It was, no doubt, a very small sum, but had this woman known the law she would not have sent in the Form IV. She would have torn it up and put it into the fire, and then she would not have been in the hole in which she now finds herself, because the form was illegal. It was only because she honestly attempted to fill it in that the Government are now able to take advantage of her act and require her to pay this Increment Duty. I say no more about that case.
The third case is that of Dean Farm, Stourmouth, Kent, and is also the case of a widow. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] Widows are the most defenceless people. They are entitled to ask for sympathy. They are more likely to be imposed on, and we find that they are more often imposed on. That is the reason why their cases come before me and the Land Union, and it is fortunate for them that the Land Union exists. Dean Farm belongs to a widow. It was bought by her father a good many years ago for £8,600. It has gone down very much in value, and three or four years ago she attempted to sell it by auction. A reserve price of £5,500 was placed on the property, but it was not sold. Last year she was fortunate in selling it, because it was found that there were some minerals under the property, and she sold them for £1,800, the farm, or the surface, being sold for £3,650, so that she got £5,650 for this farm which her father had bought for £8,600. There was a mortgage on the farm, and she had to pay that off. This was her sole source of income. After she had sold the farm, the Land Valuation authorities informed her that she, like the Tamworth widow, had neglected to state in Form IV. the value of the minerals under the property, and that she would have to pay £360 Increment Value Duty. That is more than two years' income this lady possesses. She sold the farm at a loss of £3,150. and the Valuation Department call upon her to pay more than two years' income out of the purchase money as increment. Of course, if this lady, like the widow at Tamworth, instead of filling up her Form IV. to the best of her ability, had put it on the fire, she would not have been in a hole. The Chancellor of the Exchequer this afternoon was asked if he would allow her to make her return now as to the value of the minerals. He replied that he would give no answer because there was another case on this subject which was before the courts, and the matter must be left until that case was decided. This poor woman, like all the others, has to do something. She has either to resist the claim or pay it. In all these cases it is not so much the amount of the tax they have to pay, but they have either to pay a tax which they know is unjust or to resist it, and be dragged up to the House of Lords and lose their whole fortune.
The fourth case is one from Glasgow. Again it is the case of a widow. This is the worst case of all. This property belonged to two ladies who lived in Ireland. It is a small property, and they were fortunate in selling it in 1912 for £1,200. Having sold it they discharged a mortgage of £1,000 out of the purchase money, with arrears of interest and costs, and they had practically nothing for themselves. Having done that, and thought they were clear of everything, a claim is then made on these ladies for £134 Increment Duty. Having sold the property for £1,200, paid off the mortgage, which was also charged on one property worth £600, a claim is made upon them. They inquire why this claim is made on them, and they are told that the property, having been sold in 1912 for £1,200, has in the year 1913 been valued by the official valuer at £478. The official valuer had full knowledge when he made that valuation that the property had been sold for £1,200. Nowithstanding that, he places that value on it with that full knowledge, and demands £132. Of course, the ladies said that they were unable to pay, and they appealed to the Referee, Mr. Binney, who pointed out to them that had they had legal advice they might perhaps have been in a somewhat better position, and possibly claimed what is called substituted site value under one of the Sections of the Act, and, in giving his decision, he used these words:— classes in the past, because they have practically housed themselves. Two-thirds of the cottage property in this country belongs to the artisan and working classes. All those difficulties arise from the technical character of this scheme. It is not so much the Duty that they have to pay, although that is bad enough, but it is the papers which are flung at them, and the impossibility of understanding them, and the few instances I have given and the remarks of Mr. Binney will, I hope, make it clear what the difficulties are of this class of people and that they have ample and sufficient reasons for being frightened at investing their earnings in future in that class of property.
This is, after all, only another rehearsal of the case against the Land Taxes which we heard put at its highest value and answered completely on the Debate on the Address. Some of these cases are the same cases. It would not be surprising if, when you start a new system of taxation, you might be able to find some hard cases incidental to the difficulties of enforcing the taxes. In this particular matter the hon. Member, after a great deal of research, found cases, which, I am sorry to say, he has stated most unfairly.
I must ask in what respect I have stated the cases unfairly. The hon. Member has made a charge against me.
If I could not substantiate that, I would gladly apologise to the hon. Gentleman. I have only ten minutes to reply, and I cannot go fully into all the cases. Take the Glasgow case of widow Ellen Toye and A. Cassidy, who had got property valued at £1,200. It was sold in 1912 for that amount, and the hon. Member stated that they actually valued it in 1913 at £478. The statement was received with jeers and laughter. But he did not say that the value ascertained in 1913 was not the value the property had in 1912 or 1913, but in April, 1909.
was understood to say that he did make that statement.
If the hon. Member said so, I did not hear him. If the hon. Member says that he made that statement I apologise to him most profoundly. I gladly accept what the hon. Member now says, and I am sorry for what I said. I will give him other instances. Another thing that he omitted to say was that between 1909, when this property was supposed to be worth £478, and the time when Increment Value Duty was charged upon it, a new factory had come upon the scene, and this property had gone up enormously in value in a way that was absolutely unforeseen at the time. In fact these ladies themselves stated for Death Duties in 1910 that the property was worth absolutely nothing. The buildings on it were worthless and it was only because the factory extension occurred in the interval that they were able to sell it at all. This is the kind of windfall that the Increment Value Duty was imposed for, and that is one of the fairest examples of its working.
I now come to deal with the Dean Farm case. Ever since these taxes were first started they shelter themselves behind widows and orphans. Here is exactly the same sort of case. This was land which was worth a great deal more in 1868 than now. But quite recently, as the hon. Member knows, coal has been discovered, or is said to have been discovered, in Kent. It is only in the last few years that mineral rights there have become marked. It was for this windfall that Increment Duty was demanded, and the lady sold it for £3,150 less than her father bought it for in 1868. But if it had not been for this windfall of minerals which were discovered under the soil she would have sold it for £4,900 less than her father paid for it in 1868. With regard to the Tamworth case, I do not think that the hon Member treated the answer given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer this afternoon quite fairly. That is the case in which it may well have been that the minerals were there when the valuation was made, that it was an oversight, and that the Commissioners may in accordance with the section permit a revaluation; and he was told that this case was under consideration of the Commissioners, and that the application only came in on the 12th of this month. I do not think it fair to judge until we have made a complete investigation of this case. So we are left with the last ease of all, the case of Richmond, where it is suggested that £715 was the value put upon it by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, and that it was sold for £295. It was sold for £295 some years afterwards Seven hundred and fifteen pounds was the provisional valuation which was accepted.
Under threat of legal proceedings.
No. The £715 was a provisional valuation under the Budget of 1909.
No.
I assure the hon. Member he is wrong. When the Death Duties came to be paid, because the provisional valuation under the Budget had never been objected to, the Commissioners of Inland Revenue suggested it should be taken as a basis for Death Duties. They objected, and eventually the property was sold for £295. They paid the duty. In the light of what had happened, the Commissioners agreed to reduce the valuation to £540, and the difference in duty was refunded. The hon. Member was told this afternoon that in the time between the valuation and sale of the property there was dilapidation. Requirements had been made under the Housing and Town Planning Act to carry I out certain repairs in order to make the house habitable. These had not been carried out, and therefore there had been great depreciation of value. In this case they probably valued the land too high when it suited the taxpayer, and low when a low valuation told in his favour. The taxpayer was given a most generous revaluation. The fact is that it is an astonishing thing that, in view of the value of property is as such as is shown by the remunerative sales that take place from day to day, in face of the talking and calumny which has been carried on by hon. Members opposite.
It is a very remarkable thing that the hon. Gentleman commenced his speech by saying that it was obvious that in starting a new fiscal system there must be a certain number of hard cases which would arise, I thought by his observations that he was going to deal with those particular cases which had been brought forward by my hon. Friend, and that he would give cases of that sort, hard cases, which it was impossible to avoid. But as he developed his argument—and I congratulate him on the amount of force and fervour that he has already brought to his new duties—he charged my hon. Friend with having made a considerable number of misstatements, and as I followed his argument it was not that there are many hard cases, or that any of them are hard cases, but that they all perfectly right and proper cases; though in each case the hon. Member did not answer the real grievances brought by the hon. Member for the Sleaford Division, namely, that very hard exactions were made from very poor people in cases where it could only be discovered by a sort of statutory means that there had been any increment at all.
It being half-past Eleven of the clock. ME. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
Adjourned at Half after Eleven o'clock