I beg to move, in Sub-section (1), to leave out the words "being a British subject but not being," and to insert instead thereof the words "not being an alien enemy nor."

I did not reply.

At any rate, the reasons which he gave in anticipation of criticism. He said that on two occasions it had been difficult to distinguish the nationality of men who had been arrested under the Act. In two cases enemy aliens had tried to shelter themselves under a false nationality. I confess I do not understand the basis on which you try even an enemy alien by martial law, because I suppose the civil tribunals of England are probably not prejudiced more in their favour than martial tribunals. Really it does not seem to me to be a good enough reason, because there are two cases where enemy aliens have tried to pretend that they belonged to allied or friendly countries, to deny to the subjects of other countries—Dutch, Scandinavian, American, French, Russian, Belgian, and Servian citizens—the appeal to the Civil Courts which they would have had but for the War and this legislation. I think the Government would do wisely if, having agreed to restore their civil rights to British citizens, they also agreed to restore, except in the case, of enemy aliens, the rights which aliens have hitherto had—to make a thorough change and restore civil rights all round.

This question was glanced at in the Debate on Second Reading, and with a great deal that my hon. Friend has said, or at any rate with the spirit in which he has said it, I should find myself in hearty agreement. Still, I must ask the Committee to consider whether we should not in this respect keep the Bill as it is. There are some changes which it appeal's to me, as a result of the Second Reading Debate and other criticisms, it will be well to introduce, but this change is one which, viewing it as fairly as I can and with no prejudice against the right of being tried by jury, I ask the Committee not to make. As long as you are prepared to take this broad ground, that everybody is to exercise the right of being tried by judge and jury without question, there is obviously no reason why you should distinguish between alien and British subjects. That is the condition of things under which in ordinary times we live, and the sooner we get back to that state of things the better we shall all be pleased. That is right enough. But I do not think that my hon. Friend really suggests—indeed, his Amendment shows that he does not—that we are so to change this Bill as to substitute for British subjects anybody of any nationality. On the contrary, what he proposes is that we should exclude from the operation of this Clause subjects of enemy states, but that instead of limiting it to British subjects we should include also foreigners so long as they are not subjects of enemy states.

The Attorney-General has been as clear and lucid as he always is; I think he has been so clear that he has shown that he has not got any reasons for adhering to the limitation to British subjects in the Bill. The general principle of the Bill is that the accused person shall have the option to be tried by the ordinary Civil Court if he exercises that option within four days. To that general principle the Bill introduces a limitation that this option should only be exercised by a British subject. Why has that limitation been introduced? What is the reason the Government had in their mind in introducing this limitation? It cannot be in the nature of the offence. It cannot be the intention to punish the alien by having him tried by court-martial, because I should have thought that if there was any difference in the nature of the offence as committed by an alien and as committed by a British subject the balance would lie against the British subject; it would be a much worse offence when committed by a British subject than when committed by an alien. A British subject would be guilty of a double offence; he would be guilty of a breach of" these regulations, and of the far more heinous offence of disloyalty and treachery to the country to which he owed allegiance. Of that aggravated act the alien would not be guilty. If he is an alien I think he cannot be guilty of that kind of treachery.

My hon. Friend is really mistaken about that. An alien who lives in this country comes under our law and therefore might be guilty of treason. I think a statement like that of my hon. Friend, made in the House of Commons, might have a most deleterious effect.

The word "treason" was rather put in my mouth for the moment. It was not the word I used originally. I used the word "treachery" or "betrayal." In the case of an alien to act as a spy or to endeavour to injure this country is understandable. In the case of a British subject the endeavour to commit the same offence is really much more heinous and blameworthy. I do not think the Attorney-General will dispute that. If there is any discrimination between the character of the offence the utmost opprobrium should be reserved for the British subject who is guilty. If that is not the reason why this limitation is introduced, what is the reason? There was, I think, only one suggestion of a reason in the remarks which the Attorney-General made, and that was for expedition. Now that would be valid, I think, against this particular Amendment which introduces a further discrimination between different kinds of aliens, but it would not be valid against the Amendment which appears a little further down on the Paper which would leave that option open to all accused persons without any distinction whatever. If the object of the Government is expedition, then undoubtedly that object would best be served by giving this option to all accused persons whatsoever, and not seeking to ascertain whether they are British subjects or neutral aliens or enemy aliens. There arises the question: ought this right of option to be extended to enemy aliens? And there I ask, why not? What is the object in not extending it? Is it thought that it is a worse punishment to be tried by a court-martial than to be tried by an ordinary Civil Court?

No.

Then, I think, that may be dismissed. Indeed, I think all the interests of the alien enemy are to be secured by being tried by a court-martial. If he were tried by an ordinary Civil Court, with a jury, undoubtedly the great public prejudice against enemy aliens at this time—a necessary prejudice—would necessarily militate against his having a fair trial. That fact being obvious, it would be perfectly safe to leave him the option of saying which Court he would be tried by. Under 1hese circumstances, I am sure no enemy alien would exercise the option at the present time of being tried by a jury; he would certainly accept trial by court-martial. I do not think the Attorney-General has really made clear what is the object of the Government in introducing this limitation. It cannot be in order to inflict a severer punishment, and it cannot be to secure expedition. The Attorney-General has thrown no light upon it so far, and I hope that before the discussion on this Amendment is ended, he may be induced to accept the Amendment a little later on the Paper to leave the option open to all persons without exception. I hope the Attorney-Genera will either accept that Amendment or will explain what is the reason which weighs with the Government in introducing this limitation into what is otherwise a very clear principle of the Bill.

The hon. Gentleman opposite moved this Amendment in the interest of liberty. I think the first liberty we ought to enjoy is the liberty to dispense with the spies who come over here, that we should have the right to go about without fear of bombs, without fear of railway bridges being exploded, and other matters of that kind. Therefore, I think that those who support the Government in maintaining the Bill as it stands are standing up for the primary liberties of the subject. With regard to prisoners being court-martialled, I think those who are in favour of a jury are against the foreigner. When I was younger I prac- tised a good deal before courts-martial, and a fairer tribunal could not be conceived. If I had to be tried for my life I would prefer to be tried by court-martial, and the suggestion that these foreigners who come over here and are charged with doing matters against the public interests would get fairer treatment before a jury is the most absurd suggestion.

I suggested the opposite.

I really believe the Government, in taking the line they are taking, in restoring to the citizens of this realm the right of trial by a jury of their countrymen, are acting wisely, but I wish to say for myself, in regard to the suggestion that we were not aware of the effects of the original Act, so far as I am concerned that is not so. We knew very well what the Government were about. We knew very well what the powers of the Government would be, and for my part I heartily endorse those powers. I think it only right to say that some cases of very great difficulty have come before courts-martial, and, almost without exception, the law has been strained in favour of the accused, and acquittals have, in the main, resulted from those court-martial tribunals. I think it only right to say that of the soldiers who are dealing with these grave matters. But there is one point I would like to make, and I hope the Government will give it respectful consideration. I should like to see those men who are tried before a court-martial prosecuted by an expert—that is to say, by a lawyer. That is really the protection to which these men are entitled, because it is absurd to say that, however fair a military or a naval man may be, he knows the law and will apply it in the same spirit.

In the serious cases that have come to my notice I think I may say, without exception, that course has been followed. The military authorities have asked that they might have the assistance of the Department, and I have myself in several cases nominated some expert in criminal law who has not only presented himself for the purpose of taking the proceedings, but has examined the matter beforehand in order to be sure that the material is in proper order to be presented.

I quite agree that in England that is so, but the Treasury does not allow us the luxury of lawyers in Ireland. So far as I have watched the proceedings, the prosecutions in Ireland have been conducted, I think I am right in saying, in every case by military men. A pledge was solemnly made to us by the then Prime Minister, the present Member for the City of London (Mr. Balfour), with regard to the examination of prisoners in their own defence, that the Act would only be applied to England, whereas in Ireland the prisoner has been examined and cross-examined against the public pledge. It may be it is right; it may be you have a very long list of rules you have made in which you have extended to Ireland the Prisoners' Evidence Act. If so, it is against public right; it should not have been done, and, in my opinion, there were special reasons why we resisted that. I think the Mover and supporters of the Amendment are mistaken, but I think they are right to claim for the three Kingdoms that the lawyer in really serious cases should have charge of the matter. I think it only fair to the Government to say that, in the difficult circumstances in which they are placed in the administration of justice under this Act, in my opinion sufficient justice has been done in every case.

The hon. and learned Gentleman has rather reversed the historic part, because he rose to bless the Government, and in the most important part of his speech, to some of us, he made use of very keen and trenchant criticism as to the methods of martial law. Therefore, I am sure, even people who do not agree understand the point of view of those of us who are anxious, as far as possible, to restore civil jurisdiction in these matters, and to limit, so far as is consistent with public safety, the operation of martial law. The Attorney-General to-day, with transparent clearness, gave at greater length the argument which he gave the other day in introducing this Bill. I think we may reasonably conclude that if we find the same argument used twice by my right hon. Friend, and no other argument, that that exhausts his treasury of reasons on this particular matter. His one argument was that there might be difficulty in ascertaining whether a person of foreign appearance, and none too English a name, was or was not an alien enemy or an alien friendly or neutral. I think the Committee would admit that that argument, so far as it goes, is not only true, but legitimate; but does it go far enough to justify the Government in depriving the subjects of allied and neutral States of that protection of the ordinary Civil law of this country which they have hitherto enjoyed, and which now we are most grateful to the Government for restoring, at any rate to some extent, to His Majesty's subjects themselves? Of course, in discussing this Amendment—in discussing, in fact, any Amendment to a Bill of this kind—it is quite impossible to empty the mind completely of consideration of other Amendments which appear on the same point. There are Amendments on the Paper which, if adopted by the Government, would give power to the Government to have such persons tried, not necessarily by a jury, but by a special commission, and what I think many of us in this House desire, and apparently some very eminent legal authorities elsewhere, is that the Civil law should be generally interpreted by men whose lives have been given to the work in Courts presided over by men who are the leading authorities on criminal procedure.

I cannot quite agree with the attitude taken up on these questions by the hon. Member for Middleton (Sir Ryland Adkins) and I confess that my sympathies are more with the hon. Member for the Bridgeton Division (Mr. MacCallum Scott). I agree that the real alternative in this matter is British subjects or everybody. I cannot help feeling great repugnance at any attempt to establish two forms of justice, even as an emergency measure, that is a higher form for a British subject and a lower form for alien enemies. It is not a question of coming back to Civil tribunals or anything of that kind, but it is the distinction of having these two forms of justice at the same time which is rather objectionable to me. I agree with the Attorney-General that you have just as good a chance of obtaining justice from a Military Court as from a jury, but if that is so what is the reason for this proposal? It is thought that this Amendment would be some concession to the view that a British judge and jury is, on the whole and on the balance, a better tribunal for the administration of criminal justice to civilians than a Military Court. The hon. Member who has just spoken holds that view. The conception is that an alien enemy is an enemy altogether, and is not entitled to the same degree of justice.

No.

Then I do not understand the hon. and learned Gentleman's position.

When you are dealing with an alien enemy measures appropriate to war are more defensible than when you are dealing with persons in a state of complete peace in this country.

Does the hon. Member think they are more just in the one case than in the other?

Equally just but adapted respectively for the different cases.

I think it is even more objectionable to submit the subject of a friendly or a neutral State to a less satisfactory form of trial. I do not wish to say anything derogatory regarding Military Courts. I agree with the Attorney-General who said, with great force, that you may have considerable difficulty in proving that a man is a British subject, and you may easily have a mis-trial. If you do have such distinctions as these you ought to be quite sure whether the man is the subject of a friendly State or not, because it may turn out that he is not, and the proceedings would be void altogether. There would be great difficulties and delays, and I am not quite sure that those difficulties will not arise, even when you come to the British subjects. It will not be quite so easy to prove that a man is or is not a British subject. The British Empire is enormous and contains many nationalities, and history furnishes us with a celebrated international case of a man who was a British subject whom nobody would ever guess to be a British subject, either by his appearance or his language. I think you will have those difficulties under the compromise which has been suggested, and the only way to avoid them is to make the rule apply to everybody—enemy and alien. I quite understand the difficulty of this, and such a change would undoubtedly be open to considerable animadversion and some would be shocked at the suggestion that you were going to allow alien enemies at this juncture to be tried by a Civilian Court. I can well understand that there might be circumstances where it would be wrong to do so, and I hope the Government will not weaken that Clause of the Bill. If you are going to have for different parts of the country not subject to military emergency any relaxation of the existing Act, I am not convinced of the wisdom of that policy. If you do go so far, I am inclined to think that the proper course is not this Amendment which we are discussing but the one which the hon. Member for the Bridgeton Division has referred to, namely, the extension of this right to all persons who come before the Criminal Court.

The case for this Amendment has been put so clearly by the Mover and Seconder that it is not necessary for me to pursue the matter, and I wish to traverse only one or two observations made by the Attorney-General. The right hon. Gentleman has spoken in a manner which is distinctly novel from the Front Ministerial Bench. We have hitherto been assured most solemnly that all alien enemies are known and registered. The country at the present moment is sharply divided into registered alien enemies and those who are not, and it is amazing to hear that the practical difficulty lies in administering that distinction rather than in administering the quite new distinction between British subjects and the members of a neutral State. I want to enforce the observations made by the Noble Lord who spoke last. It is extraordinary to hear that a British subject is so easily recognised when you see him. You get people with Teutonic names who are citizens of Canada or Australia, and it would take them a long time to establish the fact that they are British subjects. I want to urge that having divided the country into sheep and goats the Government should adhere to that distinction. They really cannot come down here and tell us "we have become experts in distinguishing between sheep and sheep," and to ask us to distinguish between sheep and goats is too high an intellectual effort for us. The distinction is there already, and the Amendment we are suggesting will continue that distinction in existence. Surely there is this safeguard, that the onus of proof must rest with the claimant. When a man is tried he is told that he is entitled to come before a jury or a Military Court provided he can prove under the Amendment that he is a British subject, and so long as he cannot prove that he remains in custody. What, therefore, is the danger? It seems to me the fact that the onus of proof rests with the claimant is a complete safeguard against throwers of bombs, who seem to frighten the hon. and learned Member opposite.

Why "frighten"!

I must have misinterpreted the observations of the hon. and learned Member opposite. I thought he argued in favour of a trial by a Military Court giving some particular immunity from the risk of bombs. That is how I understood his argument. I appeal to the Government that while they are extending rights in this way let them do it generously, and give the rights not only to our own subjects, but to the neutrals and to Allied persons who are in this country.

Equally from sentimental reasons I was anxious to extend this privilege to members of the States who are Allies with us, but after hearing the Attorney-General I am converted to the view the Government holds that this is a privilege which ought to be granted simply and solely to British subjects. To do otherwise would be both undesirable and inconvenient. The justification of this Bill, as I conceive it, is not that trial by court-martial is less just than trial by jury, but that trial before a Civil Court by a jury is, and has been for a great many years, an essentially British right, and is a right which should not be suspended until a strong case of necessity arises. This trial by jury, however, is not a right which extends all over the world, and is not a right which many of our foreign friends and enemies are in the habit of getting. Therefore, I say that to my mind the justification for this Bill is not that you are doing better justice by giving them a right to go before a jury instead of going before a court-martial, but that you are giving them a right, if they choose to exercise it, of claiming trial by jury. My Noble Friend, to my considerable astonishment, seemed to think that this British right of going before a jury should be extended not only to our alien friends, and not only to the subjects of States who are fighting with us, but also to alien enemies. For the first time almost in my recollection, I did not follow his logic. He seemed to have an underlying idea that courts-martial are not as good instruments for this purpose. If that is his meaning, I take issue with him, and I say that in cases of popular excitement which must necessarily arise courts-martial will administer at least as good justice as, and in many cases better justice than, a jury necessarily prejudiced or influenced by motives and excitement.

Then what is the purpose of the Bill?

I have already explained that. I say, "Give to those British subjects who choose it the right to have that form of trial which is essentially British," and I confine myself to that reason. Unless my Noble Friend is prepared to assert that you cannot get justice for anybody by court-martial, the whole foundation of his argument falls to the ground.

I very much regret that I did not hear the speech of the Attorney-General, but from such discussion as I have heard I gather that he dealt at some length with the point raised by the Amendment now before the Committee. When the hon. and learned Gentleman who has just sat down uses the word "privilege" with such insistence, I think we are entitled to remind the Committee that those who are supporting the Amendment do not ask for privileges, but appeal to the Government to restore a right to the citizens of this country which they have enjoyed for upwards of 600 years.

I certainly call it a right and not a privilege, and the people and citizens of this country get that right under this Bill.

The right hon. Gentleman is not in the habit of being impetuous, and if he had allowed me to finish I was just proceeding to say that even foreigners had enjoyed the same right as British subjects. For a very large number of years not only British subjects, but also foreigners resident in this country have enjoyed not the privilege, but the right to be tried by Civil Courts under similar conditions and in similar emergencies as obtain at the present time. We ask the Government to restore that right. The Government have felt themselves under the necessity of bringing in this Amending Bill primarily for the purpose of restoring a right that was taken away when the Act was passed under emergency conditions in the early stages of the War. Personally, whilst I should desire the Bill to be more comprehensive and inclusive than the terms of the Amendment which embraces our Allies and subjects of neutral States, I think the suggested compromise is reasonable and just. I sincerely hope that the Government will appreciate the point that we are not asking for privileges or favours. We ask that the rights we enjoyed prior to the War breaking out shall be restored not only to British subjects, but to subjects of our Allies and neutral States, and that they will at least make an honest attempt to maintain the traditions of this country so far as the administration of civil justice is concerned.

The discussion has ranged over two points—first, as to the form of trial, and secondly, as to who shall enjoy one form or the other. There is great force in the fact that trial by jury has been the established system in this country not merely for British subjects, but for aliens and even alien enemies. There was a departure from that in the Act which we are now seeking to amend. It is now proposed not only that the right of trial by jury should be restored to British subjects, but that it should also be restored to neutrals, and especially to our Allies. When the Defence of the Realm Act was under discussion, I ventured to say that I saw no objection to the extension of the right to alien enemies. There could be, as was pointed out then and as has been well pointed out to-day, no injury to the public interest in allowing the extension to alien enemies, because if an alien enemy chooses to accept trial by jury he goes before a tribunal which, in all probability, is more unfavourable to him than a court-martial.

I must confess that as regards this Amendment I have been convinced by the Attorney-General and the Noble Lord the Member for Hitchin (Lord It. Cecil) that there are practical difficulties in the way of it, and that the right thing as a matter of policy would be that all should be tried in the way prescribed. I feel some difficulty, because I understand that the Amendment which I have down to give effect to it, unless this Amendment is withdrawn, will not be in order. On the question of the general merits of this applying to all or none, I think the argument of the Attorney-General proved too much. I understood his argument was that he did not think an alien enemy should be tried in this way, because he would not get a fair trial before a jury. What would happen to an Englishman or a British citizen who was called up before a jury for this offence? He would be less likely to get justice than an alien enemy, for surely what would be repulsive to a jury in an alien enemy would be more repulsive still in a citizen of their own country. There was a point raised with regard to spies. We all feel, war being what it is, that spies should have a summary trial, but so far as I understand the law, and so far as I am told by people more experienced than myself, with the Defence of the Realm Act or not, a spy can still be tried by court-martial. He can be dealt with in the most summary way. Those who are in favour of this general civil trial by jury must not be accused of making any attack upon courts-martial. I know nothing about them, but the whole experience of courts-martial has been devoted to the discussion and the administration of military law which is well and clearly defined. Although the offences provided for in the Act are of the vaguest nature, they require most careful consideration, and surely there is nothing more likely to secure that than legal training. If legal training is to be treated as of any value at all, then why say that courts-martial conducted by officers of military experience are best able to deal with these cases? The Attorney-General seemed to assume that it was trial by jury, and that only, which we are seeking to get for everybody in this Clause. I agree that trial by jury is one of the most precious things of which we desire to obtain the restoration, but it is not only trial by jury we ask for We are asking for the whole of the safeguards which are associated with the procedure of our Civil Courts in connection with the taking and sifting of evidence. I should like to quote some words by Lord Chief Justice Cockburn on this point. The learned judge, charging a grand jury, said:—

"Those safeguards which are of the essence of justice, which have been found by experience to be necessary to prevent the rash conclusions and hasty judgments which men experienced in the administration of justice are at times liable to form—to prevent, what sometimes happens, innocence from being confounded with guilt, on appearances which a more thorough and patient investigation would be placed in a different light—safeguards more especially required in times of excitement and passion, when the minds of men are more apt to be led astray."

It seems to me that there is a good deal more sound than substance about this Debate. What we are concerned with to-day is not the theory of the constitution, but the practice of the Executive Government and its Courts under the exceptional circumstances of this terrible War. When the Lord Chief Justice uttered the words quoted by the last speaker, Great Britain was not at war, and it is the practical and not the theoretical considerations which—

Chief Justice Cockburn's charge was given at a time when there was a serious insurrection in Jamaica.

It was after the insurrection in Jamaica. In any case, there is all the difference between a petty revolt in a West Indian colony and the condition of things in Europe now. One cannot imagine that the Attorney-General would have taken the stand he has on this point if he had not been guided largely by the opinions of those Executive Departments which are most concerned. It is quite evident he spoke here with the approval—I do not say by the direction, for that is an offensive term—but with the approval of the Council of War and of the Lords of the Admiralty, and these are the people who can judge best what are the dangers of pressing an Amendment of this kind. I say the issue raised is theoretical rather than practical, because hon. Members opposite have tumbled over one another in stating that the administration of justice in courts-martial is every bit as fair, and probably more likely to favour the prisoner than in civil tribunals. There is not one who has alleged that justice would not be done by a court-martial.

I cannot follow the argument of the hon. Member who last spoke and who seems to think that it is a safeguard for the nation that any advantage which comes from the Civil Courts should be denied to those who offend against our law. I was not in the least surprised that the Noble Lord the Member for Hitchin (Lord Robert Cecil) should stand up for the traditions of liberty and justice of which we are so-proud, as I have heard him do it many time before; but I am astonished that lawyers in different parts of the House should be found to defend courts-martial as against Civil Courts, and I was especially astonished that the hon. and learned Member for North-East Cork (Mr. T. M. Healy) should have ranged himself on that side. I should have thought that he at any rate knew enough of the interference with the ordinary course of civil justice in his own country in past years to-be very jealous of its being aggravated in the case of anybody.

We can always pack a jury in Ireland.

I believe it was a very eminent man who said that court-martial law was no law at all, but that it was the abrogation of the ordinary law, and, if that be so, the less we have to do with it the better. The Civil Court, at any rate, is a court of justice. All I ask is that offenders against our laws should be tried by the Civil Courts, and I am entirely unconvinced by the arguments of the Attorney-General, who, not only in this Debate, but on several previous occasions, has said that it is a great thing to uphold the traditions of law, justice,, and freedom, of which we in this country are so proud. What is the great tradition of which this country is proud? It is the tradition of justice—justice not only to our own subjects, but justice to all, British or foreign alike. It has been a blow to my faith in that British spirit and that British tradition to find Members of this House—hon. and learned Members—defending the rules, procedure, and decisions of courts-martial. I would not have been surprised to hear Service men say that, in a crisis such as now exists, that in exceptional circumstances you must hurry a prisoner before a colonel and give him quick punishment, whether it be justice or not. But for lawyers to take up that attitude has been not only a discouragement to me, but a revelation of the mistiness of mind to which those learned men appear to be subject.

I am going to support the Government on this occasion, whether I incur the censure of the last speaker or not. It is, no doubt, desirable that Englishmen should have the regard which their forefathers have had for the administration of justice, but our sensitiveness regarding the administration of justice must be tempered, in time of emergency, by a quality quite as important and sometimes paramount—the quality of common-sense. We have to deal with cases in which this country is being attacked from within by persons who are utterly unscrupulous and not possessed of those fine considerations which have been so admirably expressed from both sides of this House—people who are as unscrupulous in civil life as they are in regard to the usages of war. We have to protect the State itself; we have to protect the lives and property of our countrymen from the inroads—the secret inroads—of these men, against whom at any moment it may be necessary to take action as alien enemies, and you have to try them by court-martial, as was done in the case of the spy Lody. He was not tried in the manner he was by virtue of any legal right he possessed. I do not think there can be any doubt that Lody was tried by virtue of absolute right of the Crown of this country, in time of war, to deal with the life of an alien enemy found engaged in the hostilities in this country. That is the principle upon which Lody was tried, and I am very glad to have had an opportunity of stating it, and to have the assent of the Attorney-General and of my hon. and learned Friends on this side who have considered this matter. It does afford us certain safeguards, and I believe it is the fact that the fate of Lody, who was tried before a court-martial, has acted as a deterrent across the Atlantic and has saved us from imminent perils, especially espionage and observations of the movements of our Fleet, and matters of that kind. Lody's life was well sacrificed in the cause of his country. He suffered justly. Public interest, common sense and natural courage requires that if that danger exists in the case of others than Lody, as to whom it is not within the constitutional power of the Crown to deal as it dealt with Lody, the constitutional power of the Crown—acting in these days when the Crown and the people are one people and community and there is no diversity of interest between them—ought to be extended. As in the case of Lody, the Crown should be enabled to put a man upon trial for his life before a court-martial in respect of an offence aimed at the life of this State, or in the case of enemies or of people who masquerade cither under certificates of foreign naturalisation, or under forged passports, or under any of those elaborate means by which enemies conceal themselves in our midst and, with education, resource and infinite ingenuity, are able to worm themselves into the secrets of the land and so do mischief. If there are neutral enemies, if there are also foreign enemies who are guilty of practices of that kind, and if it means that every power of the fighting Departments of the State is required for the purpose of defending us against people of that kind, we ought cheerfully to give it. I deal with this matter upon the ground of emergency.

I hope the Committee will excuse me for just stating how the matter stands. I want to point out to the Committee, since some Members of it have come in since the Debate began, what is the application, as it seems to me, of the very powerful speech to which we have just listened. There are two ways in which we might deal with this matter, but the Amendment does not suggest either of them. It is possible to deal with the matter by saying we will confer the right to claim trial by jury upon everybody who is charged with an offence under these regulations. In that, event no question of nationality arises. It is a perfectly intelligible proposition, but it is one which the Government would be bound at this time to resist, in view of the information which is in their possession. The only other alternative is the alternative provided in the Bill of saying that we will confer the option upon British subjects. The Amendment says neither the one thing nor the other. It says that we shrink from the logical alternative of conferring the right upon everybody, so we will confer it upon everybody so long as he is not a subject of an enemy State. That raises practical difficulties which cannot be got over. We cannot get over the difficulty which is presented if that question has to be solved in the case of a man who is obviously a foreigner and is suspected by the authorities of being the subject of an enemy State, but who persists in saying that he has the nationality of one of the neutral States. That question might take weeks, months, and even years to answer. It is perfectly impossible that we should accept as an improvement of this Bill something which is not one of the two logical alternatives, the real truth being that the Committee generally would resist including at this time the subject of a hostile State in this Section; consequently we are left with the Bill as it stands.

I want to ask one or two practical questions, and I hope that therein I shall have the approval of the hon. Member for Mile End (Mr. Harry Lawson), who thought the Debate was far too theoretical. I would ask for information, quite frankly, as to the position of women in this question, and the position of Belgian friends—particularly Belgian soldiers. I mention women as being important, because the most dangerous spies in this country are women. You have alien women belonging to hostile nationalities with which we are at war at the railway stations meeting the refugee soldiers from the front and picking up news in order to transfer it to our enemies. For the Committee simply to consider the male sex misses very largely the principle point that is troubling me. The second point in regard to which women are in an exceptional position is that the woman's nationality follows that of the husband, and if he chooses to change his nationality, as some of them are doing by applying to the French or Belgian Governments, or to some neutral Government, the woman changes her nationality whether she likes it or not. You are not dealing solely with strangers, but with the position of British women who may find they have lost their rights before our Courts, and who may be charged in some cases because of the foreign names of their husbands, particularly if they marry one with a Flemish name. Although they are British women and have always lived here, yet they will be denied the right of trial by jury. As time goes on we shall particularly have to be on our guard against women spies, and it is possible that British women who have married subjects of Allied Powers will find themselves in considerable difficulties in Court. I am not saying that the Government are not right in the matter. If the right hon. Gentleman can satisfy me on this point, as he did in his speech on the other Bill, I trust he will enable me to come to a proper decision.

The speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Duke), to which the Attorney-General referred as a powerful contribution to the Debate, seemed to me to be a very fine example of his well-known power of addressing a jury, because he omitted a Sub-section of this important Bill which would cover the picture le drew of invasion of this country at any point of the coast. Sub-section (5) says that:—

The hon. Member has pointed out an apparent want of logic in my remarks, and I should like to defend my position. We are dealing with foreigners. They have no business to be here, primâ facie, in time of war. This is our country; it is not their country.

Have Frenchmen no right to be here?

When the French Government makes a protest against the action of the British Government with regard to this Bill, I will consider that point. We know the difference between a tribunal consisting of a court-martial and a tribunal with a jury, but the foreigners who come here do not. We know, at least we think they get just as much justice, and perhaps more, before a court-martial. They do not. The Act is held in terrorem. That is the effect of the Act. We want to create in the minds of the alien enemy the effect that we have ample power to deal with them and to deal with them summarily. That is why the Government have brought in this Bill. It is held in terrorem over evildoers. I do not care about the logic of the thing one bit, and perhaps, if the hon. Member opposite travelled to London by sea instead of by the convenient method of the London and North-Western or Great Northern Railway, he would appreciate the beauties of the Bill much better. I cross the sea every week, and sometimes twice and three times a week, and I know that the steps the Government are taking are just, proper, and necessary. I do not support them from any love of the Government. I suppose I have opposed them as often as any other Member of this House. But we know this War is being forced upon us. We have not drawn the sword. The sword has been drawn against us under the most cruel and abominable circumstances in regard to which war was ever declared by any merciless, savage, and fiendish Government. The Government are only taking the ordinary, natural, necessary steps which every man of sense would take. They are acting as our trustees in this matter. They are the trustees in this State of Great Britain and Ireland. We have our own lives and our own liberties to protect. We have not to protect those of foreigners. Let the German Kaiser protect them. We here have to protect ourselves. The Government are only taking the only really necessary and proper steps, and I heartily congratulate them upon the action they are taking.

The hon. and learned Gentleman has told the House that he made his speech because he thought his views represented those of the Government. The Attorney-General has told us that his sole reason for not accepting the Amendment is that he is unable to discriminate between two different classes, the alien enemy and the neutral. But the hon. and learned Gentleman, representing, as he says, the views of the Government, says this Amendment is refused because we desire to hold a court-martial in terrorem over the alien enemy. He seems to me to be imbued thoroughly through and through with the spirit of Prussianism. He wants the rejection of this Amendment and the maintenance of the Bill as it stands, as a species of frightfulness. He is not much concerned with the maintenance of justice as with putting fear into the hearts of possible evildoers. That is the spirit of Prussianism and frightfulness. At the same time in his former speech he suggested that a court-martial is a superior Court and one where one is more likely to get justice than in a Civil Court. It has been a revelation to me, and I dare say to other lay Members, to find the estimation in which the Courts of justice are held by learned Gentlemen on the other side who practise before them. There can only be one object in the refusal of this Amendment. That must be that there is some disadvantage in not being able to apply for justice to the Civil Court. I see no-reason why, through the fear which seems to inform the mind of the hon. and learned Gentleman, we should deny that superior justice.

The only offence that can be dealt with under the regulations is an offence committed by a spy. I wish to point out, before Ave come to a decision in the matter, that a spy can be dealt with under martial law, apart from these regulations, I quote a statement made by the Home Secretary on 9th October last:—

"The present position is, therefore, that espionage has been made by that a military offence triable by court-martial. If tried under the Defence Act the maximum punishment, under the Defence of the Realm Act—the maximum punishment is penal servitude for life, but if dealt with outside that Act as a war crime the punishment of death can be inflicted."

There were one or two matters mentioned in the Debate to which I desire to reply. My hon. Friend the Member for East Edinburgh (Mr. Hogge) asked what was the practice if a man who, when arrested and charged with an offence under these regulations, claimed to be a neutral person coming from a neutral State. I cannot speak as to the general practice, but I have, two cases in my mind in which the claim to be a neutral has arisen. In both cases a communication was instantly sent to the diplomatic representative of the neutral country, and in both cases it turned out that the gentleman was repudiated as a subject of the neutral State. The hon. Member for Pon-tefract raised another point which seemed to me a good point. He pointed out that a woman, a British subject, who married a foreigner automatically became of foreign nationality. It do not think there will be any difficulty in detecting a case in which a woman who was a British subject became a foreigner in that way. I am agreeable to answer the appeal that was made to me on the matter by making an Amendment on Sub-section (6) to provide that a woman who is a British subject and who marries a foreigner shall have her interests protected. That is a perfectly proper addition to make to the Clause. I hope that the Committee will pass on to the consideration of the other Amendments on the Paper.

I beg to move, after the words "British subject," to insert the words "not owing any allegiance to any foreign State."

There have been many gentlemen connected with this House who have been naturalised.

Probably they have, and I think that they have probably been wrongly elected. No doubt there have been cases where they have been Members of this House, but perhaps the Attorney-General will tell me if I am wrong. Let me put this—if the Act of Settlement was not repealed until 1914 why was it necessary to repeal it under the Act of 1914? Therefore I say that until the passing of the Act of 1914 naturalised persons could not be Privy Councillors or Members of Parliament. It may be said that the Act of 1914 puts all that right. But that is not so. I was informed the other day that the Home Secretary is not giving certificates of naturalisation under the Act of 1914 to any person who has a dual nationality. Therefore I say that a person with this dual nationality is an incomplete British subject. He is incomplete in two respects, because he is under the disabilities of the Act of Settlement, and because, if he goes back to his own country, he ceases to be a British subject. Therefore I say that an incomplete person of that sort should not be able to claim the right of trial by jury.

The difficult case which the hon. and learned Gentleman has referred to is a proper one to be raised, but I submit we shall best serve the interests of the country here if we make our rules simple. I think if we qualify the definition in the way proposed by the hon. and learned Gentleman we will not get the advantages which he intends. It is true that a man from one point of view may be a British subject and from another point of view a subject of another State.

Why was it necessary to repeal the Act of Settlement?

I think we had better defer the consideration of that. The point having been raised, it will be borne in mind in administering the Statute.

May I suggest to the light hon. Gentleman that there is a case which has a bearing on this subject? I was astonished to see a large number, I think I may say hundreds, applying for naturalisation in Canada. The judge said that as a matter of law he had no discretion, and that he was bound by the Canadian Statute. The Home Secretary takes very good care to see what are a man's antecedents when he applies for naturalisation. That is one of the dangers that we have to encounter, and while I do not for a moment quarrel with the decision of the Government, as regards the hon. and learned Gentleman's Amendment I do think that at a subsequent stage we ought to consider whether this Bill should extend to persons who have not obtained their naturalisation before last August, having regard to the difference in method of naturalisation here and in the Colonies.

I beg to move to leave out from the word "be"["Act. 1914, he shall be"] to the word "tried"["to be tried by a Civil Court "].

I have been listening to my hon. and learned Friend, and I am not quite certain whether what he proposes is only a change of substance or a change of form. Part of his speech would make me think that it was a change of substance; but I am not certain whether he is suggesting anything more than that he would prefer to have it laid down that trial by jury should be the rule and trial by court-martial be the exception, which would have to be asked for by the accused, instead of having it stated in the reverse terms of the Bill. Is that the extent of his proposal?

I personally would like to see this Bill read so that there should be trial by jury or judges in every case. I only want to point out to my right hon. Friend that, if the Government for reasons of State are obliged to oppose that proposal, I would welcome the change which my right hon. Friend calls a change in form for the reasons which I have already tried to explain.

Let me deal with it in that way. Of course one form may be better than another, but it does appear to me that there are some advantages in expressing the matter as it is expressed in the Bill as it stands. I sympathise to the full with my hon. Friend and others who protest that the system which will remain for the time being under this Bill is exceptional and abnormal. Certainly it is, and I have no sympathy with people who treat the right to be tried by a jury as a thing of no consequence. But surely we had very much better express our Bill in a form which shows that we realise that we are living in exceptional times, and that we realise that the sooner that we can get out of those exceptional times, and back to the old traditional system, the better.

I beg to move, after the word "entitled," to insert the words "within forty-eight hours of his arrest to have the nature of the offence with which he is charged communicated to him in writing and."

The hon. Gentleman's point is a different point from that which I am trying to make by the Amendment which I have put on the Paper. I should like the House to realise the extent to which the Government propose to make the machinery of this Clause more certain and precise. In the Debate on the Second Reading it was pointed out that it was not precise enough, and I think the criticism was well-founded. When we come to it, I shall propose, first, not only that the nature of the charge shall be communicated to the person accused, but that it shall be done in writing, and, secondly, at the same time that he is told the general nature of the charge, he shall be told, also in writing, that he has the right to claim under this Section trial by a judge and jury. Those two points will be meet by my proposals. But this is a different point. I do not say that it is an unimportant point, but it is not a point, I regret Lo say, which I think can be dealt with in this way. It is in the Executive's interest to see that the charge is formulated with promptitude, because the time within which the accused has to make choice of the tribunal before which he desires to be tried must run from the time that the charge is so formulated in writing, and they could not even begin to make arrangements for the trial, gathering together witnesses and dealing with other matters, until after that interval had elapsed; so that it is absolutely necessary that we, should not act unreasonably about the matter.

I have some sympathy with the view contained in the Amendment, because I think I appreciate the object which the Mover has in mind; at the same time, I think the answer of the learned Attorney-General is both adequate and sufficient to prevent the Committee from adopting the proposal. No doubt its object is to try and safeguard any person's right that he should know why he is being detained at the very earliest possible moment. But one has also to consider that this Act is for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of the public, and it is quite conceivable that the Attorney-General and those under him may have to proceed against persons who may be guilty. One has got, therefore, to consider not merely the innocence of the person arrested, but also his guilt, and from that point of view the Executive would, if they had to formulate the charge within forty-eight hours, in order to be quite certain that they would convict the person guilty, have to be ready to formulate it in precisely the right terms to him.

If a summons or a warrant is served upon a person it contains the specific charge which is to be made, and the nature of the offence.

I am not forgetting that, but it is known that if a summons is not perfect, or there is necessity for bringing a fresh charge, a fresh summons can be issued. You are really not safeguarding the rights of innocent persons by putting what may be a very ineffective time limit upon the Executive Government. There is really at the bottom of the mind of some hon. Members, as to the proceedings to be taken under this Bill, a confusion of martial law with military law. What we are dealing with under the Bill is a system under which military law will be as always, administered by Military Courts, just as justly and just as perfectly as other law is administered by other Courts. We are amending the Defence of the Realm Act, and it is worth while to remember that what we are dealing with is merely a few Sections of the Defence of the Realm Act. It is worth while to remember that in the first three lines are these words:—

I will now raise a point I intended raising later on the Amendment of which the Attorney-General has given notice. It is a point which is relevant to this Amendment, and my right hon. Friend has himself made reference to his own Amendment, and I think it might be dealt with now. It is a question of interpretation, and I am certainly not going to set myself against the Attorney-General in the interpretation of any Act of Parliament or Bill. I am rather seeking his help in the matter. The Amendment which he has on the Paper will read, "Within four days from the time when written notice is given of the general nature of the charge, and of the nature of his rights under this Section." The Bill gives the option to the accused person of being tried by a Civil Court, and that option is contingent upon its being exercised within four days of a certain time, and that time, in accordance with the Attorney-General's Amendment, would be the time when the written notice was given to him of the general nature of the charge made. The rights under this Section are contingent upon such notice being given to the accused person. On a point of interpretation, I wish to ask, Do the words of the Bill, in their present form or in their form to be amended by the Attorney-General, make it mandatory that this notice shall be given? I take it that at present they do not make it mandatory or imperative, and if this notice is not given the proceedings will not be invalidated, and, to deprive any person of the option given by the Bill, all that it would be necessary to do would be not to give him notice.

There are two points which I referred to on the Second Reading of the Bill, and I am not quite satisfied that what I wished to see indicated will be so attained by the Amendment which stands in the name of the Attorney-General. I understand that the whole of the subject is being debated on this Amendment because it covers the same point.

I think it will be rather difficult to separate the points since they are so closely allied, but I suggest that we should not have the Debate a second time.

I speak avowedly in the interests of the profession to which I am proud to belong, as they are particularly liable to prosecution under this Bill. Of course, journalists are liable under separate Sections much more than other men. As, for instance, on the charge of circulating false intelligence and spreading false reports, or communicating naval or military secrets, or taking steps detrimental to recruiting. Under all those Rules end Orders that have been made by way of regulations journalists are particularly liable to prosecution. I want to ensure that they will have proper notice given to them of the nature of the charge which is brought against them, and of their right to be tried by a civil tribunal. The Attorney-General stated that the Committee rather confused military law and martial law, but I would point out to him that under the Rules and Orders, as he well knows, any person authorised for the purpose by a competent naval or military authority, as well as any police officer or other officer, in the discharge of his duties, may arrest without warrant, and so on. Those officers will have to state the charge and they will be very largely, or almost always, men unskilled and not learned in the law in any sense. The military or naval officer in stating the charge may unintentionally and bonâ fide make a mistake. I do not think the point is wholly met by the words which the Attorney-General proposes to introduce later on authorising him to put the charge in writing, so that the option, to take advantage of the Amendment we are now making, to claim to be tried before a civil tribunal shall be brought home.

assented.

I therefore leave that point. There is the other point which I mentioned. Besides the formula being definitely laid down to be used by persons ignorant of the law in discharge of the duty, I also want to make sure that the communication is made by an authorized officer. I do not think that that is laid down by the Attorney-General's Amendment, though he may say it is implied. It is all very well if you are dealing with the ordinary Courts; then there will be no difficulty and the normal procedure will be followed. But we are avowedly dealing with emergency cases, and under those circumstances you cannot be too precise in settling the machinery as well as the form of words to be used. The people who will be most grateful will be the officers employed in this duty. If, under the regulations, precise words are given the naval or military officer always does use the formula he finds in the book and far more closely than lawyers under similar circumstances. I do not feel that the words of the Attorney-General carry out the intention in that respect I ask him to assure us that by way of regulation, if not now, that that procedure will be closely laid down so that it can be followed, and so that the rights of the subject, whom we are protecting under this Clause, should be fully established. If any other means equally satisfactory can be suggested, of course I should not wish to press the point. I do think it is most important, now that we are clearing the matter up, that it should be done in a way which is perfectly definite and easily understood by those who are subject to the law, as well as by those who administer it.

I think the right hon. Gentleman must make some concession here. The Amendment which he proposes amounts to this: A man may commit some offence unwittingly, and he would be in gaol day after day, with no notion of what he is really charged with. I will give an instance. On 24th November, a Scottish skipper had the misfortune in coming into Hull to run against a submarine. It was a misty morning. The owners of the ship at once admitted their liability to pay for the damage, but the naval commander took the skipper and lodged him in gaol and the whole of the crew. They were kept there from the 24th November until somewhere about the 10th December. No charge was preferred against them. The owners of the vessel offered to allow another vessel to take the crew on so as to save the expense of keeping them in Hull, but the skipper was kept in gaol and the whole of the crew were held, and in the end they did not launch an action against the man under the Defence of the Realm Act, but under the ordinary Merchant Shipping Act for negligence of navigation. That is the sort of thing which is likely to occur. Inter arma silent leges is all very well, but there should be some period within which a man should be informed of the charge which is to be preferred against him, to prevent him being kept there for possibly months without knowing what he is charged with.

I would be very glad if the Government would make some con- cession on this point. I rather doubt the view which the hon. Gentleman who moved this Amendment has given us with regard to habeas corpus. I do not think any Court could refuse to grant habeas corpus merely on account of the fact that a man is in military custody. In Wolfe Tone's case, Wolfe Tone on board a French invading ship was taken. He was tried by court-martial and sentenced, but nevertheless the Civil Court granted a habeas corpus as against the decision of the court-martial. I am certainly alarmed if the condition of the law is as stated by my hon. Friend, namely, that a man who has been guilty merely of a civil wrong can be held in the way suggested. Anything, of course, is possible, if a man will not exercise his rights. As to the case of the Scottish skipper, I should really think he still had his remedy. I think he could have gone to the Court and got a habeas corpus, and I am not sine that even to-day he has not the right of taking an action for false imprisonment. I do not think that, the Defence of the-Realm Act has quite the sweeping effect which is suggested. I do think that when a man is arrested a charge ought to be formulated against him. We are dealing now only with British subjects as this Act is limited to them, and I think it is the right of every British subject to have a charge formulated against him in a reasonable time.

It seems to me that the hon. Member for Glasgow (Mr. MacCallum Scott) did point out a difficulty in the proposed sequence of events. I do not think myself it is a difficulty which is intentionally raised by the draftsman of the Bill, or that it need in any way present any formidable impediment to amendment which will secure the object of the Government, and which will lay down the express provision that before a man is tried, and with a proper interval before his time of trial comes on, he shall be given this notice which will enable him to decide what course he will take in respect of his trial. The hon. Member for Glasgow pointed out that, although the intention of the Clause seems to be very clear, namely, that the man shall have notice before his trial, the Clause does not say he shall. If he were tried by court-martial and subjected to the extreme sentence which is mentioned here, it would be a little too late to investigate the irregularity of the proceedings subsequently. So, if I may, I would suggest that the Attorney-General should make the Amendment proposed by him to the effect that written notice shall be given to the alleged offender of the general nature of the charge, and of the nature of his rights under the Section, and also add at the end of the Sub-section a provision that such written notice shall be given to the person charged not less than five days before the commencement of his trial—five or six days, or whatever is the proper period—a sufficient period to enable him to take the necessary steps. I suggest that there should be a peremptory provision that the notice shall be a condition precedent to the trial for such a period as will enable the accused to avail himself of his rights.

If I may interrupt the hon. and learned Member, the object of my Amendment is that the charge should be made within a certain limited time so that a man cannot be held in custody without full notice of the charge impending against him. I want to ensure that no man shall be held in custody except for a limited time, and that during that limited time he shall have full notice of the accusation against him.

I quite understood that the hon. Member had in his mind that summary substitute for habeas corpus. I take 1he view of my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Healy) that habeas corpus applies in these cases, and if the Executive tell us that in this emergency legislation they regard it as important that you should not interpose this kind of provision. I accept the statement; but I say that you can go some distance in the direction in which I understand the hon. Member desires to go, and the whole way desired by the hon. Member for Glasgow, by inserting a peremptory provision that no man shall be brought to trial except after the lapse of a sufficient period after the communication to him of the nature of the charge and the nature of his rights to enable him to exercise those rights.

I think the hon. and learned Member has really been speaking on a somewhat different point, although a very important one, from that of the Amendment. Does not the Committee desire, speaking generally, three things? The first is that anyone charged under this Section shall be made aware of the precise nature of the charge as soon as possible after he is taken into custody. The second is the important point raised by the hon. Member for Mile End (Mr. Law-son) that, when he is told what the charge is to be, he should be told in clear and stereotyped language what the alternatives are, and that that should be provided, if not in the Bill itself, in the regulations. I suggest that the Attorney-General should give us the draft of that provision before the Report stage, so that there may be no misunderstanding. The third point is that the communication as to the nature of the charge should be made a reasonable time before the day of trial, in order that the accused may be able to exercise his option. I hope the Attorney-General will see his way to meet all three points. I quite agree that forty-eight hours may in some cases be too short, a period. Whatever view may be taken—and there is a difference of view—as to the applicability of habeas corpus under these circumstances, there can be no doubt that among the few people who would be charged under this measure some would not be aware of what they could do under the Habeas Corpus Act, and possibly could not afford it, and might, in practice, lie in prison for many days without knowing exactly why they were put there. This has happened in other cases, according to my information. If the Attorney-General cannot accept forty-eight hours, would he put in the words "a week"? That would be far better than an indefinite period. Surely any charge under this Statute could be formulated within a week! That would ensure that no man under this legislation would be an a worse position than a man under the ordinary law, who today is remanded for not more than eight days.

I am going to make a suggestion. I do not think that to draft a provision by interchange of suggestion is always a very good or precise process. But the Committee has fully before them the different points, and it appears to me that they can be met quite well in a manner satisfactory to everybody. Taking the actual Amendment first, I cannot agree to forty-eight hours; but I do not see any reason why we should not put in the Bill that the notice is to be given as soon as possible after arrest. In nineteen cases out of twenty that would probably be less than forty-eight hours.

It was not in the case to which I referred.

At any rate, I must make my suggestion. As to the point that we must be sure that notice of these rights is effectively served upon a British subject before he is tried by court-martial, that can be met by a form of words. The third point was that whatever notice was given ought to be in writing, and the fourth, that it is desirable that the form in which the accused is notified of his rights, should be, not an impromptu form, but a carefully formulated document. It seems to me that these points will be met if we leave Subsection (1) as it is, and insert the following Sub-section:—

Would it be advisable to lay down by whom the charge ought to be reduced to writing, and by whom the question ought to be put?

We cannot do it by the Court. To tell the truth, that is the way in which the provision was first drafted. The analogy which occurs to the hon. Gentleman is the one that occurred to me. It was provided that when the court-martial was assembled, the president of the Court was to say, in the form of words that we proposed to set out, "You have a right to claim to be tried by a jury." But this criticism arose—that you have assembled your court-martial, you have gone through all the preliminary business, and then you are liable at the last moment to be told that a court-martial is rejected. I think that if we leave it to regulations we shall be able sufficiently to indicate how it is to done. I hope the Committee will think that what I have suggested is sufficient.

Would the Attorney-General consider the question of inserting a definite period, such as a week, if forty-eight hours is not possible? Also, would he would allow the House to see the draft regulations before the Report stage?

I think the Attorney-General has tried, as well as possible, to meet the difficulties which have been raised in the discussion. I quite agree with him that it would be impossible to insert a limit of time within which the charge should be formulated. We are dealing with a very difficult set of circumstances, where it may be necessary, if you are going to give any effect at all to your action, to arrest a person very speedily in order to avoid mischief. In that case it may be that at the very start your evidence is very shadowy. It may be a very important matter, and you may have to arrest somebody on very shadowy evidence. You will then have to inquire into the evidence which, as it stands, would not be sufficient to sustain a charge made in proper form. You may get on the track of evidence which may take a considerable time to examine, and if you were pressed in the early stages, before you had really sifted the evidence, you might draw up a charge which would not be the full charge or the accurate charge as eventually presented. Therefore, I think, the Attorney-General has adopted the right course in making it incumbent upon those who are charged with the administration of this law to frame the charge at the earliest possible moment, and I hope the Committee will not ask him to go any further. I should like to put this point to the Attorney-General. Suppose you have stated your charge in form and given it to the accused person, if you subsequently find evidence justifying a more serious charge and you wish to prefer that charge, will you be prohibited from so doing by the fact that you have previously given the other notice? I hope you will not.

No; but when a further or more serious charge is mentioned, the accused has a further option with regard to a jury.

He must have the option on any charge. That I understood. But the fact that you may have to amend your charge by reason of further evidence being adduced, shows the necessity of not limiting yourself to forty-eight hours or any other period. As far as I am concerned, I am quite satisfied with the suggestion of the Attorney-General.

There is one observation I wanted to make, and that is that it is no use putting a duty into an Act of Parliament that this or the other should be done in a given time without having some consequences if such a duty is not done. People will not do it merely because it is printed in an Act of Parliament, ft is no use putting in a definite time in the hope that it will be convenient, unless is is made inconvenient if the time be not adhered to. I think it should be quite sufficient for all practical purposes to say that the charge should be formulated as soon as practicable, but I do suggest putting in that the thing should be done in a limited time is no use unless you put some definite consequences for not doing it.

I think the last speaker might be reassured, if he will take the trouble to note decisions under the Summary Jurisdiction Act, that there he will find that where provisions are made, such as the Attorney-General intends here in regard to the four days, that it has been held that compliance with these regulations will be a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the offence. I rise to make one appeal to the Attorney-General, and to the Committee too. It is that instead of being content to pass this question over to some regulations which have to be hereafter framed, the Committee will give themselves the trouble to see that this question, or a form of words, is actually put into the Act itself. I speak from the practical point of view. If you have an Act of Parliament which provides that this question shall be put, you must have with you your regulations, and it is a very tiresome thing indeed to find the regulations; unless you have a copy of both you cannot know what your complete duty is under the Act. The reason for putting this question in the regulations instead of in the Schedule of the Act, or in some Clause of the Act, is only that it has not yet been drafted. It cannot be put before the Committee this evening, but it can be drafted, either in the form of a Clause, or for the Schedule, before the Report stage. I do really ask the Attorney-General to put the question into the Act itself, and not allow us to pass what is slipshod legislation merely for the sake of getting rid of the trouble of attending to the matter either to-night or on the Report stage. I urge this in the interests of those who have to administer the Act, who will want to have a compendium of their duty immediately before them, and who will find it very awkward at times to find the regulations, if they are not to be found within the four corners of the Act, but are hereafter to be promulgated.

I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman the Attorney-General for meeting us so far. I hope that before the Bill is considered on Report stage he will further consider the question of giving a time limit. I am quite aware of the remedy under habeas corpus, but we ought to realise the difficulty the poor man has for making application for that. Not only that, but I have already drawn the attention of the Committee to the fact that there have been occasions under this very regulation, where the Civil Courts for some reason or another—

Where will you find that?

In the "Times" newspaper two or three months ago. I remember the case very well, and have no doubt about it. The Civil Court refused to make the order. Under the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

I beg in Subsection (1) to move to leave out the word "four" ["within four clear days"] in order to insert thereof "seven."

As my hon. Friend says, this question cannot possibly be regarded at all as a question of fundamental principle. The Constitution is not involved in the difference between four days and seven days. But I want to point out to my hon. Friend, and to the Committee, the reasons which brought the Government to the conclusion that four days was enough. You cannot judge unless you have really in mind what it is that the four days are for. The meaning of the Clause, of course, is not that the man will be tried in four days. On the contrary, in this Bill, whether it be four days or seven days, it is the period which must elapse before the authorities can begin to arrange for his trial. It is only after the end of that period, be it four days or seven days, that the authorities can know whether they must assemble a court-martial, which necessarily involves a series of military arrangements, or whether they must turn to the civil authorities and ask for a case to be prepared in order to be presented to a jury. Four days has nothing to do with the interval during which the accused person will prepare his defence. What it has to do is this, and nothing but this: Let us suppose that a man has already got written notice of the accusation which is made against him, and the written statement of his right to choose whether he will be tried by a jury or by court-martial. Is four clear days long enough for him to make up his mind? Really, I think it is! One would suppose that any man who had the slightest appreciation of the advantages of our Constitution would require, not four days, but scarcely four seconds! In the case of many people I have no doubt that that is so. I think my hon. Friend will see the point at once, because I am most anxious that we should agree about this.

I should like to point out that the Amendment is really prejudicial to the subject, because what would happen? If you put in seven days it gives the Government the power of keeping a man longer in custody without trial. The Government have practically by this Bill abrogated trial by court-martial, so far as British subjects are concerned, because they know very well that British subjects would naturally prefer a British jury. Accordingly, before they arrest a man, the Government would make up their mind that the man would ask for a jury and would bring him before a jury the next day. [An HON. MEMBER: "As soon as possible."] At all events, that is a possibility. The Attorney-General knows the character of the man, whether he is an enemy from Germany or anywhere else, and whether he is likely to claim a jury. He will not take the trouble even to think that the man is going to have a court-martial, and, accordingly, he will lay a charge against him and the man will be brought up at Bow Street, or somewhere else, the next day. I think that four days is better than seven.

I merely venture to appeal to the hon. Member who moved this Amendment, because the Bill does fulfil the purposes he has in mind. It is not a case of giving a man extra time to prepare his defence. When the man is taken into custody he has got with precision the charge made against him. He then knows exactly what he is to be tried for, and the four days is merely the time within which he is to exercise the option as to the tribunal before which he is to be tried. That gives him ample time to-obtain legal advice if he so chooses, and it gives him ample time to consider which is the appropriate tribunal from his point; of view; and, considering this is emergency legislation passed by us with a view to dealing out prompt justice to people who require it, four days is ample to enable him to exercise his option. I do not rise only to say that, because it has been much more clearly and ably said by the learned Attorney-General. But I do want to ask the right, hon. Gentleman a question which, I think, is material on this issue.

I am sorry the Government have not given way about this. I do not think it is a very important matter, and, of course, I should not think of dividing at the present stage; but I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman to consider whether there is any real reason wiry it should not be done, and, if there is not, I am sure he will agree that it is a good thing to concede such a matter, pressed in the way it has been pressed. He says we are passing an emergency measure, and we must consider the interests of the public. Of course, we all agree to that, but how far are the interests of the public involved? Supposing there is a case of a man interfering with transport, and day after day the crime may be recommitted. I quite agree the moment there is a suspicion of that I should be in favour of arresting such a man, and I should be quite content to allow the Government to exercise their own discretion in keeping him in prison under suspicion for a long period. I do not really very much agree with the argument put forward on the last Amendment, but once you have got the man under lock and key he cannot do any more harm; he is there.

I think a slight lengthening of this period would bring only good, and no harm would result. What is certain to happen is that there would be a tendency under this Act for the court-martial alternative to be suggested—I do not mean at all improperly, but quite fairly—by advisers to persons charged. It may happen in some cases where feeling is strongly excited that there may be ground for advising a person charged to select the court-martial alternative, but that is not an alternative a man is likely to choose unless it is represented to him by persons who know the state of public feeling better and come to him from outside. In view of that, and of the fact that a man's own natural advisers may be at the other end of the Island, I do hope my right hon. Friend will give more than four days—not necessarily seven—because I think there is greater danger of making it too short than too long.

I understand the right hon. Gentleman is prepared to meet us to some extent in this matter, and, therefore, with the permission of the House, I will withdraw my Amendment.

What I am prepared to do is to take the figure of six. I do not myself think that the figure of four is the least bit too small. I do not, as a matter of my own judgment, regard the Bill in any respect wrong on this point, but it is important we should not only do right, but that we should give the impression we are doing right; it is not only important we should be fair, but that we should make the public realise we are trying to be fair. In that spirit I will agree, if the hon. Gentleman will be satisfied, that six shall be substituted for four.

Will the right hon. Gentleman consider my point?

assented.

I beg to move, in Subsection (1), after the word "martial" ["instead of being tried by court-martial"], to insert the words "or by a Special Commission under this Act."

As the hon. and learned Gentleman has referred to me, I feel it ray duty to say a word or two on this subject. Although I am not a lawyer I understand that this alteration of the law is to restore to the British subject the right to be tried under any of the ordinary Courts of the land.

British subjects are already given this right before the Civil Court and jury, but this proposal is an alternative to a court-martial for persons of this character—British subjects who do not elect to go before a jury and aliens and others who have not this right. It applies to everyone except those British subjects who wish to go before a jury.

Of course I cannot embark upon a legal controversy with my hon. and learned Friend; but I understand that this proposal will apply to British subjects.

And to everyone else.

This Clause deals with British subjects, and I understand only with British subjects. The legislation which the Attorney-General has introduced is to restore to British subjects the ordinary tribunals of this country. I do not think it would be in the general interest to give yet another option. We wish to give these people the rights of British subjects in the ordinary course, and that being so, I should deprecate any further extension, of which one knows nothing, which would be very difficult to define, and which would not command that amount of confidence which the general Courts of the land do command and have commanded. So far as I am concerned I would be inclined to suggest to my hon. and learned Friend that he should not press his Amendment.

My right hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for War, doubtless because he has been most usefully and, I hope, more pleasantly occupied elsewhere during the earlier part of the afternoon, does not really appreciate the point which my hon. and learned Friend has made. I wish to support my hon. and learned Friend opposite, and to make a further appeal to the Government. Under this Bill, as it stands now, every British subject charged under the Defence of the Realm Act for offences too grave to be dealt with in a Court of Summary Jurisdiction, has the choice of being tried by a jury. As the Bill stands, if he is not tried by a jury he is tried by a court-martial. What the lion, and learned Member for York and myself desire the Government to do is to provide another alternative, not for the person charged, but for themselves. Where a person charged with a grave offence has not decided to go before a jury, we ask the Government to take power to try such a person not only by court-martial, but by a Special Commission if they think fit. We do this because you are dealing with offences too grave to be dealt with by an ordinary magistrate's Court.

The Amendment which the hon. Member for York has moved is merely a drafting Amendment, and that seems to be a point which the Under-Secretary for War did not appreciate, probably because he has not been taking part in these discussions. My hon. and learned Friend's subsequent proposal, for which this Amendment paves the way, is one that His Majesty's Government, if it thinks fit, in a case which appears to the Government more proper to be tried before a legal tribunal than before a military tribunal, shall be able to send such a case before a legal tribunal. I should like to point out what seems to me to be quite possibly an unintentional omission in the drafting of this Bill, and perhaps unintentional in the scope of the legislation which is dealing with this matter of emergency. His Majesty's Government, however strongly it might be pressed by some neutral Power, could not take the case of a neutral subject away from the military tribunal, although the case might be one involving difficult and grave considerations of law, and although amity with the neutral State and the desire to conciliate it might make it highly desirable that the Government should have some power of offering the alternative which we propose. I have in mind the case of the United States.

What the hon. and learned Member has just said certainly appeals to me a good deal, and I feel the force of what has been said. It is quite true that I did not realise that this was in the nature of a drafting Amendment, and I find that there is another proposal later on in connection with it. If I state that the War Office, in conjunction with my right hon. Friend, will consider the proposal and endeavour to see whether some form of words cannot be inserted at a later stage to carry out the intention of this Amendment, perhaps the hon. and learned Member will be good enough to withdraw his proposal.

I hope the right hon. Gentleman will also consider a further point. Part of the scheme of this Bill is the question of Amendment. I ventured to say on Second Reading, and I think some hon. Members agreed with me, that there was a great difficulty in moving an Amendment. Take my old friend, the poor and innocent, accused under this Bill. If he is charged with an offence, let us say, committed in some Southern County, and the venue is moved up to Northumberland, he will be in a great difficulty in order to get his witnesses there. I think the prosecution would feel this so much that they would never do it, with the result that you would never be able to get the man tried before the Civil Court rapidly. One of the advantages of the scheme of my hon. and learned Friend is that it would give an opportunity for a Civil Court to sit rapidly for the decision of these cases without any injustice to the accused. I hope that aspect of the case, in addition to the other aspect so well put forward by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Exeter (Mr. Duke), will be considered before the question is finally decided as to whether some plan of this kind may not be adopted as a relief both to the accused and still more to the soldiers who feel, as I am sure the right hon. Gentleman the Under-Secretary for the War Office well knows, the burden of sitting on courts-martial as interfering with their work.

My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Exeter (Mr. Duke) has said that this Amendment is really only a drafting Amendment, and that point has been accepted by the right hon. Gentleman opposite. It is with the very greatest possible diffidence that I venture to differ with such authorities, so I will put my point in the form of an interrogation to the Attorney-General whether it is strictly and solely a drafting Amendment. I have been very much interested by what my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Exeter has said, and I think it would come with very great force if my hon. and learned Friend the Member for York (Mr. Butcher) ever comes to move his new Clause, but surely the new Clause and the present Amendment deal with a different matter altogether. If the present Amendment is accepted, it will give a third alternative to British subjects. The present Clause, so far as I understand it, is entirely confined to British subjects by the words in the introductory sentences.

So far as I understand the drafting, the apprehension with which the hon. Member deals is not well-founded. It is not proposed here to give the British subject the right to be tried by a Civil Court or by a Commission. It is proposed that a British subject may claim to be tried by a Civil Court and jury instead of a court-martial, and, if you are going to introduce an Amendment, a Commission under this Act. It still leaves the methods other than a Civil Court with jury to be the methods to be pursued in the cases of other than British subjects.

Of course, I admit at once that my hon. and learned Friend has much more skill in matters of drafting than I have, and therefore I will put it before the Attorney-General to decide whether or not it is required in this particular place, or whether the point my hon. and learned Friend has pressed with regard to neutral subjects would not be sufficiently dealt with by the new Clause.

It does strike me that the new Clause is put down in such terms as to suggest that it is addressed to British subjects. It is drafted to read:—

Is it not the fact that the rejection of the Amendment of the hon. Member for Yorkshire referring to aliens confines the operation of this Clause to British subjects?

I think that is so, but that is no reason for my ruling out of order here the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for York. The thing I had to do was to see if he had sufficiently indicated the consequential proposals later on in the Order Paper, and I think that he has done so.

In view of the assurance given that this will be considered in consultation with the War Office, I ask leave to withdraw my Amendment. I might say as regards my new Clause that it is intended to deal not only with British subjects, but with all others who may be charged, and, if the occasion ever comes, I shall be prepared to defend my drafting, or to admit that it is wrong if I am satisfied that it is.

The next Amendment in order on the Paper is that of the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Pollock) to leave out the words,

On a point of Order. Will my Amendment, providing that "This Sub-section shall not apply to persons of German, Austrian, or Turkish nationality who have not been naturalised for a period of at least three years before the commencement of this Act," be in order?

I thought that question had been settled on the hon. and learned Member's earlier Amendment.