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Commons Chamber

Volume 75: debated on Tuesday 2 November 1915

House of Commons

Tuesday, November 2, 1915

Private Business

London County Council (Celluloid, etc.) Bill (Suspended Bill) (by Order),

Glasgow Corporation (Celluloid) Bill (Suspended Bill) (by Order),

Consideration, as amended, deferred till Thursday, at a quarter-past Eight of the clock.

TREATY SERIES (No. 9, 1915)

Copy presented of Exchange of Notes respecting the accession of Japan to the Declaration of 5th September, 1914, between the United Kingdom, France, and Russia, engaging not to conclude Peace separately during the present European War [Treaty Series (No. 1, 1915)]; London, 19th October, 1915 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

TREATY SERIES (No. 10, 1915)

Copies presented of Treaties, etc., between the United Kingdom and Foreign States; Accessions, Withdrawals, etc. [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks (Temporary Rules) Acts, 1914

Copy presented of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks (Temporary) Rules, 1915 (Second Set) [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.

Factories and Workshops

Copy presented of Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the year 1914 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

Diseases of Animals Acts

Copy presented of Order No. 9530, dated 16th October, 1915, postponing the operation of the two Orders described in the Schedule thereto until the 1st November, 1915 [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.

Destructive Insects and Pests Acts, 1877 and 1907

Copies presented of Orders numbered D.I.P. 266 to 275, inclusive, declaring the respective areas described in the Schedules thereto to be infected with Wart Disease and infected areas for the purposes of the Wart Disease of Potatoes (Infected Areas) Order of 1914 [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.

Telegraph (Inland Written Telegrams)

Copy presented of the Telegraph (Inland Written Telegrams) Regulations, 1915, dated 30th October, 1915 [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.

Bridlington Piers and Harbour

Paper laid upon the Table by the Clerk of the House:—Copy of Abstract of the General Annual Account for the year ending 26th July, 1915 [by Act].

War

Execution of Nurse Cavell

Message from French Chamber of Deputies

informed the House that he had received from Monsieur Cambon, the French Ambassador, a telegram from the Chairman and Members of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies relative to the death of Miss Cavell, a translation of which he read to the House as follows:—

" The Chairman and Members of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies, deeply moved by the tragic fate of Miss Cavell, desire to offer to the Members of the House of Commons an ex- pression of the respect and admiration which they feel for this noble heroine of British patriotism. They beg the House of Commons to accept, on behalf of themselves and all their colleagues, this their message of grief and indignation."

The House will no doubt desire that I should send a suitable reply? [ General assent indicated. ]

Oral Answers to Questions

Questions

Declaration of London

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any and, if so, what Articles of the Declaration of London are still held to be in force and to bind the British Government?

I must refer the hon. Member to the answer returned to the hon. Member for the Devizes Division of Wiltshire on the 28th ultimo.

If the hon. Member will look at the answer I gave last week, he will see that I said that no Article of the Declaration of London, as such, was binding; it is of no force at all. Every now and again one has been incorporated, and has been enforced, according to the rules of international law, by Orders in Council, or by Proclamation. I have previously explained that.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the fact that Article 57 of the Declaration of London has ceased to be adopted by His Majesty's Government, it is their intention to determine the nationality of a merchant ship in accordance with the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1864, or whether, under the provisions of the Companies' Act of 1862, enemy aliens may continue to own in part or in whole the capital of companies owning vessels nominally British and flying the British flag; and whether such vessels, when so owned in part by enemy aliens, are liable to capture and condemnation in our Prize Courts, so far as the proportion of the vessels that is actually the property of enemy shareholders is concerned?

The nationality of a prize is a matter to be determined by the Prize Courts. His Majesty's Government do not consider it necessary to supplement the directions given on this subject in the recent Proclamation.

Near East (Allies and Italy)

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he is aware that publicity has been given to the general conditions of an alleged agreement made between the Allies and Italy relative to the disposal of the Dalmatian coast after the War; and whether, in case any such agreement is in existence, there are any reasons which prevent the publication of the original document so that the engagements of this country in the Near East may be clearly defined?

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1) whether he is aware of the statements made of the details of the alleged Treaty between the Allies and Italy under which Italy entered the War as a belligerent; whether, in view of the necessity of making clear the engagements of the Allies as to the future of the Dalmatian coast of the Adriatic and the position of Serbia, he will make a statement on this subject; and (2) whether this country has entered during the present year into any undertaking, either with Italy or any other Power, as to the future of the Eastern coasts of the Adriatic sea; if so, whether Serbia is a party to such agreement; and whether such agreement can be published in full or its chief provisions made known?

I can only say that I am in no way responsible for any unauthorised statements that have appeared in the Press, and am not in a position to make any statement on the matter.

Serbia

asked whether Serbia's direct appeal to this country for help was made in reliance on the statement of the Government that we were prepared to give our friends in the Balkans all the support in our power in the manner that would be most welcome to them, in concert with our Allies, without reserve and without qualification; whether that pledge was given after ascertaining from the military advisers of the Government that it would be possible and expedient to send effective aid to Serbia; whether immediate preparations were made for redeeming the pledge; whether the Serbian, French, and Italian Governments were informed and, if so, on what date, of the strength of the British force which would be sent to assist Serbia, and how soon it would be in the field; and whether the dispatch of 13,000 men, with a promise of a larger force to be sent at some future time to an unspecified destination, is the fulfilment of the undertaking given to Serbia on the 28th of September?

This matter will be dealt with by the Prime Minister in his speech to-day. I would, therefore, ask the hon. Gentleman to postpone this question.

Standard Oil Company

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether His Majesty's Government shortly after the outbreak of war consented to the transfer of about 20 oil-carrying ships, of a collective capacity of some 150,000 tons, belonging to the German branch of the Standard Oil Company, from the German to the American flag; and, if so, what were the reasons that caused His Majesty's Government to consent to this course, considering that, according to international law, they could have refused their consent?

The British and French Governments consented to respect the United States flag on these vessels on it being officially certified by the United States Government that the beneficial interests in them were American before the outbreak of war, and on condition that they were not employed in trading directly or indirectly with the enemy countries.

Diplomatic Service (Compensation)

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether any grant or compensa- tion, and, if so, how much, will be made to members of the Diplomatic Service who were at Berlin, Vienna, or Constantinople on the outbreak of war and have now been, or in the future may be, appointed to fresh posts to indemnify them for the total loss of their household, personal, and other effects, which had to be left behind and will probably never be seen again, so as to enable them to start afresh?

The question of compensation will be considered when it is known what actual loss has been suffered. Arrangements have, however, been made to enable members of the Diplomatic Service who were in Germany to have their property returned to this country, and it is hoped to make similar arrangements in regard to Austria.

Foreign Cabinets

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has the information at his disposal which would enable him to state the size of the Cabinets responsible for the conduct of the War in France, Russia, Italy, Germany, and Austria-Hungary?

I will give the hon. and gallant Member the numbers of the various Ministries, so far as I know them, if he so desires, but it is obviously impossible, owing to the wide divergence of the forms of constitution in the various countries, to draw any comparison between their respective responsibilities. Nor cam I say what special arrangements they have made for carrying on the War.

Arms of Officers

asked the Undersecretary of State for War, whether any and, if so, what officers are armed with rifles; and, if so, whether such officers have been forbidden to use telescopic sights?

I cannot answer this question without making special reference to the General Headquarters in France, in the Dardanelles, and elsewhere. I do not think that any good purpose would be served by making such a reference.

Army Dental Commissions

asked who is responsible for the appointment to Army dental commissions; what are his qualifications; and whether the post was advertised?

Dental commissions are granted on the recommendation of the Director-General Army Medical Service, who consults the heads of the various dental schools. I do not suppose my hon. Friend seriously thinks it would be necessary to advertise for a director-general.

Soldiers' Leave

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he will issue an order to commanding officers instructing them to arrange the leave of Scotsmen serving in England in such a way as not to deprive the men of all advantage of their short leave by long railway journeys at expensive fares?

I do not think Scotsmen are the only persons desiring consideration in this respect, and in point of fact the intention is that wherever possible each man shall have four clear days at home, whether he proceeds from South to North or North to South or from East to West or from West to East, and I have every reason to suppose that this object is generally attained.

Territorial Force (Classes)

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether supernumerary companies are being divided into three classes according to age; whether men in Class C who have volunteered for Class B are not being accepted; and whether he can see his way to give those men the opportunity of other than Home defence?

My hon. Friend is referring to the supernumerary companies of the Territorial Force. It is the case that these have been divided as far as possible into classes based upon age and physical fitness. As Class C consists of men over forty-five years of age it would serve no useful purpose to allow them to enter Class B, which consists of men under forty-five years of age. There is the possibility of men in Class B being employed on lines of communication or on garrison duty, but I cannot hold out any hope of them being employed on service abroad other than in such capacities.

Recruiting

Lord Derby's Letter

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether Lord Derby's letter asking for volunteers has been addressed to all men of military age whose names are on the National Register; and, if not, upon what principles has a selection been made?

No, Sir; the letter has only been sent to men who are on the un-starred list. The men whose names have been starred are regarded as being required in the national interest for other than directly military service.

Civil Servants

asked the Undersecretary of State for War whether, under the National Register, the returns relating to men employed in Government offices-have been separately collected and tabulated; and, if so, whether he can say how many members of the Civil Service are of military age?

The returns relating to men in Government service registered under the National Registration Act have not been separately collected and tabulated. The occupation group containing them includes also the Local Government services.

May I ask whether all people employed in Government service have been automatically starred?

asked whether instructions were given, and, if so, by whom, to those employed in starring the returns obtained under the National Register to star automatically all Civil servants in Government offices; and whether large numbers of starred Civil servants of military age are in fact now being employed on mechanical or clerical work which could be equally undertaken by men above the military age or by women?

I am not aware that any such instructions have been given, or that Civil servants have in fact been starred. With regard to the second part of the question, the information could only be obtained by returns from each individual office.

Enlistment Under Age

asked if an application has been repeatedly made by the father of Private Forbes, 22,870 10th Battalion East Lancashire Regiment, for the discharge of his son on the ground that he was barely seventeen at the time of enlistment; if such applications have been ignored or refused on the ground that the attestation form gives the boy's age as nineteen, though a birth certificate showing his correct age is now in the possession of his superior officer; and will the application of the parent be now considered?

The minimum age at which men are authorised to be taken for service with the Colours is at present nineteen, and no man is accepted for direct enlistment unless he gives his age on attestation as nineteen or over. Strict orders have been given to all recruiting officers that unless a recruit evidently has the physique equivalent to his declared age he is not to be enlisted without an examination of his birth certificate. If a recruit enlists who has declared his age to be over nineteen, but who is actually below that age, the War Office do not consider that to be sufficient cause in itself for discharging him from the Army. Under existing arrangements a soldier who is actually below nineteen may be sent abroad provided his physique is considered by the medical authorities to be that of a man of eighteen and a half. If his physique is below that of a man of eighteen and a half he is retained for training and service at home until he reaches the required standard. In practice, however, the War Office always allow a lad who is under seventeen to be discharged provided application is made to his commanding officer whilst he is serving at home. In the case of all soldiers serving Overseas, the question of discharge or return to this country rests with the Commander-in-Chief, who retains only those who are considered fit for service abroad.

Will the right hon. Gentleman give instructions that no recruiting sergeants are to take any boys unless they produce their registration cards at the same time; and is the right hon. Gentleman aware that many boys of fourteen, fifteen and sixteen years of age have been enlisted?

With regard to the first part of the question, the instructions suggested by the hon. Baronet would undoubtedly take a very considerable amount of time.

In cases where there is doubt such instructions have been issued as I have indicated. As to whether I am aware that young lads have been recruited at fourteen, my hon. Friend has brought to my notice two or three cases of boys of sixteen, but not of fourteen or fifteen.

I am not aware of that, and I cannot imagine recruiting sergeants would have taken them.

Medical Students

asked the Undersecretary of State for War if the policy of the War Office, as explained by him recently, has been changed in regard to the enlistment of first and second year medical students, namely, that it was neither in the interests of the nation nor the Army that they should enlist; if his attention has been called to a notification just made to such students by the university authorities which says that the Medical Council, in consultation with the War Office, had decided that first, second, and third year students might enlist; and will he say if this decision was made with the knowledge of the seriousness of such a step in relation to the future scarcity and efficiency of doctors?

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that second and third year medical students have received copies of the letter addressed by Lord Derby to un-starred men eligible for military service, and that they are being actively canvassed at their homes to join the Army; and whether, having regard to the difficult position in which first, second, and third year students find themselves as to their duty in the matter of joining the Forces of the Crown owing to the absence of any definite expression of opinion on the part of the War Office, he will say at what stage in their course of studies the Secretary of State and he concur in desiring that medical students should answer to the call to join the Army, and also at what stage they should remain at college to continue and complete their studies with a view to qualifying as medical practitioners, of whom it is feared there will be a considerable shortage at the close of the War?

I presume the hon. Member for Blackburn is referring to the statement I made on the 21st June. I would now, in the light of the experience of the last few months, make this modification of that statement. I think we must remember that we have first to win the War, and afterwards to encounter problems arising out of it, if they do arise. I would, therefore, answer these questions by saying that the view of the War Office at the present time is that fourth and fifth year students should continue their studies, but that students in the first and second and third years must consider for themselves what answer they should make to the recruiting appeal addressed to them, and not regard themselves, so far as the War Office is concerned, as under the duty of continuing their medical studies.

Agricultural Workers

asked the Undersecretary of State for War whether he is aware that in certain cases the exemption from enlisting given to skilled agricultural workmen is being improperly used, and that persons are being starred as being skilled agricultural workmen who are not entitled to be so starred, to the prejudice of recruiting; and will he say what steps he proposes to take in the matter?

Yes, Sir; I am aware that there is the possibility of errors being made in this matter, but arrangements are being made by which men improperly put on the starred list will be transferred to the unstarred list.

If agricultural labourers are withdrawn, will they be used solely in the production of the necessaries of life?

Sheffield Workmen Circularised

asked why the new recruiting circular is being addressed to workmen at Sheffield who have filled in the registration paper as being employed on munitions work, and who are actually in the service of a company that is on the point of becoming a controlled establishment?

The answer I have just given applies also to this question. It would appear that in the case the hon. Gentleman has in mind there has been a mistake.

Emigration

asked the Prime Minister whether he intends to take any steps to stop all emigration of men of military age from Great Britain and Ireland until the result of Lord Derby's recruiting scheme is known to the Government, so as to keep men in the United Kingdom who may be required for the military defence of the country?

In view of the facts stated by the President of the Board of Trade on the 26th October, I do not think that any special action is needed.

Did not the answer to which he has referred relate to normal emigration in a time of peace, and does he think that has any relation whatever to what is necessary and right in time of war?

Specialised Labour

asked the Prime Minister if, in view of the possible serious disorganisation of trade and the consequent danger of unemployment of many who are unfitted for military service and in view of the absolute need of retaining, even in industries not directly connected with the War, certain highly trained men, he will consider the advisability of appointing a tribunal to decide what men, if any, are indispensable for the carrying on of a certain specialised work and who should, therefore, be retained in their present employment?

Local tribunals are being set up in every area to deal with these questions.

Prisoners of War

asked the number of British prisoners of war in Germany captured up to 15th October?

Men taken prisoners are very seldom reported from Germany in less than a month after the date of capture. As I stated in reply to my hon. Friend on the 19th October, the total number of British prisoners of war in the hands of the Germans in September was approximately 25,000. This number will have been added to since then, but I cannot state any precise figure.

asked whether lists of British prisoners of war in Turkey have yet been obtained?

Five official lists of British naval and military prisoners of war in Turkey have now been received. The latest of these lists has only recently reached the Foreign Office. It is being translated from the original Turkish, and will be forwarded to the War Office as soon as the translation is completed. It comprises the names of eight officers and 116 men—all military. The names of the eight officers have already been communicated to the War Office.

asked for the date of the last report regarding the condition of British prisoners of war in Germany in respect of clothing?

Requests for clothing are received from time to time from prisoners of war and reports made by the American Consular officers in Germany deal with the question of clothing, but I am not aware of any report dealing with the question of clothing generally as it affects all the camps and all the prisoners.

asked the Undersecretary of State for War whether he has information to show that the money provided for British prisoners of war in Germany is in fact distributed among them?

There is no reason to doubt that any remittances sent from here to British prisoners in Germany are received by them. As a general rule, all letters and parcels appear to reach prisoners in Germany.

asked the Postmaster-General whether parcels can be sent with a reasonable expectation of their safe arrival to prisoners of war in Turkey; and whether any regulations have been issued as to how such parcels should be packed and dispatched?

Parcels for prisoners in Turkey can be forwarded through the Swiss Post Office. They should be addressed to the Central Post Office, Constantinople. I requested the United States Ambassador on the 19th ultimo to ascertain from the United States Ambassador at Constantinople whether there was any truth in a statement which had appeared in the Press that restrictions had been placed on correspondence for prisoners in Turkey, and that parcels and newspapers were forbidden, and I will communicate with the hon. Member as soon as I receive a reply. The reply to the second part of the question is in the affirmative.

Camp Damages (Levy)

asked whether there is still a levy of 1s. per month a head upon the men in the 4th battalion of the King's Shropshire Light Infantry, at present stationed at Singapore, in respect of camp damages, notwithstanding that it has been stated by the Secretary of the War Office that the regulation on this subject has been withdrawn?

I will have inquiry made and will let my hon. Friend know the result

Secretary of State for War

asked whether the Secretary of State for War exercises the functions of the last Commander-in-Chief; and whether he is responsible for advising the Government as to their strategy in all theatres of the War and for the selection of all commanders of high rank?

The constitutional functions of the Secretary of State remain unaltered, and have not been limited to those exercised by the last Commander-in-Chief. They include that of advising, subject to any necessary communication with the Selection Board, as to the choice of commanders of high rank. As regards strategy, the Government, which of course includes the Secretary of State, have at their disposal and receive the advice of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say to what extent the Secretary of State for War has taken into his own hands, and personally exercises, the statutory powers and duties formerly exercised by the Commander-in-Chief and Adjutant-General, and transferred by the Army Council Act—

Soldiers' Teeth

asked the Undersecretary of State for War whether he is aware that in certain cases soldiers have been ordered by the medical officer attached to their unit to have all their teeth extracted, in order to make them more fit for service in the Army, and that the War Office have refused to make them any allowance for the cost of replacing their teeth when extracted; and whether he will take steps to rectify this hardship?

No, Sir; I am not aware of any such refusal, but will inquire if the hon. and learned Member will give me particulars.

German Officers' Escape

asked the Undersecretary of State for War whether he can state by what means certain German officers recently escaped from Donington Hall, and whether it was by means of a tunnel excavated by them; if so, whether he can give any information as to the nature of these tunnelling operations and why their existence was not discovered till after the prisoners' escape; whether the official responsible for the safety of the prisoners is still employed at Donington Hall; and whether more stringent restrictions are now placed on prisoners at Donington Hall and elsewhere?

The hon. and learned Gentleman is right in suggesting that it was by means of a tunnel that certain German officers escaped from Donington Hall, but as the details of this escape cannot be given briefly within the limits of an answer I shall be glad to give my hon. and learned Friend all the information in my possession. The officer who was in command at the time of the escape is still there. Some alterations in the conditions of internment were made after the escape.

Have steps been taken to discover tunnelling operations by German prisoners?

National Registration Act

Belgian Refugees

asked whether Belgian refugees were included in the recent National Register; whether the returns relating to such Belgian refugees have been separately collected and tabulated; and, if so, how many Belgian refugees of military age are at present in the United Kingdom?

Belgian refugees, with others of foreign nationality, were registered under the National Registration Act, but the returns relating to them have not been separately collected and tabulated.

Refusals to Register

asked the Home Secretary if he is aware that a number of persons have been committed to prison for refusing to register under the National Registration Act; and, in view of the declaration of some magistrates that the Act gives them no power to commit a person to prison for non-compliance, will he recommend the release from prison of the persons now undergoing sentence?

I am aware that a few persons who have been convicted of offences against the Act have been committed to prison in default of payment of fines, but I do not know of any reason for doubting the legality of such commitments. The general provisions of the law for enforcing the payment of fines apply to these cases just as much as any others.

London County Territorial Association

asked if the London County Territorial Association is still in existence, and when it held its last meeting?

Yes, Sir; this association is, of course, in existence, but I have no information as to the dates when this and other associations hold their meetings.

Re-Enlisted Warrant and Noncommissioned Officers

asked what reason re-enlisted warrant officers and noncommissioned officers who have served as such for at least six months since the commencement of the War, and have been promoted to commissioned rank, are not receiving the same rate of pay as officers promoted to commissioned rank after serving as warrant or non-commissioned officers in the Regular Army?

The reasons for the difference in the rates of pay mentioned by my hon. Friend is that in the former case the officers are granted temporary commissions, and the latter commissions as permanent Regular officers.

German Prisoners at Dorchester

asked if the German prisoners at Dorchester are in tents or in huts; and if they are provided with the most recent lavatory accommodation and hot baths?

The German prisoners; at Dorchester are in huts. They are provided with lavatory arrangements such as are usually supplied in hutments. There is a supply of both hot and cold water.

asked if the officers is charge of the guard over the German prisoners at Dorchester are in huts or under canvas?

All the troops of the guard at Dorchester are in huts, with the exception of a small number, for whom hutted accommodation will be ready in a few days.

asked if the barracks at Dorchester are empty; and, if so, how long they have been empty, and why they are not being used instead of erecting huts?

My hon. Friend is, I think, confusing, if he will pardon my saying so, emptiness with temporary existence of vacant accommodation. The barracks are not and never have been empty, but as recruiting is apt at times to fluctuate it is inevitable that the accommodation should be at times partially vacant. It is, however, necessary to keep spare accommodation available in this and in all depots.

Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (Casualties)

asked how many sick officers and men other than wounded have been removed from the Gallipoli Peninsula since the expedition began; and how many were removed in the months of August and September, respectively?

asked the Prime Minister the number of casualties, including officers and men, invalided in the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force up to date?

The information available and obtainable does not enable me to give more than approximate figures. Subject to this reservation, the total number of officers and men, including native Indian troops, leaving the Peninsula on account of sickness from 25th April to 20th October may be stated as 3,200 officers, and 75,000 other ranks. Of these two aggregates, 1,500 and 27,000 respectively have been removed to England. During the month of August, approximately 160 officers and 3,500 other ranks and daring September 600 officers and 11,500 other ranks were removed to England on account of sickness, but I cannot give the numbers of those removed from the Peninsula in the two months mentioned.

Geneeal Hospitals

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War if he is now in a position to state what number of medical officers, sisters, and nurses constitute a unit; and if, in view of the fact that a large contingent of medical officers, sisters, and nurses have now been here for weeks with nothing to do, he will state if there is a reasonable possibility of their being employed as a unit at Salonika or elsewhere?

A general hospital consists of 34 officers, 72 nurses, and 201 noncommissioned officers and men, with about 1,000 tons of ordnance and medical stores. The personnel referred to in the second part of the question are at the disposal of the Australian military authorities, and I understand most of them are employed on special work in connection with the large number of Australian sick and wounded at present in the United Kingdom. There is the possibility of this personnel being utilised in one or more special units, but I am not in a position to make any definite statement.

Hay Purchases

asked the Undersecretary for War the price now paid by the Government for hay suitable for military purposes; and if any effort is made to buy hay at reasonable prices; or if the Government has found it necessary, in order to get the hay, to advertise in newspapers that they are prepared to give the highest possible price for all hay suitable for military purposes.

The price varies in different districts, but generally it is about £5 per ton, which is considered fair and reasonable, and large quantities are being purchased. I have no knowledge of the advertisement referred to by my hon. Friend in the latter part of his question.

Royal Scots (Private Ferrier)

asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether he is aware that No. 3721, Private W. Ferrier, D company, 11th battalion Royal Scots, who joined the Army on 1st September, 1914, was discharged as medically unfit after three months' service; whether he is aware that Private Ferrier has never been able to work since and is the only support of a widowed mother; whether he was accepted as medically fit by the Army doctor; and whether the War Office intend to make him any payment of any kind?

The man was discharged on account of diabetes after seventy-five days' service only. The disease was not the result of military service or climate, and there is no regulation under which any payment on account of it can be awarded.

Has my right hon. Friend done anything with the medical officer who accepted him as medically fit?

I have not had time to investigate the circumstances, but I am quite sure that it would be impossible for a patient with diabetes to escape the notice of the doctor.

Naval and Military Services (Pensions and Grants)

asked the Prime Minister whether he has received a resolution from the Edinburgh City Council calling for a Scottish committee to deal with supplementary pensions, etc.; and, if so, whether he proposes to introduce legislation to give effect to their resolution!

I am aware of the resolution to which my hon. Friend refers. The Government is not prepared to introduce legislation for the purposes suggested, but I have no doubt that in appointing the members of the Statutory Committee due regard will be paid to the representation of all parts of the United Kingdom.

Allowances to Dependants

asked (1) the Financial Secretary to the War Office if he proposes to reckon disablement benefit under the Insurance Act in diminution of parents' allowances under the dependants' scheme; and whether he proposes to return to such insured persons and their employers the premiums paid weekly for the obtaining of insurance benefits; and (2) if under the new scheme for dependants' allowances an insured person who has paid weekly for a right to disablement benefit is to be deprived of this income and placed on a level with any other woman dependant on a sailor who has not made such contribution; and whether he proposes to refund the premiums taken under false pretences?

The new scheme will not deprive insured persons from disablement benefits, consequently the point raised in the second part of the question does not arise. No dependant of a deceased sailor or soldier will in consequence of this scheme lose anything to which he or she may be otherwise entitled under the National Health Insurance Acts, but in assessing awards the War Office and the Admiralty feel that they would not be justified in ignoring wholly support which the claimant receives from other Government sources such as the National Health Insurance Acts. Should this principle lead to any case of real hardship, it will be open to the Statutory Committee, which it is proposed to set up, to consider the case on its merits.

Does my hon. Friend not realise that this is not merely a Government scheme, but it is worked by voluntary societies, and there is a definite contract with insured persons that they pay for this benefit of 5s. a week, and they have not received one single penny of it as compared with the person who is not insured at all. Does he not consider that that is simply fraudulent robbery?

My hon. Friend will see when he reads the answer I gave that we deprived these people of none of the benefits of the contract into which they have entered. I may further remind my hon. Friend that the merits of the question are open to be considered by the Statutory Committee.

What Statutory Committee does the hon. Member refer to? I would like to know whether there should not be some special consideration by this House of the fact that this million of per- sons having paid for benefit are not in any superior position to persons who have not paid anything at all?

Government Coal Contracts

asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether a subordinate official, partly responsible for handling Government coal contracts in Leith, was lately placed under the observation of the city coal inspector and of the police; and, if so, with what result?

Yes, Sir; two barrack subordinates have been suspended from duty, and the matter is at present in the hands of the civil police.

Albion Iron Company

asked whether an order for ranges and stoves has been given to the Albion Iron Company, Limited, of Upper Thames Street; whether the company has any works of their own; and whether he is aware that the work is now being offered to foundries in Scotland which are in need of work at a price which is much below the contract price?

The firm in question hold a contract for the supply of ranges and stoves. They are merchants and have no works of their own, but they have previously carried out similar contracts satisfactorily, and the quotations submitted by them were more favourable than those of the actual manufacturers. I have no information as to the price paid by the firm to their sub-contractors.

What we want is the best possible material at the lowest possible price.

Saddlers and Shoemakers (Rates of Fay)

asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office if he will state the rate of pay allowed to saddlers in the Army repairing the horses' saddles?

The standard rate of pay in peace for a Cavalry saddler is 1s. 9½d. a day; in Artillery, 2s. a day. For fully-trained and efficient tradesmen specially enlisted for the War it has been found necessary to pay 5s. a day.

asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether he will state the rate of pay for shoemakers in the Army repairing the boots of the soldiers; and if he can state the reason why bootmakers who have served several years' apprenticeship, and who are capable of making boots as well as repairing them, should be given lower pay than that given to the saddlers?

The rates vary from 1s. 8d. a day upwards. I see no ground for the suggestion that these men should be paid higher rates than are necessary to secure efficient service.

Government Supplies (Irish Products)

asked what further developments have been made or are in progress to bring into efficient operation the economy and convenience of an examining and receiving depot in Dublin for Government supplies, stores, and material of Irish product and manufacture?

The matter is receiving very careful attention, but I regret that I am not in a position to make any definite statement as to the further development of the Dublin depot at present.

Is it not a fact that this depot has been recommended by the military authorities serving in Ireland?

Retrenchment Committee

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the Retrenchment Committee have been asked to deal with the sums expended in connection with the High Courts in London and with the Court of Session in Scotland; and, if not, will he see that these institutions are considered in the same way as others by that body to find out whether war-time economies can be effected in their expenditure?

The Royal Commission on the Civil Service have for some time past been engaged on an inquiry into the administrative and clerical establishment of the High Court in London and the Court of Session, and their Report is expected at an early date; but it will, of course, be open to the Retrenchment Committee to supplement that inquiry in any way that they may consider necessary.

Inland Revenue Valuation Department

asked (1) how many of the retrenched officials of the Valuation Department were married men, and how many of these had been found employment in other Government Departments or in other branches of their own; and (2) whether the retrenched Valuation Department officials were looked upon as having a prior claim for employment in other Government Departments or other branches of the Inland Revenue provided that they possessed the necessary qualifications; and whether appointments from the outside had been made during the past three months, although fully qualified men among the retrenched officials could have been found on application to that Department?

In connection with the reduction of the temporary staff of the Inland Revenue Valuation Office consequent upon the stage reached in the work of the original valuation for which it was engaged, the services of approximately 480 married men have been dispensed with. I have no record of the number which may have found employment in other Departments. The attention of such Government Departments as might be likely to require men with valuation qualifications was called to the fact that the temporary valuation staff was being reduced as the work for which it was engaged advanced towards completion, but I am unable to interfere with the discretion of other Departments in the matter of selection of staff. As regards the Inland Revenue, there has as yet been no occasion for considering whether any of these gentlemen are suitable for employment in other branches, but as already stated in the House, applications from the Valuation Office as well as from other public Departments will be received for consideration by the Selection Committee in connection with any appointments that may be necessary under the Finance Bill.

asked the Prime Minister whether he will give directions to the Ministers responsible that no appointments in their Department shall be filled from the outside without application being first addressed to the Valuation Department for the purpose of ascertaining whether any of the retrenched staff possess the qualifications necessary to fill the position?

I must refer the hon. Member to the answer given to the hon. Member for Blackburn on 26th October. Every effort will be made to find employment for the men referred to. The attention of the principal public Departments has been called to this matter.

Foreign-Manufactured Articles

asked whether any and, if so, what further steps will be taken to prevent the use of foreign-manufactured articles?

War Loan

asked whether the Bank of England's action in preventing savings banks in Scotland from facilitating the conversion of certain of the Government Stock held through them after the 15th instant is a contravention of the terms of the War Loan prospectus, which stated that conversion facilities would be available until 30th October; and whether holders of stock through the savings banks in Scotland are to understand that a specially restricted reading of Government prospectuses may be applied to them at the discretion of the Bank of England?

Having regard to the great number of transactions and to the steps which are required before a conversion can be completed, it was thought desirable in the case of forms issued by the Post Office, the Savings Bank, and the Bank of England to ask that applications for conversion should be lodged by the 15th October, but this request will not prejudice applications duly lodged with the Bank by the 30th October.

Income Tax (Trade Unions Contributions)

asked whether contributions paid by members of trade unions providing superannuation, sick, and unemployment benefits will be deducted from the amount assessed for Income Tax?

I would refer my hon. Friend to the answer I gave to the hon. Member for Derby on the 30th September last.

Office of Chief Inspector of Taxes (Appointments)

asked whether, in making the appointments in the office of the Chief Inspector of Taxes, mentioned in the Somerset House circular of the 13th October, he will direct that they shall be filled only by married men of non-military age?

In considering applications for any appointments in the office of the Chief Inspector of Taxes the Selection Committee must, in view of the important nature of the work, have primary regard to merit and capacity and cannot be restricted in the manner suggested; but account will, wherever possible, be taken of the point raised by my hon. Friend.

Patriotic Food League (Scotland)

asked the Secretary for Scotland whether he has seen the publications of the Patriotic Food League (Scotland); and whether he can see his way to arrange for a free distribution through the Scottish Education Office of such inducements to national economy?

In a circular to school boards, with regard to instruction in economical cookery, the Department have already drawn attention to the publications of the Patriotic Food League, and a list of the publications was enclosed with the circular. The pamphlets can be purchased at a very cheap rate, and there seems to be no occasion for making a free distribution as suggested.

Rent-Raising and Evictions

asked what progress has been made by the Committee inquiring into arbitrary rent-raising and evictions, and when it is likely that the promised measure will be introduced; and whether in the meantime steps will be taken to delay ejectment orders until this matter is considered and dealt with by Parliament?

I would refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave on this subject on 28th October to the hon. Member for Attercliffe. The Committee has proceeded with great expedition. I understand it had completed its sittings in Glasgow last week, and was proceeding to Dundee.

Administration of Justice (Scotland)

asked the Lord Advocate whethed he can see his his way to recommend to the Dean of the Faculty of Advocates in Scotland, and to that faculty any war-time economies in connection with litigation in the Court of Session, so that the public may have the advantage of cheaper administration of justice during the currency of the War?

I am not aware that either the hon. and learned Member for West Edinburgh or I have power to take any action in the matter referred to by my hon. and learned Friend. The expenses of litigation in the Court of Session can be dealt with only by the judges of that tribunal or by legislation.

Munitions

Supply of Shells

asked the Minister of Munitions if he has secured all the works he requires for the production of shells, or is he still prepared to give consideration to any applications that may reach him from firms willing to contract for such work?

Applications are still being considered for the manufacture of shell and components where plant and other facilities are already available.

Inventions

asked the number of inventors who have submitted proposals to the newly-formed Board of Inventions; the number of inventions accepted by the board; and whether it is the practice to invite inventors to attend before the board to explain the details of their proposals, or are they interviewed by subordinate officials?

Between 5,000 and 6,000 ideas and suggestions have been placed before the Munitions Inventions Department up to the present time. As is to be expected the greater number of these are of small utility and have already been considered. It would not be advisable to state the number that have been accepted. Inventors putting forward ideas are invited to attend the meetings of the panel if the panel desire this. It would clearly not be possible for this to be done in the case of all inventors, but wherever this appears desirable, persons putting forward ideas are interviewed by the Controller or the technical staff attached to the Department, who are men of experience and used to this class of work.

Bombs

asked whether any reports have been presented as to the character of the bombs supplied by the Department or as to their efficiency in powers of explosion and detonation; and if any penalties have been inflicted on makers for failures?

Reports have been received, and all necessary steps taken in pursuance of them.

Messrs. Nobel's Perranporth Factory (Women's Wages)

asked the Minister of Munitions whether some 150 girls are employed in grenade filling in the Perranporth factory of Messrs. Nobel, Limited, at the low remuneration of 12s. per week; and, if so, whether he will insist on a fair wage being paid for Government work?

I have not had this case brought to my notice. I am making inquiries, and will let the hon. Member know the results.

Parliamentary Committee (Memorandum for Speakers)

asked the Minister of Munitions whether he is aware that in a memorandum for speakers issued by the Munitions Parliamentary Committee in July, prefaced by a letter written by him and dated the 14th July, 1915, it was stated that the Germans believed they were in a position to withdraw troops from Russia which would enable them to break through the Allied lines in Serbia or elsewhere; whether this statement was circulated with his sanction as indicating that a German invasion of Serbia was recognised by the Government in July as an occurrence to be guarded against; if he will say whether the military advisers of the Government were consulted in July as to the military measures to be taken by Great Britain to support Serbia in case of invasion and to prevent the enemy from gaining command of the military and economic resources of the Balkan States; and whether any measures were then taken for that purpose?

I am aware of the memorandum and preface referred to. They were issued at my suggestion. As regards the other parts of the question, I would suggest that the hon. Member should wait for the promised statement by the Prime Minister.

Is the right hon. Gentleman able to say that the Prime Minister will in the course of his statement give an answer to these questions?

Reported Accident

asked the Home Secretary if he has any information of an accident by which several girls have lost their lives at a munitions works on the North-East coast recently; and if the Home Office is inquiring into the causes with a view of preventing similar accidents in the future?

No such accident was reported to the Home Office. I have made inquiry and am assured that no such accident has occurred.

Meteopolitan Stage Carriages (Female Conductors)

asked the Home Secretary whether, in granting licences to women to act as conductors on Metropolitan stage carriages, it is intended that such licences shall be operative during the continuance of the War only?

Under Section 8 of the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act, 1869, a conductor's licence is in force for one year only.

asked the Home Secretary if he is aware that the proposed method of granting conductors' licences to women to be employed on Metropolitan, stage carriages will be different to that followed in the case of males; and whether instructions will be issued to the police authorities to the effect that the requisition form at present required to be filled in by male applicants shall apply generally?

I am informed by the Commissioner of Police that the licensing authority will require to be satisfied as to. the character and fitness of the applicant, as required by the Statute; but he will for this purpose dispense with the usual inquiries by the police and accept a certificate from a responsible official of the company or body who proposes to employ the applicant that inquiries have shown that she possesses these qualifications.

Aircraft Raids

Signalling

asked the Home Secretary whether he can assure the House that, in case of any future aircraft raid on London, adequate steps will be taken to provide men to watch, from the roofs of such of the higher buildings in London as will afford an adequate and systematic observation of the London area, whether any signalling does take place during aircraft raids, and that men so stationed for that purpose shall be in telephonic communication with the police; and, if no such men have been provided, whether ha will give facilities for volunteers to undertake the duty?

Defence of London

asked the Prime Minister whether the authority vested in Sir Percy Scott for the defence of London extends to the coast line north and south of the mouth of the Thames; whether he exercises undivided control over all aircraft as well as guns available for the defence of London, over the arrangements for lighting, the movements of trains to and from London termini, and the police and fire brigades within the area of his authority; and, if not, whether it is proposed to make the defence of London against aircraft effective by giving unified control in these respects to Sir Percy Scott?

As my hon. Friend will have seen from the previous replies I have given on this subject, Sir Percy Scott's duties are concerned primarily with the gunnery defences of London against attack by enemy aircraft; but it must not be supposed that the co-ordination between the several services mentioned in the question is incomplete, or that the requirements of the anti-aircraft department of the Admiralty are not regarded as decisive and promptly met.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether there is any intention to still further unify the command in this respect?

I dare say if we were arranging for the defence of London in peace time against aircraft and other attacks we should put it under a military governor, as Paris, I believe, is under a military governor, but I think the idea of so colossal a reorganisation at this moment would probably cause a great deal more confusion, for some time at least, than it would be able to cure.

asked the Home Secretary if he has received representations from the Deptford and other borough councils urging that in place of issuing regulations regarding the lighting of the streets and business premises, it is necessary to adopt more strenuous and effective measures whereby the enemy's aircraft may be prevented from getting beyond the coast and raiding our cities and towns; and whether he is in a position to give some reassuring information to the citizens of London upon this matter?

I have received a resolution to this effect from the Deptford Borough Council and have forwarded it to the Admiralty, who are responsible for the defensive measures against aircraft attack on London.

Casualties (Government Aid)

asked the Prime Minister whether he has any information as to the total number of civilian persons permanently injured in this country by Zeppelin raids or by bombardment; and whether it is the intention of the Government to recognise or assist in any of these cases?

The total number of persons seriously injured is 333, but the figures for those permanently injured is not available. No direct payments by way of relief in respect of personal injury or damage to property have been made by the Government since the introduction of the Government scheme of insurance on 19th July, except as provided by that scheme in respect of insured property. In view of the existing agencies for insurance against personal injuries, it is considered that there is no ground for the grant of compensation by the Government. The National Relief Fund is available for the purpose of affording assistance in suitable cases.

Air Service

asked the Prime Minister whether, having regard to the feeling of the people of London concerning the recent Zeppelin raids, he will give a day for the discussion of the whole subject of our Air Service?

I think that sufficient opportunity for this discussion will shortly arise in the ordinary course of business.

Independent Labour Party (Pamphlets)

asked the Home Secretary whether he is aware that the pamphlets of the Independent Labour Party, the destruction of which were ordered by Sir John Knill on Monday, 25th October, sitting at the Mansion House, have been published and in circulation for many months; and whether he can explain the delay in taking action against these pamphlets?

There was no delay in. taking action in this matter. The Regulation (51a), under which the proceedings-were instituted, was made on the 28th July, 1915, and on the 18th August the pamphlets which were subsequently condemned were seized under a magistrate's warrant.

Wormwood Scrubs Prison (Warders)

asked the Home Secretary whether he has received from His Majesty's Inspector of Prisons any report of the combined dissatisfaction having been shown by the warders at Wormwood Scrubs Prison on Thursday the 21st instant over the refusal of increased pay or war bonus; will he state the reasons for granting a war bonus to the Metropolitan Police; whether the same reasons equally apply to the warders; and, if so, will he reconsider his decision regarding their position?

The officers of the prison, through one of their senior officers, made a perfectly proper combined representation to His Majesty's Inspector of their desire to appeal against the decision on their application. This decision was arrived at by the Treasury after consideration of all the facts, and, much as I regret the necessity for it, I do not feel justified in asking for a reconsideration. The case of the Metropolitan Police, whose duties have been greatly increased by the War, stands on a different footing, and I do not feel that the grant of a war bonus to them is of itself a sufficient reason for granting an increase of pay or war bonus to the prison staff.

Press Bureau

Dardanelles Campaign

asked the Home Secretary whether Captain Granville Fortescue's book, entitled "What of the Dardanelles?" has been passed for publication by the Censor?

asked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been drawn to the report of Mr. Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett's lecture on the operations in the Dardanelles in the "Times" of 28th October; and whether this Report was submitted to the Censor and published with his sanction?

Sugar Supply

asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will consider the advisability of establishing local Government depots for sugar so that traders in country towns will be placed on equal terms with London firms instead of having, as at present, to sell sugar at the same price as in London, although they have in addition to pay the railway carriage and delivery, costing from 13s. 9d. to 32s. 3d. per ton; and, failing this, will he arrange for the sugar to be delivered carriage-paid to country stations?

The Government is not prepared to adopt either of the alternatives suggested by the hon. Member But the difficulty which has prompted his suggestions will, I believe, be found to be largely met by an announcement in regard to prices of sugar which will appear in the Press tomorrow morning.

Meat Supply

asked the Undersecretary for War why the chief veterinary inspector for the City of London, Mr. T. Dunlop Young, M.R.C.V.S., with his scientific knowledge of meat inspection, should not have been utilised for that work instead of being engaged in the Army Remount Department at Woolwich?

I would refer the hon. Member to the answer given in reply to a question on this subject on 23rd September last, to which I have nothing to add.

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that among the firms selling New Zealand and Australian meat on behalf of the Board of Trade, and who are also tenants of Smithfield Market, a practice is growing up by which certain firms instead of selling their goods off the hooks for what the trade will give make sales in bulk quantities to other firms, who are also Government agents, who in their turn sell them to the trade, thus taking out of the goods not only the recognised commission but market profits as well; whether he can state the total number of beef quarters, sheep, and lambs, thus transferred from one Government agent to another Government agent during the month of September; whether he has noticed if parcels of meat slightly damaged in transit and Army rejections are often the subject of these peculiar transactions; and whether any safeguard exists to prevent a wholesale system of corruption developing itself along these lines?

I can only refer my hon. Friend to the answer which I gave him on 19th October.

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether it is the practice of the Christchurch Meat Company, the Colonial Consignment and Distributing Company, and certain other firms selling meat on behalf of the Government, to print on each Saturday a price list for their provincial customers, this list to stand good during the ensuing week; whether copies of the list are sent each week to the Board of Trade; whether comparisons are made between the quotations contained in these lists and the prices realised by those selling the same class of goods in bulk transfers ex store to wholesale firms; and what method is adopted to check these thousands of small provincial sales so as to assure that the commission agents return the full value realised less only commission and expenses?

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, since the commandeering of Australian and New Zealand meat supplies, any goods have been purchased from the Australian Meat Export Company's works on Brisbane River, Queensland, or from the same firm's works at Alligator Creek, Townsville, the usual brand of the goods being a diamond with the name of the company outside the mark, and a distinguishing letter and number within the diamond; whether any of such goods not required for Army use were sold in England; whether the Swift Beef Company were entrusted with the sale of the same; and, if not this company, will he give the name of the Government agents in England for any surplus of this company's exportations?

The Board of Trade do not purchase meat directly from Australian meat companies, but only through the State Governments who exercise their discretion as to what meat is bought. I do not consider that it would be in the public interest to disclose the names of the firms handling particular parcels of meat.

Steamship Services

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether alien enemies are permitted to run steamship services to the various ports of the United Kingdom; and, if so, whether they have a preference in some cases of as much as 60 per cent. over and above British steamship companies?

The answer to the first part of my hon. Friend's question is in the negative. Consequently, the second part does not arise.

Imported Articles

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in view of the importance of restricting the purchase and consumption of imported articles, and in view of the general ignorance as to what articles of ordinary consumption are in fact imported, he can see his way to give public notice in the Press, and by posters or otherwise, of articles of daily consumption but of foreign origin, the importation and consumption of which it is desirable and patriotic to restrict, together with a list of substitutes, if any, suggested in lieu thereof?

I do not think it would be practicable to compile any such comprehensive list as is suggested in the question.

Clerical and Commercial Employment

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether a Departmental Committee has been recently appointed to consider how the civilian work of those who have enlisted for the Army may be best supplied; if so, whether he will give the names of the Committee and the terms of reference; and whether the Committee will consider the suitable employment of literary, artistic, and professional men who are ineligible for military service and have as a class suffered through the War?

My right hon. Friend has asked me to answer this question. I appointed a Committee to consider the conditions of clerical and commercial employment with a view to advising what steps should be taken, by the employment of women or otherwise, to replace men withdrawn for service in the Military Forces. The names of the Committee were published in the Press on the 27th October. The Committee will consider every possible source from which the vacancies left by enlistment from these occupations can be filled, and I have brought to their notice the suggestion in the last sentence of my hon. Friend's question.

Hop Importation

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he can state to whom was granted a licence to import hops from Germany during the year ending August, 1915, and to whom were they consigned; whether he can give the names of the consignors and consignees of the 280 cwts. of hops imported during the same year from Norway; and whether he has any information as to where these Norwegian hops were grown?

Two licences to import certain limited quantities of hops of German origin, which had been paid for prior to the War, were granted in November, 1914, and March, 1915, respectively, to Hartley's Brewery Company, Limited, of Cowick, and the executors of F. Robinson, of Stockport. As regards the 280 cwts. of hops, referred to in the latter portion of the question, I am informed that this consignment was passed at the Port of Newcastle-on-Tyne, in February last, by Messrs. Gerhard and Hey, Russian merchants, and that the Customs have now ascertained that the goods, though shipped from Norway, were actually consigned from Russia.

British Shipping (Transfer)

asked the President of the Board of Trade how many British ships have been transferred to foreign flags since the commencement of the War?

Of the 247 British vessels which have been transferred to foreign flags since the commencement of the War, about one-half were transferred before the British Ships (Transfer Restriction) Act came into force. In the case of vessels transferred since the Act came in force a bond or other effective guarantee is required that the vessels will not be used directly or indirectly to help the enemy's trade. The list also includes vessels transferred to Allied Governments.

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman if steps have been taken to prevent British ships from being sold to neutral countries, and if an owner can sell a ship provided the necessary guarantees are given?

No owner is free to sell a ship even to an Allied country without a licence which has to be issued by the Admiralty and the Board of Trade, and in every case the transaction is considered on its merits.

Navy League (Mr. Churchill's Speech)

asked the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster whether he can state to what delays he was referring in his communication to the Navy League, when he stated that through our long delays the enemy has seized a new initiative in the Near East; how these delays were brought about, and who was responsible for them?

asked the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster whether, in attributing the new German initiative in the Balkans to our long delays, he referred to the fact that the Allied Governments were warned by the Roumanian Government in April as to the probable hostility of the King of Bulgaria, and that, notwithstanding this warning, added to other indications of the German intention to invade Serbia, His Majesty's Government made no preparation for such an eventuality until too late to take effective measures; and if he will say to what other delays he referred?

I have to express my regret to the hon. Member and to the House that I was not in my place on Wednesday last to answer his question. The Duchy of Lancaster is not very used to questions, and consequently I did not receive any departmental notice or preparation for the answer, and I was not aware the question was going to be put. I will answer both questions addressed to me together. I referred in my remark to the delays incidental to joint action on military and diplomatic affairs of the various Allied Governments, among whom the responsibility is shared.

Road Board (Finance)

asked the Secretary to the Treasury what is the amount of money received by the Road Board since it was established; the sum expended by that body in the improvement of the roads; and what is the balance now in the hands of the Board?

The total receipts of the Road Board up to 30th September, 1915, including interest on investments, amounted to £7,176,059. The total Grants actually made to highway authorities up to the end of last month amounted to £2,410,978. Advances by way of loan shave been made up to a total of £932,259, of which £201,682 has been repaid. The balance in the hands of the Board on 30th September amounted to £3,966,065, including £3,924,742 investments at cost.

National Insurance Acts (Disablement Benefit)

asked the Comptroller of the Household, as representing the National Health Insurance Commissioners, if he has made any representation to the Army and Navy authorities protesting against the dependants of soldiers and sailors being deprived of the disablement benefit under the National Insurance Acts?

I understand that the payment of benefits under the National Insurance Act is not in any way affected under the scheme for allowances to the dependants of deceased sailors and soldiers.

May I ask my hon. Friend if the position is not this, that these insured persons have been paying for the benefits and will not receive them, although they have made the full payment?

As I understand it, insured persons will receive under the Insurance Act the benefits for which they have paid. My hon. Friend's criticism is apparently directed to the pensions scheme.

I must press for an answer. Is the hon. Gentleman not aware that these insured persons have been paying for a particular benefit, and that they will not be in an advantageous position as compared with people who have not paid.

Japan (Cotton Imports)

asked the Secretary of State for India whether there has been a largely increased export, in Japanese steamers, of raw cotton from Bombay to Japan in the last three months; and whether he can give the figures in this behalf?

The latest figures received indicate that the total exports of raw cotton from Bombay to Japan have tended to rise, the daily average having been 14,550 cwts. from 1st April to 14th August, and 16,518 from 15th August to 11th September, but I do not know what proportion of the increase has been carried by Japanese steamers.

Mysore (Suppression of "Daily Post")

asked the Secretary for India whether the Government of India has received any report regarding the suppression by the Durbar of a newspaper published in English in the Mysore State called the "Daily Post," the offence (if any) committed by the editor of which was apparently the publication of an article urging that action should be taken against the numerous Germans employed in Mysore such as has been taken in similar circumstances by the Government of India?

This paper was not suppressed by the Durbar. Under Orders passed in 1891 no newspaper may be published in the civil and military station of Bangalore without the written permission of the Resident. In the case of the "Daily Post" this permission was revoked by the Resident acting under the authority of the Government of India. I understand that the reason for this revocation was that in an article dealing with enemy subjects in Mysore it cast aspersions on the loyalty and good faith of the Durbar. I need not remind my hon. Friend, or the House, of the striking evidence of its loyalty afforded by the Mysore State during the present War. We expect the ruling chiefs to uphold and protect the dignity of the Government of India within their jurisdiction, and we owe them reciprocal protection when the occasion arises. I may add that, as far as I can ascertain, the "numerous Germans" employed by the Mysore Durbar were in fact two. The "Daily Post" has been permitted to resume publication under another editor, and has withdrawn and apologised for the article in question.

Dardanelles Campaign

asked the Prime Minister if he will give a day for the discussion of the Motion standing in the name of the hon. Member for Pembroke?—[That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the initiation, conduct, and position of the campaign in the Dardanelles.]

My hon. Friend will have the opportunity of raising this question in the discussion which follows my statement.

Sittings of House of Commons

asked the Prime Minister whether he proposes to move for the amendment of the Standing Orders regulating the sittings of this House in order to bring the working hours of Parliament for the present more nearly within the hours of daylight?

I do not think that this suggestion would meet with the approval of the House.

Duration of Parliament

asked the Prime Minister whether it is his intention to introduce a Bill by which the Parliament Act shall be so amended that the period of the War shall not be calculated in the five years which under that Statute is the life of Parliament; and, if so, whether he will promise that the Bill will be introduced in such a way that its provisions may be fairly considered by the House and the country?

This matter is receiving the consideration of the Government. I will undertake that due notice of the Government's proposals is given.

asked when, under the Parliament Act, the life of the present Parliament will terminate; and whether it is proposed to extend this or to deal with the situation by a General Election.

The life of the present Parliament will expire in January. With regard to the second part of the question, I hope shortly to announce the decision of the Government.

Government Departments (Service With Forces)

asked the Prime Minister whether Civil servants who have joined the Colours are receiving from the Government in addition to their military emoluments, which include clothes, food, and allowances, the difference between their military and civil pay; whether, for the purpose of arriving at this difference, the military pay of men of all ranks, other than commissioned ranks, is taken to be Vs. a week; and, if so, what is the cost of this arrangement, and what would be the cost if the military pay were taken to be the actual pay, plus all emoluments, including separation allowance?

The answer to the first two parts of this question is in the affirmative, except that separation allowance, in addition to 7s. a week, is deducted in the case of those below commissioned rank who receive it. It is not possible to state what would have been the cost if actual military pay, plus all emoluments, had been deducted; it was precisely because it was practically impossible to ascertain in each case the actual emoluments in cash or in kind with a view to making a deduction from civil pay that at flat rate of 7s. a week was adopted.

Cabinet Control

asked the Prime Minister (1) whether he can now state the results of his consideration of the suggestion recently made to the effect that the War Committee of the Cabinet should issue an authoritative regular weekly or bi-weekly statement of such a complete and full nature as will remove the dissatisfaction now existing in the public mind that they are not given all the information which, even allowing for military necessities, they are entitled to receive; and (2) whether there is time for the War Committee of the Cabinet in all cases to await the decision of the full Cabinet on matters of vital importance; and, if not, whether he will consider the advisability of the War Committee being constituted as a definite War Council with full Cabinet powers, so that the country may know who is responsible for the conduct of the War?

asked the Prime Minister whether he is now prepared to modify his refusal on 6th May, 1915, to reduce the size of the Cabinet?

asked the Prime Minister whether he is aware that statements are being made day by day at recruiting meetings, by men not connected with the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee, that unless men of military age enlist under Lord Derby's scheme the conditions under which they will be compelled to serve will be altogether different as regards duration of service and amount of pension and separation allowance; and if he can state whether the Cabinet has discussed such a proposition and come to a decision upon the question?

asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the promise of the Government to assist Serbia to the full extent of our power, and of the heroism with which Serbia has fought for the cause of the Allies, he will now add to his declaration of the objects to be attained before consenting to peace a statement that Serbian independence must be restored, and such reparation made to her as is possible for the loss and suffering she shall have undergone?

Foreign Affairs

asked the Prime Minister whether, in the present crisis through which the country is passing, he-will consider the advisability, in the national interest, of instituting a Foreign Affairs Committee of this House which, while in no way impairing the individual responsibility of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, might exercise some supervision and control over our international relations and secure reliable information for Parliament, without which its-most important functions are rendered ineffectual and useless?

:I do not think that this expedient—more especially in time of war—would prove of practical advantage.

Payment of Members

asked the Prime Minister, whether the Cabinet have, in the interests of economy, yet considered the question of the payment of salaries to Members of Parliament and, if not, will he propose to the House that only Members be paid a salary who make a private declaration that their private income is inadequate to maintain their position as Members?

As I have said before, this is a matter in which the Government must be guided by the general sense of the House. I have no reason to suppose that the suggestion contained in the latter part of my hon. Friend's question would be acceptable.

Are the vested interests of politicians, therefore, to stand before the interests of England in the hour of her need?

Political Pensions

asked the Prime Minister (1) whether he intends to continue the present pensions paid to Lord George Hamilton, Lord Balfour of Burleigh, the Member for Wimbledon, and the Member for Rotherham; whether Lord George Hamilton has already received over £110,000 by way of salary and pension for his Parliamentary services; will he say the total sums of public money paid to the other three right hon. Gentlemen for their Parliamentary services; and whether, in view of the large estate left by the late Lord Cross, though in receipt of a political pension, he will call upon all right hon. Gentlemen in receipt of political pensions to make a formal declaration of their private incomes; and (2) whether, seeing the small pensions paid to the widows of officers in the Army and Navy who have given their lives to their country during the War, he will say why he continues to pay pensions to gentlemen solely for Parliamentary services on a scale many times greater than that paid to the widow of an officer; whether he will call the attention of these political pensioners to the fact that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Battersea has refused to take any political pension for his services to the State; and will he ask them to follow the example of this right hon. Gentleman?

I have no power to discontinue the payment of these pensions, which are governed by Statute. The question of declarations by recipients of pensions was fully dealt with by me in answer to questions addressed to me on 22nd and 23rd April last year.

Does the right hon. Gentleman say he has no power to refuse to grant these pensions? Did he not recently grant a pension to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Rotherham?

The question is addressed to pensions already granted. I have no power to deal with them.

May I ask if I should be in order in asking the leave of the House to make a very brief explanation, as I have been mentioned in the question?

I will not avail myself of that, because I should be intervening between the House and the statement of the Prime Minister which everybody desires to hear. I will take other means of meeting what I regard as the challenge of the hon. Member.

Attorney-General

asked the Prime Minister whether an appointment has been made to the office of Attorney-General?

Freights

asked the Prime. Minister whether the Government are taking any steps to deal with the present rates of freights, which are not only adding to the cost of the necessaries of life, but seriously crippling our trade?

This subject has been under the consideration of a Cabinet Committee. Their recommendations have been adopted by the Government, and will be carried into effect without any delay.

National Gallery

asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the fact that many valuable and irreplaceable pictures are still hanging on the walls of the National Gallery, he will take the necessary steps to ensure that all the pictures in the gallery shall be for the present removed to a place of safety?

The question of the protection of the National Gallery has received the close attention of the trustees and director in consultation with experts. Many pictures have been removed from exhibition, and, in view of the special precautions adopted, the trustees, after full consideration, have felt that they would not be justified in closing the gallery.

Are there not a great many absolutely irreplacable pictures on the walls?

Naturalisation

asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the abuse of the naturalisation laws of this country by Germans, he will consider introducing legislation to modify the Naturalisation Act so as to make the acquisition of British nationality more difficult, and also securing to the Government the right to cancel acquired British nationality in the case of foreigners who abuse the privilege?

The Prime Minister has asked me to reply to this question. I would refer the hon. and learned Gentleman to the answer to a similar question addressed to me on 21st September, by the hon. Member for the St. Augustine's Division of Kent.

Will not the right hon. Gentleman appoint a Departmental Committee to report upon the desirability of this?

If my hon. and learned Friend will look at the answer he will see that there will be difficulties in doing that during the War. The matter shall not be overlooked.

British Steamers at Hamburg

asked the Prime Minister whether the British steamers "Iris" and "City of Berlin" were detained at Hamburg at the outbreak of the War; whether they have now been sunk; if so, on what pretext this was done; and whether he will consider what steps can be taken to make German property in this country liable to recoup the loss incurred by such destruction?

His Majesty's Government were informed at the beginning of the War that the "Iris" and "City of Berlin" were detained in Hamburg, but I have no information with regard to their sinking or the pretext for it beyond that which has appeared in the Press. By Article 2 of The Hague Convention No. 6 which has been ratified both by Great Britain and Germany, vessels so detained in enemy ports are to be restored after the War without payment of compensation, or they may be requisitioned on condition of paying compensation. Claims by the owners of these ships have been noted for consideration at the end of the War.

Mexico

asked whether, in view of the fact that the United States Government, as well as the Governments of the principal South American Republics, have recognised the existing de facto Government in the Republic of Mexico, of which General Carranza is the chief executive, His Majesty's Government propose to follow the same course, and whether this will be done at an early date?

His Majesty's Government propose to follow the course already taken by the Government of the United States with regard to the recognition of the de facto Government of General Carranza, and they are in consultation with their Allies as to the time and manner of such recognition.

Foot-and-Mouth Disease

asked the Parlimentary Secretary to the Board of Agriculture whether he can state further particulars to date respecting the foot-and-mouth distemper in Bath and neighbourhood; and whether it has been ascertained from what source it is considered that this sporadic outbreak has arisen?

Since my reply to a similar question by the hon. Member, on the 27th ult., eight additional outbreaks have been confirmed in the Bath district up to 11.30 this morning, bringing the total up to twenty-three. Seven of the additional outbreaks have occurred in the district immediately surrounding Monkton Combe, and the remaining one over 3 miles from the nearest disease centre, and nothing has yet been discovered to connect it with the Monkton Combe series. In addition to the cases in the Bath district, an outbreak has been confirmed in the extreme southwestern corner of Pembrokeshire, but a direct connection has been established between this case and those in the Bath district, disease having been detected among certain calves which were conveyed direct from Bath to Pembroke. It has been possible, therefore, to keep this disease centre under complete control.

Could the right hon. Gentleman say whether it is a fact that the majority of these animals actually diseased have not been slaughtered according to the usual custom, there- by involving great risk to the live stock throughout the country and to the national meat supply?

I think that is not correct. Slaughter was difficult to arrange, owing to a scarcity of labour, both with regard to butchers and with regard to people for preparing graves for the burying of the carcases, or for the burning of them, because of the very stony nature of the soil. I believe that in all the surrounding districts slaughter has already taken place, and in the centre slaughter is now taking place. Those farms having been absolutely isolated from contact with other places where there is no disease since the outbreak began, I think we can say that there has been no danger of spreading at all owing to the delay in slaughter.

Motor Traffic (Metropolis)

asked the Home Secretary whether he is now in a position to make a statement regarding the new Regulations governing the question of motor traffic in the Metropolis?

After consultation with the President of the Local Government Board and the Commissioner of Police it has been decided that this matter should be dealt with by making the fullest use of the powers given by Section 1 of the Motor Car Act, 1903. That Section makes it an offence for any person to drive a motor car on a public highway "recklessly or negligently or at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances of the case"; and it is obvious that the reduction of lighting now in force is a material circumstance in the application of this provision. I have, therefore, given special instructions to the Metropolitan Police stringently to enforce this Regulation, and I have written to all magistrates within the Metropolitan Police area, pointing out how the prevailing conditions of darkness ought to affect the mode of dealing with charges which may be brought before them by the police.

Message from the Lords

Naval and Military War Pensions, Etc., Bill

That they do not insist on their Amendments to the Naval and Military War Pensions, etc., Bill, to which this House hath disagreed, and they agree to the Amendments made by this House to their Amendments and to the consequential Amendments made by this House to the Bill.

Indian Civil Service (Temporary Provisions) Bill [Lords],

Read the first time; to be read a second time To-morrow, and to be printed. [Bill 152.]

Orders of the Day

Naval and Military Situation

Prime Minister's Statement

I am sure, Sir, the House will not desire to proceed with its ordinary business without expressing, as I venture to do in the name of the whole House, our regret at the unfortunate mishap which our King has sustained. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"] I am glad to say that His Majesty is now once more upon British soil. He is going on as well as could possibly be expected. His injuries are not serious, but the occasion is one of which I think we ought to take advantage to express to him once more our admiration at the manner in which he has always discharged the peculiarly responsible duties in these times as Sovereign of this Empire and our personal affection and respect.

The statement which I am about to make to the House has been delayed in point of time by circumstances which I regret, but which I could not control. The delay has had one consequence—perhaps I ought to call it an advantage—in that it has enabled me to receive from every possible quarter injunctions, counsels, exhortations, and warnings as to what I am and as to what I am not to say. I am afraid I am doomed to disappoint many expectations, but not the least the expectations of those of my many advisers who seem to think that it is my duty to appear here today in the guise either of a criminal in the dock—making the best defence he can for a somewhat doubtful past, or even of a white-sheeted penitent—with a couple of candles, one in each hand, doing penance and asking for absolution. I do not propose to adopt either the one attitude or the other. I am going to speak to the House to-day as the head of the Government, and in that capacity to describe, as far as possible, our actual and prospective situation to a nation which, as I believe, is as determined to-day as it has ever been to prosecute this War to a successful issue, and which trusts the Government, however—and by whomsoever that Government may be composed—to use every means and to exhaust, if need be, every resource in the attainment of our common and supreme purpose.

It is true that to-day some parts of the horizon are overcast. This War, like all the great wars of history, has been fruitful in surprises and disappointments to all the combatants engaged. For us here in this country it seems to me at this moment to call in an exceptional degree for three things—a proper sense of perspective, a limitless stock of patience, and an overflowing reservoir of both active and passive courage. I do not think our people as a whole—I need not pay the compliment of more than passing notice to the small coterie of professional whimperers who keep our enemies supplied with a daily-diet of falsehoods—show any lack, or any falling off, in any of these qualities. All they desire, as far as I can discern and appreciate their minds, is to be told, to the extent which diplomatic and military exigencies permit, how our cause stands, and to be assured that in the maintenance and the defence of that cause, we, as a Government and as a people, are playing a worthy part. The wish for the fullest possible information is natural and is most legitimate; nor can there be possibly any greater mistake than to suppose that the Government has any interest of any kind in concealing anything that is known to themselves, subject to the one overruling condition that its disclosure does not assist the enemy?

Total British Forces Engaged

How do we stand to-day? When we began the War, in August of last year, we were prepared to send abroad, and without hitch or delay we sent abroad in August and the early part of September, six Infantry and two Cavalry divisions. In the operations which are described by Sir John French in the dispatch that is published to-day—in those operations of the last week of September and the early part of October of the present year—he had under his command not far short of 1,000,000 men. To these, of course, must be added troops employed in the Dardanelles, in Egypt, and in the other theatres of war, as well as our reserves and our garrisons for the defence of the United Kingdom and of the outlying parts of the Empire. How has this gigantic Force been got together by a nation which has never aspired to be a military power, whose main reliance both for defence and, if need be, and should occasion arise, for aggression, has always been upon its Navy—how has it been composed? First and foremost, of course, of the manhood of this United Kingdom. In the course of the last fifteen months—I leave for the moment the Navy out of account—we have recruited for the purposes of the Army, Regular and Territorial, an enormous number—I do not like for the moment to give the precise figures —an unprecedented number of men. The contribution of India is splendid and well known.

4.0 P.M.

There are one or two figures I should like to give to the House, and through the House to the country and the Empire, which show the assistance that we have received from the Dominions of the Crown. Canada has contributed 96,000 officers and men to the Expeditionary Force. Australia has sent 92,000. New Zealand has sent 25,000. South Africa, having completed the reduction, after a most successful and brilliant campaign, of German South West Africa, has supplied important contingents for service in East and Central Africa, and, in addition, has furnished 6,500 men for service in Europe. Newfoundland has sent 1,600 men, in addition to her substantial contributions to the Royal Navy. The West Indies have supplied 2,000, and contingents have been provided by Ceylon and Fiji. In these figures, remarkable and significant as they are, I have included only the Forces furnished in the shape of complete units. No account is taken in these figures of the preparation made for the maintenance of these units in the field—the future expansion of contingents already supplied—nor of the very large number of men from all parts of our Empire who have made their own way to the United Kingdom and en- gaged themselves here. I should add, to complete that aspect of the story, that in Rhodesia, East Africa, and the West African Colonies, important additions to the existing local Forces have been placed in the field, whilst in the other Colonies and Dependencies more remote from active military operations, all defensive organisations have received a profound stimulus.

Work of Grand Fleet

I have said nothing, so far, of the Navy, but let me add, while I am dealing with our military Forces—for I am certain it will interest the House, and the whole Empire—an account of the service which the Navy has rendered in the transport of our troops. Since the War began, the Transport Department of the Admiralty, for the Army alone, have carried 2,500,000 officers and men, and 320,000 sick and wounded and nurses. They have carried, further, 2,500,000 tons of stores and munitions, and 800,000 horses, mules and camels. These operations have involved thousands of voyages through seas which, at one time—though happily that time has now long since past—were subject to the raids of German cruisers, and which even now, to some extent, though I believe a rapidly diminishing extent, are infested by submarines. Up to the present—and I think this is a most remarkable fact—the loss of life in the whole of these gigantic oversea operations has been considerably less than one-tenth per cent. I do not believe that anywhere in the history of the world any nation, under any conditions, can produce such a comparable record. Of course, these figures, as the House will understand, are exclusive of millions of tons of stores, mainly coal and oil, which have been carried for the Navy and for Allied Governments.

I said for the moment I would leave the actual service of the Navy itself out of the account. But has there ever been anything comparable to it in history? There they are, our men of the Grand Fleet, living— as I told them when I had the honour, a couple of months ago, of addressing them myself—in those dim and distant spaces, in the twilight, as far as public observation is concerned, unnoticed, unadvertised, performing with an efficiency and a vigilance that it is impossible to describe, or even to appreciate, service to the whole Empire, which makes not only us here absolutely secure against invasion, but which has cleared the whole high seas from one end of the globe to the other of the cruisers of our enemies, and of the whole of the German mercantile marine.

German Fleet

Where is that great Fleet, on which so much thought, so much science, and so much money was expended, which was to be a perpetual menace to us here in the United Kingdom? Locked up in the Baltic, it dare not show its face upon any sea where it can be met and dealt with; and the whole effective maritime military resources of Germany upon the seas, after fifteen months of war, are reduced to the sporadic and constantly diminishing efforts of a few furtive submarines, which have sent to the bottom far more innocent, unoffending civilians than any armed enemies. I think figures such as these are more eloquent than columns of rhetoric, and I can conceive no better medicine for people, if there be such, outside a few very small and selected areas in this country, who attempt to be downhearted and doubtful that the Empire is playing its part in the greatest struggle in history.

What We Are Doing

I am not going to apologise, or to assume an attitude of excuse or defence either for the people of this Empire, who have borne their part so magnificently, or for the Government of this country, which from the beginning of the War up to this moment has, to the best of its ability—I doubt not with many shortcomings and mistakes— and, I believe, with the confidence of the great mass of our fellow-countrymen, controlled and organised and directed this great effort. Having said something of the Forces which we have brought into being, and the debt we owe to our fellow-citizens all over the Empire, I pass to the very important and relevant question, What are we doing with all this vast apparatus of destruction and defence? I will say nothing, or hardly anything of the Western theatre of war, which for the last year has absorbed by far the larger part of our Army. Our total casualties in France and Flanders up to the present moment, or at any rate up to a week ago, were 377,000 men—that is to say, considerably more than twice the total number of the Expeditionary Force which was dispatched in August and September of last year, though, happily, the very large percentage of the recoveries from wounds makes the net permanent wastage on a much smaller scale. Sir John French's dispatch, published to-day, described the latest achievements of his gallant Army. For the moment, so far as that sphere of war is concerned, I have nothing to add on the part of the Government, except that, so-far as I know, in this Western theatre the Germans have not, on balance, gained one foot of ground since April of the present year. Indeed, that is, I believe, a very great understatement of the case.

Mesopotamia

I turn for the moment to the Eastern theatre. Though I am going to deal exclusively or mainly with the role played by our own troops, I cannot pass to that theatre without pointing out to the House the supreme fighting qualities of the Russian soldier, which have never been more splendidly or more conspicuously manifested than during the recent retreat, and assuring our great Ally there, that we here in this country have the greatest confidence in his capacity, ultimately and before long, to roll back the tide of invasion, and to reverse the past. But, as I have said, I am concerned to-day and for the moment with the doings of our own Forces in that quarter of the War. First, I would like to say two or three words on an important and a highly successful campaign, which has not, I think, attracted the attention it deserves, namely, the proceedings of our troops in Mesopotamia. The object of sending a Force, which originally consisted of only one division —the 6th—in the autumn of last year, to Mesopotamia was to secure the neutrality of the Arabs, to safeguard our interests in the Persian Gulf, to protect the oilfields, and generally to maintain the authority of our flag in the East. The history of what has taken place since can be very easily summarised.

In November last General Sir Arthur Barrett, with the 16th and 18th Brigades of the 6th Division, after a pitched battle with the Turks, occupied Basra. In January a further advance was made, which resulted in the capture of Kurna, which, as the House probably knows, is at the junction of the Tigris and the Euphrates. Two or three months later, in April, a second division was added to the Force. The command was assumed by General Sir John Nixon. After a brilliant series of land and river operations the Turks were driven back, both on the Upper Euphrates and the Tigris. In July the final positions on both rivers were captured with heavy casualties to the enemy, and General Nixon's Force is now within measurable distance of Bagdad. I do not think that in the whole course of the War there has been a series of operations more carefully contrived, more brilliantly conducted, and with a better prospect of final success.

Dardanelles

I come now to what is not so un-chequered a chapter, the story of our operations in the Eastern theatre of war—I mean those which have gone on in the Dardanelles. During the first few months of the War we were still at peace with Turkey; but owing to causes which are now well known, and to which I need not go back, a state of war between ourselves and the Turkish Empire came into existence in the first week of November, 1914. From that moment it was no longer possible, either from a strategic or from a political point of view, to concentrate our entire energy on the Western theatre. The Turks threatened our Allies the Russians in the Caucasus. They threatened, not directly, but remotely and indirectly, our position in Egypt. They were able to close the Black Sea, and, in consequence of that, to cut off our source of supply of Russian wheat from Russian ports. The advent of Turkey as an ally of Germany and Austria produced a great, and in some respects a lasting effect upon the attitude of the Balkan States. When that condition of things was brought about, the Government had to face a question which was not merely strategic. And I will venture to say here, because it applies to a great many other operations, past, present and future, that in a great War like this you cannot determine your policy or your course of action entirely and exclusively by military and naval considerations. There are other items that come in. It is the duty of the Government very largely to rely upon the advice of its military and naval advisers, but in the long run the Government, any Government which is worthy of the name, which is adequate to the discharge of the trust which the nation has reposed in it, must bring all these things into some kind of proportion one to the other. Sometimes it is necessary—not only expedient, but necessary—to run risks and encounter-dangers which purely naval or military policy would warn them against. We must take all those things into account.

Now with regard to this matter. From the first moment that a state of war began to exist between Turkey and ourselves in November last year, we had to consider-in consultation with our naval and military advisers, what was the best and most politic course for us to take, either aggressively or defensively, in that part of the globe. In January we had not sufficient military forces available—having regard to the requirements of the Western theatre—for service in the East, to do more than provide for local defence in Egypt against the impending Turkish attack, which was delivered and utterly defeated on the 2nd of February. The Government had then brought under their notice the possibility of naval attack in the Dardanelles. After full investigation and consultation with the naval experts, including the Admiral commanding in that part of the Ægean, and notwithstanding—I am betraying no secret in saying this—some doubts and hesitations, which undoubtedly there were in the mind of our principal naval adviser at that time, Lord Fisher, the Government felt justified in sanctioning the attack. People who think and say that that attack was initiated without due consideration, without a full review of all its naval possibilities, are entirely mistaken. It was most carefully considered. It was developed in consultation between the Admiral on the spot and the War Staff of the Admiralty here, and before any final decision was taken it was communicated to the French Admiralty, who entirely approved of it, and agreed to take part in it, and it was—I am not using too strong a word—enthusiastically received and acclaimed by the illustrious Grand Duke, who then commanded the Russian Armies, and who rightly thought that it would assist his operations in the Caucasus.

The matter was carefully reviewed over and over again by the War Council, and in answer to a question which was put to me to which I promised to reply, I may say that all the operations so contrived before a shot was fired, or any actual step taken, were communicated to and approved by the Cabinet. In the circumstances of the case in which we then stood, the operation conceived was a, purely naval operation. We could not afford at that time—Lord Kitchener said, and we all agreed—any substantial military support. It was, therefore, decided to make the attempt with the naval forces alone. I take my full share of the responsibility for the initiation of that operation—my full share. I deprecate more than I can say the attempt to allocate responsibility to one Minister or another, or to suggest that in a matter of this kind some undefined personality, of great authority and overmastering will, controlled and directed the strategy of the operations. That is not the case. If anybody is responsible for the initiation of this enterprise in the Dardanelles, nobody is more responsible than I. I thought then, as everybody must have thought who knew the whole circumstances, and surveyed the whole situation, that we ran great risks, but, on the other hand, we had very great, and in the prose- cution of the War, capital objects then in view—to influence the whole Balkan situation in a sense favourable to the Allies, open communications with the Black Sea and relieve what was then a very pressing necessity in this country—the necessity for a fuller and freer influx of wheat and other supplies—and, if we could, strike a blow at the very heart of the Turkish Empire.

As I have said, in its first conception and initiation this was a purely naval affair. The naval attack took place towards the end of February, and the outer forts gave way and were completely subjected. Those naval operations were continued systematically for a month. They culminated in the attack on the Narrows on the 18th of March, which resulted in a set-back and the loss of or damage to several important naval units. We had then to consider whether, and to what extent, this operation should be continued, and it was the opinion of those who advised us—and looking back on the past to bring myself again to resurvey the situation, it seems to me that, if not a sound, at any rate it was a very tenable opinion—that by the aid of an adequate military force the attack might still be driven home with success. Sir Ian Hamilton was selected to command the expedition. He left London early in March, and was present at the naval attack on the 18th of March; and a few days later, after consultation with the Vice-Admiral on the spot, he reported to us that they were in agreement that a joint naval and military attack was necessary. The actual plan of operations was left, as I think it ought to be, to the judgment of the commanders on the spot, though, so far as I know, there was never any disagreement between them and the opinion of the General Staff here at home.

I will not go into the intermediate stages of the operation until we come to the beginning of August. We had then assembled at the Dardanelles a very large naval and military force. The actual operations which took place have been described, and are familiar to the House and to the public. I will not attempt at this moment—it would be quite irrelevant to my purpose—to attach either praise or blame to this man or that, or to this unit or that, but I will say this for myself, that, in the whole course of the War, with its ups and downs, I have never sustained a keener disappointment than in the failure of this operation. The chances of success, as it seemed to us and to those on the spot, were not only great, but preponderant. The consequences of success, if success had been attained, were almost immeasurable. It would have solved the whole situation in the Balkans; it would have prevented the possibility of that which unhappily now is the realised fact, the adhesion of Bulgaria to our opponents; it would have laid the capital of the Turkish Empire open to menace and possibly to capture; and, throughout the whole of the Eastern world, it would have been acclaimed as the most brilliant and conclusive demonstration of the superiority of the Allies. We did not succeed, notwithstanding the magnificent exhibitions, never surpassed, of gallantry and of resource on the part of our troops, and by none more conspicuously than on the part of our Australian troops.

Nor ought the House to forget the extraordinary and magnificent service rendered throughout these operations by the whole of the Royal Navy. Nothing has been more conspicuous than the service of our submarines. Let me just mention this fact, a most significant and most encouraging fact, as showing how the old spirit of the British Navy—its adventure, its gallantry, its resource—pervades those who have to manipulate these strange modern machines, just as much as it did those who served under Blake, or Hood, or Nelson. After the 26th of last month, British submarines operating against enemy vessels in the Sea of Marmora have succeeded in sinking or damaging two battleships, five gunboats, one torpedo boat, eight transports, and no less than 197 supply ships of all kinds, whether steamers or sailing vessels. That is a wonderful chapter in the history of the British Navy. The arrival of German submarines took place in May, and, of course, added an enormous danger to the situation. The Navy showed themselves quite equal to it. Safe harbours were selected and prepared where ships could remain securely. Small craft were assembled in great numbers to maintain the communications of the Army, and, finally, a number of specially constructed vessels, largely due to the inventive genius of Lord Fisher himself, which had been built by the Admiralty in anticipation of such requirements as this, went out to the Mediterranean, and have done, from that day to this, most magnificent work. The Navy throughout this campaign has risen superior to all difficulties, and has been able to maintain the communications of the Army intact. But, as I have said, the result of the series of attacks made in August has been disappointing. I admit that to the full. I am telling the House the whole truth about this matter, because I think the country ought to know it.

But when you come to form a judgment —I think it is premature yet to do it—of whether this attack on the Dardanelles was an operation which ought to have been undertaken, you must consider what would have happened if it had not been undertaken. It is at least probable that the Russians, who were then already beginning to retreat before the Germans in Poland, might have had a serious setback in the Caucasus. In all probability, a great attack by the Turks might have been organised against us in Egypt. The Mesopotamia Expedition, of which I have spoken, might have been swept out of existence, and Bulgaria would almost certainly have allied herself with the Central Powers months before the time when she actually did. And during the whole of this time, and up to the present moment, do not forget that our Force on the Gallipoli Peninsula has held up, and is holding up, a force of something like 200,000 Turks, and preventing them from doing incalculable mischief in other parts of the Eastern theatre. I am not, on behalf of the Government, going to say more as regards the future of this particular sphere of the theatre of War, because I think, as I said a moment ago, it is too soon to pronounce a final judgment. The situation at the Dardanelles is receiving, I need not say, our most careful and anxious consideration, not as an isolated thing, but as part and parcel of a far larger strategic question which is raised by the whole of the recent developments in the Eastern theatre of War.

Balkan Situation

I will say a few words and they shall be very few, because they must be very carefully chosen, on the position in the Balkans. Ever since the beginning of the War, and especially since Turkey entered into it, we—and by "we" I mean not only ourselves, but the Allied Powers, who have always acted together—have not ceased or slackened in our efforts to promote united action among the Balkan States and Rumania. The efforts of diplomacy ever since August and September last in that direction have been ceaseless and untiring. The result—I again make this admission—as far as the promotion of Balkan unity is concerned, has been disappointment and failure, and it is not surprising, perhaps, that there are critics who think that by greater firmness at one point, and by greater adroitness at another, more successful gains might have been made. If I might, for a moment, say a word to those critics, there are two or three points which are often left out of account, and which ought to be taken into account when you are dealing with this tangled and thorny chapter in diplomatic history. The first is this, that unity of direction is as important an asset in diplomacy as it is in strategy. Throughout the whole of these proceedings Germany has had that advantage, for Austria has always been a mere cypher and appendix to German diplomacy. But with the Allies, on the other hand, every important step has, naturally and necessarily, been taken in consultation and in concert between three and, latterly, four different Powers. With the best good will in the world, and with the most genuine common purpose, there must be differences of angles and of points of view in an operation of that kind.

Another point which is equally relevant and important in this particular connection is the mutual animosities—I am not using the word in any censorious sense— of the Balkan States themselves, an unhappy and a still unliquidated legacy of the two Balkan wars, and especially of the Treaty of Bucharest. It is an easy thing, it has been throughout an easy thing, for Germany to make lavish promises to Bulgaria of Serbian and Albanian, and perhaps, secretly, even of Greek territory. But we, the Allies, could not barter away the property of our Allies and friends behind their backs, without their consent, or without an assurance, at any rate, of adequate compensation, which has been a source of infinite complication and controversy. Further, when the Allies are reproached, as they are in some quarters, with being too late in providing active help for Serbia, it must be remembered that up to the very last moment there was the strongest reason to believe that Greece would acknowledge and act upon her treaty obligations to Serbia. When, on 21st September, after the Bulgarian mobilisation had begun, M. Venizelos, who was then the Prime Minister of Greece, asked France and ourselves for 150,000 men, it was on the express understanding that Greece would also mobilise. Greece did in fact mobilise under his direction on the 24th September, but it was not until the 2nd October that M. Venizelos found himself able to agree to the landing of British and French troops under the formal protest, a merely formal protest, which he had already made to the French. Government.

On 4th October—I wish these dates to be borne in mind—M. Venizelos announced what had happened to the Greek Chamber, and at the same time declared that Greece must abide by her Treaty with Serbia. Next day the King repudiated the declaration, and M. Venizelos resigned. The new Government which succeeded declined to recognise that a casus faderis had arisen between Greece and Serbia, despite our constant insistence that Greece should make common cause with Serbia, and the new Greek Government, while declaring the desire to remain on friendly terms with the Allies, declined to depart from their attitude of neutrality. Those are facts which ought to be taken into account by the people who criticise the alleged inertia of the Allied Governments. I make no comment upon that for the moment. I think it is better not to do so. The result is that Serbia, without Greek support, was left to bear the brunt of a frontal invasion by Germany and Austria and a side attack from the King of Bulgaria. I have to say this—and I say it on behalf of the Government and of the people of the United Kingdom—we here in this United Kingdom, and I know it to be also the opinion of our French and our Russian Allies, cannot allow Serbia to become the prey of this sinister and nefarious combination. The General Staffs of the French Army, and of our own, have been in close consultation, consultations which culminated with the very welcome visit to London, at the end of last week, of the illustrious Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Joffre. The result, I am glad to say, is complete agreement between us, not only as to the ends, but as to the means. The House will not expect me to, and I ought not to say by what method or in what form, that common policy will be pursued. But this I will say, our co-operation will be close, cordial, and in full concert, and Serbia may be assured, so far as I am able to do so, and I give her that assurance on the part of the British Government to-day, that her independence is regarded by us as one of the essential objects of the Allied Powers.

Allied Finance

I am sorry to have kept the House so long with these matters, but I set forth with the object of telling them everything that I could well do; and I now proceed to ask myself and to ask them the further question after this review of the various theatres of operation: What are we doing and what ought we to do, in addition to all that we have done, first, as a community, and then as classes and as individuals? We have, as my right hon. Friend the Minister of Munitions said in a speech in May last —which I trust was widely read—as partners with our great Allies, three special co-ordinate functions to discharge. First of all, there is the supply of men, an adequate supply of men for the Army; then the provision of the munitions of war, not only for our own troops but for the forces of our Allies; and thirdly, the burden which we have taken upon ourselves, and which to the utmost of our ability we shall endeavour to discharge—the burden of common allied finance. One of the things which we have to consider is how we are to co-ordinate and to adjust the different functions, the object being that we here in the United Kingdom and in the British Empire should contribute most fruitfully and most effectively to the common cause. I would say just one word, first of all, as to the third of those points, namely, the question of finance. The financial position to-day is serious. The extent to which we here in this country are buying goods abroad in excess of our exports is more than £30,000,000 per month against an average of about £11,000,000 per month before the War; and, at the same time, we are making advances to our Allies and to others which were estimated by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his Budget speech to amount to a total during the current financial year, to say no more of what is to come, to £423,000,000. We have also, be it remembered, alone amongst the belligerent countries, maintained our free market for gold, and, indeed, have exported a large amount to all parts of the world; and it is certain we are making purchases and undertaking commitments to provide credits abroad to an extent that can only be paid for by the further export of gold, or by the further sale abroad of securities and of our own debts.

I only bring these facts, which are familiar, in this context to the recollection of the House, in order to say once more that this is a burden which, rich as we are, resourceful as we are, we cannot go on discharging unless there is, both on the part of the Government as well as on the part of the individuals, the most strict and stringent rule of economy, the avoidance of unnecessary expenditure, and the curtailment of charges which under normal conditions we should think right and necessary, and, if I may use a homely expression, cutting our coat according to the cloth with which we have to make it. I do not think, I am not a pessimist in this matter, our position compares unfavourably with that of the Governments who are opposed to us. The consumption of the German Government and the German nation has been far in excess of what they have been able to produce or import, and their stocks of available commodities are, from all we hear, rapidly diminishing and dwindling. And, further, the standard of life of the greater part of the population of Germany has been depressed to a point at which there is little or no margin of reserve. We in these respects no doubt apparently and ostensibly stand in a better position, but I would once more say with all the emphasis of which I am capable, we cannot sustain the burden which this great War has laid upon us unless as individuals, as classes, as a community, and as a Government we make, and are prepared to make, far greater sacrifices than we have hitherto done in the direction of retrenchment and economy. There is another point in that connection I should like to mention before I deal with the question of men, and to which for a moment I desire to call the attention of the House, and that is the cost of the Army. The average cost of the Regular Army in peace time, on a very rough and an approximate estimate, used to be reckoned and is reckoned as about £100 per head per annum. I am quite certain that I am using a very moderate and more than moderate figure when I say in the condition which now prevails the complete cost per head of the Army, the vastly increased Army which we are now maintaining, is somewhere between £250 and £300 per head. I do not want to go into details. I purposely said it was an approximate and a very rough estimate. That is a fact which everybody ought to bear in mind.

National Service

5.0 P.M.

I come to the question of men. I lay down myself one very simple proposition, and it is this. Under the conditions in which we are now placed every man in this country, without any distinction of any kind, ought to be doing the thing for which, in view of the purposes of the War, he is best fitted. I make no exception or qualification of any kind. The difficulty, of course, is to find out any system under which you can say what each particular man or class of men should do, and my right hon. Friend the President of the Local Government Board introduced the National Register, of which Parliament approved, with the very object of providing the material upon which a system of that kind might be based. I will go a step further. I am speaking my own views, though I have no reason to think they are seriously dissented from by any of my colleagues, and where in the course of the arguments I think they are I will draw attention to possible points of dissent. My next proposition is this: After you have made, by the best system of examination and classification that you can adopt, adequate provision for all the other necessary national services, amongst which I need not say I do not merely include the fabrication of munitions, but also the maintenance of industries which are essential to the life of our country, the carrying on of industries that are essential for the production of our exports—when you have made adequate provision for all those national interests, the residuum—not, perhaps, a very happy word to use, I will say the reservoir—which is left of men of military and recruitable age ought to be fully explored and exhausted. Now I approach thornier ground. There have been, and probably are, differences of opinion as to whether that recruitable reservoir can be fully made use of by what is called the voluntary system without resort to some form of compulsion. I will let the House for once into a Cabinet secret. So many things have been said and written of what goes on in the Cabinet—

Very few. Some of them are true, but very few. Many things appear to go on in the Cabinet which those of us who sit in the Cabinet have never heard or dreamt of in our lives. But I will let the House into a Cabinet secret—I hope without breaking any obligation of secrecy or any confidence—and that is that there have been differences of opinion amongst the Members of the Cabinet as to whether what we need, whether, in other words, what I call the full exploitation and employment of the recruitable reservoir, can or cannot be obtained without resort to some form of compulsion. I will state my own view. In the first place, I have no abstract or à priori objection of any sort or kind to compulsion—in time of war. I have nothing at the back of my mind which would make me go to the stake, or through some less severe form of penance, in defence of what is called the voluntary principle. I think that in time of war we must get rid of all those predilections both on the one side and on the other. It is a pure question of practical expediency—how are we going to bring the War to a successful conclusion? I will make a further admission—if admission it can be called—that is that I think our system of voluntary recruiting, which does very well, or well enough, under normal conditions in time of peace, operates, as it has been hitherto practised, in a haphazard, capricious, and to some extent unjust way with regard both to individuals and to classes. It is like a net with very irregular meshes. It lets through some things which ought not to be allowed to escape, and it holds and keeps some things which had better be let through.

My objection to the employment of compulsion for the purpose of recruiting the Army under existing conditions has not been based at all upon abstract attachment to an à priori principle, or upon blindness or indifference to the imperfections and defects of our existing methods of voluntary recruiting. It is based upon an entirely different ground, namely, that the employment of compulsion under existing conditions would forfeit what I regard to be of supreme and capital importance, that is, the maintenance of the national unity. That again is an abstract objection, but when translated into concrete terms it means this; if you were to apply, I do not speak of any particular method, but any method of coercion or compulsion, without something in the nature, I will not say of universal, but of general consent, you would defeat your own purpose. It would not be a practicable or workable method of making good and filling up the gaps left by the defects of the voluntary system. I am speaking my own view—entirely my own view. My proposition, if I were to formulate one, would be this: not that I rule out compulsion as an impossible expedient, but that compulsion, if resorted to, ought only to be resorted to, and can only from a practical point of view be resorted to—or, in other words, be made a workable expedient for filling up the gap which you have to supply—with something in the nature of general consent. I am glad to say that to a large extent these, I hope, are not for the moment practical or relevant considerations. Lord Derby's scheme, the details of which are familiar to the House and to the country—therefore I need not attempt to describe them—is being worked, I believe, with the hearty consent and cooperation even of the most ardent supporters of compulsion, certainly with the goodwill and active co-operation of organised labour, the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee, and all the various agencies in the country which are seeking to supply this great national necessity.

If you ask me how many men ought we to aim at getting under that scheme, or under any scheme, my answer is that you ought to aim at securing everybody of military age and capacity who is left after you have completely supplied the other national necessities to which I have referred. I would much rather state the requirements of the Government and of the nation in those general terms than by reference to any particular set of figures. It covers everything. It covers everybody who remains over and who ought to be made available wherever he may be or whoever he may be. If you ask me again when I should form a conclusion as to whether the voluntary system, as organised under Lord Derby's scheme, had reached a result which would enable us to say whether it was successful or not—I think he has fixed the 30th November as the date on which he will close the lists—my answer is, as soon after that date as it is possible to classify and arrive at the results which his labours have achieved. Then, and not before then, and not later, can we say whether or not the experiment of voluntary recruiting is a success. I very much deprecate—I hope I shall have here the assent both of those who, like myself, are strong voluntarists and of those who are disposed to favour a system of compulsion— I think it would be much better to leave it like that, and come to a decision when we have arrived at that point of actual experiment, than to lay down hard and fast lines in terms of numbers as to this or that principle.

I believe myself that the result will be wholly satisfactory. I have not the least fear of there being any necessity to resort to anything beyond this great organised effort which is being carried on with the goodwill of all parties in the State and with the hearty co-operation of the leaders of organised labour. But if, when every just allowance has been made for other necessary work, and the whole of this machinery has been in operation and has achieved what it can, there should still be found a substantial number of men of military age not required for other purposes, who, without excuse, hold back from the service of their country, I believe that the very same conditions which make compulsion impossible now, namely, the absence of general consent, would force the country to the view that they must consent to supplement by some form of legal obligation the failure of the voluntary system. As far as I myself am concerned, I should be prepared to recommend them to take that course. But I dismiss it as a contingency which I do not think is ever likely to arise.

I am determined—I stick at nothing— I am determined that we shall win this War. Sooner than not win the War, if I found—I do not believe I shall—such a situation as that, I should come down without the faintest hesitation or doubt to all my friends, those who like myself are what I call strong supporters of the voluntary system, and say, "We have done what we could; we have not obtained the results we hoped for; we must do what is still necessary by other means." Let me say one word more in this connection. I am told by Lord Derby and others that there is some doubt among married men who are now being asked to enlist, whether, having enlisted, or promised to enlist, they may not be called upon to serve while younger and unmarried men are holding back, and not doing their duty. Let them at once disabuse themselves of that notion. So far as I am concerned I should certainly say the obligation of the married man to serve ought not to be enforced or held to be binding upon him unless and until—I hope by voluntary effort, if it be needed in the last resort, as I have explained, by other means—the unmarried men are dealt with.

I felt bound to deal at some length with that matter—not because I myself have any doubt. I have far too much confidence in the patriotism and public spirit of my fellow-countrymen to doubt for one moment that they are going to respond to that appeal—that the young men, the unmarried men with whom the promise of the future lies, are not going in this great emergency to shirk, and to leave the fortunes of their country and the assertion of the greatest cause for which we have ever fought, to those who have given greater hostages to fortune and are least able to bear the brunt. I think it is only fair, just, and right to the House of Commons that we should face every contingency.

Cabinet Control

I have detained the House at very great length, but there is one other matter to which I must refer. I have spoken of finance. I have spoken of the provision of men. But I am told there is great anxiety in some quarters, as to what is called the higher direction of the War. We have a Cabinet of twenty-two members."

Twenty-one at the moment, but I wish it were twenty-two. Call it twenty-one, if you please. Some people seem to think that a Cabinet of twenty-one members is incompetent to conduct the affairs of a great Empire in times of emergency like this. Mr. Pitt, when he carried on the great war against France more than one hundred years ago, had, I think, a Cabinet of seven or nine, but the exiguity in size of that Cabinet did not prevent him from committing great blunders, or from suffering from many strokes of ill-fortune. For myself, I do not think there is any numerical specific against either want of foresight or want of good luck. That is a very mechanical way of looking at it. I do not propose to change the size of the Cabinet; but, of course, there is a great deal to be said in time of war for having one, or it may be more—at any rate one—comparatively small body of men who will deal with the daily exigencies of the State. We realised that—it may be very strange for some of our censors to know it—in the first few weeks of the War. I do not think any Prime Minister has ever, to a greater degree than I have done, delegated work, which in normal conditions is done by the Cabinet as a whole, to Committees and smaller bodies. I did not know it until I was reminded of it the other day, but I believe, from first to last, since the beginning of the War, we have had something like fifty different Committees and advisory bodies, all framed out of the Cabinet, sometimes with material aid from outside, to which special departments of activity, brought into prominence or urgency by the needs of the War, have been relegated—subject always to ultimate Cabinet responsibility.

In particular, we have had since a very early period of the War a body fluctuating in number from time to time, and which has varied in name. Sometimes it has been called a "War Council," sometimes a "War Committee." Sometimes it has gone by other designations. It is a body to which either general questions of State or questions of strategy in particular areas and arenas have, by the consent of the Cabinet, been referred. I have come to the conclusion, after now some fifteen months of experience, that it is desirable to maintain that system, but to limit still further the number of the body to whom what I may call the strategic conduct of the War is from time to time referred. I think, and my colleagues agree with me, that the Committee, or by whatever name it may be called, should be a body of not less than three, and perhaps not more than five in number, but with this important proviso that, whether it be three or five, it should, of course, have power to summon to its deliberation and to its assistance the particular Minister concerned with the particular Departments whose special knowledge is needed, or is desirable, for the determination of each issue as it arises. I think further—and this is rather a delicate question—the relations between any such body and the Cabinet should be of an elastic kind. At the same time, it should be understood that the Cabinet, which, as a body, has the ultimate responsibility for questions of policy, shall be kept, not only constantly informed of the decisions and actions of the Committee, but in all questions which involve a change, or a new departure in policy, should be consulted before decisive action is taken. It is only on these lines that you can successfully conduct a war like this.

I entirely agree with those who say—and I have had plenty of experience—that it is very undesirable, and leads to delay and often to confusion, that decisions which have to be taken, very often at very short notice, should not become effective until they are referred to the Cabinet as a whole. That is perfectly true. I think a Committee such as I have indicated ought to be clothed with power to take such decisions, and to act upon them. On the other hand, I am very jealous of the maintenance of collective Cabinet responsibility for large changes and new departures in policy; but I believe that in practice it will be found perfectly capable of working the two things together. That is what we propose to do. I hope that before many days are over we may be able to announce to the House, as I think the House ought to be told, the members who will compose the Committee, whatever the size that we ultimately decide upon. In conjunction with that, but still in connection with the subject of what is called the higher direction of the War, I attach very great importance, first of all to a more complete and intimate coordination between the staffs of the various Allied Powers. We have had a very happy illustration of the advantage of that in our recent deliberations with General Joffre. We should also have a more intimate and regular interchange by some form of combination with the staffs, not only of the War Office and the Admiralty, but with those who conduct our diplomatic affairs. It is impossible to carry on these things in watertight compartments. You must have co-ordination of contact—close, constant, practical, continuing. Those are the general outlines. Those are the views I desire to express to the House in regard to our position.

I have this afternoon tried to tell the House the whole truth. I am not aware—I do not think I have kept back anything known to us which ought to be known to the House, unless it is a thing which, if told, would go for the first time to our enemies. I have made no attempt to conceal anything in the past history of the War—its conduct, its failures—shortcomings, if you like.

Personal Position

If I may, by leave of the House, I should like, before I sit down, to say one or two words with regard to my own personal position. When the War broke out, I was the head of the Government. I take my share—and no one has a larger share—of responsibility at that supreme moment for the attitude and policy of this country. A terrible responsibility it is, measured by what has happened, and by what is still to happen! Much of our best blood spilt! Thousands of young lives, the hope of our future, cut short in the very promise of their youth! The cry goes up in ever-increasing volume day by day and week by week from torn hearts, from mutilated homes. Every morning is there throughout the country, in almost every home, one or other of us who does not tremble to think of what message of direct and personal loss may be in store? We might have stood aloof—spectators and not actors in this the most moving tragedy in the history of man. We might have stood aloof, but is there one even of those who are enduring unspeakable anguish-childless parents, widowed wives, desolate comrades and friends—is there one who wishes—or even thinks—that Britain should have acted otherwise? I do not believe that there is. Searching, if the House will allow me to say so, the utmost depths of my own heart and conscience, I would not unsay or undo that great decision. I have from that moment to this laboured, with the unceasing and devoted aid of loyal counsellors and colleagues, to uphold the common cause, to bring to its support every resource in man and money, in prudence and courage, in unity and self-sacrifice that this Kingdom and this Empire can provide. That there have been errors and shortcomings, failures of judgment, lack of foresight in the conduct and direction of our policy, I am the first person in the United Kingdom to acknowledge and to deplore. That there has been anything of sloth, indifference, self-complacency, unwillingness to face unpalatable facts, a desire, or even a disposition, to conceal from our fellow countrymen the truth, I challenge anyone to prove.

I am as confident as I was fifteen months ago that we are going to carry a righteous cause to a triumphant issue; and I am not going to shift the burden which has been put upon me until I am satisfied that I cannot bear it, or that it can be borne better by others. So long as I enjoy, and I am proud to think that I still do enjoy the confidence of my Sovereign, of the House of Commons, and of the country, I shall not surrender the task, heavy indeed beyond the power of myself, or those of any other man, but as noble and as inspiring as any in history. If there be moments such as come to all of us when we are tempted to be fainthearted, let us ask ourselves: What year in our history has done more to justify our faith in the manhood and the womanhood of our people? It has brought us, as we cannot at this moment forget, the imperishable story of the last hours of Edith Cavell facing a worse ordeal than the battlefield—the moments creeping on slowly and remorselessly and death already swallowed up in victory. She has taught the bravest man amongst us a supreme lesson of courage. Yes, Sir, and in this United Kingdom, and throughout the Dominions of the Crown, there are thousands of such women, but a year ago we did not know it. We have great traditions, but a nation cannot exist by traditions alone. Thank God, we have living examples of all the qualities which have built up and sustained our Empire! Let us be worthy of them, and endure to the end.

I beg to move, "That this House do now adjourn."

I am sure I shall be only voicing the general opinion of the House when I say how much we welcome back to our counsels the Prime Minister, on whom has fallen the burden of this War for the last fifteen months; and, so far as I am concerned, if I thought the statement that he has made, and the great power of oratory he has displayed, could give a sufficient indication to the people on the matters on which they show anxiety, I should certainly not have risen after the speech of the Prime Minister. But I think it is natural, and I think it is right, that after fifteen months of war we should, as far as possible, have a free Debate in the House of Commons. We have been now fifteen months at war, and we have made vast sacrifices of men and of material. We are spending, I am told, £5,000,000 a day, and we have had casualties in our population to the extent of something like half a million. In addition to that, we have an ever-widening theatre of war, which is threatening to extend in the East to the most vital interests of our Empire. After fifteen months we still see our enemies in possession of Belgium, in part of France, in Poland, and threatening within a very short time to crush our gallant little Ally Serbia, to whom I am sure the heart of every Member of this House goes out in the valiant struggle which she is making. Our Forces at Gallipoli are still held in check, and the operations that are going on there are costing us countless numbers of those who are wounded and of those who are stricken down by disease.

That is a position, in my opinion, of grave peril which this country has to meet, and for my own part I have never thought that anything was gained by trying in the face of the country to minimise that danger, or in the slightest degree to shut our eyes to the difficulties that lie before us. But if we desire to-day to have a discussion—and I think the Notice Paper of the House shows how widespread that desire is—I am sure I may tell the Prime Minister that the desire of that discussion is not in consequence of any weakening of any single man in the House or in the country on the main object of the War, but is, indeed, a symbol of the determination—and the growing determination—of this House, and of the country, that everything that can be done, and is possible, will be done to bring this War to a satisfactory conclusion at the earliest possible moment. What the House and the country are really anxious about is, as to whether our resources in men and material are being used to the best advantage; secondly, as to whether what appear to be grave miscalculations could have been avoided; and, thirdly, above all, whether the machinery of Government for carrying on the War is the most adequate and the most effective that we can devise. Upon all these questions the country is groping in the dark for information. I am not going to discuss whether the country has been told all that it might have been told. For my own part, I have a strong view that our country never fights so well, or so readily makes sacrifices, as when at understands the whole situation, and when with its back to the wall, if necessary it determines at all costs to surmount those difficulties.

But, while we ought bravely to face such a situation as I have described, I should? not like the right hon. Gentleman, or anyone who is listening to me, to imagine for a moment that any of us has forgotten what he has so eloquently described as the difficulties which we have surmounted. Our unconquerable Navy which rules the seas, and which has swept the German commerce off them as if it had never existed, is a matter of which we may well be proud. The process of converting ourselves into a military power is one the gigantic nature of which it is almost difficult to contemplate, and the feeding and transport of our troops bring a credit to that particular branch of the Army, and that particular branch of the Navy which we cannot over-estimate. And, above all, as the Prime Minister has so well said, we have exhibited to the world an Imperial unity which has brought from all quarters of our Empire some of the bravest troops that have ever brought glory to our fields of battle. But at the same time, as I said before, I think the country is uneasy as regards certain matters that have happened in the various theatres of the War. For my own part, I see little use in dwelling upon the mistakes which have been made in the past, or in acts of omission or in matters of default or miscalculation, except in so far as it may enable us to find out the root cause and so try to prevent similar misfortune in the future. I do not intend to go into detail in certain matters, some of which have already been referred to by the Prime Minister. The first shock to the country in the conduct of the War was the terrible revelation of the absence of munitions. I only refer to that, and the other matters on which I shall have to say a word, because I intend, whether it be popular or unpopular, to state here from my own experience that, in my opinion, a Cabinet, however useful in times of peace, is an organisation and machine utterly incapable of carrying on a war under present conditions. [Laughter.] Hon. Members may laugh. I am quite prepared for their laughter, and I will tell the House why in a moment. I have never heard an explanation as to why, if a Cabinet can show that supervision over our preparation for war that the country expects of it, a Cabinet of twenty-two, or any one of them, never found out the causes or the reasons of our want of ammunition at the very time when the want of munitions was bringing home to us day after day from our friends in the trenches in France the most appalling accounts of their sufferings, and of how they had to undergo the tortures of the plentiful supply the enemy had while they could make no return.

I myself, at all events, frankly say I have never yet understood how no one of the twenty-two of the Cabinet could see that it was as far as carrying it out to a successful conclusion, absolutely impossible to undertake the military expedition to the Dardanelles, which has hung round our necks like a millstone throughout the whole of these recent months. It is all very well to tell us, as the Prime Minister told us, as a general proposition that the Cabinet had very often to determine questions exclusive of naval and military considerations. I do not know exactly how far the right hon. Gentleman would push that. Does that mean that if he had not a reasonable chance of success he would still undertake an operation like the Dardanelles for other questions outside military and naval ones? If that is so I think it is a vice of Cabinet Government. I do not believe that the country would be justified in entering upon an expedition which has cost some 100,000 men in casualties and suffering which baffles description unless they had assurances from their naval and military advisers that they were likely to carry out the expedition to a successful conclusion. Was there ever such an illustration of a miscalculation which can arise under our present system of instituting these operations as what has happened in the story of the Dardanelles itself? First you had the miscalculation as regards the naval expedition. Then you had a miscalculation as regards the landing of troops where you lost in casualties 40,000 men, and had an entirely inefficient force to enable you to go on. Then you had later another miscalculation when you sent out an inadequate force and attempted the expansion of your operations at Suvla Bay, where you had another 40,000 casualties, and your expedition not advanced a single mile towards a successful conclusion. From that day to this when that disaster occurred—a disaster in my opinion the most vital that has happened in the course of this War—under your Cabinet system you have never been able to make up your mind, and you have not now made up your mind, as I will show in a moment, as to whether you ought or are able either to proceed with these operations or whether you ought to boldly withdraw your men and save the suffering and the loss that goes on from day to day with absolutely no hope of any satisfactory result.

I have no experience of a Cabinet in peace time. A Cabinet in peace time is a microcosm of this House as the House is of the country, and I dare say it is the very best form of Government which could probably be devised for ascertaining what is best in the interests of the majority of the people, and very often as a debating society for discussing how best you can keep your party together and by what methods you can obtain most support in the country. But, Sir, I absolutely deny that any of those considerations come in in time of war, because spasmodic meetings of the Cabinet and debate are absolutely fruitless in carrying on a war What is wanted for carrying on a war is a small number—the smaller the better—of competent men sitting, not once a week, but from day to day, with the best expert advisers they can get, working out the problems that arise in the course of the War from day to day. You want the best military staff you can get, and so far as I could see when I went to the Cabinet and up till very recently there was no staff at all, or at least I never saw their productions. It is quite true that during the last few weeks I was there there was a staff who furnished us with certain information, but in my opinion the staff should not be a scratch lot. The staff should be the very ablest men that you could get to keep your Cabinet advised as to all the means that were necessary for carrying out the operations that you, as a matter of policy, had determined upon from time to time. What happened when the War broke out? Whatever military staff they had at the War Office—and I am told some of them were very experienced generals— all went off to carry on the War on the Continent, and so the staff was depleted. I venture to say, and indeed I feel bound to say, that as long as that system—which I believe has greatly accounted for all the various miscalculations that have happened since the War broke out—continues, I do not think you will turn the forces and materials at your disposal to the best advantage in the interests of the country.

6.0 P.M

The Prime Minister has announced, after fifteen months, that he has come to the conclusion that it would be better to have a Committee, a War Committee, or something of that kind, consisting, as I understood him, of about four—[HON. MEMBERS: "From three to five!"]—Yes, from three to five. I do not see how that will be any great improvement. The whole question is one of concentrating responsibility, and if you have three or five men, I care not which, who are to be accountable to the Cabinet, or for whom the Cabinet is taking responsibility, you will only be back on the same system. It is quite clear that if you are a member of a Cabinet either of two things must happen: Either you must be satisfied to be a nonentity and endorse whatever is put before you as is much too often done, or you must get exactly the same infor- mation and go through exactly the same reasoning and sifting that your Committee of three or five have done. With great respect to the right hon. Gentleman, although I dare say it may seem very foolish to some persons, I say from my short experience in the Cabinet I would much prefer to see the right hon. Gentleman exercise the right he has of cutting his Cabinet down even to five or six from twenty-two, placing upon those five or six the whole burden of responsibility, and then the country would know that there was no divided responsibility, or anything of that kind. They would know the men to hold responsible for the miscalculations which are made, and which have been made, and may no doubt in the future be made in the course of the War. I do not believe in a Committee of the Cabinet, then a Cabinet, and then an Inner Cabinet, and that is what we have had. What happens? The Committee decides something. The Cabinet knows nothing about it. Sometimes it says ditto, and sometimes it may have a discursive talk over why this or that was done. Then, all of a sudden, you see in the paper, even after your Committee and after your Cabinet, that the offer of some important territory has been made to some foreign Power for a particular purpose. You wonder where on earth the offer came from, and you find, I suppose, that it is a process evolved from the Inner Cabinet. I press upon the right hon. Gentleman with all the force that I have at all events—and I can have no object except a desire to set up the best machine that is possible for the Government—once more to consider whether when he is making this change he should not make it in the direction I have indicated and concentrate the responsibility upon the best small Cabinet that he can choose.

Perhaps the gravest instance and the most recent one of how Cabinet Government works is to be found in the situation in which we have found ourselves in the Balkans. I am bound to say that nothing has ever astonished me more than the gyrations which we have gone through in relation to our policy in the Balkans. The Balkan question has been staring us in the face certainly ever since I went into the Cabinet and long before; but on the 28th September the Foreign Secretary made a statement in this House which he made as the considered policy of the Government, and which he made no doubt with the full knowledge of the military adviser of the Government, and it was this:— [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] Well, you asked me to read it.

I have not once intervened in any Debate on the War since its inception. But that has not been because my colleagues and myself had not profound dissatisfaction with certain events which have taken place, both in this country and abroad. It was due solely to the fact that we felt, rightly or wrongly—I think rightly—that the best service that we could bring to the country in this terrible crisis was to extend to the Government of the day, and to the men who form that Government, whoever they might be, the fullest possible trust, and a loyal and. as far as possible, silent support. That attitude was maintained by my colleagues and myself even after the formation of the Coalition Government. During the long and terrible months that have passed, I think that Ireland has exhibited a remarkable spectacle. Ever since the War commenced the voice of party controversy has disappeared in Ireland. Men who before that were divided by the bitterest party passions have since come together, and worked together amicably and unselfishly, side by side, for the common cause. I myself the other day, under the presidency of the Lord Lieutenant at Dublin, sat in amicable consultation with the leaders of the Ulster Unionist party.

In addition to that we have had in Ireland no labour unrest, no industrial strife, and our workmen and women, after the particular offer made to them by the new Minister of Munitions, have gone with enthusiasm into the service of that Department, and I am glad to be able to tell the House that to-day thousands of men and women, not only in Dublin and Belfast but up and down the whole country, are engaged working full time upon munitions work. And this is only the beginning. In a few weeks' time, I believe, this work will be going on without interruption all over Ireland. Wherever trouble and friction may come from it will not come from these Irish workers. At the same time the work of recruiting, to which I will refer more particularly in a moment, has been and is to-day going steadily and satisfactorily forward. In a word, it is true to say that from the commencement of the War until this moment you have been faced by no trouble, by no dangers, by no vexatious criticism, and by no lack of loyal support in Ireland. I again say that has not been due to the lack of grave causes of complaint on our side. It was due solely to the determination that no responsibility, or blame, or appearance of disunion in the face of the enemy should at the end of the War be laid to the account of Ireland or her people. I think that to-day, especially after the speech the right hon. Gentleman has made, I am fully entitled to express my views in this Debate, and I think the record of Ireland entitles me to be heard.

We have been in Ireland profoundly disturbed by many things that have been taking place in this country during the last few months. The spectacle of industrial unrest, the determined and unceasing attacks in certain sections of the Press upon the Government, upon individual members of the Government, and in a special way upon the Prime Minister, have aroused the gravest concern and the deepest indignation in Ireland, and I would like to say to the right hon. Gentleman, to whose moving speech we all listened with such respect and with such deep satisfaction—I would like to say to him that the attacks made upon him by sections of the Press in this country have found no echo whatever in the length and breadth of Ireland, and he stands to-day, as he stood before the War, high in the confidence of the Irish people. The persistent pessimism which has been so long preached in certain quarters with reference to the War has had no effect in discouraging the Irish people. The only effect it has had in Ireland has been that it has to some extent brought aid and help to that little fringe which exists there, as in England, of men who would if they could interfere with the success of recruiting. I for my part listened to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman with pleasure, for two reasons mainly. Although that speech put before the country indeed in serious colours the gravity of the problem with which we are faced, at the same time I think, taking the speech as a whole, and taking the proper prospective of the whole problem, the speech will do much to counteract the pessimism which is taking the heart out of so many of our people in every part of the Empire at this moment, and is undoubtedly bringing hope, help, and comfort to the enemies of the Empire.

Secondly, I listened with pleasure to the speech because the proposal the right hon. Gentleman has made with reference to the Cabinet is one which—and it is not saying very much for it—will, in my opinion—for the time being at any rate—I will not say more, silence the wreckers. I am not in favour of the idea of a Cabinet within a Cabinet. If this Committee were to be a Cabinet within the Cabinet, it would be utterly unconstitutional, it would be scrapping the whole English Constitution, it would be without any precedent, and the position of every member of the Cabinet who is on the outside would be humiliating and absolutely impossible. If, on the other hand, the Committee is to be merely a small body of men who are to attend to carrying out in detail the decisions already come to by the Cabinet as a whole, then I am inclined to agree with the right hon. Gentleman who last sat down that, after all, it does not mean very much at any rate in principle, and the most that can apparently be said for it is that instead of this fluctuating War Council, as it was called, which met periodically, and which was not always the same in its component parts, you would have sitting from day to day a small body of men whose names would be known to the country, and who-would have the conduct of every matter of detail.

So far it is good, but I must say to the House of Commons, and to the Prime Minister, in my judgment the whole of the present position is wrong—fundamentally wrong. I never believed in the wisdom of the creation of the Coalition Government. I did not hear at the time, and I have really not heard since, any reason to show that that creation was either desirable or necessary. The Government at that time was united. It had the confidence in the House of Commons. It had the open and enthusiastic support of every party and every section in this House, and, in addition to that, it had the advantage, and the country had the advantage, of a responsible and, I will add, a patriotic Opposition. A great deal of nonsense has been talked in the past few months about the desirability of having no criticism on the Government. Criticism of a War Government, in my opinion, is essential. Yes, but it must be reasoned, measured, -patriotic criticism controlled and directed by a responsible Opposition.

The idea that the new Coalition Government was to be a stronger Government than its predecessor because it was to be made up by the selection of men to represent various sections and various parties, not on account of their personal efficiency and fitness, seemed to me—then and now—an absurd idea. How has it resulted? Is there any candid man who will say to-day that the present Government is any stronger than the Government it has succeeded? And, as for criticism, proper and necessary criticism in this House, will anyone say that the kind of criticism we have had, in the main, what I may call a kind of guerilla criticism by irresponsible men— [HON. MEMBERS: "NO, no!"] I hope no hon. Member will put the cap on.

I hope the hon. Member will not think I meant him. I say the kind of criticism we have had has certainly not afforded the Government or the country that considered, restrained, responsible criticism which would have been found if they were sitting on that bench a responsible Opposition. I had the great honour of being offered a seat in the Coalition Cabinet by the Prime Minister, and amongst the many other reasons which I had for declining that offer probably the most powerful was this: I felt convinced then—and I am more convinced than ever by what has happened since—that my power of doing good work in this matter and of helping the country would have been lessened and not increased if I accepted it. I urged on the right hon. Gentleman it was unwise for him to bring into the Coalition Government any Irish party. He did not take my advice. I am still of that opinion, I do not know what his opinion is now. Therefore, I do not believe that the present proposal of this small Committee will remedy the difficulties and the evils of the situation which I recognise exist. A homogeneous Government and a responsible Opposition is, in my view, the only satisfactory solution. But though those are my views, and the views of my colleagues, I would like to say to the Prime Minister that they will not in the smallest degree affect our attitude towards his Government, and I promise the Prime Minister, on behalf of my colleagues and on behalf of Ireland, that any Government of which he is the head will, in the conduct of this War, receive our constant and loyal support.

I do not think it would be prudent or wise for me to follow the right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken into a discussion of the reasons which induced him to leave the Cabinet. He commenced by telling the House that he did not see the value of thrashing out and discussing past difficulties and past mistakes, but he dealt rather fully with some of them. What I would say is that with the imperfect information which I have, and not speaking with inner knowledge of what has happened in the Cabinet, I believe it would be wrong for me to attempt to appraise the blame for any of the mistakes which undoubtedly have been made, both in our warlike operations and in our diplomacy. The time will come when those things will have to be discussed, and a strict reckoning taken; but with the imperfect information which would be in the possession of persons like myself I should be doing more harm than good. All I say is that we want some guarantee that mistakes of this kind will not be repeated. We want to make very plain to the Government the view that the mis- takes which have been made in the Dardarnelles should be remedied, and that an adequate Force should be sent to the rescue of Serbia. I remember the intense feeling that existed in Ireland when Belgium was first victimised, and I say the same feeling exists with reference to Serbia. We recognise this War, and we enthusiastically support the action of this country in the war, because, among other reasons, we believe it is a war in favour of the independence of small nations. Therefore, whatever our advice may be worth, we urge most strongly upon the Government that they should go in the most effective way to the rescue of Serbia.

The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister spoke about recruiting and about possible compulsion. I, like the Prime Minister, am against compulsion. I believe that to impose compulsion on this country, unless, as he said, the country were practically unanimously in favour of it, would be a folly and a crime. I am quite convinced on my own part that that necessity will never be pressed upon any one. I do not believe the voluntary system has ever had fair play in this country. I, of course, cannot speak with intimate knowledge of what has happened in England, but I know what has happened in Ireland, and most undoubtedly up to the other day the voluntary system never had fair play in Ireland. I am not sure that hon. Members fully realise the task which was before us in Ireland when the War commenced on this question of recruiting. It is a fact, which has its origin in history, and to which I need not refer more closely—it is a fact that in the past recruiting for the British Army was not popular with the mass of the Irish people. But when the War broke out, my colleagues and I, quite regardless, let me say, of the political risks which stared us in the face, instantly made an appeal to those whom we represented in Ireland, and told them that this was Ireland's war as well as England's war, that it was a just War, and that the recent attitude of Great Britain to Ireland had thrown upon us a great, grave duty of honour to the British Empire. We then went back from this country, and we went all through Ireland. I myself, within the space of about a month after that, made speeches at great public meetings in every one of the four provinces of Ireland. We set ourselves to the task of creating in Ireland—creating, mind you—an atmosphere favourable to recruiting, and of creating a sentiment in Ireland favourable to recruiting. I say most solemnly, that in that task we were absolutely entitled to the sympathy and the assistance of the Government and of the War Office. I am sorry to say we got neither.

In what I have to say I wish, in the most emphatic way, to exclude any idea that I am referring to the Prime Minister himself. No one could have been more kind and sympathetic than he was in all our communications with him, and the same thing applies to the right hon. Gentleman the Under-Secretary of State for War, to whom I have more than once conveyed our sense of our deep obligation for his unwearied courtesy and desire to assist us in our work. But the fact remains that when we were faced with that difficult and formidable task, practically every suggestion that we made, based on the strength of our own knowledge of what was suitable for Ireland and the conditions there, was put upon one side. The gentlemen who were responsible for that evidently believed that they knew what was suited to the necessities of Ireland far better than we did. A score of times, at least, I put upon paper and sent to the Government and the War Office and various members of the War Office my suggestions and my remonstrances, but all in vain. Often, almost in despair, I was tempted to rise in this House and publicly tell the House of Commons the way in which we were hampered and thwarted in our work in Ireland. I refrained from doing so from fear of doing mischief and from fear of doing harm. To-day I am very glad that I so refrained, because, in spite of these discouragements, in spite of this thwarting and embarrassing, and in spite of the utterly faulty and ridiculous system of recruiting that was set on foot, we have succeeded and have raised in Ireland a body of men whose numbers Lord Kitchener, in his letter to the Irish Conference, declared were magnificent.

There is no harm in my repeating figures. I cannot say they are War Office figures, except that they were quoted by the General Officer Commanding in Ireland. I think they were prepared in Ireland. There were raised, in the last few months, three Irish Divisions, which is equal to an entire Army corps of the New Army. In addition to that, we have sent to the regiments of the old Array many thousands of men. Three months ago the General Officer Commanding in Ireland, General Friend, made a public speech in which he said that 23,000 recruits had gone up to that date to the old regiments. Many thousands have gone since. Many thousands are probably on their way to the East at this moment with the old regiments. In addition to that, about 30,000 reservists were called up from Ireland. If you tot these figures up and add to them Irish soldiers who were in the Army when the War commenced, you will find that at this moment we have little short of 150,000 men with the Colours. If you want to see what the Irish race is doing, you must add to that 115,000 men of Irish birth in Great Britain, Scotland, England, and remember also, a large number in Wales, who have joined regiments here. And if you take the proportion of Irishmen who are serving gallantly in the Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Forces, you will find that the Irish race, unlike anything that ever existed in history before, unlike anything that the most sanguine of your statesmen ever dreamed of, has put a body of 300,000 or 400,000 men into the Army.

I say nothing of the Navy, although the presence of the Noble Lord on the front Opposition Bench (Lord Charles Beresford) reminds me of the fact that the Navy, too, owes something to Ireland, and that some of her most gallant and successful Admirals are Irishmen, and that no inconsiderable number of Irishmen are among the men in the battleships. That is, I think, a record of which we have some reason to be proud, and I am glad to think that the War Office has not been able by their policy of thwarting and embarrassment—ignorant thwarting and embarrassment, I am sure—to prevent us from achieving that result. I am glad to say that at last, after long waiting, recruiting in Ireland has now been put upon a business basis, and just as I am certain that the voluntary system will triumph under the recruiting campaign of Lord Derby, so I am certain that in Ireland you will find recruiting for the necessary reserves for our new divisions and the old regiments will be ample.

I have only alluded to these matters because there are still two outstanding questions which are gravely affecting recruiting in Ireland at this moment, and which we have utterly failed to get removed out of our path. A good deal of denunciation has gone on of the Censor in this country. I will not enter into that general discussion at all, except to say this, that it does seem to me that in one particular the Censor has been guilty of the most crass stupidity. The right hon. Gentleman used a phrase in his speech in which he said that in giving particulars of the War the only overriding condition was that the disclosure should not be such as to bring help to the enemy. I want to know how it can bring help to the enemy to let the people of Ireland know, to let the people of Scotland know, and to let the people of England and Wales know what their own regiments and divisions are doing? I argue this from the Irish point of view. It is not only an Irish question, because I am quite sure it affects every hon. Member's Constituency, and every part of England, Scotland and Wales as well. Let me argue it from my own point of view. The obstinate refusal to allow the Irish people to learn officially of the achievements of the Irish regiments, and the total absence of official recognition of their gallantry, do more harm to recruiting in Ireland than anything you could conceive. What happens is this: In the end we do get to know what our troops have been doing, but we get to know it from the statements in letters and interviews of wounded officers and men who come home. In that way we have heard a good deal about the gallantry of Irish troops and their sufferings. But in the official dispatches they have not even been mentioned. That is a strong statement to make. Let me substantiate it. Here is a letter which appeared in an English paper a little while ago, signed "A Father of Irish Soldiers." I know this man. His only two sons are to-day with the Army in the East, and were present at Gallipoli and Suvla Bay. He says:— We know that these men, who were the first to land there, were the Dublin and Munster Fusiliers. Everyone knows that to-day. The few surviving officers who came back have given us full particulars. The men received the most lavish praise from other generals in the field. The Commanding Officer of the New Zealand troops, for instance, sent a message to the remnant of the Dublin and Munster Fusiliers to thank them, and say what magnificent work they had done, and yet in this dispatch—and this is the only official dispatch which has been published—while the Australians, the Scottish Borderers, Royal Fusiliers, Lancashire Fusiliers, South Wales Borderers, etc., are all picked out for special praise, the Munsters and Dublins are not even mentioned. There is not even the mention of the words "Munster Fusiliers" or "Dublin Fusiliers." That kind of thing is doing untold mischief. There is not a man of us who does not resent it. In this Dublin Fusilier Regiment there was one battalion which was known as the "Pals Battalion." It consisted almost entirely of well-educated young men from the universities and schools and the professional classes. They were all practically annihilated, and I know scores of families in Dublin to-day who are plunged in the most terrible anguish because of the death of their children. I have seen letters from survivors to the parents of those dead boys speaking in the most extravagant terms, I might almost say, that were possible of their gallantry and the gallantry of the regiment. What do you think the feeling of the young men in Dublin must be when we go and ask them to enlist, and when they are able to answer us back by saying, "Yes, enlist and send us out to be killed in the barbed wire entanglements at Gallipoli, and then when we have all done our work and acted gloriously for our country and our regiment, not one word is allowed to be published with reference to our achievements." I cannot tell the House of Commons what a strong view I take of this.

That, mind you, is not an isolated case. Let me take another—the landing at Suvla Bay the other day. We have not heard the truth about that. I have received myself, not from men in the ranks, not from junior officers, but from officers of high position in the 10th Irish Division communications which I dare not read to this House. I have sent them to the War Office. I felt it my duty to do so. I sent them to the Prime Minister. Some day these facts will come out. Sir Ian Hamilton is back here now. These things will have to be inquired into, and some day they will be known, and when they are, I tell you that in the whole history of war you will find that no troops ever were subjected to such horrible hardships and sufferings or showed such extraordinary gallantry as this 10th Irish Division, raised in Dublin and the Curragh and commanded by General Sir Bryan Mahon. Yet not one word of official recognition —not one single word. Where allusions were made to them, they were spoken of as "a division." Names are given to other divisions, but being an Irish division it was mentioned as simply "a division." Why should this be? We are engaged at this moment in trying to raise in Ireland—and we will succeed— reserve battalions for the 10th Division. Why is it that you will not tell us in Ireland what our brave lads are doing and suffering? Let us know that. The last instance occurred only the other day, in the battle of Loos. Many of you have seen in the newspapers the graphic account of the gallantry in the battle of Loos of the London Irish Territorial Regiment. Nothing could exceed their gallantry and their losses were very heavy, and they received the greatest praise in some of the unofficial notices which have come back. But General French, in his dispatch today, never mentioned them at all. He simply lumps them in as Territorials. The way we feel about the matter is this. God knows we do not grudge praise to any troops, and we were almost as proud as they were themselves when the London Scottish Territorials were singled out for lavish praise. They deserved it, and I was delighted that they got it. But when the Irish Territorial Regiment does the same, or practically the same, why are they not mentioned at all? That is the first thing which I failed altogether to get the War Office to take into serious consideration, and it is doing infinite mischief in our work of recruiting in Ireland.

The second matter I want to mention is my complaint that the War Office has obstinately refused, from the very start up to this moment, to utilise the Volunteers in Ireland. It may be remembered that the very day the War broke out I rose in my place in this House and offered the Volunteers to the Government for Home defence. I only spoke, of course, of the National Volunteers. I was not entitled to speak for the Ulster Volunteers, but I suggested that they and we might work shoulder to shoulder. From that day to this the War Office have persistently refused to have anything to say to these Volunteers. The Prime Minister, a few days after I spoke, in answer to a question told me that the Government were considering at that moment how best to utilise these Volunteers. They have never been utilised since. A few days after I made my speech I went myself to the War Office, and as a result of my interviews there I submitted to the Government a scheme which would have provided them at once with 25,000 men. If that offer had been accepted not 25,000, not 50,000, but 100,000 men would have been enlisted for Home defence within a month. But no; it was obstinately refused. I hear that an hon. Member below me is now apparently inclined to take the point that the War Office took. The War Office said that would interfere with recruiting in Ireland. Of course, we know Ireland better than the hon. Member. We know our difficulties in Ireland. We do not believe that it would. On the contrary, we believe that it would have promoted recruiting. We believe that the enlistment of these men. their association in barracks and in camp, with the inevitable creation and fostering of a military spirit, would have led to a large number of volunteers for foreign service. Our views counted for nought. In this instance they were not only our views. These views had the approval of the Irish Command, and from the purely military point of view the Irish Command was in favour of some such scheme as I had outlined, and their reason was plain. They have to provide, and are providing to this day, 20,000 to 25,000 men from the Regular Army for the defence of the coasts of Ireland—guarding the coast, guarding piers, railways, bridges, and so forth. If these men of ours had been taken up, within two or three months of training and in camp they would have been able to do this work, and would have done it ever since, and would thereby have released from 20,000 to 25,000 men. That is the chief reason, I fancy, why the military Command in Ireland were in favour of this idea. But to this moment the refusal continues. I see that an unofficial Bill was introduced by the Marquess of Lincolnshire into the House of Lords doing, to a great measure, for England and Wales what we have been asking should be done for Ireland. I claim that that Bill shall be extended to Ireland, and I must say if it is not extended to Ireland it will meet with the most severe opposition from myself and my Friends.

7.0 P.M.

As I have dealt with the question of Volunteers, let me give two figures to the House which, I think, will be interesting, to show you that these Volunteers are willing and anxious to go to the front. The latest figures, up to 9th October, show that 27,054 National Volunteers are to-day with the Colours. Lest anyone should imagine for a moment that I want to say anything unfair, let me say that the Ulster Volunteers have done better. I will give their figures. Their number is 27,412. That is about 350 more than ours. From these figures alone you have an indication that these men are willing to go and do their share and take their part. Of course, many volunteers are impossible for foreign service, because of age and so on; but there is a large number of them who, I am convinced, if they were given this official recognition and given this initial military training, would be willing to volunteer, and go to the front and swell the number of our recruits. The whole of the Irish race for the first time in our history are in complete sympathy in this War with this country. Ninety-five per cent., in my opinion, of the Irish in America are upon our side in this War. The men in America who are not are for the most part men who were always opposed to the constitutional movement in Ireland, and who are noisy in inverse proportion to their numbers. As far as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand are concerned, all the people of Irish birth or Irish blood are upon our side, and in Ireland itself the situation was, I think, rightly described three or four days ago in an article in the "Birmingham Daily Post," which declared that what had happened in Ireland was a miracle. Ireland for the first time in her history realises and values her position in the Empire and is willing, and indeed eager, to do her duty. But in the minds of all of us, in the mind of every Irishman I believe, in Ireland, there is always one condition. There must be no talk of premature peace. Any peace which does not mean condign punishment for those who have been guilty of outrages far greater than the outrages which generations ago won for the late Sultan of Turkey the title of the "Grand Assassin," any peace which does not mean the restoration of the independence of Belgium, the expulsion of German troops from French soil, and I would say also the free restoration to Alsace- Lorraine of what they regard as freedom— any peace which does not mean the assured independence of the small nations in Europe, and especially in Serbia, any peace which does not mean some reasonable guarantee for the future peace of the world—will be regarded by public opinion in Ireland as a gross and criminal betrayal of the living and the dead. So long as the object that we have in view is to bring the War to a victorious end upon those lines, then, no matter how long the War may last, and no matter what sacrifices it may entail, you can count upon Ireland to the end.

I rise to offer a very few observations, and they will be offered in the same spirit as those expressed by the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Redmond). Like him, I have been from the first convinced that there was no option for us but to enter this War, and that having entered it, there was no option, consistent with continued freedom and democratic progress, but to go on with it until we have achieved our purpose. The Prime Minister this afternoon, as might have been expected from him, has laid down the facts of the War, and all appertaining to it, on the broad ground of national welfare and human progress. I take it that the declaration of the Prime Minister which he made last November, which he repeated in March and since then, as to the causes and the objectives of the War, still hold good. These, briefly paraphrased, were that we were forced into this War, and we are going to remain in this War, until Belgium has been restored and compensated; until the nations of Europe are freed from the fear of future wars, and until Prussian militarism is broken and destroyed. I take it that these declarations of the Prime Minister still hold good. I am content for my part to leave it at that, with this further word, that in my humble judgment any man, or any section of our people, who may not be doing something to achieve those objects, will be considered in years to come to have been traitors to their country and to the cause of freedom.

The Prime Minister this afternoon, if I may interpret his speech, made a plea, and repeated that plea several times, for national unity. I believe with the Prime Minister that national unity is the thing most wanted at the present time, and those people and those newspapers, or newspaper editors, who are not doing all they can to maintain national unity are doing a very great disservice to the nation. I have noted a good deal of newspaper comment, not only on one side but on both sides of the controversy, as to Cabinet secrets and Cabinet dissensions. I think the worst type of person is the person who claims to have inside knowledge of Cabinet proceedings, who claims to know either one section or the other, and is ever crying out that this or that section of the Cabinet has sold the pass — meaning, of course, that some particular section of the Cabinet does not agree with his particular fad. I say that these people, and this type of people, are doing the greatest disservice that can possibly be done to the nation at this critical juncture in our affairs. They magnify the causes of disagreement instead of smoothing them over, as even-body ought to do at the present time.

With respect to the conduct of the War, I shall say but little. I do not think it is for me to say much at the present time. I am not a soldier. I have had no training or experience such as would give any weight to any opinion I might express as to the conduct of the War. Of course, there have been things happening which seemed to indicate a lack of proper provision for co-ordination among our Forces; but it seems to me that the time is not now to discuss that. Even when the time comes it ought to be done by those having the necessary knowledge, training, and experience, and I can claim to have none of these. I would like to point out that the criticism that has been offered as to the conduct of the War comes very often from those who have, I might say, a narrow view of the position. I believe that the discussion of the mistakes that have been made, if mistakes have been made, and I dare say there have been many, has merely touched the fringe of a great question, and that very largely what has happened in the way of mistakes is due to defects in the manning of all our Departments. I believe that more attention will have to be given to that in the future, when we come to discuss the mistakes that have been made. I am afraid that some of our recent critics have not kept that thing in mind.

I am not disposed to criticise the conduct of the War, but I think we have a right to claim that when mistakes have been made, and when those mistakes are admitted by those in responsible positions, those responsible for those mistakes should be brought to book. I note in to-day's dispatch from Sir John French, and I have noted the same thing before, that in the carrying out of certain instructions which have been given by him, somebody has been in fault, and as a result many valuable lives have been lost. I came across a man quite accidentally the other day, and there was a pathetic interest in his case, because he was in constant daily touch with my own son. I saw him in hospital, and he told me that he had been bayoneted by one of our own men. He told me that he had been in one of the Scottish regiments which had stormed a certain position, and which had not only done all that they had been told to do, but had even gone beyond the point which they were told to reach. They were forced to withdraw, and again, I was told, they took the position, but in consequence of the failure of supports—and that is what I think Sir John French refers to in his dispatch—in consequence of the failure of reinforcements to come up to their position they had to fall back in the dark, and, falling back in the dark, were bayoneted and fired into by the Devons on our own side. I do not know who is responsible for that, but I think we have a right to demand that whoever is responsible for it should be treated the same way as an inferior officer would be treated if a thing of that sort took place. He should be haled before some proper tribunal and made to suffer for his culpability. Therefore we have no need to wait, and we have no right to wait, for satisfaction in regard to these matters until our criticisms of the conduct of the War as a whole takes place. We have a right to demand that the people responsible for mistakes of that sort should be brought up and dealt with.

The Prime Minister, with his characteristic chivalry, has undertaken the burden of carrying, mainly upon his shoulders, the weight of the trouble and the mistakes in the Dardanelles. It came as a revelation to me, and I dare say to many more hon. Members, because most hon. Members had believed, with a great many people outside, that that particular expedition was due to the headstrong character of the First Lord of the Admiralty. I am glad to be relieved of that idea, because it will tend at all events to increase my confidence in the Government. It is satisfactory to know that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee (Mr. Churchill) was not responsible for all that took place there, and that it was the Cabinet as a whole which sanctioned that expedition. I am inclined to think that the tragedy of the Dardanelles is very largely due to Greece. We had been led to believe that we should have the support of Greece, and that if we sent a land force there, probably Greece would send a very much larger land force to our support. We have been let down by Greece, and I would express the hope that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the proceedings from now onwards in Salonika, will see that we do not trust Greece any more, and that if men are sent into the inland there, we shall at all events make good our communications, and see that | the lives of our men are not needlessly sacrificed there.

Now I come to the question of military service. We—and when I say "we" I do not simply mean those with whom I am associated on these Benches, but I think I may say the whole of the Members of this House—want this War waged and carried through to a successful issue, in accordance with the traditions of freedom which have been handed down to us as a heritage. On the other hand, I do not object to the statement of the Prime Minister to-day—a statement which I think was made by one of my hon Friends, the Member for Ince (Mr. Walsh) recently —that the safety of the State must be the supreme consideration, and that if it became absolutely necessary to bring compulsion to bear upon those young unmarried men who have not as yet seen their duty, I believe it would be justifiable to apply that pressure. I do not, however, think the time has come for that, and I hope and believe that the time will not come. I do not believe that recruiting on the voluntary principle has been given a fair and square trial. I refuse to believe that voluntaryism is going to fail us, because to believe that would be almost tantamount to believing in the moral bankruptcy of the nation. I say that the voluntary principle has not been given a fair trial, because we have had in many cases circumstances which have set people's teeth on edge and have been responsible for a great deal of division amongst us. Recruits are not treated properly. When I was in Leeds at a recruiting meeting last Sunday week, one of the speakers there said that ten or twelve men that day had been stripped for medical examination, and when it came to one o'clock they were told that they must put their things on again, because the doctors were going away for their lunch. The doctors ought to have known before one o'clock that they were going for their lunch, and ought not to have had these men stripped. This is only one example, but it is an illustration of the sort of treatment that men get when they come forward and offer their services. It should be remembered by everybody concerned in recruiting men, whether they be compulsionists or not, that at all events, so far, compulsion has not been adopted, that so far we are a nation of free men, that every one of those recruits, no matter from what humble station he may be drawn, has a right to be treated on an equal footing with a doctor or anybody else in that recruiting station. That has not been done, and if it were done, as I hope it will be, I believe that a stimulus would be given to recruiting.

But there are several other things that weigh at all events on the minds of the working men, which have militated against recruiting. First of all, there is the Munitions Act. I want to guard myself. I believe that the Munitions Act, or something like it, was necessary when that Act was passed. I know that the competition between employers to get men, the sneaking of one employer's men by the other was becoming nothing less than a positive scandal. I know that employers had offices set up outside their gates, with an agent there who had sub-agents throughout the town, trying to get the men to come away from other men in that same town, and the other employers had exactly the same sort of machinery set up to get his men away from him. So that some Act of Parliament was necessary there, even if it cramped the rights of labour in getting from one place to another, whereby the nation should be served in this great time of need by employers and working men alike, without so much regard to their own sectional interest as to the interest of the community as a whole. But in carrying out the Munitions Act I am afraid that a great deal has been done with regard to which there is no principle of mutuality at all. I am told by my colleague that it was intended when the Act was passed that if we did restrict the freedom of labour we should at the same time restrict the freedom of the other side. What are the facts? If a man goes into a controlled establishment he cannot leave that establishment until he gets leave from a particular employer who is employing him at the time. I have a case in my mind now where a man lives at Erith. He had started at a shop here in London, as he thought temporarily, before the Munitions Act passed. But living at Erith he is fixed to this shop in the centre of London and he travels from Erith and back every day. He wants to move, but the employer says, "You cannot move, I have got you here in Erith." There is no question as to the right of the employer of labour under this Act. He can refuse to let a man go. [An HON. MEMBER: "There is an appeal!"] I know about the appeal. I was coming to that directly. It is a fraud on the face of it. On the other hand, if the employer wants to discharge that man, there is nothing in the Act to prevent him. Consequently, there is in the Act an element of non-mutuality, which is causing an intense feeling of distrust and indignation in all parts of the country where these controlled establishments are placed. My hon. Friend says that there is an appeal to a tribunal. There is, and when the man gets to the tribunal he finds it presided over by a lawyer—with no disrespect to my right hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Duke). I wish he was presiding over some of these tribunals. The lawyer is unaccustomed to the ways of working-class thought, and even of working-class speech, which is quite as important, and does not understand this poor fellow who is making the appeal. I had a case, the other day, of a man who was charged with refusing to work overtime. He went to the Court. He had an explanation, if not a justification. He started to make this explanation to the lawyer. Before he had got a couple of minutes into his stride the lawyer stopped him abruptly and fined him 10s.

That is the sort of thing that takes place at the tribunals. I know about the assessor. Still, the chairman is a lawyer, and that is the sort of thing that goes on. Therefore, the tribunals under the Munitions Act are very largely a fraud, and not only so, but they seem to me, from all I have heard, to be a breach of confidence. I believe we were told that there was to be an absence of lawyers, but they seem to be managed by lawyers. That sort of thing should be stopped. We ought to have these tribunals presided over, if you like by a lawyer, but, at any rate, by men of intelligence. [Laughter.] I will withdraw that. We ought to have them presided over by men of affairs, men who know working-class life, and who know other phases of life as well, men in whom the people of the district on both sides would have confidence. I feel sure that if tribunals were presided over by men of that character a great deal of trouble might be avoided.

Then there are certain people who should have the right, in any circumstances, to leave their shops. The failure of that right being given is at times a cause of very great trouble. Take the case of a marine engineer. Those who are conversant with marine engineering, as I am, will know that it is the commonest thing in the world for a marine engineer to come on shore for a few weeks. It may be that his wife is about to be confined, or that his boy has got into trouble, and he wants to come home for a few weeks to look after him. Hon. Members may take it that the man who follows the engineering profession, as a profession, and goes to sea, generally comes ashore at intervals of about once a year for a few weeks or a month. What happens to him? I know that these cases are actually happening in my own Constituency in Glasgow and elsewhere. He leaves his ship in Glasgow and takes a job near his home, and having taken that job for a few weeks until he has arranged whatever he wants to look after, he finds that he cannot get away. There ought to be some elasticity about this Act of Parliament, so that a man of that sort can leave his job if he likes, and in giving him that right you would be only putting him on exactly the same ground as the employer of labour now occupies.

These are some of the things which seem to me to interfere with the smooth working of the Act. There is the further question of rent which has been brought up by the hon. Member for Poplar and myself and others on these benches many times. I asked the Prime Minister a question about the increase of rent nearly a year ago. Nothing has been done up till now, except the appointment of a small Committee in regard to Scotland a week or two ago. We demand, and I think we have a right to demand, not Rent Courts with more lawyers to preside over them, not elaborate machinery which takes two or three months to set up and get into working order, but that the tenant in a small house should be protected, and that the rent which he is now paying shall not be more than the rent charged him before this War began. A great deal might be said about the increased cost of labour and so on, but stockbrokers and people of that sort had a moratorium applied. Why not apply it to the bondholder and apply it to those people who have borrowed money, and give them the relief which has been given to the other classes? If that is the cause, and I believe that it is the cause to some extent, of rent having been increased, I believe that the Government might very well take action and relieve those people.

The last thing that is telling against recruiting at the present time is the sight of our broken soldiers. We thought we had got beyond it. Certainly there is a great deal better provision made for victims of this War than was made for the victims of any previous war. But I am told that soldiers are still coming home, still getting the small pensions given to them, and that still that pension figures in the money which they are earning. I had a letter only last week from the Trades Council of Norwich detailing the case of a man who had come home injured from the War. He had 12s. 6d. pension granted to him. He went to work as a timekeeper and for the first few weeks in Norwich he was paid another 11s. or something of that sort. He thought that that was only a temporary arrangement. He began to inquire about getting more wages and was told that he was only entitled to 25s. altogether, including his pension, and he was even told that there was an Army Order which laid down that if he was getting 25s. a week he was not entitled to any pension at all. That was not the intention of Parliament last April or March when they passed that provision about pensions. That was not the intention of the Committee which dealt with pensions, which decided that if men were partially disabled they should be entitled to such sum which the Committee or deciding authority might think, which would make his earning capacity up to 25s. a week, but that, having got that, nobody would have any right to take any part of it away from him. Therefore, this case which I have mentioned, if it is stated correctly, is not at all consistent with the intentions of the Committee and with the intentions of Parliament.

These are a few things which seem to operate against recruiting at the present time. I hope that they will be removed. We all want to see the voluntary principle maintained. I think that it would be one of the finest feathers in the cap of this country if we can get through this War with the maintenance of our traditional policy of freedom. I should like still that every man who went to this War went of his own free will, influenced solely by his feelings of patriotism and his determination to help in a great national crisis. I think that we have all striven for that. I hope that it will take place as a result of this new campaign which is now started, and which myself and many of my hon. Friends are helping to make a success. But something after all remains for the Government, and I think that the Government ought to make it as easy as possible for us who are working in this campaign, by removing the cause of the trouble among working-class people, from whose ranks after all we must get the great bulk of recruits. If that is done I have every confidence that we shall get all the men we want for this War by voluntary means. In any case I feel sure that the great mass of the people of this country, including the working people, are in this War and are going to remain in this War until those objects which the Prime Minister set out several times, in language far more eloquent than any which I can command, have been fully attained.

I only rise to correct one misapprehension which must go forth if it is not corrected, arising from the speech of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Dublin University (Sir E. Carson), who has recently left the Government. I do not propose to go into the question of the whole of his speech. He advocated publicity, and said that this country could bear to be told, and would be better for being told, and would fight all the more resolutely for being told, the full facts. In that I entirely agree. But his speech itself contained some things which are an example of the difficulty of speaking freely, not in time of peace, but in time of war. If we were to tell this country everything without everything we say being, at the same time, known to the enemy, our task would be very much more easier. There were some things in the speech of the right hon. and learned Gentleman which were examples of the difficulty of speaking freely in order to enlighten this country, without at the same time helping the enemy, whom it is our object to combat. There is a particular misapprehension in his speech which I wish to correct, and in doing so I will say that no one could have sat with him in council without being conscious that in that council, with regard to the conduct of this War, he has brought no politics into the discussion. It has been clear to all of us that no political motive, in the old sense, has influenced any of his views with regard to the War, and that the views which he has held in regard to the War have been transparently sincere and single-minded.

But one thing to-night he said which ought not to pass uncorrected. He must have left the House, and, what is more important, he must have left our Allies under the impression that we made a promise to send help to Serbia, and that then we vacillated, hesitated, and that in consequence of that vacillation and hesitation of the Government, some valuable opportunity of giving help to Serbia has been lost. The promise which he has quoted was in words of mine in this House, on 28th September, but those words were founded on something definite. I can quote the words nearly accurately from memory, but they are on record in the right hon. and learned Gentleman's quotation, which is perfectly accurate. They were that we were prepared, if Bulgaria joined the Central Powers, to give to our friends in the Balkans all the help in our power in the way most welcome to them, without qualification and without reserve. That statement, made on the 28th September, was founded on a promise which we had made in answer to a request from Greece—a promise which we had made in common with the French Government— to send a certain definite number of men to Salonika for the express purpose of enabling Greece to fulfil her treaty obligations to Serbia. That was the definite and specific promise on which that statement was founded. When I went on to say "without qualification and without reserve," it meant that, so long as there was hope of a Balkan agreement and Balkan unity, we were expressing ourselves as ready to work and help to realise the national aspirations of Greece and of Serbia, and also working to achieve Balkan unity by urging certain concessions to Bulgaria. In my belief it might have been inferred from that that if we were to give help to Greece and Serbia it would be conditionally on certain concessions being made to realise Balkan unity. What I wished to convey, on the 28th September, was that once Bulgaria joined the Central Powers there would be no more talk of concessions from Greece or Serbia, and that the help we were prepared to give thenceforth to Greece and Serbia was to be given without any qualification and reserve. That was the particular promise made.

The statement of the right hon. and learned Gentleman must have left the impression that after that promise was made we had missed opportunities of giving help to Serbia, that we might at this moment have had more troops landed at Salonika than have been landed, or that more troops might be on the way there than are on the way. That is not the case. It is perfectly true that when the Greek Government that succeeded M. Venezelos took a different view of their treaty obligations to Serbia from that which we had expected, there was close consultation between ourselves and the French Government as to the best use which could be made of the Forces to be sent to the East. But there was no delay in preparation. The Forces that were immediately at our disposal for landing at Salonika were landed, and are engaged in the operations in the Balkans now. Preparations went on without delay to send further Forces to the East, and it is not the case that we delayed or hesitated, or that any consultations that took place could have had the result of delaying any practical steps which could have been taken in giving help to Serbia. As a matter of fact, the preparation of the Forces to be sent to the East went on, and the actual use of those Forces was discussed in close consultation with the French Government; and it would be quite a wrong impression, and contrary to the facts, to suppose that in practice we have lost opportunity, or that the use that could be made of the British Forces to help Serbia has been suspended or delayed by hesitation on the part of the Government. That is the real state of the case. One cannot go closely into prospective military operations, but I think it ought to be clearly understood that, however much time may have been spent in consultations and in taking final and definite decisions, there has been no delay in preparation, no going back on any promise made in this House, and that, in actual fact, no time has been lost, acting in concert with the French Government, in giving help to Serbia.

I wish to join in the expressions of pleasure at seeing the Prime Minister back in his place this afternoon. Whatever criticism some of us think it our duty to offer on the administration of the right hon. Gentleman, no one can suggest that it has been actuated by any hostile attitude, so far as he is concerned. He has had great and ever- growing responsibilites from day to day; he has had daily and hourly anxieties from the commencement of this War, and I venture to say that never had he more abundant sympathy from the great mass of Members of this House than he has at this present moment. I am glad that at last the Government have condescended to give the House of Commons a statement of their policy, and an opportunity of reviewing it. It is six months now since I was promised a day by the Home Secretary on behalf of the Prime Minister to discuss the question of the Dardanelles. I cannot conceive why the Government should be so shy of the House of Commons. I cannot understand what has happened, or what could happen, to justify the fear which they have in regard to Debates in this House. I have heard the Debates since the commencement of the War, and I have been present at most of the proceedings, and I challenge the Government to point to any incident in this House, or to refer to any Debate, which by any interpretation whatever could be said to be disastrous to the best interests of our country. I think one of the most bright chapters in the history of this War, when it comes to be written, will be the absolute patriotism of all sections of the House of Commons. It is no secret that there are many Members of this House who doubt very seriously whether the House of Commons was treated properly even before War was declared—whether the House of Commons was treated with that respect due to it, when vital facts and statements were never communicated to it, and when decisions had already been taken and policies already decided.

I submit that the House of Commons has a right to be treated with more confidence than it has been treated by this Government The House of Commons, after all, is the representative of the people. This is the people's war; this is national war. The Army is the nation. It is not a Cabinet war; and, therefore, I say this War more than any other demands, if the Government is going to win, that it must carry the House of Commons and people with it. Up to the present moment the House and the country have not been treated properly by the Government. They have kept back information of a most vital character that the people of this nation ought to have known, just as in every other country in the world. Why, we have to buy American papers to see what is going on in France or Flanders! I submit that the Government have made the initial mistake of not having trusted the House of Commons sufficiently, and therefore of not having trusted the people. The statement made this afternoon by the Prime Minister was in some respects a welcome statement. I confess that I wish he could have given the House more definite information as to his policy both at home and abroad. The right hon. Gentleman rightly praised the Navy, about which there is no controversy; we are all proud of it; everyone trusts absolutely the Navy; everyone is agreed that it has rendered splendid service. Nor is there any controversy with regard to our Colonies; we are proud of everyone of them, but I am not quite sure that they are as proud of our administration as we are of their patriotism. I do not want to refer to matters which have been discussed before, but I want to know whether our General Staff is as well qualified as that of the French. We know what disasters occur when victory is within our grasp, and we must know that we have competent men, and, if we are not satisfied, inquiry ought to be made in regard to the general in the same way as in the case of a private. Therefore, I hope that this new staff we are going to have for this closer direction will show no favour to any general, however high he may be placed, if he commits a mistake which ought not to have been committed.

I come now to say a word about what I regard as the most important matter in this Debate, namely, the question of our position in the Near East. I am one of those, and I do not know whether there are many in this House who hold the view very strongly that Turkey ought not to have been against us in this War if we had taken reasonable precautions to get her on our side. I will ask any hon. Member to wipe his mind of all prejudice and of every other consideration which might lead him to a partial decision to read the Turkish correspondence, and I venture to say that after doing so he can come but to one conclusion, and that is that we did not do everything we ought to have done in order to keep Turkey from being one of our enemies. What was the governing factor that brought Turkey against us? It was, of course, our failure in regard to ships which were being built in this country for Turkey. Insufficient importance was attached to the fact that those battleships had been subscribed for by the pennies of the people of Turkey, and that they were, as it were, a national institution. The fact that we did not deal with them in the way they desired and that we immediately commandeered them and gave no promise as to when we were going to pay for them placed a weapon in the hands of those who wanted war against us, and allowed them to appeal to the national aspirations and patriotism of the Turkish people, and in that way they were able to get Turkey against us. I know that it is a common view that if you want a Turk you only want money. It may be true of some, but I am certain it is not true of Enver Bey. I am certain if ever there was a man money could not buy, though he is at war against us, he is the man. We took no trouble whatever, or not sufficient trouble, to pay any attention to those national views. I understand also it is true that no one at our Embassy could speak Turkish in Constantinople. With all those difficulties, I say we were not alive enough in order to prevent Turkey going against us.

The next point is the question of our policy with regard to the Dardanelles. I hope it may not be considered because that policy has been unfortunate that, therefore, it ought not to be referred to. What I think we have got to ask ourselves is whether the Cabinet took proper evidence and information before they decided on that policy. I was told in reply to a question that the Cabinet had consulted the naval authorities before a shot was fired. I want to know whether our Admiralty advised that we should make a naval attack in the Dardanelles? I will answer that question, as there are so few Ministers present and not one connected with the Departments concerned, which I think is very unfair when we have only one day to discuss this matter. I am making an important assertion, and asking an important question. I ask, before a naval attack was ordered in the Dardanelles did we have the advice of our highest naval authority that it ought to be undertaken? I say we did not. I say that that is a very serious thing indeed. Did the Cabinet know when the decision was taken that the Admiralty itself had not advised it. Can the House and the country be surprised when things like that are going on. There is only one consideration.

On a point of Order. Would it be in order to move that the House do now adjourn as there is not a single Minister on that Front Bench from the Departments concerned.

If I supported the Noble Lord's suggestion my speech would be in jeopardy, and however much I may appreciate the Noble Lord's intention his suggestion would not serve the purpose he has in view. The country should take note of the contempt, the supreme contempt, which the Government still shows for the House of Commons after the Dardanelles operations have been going on for about eight months when they will not even come and listen to the criticisms we have got to offer. That is a sign of the sort of way in which they are conducting this War. I come back to an important point. I do not want to make capital of any kind, but I want to say that the Government began this Dardanelles business without making the slightest inquiry, or without taking the highest advice to which they ought to have referred it. I accept the statement that the Admiralty Chief in the Dardanelles advised that it was possible that he might be able to do it. I do not deny that. I do deny that when the Cabinet came to a decision they were not aware that our highest naval authorities did not advise it. It say that is a very serious matter which ought to be taken into account, and has still got to be defended. I think what is still more serious is that they began the naval attack without making the slightest inquiry, apparently, as to whether a field attack was necessary at all. What was the result? Why, the result has been 100,000 casualties, since it gave the Turks time to equip themselves with machine guns in a way that has never been seen or known before in the history of war. There are in this country photographs of Blue Jackets having tea on the top of Achi Baba, which shows how simple it would have been, and that if we had only the military to lend aid at the same moment it would have been a walk-over with no trouble at all.

Those are serious matters since you gave two months' notice to your enemy as to what you were going to do. I think some explanation is required when the Colonies send their best blood to be destroyed by machine guns which were there waiting for them. That is not all. What about the men that we sent to the Dardanelles—new, unseasoned men who had never seen fire, and, after being stowed up on a troopship, were walked ashore into fire without a moment's rest—I mean at Suvla Bay, which is only an instance and an indication of what has been going on all over the place? I say it was not fair to send men under those conditions to attack, especially where they were landed. Who was responsible for the men who were placed in charge? Who decided the staff that was going to be in charge and have influence over thousands of men? It was not, as I understand, General Sir Ian Hamilton; he was not responsible for the men; he did not get his own staff. Some of the men who were responsible for that disaster were men who were sent from home by the authorities, and who were not suggested by the Commander-in-Chief himself. We had this statement at the Table the other day from the Under-Secretary of State for War, that the General concerned has been retired. Why did he not tell us all the truth? Probably he was not answering that question, and I know he is the last man to keep anything back, and I wish he had his way with regard to these matters, and I am sure he would give us information. The answer to which I refer was that a general had been retired, but is it not the fact that not one, but two, three and four generals have been retired? Why keep these facts from the public? The man in the street practically knows them, but they are not stated publicly. What is the result? The men themselves lose confidence when they know of those who have made mistakes costing the loss of thousands of men.

I say it is due to the men concerned and to the friends of those who are lost that we should see that the men who are responsible for committing these blunders should no longer be in charge of the lives of men. Therefore, I should advise a fuller statement in regard to that matter. There is still the fact that one of the generals in charge has been proved a failure in France, and I think that is very lamentable. That is so much for the officers in charge and for the men landed, but what about the preparations after they landed? I assert that it is true, and my authority is a Member of this House, that scores of our men died within two days for want of water by thirst owing to the failure of the authorities to provide water. Can we stand by and say nothing about that? Is the man who was responsible for that still in the Service? Of course he is, and having a fairly good time at the present moment. I say that that is not preparing and taking everything into consideration, as the right hon. Gentleman said to-day had been done. What about our wounded dying because there was no ice within twenty-four hours of their landing? Who was responsible for that? Is there anybody going to be sacked because that occurred? Are we going to be told that So-and-so has been retired and know nothing about it? What about the want of munitions which did not give our men a chance? That has appeared in Sir Ian Hamilton's dispatches, and it has been stated on the authority of the Government and was published the other day in a lecture by a war correspondent. It has been muddle, muddle, muddle at every point, at the initiation in the conduct and right through the whole thing.

8.0 P.M.

Are we not entitled to ask the Government what their policy is at the present moment. What is their policy? I am not aware they have any policy at this moment. If they have why do they not tell us. Are they going to stick to this. It was stated the other day on behalf of the Government that a distinguished general had been sent out there. Is he sent out to carry out a policy or to find one? [An HON. MEMBER: "To find one."] We know the facts. Sir Ian Hamilton is here and can give the full circumstances connected with it. Are we to wait until General Monro, a distinguished officer, can find some solution of the muddle into which we have got. I say that this is all due to the fact that the Government have never been able to come to a decision, and so we are allowed to drift on. Time is going on, and every day the weather is getting more serious, and we are losing about a thousand a day with sickness and other things. [An HON. MEMBER: More than that."] Surely that is very serious, and we have got to take those facts into consideration. We know that there is every indication that our losses are likely to become more rather than less as time goes on. What have they to give for all those things. At the present moment we know how much we hold there and how insecure, I believe, is the position. What I plead for is this. I do not refer now to our mistakes, and I know our enemies have made big mistakes as well as we have, but in Heaven's name let us have a policy. If you have a policy it is time to show the men who are willing to give up their lives and thus to make the greatest sacrifice they can be called upon to make that you have made proper provision for them. What is the use of being brave when you never have a chance to show your bravery. Give them the chance, and the Colonials deserve it, an even chance against their enemies, and then we know they will come out well. I want to say a word with regard to another question closely associated with the Dardanelles. The Debate this afternoon, important though it has been, has not touched a point which to my mind is the most important of all, and that is that at this moment a vital blow is being aimed at the heart of the British Empire. Is not the whole of this War at this moment centred in Serbia? We have been, as usual, as in every vital matter in the War—cotton, aliens, everything—too late to be effective; we are too late in Serbia. I want to ask the Government—I see the Minister of Munitions and the Colonial Secretary present; perhaps they will be able to tell us—when did they first know of the possibility of an attack by German forces upon Serbia? What was the date? It was not the end of September. This is not a new matter. Every man who studies politics and the War at all has been discussing for the last three months where Germany would attempt to strike her next blow. It was obvious that when Russia was pushed back there were only three separate directions with which the blow could be struck—either in the West, or they would strike at Italy, or they would go for Serbia. What was the possibility which was the place that they would probably select? Why, the place where they would have the most picturesque setting, where they were likely to create an effect upon neutral nations, where their armies were more likely to be successful. We were allied to Serbia then. It has been obvious for the last three months that they would attack Serbia. What have we done? Nothing much.

Do the Government plead that they did not know of the likelihood or that they did not know of the possibility? It was announced in the newspapers—the newspapers which they treat with so much contempt when they are not publishing leading articles in their favour or reporting their speeches in full. It was published that armed forces were gathering on the Danube. The whole scheme has been published in the American papers. Correspondents from the front have gone back and for the last two months have been saying that this was the next great blow. The fact that all these forces were gathering by the thousands has been published widely for the last two months. Surely the Government knew that! If they knew it, why did they not take action and prepare for it? If they did not know it, in Heaven's name what is the use of the Secret Service and their other agencies? We have allowed this matter to come to a very dangerous point indeed. I fear the news that may come at any moment of the position of the gallant Serbians. It is only a question of figures to see what the possibility is. What are you going to do then? If we lose, as we may lose, the Serbian Army, are you prepared for that? Have you got a plan? Have you got a scheme? Are the Germans to be allowed to go right to Constantinople without any objection at all?

When I look at all these things, when I see delay at every point, I cannot honestly have confidence in the men who are running this War. There are obvious things that ought to have been done but have not been done. I cannot give them confidence when I see the deplorable mistakes that are being made from time to time. I say to the Government—I hope that this new organisation of theirs may do some good—the first thing to do is to take the people into your confidence. If you have made blunders, confess it, acknowledge it, and the people will forgive you. But if you have made blunders and are trying to drift on and to screen things from the people, you are making a mistake. Think something of your Colonies. Australia is having strong views of what is going on in the Dardanelles. It is due to them that you should take them into your confidence. If you have made mistakes, acknowledge it and try to redeem them. We want not only that the people shall be taken into the confidence of the Government, but that the Government shall give a proper direction to affairs. Who can say that the War is being well directed when we are having before our eyes things which are absolutely helping the enemy? At the present moment you have your censorship; you are keeping information from the people. You are trying to run this War in blinkers, as the Secretary for India said before he became a member of the Cabinet. It is wrong. Some day the people will be angry because you have kept knowledge of the War from them. Change your censorship from top to bottom. Put in charge of it one of your Cabinet Ministers in whom the House has confidence. What is the state of things at present? You have Army and Navy men there, appointed not by the chief of the Censorship Department at all, but by the different Departments. I do not think he has power to appoint or to dismiss. I do not complain of the general running of the censorship at all. I think the high officials have done their duty very well, but they have had no power with regard to the staff. The men who are really responsible are the Cabinet; they give instructions as to what is to be published or not.

The next thing I say is, have a real revision of the methods of your censoring and also of the Department. Wake up at once to the fact that you are losing your Allies because you are not paying them sufficient attention. At the beginning of the War the Foreign Secretary was good enough to ask me to go and see him and give my advice. I gave it. Unfortunately it has not been carried out. I hope hon. Members will not think that I have a personal grievance in the matter. My advice, knowing as I did what the enemy would be trying on from day to day, was that every neutral country in the world should be handed over to someone whose duty it should be to see that they got proper British news of what was going on. That has not been done. We have lost neutral countries because the British view has not been properly presented in the Press, and we are going to lose more—at least one very important one—unless this matter is attended to. The Allies have no confidence in the Press. Why should they have? At the very beginning of the War we had a naval mishap. To this day no British newspaper has dared publish it. Within a fortnight of the event photographs appeared in American papers which could be obtained at Charing Cross, and anybody could read the whole incident, but down to this day no British paper is allowed to mention it. Then you ask neutral countries to have confidence in the news which you publish. I say it is wrong. Pay more attention to the news that is given to neutral countries. I say further, employ your young men in the Army and ask some of your old men to come home. To what is the success of the Navy due? Young men in charge at every point. Why not give the young officers in the Army the same chance that you give the officers in the Navy? It is not a case to-day of how well you know your drill book; it is a case of common sense and courage, in altogether new conditions in the field. Give the young men of the Army the chance that you give the young men in the Navy, and you will have better results.

Further, you ought to stop exports which are going through to Germany. The quantity of linseed oil going to Holland is thirty times what it was before the War. A million pounds can be made on that. I had a letter from a large manufacturer in my Constituency who is largely interested in this matter telling me that a million pounds could be made on the linseed oil going to Holland and passing through to Germany. Is that right? Ought that to be permitted after fifteen months of War? No; it shows slackness, incapacity, and, in my opinion, inability to deal with the situation. We ought to pay heed to that. We ought also to take steps in regard to finance. It is notorious that there is going-on in every part of the country expenditure which would ruin any nation. Men not worth five shillings are being paid seven guineas a week, and the wages paid in a particular locality are all being raised in consequence. If I were to advise the Government I would suggest that they should have a secret Committee where any members of the public could supply evidence of waste that is going on, having an assurance that they themselves or anyone would not be implicated by the information given. I believe the Government would get enough evidence to stop waste amounting to almost a million pounds a day. I myself could give them instances which would save many thousand pounds. I have already given some and could give others. I hope, therefore, in regard to that they will press the House of Commons and the public generally to give them instances where waste which could be avoided is going on. We ought to have a strong and important lead from the Government in regard to all these matters. I know that they look upon any who criticise them or give them suggestions as presuming upon their authority. Personally I do not care what they think or what they do. I shall continue to do my duty, and point out these things as long as I am here. The country is rightly uneasy, and it is up to the Government to give a stronger lead than they have yet done. Give us a real war policy, and let us have a council which shall direct that policy. In that way-alone can you win and continue to hold the confidence of the nation.

The speech of the Prime Minister covered a great number of points, but I do not think it will relieve the anxiety of this House or of the country with regard to the conduct of the War. The Prime Minister and the Government cannot complain of criticism. The only criticism of the Cabinet has come from one Minister or another upon each other. I, and I think everybody in this House, would be prepared to support any Government, no matter from which party it was drawn, who would try to win this War. If you are in a bad stream in which there are nasty rocks, you do your best to help the pilot through; you do not consider the pilot's political or fiscal opinions. I believe that everybody in this House would do his level best to help the Government through. I agree with the Leader of the Irish party that the great or cardinal mistake made in the War was having a Coalition. Certain circumstances may arise in the country, but you have no alternative Government. Under the old conditions it was a safety valve. As long as the Opposition was there it was useful in offering constructive criticism. Nobody wants destructive criticism; we want to help the Government. There has really been no criticism at all. All the chance we have had has been for an hour on the Adjournment of the House. This is the first day we have had, and a very useful day it will be found to have been. We do not want to hinder the Government. We do not want to let the enemy know anything they should not know; but we do want to let our own people, who are the most concerned, know the whole state of affairs in regard to the War as far as it can be told. The result of this policy of mystery and silence has been that very often we have had reports of British victories that were really very little short of defeats. We ought to have known the whole circumstances of the case. Let the Government declare what, in my opinion, is a fact—that the country is in a state of national danger. If that is so, why should not the people know it? It will help recruiting. It will stop small criticism and irritable remarks. As a whole, the nation will get together very much quicker if they knew that such a danger exists.

I do not see the Minister of Munitions here at present, but he is the only Cabinet Minister who has really told the country how grave is the situation. We want more speeches of that character on that Bench opposite. We want to know why certain statements have been made. I see the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs present. I say that not only have we had silence, but we have had misstatements. I do not for one moment say that they have been intentional misstatements, but they have been misstatements. These misstatements are calculated to raise false hopes, and to delude the public into a confidence they would not otherwise have. One of the misstatements made was that in Gallipoli "we were separated by a few miles from a victory such as this War has not yet seen." The other misstatement was, I think, made by my Noble Friend opposite, that "we are within a little of a great success which will have an enormous effect in all parts of the world." Those speeches were made in all good faith, but they were absolutely incorrect. They deceived the public. The right hon. Gentlemen know perfectly well that we shall never get through the Dardanelles. I make that statement perfectly boldly, because I know the whole circumstances of the case. The right hon. Gentleman opposite pointed out that we should have got through the Dardanelles if there had been a plan of campaign properly thought out between the naval and the military authorities. The Cabinet must have responsibility for policy, but a Cabinet cannot be responsible as to how their policy is carried out by the naval and military people. Once a policy is determined on, it must be turned over to the soldier and the sailor, and the politician must not interfere with it, unless he wants disasters. Politicans have been interfering with the Executive. Their business is to stick to the administrative and political situation. That interference was the cause of many disasters in the beginning of the War. It was nothing else but the political people interfering with the Executive. The duties of the Executive must be carried out by the Admirals and Generals after the Cabinet have dictated the policy that they say is necessary for the country.

I want to review the past a little, not in the way of recrimination, not by any ill-natured criticism, but merely so that we may, from my point of view, try to see to it that these circumstances do not occur again. It is only by so reviewing what has happened that we may be sure of getting the public behind us—by assuring them that so far as possible these things will not occur again. We have had a long list of failures. We want the opposite. A number of these failures have taken place owing to what I have just described —Cabinet interference with the Executive. I should like to see a smaller Cabinet. What, however, I should like to see is a body on exactly the same lines as the German Staff, sitting day and night, thinking on nothing but the War. How can you expect the First Lord of the Admiralty, or the Minister of Munitions, with all the tremendously extra work thrown upon them by this War, to sit at the Cabinet and carry out the conduct of the War? It is impossible! I do not say these gentlemen to whom I refer should be in the Cabinet. They should not be in the Cabinet, these military and naval advisers, but should be working at the Admiralty and the War Office, dealing round a table with the conduct of the War. Then these matters could be referred to the Cabinet, or some sort of Committee, such as the Prime Minister suggested, who would take them in hand and thrash them out. I object altogether to having a Cabinet within a Cabinet. We must have the whole Cabinet or nothing. But we may have certain men in that Cabinet to thrash out the advice given by the Executive, by the naval and military people who know what they are talking about, who have got to make the plan of campaign, and to think beforehand of the working out if a certain policy is decided upon. Such a scheme would prevent such lamentable, such wicked catastrophes as have happened in the Gallipoli Peninsula. If the Government had done what I suggest, those catastrophes could not have occurred, because the naval and military people would have got together and would have said, "You must do so-and-so." We would not have had the men. The men were not there. We ought not to have attempted to send the Navy there without the Army. It is no excuse to say we had no Army; if so, why embark at all upon this enterprise? It is no excuse to say that we had to run risks of some sort. I know you have to run risks in warfare, but you do not run risks where you are certain of failure.

Another point is, that I think it is altogether and absolutely wrong that the Minister of War, or rather that the Commander-in-Chief in the War, should be in the Cabinet. He would be much stronger outside. What does he do? I suppose he argues that he wants men. But the question of getting men, if the present scheme fails, is a most abstruse, difficult, political question, about which there may be all sorts of different opinions. There is the question of the trade unions, of the miners, of my own country, Ireland. What does the Commander-in-Chief know about these things? Nothing whatever. Yet he has, I suppose, to argue about these things. His business is to run the War. He has nothing whatever to do with the political features. His business is to take a sheet of paper, and say to the Cabinet, "I want so many men, and such munitions, on every Monday fortnight." He has no business with how these are to be got. He is wasting his time considering that. He ought to be in his office. Supposing it was said by those concerned that we can or we cannot get the men. Suppose he is told, when he says, "I want so many men," that they cannot be got. He will probably say, "I must reform my front, my reserves, my supports, and I think the War will last three or four years." That is his business. There should not be the least bit of friction with his own colleagues. He ought, I believe, to let his own colleagues know what he is going to say in the House of Lords. The country has great confidence in him, and he has great power, but I maintain that as long as he has a seat in the Cabinet he stultifies himself. Let me give him an instance of what I mean.

Suppose there is a discussion in the Cabinet about men—as to whether they shall be got by voluntary or compulsory service—which side is he going to take? That is a very difficult question for him. It may be said, "Oh, he takes no side." I say he is not there at all to argue about it. It is not his business to get the men. His business is to run the men after they are supplied, and the business of the politician, which is quite another thing, is to supply the men to him. Of course, in all these questions, the Cabinet must be responsible. The Cabinet—if I may try to make myself quite clear to the House— must be responsible for policy. For instance, if the Cabinet thinks to-morrow that it is necessary to send the whole of our Fleet to the Mediterranean for a definite policy, that is their policy. But when they have sent it out with a definite object, they have no right to interfere with the Admiral as to how he is to carry out that policy. That is my point. That occurred at the beginning of the War—the administrative and political people interfering with the Executive. We have had a lot of failures, and we have had the pro- longation of the War. I believe the whole reason is this: we have had—I am sorry the Prime Minister is not here—what I call a cynical and callous doctrine, which is known by the name of "wait and see." Now that doctrine is absolutely fatal to success in war. When reverses and failure occur, the Cabinet wait for the public judgment, but they withhold from the public the whole information, without which the public cannot form a just judgment. That does not appear to me to be very sensible.

The public are getting more and more anxious, and no wonder. I do not think, with all its amazing ability, with all the sympathetic, kindly references to the Services, and to those who have lost their lives, that the public mind will be less anxious after the Prime Minister's speech. War is a question of quick decisions and prompt actions, and up to now we have had no policy and no objective, and we have had a complete misunderstanding of what is necessary for war, because of the "wait and see" policy. In all wars, of course, we have new objectives and new fronts. The Germans, I am glad to say, have made quite as many, or more, mistakes than we have. We must recognise that, but hon. Members opposite will remember that when the Germans have changed their objective, and when they have changed their front, they have had a definite plan of campaign to carry it out. Whenever we have changed our front and objective, we have had no plan of campaign whatever. It has been all happy-go-lucky, as is seen in the failures that have occurred. We have had magnificent failures. We have had Antwerp, the Dardanelles, and I think we may have Serbia, I am afraid. It was all because we had no definite plan of campaign. That policy of "wait and see," without a definite plan of campaign, waiting for things to turn up, involves the most ghastly sacrifices of men, the most appalling waste of money, undoubted loss of prestige, and failure.

The Government treat failures we have experienced as ordinary, and to be expected incidents of war. That appears to me to be the pith of the Prime Minister's speech. We know there have been failures and mistakes in all wars, but the mistakes the Government make are interminable. We have had no real great success, except in Mesopotamia since the War, and that is because we wanted plans of campaign and proper businesslike arrangements. The right hon. Gentleman opposite spoke about the Dardanelles. My belief about the Dardanelles is this. The policy of the Government was to try to force the Straits, and go to Constantinople. There they were perfectly within their right, and if it could be done it was a most admirable policy; but they never consulted the Navy and asked, "Can you do it?" The Navy was told to do it. Suppose I had been commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean and was told to go through the Dardanelles, do you think I should differ for a moment, whether it was possible or not? I should obey my orders and do my best to carry them out. That is what they did. They had the only plan that was possible or might have been possible or feasible. Of course, they did not succeed. Anyone who knew anything about war and the Dardanelles, knew the Fleet could not get through the Dardanelles at any time unless there was assistance on shore, and not only assistance such as was sent, but 200,000 men on the Asia Minor side—it is now all swamp—and 150,000 on the East side, everything laid out for their base supply of ammunition, water, etc.—everything necessary to allow them to go to the front, and then it would have taken six, eight, ten or, perhaps, thirteen weeks to have got the Fleet through. The Cabinet does not even understand what the meaning of "going through" is. They never even calculated that out. The whole thing was mismanaged.

I do not say, and I do not think this House would want the Cabinet to give a definition of their policy. What we want to know is, have they a policy? If their policy is to leave the Dardanelles, I do not think it would be wise to say so. That is letting their enemy know something they should not know. I propose to ask the Government a few questions with regard to the Dardanelles. Are they aware that our troops cannot advance from their present position without further useless slaughter? Are the Government aware that the troops will probably lose their entire equivalent of the present numbers by sickness alone during the winter if they remain there? They are now losing-1,000 a day—rather more—by dysentery, typhoid, and casualties. When the rain conies the whole of the water will run through this charnel house of dead bodies. I know the ground. The water easily percolates through the trees, into the-trenches, and into the wells. The con- dition of the men there at this moment is perfectly shocking. I dare say some hon. Members have seen people who have returned. Let me show you how lamentable is this idea of doing something quickly without thinking it out. Why, the first thing that ought to have been landed there were condensers. The first thing you do when you land forces anywhere is to see how to feed and water them, particularly in a place where water is scarce. I do not believe they landed a condenser until five weeks ago. They ought to have dug a channel and landed condensers in the night, because the whole beaches were under fire in the daytime. They landed one five weeks ago, and it was not there thirty minutes before it was blown to smithereens. That is not war. It is no organisation and no plan of campaign, and we have no right to lose the best we have got through want of proper organisation, administration, and knowledge of war.

Further, I will ask the Government, Are they aware that the enemy's positions command ours, and it is only shortage of their ammunition that has saved the situation up to the present? Are they aware that it will be unlikely we can prevent ammunition and men passing through Bulgaria to Turkey? The Germans are not such fools as to send their armies into Turkey. What they will do will be to send as much arms and ammunition as they can, and plenty of instructors to drill, not only the Turks there, but in Asia Minor and Tight away to Persia. At this moment, I am informed, they are drilling there something like 1,000,000 men without arms, tout with sticks, broom handles, and such things. The public ought to know these facts. Further, I ask the Government, Are they aware that we cannot hope now to reach Constantinople since Bulgaria has thrown in her lot with the Turks? And are they aware that communication with the shore is interrupted for weeks this time of the year? I bring those things out to help the Government in whatever policy they may decide. I do not know what their policy will be, and I do not think they should tell us, but those dangers should be clearly impressed upon the mind of the Government at a moment in which things are getting rather black in the East. I would like to say a word or two about Serbia. I was amazed at the speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. His language to Serbia was that the British Government would give them all the support in our power without reserve and without qualification.

Certainly Serbia was one. The Foreign Secretary said, "We are prepared," and he got up here and said there has been no change of policy, which remained entirely as it was at first and that they were now sending men. I understand the difficulty about Greece not being truthful to us after the undertaking she had given, but I ask this House if it is likely that when the Foreign Secretary told us that we were going to support Serbia he meant that we were going to send 13,000 troops! As a matter of fact we shall want 200,000 men there, and we cannot send them for two months.

If you tell the enemy that you are not able to send our troops there for two months, is not that information damaging to us?

I think the hon. Member has made a point in his favour, but on the other hand I wish to say that if you send too few men you may get a very serious disaster there, and that is my object in making this statement. I confess that the hon. Member has made a point as to whether I should have said that or not. However, I have said it, and now I say it again. The Foreign Secretary stated that we were prepared, and I maintain that that meant certainly an Army of 200,000 or 300,000 men, and we have sent 13,000, and more are on the way. This point was not thought out. It was not a question which needed sudden determination, and the Noble Lord opposite knows. This attack was spoken of as far back as May and June. We knew they would go over to Italy, Roumania, or to Serbia, and they elected to go to Serbia, and this has placed us in a very dangerous position because of Islam. Every Mahomedan boy has been taught that the Crescent will go above the Cross, and the question of religion entering into this War would be a very serious thing. We have no right to have run these, risks. Our position at first was to have sent this large Army to Serbia, and not go into a sort of blind gamble risk to Gallipoli, when anybody who knew anything about war would have opposed it, and I believe the authorities did not give it that support which was necessary before we undertook such an operation as that.

With regard to the question of bribes, I do not like that policy. We offered Bulgaria ether people's property which is rather following German methods, but Germany offered Bulgaria more of other people's property. We offered Greece our own property, and now we are in the humiliating position of Greece not accepting the bribe and refusing to take the property we have offered her. Everywhere we see the result of this policy of "wait and see." There is no definite, determined, clear idea of what we are going to do and how we are going to do it, and until we get that this War will go on and we shall waste thousands of lives and lose millions of money. Why on earth do we not let the Fleet act? We have command of the sea and why do we not stick to the old usages, customs and laws of the sea? When the Fleet takes three or four ships the Foreign Office orders them to be let go, and the confusion is extraordinary. We had the Order in Council of the 11th March, and the Prime Minister, from the Treasury Bench, declared that we were going to stop all supplies going to Germany, but Germany is now getting nearly five-sixths of what she had before the War.

The Noble Lord says, "No," and he ought to know more than I do about it, therefore, I bow to what he says. At any rate Germany is getting a great deal more than she ought to do, and she is getting what is enabling her to continue the War. You can make everything contraband now, and you can have an effective blockade, and then you would have Germany by the throat. She is now getting oil, coal, and cotton, and when she gets to Constantinople she will have the whole of Asia as a basis of supply and then she will be able to go on. In the meantime we are losing millions, and not only that, but we are also losing the best which our land ever produced. I think the Foreign Office can do a great deal more than it is doing. Why, after fourteen months of war do they suddenly scratch out Article 57? Why do they issue this Order in Council of the 11th March? I asked whether that Order in Council abrogated the Declarations of Paris and London, and The Hague Conventions, and I was told,. "No; the whole of them are valid still."

The Noble Lord makes a great many statements, and almost all of them are inaccurate.

I asked whether those matters I have just referred to were abrogated by the Order in Council of the 11th March, and my Noble Friend replied that they did not affect the validity of any of them. Fourteen months after they dropped Article 57, relating to enemy's goods carried in neutral ships, and as long as we proceed on those lines so long will the War continue. We have the opportunity of strangling Germany if we use the Fleet. If we do not, it is a great mistake, and the War will go on. What is the objection to making everything contraband to Germany? Perhaps the Noble Lord will tell me. What is the objection to making an effective blockade? We have very nearly got that now and we can have it. We have got the mastery of the sea. Why do we not use the mastery of the sea? I still say that the Government have not got a policy. I want to ask the Government, Have they succeeded up to to-day, and can they claim that the failures have not been preventable. There is another cause of these failures. Naval and military officers and politicians, whenever they fail or whenever they have been superseded, invariably get better posts. That is very wrong indeed, particularly in cases where men's lives are lost. They are immediately given new posts, and they resume their mischievous activities as before. I say that is very wrong. The appointments involve preventable losses, to the Empire and a scandalous waste of money. Incompetence at all times should: be treated severely. The State cannot afford incompetence at any time. In peace it is debatable, but in war it is criminal, because you lose so many of your1 best. Until this system is broken I do-not see a chance of the War being ended for a very long time. I think the position is black all round. It is entirely due to the Wait-and-See policy. But there is; no necessity and no room whatever for pessimism. The worse things look the more you have got to feel confident and be determined to win, and that is the characteristic of our race. I believe that we shall succeed notwithstanding the disproportion between the actions and the magnificent heroism of our Services and those who prevent the benefit of this courage being reaped by the country. Up to now we have been proceeding along a road leading to chaos and possibly bankruptcy, and though I believe that we shall succeed in the end, owing to the superb heroism of our Forces and our mastery of the sea, the victory will be bought at a price in men and money no country can afford.

I should like to express my great satisfaction with the Prime Minister's statement. I am convinced, when that statement is read in the country to-morrow, that it will give great satisfaction to the nation as a whole. We are having a Debate on that statement, but I am not sure that it is any benefit to the country. Debate under present conditions is extremely difficult. If that Debate is occupied with petty details, as some of the speeches delivered to-night have been, it looks like trifling with a great problem at a very serious time. If private Members begin to discuss questions of high policy, it seems to me that it is extremely dangerous, and that no good can result. The Noble Lord who has just sat down (Lord C. Beresford) has put a number of questions to the Government. I should judge from those questions that he assumes that neither the Government nor their advisers, military or naval, know anything. They are the sort of questions that a schoolmaster would address to children in a school. He talks as though these men know nothing and have had no experience, and as though the members of the Government get no advice from experts, either naval or military. He comments on our sending 13,000 men, and says that 200,000 are required at Salonika. England never undertook to send 200,000 men; it was the Allies. How many are the Allies sending? They are sending a great deal more than 13,000. It is not a fair way to look at it.

If there is all this incompetence and incapacity, what are you going to do? We have got the leaders of both parties in this Government. We have got the best and ablest men on both sides, and I have yet to learn that they are the set of incompetents which the Noble Lord makes out. The Noble Lord says that the Commander-in-Chief ought not to be in the Cabinet. If one could arrange these things as one liked, I have a very strong conviction and feeling that few things are more undesirable than that you should have a military man the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State should be a civilian. I feel that very strongly indeed. But what are the special circumstances of this case? What were the special circumstances when this War broke out? If you remember, we had had very considerable trouble with the Army, The War Office was in a very difficult position, and to save the situation the Prime Minister himself had gone there to be the War Secretary for the time being. When the War broke out it was quite impossible that the Prime Minister should continue in that position. Remember that we had a party Government in power. Who was he to make War Secretary? There was no one in my judgment available at the moment who could have been made War Secretary so satisfactory to the country and to the Army as Lord Kitchener, although it involved a departure from a principle which, in general, I think is sound. The circumstances were extremely exceptional. Are you going to swop horses whilst crossing the stream? Are you going to make the change now? Are you going to put a civilian in the place of Lord Kitchener as Secretary of State? I think that would be a very dangerous thing to do now. We might have a great deal of friction and difficulty. Unless the Noble Lord meant that, I do not know what he meant.

Yes, and I am expressing my opinion with great respect to the Noble Lord. The Noble Lord admits that the Germans have had failures. All have failures and mistakes in war, and we are likely to have more difficulties and more mistakes, because we never prepared to have an Army approaching 3,000,000, with 1,500,000 out in the field. We never prepared for it, and therefore we are adapting an organisation intended for a much smaller force to a big one. That is not the position of Germany; but they are having their difficulties. I would remind the Noble Lord that the German Army is managed by experts, and these experts have had failures and disappointments. The Noble Lord says that there is no plan of campaign. I do not know how he knows that.

That is jumping to a conclusion, and I venture to say it is a wrong conclusion. We are not the only military force of the Allies, and we are not the main military force of the Allies. On the Western front the plan of campaign will be decided practically in the main by the French Commander-in-Chief, of course, in consultation with ours. This declaration that we have no plan of campaign means that the French have no plan of campaign; it is an indictment of the French Government. Really high as my opinion of the Noble Lord is, I have more confidence in the French Government and in ours than I have in him on this particular point. Then he attacks the Government because a condenser was landed in the daytime and was blown to pieces in a few minutes. Does he mean to indicate or suggest that the Government here, in Whitehall, specified that it was to be day or night?

You are condemning the Government here. If it was a mistake, and about that I do not know, to land that condenser in the daytime, surely it was a mistake of the naval and military authorities on the spot.

I am not prepared to enter into sweeping attacks upon our soldiers and sailors out there. I am no naval or military authority. They may have made a mistake there, but it was brought forward as part of the general attack on the Government here. They cannot be held responsible for that. Just a word about the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University (Sir E. Carson). I deplore his speech. What good could that speech do to this country at this time?

One opinion I heard expressed in the Lobby to-night was that the right hon. and learned Gentleman had taken to moonlighting. It seems very much like it. So far as there was any practical point in the speech, it seemed to be this: He thought that the Government ought to take the advice of their professional advisers. But upon the point on which the right hon. Gentleman resigned they did take the advice of their professional advisers, and he resigned because they took that advice. What effect on our Allies, and on our Colonies, will that speech have? It can be nothing but disastrous and unhelpful. I do not think this Debate will help them very much.

There are difficulties enough to deal with. We know little of them. The Government have to deal with extremely complicated situations in the Balkans. We have not the knowledge and the information which they have. We do not know the internal difficulties. We know that they are an uncommonly difficult lot to deal with, and that they are jealous of one another, but we do not know the difficulties which the Government have to deal with. We must always remember that every movement we make, every step we take, everything we attempt must be done in conjunction with our Allies. We must act unitedly with them, and we are acting unitedly with the statesmen of four of the leading countries in Europe. When they come to a decision, I hope it is no disrespect to the Noble Lord for us to form an opinion that we would rather accept their views than take his. Really what does this Debate mean? What does the controversy and criticism in the Press and elsewhere mean? It means that we have to make a choice between a number of hon. Members on the benches opposite, and some who sit here on these benches, as to their capacity and power to guide this nation. If I am to choose between those Members and the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London, I say with my knowledge of both, and with my experience of them, although it may surprise some of our critics, my judgment does lean towards the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London.

9.0 P.M.

When it comes to a question of foreign policy, and the Noble Lord criticises the Foreign Secretary, I prefer to rely on the judgment, knowledge, and sound sense of the Foreign Secretary, rather than on that of the Noble Lord. We who are outside the Government, we private Members, and I believe the people in the country, will judge by their personal knowledge of the men we have representing both sides, and our experience of their capacity. We know what they have done in the past. I do not know what other Members think, but I remember when I read the documents that were published after War was declared, when I read the diplomatic correspondence that had taken place between our Government and the Governments of the countries with which we are at war, I felt pride in our country. Looking back, even now, I do not know that I can suggest an alteration of a word in that correspondence. These dispatches of the Foreign Secretary were not only masterly, but they indicated an extremely calm judgment, although many of them were written in circumstances of pressure and great difficulty. Still they bear looking at again now, and they show nothing but sound judgment. I judge of the present, when. I have no knowledge, by the past, of which I have knowledge, and I say of the man who conducted our affairs during that time in a way which secured for us the support of the civilised world—I have confidence in that man. I am tired of the snapping and snarling—there is too much of it in this House and out of it—of people who, like a pack of curs, snarl and snap at the heels of the man whom they are not worthy to look at.

There is an old saying that you should not speak to the man at the wheel. At the present time our Government is piloting this nation under conditions of stress and difficulty, compared with which no man at the wheel was ever faced. This is not the time to chatter and talk and distract his attention. Let us give the Government our support. Let us trust them. What alternative have we got? I should not like to see these critics carrying on the Government of the country, That would be nothing less than a misfortune. Let me say one word on a matter to which the Prime Minister referred. The right hon. Gentleman spoke very seriously regarding the finance of the War. It is a very serious matter indeed, and I do want to urge upon the Government the necessity of retrenchment and of avoiding extravagance and waste.

I am supporting the Prime Minister's own words. This is a very important matter indeed. We should remember that the House of Commons has lost all control over its expenditure. It is inevitable.

The House of Commons cannot have control in war. It cannot have details of the estimated expenditure submitted to it, and that puts, a greater responsibility on the Government. The question of our expenditure is extremely serious. We can win this War if we can provide money for it. Men and munitions can be found if we provide the money. My concluding note, therefore, is to urge upon the Government that which the Prime Minister referred to in his speech, the necessity of giving great attention to the question of economy, and of restricting the expenditure as much as possible.

I am sure the newspapers to-morrow morning will refer to the speech of the Prime Minister as an historic utterance, but I think when historians come to describe it there is one point of the speech to which they will attach immense importance, and that will be the portion in which the right hon. Gentleman admitted that politicians in the Cabinet had overruled the advice of a great admiral with regard to the disposal of our ships. I think that is a deplorable example, and I am sorry to see the Prime Minister has shown every intention of continuing a similar policy. It is altogether most unfortunate. There are many cases in history where the direction of war has been diverted for political reasons, and I believe in almost every case the diversion of military force for political reasons has involved the nation which did it in disaster. I understand there is to be some organisation in the future by which we and our Allies shall co-operate in the direction of the War, but if the principle of the overruling in military matters by the Cabinet of the advice of experts is to be continued, I do not quite see how the War will be directed with more efficiency and more speed, because if the Allies meet together and decide upon a particular policy, is that policy, decided upon by the military or the naval experts, to be submitted in one country alone—in this country—to the decision of a Cabinet which meets occasionally, and which, with all respect to it, only includes one individual with any professional knowledge of the subject which will have to be decided?

There are certain points with regard to which the country has legitimate cause of complaint against the Government. I greatly regret that the Prime Minister's speech in certain places showed no sign of any improvement in regard to those facts. First, I think we want a perfectly clear policy of stopping the concealment of the truth from the nation when disasters occur. We do not get the truth told us properly. We have victories sometimes announced in the papers, but afterwards we read in the papers that the line has not moved and that the position is unchanged. Moreover, the Government very often fails to take vigorous action where the people of this country are ready for vigorous action. If the people of this country are to direct and control the War, they should be told the truth with regard to the War, so as to know what decision should be arrived at. There has been a failure of proper co-operation between the Foreign Office and the War Office before the War, during the War, and up to the present moment. Our foreign policy depends at present so entirely upon the amount of force we have available, that there should be closer co-operation between the Foreign Office and the War Office and the Admiralty. A protest must be made against what occurred some time ago, namely, that when men are fighting at the front are not getting proper supplies of shells, and when Lord Kitchener has practically warned the country that we are short of munitions, we must never again have the example of the Prime Minister going down to Newcastle and practically contradicting the War Minister, as he did. That has impeded our chance of success, and was altogether unfortunate.

It would be wholly to the gain of both parties in the House, if I may say so with great respect, if some clear guidance could be given by the Prime Minister with regard to the question, which I do not propose to debate, of National Service. For instance, if the National Registration Bill had been brought in with a clearer indication of the purposes to which it has been put, a good deal of most unfortunate controversy would have been avoided. The suggestion which I want to put to the House is a simple one; it is that we should be told definitely and clearly what are the estimates by competent military authorities of the needs and requirements for drafts for keeping up the proper strength or our Armies in the field for the next six months, or better still, for the next nine months. Secondly, I suggest that we should be told, clearly and definitely, what are the numbers of unstarred men available for filling those gaps. Then we ought also to be told, when Lord Derby's experiment is over, what are the actual numbers realised, for then the House will be able to decide, without all these most unfortunate controversies, between those who defend National Service and those who do not. We can then judge what the requirements of the country will be for the next six or nine months, what is the number of men available on the Government's own estimate, arrived at by the process of starring or not starring, and we can then see how many men are available, and all this controversy would be settled. If the men have come forward in sufficient numbers for the requirements of the future, these heated discussions would cease and we should all be satisfied; if the men have not come forward in sufficient numbers, then I take it the Government themselves would acknowledge that further steps were needed to compel, if necessary, the men to come forward and fill the ranks.

I would put one more point with great respect to those from whom I differ. I would urge all those who oppose National Service in this country to offer their opposition to it in moderate language and by arguments and methods which are not insulting to our Allies. It was not a particularly bad case tonight, but there are people who speak of anything in the nature of compulsion or National Service as the abandonment of freedom. I think that the use of any such phrase in these Debates is unfortunate. Are not the French people, who have decided as a whole nation, that they will come forward, free? Are they not free, because they had compulsion before the War, and would they have less of freedom if they had not had compulsion? Are not the Swiss people free? Are not our Australian brothers free, although they have decided to have compulsory training for themselves? I would urge upon those who engage in this controversy not to use language in their statements which is in fact unfair to our Allies and insulting to those gallant armies with whom we are so proud to associate ourselves in this War.

I will not follow my hon. and gallant Friend (Captain Tryon) in dealing with the question of National Service, because I have more than once already trespassed on the patience of the House with regard to that matter. All of us who are in favour of National Service are prepared to give the most loyal and wholehearted support to Lord Derby in the effort he is now making to secure some of the method, fairness and organisation of National Service on voluntary lines. About that effort I would only say this: that it has come very late. I think that both the advocates of National Service -and the advocates of the voluntary system have some reason to complain that it is only made now when Lord Derby's task is enormously complicated by the existing grave shortage of men for drafts. This scheme, in many ways an excellent scheme, that Lord Derby favours, does not begin to work until at least 30,000 men a week are taken to fill up the immediate needs of men at the Front for drafts. If the scheme had been introduced before the grave shortage came into existence, almost all the men we are recruiting would have been available, classified according to married or unmarried state, and called upon by degrees. What we who criticise the Government do complain of, and what we have a right to complain of is that when this breakdown in the drafting arrangements was more than imminent, when it was known to almost everybody in touch with military affairs, yet on 28th July the only thing the Prime Minister had to say on that situation was that recruiting was in a highly satisfactory condition. It is not as if this scheme of Lord Derby's is suggested now for the first time. Practically the whole scheme was put forward by the authorities of the Recruiting Department in the War Office in the first month of the War, was actually accepted for a day or two and then rejected, for reasons into which I need not go in any detail, though I regret that the influence of the Prime Minister, who was the head of the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee, and who obviously must have known much more about the conditions of life in this country than the Secretary of State for War fresh from a different position, was not used on this great question of recruiting to try and combine the advantages of national service with the desire of the great majority of the people, at that time at any rate, to carry on this War on the lines of voluntary service.

However, I do not wish to deal so much with that particular question, but rather with the more general question of the conduct of this War by the Government, and I believe, in spite of what the right hon. Baronet said just now, that the House and the country as a whole will be grateful to my right hon. Friend (Sir E. Carson) for having broken the ice and initiated a frank and free discussion on the conduct of the War, from which we cannot go back. I agree with him that in a free country like this you can only get the fullest value out of the patriotism of this nation by frank and full discussion, and you cannot get full value out of the Government in a country like this without frank and fair criticism. I daresay the great majority of the Members of this House are prepared to extend continued confidence in His Majesty's Government. But how can they expect the Government to avoid continuing past errors unless those errors are frankly inquired into and freely discussed in this House? This House and the country have the right to insist that the heroic self-sacrifice of our men shall not be thrown away for want of proper direction, that the patriotism of our people shall not be frustrated, that our immense resources shall not be dissipated and squandered. We have a right to demand foresight, courage, and decision from the Government. We have a right to demand co-operation between all the Departments of the State. Can anyone say that that demand has been met so far, or that the trusting, silent support of the country has ensured those qualities in the conduct of the War? We know that we have had a Government which has hardly ever led but has continually yielded, a Government which has hardly ever foreseen, but has always been surprised.

The Prime Minister this afternoon spoke of this War as fruitful in surprises. It does seem to have been fruitful in surprises to His Majesty's Government. It seems that His Majesty's Government have been surprised by the shortage of munitions. They were surprised by the shortage of men. They were surprised to find that cotton was useful to the German artillery. They were surprised to find the Turks fight well in trenches. They were surprised to find Bulgaria hostile and anxious to be revenged upon Serbia. They were surprised to find that Greece hesitates in face of such a grave military danger as that to which she is exposed to-day. It is always the same story. We always pass through the same stages. There is the first stage, the bland denial of the facts. When for months we had been unable to do anything in France for want of munitions the Prime Minister goes to Newcastle blandly assuring the country that there never has been a single action where we have failed for want of munitions. When we are on the verge of a breakdown in recruiting and drafting the Prime Minister assures this House that recruiting is highly satisfactory. Of course in the end, when criticism has been unanimous and sufficiently insistent, the Government has given way. So, after nine months of war, you get the Government taking the question of munitions seriously, and because it does not seem to have been properly dealt with in the War Office, appointing a separate Minister. At the end of a year of war you suddenly declare cotton contraband. Then there have been other cases where criticism in the Press or in the Cabinet has differed. Then irresolution has dragged on indefinitely. As a last respite from the painful necessity of taking a decision the Government have generally flown to some distinguished outsider to find them a policy, and that is how we go to Lord Derby to find us a national service Army without national service. That is why you go and call General Monro from the trenches in France and send him out to the Mediterranean, like a dove from the ark, to look and see if he can find some solid rock of policy somewhere amidst the shifting tides of our indecision—some Mount Ararat where the members of the Government, duly paired according to party, once more can wander freely and without criticism.

In no field has this want of foresight, this refusal to face facts, this inability to bring our military and diplomatic arrangements into any sort of relation to each other, been so clearly and palpably shown as in our dealing with the situation in the Near East. It so happens that my own military work brought me for many months in the spring and summer into contact with that situation, and I can say, without trenching upon any of the confidential knowledge I have acquired in the course of my work, but simply dealing with those matters which are common knowledge if not here in London, at any rate in any Balkan capital, you get a story of inconsistency, hesitation, and want of foresight which is more than amazing. I admit that, as the right hon. Baronet (Sir T. Whittaker) insisted, you must not ignore the difficulties which come from the necessity of co-operation between four Allied Powers. But we throughout this matter-have enjoyed a peculiar position and have a peculiar responsibility. We are the one great Power which is entirely disinterested in Balkan affairs. We have no local ambitions to gratify. On the other hand, our vast interests in the Near East, in Egypt, and in India, make it all the more important to us that the Balkans should not become a mere instrument of German policy; and the fact that we possess command of the seas and are not threatened at home gave us an opportunity of developing force in those regions which were denied to some of our Allies. We had a right to play the leading part, and did play the leading part, and the Government of this country deserves at any rate the main part of the responsibility for the mistakes which have occurred.

The situation that has arisen in the Balkans is one which may surprise many people. It seems to have surprised the Government, but there is nothing in it that ought to have surprised them. Anyone who knows anything about the feelings with which Bulgaria was left at the end of the second Balkan war, the bitterness of her feeling of revenge against Serbia and Greece, anyone who knows anything of the feelings and prejudices of King Ferdinand, would not have thought this affair that has happened surprising, but would rather have felt that what has happened is the thing which was most likely to happen unless great care and great precautions were taken. After all, the situation with which we are confronted to-day is one that all but occurred just a year ago, if it had not been for the heroic gallantry of the Serbian Army last November, when on the very verge of destruction, almost on the very ground on which she has been fighting in the last two days, she hurled back Austrian resistance. Did not the Government know that at that very moment Bulgaria was meditating joining our enemies, that a band of Bulgarians blew up the vital railway communication at Strumnitza only the very day after the munitions passed through which enabled the Serbians to win their victory? At that moment Germany had been checked by the Allies in Flanders, and checked by the gallant Russian Army in Poland. Very soon after these events the Allied Governments discussed the sending of a division into Macedonia in order to guard against the Bulgarians. There were certain diplomatic hitches, and while those were taking place our Government was suddenly distracted and drawn away by a far more ambitious scheme, the scheme to capture the Dardanelles and Constantinople. I will say this, that there were immense possibilities in that idea. Given a coherent naval and military plan, given a diplomatic policy based upon that plan, and the result of that policy might have been almost incalculable. If we had had a force capable not only of making sure of the Dardanelles and Constantinople, but of then being a dominant factor in the military situation in the Balkans, I believe we could have secured that Balkan agreement of which the Foreign Secretary has spoken, and by utilising the Salonika Railway and the Danube we could have marched into Hungary at the head of an almost irresistible coalition of forces. How did we set about carrying out that idea? We began by a naval bombardment which, whether some of our admirals were prepared to accept it or not, at any rate only served to advertise our intention to the Turks and to give them abundant time to make their preparations. Then, when we had at last recognised the costly futility of a purely naval bombardment, we sent a military force. What force did we send? Did we send a force to cope with 250,000 or 300,000 Turks, which was the army that had concentrated once surprise was out of the question? No, we sent 70,000 men. There was not a single General Staff in the Balkans who did not know that our plan was foredoomed to failure, or who even expected that our troops would secure a foothold on the soil of the Peninsula. I doubt if any troops less valiant than those commanded by Sir Ian Hamilton or less valiant than the immortal 29th Division or those gallant Australians, could even have secured so precarious a foothold as they secured on that difficult ground.

Those were the conditions under which our diplomacy began to negotiate for Greek assistance. M. Venizelos, confident in the ultimate victory of the Allied cause, persuaded perhaps by our own too-easy confidence in success, was prepared, there and then, to support our expedition with the assistance of the Greek Army. But King Constantine, a sympathiser, and a honest sympathiser, with the Allied cause, and his general staff, took a view which was less broad and less bold perhaps, but which was based on certain very practical con- siderations. They made Greek co-operation dependent upon two conditions. One was that the Allied force to embark upon that enterprise should be sufficient to give some reasonable hope of success, and the second was that we should be able to guarantee Greece against the danger of Bulgarian aggression. However, as we were unwilling either to face the fact that Turkish resistance was more serious than we hoped it would be, or that the Bulgarian danger was a real one, these negotiations fell through. That left in Greece, and this fact should be stated in fairness to Greece, a strong impression of our futility, of our unwillingness to face the difficult facts of the situation. We failed, as I have said, in our first attempt with that wholly inadequate force. By this time we seem to. have forgotten completely that the whole original motive of undertaking operations in the Near East was the Bulgarian danger, and we began to cherish the vain delusion that perhaps, after all, the Bulgarians would help us if Greece was not willing.

What reasons had we for imagining that Bulgaria would help us? Was it because we had better terms to offer than the other side? Was it because we had greater certainty of success to offer? No; because we were in a hole in the Dardanelles and wanted Bulgaria to pull us out. How often did I hear people say out there: "We must have Bulgaria, we cannot get through without them." Was that a. reason that was likely to have any weight, with Bulgaria? Accordingly, in May, we made certain offers to Bulgaria. One of those offers was that Bulgaria should have certain Turkish territory as soon as she occupied it. The rest of our offers were purely hypothetical. If we could induce Greece and Serbia to give up certain territory after the War, subject to their getting much wider compensation elsewhere, we would use pressure, or our influence—I do not know exactly what it was we were going to do, but at any rate we were going to try to secure these territories for Bulgaria. Why and how we expected that these offers would be taken seriously by Bulgaria, and win over Bulgaria to our side, in view of the military state of affairs, passed my comprehension, and I believe it passed the comprehension of almost every diplomatic representative of the Allied cause in the Balkan Peninsula. What was there in our offer to make Bulgaria forget the bitterness of 1913? What was there in our offer to make King Ferdinand change his point of view? Where was the irresistible force on our side which alone would have made these terms palatable to Bulgaria and have induced her to fight by the side of the hated Serbians, or of Greece, or make King Ferdinand violate the one creditable emotion that I have ever heard him credited with, namely, his feelings of affection and gratitude for the aged Emperor Francis Joseph?

That is what the Foreign Secretary has described as the policy of Balkan agreement. I say it was a policy of meeting unpleasant solid facts with empty phrases. It was a policy of self-deception. It was a policy partly dictated by a belief that all men are actuated by copy-book motives and principles, and partly due to the indolence and the timidity which will not face unpleasant facts. If we had faced these facts and realised the Bulgarian danger, instead of trying to delude ourselves, we might have got the support of Greece long ago. What was the result of our offer to Bulgaria? I was in Sofia when that offer was made, and I can tell the House what was the result. It was to convince the Bulgarians, if they had not been sure of it before, that we were really in a mess. The first thing they said was, "So Italy evidently is not going to help the British in the Dardanelles, so they have come to us." The only result that offer had, I am confident, was to make King Ferdinand surer than he was before that Germany was winning, and that the "right horse to back" was not the Allies. The immediate consequence of our offer was that in the next few days Bulgaria began negotiating with Turkey on the strength of our offer for the cession of certain territory which was ceded not long ago. Meanwhile, Bulgaria went on playing with us and bargaining with the Turks. We, having once embarked on those negotiations could not screw up courage to break them off, though the whole conditions under which we had opened those negotiations were steadily growing more and more unfavourable. Russia's defeats and our failure at Suvla Bay only increased the fervour of our misguided wooing, instead of making us realise that the game was up—that we had to reckon not on the friendship of Bulgaria, but on the possibility of Bulgarian hostility, and that the sooner we made preparations to meet that danger the better. What preparations did we make? What decision did we come to after the Suvla Bay defeat? We hung on idly at the Dardanelles with our weary and spent troops, waiting to see what might turn up in the Balkan world, though we knew quite well that Germany was making her preparations, and that at one point or another she was going to strike within the next few weeks.

When Germany's preparations were completed, then Bulgaria showed her hand. For a moment there was decision and promptitude, but not from His Majesty's Government. The decision and promptitude came from M. Venizelos. He said that he was prepared to mobilise the whole forces of Greece if an army of 150,000 men was despatched to help them. So far so good. I do not know whether the Greek general staff afterwards thought that 150,000 was an inadequate force, or whether they suspected that that force was not really forthcoming in any reasonable time, and I confess that the way in which the Foreign Secretary spoke just now would give him some grounds for that suspicion. At any rate, on October the 5th King Constantine drew back, and declared that, though bound by Treaty to Serbia, and though bound in a certain sense to the Allies, yet he was not prepared to risk the existence of Greece in a fight against what he believed to be irresistible odds. Then was the moment for a strong policy and a prompt decision. Then was the moment to make bigger offers to Greece, and couple them with effective threats, if our offers were not accepted, to hasten to increase the men we were sending, and to make it clear to Greece that we were not going to allow her, if she fulfilled her Treaty obligations, to be crushed by any German and Bulgarian combination.

Instead of that we had complete paralysis. The Foreign Secretary may deny as much as he likes. It is perfectly clear that what we were going to do, and what was in motion before the 5th of October, somehow seemed to cease to be in motion after the 5th of October. A handful of troops was already on its way to land. The French portion of those troops was sent up the country, where it has done much gallant work to help the Serbians. Our contingent was kept sitting there at Salonika with orders not to move. I think that the House can imagine the feelings of shame and indignation with which the gallant Irishmen of the Tenth Division had to sit there in Salonika while the Serbians and the French were looking for their help, and while the Greeks, and Turks and Jews, and the German spies at Salonika laughed at and despised them. Why, rumours have even gone abroad, based upon our action, that we were negotiating a settlement with Bulgaria. I am glad to hear now, at any rate, that some little detachment of the British Force has gone forward. While we were sitting there helpless and paralysed we began making offers—extravagant offers—of territory to Greece. It was not a bribe of more territory that Greece wanted on that occasion. It was simply the certainty that she should not be left in the lurch, the certainty that they were going to carry on the War with a reasonable prospect of success. Cyprus and 13,000 men—what a confession of weakness! Greece would not have wanted the offer of Cyprus if we could have sent 130,000 men or 230,000, or 330,000 men. It was mere folly to make offers like that at the wrong moment. I am not saying that it might not have been offered three weeks or a month earlier if coupled with a reasonable assurance of support, but, offered as it was, it was the merest futility.

The Foreign Secretary has suggested that there were no Forces to send. If there were not, why did he promise M. Venizelos to send him those Forces? Does anyone suggest that as a fact that 13,000 men were all that could have been sent from the Dardanelles if we had really taken the Serbian situation seriously? I heard it suggested that of course we cannot do much in the Balkans because of the difficulties of transport and of the single line of railway. But these difficulties are nothing to the difficulties which Germany has got to face in invading that country, in crossing the Danube, and in having to repair that single line of railway, which is all broken and destroyed. But Germany had a plan, and we had no plan. And if it is said that we had no transport for the roads of that country, let me ask the House to consider what that means. If we had no transport for our Forces to operate in the Balkans, apparently we could have had no transport to operate in the Dardanelles region. So that explains what would otherwise have been inexplicable, why Sir Ian Hamilton, instead of acting as the plain dictates of strategy would demand, and landing either in Thrace or somewhere in Asia Minor, dumped his Forces down in that impossible peninsula at the Dardanelles. It also suggests another question. If no transport was available in those regions, then what should we have done if we had had a success in the Gallipoli Peninsula? Should we have sent our troops to the quay at Constantinople to rest there? Surely, if we had any measure of success in the Dardanelles, we should have been compelled to land somewhere in Europe or Asia Minor and deal with the Turkish Army, and we should have wanted those Forces to operate further against an enemy. Apparently, if that excuse has any grounds in it, if it is really true that' there is no transport available to make the Forces mobile in the Near East, then we have got to face the fact that we were as inadequately prepared for success as we proved to be for failure. What are we doing now? Having had no plan and no policy, we send General Monro out to that region. How can you expect a general, who has been steeped in work in the trenches, and who probably has hardly had time to read the newspaper accounts of the state of affairs, to land at the Dardanelles and from that point of view to arrive at a sound judgment of the situation in Bulgaria, Mesopotamia, and Egypt, as well as of the needs of the Western Front?

It is a ridiculous responsibility to impose on any man. It is a responsibility which the Government ought to assume. Apparently, and I hope, it has been assumed for them by General Joffre. Meanwhile we have got to face the actual situation at the moment. I do not think that there can be a Member of this House who is not thrilled to the heart by the spectacle of that gallant little Serbian Army, contesting every inch of their beloved land against the hordes that are pouring in on them from every side, and threatening their homes and familes with horrors that are worse, I believe, than anything that has ever been inflicted in Belgium, hordes that at this moment are already emcompassing them on every side, and have put a hundred miles and more of hostile territory between the Serbian Army and the little French Force that is striving to succour them. It is too late, I fear, to prevent the forcing open of the gateway between Germany and the East. It is too late to save the fair land of Serbia from devastation and ruin, but, at any rate, it is not too late to enable some remnant of the Serbian Army to fall back, like the Belgian Army, and to remain in and contest some little corner of their country from which, when better times come, they can hope to push back on the flank of their enemy and recover what they have lost. At any rate, it is not too late to save our honour.

The policy that seems to have been the policy of His Majesty's Government a week or two ago was a policy which would have made it impossible for any neutral to come in on our side. At any rate we may now hope that it is not too late to bring Greece, and perhaps even Roumania on our side, and if that can be done, then it may be that there is still hope that the German plan may be frustrated, and that this adventure of theirs may lead, not to great success, but to irretrievable disaster. I have dwelt on these things at considerable length and in some detail, not because it is a pleasant thing to rake up past mistakes, but because it is necessary that we should awake and so deal with things as to make them somewhat better. We must have unity of direction. I listened with the deepest admiration and sympathy to the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Waterford (Mr. John Redmond). With every word of his speech I am in the fullest and deepest sympathy. Nothing in that speech struck me more than his unanswerable argument against the present Government, that its weakness is not so much in the number of the Cabinet as in the fact that it is not homogeneous; that there is not a single mind, and a single policy, and that the very ability of its members make it worse. The hon. and learned Gentleman did not, I understand, mean homogeneous in the old party sense. That is a homogeneity which you are right in getting rid of at all costs, and which I hope you have got rid of. At any rate the Coalition Government has had this immense advantage, that I think it has broken up all the old party divisions, and that any discussions there may be are purely on matters concerned with the conduct of the War. In such matters I should as willingly and readily follow the hon. Member for Waterford as I would my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Trinity College (Sir E. Carson).

I have some few words to say upon the subject of the General Staff. I will only say that that most important matter is again one that seems to have come as a surprise to the Government of this country. But if ever there was reason for being prepared in this particular matter we have it here. Have we forgotten the South African war? Have we forgotten the result of the Commissions and Committees that sat after that war, and elucidated the fact that our failures had arisen owing to the absence of a proper General Staff. They recommended the reconstitution of our War Office, and pointed out with irresistible force that the blight of the system, that existed before then was the centralisation of all power and responsibility in a single commander-in-chief, responsible for everything, but, in fact, responsible for nothing. An Army Council was created on which were the responsible heads of the departments, which were linked together and brought into touch with the Cabinet through the Secretary of State for War. Unfortunately, in some respects, we inaugurated this War by asking a soldier to become Secretary of State, a soldier whose experience of war was always that of a commander-in-chief, who was unfamiliar with the system introduced after the South African war, and who, in consequence, almost inevitably, from the outset, became Commander-in-Chief and Secretary of State, with the result that the responsibility of the heads of the departments, which it was the whole object of the reconstruction of the War Office to preserve, disappeared almost at once. The failure of munitions was remedied by the very doubtful device of getting a separate Minister of Munitions; and the same method has been adopted with regard to recruiting also. Above all, we now have the serious difficulty of policy. Such General Staff as did exist before the War and which did admirable work was all swept away before the War began.

I do not believe there is more than one officer of the original General Staff, and instead of the Staff being expanded to 100 or 200 officers, it was bled white, and was filled up with wounded and such other officers as could be spared. It has never enjoyed the responsibility and power that the General Staff ought to have. In war military policy should always be separate from the provision of men. In the German Army the Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of War have nothing to do with each other; they both approach the Emperor on an equal footing; the Chief of the Staff is the real adviser and counsellor of the Emperor, and the policy he decides is carried out by the Secretary of State for War. I do not say that we could have exactly the same system in this country, but what is essential is that the Government should have at its side a Chief of Staff, with an adequate staff below him, giving direct and responsible advice, not advice submitted through the Secretary of State for War in memoranda, liable to be re-edited and changed. It is only when he has the heads of his staff behind him making plans and working out policies that he can make out his policy and give the advice by which he will stand or fall. Have you any reasonable prospect of having any more definite policy or definite plans in the future than you have now? I hope hon. Members do not think I am making an attack on the Secretary of State for War, but I submit that it is entirely impossible for a single man to create a voluntary army, or, as the Prime Minister described it, to convert the country into a military nation, and at the same time to sit down to make adequate plans to meet all the contingencies which arise in the course of the War.

There is only one other point on which I wish to say a word, and that is the question of finance. I do hope that we are not going to be surprised by failure in finance as we have been surprised in so many other matters. We have heard again to-day of the grave problem arising from the immense excess of our imports over our exports, and the need of drastic measures for economy in many Departments which is necessary—not such feeble little measures as the Chancellor of the Exchequer has adopted, with the possible infringement of certain ancient views that are held. I say unless this matter is taken seriously in hand, and unless the whole of our finances are drastically revised, not by pious exhortations to economy, but by direct and effective legislative measures, we may be up against a situation of affairs far graver than anything that has confronted us yet. I am not a pessimist. I believe we are bound to win if we only conduct this War properly. The spirit of our people throughout the British Empire, the vast resources of that Empire, and of our Allies, make it impossible for us to be defeated, unless we are guilty of fatal errors, and unless we dissipate and waste all our resources. But I do believe in this matter of money there is the grave danger that at the very moment when Germany may be cracking for want of men, for starvation of men, we may find ourselves in the midst of a financial crisis so grave that we cannot set things right. I wish there was no reason for doubt or disappointment as to the conduct of this War. I am quite cer- tain we have spirit enough to bring it to a victorious conclusion. What we do want is courage, decision, leadership. Any man who will lead this country as it ought to be led, who will go forward confident in his own policy, and not looking over his shoulder, not afraid of his own shadow, will have behind him an invincible host following him to victory.

10.0 P.M.

Though I gave way this afternoon to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Trinity College (Sir E. Carson) in his desire to follow the Prime Minister, I wish now to say a few words, because I would feel sorry if it went forth that the speech of my right hon. and learned Friend, that of my Noble Friend the Member for Portsmouth (Lord C. Beresford), and that of the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, were the only three speeches from Members of the Unionist party, and that those speeches should go forth as the only contributions to voice that entire party as a whole, although I am bound to say there is much in what fell from each of those Gentleman with which in large degree I concur. I should like to join in the congratulations which were offered to the Prime Minister, that in recovered strength he was able to resume his place in the House of Commons this afternoon. When we bear in mind what he reminded us of himself, namely, the ceaseless strain of immense responsibility which must rest on any man in his position, and has rested on him during the fifteen months of this cruel War, I am sure his return was all the more welcome to one and all of us. I often think that we forget much too often, when we make criticisms on the conduct of a great campaign like this, that some allowance ought to be made for the strain which falls on men in the position of a Government, charged with such tremendous difficulties, which, when prolonged as it has been in this case, must tell at times on the strength and energies of all of them. There is another reason why I welcome his return. It gave the Prime Minister another opportunity of learning how strong and growing is the feeling, a feeling which I confess I share myself, that we in England, as many people I am sure quite think, have been kept far too long almost completely in the dark with regard to the progress of the War in some directions, which I do believe might have been perfectly well disclosed, not only without any prejudice or harm, but even to the great advantage of the Government themselves. I will not dwell on the rather remarkable speech which we had from my Noble Friend the Member for Portsmouth not very long ago. It was amusing in some respects and more remarkable, I think, in another, namely, for the enormous number of times in which my Noble Friend succeeded in contradicting himself. The speech was sufficiently dealt with by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Spen Valley (Sir T. Whittaker), and I shall say nothing more whatever on that point.

I wish to refer to something which fell from the Prime Minister upon the question of National Service. What I understood him to say was this: that National Service under no circumstances could be workable except by general consent. I want to know why, and I ask the question for what I think is a very good reason. I am afraid the Prime Minister must have forgotten this fact. Surely in the old days there was compulsory service for the Militia? It was made compulsory by ballot, and I never heard that it was unworkable or impracticable. I always understood, and I shall continue to believe until I know it to be contradicted, that that system for the Militia worked perfectly well, and was the very reverse of being unworkable.

The Prime Minister went on to refer to the endeavours which Lord Derby was making, and as to what would happen if he failed. I am quite sure of this, whether he fails or not, if he is unable to command success, every one of us, wherever we sit, will agree that he most thoroughly deserves it, and we shall be delighted if he does succeed. The Prime Minister said that "if my Noble Friend did fail by the 30th of November, well then I will consider the other proposals." [HON. MEMBERS: "NO, no!"] Let me proceed, and see if you agree with this. He also said, if a substantial number of qualified men refused he would not object to it, and he would not hesitate to do the other thing. So far as I was able to hear them, they were the very words. I was very glad to hear the statement of the Prime Minister, because I myself have always been in favour of compulsory service—long before the question was so prominent as it is to-day. But of late I have had very uneasy feelings upon the subject, and indeed I feel that I have a confession which I ought to make. The last time I spoke on this question in the House of Commons I said that I was absolutely certain that Lord Kitchener, if ever he felt or believed that compulsion was necessary, would not hesitate for one single moment to declare it. That I firmly believed, and, like many others, I have been waiting for the signal from him. I think I stated at the same time that when he did make that declaration he would find in Parliament no more determined supporter than myself. But ten days or a fortnight ago I came across in the "Times" a statement which has never been contradicted and which seemed to me to be of such a character that if it was not true it ought to have been contradicted. The statement, which was published on the 14th October, begins as follows:— made in this House by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. It has been quoted already to-day, so I need not repeat it. It appeared to me to be a complete undertaking to go to the help of our friends in the Balkans, of whom Serbia undoubtedly was one, if the position of Bulgaria should become one of aggression. I think that that position has been assumed by Bulgaria, and I know not myself how an undertaking like that to Serbia could have been abandoned. It was therefore with real pleasure and satisfaction—and I am glad to take this opportunity of saying so —that I heard the unqualified statement by the Prime Minister this afternoon with regard to Serbia and the assistance which this country, in concert with our Allies, would be prepared to render her.

I will not speak about the Dardanelles, except to say that it has always been a wonder to me how an English Cabinet, consisting as it did of twenty-one men when the decision with regard to the Dardanelles was taken, could have embarked upon that policy in the way it was done, apparently without being aware that they were undertaking a hopeless operation. I say this, not without some ground for saying it, because many years ago, very shortly after I first joined the Cabinet, I spent three weeks in Constantinople, where I had the opportunity of learning a great deal on various points of the Eastern question, and I came away with the firm and confident conviction, from all that I had been told on the highest and best authority, that no matter who it was who made the attempt, with the Turkish Government, country, and army against them, it would be an impossible operation to force the Dardanelles and get to Constantinople without an immense land force as well as a great navy. I confess that had I known of its being in contemplation, so convinced was I of the truth of what I had been told in those days gone by—and the truth has been verified by what we have now seen—I should have taken the earliest possible opportunity of giving the Government some warning on the subject. Unhappily the thing was undertaken and was in full swing long before any of us on this side of the House knew anything about it.

I pass from that question altogether to what was said about the reorganisation of the Cabinet. Personally, I have always held the opinion that very large Cabinets, although they have been the fashion now for a good many years, are a mistake, and it would be much better if they were small ones. That is the opinion I have formed from serving in some large Cabinets myself. We were told that there ought to be a General Staff for planning campaigns. What we want is the best and ablest architect we can find to advise upon the plan upon which we are going to work; and it is for the Government and the Cabinet to take care that they provide the workers with all the means and materials necessary to give effect to the plan they have decided upon. Whether that has been done in the past is questioned, and has been questioned very much in the course of these Debates. Whatever may have happened in the past, though, I do most sincerely hope that the statements that have been made and pressed upon the Government will be thoroughly considered and turned over in their minds. If they do that, I myself do not doubt that, in spite of the gloomy view that has been? taken by one or two speakers to-night, I at least shall have no fear of the general result, because we are supported by a people who, if they are told the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, will rise to the occasion. They are not to be cowed or frightened by anything in the world, but only by adversity made more steadfast than ever in their determination to fight out this bitter War to the very end.

I hope my right hon. Friend who has just sat down will not think me guilty of discourtesy if I do not attempt to follow him in the very interesting speech that he has just delivered. He has touched on a great many topics—on the Dardanelles, on Serbia, and on other questions which have already been dealt with by the Prime Minister, and on which it would, therefore, be impertinent of me to attempt to add anything. Indeed, I would not have intruded myself upon the House at all except for the speech of the Noble Lord the Member for Plymouth (Lord C. Beresford). He made one or two observations in the course of his speech which I do think ought to receive some reply from this Bench. The observations to which I refer were made upon the text that "the Fleet were not allowed to act"—I think that was the exact phrase of my Noble Friend. If that were so, it would be a very serious charge against the Government, and—as he was good enough to say it was the Foreign Office that had interfered with the action of the Fleet—a very serious charge against that Office of which I am a humble member. I venture to think that it is utterly untrue, and I propose to state, as shortly as I can, what I understand to be the policy of the Government in connection with this question of the blockade of Germany. I shall not attempt to review the suggestions which we sometimes read in some of the Press, that there is—I do not know what—but a sinister and obscure influence in the Government which makes them desire to save Germany. That is an insinuation which is beneath contempt, and which has not, of course, been repeated in this House because there is absolutely nothing to be said in its favour. But there is a suggestion that there has been a want of—what shall I say?—strenuousness and energy in the direction of the blockade for which the Foreign Office has been made responsible.

What are our objects in the blockade, or rather in the whole of that policy? I take them to be two. We wish to weaken Germany by depriving her in the first place of all the war materials that we can, including all necessary foodstuffs. We also propose to weaken her by general economic pressure put upon her by blockading all avenues of external commerce. In addition to that, we have also—and, if my Noble Friend will forgive me for saying so, I do not think he allowed sufficient weight to that—the business of preserving the friendship of neutral countries, and treating them with fairness and justice. Those are the two great objects which have to be co-ordinated in the pursuit of our policy.

My Noble Friend was rather grieved with some answer, to which I have not had an opportunity of referring, which I gave to him as to the extent to which Conventions and Treaties were still pre-served. I think the position is quite clear. So far as Germany is concerned, she has broken all those Treaties and Conventions, and she has not any right to rely, and we should not admit any right on her part to rely on any of those Treaties or Conventions. I thought that position was made quite clear by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a day or two ago. But when you come to neutrals, the position is rather different. However badly Germany may have behaved, that is not a good ground for us to disregard the rights of Treaties and the general provisions of international law. I am sure my Noble Friend will agree to that. It might happen, however, in an extreme case that a neutral had failed to protest against a breach of international law by a belligerent to such an extent that the other belligerent was relieved from the duty of giving the neutral the benefit of the international law. One can imagine this kind of case, for instance—the question of distributing mines in places under conditions not authorised by international law. It may be said that that is an infringement, and so it is, of neutral rights. If one belligerent does it, it is quite plain the other beliigerent must do it, or he would be put to serious disadvantage in conducting the War. But with that exception it is not always easy to define neutral rights under international law, and in applying our blockade we have to be guided by the rights of neutrals as well as by our own rights as belligerents in our efforts to impose pressure and restraint on the enemy.

My Noble Friend says, why not have an effective blockade? What does he mean by an effective blockade? So far as the ports of Germany are concerned, we may be able to get at the. Baltic ports, but we have not hitherto to any great extent, as my Noble Friend knows. But the ports of Germany which open on the North Sea have always been blockaded since the beginning of the War absolutely and entirely. What we have done is to go a step further and to blockade German commerce, even when it is going by neutral ports. That is a thing which has never been done in a war before.

Since the Proclamation of 11th of March, and when my Noble Friend says we have not allowed the Fleet to act, we have really called upon the Fleet to do more than it has ever been asked to do in any previous war. Let me go a little into detail as to what we have really tried to do. In the first place we tried to stop the export trade of Germany altogether, and that is really, if I may say so, the vital thing. It is much more important to stop exports from Germany than imports into Germany, and I need not dwell upon that point. It is clear that unless Germany can keep up her export trade she cannot pay for her imports, except by shipment of gold or new loans, neither of which are satisfactory from a financial point of view. If we can stop the export trade, the imports of Germany must automatically cease because she will not be able to pay for them. Not only this, but we destroy or weaken the credit of Germany so far as her Foreign exchanges go. We strike a serious blow at her credit, and at the same time inflict great economic pressure upon her. Therefore, it is most important to stop Germany's export trade. Now I come to what we have done. One of the charges made against the Foreign Office is that we have agreed to a number of things being exported since the Proclamation of 11th March. I saw a statement the other day that we had agreed to £37,000,000 worth being exported. I want the House to observe that it is only exports which are paid for that will do Germany any good. If Germany only exported that for which she got nothing, she would not get any advantage out of them, and therefore it is the exports that are paid for, and those only, that we wish to hit.

What has the Government done? They have said that where goods have actually been paid for before the 11th of March, or there is an obligation upon the American buyers to pay, and he would have to pay whether the goods reached him or not, in those two cases where the contract for their purchase took place before the 11th of March, they may be exported. [An HON. MEMBER: "Why?"] The result is that the money is going to Germany in any case, or has gone. If you stop the export, the only result is to prevent the American purchaser getting the goods, although the German seller is going to get his money in any case, or has already got it. It is possible that, in some cases, we may be taken in; but we have taken very elaborate precautions before granting any licences of this kind, and it is clear that, if the money is going to Germany in any case, the only result of such action is to deprive the American purchaser of the goods which he would otherwise get; and by stopping the goods you do not inflict any injury on Germany, but you do inflict injury on the American firms, and do the reverse of a sound policy, which is to inflict as little injury as possible on neutrals and as grave an injury as possible on Germany. We are charged with having allowed £37,000,000 worth of goods to be exported. That is not so, because the amount is only £2,000,000, and not £37,000,000. As a matter of fact, that is not going to do Germany the least bit of good in any case, and the only reason why it has been granted is because we do not wish to inflict injury upon the American purchaser if we can possibly help it. I want to be quite frank with the House. There is one other small item which has been allowed and which undoubtedly does constitute a genuine exception to the blockade. Some very small items, relatively, such as certain kinds of drugs which are only made in Germany, I think some kinds of chemicals and dyes, and a painted glass window for a cathedral which had been ordered before the War—things of that kind have been allowed to go through to America on the urgent appeal of the American Government, amounting in the whole to some £200,000 or £300,000. That is the solitary exception to the blockade of exports which has been made by the Foreign Office.

What is the broad result of the blockade policy, as far as exports are concerned? The broad result is that, as estimated by the American official figures, we have succeeded in stopping 96 per cent. of the exports of Germany. That is rather an unfavourable view of our operations, and I will tell the House why. Before the War Germany had treated, to a great extent, direct with American ports. Since the War, owing to various causes, the whole of her trade goes through New York. Therefore, if we have cut off 96 per cent. of her New York trade, we have really cut off rather more than that, because we have to take that fact into consideration. If the result of the policy of the Government has been practically to stop almost the whole of the exports from Germany that is not a result of which the Foreign Office need be ashamed. It may be said, "Ah, but perhaps those exports now appear as exports from neutrals."

That is a very proper criticism, but, unfortunately, the exports of neutrals have not gone up. They remain substantially the same as they were. In some cases there is a slight rise and in some cases a slight fall. Substantially they are the same.

Supposing before the War the exports of a particular article coming from a neutral country really came from Germany, they would still come from Germany, although appearing to come from a. neutral country?

As far as exports from Germany are concerned, they show a diminution of 96 per cent. since the outbreak of the War; and as far as exports from neutral countries bordering on Germany are concerned, they show no particular change one way or the other. Therefore, the decrease of exports from Germany is a real decrease, and is not made up by any corresponding increase from the neutral countries adjoining Germany. I hope I make my point clear.

I am sorry that it does not meet the point of the hon. Gentleman. That is my stupidity in not understanding it. This is really the burden of my Noble Friend's complaint. He said a great many ships were stopped by the Fleet and yet a large number were ultimately allowed to go on. I quite understand that that must be very discouraging to the Fleet, and nothing I will say will diminish or throw doubt on my sense of the great debt which this country owes to the magnificent work done by the Fleet. There is nothing further from my thoughts than to say anything derogatory of the Fleet in any way. It is quite true to say that if there are no goods on board ships going to Germany in effect there is no excuse for stopping them. The more complete your machinery is for keeping goods which are going to Germany off ships, the more cases there will be when upon visit and search it will be found that the cargoes are innocent and must be allowed to go forward. That is really one result partly of the procedure adopted and partly of the circumstances of modern times. If you succeed by your vigil in stopping one or two cases of the breach of the blockade and the result is that considerable delay and inconvenience is inflicted on the ship, that is, in view of the great ships now engaged in the mercantile trade, such a loss to the owners that they will take very great care in the future not to run the risk of that loss again, and the result of one or two stoppages will really secure you in a way which would not have happened in the old days against breaches of the blockade, and it will not be necessary to condemn all, or nearly all, the ships actually engaged in trading from one neutral port to another. That is really my whole case. There is no idea whatever of allowing goods to go forward which come from or are going to Germany provided we have real evidence that that is the case. We are anxious—and so far as the Foreign Office is concerned, it is profoundly anxious to enforce to the utmost our blockade rights, and particularly the blockade of exports for Germany.

Is it not a fact that the Foreign Secretary in a dispatch to the American Government, which has not been laid on the Table, states that the exports from Scandinavian countries have increased by 300 per cent.? Why do the Foreign Office give figures of exports in diminishing or equal quantities for Denmark, Holland, and other Scandinavian countries, whereas they have increased threefold or fourfold as compared with the period previous to the War?

It is difficult to carry these things in one's mind. I do not know if my hon. Friend is quoting rightly. I am dealing with the period from the 1st June when the Coalition Government was formed. I cannot deal with the period before that, and if my hon. Friend is referring to that prior period that must be dealt with on another occasion. I come now to Article 57. That Article has nothing to do with exports or imports. It is merely a question as to how the law is to apply to ships sailing under a neutral flag. Under the old prize law it appears to me—I speak with great diffidence on the question, the law was this before the Declaration of London, as far as England was concerned—it was different in other countries, but the prize law we adopted was that we were entitled, even if a vessel was sailing under a neutral flag, to seize the beneficial interest if the beneficiaire happened to be an enemy. At the outset of this War the Government issued a Proclamation saying what law they proposed to be guided by during the War. That does not alter the international law. It is merely a Declaration always made by a belligerent on the outbreak of war as to the principle he is going to proceed upon during the War. The Government, rightly or wrongly, said, "We shall proceed on the principle contained in the Declaration of London, on a certain principle, with very important exceptions as to the laws of contraband, and so on"—a very important modification. They said, "That is the principle upon which we are going." Among these was the Article 57 of the Declaration of London, which said that the neutral flag should be decisive.

No, but it bound this Government. When it became clear that there were ships which, although they were sailing under a neutral flag, were really owned by enemies, and when it became clear that it was a serious matter, the Government decided that it was desirable to revert to the older practice and allow themselves the liberty of seizing the ship. I do not think there is anything unreasonable in that. I am certain that Proclamation removed what the Noble Lord would say was a fetter which had existed before on the action of the Fleet. He ought not to have attacked, but congratulated, the Government upon it.

As to the Declaration of London, I think my Noble Friend will find, if he looks at it now, that there is nothing left of it except what is sanctioned by the old prize law of this country The Declaration of London consisted of qualifications of the law of prize and contraband. Almost all those were removed by the Proclamation which adopted it at the outbreak of the War. The Government, in adopting it, said they adopted it with certain modifications, which removed what my Noble Friend would rightly call its objectionable features. There was this one relatively small matter left, and that has been taken away. If it turns out that in any respect the Declaration fetters the free exercise of our belligerent rights, I am perfectly certain the Government will be ready and willing to see any difficulty under it dealt with in the same way No such difficulty, so far as I know, can be pointed out at the present moment.

Did not the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to-day state that no single clause of the Declaration of London had any binding effect at the present time? If that is the case, would it not be better to abolish the whole thing altogether?

I do not think it would. It is perfectly true that the Declaration of London, as an instrument of international law, never came into effect in this country, or, so far as I know, in any country, because it was never ratified and never adopted. It never became a Convention between the nations, but it does form a convenient statement, with certain exceptions, of international law as applied to belligerents, and from that point of view I think it is a convenient plan to say that we adopt the Declaration of London with certain modifications which shall restore us to the same conditions, broadly speaking, as the contraband law and international law applicable to belligerents before.

It has taken fourteen months to find out that. Article 57 was against our interests. Would it not be wise to do away with the whole Declaration? We might find out something more in sixteen months.

Is not the Noble Lord aware that while there are some people, like the Noble Lord opposite (Lord C. Beresford), who think it would be a very good thing to abandon the Declaration of London, there are a great many other people who think the Government has made a great mistake?

I am quite sure that any course the Government takes will be open to criticism from one quarter or another. All I can say is, taking the broad results of the action of the Government, the blockade of Germany has in my judgment been a great success, and not a great failure. As to the reason why Article 57 was not altered before, the answer is quite simple No case arose which made it the least important whether Article 57 existed or did not until quite lately. It was only when that case arose that it became necessary to make that change.

I want to say a word about imports, because that is of some importance. Your object has been to stop imports into Germany, at any rate, those imports which deal with munitions of war or materials for munitions or necessaries, such as clothing or foodstuffs, or even the raw materials for the manufacture of anything, that is to say, which really contributes to the strength of Germany. It is quite true that the Proclamation goes further than that, and I conceive that it might be argued that it goes too far and that there is no purpose in stopping the importation of pure luxuries into Germany, on the contrary, that there is some advantage from our point of view for allowing the import of luxuries for exactly the same reason as we in this country are anxious to prevent the import of luxuries into this country, that any import that does not increase the fighting strength of the nation is in time of war a loss of strength, because it requires either an equivalent export or payment in gold or securities, or something else which will weaken the country. But broadly speaking, the object of the Government, apart from any little exceptions of that kind, has been to stop imports into Germany. As far as the ports we could get at, the direct open ports were concerned, that was done immediately. As far as neutral ports were concerned, that was only attempted to be done by the Proclamation of 1st March. But I wish to press upon the Noble Lord that that was entirely a new departure—a very necessary departure—brought about by the different considerations of modern warfare—a perfectly legitimate extension of the policy of blockade, but still an extension. No one had ever attempted before, I believe, to blockade a country through the neutral ports of a country adjoining the belligerents.

I am dealing with March 11th. I think the much abused Foreign Office has a right to ask some recognition from the House that it has succeeded in carrying that policy out without getting into serious trouble with any of the neutrals concerned. It was a new departure. It was a considerable invasion of what they, at any rate, considered recently as, I think, to be their right. It required delicacy of treatment and adroitness in handling. I think the Secretary of State is entitled to say that that part of his policy, at any rate, has been so far crowned with a very large measure of success, and the difficulties involved in the enterprise were really all very great, not only with these neutrals, but there was our own trade in this country. It was clear that if you were to stop the trade of neutral with neutral you must stop the trade of this country with the neutrals also. It was also clear that if you were to stop exports from this country to those neutral ports on the chance that they were going through to Germany you were inflicting a considerable injury on our own trade, a very difficult and serious question arose which I do not propose to go into this evening. As to neutrals, the difficulties are quite familiar to the House. We have no right whatever—we never affected to claim the right—to stop the trade of one neutral to another. We have no right to do it. The United States is perfectly entitled to trade with Holland. As long as it is really neutral trade we have no right to interfere with that trade at all. The whole difficulty, and it has been a difficulty of an immense character, is to distinguish between that part of the trade going to Holland which is really destined for Holland and that part which is ultimately going on to Germany. That, believe me, is no simple matter. It involves elaborate examination of the documents and the history of the cargo to try and find out what its real destination is. That is a laborious process, which inflicted considerable difficulties on ourselves and. obviously, great injury and inconvenience upon neutral countries. Then we tried in Holland a plan which, I quite admit, had a good deal to be said against it, and that was the plan of getting a strong society in Holland—in this case the Netherlands Overseas Trust, composed of some of the most substantial business men in Holland—who would give us an undertaking that anything consigned to them should not be exported to Germany. That was an undertaking given, subject to very considerable pecuniary penalties. It has, on the whole, I believe, worked well. I do not mean to say that anything you can devise in this way will work absolutely perfectly. Then, of course, we rely very largely upon persuading neutrals to prohibit export of those goods which we were most afraid would reach Germany. There, again, we have had a very considerable success, and in almost all these neutral countries the most important goods are prohibited from being exported to Germany. I do not think any of these terms are perfect.

I have myself been always a strong adherent of a different plan, namely, that we should only export to the neutral so much of each article of consumption as it nominally consumes, but the difficulties of trying that plan, as I am sure the Noble Lord (Lord C. Beresford) will appreciate, are very great. You have, perhaps, 100 importers or consignees; you may have thousands. It is an endless task for us here to find out what each of those consignees would import in the year, and allow for each of the consignees that amount to go forward. It is almost impossible to do it. Therefore we must get a distributing agency in the country which will undertake that duty with greater local knowledge and greater means of information than we have. It has been our object to obtain such societies where we can get them. It is a thing that we cannot command: we have to persuade people to do it. We have got it in a certain number of cases—the cotton spinners of Sweden, for instance. We have got it in a number of other cases, and I hope the Noble Lord will forgive me if I do not enumerate them now.

No, Sir, not in the last four months, not since the 1st June. There is not a word of truth in the hon. Baronet's statement.

In the last five months. Why do you not lay the figures on the Table instead of publishing them in the American papers?

If the hon. Baronet wishes to interrupt me courteously, I will give way, but if he wishes to interrupt me discourteously I will not. As a matter of fact, it is utterly untrue that since 1st June—I am only dealing with the period since 1st June—imports Into neutral countries have increased. On the contrary they are substantially receiving only the normal imports of those countries. Take the case of cotton. The House will remember the kind of violent accusations which were made, and constantly repeated, because we did not declare cotton contraband. Not one of those charges was true. I say that from the 1st May, certainly from the 1st June, no cotton has gone into Germany, except so much as will always go in, whatever device you may adopt, by smuggling and so on, and in ways which it is impossible to deal with. All the facts show that the import of cotton into Germany practically ceased on the 1st June. As to the amount going into neutral countries, hon. Members will remember that the figures have been published in the Press. The amount going into Scandinavia and the Netherlands is substantially the same as had gone in months and months before the War. The price of cotton in Germany has gone steadily up, or, rather, rapidly up. There are the figures, taken from the "Vossische Zeitung" of 28th and 30th September this year. The prices given there show that in January of this year the price was 9d. per 1b., in March it rose, and by May it had gone up to 11½d., in June it had gone up to 15d. Since that date 19.7d. has been paid for any cotton obtainable, but as far as we can learn there has been no regular price since June because there has been no regular market for cotton, which is not an article that is bought or sold in Germany by private persons at all since that date.

Is it not a fact that the American Government were so certain that we were going to make cotton contraband of war that they warned southern farmers to put their land under other crops?

I do not know about that. I am merely dealing with the result of our action. Before it was made contraband we had stopped cotton going into Germany. By making it contraband no change was produced, as far as we can tell, in the amount of cotton that was being conveyed there. I have here the list of prices of cotton in the United States. It is quite plain that if the declaration of cotton as contraband had made any great difference you would have expected a diminution in the price of cotton in the United States, as you would have cut off a market which up to then was open. But no such diminution in the price took place. On the contrary. The date of the declaration was the 21st of October. The price on the 20th was 9.35 cents. It went down to 9.20, or 15 points of a cent, on the 23rd. By the 25th it had gone up to the same price as it was before the declaration of contraband. By the 26th it was above it. Therefore I may say quite confidently that the declaration of cotton as contraband produced no effect upon the trade in America.

As it is getting late I cannot go into the matter in detail. All I wish to say is that all the reports that come from Germany, reports in their own papers and reports from neutrals, and the letters written by people in Germany which come into the hands of the Government in one way or another, all show great scarcity in Germany and a great rise of prices, particularly in matters like oil, which was one of the things mentioned by my Noble Friend, meat, and bread. Everything has gone up enormously. The only explanation of that is the success of our blockade. I do say very respectfully to my Noble Friend—I know that he wishes to be quite fair—that it is not really fair to suggest that the Fleet has been hampered, that our blockade has been impaired, that the Foreign Office has been engaged in some deep, dark, or at any rate cowardly intrigues.

No, but people have repeated, outside the House, only with great want of moderation, what the Noble Lord has said with great moderation in this House. There is not a scintilla of evidence in support of any such doctrine. I am not saying that we are perfect, I am not saying that we are infallible. No doubt we have made mistakes. No doubt in the carrying of this very difficult complicated purpose the Foreign Office, which after all was not specially designed for commercial purposes, may easily have made mistakes. No doubt smuggling has taken place. No doubt we have been taken in time after time. But broadly speaking we have carried out the policy of the blockade not only fairly but successfully, and I say that the fact that we have carried it out fairly and successfully and have yet avoided serious trouble with neutral nations is, at any rate, one successful act which this Government may claim to have performed in the service of the country.

It being Eleven of the clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

The Orders of the day were read, and postponed.

Neutral Trading With United States

Whereupon Mr. SPEAKER, pursuant to the Order of the House of the 3rd February, proposed the Question, "That this House do now adjourn."

I wish to briefly refer to the speech of the Noble Lord who has just sat down. I do not want to import heat into this discussion, nor do I understand why the Noble Lord should have said that when I interrupted I should do so courteously. I want to know why the dispatch of the Secretary of State to the American Government was not laid on the Table of the House, though it has been published in every American paper. The American people are allowed to know what the views of His Majesty's Government are by their being published in the American papers, but the British House of Commons are not allowed to know the views of their own Government. In the dispatch of the Secretary of State to the American Government it is stated that the exports from neutral countries to the United States for the first five months of this year had increased by 300 per cent. The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will not contradict those facts. I sent the Noble Lord the number of sailings of ships and the dates of those sailings, which had been supplied to me by some shipping friend. Those figures showed an enormous increase in the number of such Dutch and Norwegian ships which were carrying goods from neutral countries to America, thus showing that Germany was at the same time carrying on an export business. The Noble Lord had that information, and there was no difficulty in obtaining the names of the steamers. It seems to me that there must have been trade going on with Germany, or why this enormous increase of sailings from neutral countries since the outbreak of the War? The Holland-America Company have now daily sailings to America, whereas before the War they had two or three a week— more often only two. I want to ask the Under-Secretary to tell us in what respect his Order of March has been modified. He told us that under the Order no more exports whatever were allowed. The Noble Lord admitted that £2,000,000 worth of dye-stuffs had been allowed to pass.

In point of fact a very large sum has been spent on dye-stuffs, which have been allowed to pass from Germany to America notwithstanding the Declaration. I am not versed in these matters of international law, but I know that we owe a great debt of gratitude to Mr. Thomas Gibson Bowles, who fought this question of the Declaration throughout the country, for the purpose of calling attention to the gravity of the position in which it was placed. I am not at all satisfied that in point of fact trade with Germany has ceased as he tells us. The Noble Lord told us that 96 per cent. of the export trade of Germany has ceased. My shipping friends tell me that a very considerable trade indeed with Germany is still going on through neutral countries. The figures no doubt will be analysed by the shipping world. I venture, with all respect, to ask the Noble Lord to disclose to us on what authority he has based his information as to the exports from Scandinavian countries since the Order of 11th March?

As far as the figures of 96 per cent. are concerned, they come, I understand, from the official American figures dealing with the port of New York. I have taken those as typical of the effect on the trade of Germany as a whole. It is, of course, conceivable they may be favourable or unfavourable. As to the other point. I am sure I did not intend to be rude to the hon. Baronet, but I did think, quite wrongly no doubt, that his interruption was intended rather discourteously to myself, and as that was not so my observation had the less point. So far as laying the Dispatch on the Table is concerned I will certainly consider the matter. I do not know whether there is or is not any objection to doing so. I am quite sure we only wish to throw the fullest light on this question, and if it turns out that in any respect our policy can be improved we shall only be too grateful to the hon. Member for suggestions as to the way in which it can be done.

In reference to the very interesting statement made to-night there was one fact which the Noble Lord probably intended to but did not include. The very general idea has become prevalent that a large amount of imports were allowed through neutral countries into Germany during the earlier part of the War. The Noble Lord was able to speak with authority as to what had happened from, I believe, June last. Is the standard which the Noble Lord took as to the increase of imports the amount of import which was going on in April or May or is the basis the figures of July, 1914, or of April, 1915. When we know which basis is taken we shall be able to know whether that has been the real increase over what I may call the pre-war standard. If the Noble Lord's figures are intended to be compared with those of July, 1914, then we understand that there can be no large increase of imports. That gap has not quite been covered by the Noble Lord. With regard to the Declaration of London, many of us had misgivings when it was before the House. The Noble Lord says that at the present time, so far as any portion of it is maintained, it is used only as a sort of code or document in which a number of old-established rules can be found. Is that quite so? The principle of the Declaration of London was to modify a very important doctrine—that of continuous voyage in the case of conditional contraband. Article 35, which abolished the doctrine of continuous voyage in the case of conditional contraband, undoubtedly militated very strongly against this country. The principle of international law which prevailed before the Declaration of London was brought into being so that we were always able to look at what was the real destination of the goods and to estimate whether they were subject to detention according as they were really intended to go to the enemy country, never mind whether they were going to be landed in the first instance at a neutral port or not. So far as conditional contraband is concerned, that principle was altered by Article 35 of the Declaration of London. What one wants to see is the old maritime international law once more re-established in this country. We do not want to have any claim made hereafter based on the principles of the Declaration of London. Therefore, if there is any question which arises on Article 35, and if the remainder of the Declaration of London can be appealed to as still reaffirming the doctrine which is enshrined in Article 35, I think that those who have claimed that the Declaration should be swept away root and branch have still some justification for their claim. It is because I have some misgivings that in this and one or two other points alterations found in the Declaration of London may still remain and may prove, hereafter, to be a difficulty—as Article 57 has done at a late stage of the War—that I should welcome the statement by the Government that even the shadow and the shade of the Declaration of London had gone. I should be glad because, not merely a lawyer like myself, but a certain number of persons well versed in the maritime trade of the country have a right to have their suspicions and misgivings allayed.

The Noble Lord said that substantially all parts of the Declaration of London which changed the old maritime laws were abolished at the outbreak of hostilities. How does he reconcile that with the Secretary of State's memorandum to the United States of December last, in which he said in effect, "You can make no complaint about cotton; we have touched no cotton. The rules under which we are conducting our operations give us no power to do so." He must have referred to Article 28, which established a free list, and cotton is there as an item in that list. I ask the Noble Lord to explain how it is if all the rules which hampered our naval action were, in fact, abolished at the very outbreak of hostilities by the Declaration which was made—how is it that he has appealed to them as if there were something almost sacred with their binding character as late as December of last year? I would point out to the Noble Lord one thing in regard to his claim: that really the making of cotton contraband produced no material effect. He appealed to the American price of cotton, and said it had not gone down materially since we declared cotton contraband, consequently it must have produced no effect. I say with all respect to the Noble Lord that it appears to me that his reasoning is a little deficient, because he leaves out all the factors of one side of the question. Cotton has been used by other countries besides Germany, for the manufacture of explosives on a scale never before known in history. We must bear in mind the fact that the price for cotton is regulated by the supply and the anticipated crop of cotton. I am told that both those factors operated to keep cotton up in spite of the fact that the declaration of cotton as contraband has materially tended to keep the supply out of Germany, which we really made no effort to do till the beginning of this year.

As to the last point of my hon. Friend, my answer is this. If you look at the list of prices of cotton, say, for the 1st August, it will be found that practically they remained stationary somewhere about 9 cents or 9.30 cents. On 23rd August there was a slight drop of 15 points or so, but it recovered almost immediately, and cotton was fairly level, with an inclination to rise owing to causes which my hon. Friend pointed out. If the Declaration had cut off important sources of consumption, it must have shown, at least, some effect on the price of cotton. But I do not rely upon that point only. I say, owing to the fact that before the end of June we had cut off the supply to such an extent from Germany it had ceased to become an ordinary article of commerce—so far as my information goes. In Germany, when it was last heard of, so to speak, in the private market the price had gone up enormously. As to the other point of my hon. Friend below the Gangway, he suggests that the Declaration of London was innocuous because it had not the effect to which the Secretary of State referred, cotton being on the free list, showing it was then in existence. I do not agree. Everything is on the free list unless it has been declared absolute or conditional contraband. All that my right hon. Friend's words amount to is, was that the Government up till then did not declare cotton absolute or conditional contraband, and so could not stop it going into Germany because of course at that time there was no effective blockade. My hon. Friend will find that, after all, the sense in which the words are used really appear in the Declaration of London. Everything is free until it becomes contraband, conditional or absolute. As to Article 35—I have looked at the initial Proclamation of 22nd August, 1914, and in Section 5, I find:—

"Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 35 such declaration of conditional contraband if shown to have the destination referred to in Article 33"

roughly speaking an enemy destination

"is liable to capture to whatever port the vessel is bound, and at whatever port the cargo is to be discharged."

That is to say, Article 35 was in effect repealed, and it was positively enacted that the doctrine of continuous voyage should apply to conditional contraband, so that in any respect my observations were not open to any impeachment. I shall be very glad, indeed, if my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Pollock) can point out any Article left standing in the Declaration of London which he thinks is likely to give us serious trouble. I promise to consider it very carefully if he will do so. Of course on the question of date my hon. and learned Friend was perfectly right. My comparisons were all with pre-war periods, July, 1914, against July, 1915, and so on; indeed my recollection is that it was not July, 1914, but an average of two or three years in order to ensure that we were not taking an exceptionally favourable period for our purpose. That is my recollection, but certainly it was pre-war compared with post-war.

Question put, and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at Twenty-one minutes after Eleven o'clock.