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Commons Chamber

Volume 75: debated on Wednesday 10 November 1915

House of Commons

Wednesday, November 10, 1915

Shops Act, 1912

Copies presented of Orders made by the Councils of the under-mentioned local authorities, and confirmed by the Secretary of State for the Home Department:—

County of Lancaster (Failsworth urban district);

City of Wakefield (two);

Borough of South Molton;

Urban district of Royton

[by Act]; to lie upon the Table.

Navy and Army Services, Warlike Operations, and Other Expenditure Arising Out of the War, 1915–16 (Supplementary Vote of Credit)

Supplementary Estimate presented of the Amount required to be voted during the year ending 31st March, 1916, for general Navy and Army Services, Warlike Operations, and other Expenditure arising out of the War [by Command]; referred to the Committee of Supply, and to be printed. [No. 378.]

Oral Answers to Questions

War

Royal Naval Air Service

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether men serving in the Anti-Aircraft Corps of the Royal Naval Air Service are actually enlisted in a branch or section of the Royal Navy; and whether they are subject to the provisions of the Naval Discipline Act?

The men in question are enrolled in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, and are subject to the provisions of the Naval Discipline Act.

Naval Courts-Martial

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, according to the custom of the Navy throughout its history, as set forth in the Naval Discipline Act and all Statutes and Regulations up to 1907, courts-martial for the loss of all warships will be held on the survivors as soon as the public interest will allow of public courts-martial being-held?

The tradition of the Navy is, as my hon. and gallant Friend suggests, that whenever a ship is lost a court-martial should be held on the survivors. We desire to adhere to the spirit of that tradition as far as the public interests and the conditions of modern naval warfare will allow.

Does that mean that the rule will be followed? As there is no precedent, will the rule be followed and a court-martial be held some time—even a year or two years hence?

I can only speak with regard to the present. As regards the future, that must depend on circumstances, I think the general tenour of my answer is unmistakable and should satisfy the hon. and gallant Member. He wants me to give a pledge that on every ship lost, no matter what the circumstances may be, a court-martial will be held, probably after I have ceased to be First Lord of the Admiralty. It is an unnecessary pledge. So far as I am concerned I shall always direct that a court-martial be held wherever the public interest seems to need it.

Does that answer apply to all losses of vessels during the War previous of the time when the present First Lord of the Admiralty came into office?

What may happen at the end of the War with regard to vessels lost before the time of the present Board of Admiralty must be a matter for future consideration. Naturally I have not reconsidered the decisions of my predecessors with regard to this matter.

Does not the law under the Naval Discipline Act override the decision of the previous Board of Admiralty?

No, I do not think so. The decision of the Board of Admiralty was made and is made in view of the general public interest, and I do not think the law the hon. and gallant Member has in mind will override that, nor do I think he would wish it to be overridden.

Balkans

Bulgaria and Central Powers

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on what date he became aware of the existence of an agreement between Bulgaria and the Central Powers; whether he knows the approximate date of that agreement; and, if so, what was the date of it?

I am afraid that I have no information on this subject which I can give to the House.

Serbia and Bulgaria

asked the Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether as soon as Bulgarian mobilisation was announced the Serbian Government asked permission of its Allies to attack Bulgaria, in anticipation of what it believed to be an inevitable attack by Bulgaria upon Serbia; whether such permission was refused; and, if so, on what ground?

The Serbian Government expressed the opinion that the right military policy was to attack Bulgaria before her mobilisation was completed. In the view of my right hon. Friend, that was a question which it was for the Serbian Government to decide in the light of the various political and military reasons for and against such a course. My right hon. Friend, therefore, sent no instructions to the British Minister at Nish, and the only record he has of his intervention on the subject is that when his opinion was pressed for, on 27th September, he said that all the political and diplomatic arguments were against such action, and that he was no judge of strategical considerations and could deal only with the others. There was no question, as far as he was concerned, of refusing permission; what he felt unable to do was to say whether the strategic considerations for taking the step should override the others against it.

I think the answer I have given is quite clear. My right hon. Friend says, "all political and diplomatic arguments were against such action, and he was no judge of strategical considerations."

Dr. Dillon's Dispatches

asked the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether the despatches from Dr. E. J. Dillon to the Press in this country dealing with foreign affairs have been submitted to the Foreign Office by the Censor before being mutilated, and the passages deleted have been so treated on the advice of the Foreign Office; and whether, in view of the fact that Dr. Dillon writes with authority and knowledge on Balkan conditions and politics, he will instruct the Censor to submit Dr. Dillon's dispatches to the Foreign Office for examination?

Yes, Sir. The Foreign Office takes full responsibility for all censorship of Dr. Dillon's published dispatches dealing with foreign affairs. I should like to take this opportunity of expressing the great obligations of His Majesty's Government to the directors of the newspaper to which Dr. Dillon most frequently contributes for their loyal acquiescence in all the suggestions made to them in the public interest and the discretion they themselves exercise.

Will the Noble Lord say whether the Foreign Office will avail themselves of the advantage of perusing these dispatches from Dr. Dillon and getting a wrinkle from them?

I do not know about a "wrinkle." But I can assure my hon. Friend I have had the pleasure of reading every one of Mr. Dillon's dispatches since I have had the honour of holding my present office.

Bluejackets With Serbian Army

asked whether the force of British bluejackets now with the Serbian main army is under the command of the Serbian Commander-in-Chief?

A British Naval Mission was detailed for special service with the Serbian Forces, and its head, of course, conforms to the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief of those Forces in all matters connected with military operations.

British Troops in Serbia

asked on what date the order was issued for British troops to proceed from Salonika to Serbia, and on what date the troops crossed the frontier?

Permission was given to the general in command to cross the frontier into Serbia on the evening of the 26th October, his permission was acted upon without any delay.

asked the Prime Minister whether the decision was arrived at by the Cabinet to send a large British Force to Serbia before General Joffre visited this country; and whether this decision was arrived at after the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University had resigned from the Cabinet?

I can add nothing to what has been said on this matter by myself last week and by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs yesterday.

Questions

West Africa (Operations)

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he can make any statement upon the progress of the operations in West Africa?

My right hon. Friend does not think it desirable to make any general statement, but he is satisfied with the progress of the operations.

South Africa (Troops for Europe)

asked the Secretary for the Colonies whether the Imperial Government has invited the Union Government of South Africa to send an official contingeant to Europe?

Before the conclusion of the South-West African Campaign the Union Government expressed their readiness to render to His Majesty's Government all the assistance in their power in prosecuting the War in Europe and elsewhere to a successful conclusion. In pursuance of this policy they agreed to send a contingent to Europe, which I am glad to say is now training in England.

East Africa (Operations)

asked the Secretary for the Colonies why military operations in East Africa are only reported at the time by the authorities in East Africa for local information; and whether he will take steps to ensure that at least these official communiqués should be issued here also, so as to ensure that people with friends in the Colony should be kept in touch with what is happening?

My right hon. Friend has asked me to answer this question. Reports of military operations of sufficient importance are communicated to the Press by the War Office in due course as received from East Africa. Matters of mere local interest would not be reported by telegram by the General Officer Commanding.

Dispatches of Eye-Witness

asked the Under-Secretary for War whether the contributions of Eye-Witness to the public Press have been discontinued; and, if so, why this has been done?

Yes, Sir, these contributions have been discontinued, as it was considered that the special purpose which they were originally designed to serve was being adequately met in other ways.

Leave for Troops

asked the Under Secretary for War whether his Department will take into consideration the question of free travelling to those of His Majesty's Forces who are allowed to visit their homes during the Christmas and New Year holidays, especially those troops who are in training in this country; and will he consider the advisability of allowing as many of the troops as possible who are on active service to visit their homes during the season's holiday; if so, will early arrangements be given to this effect?

I recognise the natural interest taken in this matter by the public generally. It is under careful consideration, but my hon. Friend will recognise that it is quite impossible to make a detailed public announcement on a matter of this kind, and I must ask him to leave it to the Department to reconcile all the considerations involved.

asked the Under-Secretary for War whether, now the winter in Flanders has begun, he will reconsider the question of giving those of our troops who have been out more than a twelvemonth a complete rest, which would be of more value than the four days' leave now given, and would enable such troops to go back thoroughly refreshed for the next campaign?

It does not follow because winter may have begun in Flanders that the military situation is rendered so much easier that leave can be granted on a more extended scale. Subject to this reservation, I think I may say that the Commander-in-Chief will give all the leave that is possible, but I must again emphasise the fact that the decision on this matter rests with the Commander-in-Chief, and only with him.

Press Censorship

asked the Under-Secretary for War how many men and women of nationality other than British are employed in the Censor's Department of the War Office, stating also to what nations they belong?

In the postal censorship there are 140 examiners who are subjects of one or other of the Allied States, and there are fifty-nine who are subjects of neutral States. It would take too long to state in detail the various nationalities represented, but I can forward the information to the hon. Gentleman if he so desires.

Has the right hon. Gentleman inquired into a case I sent him? Is that person who has German relations fighting at the front still in the Department?

I cannot charge my memory with every case, but if my hon. Friend will see me privately I will go into the matter.

asked the Prime Minister whether he has considered the criticisims passed recently upon the Press Censorship; whether he is aware that the German Press Censorship allows excisions by the Censor to be indicated by asterisks, whereas the British Censor expressly forbids this, and that, partly as a consequence of this, neutral countries have come to regard news from German quarters as more honest and trustworthy than news from British newspapers; and whether he can announce any modification in the policy of the official Press Bureau?

I am doubtful whether the comparative study of censorship methods can be advantageously pursued by way of question and answer, though I have no doubt that the Home Secretary will consider any suggestions which my hon. Friend may submit to him.

Has the Prime Minister considered the speech recently delivered by the most eminent journalist living, Lord Morley?

May I inquire whether it has had any influence in suggesting a change of policy of the method in the censorship?

asked the Prime Minister whether it is the intention of the Government, as suggested by the Lord Chancellor, to further curtail the liberty of the Press in criticising Ministers?

There has never been any intention on the part of the Government to curtail the liberty of the Press.

Naval and Military Services (Pensions and Grants)

Officers' Dependants

asked the Under-Secretary for War what separation allowance is paid to a wife and five children of a second-lieutenant serving abroad who are entirely dependent on the same owing to the husband having given up his civil employment and not receiving any allowance from his employers?

Separation allowance is not paid to the wives of commissioned officers

Then what allowance is paid to the wife and five children of a second-lieutenant?

An HON. MEMBER: He said "Nothing at all."

Separation Allowances

asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office if the limit of one month is still relaxed in the case of applying for separation allowances; and whether he can make any statement as to the present position?

A public announcement on this point is about to appear. I will send the hon. Member a copy.

War Pensions

asked the Secretary to the Treasury whether he will consider the advisability of issuing to Members a brief statement showing how the various persons entitled to naval and military war pensions can apply, to whom they can apply, and within what limits of time?

I hope shortly to circulate a statement on this subject, after I have conferred with my right hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty.

Recruiting

Boy Recruits (Discharge)

asked the Undersecretary for War whether he will give instructions to regimental officers that all boys below the age of seventeen years serving at home or abroad can be discharged on application made by the parents or guardians of such boys for such discharge?

So far as concerns lads serving at home, necessary instructions in the sense desired have already been issued. As I have already stated, if a lad below the age of seventeen years is serving abroad, the matter falls to be decided by the Commander-in-Chief concerned.

Will lads of thirteen or fourteen who are serving abroad be discharged?

asked the Undersecretary for War whether two boys, aged respectively seventeen and eighteen, recently ran away from a public school and enlisted; whether the Secretary of State himself gave instructions that these boys were to be discharged from the Army and sent back to school; and, if so, will he say why the Secretary of State refuses to allow boys of the working classes to be treated in a similar manner?

I understand that two boys at a public school did act in the manner mentioned in the first part of the question. As soon as they had run away the request was made that if possible their enlistment should be stopped, and an undertaking in that sense was given Departmentally. The matter did not come before my Noble Friend the Secretary of State. The boys had, however, already enlisted before they could be stopped, and, in view of the pledge given that these boys should be stopped, an order for their discharge was given. No case precisely similar has arisen, but everything possible to stop such enlistments, whoever was concerned, would be done if immediate information was given.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in the case of two boys belonging to the same town where the school is situated, being fifteen years of age, the War Office have refused to discharge them?

I can only say, in answer to that, that if the information had been conveyed to us in the, same manner as the information was conveyed in the other case, we should have taken precisely the same steps.

asked the Under-Secretary for War whether, seeing that all persons who desire to join the Army have now in their possession a registration card, he will, to prevent boys being enlisted, give instructions to the recruiting officers that no recruits are to be enlisted who do not produce their registration cards?

Recruiting officers have already been instructed to examine the registration cards of recruits presenting themselves, and their attention is being directed specifically to the question of age.

asked whether the War Office have any information as to the number of boys of fourteen and fifteen years of age serving in the Army who have been enlisted as being nineteen years of age or over?

No, Sir; I have no official information, though my hon. Friend has sent me a list of such cases which reached me this morning.

Did I not send the right hon. Gentleman seventy-nine cases of boys between thirteen and sixteen years of age who enlisted as being over nineteen years of age?

Skilled Employes

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War (1) whether recruiting officers are still in possession of orders directing them not to enlist skilled employés of electric power corporations, tramways, etc., without the written consent of the company, or have those orders been modified or withdrawn since the 12th of July; and (2) whether he is aware that to ensure the carriage, to and from their homes, of workmen engaged in the manufacture of munitions of war at Bradford there must be retained in the tramway department of the corporation an irreducible minimum of skilled artisans of military age after every possible substitution of older and less skilled men for those younger and more efficient has been made, and after reductions have been carried out to the limits even of wartime possibility; and can he now state whether these remaining necessary men will be granted an official badge to show they have been refused enlistment in the Army of the King by the recruiting authorities on the ground of public expediency?

The attestation of all such men as those mentioned has been authorised by the War Office. When attested, they will be placed in their proper group and will not be called up unless and until when their time comes, they are found to be no longer indispensable to their employers; but, in the meantime, the employers are required to take every step as far as is possible, to provide temporary substitutes for these men either from men medically unfit, men too old for enlistment, or women. This arrangement has been agreed to by the various Departments concerned.

Is a special badge to be given to those men who have been recruited but who, for the reasons stated, have not been enlisted?

Yes, Sir. My Noble Friend Lord Derby has in contemplation the giving of an armlet.

Appeal Tribunals

asked the Undersecretary of State for War whether appeal tribunals in connection with the present recruiting campaign will be set up in each Parliamentary area or in each recruiting area; whether, in the case of large Parliamentary areas or large recruiting areas there will be more than one appeal tribunal; whether they are to be constituted according to instructions of the Director-General of Recruiting; if not, under whose authority are they to be constituted; and whether copies of the regulations constituting such appeal tribunals and of the rules issued for their guidance in determining appeals will be laid before this House?

Every rural district council and urban district council and borough council has been asked to suggest the constitution of a tribunal for its area. These tribunals are appointed under the Local Government Board, with the concurrence of the War Office. The point raised in the last part of the question is being considered.

When will the issue of rules for guidance, which are constantly in request, be made?

Very shortly, I think. Perhaps my hon. Friend will give me notice of that question?

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the non-issue of these rules is seriously affecting recruiting?

I will make that representation to my Noble Friend and see if it is possible to issue these rules without any delay.

Firemen

asked the Undersecretary of State for War if firemen in the Metropolitan Fire Brigade and in brigades in the neighbourhood of London, whose services, in view of the danger from hostile aircraft, are of exceptional importance during the war, are unstarred and have received Lord Derby's recruiting appeal, notwithstanding that they have hitherto been on the exemption lists of the Admiralty and War Office; whether the fire brigades referred to are working in co-operation with a view to air raids according to a scheme devised by the Commissioner of Police at the Home Office on the 25th May; and whether it is desirable that these firemen shall enlist, in order to settle their doubts as to their duty in the matter created by their receipt of Lord Derby's appeal?

I am informed by Lord Derby that this question has been satisfactorily settled between himself and the London County Council on the lines that the men will be allowed to enlist, that they would be placed in their proper group and not called unless and until the London County Council have notified the recruiting officer that they have ceased to be firemen.

Does that apply equally to members of brigades who are not under the London County Council, but who are in the home counties, for instance?

Members of Parliament

asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office if any Members of this House have received payment for expenses or for their services for addressing recruiting and munitions meetings during the War; and, if so, what is the total amount?

I understand that no Member of this House has received any payment for his services in the connections mentioned, but that claims for expenses have been made and paid. I cannot state what is the total amount involved.

Questions

Head Wounds

asked the Undersecretary for War whether he has now ascer- tained the percentage of head wounds in British and French hospitals, respectievly; whether there is any communication between the British and French military authorities with regard to the adoption of appliances which may be useful in war; and on what date the first order for steel helmets was placed by the British Government?

I have no information regarding the percentage of head wounds in the French Army. In the British Army in France the percentage of such wounds during the last three months has been 15 per cent. As regards the second part of the question, the military attaches of the two Powers are in a position to get information on the points mentioned, and this they communicate to those concerned. I have already stated that I am not prepared to answer questions as to the date when orders for articles of equipment have been placed.

Staff Appointments

asked whether the Duke of Marlborough, the Duke of Westminster, and the hon. Member for Hythe hold positions on the Staff of Sir John French; if so what those positions are; and what are the qualifications of the holders of them, what rank do they hold in the Army, and to what regimental units, if any, are they attached?

My hon. Friend has been entirely misinformed. The three officers he mentions do not hold positions on the staff of Sir John French. But the last-named gentleman is on the staff of Lieutenant-General Sir H. Rawlinson, where I know he has performed most valuable work.

Army Discharges With Disease

asked whether the War Office has yet adopted any principle applicable to men discharged from the Army with disease which the War Office claim was contracted before enlistment, although passed as medically fit by medical men, whereby they will receive any consideration; and, if so, what do they propose?

These cases will continue to receive, as in the past, the fullest consideration of the Commissioners of Chelsea Hospital and the Army medical authorities; but the suggestion that all disease subsequently manifesting itself in a man who has passed the doctor as a recruit should be regarded as due to military-service cannot be accepted.

Do the War Office intend to lay down any principle, or do they mean simply to consider these cases on their merits?

The principle upon which we have always acted is that where it is proved that the illness or disease is the result of military service a pensioner whatever is the consideration, is given—it may not be a pension, but a lump sum. If it is not proved that it is due to military service, there is no charge on Army funds.

Is it necessary for the discharged soldier to prove that the disease is due to military service or does the onus rest upon the War Office to prove the opposite?

In cases of this kind there is not much onus. What is done is that the Chelsea Commissioners examine the case. It is then subject to revision by the Director-General of the Army Medical Service, and when we come to a decision that the case is due to military service then a grant is given.

Medically Unfit (Doctors' Fees)

asked the Under-Secretary for War whether he proposes to recover from doctors the fees paid to them for passing men into the Army as medically fit who have subsequently been discharged as medically unfit?

Under instructions given in December last fees are recovered in the case of recruits discharged as medically unfit on first joining.

Recall of Generals

asked how many generals since the War began have been allowed to resign or have been recalled or retired while on active service; and what is the average age of the generals thus allowed to resign or who have been recalled or retired?

Several general officers have been recalled for various reasons, but none have been allowed to resign nor have any been retired. The calculation of the average age of generals suggested in the last part of the question would be extremely misleading, as age had nothing to do with recall in a great many cases.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is a general impression that inefficiency is generally the result of the age of these generals?

I would not like to say that in no case could it be conceivable, but, on the other hand, I do not think it is at all a necessary disqualification.

Lieutenants-Colonel (Promotion)

asked the Under-Secretary for War whether there has been any instance in the present War of a lieutenant-colonel promoted to the rank of a general because of distinguished service on the field; and, if not, is it that there has been no lieutenant-colonel worthy of such promotion, or has regulation or custom or the vested interests of older and untested officers intervened to prevent it?

I assume that when my hon. Friend speaks of the rank of a general he includes the rank of brigadier-general, and I may inform him that there have been many cases of promotion of lieutenant-colonels and even of majors to the rank of brigadier-general. That being so, I am not called upon to answer the last part of the question, which contains an imputation quite undeserved by the Army, and, if I may say so, unworthy of my hon. Friend.

May I ask my right hon. Friend if he is speaking in that way for the Government or if it is his own personal opinion?

( later ): May I ask your ruling, Sir, on a point of Order which has arisen concerning a question which I put to-day in courteous and polite terms, and to which I received an answer which was personal and offensive, and I think, in a Parliamentary sense, impertinent. I want to know if I have any redress, and can I give notice now to call attention to this subject this evening, or is there any other method which I can adopt, or can I refer to the matter on the Adjournment of the House?

I have no particular remedy which I can offer the hon. Member. He must take advantage of those opportunities which the House affords, if he thinks he has been in any way injured.

I will repeat the question which my hon. Friend asked me:—

"Whether there has been any instance in the present War of a lieutenant-colonel promoted to the rank of a general because of distinguished service on the field; and, if not, is it that there has been no lieutenant-colonel worthy of such promotion, or has regulation or custom or the vested interests of older and untested officers intervened to prevent it?"

My answer was:—

"I assume that when my hon. Friend spoke of the rank of a general he includes the rank of brigadier-general, and I may inform him that there have been many cases of promotion of lieutenant-colonels and even of majors to the rank of brigadier-general."

I went on to add:—

"That being so, I am not called upon to answer the last part of the question, which contains an imputation quite undeserved by the Army—"

"And, if I may say so, it is unworthy of my hon. Friend."

I only want to say that I think the House will recognise that it is out of delicacy of feeling to my hon. Friend that I ventured to say what I did say, that it was unworthy of him. I think he would be the last man -to make an imputation which was really undeserved, and, that being so, I put in those words. I can assure my hon. Friend 'they were not intended to be disrespectful to him or to be impertinent in any sense of the word. If I have injured his feelings, I am perfectly willing to apologise.

I desire to ask you, Sir, whether a Minister, in answering a question at the Table, is entitled to express his personal opinion on the merits of any question, seeing that Members are not allowed in the questions they put to express their opinions; and are not Ministers bound merely to give an answer to the question, without expressing any personal opinion?

It is not a personal opinion at all; it is the opinion of the War Office.

May I thank my right hon. Friend for the explanation, which I entirely accept.

Indian Aemy Reserve of Officers

asked the Secretary of State for India whether he is aware that Indian Government civil officials who join the Indian Army Reserve of Officers are informed that military service out of India does not count for leave; that this rule presses with peculiar severity on such officers now on active service in Mesopotamia who, however long the War may last, will still require to return to India from Mesopotamia to serve out the balance of the months or years during which it is necessary in peace time for civil officials to reside in India in order to qualify themselves, according to regulations, to receive a specified grant of leave; and whether he will cause a remedy to be found for this hardship?

I will consult the Government of India on the subject.

asked the Secretary of State for India whether he is aware of a grievance felt by certain former lieutenants of the Indian Volunteers who, after five months' active service, saw their regiments demobilised in consequence of the sinking of the "Emden," and themselves reduced to the rank of second lieutenant in the Indian Army Reserve of Officers, while Territorial officers attached to British units suffered no such degradation of rank, and how this sense of grievance was increased when these lieutenants discovered that while they were on active service other gentlemen, never Volunteers at all, had been appointed to the Indian Army Reserve of Officers, and thus became their military seniors; and whether he will remove this grievance by arranging that all Volunteer officers who have been actually on active service shall, on appointment to the Indian Army Reserve of Officers, be given the same rank which they held while on active service?

I have no information regarding the circumstances referred to in the question, but if the hon. Member will furnish me with particulars of any specific cases which have come to his notice, I will make inquiry of the Government of India.

Indian Army (Officers' Service)

asked the Secretary of State for India if he will, for the period of the War, recommend that in the case of officers of the Indian Army the eighteen years' service necessary for promotion to major shall be reduced?

I do not consider that circumstances would justify a general measure of the kind suggested, as it would run counter to the principles of the Indian Army system which I have explained in the House on more than one occasion. The grant of temporary rank to meet the needs of certain classes of cases is now under consideration, and has to some extent already been given effect to.

Will the right hon. Gentleman ensure that some temporary rank will be given to officers of the Indian Army during the course of the War so that they may not be superseded while on active service by officers much junior to them?

Promotion from Ranks

asked the Under-Secretary for War whether, in view of the number of men suitable for commissions who joined the Army as privates in the early stages of the War, he will arrange that if recommended as suitable by their commanding officer they will be given preference over men without military experience who are now applying for commissions?

It is the practice to give preference to suitable condidates who have had recent military experience.

Will my right hon. Friend notify commanding officers at the front that men who have been out there some time may have a preference?

It is the practice, and I do not think it really requires to be notified to the General Officers Commanding. If my hon. Friend has any particular case in mind I will certainly look into it.

Royal Army Medical Corps (Promotion)

asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether the decision to promote to the rank of captain all lieutenants of the Territorial Force, Royal Army Medical Corps, who have given six months' mobilised service, with effect from 1st April last, is being carried out; and when the promotions will be gazetted?

Yes, Sir, the decision: was promulgated by special Army Order of the 5th August and has been acted upon. Promotions are carried out immediately on receipt of individual recommendations. The majority of these have already been put forward and have been duly gazetted.

No-Treating Order

asked the Prime Minister what are the views of the Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) on the subject of extending the provisions of the No treating Order to all parts of the United Kingdom; and whether he intends to introduce legislation to effect this?

I have consulted the Central Control Board, who inform me that, in view of the results attained under the Board's orders, they think it expedient that progress should continue for the present on existing lines. The Board are extending their action to further large and important areas after local inquiry in each case.

Has the Minister of Munitions any official information as to the effect of the No-treating Order in the Metropolitan district?

The convictions for drunkenness in the Metropolitan Police district for the three weeks subsequent to the No-treating Order show a marked diminution compared with the convictions for the four weeks prior to the Order, the weekly averages being 695 and 993 respectively. In addition, the police have reported as follows:—

"There is a Consensus of opinion among the superintendents of all divisions that drunkenness generally, and among women in particular, has decreased.

A marked diminution in the number of women and children standing outside public-houses drinking has been noticed, and in many districts the practice has ceased altogether.

Police have invariably found fewer people on licensed premises, and a tendency to make shorter stays has been observed.

Practically no breaches of the Order have occurred, and licensees and their servants have shown at all times their willingness to assist police."

Has the right hon. Gentleman the separate convictions of men and women, showing the ratio of diminution?

Government Employes (Royal Naval Air Service)

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether it has been ruled by the Treasury that employés of Government Departments who have enlisted in the Royal Naval Air Service, and are at present engaged in home defence, are to be regarded as having placed their whole time at the disposal of the Admiralty; whether they are only in receipt of the balance of Civil pay, i.e., Civil pay less naval pay, from their Department; and whether it is the intention of the Treasury that such men shall be treated in all respects similar to all Government servants who have joined His Majesty's Forces?

Employés of Government Departments enlisting in the Royal Naval Air Service continue to receive their Civil pay less a deduction in respect of their naval pay under conditions similar to those applicable generally to Government servants who enlist in His Majesty's Forces. No ruling has been given by the Treasury on the point raised in the first part of the question, but I understand that a number of Government servants are in fact serving in a section of the Anti-Aircraft Corps which is recruited on a part-time basis.

Co-Operative Societies (Income Tax)

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer (1) if he has received resolutions and memorials from associations of traders advocating the assessment to Income Tax of the profits of co-operative societies; if he is aware that co-operative wholesale societies, which own a fleet of steamers, have secured Government war contracts in competition with private traders and limited companies, and their immunity from Income Tax gives them an unfair advantage over their trade competitors; if, having regard to these facts, he will take steps to make the profits of these societies liable to Income Tax in the same way as other industrial concerns and especially allocations of profits to reserve and capital purposes; and (2) if he is aware that, having regard to the present rate of Income Tax, private traders throughout the country strongly resent as an injustice to them the immunity from taxation enjoyed by trading concerns known as retail, wholesale, and productive co-operative societies; and if he will appoint a special committee to inquire into the working of the Industrial and Provident Societies Act, 1903, with special reference to the desirability of repealing Section 24 of that Act?

In so far as co-operative societies make a profit through their trading operations with non-members, such profit is already assessable to Income Tax in the hands of the recipient. The ordinary transactions of these societies resulting in a return to members of any excess purchase price that may have proved to have been paid by the members is, in fact, a mere discount on purchases and not a profit. In these circumstances I am unable to adopt the hon. Baronet's suggestion.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the profits of these societies during the past year have amounted to no less than £14,000,000 whilst only £1,750,000 has been distributed to the shareholders?

Assuming for the moment that the figures stated by the hon. Baronet are accurate I should have called them not profits but discounts.

Does the right hon. Gentleman think anyone who is a member of a co-operative society escapes payment of the tax?

No, I believe every member of a co-operative society who is above the limit and is assessable is bound to pay.

Does not a company which distributes dividends pay Income Tax, and does that excuse the company from paying?

No; in the case of a company the profits earned are regarded as profits, and Income Tax on them is collected at the source. The only issue between the hon. Baronet and myself is whether the tax should be collected at the source or later.

Will the right hon. Gentleman explain how he derives Income Tax for the £10,500,000 of undistributed profits which are placed to the Reserve Fund?

American Bonds

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the Treasury Committee on new issues lately sanctioned the placing of £500,000 Bonds of the Pullman Car Company purchased by Messrs. Higginson and Company, both being American concerns; and whether, as the result of the transaction, if successful, would be the transfer of British money to America, he will explain why sanction was given, in view of the principle of the Committee's action, namely, that sanction is refused except in cases where the issue is definitely desirable for the successful prosecution of the War?

The Committee have not sanctioned the placing of the above bonds, nor has any application to place such bonds been received by them.

Was this issue advertised in the papers with the statement that it had been passed or had the sanction of the Treasury Committee?

I am not a member of the Committee myself, and I can only give my hon. Friend the information that is communicated to me. I understand that no application of the kind referred to was made.

Finance (No. 3) Bill

Income Tax (Woodlands)

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, in Section 21 of the Finance (No. 3) Bill, the word husbandry includes forestry; and whether owners of woodlands would have the option of having their Income Tax assessment as occupiers levied on their actual profits under Schedule D?

The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative. In accordance with the promise made by my right hon. Friend the Financial Secretary on the 26th October, the question of a satisfactory basis on which the option to be assessed under Schedule D may be extended, so as to include the case of woodlands occupied for commercial purposes, is now under consideration.

Excess Profits Tax (Limited Companies)

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, in the case of a limited liability company which has been liquidated and whose assets have been distributed, it is intended, under Section 40, Sub-section (2), of the Finance (No. 3) Bill, to make the directors personally liable for the Excess Profits Duty on last year's trading; and whether he is advised that the words of the Section would have this effect?

Where a company has bonâ fide been liquidated and its assets have been distributed prior to the introduction of the present Budget, it is not proposed to hold the directors personally liable for any Excess Profits Duty.

Has my right hon. Friend considered whether the words of the Clause as they stand could be interpreted as holding the directors liable?

Questions

Officers (Age Limit)

asked the Prime Minister whether there is any age limit applicable to general officers occupying the highest positions on active service abroad, and, if so, "what is that limit; and whether, in the selection of officers to command divisions in the field, he will consider the desirability, as a definite Government policy, of restricting, as far as possible, all such appointments in the future to officers whose age does not exceed forty years?

There is no hard and fast rule as to the age limit for officers commanding the different formations. It is found in practice that officers differ considerably in their characteristics: some men age much sooner than others. It is therefore not proposed to introduce any hard and fast rule, but to appoint to and retain in command of divisions those officers who, from both physical and mental qualifications, are most suitable for such appointments.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that Sir John French and Sir Ian Hamilton, not to speak of many others, are all senior to himself in years, and does he think that officers of that age have sufficient combined mental and physical energy—

Prolongation of Parliament

asked the Prime Minister whether he was in a position to state that he will shortly introduce a Bill to amend the Parliament Act and provide that the period of the War shall not be calculated as time in the five years' life of the present Parliament?

The Government will shortly introduce a Bill to amend the Parliament Act, so far as the present Parliament is concerned. As to the method by which it is proposed to be done, I must ask my hon. Friend to wait until he sees the Bill.

Enemy Goods

asked the Prime Minister if he will take the opportunity to be afforded by the expected presence in this country of the leaders of several of the Dominions to hold a conference with them to consider the steps to be taken throughout the Empire to meet the flooding of the whole Empire with cheap goods from enemy countries which is expected at the conclusion of the War?

This, and any other question of interest to the Empire, will be discussed when the opportunity is given by the presence in this country of the representatives of the Dominion Governments.

House of Commons (Ministers' and Members' Salaries)

asked the Prime Minister if ho has considered the repeated suggestions that the Government should show its personal interest in making efforts to promote economy by reducing the salaries paid to Ministers and to Members of the House of Commons by 50 or 35 per cent., so as to make it easier for Members to advocate economy by others after they have put it in practice themselves?

I have no doubt that those referred to in the hon. Member's question are doing what in them lies to promote and practice economy in their personal expenditure. Whether the abolition of their sources of income, or a considerable portion of them, would make this task easier I cannot say.

Will the right hon. Gentleman give an opportunity to the House to discuss this question on the Resolution standing in the name of the hon. and learned Member for Cambridge, which has been for a long time on the Paper?

I think it may be discussed possibly on the Vote of Credit; certainly on the Consolidated Fund Bill next week.

Will the right hon. Gentleman consider the advisability of reducing the salaries of Ministers and set an example to the country on the lines of economy he has preached from that bench?

Everybody has got to consider what he conceives to be his duty in this matter.

Will the right hon. Gentleman consider the advisability of pinching the profits of coal owners?

Cabinet War Committee

asked the Prime Minister if he is in a position to announce to the House the names of the Committee of the Cabinet to which it is intended to refer the strategic conduct of the War?

asked the Prime Minister whether he will consider the appointment of a War Council of the Cabinet, consisting of Ministers without portfolios, in order to relieve such Ministers of Departmental work and allow them to concentrate on the prosecution of the War; and whether he will add to that Council any naval and military adviser also untrammelled by Departmental duties?

I do not think that this suggestion would prove otherwise than disadvantageous. It is essential to maintain the closest touch between the War Committee and the Departments which have to carry out their decisions.

Midwives Bill (Scotland)

asked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been called to a memorial in favour of the passing of a Midwives Bill for Scotland as an emergency measure arising out of war conditions; and whether he can see his way to fulfil the wish of the memorialists and the urgent need of Scotland?

I can only refer my hon. Friend to the answer given on 26th October on my behalf by the Minister of Munitions, in which the hope was expressed that this Bill might be proceeded with.

Nitrate of Soda

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Agriculture what quantity of nitrate of soda the Government have bought for shipment between 1st September last and 31st March next for use as a fertiliser; have they specially chartered vessels in the open market to carry it or any part of it from Chile, or do they intend to use steamers chartered or requisitioned by the Admiralty at rates with which merchants cannot compete; and whether the Board of Agriculture contemplates any further trading operations with public funds?

In order to maintain the production of food at home the Government have purchased a certain quantity of nitrate of soda, and they are hoping to make an arrangement with importers which will be announced when it is concluded. Any statement as to the future involves prophecy as to national necessities which I am unwilling to make.

Will the right hon. Gentleman answer that part of the question as to ships being requisitioned? If ships are requisitioned it will make a great difference as to current rates.

I am not willing to make a great difference. The holders of stocks will vary their policy according to their knowledge as to what we are going to do.

Temporary Post Office, Regent's Park

asked the First Commissioner of Works what is the estimated cost of constructing a new temporary Army post office in Regent's Park; and why the more economical course of renting an existing building for this temporary purpose was not adopted?

The estimated cost of the temporary building, including fittings, is £50,000. There was no satisfactory alternative. No existing building in a position at all suitable would have afforded the accommodation that was urgently required.

The question of the Agricultural Hall was considered, and I may add that we considered many other places, including the White City, the Botanic Gardens, even part of the docks; and we were driven to the erection of a temporary building as a last resort. The idea of this structure was fought in the Post Office itself till it became inevitable. The Post Office work in connection with the Army grows continuously with the growth of the Army itself. We must have at least one bag for every unit of the Forces, and that alone represents a large total.

Can the hon. Gentleman say how many acres of Regent's Park the public are to be deprived of?

Temporary Clerks

asked the Secretary to the Treasury whether he is aware that the Civil Service Commissioners, in dealing with appointments of clerks for temporary service in Government Departments owing to the War, have laid it down that their employment is strictly temporary, does not entitle them to a gratuity, and cannot lead to a permanent situation in the Civil service; and whether, in view of the employment of clerks in certain Departments who have not been appointed through the Civil Service Commission, he will state that the terms as mentioned above apply to all clerical appointments made as a result of conditions arising out of the War in other ways than those provided for the regular appointment of permanent officials in ordinary times?

The answer to both parts of the question is in the affirmative.

Lighting Regulations (London)

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will state under what authority he issued a circular to the Metropolitan Police magistrates pointing out that the prevailing condition of darkness ought to affect the mode of dealing with charges under Section 1 of the Motor Car Act, 1903, which may be brought before them by the police?

The circular was issued on my authority. It is one of the ordinary functions of the Home Secretary to assist magistrates with information and advice in matters of this sort.

Is not this question one for the judiciary rather than for the executive?

The judiciary, subject to direction by the Higher Courts, of course lay down what the law is. If my hon. Friend will read the circular he will see that it is not laying down what the law is, but that it is asking to have attention paid to particular parts of the law.

If my right hon. Friend will let me have the circular I will deal with the matter.

Were not the right hon. Gentleman's directions to the magistrates made necessary by the increasing number of fatal accidents?

I rather demur to the hon. Member describing the circular as directions. It is the duty of the Home Secretary, on proper occasions, to call the attention of magistrates to certain provisions of the law. That is all that I have done.

"Ramazan" (Loss of Transport)

asked if it was through the instrumentality of the Press Bureau that the news of the loss of the British transport "Ramazan" was withheld from publication from 19th September until 5th November; and if this suppression of information was directed solely by military reasons?

The reply to the first part of the question is in the negative. As regards the second, the telegraphic reports received were incomplete, and the written report of the senior surviving officer was awaited. This only arrived at the end of last month, and, as soon as practicable after this, the Press Bureau were furnished with the communiqué which they issued.

Emigration of Men of Military Age

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will say whether out of 500 third-class passengers on the Cunard liner "Saxonia," which sailed from Liverpool on 6th November, nearly the whole of this number are men of military age; will he inform the House the respective numbers of English, Scottish, Irish, and Welsh on board this vessel of military age; will he state whether the instructions to the agents of the American liners "St. Paul" and "New York," appointed to sail from Liverpool 13th and 20th November, respectively, are that they can take no further third-class passengers, as the ships are full; and whether, in view of these facts, his Department will stop all men of military age from leaving this country for the next two months?

As the hon. Gentleman will have seen from this morning's newspapers, certain action has already been provisionally taken to deal with the matter to which he refers. I have been in active consultation with the other Departments concerned, and if the hon. Member puts down a question in the course of a day or two, I hope to be able to make a more complete statement of what is being done.

In the meantime, let me say that the figures for emigration from Ireland are much below the average; that so far as there is any unusual movement during the last week or two, it is not confined to any one quarter of the Kingdom, and is, as I happen to know, condemned by leaders of public opinion in Ireland no less than by leaders of public opinion in Great Britain.

On the question of the nationality of these would-be emigrants, might I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether the following statement which appears in a number of the London papers is correct:—

"The passports department of the Foreign Office is daily crowded and all sorts of excuses are being offered by young English slackers to go abroad. The average number of passports issued before the "War was 30 a day. The applications now are nearer 500? "

I am not able to confirm those figures. I have had no opportunity of investigating them, but my information certainly is that the criticism is one which arises not in reference to one portion of the United Kingdom alone, and the remedies that have already been decided on and will be proposed will apply to the whole United Kingdom.

Did not the right hon. Gentleman inform the House a week ago that there was no occasion whatever to take any action?

No, I did not. What I said was that the returns which were available showed, as they did show, that emigration on the whole is not so great at the present time as in previous years.

Can the right hon. Gentleman state whether representations have been made to him by bankers, magistrates and others as to the abnormal numbers of Englishmen of military age applying for certificates of identification for the purpose of applying for passports to neutral countries for real or assumed business reasons, and have any steps been taken to investigate the bona fides of such applications?

I cannot answer my hon. Friend about that without notice. I shall be very glad to look into the matter now that he has raised it.

Can the right hon. Gentleman see his way to acknowledge the patriotic action of the seamen and firemen of the port of Liverpol—[HON. MEMBERS: "Order, order!"]

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that for many years in the West of Ireland where the land is very-poor and the Land Acts have not been applied, a considerable number of young; men go to America, and that that is the explanation of the presence of those emigrants in Liverpool?

No doubt what the hon. Gentleman says is quite true, but the material question is whether this is an unusual movement, and what, if anything, should be done to check it.

Aircraft Raids

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he has any figures to show, as the result of past Zeppelin raids,, whether it seems to be safer for the civil population to remain under shelter or in the streets when a raid is taking place?

Generally speaking it is much safer to remain under shelter, though the degree of security depends on the size and construction of the building. In analysing statistics of casualties, it must be remembered that after dark the majority of the population of London is normally under cover. In spite of this, in the attack on London between 9 and 10 p.m. on 13th October last, out of thirty-three persons killed and twenty-six seriously injured all but five who were struck were in the open.

Belgians of Military Age

asked the number of civilian Belgians in this country of military age; and if special efforts are being made to recruit them for the Belgian Army?

It is not possible to state the number of Belgians in this country belonging to any particular age groups. By a Decree of the 1st March last, all male Belgians between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five were required to enrol themselves and to appear before a Belgian Recruiting Committee for enlistment or exemption. The Belgian authorities have been given every assistance by the Home Office and the police, and also by my Department, and the Registrar-General, in carrying out this Decree with the view of securing that every male Belgian in this country to whom it applies is either exempted, temporarily or permanently, or enlisted. It may be added that, apart from the requirements of the Decree, a large number of Belgians have joined the Belgian Army from this country as volunteers.

Use of Telephones by Germans

asked the Postmaster-General whether the use of telephones by Germans is forbidden; and, if so, why in the last published directory in August of this year telephone numbers are still assigned to the German Benevolent Society, the German Church, the German Gymnastic Society, the German Industrial and Farm Colony, the German Sailors' Home, and the German Y.M.C.A.?

The police are the authority under the Aliens' Restriction Act to determine whether telephones should be removed from the premises of particular alien enemies. The Department is in close touch with the police, and has removed telephones from all premises with respect to which representations have been made by them. No such representations have been received with respect to the institutions mentioned by the hon. Member. My right hon. Friend would add that the German Sailors' Home has-been taken over by the British and Foreign Sailors' Society, and that the German Industrial and Farm Colony is now an Internment Camp under the control of a commandant appointed by the War Office.

Newspaper Foreign Post

asked the Postmaster-General, whether he is aware that during the last twelve months a copy of the "Athletic News" has been sent from Edinburgh to Denmark weekly, but that only two copies have been delivered; that it has cost the sender 3d. weekly; whether he can say where the other copies are; and if he will refund the sender the cost of the paper and postage?

My right hon. Friend is not aware of the case to which the hon. Member refers, but he will be happy to make inquiry if he is furnished with the necessary particulars.

War Loan Stock

asked the Postmaster-General if his attention has been drawn to the circulars being sent through the Post Office to registered holders of War Loan Stock inviting them to join a lottery, promoted by a man named William Poole, of the War Loan Club, Geneva, under which they may perhaps obtain further sums of War Loan Stock; and if he proposes to take any and, if any, what steps to deal with the matter?

The Postmaster-General has referred this question to me. Consideration is being given to this matter, but I am not yet able to answer the last part of the question.

Will the right hon. Gentleman get information from the Foreign Office as to the status of the club?

Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (Letters)

asked the Postmaster-General whether he is aware that a letter from Gallipoli to the hon. Member for South-West Manchester, addressed to the House of Commons, marked by the sender Free from Censor, stamped Field Post Office, 13th September, and Base Army Post Office, 14th September, apparently arrived at the House of Commons on 6th November; whether the length of time, fifty-four days, is the normal time required for letters from Gallipoli to hon. Members of this House; if not, what is the explanation of the delay in delivering the letter in question; and whether he can give the assurance that in future there will be no avoidable delay with correspondence from the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force to hon. Members of this House and to relatives of soldiers?

My right hon. Friend will make inquiry as to the delay in transmission of the letter to which the hon. Member refers. Correspondence from the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force for this country is dispatched by such means as are available, and the time occupied in transmission varies considerably; the time in the case mentioned in the question must have been due to exceptional circumstances. The hon. Member may rest assured that there is no avoidable delay on the part of the post office, whether the letters are addressed to Members of Parliament or others.

Has anything been done in consequence of the sending of a special inspector by the Postmaster-General to the Dardanelles?

Our representative has returned to this country, and the Postmaster-General referred to that in answer to two questions last week. The time for transmission from Mudros is fixed at fifteen days, and perhaps that is not realised by all Members of this House.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that parcels have been on the way five and six weeks, and have not arrived at all?

A statement has been made with regard to the matter, and a further statement will probably be made shortly.

Increased House Rents

asked the Secretary for Scotland whether he will take steps, whilst waiting for the report of his Court of Inquiry, to prevent any persons in Scotland from being evicted for refusing to pay increased rent?

The report is now in type. I have no power to do as my hon. Friend suggests.

Munitions Limitations of Profits Rules

asked the Minister of Munitions whether he has received any representations to the effect that the Munitions Limitations of Profits Rules, 1915, have been drawn in such a way as unduly to favour the interests of controlled owners and to render illusory the provisions of the Munitions Act limiting profits?

I have received no representations on the subject, but I have seen certain references in the Press, all founded on a complete and sometimes an absurd misinterpretation of the Act and the Rules made under it. There is no foundation whatever for the suggestion that these Rules place the owners of controlled establishments in any better position than that intended by Parliament and expressed in the Act under which the Rules are made. The Rules provide for the necessary machinery and procedure by which certain matters which the Act says are to be considered shall be considered, but they do not in any way extend the matters for which the owners may claim consideration. I may add that the Rules were approved before issue by the National Labour Advisory Committee.

Is my right hon. Friend not aware that under these Rules regarding excess profits the owners of controlled establishments are in a better position than those charged the Excess Tax under the Budget?

My hon. Friend is wrong there. It depends entirely on the profits which they make. The Budget would only take half, whereas if the profit were 100 per cent. the whole, after a very small percentage, would be taken by the State.

Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that the owners are very much relieved to know that they will get rid of the Excess Profits Tax from the period of their establishments becoming controlled?

My hon. Friend is wrong there. They do not get rid of it. On the contrary, where the profits are small, the Chancellor of the Exchequer will get a very good slice of them; and where the profits are very considerable the Government, between the Munitions Act and the Budget, will get most of them.

Temporary Judges (India)

asked the Secretary of State for India whether the power conferred by the Statute 1 and 2 Geo. V., c. 18, upon the Governor-General in Council to appoint from time to time persons to act as additional judges in any High Court for such period not exceeding two years as may be required has been exercised in the Calcutta and Madras High Courts; how many temporary judges have been appointed and for what periods in each Court; whether the appointment of temporary judges has been successful in getting rid of the congestion of business; and whether the Government intends to continue the present system or to adopt some other method of overtaking arrears?

There have been four temporary additional judges in the Calcutta High Court since March, 1912. In the Madras High Court there were two from 1912 to 1914, since which date there have been four. It does not appear that these temporary appointments have materially reduced the congestion of work, but they have prevented its increase. The establishment of a new High Court at Patna will relieve the Calcutta Court, while at Madras the judges hope that by the end of this year the arrears will be much diminished. I am aware of the disadvantage of making temporary appointments, but an increase of the permanent strength of the benches is not a suitable remedy for a temporary congestion of work.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that these temporary appointments have become in practice practically permanent, but yet have not succeeded in producing any reduction of the arrears?

National Insurance Act

Tuberculosis Cases (Renfrew)

asked the Comptroller of the Household, as representing the National Health Insurance Commissioners, whether his attention has been drawn to the statement made to the recent conference of the Scottish Association of Insurance Committees by Mr. Johnstone, of the-Renfrew committee, to the effect that by reason of gross abuse the public is not getting value for certain of the money contributed under the Act and, in particular, that the average cost of treating each tuberculosis case in Renfrew district amounts to £100; whether the Scottish Commissioners have for some time advocated the introduction of a system of figure control which would lead to the earlier detection and elimination of excessive expenditure of this kind; and whether the Renfrew authorities have been advised to curtail such outlay?

The answer to. the first part of the question is in the affirmative, though I must not be understood as acquiescing in the inferences contained in the statement quoted. I understand that the suggestions made by the Scottish Insurance Commissioners, which are referred to in the remainder of the question, dealt not with the remuneration of medical practitioners in respect of their liability to provide domiciliary treatment for tuberculous insured persons, but with the supply of drugs and medicines; and of additional nourishment suitable to their case to persons in receipt of such treatment.

Sanatorium Benefits

asked the Comptroller of the Household, as representing the National Health Insurance Commissioners, if his sanction was given to the Leicester Insurance Committee in defending legal proceedings brought by a panel doctor in resisting a surcharge on account of the drug fund; whether the Commissioners have stated to the London Insurance Committee that there is no legal claim on the part of any insured person for sanatorium benefit; if he is aware that legal proceedings are threatened against the London Committee arising out of such claims; and if he has taken the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown upon these questions?

As regards the first part of the question, I would refer the hon. Member to Section 30 of the National Insurance Act, 1913, from which he will observe that an insurance committee is a body corporate which may sue and be sued. In reply to the second part, reference was made at a conference between the Commissioners and the London Insurance Committee to the provisions of Section 16 (3) of the National Insurance Act, 1911, which enacts that an insured person shall not be entitled to sanatorium benefit unless the insurance committee recommends the case for such benefit. The reply to the third part of the question is in the negative, nor am I aware that any doubt has been suggested as to the interpretation of the Sub-section referred to above.

Can the hon. Gentleman say whether any communication took place between his Department and the Leicester Insurance Committee before legal proceedings were taken?

An insurance committee may be sued or may sue without reference to the Insurance Commission.

Did negotiations take place between this body and the hon. Gentleman's Department?

Female Members

asked the Secretary to the Treasury if the sum of £500,000 which previously appeared in the Estimates to aid the funds allocated to the benefit of insured women has been used in the War; and whether the Treasury are considering the provision of a rapidly increasing amount to sustain the approved societies containing female members whose scale of contribution has been proved inadequate to meet the scheduled benefits promised at entry?

No, Sir. A scheme for the distribution of the grant referred to in the first part of the question, for the purposes for which it was voted, is in course of preparation by the Joint Committee. As regards the second part, I have nothing to add to the reply which I gave to a similar question by the hon. Member yesterday.

Questions

Parliamentary Police

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, why the cost of the police at the House of Commons is now increased by two men to give other police men their holidays without such additional expense; if he can state what Department the extra cost will be charged to; (2) whether he is aware that changes have recently been made in the duties and pay of the police employed in and about the Houses of Parliament; if so, what is the nature of and the reason for those changes, and by what authority they have been made; whether, both in the interest of Members of Parliament and in justice to the men whose discharge of their duties has given satisfaction to the House, he will have those changes promptly investigated with a view to their being cancelled; and (3) why it is necessary to increase the staff of police by two extra men when at the same time the House of Commons is only sitting three days per week; and whether he can see his way to revert to the old system?

On previous occasions, namely, the 12th, 19th, 21st, and 26th October, and the 4th November, I have given all possible information upon the points which are again referred to in my hon. Friend's question, and there is nothing which I could say now without repetition.

Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that before the House of Commons sat only three days a week the policemen guarding this House were receiving 7s. a week extra, and since then they have been cut down by 4s. a week, and does he not think that a mean economy?

I do not know that I would accept what my hon. Friend says, but I think that the matter to which he refers is dealt with in the answer to another question which has not yet been answered.

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is aware that the permanent staff of police at the House of Commons who do duty at the principal posts of the building have to take their leave on days when the House is sitting and that the Sessional men and the service staff take their leave on days when the House is not sitting; and can he state why this difference is made?

On each of the three days when the House is sitting two members of the permanent police staff take their weekly leave; the remaining seventeen members get their leave on days when the House is not sitting. The existing permanent staff get their 7s. weekly allowance irrespective of the days when they take their leave. The Sessional staff can only draw the 1s. daily allowance when the House is sitting; so if compelled to take their leave at such a time they would lose the allowance for that day. The protection staff (which my hon. Friend apparently intends to refer to by the term "service staff") are under the same conditions as the Sessional staff.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in consequence of this House sitting only three days a week the amount paid to the policemen guarding this House is reduced by 4s. a week?

My hon. Friend will see that the number of days on which the House sits is a matter which has to be decided by the House in view of public considerations, and that the House can hardly sit four days a week for the reason which he is advancing.

Does the right hon. Gentleman think that the policemen should be cut down by a shilling a day in consequence?

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he is aware that when a sergeant of the police of the House of Commons is on leave on a week-day the inspector patrols the buildings in his stead; and, seeing that the sergeants have to do 12 hours' duty on Sundays, namely, 6 a.m. to 6 p.m., which is four hours longer duty than is done on any other of the buildings, and that the inspector does the sergeant's duty on week-days, will he relieve the sergeant on Sundays so that his duty will not exceed eight hours?

The sergeants attached to the Palace of Westminster police take their weekly leave on two Sundays and two week-days in the month. The week-day leave is taken when the House is not sitting, and as there are two inspectors on duty to patrol the buildings, it is not necessary to replace the sergeant on leave. On two Sundays each sergeant does twelve hours' duty according to long-standing practice, and for the extra four hours' duty thus performed "time off" is given.

Forestry Lectures (Scotland)

asked the Secretary for Scotland if he will state what is the number of students who attended the forestry lectures at the University of Edinburgh during each of the past five years; and how many have graduated in this subject in each year?

As regards the first part of the question, I am informed that the figures are as follows: For 1910–11, 45; for 1911–12, 55; for 1912–13, 77; for 1913–14, 95; and for 1914–15, 33. As regards the second part of the question, I understand that the figures for these years are 2, 5, 2, 10, and 5 respectively.

Orders of the Day

Bill Presented

Patents and Designs Act (Partial Suspension) Bill

"To suspend the operation of section twenty-seven of the Patents and Designs Act, 1907, during the continuance of the present war and for a period of six months thereafter." Presented by Mr. PRETYMAN; to be read a second time To-morrow, and to be printed. [Bill 155.]

Supplementary Vote of Credit

Prime Minister's Statement

I regret, Sir, to find, what I was unaware of when I came down to the House, that, owing to some technical mishap—the failure to lodge this Vote in due time—it is not possible, in accordance with our rules of procedure, that the Vote can be put from the Chair to-night. I should be sorry, if from a technical mistake of that kind, the House should waste its day, and not have an opportunity for the discussion which has been promised. Therefore, though I am unable to move the Vote, I will make my statement, and put myself in order, and give the House full opportunity for discussion at the conclusion of what I have to say by moving the Adjournment.

I do not know why that question is put. I think the hon. Member should do me the courtesy of waiting to hear what I was going to say as to what course the Government propose to take. We shall take the Vote itself to-morrow (Thursday), and, if time permit, after the discussion to-morrow we shall take the Second Reading of the Indian Civil Service (Temporary Provisions) Bill. We shall then ask the House to sit on Monday, and on that day we shall take the Report stage of the Vote of Credit, which, I hope, may be taken, after the two days of discussion, as a formal stage, and we shall continue on Monday the Committee stage of the Finance Bill.

This is the fifth Vote of Credit in the present financial year, and if the Vote, which is for £400,000,000, be approved, it will raise the total of the Votes of Credit granted in 1915–16—that is the current financial year—to £1,300,000,000, and to a total since the outbreak of the War of £1,662,000,000. It will be convenient if I give the particulars. I will take first the financial year 1914–15, during which we asked Parliament for three Votes of Credit—one in August, at the commencement of the War, for £100,000,000; another in November, for £225,000,000; and a third on the 1st of March, for £37,000,000, making in all a total of £362,000,000 for that financial year. The figures for the present financial year are as follows: In March we got a Vote of Credit for £250,000,000; on the 16th of June another Vote for £250,000,000; on the 20th of July a Vote for £150,000,000, and on the 15th of September a Vote for £250,000,000, making a total at the time the last Vote of Credit in September was granted for the current financial year of £900,000,000. If we add to that the Vote which we are about to ask the House to sanction, that is, an addition of £400,000,000, it will bring the expenditure chargeable to Votes of Credit for the present financial year to a total of £1,300,000,000. The House will see that in that way the figure of £1,662,000,000, which I gave a few sentences ago, has been reached.

In proposing the last Vote of Credit on the 15th of September, I stated that, in order to explain to the House the exact position in which we stood, it was necessary to give two sets of figures. There were, first, the figures which show the gross issues of Votes of Credit, and which represent the total payments of all kinds issued from the Votes. But I pointed out that, in order to arrive at the actual expenditure to be chargeable to the period with which I was dealing, it was necessary to make certain allowances for unspent balances, in the hands of Navy and Army accounting officers, and, further, for certain other items which represent advances made for the purpose of financing particular operations, those advances having been made to provide funds for expenditure that will come into charge at a date subsequent to the period which was then actually under review. I pointed out further, and in illustration of the difference between those two sets of figures, that the gross issues from the 1st of April, the commencement of the financial year, to the 11th of September—that is to say, to the Saturday preceding the date on which I made my statement—amounted to £550,300,000. In this figure were included unspent balances and other special advances of the kind to which I have just adverted, amounting to £50,800,000. So that the net or true expenditure up to Saturday, the 11th September, came to £499,500,000, or, roughly speaking, £500,000,000.

4.0 P.M.

I think, as I have suggested, it would be less misleading henceforth to distinguish these two sets of figures—on the one hand the total issues from the Votes of Credit, and, on the other hand, the true or adjusted expenditure. The reason is, as the House will see, that while the aggregate issues from the Votes must exceed the true expenditure necessarily under these conditions, it may happen that when we compare one period of the year with another, particularly if the periods be comparatively short, the true expenditure in one period may be actually larger than the total issues made from the Votes in that period, owing to the variation in the amount of the balances in hand in the period concerned. That has actually been the case, as I will show in a moment, in the period from the 12th September to the present date. I think it desirable to give that explanation to the House, because the figures cannot properly be appreciated or understood unless these considerations are carefully borne in mind.

Dealing with the period covered by the last Vote of Credit, submitted to the House in September, I was careful to say that I would not commit myself to any- thing in the nature of even an approximate estimate; but I felt justified in assuming that the balance in hand at the date of my statement, about the middle of September, would provide for the public services to the end of that month, and that thereafter—that is to say, from the 1st October onwards—taking everything into account, the average weekly expenditure out of the Vote of Credit would not exceed £.35,000,000 gross, or, taking the week of seven days, a daily average of £5,000,000. On that basis I anticipated that the Vote of Credit proposed on 15th September would carry the Government on to the third week of this month of November. That was my rough approximate forecast. The House will be interested to hear how that forecast compares with the actual result.

The Vote passed on the 15th September, as I have said already, raised the total of the Votes of Credit granted in the present financial year to £900,000,000. The total sum which has been issued out of the Votes of Credit between the 1st April—that is the commencement of the financial year—and the 6th November—that is, Saturday last—has amounted to £789,500,000. The House will therefore see that, substracting one figure from the other, the Treasury has still in hand, out of the sums granted from successive Votes of Credit by this House, £113,500,000. That sum, together with the unspent balances of sums which have been issued from the Votes, and which are now in the hands of the Army and Navy accounting officers, added to the portion of the special advances which will shortly be repaid, will be sufficient, as we estimate, to carry us on to the end of the present month of November. The House will therefore see that the last Vote of Credit, which I moved and which the House granted in September last, has provided for our necessities somewhat longer than was anticipated at the time when I moved it.

Let me ask the House to turn to the adjusted sum which represents the true expenditure chargeable to the period in question. As I have said, the total issues from the Votes of Credit between the 1st April and the 6th November were £786,500,000. Deduct from this amount, to get the adjusted expenditure, the unspent balances in the hands of the accounting officers and the special advances which will not come into charge until after the period. These items amount to £43,400,000. Deduct the £43,400,000 from the total issues of £786,500,000, and you arrive at the true net or adjusted expenditure for the whole period from the 1st April to the 6th November of £743,100,000. That, the House may take it, is the adjusted sum chargeable to the Votes of Credit. I ought to say in passing that the unspent balances now carried forward are less by £7,400,000 than they were on the 15th September, with the result that the true expenditure for the period from the 15th September to the present date exceeds the total issues, as we are carrying forward a less sum now than we carried forward then.

I now come to the distribution of that total adjusted expenditure of £743,100,000 as between the various periods of the year. We have had, as I have pointed out, three Votes of Credit. The first extended from the 1st April to the 17th July—a period of 108 days—and the expenditure in those 108 days was £301,000,000. The second Vote of Credit covered the time between the 18th July and the 11th September—a period of fifty-six days. The total expenditure for those fifty-six days was £198,500,000. The third Vote of Credit extended from the 12th September to the time at which I am now addressing the House. I have to take the figures up to the end of last week, that is, the 6th November. The total expenditure for that time, which was again fifty-six days, was £243,600,000. Perhaps I had better recapitulate. The first 108 days—I will now use round figures—£301,000,000; the next fifty-six days, £198,500,000, or nearly £200,000,000; and the fifty-six days which followed, £243,600,000. In order to make that clearer, let me see how it works out in daily averages. It works out in this way: For the first term of 108 days, from the 1st April to the end of June, it was £2,700,000 a day; from the 1st July to the 17th July, it was at the rate of £3,000,000 a day; from the 18th July to the 7th September, it was slightly over £3,500,000 a day; and from the 12th September to the end of last week, the 6th November, it was approximately £4,350,000 a day—a very remarkable and progressive increase, as the House will see, in the daily cost.

The House will naturally wish to know the chief heads under which this gigantic and growing expenditure has been incurred. I will give them. Take first the 108 days from the 1st April to the 17th July. During that time the expenditure upon the Army, the Navy, and munitions was £241,700,000; loans of various kinds to Allied Powers and to our own Domininions, £44,000,000; food supplies and other miscellaneous charges, £15,300,000. In that way the aggregate of £301,000,000 was made up. In the second period of fifty-six days, from the 18th July to the 11th September: Army, Navy, and munitions, £130,000,000; repayments to the Bank of England—I will speak of those presently—£50,000,000; loans, £13,900,000; food supplies and other miscellaneous charges, £4,600,000; making the aggregate of £198,500,000. In the third period, again fifty-six days, from the 12th September to the 6th November last: Army, Navy, and munitions, £145,600,000; Bank of England, £54,000,000; loans, £40,400,000; food supplies and other miscellaneous charges, £3,600,000; making the aggregate of £243,600,000. I complete that statement by giving a summary of the whole period from the 1st April to the 6th November, 220 days. These are figures which the House will probably like to bear in mind. Army, Navy, and munitions, £517,300,000; Bank of England, £104,000,000; loans, £98,300,000; food supplies and miscellaneous charges, £23,500,000.

Can the right hon. Gentleman give the separate figures for the Army and Navy?

It will be more convenient for my statement if I lump together the total. As regards these other items, the food supplies item must not be regarded as irrecoverable expenditure, whereas the expenditure on the Army, Navy, and munitions must be so regarded. That makes a total of £743,100,000. As will be seen and realised from the figures I have given—and as I anticipated, and told the House I anticipated, when I made my last statement—the upward tendency of expenditure has continued. I need hardly say that the main causes of expansion are, first, advances made to Foreign Powers and to our own Dominions, which have continued to grow; next the expenditure on munitions, which also has increased. The other items of Army and Navy expenditure have remained fairly constant. I cannot hold out any hope that under these two heads—advances to other countries and munitions—there is likely to be any fall in the period to which we are now coming. On the contrary, I think both are likely to increase.

I do not know whether it is necessary, in passing, again to point out to the House, as I have done on previous occasions, that the Votes of Credit for the present financial year, unlike those which we took in the year 1914–15, include the normal peace expenditure on the Army and Navy. When you are finding out the cost of the War you have to deduct that. The normal peace expenditure of the Army and Navy, taken upon the basis of the Estimate we last voted before the outbreak of the War, is £220,000 per day. It follows that the average rate of expenditure for the last period we are now passing under review, from 12th September to 6th November, has been approximately £4,350,000, if the normal peace expenditure on the Army and Navy is excluded—as it ought to be when you are estimating the cost of the War. The War expenditure made from the Vote of Credit for the period was about £4,130,000 per day. That is the total War expenditure.

The House would perhaps like to have separately, apart from the other items, the total expenditure on the Army and Navy. In the Army and Navy, for this purpose, I include munitions. In these fifty-six days it has amounted to £145,600,000, or an average of about £2,600,000 per day. If you deduct, as for this purpose you ought to do, as I have said, £220,000, the expenditure on a peace footing, you arrive at the figure of £2,380,000, which may be called the additional expenditure taken per day of the Army and Navy services owing to the War. There is another item in the figures I have given to the House which needs a moment's explanation and comment. That is repayments to the Bank of England. They amount from 18th July to 6th November to £104,000,000. By these payments we have discharged all the liabilities of the Government to the Bank incurred before 18th August last, whether on account of pre-moratorium bills or of advances to Foreign Powers. Since that date the Bank of England has, at the request of the Government, made certain further advances to Foreign Powers which have not yet been repaid, but which will, in due course, be discharged out of the Votes of Credit.

Another item which must have struck the House is the item of loans to Allied Powers and to our own Dominions. Loans to Allied Powers since the beginning of the financial year amount to £58,900,000, or in round figures £59,000,000, and to our Dominions £39,400,000. I will compare the two periods under this head—18th July to 11th September, and 12th September to 6th November. I am now speaking of the total advances made to Foreign Powers and to the Dominions, whether out of Votes of Credit or out of funds provided in the first instance by the Bank of England. In the first period, the approximate total was £58,735,000, or, roughly speaking, £1,050,000 per day. In the second period, 12th September to 6th November, the approximate total was £71,959,000, or an average of £1,285,000. I hope I have made it clear to the House that these figures take into account not only the loans made directly out of Votes of Credit, but also the advances made in the first instance by the Bank of England.

Can the right hon. Gentleman state the total amount of these loans from the beginning?

Oh, yes, that was my right hon. Friend's estimate, given in his Budget statement, but these are not comparable figures to what I am giving. I need say nothing in regard to the item of food supplies. These are gigantic and startling figures. I now turn to the Vote which is, though not technically before the House, the subject of discussion. It amounts to £400,000,000. The last Vote which I moved in September was prepared on the assumption that the weekly average and total issues, taking everything into account, would not exceed £35,000,000 per week, or £5,000,000 per day. The figures which I have given will show that during the past week the expenditure has been well within that limit. As I have already stated, the expenditure in respect of advances to Foreign Powers is expected to increase, and so also, I am certain, for perfectly legitimate reasons, will the expenditure on munitions. Notwithstanding this, and although it becomes increasingly difficult to forecast the rate of expenditure as the total involved expands, we see no reason at present to suppose that during the next two and a half months the total issues from the Vote of Credit which we are now asking will exceed the figure upon which my last estimate was based, namely, £5,000,000 per day. I will not call it a liberal, but I think it is a safe estimate of the outside figure the expenditure is likely to reach.

We now propose to the House a sum at the rate of £5,000,000 per day, which, as far as we can judge, will be sufficient to carry on the public services until about the middle of February of next year. Let me say here that I myself would have been quite prepared to propose a smaller Vote to the House than the one I am actually submitting—which exceeds very considerably any of the Votes of Credit to which the House of Commons has already assented—provided, of course, that we proceed upon the calculated basis of an expenditure of £5,000,000 per day. It is really, I think, a matter of Parliamentary convenience whether we should take a Vote now, as the Government are proposing, of £400,000,000, which would carry us on, upon that basis, to the middle of February, or whether we should take a Vote of £50,000,000 or £100,000,000 less, to carry us on to some date in January. Having regard, however, to Parliamentary exigencies and Parliamentary convenience—there being no question of principle involved in the distinction between the two courses—I am disposed to recommend to the House—though I rather tremble at the figure I am asking—to provide the Government, by means of the Vote of Credit, with the sum which upon our estimate will suffice to carry us on until the middle of February.

Before I bring my statement to a close—and I am purposely to-day at this stage of the discussion confining myself in a very large degree to financial and indeed statistical matters—I wish to say one word upon these gigantic and unprecedented figures from the point of view of public economy, and of our national capacity to sustain the burden which we have willingly undertaken, and which we are all resolved to the very last to bear. This is a subject which, though perhaps it will hardly be believed, without any external stimulus or any suggestion from our numerous advisers outside, has engaged the closest attention of the Government for weeks and for months past: and we have had sitting a Committee of the Cabinet for a considerable time now to review, to take into account the whole of these commitments to discover if they can see possibilities not inconsistent with the maintenance of the efficiency of our services and due prosecution of the War, for saving expenditure, and to suggest expedients and remedies, if such can be found, in that direction.

The Committee was presided over by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and it includes—it has by no means completed its labour—seven Cabinet Ministers and the Financial Secretary to the Treasury. The House may be quite assured, and I give them the assurance, that this Committee in the course of its investigations has considered, and is considering, the possibility of economy in every branch of our expenditure, particularly the expenditure upon the Army and the Navy. They have already made recommendations in that direction, and there are two or three points particularly connected with the Army I should like to indicate to the House. It has been suggested, as the result of the investigations of this Committee, that money might be saved in regard to the Army by a closer examination of contract prices, by revising the scale of Army rations, and by sending back to civil employment men found unfit for active service, either permanently or for long periods. Action has already been taken, and is being taken in all these directions.

As regards contract prices, although I do not say for a moment that more might not and will not be done, arrangements have been made with the Allied Governments to avoid competing against one another, which is almost inevitable in a War like this, in the home and foreign markets, so as to keep down prices. The War Office has also arranged for sending a contracts officer to France, to examine closely the position as regards prices paid for the Army purchases there. In regard to other matters, I will not go into details, especially as regards particular trades, as it would be invidious to suggest, and I do not want to suggest, that persons engaged in a particular trade were taking advantage of the necessities of this country to exact undue profit from the Government. But with regard to particular trades, which I will not specify, action has been taken where there was reasonable ground to suspect or believe that excessive profits were being earned, and effective steps have been taken to reduce prices to a reasonable level. That is a beginning, but it is a beginning which has made very considerable progress, and I am quite satisfied myself there is still a great deal to be done in the reduction of charges and in the direction of curtailable items or categories of expenditure in the supply of the necessities of our Army.

The second point as to which I indicated the Committee thought there was the possibility of economy, namely, the scale of rations, my right hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the War Office gave, I think, a reassuring answer yesterday. The matter has been left for the moment—with strong injunctions that due action should be taken—to the General Officers Commanding in the various districts; but I am disposed to think we shall have to go further than that, because I myself, and I believe all of us who are concerned in the War Office administration, temporarily or otherwise, are convinced that something in the nature of uniformity of practice ought to be established, and, if it is established and enforced as it ought to be, very large savings might be made under a heading of expenditure which at present, I am afraid, is in many respects wasteful and avoidable.

Then with regard to the third point—the return to civil employment of men unfit for duty—on the 1st October last orders were issued to ensure that men who were still unfit for duty six months after leaving hospital should be specially examined with a view to discharge, if recovery then appeared doubtful or distant. There again, I think, we can go further. I am coming to the conclusion that there are considerable numbers of men who have returned from active service, for the time being unfit, who yet might be made available for various civil occupations and employments, if they were, of course, always subject to the condition that the State would have a lien upon them if their furlough, so to speak, came to an end the moment they were required to rejoin the active forces. If that principle were adopted and carried out, we should, on the one hand, save a considerable wages bill for the Army, and, on the other, we should supply employments now more or less depleted of labour, at all events, with temporary assistance to carry on services which are very beneficial, and indeed necessary in the interests of the nation. I have indicated those points in order to show the House that in a matter which has engaged for a long time past the serious consideration of the Government steps are being taken, and I hope will be taken on a still larger scale and with still more effective results, to bring about necessary and possible economy in our expenditure, without any prejudice to our active prosecution of the War.

There is one other point, and one only, on which I should like to say a word before I conclude, and it has only, as the House may think, indirect relation to this Vote of Credit. I mention it, and I make it from a purely War Office point of view. We have for a considerable time past come to the conclusion, and acted upon it, that one of the most important steps which could be taken for a more effective and co-ordinated prosecution of the War on the part of the Allied Powers was the strengthening of our own General Staff, and more inter-communication, not sporadically or incidentally, but normally and habitually, between the military and naval advisers of all the different Allied Powers. I myself have for months past attached great importance—and my view of the subject is very much strengthened by what I have seen on two visits to the Army at the Front—to interchanging between the staff of the War Office here and the Army in the Field those officers here who have not seen anything much of the actual conduct of the War and those there who have been intimately associated with trench fighting—with all the strange and novel operations which this War has made part—an unsuspected part—of military science and practice.

We have at the head of the General Staff now a very distinguished general, Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Murray, who was Chief of the Staff on Sir John French's staff in all the early months of the War. He, since his appointment to his present post, has taken active steps to reinforce and strengthen his associates. He is about to appoint a distinguished officer, General Kiggell, to be assistant to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and General Shaw, who has had great experience of the War, both in France and in the Dardanelles, to undertake the post now filled by General Kiggell as Director of Home Defence. I have satisfied myself that the General Staff now at the War Office is far more numerous than people think in those very able and distinguished officers, and I may point out, with reference to the consideration to which I alluded a moment ago, that of the officers serving on or attached to the General Staff at the War Office there are at the present moment no fewer than twenty-six who have had actual experience of the present War, ten of them officers who have been wounded in actual operations. There are twenty-six officers at the War Office here in Whitehall who know intimately the whole atmosphere under which operations are being carried on.

That interchange between officers and staffs has not only our hearty sympathy, but it will be carried on from time to time, as circumstances permit, with the one aim and object that we shall get the very best military information and military brains that we can command to direct our share in the struggle. Then as regards our relations between our Staff and those of the Allied Powers. Of course it would be a great mistake to suppose that during all these months of war we have been living in water-tight compartments, without communication one with the other. Nothing of the kind has happened. We had our military attaché at the headquarters of General Joffre. We have a distinguished French military attaché in daily communication with the War Office here, and we have had officers of liaison all over the Kingdom. During the course of the last few months both our French Allies and ourselves have felt a growing desire for more intimate co-operation and interchange of views, and a development, in common and in concert, of the plans for our various military operations in all the different theatres of war I am glad to say that we have now reached a stage when we shall have from France at the War Office here, in daily communication with our General Staff, a very distinguished French Staff officer, and we ourselves shall, at the invitation of our Ally, send to France officers of our own entrusted with a like mission and for a like purpose.

It is possible, and indeed more than possible, that this organisation may be still further developed. I know, and I am betraying no secret when I say that the distinguished man who now holds the post of Prime Minister in France, Monsieur Briand, is anxious—and I am as anxious as he is—that we should develop the system of informal and occasional conferences, which have taken place with a great deal of advantage during the last few months, into something more definite and better organised. Neither is he nor am I without hope that before long we may have something in the nature of a common War Council, on which shall sit Ministers of the Crown here and Ministers of the Republic there, and which from time to time will, with the expert advice of their united General Staffs, control and direct our conjoint military and naval operations. Although it is not directly relevant to the Vote, I thought that I ought to state these facts, both here in our country and in France, and among all the Allied Powers. I do not place any limit to the extent to which this co-operation should be carried, and we shall be only too delighted if Russia and Italy will join with us for all the purposes I have indicated. By a broad-based, well conceived, and sympathetically worked system of that kind we are very confident that the operations of the War will be even more efficiently conducted and co-ordinated in the future than in the past.

I apologise to the House for the length at which I have detained them. I have reviewed so lately the general diplomatic and strategic situation that I do not propose again to travel over the ground I then covered. I am certain I am speaking not only in the name of the House of Commons, but of the whole country when I say that, subject to proper safeguards against waste, there is not a penny which any of us would grudge—drawn as it is to a large extent from the pockets of the taxpayers—if it can be shown to be needed for the successful prosecution of the struggle in which all our hearts are unitedly engaged, and as to which I say again to-day, as I have said before, I entertain no doubt whatsoever that the combined spirit and resources of the Allied Powers will bring it to a triumphant issue.

I beg to move, "That this House do now Adjourn."

I feel sure that everyone in the House agrees with every word the Prime Minister has spoken in his last few sentences. There is not the slightest difference of opinion in this House, I am sure, in granting this Vote of Credit, and nothing that I shall say, even though I may have to appear to criticise in some directions, will denote the slightest reluctance on my part to vote this Vote, or any number of other Votes that may be necessary to bring this War to a successful issue. Those sentiments are shared not only by hon. Members of this House, but they are widely shared throughout the country. We, in this House, have a duty which goes rather beyond the expression of sympathy. In the House of Commons we have specially to consider the raising and spending of money, and do what we can towards directing the financial policy of the Kingdom. The Prime Minister made a very important announcement with regard to the creation of a General Staff. I do not propose to follow him, or to attempt to criticise his statement in that respect, but I wish he had added something else. I wish he had announced the creation of a General Staff for financial purposes. Just as a General Staff is important for the purpose of carrying on the War, and causing all the elements in the War to cooperate for the purpose of winning it, so for the purpose of co-operation in finance a General Financial Staff seems to me to be required now.

I propose, if I get the opportunity, to consider rather more closely what such a General Staff ought to be. At the present time we have the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Treasury, and the Governor of the Bank of England. These separate elements no doubt work together, but, after all, the Governor of the Bank of England is only one man not hitherto specially experienced in banking, and therefore I suggest that it would be wise to establish a Financial General Staff, consisting of a small Commission, to help the Governor of the Bank of England in the extraordinary, difficult, and onerous duties which fall upon him. The Prime Minister also referred to a Cabinet Committee which had been considering what appeared to me to be somewhat small items of economy, if we are to consider the whole of the expenditure of the War. He said that they had considered three points. However well they succeeded in their consideration, the savings on those three items must be relatively unimportant, when we consider the large sums now being spent. The Prime Minister explained in detail the Vote of Credit which he placed before the House, but it does not quite present to the House the picture of the actual expenditure to which we are committed nearly as well as the figures which are ordinarily presented on Budget day. I only remind the House of those figures because they were presented quite recently, when the estimated expenditure for this year was given as £1,590,000,000. The details which the Prime Minister gave of our present expenditure seemed to confirm the estimate made on Budget day. The Prime Minister is able to confirm the statement that we are not now spending more than at the rate of £5,000,000 a day. Owing to the very rapid increase of expenditure in times past I, for one, should not have been in the least surprised if the Prime Minister had stated that the expenditure had increased beyond £5,000,000 a day. I am thankful he was able to say that his previous estimate was conservative, because the expenditure has never up to date reached £5,000,000. It has reached £4,350,000 a day, but it has never yet reached £5,000,000. This confirms the estimate for the next two and a half months, and I think we may take it for granted that the Chancellor of the Exchequer's estimate of £1,590,000,000 for this year is an estimate which is likely to turn out accurate. The Chancellor of the Exchequer estimated the expenditure for next year at £1,825,000,000, being for the two years £3,415,000,000. Of that sum, £692,000,000 only are to be raised by taxation. What I confess I am disappointed about is that the Prime Minister did not deal in any large way with the financial policy of the Government. Recognising the right hon. Gentleman's great abilities, I confess that I thought that he was almost wasting his time in giving the detailed figures of this Vote, instead of employing his time to lay before the House a financial statement of policy which the Government will understand.

If that be so, I would have liked someone else to have dealt with the details in order that the right hon. Gentleman might have devoted his energy and his ability to making a statement of policy, and declaring whether he is satisfied that this large expenditure which is going on is raised in the right way. Let me deal with that question. I would like to ask, are we paying enough out of income? We are paying about one-fifth of our expenditure out of income and four-fifths is being paid out of capital, which we ourselves and future generations will have to pay. The amount raised in taxes seems very big, but what does it amount to in proportion to the income of the country? It represents about one-seventh of the income of the country, and consequently six-sevenths of the income of the country continues to be devoted to the purposes to which it was devoted in ordinary peace time. I rather think the Government are afraid to impose more taxation, or else they have not yet quite screwed up their courage to do what is necessary to get a larger proportion of the expenditure on the War paid out of income, and a less proportion out of capital. If the Prime Minister made a statement and told the country what was wanted, the country would support him in finance, just as they would in his war measures. There is, however, no complete statement. It is true that the Financial Secretary to the Treasury gave us a lecture the other day, and it was a very excellent lecture which might have been cut directly out of an elementary text book on economics. What was the result of his cogitation? He told the people that they ought to spend only half their incomes, and that the other half ought to be devoted either to payment of taxes, or the payment of loans for the purpose of carrying on the War. That is a policy, an ideal policy, but it is an utterly impracticable policy. Everybody knows it, and the effect of that speech is nil. The country knows that it cannot do that, and it has not yet been given any reason why it should do it. Nobody has told it that it is in a difficulty. If the assets of the country are properly handled, there is no difficulty in financing this War and getting through to a finish; bat if the country is going to be asked to make so large a sacrifice of personal income—of personal pleasures if you like—it must be given a real statement detailing the present position, and an appeal must be made to its judgment and reason. It is quite impossible as a policy to say that the people are to spend only half of their income. The hon. Gentleman hardly realised perhaps when he made that statement that half the income of this country is received by people who are not Income Tax payers, and whose incomes on an average are less than £3 per week. The average is probably nearer £2. We cannot go to people with incomes of £2 per week and say to them, "£l of your income has cither got to be spent in taxes or subscribed to War Loan, and you and your family have got to live on the other £l per week." They realise at once that is not a practicable policy, and they really discount the statement. The other question which it seems to me does require immediate consideration is our position in regard to external finance. That which we require of work and services in this country by some means or other, by loans or by taxes, we can raise and obtain in this country; but that which we require of work and services abroad we have got to pay for abroad in the money of the country in which we buy them.

What steps are there that we can take to reduce our imports? What can we do to prevent the bills that we have got to pay growing higher and higher? What can we do to reduce our imports? Of course, we can reduce our imports if we can succeed in reducing consumption, and here the Government, I think, have done something definitely which hinders and does not help, and I call attention to it with a view of seeing whether in future it need be repeated. High prices would themselves tend to reduce consumption, but as soon as there is a complaint of high prices immediately a war bonus in cash is offered. I do not want anybody who works and works hard for this country not to have his just and fair reward, but to pay a cash war bonus is to aggravate the very evil, if it is an evil, of high prices. The Government might have paid that war bonus in post-war bonds; they might have let the man who is working well and earning well realise that he was doing good for the country in taking post-war bonds. I believe if the appeal had been made properly the working classes would have taken these war bonds, and it would have been a great nest-egg to which they could have added by savings in other directions. If that had been done it would have tended, at any rate, to have reduced consumption. Consumption can also be reduced if you can do something to attract the high and large earnings that are being received now by many men, even double that which they have been accustomed to receive in the past. Can you attract those earnings? If not, they are very apt to go into consumption and to buy things which people would otherwise do without, and it is that increased consumption, of course, which is causing a great deal of the balance against us.

What effort has been made to attract those savings? The only effort has been a half-hearted Parliamentary savings campaign with an attempt to get the working classes to subscribe to the War Loan. That attempt relatively failed. Comparatively little was subscribed in that way, nor am I surprised; the people did not understand it. They were not taught to understand it. The campaign did not begin in time, and it did not continue long enough. Give them something which they understand, and I believe you can do it. There is a great National Insurance Act now with approved societies of working people who get closer into the homes of the working people than any post office. If you can use those people, the men attached to the approved societies, to carry out your scheme you will get into the houses of the working people, and if you offer an attraction to them you have a very reasonable chance of securing some of their superfluous savings and so reducing consumption, whilst at the same time increasing the financial resources of the country. I suggest to the Government that they should consider the offering of old age pensions to people between fifty and seventy for a cash sum down or for a weekly payment spread over a year. A certain capital sum would be raised in that way. It would not be unimportant in amount, but the importance of it would not be so much the amount of money that would be raised as the fact that you would be offering something to the working classes which would help to reduce the consumption which is now increased by high wages.

The other way of reducing the balance against us would be by increasing our exports. Can we increase our exports? I have heard a good deal of complaint that those engaged in the export trade at the present time are unnecessarily hampered by Government regulations. I cannot really say how far that is true. A case in point was given me the other day, and if it is symbolical of others there is certainly a just cause of complaint. I heard of a. firm of manufacturers who were sending" an article of clothing, actually three dozen pairs of ladies' garments, to South America, and they were stopped at the Customs House because they contained some rubber. Rubber, of course, is a thing which obviously we do not want to have exported for enemy use, but it does seem to be a little unnecessary to have stopped those few articles, and it surely might be possible by a better arrangement to prevent trade from being hampered in that way. There was another case given me of a parcel of carpets being held up in the Customs House because the backs of the carpets had got some jute in them. It is obviously right that no jute should be exported for the possible use of the enemy, but it seems rather absurd to think that the trade in carpets should be handicapped because some backs of carpets had jute in them.

Whatever steps may be taken to reduce the imports or to increase the exports, there will be a balance left which we shall have to pay over. Payment of that balance seems to me to-day to be our greatest problem, and it was upon that and kindred subjects that I should have hoped the Prime Minister might have made a statement. Let us try and find out what that balance is. There has been a great difficulty. The Government will not say. The Prime Minister the other day said that our ordinary trade balance was increased from, say, £11,000,000 per month to £30,000,000 per month. That is to say, the trade balance against us, being the excess of imports over exports, was £360,000,000 a year. Those are the figures of the Board of Trade. It is important to remember that, because that does not include all the imports. As against that £360,000,000 of Board of Trade excess imports, we have got of course our invisible exports. I believe myself the account about balances. I do not think there is anything against us. I put it that our freight and our bankers' services are probably at least £180,000,000. a year, and I put it that our income from investments, although reduced owing to sales and so on, is at least another £180,000,000 a year. I believe, therefore, that the whole of the commercial balance of £360,000,000 is at least balanced by our freight and bankers' services and our income from foreign securities. That apparent balance I do not think need alarm us at all. But that is not all. There is another item, and indeed two items. There is, first, the amount that we are lending to our Allies. I understand that is, altogether, £423,000,000 this year. The Prime Minister to-day gave a figure which did not seem to be quite consistent with that £423,000,000, and I am in hopes that it may prove that the £423,000,000 as an estimate should be revised. It is the estimate given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Prime Minister, if I remember rightly, said that we had at present advanced this year about £92,000,000, and that in addition there were some £30,000,000 or £40,000,000 which was repaid to the Bank of England for other advances. If that is so, it would seem, if we are to get the figure of the Chancellor of the Exchequer of £423,000,000, that there is a very large sum of something like £300,000,000 to be advanced in the next four and a half months. I do not know whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer will require to revise his earlier figure.

I understand that the figure is still to be £423,000,000. By so much as that represents goods supplied in this country and by services rendered by this country it need offer no difficulty, but by so much as it represents goods or services which are supplied by foreign countries it will fall to be paid by us as part of our additional imports. It is very difficult to say what that sum is, and I do not pretend to do more than to speculate. I am quite sure that we are supplying the Allies with certain items, and it may possibly be that the value of those will amount to £73,000,000 in the course of the year. If that were so, there would be a balance against us on that account of £350,000,000. In addition there is the Government purchase of munitions and arms. Those purchases are not included in the Board of Trade figures. I do not know what that figure is. It is a very large figure, but it is pure speculation to fix upon any one figure more than another. It must be a large figure. As the Prime Minister explained, it is an increasing figure, or rather a figure which will come into course of payment at an increasing rate. Whatever that figure may be, and I suggest we might put it down at £250,000,000, it will have to be paid abroad, and it forms a portion of the balance which is part of our problem of external finance.

These two figures amount to about £600,000,000. There is a set-off against them. We have already borrowed £50,000,000—in the form of the Anglo-French Loan—and holders of foreign securities in this country have sold large amounts of securities abroad. I hope they will go on doing it, because the more they sell the more they will help this country to discharge its indebtedness on the other side of the Atlantic. Some gold, too, has been issued. There is a great difference of opinion as to how much of the foreign securities have actually been sold. I have seen an American estimate which suggests that about £100,000,000 worth of foreign securities have been sold in the course of last year. I have seen a somewhat similar suggestion in this country; personally, I believe the amount is rather more. I would suggest that the set-off against the balance against us on the gold and foreign securities accounts should be not less than £150,000,000. Of course these figures are quite conjectural, but if they are anything like accurate it brings it out that we shall have to pay, in the course of this year, a sum of between £300,000,000 and £400,000,000 to our various creditors in foreign countries.

I suggest to the Government that we can do that well and easily if we only use the assets that this wealthy nation possesses. The Government ought to mobilise those assets, and they should consult their General Financial Staff as to the best method of mobilising them so as to bring them into line to help us to win this great war. The first step that should be taken should be to ascertain exactly what foreign securities we have in this country. As one knows, there are estimates of all sorts. According to the last American estimate I saw, we have £500,000,000 of American railroad and industrial securities. That may be too small or too high an estimate. I am inclined to think that the net balance remaining to us of these particular forms of securities does not amount to so large a figure. But whatever the figure may actually be, the Government ought to know it. Preparation in advance never did any Government any harm, and if our various foreign creditors realise that we are taking steps and are prepared to do whatever is necessary, then their feeling of confidence must surely be, strengthened. It has been suggested that merely speaking about indebtedness is going to give our foreign creditor cold feet. It is not going to do anything of the sort. He knows perfectly well what the liabilities on the trade account of the Government are. He knows better probably than Members of this House. He will know also we in this country are prepared to cast aside our old habits of pri- vacy and secrecy with regard to investments, and are prepared to have a registry made of our foreign investments and to surrender those investments if requisitioned by the Government, to be used for the purpose of supporting the nation's credit. He is much more likely to realise we are not afraid of the position when he sees how willingly we prepare ourselves for emergencies. I will not detail the scheme which I have put before the House for a national registry and for the calling up of securities as they are required, but I will, if the House will allow me—

With regard to the calling up of securities they would have to be classified in the register. The first class of securities would be those which are readily marketable in the United States, and if the necessity arose I would call up that class and I would give power to the Government to deal with them, of course, paying the holder either in cash or in War Stock the full value of the security that was called up. I think I have already made my point clear in regard to that, and I want, if I may, to deal with two objections which the Chancellor of the Exchequer raised to that plan the last time I spoke upon it in this House. The right hon. Gentleman, as I understood, did not contend that the possession of those securities would not be useful to the Government, and I did not gather that he ruled out compulsion. He said there were enormous difficulties, and he pointed out two pitfalls. He said, "If you take the market price the holder will say, 'I cannot live on what you have left me.' If you give him the quota in interest the Government would lose in capital value." The right hon. Gentleman said we should fall into one of those two pitfalls; but unless we were particularly blind I do not think that pitfalls of that sort would be likely to trip us up. If these are really the right hon. Gentleman's only objections, I feel pretty certain it will not be long before the scheme is adopted. Just let me apply those objections to the actual securities as they would have to be applied. According to Mr. Theodore Price, a well-known writer on economics in the United States, the European holdings in the United States of railroad securities are roughly two-thirds in bonds and one-third in common or preference stock. Let me take the bonds. Most of the railroad 4 per cent. bonds stand at 92, or upwards; in other words, they pay less than 4½ per cent. Anything like a first-class American railroad bond at this moment pays less than 4½ per cent., and even the second-class bonds do not pay more than 4f per cent.

The bonds are of varying dates. I have one in my mind which matures in 1929; another in 1959, one of these stands at 93 to-day and the other at 92.

In London. I do not want any dispute on this point. I do not know the precise point at which they stand; but my main point is this: that this class of bonds stand at such a price today that they do not return to the investor more than about 4½ per cent., and any investor who had that bond would receive actually a larger income if he exchanged it for our 4½ per cent. War Stock, which, at its present price, pays about £4 14s. per cent.—say 4¾ per cent. If the holder of that 4½ per cent. American bond gave it up, and was asked to take in exchange War Stock, not only would he not lose income but he would actually get an increased income. That is true of all bonds up to 4¾ per cent. The Chancellor of the Exchequer asked me just now as to the maturity of the bond. I have no doubt he had in his mind a point made by my hon. Friend the Member for the City of London (Sir F. Banbury), the other day, when he asked what was to be done with a bond at a low rate of interest standing at a discount and with early maturity. My hon. Friend was afraid that the holder of that bond would lose profit on repayment. The point is absolutely simple, and if that is what the right hon. Gentleman had in mind, I will deal with it now. Those bonds to-day are not paying more than 4½ per cent., and the holder can do either one of two things, he can take cash or War stock for its market value, or, if he chooses, he can receive from the Government a bond at the same rate of interest and with the same maturity. Indeed, it would pay the Government better to do that, and if the Chancellor of the Exchequer were to work that out with any of these bonds at low rates of interest and early maturity he would find it would be to the advantage of the Government to take that course.

But the point the right hon. Gentleman had in his mind might have been that if you take a railway common stock and give War Loan in exchange, you are going to reduce the holder's income. If that is his point I will deal with it. In the "Economist" of last week—6th November—there happened to be a list of eight of the principal American railroads. I ran my eye through them, and I found that four of them pay under 4| per cent., two of them pay 5¼, and two about 5½ per cent. If they were taken over at market value in exchange for War Stock there would be no loss whatever on the first four of those securities. The holder would get a Government Bond instead of stock in a railway, which must necessarily fluctuate somewhat with the trade of the country. As regards the other four, if the holder wished stock of equal security, he would get a larger rate of interest by investing in British railway stock. If he wants the better security of Government Bonds it is only reasonable and fair he should not complain if his income is somewhat reduced.

There is one other point in regard to railway stock which I want to make quite clear, and I will take an actual example and ask the House to bear the figures in mind. In June, 1914, before the War, the stock I have in mind stood at 100. To-day it stands at 114, and that 14 per cent. rise is largely a war profit. It has gone up very largely because of the increased benefit which has accrued to trade and finance in America through the conditions that prevail on this side of the water. If that security were taken the holder would be entitled to cash for the whole of his war profit, and he would not have, as have the holders of business securities in this country, to share those profits with the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

I hope that the Government will seriously consider the proposition that has been put before it, because preparation has never yet done anybody any harm, and with reasonable foresight and proper preparation we shall be able to overcome all our difficulties, even if the difficulties with which we are confronted look big. In my judgment the nation is behind the Government. It is willing and expects to throw in its money and its securities, as well as the lives of its manhood, to any necessary extent, whether in the form of taxes or of loans, in order that we may conquer the enemies with which we are laced. There will be no faltering on the part of the nation. It looks to the Government for a distinct and definite financial policy, it expects the Government to take steps to reduce consumption, it expects the Government to take steps to increase our exports, and it expects the Government to make a definite and early preparation for mobilising our present financial resources to pay the balances both at home and abroad.

The Prime Minister has made to-day a speech of extraordinary interest and importance, touching upon a number of questions relating to the War, to most of which I do not propose to make any reference. In asking for a Vote of Credit for £400,000,000, he apologised to the House for the magnitude of the sum. Every Member of the House feels what the Prime Minister stated, that none of us here grudge any money the Government may ask for the conduct of the War, subject to the safeguard of which he spoke; but I think the House ought to remember that we are without some of the safeguards with which we work in ordinary times. It is not only that we cannot scrutinise the expenditure in the way that we should do in peace time, and not only that we have not the Estimates before us beforehand as to the expenditure which is to be made, but the Services are doing now what they never do in peace time—the Departments themselves spend the money, and act really without control. The country and the House are dependent now upon the good administration of the Army and the Navy for any limitations that may be put on the expenditure of those Departments. Therefore the ordinary Treasury control, which is what the House mainly relies upon, has gone. The Treasury issued a Minute some months ago, by which they gave the War Office and the Admiralty the power to spend at their discretion, without going to the "Treasury for that sanction which is essential in peace time. I do not demur to that power having been given to these Departments. Probably it may have been necessary to relax the control which is desirable in peace time. At the same time it lays upon the shoulders of the Departments a new responsibility, the responsibility of not only spending money which is entrusted to it, but also of seeing that no expenditure is made which is not necessary, or which would not be sanctioned by the Treasury and by the House if there were time to consult the different bodies.

Therefore I was glad to hear the Prime Minister—who spoke to us as War-Minister, at any rate temporarily—say that the War Office is paying peculiar attention to the necessity for economising. He instanced three directions in which they are at this moment looking more carefully into expenditure than they have done. One is in regard to Army contracts. I am sure that hon. Members in different parts of the House have had experience in their own districts of the working of Government contracts. I say there is not a man here who cannot tell stories to the Government and to the Department of monstrous extravagance in regard to the expenditure of money on these contracts. There is waste in many directions. I will take one instance. The Government began the War with a heavy payment to contractors on a percentage basis—a 10 per cent. payment to contractors on the amount of their expenditure. Can you conceive a system more calculated to make expenditure mount up? I am told that that system has not come to an end. I am told that new contracts have been entered into under which the payment is to be made of 10 per cent. on the expenditure. I venture to tell my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer a story which was brought to me two days ago about a Government contractor. He has been paid 10 per cent. on his expenditure on behalf of the Government. He had occasion to buy a large number of wheelbarrows. He went to a man in a town in the North and asked him the price, and he was given a certain figure. He went to a second man and he got a higher figure, and he went to a third man and got a higher figure still. He bought from the last man, at the highest figure, a certain number of wheelbarrows. That man went to the second man to buy his wheelbarrows, and the second man went back to the first man, who was the only man in that town who could supply the wheelbarrows. I have no reason to doubt the truth of that tale. I believe there are several Members who could tell similar stories. I believe that such instances must happen so long as you pay your contractors on a system of so much per cent. on their expenditure. The Prime Minister referred again to the question of rations. I wondered that the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Colchester (Major Worthington Evans) should have refrained from referring to that, because he could a tale unfold to the House in regard to the waste there has been in regard to rations.

It is much better now, partly owing to the work of my hon. and gallant Friend, but there is much left that it is possible to do, and I should be glad to know if the Government are doing it. The Prime Minister spoke of the discharge of unfit soldiers into civil employment, with a possibility of their being called up suddenly for Government service. May I point out that there will be great difficulty in these men getting civil employment if they are to be called away at a moment's notice. Whatever arrangements the Government make, if they are to get any saving at all, they will have to make it reasonably certain that these men will be given reasonable time, so that due notice may be given of any termination of their civil employment.

To come definitely to the position of the country, upon which my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Colchester has been speaking, I share with him some disappointment that the Prime Minister did not take the opportunity to review the whole financial position of the country. I want to follow for a few moments on the lines my hon. and gallant Friend pursued. I take it that we are agreed that everybody in this country should now be engaged in doing what may be called necessary work, that we want to mobilise all the resources of the country to one end, to make the production of the country, the work of the country, the manhood of the country all conduce to the successful carrying out of the War. For that purpose there should be no employment in this country which has not either directly or indirectly a bearing upon that issue—that is to say, everyone who is at work should be working either upon necessities, or upon munitions of War, or upon exports. My hon. Friend and many others talk a great deal about reducing our imports. I entirely agree with that being done if you are going to reduce consumption, but if you are merely going to substitute the consumption of home articles of luxury for that of foreign articles of luxury, you will have done little or nothing to help towards the purpose of the War. As a matter of fact, we cannot very greatly reduce our imports. No doubt we can reduce them in certain directions, but the great mass of the imports coming in now are imports we cannot do without. They are either food, munitions of war, or means of making munitions, or necessities for the people of this country. Therefore I do not look for any great reduction in imports as a solution of our financial position.

That being so, we have to consider the problem of how we are to pay for these imports. They can be paid for by gold, by the export of securities, or by the export of commodities. It is not possible for us to export gold in great quantities. In the case of securities, my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Colchester has outlined a plan, which merits a good deal of attention from my right hon. Friend, for the registering of foreign securities held in this country. I do not know how far the Chancellor of the Exchequer is in possession of figures upon this matter. There is no doubt that a very large number of these securities were held in this country before the War, but I suspect that there-has been a far larger number sold lately than my hon. and gallant Friend is inclined to recognise. The very high prices which are now prevailing in the American markets have brought out for sale an immense amount of American bonds and of the common stock of American railways, because investors are not at all unaware of the fact that many of these railways and bonds are now paying only 4 per cent., while they could get 4½ from the Government, and the security of the British Government is still held in high esteem by investors all the world over. There has been a large sale of American securities, and it is constantly going on. I do not know that the method of force to which my hon. and gallant Friend alluded is really necessary, but I join with him in suggesting to the Chancellor of the Exchequer that any knowledge upon this matter which he can get might be very useful. There is no harm in taking time by the forelock and getting the knowledge now even before it is necessary to maker use of it.

The main way, however, of paying for necessary imports is by the exports we send out. That is a side of the question which has not received from this House the attention it merits, because it touches the very heart of this war problem for the people of this country. The maintenance of our exports at their highest point is just as necessary to this country as the maintenance of our Army. I will not say it is as necessary as the maintenance of the Navy; they are both absolutely necessary. The problems must be considered together. You cannot really consider the question of how many men you are to put in your Army, unless at the same time you consider what your financial responsibilities are, and what is your duty towards the Navy. The whole problem must be considered together. In regard to many elements of the problem, we are not able to deal in precise figures with regard to any one of them. I urge that the problems cannot be considered separately. You must consider the size of the Army, the amount of your exports, the financial loans you have to make, the size of the Navy, and the necessities of the people. All must be considered as part of one problem, and the determination of any one figure involves an effect upon any other figure in the series. The only way in which you can really increase your imports is to see to it that nobody is working in this country upon anything which it is not necessary to work at the present time, and that there is no unnecessary expenditure in the country, because it must buy the articles it is not necessary to make. It is to the savings of the people in one way or another that the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Government must look for the financial support they need. The Secretary to the Treasury told us that the people of this country ought to save half their incomes in the coming year. I should be very glad if the people would do it, but I do not think the people of this country will save half their incomes unless you help them very materially to do so, and it is not only rich people you have to help to save in their incomes. You have to help the wage earners as well as those who are very rich. The very rich are getting well on towards the half of which the Secretary to the Treasury spoke, but you will not get a voluntary saving of half the incomes of the people of this country, nor do I really know that that figure is a thought-out fraction. Sir George Paish, in a very interesting speech which he delivered in London a few weeks ago, estimated that there would be little anxiety about the financial position of this country if on an average the people saved at the present time 15 per cent. of the national income and handed that money over to the Government, and he estimated that that would be done if the well-to-do would put aside 25 per cent. of their incomes and the wage earners reduced their expenditure by 10 per cent. and increased their production by 10 per cent. I would urge upon the Government that the way to solve this problem is at once to diminish the consumption of all unnecessary articles in this country, and, if you can, to increase the productive powers of the people. The people must be assisted by the Government in this matter, and I do not think the Government have done as much in the direction of increasing the productive power of the people and in inducing saving as they might do, or as yet they may be compelled to do.

The House will think I never make a speech without dragging in the question of drink, and possibly it is true. But on this question, at any rate, I claim that it is absolutely relevant to the subject which we are discussing, because when you come to the expenditure upon drink there is waste going on in many directions which the Government might go a long way to stop. I know the Board of Control is doing a good deal in portions of the country, but not enough has yet been done, and, as a matter of fact, the expenditure upon drink has not, so far as I know, diminished. It has increased in the first six months of this year as compared with last year. There is a threefold waste in connection with drink. One point I have not heard made in the House before is the waste of food in making the drink. I do not know if hon. Members are aware that the weekly use of grain in the making of drink at present is over 1,000,000 bushels. When it is remembered that you have in the country five years' supply of spirits at the present rate of consumption, it seems to me that the Government should seriously consider the proposal, which commended itself to Mr. Pitt and which he put into operation, of suspending all distilling for the present. There is five years' supply in the country, and if people wish to go on drinking spirits there would be nothing in the suspension to interfere with it. But there is this waste of food in making the drink—1,000,000 bushels of grain per week and nearly 10,000,000 lbs. of sugar per week, which is a very large percentage of our total consumption of sugar. If you could save that, or half of it, you would have made a very substantial contribution towards the cost of the War. There is also waste of efficiency in the consumption of drink by the workers. It was calculated by a Committee of this House that the waste of efficiency of the workers was one-sixth of their total productive power. I do not think anyone who has considered the problem would put it at a less figure. People in Russia who have gone into the question and investigated it practically there, say they have increased the productive power of the workman by more than one-sixth by their operation in prohibiting the liquor traffic; and, therefore, in connection with this saving and the diminution in consumption and increase in production, I cannot leave out the drink trade as one of the matters to which the Government could turn their serious attention. It is not the 10 per cent. of which Sir George Paish spoke. It would be at least 15 or 18 per cent. of the expenditure of the workers and of their productive power, and that by one and the same stroke. The country grudges no money for the purpose of the War, but we expect stricter economy than there has been on the part of the Government, and the people on their side will, if helped by the Government, respond to the appeal that is made to them. No demand can be too great for the patriotism of the people, who are determined that this War shall be carried to a triumphant issue, and who will support a Government which, in their opinion, is pursuing that end.

One cannot look round the Benches here at ten minutes to six, at the height of this part of the Session, and when probably the most vital question is being discussed in the House, without feeling what a misfortune has come upon the House by its being deprived of the advantages and the safeguards of the party system. I have thought from time to time in recent days, when we have constantly been threatened that there would be demissions from the Cabinet, that the presence of some members of the Cabinet—I do not much care what their past party politics has been—upon this Bench, where they could give form and effect to the proceedings of the House, would be a much more advantageous matter for the House than their absence from that Bench would be a disadvantage. We stand here to-day practically, by common consent, at the climax of the present tremendous conflict in which this country is engaged. Everyone recognises that we have come to a point of time when, not only have the efforts of our opponents culminated, but our preparations have culminated. I will not say that in every particular we have completed our preparations—I dare say we have not—but we are at what must be very nearly the climax of this War. We have spent, or provided for spending, upon the War £1,600,000,000 odd in the course of coming to the climax of it. The Secretary to the Treasury very recently made a forecast which has been accepted by other Ministers since, and which means that in all human probability we are on the way now to spending £1,800,000,000 more before we can expect that the War will be brought to a close. That represents a total of very nearly £3,500,000,000, and when one bears in mind that the accumulated wealth of this country has been variously estimated at from £10,000,000 to £15,000,000—an estimate which was recently quoted by one of the occupants of the Bench opposite—it is impossible not to see that the decisions of the Government now with regard to economy and with regard to expenditure are decisions which must have the most serious consequences, not only upon the prosecution of the War at present, and the burdens entailed upon the country, but which may have this effect: that at the end of the coming twelve months, when £1,800,000,000 more are spent, this question may arise: Has your warfare progressed so rapidly and so successfully that you have kept within your means of paying for it?

If that question should arise at a time when this country has shot its bolt with regard to expenditure and has not yet completed the objects which are of such vast consequence to the fortunes of the Empire and the destinies of the civilised world as are involved here, the disappointment which would rest upon the people of this country would be such that it would obliterate the memory of their sacrifice. At this period of the War, when the question upon this Vote of Credit, as everyone has recognised now for days, if not for weeks, it would be, is one of economy, the House of Commons now, at five minutes to six, shows the grasp it has of the finances of this country and of the fortunes of the War by the condition of that Bench and of this. My view about this subject is that if we had had the control of an Opposition—and I do not care from what quarter it was recruited—the Government to-day, which has recognised the public sense with regard to the urgent necessity of economy, would have presented much more drastic provisions for economy, not merely in respect of expenditure, but in respect of thrift, than the provisions which have already been presented. I can only hail the statement of the Prime Minister as a forecast of something much more effective to be presented soon, and my view on the present situation is that in the House, as well as in the country, if His Majesty's Government will formulate proposals much more definite, much more drastic, much more effective, than the proposals which have been outlined to us this afternoon, the country will feel that we have at length come to business upon a difficulty which underlies the whole situation, and which, if it is not solved, may land us in the disappointment of all our hopes.

6.0 P.M.

There is the matter, first of all, of expenditure. One learns, and we learn today gladly and with gratitude, that now a Committee of seven members of the Cabinet, with the help of the Secretary to the Treasury, has been engaged upon the question in particular of extravagance in contracts, extravagance in respect of rations, extravagance in the waste of the retention in the public service of unfit men. What has been the practical effect? The Committee has been at work. What has happened by reason of the deliberations of the Committee? Is there in the War Office, which is the centre of the lavish expenditure which is going on at present, any greater fear on the part of those who control expenditure that extravagant expenditure will meet with condign punishment by the Government. Is there any greater recognition of that, which ought to be the case, than there was before this Committee sat? Really the Committee may sit and may produce an excellent scheme, but days are passing, weeks are passing, months are passing, at £5,000,000 a day at present, and the time for economy is now, and that need for economy will not be met by any regulations of one of the fifty Committees which have sat in the Cabinet in the course of the last twelve months. We have to come much closer to realities than that. How is it to be done? It is to be done by retail as well as by wholesale methods. Two Members of this House, both of them excellent men of business, gave their experience within a very recent period upon the subject of the extravagance there has been in the Departments. One of these statements was made by the hon. Member for Mansfield (Sir A. Markham). However much many hon. Members may disagree with the views the hon. Baronet takes as to the Government, he is a shrewd man of business, who understands economy and the management of money. The hon. Member for Mansfield made a statement in regard to expenditure at the present time which was not dealt with then because we are in a condition in which the House of Commons is stultified by the absence of a proper grip upon the Government. The hon. Member for Mansfield made the following statement:— and when you find the man who has committed a definite act of waste you will have to relegate him to manufacturing exports, or to performing some other useful purpose, if a man who is capable of gross waste in time of war is fit for any employment of that kind. If the House of Commons had its old control over the public purse, in this time when the Treasury is powerless to control extravagance, the House of Commons would have had such a grip, through the Government, upon the spending Departments, that this waste would not have been a common scandal to-day.

I ask myself first the question, Do we deal with the matter urgently enough when it rests upon a Cabinet Committee which will some day take action? Certainly that Cabinet Committee has not yet produced the benefits which it ought to be capable of getting. Although there is no Opposition, although the House of Commons feels its inability to control these matters, which are not party matters, but which are matters of common concern, I hope the Government will go down into the Departments and take care that where there is waste, which is culpable, there shall be pitiless punishment. This is a matter which I commend to the attention of the Government. I know there is no man in this House who regrets more than the Chancellor of the Exchequer that the circumstances of the time have made it impossible that the Treasury should now exercise that power of control which it exercised in former times. That control is one thing which, having regard to the situation in the country and the crisis in which the War stands, is the imperative and urgent present duty of the Government. Again, we have had excellent advice given to the country about the replenishment of the reservoir, the husbanding of the common resources of the people of this country, out of which the war expenditure of the country is to come, for we know not what period of months, if not of years. The Financial Secretary of the Treasury made a most appealing speech about the beginning of this month, or at any rate quite recently, in which he laid down the principle, and made the prophecy, that an Englishman should reckon that he must put by half his income to meet the crisis. Half the country may be put outside of that excellent counsel of the Secretary of the Treasury. It is quite useless to expect, if your income is £2,000,000,000 a year, that as to the small incomes which make up £1,000,000,000 of it, you are going to get people to put by 10s. out of every £ or £l out of £2, or 30s. out of £3. My right hon. Friend did not mean that. He set the text, but the sermon remains to be preached, and the application of the principle remains to be made. Who is to make it? It ought to be made by the Government. What is the use of telling us in a general way that the Government is pouring out the resources of the country for these necessary purposes under the conditions with which we are all familiar and that we must individually economise? It really reminds one of the noble head of an ancient house who has brave interests and a gallant way of dealing with them, who goes home and tells his wife she must keep down household bills. That is what we are told. At least, that is what many people suppose we are told. I heard of one of the meetings of a most excellent Committee, one of the public Thrift Committees, where an accomplished and charming person described how he had put down two of his footmen. Are you going to preach economy on lines of that sort?

Economy in these times is not only to empty our pockets but to purge our souls, and the Government has not given a lead to the country in that respect. In regard to that matter the Government has to retrench. It must retrench. The country expects it to retrench. It may well be that we can afford out of the immense resources of this country to carry on for eighteen months as we have carried for fifteen months, but that is a thing we ought not to do. The task in which we are engaged is of far too solemn and vital a nature to be dealt with on these lines. We ought to retrench as our Allies in these matters have retrenched, upon principle, and because it is the right thing to display our devotion to the cause which we have at heart by making sacrifices for it. Many sacrifices have been suggested to the Government. It has been suggested to this House that Members should not draw their salaries. Every man will consult his own mind about that. On these matters I do not dwell at all. There is, however, a great mass of expenditure right through the ten or twelve Departments not immediately concerned in the War, but represented in the Cabinet, each of them with its pull upon the Exchequer, not very much abated in these times. Why cannot we retrench there? Then there is the great municipal expenditure of the country which is going on daily. There may be here and there interference, but taking it on the whole this municipal expenditure is going on. Will not the Government at this time, when the supreme efforts of the War are yet before us, when the supreme sacrifices of the country are yet before us, look to the spending Departments in the country who rival the expenditure of His Majesty's Imperial Government in times of peace, and say to them, "You must retrench." There has been a Retrenchment Committee which has been dealing with the alterations of the postal system and that sort of thing and cutting down the cost of stationery. Will the Government not establish a Retrenchment Department, which in regard to the Imperial services and the municipal services will take care that millions of money are saved? That can be done. But the matter does not end there. The Government has preached economy to us. The country wants the Government to say, in plain terms, for plain people, what the limits are within which a good citizen now should retrench and ought to retrench. One great difficulty of the matter is that about a man of any means there are his neighbours who are more or less depending upon him, and right through the country there are trades making domestic supplies and supplies of little conveniences and necessaries of life which are already hard hit by the War. We want some guidance as to whether the situation is such that, be the result what it may. our duty is to cut down our expenditure by such-and-such a percentage above a certain amount. The Government has Committees enough and it has members enough, so long as it consists of twenty-two, to form Committees with the ability to formulate propositions for the guidance of the cititzen upon this matter of economy. The most interesting, admirable, and moving speech which the Prime Minister made to-day, and with every word of which one agrees so far as it went, does not go far enough. We are here at hand-grips in the crisis of the destinies of the country, and the Government will render a service of incalculable consequence and benefit if they will take hold of these two questions—the rigorous retrenchment of expenditure and the best means, with due regard to our situation, of replenishing the national fortune as we go along, so that no continuance of months, or even of years, of this trial which is put upon us shall find us, in the long run, unable to achieve that triumph which sacrifice, and interest, and, as it seems, the necessities of the universe must accrue.

I desire to say a few words on the financial aspect of the War. Before doing so, I would like to observe that I think that the whole House owes a debt of gratitude to the right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken. A Coalition Government puts the House of Commons in a very difficult position. In the country generally I believe that there is a feeling that something is wrong in the House of Commons. The House itself, I believe, is conscious of its inefficiency. [HON. MEMBERS: "NO!"] I think that a large number of Members of the House of Commons are conscious of the inefficiency of the House, not the individuals, but the House as a whole, because we have not got any responsible Front Bench behind whom we can act with any sort of discipline. The result is that we have right hon. Gentlemen on the Bench below, who represent a small minority in this House, and who, from their high position in the House, occupy a considerable portion of the time of the House. They represent not in any sense a general, responsible Opposition—or, rather, I would put it, the presence of criticism in this House—but they represent the voice of a small minority. We have heard the right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken, and who has spoken forcibly and at the same time moderately, and I think helpfully, from the point of view of criticism, and not from the point of view of opposition to the Government. I think that when the Coalition Government has been in power for a time it will grow increasingly out of touch with the nation, unless somehow or other we in this House evolve something in the nature of a representative group of men who will be able to voice not merely the views, very important views, of this and that section, but also give utterance to the general pervading opinion of the House in criticism of the Government. Every Member of the House knows that even in times when we are divided sharply into parties, in the Smoke Room and in the Tea Room we do find very often general opinion expressing itself irrespective of party. That opinion can only be voiced in ordinary conditions by the Opposition side of the House and on the other side by the Whips, but at the same time those on the other side are not ungrateful that their opinions should be voiced. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will persist in asserting himself from that bench, and that in time we may evolve some group who will be able to express the opinion of the House and the opinion of the country, not in opposition to, but in helpful criticism of the Coalition Government, which otherwise I think is bound to make great mistakes. The hon. Member for Colchester (Major Worthington Evans) spoke on a very important subject, the subject of paying our foreign liabilities. His suggestion was that we should make use of our foreign assets in this country; that is to say the bonds, stocks and shares which we hold in this country, which are issued in foreign countries. I have heard an argument against any such action put forward by some who say that, if you take any action of the kind suggested, you would be taking forcible action against a section of the community. What are you doing in respect of those who happen to have put their money into munitions factories? You are controlling their profits, and, provided only that justice is done—and the hon. Gentleman I gather does not contemplate anything else—we have to regard this as a source in reserve, available when the Government think it desirable that it should be used.

I am referring to what is within the jurisdiction here. Within the jurisdiction here we have the actual bonds and stocks that we can get at.

The hon. Member knows perfectly well that you can put your bonds and stocks into banks in New York.

I do not think that the hon. Gentleman has put the matter before the House in all its details. He has put before the House the essence of the matter. We as a nation have to make payments abroad to the extent of several hundred million pounds, and if in the opinion of the nation it is desirable to use this particular type of our national assets, provided that justice is done to those who happen to possess it, I do not see anything to object to in the principle itself, provided, of course, that you can get over the difficulties.

There is one very special reason why that is important. Apart from the depreciation of the national plant in this country—I take it that we are not in all cases making good the repairs which, in the ordinary course, would be effected in the plant in this country, and to that extent we are drawing on the capital of this country—apart from that, it is a very important thing to say widely in the country that the only way in which we can throw a portion of the cost of the War at the present time upon the national capital, is by throwing a portion; of it upon these stocks and shares which we hold abroad. The hon. Member for Colchester used an expression which illustrates exactly what I feel at the present time is doing so much harm in the country. He said that he had hoped to have heard the Prime Minister refer to large financial matters, among others to the fact that we are levying in taxation for the purposes of this War only one-fifth of the annual cost as taxes on our income, and that four-fifths were being paid from capital. He said, "You are taking only one-seventh of your income."

Though that is technically true, true in a sense, it is taken as true in another sense in the country at large. We cannot tax capital in this country for the purpose of ways and means now and here, to carry on the War in this year, unless we tax the relatively small amount that is involved in depreciation. We cannot take the actual steel rails on the lines of railways which are owned by a shareholder in a railway company, and turn them into food for soldiers and for munition makers. You can only take the income of the country and convert a large section of that income to use for the purposes of the War. It is perfectly true that you may affect that income in two perfectly different ways. You may tax it, and so obtain a portion of the income, and you may take part of it on loan, but you are taking income all the same. You may say to individuals, "We are going to take a large section of your income as excess profits, and of your capital as loans You may take from them by loans what individuals call their capital, but what really has to be paid out of the national income, and I believe the fact that that truth is not driven home, and driven home from that bench with all the authority which no one can deny, and the great wealth of homely illustration of the Minister of Munitions, is responsible at the present time for a great deal of the foolish extravagance and lack of economy on the part of all classes in the country.

At the present time you may take it that the yield of the national plant and work in the country amounts to something like £2,300,000,000 a year. We are told that the cost of the War this year will be £1,600,000,000. We have got to write something off that £1,600,000,000. No doubt in paying for munitions there is an element of profit which comes to the munition makers, and that profit goes to their bank balances, and out of that profit they pay their contribution to the next Loan, or to the taxes; therefore you must deduct something from the £1,600,000,000, because you are going to get a certain portion of it back. We are talking of ways and means now, and not of the ultimate position. Therefore you may reduce the actual cost possibly to the neighbourhood of some £1,200,000,000 or £1,300,000,000. That means that half the entire national income is being spent on the War. That shows the truth of what the right hon. Gentleman the Financial Secretary to the Treasury has said, that one-half the total produce of the nation is required for the purposes of the War—one-half of the total yield of the labour and plant of the nation in this year. You cannot take national capital for that purpose, it is true, but you borrow capital from individuals, and you say to them, "We will give you interest on this amount, and we will undertake to repay ultimately." But in this year one-half of the produce of the nation will be taken.

I believe that the fact that this truth is not driven home with authority by our leaders is responsible for a great deal of harm in this country. In face of facts of that sort, what do we get from the Prime Minister? We get utterances as to the gravity and seriousness of the financial position of the country. We have had similar utterances before by right hon. Gentlemen opposite—the Minister of Munitions, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and other Ministers. But they hardly ever descend from generalities. There was the one point mentioned, as to the expenditure of half the income, but that was so general that the right hon. Gentleman was misunderstood very widely. We have had the point also that we are to limit our expenditure on articles imported into this country. I regard that as a very unfortunate utterance, because I believe it has led to a very great deal of what I call light thinking on the matter of economy. It said that if you do not consume articles produced in this country then the produce of this country will go further, and it will not be so necessary to import from abroad. You can only govern the position, not by selecting what you are going to economise on, but by economising generally upon everything. You must put down consumption, and yon cannot make a choice of your imports. You import a large part of your wheat and your beef. You can economise as efficiently by saving wheat and beef, as by saving sugar, a thing which you do not make here, but which you have to import. The foreign exchanges are affected equally in both cases. I believe that a great deal of false comfort has been taken to the hearts of a great many people of this country among all classes, wealthy and poor, when they have heard that utterance. They have done their best to limit the employment of articles which are imported into this country, and they have thought that by doing so they were at liberty to spend their money on what is produced in this country. It is just as ruinous from the economic point of view to spend our funds on what is produced in this country as on what is imported into this country, because what is produced in this country, if it were economised, would render unnecessary a very large portion of the imports into this country.

I dare say that right hon. Gentleman opposite will tell us that they have made general statements, that they have used words of great gravity, and that it is for the Parliamentary Committee on Savings to do the spade work. From all that I have observed—and I have attended some of their meetings, and I have read some of their literature—that Parliamentary Committee is relatively a failure. In Scotland, I am told that they ceased having meetings expressly for the enforcement of economy, because they found that they were not attractive, and they combined economy with recruiting, with the result that recruiting, which is the most remunerative subject to a speaker, so far as applause from the audience is concerned, took the lion's share and economy has gone to the wall. I do not wonder at it. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman who has spoken, in the way in which he has characterised a great deal of this pleading for thrift. I have attended meetings to which perhaps a gentleman—some notoriously wealthy man—has come in his motor car, and he tells the great audience, it may be, how he has partaken of a thrifty lunch. What is in the minds of the people is that he is simply trying to avoid the gout. That is playing with the thing. And your Parliamentary Committee is organising such play. What we are up against in this matter of national economy is pretty nearly what you are up against in the matter of trade union rules, and in the, matter of the unwillingness of some people to appreciate the foreign position. You are up against this, that for generations we in this nation have been safe because we won the Battle of Trafalgar, and safe because we know that we are behind our ocean; and, knowing that, we have occupied ourselves with internal affairs in the main, and, being so occupied, we have thought of the distribution of wealth between class and class. But now we are suddenly faced with the greater problem of the total production and total consumption of the nation, because it is the difference between consumption and production that gives you what I call your War Fund. The more you can reduce consumption, the more you can increase production; the more you can practice these two inverse processes, the wider will become the margin. I see a notable economist sitting opposite shaking Ms head, but he has not, I think, grasped my meaning. I am not thinking of a fund which is available at any given moment to be summed up in money, for once you have got the difference between the two you apply it to carrying on the War, and therefore you increase again the total consumption.

But you have got to consider as Germany thinks, and as we ought to think of it, without money. It is the use of pounds, shillings, and pence which is so confusing in these matters, and which leads to all the fallacies which mislead all classes. Think of it in actual human work, in actual human service to the nation, and what have you got? You have got a nation divided into two sections, as is every nation carrying on this War. You have got one section which is the fighting section, and the other section is the producing section. The fighting section includes soldiers, sailors and munition workers of all sorts, and in the other section you have those who have to carry both themselves and the fighting section. The whole problem is how large can you venture to make the fighting section. There is a limit—theoretically at any rate—at which you might go on fighting indefinitely, because the producing section which is left can produce enough to maintain itself in efficiency and to maintain the whole fighting section of the country. The problem before us, and which is always present in the fears of hon. Gentlemen, is, Are we exceeding that limit? Are we getting into an unstable position because we are putting too much in the fighting section of the nation and making it top-heavy? However you think on that matter, you must control consumption and you may increase production. I may say that I think in these discussions on economy at the present moment we are a little unfair in regard to production. Notwithstanding a few strikes which have played a great part in newspapers, notwithstanding a number of indictments under the Munitions Act, I believe it is broadly true that the mass of the working classes in this country have risen to their duty and are producing now, man for man, more by far than they have ever produced under ordinary conditions. Not merely have you women employed, not merely have you boys employed, but you have overtime, and you have time better kept. I believe that at the present time you have gone a long way to replace by the production of the country the loss which you have experienced by withdrawing a large number of men.

Having said that, we turn to the other side of the matter, which is consumption. I am afraid I cannot describe the condition of the country as equally healthy in that direction. I have heard two arguments—one the argument of the rich, and the other the argument of the poor. The philanthropic argument of the rich is that you must keep money circulating, and that you must patronise the people with whom you have been in the habit of dealing. Ladies in the drawing-room talk about having new dresses in order to keep money circulating. They do not see, when they pay away a sovereign, they are paying away so much human labour which could be devoted to one or other purpose of benefit to the country. I find another fallacy among the working classes—a very natural one. They say, "We are fighting, we give our lives, we give our all; it is for the richer classes to pay." That is just the critical point at which we arrived just now—the fact that people do not distinguish between the capital of the individual and the capital of the nation. You may tax the rich man, and by all means tax the rich man; you are doing that already, and I hope you will do it more; but there is no economy in that. The rich man's expenditure is simply a matter of payment of wages, as to a vast amount of it, or payment for services; directly or indirectly, the expenditure of the Income Tax paying classes goes to the payment of wages. All you do in taxing the rich man is to transfer so much of his employing power from him to the Government. That does not touch the question of consumption; that does not touch the question of diverting the expenditure on clothes that he or his wife or children may wear to render it available for clothes to be worn by soldiers in the trenches. The man who forgoes his new suit of Sunday clothes, and refuses to buy one, is actually providing a suit of khaki for his son in the trenches; he is doing that indirectly. This saving can only be done in the main by the working classes of this country. You may organise it, you may transfer it from one expenditure to another, but you come, after all, down to the fact that it is to be a limitation of consumption.

There are two ways, the British way and the German way. The only practical way the British can have is the free way; the German way is the despotic way. In Germany they ration the whole population. How are you going to act? You must appeal to the democracy. Our democracy is intelligent, and if a thing is put before them, with sufficient authority, clearness, and with power, such as possessed by the Minister of Munitions; if the matter is seriously taken up by one of our great leaders, and if it is done by way of campaign, you may possibly produce some understanding of this question in the country, because it is not intelligence which is wanted among the people, but a clear statement of facts. In this matter the Government have not done their best in the country, as they have done in some other matters, because I do not think they have faced the conditions under which a great democracy is to be influenced in these times. Everyone knows that if he is talking to an individual he may speak rapidly, and if he is talking across the table, he must speak less rapidly, and, where he is addressing a large audience, his points must be massively made in order to move the whole body of his listeners. It seems to me that it is only by repeating a striking phrase frequently that you can drive the idea of true economy home. If you want to establish an idea in the mind of the nation it must be by some dramatic stroke of policy, or by some great and oft-repeated phrase, as well as by striking illustration. We had the appointment of the Parliamentary Committee on this subject of the serious necessity of economy, and we had the advice to the people to make small contributions to the last War Loan through the Post Offices of the country; but those efforts have never been followed up with that energy and determination which we have witnessed in regard to recruiting and munition work. Recruiting and munition work are important, but a third work of equal importance is to imbue the community with a clear perception of the necessity for economy.

The Government have not realised that the great principle of democratic government is that it must place before the great masses of the people some idea of the scope of its policy, and follow it up with businesslike machinery. When an inventor produces a new machine and floats a company for the purpose of selling it, he is ready, as they say in Scotland, to implement his undertaking. It is assumed by the business community that demands for it will be dealt with promptly and in a businesslike way, and that the company will be able to give a supply. If they are not able to do that, what follows? As every business man knows, failure follows, though the idea may be a good one. At the decisive moment prove yourselves businesslike and you will command the faith and confidence of the people. That is the position of the matter.

The only other point I wish to make is this. I speak as one of the public. I do not believe at the present time that we are going to run short of men; I do not believe we are going to be, as far as I can see, defeated by military genius; I do not believe that even mistakes in foreign policy are going to bring us down; but I do think that at this moment finance, and by finance I mean the organisation of the production of the country, should be conducted in the most efficient way for the prosecution of the War. I believe that is of fundamental importance. Why is Germany getting territory in Belgium and France? What has she got there? She has got there plant to be used for production of wealth. What has she got in Poland? Plant, agricultural and industrial, for the production of wealth. She is bent on adding to what I call the producing section of the nation, the production of a large portion of half slave populations held by military conquest. She is bent on releasing the larger portion of her own population for fighting purposes by incorporating into the nation for productive purposes a large section of the neighbouring countries. Against that, what have you got? You have got the British Empire, and all that lies behind the ocean, including neutral countries; you have got the vast potential wealth of Russia; you have got enormous resources, but they must be marshalled, and in order to marshal them in a free country like this, if you are not to resort to rationing or dragooning, or Prussian methods, you can only have recourse to the pure democratic method of government, namely education. I see the right hon. Gentleman the Minister for Munitions in his place, and I ask him to inaugurate a campaign now, of the same force, eloquence, homely appeal, worldwide urgency, to explain to the country the necessity of, and the real mode and nature of, the economy that is asked of it, as he has done in the case of munitions, and as he has done in the case of recruiting.

I am quite sure that the House will extend to me the same kindness which it always shows to those of its Members who address it for the first time. I followed with the greatest possible sympathy the important speech which fell from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Exeter (Mr. Duke), which had special reference to the tremendous and colossal expenditure that is going on in the country just now. It is obvious that no Member can possibly discuss with any intelligence expenditure unless he happens to know what the details are. All that he can do is, so far as he has knowledge, to discuss generally the principles and methods adopted in that expenditure. I can say that there is a very deep and strong feeling throughout the country that the business knowledge of the community has not been used to the extent that it might have been used. It is a truism to say that business is a very great science indeed. It does not matter whether it is the business of a bill-poster, or that of an East India merchant, or that of a large engineering concern, it requires many years of laborious training before you come to any state of efficiency. What happens? All of a sudden the country was plunged into this terrific War, and suddenly a new business was entirely created in the country. One may divide that business under two special heads. First of all you have what one may call the military section, which really had to do in the first instance with getting the recruits, arming them, and deciding how they should be fed. The other section had really to do with the civil side—that is to say, what methods should be adopted in order to obtain the necessary supplies. What I think is felt throughout the country is this, that the Government of the day should have gone down to the great chambers of commerce in the great cities of the country and asked them to appoint committees of their very best men, so that their business knowledge of the intricacies of all the business necessary to carry out the requirements of the country should be at the disposal of the Government. That, unfortunately, was not done.

In some instances large business firms were undoubtedly consulted, but I think too few. Agents were largely used to go about the country, and the result of that system was this, that it became an open market, and every person naturally desired to make as much out of the business as he possibly could. They did so with the unfortunate result of the excess of profits of which we have been hearing so much, and also in the unfortunate labour unrest which arose, naturally, in my opinion, owing to the desire on the part of the workmen to get a share of those profits. No one could honestly blame them for that desire. I am not attempting for one moment to recriminate over the past. I am only referring to the past so that it may be of some use to us for the present, and for the future. I am aware, and the country is aware, that now business men of great knowledge and great capacity are being used, but I do not think they are being used to the proper extent. The right hon. and learned Member for Exeter and the hon. Member for Camlachie (Mr. Mackinder) referred to the necessity of savings on the part of the people in the country. I happened to be the convener of the joint political committee which had to deal with this subject in Glasgow and the West of Scotland. I mention that for the purpose of suggesting that I know a little of what I am talking about. What the hon. Member for Camlachie said as to the work of that committee in Scotland being at an end is absolutely and undeniably the case. The reasons so far as my experience goes for the cessation of work in Scotland were these. Unfortunately, to begin with, the word thrift was used. Anyone who knows Scottish people knows perfectly well that they will not tolerate any person coming down and talking to them about thrift. Whenever I attempted to speak at any of those meetings, I always assured those present that I was perfectly conscious of the fact that they knew infinitely more about thrift than I did. Another cause was that I found wherever I went they said, "There is no use coming to talk about thrift to us, unless those at headquarters exercise it themselves." The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Exeter put the matter very generally and I put it in the same way; but until something definitely on that line is done, and until there is a reduction right down from £10,000 to any sum you like, I can assure the House there is no use whatever in anyone going down to talk about economy; but if that is done, and a campaign is started to go down and tell the country what the future of the country will be financially, unless the greatest possible care is taken, then I am certain that the country will heartily respond.

I am sure everybody who heard the speech of the hon. Gentleman enjoyed hearing it, and if I do not speak of it now in the terms which it deserves it is because it would be only presumption on my part, and I will leave it to somebody of greater experience to do so. I wish to take this opportunity to raise a somewhat more limited question than that which has been raised up to the present.

I was hoping that the hon. Gentleman would continue the discussion on the lines on which we have started. I am very anxious to keep the Debate to the high level which it has reached, and not to descend to particulars, if the hon. Member can avoid it.

I propose to deal more with the general conduct of the War and with reference to the Dardanelles.

if the hon. Member would kindly postpone his observations, I will give him an opportunity when we reach that point. We are now dealing with the general financial question.

7.0 P.M.

I regret that the Prime Minister in his speech this afternoon did not give us a general review of the situation, of the grave financial situation, with which we are confronted. We are asked to sanction a Vote of Credit for £400,000,000. In doing that, let us not forget that we shall very soon have to foot the Bill. We have to consider where and how we are going to raise that £400,000,000. The financial situation is, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer told us recently, that on the 31st March next we shall have a dead-weight national debt of £2,200,000,000. The Prime Minister told us to-day that he estimates our expenditure in the next twelve months at £5,000,000 per day. That means, when you add to it the ordinary expenditure of the country, an expenditure in the next year of not less than £2,000,000,000, towards which we are going to tax ourselves to the extent of £387,000,000, leaving £1,613,000,000 to be raised in the next year, in. addition to the £400,000,000 that we are considering today, either by increased taxation or by loans. Our whole national income is put at a sum of £2,200,000,000, out of which the whole nation has to live, and it is only after the cost of the nation's living has been paid that we have a surplus left available either for extra taxation or for loans. I consider that unless the attitude of the whole nation in the matter of thrift and economy, in the matter of public and private expenditure is radically and promptly altered, if this War is prolonged, as we may fear it will be, that we are going as a nation headlong towards almost national bankruptcy. Our imports, including Government purchases, exceed our exports by not far short of £500,000,000 a year. An hon. Member on this side advocated a register of our foreign investments. I think the hon. Member's suggestion is worth considering; but we must not forget that a large number of foreign securities of the highest description have already been realised, and in my judgment it would be an act of folly to proceed to sell a great many of the foreign securities that we hold to-day which could only be realised at a loss of 30 or 40 per cent. Further than that, the outlook commercially in America is of so excellent a character that there is a hope that the securities which we now hold will in a short time reach a higher value. Therefore it appears to me that it is to the restriction of imports and the increase, if possible, of exports that we are to a certain extent driven to meet the enormous outlay that the nation is undertaking. The possible saving on the part of the wage-earning class of the country is considerable, having regard to the extremely high wages that a large section of them are now enjoying, if only we could make them realise the absolute necessity for it in the interests of the country.

But are we getting value for the money we are expending on the War? I am afraid that we are spending money most extravagantly. I had intended to refer to certain questions showing how extravagantly our money has been expended. There were present a moment ago the Financial Secretary to the Treasury and a representative of the Admiralty, to both of whom I gave notice of the questions I intended to raise. With regard to the Admiralty, one reason why the cost of the food of the people has gone up so tremendously is the enormous rise in shipping freights, which is largely caused by the huge amount of mercantile marine tonnage that has been commandeered by the Admiralty. The figures given by the Prime Minister some time ago were 500,000,000. I do not know what the figures are to-day. It may be all necessary commandeering, and after all the War must come first; but the taking up of that 500,000,000 tons of mercantile marine shipping has undoubtedly increased freights and enormously raised the cost of the food of the people and of the raw material for our manufactures. The Government must have large quantities of pig-iron ore which has to be brought from Spain. In the judgment of shipping experts this huge tonnage of 5,000,000 tons is not being utilised to the greatest advantage. It is under the management and direction of a very excellent Civil servant, but no Civil servant, and no shipping expert is qualified to manage that huge fleet. Some months ago we had the satisfactory announcement of the appointment of a Committee of three shipowners to assist in advising, directing, and controlling the working of this huge mass of tonnage, but I find that they are not given a free hand, that they are not able to exercise their judgment and to make requisite changes: they are overruled by the Admiralty authorities, I dare say with the best intentions in the world. It is no use our bringing in shipping experts to advise and assist unless we give them considerable executive powers.

I would urge the Government to consider not only whether they ought not to increase the powers already given to the three shipping experts now forming the Committee, but also whether that Committee could not with advantage be added to and strengthened. What is happening? Vessels that convey coal from Cardiff to Bordeaux and other ports in that direction come right back to Cardiff and take in coal again, while the freights on iron ore from Bilbao, in Spain, to Middlesbrough have gone up from 9s. to 26s. a ton. If these vessels could call at Bilbao on their way back to Cardiff and bring a cargo of iron ore to South Wales, Middlesbrough, or the iron-using districts, it would have the effect of reducing freights substantially, and in proportion as it reduced those freights it would reduce the cost of pig-iron, which on the West Coast has gone up to the enormous figure of 740 shillings per ton. I will not enlarge on that question, but in the judgment of many shipping experts there is no doubt whatever that that huge fleet of commandeered shipping is not being worked to the greatest advantage, that under expert management probably much less tonnage would do the work, and by the setting free of a portion of the shipping freights would be considerably lowered, the financial strain arising from huge freights lessened and our national expenditure decreased.

Turning to the expenditure of the War Office I do not wish to make any reflection upon the men in the different Departments, who I am sure are doing their best in the national service. But we are not living in ordinary times. We are living in a time of enormous pressure, and it is absolutely impossible for anything like the ordinary peace-time staff at the War Office and elsewhere to cope efficiently with the huge pressure of work now confronting them. Some time ago we learnt that Sir George Gibb, with expert assistants, had been sent to the War Office to control contracts. I brought under his notice a combine of khaki makers and a combine of uniform makers. I gave the name of the secretary in each case, and asked that an investigation should take place, because one naturally associates with combines an arrangement as to prices not to the advantage of the buyer.

The hon. Member said khaki makers; does he mean khaki manufacturers?

I do; and I sent to the War Office the name of the secretary in each case. I am not charging the combine with doing anything more than is quite usual to be done in many trades and businesses. But I say that when I brought this under the notice of the War Office and could not secure any proper investigation or consideration, it did not encourage me to have much confidence in their getting their contracts placed at the lowest prices in the best interests of the general body of taxpayers. When I went back after a little time, I found, to my surprise, that Sir George Gibb and his excellent assistants were no longer supervising contracts at the War Office, and that the making of contracts had drifted back into the old hands who had charge of it prior to or immediately after the outbreak of war. What I submit is that with the enormous number of contracts that have to be made it is absolutely impossible, unless the Government call in to their assistance expert commercial men, that the country should get value for its money under those contracts. That is just as far as I go. Scores and hundreds of the best business men in the country are willing to place their services at the disposal of the nation, but over and over again, when they have offered those services, they have been treated with scant courtesy. I hope that at last the Government will make up their minds that, whether the military section in the War Office dislike it or not, they will insist on bringing in to their assistance expert commercial men and giving them real control over some Departments in order to save the nation's money.

What about the waste in connection with camps all over the country? I am glad that at last that has been recognised. I brought the matter forward in the House months ago. I am glad to know now that the rations are to be reduced and that greater care is to be taken to prevent waste. But to do that you must have a sufficient number of reliable inspectors to go down to all the camps periodically and see that no waste is taking place. I am perfectly certain that there is a strong desire to prevent waste and that many men are doing their utmost in that direction. But the question has become so huge that we need the assistance of a greater number of expert business men. Look at the prices that are being paid for huts all over the country, and the waste that has taken place in the selection of sites for large camps! I went last Saturday to one camp where a representative of the War Office spent twenty minutes in selecting the ground. Naturally he selected the most valuable land in the district, thereby putting it out of cultivation so far as the production of food for the country is concerned, while land close by, of comparatively little value, higher ground, much more suitable for the purposes of a military camp, was left unoccupied. The London and South-Western Railway Company offered to construct a double-track railway line into that camp for the transport of everything required. No, the authorities would not accept the offer. They have gone on transporting by road at much greater cost, with the result that the main turnpike road leading from Exeter to Bath is absolutely destroyed for miles and miles, and, according to my information, after refusing to have a railway for £20,000 to transport cheaply everything required, they will have to pay, according to one estimate, as much as £100,000 for remaking that long stretch of road. The condition of it is deplorable. I traversed it in a motor car, and had no pleasant time in doing it. I need not go further into details. That is one example, and my contention is that generally the contracts entered into on behalf of the Army and the Navy are not being thoroughly and properly supervised. What we need is to call upon the best business men of the nation to come to the nation's assistance in these matters. We do not reflect upon the old officials. They are doing their best, I have no doubt, under most difficult circumstances; but they are quite unable to cope with the enormous pressure of work that this War has created in their different Departments.

Again, may I say that another way to enable the country to meet the enormous expenditure with which we are confronted is that the Government should take more drastic steps to ensure that very yard of land in the country capable of producing food is made to produce the maximum of crops of which it is capable. We want more organisation. We want a little bit more of the German thoroughness in organisation. Germany has made herself practically self-contained with regard to food supplies. We, on the other hand, are importing and increasing our imports, and sending out money by bringing in a good deal of the food supplies that the land of the country, if properly utilised, is quite capable of producing. There is no doubt whatever that, looking to next year, the nation will get a rude awakening. What we desire is that the Government should boldly and frankly face the existing situation, and as that situation is going to be developed in the course of the next year. It is for us to prepare to overcome the great financial difficulties with which we are confronted. We are a wealthy nation, and we are prepared to be taxed to the uttermost. But if the bankers of the country have locked up all their depositors' money in war loans, if those who have money to invest, apart from the bankers, have locked up their resources in war loans, and otherwise, where, I ask, are the increased financial facilities to be got when the War is over, and we need a great expansion of trade and commerce to produce what is necessary and to pay our debts in other countries? I have spoken perhaps warmly, but I feel strongly. At the same time I do not desire in any way in anything I say to suggest more than frank and full criticism. I impute no charge whatsoever to any of the servants of the State, to whom I give credit for having, under very difficult circumstances, tried to do their duty.

I do not propose to follow the hon. Baronet into the topics which he has brought forward, beyond saying that he has mentioned matters of the most extreme importance to the commercial community and to the nation at large. So far as shipping and freights are concerned, consequent on the large commandeering which has taken place, as every one knows, the effect on prices has been considerable. So far as the wastefulness to which the hon. Baronet has called attention is concerned, each one of us in this House could bring illustrations. I leave the matter at that. I want to draw attention, following on some previous speakers, to the finance of the War. We have raised two Loans in this -country. In addition the Government have raised a considerable amount of money by means of Treasury Bills. Sooner or later the question will come: How is the next large sum of money to be raised? In the past two Loans we have had to rely to a certain extent upon the bankers. For my own part I think it must be—and I believe it will be so thought by everyone who thinks about it—recognised that it is quite undesirable to rely upon the banks in the matter of loans. To rely upon the banks mean that the banks have to use their depositors' money, and the result is that the Government is relying upon credit, whereas if the money is actually invested by the actual depositor of the bank directly with the Government the money has a purchasing power, and the purchasing power of that money is taken from the depositor in question and handed over to the Government of the day. If bankers' money only is used, in the bankers' balance sheet there still remains on the debit side the liability to the depositor. Therefore, the purchasing power still resides with the depositor to the extent of the money lying to his credit. You have this position brought about: that you really have a competition of purchasing power by the Government because of the money loaned to them by the bank, and you still have the possibility of the purchasing power remaining in the hands of the depositor.

I believe there is a very close connection between the high prices of today and the operation of the banks that have advanced money to the Government in connection with the War Loans. It has been already suggested in this House to-day, that adequate efforts should be made to increase the interest of the people of this country in the raising of War Loans. I appreciate very much the attempt entered into by the Government to interest the small depositor, but I strongly believe that they did not devise as good a scheme as might have been devised. If you want to interest the small depositors and the small investor to any considerable extent, you will have to put before them your scheme in a manner that they understand, and you will have to give them facilities of which they can make use. In the last Loan the only facilities practically offered to them were the buying of 5s. coupons, and such facilities as were afforded by works and the boards of institutions, by which such works and such institutions took up War Loan Stock, and then their employés or other contributors were at liberty to buy War Loan by means of weekly sums. It is a necessity that the Government for their next Loan should organise a wide publicity campaign. Attention should be drawn to the facilities given by the Government, so that large and small investor alike, of sums of £5 and upwards, may be able to pay for them over a considerable period of time, and thus take up a very much larger sum by way of War Loan. Then comes the question: For what length of period should the War Loan be?

One of the difficulties I have found in addressing meetings of workpeople was that they told me that this Loan was for thirty years, and if they wanted their money they could not get it out. We, who were speakers, replied, "Oh, but you can sell the War Loan, and in that way obtain your money." That, however, is not a sufficient answer. The people are not used to buying securities in that way. It is not their habit. I am going to suggest that in the next War Loan one of the means of raising the money should be by means of short-term bonds, for a period of, say, three years, and that you should give the people the opportunity of paying up their calls over a period of, say, ten months. Take the case of a man who is willing to invest £10. He should be given the opportunity to pay in forty weekly subscriptions. Take the man who could invest £50. He should be given the opportunity of paying £5 a month over a period of, again, ten months.

What would you be doing if you adopted such a course? You would be providing the means of saving, and of utilising the future earnings and savings of many people. You would not be depleting the Post Office Savings Bank or any organisation of that kind if you gave such people to whom I am referring the opportunity of paying their money over a long series of months. Although I have not found the opportunities given by the Government very good ones, still I do think that we owe them some gratitude in that for the first time they have allowed the people—that is to say, the small investors—the opportunity of taking a part in Government finance. To that extent we are indebted to them, but if they will only organise the raising of money so that people can take up and pay up over a period of time, my own belief is that they will accomplish a great deal more than they have done in the past. In addition to the question of a period of time, in addition to the question of issuing only short-term Loans, I would suggest that the Government should extend the principle that they have adopted in regard to Treasury Bills. Anyone who wishes to take up Treasury Bills for £1,000 or more is allowed a fixed rate of interest.

To-day the Government are paying 4¾ per cent. for three months' bills, 4¾ per cent. for six months, and 5 per cent. for nine or twelve months' bills. In other words, they are allowing people with a thousand pounds or more to go at any time to the Bank of England and make a loan to the Government. That principle ought to be extended. The municipal corporations of this country have during a series of years collected three or four hundred millions of money, and they have done it in this way: The banks at one time used to assist them. When the banks declined to assist the municipal corporations, they adopted or invented a method which is common enough in Lancashire. They said to the public, "We are ready to receive your money, and to give you three, five, or seven years' mortgage bonds at a fixed rate of interest." If that principle were adopted by the Chancellor of the Exchequer I believe that he would day by day receive sums of money which in the aggregate would provide to a very considerable extent for the expenditure which is necessary for the War. The loans in question would attract people, because they would know that at the end of three or five years they would get back their principal. They would attract people because they would be doing their duty by subscribing to the needs of the country at this time. The whole of these things are conditioned by the absolute necessity of making such opportunities of investment known. If only the Bank of England were used, I believe such a effort as I suggest would be an entire failure. On the other hand, if you utilise opportunities and agencies which are perfectly well known to the people at large, such a scheme as this would be a complete and pronounced success.

What is there to prevent every post office in the country being a receptacle or office for receiving small sums to pay for a £5 Bond. The small sum could be paid and entered into a pass-book provided for the depositor—he is used to such a book now in the Post Office Savings Bank—and when his £5 or £10 was fully paid up you would give him his bond. What is there to prevent the use of other banks, of every banking office in the country for the men who have £50 or £100, and who wish to take up the Loan of £50 or £100? I would suggest this utilisation of the banking offices of this country, and then you would once more be making use of opportunities very well understood by people at large. You would be giving them facilities which would not exist if you only have the Bank of England as your receiving office. I am sure the House will see that this is entirely different from the scheme of the last War Loan. The last War Loan consisted in announcing very suddenly that you were going to throw open the Bank of England to receive applications for a very short period of ten days or a fortnight, for an enormous sum of money. That somewhat failed in that it did not provide a sufficiently long period of time in which people might pay up their applications for allotment. People, for the purpose of that Loan, would only go in for it practically to the extent of the bank balance they had then at their disposal. That is proved clearly enough by the fact that at the date of the first call over 50 per cent. of the total War Loan issued was paid up in full, and as each call matured a less percentage remained to be paid up each time. The point of the scheme I am suggesting to-day is that the Government should allocate a longer period of time, and in that way they would be providing for people to say to themselves, "I can see during the next ten months that I can take up £150 out of the savings which I am determined to make." You would then be contributing very directly to the plea which has been so powerfully put forward by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Exeter (Mr. Duke) and the hon. and gallant Member for Colchester (Major Evans) and others. You would then be contributing very directly to the plea that a lesser consumption in this country must take place, and increased savings must of necessity follow, and these increased savings must be contributed to the State in order to carry on the War in a perfectly successful way.

I am quite sure that there is a reservoir of financial ability in this country which could give a considerable amount of assistance to the Government in these matters. I think sometimes the Government is far too much inclined to rely upon London advice. After all, there are such places of commercial importance as Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester and others where we know that we are able to think out commercial and financial matters as-well as London; and we not only believe that, but we do feel that we know what the habits of the people are in these places, and as these places I have named are centres of large industrial populations I think it is not asking too much that when matters which affect the whole nation at large are under contemplation, advantage should be taken more fully of men of financial importance in cities such as I have named than perhaps has been the case in the past. The hon. Member for Colchester talked about the necessity for a Financial General Staff I have every sympathy with what he said on that point. We cannot make too serious preparations in regard to the finances of this country. We have listened to suggestions that we should have economy, less expenditure, greater production. All these points are absolutely important, but we have not yet got these points spread throughout the country at large, and they have not yet got into the country at large, simply because there is no organisation by which they can be dealt with.

I am reminded on this point as to the value of organisation of my experience in connection with the last War Loan. There are two Members of this House who told me two entirely different results, as the consequence of two entirely different methods. One hon. Member who was connected with works employing 10,000 or 14,000 men, in the aggregate—I should think three or four works—told me that when the War Loan was open, they themselves opened offices near their weekly pay desks, and gave facilities to their workpeople to buy 5s. coupons. The result was that a total of £20 or £30 of War Loan, was bought on that occasion. Take the case of another hon. Member, who is employing workpeople and paying £2,000 a week in wages. He went to his workpeople and he had five minutes with them in the dinner hour. The result was that at subscription of £3,000 of War Loan was accomplished. My own experience in addressing workpeople with whom I am connected is that I found that they did not understand matters, that they were suspicious about the 30-year Loan, and were not inclined to fall in with the 5s. coupon system. But the moment we offered to buy the War Loan, and to allow them to pay Is. or 2s. a week, the result was that the first week after the War Loan was issued 10 per cent. of wages came back. The whole point lies in organisation. I venture to quote these concrete examples, because I know they illustrate the necessity for financial organisation in this country; and if the Government will be good enough to look for men in the various provinces who have experience, and consult with them in regard to these questions, I believe it will be to the advantage of the country at large. There are many other points connected with the financial side of this War in the discussion of which I would have liked to join, such as the question of external indebtedness, and so on, but these matters have been dealt with by other hon. Members. I think we cannot pay too much attention to the necessity of the Government calling for economy, and the necessity for the Government exercising economy, and of their setting a lead in a propaganda and campaign of publicity of all these matters in the four corners of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

I sincerely hope the Treasury will give very careful consideration to one of the suggestions that has just been put forward by the hon. Gentleman who spoke last, that in the next issue of War Loan, at any rate, certain bonds shall be issued at short term. I am sure a number of small investors would be very much inclined to take short term bonds, because they would feel not only sure of getting their money back, but that they were practically guaranteed against any loss on investment. The Prime Minister, on each successive occasion he has moved a Vote of Credit in this House, has put before us figures increasingly surprising, or increasingly staggering, of, at any rate, very serious import. I think on many occasions he has pressed upon us the necessity for economy, but it is only now, after fifteen months of war, that the Prime Minister has told us that certain definite recommendations towards economy in the direction of contracts, rations, and the use of wounded soldiers no longer fit for service, have been considered. I cannot help thinking that some such pronouncement was overdue some time ago. I am afraid the various and excellent speeches which have been made on the subject of economy, when they only take the form of advice to other people, are not likely to have very great effect, unless they see that some example is set by those who give that advice.

I am sure that not only this House, but the whole nation, is now beginning to understand what a very important part finance is playing in this War. I am perfectly certain that now everybody is beginning to understand that the position of finance is becoming more and more important in comparison with the position in which we stand in the field, and that the dangers which arise from finance are much greater than any military dangers which we either see or are likely to see in the future. The fact remains that we are spending some £5,000,000 a day, and it cannot be too often impressed on the public that that £5,000,000 a day can only come either from the incomes of the people of the country or from the sale of foreign investments, which are the only form of capital they can sell. I am sure there are people who still believe that a capital tax is possible on an occasion like this. There can be no greater fallacy. A capital tax, when that capital cannot be realised, is an impossible expedient. It is no use for the Government to say they will take a percentage of the capital in the country unless they can realise it, and they could not realise it unless there were buyers. It may be said, "We have already a capital tax in the shape of Death Duties," but the Death Duties are only possible because we do not all die at once. It is necessary that some should live in order to buy the proportion of the capital which has to be sold by those who die, and a capital tax levied all at once is an absolute impossibility.

The hon. Member for Colchester put forward, as I think, some very valuable and interesting suggestions with regard to making use of our foreign investments. As I say, I believe they are the only source in addition to income which we have, and on which we must find this money. It has been generally admitted, and I need not labour the point, that the suggestion that half the' income of the nation must go to financing the War is impossible, because, as the right hon. Gentleman the Financial Secretary to the Treasury readily admits, there is such a large proportion of the income of the country which cannot pay this half that it would be necessary to take practically the whole of the other half in order to make up the whole cost. Therefore this question of foreign investments seems to me to be of a greater importance, because sooner or later we are bound to rely on them for finding a portion of the money which is necessary; but, of course, they have a special interest in the fact that they can be used for paying for imports, where otherwise exports of gold can be the only means of paying for them. But I think the principal arguments in taking the steps which my hon. Friend recommends are that there is no suggestion that these securities should be seized at once, or in large quantities. His suggestion is that the Government should take steps to get a register in order to know what securities there are and who owns them. It seems to me that there is no difficulty about ascertaining those facts, and practically we have the machinery already in existence to ascertain the income which people in this country derive from foreign securities. We ask people to declare what income they receive from abroad and they give us a statement, and it would be quite easy in a similar way to ascertain by statement what foreign securities people hold, and that is practically all you want to do. I agree that when you come to acquiring these investments you will have to use some form of compulsion, because certain people will doubtless feel that they want to stick to their foreign investments and not part with them upon any terms. So far as I own foreign investments, I should consider myself fairly treated if they were taken from me and I were supplied with sufficient War Loan to bring me in an income equal to that which I was deriving from my foreign investment. In that case I do not think anybody would have much cause to complain if they were treated in a like manner.

The hon. Gentleman opposite disarmed criticism with regard to the maturing of short term bonds which certainly would have been rather effective if it had not been so disarmed. The suggestion that the Government should issue a Government Bond of like interest and date of maturity to overcome that difficulty seemed to me to be one open to the greatest objections. A great deal had been said on various occasions about enforcing economy, but I am quite sure that no amount of preaching will ever enforce the amount of economy that is necessary. I am now speaking of private property. I hope we shall be able to induce the Government to adopt some example of public economy, but as regards private economy I believe it will be impossible by mere preaching to bring about that saving in consumption which real economy necessarily means. Is it not possible, or even likely, that we may have to come to an arrangement by which a portion of all incomes is paid in War Loan? That would mean a form of forcing economy on a great many people who do not exercise it. It is true that if a proportion, say, a quarter or one-eighth, of people's incomes was paid in War Loan, bonds, or vouchers, according to the size, the individual would receive an investment already made for him. It is true he could sell the vouchers if he wanted the money, but in a great many cases if people had a proportion of their receipts put into their hands in the form of a Government Loan; it would, at any rate, give them the idea, and in many cases an inclination to keep them and not to realise them even if they could. I cannot help thinking that in this way a very large amount of Loan might be taken up which otherwise would not be taken up, principally through carelessness and want of opportunity for smaller people of getting it.

As regards the question of Government economy, which I think is very important, I believe in some Government Departments there has been an attempt, and a fruitful attempt, to economise, whilst in other Departments the resistance has been due principally to a want of proportion in the view of those who resist possible economies where there has been a feeling, which is very natural, that makes people think the particular work they do, or the Department they look after, is the only one that really matters. There is no doubt whatever that the chief offender in the matter of extravagance right through the history of the War has been the War Office. I think there is one thing that must be said in fairness to the War Office, and it is that when a Department is suddenly called upon to expand in the extraordinary way in which the War Office has been called upon in the last fifteen months, and to expand in a very short time, it is not surprising that very great extravagances should be committed from sheer want of machinery and staff to prevent it. At the same time there is no doubt that mistakes of policy were made in the beginning, and if I mentioned them now it is with a view to seeing that such mistakes might be remedied in the future.

The first case I should like to say a few words about is in regard to the way in which munitions were bought in the early days of the War. The Government asked certain manufacturers to make munitions of war. To my mind the proper way for them to have dealt with that matter was to have said to these manufacturers, "If you have to put down special plant to make munitions of war, plant which will be quite useless at the end of the War, we will guarantee you against the loss of what you spend on that plant." If that had been done the manufacturers of this country would have been perfectly willing to take contracts at very moderate prices, and they would not have been inclined to make big profits, because they would have felt more secure against loss of their capital. As it was, the Government steadily refused to do that, with the result that they obliged manufacturers to enter into a sort of gamble because they had to expend money on expensive plant, which, if the War had come to a conclusion at an early date and the munitions would no longer have been required, would have been a direct loss as far as that expenditure was concerned. If, on the other hand, the War lasted for a long time and the manufacturers continued making munitions, they would have recovered the whole of their expenditure on such special plant. It was a sort of gamble, because instead of guaranteeing the manufacturers against loss, the Government gave absurdly high prices, in many cases calculated to allow the manufacturers to get back the cost of their plant in a comparatively short time. I think that policy has cost the country a very great deal, and it was a mistaken policy from the beginning.

I do not propose to labour that point any further, because I have one or two other points to raise. Out of the total expenditure of the War Office, the larger part is payment to the men. There are two or three points in this connection which, I think, are worthy of attention. I have often been surprised that the men who were in receipt of pensions who had previously been in the Army and have been recalled to active service should receive their active service pay plus their pension. That seemed to me to be quite unnecessary generosity, and I cannot see why these pensioners should receive more than the ordinary active service pay, and the pension might be suspended for that period. There is another point which struck me as rather unnecessary. I think we are all agreed that where a man has been in civil employment in the Government service and has gone into the Army he should not be allowed to lose anything by doing so, and should receive the difference between his civil and military emolument. I think that is a reasonable suggestion, but I do not see why a man because he leaves his civil employment and goes into the Army should receive more than he did in his civil occupation, and yet that is the position of all the servants of the Government who have gone into the Army. Instead of receiving the difference between their civil pay and what they actually get as soldiers, which is never less than 7s. a week and is frequently a great deal more, and includes food and clothing and various allowances, they get the difference between their civil pay as it was before they entered the Army and the 7s. a week, no account being taken of the allowances and food and clothing.

8.0 P.M.

I have only got one more point of extravagance, and it is one which arises not far from where I live, and that is why it has been brought to my notice. At a small town near where I live there are, I think, something like 600 men belonging to the Motor Transport Department and about 100 lorries. Those men have been there for a very long time, and for a great many months, and I find that many of them were enlisted in the very first month of the War; consequently they have been enlisted for fourteen or fifteen months. They are in receipt of two guineas a week plus separation allowance if married, and board and lodging, costing the country between £3 and £4 a week each, and they have not done any work, and are not now doing any work, but simply waiting there until they are wanted—

[ROYAL ASSENT.—Message to attend the Lords Commissioners. The House went, and, having returned,

Mr. SPEAKER reported the Royal Assent to—

1. Naval and Military War Pensions, etc., Act, 1915.

2. Clubs (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1915.

3. Dundee Corporation Order Confirmation Act, 1915.]

Vote of Credit

Question again proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."

( resuming ): When we were summoned to the other place I was complaining that in the case of the Motor Transport Service I found that considerable numbers of men had been established for several months at the small town in which I live—there are something like 600 of them with an equivalent mumber of lorries—and I was pointing out that as these men are getting about £2 2s. per week plus separation allowance and food and lodgings, they are not costing the State less than between £3 and £4 per week each. I found on inquiry that several of these men enlisted over a year ago, in the early days of the War, and, as far as I know, they have absolutely nothing to do. They are very disappointed at having so little to do, not having any duties, and I suggest that if they were were not wanted, and if they were merely enlisted in case they might be required, they might just as well have been returned to their civil occupations. Many of them were in good service, and they could have gone on with their civil occupations until they were required. No attempt, however, has been made to make any use at all of these men's services. At Didcot, which is not very far off, the new Army Stores Department is extremely hard-up for labour to do the necessary moving and to put away the Government stores. They have only got a very limited number of soldiers there, and they cannot very easily have any more, because they have not got any huts to accommodate them. Surely some use might have been made of this large body of men, who are doing absolutely nothing. Surely they could have gone over to Didcot to do the work which they have the greatest possible difficulty in getting done at all. Far from making use of these men and the lorries, however, although volunteers in large numbers have been over to Didcot to get the work done—only the other day I went over, myself with 900 men and did a considerable amount of work—it has been impossible to get the loan of these lorries to get the men there. I suppose the refusal may have been necessary, but we tried to get the loan of the lorries, and it was impossible to do so.

I do not know that it is a very big point, but it seems to me to be a case where there has been some want of organisation, and where, if these men have not been required for military service until now, they need not have been taken away from their civil occupation. If it is proposed now to enlist more motor drivers—I was told the other day by one of my own men that he could be enlisted now—then they should be put under the same sort of group system as now prevails in other branches of recruiting and left in their present occupations until required. Finance is really the most important thing which we shall have to consider in the whole conduct of the War, and if we are going to take steps to enforce saving, which is really the only valuable form of economy, we must begin by setting an example in the Government Departments and then endeavour to bring the people to adopt systems of economy and reductions in consumption by making the means more easy for them to acquire some form of economy which they can understand and can appreciate.

I desire to congratulate the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. James Mason) upon the speech which he has just delivered. I am sure that we all very greatly appreciated it. I have had the privilege of serving with him on a good many Committees, and I can say that no more useful member ever sat on a Committee, and the speech which he has made to-night is quite worthy of him. I should also like to congratulate the hon. Member for the Central Division of Glasgow (Mr. Macleod). He bears in Scotland a very honoured name. Very few Members of the House realise, perhaps, that he is the son of the great Dr. Norman Macleod, who occupied such a high position in the ecclesiastical life of Scotland. I am sure if the House generally had known him he would have received a very warm welcome. On behalf of the Scottish Members on these benches I wish to say that we cordially welcome him to this Chamber.

The House is to be congratulated on the fact that on this Vote of Credit the Debate has centred around the real subject before us. Last time a Vote of Credit was taken the Debate centred round the question of Conscription, and I think it was deplorable, when such an enormous amount of money was being voted by this House, so little attention was devoted to the consideration of how the money was to be spent. On the last occasion I spoke I referred to the fact that it is our duty when we axe voting money to see that the House keeps its hand on the purse-strings of the country, and I further said that each Department should be watched to see how the money voted was being spent. In my judgment there has been no improvement whatever in the supervision of the expenditure of the moneys voted by Parliament—absolutely no change what- ever. Here and there you see the great waste that is going on in the country. The Prime Minister said there was a Committee of seven appointed to watch over the various Departments to see how they spent the money. I have no expectation that that will do any good at all—none whatever.

What you could do, and what I advised when the War broke out, was that each Department and each Minister should be associated with some of the business men of the House whose duty should be to supervise the contracts which were being entered into by the respective Departments. That was a very simple proposal. It was one which no House and no Government that had any regard for the expenditure of the many millions which are being voted by this House should have disregarded. It was a very simple suggestion, and Members on both sides of the House with business experience would have been only too glad to render advice in any shape or form to the various Departments, in order to ensure that the money voted was spent in a proper manner. I regret very much that such a plan was not followed out. I was not the only hon. Member who spoke in favour of it. The right hon. Gentleman, the then leader of the Opposition, now the Colonial Secretary (Mr. Bonar Law), from the very beginning of the War said, "You must adopt business methods." But since the formation of the Coalition Government we have not heard any such voice from any quarter until to-day when there has been a suggestion that this War should be carried on by business men.

The right hon. Gentleman told us that he had appointed representatives to go to the Continent to see whether money was being wasted. I know as a matter of fact that an enormous amount of money is being wasted there. After I spoke to the House on the last occasion I had letters from people all over the country giving me appalling instances of gross waste of money, and after that I had a call from an officer who had been on the Continent, an officer in the Territorial Force, who before he went out was a contractor, and he has sent me a letter consisting of eleven closely typewritten pages, all referring to cases of gross waste of public money. I make it a rule, when I speak in this House, never to speak about that of which I have had no personal experience or which I cannot verify. I always examine where possible those who make the statements to me, and therefore in the statement I am about to make to-night I hope to be in a position to produce proof for what I have to say.

Before I come to particular cases I should like to refer to a remark which was made by the hon. Gentleman who last spoke with regard to thrift. In Edinburgh, as, of course, everybody knows, there is a great deal of thrift. There is much more thrift in Scotland than in England. Edinburgh is a very thrifty place, and perhaps Aberdeen is more so. So far as thrift is concerned, it is well to observe that we were instructed, in different parts of the country, to organise meetings in our respective divisions in order to instil into the minds of the people the idea that they must be saving and thrifty. But in every place where men went to speak they were met with the retort, "You go away; instead of the Government lecturing us upon thrift, let them see how they are spending the money when they get it." Further, they said, "Your words are useless; we know the waste which is going on all over the country." The hon. Member for the Sowerby Division (Mr. Higham) said he visited several works in his division and was simply hunted out of the workshops and was told, "You go away. Don't come and lecture us on thrift. You yourself practise economy and carry on your Department in a proper and businesslike manner." I regret to say, as far as my experience goes, there is not the slightest particle of change or difference in the way in which this War is being carried on. When the War broke out the Board of Trade called the attention of the whole country to the necessity of trying to capture German trade What a farce! Why on earth did they not capture German enemies? What was the use of talking about capturing German trade when they were doing absolutely nothing to capture German enemies?

I made one simple suggestion to this House, and that was that all parts of the country should have opportunities of tendering for goods that were required by the War Office. I am glad to see the Financial Secretary to the War Office is in his place. When the War broke out I suggested there should be in some convenient centre in Scotland a place where Scottish merchants might see the goods for which they were asked to tender. That was a simple suggestion which I should have thought any Department would have been only too glad to carry out. In the first place, in the case of some contracts, it is not worth the while of a man to go to Woolwich to see the sample. But a far greater reason is this. I should have thought it would have been prudent to see that your samples were not all kept in one centre. We have Zeppelin raids. Suppose one landed on the particular place where the samples were kept and blew the whole department to smithereens. What good would your samples be then? Surely it is a mere act of prudence to scatter your samples all over the country, so that if they cannot be seen at one place they are available for inspection at another. Directly the War broke out I made that suggestion, and it has taken the Government twelve months to carry it out. I understand they propose to have a depot in Glasgow, as I had a letter from the Financial Secretary to the War Office, dated the 14th September, 1915—thirteen months after the War commenced—in which these words were used:—

Let me give a case to show how the thing works. On Saturday morning a firm received a request to tender for a certain article. I will not mention names, because some of the contractors are afraid of making complaints in case they should be struck off the list. On Saturday morning this firm received the request to send a tender to the War Office, and it had to be at the War Office by ten o'clock on Monday. What were they told to do? They were told between Saturday and Monday morning to come to Woolwich to see the samples. Did anybody ever hear such stupid nonsense? In another case a firm was asked to send a tender for another article. It was a very small article which could easily be supplied in Glasgow, but they were asked to come to Woolwich to see the sample. The firm wrote to me to say it would not pay them on that contract to spend money on the railway fare, the hotel bill, and the return fare. Why is not every sample sent up? The thing is very simple. One feels that there must be an absolute design to see that Scotland does not get a fair chance in this matter. I see the Financial Secretary to the Treasury is present. I hope he will try to do something. Frankly, I do not expect anything will be done, and nothing will be done because the Government has despised the business man. It has taken no advice from any business man so far as I know.

My hon. Friend said we have not consulted one single businessman, and I ventured to suggest that we have.

I mean in this House. That is my point. I understand the right hon. Gentleman gives way on that.

I do not agree. From my own personal experience I can say that I have consulted any number of business men in this House. I have even had the advantage, on certain points, of conversation with the hon. Member now speaking.

If the right hon. Gentleman will excuse me for saying so, that is-a very clever remark indeed. He has never consulted me on business. That is what I was speaking about. When he interjects a remark he should interject one which has some relevance to the subject which I am discussing. Let me give another case. Take the case of contracts for flour. I have bought hundreds of tons of flour. The War Office, when it wants to buy flour from a particular place, does not put in the contract where they want the flour delivered. They say "quote free on rail," thus leaving themselves free to take what they consider to be the best contract. That is not the way to buy flour. What they should have done is to have informed the tenderers where they wanted the flour delivered. Anybody who knows anything of business knows perfectly well that sometimes a man, in order to keep a competitor out of his district, will actually quote lower than cost. That is often done to keep the market. Why does not the War Office take advantage of that? They will not do so. As long as they carry on their present methods we shall have no change whatever. The reason for it is that the Government has not from the beginning used the business faculty of the House. Hon. Members would have been only too glad to render them any service whatever. I would appeal to the Financial Secretary to the War Office to see, first, that in Scotland we have the same legitimate chance of tendering; secondly, that the sample room in Glasgow should be enlarged, and that along with the samples specifications should be supplied. I know one firm went to Glasgow because they thought the sample was there. It was not there, and when they found the sample was not at another address they had to go to Woolwich. That is not fair. Inasmuch as this country boasts of vast business ability, the Government should use that vast business ability both inside and outside the House, so that we can feel that we are doing our very best to meet our great enemy.

With regard to the question of waste, I suppose that each one of us is able to reinforce the arguments we have heard here as to the waste that is going on in all directions. We hear of it taking place at the front, we know it exists in camps, we hear of it from officers and we hear of it from men. I do not know whether the War Office have ever yet taken any proper steps to try and overcome and get rid of this waste. It occurs to me—I venture to say this very humbly and respectfully to the War Office —that one vital mistake they make is that in their provision for the camps—I use the word "provision "in the widest sense—provision is made according to some sort of standard per man, whereas I believe the amount consumed varies very much in the different districts. One change which would be of benefit would be to place an officer—I do not mean a military officer but such a man as mentioned by the last speaker, a man accustomed to being a contractor in private life, but who has now joined the Forces—in some control at a camp or a centre where troops are gathered. He would be able to effect an enormous economy, and do that without the smallest decrease of efficiency or in any way starving or cutting down the ample rations for the men and for the use of all persons who are gathered at the centre. I have heard from men who have come back wounded from the front of the appalling waste that takes place even in the trenches. It seems an extraordinary thing, but I have been told over and over again of the number of tins that are used merely for the purpose of paving the trenches because it is utterly impossible to make use of them. I am sure hon. Members have heard the same story again; and again, either of meat or jam, or something else being used for this purpose of paving trenches. No one wishes—indeed, one need not disclaim the wish at present—to do anything that would decrease the excellent standard which has been set up for the men both at home and abroad; but even the men and the officers themselves revolt at this sort of waste which is going on, and which could be controlled if you got the right man. One of the advantages which the present system offers is that you get a great number of men who are not merely soldiers, but have had a great deal of training in civil life beforehand, and I believe it would be perfectly possible, not necessarily for the War Office, but for the commanding officers to find skilled advice which would decrease the expenditure at camps in the aggregate to an enormous extent.

I have said that on the matter of waste. There is one more practical thing we might do ourselves. It is one of those difficult subjects to deal with, but I am confident that what the hon. Member (Mr. Price) said is perfectly true as to the weight that we have, as Members of Parliament, when we go round to inculcate economy or to advocate subscriptions for the War Loan or anything else. The retort is so obvious. It may be possibly an unfair retort; it may be an unwise retort, and it may not have much weight, but the retort is, "What are you doing yourselves to try to set an example of economy?" I think it would be possible to find some means to reduce the sums which are received by everybody in this House, by Ministers and by everyone alike, if it was only a very small amount. If we took the matter in hand and, from the Prime Minister down-wards, tried to accept a little less, I think people would understand that we had tried in our own person to give some effect to our words—not merely to offer precepts without corresponding personal examples. That is a difficult matter. I should be very sorry indeed to think I was speaking of any particular part of the House, and that is why I suggest that we should begin absolutely at the top, and possibly by a percentage, but it would be something. Let me make another practical suggestion. What do you mean by asking for economy throughout the country? It is no use to say you ought to spend only half your in-come, that you ought to cut off luxuries, and so on. All these precepts are of very little and very imperfect application according as you are addressing particular people who belong to various grades and classes of society. But I think there is one rule we might try to follow. Cam any of us remember a time when we enjoyed a less high standard of living than we have in the last five or ten years? If that be so, if any of us can recall that there was a time when our standard was not so high, I think we might say with confidence, and insist upon it, that the right course at present is to go back to the old standard, a standard which certainly involved less extravagance but which has been cast aside owing to the great increase of wealth in the country and the opportunities of expenditure which have been offered to us during periods of unexampled prosperity. I hope that in these two particular matters I have referred to something real which can be done, and that we shall not merely talk economy in the House of Commons, but endeavour ourselves to practise it.

I come to another matter which I think is of great importance. I have been very much impressed by the scheme which has been adumbrated by my hon. Friend (Major Evans). We must approach all questions of finance from a new point of view. Our country, with a debt of £2,200,000,000—it may be £3,000,000.000 in the course of the next year, and probably will be—must be a very different place from what it was when we had a National debt of something like £700,000,000, which we had greatly been reducing over a period of years, and when we have got this appalling figure of debt the sooner we realise that in our own time, and indeed in the generation to follow, the standard of living can never be so high again as it was in the past, the sooner we shall realise what our true position is. If that be so, are we content to go on with the old system of finance which has prevailed in the past? Is it not quite obvious that we must try and approach the problems that lie before us with fresh skill and new devices in order to overcome our difficulties? I think if we merely rely upon an annual Budget, or perhaps two Budgets in the year, and merely raise a little more by Income Tax, and a little more by other taxes, we have not really grappled with the important problem which faces us. I hope very much that by the increase of power in the output of munitions it will be possible to buy less and less from foreign countries; but I do not suppose we can reckon on the working of that being very different from what it has been in the past during the next six months. So one has to consider whether we are at present taking every possible step to meet the new situation which is rapidly developing, and developing in a certain and sure direction—namely, greater indebtedness on the part of this country to foreign countries, and particularly to America.

What step are we taking to meet that sort of situation? My hon. Friend (Major Evans) begins. He suggests that we should have a register of foreign securities, and particularly American securities. Is that really a very drastic step to take? At the present moment we require a return to be made for the purpose of Income Tax. We are going to require a very drastic return to be made in respect of excess profits. Is it very much to ask that the owners of foreign securities should register those securities and give the information to the Government? It can be kept as confidential as you please, but it would be there. It would be ready. We should not have to wait if the occasion arose when we desired to make use of the information which has been obtained. The information need not necessarily be used under any system of compulsion. It might be quite possible, if the Government knew exactly where to put their fingers on a particular class of security, to approach the right person at the right time, and the terms which would be offered might be so satisfactory that what is called the voluntary system might still prevail. But what I should regret is that we should take no steps at present in order to have that information ready. What I am anxious about is that we should exercise in this matter a certain amount of foresight, and that we should not wait, and be told hereafter that "we never thought this disaster would come upon us; we never fully realised the difficulties of the problems with which we have to deal, and we never expected that the difficulties would arise." We do not want to have that told us in the matter of finance. We want to have all the skill and foresight of business men brought together in order that we may take time by the forelock. I believe that if this step was taken it would increase our credit, because it would be realised that whatever happens in the future we are prepared by measures, sound, useful, and businesslike, to meet any difficulties that can possibly arise. On these grounds I believe the right course is to ask that a register should be made at the present time, so that we may have the means of using it if the occasion arises. What is the proposal, even if it comes into actual operation? It is to change the credit which you give to foreign countries to the credit of the British Empire, and to exchange that on terms which must be satisfactory, because hereafter, whatever may happen throughout the rest of the world, the one country whose credit must stand unimpaired with foreign countries is, I am confident, our own. If we do not take proper steps at the present time to see that we have any opportunity, any chance, any method of dealing with difficulties that will arise, then we shall have to blame ourselves for not having been wise enough when we had the opportunity. We shall also have given another illustration of the fact that we are always trying to muddle through without, even after our recent experience, attempting by proper devices to safeguard the interests of our Empire.

These questions are so great and so important that I believe they really are the most important of all. Our Navy and our Army are able to deal with the military and naval difficulties that are presented by a many-headed foe. But they will need time, and the one danger that this country may possibly suffer from is that, in not having safeguarded our finances with sufficient care, there may be some sort of time limit to the period during which the War continues. We want to prevent any sort of uneasy impatience arising which could put any sort of limit upon the time required by our naval and military forces, who must be allowed to choose their own time to make victory secure. We at home, at least, can do this and reassure them that whatever time they require shall be safeguarded to them.

I want to make a practical suggestion to the Financial Secretary to the War Office, and I am sorry he is not here. I want very much to press upon him, as a means of effecting great saving, the publication of prices for commodities accepted by the War Office. I am perfectly certain that this would encourage a number of manufacturers and providers of supplies to tender who do not tender at the present time. I can speak from my own practical experience in years gone by. The advantage that it would give to the heads of the buying departments of the War Office, the Admiralty, and other Departments would be that they would have some security that there was no favouritism, and that things were being fairly administered. I am not accusing any Department of anything like favouritism, or anything like dishonesty, because I do not believe it exists; it is more incapacity than anything else, and having too much work to do. The only absolute guarantee, in my opinion, for public contracts being fairly let is publicity. It is a very different matter from the buying of a private firm. There the people interested in the management of the concern may be interested in the profits; but here you have public Departments concerned. I believe that the Civil servants in this country are more honest than in any other country in the world. I would not even bar any of our Colonies, and certainly not the United States. I believe there is no country in the world where justice is so fair as in this country, and where Civil servants are as incorrupt as they are here. I make no charge of corruption whatever; but I say that we do hear stories,, absurd stories like the one given by the hon. Member for the Rushcliffe Division (Mr. Leif Jones) this afternoon. I think that story beats everything. I could give many illustrations that I have heard of similar incapacity in the giving out of War contracts.

We know the difficulty that the War Office have been in, and we give credit to them for doing their best under very difficult circumstances. They had the whole of the buying departments to organise for the purpose of the War. My proposal which I think would have very beneficial results, is that the prices at which contracts are let for all kinds of things should be published. This suggestion; and another suggestion, which I now make, not for the first time, would, if adopted, save the country a vast amount of money in the future. It was said by the present Colonial Secretary, when he was in Opposition, that business men have not been brought in sufficiently in regard to giving advice when contracts are let. I want to emphasise the truth of that remark. He said that politicians, as such, were not business men, and that Civil servants, as such, were all suspicious of business men on the average, and that business men were just as patriotic and honest as any other class of the community. I can only say for myself that, although the firm with which I am connected, a large manufacturing firm, is a limited company, and, therefore, has been able to furnish khaki to the Government, I should be most willing, and I have ascertained that my partners would be most willing, to give up entirely that business, if it would enable the country to have the benefit of my services. I should be delighted to give to the country the kind of service that I know I can give more effectively than any other kind of service, and more effectively than speaking in this House, because I am an expert in my own line of woollen cloth manufacture.

I would like to point out that last October, in regard to the question of the supply of khaki the War Office was placed in a difficulty. There were new recruits to clothe, and there were large Armies in prospect. The amount of cloth that had been previously provided had been made by a small number of manufacturers who had made a speciality of this article. The War Office had, therefore, to go outside the usual track, and in their eagerness to get the cloth they made a mistake. I know I am treading on dangerous ground, but it is well-known in the trade, and the House of Commons ought to know it. They made the mistake of not realising the length of time it would take manufacturers to get fully going, and they ordered far more cloth than they need have done in October and November of last year, with the result that when contracts were finished about April, May and June of this year they had enormous stores; stores larger than can be actually known by any system of bookkeeping at the War Office. Any commercial man who had been called in to advise by the Government could have foreseen this result at the time of ordering this particular class of cloth made from crossbred wool. The ordering of these enormous quantities of cloth had the inevitable result that any business man could have foreseen, namely, the forcing up of the price of raw materials. The result has been that these goods have cost this country hundreds of thousands of pounds more than they ought to have cost. I am giving these facts from my own experience and knowledge. Many manufacturers in the trade would have been delighted to stand out and not have anything to do with manufacturing for the Government, and would have been glad to serve the Government in every way they could. This can be done in every part of the Government's buying. We really ought to take a lesson from the Germans in this matter. They have standing committees, which advised the Government in a regular way in buying. They have the benefit of expert advice on every important article that they buy. I believe that this country could have been saved hundreds of thousands, I venture to say millions, of pounds, if expert business men of the country had been consulted earlier, when the War Office had these difficulties to contend with.

It is not too late to begin the practice of economy. I want to emphasise it in every way I can. Officers and men from the Front have told of the waste of bully beef. It is a great mistake to take the appetite of the biggest and hungriest man and multiply it by the number of men in the field to discover the amount you require. We should be quite sure to give them enough, by ascertaining: from experience a good full average and leaving a small amount, and not a large amount, to waste. It is no good telling our wives, mothers and sisters to economise at home if the nation does not economise in its administration. The hon. Member for the Camlachie Division of Glasgow (Mr. Mackinder), with whom, as a rule, I do not agree, made a most excellent speech this afternoon, in which he has shown that what we really want is less consumption and more production.

9.0 P.M.

The real situation is hidden away from the public by this question of money—figures. What we really want is, as he says, for our workers to be working sufficiently to provide either directly or indirectly for our Armies in the field, while the other portion of the workers should be working to provide for raising the money to pay our foreign debts. That brings me to the export trade, and the question which workers shall work for export and which for home production, and which shall work for munitions, is one which will have to be faced very soon, because the export industries of Lancashire and Yorkshire have begun to be damaged already by the absence of the workers who should have been working for the export trade, to produce the money which, as all statesmen agree, we must have to pay our international indebtedness. We have not had sufficient light and leading from the Government to guide us as to how far we are to trench on that reservoir of workers, who are working for the Government at present. I am really astonished, after the experience which the Governments of Australia and New Zealand have had in trying to force the workers to work against their will under the Arbitration and Conciliation Acts, that this Government should have tried to force our workers in South Wales. There are only two ways of getting our workers to do their best. One is by getting them to do it, as many of them are doing it at the present time, from motives of patriotism; the other way, which is one of the best, is by giving the workers some interest in what they do. I know that the piecework system has this disadvantage, that a great many trade unionists find out that the piece rate is cut down, so that in their own interests they have restricted production. I would press upon the Secretary to the Treasury, who is a very important man in the Government, though not at present in the Cabinet—he will be again—to press upon his colleague, the Minister of Munitions, to give the workers in all the 1,600 munition works which the Government control an interest in doing their best, paying them extra wages, depending upon the work which they do. Politicians, and public men, and writers seem to me to have dealt too much with the point of restricting consumption, and not enough with the point of increasing production. We want to increase production. It is most important, if you do not want to lower the standard of life too much in this country. We do not want to impoverish the poor. We must aim at, work for, advocate and explain to the public, as the hon. Member for Camlachie has put it, the absolute necessity, not of prohibition, and not of restriction of consumption, but of increasing production. And if we all work for that we need not lower the standard of living, as would otherwise have to be done.

The only way to cause people to economise is not to talk to them but to tax them. When I have been asked to go to meetings to advocate that people should go without something, I have thought how much more powerful would be the action of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in taking from people increased taxation. Then they will find their own ways of economising. That is the real and the only way of effecting economy. I would support the Chancellor of the Exchequer in raising the Income Tax, and in raising still more of our expenditure from taxation than he is actually doing. To conclude, I would press on the Government to consult business men more, in accordance with the view of the Colonial Secretary, to publish the figures of tenders that are accepted, so as to get things cheaper and give better guidance, and again I would press on the Government to the extent to which they now control the workers of this country to give them an interest in increasing production.

We are being asked this afternoon to Vote £400,000,000, which will carry on this War until the middle of February. Every Member of this House is perfectly prepared to do that, and every Member of this House, while prepared to do it, is entitled to demand from the Government in return that they shall hinder and stop waste, encourage economy, and promote accurate knowledge of the War and its issue. I desire to touch briefly on those points. I want, first, to thank my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Exeter (Mr. Duke) for the speech which he has delivered. I agree with every word of it, and I greatly admired the force with which he put his points. No force is too great at this time to impress on the Government and on the country the supreme necessity of stopping waste and encouraging economy. Every speaker to-day has given from his own knowledge cases in which there is remediable waste in the various Departments governing expenditure in this country. During the last few weeks it has been my duty to call the attention of my right hon. Friend to serious waste in no fewer than six different counties, and waste of as many different kinds in building, waste in material, waste in not giving proper information as to samples of munitions, waste in setting people to make things when they can already be made by experienced people elsewhere. I am not blaming my right hon. Friend; I am not blaming the overworked officials of the War Office, but I do say that it is our duty, in loyalty to the Government and its officials who treat us with the greatest courtesy and consideration, to bring these things to their knowledge and to say here, in our place in Parliament, how gravely we are affected by what we know, and how concerned we are at its effect upon public opinion, in damping down that idea with regard to the War, which we want to see exemplified everywhere.

On that I would add a further word. Besides hindering waste, economy has to be preached and practised. Look at that great Department of Local Government! We ask from the Imperial Government, from the central Government, a much more definite lead than we have had already. Only to-day I have reports from English counties as to the way in which they are endeavouring to bring about retrenchment; but the difficulty is that a very great deal of local expenditure depends upon the direction of Government Departments, and the Government Departments must tell us what standard they insist upon our keeping up to, what relaxations they are prepared to give us, and inform us in the clearest and most unmistakable manner in what way we have to work, when penalties and fines are to be incurred, and when a Grant is to be withdrawn. If advice were given clearly and distinctly in these directions to all the local authorities of the country, each would endeavour to act upon it economically and without undue favouritism. Besides that, there is, of course, the duty of providing for enforcing the necessity of economy. I am afraid that the war saving campaign has not gone with the same success and with the same hearty support which have been witnessed in the recruiting and the munitions campaign. I speak as one who has addressed meetings on this subject, and I would point out that striking examples of economy are wanted, both in central and local government.

We want dissemination of knowledge about the War. I am not going to discuss here the great question of the censorship, but I do submit that if the facts of what has been done by the regiments belonging to the different counties and different towns in the country were officially made known it would bring home to the public to a degree, which has not yet been achieved, the great difficulties which they have encountered in the conflict in which they are engaged. The difficulty is to make the people realise the difficulties and hardships which are endured and the valour which has been displayed; but there is no people more ready than ours to fully recognise those things when they do realise what has been done in the course of this War. It is a part of the Government's duty to see that more accurate information is given, not as to policy or as to what is proposed to be done, but as to what has. already been done, for it is upon the facts of what is done in the field and the courage and persistency shown by Englishmen that the people will be able to measure the vastness of this War. When, by the consent of this House and the acquiescence of the country, it is left to the Government to give directions as to who is to be recruited and who are to be left for the making of munitions and the keeping up of exports for the general credit of our country, we, who look on when that decision is being taken, follow the Government with loyalty and anxiety, and I say with confidence that the decisions which the Government make, and their being right and wise, depend very largely on the country believing that the Government are doing all they can to waste no money and to keep before them the great duty of economy, for after all, it is upon the power of the purse, now as ever, that the success of this great War rests.

Before I make the few remarks which I want to make this evening, I would like to say that I was fortunate enough to catch the Speaker's eye, and I wish, further, to say that it was not my intention then to adopt the course of switching the discussion off from the question which was then the subject of Debate. I thought the Debate was open for any Member to raise any question on which he desired to speak. May I also say how much I feel, and how many hon. Members feel, the force of the speech of the right hon. and learned Member for Exeter. The feeling we have is that the House of Commons is largely impotent owing to the fact that we have not got that effective position in which we can speak and bring forward questions with that sense of responsibility which only Members of accredited position can do. In the few remarks I have to make I certainly shall not abuse the opportunity afforded me, but shall speak with as much restraint as I conveniently can on a subject on which I feel very deeply. I think it is better that criticism on the Government of the day, carrying heavy burdens, should be made in the House of Commons, of all places, rather than elsewhere, because the opportunities for criticism by Members of the House of Commons are seldom abused, and I do not think ever have been abused during the course of this War; and, above all, when they are made in the House of Commons they can be answered. I think the danger to the country is not the criticism of all sorts levelled at the Government, be it just or unjust, but that the criticism of all sorts is made against the Government when there is no opportunity for an explanation to be given; and the danger is not so much in the criticism itself as in the fact that no explanations are forthcoming. I think, too, that the House of Commons of all places is the place where we should undertake such criticism as can be made.

The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Exeter pointed out that the Government has now got control not only of hundreds of millions of pounds, but of hundreds of thousands of lives, and I think it is not only unquestionably right but it is the duty of the House of Commons to watch anxiously and with a jealous eye the use that is being made both of the hundreds of millions of money and the hundreds of thousands of men. I think everyone will appreciate the great burden the Government is bearing, and, if one does direct any criticism to any part of the War which is being waged, the Government should not assume that there is not a general recognition of the large amount of work they have done under inconceivably difficult circumstances, and which has been done wholly admirably and well. I wish to address a few observations to the House about one particular phase of the great War in which we are engaged, and that is with regard to the campaign at the Dardanelles. Many anxious eyes are directed towards that theatre of war. We naturally watch the course to be adopted in that theatre of war, but it would not become me, or any private Member, to say anything about the present position, which is now being considered. We know that it is being care- fully and thoroughly considered by the Government. We know that Lord Kitchener, perhaps the greatest authority on the East, has now gone out there. All I say is that, when a decision is come to as to the course to be adopted, I trust it will be guided almost entirely by the military possibilities which now exist, and will not lose sight of the almost terrible conditions under which the men are now fighting in that place, nor of what another campaign in that theatre of war may mean.

I only wish to direct a few words of criticism to the past, not with the object, may I say with all sincerity of recrimination—nothing is further from my mind than to do that—but because I think it is only by the House of Commons showing that it is anxiously watching this matter, and by bringing forward in a careful and moderate way such criticisms as are now almost public property, and hearing what explanations may be given, that we can see that the machinery of the Government, so far as is possible, is adequate, and that some mistakes that have been made are not committed again. I want, first of all, to direct attention to one or two points which, as I have said, are almost public property, and there are also some other criticisms which have accumulated and form a body of opinion that have come from men who have returned from the Dardanelles, besides what has been put on record by two prominent war correspondents, men of wide experience and knowledge, whose criticisms are now published in the form of literature which is going through hundreds of hands of people who are anxiously watching the present position. The general criticism which I wish to direct is the feeling that is accumulating that when new campaigns are entered into there is not that complete thrashing out by a skilled staff of what can be achieved or of what the potentialities in the hands of the Government are. In other words, there is the feeling that there is not that complete diagnosis of the possibilities of what they can achieve and of the means that they have got to do it. May I say how that arises on matters which are now public property? It has not escaped—it cannot escape—public attention that this vast new campaign was undertaken in the Dardanelles in the first instance at the very moment when we were going through that crisis which arose here owing to the shortage of munitions. It may be that the Government have a perfect explanation to give, but it does strike one that there was not that co-ordination of all the points which should have been carefully gone into before a vast new campaign was undertaken. On that point much public attention has been called to the fact—though I do not know for certain whether it be true or not—that there were really no proper maps on which the first landing was undertaken. There is then the point that there was some kind of unexplained delay in the landing of the men, even when the men had been got out to that theatre of war. I think that is a matter on which some explanation should be given.

There was even a more important matter showing how carefully and earnestly the Government ought to consider these matters before embarking on these new campaigns There was the question of dealing with wounded men. I had occasion, at the early stages of this campaign, to call attention to the want of hospital ships, to the absolute want of dealing with those thousands of wounded men who unhappily had to be dealt with at the very outset of the campaign. I do venture to think that the House of Commons has not only the right but the duty to say that before a campaign of that kind was launched there was a solemn duty placed on the men concerned to see that every human precaution should have been taken to deal with those thousands of casualties. I think, too, that during the many months which this campaign has been lasting the most anxious consideration should have been given by the Government to the state of the health and conditions under which those men were fighting. They must have given the most anxious consideration to the enormous losses that were being incurred, to the inevitable losses owing to dysentery, and all the effects of a long and protracted campaign which was taking place under the climatic conditions which prevailed in the Dardanelles. Those are four general points which are now public property. I do think, when those things are really in the minds of masses of men, it would be a wise and prudent thing of the Government, in the interests of public information, to give such explanation as is possible of the whole of the circumstances to which I call attention.

There is another body of evidence which is now public property in this country. Those are the numerous writings on the one side of Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett, who wrote from the purely British point of view, and a most interesting book which has been written by Mr. Granville Fortescue, who was an experienced American correspondent, and saw the whole campaign from the other point of view. May I say to the Under-Secretary of State for War, who, I am sure, appreciates the intense anxiety which exists for news, and to know the facts and the conditions and the possibilities of what this campaign meant, he really cannot wonder that Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett's lectures are crowded out with hundreds of people, and that those books are literally being devoured by those anxious people. I should like to give two short extracts, one from each of those men. These are both articles which have been passed by the Censor. This is what Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett published to all those anxious people:—

Can my hon. Friend give us an illustration?

I am quoting from Mr. Granville Fortescue. If I may, let me refer to the extraordinarily optimistic statements which were made by members of the Government. I may, as the right hon. Gentleman has challenged me on the subject, refer to the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty at Dundee.

I am not sure that it is quite fair to indulge in those prophecies in the absence of facts. Then there is the later speech made by no less a person than the Noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which he again reiterated that he was convinced we were shortly, I think I am quoting the substance of his words, that we were within sight of success. Then there are the numerous telegrams coming from Athens, Home, and other parts of the world, speaking of the absolute break-up of the Turkish Empire, panic at Constantinople, and so forth. Let me continue the quotation from Mr. Granville Fortescue:—

The only object in referring to these past events is to see, as far as we possibly can, that they do not occur in the future. That is all we can gain. We wish to have no recriminations. But I think that this campaign does show that there have been some deficiencies. Heaven knows the task of the Government in having to create and supervise an Army of 3,000,000 men was a burden almost impossible to bear; but I think we are entitled to demand that, so far as it is possible, the machinery of the Government shall be improved so that such deficiencies and even blunders may be avoided. I am sure we all welcome the statement of the Prime Minister to-day that a really strong staff is going to be created. If a civilian may express an opinion, I hope there will be on that staff some of the strongest and most outstanding of our military people that can possibly be obtained, so that when these new great ventures are being contemplated the whole of the detail of military opinion, of military preparation, and of military possibility, may be thoroughly thrashed out by the War Council before they are embarked upon. That is all I wish to say. I only wish to take this opportunity of putting on record that with an anxious and jealous eye, which I think the House of Commons is entitled to direct towards a Government which has not only the control of hundreds of millions of pounds, but also the responsibility for thousands of millions of lives, we are watching, and I think that some explanation, when the time comes, shall be fully and freely given us at the hands of the Government.

If I do not follow entirely the line taken by the hon. Member opposite (Mr. Roch), it is not because I do not attach the greatest weight to the hon. Member's words, or because I do not think he has made a very weighty statement of the case for inquiry. I do not envy any Member who rises to address the House at a crisis like the present without a very deep sense of responsibility. We know that however insignificant a private Member may be, his words, by the place in which they are spoken and the terrible crisis in which we are placed, may acquire an importance and a power for mischief altogether out of proportion to the significance of the private Member uttering them. But this demand for a Vote of Credit for £400,000,000 lays upon us, as Members of the House of Commons, the duty of balancing our relations with the Government. In trying to do so I shall give up entirely any thought of personalities or of recriminations. The crisis is so great that it seems to me that all personalities and carpings over the past wither into insignificance. What we have to do is not to throw our eyes over our shoulder, but to keep our eyes in front. That also is the duty of the Government. There only does our duty lie, and there, too, does their responsibility rest. The time for settling accounts for what is past may come hereafter, by an inquiry at the end of the War, or before the tribunal of history; but it is not now. So far as I am concerned, I will go further. I am not prepared to ask questions as to details of military or political considerations. I shall follow the direction of the Government. I know how difficult such inquiries may be. I know the perplexed and tangled path along which they have to steer. The political and diplomatic complications and obligations, the commitments of our Allies, the difficulties of military considerations on which expert military opinion may not always be agreed—these are all matters of entanglement and perplexity, and they become ten times more perplexing and entangled when they, as they necessarily do here, impinge one upon another, and each affects the other.

The difficulty of steering a clear path is great, I admit, and I fully give credit for that to the Government. But because the difficulty is great, their responsibility and the necessity for their exercising that responsibility is none the less. Either they must rise to the height of finding a clear path through the difficulty or they will sink into a depth of guilt and responsibility to the country that will be hard to bear. I will go further. I only ask them to find that path, as it is their duty to do, and to steer their way along it without flinching by one hair's-breadth from their settled aim. That way alone lies victory. I will go further still. We, as individual Members, may have formed personal opinions. We have studied the political situation as well as we can. We know the history of the various States engaged in the War, and it cannot but be that each one of us should have formed distinct opinions as to the right course to be followed. But for my part, if the Government announce a decision differing from that which I think is called for, for the honour of the country, I shall willingly surrender my opinion and my support will not be in the least less strong along the clear path which they have chosen if only they announce it and make it clear to us. Do they think that a declaration of this sort, which would be acquiesced in by an enormous majority of the House, agreeing almost unconditionally to support them, agreeing not to ask questions or to pry into details, agreeing that the judgment rests with the Government, agreeing that if that judgment is clearly given we will surrender our own opinion and give them an unquestioning support—do they consider that a declaration and support of that sort would be of doubtful value? Let them get rid of the idea of some strange conspiracy which they have conjured up in their minds and which seems to haunt their dreams and paralyse their action. Can they not throw that idea aside and accept that submission of our individual opinion, that free surrender of our judgment, which we freely offer without restraint or question? There is only one condition that we attach. We must see that that clear path has been chosen and is being followed. We must have sufficient evidence that that fortitude of purpose and rapidity of action which the situation demands are really being exercised by the Government.

The whole nation is vibrating with one single purpose, and is prepared to throw all its energy in the attainment of that purpose, which is the carrying on of the War to a successful issue. Can the Government not give out a clear clarion note and point the way along that path? Can they not give us a lead? Will they still continue to allow us to live in the fog of doubt and hesitation which paralyses all effort? Surely this is no exacting demand for us to make in return for our full and cordial support? If we say a word against the Government we are accused of all sorts of intrigue, underhand dealings, personalities, and recrimination. I set that aside. I have nothing to do with these conspiracies. I know nothing about them. But I cannot give support unless evidence of a clear path and a clear purpose can be discerned. I shall mention only in a very few words one or two-matters which seem to me to indicate that that clearness of purpose is singularly lacking in this Government. Have we not had a little too much of this whining about journalistic and other criticism? You have practically closed the mouth of this House, and you are masters here. Very rarely have we any opportunity of" opening our mouths in criticism. Is it worthy of the dignity of the Government of this great country that they should be so unduly nervous and afraid of anonymous journalistic criticism by a few miserable organs of the Press? We are told that they welcome criticism, but it must not, according to the new dicta, be criticism that tends to drive a Minister out of office. What is the use of criticism if, when you do not approve of the conduct of a Minister, it is not to be effective? Is it to be the case that you must not criticise if you think your criticism will possibly help to drive a Minister from office and put another in his place?

The Government might be strong enough to set aside that sort of consideration, and not show that undue sensitiveness and timidity which they have shown. If they would recover from that fit of nervousness into which they seem to have fallen and take the House of Commons into their confidence and allow free criticism here, it could be answered, not anonymously; responsible criticism could be answered openly and in this House. Another matter seems to me to indicate something like infirmity of purpose. We hear a great deal about the necessity for saving and thrift. I do not wish to reopen the financial discussion that took place in the earlier part of the evening, and which was so instructive and so helpful. But have you taken in your own sphere? This question will go on being asked by the nation: "Have you begun in your own sphere to exercise that saving, that thrift which you have been preaching to others?" It is all very well for millionaires with thousands a year to come down and tell us, who have been accustomed all our lives to endeavour to save, and have had before us all our lives the fear that the constable might overtake us, that we must live on half our income. That is what we have been trying to do all our lives. They tell the poor men that they are to save a nation like this. Explain the financial position! Preach saving and thrift with the same assiduity that you preach your recruiting campaign. Bring light to those who can possibly help. But do not preach in words and fail in practice!

In the matter of administration, have you given us that clear lead and that clear light that we need? What were we told when we asked that responsibility should be concentrated in a small number of people? First a little, and then after a few days a further few words come out to the effect that the fifty-first Committee of the Cabinet would be appointed. The Prime Minister has told us that already there have been fifty Committees, and that this fifty-first is to consist, for some mysterious reason, of between three and five members. We are not told who are to be the members. We are not told exactly what power they are to possess. A little light was thrown upon the matter in the speech of the Prime Minister. A little more light was thrown upon the matter by the speech of Lord Lansdowne in another place yesterday. Why cannot the Government make up their mind as to what they intend to do, and declare it once for all? This is a moment which does not brook delay. If you are going to settle your business, settle it and be done with it.

I turn to another, and perhaps the greatest of the matters I wish to refer to—Serbia. What is our line in that matter? On 28th September we had a statement by the Foreign Secretary which quite recently has been explained by that right hon. Gentleman. I venture to think that no fair-minded man who listened to that statement in the House of Commons would put upon it that interpretation. We have had a further statement from Lord Lansdowne in the other House. I heard it. It differed altogether from the statement of 28th September, for the Noble Lord told us that the time for effective aid to Serbia was past. We have had another statement from the Prime Minister, to the effect that the independence of Serbia would be one of our chief and most settled purposes in the War. But we know what the state of Serbia is now. We know how she has been deprived of two-thirds of her territory, and how her army has been harassed. We can picture to ourselves the horrors that are now, while we speak, being enacted there—which should provoke something more than smiles from hon. Members. What is to be achieved by the settled purpose of the Government in regard to the independence of Serbia? Is it to be a sepulchral monument? I doubt if there will be much room for anything else. We were told that the Government had fully considered the situation. A fortnight or three weeks ago we sent out a General to report. That General must already have sent in his report. Instead of hearing anything about what we were told, we now hear, after two or three weeks have passed, that Lord Kitchener has gone out to report.

Does that look like a settled policy, a clear indication of leading, and of the line which you wish to steer? These are only a few instances. The story is one of fatal procrastination. It is not a matter of personal recrimination. But we accuse the Government at the present time, and every hour that is now passing, with a fatal vacillation which is eating like a canker into the whole of the nation. I would venture to use to the Government the words of the Divine message sent to Joshua in the peril of the children of Israel,

It struck me that the speech to which we have just listened was, perhaps, a trifle dismal in tone, and I cannot help thinking that the hon. Member who represents two famous universities in Scotland might have had a rather fuller acquaintance possibly with the past history of this country's wars. I do not know whether those universities go to modern history so modern as the days of the Crimean war, but possibly the Crimean war, when it was being waged between us and our present Allies, gave to the world even worse examples of terrible mismanagement than the present one. And if you go back further, and read of that heaven-born minister William Pitt, you will find that even William Pitt occasionally made expeditions rivalling the Dardanelles in fame. There was an expedition to Dunkirk, in which we did not exactly shine. There was also an expedition to Buenos Ayres and Monte Video, which, of course, has always been carefully obliterated in English history. Then there was the Walcharen Expedition, in which thousands of Englishmen died of disease, and also Corunna, in which the British troops by the very skin of their teeth saved themselves by getting on board ships. It is by remembering these things, I think, that you are in a better position to criticise the Government than by thinking that everything in the past has always gone well with us in war time, and that in this War there has been exceptional blundering. We have always blundered in the past, and have always pulled through in the end, and the worse blunder you get into, the more the credit for getting out of it. I want to raise a few questions about the Dardanelles expedition, and, before doing so, I would like to thank the Government for giving us an opportunity of criticising them on military questions. At the same time one is tempted to ask why, when there are twenty-two members in the Cabinet, none should manage to be present. Of course, one would not like it to be said that they "sacrificed their coffee." We have present, however, some very amiable Under-secretaries.

I do not think we could have anybody better fitted to represent the Government than the Under-Secretary for War. I am one of those who entirely approve of the inception of the Dardanelles expedition. I believed at the time it was justified, even although it was a gamble. If we had succeeded in forcing the Dardanelles, the success would have been enormous, and the result to the whole course of the War would have been decisive. Everybody, when contemplating that expedition, whether at the Admiralty, or in the Cabinet, or at the War Office, must have realised that it was a gamble, must have worked out the risks, and must have decided that, even though the chances were against its success, the chance of breaking through the Dardanelles was worth the risk. That is what you have got to do in war time. You have got to take risks. You cannot carry on war on the principle of limited liability or insurance. What was the immediate event preceding that expedition to the Dardanelles? It was the capture of Antwerp, solely by the use of heavy artillery, by the Germans. The history of the War up till then had been one long series of successes of heavy guns against fixed fortifications. Anyone living through those early months of the War, and seeing the success of big howitzers against fortifications must naturally have had a bias towards the great gun, and it was no doubt partly those early successes of the great gun that led people at the Admiralty—I have no reason to speak for the Admiralty of course, but neither the late First Lord nor the present First Lord is here—to attach greater importance to the heavy gun power of the Fleet than subsequent events have shown to be justified. But I would put in this caveat: it was not only that there was a chance of success, but we had also, as subsequent publications showed, a very insistent demand from Russia for assistance, both at the Caucasus and to enable the wheat supply of Russia to get out in order that the Russian exchange might benefit.

Unfortunately at the beginning of the War the whole of the Army Council dashed off to France, anxious to gain laurels and command armies, quite naturally. As the whole Army Council went away, we had no efficient Army Council left behind. [An HON. MEMBER: "Oh!"] I repeat, no efficient Army Council: ask anyone in France, and he will tell you. There was not in England, at the time the Dardanelles expedition was decided upon, a body of military opinion capable of giving the best military opinion in the country on the question. That being so, I for one absolutely decline to put the blame either upon the Cabinet or upon the late First Lord of the Admiralty for the initiation of that Dardanelles expedition. I think probably after the 18th March it was unfortunate two months were wasted before the Army was landed, but it was unfortunate that they were forced by their small numbers to land at the tail end of Gallipoli instead of further up. But, so far as that expedition is concerned, I believe the criticism which has been levelled against the Government is to a certain extent unfair. They had to take risks. They knew they were taking risks, and it happened to turn out badly. I do not think the Government are to blame for this: seeing that it has turned out badly, they ought to be able to cut their losses without talking about loss of prestige. What does prestige matter while the War is going on? British prestige will not be in question by what has occurred during the War, but by the peace which we impose upon our adversaries, and, therefore, to talk about the abandonment of the Dardanelles expedition as though it were going to set India in a blaze, drive us out of Egypt, and upset our whole position in the Eastern world is, to my mind, nothing short of ridiculous.

Everyone knows in peace time disaffection, and a sort of Radical opinion as I sometimes express, can be expressed safely in the subject countries. In India and Egypt it is quite possible disaffection in peace time might be a nuisance and even dangerous, but disaffection in war time is absolutely helpless, because the value set on human life has gone down, and the machine gun is something far more terrible than the policeman's baton. Populations directly hostile to their masters, such as the Czechs, the Poles, or the men of Alsace and Lorraine, when it comes to actual war, are bound to go with their masters. Subject races will have to obey as long as war goes on, so that the question of the loss of prestige may be ruled out of the considerations before the country. In his very able speech at the opening of this Debate the hon. Member for Pembrokeshire made certain criticisms upon the actual equipment of the Army that went out to the Dardanelles. I do not think that on the whole those criticisms upon the condition of the Army were quite justified. I know we had maps which struck me as being quite good enough, and they were superior to the maps supplied in South Africa. The feeding of the Army also struck me as being very superior to what I had been accustomed to fifteen years before, and the arrangements for the wounded, while nothing like so good as at present goes on in France, was certainly so infinitely superior to what went on in Hospital No. 9 at Bloemfontein that one could not compare the two for a realty well-thought-out arrangement.

10.0 P.M.

There were not doctors enough, and there were not enough hospital ships. I went away from Gallipoli with 800 men on a hospital ship with only three doctors, (one of whom broke down through overwork on the voyage), and twenty-five orderlies. After all, when you are hundreds of miles from your base, and the ships used were bound to be transports, and the doctors were more wanted on shore, where the battle was still raging, rather than on the ships, I should be the last to say that these hospital arrangements, though anything but perfect, could by any twisting of terms be worked up into a scandal, or anything like the scandal that applied to No. 9 Hospital at Bloemfontein. The House must remember that an absurd optimism always seems to precede our expeditions, and therefore arrangements which are conceived to be ample for our anticipated losses are bound to seem rather short when those losses are largely exceeded. Although the Army was, I believe, well equipped, and although I believe the Army which originally went out there was very well generalled, after all, I think, nobody in this House has ever heard anything but praise for General Birdwood, who commanded at Anzac, and I trust that a mere inferiority in rank will not be a bar to his more distinguished promotion. I do not think the same can be said of the expedition that proceeded to Suvla Bay. That expedition was unfortunate, but what was more unfortunate was that after we had that severe reverse—and no other term can be applied to it—at Suvla Bay, the country was kept in entire darkness as to the extent of that reverse. It is no good trying to conceal reverses when you have hundreds and thousands of men who have been wounded coming back to this country. It is no use trying to conceal these facts, because anyone can write to a Member of Parliament without having his letter censored. I have seen letters from my own colleagues who are Members of Parliament dealing with this Suvla Bay affair, which paint the position and mistakes which were made in exceedingly black terms. But it is no use complaining of what went wrong at Suvla Bay. It is no use washing dirty linen in public now, but what is important is that the House and the country should be assured that these men who conducted those Forces to disaster are no longer in a position of command. Many lives have been literally thrown away by the mistakes made at Suvla Bay. We know perfectly well that there was a good chance when that Force was first landed of breaking through the Dardanelles, and winning the fight, as the then First Lord of the Admiralty declared, at Dundee, in a speech for which he has been universally and, I believe, unjustly blamed. We know perfectly well, and the people of this country know perfectly well, that it was bad leadership that did it. We want to know if those generals are still commanding our Armies, or are they likely to be sent with an increase in rank to command somewhere else. It is often said that it is unjust to criticise a general who makes mistakes, and it is said that it is very unfair; but we are now in a position that we cannot consider the feelings of generals, and we have to consider the feelings of the country as a whole, and if an injustice is done even to a dozen generals that cannot be helped, for we have to look to the country first and the weeding out of the bad generals. They must be got rid of even at the risk of including many men who are being unjustly blamed, and whose conduct was really admirable, but who have got to bear the brunt of the blame.

In France they resort very largely to a system of dégommage, under which generals who fail are sent back, and we have seen the result in the revolution in the morale of the French Army, which is perhaps now composed of the best soldiers history has ever known. They have faith in their generals, of which we could do with a little more of; they have a belief in their strategic policy and their personal courage, and they have arrived at this state of things by a recourse to the weeding out of everybody who made a failure. There are at the present moment in France dozens of men who are admirable generals, but who have been sent back. If anybody made a failure, back he was sent. I do not believe that we have a similar reserve of talent to fall back upon like the French Army. What we want in our Army is quicker promotion. Men who are majors and captains at the beginning should be promoted to higher commands. Officers in the trenches who ought to be commanding are being killed off while others on the Staffs behind the line continue in command. This Suvla Bay expedition ought to have been made an example by the Government of the way to treat unsuccessful generals. I do not want their names published—the person who is responsible is the person who appointed those generals—but we do want to know that these men are not to be given further commands. We know that there are two generals out there still, and unless something is done, something radically done, by the Government to change this state of affairs and to see that there is a real chance of the British soldier getting efficient leading and a real chance of quick promotion for the junior ranks among the generals you will have a very dangerous cleavage between the men in the front line who are doing the fighting and who are suffering the casualties and the people on the stall behind. I think the whole thing is a very strong argument for an Army Council here who can deal with these matters. If you had a strong body of military opinion in the War Office here, they would be able to deal with these problems in a way that is absolutely impossible for the Cabinet to deal with them at the present time. The Cabinet, whether of twenty-two or seven men, are not experienced in military matters, and they cannot act with decision. They cannot form judgments upon the capabilities of the generals; but with a strong body of military opinion, who would be unswayed by family ties and by old friendships and who would act strictly from the point of view of the public interest and the public interest only, there you would have a body which could restore, because it is a question of restoration now, the confidence of the people of the country in the leadership of the Army in the field.

That is the real lesson of the Dardanelles expedition. What we ought to do now is, of course, a matter for this skilled military opinion. To my mind the real new factor is the possibility of the Germans getting through with heavy guns and high explosives to the Dardanelles. It is easy enough, I think, at present to withdraw any troops that we have there, but whether that will be possible three weeks or a month hence is a very great problem. The decision, if it is to be made, should be made quickly. If they are to stop at Gallipoli, then preparations should be made for very deep dug-outs; they should get the best experience from France of the means of meeting the heavy artillery the Germans use on the Western front, and they should prepare in earnest for a serious offensive winter campaign, If, on the other hand, they are to come away, they should come away very quickly. To my mind, the Serbian question is the key of the East at the present time, and I am thankful that we have out there two such men as Lord Kitchener and General Monro to give us the best military opinion on that expedition; but I must say that I view with considerable misgiving the position of ourselves relative to Greece. Working with a foreign port as our base in a country having an army of some 300,000 troops is a very serious undertaking, and I do hope that there, too, we shall not have troops sent out by driblets, as was the case in the Dardanelles, but a large force sent out simultaneously as quickly as possible, or none at all. The worst thing about the Dardanelles was the constant arrival of small bodies of fresh troops without the generals in command being in a position to say exactly what force would be at their disposal at any particular time. The continuous begging for troops is not the best ground for a general to make a satisfactory plan of campaign. Therefore, if anything is done in Serbia, for goodness sake let ourselves and our Allies send as many troops as possible and not just as many as may be eaten up by the conditions of the campaign out there.

I have trespassed rather long on the attention of the House. I am afraid that I have touched on subjects which are dangerous to touch upon, but to my mind the free expression of opinion here, though risky, is of such importance that even the giving of information to the enemy about past events may be worth it, provided the people in the country believe that they are getting real genuine information from their own representatives and from their Government. I am extremely sorry that the late First Lord of the Admiralty is not here to-night. All that I have said in defence of the Dardanelles Expedition could have been said, and would have been said, I am certain, much better by him. It would have been a good thing for the country had he spoken. I hope he may yet take an opportunity, before this Vote of Credit is through, of speaking on this question, not only with a view of putting his reputation right—after all, his reputation does not matter—but of showing that things are not arranged on quite such a hugger-mugger-muddle basis as seems to be the very general impression at the present time. If I have said anything which has given offence anywhere, I hope that the public at least will believe that I have only spoken after great hesitation, and only with one aim in view, and that is the successful and satisfactory carrying through of the War.

May I ask your ruling, Mr. Speaker, on a point of Order? In an ordinary Debate, when the Government gives facilities to the House of Commons to criticise their procedure, it is open to any Member, if no Cabinet Minister attends, to move the Adjournment of the Debate. The question before the House is, "That this House do now adjourn." I do not know quite, under these circumstances, how we can show that the majority of the House feels strongly the great insult which has been put upon it by the non-attendance of Cabinet Ministers. [Cheers.] Could you, Sir, tell us in what way we could show that disapprobation, either by moving the Adjournment of the Debate or by some other method?

The hon. Baronet has, I think, taken the best method of arriving at his object.

The cheers which greeted him probably show that the House thoroughly approves of what he has said.

HON. MEMBERS: Let us adjourn now.

Question put, and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at a Quarter after Ten o'clock.