( speaking from the bench behind Ministers ): My letter to the Prime Minister gives fully and truthfully the reasons which led me to ask for release from His Majesty's Government, and I do not need to add anything, so far as I am concerned, to it this afternoon. But I think it important to point out that those reasons do not apply to any other Member of the Cabinet. No other Minister who does not hold a laborious office, and is not on the War Council, has been so closely connected as I have been with the conduct of the War for its first ten months. In the second place, I alone have open to me an alternative form of service to which no exception can be taken, and with which I am perfectly content. Neither does the fact that I do not take my place on the Front Opposition Bench imply any criticism of those who do. In particular I earnestly hope that the right hon. Member for Dublin University (Sir E. Carson) will find it possible to be constantly in attendance in the House.

It is a high public interest that someone with complete secret information of the whole position as it is to-day, someone unimpeachably devoted to the public cause and altogether independent of the Government, should be available. That bench is the right hon. Gentleman's war station, and I hope that he will continue to occupy it for the good of the House, for the good of the country, and for the good of the Government. I had great doubts as to whether I should trouble the House at all this afternoon, but I feel that I ought not to leave this country without dealing to some extent, so far as the public interests permit, with certain episodes and incidents in the Admiralty war direction which occurred during my tenure of office. These have been the subject of much comment in the country, and I have lain under serious reproach in regard to them. These incidents are, first, the destruction of Admiral von Spee's squadron in the series of operations which included the actions at Coronel and the Falkland Islands; second, the loss of the three "Bacchante" cruisers; third, the attempt to relieve Antwerp; and fourth, the initiation of the naval attack at the Dardanelles.

With the first two points I can deal very shortly. It is for the First Lord of the Admiralty to decide when the story of Coronel and the Falklands can be told. I see no reason why it should not be told now. More than a year has passed. The seas have been swept clear of the enemy's flag. For more than six months the entire naval situation has altered, and I cannot conceive of any military or naval reason which should prevent the story being told. If it were thought undesirable to lay a Paper containing paraphrases of the authentic telegrams, I would suggest to my right hon. Friend that a full account should be prepared from the authentic documents by some good naval writer—Julian Corbett or someone like that—with Admiralty authority, in which it would be shown that the political head of the Admiralty was in full agreement with his expert advisers, at that time Prince Louis of Battenberg and Admiral Sturdee. It would be shown that the Admiralty's dispositions were sound, probably the best that could have been made in all the circumstances, and I think that this can be proved without detracting from the gallant devotion of Admiral Craddock. It would also tell a fine story of blue-water operations, of which, owing to our preparedness and our strength, we have only had too few in the case of the present War. All my directions and comments had been made in writing. All my business at the Admiralty was conducted in writing, and my right hon. Friend has my full authority to quote or publish any minute of mine on this subject which may be considered relevant or of interest. More than that I cannot say. It would be impossible to give an idea of that operation without maps, charts, and an intrusion on the time of the House which I certainly cannot think of making, and I will leave the matter entirely in the hands of my right hon. Friend.

With regard to the three "Bacchante" cruisers I must be more definite. The definite charge has been made, and publicly repeated, that I overruled the naval authorities in keeping these cruisers out against their advice, and that the disaster was due personally to me. That charge is not true. I take general responsibility for everything that was done or not done, but it is not that invidious responsibility which falls upon a Minister who incompetently overrules his professional advisers. It is for the First Lord to determine what should or should not be published. As far as I am concerned, I make no objection to everything being published; but I do not press for it, as the papers might do injury to officers who are serving and to others. I do not see that I can do more than that. Let it be fairly understood that I am not the cause of any withholding of papers from publication. It is not in my interest that they are withheld, though I do not in the least wish to press for any publication which the naval authorities consider is not, I will not say in the public interest, but is not convenient to the smooth and orderly working of the Admiralty administration.

I now come to Antwerp. Here, again, I hope to be brief. The project of sending a relieving Army to the aid of Antwerp did not originate with me. It originated with Lord Kitchener and the French Government. I was not concerned or consulted in the arrangements until they had advanced a long way, and until large bodies of troops were actually moving, or under orders to move. On the night of the 2nd October, at midnight, I was summoned to a conference at Lord Kitchener's house, where my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the First Sea Lord, and others were present. I then learned what, to some extent I knew from the telegrams, first, that plans for sending a relieving Army to the aid of Antwerp were already far advanced, and were being concerted between Lord Kitchener and the French Government; that they had not yet reached the point where definite offers and promises could be made to the Belgian Government; and that, meanwhile, that afternoon, the Belgian Government had telegraphed their decision to evacuate the city with the Field Army, to withdraw from the fort, and practically abandon the defence.

We were all extremely distressed at this. It seemed that at the moment when aid was available everything was going to be thrown away for the sake of three or four days' continued resistance. In these circumstances I offered—and I do not regret it a bit—to proceed to Antwerp at once, to tell the Belgian Government what was being done, to ascertain the situation on the spot, and to see in what way the defence could be prolonged, until either a relieving force could arrive, or the impossibility of sending a relieving force could be established. My colleagues accepted this offer on my part, and I crossed the Channel at once. Next day, having consulted with the Belgian Government and with the British Staff officers who were in Antwerp watching the progress of operations, I made a telegraphic proposal. I had to be extremely careful not to say anything on behalf of the British Government which would encourage the Belgians to resistance in the hope of getting help which we could not afterwards make good. But the proposal which I made may be briefly stated. It is all set out in the telegrams, and some day can be made public. It was as follows: The Belgians were to continue their resistance to the utmost limit of their power. The British and French Governments were to say within three days definitely whether they could send a relieving force or not, and what the dimensions of that force would be. In the event of their not being able to send a relieving force, the British Government were to send, in any case, to Ghent and to other points on the line of retreat, British troops sufficient to ensure the safe retirement of the Belgian Field Army, so that that Army would not be compromised through continuing resistance on the Antwerp fortress line. Incidentally we were to aid and encourage the defence of Antwerp by the sending of naval guns and Naval Brigades, and by other minor measures. This proposal I made, subject to confirmation on both sides. Nothing was settled until both Governments accepted. The proposal was accepted by both Governments. I was informed by telegraph that a relieving Army would be sent, and its dimensions and composition were sent to me for communication to the Belgians. I was told to do everything possible to maintain the defence meanwhile. This I did without regard to consequences in any direction.

I am not going to describe the military events, which are well known, but I think it is a great mistake to regard Lord Kitchener's effort to relieve Antwerp—in which I played a subsidiary though important part—as an event which led only to misfortune. I believe that military history will hold that the consequences conduced extremely to the advantage of the Allies in the West. The great battle which began on the Aisne was spreading day by day more and more towards the sea, and everything was in flux. Sir John French's Army was coming into line, and beginning the operations of the battle of Armentières, which developed into the great battle of Ypres, and everything was in flux. The prolongation of the resistance of Antwerp, even by only two or three days, detained the German forces in the vicinity of the forts.

The sudden and audacious arrival of a fresh British Division, and a British Cavalry Division at Ghent and elsewhere, baffled the cautious German staff, and led them to apprehend that a large Army was arriving from the sea. At any rate, their advance proceeded in a halting manner, although opposed by weak forces; and I believe it will be demonstrated in history—and certainly it is the opinion of many highly competent military officers at the present time—that the whole of this enterprise and moving of those British troops, and the French troops who were in association with them, although it did not save Antwerp, had the effect of causing the great battle to be fought on the line of the Yser, instead of 20 or 30 miles further south. If that is so, the losses which were incurred by our Naval Division, not very heavy in life, will certainly have been well expended in the general interest. Of course, it is true that these operations were begun too late. But that is not my fault. On the 6th September, nearly a month before, I drew the attention of the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for War, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the dangerous situation which was developing at Antwerp, and to the grave consequences to the Admiralty interests which would be entailed in the loss of that fortress. I suggested that a Territorial Division should be sent to stimulate the defence, and made other proposals of which I will say that the difficulty of adopting them was certainly not less than the need to adopt them. But no action was taken upon that, and the situation of 2nd October supervened, as I have described.

That is all I wish to say on this point, except in regard to the Naval Brigade. The decision to send the Naval Brigade was actually taken over here by the Government, at my desire; but the decision was actually taken here. I had no authority from Antwerp, where I was, but the quality of these brigades was known only to me. If there is any blame for putting troops of that character into a business of this kind, that blame falls on me, and on me alone. Let us see whether there was any blame. The situation was desperate, and the need bitter. I knew that Lord Kitchener would not send a Territorial Division. I knew it would be wrong to lock up a Regular Division in a mere fortress line. These were the only men who were available. They were the nearest. They were at Deal; they had a few hours' march into Dover, where the transports were lying. They were the only ones that could get there in time.

It is quite true that the Naval Division was only made up out of what the Navy could spare and leave behind after the mobilisation took place. They had good non-commissioned officers, and a sprinkling of trained professional officers, and they had rifles, and plenty of ammunition. They had been together for a couple of months or six weeks. They had acquitted themselves elsewhere on terms which would not do any discredit to the finest troops of the Regular Army. They were undoubtedly unfit to manœuvre in the field, but that was not what they were for. They were going into trenches alongside of exhausted Belgian troops and townsfolk, who had received far less training than they had, and who were far less well equipped. Under all the circumstances they were, I may mention, in exactly the same position as the Division of Fusiliers Marins who were sent by the French at the same time, and fought in a most gallant manner in all these operations. Therefore, I say, there being nothing else in view, I was justified in proposing to the Government to use those troops, in spite of their want of training Of course, all these matters can only be judged fairly in relation to the great emergency in which we stood. That is all I say about Antwerp.

I now come to the Dardanelles. What am I going to prove or try to prove about the Dardanelles? I am not going to prove that we forced the Dardanelles. No amount of argument, however excellent, will do that. Nor am I going to try to prove that the plan we adopted was the best plan that could have been adopted. No amount of argument will do that. Nor, least of all, am I going to try to prove that my responsibility in the matter is not a great one. I am concerned to make it clear to the House, and not only to the House but to the Navy, that this enterprise was profoundly, maturely, and elaborately considered, that there was a great volume of expert opinion behind it, that it was framed entirely by expert and technical minds, and that in no circumstances could it be regarded as having been undertaken with carelessness or levity. That, I am concerned to prove. It is important to me to do so, and it is also important in the general interest.

In the month of December last the political situation in the South-East of Europe was stagnant and torpid, and the immense currents of opinion which were then favourable to the Allied cause flowed sluggishly, or even ebbed. In Italy our negotiations made little progress. At the same time, the Russian Government asked the Foreign Office whether some action against Turkey in the Mediterranean was not possible to relieve the pressure in the Caucasus? In consequence of those communications from the Foreign Office and the War Office, I began to direct the attention of the First Sea Lord and other naval advisers to the possibilities of action in Turkish waters. The Dardanelles stood out as incomparably the most decisive operation that was open. Of course, from the beginning we all recognised at the Admiralty that a joint naval and military operation by surprise was the best way of attacking the Dardanelles.

As early as 3rd November, over a year ago, we obtained from the War Office their appreciation of the number of troops necessary to seize the Gallipoli Peninsula by a joint amphibious coup de main. On 30th November I sent a Minute to my Noble Friend Lord Kitchener offering to congregate transports for 40,000 men—that is to say, sufficient for the first echelon of an Army for the purpose in Egypt, on the chance of their being wanted, as I could see that the situation was developing in the direction of an attack in the Eastern Mediterranean on the Turkish Empire. We were informed that no arms were available; and, further, in the early discussions which took place among us, and also at the War Council, it was clearly the opinion that, even were they available, they should not be used for attacking the Gallipoli Peninsula. On the other hand, the need for action in the Eastern Mediterranean was constantly pressed upon us from many quarters.

As a result of all those representations and discussions, I telegraphed on 3rd January to Admiral Carden, who was our admiral blockading the Dardanelles, and who had been there since the Turkish declaration of war, and I put to him this specific question—of course these are not the actual words; it is a paraphrase—"Do you consider the forcing of the Dardanelles by ships alone a practicable operation?" The admiral replied to the effect that the Dardanelles could not be rushed, but could be reduced by a regular and sustained naval bombardment. I put the same question simultaneously to Sir Henry Jackson, the present First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, and I received from him an almost similar answer. The coincidence of opinion between those two officers, both of the highest attainments and so differently circumstanced—one man on the spot, and the other the expert at the Admiralty, who was studying the Eastern theatre with the War Staff—the coincidence of opinion between those two made a profound impression on my mind.

I am very well accustomed to weigh expert evidence, and most of the important decisions which have been taken in the last three or four years at the Admiralty have been taken by me on a divergence of expert evidence. I have had different recommendations made on great matters like 15-inch guns, oil ships, size of "Arethusa" cruisers; and decisions really had to fall upon the political chief. I have no doubt that sometimes my right hon. Friend who succeeded me at the Admiralty has had similar experiences. But this coincidence of opinion struck me as very remarkable. Admiral Carden was then asked to formulate his plans, and to state his requirements. He did so in full detail in his telegram to me of 11th January. We were in a position to meet those requirements. The victory at the Falkland Islands had cleared the German flag from the seas, and liberated a large reserve of naval forces. The strength, actual and relative, in Home waters was undergoing that steady increase which has been in progress ever since the beginning of the War, and the action of the 24th January on the Dogger Bank had shown that ship for ship, man for man, and gun for gun, we had a clear advantage.

That being so, we were in a position to meet the very large requirements which Admiral Carden put forward. His plan was then examined by the Admiralty War Staff. Sir Henry Jackson expressed his full concurrence in it, and advised in writing an attack on the outer forts being made as early as possible. Lord Fisher, of course, knew everything that was passing, and he never expressed any opinion against this specific operation, nor indeed against the operations at all at this stage. He was very much impressed with the proposal of the Admiralty War Staff to add the "Queen Elizabeth" to the bombarding Fleet. We had seen—it was fresh in everybody's mind—great fortresses, reputed the strongest in Europe, collapsing, fort by fort, under five or ten shells from 15-inch howitzers; and here was the "Queen Elizabeth" going through her gunnery at Gibraltar with eight 15-inch guns on the broadside. Lord Fisher was also strongly in favour of action in Turkish waters, and wrote to me repeatedly on the subject, especially of a joint operation of the Fleet and Army at the Dardanelles. His scheme involved the cooperation of Powers which were neutral, and of an Army which was not available; but they all led up to the central point of the forcing of the Dardanelles with old ships of the "Majestic" and the "Canopus" class. Sir Arthur Wilson was in favour of attacking the outer forts, but felt that the future progress must depend on the amount of Turkish resistance. I state all these points, not in order to shield myself from responsibility, but to let the House know that the business of the Admiralty had been properly conducted.

After these preliminary discussions, I brought Admiral Garden's plan before the War Council on the 13th January. This meeting was attended by the principal Members of the Cabinet, by various high military officers, by the First Sea Lord, and by Sir Arthur Wilson. The War Council was immensely impressed with the political advantages of the plan if it could be carried out, and they pressed the Admiralty to find a way to carry it out. No one spoke against the methods proposed. No expert adviser indicated any dissent. The War Office have always assumed in their State Papers that the decision to make a purely naval attack upon the Dardanelles dated from the meeting of the War Council of the 13th January. I did not so interpret it. I considered that the decision was that the Admiralty should go on perfecting its plans, and making its preparations without our being finally committed to action, and this is what we did. The whole plan of Admiral Garden was searchingly re examined by the Admiralty War Staff and various gunnery experts whom we had at our disposal—the highest and the best in the world—and a general consensus of opinion was established in its favour.

On the 25th January Lord Fisher gave me a memorandum on naval policy. This memorandum did not question the feasibility of the particular operation which was being studied, but it deprecated reducing our margins in Home waters, or using fighting ships for bombarding purposes except in conjunction with military operations. It was a memorandum directed not only against the Dardanelles operation, but against others which were being very strongly pressed forward at the time. I sent the memorandum to the Prime Minister, with an analysis, which I drew up myself, of the naval margins available at the time. I think on that point I may claim that my view has been vindicated by events, because, not only did Lord Fisher himself at a later date consent to the naval operation, but the new Board of Admiralty sent to the Eastern Mediterranean all the ships which were then under consideration and a great many more; and, so far from any misadventure occurring in Home waters, it is well known that our position has become all the time increasingly safe.

I attach importance to the fact that at no time did I receive from Lord Fisher any criticism of the definite method of attack proposed. On the principle he had doubts and objections, but on the special technical and professional points involved I received from him at no time any expression of adverse criticism. Early in the morning of the 28th January I had an interview with Lord Fisher in the presence of the Prime Minister, and we discussed the whole situation. The impression I derived was that Lord Fisher agreed and consented to a purely naval attack on the Dardanelles being made. The whole matter then came up for final decision at the War Council which was held later in the day, and was again fully attended. Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson were both present. As the result of prolonged discussion—in which again no adverse opinions were expressed, and in which Lord Fisher contented himself with saying that he had expressed his opinion to the Prime Minister—the operation was definitely sanctioned, and we were directed to execute it.

Meanwhile the War Staff had completed their work on Admiral Carden's plan, and had drawn up the necessary war orders. The project was also laid before the French Minister of Marine. M. Augagneur came over to London, and the principles and methods were fully discussed. The project was examined in detail by the French General Staff. They were very favourably impressed by the plan. They announced their agreement, and said it was a plan conceived in a spirit which was prudent and prevoyant. They pointed out that it enabled us to withdraw at any stage, should the gunnery results not be such as we anticipated. What happened? They sent their ships, and ever since have supported the enterprise with a loyalty and valour beyond description.

Action meanwhile proceeded. Ships, in number many more than Admiral Carden had asked for, were rapidly concentrated from all over the world. On the 18th February the attack on the outer forts began. The first phase of the operations was successful beyond all our hopes. The outer forts were destroyed; the Fleet were able to enter the Straits, and attack the forts at the Narrows. Up to the time that this happened, we had always kept in view the possibility that if this operation, which necessarily depended for its success upon a number of incalculable factors, did not develop as we hoped, and if the obstacles were found to be much greater than had been foreseen, we could convert it into a demonstration, and turn our attention to some other part of the Mediterranean theatre. We had kept in view, and had prepared, an amphibious operation which would serve as an alternative in case we wished to withdraw, so as to safeguard our prestige. But the success which we had achieved at the outer forts produced an electrical effect throughout the Balkans. Its repercussion was evident from the first moment in Italy. We had touched the great strategic nerve centre of the world-war of 1915, of this year's campaign.

Within a week the leader of the Greek people, M. Venizelos, had taken the decision which led to his first retirement from office. Within a fortnight the Turks were forced to move back to Adrianople, and to develop their defences against Bulgaria. The movement in Italy was also most marked. A panic was created in Constantinople. Everyone supposed that the enterprise was going to succeed. Day by day I held Staff meetings at the Admiralty, at which I received the appreciation of the greatest authorities, who were unanimous that the movement was progressing in the most favourable manner—more favourable even than we had anticipated, though we quite recognised that the greatest difficulties were yet to come. It was not now desired by anyone to go back, or to ride off on any alternative operation. The eyes of the whole world were riveted on the Dardanelles. Every interest, military, naval, political, and economic, urged the prosecution of the enterprise.

Meanwhile, however, in the early days of March, the progress of naval operations became slower. I should like to say, as people have said that these operations in their early stages were unduly boomed, that nothing was published about them but what was sent by the admiral on the spot, and was approved as a fair appreciation of the position by the experts at the Admiralty. Across the prospect of the operations a shadow began to pass at the end of the first week in March. The difficulties of sweeping up the minefields increased, and although great success was obtained by the guns of the ships in silencing the forts, they were not able at that stage to inflict decisive permanent damage. The mobile armament of the enemy began to develop, and to become increasingly an- noying. It was, therefore, decided that the gradual advance must be replaced by more vigorous measures. Admiral Carden was invited to press hard for a decision, and not to be deterred by the inevitable loss.

The Admiralty telegrams gave to the officer on the spot, and were intended to give to him, the feeling that whatever he felt inclined to do in the direction of vigorous measures he could do with the certainty of being supported. These Admiralty telegrams were the result of close consultation between the First Sea Lord and myself, and, like every other order of importance which has emanated from the Admiralty during my tenure in peace or war, bear the written authority of the First Sea Lord. I wish to make that point quite clear. I may extend it, and say there is no important act of policy, no scheme of fleet distribution, of movements of ships, or of plans of war which have been acted on during my tenure at the Admiralty in which the First Sea Lord has not concurred in writing. The admiral on the spot, Admiral Carden, expressed himself in entire agreement with the spirit of the Admiralty telegrams, and announced his intention to press forward in his attack on lines which had been agreed upon, and with which he said he was in exact accord. The date of the attack was fixed for 17th March, weather permitting. On the 16th Admiral Carden was stricken down with illness, and was invalided by medical authority. On the advice of the First Sea Lord, who fully concurred, I appointed Admiral de Robeck, the second in command, who had been very active in the operations, to succeed him. I thought it indispensable, on the eve of this difficult attack, to find out whether the new Admiral shared the opinions of his predecessors, and I therefore sent him a telegram, of which the following is a paraphrase:—

4.0 P.M.

Every day the danger of the German submarines arriving—a danger which we greatly exaggerated in our minds—seemed to become more imminent. Every day the possibility of a renewed German attack on Serbia—I think already it has almost succeeded—seemed to draw nearer. Every day I knew the Turks were digging. I knew they were drawing reinforcements from all parts of the Empire; and I can assure the House that the month which apparently had to be consumed between the cessation of the naval attack on 18th March and the commencement of the military attack on 20th April was one of the least pleasant I ever experienced. I have gone through this story in detail in order to show and to convince the House that the naval attack on the Dardanelles was a naval plan, made by naval authorities on the spot, approved by naval experts in the Admiralty, assented to by the First Sea Lord, and executed on the spot by Admirals who at every stage believed in the operations. I am bound—not only in justice to myself, but in justice to the Fleet, who require to know that the orders sent to them from the Admiralty are those which always carry the highest responsible professional authority—I am bound to make that clear. I will not have it said that this was a civilian plan, foisted by a political amateur upon reluctant officers and experts.

I am not going to embark upon any reproaches this afternoon, but I must say I did not receive from the First Sea Lord either the clear guidance before the event or the firm support after which I was entitled to expect. If he did not approve the operation, he should have spoken out in the War Council. War is a hard and brutal job, and there is no place in it for misgivings or reserves. Nobody ever launched an attack without having misgivings beforehand. You ought to have misgivings before; but when the moment of action is come, the hour of misgivings is passed. It is often not possible to go backward from a course which has been adopted in war. A man must answer "Aye" or "No" to the great questions which are put, and by that decision he must be bound. If the First Sea Lord had not approved the operations, if he believed they were unlikely to take the course that was expected of them, if he thought they would lead to undue losses, it was his duty to refuse consent. No one could have prevailed against such a refusal. The operations would never have been begun. That was the time for resignation. He did not take that course. He hoped, as I did, as the French Admiralty did, as the War Council did, that a speedy success would result. Had it resulted, I think he would have had some of the credit.

On the other hand, I wish to say that I do not at all regret having insisted on Lord Fisher's return, in the face of great opposition, to the Admiralty in November, 1914. No man has ever been able to put war purpose into the design of a ship like Lord Fisher. At the beginning of this War megalomania was the only form of sanity. Prince Louis and I had ordered large war programmes on the outbreak of war, and, perhaps, from some points of view, they may have been considered sufficient for the moment. But Lord Fisher came along with a new wave of impulse and enthusiasm. He was able to produce vast schemes of ship construction of every kind, with new designs and improvements on old designs. Hardly a day passed without his bringing new projects to me which I was delighted to encourage, and which, without Treasury control, I was happily able to finance, and if my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty to-day finds himself, as he does, week by week upborne upon an ever-swelling tide of deliveries of craft of all kinds, and of the best kind suited to the purposes of this War, that is the consequence of Lord Fisher's return to the Admiralty in November, 1914. I am quite prepared to console myself with that for any difficulties which arose at a later stage.

For the naval operations, subject to what I have said, I take the fullest personal responsibility. I did not make the plan. Not a line, not a word, not a syllable that was produced by naval and expert brains of high competency, without the slightest non-expert interference, but I approved of the plan; I backed the plan I was satisfied that in all the circumstances that were known to me—military, economic, and diplomatic—it was a plan that ought to be tried, and tried then. After weighing and sifting all the expert evidence with the personal knowledge I had of all the officers concerned, I recommended it to the Prime Minister and the War Council in the presence of my principal naval advisers, believing, as did everyone there, that I carried them with me, and I pressed it with all the resources at my disposal. I recommended it to the War Council, and to the French Government, not as a certainty, but as a legitimate war gamble, with stakes that we could afford to lose for a prize of inestimable value—a prize which, in the opinion of the highest experts there was a fair reasonable chance of our winning, a prize which at that time could be won by no other means. On that basis clearly understood it was accepted by all concerned.

On that basis I accept the fullest responsibility. I require no shield. I do not desire to reduce or to divide my burden in the slightest degree. For the military operations at the time they were embarked upon, for the methods by which they were executed, for the numbers of troops estimated to be necessary, for their quality and for their commanders I take no responsibility, except by what is implied by my having remained a member of the Government. That general Ministerial responsibility, of course, I accept; but I accept it only subject to my written and recorded opinions, expressed in every case before, and not after the event. Luckily there is no dispute about this. In the early days of March, when it became clear that military operations might be required, and that military support would be forthcoming, I sought, in view of my experience at Antwerp, an interview with the Prime Minister, at which I asked Lord Kitchener directly whether it was understood that he assumed the responsibility for the military operations, by which I meant, and said I meant, the measuring of the forces required to achieve success; and, after he had replied in the affirmative, I transferred the Naval Division on the 12th March to military command. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister told me the other day that he recollected this interview vividly, and, therefore, it is not necessary for me at this time to enter upon an analysis of the military movements. I am glad that is so.

But I must examine this question. Did the fact that the naval operations had been begun necessarily and inevitably compel the beginning of, and persistence in, the military operations? I have shown how, at the beginning of the naval attack, we kept open an alternative operation of an amphibious character on which we could at any time, if necessary, ride off. But would it have been possible, after the naval attack of 18th March had been broken off, to sail away and cut the loss? A careful survey of the facts as we know them to-day shows that undoubtedly it would. The naval attack finished on the evening of 18th March. The military attack did not begin until the 25th of April. If in that period we had known what we now know of the course of the military operations, I cannot conceive that anyone would have hesitated to face the loss of prestige in breaking off the attack on the Dardanelles. I do not consider the naval operations, begun as they were, necessarily involved the military operations begun as they were. That was a separate decision, which did not rest with me or the Admiralty either in principle or in method; but I wish to make it quite clear that I was very glad that the War Office authorities were willing to prosecute the enterprise by military means, and I certainly did my best to induce them to do so, and to support them in doing so.

There are, however, two observations which I wish to make of a general character upon the military operations. First, the essence of an attack upon the Gallipoli Peninsula was speed and vigour. We could reinforce from the sea more quickly than the Turks could reinforce by land, and we could, therefore, afford to renew our attacks until a decision was obtained. To go slow, on the other hand—to leave long intervals between the attacks, so as to enable the Turks to draw reinforcements from their whole Empire, and to refresh and replace their troops again and again—was a great danger. Secondly, on the Gallipoli Peninsula, our Army has stood all the summer within a few miles of a decisive victory. There was no other point on any of the war fronts, extending over hundreds of miles, where an equal advance would have produced an equal, or even a comparable, strategic result. It has been proved in this War that good troops, properly supported by Artillery, can make a direct advance of two or three miles in the face of any defence. The advance, for instance, which took Neuve Chapelle, or Loos, or Souchez, if it had been made on the Gallipoli Peninsula would have settled the fate of the Turkish Army on the promontory, would probably have decided the whole operations, might have determined the attitude of the Balkans, might have cut Germany from the East, and might have saved Serbia.

All through this year I have offered the same counsel to the Government—undertake no operation in the West which is more costly to us in life than to the enemy; in the East, take Constantinople; take it by ships if you can; take it by soldiers if you must; take it by whichever plan, military or naval, commends itself to your military experts, but take it, and take it soon, and take it while time remains. The situation is now entirely changed, and I am not called upon to offer any advice upon its new aspects. But it seems to me that if there were any operations in the history of the world which, having been begun, it was worth while to carry through with the utmost vigour and fury, with a consistent flow of reinforcements, and an utter disregard of life, it was the operations so daringly and brilliantly begun by Sir Ian Hamilton in the immortal landing of the 25th April.

That is all I have to say about the Dardanelles. I do not intend to be drawn into any further controversy on this subject, whatever is said by way of reply to my speech. I leave all the Papers and documentary evidence, which justifies everything I have said, with my right hon. learned and gallant Friend the Attorney-General. I do not leave them to him in his capacity as a Cabinet Minister, nor in his capacity as Attorney-General, but as an old friend, to look after my interests in the matter, and I am quite sure that his tact will be found fully equal to the task of adjusting these different obligations.

I do not propose to occupy the House by discussing such matters as the resignation of Lord Fisher, which occurred on the 14th May, or the circumstances immediately preceding the formation of the Coalition Government. This will, no doubt, afford a fine "theme for the Crokers and the Creeveys of our time." But it has no bearing on the military questions, on which I have ventured to address the House, and with which alone I am concerned. When Lord Fisher's resignation occurred, I told the Prime Minister to consider my office at his disposal if his convenience required it. On the next day, being acquainted with all the facts, he told me he wished me to continue. Sir Arthur Wilson undertook to be the First Sea Lord, and the other members of the Board remained at their posts. The next day (Monday) great political events of consequence supervened, arising principally out of matters connected with the, War Office and the attitude of important Ministers, and the old Liberal Government passed away. The fact that I knew I had retained the confidence of the Prime Minister, and that his decision had been on the merits that I should remain at the Admiralty, enabled me to comply with his request to join the new Government in the office from which I have this morning retired. That, Sir, is all I have to say to the House by way of personal explanation, and I am extremely grateful to hon. Members for the patience and indulgence they have shown me. But before I sit down, if I may, with the special indulgence of the House—I have not addressed the House for a long time, and I do not expect to address hon. Members again for some time—I think it is necessary and right that I should say a word on the general situation. There is no reason to be discouraged about the progress of the War. We are passing through a bad time now, and it will probably be worse before it is better, but that it will be better, if we only endure and persevere, I have no doubt whatever. Sir, the old wars were decided by their episodes rather than by their tendencies. In this War the tendencies are far more important than the episodes. Without winning any sensational victories, we may win this War. We may win it even during a continuance of extremely disappointing and vexatious events. It is not necessary for us to win the War to push the German lines back over all the territory they have absorbed, or to pierce them. While the German lines extend far beyond their frontiers, while their flag flies over conquered capitals and subjugated provinces, while all the appearances of military successes attend their arms, Germany may be defeated more fatally in the second or third year of the War than if the Allied Armies had entered Berlin in the first.

Our well-established command of the seas, and the rapid and enormous destruction of German military manhood, are factors upon which we many confidently rely. At the outset of the War the number of males capable of bearing arms in Germany, as compared with England, was three or two; but to-day our numbers are probably superior, and at the end of the second year the original proportions will be reversed. We are becoming, therefore, a continually stronger Power, actually and relatively, as far as military manhood is concerned. We owe this fact of profound significance to the valiant sacrifices of the French and Russian peoples, who have so far borne the brunt of the struggle. We are the Reserve of the Allied cause, and the time has come when that Reserve must be thrown fully into the scale. The campaign of 1915 has been governed mainly by a shortage of munitions. The campaign of 1916 may be settled against Germany by a shortage of men. It is, therefore, vital to us, as a matter of honour and sacred duty, to increase and maintain the numbers of our Armies in the Field, and to render this possible the best economic organisation and the most unsparing thrift must be applied at home. It is no doubt disconcerting for us to observe the Government of a State like Bulgaria convinced, on an impartial survey of the chances, that victory will rest with the Central Powers. Some of these small States are hypnotised by German military pomp and precision. They see the glitter, they see the episode; but what they do not see or realise is the capacity of the ancient and mighty nations against whom Germany is warring to endure adversity, to put up with disappointment and mismanagement, to recreate and renew their strength, to toil on with boundless obstinacy through boundless suffering to the achievement of the greatest cause for which men have ever fought.

There is no question before the House, and it would be entirely out of order for me to deal with any of the topics which have been so ably and eloquently dealt with in the very moving speech to which we have just listened from my right hon. Friend. The House is always accustomed, and properly accustomed, to give great latitude, and even to expect great latitude, to explanations from a Minister of the Crown who has resigned his office, and my right hon. Friend has taken advantage of that privilege in a manner which, I think, will be generally appreciated and admired. I only wish to say two things. I think my right hon. Friend has dealt with a very delicate situation not only with ability and eloquence, but also with loyalty and discretion. He has said one or two things which I tell him frankly I had rather he had not said, but, on the other hand, he has necessarily and naturally left unsaid some things which, when the complete estimate of all these transactions has to be taken, will have to be said. But that does not affect his personal position at all, and I desire to say to him and of him, having been associated with him now for ten years in close and daily intimacy, in positions of great responsibility and in situations varied and of extreme difficulty and delicacy, I have always found him a wise counsellor, a brilliant colleague, and a faithful friend. I am certain, Sir, he takes with him to the new duties which he is going to assume, having with great insistency abdicated those he has hitherto discharged, the universal good will, hopes, and confident expectations of this House and of all his colleagues.

We have just listened to a remarkable statement from the late Chancellor of the Duchy, but what is in all our minds mostly is why the right hon. Gentleman is sitting behind the Ministerial Bench. Those of us who have known some of the operations which have been conducted by the Admiralty have been well aware that the right hon. Gentleman for many months has suffered from very cruel libels which have been circulated about him. I am one of those who has always admired the right hon. Gentleman, but when he came before the country in 1914, and asked this House to vote enormous Estimates for the Admiralty, I was little aware at that time that the right hon. Gentleman had been sent by the Prime Minister to the Admiralty to prepare for war against Germany. Although I have been in this House for fifteen years and voted for all Navy Estimates, I could not understand why at the time I have referred to the Prime Minister was allowing the Liberal Federations to pass resolutions in favour of disarmament. At that time the Minister of Munitions was writing about disarming in the "Daily Chronicle," and how it came about that this House was asked to vote enormous sums of money without being told the reason seems to me perfectly incredible. Now the right hon. Gentleman has vindicated the Estimates which he brought before the House, which were passed under conditions which he knew about, but which the House did not know. The Prime Minister at that time had not told the country, or his colleagues in this House, the specific reasons for allowing the Liberal party to pass these resolutions in favour of disarmament at a time when he knew war was pending with Germany. The right hon. Gentleman in his speech has stated that he hopes the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University (Sir E. Carson) will always endeavour to be present in this House during these Debates, and he added that the right hon. Gentleman was devoted to the welfare of his country. When these discussions have taken place in the House during the last fifteen months only a few of us have joined in criticisms of the Government, and I do not think we were treated fairly by the House, because we had exactly the same feelings on this subject as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University, and the same devotion to our country. We had no other object to serve except to see that the Government did their duty, which they have so lamentably failed to do. I earnestly hope that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University will attend to the discussions in this House, and lend what useful aid he can give to seeing that the War is prosecuted with vigour and decision There is no man I would rather follow during the war than the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University.

There is quite a striking statement which has been made by the Chancellor of the Duchy, which I hope the House will take note of. He says that the expeditions to Antwerp and to the Dardanelles were largely taken on the advice of Lord Kitchener. I wish to say two things about the failures for which Lord Kitchener is responsible. At the outbreak of war Lord Kitchener was called to the War Office, and received the approval of the Press of this country. This country thought Lord Kitchener was a leader in whom they could place confidence. The French took General Joffre as their idol, and the Russians took the Grand Duke Nicholas. The mistake Lord Kitchener made was in regard to concentration. He found at the War Office an organisation capable of dealing with only a small number of men, and probably not more than 300,000. Instead of decentralising he centralised, and for that purpose he brought back to the War Office all the old officers—commonly known under the name of "dug-outs"—men who, no doubt, had done useful service in the sphere of life they had filled, but who were wholly incapable of building up a great business organisation such as was essentially necessary for the great Army with which we were to be provided. Young men of great ability should have been enlisted by Lord Kitchener in order to take part in this business. But instead of following the German example we took the opposite course; we centralised the administration in Lord Kitchener, and the House of Commons was asked to accept all that he did. What had he done to justify that confidence? He had been responsible for carrying on a successful campaign in which the total number of men under his command was not very much larger than the total number employed in certain large businesses in this country. He took eighteen months to carry out every detail, and he conducted the War to a successful conclusion. But it does not follow that, because a man is able to carry out a small organisation centralised in himself, and to work out every detail, he is qualified for a task such as was entrusted to Lord Kitchener. The Government were responsible for allowing Lord Kitchener to centralise in the manner he has done. He had never had any experience of administration on a large scale, and the Government, which gave him these powers, must now bear the responsibility.

What was the first cardinal mistake Lord Kitchener made? We, on these Benches below the Gangway, in the early part of the War urged, time after time, that men should be registered, and, when they were required for the purposes of the War, should be taken from their employment and used accordingly as the Government were able to equip them with rifles and uniforms. At that time there was in this country no organisation for munitions such as would enable us to equip the large Army which the necessities of the case demanded. We were laughed at by the Under-Secretary when we asked, as we did time after time, "Why will you not register these men?" You took them away from their employment; you kept them marching about and forming fours for months when you were not in the position to equip them with rifles; and when we implored the Government to allow them to remain at their industrial occupation we were laughed at; we were given the usual official answer, and nothing was done.

I did not laugh.

My hon. Friend near me says the Prime Minister did even if the right hon. Gentleman did not. Be that as it may, the War Office took these men; they paid them separation allowances, and they billeted them out at 23s. a week at a time when they could not equip them. What is happening to-day? Recently you have sent Members of Parliament down from the Munitions Department to address the New Armies which have been formed during the last fourteen months, and these Members of Parliament, in the presence of staff officers, have been making speeches to the men, asking those who have experience in the making of munitions to give in their names and not to go abroad with the units to which they belong! After fifteen months training and all the expenses you have been put to in equipping these men, detaching them from their business, and paying them separation allowances, you now, at the last moment, withdraw them from the New Army because you had not the foresight, in the first place, to see that men who were skilled were necessary for the purpose of making munitions and should not be enlisted! You took these men immediately after the outbreak of war: in the very first months you took them from Vickers of Sheffield and from other great manufacturing industries—men whom were essential at home. If Lord Kitchener knew the War was going to last for a period of at least three years, was it not bad management to take men away from the manufacture of munitions in order to put them in the field? It was not until the Minister of Munitions took his office in June last that you ordered the material you required to enable you to equip the troops you had enlisted. You lost a whole year of the campaign because you would not even go to the trouble of carefully working out in detail what you wanted, and although this War has become a war of rifles the most difficult thing to-day is to get rifles, because the machinery for manufacturing them can only gradually be obtained. All you did at that period was to decline a supply of shells on the ground that you already had them.

Lord Kitchener then took a step which I do not think can be justified. He came down and addressed a meeting not of Members of Parliament generally, but of Members of the Labour party. We, the elected representatives of the people, are not even told in secret session what are our needs and requirements. The information is given only to a small and insignificant section of this House, a section which, if it were left to fight its own battle, would not probably retain half-a-dozen Members here. Lord Kitchener took that step. He knew that the Prime Minister had a servile House of Commons in his pocket. The House does whatever the Prime Minister asks it to do. If we sitting below the Gangway here had had our way when the Minister for War, who is responsible to Parliament, came to address a meeting of the Labour party on matters about which the Members of the House generally were given no information, we would at once have turned the Government out of office. We have not had an opportunity of doing that, because this House of Commons does whatever the Prime Minister asks it to do. The House has long since ceased to take its proper part in the real administration of the affairs of the country. It no longer governs, and, for all useful purposes, we might just as well shut the House of Commons up altogether. You are paying Members of Parliament to do certain things, but, after all, they are practically helpless. The Noble Lord the Member for Portsmouth (Lord C. Beresford) very rightly said that the business of the War Minister was to go to his colleagues, either in the House of Commons or the House of Lords, and say, "I want so many men and so much munitions." It is not the business of the War Minister to address a meeting of politicians and to suggest how what he wants can best be provided. He should not interfere with the duty of the politician, and it is the duty of the politician to say how the men under our civil administration are to be found. Lord Kitchener ought to have gone to the Cabinet and stated his requirements and to have left it to the Cabinet to see that they were supplied. But he has not done so.

Where do we stand at the present time? The Government passed the Registration Bill through the House of Commons under false pretences. We were never told at the time it was passed that it was going to be used for the purpose of bringing in Conscription. It went through the House as an uncontested measure. Members in all quarters of the House agreed to let it go through in that way. Why? Because we were told it would not be used for the purposes of Conscription. Now I take the view that anyone who says that Conscription is necessary is an ass, and anyone who says it is not necessary is likewise an ass, for the very good reason that it is impossible, unless you have all the information before you, to definitely say whether or not Conscription is necessary. The Prime Minister came down the other night and told us it was the intention of the Government to continue making large payments to our Allies by way of loans. One thing is perfectly clear. We cannot go on taking men from their industrial work for the purpose of fighting in the field if at the same time we are to provide munitions for our Allies—particularly Russia—and also to finance them. It is perfectly ludicrous that we should be asked even to consider this question of Conscription until all the information is before us.

The Prime Minister, I understand, approves a notice which Lord Derby circulated to the Press last Friday, and he told us to-day that he would take no step without the authority of Parliament. It was very kind of him to make that statement. He is the head of the Executive to which Parliament has given great powers. I gather from the declaration of the Prime Minister that we are shortly to have introduced into this House a proposal in favour of Conscription. I want to make my position quite clear on this. I have already said that, if it is necessary in order to win this War, I will vote for Conscription without any hesitation—that is, providing that it is necessary. But I have no mandate from my Constituents to vote for compulsory service. When they sent me here they gave me no power to take their persons compulsorily by Act of Parliament to fight in a war which I am quite convinced the majority of them quite approve of. Therefore I feel it is my duty, at all events, first to lay the matter before my Constituents and to obtain to the best of my ability the views they hold upon it; and until this House and the country have been given all information as to our requirements in the matter of men, munitions and finance, I think we should be making a great mistake in acceding to the proposal of the Government. I believe the House will not be given that information, because I believe the Prime Minister will endeavour to keep it back from the House, on the ground that it will not be in the public interest to give the information. At all events, they will have no vote from me, but my most strenuous opposition at every stage of the Bill, if they produce one, unless we are given the ordinary possible means of ascertaining what are the data upon which the Government have formed their decision to ask for the Bill.

I do not like to use strong language, but when the facts are strong, strong language is warranted. I do not think that there has ever been a period in the whole history of the British Army, except under the direction of Lord Kitchener, when the word of a British officer has not been synonymous with that of a gentleman, and when the word of a British officer was not, in fact, as good as that of any subject in the British Empire. There has been fraud, deceit, and lying practised by the War Office. My right hon. Friend may lift his eyebrows, but I will give him the answers in black and white from his own Department showing how they have treated the standard of honour under the administration of his right hon. Friend. You have taken boys of the ages of fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen rather than face the issue of Conscription. I leave out the case of boys of the age of seventeen, eighteen, or nineteen. You have taken these boys knowing that they were boys, and then the War Office have said that they did not think they were under age. You have said that you would not send them to the Front until they reached the official age, but you have time after time broken this promise and sent little lads to the Front. I want to know how many of these boys have been shot for desertion? We are entitled to that information. I am referring, of course, to boys under military age. We are entitled to that information, although I do not suppose we shall be given it. I want to give the House one or two of these cases, to prove the utter lack of honour practised by the War Office in this matter. Owing, unfortunately, to a question I asked appearing in the "Daily Mail"—the Press do not seem to appreciate how much the country feels on this question— I had one morning a snowball of over 300 letters from people who have sons who had enlisted under age. I will take a few of these cases. I will not take the case of boys over 17 years of age, but will confine myself to boys of 13, 14, 15, and 16 who have been enlisted as being 19 years of age. I sent my right hon. Friend particulars of two cases of boys of 13. One was sent on his 14th birthday to France, I have not selected these cases as being extreme cases. I have taken the cases of boys of 16 and 17, and will leave out those of boys of 15. The first case is that of a man named Bailey, who is a Welshman. He comes from Newport. I thought that the Minister of Munitions would probably like to have a Welsh case. I will take a Welsh case, an English case, and a Scottish case. This man Bailey, of Franklin Street, Newport, has three sons serving in the Army. He wrote to the War Office complaining that his boy of 17 years of age was to be sent to the Front. This is what he said:— I have here hundreds of cases where the War Office, knowing that the ages' of these boys were fifteen, sixteen or seventeen, and after they have received the certificates from the parents, have written back saying the age of the boy is the official age, knowing what they are saying is untrue. Yet they have the impudence to write to the parent saying it is not their wish or intention that boys under nineteen should go out. That is a strange way for the War Office to act. Take the case of a boy of sixteen years of age. He comes from Wandsworth. He has two brothers serving in the Army, and he has a cripple father entirely dependent on the three sons. I received the following letter:—[ Letter read. ] The writer refers to a boy of eighteen years of age. The next case is one which occurred on the borders of my own Constituency. This man has a son sixteen years of age. I would like the right hon. Gentleman to hear what he says about him. He writes to me from Nottingham saying that the boy was under seventeen years of age, and that it was a disgrace to the country to take mere boys; that he sent a birth certificate to the recruiting officer, who would not look at it. That is the case of a man who has given all his boys to the country. When he wrote to the War Office time after time these lies are received back. To show what is going on, I have a letter from the headmaster of a great public school. I will not mention the name. [ Letter read. ] I will not mention the name of the boy, whom I will call "John Jones," and who was sixteen years of age on 6th May this year. The headmaster says he received a telegram saying:

From whom was the telegram received?

The telegram came from the aunt of the boy, who was of good social position and an orphan. I will not trouble the House with any more cases of these boys. The answer cannot be denied. It is another official lie saying he was nineteen years of age, when a birth certificate was sent showing that he was fifteen. The answer is:— definite promise that he will not be sent. There is a boy in Westminster Hospital to-day who was sent, when fifteen years of age, to the Dardanelles. He had only one month's training. He has had a leg amputated, and is now within two hundred yards of this House.

5.0 P.M.

The honest and right thing for the War Office to do is to reduce the age limit, and to say so now. What is the objection to taking youths of 17½ or 18? Let boys go at that age to serve their country, if you like, but do not put it forward in your official papers that nobody will be taken under the age of 19 and then take little boys of 14, 15, and 16, who are totally unfitted to fight for their country when older boys are not doing their duty. I want briefly to refer to the Ministry of Munitions Department. I have a bone to pick with them, and also personally with Lord Kitchener. The Ordnance Department is still blocking the way to getting efficiency at the Ministry of Munitions. I have had no conversation whatever with the Minister of Munitions on this question. It is always said if anyone raises a question here that it is an attack on the Ministry of Munitions. That is quite untrue. The attack made on Major-General von Donop was always believed to have been instigated by the Minister of Munitions. There is not a word of truth in that, but it pleases Ministers to believe that there was some sinister move. What is the basis of the complaint—that the Department are still blocking the way? They have produced a large number of hand grenades which they sent out to France during the last advance without having the detonators put inside them. Who is responsible for that? I am associated with electrical engineering, and my brother is chairman of one of the largest steel companies in the country, and to these works were sent some months ago the following inspectors to inspect steel: A publican's son, who had never been in a steel works in his life before, a carpet manufacturer, a tailor, a bar-keeper, a butcher, and a fishmonger-men who have never had any previous knowledge or experience of the steel industry. Three of these gentlemen went to these works—the butcher, the carpet manufacturer, and the bar-keeper—although we have at these particular works at present some thirty Government inspectors. If they wanted to get men to inspect this steel being made, why could not they have gone to my hon. Friend the Member for Gorton (Mr. Hodge), who could have found plenty of old men who could have been relied on, and who had some knowledge of the steel trade, instead of going into the highways and byways to sweep up inspectors of steel of a high standard, and to pass judgment? The work was hung up because they had to wait for an old gentleman, aged eighty-two, who appeared in a frock-coat and silk hat to inspect shells, who had never seen a shell in his life before. My brother wrote to mo and asked who appointed them. I want to know who was responsible for appointing them, and when they were appointed. They were not appointed, I am glad to say, by the Minister of Munitions, but some months previously, which shows what is the state of mind of the Ordnance Department, which permitted this kind of thing. What did they do?

This Ordnance Department ought to receive no consideration at the hands of Parliament. The Prime Minister—let the House observe this—went to Newcastle and said, "Our operations, and our Allies, have in no way suffered or been impeded for want of munitions." That statement was absolutely untrue; there was not a word of truth in it; but the Prime Minister did not make that statement as deliberately false. The information on which he made it was false. This matter is so important that I would ask the House to deal with it strictly. After that information was given to the Prime Minister by Lord Kitchener, as it was given, what was the result? We were losing at that time in France thousands of men for want of ammunition. Many of the guns at the front had gunners who had not more than two or three rounds a day. The Prime Minister then makes this statement to the country that we have an ample supply of ammunition. The Chancellor of the Exchequer shortly afterwards says, "There is no truth in the report that there is a shortage of munitions." The placing of these orders proves it. These men who are responsible for this shortage you still keep and retain in their offices. This country of ours has been built up on an individualist status. We are individuals, and if an individual makes a mistake in his private business in life he goes out of it. If a man makes a mistake in the Government's service, that seems to be a reason why he should be promoted, as men have been promoted as a result of failure to carry on their work. Why have not you got rid of all these incompetent people who put this statement into the mouth of the Prime Minister? When the Prime Minister was cornered in the House he said, "I will answer this question and numbers so-and-so and so-and-so together. It is not in the public interest to answer these questions." Not in the public interest, it is quite clear, for the Prime Minister to make a statement which was totally untrue. Why did not he then bring to book these people who had put this false information into his mouth?

I want to say a few words about extravagance. This is a Government of extravagance and waste, and of incompetency as well, but I think their proceeding last week is really about the limit. Neither the Prime Minister nor his Ministers seem to think anything of example in this country at all. I am a great believer in the view that if you want people to do their duty, those who rule and govern them, should set an example. What did you do last week, in a time of great national stress, when we may probably fail, if we do fail, through munitions and want of money, because the question of finance is becoming daily and hourly more serious. The Prime Minister and his colleagues might have set an example of economy to the country. What did they do? They go to the Mansion House and there they carry on the usual Mansion House feast, with eight lots of wine, varying in prices from 12s. a bottle downwards, and then they think that the workmen, when they see this waste of living going on, are going to follow them when they ask them to economise. A daily paper rang me up on the telephone and asked me whether I would give them an interview on the question of extravagance. I said "No," and I added, "Of course, you know the Parliamentary Committee has advised the country to eat less meat, and that on the Mansion House menu there will be 'Eat less meat!'" The paper took this seriously, and said that on the menus of the Mansion House there would be "Eat less meat!" Then the Lord Mayor sent a letter to the newspaper, saying that "Eat less meat!" was not on the top of the menu. I am sorry for misleading the journal in question. The Prime Minister is directly responsible for all the gross waste and extravagance going on in the country at the present moment. I am going to seek to prove it. What is the position to-day? Let us deal, first, with the position of the great industrial trades. The position of the workmen in this country to-day, in a time of great national danger, when their comrades are fighting in the trenches at 1s. 2d. a day, is better than it has ever been; they are better paid, and better off than they have ever been in the history of the country. I implored the Government and the Prime Minister earlier in the War, and said, "If you go to the working classes, you must first deal with the employer. You cannot ask working men to make large sacrifices, if employers make large profits owing to the War." I urged them to see that no one was allowed to make money out of the War, but to put on an Excess Profits Tax of 20s. in the £. What happened in the industry with which I am associated—the coal trade? You put on the people of this country, by way of wages, an increased cost of wages to miners of £20,000,000, in one industry alone. The matter was referred to in the mining world, and the Prime Minister said, "You are entitled to a war bonus. The increased cost of living warrants your obtaining these increased wages." Of course, the men were entitled to it, when coal went from £1 a ton to 30s., but the Miners' Federation said that if the Government were prepared to limit prices and keep them on the same scale as before the War, they were prepared to work for no increase of wages. The Government, as usual, did nothing—wait and see—with the result that you have this high cost of wages established throughout the country. In munition works you are paying men wages unheard of, and of which they never knew before the War, and throughout all the great industrial branches of trade to-day, people—and the working people in particular—are living on a scale which they never before enjoyed. What is to be the result of that? During a time of war, when you ought to have been making sacrifices, and all classes of the community ought to have joined with those who are giving their lives and blood to the country, you have increased the whole standard of living in that period. And when, by economic laws, after the War you will be forced to reduce the standard, you are laying up stores of trouble which no man can conceive. That is the result of want of foresight, and the Government has taken no steps whatever in the true sense of economy.

I have raised in this House several times the question of political pensions. I am glad to see the hon. Member for Wimbledon (Mr. Chaplin) in the House. I want to explain why my question referred to him and to a member of the House of Lords. I could not put a question down referring to a member of the House of Lords, unless I equally applied it to a Member of this House, otherwise it would have been said at once, "You are leaving Members of your own House alone, and dealing with Members of the Upper House only." The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Chaplin) wrote to me and I wrote back to him and said, if I was in his place I should have taken the salary which he is taking to-day, and I think he is entitled to it. But the position of the other two gentlemen who are taking these large salaries is that they are receiving very large sums of money by way of directorships, amounting to several thousands per annum, and at the time when these pensions were granted they were not granted for the purpose of giving public funds to ex-Ministers unless they were more or less dependent on them. While this system of pensions continues it is only right that those who are dependent on them should have them, but it is equally wrong that those who are not dependent on them—and Lord Balfour of Burleigh and Lord George Hamilton are not—should continue to draw them. When the Prime Minister says he has no power to stop them he is merely playing with words, because he has the power if he chooses to exercise it.

I do not see the relevancy of this to the Vote of Credit.

With all respect to you, Sir, if out of this Vote a certain sum of money is required for carrying on the business of the country during the coming year and if, out of the money that we are now voting, even a fractional part is paid out of the Exchequer to these right hon. Gentlemen—

None of this is paid to the right hon. Gentlemen to whom the hon. Member refers. These pensions are given by Act of Parliament quite independent of this Vote. There is nothing taken in this Vote which relates in any way to these pensions.

I was unaware that that was so and I will not pursue the point. Let us see what the Government are doing in other directions in the matter of economy. I am told that a member of the other House referred to the case of a steamship which is costing the country £100,000 a year for the Commander-in-Chief of the Dardanelles alone. Is this so? I am told by shipping friends that the Admiralty have a great number of ships still commandeered which they ought not to have commandeered, but they pay no attention to business people who go to see them, and they practically tell them to mind their own business and that their opinions are not wanted. I do not think that is desirable. The most important thing the Government can do at present to save money—and it seems to me we shall have to do it—is to put an Import Duty on every class of manufactured goods and luxuries coming into this country. We must do that at an early date, although we have an apostle of Free Trade on that bench telling us it would be ruin to the country if we took such a step. What did the Prime Minister, in effect, say? We had a long speech from him and there was nothing in it. He told us three things which were the basis of the economies to be practised. The first was that arrangements had been made to prevent competition among the Allies—a thing which my hon. Friends had been asking them to do for months. That was one of the cardinal points of the speech. The next was a revision of the scale of rations. We have asked time after time to have these scales revised. The third was the sending back of unfit men into civil employment. We have asked for that as well. All these suggestions which have been made by private Members and treated with contempt by the Government, are now adopted by the Prime Minister. Although they are small in themselves, they are the main substance of his speech that he made to the House on the great economies and the reorganisation which the Government are effecting. It is impossible that the House should believe it is receiving anything from the Prime Minister except mere rhetoric.

Coming again to Lord Kitchener, the House has to remember that the present Chancellor of the Exchequer bore all the brunt of the unpopularity of the aliens question when he had nothing whatever to do with it. When he was Home Secretary, Lord Kitchener released all those aliens who had been sent to internment camps by the police, and he took the whole of that responsibility on his own shoulders, and it was Lord Kitchener who received people who came to him and said, "Will you release Mr. Gutenheimer"? and went lobbying Lord Kitchener at the War Office. Not content with all this centralisation, Lord Kitchener took control of the aliens question, and not satisfied with that, he wants the Censorship as well. I am told that Lord Kitchener himself censors some articles which are brought before him. Imagine the Commander-in-Chief who, we are told to-day, has been responsible for the Antwerp blunder and who has been responsible likewise for the Dardanelles blunder, and not satisfied with all the engagements he has taken over at the War Office takes control of the censorship. What is the position to-day with regard to the censorship? I should like to know where we stand. Lord Buckmaster stated that if any attack was made on a Minister with a view to getting rid of him, and if that attack was persisted in, it was a question whether the Government would not take steps to prevent that criticism.

He said he spoke only for himself. I hope the hon. Baronet will remember that.

I take it the hon. Member, being in the confidence—

No, I heard the speech.

The statement was definitely made by Lord Buckmaster that if the Press, or anyone, attacked a Minister with a view of getting rid of him, in that case it would be a matter for consideration—

An HON. MEMBER: The Member for Dundee said the same thing.

I was unaware that the Member for Dundee had said the same thing. I should like to ask whether that is the settled policy of the Government. I understand, from what the hon. Member now says, that Lord Buckmaster was not speaking for the Government, and that the Government, as represented by the Prime Minister, does not hold that view.

What I said was that Lord Buckmaster, in a speech in the House of Lords, expressly stated that he was speaking for himself and not for the Government, and it is only fair, if the hon. Baronet wants to quote the Noble Lord, that he should quote him quite fully.

No Cabinet Minister occupying the high position of Lord Chancellor can speak for himself. He either speaks as a member of the Government or he does not. He and my right hon. Friend (Mr. Churchill) are both members of the Government and cannot divorce themselves from their responsibility in anyway. Lord Buckmaster was an ex-Censor. Let us be fair to these ex-Censors. These Censors have been fighting all along for information for the public, and who is the man who has refused them? The man who has refused them all through has been Lord Kitchener. Lord Kitchener has had the whole question of the censorship in his own hands. The Censors have been fighting day by day and going round the Lobbies and to the War Office to try to get information for the public, and Lord Kitchener has thwarted them. He thinks the people of this country are a nation of Dervishes. We are not a nation of Dervishes. We are a nation of free people.

I have a few words to say about the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister possesses, to a degree seldom enjoyed by any other Minister, the confidence of the country and the confidence of his party, but I want hon. Members here to recognise what he has done to bring this Vote of Credit here to-day. He knew all the while we were kept in darkness what was going on in the inner councils; he knew the danger we were in, and he knew our state of unpreparedness. Not a word did he tells us. He kept us in darkness, with the result that we are now spending double the amount of money we should probably have had to spend otherwise. It is now said by Lord Curzon and by the Attorney-General that it is wrong to criticise the Prime Minister. It was Lord Curzon and the party opposite who had arranged to put down a Vote of Censure on the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister said he saw no reason why we should form a Coalition Government. When the party opposite came to him and said, "Unless you form a Coalition Government, and unless you turn Lord Haldane out of that Government, we are going to turn you out," of course the Prime Minister at once hauled down his colours and reconstituted his Cabinet. Lord Curzon, therefore, should be the last person to deprecate discussion when he was one of the party who threatened the Prime Minister to turn him out of office for the palpable failure of the Government. Instead of that the Coalition has prevented any form of alternative government, and it is not a bit better but rather worse than it was before. I only say this because I think the editor of the "Globe" wants horsewhipping for the utterly foul and baseless attack which was made on the Prime Minister. It was the most outrageous statement to make on a man who has three sons fighting with the Army, and I think the castigation which the Attorney-General gave to the editor of that paper was fully deserved. When the Prime Minister talks about whimpering, what does whimpering mean? It means a low, muttering voice. I do not know whether we are accused of having low, muttering voices below the Gangway. I suppose if we raised our voices louder we might get into trouble with Mr. Speaker. Therefore I say the Prime Minister has not the right to criticise our action by merely saying we are whimpering. I believe we are going to see no good until, in the first place, we get a change at the War Office. That is the first essential.

I think my hon. Friend (Mr. Hogge) did a disservice in taking the position of the Prime Minister somewhat differently. No more honourable and upright man ever came to the House, and he is a man on whose word one can always rely; but he has the inherent weakness of never being able to know his own mind and always taking steps too late to carry his policy into effect. No one else would have allowed a position to arise as he did in a matter which is quite fresh in the recollection of the House. But I trust the Prime Minister will not consider that he will have to bring Lord Kitchener back again because of his statement that Lord Kitchener had not resigned. I am convinced that while Lord Kitchener remains in this office we are going to do no good with the War Office. A man who never will take and never will be a party to taking any advice unless it agrees with his own opinion; a man who persistently bullies every man who disagrees with him; he has no hesitation in breaking any man who fails to carry out what he wants. I am convinced that he is not the man who is going to bring this War to a successful conclusion. Lord Kitchener has at every stage in his life broken every man who did not agree with him. Therefore, when Lord Kitchener has failed, in the way that was pointed out very eloquently by an hon. Member last week, he should be treated in exactly the same way as he has always treated those under him.

The Prime Minister told us, on this Vote, that we should always have a Cabinet Minister present. There is not one here at the present time. They come here in the usual way, in white sheets, and apologise for the absence of Cabinet Ministers; but here, again, while we are voting £400,000,000, the only member of the Government who has put in an appearance is an Under-Secretary. The Prime Minister was very penitent the other day. He said he would take steps to see that a Cabinet Minister was in the House during these Debates. On the following day we had six Cabinet Ministers sitting on that Bench. There is not a single Cabinet Minister there now. I do not know whether there is a Cabinet meeting. If there is a Cabinet meeting that may be some reason for the absence of Cabinet Ministers from this Debate. An hon. Member here says there is not a Cabinet meeting. Then I say it is a scandal that we have no Cabinet Minister present, and as a protest against no Cabinet Minister being in the House I beg to move that the Debate be adjourned.

My hon. Friend the Member for Mansfield (Sir A. Markham) has traversed a very wide field.

On a point of Order, Mr. Speaker. Am I not entitled to move the Adjournment of the Debate in consequence of no Cabinet Minister being present?

The hon. Gentleman is entitled to move it, and I am entitled not to put it.

The hon. Gentleman in his speech has arraigned the Government upon a variety of subjects, and he has indulged in a considerable amount of invective against the Department which I have the honour to represent. He also carried the war against the Prime Minister and other Ministers of the Crown. I do not think it will be useful for me to follow my hon. Friend through all the details of his arraignment. I may, however, say some words upon a subject in regard to which he particularly attacked myself. He said that I was the mouthpiece of official lies, and not only the mouthpiece—

I did not say that.

I understood the hon. Gentleman to say that.

HON. MEMBERS: No, no!

Then I shall be very glad to accept a disclaimer. I certainly thought he said I was the mouthpiece of official lies.

I did not say so, but you may take it so.

Perhaps that is some concession on the part of my hon. Friend. He said that we at the War Office had, in fact, employed these boys of 14, 15, and 16 years of age, knowing them at the time to be of that age, and had deliberately sent them to the front. What are the real facts in these cases? Frankly, I regret them. I have told my hon. Friend, both privately and officially in this House, that the War Office do not desire to recruit boys of that age, and that it has been done by over-zealous recruiting officers who, of course, are rewarded for it. I regret these circumstances, and I say that the colonels of these regiments, when they really become acquainted with the facts, ought to send these boys back to their parents. The colonels are, as a matter of fact, instructed to do so whenever boys serving in this country are found to be under seventeen years of age. Those are the instructions of the War Office, definite and deliberate. These instructions are acted upon in a very large number of cases, but I am sorry to say that in some cases there have been oversights, and boys have been sent abroad. When a boy has gone abroad we at the War Office are not able to secure the discharge of these boys. All we can do is to represent to the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief that such-and-such a soldier, who is under age, has himself stated that he is nineteen years of age, otherwise he could not have gone abroad. This fact ought to be borne in mind, that all these boys have lied in the first instance and said they were nineteen. It is brought to the notice of the Field-Marshal that there are these boys in such-and-such a regiment, and he is requested to make inquiries to ascertain whether these particular soldiers are or are not fit to undertake the hardships involved in active operations in the field. These boys are very often returned discharged. In some cases they are not returned, because not only have these boys cost the country a certain amount of money, but they have been given training and uniforms, and in some cases these boys of sixteen, seventeen, and even fifteen years are very-efficient soldiers.

We want to make it quite clear, however, that it is no part of the policy of the War Office to encourage the enlistment of boys unless they are of the proper age. That is no part of our policy, and we do everything we can to try to prevent it, although my hon. Friend seems to think that we encourage such enlistment. We do not. I am very sorry that he has had such a large number of cases to bring to my notice. He says, "Why not reduce the age; why not say quite definitely, and be frank about it, that you will reduce the age?" The answer is that we do not want these boys. We do not want them because, in a large number of cases, they are not able to withstand all the hardships of active warfare, and they only fill our hospitals. My hon. Friend also touched upon the question of economy, and he said that we treated his counsels with contempt. He says that we have at this very late stage, after repeatedly being requested by him, altered the scale of rations. He says that we have only just done it, or that we are just going to do it. That is not the truth. The fact is that the scale of rations at the outset of the War was made on a large if not costly and even lavish scale, in order to test the position of affairs and see whether the best feeding would not produce the best results. It was very desirable at the outset of the War that there should be no mutterings or grumblings in regard to the feeding of the troops. Let us admit that perhaps we went on the lavish side. At any rate that was a fault at the outset of the War or the right side. We made inquiries because wastage was complained about constantly. The complaints continued, and inquiries were made all over the country, and also abroad, with the result that we have reduced the rations both of bread and meat. I think that was done in June or July. Therefore my hon. Friend may lay the unction to his soul that his advice was accepted four or five months ago. I hope that may give him some degree of satisfaction. I would also ask my hon. Friend to derive further satisfaction from my statement, for what it is worth, that the anathemas which he has hurled at me were hardly said in a low or muttering voice. I am glad to think that he has had the satisfaction of being able to convey them openly. There has been no "whimpering."

I should like to return to the Debate we had a few days ago, initiated by the hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. Roch) who made a speech full of force and characterised with moderation. He spoke of the proceedings in the Near East, which he views with an anxious and jealous eye, and he advanced certain arguments in connection with those operations. I want to say quite frankly and distinctly that I sympathise very strongly with the reasons why the public outside and the hon. Member as the mouthpiece of the public, should view those operations with a jealous and anxious eye. I do not know whether it was my hon. Friend, but certainly one hon. Member in the course of the Debate asked us to lay Papers on the subject of the Dardanelles. Other hon. Gentlemen rather found fault with us for not treating the whole of our campaign as one instead of treating it in the way of watertight compartments. The hon. Gentlemen who used these arguments cannot have it both ways. The reason why we are not able to lay Papers about the Dardanelles is because it would involve arguments in relation to policy covering the whole of our campaign over the whole world. It is precisely because we do not treat the Dardanelles or any part of the operations in the field as isolated operations, or treat them in watertight compartments, that we are not able to accede to the request to lay Papers on this subject on the Table of the House. I think the first point dealt with by my hon. Friend (Mr. Roch) was in relation to the staff. He said:— because the enlargement only emphasises any errors there may be in the absence of material. The maps could not be prepared upon the scale and the system we have in this country, where we have a careful ordnance survey, in regard to the Gallipoli Peninsula, where, so far as we know, no ordnance survey has taken place. We did, however, capture maps from the Turks; we captured little portions at a time, a square here and a square there. These were sent to Egypt to the Ordnance Survey Department there, and were photographed and enlarged, and when the whole of the sections had been captured and made into whole maps, the most efficient maps under the circumstances were available. No maps, even on that scale, can be adequate for trench warfare, and large scale maps have since been prepared both from the Turkish maps, from our own survey work, and also from aeroplane photographs taken by our own forces.

My hon. Friend also went on to speak about the wounded. He complained that there had been an inadequate amount of preparation for the reception of the wounded, and for their treatment afterwards. Upon this, I think, I may say there is some misapprehension in the mind of my hon. Friend, although to this extent he has right on his side, that there was a paucity of hospital ships, and in consequence there was overcrowding of transports. But it is not correct to state in any great degree that there was neglect of the sick or wounded on those ships. As a general rule they were exceedingly well looked after. It is also incorrect to imply that there was some want of hospital accommodation. In Egypt there were more beds ready for the sick and wounded than were found to be wanted. Neither in Egypt nor in Malta was there ever any shortage of accommodation. There was always an ample supply of beds, instruments and dressings. The sick and wounded had to be carried on transports. Although we had anticipated a very large number of wounded, I say quite frankly to the House that the number of wounded exceeded all anticipations. Therefore the shipping was not adequate; but the actual number of beds in Egypt was adequate to all demands. Transports are not, of course, fitted up like hospital ships: but so far from regarding matters connected with the evacuation of wounded as having failed, my informant thinks that there was cause for congratulation in the way in which those responsible carried out one of the most difficult operations that ever confronted medical authorities. My hon. Friend will understand that it was impossible to have anything except the most elementary and rudimentary clearing station upon the shore.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy drew attention the other day to the losses at Gallipoli, which, he said, amounted to about 1,000 a day. I will not trouble the House with details, but the actual figures of loss from the 25th May to the 30th October were: Officers, 1,060 killed, 307 died of wounds, 47 died of disease, 345 missing; other ranks, 13,680 killed, 5,680 died of wounds, 1,225 died of disease, 9,600 missing. This gives a grand total of 31,944, or an average, practically, of 200 a day. That does not include sickness. If you include sickness, you get: In hospitals overseas, 1,074 officers, 39,000 other ranks; sent home, 2,600 officers, and 52,000 other ranks; and with these you get an aggregate of 127,000, or an average of 795 a day over the whole period. I dare say that my right hon. Friend is not inaccurate in saying that on some days the combined total had reached a total of 1,000 in one day.

What is meant by missing? Are they prisoners?

Mostly prisoners, but inasmuch as the intimations that we get from the Turkish Government are not very full, not adequate, one cannot say with any degree of certainty. When you get cases of wounded and missing they nearly all die, but not necessarily so. The missing come to, in this case, 345 officers and 9,600 other ranks.

How many prisoners are in the hands of the Turks?

We know how many have been reported to be in the hands of the Turks. I am afraid that I should want notice to get those figures. All I wished to refer to was the statement as to losing "1,000 a day." I take no exception to my right hon. Friend having used that figure, although from what I have said I think that he will realise that it is a very full and ample cover. The average is 795 over the whole period from May to October; but what I wanted to emphasise is that the great bulk of these go to sick. They are over 90,000. On the other hand, 31,000 are killed, wounded, and missing. The difference between 127,000 and 31,000 are on sick. We know that we may expect, roughly speaking, 80 per cent. of these to return to the fighting lines, so that it is not, after all, so bad as it would be if the whole thousand were really to be put hors de combat.

May I ask whether a suitable supply of warm clothing has been sent out now that the cold weather is coming on?

Yes. If my hon. Friend would put a question down I will be able to give a more detailed reply. But I can assure him that great precaution has been taken in the sense which he brings to my notice. I now pass, if the House will allow me, from the question of the treatment of the wounded to the question of the water supply on the landing at Suvla Bay, which was animadverted upon my right hon. Friend. I think that he mentioned what had been stated by Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett, who delivered two lectures in London—not always a very reliable source of information. He stated that we made no provision for the supply of water to the troops who made that very gallant landing at Suvla Bay. I want to tell the House what actually did happen before this landing was put in force. I have here a telegram sent to me by an officer in reply to an inquiry which I sent out to ascertain the facts:—

"When Suvla operations were first planned, information available pointed to a considerable amount of water in the Biyuk, Anafarta Valley, and Suvla Plain. The correctness of this information has been proved by subsequent experience. But the following preparations were made to guard against risks of not finding water, or inability to develop local resources in the first instance:—

On 17th June the War Office was asked to dispatch with each reinforcing division water receptacles for pack transport. On 21st June the War Office replied that they were only able to provide 250 eight-gallon receptacles. In consequence, steps were taken to procure the balance of the requirement from India and Egypt, and eventually portable receptacles, consisting of petroleum tins, milk cans, camel tanks, water bags, and pakhals, were provided as follows:—On 'Dundrennan,' receptacles for 42,027 gallons; on 'Wiltshire,' receptacles for 32,475 gallons; on 'Grampian' and 'Southland,' receptacles for 11,000 gallons; on 'Prah,' receptacles for 2,000 gallons.

Of the foregoing, tins amounting to two-thirds of the total gallons were full, and bags, etc., totalling one-third of the total, were to be filled before leaving ship or beach, as it was found that the bags did not hold water for long.

Dealing with arrangements at Anzac, a high-level reservoir was built with a capacity of 30,000 gallons, pipe system and distribution tanks.

A stationary engine capable of filling the reservoir was brought from Egypt, but it broke down at one period.

A further supply was to be secured from lighters and water ships. These were under naval control, and details as to the numbers arranged for are not immediately available here. By arrangement with the admiral the responsibility of the Army was confined to the emptying of the lighters and the distribution of the water to the troops, while the Navy undertook to bring the full lighters to the shore to replace empty ones. The arrangements made by the admiral were considered adequate to provide a continuous supply.

Engineers' stores and tank pumps.

The 'Prah' carried tanks and troughs with a capacity of 195,000 gallons for erection on the beach or at local wells, and 300 water buckets, and six lift-and-force pumps; the pumps, however, were not a vital part of the water scheme."

From what document is the right hon. Gentleman quoting?

It is a reply by telegram to a request which I sent out to ascertain what had been done for the provision of water for the troops.

May we have it laid on the Table?

Yes, except my figures—I mean such things as M.F.Q. It continues:—

"The total number of mules ordered up for Suvla and Anzac was 2,700, together with 1,750 water carts, This number was in addition to 950 mules already at Anzac. Representatives of the director of supplies at Anzac and Suvla were to allot this transport, which was to be used for carrying up whatever was most needed by units ashore, whether food, water or ammunition."

I have read that rather long telegram, because I want to say to the House that so early as the 17th June this question was carefully thought over, that it was a subject of most careful scrutiny and prevision; but things do not always pan out in war time as we have proposed that they should. I need not tell my Scottish brethren—

"The best laid schemes of mice and men

Gang aft agley."

I asked a soldier who was wounded what it was like to charge in the Dardanelles. He said that it was not a picnic. Well, this was not a picnic. You cannot always bring off all you anticipate or hope for in war time, and the water scheme did not answer all the demands made upon it. I turn for one moment to the statement in this House that we have not issued all the news obtained from the seats of war. I am not able to answer for some officials who may have received information which I have not. I can only say that nine-tenths of the information which has come to me has gone to the Press—not through my instrumentality at all. I do not want to take any praise. Therefore the House and the country have received as much information as almost anyone, except possibly the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. They may have heard things which they kept back.

Does the hon. Gentleman mean to say that they kept things back from the Cabinet?

No, I am not a Member of the Cabinet, as the right hon. Gentleman is aware. The telegrams to the War Office containing any information of an interesting or descriptive character have nearly always been published in full. General Sir Ian Hamilton is preparing a. dispatch on all these operations which have been considered in this Debate. That dispatch, which is in a very forward position, will, I hope, before very long be in the hands of the public. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme made some comments on the generals who, he thought, had not been brought home. I can assure him that the generals who are principally responsible for the failures of operations were brought home. My hon. and gallant Friend suggested that wherever there was suspicion in regard to generals they should be brought home, and I think that he thought they should be dismissed.

Oh, no; merely limogés.

The policy of limogér is somewhat dubious, because it acts in two ways. It is what I think they call "Stellenbosching" in South Africa.

6.0 P.M.

Will there not be greater risk in extreme tenderness towards people who really exist for the benefit of the country, and not the country for the benefit of them?

I perfectly agree with my hon. Friend, but I ask him to bear in mind that the policy carries with it certain dangers.

That is an old-fashioned excuse.

I do not know about that. I only want to say a word or two about Sir Ian Hamilton, that he was not sufficiently on shore and too much on board ship. That was the charge made against him. If you take the map you will see that there are three landing places—Suvla Bay, forty-five minutes; Anzac, forty minutes; and Helles, forty-five minutes from headquarters. These are very much shorter times than the headquarters of Commanders-in-Chief from the forces in France. The argument used against Sir Ian Hamilton, therefore, really will not stand examination. I learn from a gentleman who was personally associated with him during the seven months he has been at the Dardanelles that no Commander-in-Chief in modern times has been more with his troops under fire than Sir Ian Hamilton. This gentleman also informed me that there is not a single trench line from Anzac to Suvla or Helles which has not been visited by Sir Ian Hamilton, and that those trenches are, some of them, even within a few feet of the enemy. Sir Ian Hamilton is a man too well known for his dauntless valour for anyone to charge against him that he would not go into the line of trenches, because of anything in the nature of fear; nobody can bring that charge. This charge, however, having been made against him, that he was not sufficiently with his troops, I want to make it perfectly clear that he was more with his troops than any Commander-in-Chief of modern times. My hon. Friend the Member for Stirling Burghs made, if I may say so, a courageous if, also, a misguided speech.

My hon. Friend spoke of the terrors and horrors of war, which he deplores no more than most of us do. If he thinks that it can be brought to a conclusion by some means other than the defeat of our enemies, except by some national degradation or even national dishonour, if my hon. Friend believes that, he is following in untrodden ways and feeding himself upon hallucinations. In regard to my hon. Friend the Member for Mansfield (Sir A. Markham), he belongs to that class of mind that listens with avidity to whispers of disaster, and is apt to receive with alacrity forebodings of evil. It is perhaps too much to hope that I shall be able to change in any degree that habit of his mind, but I know that my hon. Friend is as anxious as any of us for the honour of this country, and that it shall be able successfully to bring this War to the only issue I can conceive. During this immense struggle great sacrifices are being demanded of our people and of ourselves in this House, and even greater sacrifices will yet be required; but I would ask my hon. Friend whether those burdens can be carried any the more easily if there be grumbling or fault-finding. Is our path lightened by going to meet misfortune in the gate? Our attitude should be to proceed, as the nation has done, with calm and noble resignation in our sorrows and trials, with a single-minded desire to help in all spheres where help is possible, and with an inflexible determination to win.

The right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down will acquit me of anything in the nature of discourtesy if I do not follow him in his speech except to say that in his concluding sentences I agree with every word that fell from him. No one shares more strongly than I do the view that no peace can be concluded with the sanction of this country until we obtain the terms which have been laid down and for which we undertook this enormous responsibility—terms which will secure that the peace which is made, if we do secure peace, will be one that will last for generations. I was disappointed, on the last occasion when this question was being discussed, by losing my right to intervene in the Debate, and I trust the House will allow me to address a very few observations to them on three points in particular. One of them is the position of the Dardanelles, another the position of Serbia at the present time, and the third the present financial situation of this country, a point which properly and naturally arises out of the discussion of the Vote on Account. With regard to the Dardanelles, it was my good fortune to hear the speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Lieutenant Commander Wedgwood), a speech which, if I may presume to say so, appeared to me to be exceedingly able and temperate in expression, full of information gathered on the spot, and a practical and businesslike statement on many military points. I regret that on that particular occasion no Cabinet Minister was present. [HON. MEMBERS: "There is none now!"] Had any Cabinet Minister been present, I think he would have heard something that would probably have been of some benefit. I shall confine my observations, and they shall be very few, to the points I have named. We heard a great deal from the right hon. Gentleman who commenced these proceedings, in a speech which I thought, and still think, was admirable in itself, and which, I think, on all sides of the House was heard with pleasure and great satisfaction.

Then we have had my right hon. Friend dealing with this question, and upon that point I will only say for myself that, in view of the difficulties that are presented by that question, in whatever aspect you may be pleased to look at it, I think that in all probability the Government have done the best and wisest thing they could do in sending out a man so widely versed and experienced in all these matters as Lord Kitchener, to survey the whole situation in that part of the world in connection with the War, upon the spot, and then to report to them his views upon the general course to be taken in that theatre of the War at the present time. With regard to Serbia, I have something that I wish to say on my own account, and I hope it will be understood that in what I am going to say I have no desire whatever to make any hostile criticism at all upon the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The hon. and gallant Gentleman to whom I have referred, expressed the opinion that Serbia was very probably the key to the position at the moment in the East. I am not at all sure that the hon. Gentleman is not right. What I want to say is in justification of the views that are entertained upon the point by myself and many others of my friends, with whose opinions I am well acquainted. I think, if I may say so in no hostile spirit, that we were unwittingly misled with regard to the position of Serbia, when the right hon. Gentleman replied to a question put to him from this side of the House by the Member for the University of London, his answer being universally accepted as an unqualified pledge, given without reservation, that if Bulgaria were to become aggressive Serbia would receive all the help possible that this country could give her. Shortly after that, there was a speech made in another place, by Lord Lansdowne, from which there was a doubt as to whether Serbia was or was not going to get all the assistance and help that had been promised. That naturally created a great deal of feeling among many Members of this House, because I remember perfectly well the ringing cheers with which the announcement of the Foreign Secretary was received when he told the House that if Bulgaria behaved in this way Serbia would receive all help from this country. The Prime Minister, on the 2nd of November, stated as clearly and as emphatically as possible, that the welfare and well-being and independence of Serbia in the full position which she occupied before the War began, was one of the matters that would be considered absolutely essential by this Government, and that all the necessary help must be given her. Later on the same night, the Foreign Secretary made another statement, and then we were told that the unqualified pledge of the 28th September was founded on a promise which had been made in answer to a request from Greece—a promise which we had made in common with the French Government—to send a certain definite number of men to Salonika for the express purpose of enabling Greece to fulfil her treaty obligations to Serbia. There was nothing of that in the House of Commons on the previous occasion to inform us that those were the conditions under which that promise was given to Serbia in the speech which was made here by the Foreign Secretary. That, in my humble judgment, affected very seriously the whole position. However, be that as it may, the Government now have come to an understanding, I believe, or at least we are led to imagine that troops are being sent there, and the only question now is, I believe, as to what the military experts think of it themselves, and whether or not it may not be a very dangerous situation. I will not venture for a moment to express any opinion of my own upon that question. I only desired to make this statement on the first opportunity I could find, because, having heard the pledge that was given, I was most anxious that that pledge should be most loyally and thoroughly fulfilled, and I have never concealed my opinion for a single moment on that point.

I pass on to say a few words on the financial situation at the present time. It is a situation which fills me with great anxiety, as regards the future. I was immensely struck during the Prime Minister's speech, by his statement that every one of our soldiers in the Army at present cost from £250 to £300 per year. Let us consider what that means. Just suppose that it cost Germany as much as it does us, for, say six millions of men, then that would amount to nearly two thousand millions a year. Is it conceivable that it costs Germany anything approaching such a sum as that for soldiers alone? If that be so, are we not spending an inordinately large sum, and a very much larger sum than we ought to be spending. We have been told that our present expenditure amounts to about five millions per day, and if that is so, there must be money thrown away. It seems to me inconceivable that we should be spending so large a sum, and I hope the attention of the Government will be turned most sternly and rigidly to the reduction of the expenses of the War, and surely that must be possible when we are confronted with such enormous figures. We are, or we were perhaps not long ago, the richest country in the world, but surely it would be well for us to remember the opinion of Lord Kitchener, that the War may last for three years, in which opinion I understand he has never wavered. It does seem to me, therefore, that we may be in real danger before that period is over of reaching the bottom of our own well, as far as finances are concerned. I feel very strongly on this point, and I hope the House will forgive me for pressing it on the attention of the Government.

I am not one of those who sympathise with the constant attempts to criticise on all occasions the conduct of the Government in regard to this War. Blunders there have been, of course. Blunders and mistakes have been frankly and freely admitted by the Government, and no one acknowledges that more than the Prime Minister. There are always blunders and mistakes committed in every great war. I never remember a war without them. I am old enough to recollect two great wars. One of those was the Crimean war, and in comparison with the blunders that were made during the time of the Crimean war, this war to-day is managed by the Government with the greatest skill that ever was known. [A laugh.] I do not know whether the hon. Member remembers the Crimean war, but if he did, I am certain he would not have laughed at the statement I made. What the men and the Army suffered in those days was something perfectly appalling. I remember also the great war between the North and the South of America. I was in that country for eleven months of the time that that war was going on. The blunders and mistakes made at that time were something inconceivable. I was shown a letter the other day from Mr. Roosevelt to a correspondent, bidding him to take courage when our Government in this country was so often and freely criticised, by reminding him of what had occurred in America at the time to which I have referred, and by pointing out that they had won through in spite of all that. So undoubtedly shall we pull through too. I do not say this, because I do not recognise that there have been enormous mistakes made. I do, but it does not seem to me that we are helping the position by washing our dirty linen in public as well as in this House. The Government must be perfectly well aware of all these matters. There is no one in the Houses of Parliament to whom it is of more importance, or who must be more anxious to do everything that is possible to conduct this War to a successful conclusion, than the members of the Government who are responsible for the great duties entrusted to them. If in this House we could put aside some of those recriminations which I think are not wise during the progress of the War, and if we could still continue to show that same unity of purpose that was so remarkable when this War first commenced, then I believe we should be doing in this Assembly much more than we are doing now, and we should be doing everything that is in our power to bring this War to a successful conclusion. That is the one thing which we all heart and soul desire, and we should exert every effort in order to arrive at that conclusion.

I can assure you, Sir, I have not risen to make either a speech or a peroration. I have risen solely in consequence of an observation that was made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs when this Vote was in Committee. I am sorry to have to intervene with reference to that observation, because so far as my resignation from the Government is concerned I had hoped it would be never necessary to refer to it again. But the observation of the Foreign Secretary is, in my opinion, inaccurate, and is in my opinion misleading, and is in my opinion a great injustice to myself. In speaking of Serbia the Foreign Minister purported to tell the House accurately what had happened in relation to the promises that were made, and the preparations that were made for assisting Serbia, and, having given an account up to a certain point of those promises and preparations, and, having led the House to believe—I am sure inadvertently—that it had been all along the intention of the Government to assist Serbia, he made this statement:— the advice of our military advisers, that it was too late to assist Serbia. I myself protested with all the warmth I could that, having regard to our pledges, if that was so Serbia ought to be told through her Minister, in order that the little nation might take such steps as she thought necessary to preserve herself from absolute destruction. I left the Cabinet because that decision had been come to. What is more than that, if that is controverted as a fact, I say that I discussed the question with the Secretary of State for the Colonies and also with the Minister of Munitions, as being two of the Ministers on whose judgment I most relied in the Cabinet, and they certainly never dissented from that view. Each of them has sent in a memorandum on the subject, and if my statement is controverted I call upon the Government, in justice to me and the statement I now make, to produce the memoranda of these two Gentlemen. But I say something more. During the course of the week that followed I was asked by the Prime Minister to reconsider the question, and not to announce any final decision until after some other meetings, either of the Committee or of the Cabinet, had intervened; but it never was suggested to me in either of those letters, after I had sent in the letter which has been read in this House and published in the Press, that I was labouring under any delusion whatsoever. Therefore, taking an entirely different view from the Foreign Secretary in the statement which he makes— bonâ fide, I am sure—I am obliged, according to my recollection, to give it the most absolute contradiction I can.

The matter went on, and we know perfectly well that M. Millerand, the French War Secretary, came over here with a view to inducing the Government to change this policy. Eventually General Joffre himself came over, and it was only after that, nearly three weeks afterwards, that the policy announced by the Prime Minister in this House was come to, and what was too late three weeks before was in time three weeks after. That is all I desire to say. I have abstained from entering into many questions which I dare say I would be entitled to discuss with reference to the present Government for this reason: I think that upon the whole it is better for one who has recently left the Government to say as little as possible in regard to matters which he necessarily learned when he was in the Government. I have carefully pursued that course, but if my position, as I understand it, is erroneously put before the country, I think the House will say that I have a right to explain it.

I am sorry I was not present during the earlier part of the right hon. Gentleman's remarks. Indeed, I thought my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary was going to deal with the matter.

May I say with reference to that, I told the Foreign Secretary I was going to speak, but he said he had to go back to the Foreign Office. He hoped that I would not take it as an act of discourtesy on his part, and of course I do not.

I am rather sorry that a matter of this kind should be introduced in what appears to me a controversial sphere at this stage, when our position in that part of the world is still one of very great delicacy and difficulty. I wish simply to say two sentences. In my opinion, and I speak with full knowledge of the facts, there was no delay in sending these troops, and there was never any decision that we should not send troops in case of need, and if on political and military grounds it was thought desirable, for the relief of Serbia. The troops were sent, a division was sent, as I think my right hon. Friend will remember, from I will not particularise exactly where, from a sphere of action in the East—a detachment from the East. Other troops were sent, not, it is true, either to Salonika or the Dardanelles, but to Alexandria, to be held there in readiness for whatever particular sphere of action, in the opinion of our military advisers, they could be best employed in. There was no delay of any sort or kind. The troops were sent when they were available, and they were dispatched at the earliest possible moment, and I cannot think—I am sorry my right hon. Friend should make the suggestion—of any steps that could have been taken consistent with the military advice that we received that would have accelerated the departure of the troops or made them more effective for the purpose for which they were intended. It would be absolutely wrong if I were to tell the House now what is the force that has actually been dispatched, and what is the force that has been sent from other spheres of military activity to be in readiness to be dispatched either to Salonika or to any other part of the East in which our military necessities may require them. But I do, on behalf of the Government, most absolutely deny that in this matter there was any avoidable delay and that any steps were not taken that could have been taken to provide for the necessities of the case, amongst which the needs of Serbia have always bulked largely in the view of the Government.

Before this Vote is taken, I hope the House will allow me to discuss two things, and perhaps they will pardon my intervention as I have not spoken in this House for a long time past. I want, first of all to express a point of view which I feel strongly myself, and which I know, from conversations both with Members of all parties in this House and with people outside this House, is very strongly held. Although allusions have been made to it in this Debate, the position has not been definitely stated as I wish to state it now. What is working in a great many people's minds is this: they are asking themselves how far, as a nation, we are over-reaching ourselves and over-taxing our resources in our enormous commitments, naval, military, and financial? There was some discussion about that last week, and during his speech the Prime Minister, by way of minimising the danger, spoke of the way in which the Government were trying to deal with contract prices and Army rations, and of one or two other remedies that were being proposed and acted upon. The House, I think, received what he said with great pleasure, but after all, it goes a very little way. The most important fact we have to deal with in regard to our national resources to-day is that we are spending £5,000,000 a day. Making every allowance for any economy that can be made, to what should we be able to reduce that? Perhaps to some £4,750,000 a day. That really does not meet the problem. All the economies which the Government can possibly have made under anything that they have done in the last month or two are all swept away by the fact that we have now entered upon a new great expedition in Serbia. I am not for one instant arguing, and I do not argue, that we can now leave Serbia in the lurch. Of course, we have led her to expect that we are going to assist her, and, therefore, having assumed this obligation, by national honour and every other consideration we have got to fulfil it. But what it does is this: it implies that we are going to make another great expedition overseas, that we are involving ourselves in another vast expenditure, and that we are involving ourselves also in another huge dispersal of effort.

It seems to me that the radical danger that our country is running is this: we have started this War on the assumption that our resources are so vast that we can do anything that occurs to us, that we will respond to every Ally that moves our pity, and to every enemy challenge that excites our pride. I do not believe we can go on doing it indefinitely. It is perfectly true that Germany starts with much lesser resources than ours; but, after all, what is Germany doing? It is confining its operations to what it thinks it can manage. It is fighting a great land war; it is making munitions for that land war; and the naval war, which was always secondary with Germany, is now, owing to our complete victory, a very inconsiderable item for it. It is quite true that we in Great Britain originally started with far greater resources; but what are we doing? We are running the greatest naval war history has ever known. It is none the less great and none the less extravagant in money and in expenditure of our resources because we have won it without a new Trafalgar; indeed, the very fact that our enemy's fleet has not dared to face us makes any relaxation in the way of effort or in the financial drain absolutely impossible. Besides that, we are not only fighting a great land war, which should have been secondary, but we are extending it without limit almost every month. We are not only making munitions for ourselves, but we are making munitions for our Allies as well—perfectly rightly, but still it drains our resources. We are also subsidising our Allies, so that, as one of the members of the Government said, we are keeping 3,000,000 of men in the field.

Many of my friends are fond of comparing this War with the great Napoleonic struggle. There is this difference in the way we are managing this great struggle, and the way our ancestors managed theirs: they always knew that Great Britain could only play a certain definite part, and they laid down with tolerable precision what that part should be. I do not agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee (Mr. Churchill), when he said that that was a war of episodes rather than a war of tendencies. It was nothing of the kind. It was carried through by our people as a definite policy, as a great naval war; even the Peninsular War itself, however important that was, was a secondary exertion for this country. To my mind, when we are putting forth this great effort, we ought seriously to consider whether our ancestors did not adopt a wirier course than we are adopting now, in thinking that we can do everything, great as are our resources, and however much greater they may be. Yet, when we are putting ourselves under this strain, which many business men think is liable to go to a very, very serious point, this is the moment when a large number of newspapers in this country, and other people outside newspaper offices, are giving voice to the phrase: that now we have got to go in for a war of attrition, and that if we are unable to conquer by direct assault we must go on and on and on until we can dictate terms. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"] I want for a moment to ask the House to consider what a war of attrition means, or may mean. There have hardly been any wars in recent history which have been finished by wearing out one side economically, or by the sheer loss of men. The one case in modern history is not very encouraging for us. That is the war between the North and the South in America. The Southern States were the poorest and the less resourceful. They were the worst educated civilised population in the world.

HON. MEMBERS: But the better soldiers!

No better soldiers than the North; who shall say so? They depended upon one industry, and that industry was stopped directly the war began. The Northern States, in effective military population, outnumbered the Southern States by some three to one. The Southern States, with all these disadvantages, held out in this war of attrition for four years. Germany is one of the richest, most highly educated, most highly organised States in the civilised world. Its effective military population is not outnumbered by the Allies by three to one. How many years can Germany hold out—not for victory, which she has not got now—but in order to preserve her existence? There is no one who puts it at less than six years, and that is a sanguine estimate. I see the "Times" newspaper, the chief advocate of a war of attrition, suggests that we may have to go on for ten years. Meanwhile during that war, of years, which is going to wear out Germany—I do not deny that you may be able to wear down Germany!—what is going to happen to us and the rest of the world; where are we going to be at the end of that time? Does anyone seriously think that by halving our personal expenditure or by getting another half-million of men by compulsion into the Army we are going to last out for all those years indefinitely without ruin? A war of attrition means for us as well as for Germany utter and irretrievable ruin. I know numbers of men—not men who happen to hold my views as to the origin of the War—I am not, I assure the House, talking of them—I am talking of many men who, as much as any of those to whom I am speaking, believe that this War was brought on by Germany, but who do not believe that we can go on for all these years, and who object to contemplate the ruin of this country if there is any other way of compassing the hope of security. [Interruption.] Surely I may ask the House to listen. Hon. Members are accustomed to listen to those with whom they do not agree. I have been violently abused for using the word "peace." [Interruption.] I am not going to allow myself to be charged with saying out of this House what I dare not say inside it. I want to say this: I have never, nor, so far as I know, have any of the friends who are associated with me spoken of "peace at any price," or of "peace at any time."

For my part I have always said precisely and absolutely the opposite. I have said that I thought there were certain things that we ought to want, and without which this War could not end. I have over and over again used almost the words of the Leader of the Irish party. I have said that we wanted the restoration of the independence of Belgium; that we wanted a settlement of European boundaries on the lines of nationality far more than they have been up till now; that the problems of Serbia, Alsace, and Poland ought to be settled on those lines, and that we want guarantees for peace and an international system such as that outlined by the Prime Minister in his speech at Dublin. What I have said—and it is here I come into conflict with a certain amount of the opinion of my fellow countrymen—is that there is nothing inherently disgraceful or humiliating in attaining these things by negotiation, and not by fighting. It is just as honourable, and it is less disastrous. It avoids incalculable human suffering, and it is more effective if what you want is a permanent peace, because so much less human hatred will have been engendered. Men—some of them—may very well be less sanguine than others of how soon peace on a basis of negotiation is a possibility. Supposing it is true that at this moment the Germans would not come anywhere near the terms we should desire. Supposing they are not yet sufficiently worn out, nor prepared to submit to the terms which we should think of accepting. That does not preclude the possibility of a change of attitude two, four, or six months hence.

What I have been pleading for is that we should know. Not in mere generalities, such as that we want to break German militarism—a perfectly vague phrase—but in definite terms which the world can understand. Hon. Members who are business men know that often when a difficulty arises between one business man and another that sometimes you cannot for a while get them to meet each other. Do hon. Members imagine for an instant that the first proposition put forward on one side or the other to meet one another is accepted? Often not. Neither would the first proposition that nations may put forward to meet each other be accepted in the midst of war. But the worst of it is that we do not know, and we want to know. Why should the Government not do what a business man would do? I have another reason for saying this—another reason why we British people, or anybody else, should wish this War to be ended, if it honourably can be, rather by negotiation than by an indefinite continuance of a war of attrition. What do we stand for more than anything else? For the evacuation of Belgium and the restoration of its independence. Probably the majority of the British people feel they are fighting because of the invasion of Belgium. The sympathies of our people have been inflamed, and their hearts touched by the sorrows of Belgium as by nothing else. The shelter and charity given by us to the Belgians is, I think, and we all feel, one of the most ennobling chapters in our history. It has created in us, however, another feeling of a sense of responsibility towards the Belgians. They have suffered much. That suffering is not comparable to what it will be if the War goes back over their country. If the Allies are slowly victorious in this War of attri- tion every farmhouse and every village in Belgium is going to be made a fortress, and will be laid in ruins before our victory comes. All our charity will be as dust in the balance to the new misery of the Belgian people.

I do not say that the Germans can be got out of Belgium without fighting, but I do say that our duty to the Belgians is that if they can be honourably got out of Belgium they should be so got out without fighting. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] Well, I do not know. I come now to what I really wanted to ask, and I would express the hope that the Government will be ready to obtain the national objects by negotiation if the opportunity arises, instead of by an indefinite continuance of the War. I want to ask two definite questions: I hope the same danger may not exist with our Parliament. That is why I earnestly wish that this House will, while it discusses the question of munitions, and the question of the wisdom of the Dardanelles Expedition, also discuss the supreme question, not only in perorations, not only in vague phrases, of how we are to expect to get a good peace out of this—the supreme question of how we want the War to end!

7.0 P.M.

When I entered the House a few minutes ago I received such a warm, though satirical, welcome, that I thought perhaps it might be my duty to say something in this Debate. In any case, I hope the House will excuse me if I do so. We have listened this afternoon, for the first time, to a kind of speech which we may be sure will be very familiar to us before the War is over. I venture to say that, much as I appreciate the spirit which animates the hon. Gentleman, a speech which could have less practical effect on any of the issues with which we are concerned never could have been made than that to which we have just listened. I say so for this reason. The hon. Gentleman assumes that those of us who have the responsibility of supporting the carrying on of this War are not prepared to get the objects for which we are fighting without fighting, if we can get them in that way. Does anyone imagine anything of the kind? The hon. Member himself laid down conditions which show that his speech is absolutely useless at this time. He says that he himself would not make peace—unless what?—unless Germany were prepared to evacuate Belgium—she might be—but, in addition, unless Germany were prepared to arrange that the government of the world should be according to nationality, and unless Alsace were restored. Is there any Member of this House who believes for a moment that Germany will restore Alsace to France, or will restore Poland to the nationality to which she belongs, unless she is beaten?

Yes!

The hon. Member does believe that: then why did not she do it without war? Is there anyone in this House who does not feel just as much as the hon. Gentleman what the horrors of this War are? Are not the effects of it felt in every quarter of the House in the loss of those who are dearest to every Member of this House and outside? Does anyone suppose we would not, everyone of us, jump at the earliest opportunity of ending the War, provided we could do it in a way that is consistent with the honour and safety of the country to which we belong? The time will come when probably that kind of speech will have to be answered at greater length. That time is not come yet, for this House, like the country, is as determined as on the first day of the War that we shall not weaken in our efforts until the objects for which we drew the sword, when war was forced upon us, have been satisfactorily carried out by our Allies and ourselves.

I rose only to say these few words, but I remember that I have taken no part in any of the general discussions of the policy of the Government since I became a member of it. I remember also that I am still, so far as I know, the Leader of the largest party in this House under peculiar conditions, and perhaps I ought to take some part in the defence of the Government, which at the moment is not excessively popular. I am not going, I need not say, to answer the speech of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dublin University (Sir E. Carson). If, in fact, that attempt had to be made, I should leave it to some other Minister to make, but there is one thing in connection with his speech which I should like to say. He referred in his earlier statement to a memorandum of mine, which has got a fame it did not deserve through people not having seen it, and I noticed in some papers next day the idea was suggested that my right hon. Friend and I galloped together up to a fence, that he took it and that I refused it. That was not the case, and my right hon. Friend knows, while we discussed the matter from beginning to end in the freest way, there was not at any time any suggestion on his part or mine that I should follow him in the course he took.

Hear, hear!

And I should like to say, if I may, a word on this subject. I was as responsible as anyone for the formation of the Coalition Government. I do not think that anyone in that position should be resigning from a Government, except for, as I think, one of two reasons. I think he would be only justified if he were satisfied that the machinery which was carrying on the War was so bad that it could not be carried on effectively, or if, on the other hand, the Government were to decide on a particular line of policy which he thought absolutely wrong, and which he thought so vital that he could not accept responsibility for it. If either of those conditions arose, I should, of course, follow the example of my right hon. Friend, but they have not arisen yet, and I hope they will not arise. I am not going to make the ordinary kind of defence of the Government if I can help it. At a time like this it is not much good having the ordinary debating by-play in connection with the great issues in which we are engaged, but I should like to put to the House as a whole, and to the country, some considerations which should weigh with them in their criticism of the Government. In the first place, this is a War Government. We are carrying on the greatest War which has even been seen in the world, and, in circumstances of that kind, there is only one thing which can justify a Government, and that is success. If we were all, and we are not, as wise as Solomon, and as decisive as Napoleon, unless we gave you victories we would still be an improper kind of Government, and, therefore, the real test is whether it is the fault of the Government that victories do not come. Well, I am not prepared to say that the political centre of the Government has not a great deal to do with it, but I do wish the House to realise that that is a point which tells most in regard to any Government in time of war.

Let me illustrate that with regard to our foreign policy. There is no part of the action of the Government which at present is being more severely criticised than the foreign policy. It may be that the criticism is deserved. I am not going to defend the foreign policy; it is not my business; but I should like to say this, though it is not very relevant, that at the time party controversy was keenest, when I personally felt more bitter as regards politics than I ever felt before, or I hope I shall ever feel again, I said of the Foreign Secretary that, in my opinion, he was straightforward and disinterested. I know him better now, and I have not changed my opinion in that respect; but I quite admit that those qualities, great as they are, are not enough, and that that is not a defence. But I do wish the House to remember that, even in time of peace, it is thoroughly realised—I have heard it a score of times in the House—that diplo- macy depends upon the force that is behind it. How much more must that be true in time of war. The success of a Foreign Secretary depends at such a time as this, not upon his skill in writing dispatches, not upon the best use of words. It depends on what those with whom he is dealing believe is going to be the outcome of the War in which we are engaged. Let me illustrate that by what happened in the case of our enemies. The German Government have had one very bad diplomatic defeat—at least it was so regarded—and that was when Italy joined the Entente. For a month at least before it was known throughout the world that Italy was thinking of joining, and what did the German Government do? They knew it did not depend upon words. They made a most vigorous attempt to force their way to Calais, because they recognised that by success there they would defeat our diplomatic efforts, and not by any efforts made at Rome through their agents. Well, they failed. Italy came in, and at that time the whole Press of Germany was engaged in running down the stupidity of their diplomacy, because of that act of failure. I read one article by a well-known German publicist called Wolff, in which he pointed out to the Germans that their foreign diplomacy must be bad; the English diplomacy was always good, because by our training in the House of Commons we got the best men by competition, and therefore our diplomacy was good and theirs must inevitably be bad. We do not quite share that view, but the fact remains that in reality successful diplomacy depends upon success in the field, and that when the scale is balanced, it is the sword, and the sword alone, which weighs down and produces the result.

It is the same thing throughout in regard to the Government. A Government of this kind, as I said once before, has no friends in the ordinary sense, and something else happens. Under our ordinary party system we know what to make of attacks of one kind or another. One set of papers attacks a Government, another set defends it, and from the clash of opinion a fairly accurate decision is arrived at by the country. That cannot happen now. For one thing, platform speaking has disappeared, and, from the nature of the case, the subject in regard to which a Government is criticised, cannot be discussed by those chiefly concerned. You cannot produce the whole facts, and it is only by discussing the whole facts that you can judge of the merits, or demerits, of those who are carrying on the Government of the country. Under those circumstances, it is inevitable that a Government must be subjected to a greater amount of criticism than happens in ordinary time. That is one of the evils of this present kind of Government. I heard the Leader of the Irish party say the other day that all our evils came because of the Coalition. I will confess to the House that the Coalition Government has not succeeded as well—I will not say as I expected, but as well as I hoped. But that does not end the matter. At the time it was formed we thought—at least I thought—that there was no alternative open, and, after the interval, I am still of the same opinion. Whatever else may be said, it cannot be said that we entered into this without foreseeing some of the consequences which have arisen. I remember saying at a meeting of our own party at the Carlton Club that this was a great experiment, and the idea that the Government would be strengthened because one Cabinet Minister was a little more able than another was all nonsense. The real strength of the Government depends on its cohesion and unity of purpose, and if those are weakened by a Coalition, instead of being a better arrangement; we have a worse. At the time people had forgotten what the conditions were.

Does the hon. and learned Member suppose we could revert to a position which was difficult to maintain for twelve months when there was practically no ordinary party criticism from those Benches, and when every effort was made to avoid it? Has he and the House forgotten the conditions that arose about the resignation of Lord Fisher and about the question of munitions, which made it impossible to carry on under the old arrangement? It is my belief to-day, as it was then, that we had to make the experiment, and the country up till now has made the best of it; and in spite of the criticism both in this House and out of it, I, at least, am not prepared to say that the Government has not had a fair chance, or that the House does not mean to give it a fair chance. But there is something else to be said about the question of Coalition, and it has special reference to the War Committee recently appointed. There has been a good deal of discussion, as if this were an entirely new departure; but it is not. In every Cabinet which has existed in my time there has been an inner and an outer Cabinet, although it is not officially recognised. There has always been a Committee consisting of certain members with a dominating personality, and when they agree it may be that the rest of the Cabinet agree. What has been the actual state of affairs? A new set of people are brought in. They are not under the ordinary allegiance to the head of the Government. Some of them are very forceful personalities, and none of them are nonentities—not quite—and the result is that there is not the same smooth working that there would be in an ordinary party Government. For that reason I think that it is really necessary that some smaller body entrusted with special Executive action should be created and should be recognised. It has been appointed, and I hope it will be an improvement. I am sure of this, at least, that both the House and the country will be prepared to give the experiment a chance, and see whether or not things are done better under this new arrangement.

There is only one other subject. While I sat on the bench opposite there was no subject on which I spoke oftener, or more strongly, than about the news we received in regard to the War. I have been rather surprised that some of the critics of the Government below the Gangway have been kind enough to refrain from reminding me of my speeches on that subject. I have not changed my views, and I have not forgotten my speeches. I can say with sincerity that during the time I have been a member of the Government no information came to the Cabinet in regard to the War which in my opinion ought to have been made public which was not made public. That is the truth, but perhaps it is not a complete defence. Perhaps we do not know ourselves as much as we ought to have known. I do not think there is very much ground of complaint, but it is quite obvious that the way the news came was not satisfactory. The tendency throughout has been to magnify every little success and to hide every failure. [Cheers.] Will those who cheer put to themselves this question: How much of that general impression is due to the action of the Government and how much is due to the Press? If hon. Members will look at their papers, whatever papers they are, they will find that they publish good news because their readers like it. If there is anything favourable, the posters are full of it. It is difficult to fight against that. I will give the House an example. After the expedition to the Dardanelles and the attack on the 6th of August all the papers were speaking as if we had won a very great victory. We knew that we had had, compared with what we aimed at, a great failure, although we had a certain amount of success. We did not wish that impression to be conveyed, and it was decided at the Cabinet that a true and careful account of exactly what had happened should be prepared and issued to the Press, and this was done. Its object was to give a correct impression of what had happened. But what did we see? Coming down to the office the next morning I saw on all the posters, in big letters, "Gain of 800 yards at Gallipoli." That was the only result of our attempt to put these things in a true perspective. All I can say about this is that we are just as anxious as hon. Members of this House that the only news which should be kept back is news which would damage us and help our enemies, and we are just as anxious as you are that it should not be kept back because it is bad news and might discourage the country.

Why did you keep back Sir Ian Hamilton's dispatches so long?

I do not think we kept them back too long. It is not our desire that bad news should be kept back, and at this moment, as the Prime Minister said the other day, we are again trying to improve the arrangements. One of the members of the Cabinet is going over to France to try to get the arrangement to work more smoothly, so that the object which we all have in view may be carried out. These are the facts, so far as I know them, in regard to this question. We have heard a great deal about the general situation in which we stand in regard to the War. One of the curious results of the controversies in which we have engaged is that everyone who is in favour of raising the Army by one means tells us that everything is going the worst possible way, and everyone who thinks it can be done by another means—I mean every newspaper—takes the view that everything is going in the best possible way. I do not think it is either one or the other. I have great hesitation in expressing any opinion, because no one has been more completely wrong in their estimates than I have. I never thought the War would have lasted as long as it has done, but I think we may take this for our comfort, that we know the things which are bad in connection with our organisation and the way things are going with us, but we do not know how our enemies are feeling in regard to the same matters. Take, for instance, the position in the East of Europe, in Russia. The Russian Army was driven back completely having suffered great defeat, but was never broken. While that was going on I was reminded of a saying of General Grant in connection with the American Civil war which contains many points of analogy with the War in which we are now engaged. At one of his battles he was told that the loss of life on the part of the North was terrible, and he replied: "Quite true, but if we lose three men and the South lose one man, we have won." I think that is, to a certain extent, true in regard to Russia. The losses which the Germans have suffered in that campaign have, in my opinion, weakened them more than Russia has been weakened in spite of the defeat of Russia and the success of Germany. I believe also that the sea power, and the economic pressure we are exercising upon Germany, is telling more and more every day, and therefore, though I feel that I am as little qualified as anyone to be a prophet, and am very far from being optimistic, I do think that, in spite of the unhappy situation in the Near East at this moment, we have any reason to be discouraged in regard to the general position of the War.

While that is true, something else is true also, as was pointed out by my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee. I should like, since I am speaking on the day on which he spoke about his resignation, to say this: I entered the Cabinet, to put it mildly, with no prejudice in favour of the right hon. Gentleman. I have now been his colleague for five months. He has the defects of his qualities, and as his qualities are large the shadow which they throw is fairly large also, but I say deliberately, in my judgment, in mental power and vital force he is one of the foremost men in our country, and I am sure that every hon. Member of this House wishes him success, and every kind of success in the new sphere in which he is engaged. I should like, if I may, to go further and say something more. There is a good deal of feeling generally that one of the defects of our military organisation is that young men of capacity are not coming to the front as rapidly as they came in all great wars of the past, and as many of us think they ought to have come now if proper scope were given to them. [Cheers.] I ask hon. Members who cheer that to also agree with me in this: He is a man still young who has had some little experience of the Army, and who is resuming his old profession. We know his capacity, and I for one trust that the Commander-in-Chief will find some means of utilising his great ability. As the right hon. Gentleman has said, whatever our view may be, neutral countries like Bulgaria, and, as some of us fear, like Greece, which are not biassed, have come to the conclusion deliberately that it is our enemies and not we who are winning. That is something to give us pause. I think they are wrong, but I am quite sure that the matter is still sufficiently in doubt to make it the bounden duty of everyone in this House and out of it to spare no effort to throw our full forces into the field.

This is the first time since the War began that I have opened my lips in this House, and even now I do so with very great hesitation, and without any special preparation. I would not have done it had it not been for the speech just delivered by the hon. Member for the Elland Division (Mr. Trevelyan). When that speech is read in the British Press, and when it is reproduced in the German Press, which it certainly will be, I do not know that our German enemy will appreciate quite as much as we do here what value ought to be given to it as an expression of Parliamentary opinion. I admire my hon. Friend for the courage with which he made the speech. Holding the views he does, I think he was perfectly entitled, and indeed called upon, to make it. But I think I may say that this is probably the only legislative Assembly in the world, among the warring nations, in which such attention, tolerance, and uninterrupted hearing would have been given to such a speech. I do not think it would have been possible in the French Chamber. I doubt if it would have been possible in the Russian Duma, and I am afraid, if the speech had been delivered in the Reichstag, my hon. Friend would soon have found himself in a very uncomfortable and hot corner of the German trenches.

But the fact that that speech was made in accordance with our honoured traditions —traditions from which I hope this Assembly will never depart—and that it was listened to with tolerance, attention, and without interruption must not be allowed to deceive our enemies, or indeed our friends, into the view that my hon. Friend represented any real section of opinion either in this House or in the country. It is thought that I, a member of the Irish party, should at least liberate my colleagues and myself—and I speak with the assent and on the suggestion of my honoured leader the Member for Waterford (Mr. John Redmond)—when I say I feel it my duty, as a member of the Irish party, to at least dissociate us from any suspicion or any misunderstanding that we share the views of my hon. Friend (Mr. Trevelyan). There has been no speech in the course of a long Parliamentary career that I have made with more hesitation than the one I am making now. I have been a pacifist all my life. A lot of nonsense has been talked about people finding their spiritual home in Germany. I am not here to say that, although I loved and admired the literature of Germany before the War, I have ceased to do so now. That would be childish. I am not here even to say that the War, of which I am an ardent supporter, is to be regarded as a War against the masses of the German people. I believe this War is a War for the liberation of the masses of the German people as well as the liberation of Europe generally. If the masses of Germany had had their say as to whether or not this War should take place, if they had been told the truth, I am not at all sure the War would have taken place.

But at the same time there is a German thing with which I am at war, and I am at war with it because of opinions which I share with my hon. Friend as a democrat, as a lover of freedom, as a lover of the rights of small nations, and as an ardent advocate of the principle of nationality. My hon. Friend says it is a vague expression to say that we are at war with German militarism. But there is nothing vague about German militarism. There is no principle in the history of the world that has been put in more concrete form than German militarism. Louvain, Scarborough, the "Lusitania," the "Ancona," the treatment of Belgium, the murder of Miss Cavell—all these things give a definition which ought to be clear to the mind of any man, and especially of a democrat, of what militarism means. I say with that ideal, which is the ideal of the dominating classes in Germany, no citizen of any free country in the world can have any compromise. I do not want to speak with the language of passion. The circumstances are too serious for such language. I have, indeed, been silent because words seemed such futile things in the midst of these tragic events. Furthermore, I can tell my hon. Friend if I dissent from his views it is not because I have not a horror of war, for these horrors fill me with depression in the day and nightmares at night, and have done ever since the War began. When I read in all its details, as I am bound to do by reason of my profession, the story of the War, and of the horrors, cruelty, and suffering that lie behind the dispatches acclaiming the superficial glories of the War—when I read these things, I am filled with something like despair.

But how are we going to end this War? My hon. Friend suggests talking about peace. To talk about peace, I think, is to prolong the War. My hon. Friend, I am sure, does not mean to do it, but his speech, and speeches like it, will add length, will add difficulty, and may even add bitterness to the War. [An HON. MEMBER: "No, no!"] My hon. Friend is perfectly entitled to dissent, but that at any rate is my view, and I believe it is the view of 99 per cent. of the people of this country. And why? If this War were to end now, it would be a triumph for German militarism. It would give it another lease of life. There is only one way to put an end to German militarism and all it means, and that is to beat it. Supposing the War were ended now. I will discuss presently the conditions on which it is suggested it could be ended. Germany is still in possession of a large portion of the soil of France, a large portion of the soil of Russia, a large portion of the soil of Serbia, and practically the whole of Belgium. And when Germany comes face to face again with the great domestic struggle which has been going on within its own boundaries with 4,000,000 Socialist votes, denouncing the consequences of German militarism—when that struggle is renewed within the frontiers of Germany, what will be the reply of the military party—of the Junker party, and of the practical autocracy of the Kaiser? They will say, "These miserable Socialists have always been denouncing German militarism, but German militarism confronted and defeated all Europe," and a new lease of life would be given to German militarism, and all our sacrifices and sufferings will have been made in vain.

My hon. Friend suggests terms of peace. I wonder where they come from. Do they come from Berlin? It is said the terms of peace adumbrated in some newspapers have by accident, or by suggestion, come from Germany. I do not know. But these terms of peace to-day are about half what they were six months ago, and they will be again halved three months hence if the War goes on. Is there any official, or semi-official, or demi-semi-official presentation of such terms as those my hon. Friend mentions on the part of Germany? He says, and I quite agree with him, that the only way in which we can have any prospect of peace in Europe for the future is by establishing the principle of nationality. It does not require me to give any testimonial to that principle. I believe that the record of my own country, and I believe also that the record of the countries of Europe supplies that. Unlike my hon. Friend, I am old enough to have lived through the Franco-German war, and I said then, as I say now, that the real cancer and disease which made this war practically inevitable was the violation of the principles of nationality in the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine by the Germans after the victory of 1871, and until Alsace and Lorraine are restored to France we will have no security for peace in Europe.

I wonder how French politicians will feel when they read the speech of my hon. Friend. Good care will be taken that publicity is given to it. Even if it is not given in the English Press, care will be taken to publish it in Germany and Austria, and that is the reason why I find it necessary to speak. I do not want to hurt the feelings of my hon. Friend, but I feel bound to express my convictions on a very grave and tragic matter like this with frankness, without violent language, and I hope without disrespect. I ask what will be the feelings of the representatives of France and Russia when this speech is held out all over the world as proof that England is getting tired of the War?

May I ask my hon. Friend why it should be regarded as proof that England is getting tired of the War when the one person who has mentioned peace in the House of Commons says we ought to make peace, and that one basis of that peace ought to be the principle of nationality which you, and as you say the French, approve?

I am unable to understand the meaning of my hon. Friend's interruption. I have not mentioned peace except on terms which I believe Germany would indignantly reject at this moment. Does my hon. Friend suggest that the members of the Government, or we in this House, are wicked and homicidal enough to reject such terms of peace as we think would be in accord with our principles, with the security of our country, and with the future tranquility of Europe? My hon. Friend the Member for Coventry (Mr. David Mason) says I said so—

Allow me to explain—

No, I must be allowed to make my speech in my own way. I am not making a prepared speech. If I were I dare say I could follow the trend of that speech after an interruption. My hon. Friend will have plenty of opportunities of answering me when the time comes. The first term of peace my hon. Friend mentioned is the restoration of Alsace and Lorraine. There is no proposition which has been rejected with greater indignation and with completer unanimity by all the spokesmen of Germany, and all the German journals with which I am acquainted than the restoration of Alsace and Lorraine to France. My hon. Friend must not stop there. What about Poland? I will regard this War as an unsuccessful war on the part of the peace-loving peoples, nations and parties of Europe unless Poland is restored to autonomy and her scattered races under Prussia, Russia and Austria are gathered once more into one whole. Will Prussia agree to that now? The principle of nationality does not end there. There are 16,000,000 or 17,000,000 Slavs in Austria, there are 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 Rumanians in Austria, there are 1,000,000 or 2,000,000 of Italians in Austria, whose right to have their principle recognised is as strong as that of Alsace and Lorraine. What of the Poles? Is Austria going to break herself up at this stage? The principle of nationality! Does my hon. Friend apply that to the Armenians, and will he get Germany to give us back the 800,000 Armenians whom her Ally has murdered and Germany could have saved? That may appear to be the language of passion. I do not want to use the language of passion, but is not that true? It appears to me, therefore, that at this moment any discussion and any proposed terms of peace coming from the lips of any man who is a British citizen are far more likely to do harm to peace and to prolong the War. I do not say that in exultation, I say it with regret and sorrow, but I say it also with conviction.

My hon. Friend drew a very dark picture of the present prospects and conditions of the War. I ventured to say, many times before my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee (Mr. Churchill) said it to-day, that it was quite possible we should be worse before we were better. I think we have many a dark and perilous hour still to traverse. In passing, I may say that I do not think our journey is going to be made the more easy by what I regard as the national tragedy of having removed from our counsels a man with such courage, genius and insight as my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee. I have rarely listened to a speech in this House which so profoundly touched and saddened me as the speech of the right hon. Gentleman this evening. We shall have many a dark hour yet to go through, but I entirely refuse to accept the picture of the conditions which has been drawn by the hon. Member who preceded me. It is quite true that there is a terrible strain on our resources. It is quite true that we require severer and more rigorous methods of economy in the nation, but, in my opinion, the nation is ready for any sacrifice which it is called upon to make. For myself, I think every man in the nation, however wealthy he may be, ought to be willing to go to a garret rather than that his country and his principles should go down in this great world struggle. I believe that is the spirit of the nation. Is all so well with our enemies and all so ill with us? Anybody who reads in our papers not the articles of our own journalists, but the articles of the German journals, will see that the pressure upon Germany which our Fleet has steadily kept up is telling more and more every day. We do not know what the German people are thinking. They are not allowed to publish their thoughts, and if a paper did so it would be immediately suppressed. I am sure, if we could get at the hearts of the German people and at their real opinions, we should find there is a great deal more anxiety among them than there is among our own people.

It is a terrible strain and burden on the nation; but I want to put this question to my hon. Friend. Would there be a less strain put upon the nation if we do not fight this thing out now, but left it to future generations to fight out? That is the way it presents itself to me. I am taking, I hope, as everybody should take under conditions so tragic and momentous for our nation, a perfectly frigid view of this problem. Supposing this War ends in such an inconclusive peace as my hon. Friend would bring about—not as he would have it, but as he would bring about. Supposing it ended in an inconclusive peace, what would it mean? It would mean two or three generations of preparation for the next war. I know France very well, at least I think I know her very well, and I assume my hon. Friend does, too. I have been there nearly every year since the year when the Franco-German War came to an end. I performed the sacred duty of getting rid of something like an obsession—I have visited Alsace and Lorraine, and if my hon. Friend had done that and knew what Prussian rule really meant, I think he would be as eager as I am to see that that spirit was exorcised from the soul of Europe. What has been the position of France for forty-four years since the war? In essence and in heart she is the most peace-loving country in Europe: a nation of small families and of universal service. What does war mean to her? It means the darkening of the light and hope of every family in the country. A nation like that was bound to be a nation that loved peace and avoided war. All through these forty-four years there has not been a month in which her pride was not insulted, there has not been a month in which her security was not assailed. Through forty-four years she has lived in the nightmare of humiliation and in the valley of the shadow of death of a coming war. Does any man want England and the British Empire to go through forty-four or forty-five years of similar humiliation? Either this generation settles this question or it has to be settled three generations from now. They will be three generations of gigantic armaments, of spendthrift expenditure, and perhaps national bankruptcy at the end. These, I believe, are the feelings of Irishmen, and the feelings of 99 per cent. of Englishmen, Scotsmen, and Welshmen as well. They are the feelings of men, some of them in this House, who have lost all their sons in this War. I see no softening, but I see a hardening of national resolution. I believe that in this War, as in many other wars, perhaps slowly, perhaps after a long time, we shall ultimately conquer by our Fleet, by our resources, and, above all, by our unconquerable spirit.

8.0 P.M.

When I have had an opportunity of saying anything in this House since this War started, I have always endeavoured to help, and my criticisms have never been of a carping character. In the speech which was made by the hon. Baronet (Sir A. Markham) who initiated this discussion, he fell foul of the Minister of Munitions on the alleged charge of his having placed the whole position before the Labour party, and he said that we were the pets of the Minister of Munitions. [An. HON. MEMBER: "NO, of the Minister for War."] I understood it was the Minister of Munitions. I do not think it is the case that either of those Ministers consulted the Labour party. What happened was that the leading officials of the trade unions were brought into consultation for the purpose of helping in a certain object, but it was not the members of the Labour party. The meeting called by the Minister of Munitions was fruitful of beneficial results. During the last six or eight weeks I have had an opportunity, as the result of certain representations and requests which were made to me, of making a very extended tour in France for the purpose of counteracting such pacifist speeches as have been made not only in this House to-day, but speeches of a similar character which have been made outside this House. I have found that, as a result of what I might describe as the weakness of the Government in dealing with the "Daily Mail" and the "Times," that there are evil results from it so far as France is concerned. These Jeremiahs caused a great feeling of disquiet in France. The feeling so created was that our country was not doing what it ought to do in the prosecution of the War. As a case in point, I might say that in the city of Lyons the British Consul said that, so far as the past six months were concerned in that city, life had been one long misery to him as a result of the feeling that had been created more particularly as a result of the "Daily Mail" and, in that connection, of quotations which had appeared in the local newspapers from the "Times." The duty which devolved upon me was to endeavour to counteract these evil influences and state from personal knowledge what has been accomplished in this country, not only so far as the creation of an Army was concerned, but as to the mighty sea-grip of our Navy. It is not my intention to detail all that was said so far as that was concerned, but simply to let the House and the country know these evil results which have followed in France from those things which I have stated. I may say that one redeeming quality was also discovered in the course of my visit, and that is that the French soldiers who are getting a short furlough from the front come back with uncompromising confidence as to their own personal superiority over what they describe as the "Bosches," and that optimism has had an immense influence in getting rid of the pessimism that abounded in many of the provincial towns in the South of France.

I had not the privilege of listening to the Prime Minister when he first submitted this Vote of Credit. I was very anxious to get hold of a newspaper to find out what it was he had to say, and one of the things that struck me most forcibly was the pessimistic note he struck with respect to the financial problem. During my visit to France I had the opportunity of seeing every shell factory in every town or city which I visited, and I discovered that in those arsenals and shell factories they were discarding the boring of high explosive shells out of solid steel and forging them instead. Many months ago I suggested to the Government Department, when shells were so scarce and there was so great a demand for high explosive shells, the means whereby in the course of less than three months 40,000 shell cases, forged, could have been made by one firm alone in the district of Swansea. But the so-called experts declared that the forged shell was not so good as the bored shell. That was so far as the War Office was concerned, although the Admiralty at the same time accepted the same class of shell made from a forging, while the experts of the War Office declared that it was defective. The French Government have discovered that as a result of the boring of these high explosive shells out of the solid steel they were not so good as a forged shell, and as speedily as possible the whole of the shell factories in France are discarding the method of boring in favour of the forged shell, because that means a tremendous saving in money, if you take a 3-inch shell it means that 25 per cent. less steel is required for the making of the forged shell case than the bored shell. We are talking about the balance against us of imports as against exports. I know, as a fact, that some of our national shell factories have been retarded in their operations because they had been waiting for drilling machines coming from America, machines costing us double the value because the makers in the United States are taking advantage of our needs to increase the price. If it had not been that we were waiting for those drilling machines coming from America, those factories could have been getting these forged shell cases, and could have proceeded with the turning of them without the necessity of waiting for drilling machines. The making of shells was, therefore, hampered and harassed as the result of the difference of opinion amongst experts. Moreover, I discovered that as the result of the defective shell cases bored out of the solid steel, the French have had over 700 cannon burst by premature explosion. Since they started with the forged shell case that has been enormously minimised, a demonstration of the fact that the forged shell case is better adapted for high explosives than is the other.

I should like to support the contention of the hon. Baronet with respect to the appointment of inspectors in the Munitions Department. The advisory committee of the trades union officials have been pressing upon the Department, from time to time, the necessity of appointing men as inspectors who have technical or practical experience in the duties they have to perform. As far back as last June attention was directed to the appointment of an inspector who went to an engineering firm in Manchester, Mather ond Platt's—it may be as well to give names—who did not know the difference between a boring and a planing machine. To think that in the steel trade you can appoint butchers, bakers, tailors, and men of that character to inspect steel, and say whether it is fit for the use of the Government or not, is absurdly ridiculous. I should like to know what influences were behind those people who have received appointments of that character. I think that were the Govern- ment Departments to accept the advice so often tendered to them from all quarters of this House, as to the taking into their confidence of men of knowledge of particular departments, a great deal of this waste could be avoided. If you take the difference alone in the making of shell cases by hydraulic pressure instead of by boring, it would mean some millions of pounds saved each year so far as skill is concerned, and I should like to know whether the Minister of Munitions, now that we are told that he is in close contact with the French Minister of Munitions, has had the knowledge conveyed to him of the discovery of the French Government that the boring of shell cases from the solid steel is being discarded in favour of the other method. That is not the only saving. In the forged shell case it means fewer machines and fewer operations in the work of the shell after the case has been made. As the result also of my visit to France, and coming in contact with a great many of our British officers, as well as the rank and file, statements were continuously made to me of the absolute waste of rations at the front. Thousands of cases of bully beef were lying about being trampled over, kicked here, there, and everywhere, and the same amount of rations was going out every day just as though there were no sick men and no casualties. Also small-arms ammunition was lying about in the trenches—thousands upon thousands of cartridge cases. That is a demonstration of the carelessness of the officers. I have received a good many letters from officers protesting against the statement I have made, while in other cases I have had other letters saying it was absolutely true and that it was essential that those in charge should do their best to have that waste eliminated. I think that in face of the pessimism contained in the Prime Minister's speech when he introduced the Vote of Credit, it is absolutely essential that something should be done. If we need our money then we ought to take all steps necessary for the purpose of saving it.

With the hon. Gentleman who last addressed the House I concur, so far as the opinion he expressed is concerned, as to the determination of the people of this country to carry the War on to a successful termination. There can be little doubt that General Joffre expressed the opinions of the people of this country when he said that we had better make any sacrifice now we are at it than that our grandchildren or great-grandchildren should undergo a similar catastrophe to that which has overtaken Europe at the present time. Generally speaking, at the meetings I attended in France the French people expressed their gratification that some facts and figures had been placed before them enabling them to realise the magnitude of the British effort, because there is no doubt about it that never in the world's history has there been such an episode as an Army of 3,000,000 volunteers being created within the compass of one year. My hope is that in the future the various Government Departments will do something more than they have done in the past by way of consulting people who do know something with respect to those things which are necessary for the carrying on of the War. For instance, some two months ago—probably a week or two more than that—the Minister of Munitions called a meeting of the steel manufacturers of the United Kingdom for the purpose of consulting with them as to whether they could give him a greater production of steel. So soon as I heard of that I wrote to the Minister of Munitions, and said I thought it was a pity that he should call so many busy men away from their business when the secretary of the Employers' Association and myself could have given him inside twenty-four hours all the information that he required.

In some parts of the country the men were working Saturday afternoons and Sundays, with the result that extra rates had to be paid to the men for overtime, whereas there was any amount of plant lying idle, and if that plant had been utilised these other firms were not under the necessity of working these extra hours and physically exhausting the men; because it has been established in two districts, at any rate, where the men have been working seven days a week for many months past, that they got so stale that there was less output in the seven days than previously the firm had been getting in the six. That is a demonstration of waste in two ways, the waste in the course of manufacture and the waste in the physique of the men, while a great deal of plant was lying idle. I am glad to think that has now been got rid of, because as the result of the list of the idle plant which I was in a position to send to the Minister of Munitions that plant is now being utilised for the purpose, not only of assisting our own Minister of Munitions, but of also giving a greater supply of steel for France for the purpose of still extending their production of shells. It is also interesting to note that there was not a single shell factory in France that I visited where they were not extending in exactly the same way as we are doing—a demonstration of the determination of the French Government to leave nothing undone in the provision of the high explosive shells necessary when the time comes for complete victory.

We have listened this afternoon to a great number of very interesting speeches, and not the least interesting was that delivered by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Churchill), and I think, after listening very attentively to everything he said, the thought struck most Members of the House, Why had he not been allowed to make this statement before? He has laboured under the suspicion—it has been stated in the Press and repeated over and over again—that he was the sole person who was responsible for the disaster at Antwerp and that he was also responsible for the expedition to the Dardanelles. We now know for the first time that in both these matters he adopted the absolutely correct course of taking the technical advice of technical men, and that the responsibility was not his, but the Government's, for these two expeditions. Considering what has been said and what has been written about these expeditions, I think it is a most regrettable matter that the Government, and particularly the Prime Minister, have not thought fit either to allow the right hon. Gentleman himself to make his explanation or to make an explanation so as to exonerate him.

It is stated, I notice, in one of the American papers that in connection with this War we are not pulling our full strength and that we are not contributing our real share; but though in some respects there may be truth in that suggestion, at any rate no one can say that we are not spending our money. I think, when this War is looked at from the money point of view, we are not only spending it in the most lavish manner, but we are throwing it away with both hands. We now know that the War is costing us something like £5,000,000 a day, and Heaven only knows what will be the result if we have to continue for any great length of time spending this huge sum! I should not make any complaint if the money were being properly spent, but we have the gravest suspicion that it is being wasted, or that a very large sum is being wasted. One is looking round to see who is at any rate responsible for some part of the waste which is taking place. It has been suggested to-day, across the floor of this House, that a grave responsibility rested with Lord Kitchener. I am not going to join in any attack on Lord Kitchener. I have no information upon which to base an attack or even to make a complaint. Lord Kitchener was called, at the outbreak of War, into the Cabinet. We do not know to what extent his hands were tied by party questions or party politicians, but he was called in and given charge of the whole of the arrangements of the Army. Of course it was a huge undertaking. We know that he has given us an Army amounting to several millions of men, and as far as I am able to judge from the results which we have seen, I think he has done remarkably well. Therefore in the absence of further information I am not going to take any part in the attacks which are made upon him. But I should like to know fully and more definitely with whom the real responsibility in connection with our many rebuffs rests.

When the Government discovered, after we had been at war for many months, that we were short of munitions, and then in their wisdom they created a Ministry of Munitions, you would have thought the first thing they would do would be to appoint heads of that Ministry who had some knowledge of their subject. Instead of that the Minister of Munitions is appointed, a Parliamentary Secretary is appointed, and another hon. Member on the opposite side of the House is appointed in some capacity. Not one of these three Gentlemen knows anything about their job. They have floundered about, and I think when their work is investigated it will be found that they are floundering today, and by many of what I think are exceedingly stupid arrangements, they are going to cost the country a huge sum of money. I know I have the privilege and the honour of addressing an empty House.

It will be reported all the same in the morning.

I thank the hon. Member for his reminder. I think it was necessary that the heads of these Departments should be business men with some knowledge of their job. What we find to-day is that there is too much of the political element at work. I know a large number of men have given their services gratuitously and are helping this Ministry and are doing really magnificent work in attempting to pull the show through, but I feel that they are being pressed by the political element which is at the head of the Ministry. I see it in many directions, and not the least is the question, which is constantly recurring, of wages. Statements are being published in the newspapers that unskilled labourers, who before the War were worth 25s. a week or 27s. a week, and who are men of no great merit, are now earning on piece work £5 to £6 a week. I am the last person in the world to object to people doing well for themselves, but you have to remember that you do not depend entirely upon the unskilled labourers. You have the skilled labourers to take into account, and when a skilled labourer who before the War was earning £3 a week, is now, with the War, only earning £4 a week, and he finds that a man who was worth only 25s. a week before the War getting more money than he is getting, it is quite natural that he should be dissatisfied. I am told that there is to-day a movement on foot amongst the London Unions to demand an extra 1d. per hour. That will be 5s. a week advance for every man. I am not surprised at it, but it is going to cost the country a terrific sum of money. It is a most terrible waste of money to think that men whose value before the War was only 25s. should now be earning £5 to £6 a week.

There is another point of view which may be taken into account. Look at the number of men who have taken commissions in the Army: men who were earning salaries of £200, £300, £400, and £500 a year, who have responded to the patriotic call and taken commissions in the Army at very small salaries, leaving their wives and families in a terribly bad state. Theirs is a truly hard case; while, on the other hand, we have these men who stay at home, these unskilled labourers who are not doing any skilled work, but are only working at a capstan lathe, or some automatic machine, and who have got the trick of speeding it up and getting a big output. These men are not doing any skilled work, but they are earning wages out of all proportion to their value. Under the regulations which the Ministry of Munitions has issued no one can reduce the wages of these men. The employers cannot reduce the wages without an appeal to the Minister of Munitions, and in every case that I have had any information about the application for leave to reduce the wages has been refused. Why we are going to allow this state of affairs to continue it is difficult to understand.

We are building new munition factories. I put a question the other day to the Minister of Munitions asking him for information as to the terms upon which factories at Gretna Green were being constructed. He refused to give me the information. He said that it would not be desirable in the public interest to give information as to the terms of individual contracts, and that if they are given in one instance it would be impossible to draw the line. Why are they not to be given in every instance? What is there to hide? What is there in this policy of hushing everything up? Why are we not to know the facts? The local rumour is that these factories are being constructed on the basis of the contractor being paid the cost, plus 10 per cent. profit. That is not a very good business arrangement, because the more the contractor pays in wages the greater his profit, and the result is you get a very uneconomical method of conducting your business. I protest most vigorously against this withholding of information. If we are as a House of Commons of any use at all we ought to be able to get the fullest information as to the financial arrangements which the country is entering into. It could not harm us with the enemy. It is not information which would help the enemy. The information which helps the enemy is the information that we are spending £5,000,000 a day, whilst probably they are not spending half that sum. If it is going to be a war of exhaustion, then surely in all conscience we ought not merely to preach economy, but to practise economy in all our national expenditures, starting from the highest Minister and coming right down to the lowest, so that no unnecessary money shall be wasted or spent.

I feel that we are not doing the best in the circumstances; that there is a sort of political undercurrent in these matters, and that in a good many cases it is not always the right people who are being consulted. I have information concerning the Ministry of Munitions, and it rather amazes me. I find that among the many Committees there is a National Labour Advisory Committee. In all conscience one would think that employers of labour would, at any rate, have had some representation on that Committee. There is not, however, one employer on the Committee. Three hon. Members who sit on the Labour Benches constitute the Committee. Surely, if you want to organise this business on a businesslike basis, you ought to have both employers and working men represented on that Committee, and not merely have one class represented. I am sure that the hon. Member (Mr. Thorne) would have protested very vigorously if three employers of labour had been put on that Committee and no representation had been given to the Labour Members. There is another most extraordinary Committee called the Munitions Parliamentary Committee. It is a Committee which consists of about sixty members, and I have inquired of several of the members whether the Committee ever meets. I am told the Committee never meet. They are called a Committee, but they are no Committee at all. They are simply a schedule of members who have volunteered to go round and address meetings of workers, to go to those workers who have enlisted to get them to return to the workshop, or to address workers in the workshops to get them to enlist. They are called a Committee, but for all practical purposes they are no Committee at all.

These are things which fill one's mind with the gravest apprehension, particularly with the threatened advance in wagss which is likely to take place. I do not mind anything that is fair and reasonable. As an employer of labour I am happy to say that I never had any trouble with men, but everyone will agree that it would be very regrettable that one class alone in this country should be allowed to make a huge profit and to double, treble and quadruple their ordinary salaries. It is a loss which the country has to bear, and it is very largely due to the three Members who constitute this Ministry knowing nothing whatever about the subject, about engineering works, or the employment of labour, and simply blundering along and pandering to everyone who suggested that the trouble really was that the men wanted more money. If that is the way we are going to continue, then I take the gloomiest view of the results of this War. We are not going to win this War by waste of money. We are going to win it by putting our backs into our job, and everyone, whatever class in the community he occupies, doing the best which he possibly can for the country. Though my words fall on an empty House, I hope that they will reach those in authority, and that as a result we shall see some real attempt made at economy and proper management of these munitions factories.

I desire to correct a misapprehension of the hon. Member in reference to the Parliamentary Committee. This particular Committee is not a Committee of the Ministry of Munitions at all. It is a Parliamentary Committee appointed by the different parties which has worked very largely in daily co-operation with the Ministry of Munitions. This Committee, I believe, is quite small, like most other useful Committees.

Allow me to correct the hon. Member. It is not a small Committee. I have got an answer to a question giving a list of Members of Parliament assisting the Ministry. It is headed. "Munitions, Parliamentary Committee." I have not counted the number of names, but there seem to be at least sixty or seventy.

That is the way the document was drawn up.

That is as it was furnished.

That is a list of Members of Parliament who have gone throughout the country entirely voluntarily, at great sacrifice of their own time and labour, to address meetings of munitions workers; but the meetings have been arranged by this small Committee, which I believe I am right in saying consists of three members—a Labour Whip, the hon. Member for Sheffield, and—

Allow me to correct the hon. Member. It is his own document which was given in answer to the question on the 28th October. The question was, "Who were the Members of Parliament who were assisting or connected with the Ministry of Munitions?" Then there was a list headed, "Munitions, Parliamentary Committee," a very long list of members, and then there are the hon. secretaries. The names of three Whips are given, not as the Committee, but as the hon. secretaries.

That was a list of Members who had worked in connection with the Ministry of Munitions. That list of members is not the list of members of the Munitions, Parliamentary Committee. That is a Committee appointed by the Whips, and so far as I know consists of these three Gentlemen. A large number of Members of Parliament have gone throughout the country addressing meetings of munition workers. The hon. Member referred to "blundering along," and "window-dressing performances," and I could not allow these expressions to pass without saying that they are, I am sure quite unwittingly, an entirely unjust reference to the work which a large number of Members of Parliament have done. There is no question of their blundering along. We have asked this Committee of Members of Parliament to address meetings of munitions workers in different districts, and a programme has been mapped out, and the country has been most carefully covered in accordance with the various exigencies of the time. So far from being blundering, I think that the activities of this Committee have been as carefully organised as the work of any Committee which I have ever known at work. There is no window-dressing about it, because in the vast majority of cases no public report is made of these meetings. Members of Parliament have gone to the works and addressed the meetings of munition workers without getting any credit whatever, [An HON. MEMBER: "Inside the factories!"] There is no "window dressing" of any kind about it.

I have never suggested that there was.

Therefore, I intervene for a moment in order to correct the hon. Member. I think it only just to these large number of Members of Parliament that the statement should be contradicted as early as possible.

I do not think that there is any Member of this House acquainted with the work done by this particular Committee who would deny for one moment the extremely valuable services which these Members have rendered. Several of them have been in my own Constituency, and to my own knowledge have done extremely valuable service, but as I happened some time ago to have asked a question, and I can assure the hon. Gentleman that I am not in collusion with the hon. Member for Chippenham (Mr. O. Terrell), and had no knowledge that he was bringing this up this evening, I would like to make quite clear what I know was the point which he was trying to make. The point was this, that originally I asked the question in this House as to the names of Members of both Houses of Parliament who were assisting the Minister of Munitions in his Department, and on the 28th October the Minister of Munitions kindly gave a list, but included in it this large Committee, making it appear that there were some 140 Members of this House assisting him in his duties. I think the particular Committee referred to by the hon. Gentleman was really a Committee not directly or ordinarily assisting the Munitions Department in the sense in which the question was put. Nevertheless, nobody will deny the enormous help which has been rendered to the Department by the members of that Munitions Committee. I do not want to say anything to-night about munitions, but for my part, having taken a dood deal of interest in the earlier stages of the provision of munitions, and the establishment of the Munitions Department. I would like to say that I have a feeling that it was right to leave the Department severely alone; not, as the right hon. Gentleman will admit, that there have not been opportunities for offering criticism of that Department, for I think that it is getting material at a very heavy price, and I think it would be a great advantage if some of us properly pressed that matter. But the fact is that we are getting munitions for the War, and I can assure the hon. Gentleman and his colleagues on that Bench that Members like myself, who are credited with being, well. I shall say critics, have at any rate tried, within the limits of their powers, to restrict criticism only to those matters which, rightly or wrongly, they believe at the moment were serious, and not merely for the purpose of raising points which might be found to be disagreeable to Ministers and members of the Government.

I can assure hon. and right hon. Gentlemen that was the only motive behind anything I have ever said or asked since the War broke out; and it has been encouraging to hear, during the last few days, one Minister after another getting up on the Treasury Bench and defending the Government, at the same time admitting that mistakes and blunders had been made in administration. It is encouraging to me, because it indicates that some reason, or something has happened, that has put a new spirit into the Government, and has created a new determination to prosecute this War with much greater zeal than has been the case in the past. I do not know what that reason may be, but something has happened, and I am sure that Members of this House are only too glad if the Government now realise a little more closely what the real situation is, because, in my judgment, they have never in the past realised it, and, if they realise it to-day, and if there is a new spirit and determination to carry on this War in a better manner than in the past, there is no one, however much we may have criticised the Government previously, who will not delight to support them up to the limits of his power. I do protest against the suggestion which we have had from two Ministers to-night, and from the First Lord of the Admiralty last Thursday, deprecating criticism by Members of this House of what Ministers and their Departments are doing.

The Under-Secretary for War this afternoon spoke very strongly on this matter, and made what was little less than an unpleasant attack on the hon. Member for Mansfield, who, we all know, is ever ready to offer criticism of the Administration of this country, but who, I believe like myself, only does so in so far as he believes it is likely to serve an immediate purpose. When the Under-Secretary for War gets up and describes the hon. Member for Mansfield as a fault-finder—and that accusation applies just as much to me as to the hon. Member for Mansfield and to other Members who have criticised the Government in the past—I resent it most strongly, and I am not going to be brow-beaten by the Government into giving up criticism because we happen to have no recognised leader to give cohesion and force to our criticism. It is the duty of every one of us to our constituents and to the country to do what we believe to be right; and, if we make mistakes in the action we take, then no doubt there are some means by which we could be made to pay a heavy penalty for it. I, like other Members, have criticised the Government, and I have exercised my right of criticism solely in the interests of the country. I referred a little earlier to the improvement in the attitude taken up by members of the Cabinet and Ministers of the Government, and I have especially in mind what was very interesting to me, coming as it did from the First Lord of the Admiralty last Thursday evening. He was speaking about the preparation for war especially with regard to aerial warfare, and he said:— an Irishman, and one whom I have no hesitation in admitting that I, amongst others, a good many years ago, in the time of the South African war, called a traitor, and believed him and regarded him as a traitor, to think that on last Thursday we had to depend upon the hon. Member for West Clare to come down here and speak some plain truths about the situation in which we find ourselves at the present moment. Personally, I agree with the greater part of his speech. All he got for it was this deprecation on the part of the First Lord that an hon. Member, an Irish hon. Member, should dare to stand up to tell the Government straight what a great many people in the country are thinking of it. Before I come to the question of the Diplomatic Service, about which I desire to speak, I do wish to remind the House of a point which has been frequently referred to by Members last week, and again this afternoon, and that is that in nearly everything that we have done since the War began up to the present Britain is always coming in too late. We are too late in aeroplanes, too late in aircraft, too late, as the First Lord told us, with guns, too late with shells, as everybody knows, and with munitions of war generally, too late in interning aliens. We had them spoken of as harmless men for ten months, and at the end of the ten months, when it was too late, and when they could have done whatever damage they wished, the Government realised that they are dangerous, and put them in Islington Workhouse and other places. We were too late with our contraband regulations as to cotton. If it is right to stop cotton now because it is of use to Germany, why was that not done in August or September of 1914? The blockade has been effective, but if it had been adopted twelve months earlier it might have had the effect of saving twelve months' expenditure and loss of blood.

9.0 P.M.

We were too late to secure the support of Bulgaria. We were too late in our offer of Cyprus to Greece, because Germany had offered it before our Foreign Office had done so. We were late also in extending our help, though we all hope not too late, to Serbia. We were too late coming to an arrangement with Greece. At the beginning of the War we were too late in attacking the German Fleet when we understood that there was a very good opportunity of doing it very great damage. We were too late to capture the "Goeben" and the "Breslau." In almost everything that has happened that is really effective as to the progress or otherwise of the War Britain has always come in too late. I come to the question of diplomacy and the Foreign Office, and it is in my judgment—and I think there is very good evidence for holding the view—that the Foreign Office is too late in nearly everything they are doing. When I come to refer to the Balkans and diplomacy, there let me express the hope, because I can do no more this afternoon, that the Government have already taken the necessary and sufficient steps to see that Serbia is provided, while there is opportunity, with the necessary food to keep her Army and her people alive in the difficult circumstances in which that country finds itself with its people tied up in the mountains without sufficient food to carry that little nation through the winter. I do hope and trust that the Government have done so in conjunction with our Allies. When I come to consider our failure in the Balkans it is very galling to me to think that this mighty Empire, to say nothing of our Allies, is really grovelling at the feet of small Balkan States and grateful to them for a crumb of benevolent neutrality that any one of them is willing to give. Leaving our Allies, Russia and France, aside for the moment, surely it is humiliating that we can do nothing with those Balkan States except to be thankful for their assurances of benevolent neutrality. It does seem to me that British diplomacy has sunk to very small influence if that is all we have been able to achieve during the last nine or ten months in all the efforts that have been made to secure the goodwill of countries like Bulgaria and Greece. When we come to look back to the speech of the 2nd November made here by the Foreign Secretary and when we contrast what he said on that occasion with his statement of the 28th September and consider what has happened during this last spring and summer, one really is forced to the conclusion that things are not as they should be at the Foreign Office. In the first place the Foreign Secretary very properly stated, what I think all Members of this House would support, and that is that the country is the better for being told and will fight the more resolutely for being told the full facts of the situation. The right hon. Gentleman went on a little later to explain what he meant by his statement made in this House on the 28th September and which gave rise to so very much doubt and misunderstanding. He said:— if they had faith in him, why did they absolutely ignore the advice which he gave, namely, that in view of the treaty between Bulgaria and the Central Powers, which he gave as his express opinion, they should at once give up any hope or thought of coming to an understanding with Bulgaria and turn their thoughts into other channels, with a view to counteracting the effect of Bulgaria's joining the Central Powers? I hope it will not be long before the Foreign Secretary has an opportunity of telling us what truth there is in what I am saying. If it is correct—and I have absolute confidence that it is—it is a great reflection on the Foreign Office.

With regard to Greece, I think it appears to the public generally—certainly it does to me, without any other information than that which is open to the public—that we have undertaken, together with France, to dispatch a very considerable force to Salonika without any arrangement being made between our Government and the Government of Greece to make sure that those men are safe. If that is the fact—and I think it is the only interpretation that can be put on the information in the Press—this House ought to have an explanation from the Secretary of State for War why this Army was allowed to land in Salonika before the Foreign Office had made such an arrangement with Greece as would probably protect these men. To illustrate my fear that there is room for great improvement in the Foreign Office, I want to make a reference to the American Note published a week ago. I am not at all nervous about our Government's being able to give an adequate reply to that Note. But I cannot help feeling that proper steps have not been taken by the Foreign Office since the War began to cultivate public opinion in the United States. I am told by a well-known gentleman, who has returned from a long tour there, that the German Government has some 20,000 agents at work throughout the United States for the express purpose of cultivating a public opinion favourable to the Central Powers. I understand that we have practically no agents at work there. At any rate in towns that I could name the British Consular service in no way meets the situation or provides for our national requirements. What I mean is that in some of the towns the British Consuls are not active, they do nothing, or they are not the right type of people to do what little lies in their power to cultivate American opinion or to counteract the effect of the German agents. It is no wonder that we find in these Notes on the questions of contraband and the freedom of the seas that the United States is taking a stiffer attitude with each Note. This arises to a large extent from the extraordinary manner in which Germany organises German opinion in that country. I hope that the Foreign Office will do something to strengthen the position of the British Empire by bringing proper influence to bear on American public opinion.

Earlier in my remarks I referred to the Prime Minister's speech of the 2nd November. The right hon. Gentleman has made then and since three impressive speeches on the War—impressive because they had their effect on the minds of most Members, and certainly on the minds of the public generally. We all feel more than ever to-day, no matter what we thought in the past about the Prime Minister or the Government of which he is the head, that the right hon. Gentleman has made a promise which he has to fulfil—that is, that he will administer the War with better results, and that he is determined, as he has certainly been, I admit, to carry on the War until it is brought to a successful conclusion. But fine speeches will not win this War. None the less I am grateful to the Prime Minister and other Ministers for what they have said last week and to-day. I am much encouraged by those speeches. But speeches, whether from the Prime Minister or from anyone else, are no good unless responsible Ministers are going to deliver the goods. That is what we are going to watch. I am prepared to be patient, and to avoid criticism as much as possible, in the hope and belief that the Government are going to take far more serious and drastic steps to fight, not with kid gloves, but with the mailed fist, which we have not done in the manner we might have done in the past. I hope we shall not be disappointed in the hopes that we are building on those speeches.

On Thursday evening last there was issued through the Press Bureau from Lord Derby a statement of a most important nature. Some of us regard that statement as containing a futile and unnecessary threat, as a violation of the spirit of what the Prime Minister said on the same subject on the 2nd November in this House, as a menace to the unity of the nation, and as a breach of the privileges of this House, which alone is entitled to issue any such statement, should it so desire. Many Members with whom I had the privilege of acting had intended to debate this question at length on this the first Parliamentary opportunity that had presented itself since the statement was issued. I rise—and I think it right to do so—to state why we cannot to-day avail ourselves of this opportunity. It is because the Prime Minister was not able today to make his statement on the question. He has promised to make that statement to-morrow. In deference to his announcement we thought it right to postpone the action we should otherwise have taken to-day.

It was only natural that the very courageous speech made by the hon. Member for the Elland Division (Mr. Trevelyan), who dared to mention the forbidden word "peace" in this House, should have met with a reply. It is, however, a little incongruous that that reply should have fallen into the hands of the hon. Member for the Scotland Division of Liverpool, because that hon. Gentleman represents the party against whom, in no very distant years, a similar charge was levelled of helping the enemy by demanding that the terms of peace should be stated. I refer, of course, to the time of the Boer War, when one section was demanding that the fight should be continued until the Boers had surrendered unconditionally, and others were suggesting that terms of peace should be arranged. I believe the Irish Members at that time were particularly anxious in the matter, and demanded that unconditional surrender should not be forced upon our enemies. It is peculiar that it should have fallen to the lot of the hon. Member to make the savage attack he did upon the speech made by the hon. Member for Elland. Mention of the Boer War reminds me of another fact, and because it is in my mind I regret very much the attack which has been made upon Lord Kitchener, both by the hon. Member for the Mansfield Division and the hon. Member for West Clare. I am not concerned at any attack that may be made upon Lord Kitchener from the opposite quarters, but I do think that, at any rate, it shows a lack of gratitude for any Liberal Member to attack Lord Kitchener except with very great justification.

What was the position? What was the difficulty which faced Lord Kitchener when he was called to office? It was that we in the past had been lead to believe that this country had no foreign engagements which were likely to entail us in war. One day the Foreign Minister came down here and told us that on the previous day he had virtually placed the British Navy and the Forces of this country at the service of France, who was then engaged in war. Hurriedly, therefore, vast Armies had to be created, and I say that no man but Lord Kitchener, and I believe only he in consequence of his great name, could have saved the position in any degree whatever. I say, therefore, this criticism of Lord Kitchener comes ill from the lips of a Liberal Member, when criticism should be made with great reticence. We should always remember this—particularly in these days when we are finding new heroes and new conductors of the War. We should have some regard to the situation with which Lord Kitchener had to deal, following speeches and statements made by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen who are now leaders in the War policy, and who would now out-general such generals as Lord Kitchener. I do, for instance, consider that it ill lies in the mouths of those hon. Members who in the past told us that we had no danger to fear from Germany, to come along now and depreciate and belittle the endeavours of soldiers like Lord Kitchener, who saved us from a situation of, from their point of view, unpreparedness which they themselves had created. Take the statement made by the present Minister of Munitions in 1908, and similar statements made afterwards. It was that very statement that I will quote that affected public opinion in this country, affected my own opinion, for instance, though I have stuck to that opinion—whatever it may be worth—whilst the Minister of Munitions has not done so. The right hon. Gentleman then said:—

There is a point arising out of the speech of the hon. Member for the Elland Division to which I should like to refer. He said that a war of attrition would land this country in a tremendous loss, as well as other countries, and, indeed, would involve the world in a general downfall. At the beginning of this War, I believe, and held very firmly a possible policy, which we ought to pursue which would inflict on ourselves the minimum of loss and upon our enemies the maximum of loss. It seemed to me that if we supplied France with sufficient men to maintain their front, and if we went on with our business, the production of wealth in this country, and kept our people and our industries employed, the pressure of the British Navy would in the end compel Germany to accept our terms, or, at any rate, put Germany in a relatively infinitely inferior and weaker position to ourselves. A new set of circumstances has arisen. To carry out such a policy as I have suggested we had to keep our people employed. We had to maintain our industries. We had to continue our exports. We had to take advantage of the fact that our islands were safe from invasion. Germany was not similarly situated. What has been done? That policy, which I should say was the economic policy of the War, has been surrendered to the demands of the militarist party, who only see the military point of view, and whose one idea is to get together as many men as possible, withdraw them from industry, get them into the fighting-line, and then in that way you are going to win the War. I believe that this great endeavour to introduce Conscription into this country is fatal to this country. It is a policy which will bring us to the level, if not below the economic level, of Germany in this War.

Therefore it seems to me that by adopting this military conscriptionist policy Germany will not relatively weaken more quickly than ourselves, because it is clear now that there will be under these terms a limit to our endurance. It is all very well going on until we have used up the last man and spent the last shilling. I would agree with that if we were spending the last shilling of the people of to-day—if we were scrapping every penny-piece of this country in the War. But we are not doing that. We are not going to the wealthy and saying, "We will scrap your wealth; we will take your wealth." No; we are borrowing it from them, and borrowing it at an increasing rate of interest. If this is to be a war of attrition, won on those lines, who is to-day so optimistic as to believe that we can force Germany to unconditional surrender under another year, at any rate, of war? There is no one, I believe. The possibility may exist, but I do not think anyone believes it. Therefore, we have before us on these lines the possibility of increasing the debt of this country to £3,000,000,000 even in a year or so of further war. I say that is an impossible project. That is a project which must inevitably mean the destruction of civilisation as it exists to-day. I do not raise this point in order to whimper, as the Prime Minister called it, as regards our losses. Not at all. I am only raising it to meet what is the chief objection raised to any talk of peace or negotiation. Immediately the objection is raised that has been raised by the hon. Member for the Scotland Division of Liverpool (Mr. T. P. O'Connor). "What!" he said, "would you go back to the old conditions? Would you leave a generation or two generations hence to wage this War over again?" I believe there is a tremendous fallacy in that view. We have gone so far already in the piling up of debt and in the destruction of life and property that there is no return to the status quo ante bellum. You may make quite sure of that. If to-morrow peace were declared, and when sanity came back, and the people of this country saw the gigantic debt there is upon them, I believe you would have something very like revolution in this country. I believe you would have a revolution in every belligerent country. The people of this country will say, "Here are these thousands of millions of debt created during this War—what does it mean? It means that the rich people during this War, although they conscripted our bodies, and dispatched them to the battlefield, did not surrender their wealth to pay for that process." They will say that the landowners of this country, when the land was in danger, did not come forward with special contributions and pay for it, and the people will say they will not bear the burden of this debt. Either they will demand the repudiation of an impossible debt indirectly or they will fly at direct means, and will tax the interest on this debt in order to pay that interest. You are to-day not only providing the fuel for war, but you are also providing the fuel for such civil strife as this and every other country has not seen, at any rate for over 100 years since the Napoleonic wars created something of the like conditions.

It is an unfair retort, therefore, to say that, to suggest the possibility of some point in the not far-distant future opening up the way to negotiations for peace, if peace were so restored you would simply return to the world that existed in July, 1914. There will be no such world in this country again, not for generations upon generations, if ever again. I want to find out the policy of the dispersal of our Forces for these many campaigns. I would like for a moment to search the reason in our foreign policy. We have heard during many days' discussion the question of the Balkans. Why did Bulgaria go against us? What is the reason for the attitude of Greece? It seems to me we have never had openly stated what, to my mind, has been the determining issue all through. It is this, that we have had two policies. We have had the policy of the West and we have had the policy of the East. We have had the policy of driving the Germans out of France and Belgium—an easily understandable one, and one within the sphere of our task and of our interests. We have had the other policy of the East, an indeterminate one, difficult to grasp, but which seems to me to have been chiefly reflected in the conception of promoting a demand made by Russia to go to Constantinople. Now it is the fear of Russia at Constantinople which has set the Balkans against us and determined their neutrality as regards the other part. It was the knowledge of the advance of Russia in Galicia which set Turkey in arms against us, because she knew the fate in store for her. It was the fear of Russia going to Constantinople which determined Roumanian neutrality. At an early stage of the War there was an interview published with the King of Roumania in an Austrian paper, afterwards republished by the "Manchester Guardian," in which the King of Roumania plainly said it was not to the interest of his country that Russia should dominate the outlet from the Black Sea. Bulgaria, we know, was under the same fear, and I have no doubt the same fear is operating as regards Greece. Look at it as regards our own policy—the dispersal of our own Forces. Many theories have been advanced as to the cause of the inception of hostilities at the Dardanelles. At first we were told that it was a megalomaniac exploit of the late First Lord of the Admiralty. But then, months afterwards, my attention was drawn to a statement made by the British Ambassador in a speech he made in reply to the clamour that was being raised in Petrograd that Britain was not doing her fair share, and so strongly did this clamour arise that the British Ambassador had to go out and make a speech to show that Britain was doing her fair share in this War. One of the evidences brought forward by the British Ambassador was that, as he said, the attack upon the Dardanelles was at the request of the Russian Government, because they desired to draw off Turkish forces from the Caucasus. My belief is that underlying our true military policy is this belief, that Russia desires to secure possession of Constantinople. The point I desire to make is that the conflagration of this terrible War arose in the Balkans, and we have never had a true perception of it, because this fact has largely been concealed from the people, and it has been more popular to say that the origin of this War was the advance of Germany into Belgium, and consequently we do not get a correct view until we realise that it arose out of the contending ambitions of the Russian and German Empires as regards the over-lordship of the Near East. There it arose and hostilities have been transferred there. I am by no means a peace at any price man, nor am I a war man, and the only hope I have to-day is the possibility that as the interest has now been transferred to the locality in which it arose, and because it arose of the contending ambitions of these different Empires as regards the territories of these small nations, there may be left sufficient sanity and wisdom to bring about some arrangement that will settle this question there, not in the interests of Russia, Germany, Austria or Britain, but in the interest of those peoples themselves, and that there may be settled before long that issue which has brought this War upon the world and which if not settled will bring other wars. If this be not, and if a limit is not set to these hostilities long before a war of attrition can have determined the issue we shall have to face the fact that European civilisation is going down in blood and bankruptcy.

I desire to refer to the intervention of the Colonial Secretary in the Debate. I am sure that we all welcomed that intervention, and I think it has helped us to get nearer to the actual facts of the situation than anything that as yet happened, because that statement was very frank and clear in regard to the present situation. The right hon. Gentleman seemed to me to take the House more into his confidence and the confidence of the Government than has yet been done by any other member of the Cabinet. He referred to the censorship and said that he still remained of the same opinion which he held before he joined the Cabinet, which was that the people of this country should have all the information possible, and he went so far as to say that he thought they had had all the information which had been placed before the Cabinet. The Home Secretary has never really faced the situation when it has been brought out against the censorship. We have had Censors editing Kipling and Browning, and the Home Secretary said he could not help us because it was done on the other side of the Channel. The Colonial Secretary says that it is not sufficient to leave the people of this country for their information to the mercy of Censors of that kind, because they certainly have not the discretion, judgment, or knowledge which is necessary on the subject, and he made the announcement that a Cabinet Minister was going himself to see that more adequate and proper information should be provided for the people of this country in the future. I welcome that statement, and I hope it will lead to a better state of things. The right hon. Gentleman also stated that the colouring given by the Press in some directions had rather distorted the real situation.

We also had a very interesting statement from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee. I am sure we all listened with very great interest to that statement. I could not help feeling, as the right hon. Gentleman was speaking, that it was impossible to get at the real feats of the case at present, because there were others concerned who were not present, including the late First Sea Lord and Lord Kitchener. It seemed to me that a certain amount of blame was thrown upon Lord Kitchener in the right hon. Gentleman's statement. I regretted that very much, but I felt it was impossible to get all the facts under the circumstances. It appeared to me that the Prime Minister rather gave an endorsement to that statement. He said that he approved of the latitude the right hon. Gentleman had taken, and though he had said certain things which he regretted and regretted that he had omitted certain things, he did not enter any caveat against the case upon which the First Lord based his statement. In the course of that statement the late First Lord of the Admiralty made some rather interesting confessions in regard to the origin and inception of the Dardanelles campaign. I do not wish to go into that at any length, but I will refer to the fact that he said he regarded it as a military gamble. I am sure many of us here regretted to hear that statement, which we have heard before, confirmed by one who took upon himself a very large measure of responsibility for it. We have heard of a gamble in the food of the people, but a military gamble means a gamble in the life of our men, and it has not turned out successful and has not achieved the object intended. Before the right hon. Gentleman closed his statement he rather indicated in his peroration that Constantinople was the great object of the War, that all other objects paled before that and might be set aside. Those of us who have special information have realised that the attack upon the Dardanelles has had a disastrous effect upon the campaign as a whole. In the spring, when we were all led to believe that the great advance would take place, there was a shortage of men, munitions, and guns. We know that the Dardanelles Expedition was started without any intention of sending military forces there, but, eventually, it was found necessary to send every man and gun that could be obtained, with the result that the shortage of munitions which prevailed in the West was due not to the slackness of workmen, but to the supplies that had to be sent to the Dardanelles. If the view prevailed that Constantinople was more important than anything in the West, we can quite understand the sacrifice of our position there to the Dardanelles. But I think the view has always been held here that the main theatre of operations was in the West, with the idea of driving the Germans out of France and Belgium, and that that was where the real decision ought to be expected. This side-show, however important, has interfered with our plans in the West, and, instead of making the great advance in the spring which we hoped for, we found considerable difficulty in maintaining our position. The Prime Minister, in his review of the situation on 2nd November, remarked that he did not intend to say very much with regard to the West. That was a matter of surprise to me certainly, because, while he told us we had at least a million of men engaged there, he gave us no information and vouchsafed no reason why the recent advance there had not been successful. I do not want to pursue that topic any further. I do not think we can come to any conclusion with regard to the conception and conduct of the Dardanelles campaign until a great deal more light has been thrown upon it.

I should like to refer to a statement of the Prime Minister on 2nd November that a Committee of the Cabinet was seriously considering the question of economy. In July last I urged that this question of economy was a serious one which should be taken in hand by the Government, and I referred to certain suggestions which had been put forward by the War Commission which reported on the South African War with a view to economising expenditure during war. I was assured by the Prime Minister that everything suggested by that Commission had been carried out, and so far I was satisfied. But since then a minute of the Treasury has been published, from which it appears that so far from any control being exercised by the Treasury over the War Office and the Admiralty, that control has been absolutely withdrawn in vast areas of expenditure. Owing to that want of control some difficulty must have arisen in maintaining economy in the Army, and the Government are either quite unwilling or unable to control the terrible extravagance which is going on in every direction. Every hon. Member knows numerous instances of enormous extravagance and terrible dissipation of public funds. I hope that the institution of this Committee really means that the Government intend to tackle this question and save the precious funds of this country, which are being squandered in every direction.

Whilst speaking of the actual wastage of money, there is, I should like to point out, another cause of wastage coming into operation, and that is in connection with the effect of the new recruiting scheme on the industries of the country. I receive letters daily from my Constituency pointing out how the most vital industries are being threatened by men being taken away either for the Army or for munition work. In one town there is a textile industry wholly engaged in making cloth for our own Army and for our Allies, and the directors tell me that their efforts will be paralysed very shortly if the authorities do not stop taking away their best and most indispensable men. The same complaint applies in regard to other factories; and, furthermore, it is made by the farmers, who say their labour is being taken away; and that there is enormous extravagance in the Munitions Department in the matter of wages: boys who have been earning 10s. a week on the land getting as much as 37s. 6d., while men hitherto paid 21s., some of them feeble and not very capable of doing a full day's work, receiving as much as 37s. 6d. from the munitions factory.

I venture to suggest to the Government that some steps should be taken to harmonise all these various requirements—the questions of finance, of munitions, and the supply of men for the Army. The Prime Minister told us, as a warning I presume, that the cost of our men had gone up from £100, in time of peace, to £250 and £300 a year. I would remind the House that the whole of this gigantic expenditure, the whole of these thousands of millions which we have already voted—I think the present Vote on Account will bring the total amount authorised to £2,300,000,000—the whole of this gigantic sum is withdrawn from our control and is entirely in the hands of the Government. Why has the expenditure risen to so high a pitch? The Government can tell us. Is it due to the terrible extravagance we see all around? If so, why not put a stop to it? Why continue it? Why not have a committee of business men to help the Government; why not get the services of men accustomed to dealing with great businesses and utilise their experience and knowledge for the benefit of the country in preventing further waste?

With regard to the Dardanelles, the Prime Minister gave us some account of the situation, but he never told us why the attack failed. He told us that success was expected and seemed certain both to those here and those on the spot. He also told us that our soldiers were magnificent and that nothing could exceed their courage and endurance. And yet we have met with failure! Why? We have never heard who was responsible. There is no desire in any part of this House to recriminate in any way. But what we do desire is that some lesson should be learned with regard to the future, and we should like some assurance that we are not making the same mistakes and incurring the same risks in the future as we have done in the past. Why was this campaign undertaken when it was known that a joint naval and military force was required—why was it undertaken with the Navy alone in the first instance? Why did we not wait until we had the necessary Forces to enable us to carry out the attack successfully? The Prime Minister has told us that it was a joint military, naval and political issue, and that the political issue was so important that it overshadowed the naval and military considerations. Here we have a very good illustration of the impossibility of allowing political considerations to overshadow and outweigh the actual naval and military considerations under which these movements are carried out. What has been the result? We have not won any of these political objects which were aimed at, and we have demonstrated to the Balkans our incapacity to do this in such a way that we can hardly wonder that, with the evidence brought under their eyes of our ability to succeed in this attack, they should have been discouraged and should have been induced to look to our enemies rather than to ourselves for assistance. In undertaking an expedition of this kind we have had an unfortunate dispersal of our Forces. Are we to have another dispersal, another side-show, which is going to interfere with our position in the West? The Secretary for Foreign Affairs told us that there were no troops in excess anywhere, and that they are all being used in some sphere of operations. Where, then, are we to draw them from if we are not to take them from the indispensable Forces necessary to preserve our position in the West? We know from the letter which has been read and from the statement made to-day by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Trinity College, Dublin (Sir E. Carson) that the expedition to Salonika was against the advice of our military advisers. They there point out that our true course was to make our position in the West absolutely secure, and to bring pressure in that way to bear upon the position in the East. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs told us that if we had been successful in the West we should have solved the Balkan problem in our favour. Why, then, depart from that policy and disperse our Forces, as we appear to have done in the Dardanelles?

What is the position? It is very difficult to criticise a Government carrying on a War of this kind. They are in very great difficulty. One ought to give them every consideration. They should have every assistance and the benefit of every doubt. We ought to refrain, and we have refrained from saying anything with regard to many things which appear to be things we should like to see them do; but we have now reached the point when it appears necessary for us to have some discussion in this House. Discussion will go on. If it does not take place here, it takes place in the Press, which ought to be less well informed and which is not responsible in the same way as we are responsible to the people of this country as being the elected Members of Parliament. A time comes when we must review the situation here, and ought to take part in discussing these matters, and when we ought to be taken into the confidence of the Government. We have had some approach to that now. What is the situation in which we find ourselves, and how do the Government propose to deal with it? Lord Lansdowne, in the House of Lords, was the first to lift the veil a little. What did he tell us? He disclosed the fact that a small Force had been hurriedly sent to Salonika, and that a larger Force was under orders. I should like to quote his language, because it is very enlightening:—

That seemed to be a very alarming statement. Apparently no decision had been taken; there was no purpose and there was no object. In another place Lord Lansdowne said that Sir Charles Monro had been sent out with a view to reporting and giving his opinion. But at the same times Forces are being sent to the Mediterranean. That is really very alarming, because how can Sir Charles Monro tell on the spot what shall be done in a great matter of policy of this kind? He has not his hand on the strings as the Government must have here. He cannot tell what is being done in the Balkans. That must be known to the Government here. We now know that the Central Powers and Bulgaria have already joined arms, therefore any decision taken after a report of that kind must be too late; it cannot be in time. Suppose Sir Charles Monro reports against the expedition, what will be the situation then? At enormous cost we are sending these men by sea, and we are subjecting them to the risk of being torpedoed under navigation in the Mediterranean. If it is decided that they should return we shall have to go over the whole process again. We have not been taken into the confidence of the Government. That being the case, as the Colonial Secretary pointed out, you can only judge the Government by one criterion—that is, the criterion of success or non-success. The hard facts come out notwithstanding the small amount of information we have been able to get, and we have to consider what are the deductions from those facts. How do we stand? We have these facts, that on the sea we have a grip upon the German Navy which is unshakable and renders these Islands safe from invasion; in fact, we have won upon the sea, and so far as we can see there is nothing in all human probability which can alter that. That is an important and most gratifying fact.

When we turn to the land, we find a very different situation. Notwithstanding all the mystery about it, it comes to be clearly seen that the great spring initiative, which was to clear the enemy from France, was ruined by the want of shells, men, and guns, owing to the drain caused by the Dardanelles Expedition, and our Forces at a critical moment were insufficient. Another great attempt was made in September, but so far as we know that attempt has ended again in an impasse and deadlock. Belgium and part of France are still in the hands of the enemy. In the East, Russia has lost Poland, and Germany has secured its coal mines, industrial districts and resources, and appears to be fortifying its strategic centres. The Dardanelles are still unwon after terrible losses, and apparently there is no chance of our meeting with success there, and even if there were the situation would now be hopeless, because of the junction of forces between the Bulgarians and the Germans and the possibility of their getting to Constantinople before us. At Salonika we have a few men who were rushed in without any settled plan, and although they were said to be invited by Greece they met with a protest from Greece. Lord Lansdowne truly said that this fact had altered the situation, as, of course, it must have done, if we are acting from a base which is not our own, but is in the hands of those who are not welcoming us. It seems a very serious situation to be in, and it is very difficult to say how you can successfully attack it. There is a single line of railway, with heavy gradients, and the enemy threatening the line all the way. To continue the review: Serbia being crushed I would also refer once more to that guarantee of the Foreign Secretary. I cannot quite realise how he could read that guarantee as anything but a guarantee of assistance with military forces. He said: If we continue the survey, we find ourselves in East Africa just holding on, our troops in a precarious position, contending with very great difficulties, and making no progress. In South-West Africa we have had one great and complete success, the capture of German South-West Africa by General Botha and his forces. The Mesopotamian force, as the Prime Minister has said, has been one of the greatest successes of the whole War. Against this, of course, we have to put the fact that Germany is being exhausted. Her men and supplies must be becoming exhausted very rapidly. But is she becoming exhausted more rapidly than we? There is the whole question.

Such is the review as it presents itself to us after fifteen months of war, conducted as it has been at stupendous cost and with the unfailing support of the House of Commons. I suggest to the Colonial Secretary that this can hardly be called a success. Now we are waiting for more forces in the Mediterranean to decide what action we shall take. That seems to me to condemn any enterprise of that kind before it starts, because it is too late. What I venture to suggest is that our Colonies and our own forces have the first demand on our assistance, and if we have any forces to spare in the West we ought to make the position of our own people absolutely secure. In East Africa, as I have said, they are holding on with great difficulty. I think help should be sent to them. I see a statement in the Press that help is likely to be sent from the South. For long months they have been holding on with very great difficulty, and I trust the Government will consider the situation in East Africa and send sufficient forces to make the position of our people there secure from a successful attack on the part of the enemy. With regard to our possessions in the Mediterranean, I would ask whether every step is being taken to make our position in Egypt absolutely secure. The Prime Minister told us that if it had not been for the Dardanelles Expedition we might have had an attack on Egypt. If that expedition is not successful we may have that attack, particularly if the Germans join up with the Turks. And there are peculiar dangers there which can only be averted if adequate forces are made available. I hope that may be done. I hope our forces in Mesopotamia may be adequately supported. I do not, of course, expect us to be told what the Government are doing exactly, but I hope we may have some assurance in general terms that these matters are being cared for, and that we may not have "too late" written over them in the future. We have had many general statements in regard to the War, and I could have wished they had been more particular in their terms. I think the time has come when we do not want any more general statements as to the objects to be achieved, but some assurances as to the manner in which these objects are to be achieved; as to how the Government intends to attain those objects, what steps they propose to take, whether there is a probability of those steps being successful, and whether those steps are within our means and our strength.

I should just like to say one word more about our position and that of the Allies. It is perfectly clear that there has fallen upon us the duty of keeping the seas, and then of financing ourselves and our Allies. We have carried the War upon the sea, as I said, to an absolutely successful conclusion; and I should like to remind the House that that success has been won by a Navy established and maintained throughout on a voluntary principle. The greatest Navy the world has ever seen has been built upon that plan. Our second duty is to finance the Allies. That has imposed a gigantic task upon us which is daily becoming greater. We must not only carry on the feeding of this country, but must continue to manufacture not only for ourselves but for our Allies who require equipment, both France and Russia having important manufacturing districts occupied by the enemy. The Financial Secretary the other night warned us that you cannot fight a war with factory, and workshop, and railway, and warehouse, and wealth of that kind, but only by goods made and services rendered by the hands of men. If you take away the men you cannot have those services or those goods. That is perfectly clear. We have no excess of these goods or of munitions of war, and if we take these way, and the hands that make them, it is quite obvious we cannot have them in sufficient quantity. Our third duty is to provide sufficient military forces for our protection and then for the help of the Allies. Again I would refer to the Prime Minister, who told us that our forces cost £250 to £300 a year per man to maintain. It is perfectly certain that the men of our Allies do not cost that; neither the soldiers of Russia nor those of France. That is a pure matter of business, and it would be very unwise of us to increase our forces at £250 to £300 a year per man, while those of our Allies may be provided at £50 or £100 a year. If we are really throwing in our resources together, that ought to be considered: whether we ought to take our men who are so skilled, and who are not only so skilled, but who are able to manufacture to the fullest extent where our Allies are unable to do so in their countries. That ought to weigh very considerably in the apportioning of these forces. It seems to me that our military forces must limit the first two of these duties, and it ought certainly to be one of the first duties of the Government to see that those first two duties are not seriously impaired, or made almost impossible to be carried out, by the almost undue extension of the third.

Before I sit down, I should like to make a short reference to another point, the offer of Cyprus to Greece. It certainly was a very alarming answer given to the hon. Member for Mansfield (Sir A. Mark-ham) by the Prime Minister when he told him that that offer had been made not with the consent or knowledge of the Cabinet, but with the consent of the Departments concerned. It certainly struck me as a very serious matter that the question of giving away portions of the British Empire should be a Departmental matter. I hope we shall not have any recurrence of a matter of that kind, so destructive of confidence at a time of crisis, I have risen with reluctance to take part in the Debate. I realise the gravity of the situation, and how serious it is to discuss these grave questions, but I have felt that the situation with which the Prime Minister dealt, and which has been discussed, has been so serious and alarming that it behoves anyone who has anything to say upon it to observe in saying it every rule of caution and prudence that suggests itself.

I am led to make a few remarks by the intervention of the Secretary for the Colonies into the discussion. We have had from him another assurance, of what we must all have suspected, that the Government and the Cabinet are very uneasy about their policy in connection with the censorship. Whenever the Prime Minister or the Home Secretary has answered a question upon this subject everything has been perfectly plain and straightforward. In fact, no other policy was possible. But when the Minister of Agriculture makes a speech in another place or in the country he can hardly keep his mind or his audience away from condemning the censorship, and we have now had in this House a Cabinet Minister telling us that in his opinion all he ever said about the censorship before he came into office is as true as ever it was, and he was able to announce—an announcement which I am sure was welcomed by everyone—that impending changes can be seen. I want to call attention to the fact that anyone who looks into the opinion of the most wise and important men in this country upon this subject, or who looks into Colonial or foreign opinion, must see that one of the things in connection with this War which has been worst managed, and also which now can be most easily remedied, is the censorship. What a very remarkable thing it was when a few days ago in another place we had two leading men of such different points of view as Lord Morley and Lord Milner both condemning the censorship in unmeasured terms. I note that one of the most serious and responsible papers of the day, a paper which everybody regards with respect, both because of its old standing and traditions and because of the restraint and seriousness of its tone, I mean the "Economist," used these words about the censorship:—

"The public has come to see that it is being deluded by the censorship and it resents this."

When the "Economist," as well as the most staid and responsible Members in the House of Lords, speak as they have done I am sure some change ought to be made. In this connection I want to read to the House an extract upon this subject from a letter I received from Africa only a short time back. As we had a question asked to-day in the House about the action of the censorship in Africa, this quotation will not be without its point. This is what my correspondent, a most responsible gentleman, writes:—

"The news which we are allowed to have doled out to us here is simply ridiculous. Apparently we are only children and we must have good news given to us and so we have heard of nothing else but victories, especially from the Russian side. This side of the War is most extraordinary. I have followed the accounts carefully for weeks and I learn that there were from eight to ten million Russians in arms invading Austria, then that they had fresh victories, then that they had taken many prisoners, and were still advancing. But when I looked at the places on the map, I saw that they were always fighting in the rear of their last victory."

Is this from a native?

It is a man who is a good deal more sensible than some Members of this House.

An HON. MEMBER: He must be a native.

The letter proceeds:—

"Really they are all too ridiculous, the stories to which we have been treated from the first."

That is not a comic travesty of facts, but it is meant as a serious representation of how the censorship strikes an intelligent and patriotic African. It is lamentable that the Government should carry on in this way. I will quote an opinion on the censorship from an American newspaper.

An HON. MEMBER: Quotations from all round!

I have got to show exactly that the censorship is condemned all round, even by members of the Cabinet. It is only one or two members of the Cabinet—one of whom has not been able to resist the force of my words and has left the House when I was beginning to criticise his Department—who stand up for the censorship. The quotation is from the "Philadelphia Ledger," one of the most important American newspapers, and one most friendly to the cause of the Allies. In an article it uses these words:—

"The Americans naturally resent official trickery and deceit. They despise a censorship that deludes the public to no good end. Are they to be blamed if, not knowing what they are to accept as truth, they give currency to stories both injurious and false. The friendship of the Americans has, so far, persisted in spite of the antagonism the censorship has aroused, but constant irritation even among the best of friends is dangerous."

I hope the Government are really going to treat the country with more confidence and respect in regard to the news they allow us to have. I hope they are going to be more frank and straightforward in their policy. There are many facts in connection with this War, not only in regard to the Dardanelles—of which we have been promised statement after statement which have never been made—but in regard to other matters. For months we have had statements promised about the Dardanelles, but we have really never had any adequate statement until to-day. We were promised statements about Italy and the terms on which Italy was coming into the War. We are not even allowed to ask a question upon that matter in the House of Commons to-day. If any question is asked it is put off with the stereotyped reply that it is not in the public interest for information to be given. It is not only a question of the follies and stupidities of the censorship; but all this is symptomatic of the state of mind behind and the state of mind is this: "We have got many things we must not let out. We are afraid, not so much of the Germans, but of what our own countrymen will think of our blunders, our incapacities and our follies." I pause to observe that there is no Cabinet Minister present. I do not consider myself so important as to need a Cabinet Minister, who could not possibly answer my arguments, to listen to them.

Four hundred millions.

I must again point out that it is scant courtesy to the House. I suppose, however, that we must expect that in connection with this whole policy of depriving us of information which we can fairly ask for, and which has been promised to us and never given. In connection with the whole question of public rights of information, criticism, and knowledge, I want to call attention to a meeting which was held in London a few days ago, and was attended by Lord Derby and two Cabinet Ministers. I want to read a few words from the speech of one of those gentlemen, because it gives an indication of what they think of the public and the House of Commons, and how they fear anything like publicity or knowledge of what they are carrying on. One of these gentlemen said:— or on no information at all, and the result will be that the country will be tired of them before it is tired of the War.

If a Cabinet Minister were here I should, with the greatest earnestness that I could command and the greatest restraint that I can impose on myself at the present time, pray him to consider seriously this whole matter. I will only add one thing, that is that the House of Commons might be made use of a great deal more than it is. I will take this one question, a question which appeals to my right hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the Treasury. He wants economy. He wants the stopping of this waste that is going on. The constitutional means for stopping waste in public expenditure is control of expenditure by the House of Commons. When this War began the House of Commons was exercising its control over public expenditure, not, I admit, so severely or effectually as in times past, but there was at any rate a real machinery and method for controlling at the source the expenditure of public money. It was done away with at once. The Treasury control of the great spending Departments was done away with. The whole means of controlling expenditure by this House has ceased for all practical purposes. Here is a question in which the House of Commons is at least as anxious as the Government is for economy, the stopping of waste and the getting the fullest value for every £ that we vote, and this could be done if you went back to the old traditional system which the people understand, which we understand, and which we are willing now to work without personal interest and without party prejudice, and willing to work with more patience and more detail than we have ever worked with before, to control expenditure by the House of Commons. You might have this to-morrow, but you will not, because you do not trust the people, because you keep in your own hands and in the hands of your incapable, incompetent, and overworked officials—

Withdraw.

If the word incompetent offends my right hon. Friend, I do not wish to reflect upon officials in the sense in which he takes it, but I think that I may fairly say that officials have so much additional increased work put upon them that they are now in the natural order of things incompetent to deal with them as they could deal with them in pre-war conditions. I see the Chief Conservative Whip, who understands the forms of the House, and who has had long experience in them, and I ask him, Will he consider the point I have put before the House? It has been made elsewhere. Let the House again have some more control of the expenditure than it has had before. I make these remarks not in any sense as desiring to hamper the Government, but my feeling at the present moment is that I should like to begin my remarks all over again, and repeat my speech for the benefit of the only Cabinet Minister now upon the Front Bench. If these remarks I have made to-night have no effect, in another few weeks I shall have the opportunity of repeating them again. I believe my criticism is sound; I believe the principles I have urged are right, and if they are disregarded to-day they shall be insisted upon and repeated again to-morrow.

We have had to-night a great deal of criticism of the Government. I am very far from saying, indeed, that some of those criticisms are devoid of substance; at the same time, I think it is of the greatest importance that the Government should have fair play, and that the other side of the account should not be left out of view. I think that many of the original difficulties which the Government encountered in the first six months of the War arose from its unwillingness to fully face the task of raising an adequate number of troops. What the Coalition Government have done in that direction shows a marked improvement. We have had the Registration Bill and Lord Derby's scheme—I am far from saying that Lord Derby's scheme is perfect, few things are—and those two things are a great advance on what we had before. Turn to other work of the War Office, we have such a matter as the return from the Army of skilled men, and we have at last some economy in the management of camps; while earnest efforts have been made by the Under-Secretary to stop the evil of recruiting boys, which certainly should never have been allowed to take place. I say there, again, we have a substantial improvement. In regard to munitions, does anyone deny, whatever were the shortcomings of the Government a year ago, that no less certainly a great improvement has been made? On that point I am sorry that the Minister of Munitions has not been able to make more use of the services of women. I hope that he will make a great effort to make further use of them, and I believe that he will be successful. One of the best-founded complaints nine months ago was extravagance in the use of merchant shipping, but the communication recently made by the President of the Board of Trade shows an improvement. If you turn to finance, no one can deny that the Coalition Government has a considerable amount of public confidence, and it is the barest justice to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Financial Secretary to the Treasury to say that has been brought about within the last few months. They have attempted to rectify the American exchange and they have laid on taxes. One of the mistakes in the first six or nine months was that taxes were not laid on sooner. I think that is a point also on which the Coalition Government have something to their credit. We have also the Retrenchment Committee. Though we have not seen the fruits of it yet, it is a great deal better than nothing.

They have not sat for two months.

Another direction in which I think the present Government show signs if improvement is, perhaps, in a disposition to make their decisions a little more promptly. I cannot help thinking that great as is the loss to the Cabinet through the resignation of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Dublin University (Sir E. Carson), it is in that way bearing good fruit. There, again, I think we may look for some improvement. I think those are half a dozen points on which the Government is clearly entitled to credit. I believe that is much more the view of the country than the course of the speaking here for the last three or four hours would lead anyone to believe. It is impossible to wage war without making mistakes, just as it is impossible to make omelettes without breaking eggs. Whatever mistakes have been made I think it is very much in the public interest that the Government should have fair play, and should stand well with the country. My own belief is that its position in the country is a great deal stronger than a great many Members of this House believe.

Everybody who has followed the events of the last fifteen months must be satisfied that the Govern- ment have had an enormous task to face. There is no doubt that mistakes and blunders have been made. I am not going to harshly criticise the Government, but two or three speakers have referred to extravagance and waste, and I desire to say a few words upon that subject. In connection with waste, I am told by workmen who are employed in very large engineering works, engaged in making munitions of war, that there are times when they are in the works for fourteen or fifteen hours, and that out of that they are not really working more than five or six hours, but are simply looking at each other and waiting on material to be taken to them. There is waste and extravagance there, because the men have to be paid for the fourteen or fifteen hours although only doing five or six hours' work. That is both waste of labour and extravagance of expenditure. I believe this is due to a very large extent to the lack of organising power on the part of those supervising the works, and also I am afraid owing to the incompetency of some of those gentlemen representing the Government in works that are controlled or semi-controlled. Let me refer to another matter in connection with munitions work, and that is that I have had complaints made to me by workmen that they have had to teach the men sent as inspectors by the Government, and have had to set instruments for them to make certain tests, and that in at least one instance the inspector said he did not understand the instrument at all, and would be much obliged to the workman if he would really teach him his business. It is quite evident if the Government have men who are acting as inspectors or labour officers who do not understand their work at all there must be waste and extravagance there. These inspectors may be in other respects very estimable gentlemen, but they are not eligible for the work they are called upon to perform. I hope the Government will see to it that the inspectors they appoint are men with practical knowledge of what they are supposed to do. I am told that amongst these inspectors there are schoolmasters, bakers, and tailors. I hope that the gentlemen responsible for selecting these men will exercise more care and discretion.

In connection with the transfer of men also there is waste. If you transfer half a dozen men from Manchester to Sunder-land, and afterwards transfer half a dozen men from Leeds to Manchester to take the places of the men transferred to Sunder-land, which is a waste of energy and money. You have to pay subsistence allowance to the men sent away, and if you transfer two lots of men in the way I have described you have to pay two subsistence allowances instead of one. That is taking place. The gentlemen at Whitehall Gardens who determine whether or not men should be sent away do not seem to be quite the right sort of people for the job. It would be far better if the Minister of Munitions would get on the Committee one or two practical men who understand the practical as well as the technical side of the work. I am one of those Members of Parliament who have-agreed to address munition workers at their works, to impress upon them the necessity of putting their backs into the work and doing their best. I think there is some waste in connection with those meetings. Men have been sent from London to Glasgow to speak at one or two meetings. That is waste. There are men in Glasgow quite capable of addressing these meetings. A case was brought to my notice last week where a Member of Parliament was wired to take a meeting in Scotland, as the advertised speaker could not attend. He went thirty or forty miles, only to find that there were two other speakers and he was expected to speak for six minutes. The following night he received another wire to address a meeting in Glasgow, as the advertised speaker could not attend. He went, and again there were two other speakers with six minutes allowed to each. On a third night a speaker went from Lancashire to Glasgow, where the same time-table was in operation. There is waste of time. It may be only a small sum where you have merely one speaker to consider, but if there is the same extravagance in connection with a hundred or two hundred speakers, it represents a considerable sum in the aggregate. Greater care ought to be exercised in the selection of places and of the men who are to attend. One week I addressed five meetings. One was at a glass and tile works, and another at a paper works. Really I could not see that they were doing munition work at all. There is someone, it seems to me, responsible for the arrangements at these meetings who thinks that it is necessary to hold plenty of meetings whether or not they are doing good. There ought to be some discretion exercised in the places at which these meetings are arranged. I under- stand—to mention another point—that parties are being sent from this country to see the soldiers in the trenches. I do not know whether any useful purpose is being served in this way. These parties, I understand, have included Members of Parliament. I want to know whether opportunity will be given to any and every Member of Parliament to avail himself of an opportunity to visit the trenches?

An HON. MEMBER: The Labour party have been there!

I am not referring to the Labour party; all I want to know is whether the Government are going to allow the same facilities to any and every Member of Parliament who desires to go out. I take it that public money is being spent to pay the expenses of these parties. Therefore I do not see why there should be any invidious distinction between one Member and another. If these visits are not serving useful purpose, I would submit that there is no use continuing them, and that there is waste and extravagance.

I have listened to the very practical speech of the hon. Member below the Gangway, and I am sure it will be taken due notice of. When the Prime Minister came down to the House the other day and informed us that we were spending about five millions a day, and that probably the amount would be more, every Member, I am sure, felt that we ought to economise in every way possible with efficiency. We do not want to waste the money. On the' other hand, we want to spend it properly and Well, consistent with efficiency. Perhaps some hon. Members will be glad to know—if they do not know already—that there are changes pending and made in the Ministry of Munitions. I have reason to say from what I have heard—and I believe it is quite correct—that these changes will save us many hundreds of thousands of pounds. Prompt action is being taken. I know one gentleman, a practical man, who has had a very large experience in a certain line of business. His services have been offered and taken by the Munitions Department. I believe that gentleman alone going into the Munitions Department, and giving his services as he is doing, will save a very, very considerable sum. That will be multiplied more and more as time goes on. It is our duty to save in every way we can in the face of this stupendous sum which many of us can hardly realise, and which appals us. The other day the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Exeter (Mr. Duke) advocated municipal reform and saving. Already our municipal authorities are taking the matter in hand rather rigorously. The London County Council is leading the way and saving in many departments. Whether or not the methods are all wise I will not say. They are cutting down education. All our municipal authorities throughout England should pause before they come to the conclusion to cut down education. Even if they do save the ratepayers money by cutting down in various ways—as I know they are doing in my own borough council of Lambeth—what is to be done with the money? We know that if the rates can be saved, say a penny in the £, in these hard times it is something to the ratepayers, but is that going to meet the difficulty? Would it not be wise for the Government—I only throw out the hint as a humble Member—to give a hint to the municipalities to earmark that money so that the money could be put aside and used specially for the War? For the ratepayers to have only a halfpenny or a penny is a great matter for them, but is that going to help us in this situation? I do not think it will. I do not think the few pounds the ratepayers will gain will be put on one side and put in the War Loan, whereas if the municipalities cut down expenses, earmark the money, hand it over to the War Loan Fund, then they will be doing practical good. I only throw out the hint for what it is worth.

Then I think we might save in many other ways. Like the hon. Member who has just spoken, I have also been up and down the country speaking at these munition works, and I have noticed just now what sums of moeny the men are earning, and I believe the hon. Member will bear me out in this. Many of them are having the time of their lives. They are earning £5, £6, £8, £10, and even more than £10 a week. I read of one instance in Sheffield last week of a blacksmith earning £14 a week. Now what are these good people doing with their money I should like to know? I am not throwing stones at working people, because I have had to do with them. I have sprung from them myself. But are they taking their part? Are they in these times, when they are earning these large sums of money helping the country by putting it into the War Loan to any large extent? If it is not too late, I should like deputations to go to these works as I have gone—as our Friend said, they had to put their back into it, and I believe they are putting their back into their work to-day as they never did before—to try to get them at the same time, instead of buying cheap jewellery, instead of furnishing their houses to a costly ex-tent, to put some of that money into the War Loan, and help the country's needs, at the same time putting by a nest-egg which would be useful to them when the time of stress conies. And then, if our people would be more simple in habits, in what they spend on their food and drink. If the country gave up alcoholic liquors and put the money into the War Loan, there would be £100,000,000 at once. I wish the House of Coumons would set a better example. We are not doing that. The other day an hon. Member brought forward a suggestion which was received with levity in this House. I think the country is looking at this House as a kind of superior people who have set themselves above the rest. We force this on other people and say they shall not enter public-houses at such and such hours and shall not stand drinks, hut we ignore that here. We should set the example. We criticise the outside people and they are looking at us, and I hope the House of Commons will not consider it too late, but will take this question seriously to heart about drinking customs In connection with our own palace here at Westminster. I apologise if I have said anything—I hope not—to wound anyone, but I feel strongly on this subject. We want to economise all we can, and I think if we all try together as a House of Commons and a nation we can so economise and carry on this War to a speedy, at any rate, to a successful termination with £5,000,000 a day, instead of getting beyond.

Question, "That the House doth agree with the Committee in the said Resolution," put, and agreed to.

With reference to the speech made by the hon. Member for the Elland Division (Mr. Trevelyan), I have been asked to point out that his constituency has selected another Liberal candidate to succeed him, and as far as can be judged, he does not represent the Liberals of that or any other Yorkshire Division.

Question put, and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at Three minutes before Eleven o'clock.