House of Commons
Wednesday, January 26, 1916
Trade Reports (Annual Series)
Copies presented of Diplomatic and Consular Reports, Annual Series, Nos. 5551 to 5554 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
Shops Act, 1912
Copy presented of Closing Order made by the urban district council of Athlone [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
National Insurance Act
Copy presented of Account of the Unemployment Fund established pursuant to Section 92 (1) of the National Insurance Act, 1911, Part II., showing the Receipts and Payments during the period 13th July, 1913, to 14th July, 1914, together with the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General thereon [by Act]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 432.]
Pauperism (England and Wales)
Return presented relative thereto [ordered 23rd July; Mr. Hayes Fisher ]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 433].
Ceylon
Copy presented of Correspondence relating to Disturbances in Ceylon [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
Friendly Societies, Industrial and Provident Societies, Trade Unions, Etc
Papers laid upon the Table by the Clerk of the House: Reports of the Chief Registrar for the year 1915 [by Act]; to be printed. [No. 434.]
Oral Answers to Questions
War
Steamship "Heliopolis."
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty when the steamship "Heliopolis" was purchased by the Admiralty; what price was given for her; whether any use has hitherto been made of this vessel; what amount of money has been expended on her up to the present date; whether she is now sold; and, if not, when it is expected that she will be available for carrying freight?
The "Heliopolis" was purchased in February, 1913. It is not considered in the public interest to state at the present time what price was given for the vessel or what expenditure has been incurred on her since the date of purchase. The vessel was intended to be converted into a hospital ship, but progress on the work of conversion was delayed by more pressing work being required to be carried out at the dockyard to which the vessel in question was sent for conversion—work which, to a large extent, was not foreseen at the time the conversion was taken in hand. No use has been made of the vessel since she was purchased. The vessel has not yet been sold, but steps have been taken with a view to sale very shortly.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this is only one of many similar cases?
No. There is only "Heliopolis."
Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that there is a very large number of similar cases?
Is the hon. Gentleman aware that we have got 137 questions to dispose of?
Fishermen (St. Helens)
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he is aware that the fishermen at St. Helens have been deprived of the whole of their livelihood by the Admiralty through not being allowed to use their drift nets in the area within the examination boat off St. Helens; if he is aware that these men, of which there are only five, are very old inhabitants of the Isle of Wight and very well known to everybody; if he is aware that their request to fish from one hour before sunrise until one hour after sunset has been refused; and if he can state any reason why these fishermen should be treated in this way?
I informed my hon. Friend on 7th January that, after full consideration, it has been found impossible to accede to the request of these fishermen. I regret the decision cannot be modified.
Navy (Enrolment)
asked what is the total enrolment of officers and men in the Navy, respectively; what has been the enrolment since the beginning of the War; what is the total number of men who are engaged in the maintenance of the Navy, that is, as seamen and also as workmen in Works and stores for naval purposes; and how many men have offered themselves for naval service on ships of war since 1st August, 1914?
My hon. Friend asks for a number of detailed particulars the collection of all of which would involve some labour, and certain of which it would be quite impossible to furnish except in the most approximate fashion. The time at my disposal renders it out of the question for me to make any attempt to reply to his question now. But I will go into the matter and will communicate what I can to him.
British Wounded Prisoners of War (Switzerland)
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether arrangements have been made between the French and German Governments under which wounded prisoners of war may be treated in Switzerland; and whether similar arrangements could be made to apply to British prisoners?
It is understood that the French and German Governments have arranged to send certain glasses of wounded and tuberculous prisoners of war to Switzerland. With regard to the second part of the question, I regret that no means have yet been found to overcome the difficulties which, as I informed my hon. Friend the Member for Tavistock on the 22nd ultimo, then existed.
Will the Noble Lord make efforts to overcome those difficulties, seeing that it is so very desirable that the same advantage should be extended to our wounded?
I will convey my hon. Friend's observation to the Secretary of State for War, with whom the matter rests.
Nurses in Uniform (Military Travel Warrants)
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been called to the fact that nurses in uniform travelling back and forward to France on war service have the same difficulties and the same inconveniences as the general public in getting passes from his Department and are not put on the same level as soldiers in these respects; that the same methods rule with all the Consulates that have to be consulted; and, if so, whether he will take any action to put these nurses in a privileged position so far as obtaining passes more speedily?
It does not rest with the Foreign Office to say who shall receive military passes. The hon. Member should make representations to the War Office.
asked the Under-Secretary for War whether his attention has been called to the fact that nurses in uniform passing back and forward to France are not granted the same privileges as soldiers, or any advantages over the general public, in having their passes examined; that this frequently subjects them to long waits sometimes exposed to the weather; and, if so, will he see that such nurses, being on war service, are put on the same level as soldiers in the way of journey privileges?
Nurses in the uniform of Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service, and others who travel with military warrants, embark and disembark from military gangways and are on the same footing as soldiers. Ladies temporarily employed as nurses with certain voluntary organisations who do not travel on military warrants or under military orders pass the examination of passports as all passengers do. The regulations which make this examination obligatory were drawn up toy the French and British military authorities, and are necessary in order to prevent impersonation.
Can the right, hon. Gentleman say how these nurses are to become entitled to these travelling privileges?
It depends upon whether they are engaged upon military duties in the strict sense of the word, or whether they are members of some voluntary agency.
Standard Oil Company (Transfer of German Ships)
asked whether sanction has been given for the transfer of the German ship "Purelight," of the Deutsche Americanische Petroleum Gesellschaft, to the American flag, and, if so, was the Admiralty consulted on the subject; whether this transfer is a fresh concession to the American Standard Oil Company, and additional to twenty-two German ships already taken over as well as four others for their Dutch branch; whether guarantees have been given that the ships will not be employed either directly or indirectly in trading with enemy countries; and whether any conditions were exacted in all these cases concerning the non payment of any money to Germany?
The answer to the first two parts of the question is in the affirmative. The consent of His Majesty's Government to recognise the transfer of the "Purelight" was given as part of an agreement with the Standard Oil Company by which the latter accepted certain restrictions upon their importation of lubricants and paraffin wax to certain countries. The United States Government have been officially informed that the neutral character of the various vessels now in the registered ownership of the company and transferred from the enemy flag since the outbreak of war will only be recognised by His Majesty's Government so long as they are not used directly or indirectly in trading with the enemy countries. Except in the case of the "Purelight," which was owned by a company of which 25 per cent. of the capital is said to be held in Germany, the various vessels have been certified by the United States Government as having been before the War in the beneficial, actual and entire ownership of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, to whom the money was paid.
American Ship "Kim."
asked whether the cargo of the American ship "Kim" was condemned by the Prize Court; whether the cargo or its equivalent in money is to be returned to the original owners in Chicago; and, if so, is the prize money that would have accrued to be lost to the officers and men of the Royal Navy?
My right hon. Friend has asked me to reply to this question. The bulk of the cargo of the American steamship "Kim" was condemned as Prize on the 16th September, 1915. The owners of the cargo condemned have appealed to the Privy Council and the appeal has not yet been heard. No agreement has been made for the return of the condemned cargo or its equivalent in money to the original owners, and the last part of the question, therefore, does not arise.
Montenegro (British Minister and Staff)
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has had any information as to the whereabouts and safety of the British Minister and his staff in Montenegro?
His Majesty's Minister at Cettinje, who at the time of the recent occurrences in Montenegro was without any staff, has now reached Italy, and arrived in Rome on the 22nd instant.
Censorship of Letters (Cork)
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War, whether, in order to avoid the hardship and inconvenience caused by the present system of having the letters of Nationalists in Cork censored elsewhere, causing a delay of several days, he will arrange to have them censored in Cork and delivered, together with their enclosures, with not more than one day's delay; if for any reason this cannot be done, whether he will have business enclosures, such as cheques and postal orders, delivered without any delay; and whether, in the case of the censored letters so far delivered without the orders for money which they had contained, he will have those enclosures delivered to their owners immediately?
I am afraid that I cannot admit that the Nationalists in Cork, even if it were possible to distinguish by their contents letters emanating from that section of the population of Cork, have any claim to have their correspondence treated differently from other persons in Cork who are not Nationalists. If this were done it would increase rather than diminish the delay in delivery. All letters, including business letters and letters containing securities, are dealt with as quickly as possible. I hope the hon. Gentleman does not impute dishonesty in the last part of the question. If there is any question of this kind the matter should be brought to the test by submission of specific instances of alleged removal of money orders or postal orders for investigation in the first instance by the Post Office authorities.
The right hon. Gentleman has not said why the letters are not censored in Cork to avoid the delay?
It is impossible to treat these letters differently from others.
Military Prosecution (Listowel)
asked whether it was with the approval of the competent military authority that Mr. David Moriarty, Crown prosecutor for Kerry, asserted, for the purposes of his case against Edward J. Gleeson, at Listowel, that France had exhausted its last reserves in the War; the County Court judge having described that assertion as a serious offence, what action will be taken with reference to it; and whether the sentence of four months' imprisonment obtained against Gleeson by such means will be enforced?
The accused in this case was dealt with by a civil tribunal and I am informed that there was nothing in the remarks of the Crown solicitor to which exception was or could seriously be taken. It is not for me to interfere with the sentence.
Has the right hon. Gentleman seen the observations of the County Court judge in this case? Why has not that observation been acted on?
The observation, I understand, was made in the form of a judicial jest.
Army Contracts (Cooke and Byrne)
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he has had a sight of a letter sent to the Member for Mansfield by Messrs. Cooke and Byrne, of Dublin, dated July, 1915, in which Mr. Byrne states that his firm are devoting their attention exclusively to munitions of war and Army contract sup plies, and that the senior partner in the firm, Captain Leonard Cooke, was with the Forces at the front; whether he is aware that a number of Army officers in Ireland have become associated with Mr. Byrne; will he at once direct these officers to withdraw from the partnership seeing that Mr. Byrne is an ex convict who has served a number of terms of imprisonment, and was described by the Recorder, when he sentenced him at the Old Bailey to five years' penal servitude in 1907, as being an habitual criminal; and has Mr. Byrne or his firm, Messrs Cooke and Byrne, received any contracts for munitions of war or Army contract supplies, either in this country or in Ireland?
I have seen a copy of the letter referred to. I have no knowledge as to the association of Army officers in Ireland with Mr. Byrne. No orders have been placed by the War Office either with Mr. Byrne or with Messrs. Cooke and Byrne. As regards munitions of war, I must refer the hon. Member to the Ministry of Munitions.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether Mr. J. T. Byrne, acting on behalf of Messrs. Markham, Nelson, and Company, alias A. C. C. Schultz, senior, on 19th October, 1915, received from the Army Contract Department a verbal order for 162,000 blankets at 8s. 5d. per blanket; whether Mr. G. W. Jameson and another witness were present when the said verbal order was given; whether Mr. Byrne subsequently went to Woolwich to see these blankets tested, and were the sample blankets approved; did the War Office send any telegrams or letters to Mr. J. T. Byrne asking him to come to London from Dublin in connection with this business; was this verbal order not confirmed owing to the War Office discovering that certain commissions had been arranged between the parties; and whether he is aware that the said blankets, offered to the War Office at 8s. 5d. through the agency of Messrs. Markham, Nelson, and Company, were on offer to this firm through the representative of Messrs. Joseph Hoyle and Sons at 7s. 6d. per blanket?
No order, verbal or otherwise, for blankets was given to Mr. J. T. Byrne on 19th October, 1915, or at any other time. A sample blanket submitted at Woolwich on 12th October, 1915, was reported as suitable, and Mr. Byrne was asked, by telegram addressed to his firm's London office, to call on the War Office Contracts Department in order that it might be ascertained whether they were manufacturers. Mr. Byrne called accordingly on 19th October, accompanied by a gentleman who was understood to be Mr. Jameson. On a subsequent occasion he was accompanied by another gentleman also. Mr. Byrne purported to be acting on behalf of Messrs. Cooke and Byrne, and not on behalf of Messrs. Markham, Nelson, and Company. It transpired that the former firm were not manufacturers, and it was therefore decided not to place an order with them. I have no information as to the terms on which these blankets were offered by the manufacturers to Messrs. Markham, Nelson, and Company, or any other firm.
Is the Markham referred to in the question anything to the hon. Member for Mansfield?
No, Sir.
Soldiers' Pay (France)
asked whether arrangements will be made for the pay of the men in France in denominations of lower value than five franc notes, as, owing to the difficulty of getting small change, especially at the bases, men have to accept less change in silver than they are entitled to or to accept local notes of small denominations which are only current in a particular town or small area and not universally in France?
I am inquiring into the matter, and will let my hon. and gallant Friend know the result as soon as possible.
New Armies (Promotion of Officers)
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether, in view of the rapid promotion in temporary rank conferred on many officers of the New Armies who have in many cases only a few months' service, it is now proposed to reconsider the position as regards promotion of ex-Regular officers who were on the reserve of officers and have been recalled to their old corps, and have not the same opportunities of promotion as officers of the New Army; and whether he will consider the advisability of introducing a system on the lines of the Indian system whereby officers who have completed a certain number of years' service are given a step in rank either temporary or permanent?
This matter has received very full consideration, and I regret that I cannot hold out hopes that the decisions arrived at will be reconsidered.
Detention Barracks
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether any arrangements are to be made for more detention barracks to be made available, as, owing to the limited number of such barracks, inconvenience is caused?
Arrangements have been made to open other detention barracks to meet necessary requirements this and next month.
Military Hospitals (Medical Appliances)
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that under existing regulations in military hospitals certain medical appliances, including those of trifling cost, have to be ordered from Woolwich, entailing a delay often of several weeks; and will he consider the advisability of permitting the authorities to purchase these appliances locally, if possible, at reasonable prices, and so benefit the patient and reduce the period during which he has to be detained in hospital?
There are no regulations in military hospitals directing that medical appliances are to be ordered only from Woolwich. The regulations already provide for local purchases under specially urgent circumstances not admitting of delay, but as these local purchases are a more expensive method of meeting requirements than obtaining what is wanted from War Office contractors they are restricted to cases of urgent necessity.
Army Medical Services (Advisory Board)
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether Sir Anthony Bowlby and Sir John Rose Bradford occupy places on the Advisory Board for Army Medical Services reserved for civilians, the essence of such reservation being to check the opinion and action of the officers of the Army Medical Service, or are they themselves, as their uniform, pay, and duties indicate, officers in the Army Medical Service; and whether, in this case, it is competent for them to control the action of senior officers in the Army Medical Service?
The Advisory Board exercises no control, but advises the Director-General of the Army Medical Services. The value of the opinions of the individual members of the Advisory Board is in no way affected by the military positions they occupy.
Combatant Officers (Full Pay)
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether all combatant officers in the Army who were drawing a pension before the War are now drawing the full pay of their rank in addition to their full pension, or whether it is only officers in the Royal Army Medical Corps who are receiving full pay of rank as well as full pension?
The same rule applies to combatant officers and officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps.
Parents' Visits to Wounded (Repayment of Fares)
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether there is any arrangement made by his Department regarding repayment of railway fares of parents in visiting wounded soldiers in hospital; if so, will he say to whom application for such should be made?
I would refer my hon. Friend to the answer which I gave on the 28th June last to the hon. Member for the Kirkdale Division of Liverpool. I will send him a copy of this answer. In the case of relatives entitled to free travelling, any application for repayment of railway fares should be made to the medical officer in charge of the hospital concerned.
Deserters (Death Penalty)
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War if he will state the number of British soldiers who have been shot for desertion or other military offences since the beginning of the War?
No British soldier has been shot in the United Kingdom since the beginning of the War. It is not in the public interest to give statistics of the numbers who have suffered the death penalty in the forces overseas, but I will ask my hon. Friend to be good enough not to believe that the number has been considerable.
Wimbledon Military Camp (Huts)
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War if he will say what is the reason for the delay which has taken place in the erection of the huts at the military camp on Wimbledon Common; whether the camp was intended to house men during this winter from camps which were situate on heavy land; and whether he is aware that progress has been so dilatory that it seems now as if the camp will not be ready before the time arrives suitable for living under canvas again?
The reasons for the delay may be stated shortly—firstly, shortage of transport; secondly, shortage of labour; thirdly, congestion of railways; fourthly, bad weather at a time when most of the work to be done was out of doors. The latter may be regarded as an act of God, and the three former causes of delay as due to the fact that this country is at war and that business is not as usual. As regards the second part of the question, it was certainly hoped that the huts at Wimbledon would accommodate a brigade during the winter.
If the necessary amount of work had been done in August and September, when the weather was fine, would not the huts have been completed?
I cannot answer that question The hon. Gentleman must give me notice, and I will furnish the information.
Special Reserve (Senior Officers)
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he will give the names of any senior officers of the Special Reserve who have received official recognition in the honours list or in any other way of the services rendered by them?
No, Sir. I do not think it is right to specify in answers in this House the names of officers who have or have not received rewards. If the hon. Member will consult the Overseas Honours Lists he will find the names of many such officers. If he is referring to commanding officers at home he is right in supposing that no honours have been awarded to them. This course has been taken advisedly, as it is not considered the time has yet come for these officers to be rewarded.
British Commercial Policy
asked the Prime Minister whether the Government are prepared to appoint at once a number of small committees to undertake, for the leading industries of the country, inquiries similar to those recently made by the special sub-committee of the Advisory Committee on Commercial Intelligence of the Board of Trade, and to appoint upon the Report of such committees a Royal Commission, representative of various schools of fiscal opinion and of the leading Oversea Dominions and India, to make recommendations as to the commercial policy of this country consequent upon the War?
I propose to arrange for inquiries, similar to that to which my right hon. Friend refers, to be undertaken shortly into a number of groups of industries; but I am not at present in a position to state what subsequent action will be taken.
Will the right hon. Gentleman defer this matter until the meeting of the Associated Chambers of Commerce on the 29th February, at which this subject will be considered?
Of course, I value very highly any view expressed by the Associated Chambers of Commerce, but there are matters which cannot wait.
Old Age Pensions
asked the Prime Minister, whether, in considering the proposal to increase old age pensions on account of the increased cost of living, he will bear in mind the fact that the need for the increase is greater in Ireland, where the diffusion of money for war purposes is negligible compared with what it is in this country?
asked if the Prime Minister has yet considered the case for the raising of the old age pension by an amount approximating to the increase in the cost of living during the War; and if he has regard to the fact that the cost of an increased pension would be largely set off by the present increased cost of pauperism by pensioners being forced into the workhouse, and to the further fact that such cost per year would not, in any case, much exceed the cost of the War for one day?
My right hon. Friend has asked me to reply to these questions. The matter is at present being discussed by the Departments concerned, which will give due regard to the considerations urged in the questions.
Importations Under Licence
asked the Prime Minister, in view of the shortage of shipping space and the direct influence of imports on exchange, and the necessity for national and personal economies, whether he has considered the need for prohibiting or allowing importations only under licence of all goods and products which are not necessary for the War or for the maintenance of health and efficiency; and whether he can make a statement as to the Government policy and course of action in these matters?
The method by which unnecessary imports can best be excluded is now being considered, and a statement will be made on the subject as soon as possible.
Army Food Supplies
asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether the Army flour damaged in Dublin and sold at a loss was of Irish growth or manufacture; why it was purchased elsewhere without inviting tenders from Irish millers on the list of Army contractors; and to what extent contracts for flour have been placed with Irish firms since that occurrence?
The flour was not of Irish growth or manufacture. Part of it was bought in January, 1915, for delivery to Liverpool, and transferred to Dublin in April, 1915. The balance was bought in May for delivery to Dublin, and one Irish firm was invited to tender, but was not successful. A complete list of Irish firms is now invited to tender as occasions arise, and three Irish firms have recently secured contracts for flour for Dublin.
Is the hon. Gentleman aware that there were several Irish firms capable of supplying all that was required, and will he inform the House whether the purchase from those firms would have meant greater loss than the purchase of rotten flour from foreign firms?
asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office the quantity of flour described as intended for the Army but damaged, therefore sold by auction in Liverpool and Manchester last year; and, if the loss fell upon public funds, will he state the amount of loss, the source of the flour, and the cause to which the damage was due?
The quantity was about 71,000 bags. It formed part of a national reserve, the bulk of which the Army eventually took over. The loss, which has not been completely ascertained, will be duly reported to the Treasury. The flour was British, and its deterioration was due to long storage.
Army Pay Office, Warwick
asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office what the cost of the huts erected for the Army Pay Office at Warwick amounted to, and why this expenditure was incurred when buildings were available and had been hired temporarily for the purpose at a comparatively small rental?
The amount authorised for this service was £6,300. When the Pay Office requirements were small it was possible to accommodate the officers and clerks in hired buildings, but since the great expansion of the office at Warwick the available houses would no longer hold them, and it became necessary to put up a building which would take all the clerks.
Stock Exchange Securities (Minimum Prices)
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer, if he will now consider the advisability of doing away with the whole of the minimum prices of securities dealt in on the Stock Exchange, seeing that losses are sustained by the owners of such securities when they are forced, owing to the action of the Treasury, to realise through private negotiation instead of in the open market?
The question of minimum prices has been receiving my close attention, and I hope to be able to announce a decision very shortly.
Exchequer Bonds
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he has seen a correspondence between an investor in Edinburgh and the Bank of England, which shows that Edinburgh money invested in Exchequer Bonds on the 23rd December, 1915, was treated by the Bank of England as having been received in London on 5th January, 1916, with the result that the investor was deprived of interest for about a fortnight; whether the arrangements so resulting are beyond the control of the Government; whether the Government accepts any responsibility for the action of the Bank of England in its capacity of Government bankers and, if so, to whom questions concerning its action should be addressed; and whether he will explain who retained the benefit of the fortnight's interest lost by the investor in question?
The hon. Member has sent me a copy of the correspondence to which he refers, in which it is explained that a large part of the period which elapsed between the dispatch of a letter from Edinburgh on the 23rd December and the realisation of the cheque on the 5th January was due to postal delays incident to the Christmas season and to the intervention of two Bank holidays, two Sundays, and Christmas Day. As regards the last part of the question, the interest upon the money presumably accrued either to the investor or his bankers up to the date on which the cheque was presented to his bank for payment, and thereafter to the agent for the Bank of England on whom the expense of remitting the proceeds to London fell. I would point out that the Bank of England earned no interest on the money during the period, and that the Exchequer, which requires the money in London, cannot be expected to pay interest upon it till it reaches London or to bear the cost of remittance to London Questions regarding the Bank of England's action as Government banker should be addressed to the Treasury, which is responsible for the working of the statutory arrangements under which the Bank of England acts as Government banker.
Is the Edinburgh man entitled to compensation from another Government Department which deprived him of the opportunity of receiving the interest?
No, Sir.
Why not?
Because he is not.
Why is he not?
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that applications made direct from Scotland on the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th December to the Bank of England for Exchequer Bonds are only being credited for interest from 4th January, thus showing a loss of about twelve days interest; whether he is aware that this militates against the success of Exchequer Bonds in that part of the country; and whether, in view of that, he will choose some bank or banks in Scotland which will act for the Government there in the same way as he has recently chosen the Bank of Ireland to deal with Irish investors?
In regard to the first part of the question, the answer which I have just given to Question No. 69, put by the hon. Member for Leith, applies generally to investments in Exchequer Bonds made through the post during the Christmas season. In reply to the last part of the question, I understand that special arrangements have in fact been made between the Bank of England and the Scottish banks under which those banks receive applications from the public and forward them to the Bank of England with drafts payable in London without charge, thus performing an exactly similar service in this respect as that arranged for with the Bank of Ireland and enabling the Scottish investor to obtain Exchequer Bonds carrying interest from the date on which the money is realised in London exactly in the same way as the Irish investor does. I have no reason to think that Scotish investors have been deterred from investing in Exchequer Bonds by the fact that, in common with investors in all parts of the United Kingdom, they are not given Bonds bearing interest from a date prior to that upon which their money reaches the Exchequer.
Excess Profits Tax
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if, in framing his new financial proposals, he will consider the advisability of applying the principle of the Excess Profits Tax to all persons whose incomes are above the pre war standard?
I have noted my hon. Friend's suggestion. For the rest, I am unable to anticipate the next financial statement.
Deutsche Bank
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will explain why the services of ten Germans are still indispensable for the carrying on of the Deutsche Bank; and whether he is satisfied that, after seventeen months of settling up, there are still no British subjects equal to satisfactorily undertaking this work?
I understand that the services of the ten Germans, owing to their detailed knowledge of the affairs of the bank, were considered indispensable to the work of assisting in discharging the pre-War liabilities of the London agency of the Deutsche Bank to creditors other than enemy creditors. I do not think that it would be desirable to take British subjects away from more useful work for the very temporary employment which could now be offered to them in the concluding stages of the work of discharging the bank's remaining liabilities.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say what will happen to the English employés of the Deutsche Bank?
If the right hon. Gentleman will give me notice I will inquire. I have no personal knowledge of the matter.
May I ask whether the right hon. Gentlman thinks it safe to leave those ten Germans uncontrolled in London for the sake of settling a few liabilities?
It appears to have been safe for the last seventeen months. [An HON. MEMBER: "How do you know?"] So far as I am aware. I have no personal knowledge of the matter, and if the hon. Member desires further information I shall be very glad to make inquiries.
asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will give the names and ad dresses of the ten German managers and heads of departments of the Deutsche Bank in London whose services are indispensable; and will he say if these Ger mans are at large in London at all times of the day and night, or are they con ducted to and from their work from internment camps?
I do not think any public advantage would be secured by giving the names and addresses of the persons in question. They are not interned, but are living subject to the restrictions of the Aliens Restriction Order, and are required to be at their registered addresses after nine o'clock at night.
Will the light hon. Gentleman say whether any English bank is being carried on in Berlin?
No, Sir.
asked whether the Deutsche Bank, which is still being carried on in London, is a branch of the same institution which was implicated recently in the American smuggling conspiracies and of financing ships for the destruction of British commerce in the earlier stages of the War?
The London agency of the Deutsche Bank, Berlin, was before the War a branch of the Deutsche Bank, Berlin. Since the War began, as the hon. Member knows, the London agency has been kept open solely for the purpose of discharging its pre-war liabilities to British, allied, and neutral creditors.
Will the right hon. Gentleman answer my question, whether it is a branch of the same institution which was implicated recently in the American smuggling conspiracies?
I have no knowledge of the facts, but if it was the Deutsche Bank, Berlin, it would be the same institution; if it was not, it would not.
Does the right hon. Gentleman suggest there are two Deutsche Banks?
Treasury Bills
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in view of the impression that the discount on Treasury Bills is not subject to Income Tax, whether he will make a statement in reference thereto?
Where Treasury Bills are taken up by banks, financial houses, etc., the profits would be included in the computation of the trade profits of those houses. Where such bills are taken up by a private person, the profits are regarded as a discount and as such are liable to Income Tax.
Maintenance of Property (Allowance to Owners)
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will state what is the practice of his Department under the Finance (1909–10) Act, 1910, Section 69, as amended by the Finance Act, 1914, where an allowance is given to an owner of land or houses where the cost of maintenance, repairs, insurance and management, on the average of the last five years, exceeds a certain percentage, in the case where the owner has not owned the house or land for as long as five years and cannot therefore give such average; and, if he is thereby deprived of this advantage, will this be rectified in the next Finance Act?
Where the owner has not owned the property for five years prior to the year of claim, and cannot give particulars of the expenditure for the period previous to his becoming owner, the claim may be based on the average annual expenditure during the period of ownership.
Revenue Disputes, Scotland
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether his attention has been called to the expense incurred by his Department and others in Scotland from the practice of the former in having all disputes, however trifling the sum at stake may be, tried and determined by the Court of Session as the Court of Exchequer in Scotland; is he aware that the expenses sometimes amount to 300 to 400 times the sum involved in dispute; is he aware that the Sheriff Small Debt Courts in Scotland, decide thousands of cases annually at an average cost of 10s. a side; and can he make some arrangement whereby in order to save expenses in these times of war, he will insist on his Department remitting all revenue disputes to the Sheriff Courts instead of to the Court of Session?
The suggestion of my hon. Friend appears to be founded on a misapprehension. Where the duty at stake is small the Inland Revenue Department only appeal from an adverse decision of the District Commissioners if an important question of principle is involved, and" in such case recourse to a higher tribunal than the Sheriff Small Debt Courts is desirable and, indeed, economical in the end, the authoritative character of the pronouncements obtained preventing a multiplicity of appeals.
Consular Invoice Certificates
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will consider the advisability of instituting a system of consular invoice certificates to be issued by British consuls abroad for all goods forwarded to Great Britain from other countries, as is done by foreign consuls in Great Britain in the case of goods forwarded from this country to their respective countries, and for such consular certificates to have affixed to them consular stamps on the same scale as is levied on goods coming to Great Britain by the country concerned?.
Consular invoices for goods exported from the United Kingdom are at present required only by the United States of America, and certain of the Central and South American Republics. The suggestion made by the hon. Gentleman will be borne in mind, but as at present advised I am not disposed to recommend its adoption, in view of the considerable additional burden it would impose upon His Majesty's consular officers.
When we are so taxed at home why refuse to accept an extra five million pounds which could be so easily brought in from abroad?
It would be very welcome to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but other considerations have to be taken into account.
New Issues (Treasury Sanction)
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the sanction of the Treasury Committee on New Issues refused some months ago to the amalgamation of Barclay and Company, Limited, and the United Counties Bank has now been granted; and whether he will state, for the guidance of other applicants, upon what principle a sanction previously refused has now been given?
The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. As regards the second part, I would refer my hon. Friend to my answer to the question by the hon. Member for Colchester, on the 11th November last.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the Registrar of Public Companies has refused to register new companies or new issues of capital in existing companies unless the sanction of the Treasury Committee on New Issues has been obtained; whether, as such refusal has no legal authority, his action is based upon instructions from the Treasury Committee or other Government body; and, if so, whether such body will countermand such instructions and order the registrar to obey the law?
The Registrar of Joint Stock Companies has not refused to register any new issue of capital in an existing company. With regard to the registration of new companies in a few cases where the papers presented to him in connection with a proposed company showed that the signatories to the Memorandum of Association had subscribed for a substantial amount of capital and the sanction of the Treasury Committee on New Issues had not been obtained, the Registrar has, in agreement with the Board of Trade, declined to register the company until the subscriptions had been reduced to a nominal amount. I do not think it is expedient to make any alteration in the present practice.
National Economy
asked whether His Majesty's Government proposes to organise a house-to-house canvass for the purpose of impressing the need for economy and for collecting small sums as subscriptions to the War Loans?
Perhaps my hon. Friend would await the Report of the Committee on War Loans for the Small Investor, which I hope to be in a position to publish before the end of the week.
asked whether, in view of the fact that rates levied by local bodies have not undergone a general or a sufficient reduction in order to counterbalance as far as may be the increases effected in taxation, and of the fact that urgent need for exemplary economy exists, His Majesty's Government proposes to take power to investigate and veto local expenditure during the War?
I do not think that we have reached a position which calls for the drastic action which my hon. Friend indicates, and I sincerely hope that such a position may not be reached.
Jam Contracts (Sugar Prices)
asked whether contractors to the War Office and the Admiralty, who have contracted to supply jams and marmalade for delivery up to July next, will be paid at prices varying with the prices fixed for sugar from time to time by the Government Sugar Commission; and, in particular, whether allowance will be made to them in respect of the advance of 2s. 6d. per hundredweight announced on the 24th January?
This is a matter for the consideration, in the first instance, of the War Office and Admiralty. I have no knowledge of the terms of the jam contracts made by these Departments.
Pit-Wood (Home Production)
asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Agriculture if he is able to make his promised statement re increased home production of pit-wood?
The statement which I anticipated being able to make was with regard to the setting up of a Committee to purchase and convert standing timber, to supply such timber to Government Departments, and generally to make arrangements for the further utilisation of native timber resources. This Committee has now been at work for some weeks, and is actively engaged in producing pit wood as well as other descriptions of timber which are of national importance. A statement as to the present position with regard to pit props would exceed the limits of an answer to a Parliamentary question, but I should be glad if I might discuss it personally with my hon. Friend.
Building Society Loans
asked the President of the Local Government Board if he is aware that building societies are threatening to call up loans from their customers unless they agree to pay ½ per cent. additional interest upon the same; and will he take steps, by legislation or otherwise, to prevent the securities of such customers being realised during the War?
I have received a few representations of the kind referred to, but I cannot undertake to propose further legislation on the subject at the present time. I may, however, refer to the protection afforded by the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act, 1914.
Shipping Freights (Import of Luxuries)
asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will consider the desirability of his Department taking measures to prevent the import of luxuries in order to provide tonnage for necessities and tend to the lowering of freights?
The method by which unnecessary imports can best be excluded is being considered.
Coal Supplies
asked the President of the Board of Trade if he is able to enforce the recommendation of the Coal Mining Departmental Committee compelling ships to trade between home and foreign ports in the interests of the coal industry?
I cannot add to the answer to a similar question put by the hon. Member for West Monmouthshire on 17th January.
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether the interned steamers which were being used to bring coal from the North to the Thames are still being so used; and whether he is aware that there is still a great shortage of coal in these districts, and can any further facilities be given in order to in crease the supply?
The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. If my hon. Friend will give me some further particulars as to the districts he has in mind I will look into the matter.
asked the President of the Board of Trade if his attention has been directed to a resolution adopted at a conference held at the Mansion House, Dublin, on Thursday, declaring that the exorbitant prices charged for coal in Ireland were due to the high shipping freights; and if he in tends to take action to limit or control these freights?
I have received a copy of the resolution adopted at a conference at the Mansion House, Dublin, concerning the cost of coal. The present high freight rates on coal to Ireland are due to the general shortage of tonnage, and I can add nothing to what I have already said on this matter.
British Trade (Imports)
asked the President of the Board of Trade (1) if he will state the twenty commodities of which during 1915 the largest amount in value was imported into the United Kingdom; and (2) if he will state in order the twenty commodities, other than those required for essential home industries, of which the largest amount in value was imported from abroad into the United Kingdom in 1915?
I am not sure what my hon. Friend would regard as a separate "commodity." I am, however, sending to him a copy of the Monthly Trade Accounts for December last, which contain full details of the import trade of the United Kingdom in 1914 and 1915, and he will thus be in a position to make his own selection.
asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will state the total values of imports into the United Kingdom in 1912, 1913, 1914, and 1915, respectively?
The total value of imports into the United Kingdom in the years specified were as follows:—
Does that include the importation of munitions and military material by the Government for the purposes of the War?
We do not include in the trade returns the importation of munitions for either the War Office or the Admiralty.
asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will state the value of food and beverages, respectively, imported into the United Kingdom in 1915 and 1916, respectively?
I presume my hon. Friend desires figures for 1914 and 1915. The total value of the imports of food was £283,600,000 in 1914 and £367,300,000 in 1915; and of the imports of beverages £5,900,000 in 1914 and £6,000,000 in 1915.
Canal Boats
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he has given attention to the number of canal boats which are laid up for want of crews; and whether he is taking any steps, by conference or otherwise, with canal boat owners and others concerned to supply the men necessary, with a view to relieving the general congestion of traffic?
This question has been receiving the consideration of the Reserved Occupations Committee, and I understand they are formulating a proposal.
Messrs. a. Markham and Company
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that Mr. A. J. Jackson and Mr. T. W. Gimbert at the outbreak of war were employed by A. Schultz and Company, Limited, now A. Markham and Company; were either of these persons employed and, if so, when by his Department on a recommendation signed by A. Markham, of 165, Fenchurch Street or, if not, on whose recommendation were they employed; whether he is aware that Mr. A. J. Jackson, at the present time employed by his Department, visits the office of A. Markham and Company on Saturday afternoons, has letters addressed to this office, and communicates from the Board of Trade over the telephone with Mr. A. Markham; whether the services of Mr. T. M. Gimbert were dispensed with following a question raised in this House relating to A. Markham, late A. Schultz, junior; whether this gentleman, though employed at the Board of Trade by night, was at the same time in the employment of A. Markham and Company; whether Mr. B. M. Watt, a former secretary of A. Schultz, senior, is now employed as secretary to a member of the War Trade Department at India Office, Kingsway; whether he is aware that certain copies of the requirements of the Italian and French Governments for war stores passing through his Department are or were till recently in the possession of A. Markham and Company; and will he ascertain who took these documents from the Board of Trade to A. Markham and Company?
Mr. Jackson and Mr. Gimbert were engaged by the Board of Trade after the beginning of the War as temporary shorthand typists for evening work only. I understand that at the date of their appointment they were employed by Messrs. A. Markham and Company, They were not, however, engaged on the recommendation of the firm in question, but on the ground that they had both been employed on temporary work by the Board of Trade some time prior to the outbreak of the War. Mr. Jackson in particular had been known to members of the Department in connection with exhibition work for some years, and possessed high testimonials, He was subsequently appointed to work involving full time attend- ance, but I understand that before his appointment to full time work he had left the employment of Messrs. A. Markham and Company. I am not aware that Mr. Jackson has had any communications, either personally or by telephone, with the firm since his appointment to full time work, which requires and has received his constant attention from 10 a.m. to 8 p.m., and frequently later, daily, including Saturdays. Mr. Gimbert was not dismissed as a result of my hon. Friend's previous question in this House, of which the officer who appointed him was not cognisant at the time, but because he was found unsuitable for the work he was called upon to perform. I am not aware that any documents relating to Allied Government requirements have come into the possession of Messrs. A. Markham and Company, and I should be grateful to my hon. Friend for any further information he can give me on this subject in order that the fullest inquiries may be made. As regards Mr. D. M. Watt, who is not employed by my Department, I understand that he is private secretary to the Secretary of the War Trade Department, Central Buildings, Westminster, and that he was secretary to Mr. Schultz, senior, for about a year until September, 1913. I further understand that Mr. Watt has not seen Mr. Schultz or his son since January, 1914, nor had any communication with either of them since that date.
Is this Mr. Watt any relation of the hon. Member for the College Division of Glasgow?
Is not my right hon. Friend aware that the hon. Baronet the Member for the Mansfield Division (Sir A. Markham) is greatly annoyed by these Germans masquerading in his name and causing him all kinds of trouble by continually representing to Government Departments and others that they are acting for him?
I heard the hon. Baronet say something to that effect in the House of Commons some time ago. I am sure we should all deeply regret any misuse of his name, particularly in view of the illness from which he is now suffering.
Enemy Aliens
asked the President of the Board of Trade, whether he is aware that nearly 90 per cent. of the capital of the firm of Murrle., Bennett, and Company, Limited, of 13, Charterhouse Street, E.G., and representing a sum of £45,670, is held by enemy aliens; and will he say what steps he proposes to take in the matter?
I am aware that £45,670 representing nearly 90 per cent. of the capital of Murrle, Bennett, and Co., Ltd., of 13, Charterhouse Street, E.G., is, as stated by the hon. and gallant Gentleman, held by persons of enemy nationality. In March, 1915, the Board of Trade appointed a supervisor of the business of the company, and the case is one which will require consideration under the provisions of the Bill which was passed by the House yesterday.
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been called to the Artistic Novelties, Limited, carrying on business at 13, Charterhouse Street, E.G.; whether the shares of this concern are held by E. Murrle, an interned alien enemy, E. Saache, an alien enemy resident in Germany, and C. F. Hirth, a registered alien enemy not interned; if he can say why the latter gentleman escaped internment; and if he has, in consequence, been hitherto able to carry on the business of the firm in this country?
The attention of the Board of Trade has been called to Artistic Novelties, Limited, of 13, Charterhouse Street, E.C. The shares of this company are held as stated by the hon. and gallant Gentleman. I am not aware on what grounds C. F. Hirth has been exempted from internment, but I am informed that he has a son who is serving in the British Army. In March, 1915, the Board of Trade appointed a person to supervise the business of the company, and this is another case in which the application of the additional powers confered upon the Board of Trade will have to be considered.
War Service Badges
asked the Minister of Munitions whether, in view of the national importance of their work in connection with naval and merchant ships, he will consider the desirability of granting war service badges, or some other form of official recognition, to superintendents and masters of the docks, wharves, and basins in the different seaports in the United Kingdom?
The importance of this work has already been emphasised by its inclusion in the list of Reserved Occupations. My right hon. Friend is not prepared, as at present advised, to authorise the general issue of war service badges in such cases.
Will the right hon. Gentleman consider the issue to the special cases referred to in the question?
It is the practice in such cases to take the view of the Admiralty?
Films (Examination)
asked the Secretary to the Treasury whether the arrangements for the creation of a bonded warehouse by His Majesty's Board of Customs, fitted with apparatus whereby films in bond can be screened for examination, has been completed; and, if not, when it will be?
As I informed the right hon. Gentleman during the Debate on the 6th December last, the provision of bonded warehouses is a matter for the trade; so far, the trade has only provided a warehouse for raw film. It is not proposed to allow the screening of film in bond.
Was not an undertaking given that these facilities should be afforded?
No, there was an undertaking that facilities for examination should be afforded, but nobody gave an undertaking that screening, which is an exhibition for trade purposes and during which duplication by photography would be quite possible, should be included.
asked whether any delivery has been made to consignees of parcels containing films which were detained gy the Customs at the Parcels Post Office on the 29th September last; whether the consignees have complied with every Customs House requirement; what is the number of persons who have been engaged to deal with this matter; and what is the approximate cost of the Customs examination?
There are no films under detention at the Parcel Post Depot which arrived on 29th September, but some which arrived in October are awaiting production by the importer of satisfactory evidence in Support of his claim for their free admission as returned goods. The examination of films at the Parcel Post Depot forms only a small part of the duties of the staff there, and it is not practicable to give separately the number of the staff engaged and the cost of examination.
asked the Secretary to the Treasury whether His Majesty's Board of Customs have intimated that no drawback can be allowed on imported films which have been examined by screening before re-exportation; and whether, in view of his undertaking, he proposes to take any action in the matter?
The Board of Customs and Excise are advised that the screening of cinematograph film is use which would disqualify for drawback under Section 13(1) of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1915.
British Shipping (Congestion and Freights)
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been called to the increasing congestion in the docks of London and other British ports with consequent delay to shipping; whether this congestion is due to mismanagement by the railway, dock, or other authorities, or to shortage of labour, both clerical and manual; whether he is aware that many thousands of men in this country are retained in the Army on full pay and rations who are quite unfit for military service but could with advantage to the country and themselves be utilised in transport work; and whether he will take steps to obtain the discharge of these unfit men from the Army?
I am only too well aware of the congestion at some of our principal ports, and of the serious consequences. Every effort is being made to reduce it. I am inclined to the view that shortage of labour is the chief contributory cause, and I understand that the Port and Transit Executive Committee is in consultation with the War Office as to means by which this difficulty can be overcome.
As regards the latter part of the question, I may refer to the reply given by my right hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for War to a question by my hon. Friend the Member for the Shipley Division on the 4th January.
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his investigations have shown that high rates of freight throughout the world are due to shortage of ships and that the only real universal remedy is a greater supply of tonnage for commercial purposes; whether he will state the number of vessels and their total gross registered tonnage in which the insulated spaces for meat have been requisitioned by the Board of Trade; and whether, in addition to these steamers, he has information which shows that the Admiralty have requisitioned and otherwise engaged a great percentage of British shipping which, together with the British shipping engaged by our Allies for the conveyance of military stores, material, and animals, represents over 50 per cent. of the total number of British ships?
The main cause of the high freights is shortage of tonnage, and the shortage of tonnage is in great measure due to the large number of ships which are employed by the Allied Governments for war purposes. The exact total number of British ships so employed I am afraid I cannot give at the present moment, but the number is a very large one. The number of ships in which insulated space has been requisitioned by the Board of Trade for the carriage of meat is 152, with a gross tonnage of 1,219,186. I am afraid there is no one universal remedy, but I explained to the House last week some of the measures we are now taking. We will continue to do all that lies in our power to relieve the situation.
What about the latter part of the question; is it 50 per cent.?
I am afraid I cannot add to the information in regard to the Admiralty employment of vessels.
asked the President of the Board of Trade, whether he has in formation supplied to him by British ship owners of many instances of the wasteful and extravagant use of their vessels re quisitioned by the Admiralty for military purposes; and whether he has communicated with the Admiralty and the War Office on these cases with a view to the more economical use of requisitioned steamers and their speedy release for commercial purposes when the military authorities have no immediate use for them; and, if so, will he state the result of his efforts?
All information and suggestions which have been received by the Board of Trade from shipowners as to the manner in which their vessels have been used have been furnished by me to the Admiralty, and every effort is now being made to secure that tonnage employed for military and naval purposes shall be used as economically as possible.
asked what effect Government action totally prohibiting British steamers from trading between foreign neutral countries, such as the United States of America and South American countries, or between the United States of America and China and Japan, would have upon British commerce, trade, shipping, and finance?
We are restricting the trade of British ships between foreign ports as much as possible, but the total stoppage of all the established services of British ships between foreign ports would cause so much dislocation to trade and finance as to outweigh the advantage of bringing every one of these ships into purely British trade.
asked the number of British and neutral steamers, respectively, which, by reason of geographical position and climatic conditions, will for some months be kept idle?
I am afraid I am not in a position to give any official figures on this matter. It appears, however, that over eighty British steamers are in Baltic and Black Sea ports, seventy one steamers are interned in German ports, and a considerable number are frozen up elsewhere.
Does the right hon. Gentleman know that, according to the Scandinavian papers, that in their locality there are over 100 ships frozen up, and that they will be there for many months?
I do not know what is the exact number; certainly a considerable number are frozen up.
Railways (Congestion of Traffic)
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he has yet taken any steps to remedy the congestion on railways due to the existence of many hundred thousand private wagons; and, if not, when he proposes to do so?
The question whether it is desirable or practicable to introduce any arrangements for the common use of private wagons during the War is under consideration, but as I have already stated, there are very great difficulties in the way of such a scheme.
German Trade (Metric System)
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in order to facilitate the capture of German trade, he intends to introduce immediately legislation making compulsory the use of the metric system?
The answer is in the negative.
Belgian Manufactured Goods
asked the President of the Board of Trade under what conditions are permits given for Belgian manufactured goods or products to enter this country; can he state the number of permits given during the last six months, the class of goods allowed, and the value of such goods imported from Belgium; and, if money is paid here into a blocked account as per official instructions, can he state how Dutch or German banks can be prevented from making advances against the receipt vouchers given by the English banks?
Goods of Belgian origin may be imported by persons holding the Board's licence on condition that they are accompanied by a Consular certificate of origin and that payment is made into a blocked account in the United Kingdom. Since the conditions were altered in November last 399 licences have been issued. They are not confined to special classes of goods. The total value of goods consigned from Belgium in the second half of 1915 was £834,091. As regards the last part of the question, I may point out that the British bank is required to undertake that no charge on the blocked account will be allowed or recognised without the permission of His Majesty's Government.
Patents and Designs Act, 1907 (Appeal Decision)
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been called to a recent decision of the Court of Appeal given on the 20th October last in the case of the Diamond Coal Cutter Company versus the Mining Appliances Company, Limited; and whether, in view of that decision, he will introduce legislation to ensure that a licensee of a British patent which is vested in an enemy shall not be exempt from the operation of Section 36 of the Patents and Designs Act, 1907, and shall not be entitled with impunity to threaten the owner of another British patent with legal proceedings for alleged infringement of the enemy's patent?
My attention has been called to the decision of the Court of Appeal to which the hon. Gentleman refers, but I do not think that any legislation is necessary or desirable.
Has the right hon. Gentleman called the attention of the learned Attorney-General to this case, and taken legal opinion upon it?
Well, Sir, this is a matter in which, if I may say so, administrative opinion is as good as legal opinion; although, of course, I am always glad to have the views of my right hon. and learned Friend.
British Steamers (Tonnage)
asked the number of British steamers, and their total gross registered tonnage, purchased by the British Government since 1st August, 1914?
I regret it has been quite impossible, in the time at our disposal, to collect the facts asked for by my hon. Friend.
Anti-Conscription Handbills (Action of Police)
asked the Home Secretary why the police interfered with certain individuals who were distributing handbills in the neighbourhood of Hansper Road, Dulwich; about 9 p.m. on the 18th instant, such handbills being statements in opposition to Conscription; why these individuals were taken to the police station, where the officer in charge refused to accept the charge that they had been committing a nuisance, but took their names and addresses and said he would communicate with Scotland Yard; by what authority was some part of the literature appropriated by the police; and what action does he intend to take against the police for this interference with the persons arrested?
A police officer, seeing persons distributing literature in opposition to Conscription, was of opinion that an offence was being committed against the Defence of the Realm Regulations, and requested the persons to accompany him to the police station; having given their names and addresses there, they went away. The police officer concerned acted in good faith, and it is not proposed to take official notice of the course taken by him. The answer which I gave in the House of Commons on the 17th instant on the general question will be a sufficient indication as to the course to be taken in the future.
Will the right hon. Gentleman take steps to prevent innocent persons from being interfered with in future?
I think the police are fully cognisant of their duties.
Lord Kitchener ("Weekly Dispatch")
asked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been drawn to an article in the "Weekly Dispatch" newspaper attacking the Minister for War and, with malicious innuendo, suggesting that he is neglecting his duty; and whether this paper has been suppressed?
The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative, and to the second part in the negative.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this article contains a malicious attack on Lord Kitchener, and insinuates that he is wasting his time and should go to the Nile; and can he explain why an attack on the Secretary of State for War is permitted and a Scottish newspaper, the "Forward," suppressed for reporting a speech of the Minister of Munitions?
The hon. Member must give notice of the question.
I will raise this question on the Adjournment of the House.
Exports and Imports (Ireland)
asked the Vice-President of the Department of Agriculture (Ireland) when the official Report of Irish exports and imports for 1914 will be published?
The Report referred to has been completed and is in the hands of the printer. It will probably be presented to Parliament within three or four weeks' time.
Export of Cows (Ireland)
asked the Vice-President of the Department of Agriculture (Ireland) when it is intended to remove the embargo upon the export from Ireland of cows in calf?
The Maintenance of Live Stock Order which prohibits the shipment from Ireland of cows obviously in calf is a war measure which became necessary to prevent the depletion of cattle in Ireland. So far as can be seen at present it is not probable that the Order will be withdrawn before the termination of the War?
Enemy Raids (Kentish Coast)
asked the Secretary to the Admiralty (1) whether any British aircraft gave chase to the enemy aircraft on the occasion of the recent night raid on the Kentish coast; and if he can reassure the inhabitants of the coast towns that there are at the present moment, and that there were at the time of the recent raids, British aeroplanes of equal swiftness to those of the enemy and manned with machine guns capable of being fired as the aircraft flies in pursuit, in the near vicinity of the Straits of Dover; and (2), whether he can give any further details of the recent air-raids on the Kentish coast; if he can say whether any warning of the two raids was received beforehand either by the Admiralty, the War Office, or any other Government Department; if he can say what length of time was allowed to elapse after the enemy aircraft was first sighted before any of our own aircraft made an ascent on each occasion, i.e., the raid by night and the raid by day; and if he has any official information showing that the enemy aircraft were seen cruising about in broad daylight for over two hours?
The answer to the first part of Question 6 is in the negative, and to the second in the affirmative. To the first two parts of Question 7 I can only say that it is not in the public interest to add anything to what has already been published; and to the third part of Question 7, that, on the occasions on which British aeroplanes ascended to attack the enemy, the lapse of time between the sighting of the enemy aircraft and the ascent of the British machines was that required to prepare the machines for flight. The report referred to in the last part of Question 7 is destitute of truth.
Ought not these aeroplanes to be kept ready for flight?
They are kept ready for flight, but you cannot put an aeroplane into the air by merely touching a button.
Mr. Masterman
asked the Prime Minister whether Mr. Masterman is still being paid £1,200 a year for supplying the Government with translated extracts from the foreign Press; whether it was Mr. Masterman who brought to the notice of the Government the reproduction abroad of a map published in London, on which the late Home Secretary based his attack on English newspapers; and whether Mr. Masterman has reported to the Government the publication in the Berlin Press of verbatim reports of, and laudatory comments on, the speech in this House on the Military Service (No. 2) Bill recently delivered by the right hon. Member for Walthamstow (Sir John Simon)?
I must refer to my previous answers as to the employment and remuneration of my right hon. Friend. The suggestions made in the question are without foundation.
To what suggestions does the right hon. Gentleman refer?
All those that follow after the first semicolon.
Is the right hon. Gentleman able to say that no reports of the speeches of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Walthamstow appear in the Berlin Press?
I do not study the Berlin Press, and I have no idea. With regard to the suggestions in the question, I say they are without foundation.
Is it a fact that reports of the speeches of the hon. and learned Member for St. Augustine's (Mr. R. McNeil) appear in the Berlin Press?
Serbia
asked the Prime Minister (1) if one of the objects of the present War is to restore the independence of Serbia with her territory inviolate; and (2) if one of the objects of the present War is to restore the independence of Montenegro with her territory inviolate?
I can add nothing to my statement of the 2nd November with regard to the conditions of peace.
Army Medical Services (Advisory Board)
asked the Prime Minister whether the Advisory Board for Army Medical Services is now on the Army List; whether it was instituted by Order in Council on the advice of the Secretary of State for War and at what date; whether its members are paid by the Treasury; whether the decisions of the Directors General in England and France are subject to the concurrence of this Board; and will he say why it has not been summoned to meet once in its collective consultative capacity since the War began?
The Advisory Board, like all other similar bodies, appears in the Army List. It was not instituted by Order in Council, nor is it statutory as the hon. Member suggested the other day. Those of its members who receive pay receive that pay from Army funds. The answer to the fourth part of the question is in the negative, and the answer to the fifth part of the question has frequently been given in answers to previous questions put within the last few weeks.
In view of the need of efficiency would it not be well to avoid the multiplication of these derelict institutions?
This body has done very valuable service, and its members are now being employed by the Government; therefore I do not think it may be so described.
Has it done the service for which it was instituted?
Yes, in peace time.
asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the fact that it is the policy of the War Office not to summon any formal meetings of the Advisory Board for Army Medical Services, he will take steps to eliminate the expense of keeping up a board whose advisory function has ceased since the War broke out?
The non-official members of the board in England are employed in an advisory capacity. Those in France are similarly employed as an advisory board to the Director-General of the Medical Services.
Compulsory Service (Disturbing Public Meetings)
asked the Prime Minister what action he proposes to take to prevent the breaking up of public meetings by soldiers in uniform, in view of the fact that during the last few days meetings have been so attacked at Southgate, Lambeth, Newcastle, and Warrington; and if he is prepared to assist the carrying out of the Home Secretary's promise that no Government interference would be offered to the reasonable public discussion of the question of Conscription?
Soldiers are in the same position as civilians as regards their liability to be proceeded against by the civil authorities in respect of any breach of the civil law. In view of the fact that so large a proportion of the population is at present in the Army, it is not considered desirable expressly to forbid soldiers (who are now always in uniform) from attending, during their leisure hours, meetings which are held for the discussion of subjects of national importance, when the discussion is unobjectionable from a military point of view.
Soldiers Families (Certificates)
asked whether the question of granting a certificate to the families of soldiers who have fallen in the War will be considered; and whether a desire has been expressed to this effect by any soldiers from the Dominions or other over sea contingents?
I am not aware that any such such desire has been expressed. I recognise the point of view from which the hon. Member approaches the matter, but I fear the clerical and other work involved would be so great as to make the proposal impracticable.
American Securities
( by Private Notice ): I beg to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is in a position to give the House any information as to the operations of the Treasury Committee for the purchase and deposit of American Dollar Securities?
I am glad to be able to assure the hon. Member that the results of the fortnight during which the Treasury Committee has been purchasing securities have been markedly satisfactory. Up to the present time the Committee, having in view the somewhat complicated machinery required for the deposit of securities, has confined its initial operations—wisely, in my opinion—to the purchase outright of securities. I am informed that the list of securities priced by the Committee for purchase is being rapidly enlarged so as to ensure a steadily increasing stream of securities tendered for sale. I take this opportunity of pointing out that holders of suitable securities, by coming forward to sell them to the Government, are performing a really patriotic service in helping the Government to maintain a stable exchange with, the United States and to safeguard the gold standard of the country, while at the same time they obtain a full price for the securities sold.
Bombay (Trial by Jury)
asked the Secretary of State for India if he can give the date of the introduction of trial by jury into the procedure of the Court of Session of the district of Belgaum, in the Presidency of Bombay; whether the right of trial by jury has lately been taken away from that district; if so, what were the reasons for such action; whether it was preceded by any public inquiry; and whether the learned judges of the High Court approved of the action taken by the Government of Bombay?
Trial by jury for certain offences was introduced into the Belgaum district in 1884. In October, 1915, it was withdrawn in respect of certain grave crimes, such as murder and forgery, but at the same time extended to many other classes of offences which had hitherto been triable without a jury. In a communiqué to the Press the Bombay Government stated that their action had been taken after inquiry and after reference to and with the concurrence of the High Court, and was based on the inadequate local supply of competent jurors, the increase of violent crime, and the existence of intimidation and organised factions. It does not appear that there was a public inquiry.
Feudal Casualties (Scotland) Act, 1914
asked the Lord Advocate whether the Government, when giving consideration to a readjustment of commutation terms for Land Tax and tithe rent charge, will also deal with transactions under the Feudal Casualties (Scotland) Act. 1914; and whether information is available showing to what extent that Act has been made use of?
As the basis of compensation payable on the redemption of feudal casualties was fixed so recently as 1914 by the Act referred to by my hon. Friend, I am not prepared to recommend the course suggested in the first part of the question. During the year 1915 4,610 memoranda of the conversion of compensation into an annual sum were presented for registration in the register of Sasines. Information as to the number of cases where there has been no such conversion of the compensation is not available.
Small Holdings (Scotland)
asked the Secretary for Scotland if he can state the result of the decision of the House of Lords against the Scottish Board of Agriculture in the appeal made by the Board in the Lindean case; and whether he will consider it in connection with an Amendment of the Scottish Smallholders Act?
The result of the decision of the House of Lords in this case was to affirm the decision of the Second Division of the Court of Session that, under Section 7 (11) of the Small Landholders (Scotland) Act, 1911, a landlord is entitled to compensation in respect of the estimated depreciation of the selling value of the estate attributable to the constitution of small holdings upon it. The amount of compensation awarded for that depreciation was in this instance £3,850. The answer to the last part of the question is in the affirmative.
National Health Insurance
asked the Prime Minister if the Government can give a day for the discussion of the Motion on national health insurance standing in the name of the hon. Member for Pontefract?
No, Sir, I am afraid I cannot give a day for this Motion.
Scientific Research
asked the Prime Minister whether he will consider the desirability of appointing a Committee of Members of the House of Commons, and of other persons interested in and having a practical knowledge of the subject, to inquire into the present organisation of education in this country, and to report as to whether, having regard to the experience gained in the operations of the War and to the new social and economic conditions that may result when the War is over, any and, if so, what changes it may be thought advisable to introduce into our national system of education, with a view to establishing, without unduly interfering with other aims, a closer connection between our commercial and industrial requirements and the teaching provided in our several educational institutions, and in order to secure such further development as may be found necessary of existing facilities for scientific research and the better training of all classes of the population for the activities in which they may be severally engaged?
The House will remember that last year a scheme of educational development, which has been foreshadowed by my right hon. Friend the Postmaster General, was reconsidered in the light of existing conditions and the probable requirements of the country after the War. This scheme, to which partial effect has been given, was concerned with the special scientific and industrial interests with which the hon. Member has been associated with such distinction. In the circumstances I do not think it would be desirable to set up the Committee suggested in the question. The President of the Board of Education will, of course, be happy to consult all persons or bodies who are in a position to give advice on this matter.
British Blockade
4.0.P.M.
I beg to move, "That this House, having noted the volume of the imports into neutral countries bordering on enemy territory of goods essential to the enemy for the prosecution of the War, urges the Government to enforce as effective a blockade as possible, without interfering with the normal requirements of those neutral countries for internal consumption."
I wish to state at the outset that I have no desire in anything that I may say to embarrass the Government, nor do I at the moment wish to criticise any of their actions in the past. There are some of us who feel that if the Government had boldly grasped the nettle and had used our sea power to greater effect we might have saved a certain period of the War, but we do not know the difficulties which the Government have had to encounter nor the troubles with which they have been met, and we quite realise that anything that they have done in the past has been done in very strict accordance with the observance of the very highest traditions of British honour. I hope that this Motion will be adequately debated, because it will give the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the opportunity of hearing the deep rooted opinions of Members who are not trammelled with responsibility, and it will give him the opportunity of explaining fully to the House and to neutral countries the great difficulties which have hedged round the using in an unlimited way of the enormous and overpowering sea power possessed by the Allies. I do not intend to weary the House by going into figures which have appeared so thoroughly and frequently lately in the papers. They purport to show the enormous increase in the volume of imports into the neutral countries that are near to Germany. We are all of us aware of the fact that those imports have gone on increasing, and we all know that Germany has obtained large quantities of commodities from neutral countries which did not originate in the neutral country whence they were taken. We know that cocoa, oil, fats, cotton-seed oil, and many of the commodities that are needed not only for man and beast, but for the making of munitions, have found their way into Germany. During the earlier months of the War, when our Navy and the navies of our Allies had cleared German commerce off the seas, the German merchants imagined that they could continue buying what they needed in America and other neutral countries and bringing them forward to neutral ports. I should like to give one instance of a case where a German firm whom I know very well, a firm of high respectability, wrote to a firm in America in these words:— to the list of contraband goods that ought to have been added before, but they have neither satisfied the neutrals nor have they prevented Germany from getting the stuff. If instead of Orders in Council we had issued a Declaration of Blockade on the lines of that which Abraham Lincoln issued during the Civil War in the States, coupled with the emphatic enforcement of the law of continuous voyage and the doctrine of ultimate destination, I believe we should have prevented Germany from getting a great many of the commodities which she has already received. Personally, I hope that the Government will see their way to abolish the Orders in Council and to issue in conjunction with our Allies a strong declaration that the Allies have decided that from now on the entire over oceanic traffic of Germany will be prevented by a blockade of German ports.
I am neither a naval man nor an international lawyer, and my suggestions will doubtless require a great many modifications, but I should like to see a blockade started with a line drawn from the shores of Norway, where the Norwegian authority ceases outside their three mile limit across to Scotland, a line drawn across the English Channel and across the Straits of Gibraltar, and everything going into Germany or coming out of Germany stopped there, and, in addition, that the ultimate destination of goods that crossed that blockade should be found out, and if they were intended for Germany that they should also be stopped. If our Government should issue that block-ade, then I would suggest that they should make everything that goes in or comes out of Germany contraband. If they did that we should have shipowners endeavouring to carry out the blockade, because none of them would wish to have their ships seized and sold, knowing the amount of money that they are making out of them at the present day.
I presume, if we declared it, we should be said by people to be exercising an undue sea power and to be violating the rights of neutral nations. I venture to claim that even if we were accused of doing this, if we convinced ourselves that the institution of a blockade would be consonant with our honourable obligations to other nations and that it would help to bring the War to a speedier conclusion, we ought to consider the expediency of putting it into force at once. Undoubtedly neutral countries in Europe would very probably object, but I think it could be easily shown to them that the practice prevailing under the Orders in Council would likewise prevail under the blockade, and that they would be allowed to receive all the goods that they require for their internal consumption. We could tell the subjects of those neutral countries that we would not allow them in future to take any goods through the blockade for the purpose of handing them over to Germany, thus nullifying the effect produced by the blockade. In addition to the neutral countries in Europe we have to deal with America. From what I know of America I do not think she would object, for the proclamation of a blockade would be on the same principle as the blockade declared by President Lincoln in 1861. He declared that on his own initiative. Congress was not sitting, but he knew that if he declared that blockade it would help to bring the great war between the States to a speedier conclusion, and he knew that if afterwards his action was criticised his fellow countrymen would rally round him and support him. They all supported him, and they realised that by his proclamation of that blockade he prevented the continuance of a war which might have brought about the severance of the union between the States.
It may be argued that in blockading the German ports at points so far away from German territory we are making a new departure in international law. As a layman, I would humbly suggest that international law applies to things that were happening when international law was made, and it is not the international law that the majority of the Great Powers of Europe to-day think it ought to be. In olden times, when these laws were framed, there was no question of submarines making a close blockade unnecessary, Puffendorf never dreamed that aeroplanes would be able to carry intelligence, and Bynkershoek never thought that wireless would be able to call vessels up from one end of the world to another. No one in those days imagined that Admiral Sturdee would be able to take ships across the ocean to the Falkland Islands, almost on a time-table, and meet and defeat a hostile German squadron. The blockade, I suggest, would be an American blockade on the lines of the American blockade. That such a thing is feasible I rely on the authority of Mr. Hannis Taylor, one of the great American international lawyers, and one of the counsel sent over by the United States Government to contend with us on the Alaskan Boundary question. In his book on international law he refers to Abraham Lincoln's blockade, a blockade which all the world knew he had not the ships with which to carry out, and he says:— clamation into force we shall undoubtedly have an outcry in the United States by pro Germans who have been spending no end of money in America, not only to blow up factories, but to get their ideas in print. I am not in the least afraid of that, because to-day America is full of good common sense, and the majority of her people are keenly alive to the interest they have in seeing that we win this War. I have, and many Members of this House have, received lately a book which has been brought out in America by a well known journalist, a man who was at one time a clergyman, and who has not hesitated to try and stir up most bitter feelings between America and Great Britain. He has gone back to the days of America's childhood, when she was fighting with Great Britain, and he has put into his book letters from Thomas Jefferson, a man on whom Americans look back with pride. In these letters, one published in 1793 and one in 1813, Jefferson states that Great Britain is the country to be most dreaded. He says we want to get dominion over the seas, and that all our Orders in Council are framed with the object of enabling us to get control of the sea. But the writer of the book does not tell the American people that Jefferson, before his death, changed his views entirely about Great Britain; nor does he remind them that in 1823, when he was asked by President Monroe what his opinion was of the British suggestion to carry on the Monroe doctrine, Jefferson, replied:— moral right to declare such a blockade. I believe it will hurt the legitimate rights of no neutral nation, further than inflicting a hardship on some of the citizens which might naturally be expected when half the world is at war. A bold policy, a policy which, if it only shortens by one day this struggle to the death, must commend itself to all nationalities who do not wish to see Christianity replaced by Kultur, or the ethics of the civilised world decreed from Berlin.
No one realises more acutely than I do the extraordinary difficulty of the subject we are debating to-day. I believe there is no subject at the present time upon which it is more difficult for one who is not in the immediate confidence of the Government to express a certain opinion, and if I and others express opinions in the Debate today, I hope His Majesty's Government will appreciate that our object is not merely to criticise, but to give them that assistance which this House alone can give in their negotiations with other Powers, and in the decision which may have to be, and which I for one hope will be taken. The great difficulty under which all labour who have not the information which alone is possessed by the Government is that we cannot possibly deal with any figures. Knowledge of the extent to which trade with Germany, trade bound to Germany, and trade emanating from Germany has been stopped by the measures hitherto taken by the Government: that knowledge, incomplete as I believe it is even in the mind of the Government, is necessarily more incomplete in the mind of anybody outside, and therefore, in discussing the whole subject, at the threshold one is met with this enormous difficulty, and, in my view, the only method of approaching that difficulty is to consider—firstly, the information the Government has supplied to us; secondly, the inherent probabilities of the case, and, thirdly, the general knowledge as to the facts of importance, even although the measure of those facts cannot be expressed in figures. What is the point of view from which this subject should be approached? We have had eighteen months of war. The position on land is that, at any rate, no decisive result has been achieved, and we are at best where we were eighteen months ago. In that eighteen months, on the other hand, on the sea, the Allies have achieved com- plete and absolute superiority. On those two facts, obviously there is only one working hypothesis by which this question can be approached—the working hypothesis must be that we utilise our sea power as if that were our one weapon. That in one sense, is a platitude, but like many platitudes, it is also true. It is a fact of overwhelming importance in the consideration of the risks which it is worth while running in relation to this subject. We cannot attain the ordinary objective of naval action at the present time; the German Fleet will not fight. We can, if we choose, achieve the other object of naval action; we can completely and absolutely crush German commerce with the outside world. In my judgment that fact is a fact which necessitates the taking of risks, it may be of big risks, by the Government.
We have heard a good deal of talk, conveyed to us from the Press in other countries, of the rights of neutrals. I think the rights of belligerents are a little lost sight of by neutrals. The business of His Majesty's Government is to consider rather the rights of belligerents than the rights of neutrals. We have to take risks, but, in measuring the risks, it is worth while remembering what the true character of the risks are that we are running in relation to neutrals. I am satisfied that the Government are satisfied that there is no risk of any one of those neutral Powers which are concerned going to war with us. Upon that basis, which I assume, and I believe everyone in this House believes to be the right basis—upon that footing the only risks we run in regard to neutrals are the risks of causing pecuniary damage to their commercial interests. I never knew a commercial grievance which was not adequately compensated by a money payment. If the adoption of a stronger line, if a stronger line be possible—which I leave for the moment—in relation to this question, if it should lead to the shortening of this War by twenty days, twenty days we know means twenty times £5,000,000, that is £100,000,000, and £100,000,000 should go a very long way towards healing the wounds of neutral pockets after the War. Shorten the War by three times that and you would have trebled your fund for compensation purposes. It is incredible, if we mean what we say, when we say we are fighting the cause of civilisation, of humanity, and of liberty, that we should weigh in the balance against those causes injuries to the pockets of neutral traders. We ought not to do it, and if the neutral Powers say that we ought, our business is to say, "We do not take that view, and we are going on."
Now as to the position. We know what the Prime Minister said in March, 1915. I will refer to it in a moment. We know that immediately after his speech the Order in Council of 11th March was introduced. We have all of us, I assume, read the Government White Paper issued this month, and read it carefully. It is an interesting statement, but there is one thing that appears patently in that statement, and that is, that the Government themselves, after enumerating as they do in the White Paper, the series of steps which they have taken for the purpose of stopping German commerce, admit that in spite of everything, although they have done much they do not profess to have succeeded completely. I do not want to refer in detail to the White Paper, but the gist of it is in paragraph (28): keep returns which would enable them to give us the figures. That was the only answer that was given. I venture to think that, with the material which the War Trade Department had, this House might have been put in the possession of rather more material than it has had at an earlier date. To sum up on this aspect of the question, the need for stronger measures is one of which the nation at large is convinced. No amount of Government answers to-day that the need does not exist will convince the nation. I do not believe that this House will be convinced by any such answers, and I trust that the Government will not put the Debate on that footing. Let us discuss this question in order to see what more can be done, rather than to see whether the Government are to blame for not having done enough hitherto. On 1st March last the Prime Minister, when he was foreshadowing what we call our reprisals were to be, said this:— applied. On that footing I submit that we ought to approach the question to-day mainly by considering how more pressure can be applied. If the Debate deals with that aspect of the question we shall be giving the Government the most help.
The subject is one of great difficulty. I happen to have had occasion for many years to deal with it, and for that reason I know that it is more difficult than probably most people know, and I also speak with very much diffidence in making practical suggestions. If I make them, I do so in the hope that they may be of use, after very careful consideration of their quality from the point of view of international law and for the consideration of His Majesty's Government. The 11th March Order has been treated by His Majesty's Government in correspondence and in White Papers as if it were a blockade. It has been called a blockade. It is called a blockade in the last White. Paper, but it was put forward especially not as a blockade. The idea underlying it was that the object of blockade should be achieved by it, without calling it a blockade and without exposing neutrals to the risk of the necessary condemnation of ships and goods taken in breach of blockade. It was thought that would conciliate neutral opinion. I believe that its object in that respect has completely failed, and that instead of conciliating neutral opinion it has, if anything, irritated neutral opinion, particularly in the United States. They complain that it is unprecedented in character, not sanctioned by any known rule of international law, and uncertain in its operation, and I profoundly believe that if we desire to please American opinion we shall withdraw that Order. I do not for a moment say the Order was not valid or in accordance with international law. I believe it was, and for that matter, with the hon. Member (Mr. Shaw), I wrote a long article to that effect in the American Press; but I believe it is in our interest that the Order should be withdrawn. Can we do, with regularity and validity, according to international law, that which the Prime Minister said we would do, and that which the Order of 11th March was, I believe, intended to do? Can we stop all German commerce going in and out of Germany? I believe we can do it, and I believe we can do it in direct conformity with the principles of international law.
I want to outline the suggestions I have to make to the Government, and I do it with very great diffidence and fully alive to the possible retort from the Government Benches that fools rush in where angels fear to tread. Still, I do it. In considering questions of international law, the fundamental thing to bear in mind, in my opinion, is that it is not law, but a body of international usage or practice. It represents what you may call the major or more general or better practice of the majority of civilised nations. From that inherent nature you at once see its chief characteristic, and that is the characteristic of growth. It grows as times change to meet the changing conditions of civilisation and progress. That is fundamental. There are certain underlying principles which have been applied, which we can still apply to-day, and which we can apply to the new circumstances, I believe, in strict conformity with international law. I propose to illustrate that by taking two branches of international law. One is blockade, the other is the doctrine of continuous voyage. The essential principle of blockade I believe to be this: If your power at sea so far excels that of your enemy that you are able effectively to prevent goods going to or coming from him, you are entitled, with a view to reducing him to submission, to prevent those goods coming to or from him, after you have given due notice to neutrals and in spite of the fact that by your action injury will result to neutral commerce. That I believe to be the underlying fundamental principle of the law of blockade. That law has grown and grown in a startling degree. I dare say the Foreign Secretary is alive to the fact that it was one of the weapons used in the Peloponnesian War described by Thucydides, but I do not propose to go back quite so far. In the days of sailing ships the rule that blockade must be effective and involve danger to any vessel seeking to break blockade led to this result. You had to have your sailing ships anchored, or practically stationary, at short distances apart near to the coast, otherwise you could not prevent other vessels getting through. Another rule was, when land carriage of any substantial quantities of merchandise was an impossibility, that if you wanted to apply the law of blockade you must apply it in regard to the immediate destination of the ship carrying the goods. If the immediate destination of the ship was an enemy port, you could arrest the ship for breach of blockade. If the immediate destination of the ship was a neutral port the goods were free, because in those days there was no danger of goods getting through to an enemy destination.
Take the changes, in respect of those two rules, in the application of the law of blockade. The substitution of steamships and wireless telegraphy has revolutionised the first rule. You can make your blockade absolutely effective, your ships always being in movement and at a long distance away from the enemy coast and with a very much smaller number of ships at any given spot. Effective power can be summoned by wireless and applied at the necessary point so as to create the danger to ships running the blockade, which is necessary to make the blockade effective. That is one instance. The other is the case of the immediate destination port of the ships. The introduction of railways, with the consequent possibility of transport overland of large quantities of goods quickly, has led to the application of the doctrine of continuous voyage. To-day goods can be arrested if breaking blockade, although the destination of the ship may be a neutral port, if the goods are bound for an enemy destination. Follow out for a moment this doctrine of continuous voyage. It arose in the middle of the eighteenth century with the rule of our Courts forbidding trade by neutrals to enemy ports where in time of peace those neutrals had not been allowed to trade—the old rule of 1756. That was the origin of it. What happened at that time and in the later wars was that occasionally a ship intending to trade in a forbidden trade would call at a neutral port, discharge its goods, pass them through the Customs, load them on board again, and then proceed on its voyage. Lord Stowell, applying the doctrine in this country, said "that is a continuous voyage of the ship, and the mere fact that the goods have been discharged does not prevent it." That doctrine was seized upon by the Americans in the War of North and South and applied in three ways, which were all of them novel. One was applying it to the goods as distinguished from the ship; secondly, in relation to contraband goods; and thirdly, in relation to blockade. Those are instances of the growth of international law which are conclusive. The true view, I think, is that if you combine the doctrine of continuous voyage with blockade you can to-day declare a valid blockade against all goods going to or from Germany or other enemy Powers. And I think it is right to add to the doctrine of continuous voyage, as applied to the destination of the goods, the corollary drawn by the "Times"—which has published three extraordinarily able articles in the last three days on this subject, which deal with the position, in my judgment, in an absolutely sound way from the point of view of international law and in a way which is likely to be effective. The corollary drawn by the "Times" is that the doctrine of continuous voyage is equally applicable to the original origin of the goods as to the ultimate destination, and I see no reason why it should not be so applied.
If we accept the extensions of the law of blockade and of the law of continuous voyage made by the American Courts and apply them here, there is no reason at all, under existing circumstances, why a blockade declared by us should not be absolutely valid. What I suggest is that the Government should withdraw the 11th March Order on the ground that it has not given satisfaction, that it is not as effective as an absolute blockade, and that it has only been found possible in practice to work it by means of a number of supplementary arrangements detailed in the White Paper. That, I suggest, should be followed by a simple declaration of the blockade of all the enemy countries by all the Allied Powers. That declaration will involve the following results: Firstly, all ships going to or from enemy ports, if there were any, would be subject to condemnation; they would be confiscated. Secondly, goods going to or from enemy ports, if there were any, or indirectly through neutral ports, would be subject to condemnation; they also would be confiscated, applying the doctrine of continuous voyage both ways. Thirdly, ships carrying those goods would be confiscated if knowledge of the enemy origin or destination was properly imputable to the ship. One rule of the law of blockade is that it must be brought home in some way or another to the knowledge of the shipowner that the act he is committing is an act which involves a breach of the blockade. If you bring home to the shipowner the fact that he is carrying goods for Germany or coming from Germany after you have declared a blockade which subjects those goods to confiscation, you then bring home to the shipowner that so-called guilt which has been recognised as a ground for condemnation of the ship hitherto. Fourthly, and this is the crux of the situation, goods in excess of neutral requirements should be presumed to be intended for the enemy. Neutral requirements at first sight seem very difficult to gauge, but on that I desire to quote the Government's own words. In paragraph 28 of the recent White Paper, which deals with the subject of rationing, as we have been calling it, the language is this:—
The whole paragraph referred to rationing by agreement.
5.0 P.M.
It may be that the sentence I quote should be to that extent limited; but it is applicable to the system, and what I suggest is that the amount of neutral requirements should be taken, as a maximum, at the pre war figures of imports from all sources over a certain period of time. You must take the imports from all sources. It is not sufficient to take the imports overseas. You must allow for the importation from Germany itself before the War as part of the consumption of neutral countries. But whether the system be as the White Paper seems to indicate, simple, or whether it be difficult, I submit that it has got to be done. There is no other solution for this question of really stopping German trade than by saying, "We will apply a blockade which will filter the whole of the trade that goes across the North Sea to Germany, or through the Mediterranean to Austria and Turkey. We will filter it, and we will let through just what is necessary for neutrals and the rest we will take out." There is no other way in which it can be done, and I think we have got to face the position. I maintain that the country wishes that the Government should face that position and adopt that remedy. In these proposals I do not suggest that the liability of the ship or goods to condemnation on any other ground should be in the least curtailed. On the ground of contraband, or enemy ownership, the conditions stand. This is merely in substitution for the Order of 11th March, leaving every other ground of condemnation still effective.
Whether the whole of these proposals ought to be included in one Declaration or not, is a matter for consideration, if the Government think anything of the suggestion. My own view would be simply to include in a Declaration to the Powers a Declaration of blockade of the enemy Powers by the Allied Powers. There is a map published in to-day's "Daily News" which, I think, is useful. It gives a picture of the position, showing how the enemy Powers are absolutely surrounded by the Allied Powers. Where they are not surrounded by the sea, which the Allied forces control, they are surrounded by frontiers which the Allied forces on land hold. In these circumstances it seems to me monstrous and preposterous to suggest that because there are certain neutral countries on the fringe of that great central group of enemy countries, we should be prevented by the mere presence of those neutral countries there from carrying out the operation of war which is summed up in the word "blockade." On the decision to publish the Declaration of Blockade, I imagine it would be followed up by a Note to the Powers indicating that these results would follow and that this method would be adopted. I imagine also—and I gather that it is the view entertained by the Government from the remark which fell from the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs just now—that it would be desirable to come to arrangements with the neutral Powers as to their normal requirements. I imagine that they could be invited to come to arrangements. In the White Paper objections are made against coming to arrangements with neutral Governments. It may be, when you are trying to do the thing by the half a dozen different devious and indirect roads that have been chosen up to now, that it is more convenient to deal with traders rather than with neutral Governments, but if you are going to declare a blockade, it seems to me to follow that we should invite the neutral Governments to come to arrangements with us.
Of all the subjects which this House has considered since the outbreak of War, the crushing of German commerce is to-day, under the existing situation, I believe, the most important subject that we have had to consider. Our command of the sea is absolute. It is in the power of the Allies to stop every ship carrying goods, directly or indirectly, coming from or destined to an enemy country. We can stop them in the Atlantic, we can stop them in the North Sea, we can stop them in the Mediterranean, and we can stop them in the Indian Ocean, the Black Sea, and the Persian Gulf. We can stop them all round the enemy Powers, and we ought to do it. Under existing conditions no neutral can dispute our ability in fact to prevent the ingress and egress of German trade. That cardinal necessity of the validity of blockade cannot be disputed. We are in a position to do it. The effective force is there. We can apply it this minute without fear of effective resistance, and with a certainty, of danger attaching to every ship that tries to break our blockade. Under these circumstances the major premise is established for the suggestions that I make. I conceive that the object of this Motion is that this House should tell the Government and the world in no uncertain terms that we mean the command of the sea to be utilised to the full, that no more exceptions shall be made in individual cases, and that the blockade shall be applied rigorously to-day and in future, continuously and without intermission, until Germany admits defeat.
I am glad that the Government have at last acceded to the desire of hon. Members that they should afford an opportunity for the discussion of this very important matter. I think that the Resolution is much too weak for the purpose for which it is intended. I would much rather have preferred the Resolution which the hon. Member (Mr. Shirley Benn) has down on the Paper, and which is of a much more condemnatory character than that which he has moved to-day. That Resolution expresses dissatisfaction at the policy of the Government, and calls upon them to take prompt action. I wonder why that Resolution is not being moved to-day I Can it be that the Resolution which has been moved is a Government Resolution, put forward after consultation with the hon. Members in order to meet their views, and that it is a mere pretence at condemnation, while affording the Government an opportunity to explain their policy?
That is not so.
Of course, it matters little in a question of this kind as to the causes contributory to our discussion today. The real point is can we get any practical result from any Resolution which is brought forward? If the hon. Member gives me his assurance that the Government are in no way party to the Resolution, and did not know what the character of the Resolution was going to be, I at once accept his statement. I am sorry that the Resolution is as weak as it is. It seems to me an elaborate declaration of an obvious platitude. It simply notes what has been going on and expresses a pious hope that the Government will be more assidious in future. I would have preferred—although I fear I am in the minority in this matter—the Resolution which I have had on the Paper for some time. I do not think in a matter of this kind, which is associated with questions of great delicacy and public policy, that it is possible to say in this House all that we would like to say in regard to the subject before us. Had that been possible I should have made a very different speech from that which I am going to make. What I would have liked would have been a Select Committee, with power to call for all the officials concerned, and for all the records appertaining to our policy in regard to blockade, treating what was necessarily against the public interest as secret and giving a report to this House which could have formed a subject of discussion, after it had been considered by representative Members of this House. That has not been adopted, and we are faced with the Resolution before us, which has been supported by two very interesting speeches. I cannot understand why my hon. Friend dealt so much with the question as to what the desire of America would be, more especially in regard to the case which he put before the House. What is the American position in regard to this matter? It is, as I understand it, she would like the blockade to be absolute and would be content if the blockade was made absolute. That is the position as far as I understand the American attitude, judging from the public documents that have been before us.
No one can say that we have an effective blockade at the present time. No one pretends that it is so. The object of our Debate ought to be to ask the Government why it is that they have not succeeded in keeping supplies from going to the enemy. It is not so much our duty to put forward new policies as to say to the Government "why"—because it is not disputed—"are great and important products going to the enemy at the present time?" I do not think that the Government can dispute that for a single moment. I think it is impossible for them to do so. Therefore, we have to ask the Government to reassure the House and the nation, because there is undoubtedly great feeling about this matter outside, that the plans which they have adopted have not been successful. We cannot review this question without taking into account the whole attitude of the Foreign Office in regard to it. The Foreign Office succeeded in passing through this House the Declaration of London. I wonder whether the Foreign Secretary to-day could say that his policy at that time was one which he would be inclined to repeat under present circumstances. I do not think so. I think everybody is agreed to-day that it is a good thing for this country that the Declaration of London was not ratified. It is only fair to say that in this case we have to thank one of our own Member's, as he was at that time, Mr. Gibson Bowles, for the continued opposition which he gave to that proposal. We have to thank the other House for saving us from its passage. I would therefore like the Foreign Secretary—with whom we all sympathise in his great responsibility at the present time—to tell us if the position of the Government is that which it was as revealed by their attitude in respect of the Declaration of London, because it would interest the House generally to know how that position can be maintained in view of what has taken place since that time.
I have never been able to understand why this blockade by the Government towards our enemies was not earlier declared. Why did we wait until March, 1915, before the Government declared their intention of stopping commodities of every kind from going into or coming out of Germany? The War began in August, 1914 It was not until March, 1915, that this policy was declared, and in my humble opinion declared on an altogether unsatisfactory basis—declared in the nature of a reprisal for the action of submarines. My opinion throughout has been that we should have had a declaration of an immediate blockade on the outbreak of War. Had it been so, there is no doubt that the highest authorities who are in a position to judge believe that the War position would have been entirely different from what it is at the present time. My hon. Friend, in moving the Motion, stated practically his opinion that the period of the War would have been lessened had we had a different policy on the part of the Government from that which they have pursued. That is a very strong statement, and seems to call for a much stronger Resolution than that put forward. If that is the case, if the length of the War could have been lessened even by a single day if the Government had adopted the proper policy, then the Government would be unworthy to remain in office, and it is up to them to-day to convince the House and' the country that the policy which they have pursued is the best possible policy which they could have pursued in the interests of the country and in order to terminate the War.
I would suggest further to the Foreign Secretary that he might tell us why the blockade was not made effective in regard; to men of military age being allowed to go to Germany at the beginning of the War. In bringing forward this I am only trying to get at the mental attitude of the Government in regard to these matters. The House knows that hundreds or thousands—we have no record of how many—of men of military age were allowed, with our authority, to go to Germany. Our ships were informed that they were not to interfere with the free passage of Germans of military age, from America to neutral countries, going to fight against us. I have never been able to understand why the Government permitted that to go on so long, and I think that it would be useful to have a declaration on that point. I want to know, further, whether the Government stand to-day by their policy of March? Do they still adhere to the declaration of the Prime Minister that no commodities of any kind are to be allowed to go into Germany or to leave Germany? We are entitled to know that. I have stated in this House, and it has not yet been denied, that that policy has been departed from. I have asserted that, with our assent, commodities have been allowed to go from Denmark into Germany. I shall be glad today to hear from the Foreign Secretary whether he is prepared to deny that. Certainly it has not been denied up to the present time. We have departed from that policy. If our policy now is to allow a certain number of commodities to enter Germany, the House is entitled to some explanation of the change.
I know that there is represented in the Government a school who think that the way to end this War is to take as much gold as possible from Germany. I do not belong to that school. Sometimes we have one Cabinet Minister telling us that we are going to end the War, because we are not allowing commodities to go into Germany, and we have other people boasting that we axe going to end the War because we are draining Germany of its gold by allowing commodities to be supplied to it. It is very difficult to understand then what is the position of the Government, and the position which they are prepared to defend. Is it not a serious condition that we are allowing these goods to go to the enemy at the present time? I am not going to trouble the House with the figures which have been published in the newspapers. We have all read them. The complaint of the hon. Member opposite as to the Government issuing a statement last night is hardly justified, because it enables us to form an opinion of statistics which are really relevant to the matter before us. I have here the official figures of the Netherlands Government published by them. It cannot be suggested in any way that they are unreliable and do not represent the facts of the case. The period which I propose to take is for the nine months ending November, 1915. These figures show beyond all doubt that in regard to every matter of importance, in feeding, the exports from Holland to Germany have materially increased, while the exports to this country have materially lessened as compared with the years before the War.
Take flour and its products. The exports to Germany from Holland have gone up from 45,000 tons in 1913 to 64,000 tons in 1915. At the same time the export of the same articles from Holland to England had gone down from 30,000 tons to 18,000 tons. It is the same with regard to butter. The figures here are even more striking. The export to Germany has gone up from 17,000 to 33,000 tons, and the export to England has gone down from 7,000 to 2,000 tons. In the case of cheese, also, and practically every other daily necessity, it is shown by the official figures that the exports from Holland to Germany have materially increased, while the exports to this country have decreased. The same applies to cocoa powder, to cocoanut oil, and to fresh food, meat especially, and also to fish. So in every case on the official showing of the Netherlands Government—the exports to Germany have increased while the exports to this country have decreased. That establishes beyond all doubt that the Government policy has not been successful. But if I required more proof, I need only adduce the fact that the new organisation which has been created by the Government in respect of Holland has not been entirely successful. The Netherlands Oversea Trust was supposed to act in our interest, and to see that none of the goods which we send over were allowed to go into enemy hands. If that is so, how can the Foreign Office explain the large sum which members of that trust have had to pay in fines since they took over control? Of course, it is obvious that the system was by no means perfect and the Oversea Trust has failed in that respect because the traders have been able to pay these fines out of the profits which they made. If this were not so, I cannot understand why so many people have got to be fined for disobeying the orders of the Trust.
The attitude of the Government throughout has not been successful so far as we can see. The Government have not used their sea power to the extent which they ought to have done. I will not go into the proportions as to the number of ships brought in daily without any inquiry by the Prize Court. I wish that the Foreign Secretary could give us some information on that point, but we ought in this matter to give the Navy more power than they have had up to the present time, because, after all, we must rely on the Navy for success in this War. I would suggest to the Government that they ought to represent more than they have done up to the present how this War affects neutrals. I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman opposite that in no circumstances might we be at war with neutrals. I think that that is a very unsafe assumption to make. I wish that it were so. I think that our policy would be entirely different from what it is. But I do not think that we are right in making any such assumption. What we have got to do is to respect the interests of the neutrals, but we have to remember our duty to ourselves first. I believe that had the Government taken up a bold line, not on 15th March but on 14th August, on this as well as other matters, the whole problem would have been much more easily solved than it can be at the present moment. The result of the inaction of the Government has been that vested interests have been allowed to grow up. In these different countries cosmopolitan merchants are at every prominent port. They have been making money over there, and it is more difficult now on the part of the Government to stop it.
Had they at the very beginning made it clear that they were taking a strong line in this matter I believe that neutral countries would have been much more easily handled than at the present time. We have got to let neutral countries know that in fighting the War we are working for them. I do not anticipate for a moment any trouble with regard to America, irrespective of what action we might take. I believe that the great heart of America beats sincerely in sympathy with this country, and while in a difficult position I should never anticipate any serious situation with that country. Neither would I with the neutral countries if they are told frankly that in our own interest we must adopt a stronger policy than we have. They know that we cannot beat Germany unless we take vigorous action. Therefore I say to the Government, without any desire whatever to embarrass them in regard to this important matter, that they have not done everything which they might have done. We ask them to explain to us why it is that eighteen months after the beginning of the War all these goods are still being allowed to go to enemy hands. We ask them to declare their policy as to whether it is exactly the policy which the Prime Minister stated in March. Is it their policy to try to draw the gold from Germany in order to interfere with the reserves, or is it their policy to stop commodities going through to that country? I hope the result of this Debate to-day will be that the country will better understand the intentions of the Government and that this Debate may lead to greater vigour in regard to the question of our blockade policy.
The Seconder, in the course of his speech, told us specifically that this question was one of very great complexity. I do not think that anybody denies that for one moment. It is a question which is of vital interest and which presents many and almost insuperable difficulties. I have had the good fortune since the day before the War commenced to be associated with a Department one of whose main objects was to draw tight the chain of blockade around our enemy, and if I venture to give the House some of the impressions which I have gathered and some of the conclusions which I have formed, it is only with the object of showing how relevant some of these questions are to the subject which we are discussing. Although there are many and various opinions on the question of how best to deal with the blockade, I think every Member of this House, and every Government Department, has only one aim and object that they are endeavouring to bring about, and that is to bring the greatest amount of hurt upon our enemy without harming ourselves or those who happen to be our Allies. There are, I think, two schools of critics who have been especially prominent of late. We have, first of all, what I think we might term the Blue Water School—naval officers. I do not mean those especially connected with the Admiralty, but I refer more to those who have been doing a great deal of indefatigable work in this matter. I think that school of thought is out for one really important object, and that is to stop everything which can by any possible means be of any possible service to our enemies, no matter what the destination of the goods may be, nor to whom they may be consigned. I must say I admire the courage and enthusiasm of those who look at this great question from that point of view.
But I think the Blue Water School, as one may term it, are perhaps rather liable to put on one side the rights and privileges of neutrals. They cannot, I think, attach the same importance to this country remaining in friendly relationship with neutral countries as does the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and his Department, and apparently they do not appreciate the fact that we in this country want certain commodities which are produced in neutral countries surrounding Germany that are of great value to this country. I refer, for example, to the matter of pit props. The naval officer does not, perhaps, appreciate or know the vital importance of the productive trade between Russia and the Scandinavian countries. There is another school of critics who have been very prominent of late—the statistical school, those who base their attacks on the blockade policy on statistics and figures which have appeared very largely in the Press recently. It is impossible, in war time, to draw the same deductions from figures, or make comparisons as to increase, as we could draw in times of peace. In time of war the whole economic and productive geography of the world is changed. The traffic to great markets like the ports of Bremen and Hamburg, through which traffic was dispersed in Scandinavia and Northern Europe, is now going to other ports. The South Russian ports and the ports in the Baltic are cut off from receiving goods from outside, and the result is that Russian trade both inwards and outwards has either to go through the sea which is usually closed for five or six months every year, or over thousands of miles of Trans Siberian railway. The only other way in which Russia is able to obtain very important commodities of which she has urgent need at the present time is through neutral Scandinavian ports. That trade has become of enormous volume, and obviously swells the increased figures so continually flourished in the Press of the imports into Scandinavian countries.
The result is that we get a completely wrong impression from those figures of what is legitimate trade, and what is trade which is leaking through to our enemy. If the Government rested entirely upon pre-war figures as the basis of estimating the normal trade of the country, I venture to think that we should find ourselves confronted with very many pitfalls. Let me take the case of Holland. It is not at all unusual that some Dutch merchants come over to this country, Dutch importers, and all advance the argument, which deserves consideration, of a particular shortage in Holland of some particular commodity in which she deals, and in support of that contention the Dutch merchant will say that, in 1913, the imports into Holland of that particular commodity, say, sulphate of ammonia, were very much in excess of the imports into Holland at the present time. At first sight, those figures give ground for some congratulation. It appears from them that the trade, as certified, is under the normal, and suggests a self denial which it is perhaps rather un-usual to find amongst the Dutch. Nevertheless, those figures are extremely misleading, because, as the House will know, the pre-war figures, the import figures for Holland, include a very large quantity that was merely passing through Holland on the way to Germany and Austria. Therefore, looking at this subject in as correct and reliable a way as we can, we get, I think, a much better view of the whole question of the volume of trade which is going through to our enemies, by discarding, as far as possible, all comparison on the pre-war basis and pre-war figures.
After all, I think we have got plenty of evidence that there is a very considerable volume of trade going on at the present time between neutral countries and our enemies. No one disputes it. Thousands of merchants in neutral countries to-day are exporting to enemy countries millions of pounds worth of commodities. It is a very distressing fact, and obviously we, as a nation, have to direct all our energies, as we are directing our energies at the present time, to either stopping that trade or curtailing it to a very much larger extent. I think the figure, for instance, of the increase of trade in neutral countries during the last months of last year, point to the fact that, unless we tighten in some way our blockade, it will be a continually increasing danger to this country, and our enemies will be getting what they require. I want to put before the House how I account for this largely increased volume of trade, which I believe has gone to our enemies during the last three or four months of last year. I think, in the first place, the primary cause was the Order in Council of 11th March. When that Order in Council came into effect, it at once produced a diminution in what we may call contraband of trade, and this had a remarkable effect. Anybody who followed the figures from March until May will have noticed that effect. The result of cutting off supplies from Germany was that the price of commodities in Germany rose, and it is the very fact of prices having greatly risen in Germany which accounts for the remarkable increase in the figures relating to imports to Germany during the last months of last year.
What does that involve? First of all, it offers very much greater incentive to the smuggler, who is prepared now to take much greater risks; he is much more daring than was the case when prices of commodities in Germany were considerably below what they are at the present time. At the beginning of the War the smuggler could perhaps lose one cargo in two, and might earn some profit. To-day, there are certain commodities that it pays a man to run, say, five cargoes, and if he happens to get one of those cargoes through he makes a large profit. I think that is one of the reasons which accounts for the increase in the figures. There is another reason which, to my mind, is a rather more important and a more cogent one, and that is that the prices of commodities being at the present time so high, you find in every market and in every town or small village throughout every neutral country surrounding Germany German buyers buying the goods actually produced in those neutral countries, and paying for them much higher prices than the sellers of those goods could possibly obtain if they were sold in their own country. That obviously means that there is a great transit of such commodities as copper from Norway, fish and many other goods I could name, which are pouring into Germany from the neutral countries which happen to be contiguous to Germany. Those neutrals, having got rid of their own commodities, at once find a difficulty in providing for their own population, and consequently you find a very large increase of the imports into those neutral countries, which increase appears in the figures. That is one of the most difficult questions with which the Government have to deal. Here is a perfectly legitimate trade. Nobody can say to a neutral country, "You are not to sell your butter to Germany." We cannot say to Denmark, "You are not to sell your butter to Germany." We buy butter ourselves very largely from Denmark, and Denmark is perfectly entitled to sell her butter. I do not know upon what principle of international law you can say to Denmark that she is not to buy nuts or other articles from foreign countries to produce margarine unless it was for consumption by her own people. That is the greatest difficulty which I think the problem presents at the present moment.
I venture to consider that something can be done. We have had the suggestion made this afternoon, not for the first time, since it has already appeared in many papers, of having a rationing policy in the case of neutral countries. I am entirely in favour of a rationing policy. I do not think it is a simple policy, and that it presents many difficulties. Let me explain what I mean. A neutral country, let us say, consumes twelve hundred tons of a certain commodity in the course of the year. If you ration that country you will give it three hundred tons of that commodity every quarter. The danger, to my mind, is that you may get some unscrupulous person who, taking advantage of our markets, to allow three hundred tons to go through without interference, will import those three hundred tons, and, possibly after passing through various other hands, they may find their way into Germany. Where as the honest trader who comes afterwards will have to be told, "You cannot have any of this particular article, because already the rations have been applied for and have been given." That is one of the great difficulties of a rationing policy, but at the same time it is a policy which I think might be applied with very great success to a very large number of the particular trades which deal in those commodities of which Germany has the greatest need at the present time. I think something else might be done on the lines of what one sees that Germany is doing at the present time. Germany, whenever any neutral country requires anything which she may have, never grants it unless she happens to get some consideration in return. For instance, if Norway wishes to buy aniline dyes from Germany, Germany will not allow her manufacturers of aniline dyes to sell them to Norway unless she gets back in return a certain quantity of copper. In the same way Germany is supplying Holland with considerable quantities of coal, but for every ton of coal which goes into Holland some equivalent goes out of Holland into Germany, and in the last two months in the form of bacon. The right hon. Gentleman who spoke last referred to the Dutch figures, which certainly bear out the contention that meat which we formerly used from Holland is finding its way largely to Germany, and very naturally, because Germany is paying two or three times a higher price than we are prepared to pay.
I do think that just as Germany brings pressure on neutral countries which require certain commodities from her, so something ought to be done by our following the same line of policy. It happens, for instance, that in the British Empire, and in this country, there are certain very important commodities which are very necessary to most countries. We have, for instance, a monopoly, a complete monopoly in steam coal, and we have already used our bargaining power in steam coal with very great success. I venture to think we might increase the force with which that bargaining power is applied. We might get much bigger considerations than we do if we had some well organised and scientific all round application in connection with our method of bargaining with foreign Powers. Such a system should be a collective one. All the Allies should take part in it, and we should be prepared in this country possibly to forego part of our export trade, in order to enforce the bargaining. That would mean the loss of a very small part of our export trade, compared with the total of our trade. I think the rise in prices in Germany has increased, very much increased also, the through trade, apart from the trade between neutral countries and Germany which has got through our blockade. When I say "got through our blockade," I do not mean to say that it has not been stopped by the blockade, but the high prices which are obtained in Germany have produced what one might almost consider a sort of devilish ingenuity in the way in which goods are concealed. For instance, I find treacle or honey being consigned to neutral firms, and which on analysis may prove to be a mixture of rubber and cream. We have had onions which turned out to be made of rubber with an imitation coating of onion. A short time ago a very interesting letter came into my possession, written by a firm in Germany to a firm in the Far East, suggesting to that firm in the Far East to send a consignment to Germany of Japanese works of art. They wished them to be preferably bronze figures of the Ming age and marked with the Ming stamp, because it is well known that Ming bronzes are particularly massive. Minute instructions were given as to how the bronzes were to be packed, and it was even suggested that in order to prevent any damage, they might well be wrapped up in sheets of rubber. The artistic quality of the bronzes realty did not matter at all; all the collector cared about was to have something that was large. That shows some of the great difficulties with which one is faced at the present time in trying to stop contraband trade finding its way through our Fleet to our enemies.
6.0. P.M.
The Contraband Committee, of which my hon and learned Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Pollock) is Chairman, has done most admirable work. I think anybody who has followed the work they have done and seen the time they have spent and the indefatigable energy they have displayed must give them the very highest praise. They sit, I believe, from eleven o'clock in the morning until seven o'clock at night, and occasionally they sit from nine o'clock at night till eleven. There are minutes amounting for some meetings to over a hundred pages; they have placed millions and millions of pounds worth of goods in the Prize Court, and at the present moment there are some £3,000,000 worth of particular goods, which they have had seized, in this country. Then there is the assistance they get from their staff in examining the manifesto of the hundreds of things that pass through our blockade, many of the ships carrying cargo consist- ing perhaps of 1,000 or 1,200 articles. The care with which all those have been carefully scrutinised and examined is a matter on which I think we can well congratulate them. They have three classes of cases to deal with. There is first the vessel which manifestly has contraband goods on board. That vessel is ordered to port and the goods are placed in the Prize Court. The second class is the vessel which is believed to have an innocent cargo, or a cargo which at all events has been shipped under some form of guarantee. In such a case a careful examination is made, and if the papers are found to be correct the vessel with that cargo is allowed to proceed. But it is the third class of case where the great difficulty occurs, and that is the case of a vessel which, although you may not be able to say that you have any evidence that the cargo is actually going to an enemy destination or is contraband, yet at the same time is suspect. What is to be done in a case like that? I think everybody will agree that it is useless and expensive to put ships or cargoes into the Prize Court, unless there is a reasonable chance that the Prize Court will condemn those goods. If the Prize Court dismisses the case, it involves a great deal of trouble and expense, and you may possibly have heavy claims for compensation, especially in the case of passenger steamers. The vessel may be detained at a port, perhaps with passengers on board for several weeks, while thousands of pounds' worth of cargo may have to be taken out, in order to get at the suspect goods. If afterwards those goods are released by the Prize Court, you have very great expenses to meet, and you have aroused a feeling of intense irritation amongst the different people concerned, whether the owners of the ship or of the cargo, or the passengers who may happen to have been on board. Such action then is only justifiable if there is a reasonable chance of the cargoes being condemned. It must be recollected that all the ingenuity of a very ingenious race is at the present time being devoted to the concealment of all signs of guilt or suspicion. Goods will be consigned to a certain person; very likely the merchant to whom they are going is a perfectly innocent party; he may sell those goods to somebody, who may pass them on to a third party, and ultimately they may reach our enemies. What then is the proper course of procedure to adopt to stop such goods? Sometimes they are detained until effective guarantees are obtained through our Diplomatic or Consular representatives in the country to which the goods are going. At other times arrangements are made with the owners of the vessel that the goods are to be discharged in a neutral country to be returned to this country; or they may possibly be kept in warehouse under an arrangement that they shall remain there until the end of the War. In every one of these cases the value of goods will figure in the import returns of the particular neutral country to which they are consigned.
I do not think it ought to be assumed that everything which reaches Germany or Austria benefits those countries or assists them to win the War. That was rather the line, I think, taken by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir H. Dalziel). I know there are many people in this country who would like to see every conceivable commodity stopped from reaching our enemies Personally I do not agree with them. On the contrary, I think there are many goods which have reached, and may to-day, be reaching Germany and Austria which are doing those countries a considerable amount of harm, and giving their Governments a great deal of anxiety. It would be very instructive and interesting if some expert could prepare a list of articles which are being imported, or are in the habit of being imported, into enemy countries, and classify them according to their military or economic value Such a list would obviously start with such things as shells and other munitions; next you would find the raw materials or semi manufactured articles which have a certain military value; then you might place food supplies, beginning possibly with such articles as lard, oil, and other fatty substances which are so much needed in Germany at the present moment; then you would come to articles which are used for the purposes of manufacture or commerce; and lastly, you would come to articles of pure luxury, the list ending perhaps with something like diamond necklaces or very expensive pictures. Everybody is agreed that it is essential to do everything we can to stop from going to Germany or Austria those articles which will appear at the top of the list—that is to say, articles of any military value or of any value as an economic food for the population in enemy countries. On the other hand, the importation into Germany or Austria of such articles as appear at the bottom of the list does not prolong the War for one minute; in fact, I suggest that such importation does material harm to our enemies and may shorten the War. Articles of luxury, such as jewels, and so on, have to be paid for like everything else, and they have to be paid for either by exchange operations or else in gold or by the export of securities, with the result that we see at the present time—the very great depreciation in the value of the mark. The difficulty one has to face is in regard to the classes of articles that fall in the centre of the list, such articles, for instance, as tea or cocoa. I have changed my mind more than once about tea. Tea, I think, does not possess any very great military value, although I understand it is an alternative ration. It is certainly found' that whilst we in this country are trying; to keep certain classes of these goods away from Germany, the German Government also is endeavouring to check their sale. The German Government is doing all it can to prevent certain classes of articles, which are more or less luxuries or not necessities, from coming in from abroad and having to be paid for by the export of gold or securities.
One other matter to which I wish to refer is the question of the export of goods from enemy countries. I look upon the stopping of exports from enemy countries as one of the most important duties which can fall upon the shoulders of the Government. I think we have not been unsuccessful in that direction. A great exporting country, such as Germany, is only able to import what she requires if she can pay for her imports by selling her own commodities abroad or by paying in gold or securities. Therefore the greater pressure you can bring to bear upon the export of goods of enemy origin the more embarassing becomes the financial position of the enemy countries. Since the Order in Council of the 11th March, the export of enemy goods to countries across the seas has enormously decreased. To-day, as far as I can judge from the figures, not more than 10 per cent. or 15 per cent. of Germany's normal trade is leaving her shores. I have one suggestion to make. I should like to see a Department of the Governmen whose whole function and duty was that of watching the question of contraband. What we want to-day is a Department that will watch closely what articles our enemies need, see to what extent those articles are being received, and take what steps as a whole it can to prevent those articles from reaching our enemies. We have many committees. The value of a committee is perhaps in inverse proportion to the number of its members. I hope there may not be a committee appointed to look after this very important matter. But I believe that if we had a Minister of Contraband, if you like to describe him in that way, or somebody who would study scientifically the whole question of contraband as one subject, he would be able to give very valuable advice to the other Departments concerned. There is but one motto that we should have before us, and that is to see how we can do the greatest amount of harm to the enemies of this country.
The right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken (Mr. Leverton Harris) has made a most interesting speech, full of knowledge, and founded upon personal experience. The right hon. Gentleman is one of those, of whom there are several in the House and many outside, who have been giving most devoted service on committees in carrying out the policy of the Government with regard to contraband. There have been from the beginning of the War a number of people of great knowledge and experience who have given their services voluntarily on these various committees, and whose services have been of enormous value. I think the House will have gathered from the right hon. Gentleman's speech that the subject with which we are dealing is not really so simple, and cannot be made so simple as might appear from some of the speeches that are made upon it and some of the articles which appear outside. It is a most difficult and complicated subject. I gather from the Debate, as far as it has gone, that there is real misapprehension in the House as to what is the present state of things with regard to the amount of trade passing through neutral countries to the enemy, and also real misapprehension, and a vast under estimate, of what the Government is doing through its various agencies to prevent that trade. In the first place, I must deal with some of the figures scattered broadcast lately in some organs of the Press, which have created a grotesque and quite untrue impression of the amount of leakage through neutral countries—figures which will not bear examination, but the conclusions founded upon which have undoubtedly done great harm. The figures consist, as far as I have seen them, of statistics from the official returns of the United States giving the amount of exports to certain neutral countries in Europe in a normal year of peace. Figures are then given which purport to be the excess figure for those same neutral countries at the present time, these figures being greatly in excess of the peace figures. The peace figures are then subtracted from the figures of last year, and the conclusion is drawn that the whole of that surplus has gone to Germany. On that is founded various attacks upon the Government. These figures have been published in this way, and they do a great injustice, or, rather, attacks founded upon these figures, do a great injustice to the Government. These figures take no account of the fact that in many of these articles in time of peace neutral countries do not draw the whole of their supplies from the United States. They draw them from enemy countries, or from sources which are not available to them in time of war. Therefore, to take the exports from the United States into these countries, and to assume that because these exports have risen that, therefore, the large surplus has been imported into neutral countries which has gone into enemy countries entirely leaves out of account the fact that in many, many cases the increased exports from the United States have been for real consumption in those neutral countries, and have taken the place of the supplies which in peace time have been drawn from other sources than the United States, and which are not now available.
In the next place, the figures of exports from the United States give the amount of stuff which left the ports of the United States. These do not necessarily correspond with the amount of stuff which arrives in the neutral ports. What, too, is all the trouble and the very great friction that there has been with the meat packers of the United States? It is because a large amount of the produce coming from the United States consigned to neutral ports and which we believed was destined for the enemy never reached the neutral ports. It is in the Prize Court here. So at one and the same time the Foreign Office, or the Government, is having a very warm contention indeed with neutral Governments, or groups of people in neutral countries on the ground that we have put their produce into the Prize Court here and detained it; at the same time we are being attacked in this country on the ground that that very same produce has gone through neutral countries into the enemy countries! Some figures have been published in the Press to-day giving a very different impression of the true state of the case as regards the neutral countries and the enemy—figures published by the War Trade Department. I recommend that those figures should be studied, for they, at any rate, reduce the thing to very different proportion.
But I have had some other figures supplied to me, out of which I am going to take two striking instances. The statement has been made in one organ of the Press, in regard to wheat, that the exports of wheat from the United States to Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands collectively, rose from 19,000,000 bushels in the first ten months of 1913—that is, the year of peace—to 50,000,000 bushels in the corresponding period of 1915—that is to say, an excess of 31,000,000 bushels. The conclusion is drawn that that has all gone to the enemy through those neutral countries. It is almost incredible if the figures supplied to me are reliable—and I believe they are—that a statement of that kind should have been made. Those 50,000,000 bushels from the United States are the figures given under a collective heading in the United States Returns which is called, not merely these four Scandinavian countries, but "other Europe" with them, including Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Malta; so that these 50,000,000 bushels not only go to Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland; they also include the exports to Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Malta. The exports to Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Malta alone amounted to 23,000,000 bushels. That is a very large part of the whole increase. Why do those countries take so much? Because those countries, no doubt, depended, I presume, in ordinary years, very largely on grain coming from Black Sea ports which have ceased to be available. Therefore there is no need to assume that Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Malta were importing in order to pass on to the enemy; they wanted it to supply the grain which they would have got in normal years from other sources.
From the figures that remain some millions of other bushels must be deducted which have been allowed to go through under special international arrangements to the Belgian Relief Fund. When you have deducted those you find that as regards these four countries, these three Scandinavian countries and Holland, which were supposed to have sent 31,000,000 bushels on to the enemy, that as a matter of fact they had not imported at all in excess of their normal requirements, and there is no reason to suppose that any of these bushels got to the enemy. Then I take the figures quoted in the Press for wheat flour. The figures quoted suggest an increase in the exports of wheat flour from the United States to Holland and the three Scandinavian countries in the first ten months of 1915, over the corresponding period of 1913, of 3,700,000 barrels; the assumption again being that that had all gone to the enemy. This increase includes not merely what went to those four countries, but also includes an increase to France of 1,400,000 barrels and to Italy of 250,000 barrels. In addition there was something over 1,000,000 allowed to go through to the Belgian Relief Fund, making, with the increase to France and to Italy, a total of 3,000,000 barrels. Out of, therefore, 3,700,000 barrels supposed to have gone to the enemy there is accounted for 3,000,000 barrels. The actual increase to the three Scandinavian countries is, therefore, reduced from 3,700,000 barrels to only 650,000 barrels. In view of the deficiency of the whole production of wheat in Scandinavia in 1914, this increase, according to the information supplied to me, cannot be regarded as excessive. That puts the thing in a very different light.
Leakage, of course, through neutral countries there has been, and will be. Whatever you do, if you adopt every suggestion made in this House, you cannot prevent something. You cannot take over the administration of neutral countries. You cannot prevent smuggling even against the regulations of the neutral countries themselves. It is not in our power to do that under whatever system you have, whether you call it blockade, or whatever name you give to it. You have still got to let through to neutral countries the things which they really require for their own consumption. You have, therefore, to distinguish between the things which they need for their own consumption and the things which they import with a view to their being passed on to the enemy. You have to make that distinction. Nobody could have listened to the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for East Worcestershire (Mr. Harris) without realising how impossible it is to do that perfectly. You have got every sort of ingenuity brought to bear to make it difficult for you to distinguish; to make it absolutely impossible, whatever the Navy may do, whatever strict provision there may be, to make sure that in no case will a cargo, or part of a cargo, go through the neutral country which is apparently destined for consumption in that neutral country, but really is destined for the enemy. Some leakage there will always be. We have been anxious about that leakage. We have done what we can to get real information as to what is going on. The other day Lord Faringdon, who a short time ago was well known in this House as Sir Alexander Henderson, went over to make inquiries on the spot. He is, at least, as well qualified by ability, knowledge, and experience, to ascertain the facts as anyone who could be sent on behalf of any unofficial agency. He has produced a report. That report does not say that there is no leakage, but I think, on the whole, it is a very satisfactory report. In my opinion it shows that the leakage in the amount of trade passing from overseas through these neutral countries to the enemy is, considering all the facts of the case, much less than might have been supposed. The general tendency of the report is to show that the maximum which can be done is being done without serious trouble with neutral countries, founded upon the fact that you are really interfering with their supplies.
Can we see that report?
No, the report cannot be published. You cannot make these inquiries and publish the information obtained without its being known to the enemy. If it is known to the enemy your power of getting further information, and of watching what is going on—the actual facts even of what is going on is useful to the enemy—will be diminished. I do not, however, see any objection to the report being shown in a way in which knowledge of it cannot get to the enemy. There is nothing in the report to conceal from people who are looking at the matter, and examining it from the point of view at which the House is examining it this afternoon. All that there is to be concealed is the opposite point of view—that is the enemy point of view.
I pass from those figures to another charge which is made, not, I understand in the Debate here, not in all the Press, but in some organs of the Press, and by some persons outside, in a most offensive form, and which is grossly unfair and untrue. It is that the Navy is doing its utmost to prohibit goods reaching the enemy, and that the Foreign Office is spoiling the work of the Navy. When ships are brought in by the Navy to a port with goods destined for the enemy, the Foreign Office, it is alleged, orders those ships to be released, and undoes the work which the Navy is doing. I must give the House an account of what is exactly the machinery. I do not say that in the first three months of the War, before we had got our organisation complete, that there was not a certain amount of confusion and overlapping, and that things were not so well done as now. I will take the whole of last year up to the present date. What is the procedure? One of the ships under the Admiralty brings into port a neutral merchant vessel carrying a cargo which the naval officers think may be destined for the enemy. They have no means of searching that cargo on the high seas; it has to be done in port. Until you have got that vessel in port you cannot really form an opinion of what is the probable destination of the cargo. The ship is brought into port by the Navy. If that ship turns out to have goods destined not merely for a neutral port, but for bonâ-fide consumption of a neutral country, without which that country would be starved of some supplies which it has every right to have, that cargo obviously ought to be released, and not put in the Prize Court at all. If, on the other hand, there is reason to suppose that that cargo is not destined for bonâ-fide neutral use, then undoubtedly it ought to be put in the Prize Court. That is settled by the Contraband Committee.
The Contraband Committee is presided over at present by the hon. and learned Member for Leamington (Mr. Pollock), who, again, is one of those giving invaluable service to the State. Before he undertook the chairmanship it was presided over by my right hon. and learned Friend, now the Solicitor-General, who, of course, had to give up that position when he became Solicitor-General, because it was impossible to combine it with his official work. How is the Committee composed? Besides the Chairman, it is composed of one representative of the Foreign Office, one who represents the Board of Trade and Customs combined, and two representatives of the Admiralty; and that Committee, which has acquired very great experience in the course of its work, settles the question of whether the ship, or any part of the cargo in the ship, ought to be put in the Prize Court or whether it ought to be released and go forward. I believe that Committee has done its work admirably, and that neither the country nor the Navy have any reason but to be exceedingly grateful for the knowledge and ability it has shown and the pains it has taken. It contains two representatives of the Admiralty on it as it is. Can the decision of that Committee be interfered with? Of course it can be interfered with. The Government can in any case say if such and such a ship, which the Committee thinks ought to be detained, for special reasons ought to be released. I have made what inquiry I can, and, in accordance with my own recollection, I think in the last year there have been few cases when ships have been dealt with or undertakings about ships have been given without consulting the Committee. Two of those ships were cases of ships which were released and sent back. Those two cases were discussed, I think, more than once by the Cabinet.
Twice.
Twice by the Cabinet, and those two particular ships were released for special reasons. The third case is that of a ship which was brought into port the other day—the "Stockholm," a Swedish vessel. It is a ship to which the Swedish people attach great importance. It is, I believe, the first ship of a new line, a passenger vessel. The detention of it must cause great inconvenience, but it had on board a cargo which, I understand, the Contraband (Committee had reason to suppose—I think rightly—was not all destined for use in Sweden, and might be sent on to the enemy. Anyhow, the detention of the vessel caused great inconvenience, and a special appeal was made from the Swedish Government in regard to that particular vessel, and with regard to one part of the cargo a special assurance was given. Of course these things have to be done rapidly if they are to be done at all. If you are to release a vessel, and wish to avoid inconvenience, you must release it quickly; and, after consulting the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty, I sent, a telegram to Stockholm saying that if we could receive assurances from the Swedish Government that the cargo, which seemed to us suspect, was destined for bonâ-fide se in Sweden, and that none of it would go on to the enemy, or set free an equivalent amount of corresponding material to go on to the enemy, the ship, in order to avoid inconvenience, was to be released at once. That undertaking was given without consulting the Contraband Committee. I am sorry to say, so far as I am concerned, we have not received an assurance, and, therefore, no action has been taken. That is the sort of case in which, unless you are to forfeit entirely the good will of neutrals, unless you are to take what I consider an unduly high handed and provocative action, you ought to say to a neutral country which makes a special case of inconvenience caused in regard to a ship, "Give us assurances with regard to that cargo, and, rather than cause that inconvenience, we will be prepared to release the ship." That, I believe, represents the extent of interference with the Contraband Committee with regard to the release of ships in the last twelve months. I would ask really is it not time, after that, that these reckless figures and these reckless statements should not be made with regard to the action of the Foreign Office or any Department of the Government? What, is it supposed, is the effect upon the Navy of making charges of that sort?
Hear, hear!
If the charges made were true, and I was a naval officer, I should want to shoot the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. That is not the thing that matters. The thing that matters is the dispiriting effect it has on our seamen. There never was a time in the whole history of this country when we—and when I say "we," I mean our Allies, too—have, owed a greater tribute of gratitude and admiration to the Navy than for the work done during this War. To those of us who have to bear the brunt of much work and face much difficulty, the knowledge of the efficiency, the courage, the spirit and the patriotism which animate the whole Navy is an upholding and a supporting, thought, and there ought not to be statements of that kind, entirely unfounded as they are, put about, leading the Navy to suppose that the work which they are doing for the country, or any part of their work, is being undone by the Government, or any Department of the Government. The task of the Foreign Office in this matter is a much more complicated one and much more burdensome than people know. The Foreign Office is not burdened as a Department with deciding about the release of particular ships. That, as I have shown, if it is not done by the Contraband Committee, is done by the Cabinet, or, in a very special case, by Ministers; but it is not now done departmentally.
What is the work that the Foreign Office has to do? The Foreign Office has to do its best to retain the good will of the neutrals. Supposing you know at the Foreign Office that the War Office, the Admiralty, the Ministry of Munitions, and perhaps one or more of our Allies are specially anxious that you should maintain open communication with some particular neutral country for strategical reasons, or for the sake of supplies which you get from them. We are constantly being told that certain supplies which come from abroad are absolutely essential for the Ministry of Munitions. The Board of Trade know that certain other supplies from abroad are absolutely necessary to carry on the industries of this country. The business of the Foreign Office is to keep the diplomatic relations such that there is no fear of these supplies being interfered with, and we have got at the same time to defend, to- explain, and to justify to neutral countries all the interference that has taken place with trade destined for the enemy, which cannot be done without some direct or indirect interference also with neutral countries. That is not an easy matter. It is one in which the Foreign Office is constantly engaged, and I think the House must recognise, when Members are pressing, as they are quite right in pressing, this question of supplies to the enemy, and saying, quite rightly, that the interests of this country come first, that you must also be very careful that you do not unduly or wrongfully interfere with the rights of neutrals to get supplies which are, necessary for their own consumption. You have no right to make neutrals suffer. I would like to consider—and it is rather germane to the case—what more can be done than is being done consistently with the rights of neutrals and also with effect? The hon. Member who moved this Motion sketched out what he thought ought to be done, and I think the hon. Member who seconded the Motion agreed with him. The suggestion was that there should be three lines of blockade, one extending to the coast of Norway, one across the Channel, and one across the Straits of Gibraltar.
I said nothing about the particular lines.
I think the Mover did. I think the hon. Member who seconded was advocating the same principle. The hon. Member who moved the Motion did, I think, mention three particular lines. If you establish those lines of blockade you must do it consistently with the rights of neutrals. You cannot establish those lines of blockade, and say that no ships shall go through them at all, or you will stop all traffic of every kind to the neutral ports inside. You would stop all traffic to Christiania, Stockholm, Rotterdam, Copenhagen—all traffic whatever. Well, of course, that is not consistent with the rights of neutrals. You cannot shut off all supplies to neutral countries. You must not try to make the grass grow in the streets of neutral ports. You must let through those lines vessels bonâ fide destined for the neutral ports with bonâ fide cargoes. Nor can you put every cargo in your Prize Court, and say it is not to go on to a neutral port until the Prize Court has examined it. The congestion in this country would be such that you could not deal with it if you did that, and you have no right to say that the British Prize Court is to be the neck of the bottle through which all your trade has to pass. If we had gone, or attempted to go, as far as that, I think the War possibly might have been over by now, but it would have been over because the whole world would have risen against us, and we, and our Allies too, would have collapsed under the general resentment of the whole world. If you establish those lines, then the ship in neutral ports with a bonâ-fide neutral cargo must be allowed to go through. Therefore what I understand is meant when you say blockade is that you are going to discriminate, and not stop everything that is going through your lines, and only stop what is destined to the enemy and let go through what is for neutrals. That is what is being done at the present time, and that is actually the action of the Admiralty to-day. The ships when brought in are dealt with by the method which I have described, and no ships are going through to German ports at all. Therefore that is actually being done. We are, I think, as one hon. Member said, filtering the trade which passes through with the object of stopping all the enemy trade. We are stopping the trade coming out, and we are also stopping the imports. More than that you cannot do. You cannot do more than stop all imports into the enemy country and all exports coming out.
We are applying the doctrine of "continuous voyage," and it is being applied now. On what other ground are goods to neutral ports held up but on the ground of continuous voyage? Do not let it be supposed by adopting the actual proposal made this afternoon we are going to prevent goods reaching Germany more effectively than at the present time, except in one respect. If you had established the old technical blockade you would no doubt have been entitled to confiscate more largely ships and goods than at the present time. While you stop now and detain them and do not let the goods go through, you do not confiscate as largely as you would if you had had the old technical blockade. One of the reasons why this change is recommended is that it is going to be more palatable to the neutrals, but you are not going to make it more palatable by making the penalties more severe. What we want to do is to prevent goods reaching or coming from the enemy country, and that is what we are doing. We want to do it, and we believe that under the Order in Council it is being done. Do not let it be supposed that the Order in Council does something special either to validate or invalidate. The Mover of this Motion spoke as if an Order in Council was one thing and a blockade was another. What would have happened if we had adopted his plan would be that we should simply substitute one Order in Council for the present one. The blockade would be established by the Order in Council. An Order in Council does not make a thing good or bad, and it is merely our way under our form of Constitution of announcing to the world what we are doing.
Will the right hon. Gentleman deal with the point that the Allied nations should declare the blockade, rather than England by an Order in Council?
That is a very pertinent question, but it again shows a misapprehension. If we all declare a blockade, the French Government would declare a blockade in their own way, according to their Constitution, and we should declare it in our way. What is happening at the present moment, to carry out the policy of last March, is that certain instructions are issued to the British Navy. The French Government issued precisely the same instructions to their Navy, and so, if we and the Allied nations declared a blockade they would issue their own Proclamations of a blockade, and we should issue ours. That is the way it would be done, precisely the same as now. The French have issued exactly the same Proclamation on their behalf as we have in regard to our Proclamation of March. The only thing is that you have not, under the British Constitution to call it an Order in Council, although other people may call it whatever they please. You would not have any change in that respect. I quite agree that you want common action with your Allies, and that is precisely what we have been having ever since last March with the French Government. If anyone wishes to realise the justification for our present policy, they have only got to read the correspondence which has been published with the United States already. If they wish to read the objections taken to it, and the objections to which any sort of policy might lead, they can read the Notes from the United States Government to this country, especially the last Note which has been published, and which has not yet been answered.
We are going to answer the last Note of the United States Government, but we are considering the whole question, and we are going to do it in consultation, in the first instance, with the French Government who are concerned in this matter. That consultation is taking place at the present time with a view to pursuing not merely the same policy, but justifying it with the same arguments, and putting the same case before the world. We may also consider it, perhaps with some of the other Allies, who may have to be actively concerned in carrying out the policy. At present we are in consultation with the French Government on the subject. I can only say, with regard to neutrals, that we are perfectly ready to examine any method of carrying out the policy of last March. That is what we believe is the belligerent right of stopping enemy trade, either to or from. We are ready to examine any method of carrying that out, other than the one we are now adopting, which we are convinced will be effective, and which in form is likely to be more agreeable to neutrals, or in practice less inconvenient to them, so long as it will be effective. But do not let us hastily adopt changes of form unless we are quite sure that they are not going to impair the effectiveness of what we are doing, and that they are not going to involve us in legal difficulties more complicated than those which at present exist.
I must say to the House that at the present moment one of the greatest concerns of the Government is to explain and justify to neutrals what we are doing to avoid friction with them, and to get such agreements, not with their Governments, but with the various people interested in trade, as will make it easy to distinguish between goods destined for the neutrals, and goods intended for the enemy. I said just now that we have not any right to make neutrals suffer. By that I mean that you have no right to deprive neutrals of goods which are genuinely intended for their own use. Inconvenience it is impossible to avoid, and you cannot help it. What I would say to neutrals is this: We cannot give up this right to interfere with enemy trade. That we must maintain, and that we must press. We know, and it has always been admitted, that you cannot exercise that right without in some cases considerable inconvenience to neutrals—delay to their trade, and in some cases mistakes which it is impossible to avoid. What I would say to neutrals is this: There is one main question to be answered by them. Do they admit our right to apply the principles which were applied by the American Government in the War between North and South? Do they admit our right to apply those principles to modern conditions, and to do our best to prevent trade with the enemy through neutral countries? If they say "Yes," as they are bound in fairness to say, then I would say to them, "Do let chambers of commerce, or whatever it may be in neutral countries, do their best to make it easy for us to distinguish." Take the case of the "Stockholm," the (Swedish ship, the other day. When it was pointed out what great inconvenience we were causing by detaining that ship, it was also suggested that, in order to avoid detention in future from a Swedish source, there should be some understanding or some means of making it sure to us that the cargo was bonâ-fide a Swedish cargo and not going to the enemy. That is the sort of thing we welcome.
7.0. P.M.
What we ask of them, as we cannot avoid causing inconvenience and in some cases loss, is that they will help us to distinguish by making the distinction bonâ fide trade, and thereby minimise the inconvenience. If, on the other hand, the answer is that we are not entitled to do that, or to attempt to prevent trade through the neutral countries to the enemy, then I must say definitely that if neutral countries were to take that line it is a departure from neutrality. I do not understand that they do take that line. It is quite true that there are things in the last Note from the United States Government which, if we were to concede them, would make it in practice absolutely impossible to prevent goods, even contraband, going wholesale through neutral countries to the enemy. If you were to concede all that was asked in the last Note of the United States you might just as well give up trying to prevent goods, even contraband goods, going through neutral countries to the enemy, but I do not understand that that is the intention or attitude of the United States Government or of any other Government. After all, I would ask this: If there was a war in which a belligerent was entitled to use to the utmost every power, or every fair development of a power which has been exercised by any belligerent in previous wars, and recognised by international law, that applies to our Allies and ourselves in this War. As to the complaints as to our interference with trade, what has Germany done? She has declared arbitrarily a part of the high seas a war zone, and in that zone she has continually sunk merchant vessels without notice or warning, with no precautions for the safety of the crews, sowing it with mines which sink merchant vessels, neutrals as well as belligerents. The sinking of merchant vessels is not confined to belligerents. A neutral vessel is sunk again and again by German submarines without warning, without inquiry as to the nature of its cargo, and without regard even to its destination, because they have been sunk proceeding from one neutral port to another neutral port and not coming to this country at all. In view of the criticism made to-day upon the action of the British Government and its Allies in interfering with trade, I would ask what would have been said by neutrals if we had done that? What would have been said if, instead of bringing cargoes into our Prize Court, bringing in the ship with the crew perfectly safe, the ship undamaged, the cargo untouched, examining: it, and in some cases letting it go forward when satisfied that it is not destined for the enemy, and even in the worst case putting it into our Prize Court, so that if it turns out that we have made a mistake there can be a claim for compensation and the whole of the evidence can be examined—if, instead of doing that, we had sunk neutral vessels without regard to the character of their cargoes, and without regard to the safety of the lives of innocent and defenceless crews? [An HON. MEMBER: "And passengers!"] Well, of course, in regard to passengers, as the House knows, there has been considerable controversy between the United States Government and the enemy Government. They have taken up the point with regard to passengers where their own interests are concerned, but, with regard to the rest—the sinking of even neutral merchant vessels in this way—so far as I know nothing like the kind of protest has been made by neutral Governments that has been made with regard to some part of our own procedure which we believe to be perfectly justifiable in law, and which is, beyond all doubt, perfectly humane.
I understand that Germany justifies her action of that description by saying that it is retaliation upon us for stopping her food supply, the great case of stopping food supplies which Germany made the occasion of her departure for this illegal and inhuman policy being the fact that we detained the "Wilhelmina" early last February with foodstuffs to Germany. Was that the first instance of interfering with food supplies destined for the civil population in this War? Before that, Germany had sunk two neutral vessels with cargoes of food stuffs coming to open ports for the civil population of this country. She had requisitioned the food supply of the civil population of Belgium, and I understand that to-day confiscation goes on in the occupied districts of Poland. It was not till a powerful international organisation came into force to relieve the starvation of Belgians, whose food had been requisitioned by Germany in their own country, not till then, that there was any protection for the food of the civil population in the districts occupied by Germany. What right has Germany to complain of measures taken to interfere with her food supplies when, from the beginning of this War, her armed cruisers, so long as they could keep the seas, sunk neutral merchant vessels with food for the civil population of this country, and in effect treated food where they found it as absolute contraband? That being so, what we say to neutrals is that we are entitled to claim the utmost rights to which we can fairly found a claim upon the recognised practice—practice which we ourselves have recognised—of other belligerents in previous wars. Let us also bear this in mind. I do not say that we are exercising these measures of blockade the least bit more for our Allies than for ourselves. If we had no Allies I have no doubt that we should have done precisely the same thing, and, as the House says, it is our duty to this country to do it as effectively as possible. But do not let us forget that it is our duty to our Allies as well.
We are in this War with Allies, a War forced upon Europe after every effort had been made to find a settlement which could perfectly easily have been found either by conference as we suggested, or by reference to The Hague Tribunal, as the Emperor of Russia suggested. Prussian militarism would not have any other settlement but war. We are now in this War with our Allies. I say nothing of what the actual conditions of peace will be, because those are things which we must discuss with our Allies, and settle in common with them. But the great object to be attained—and, until it is attained, the War must proceed—is that there shall not again be this sort of militarism in Europe, which in time of peace causes the whole of the Continent discomfort by the continual menace, and then, when it thinks the moment has come that suits itself, plunges the Continent into war. The whole of our resources are engaged in the War. Our maximum effort, whether it be military, naval, or financial, is at the disposal of our Allies in carrying on this contest. With them we shall see it through to the end, and we shall slacken no effort. Part of that effort is and must remain—whether it be in the interests of ourselves or of our Allies—in the interests of the great transcending cause which unites us all together, which makes us feel that national life will not be safe, that individual life will not be worth living, unless we can achieve successfully the object of this War. In that cause we shall continue to exert all our efforts to put the maximum pressure possible upon the enemy, and part of that pressure must be and continue to be doing the most we can to prevent supplies going to or from the enemy, using the Navy with its full power, and in common with our Allies sparing nothing, whether it be military, naval, or financial effort, which this country can afford to see the thing through with them to the end.
No one recognises more fully than I do the gravity and extreme importance of the question which has been raised by the mover and seconder of this Resolution in two most eloquent speeches. The right hon. Gentleman began his speech by alluding to the attacks which were founded upon figures, and which he said had done a gross injustice to the Government. I listened to him as closely as I could, and especially to his remarks in regard to the 50,000,000 bushels of wheat from the United States, which, according to some statements in the Press, had found their way through neighbouring and neutral countries into Germany. Whereas he showed that very nearly one-half of it had gone to four other and very different countries. And what he said pointed very much to the desirability of obtaining certain lists which were suggested by my right hon. Friend who was seated next to me a few moments ago. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the question of the "Stockholm," and he said that a special and adequate guarantee was given that the cargo would not be used for any purpose of the enemy or be permitted to reach him, and on that ground the Admiralty liberated it. That; I understood, was the solitary instance of interference on the part of the Foreign Office in any case which had gone to the Prize Court. That being so, I feel quite certain the action of the Admiralty will command the approval of the House. The right hon. Gentleman went on to ask what more could be done, and he pointed out that we could not do more. We have tried to stop all that is going into the enemy's country, and we have tried also to prevent going on its journey all they endeavour to send out of the country. If that is the right hon. Gentleman's policy and he succeeds in accomplishing it, then I am bound to say I see very little to complain of. He vent on to say that he would adopt any other proposal which could be made which was likely to be effective, provided it did not add to our difficulties at present, but he could not give up the right—I think I heard that expression, and I feel it was impossible he could use any other—he could not give up the right to interfere with enemies' trade, and if neutral countries took the line of objecting to that policy on his part he would consider it a departure from their neutrality. I was glad, and I am sure the whole House was glad, to hear that plain, straightforward announcement made on behalf of the Government of this country, and I was all the more pleased because it is with regard to some other matters of policy during recent years on the same question but of a very different character that I propose for a few moments to direct the attention of the House.
Whatever the complaints which called for and led up to this Resolution being moved in this House this afternoon are, they are of no recent origin, and they date, so far as I am concerned, as far back as the Declaration of Paris in 1856. I do not accept for a moment any suggestion that the right hon. Gentleman is responsible for anything arising from that. But, personally, I never could understand on what ground the great surrenders were made and carried out at that time, seeing that, after all, we are the greatest Sea Power in the world, and were so at that time. On the contrary, I, personally, entirely agree with the late Lord Salisbury, who is credited with having written, in 1897, his opinion to the effect that the signing of that Declaration was a rash and unwise proceeding by the British Government at that time. And so it was, as things are turning out now. But, as I have already said, the right hon. Gentleman can in no way be held accountable. Since then, however, I would remind the House, other proposals have been made for the surrender of British maritime rights, to which many people very conversant with this subject have taken the greatest objection. Some of them which were of the first importance the right hon. Gentleman was himself wholly responsible.
These proposals were embodied in a Convention at The Hague in the first place. They were signed by the British representative, and they were afterwards carried further by the Convention, or rather the Conference held in London, and by the Declaration of London which followed in 1909. It really is interesting, and I think we are entitled, to follow some of the communications; I am not doing it in any hostile spirit. I am doing it because I think it was these proceedings which have led to the anxiety on the part of great numbers of people in this country who give attention to this question. It will be interesting to follow the communications which were made at that time by the right hon. Gentleman to the British representatives, either by way of memorandum or by actual instructions. Great Britain, it will be remembered, was the champion then, and had been for all time, of belligerent rights when we were at war. The Foreign Office in recent years have been much more the champion of neutral rights. I do not think that the right hon Gentleman will deny that. Great Britain has declared, on numberless occasions before this, that for a friend of both belligerents to give either one or the other of those belligerents armed help, or help of any kind, is practically an abandonment of neutrality. I propose to take two passages from instructions which were given to Lord Desart on the 1st December, 1909, by the Foreign Office. I have examined them with care, and I have been very much surprised to find what they contain. First, there was this passage:— sea power throughout this tremendous War, is a matter which I do not like seriously to contemplate.
What is the reply which has been given in answer to the objections taken on the grounds I have stated? It has been that we must be careful how we offend neutral countries. My answer is that in war we must take some risks, and when we are engaged in a war such as that in which we are struggling to-day, and which is very far from being completed, I fear, at present, which risk are we to take—that of offending neutrals at the present moment, or of indefinitely prolonging a war like this, or of, which God forbid, possibly being defeated? These are considerations which I am entitled to submit to the House on this occasion. I am perfectly sensible of the great feats which have been performed by the Army and of the splendid work done by our soldiers, and I often think, when I hear the action of the Government criticised as I have done, that we forget far too much the credit they deserve for what has been done with regard to the Army. They deserve, indeed, the utmost credit, because really what has been done is the most wonderful thing that has ever been seen in the world, for within eighteen months or less we have seen an army of 3,000,000 men, fully equipped and ready to take the field, composed of soldiers so good that they have been able to hold their own against the best trained troops in the world. On the other hand, what I want to point out is this, that the whole character of war in these days appears to have changed entirely and completely. Every battle that is fought nowadays is a siege. Sieges proverbially take a long time, and the question I ask myself—and it is one to which I can never get a satisfactory answer from any expert to whom I have applied—is: How is this all going to end? What is going to bring it about under this system of sieges? How and when can we look forward to the completion of this War? It seems to me the only answer to these questions is by exhaustion, exhaustion of men, exhaustion of food, or exhaustion of money.
What is the moral I draw from this? Being as we are the greatest Sea Power in the world, surely we ought to make every possible use we can of the Navy, with as little limitation of its power as is possible consistent with the fulfilment of our honourable obligations, or, as the right hon. Gentleman in his speech pointed out, without getting greater and more formidable difficulties to surmount than we are confronted with to-day. I hope the Government adequately recognises the great feeling which there undoubtedly is in this country on this question at the present time. I get numberless communications, as I suppose all other Members of Parliament do at the present time, entreating me to raise my voice for a more active exercise of the powers of the Fleet, with greater liberty than they are supposed to have been allowed sometimes by the Government. I acknowledge all that the right hon. Gentleman has said on that point. I recognise the difficulties with which this Government must be faced, but still I hope, and indeed I think, that after this Debate there is every encouragement for believing that the action the Government have taken will, to some extent, allay the feeling that certainly exists in the minds of thousands of people at the present time that we are not getting out of the Navy all that we ought to get and could get were more liberty and more power allowed to that branch of our fighting forces—to that great Navy and that great Fleet which the whole country regard as the first safeguard of the nation.
I wish to address a few observations to the House, because I am desirous of removing one or two misapprehensions which have prevailed, if not in the House, at any rate among the public at large, and also because I want to make a suggestion as to how we can improve the present system under which the plan of preventing contraband and other goods reaching the enemy is at present carried on. Let me at the outset say to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it is good of him to note with satisfaction the work that has been done by the Committee over which I preside. Before I say more, I should like to recognise that the work which has been done could only have been done by the loyal and able, I might almost say brilliant, co-operation of those who sit with me on that Committee, who include one representative of the Foreign Office, one from the Admiralty, and one from the Customs, all of whom have worked day in and day out in perfect harmony, loyally endeavouring to do their best. Certainly on that Committee there is no question of any friction between the Admiralty and the Foreign Office. May I also say, because if not in this House, I see it represented in so many papers at large, that there is some sort of interference or some lethargy on the part of the Foreign Office, or some desire to prevent activity—let me say, because I should like to voice what is the feeling of the permanent officials of the Foreign Office, that from every one of them we have continually and continuously received, not only their assistance and their support, but their encouragement in every possible way, not only to do our work, but to do it as well as possible, and, if possible, to tighten our grip upon the enemy. Sometimes permanent officials at the Foreign Office are criticised and they cannot reply for themselves. Fortunately there are some of us who come into touch with them and we can speak of their loyal and devoted work, by which they have constantly and effectively supported the decisions which had to be made by the Contraband Committee.
A common statement is made in a newspaper at the present time that we ought to alter the system under which we have been prepared to work, and the first observation which is always made is that we ought to be quit of and finally abolish the Declaration of London. I was one of those who, when the matter was before this House, served on the Committee who were minded to do all they could to most strenuously oppose the passage into law of the Bill required to put the Declaration of London into force. I worked with that Committee, and we looked into the Declaration of London most carefully. In order to clear up misapprehensions I have looked back to see what were the objections then taken when the Declaration of London was carefully scrutinised and when it was before this House. I take two speeches, one made by the right hon. Gentleman the Colonial Secretary, who was then leading the Opposition on this side, and the other the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Edinburgh University (Sir R. Finlay). I do not believe that if we searched the House we could find more competent critics than those two right hon. Gentlemen. I looked at those speeches to see what were the points upon which their attention was focussed. There were really three points. The first was that under the Declaration of London a Court of Appeal was to be formed, upon which a large number of States which were not maritime States at all would have representation. It was pointed out that a number of the States of South America would be represented, and would have their voice, which would count, if not with as great force as that of Great Britain, yet with very considerable force. That objection to the Declaration of London has not force or validity at the present time. Happily no part of the scheme or the Bill which would have been necessary to carry that proposition into effect was passed, with the result that there can be no objection now to the Declaration of London on that ground.
What was the next point? Public attention was largely focussed upon the fact that the Declaration of London altered the system of objection which had been taken to the arming of merchantmen on the high seas. The principles established by the Declaration of London were said to be different from what they were in the past, and it was said that, in part, we were throwing away some of our safeguards. Under the facts as they exist to-day, where are the German merchantmen that can be armed on the high seas? There are none. Therefore, that objection does not now apply, and cannot be stated against the Declaration of London to-day. The third and last objection was that a restriction had been made by which it was contemplated that the doctrine of continuous voyage should not apply to conditional contraband. That was enshrined in Articles 33, 34, and 35, being summarised finally in Article 35. It is important to know that Article 35 has been denounced almost wholly by the Order in Council of the 29th October. Although I shall have a word or two to say about Article 35 in a moment, in reference to the suggestion I want to make to the House, I desire to point out that the objections which were held to be good against the Declaration of London when it was before this House have all of them ceased to be valid or to be necessary objections now, and one may regard the Declaration of London simply as a long catalogue of the rules of international law, which have obtained practically for a hundred years.
One more point. The suggestion is constantly made that there is an interference by the Foreign Office with the work of the Navy. I should like to give an illustration as to how I believe that very improper belief comes to exist, and to show that there is no foundation for it. What is the system under which we work? A vessel is brought into Kirkwall, or somewhere else under the orders of the Admiralty. A communication is made to the Contraband Committee and, of course, it is obviously desired that as rapidly as possible a determination should be made as to whether or not she is to be released. Here let me point out that those who are desirous of knowing what the system is seem to have paid very little attention indeed to the White Paper which was presented to both Houses of Parliament this very month. It is there stated that, in order to avoid the detention of vessels, agreements have been made with the shipping companies under which the associations themselves should be bound to detain or return the goods believed by His Majesty's Government to be destined for the enemy, so that it does not follow that cargoes allowed to proceed to a neutral port will necessarily be delivered to the consignees. That is a very important agreement indeed. Why? If we were to bring into port every vessel which is stopped by the Navy we should add and add disastrously to the existing congestion which prevails in our ports. It would be almost an impossible thing to do. Many of the vessels that are detained are vessels drawing a very great depth of water, and there are not very many ports to which they could be brought. The system under which we work enables us to allow the vessel to proceed on the undertaking that the goods shall be returned.
I have no doubt that the critic who writes to the newspaper will say, "Do you ever get the goods? Is that undertaking ever fulfilled?" The answer is, "Yes," and that a note is taken of these undertakings and the goods are required to be returned. We have, undoubtedly, owing to the bunkering facilities which we give the merchant vessels, a whip hand, so that if any line or association declined to fulfil their undertaking it could be brought into play and they could be put under such, terms as would certainly prevent their breaking any other undertaking on another occasion. May I give one illustration as to how this method that has been adopted works? So advantageous do some of the vessels coming from the big ports of America find this system to be, that in order that they can get quick clearance and discharge they have telegraphed over the manifests in order that we may scrutinise them and that they may know whether any consignment of certain goods will lead to difficulties. In the White Paper you will find a statement that the manifest is scrutinised. In addition to this, some of these companies make it a practice, before accepting consignments of certain goods, to inquire whether their carriage is likely to lead to difficulties and they actually refuse carriage in cases where it is admitted that such would be the case. How far has that gone? Not long ago I was approached by a Member of this House who was interested in some manufactory in one of the Scandinavian countries. He came to me and said, "I understand that I ought to apply to the particular Committee with which you are associated in reference to some goods that I wish to ship from New York to Scandinavia. I have had several letters from my agent, saying that he cannot get any line at all to look at the goods or think of taking them on board unless he has a permit from the Foreign Office. He says the goods are lying upon the quay in America, and that he cannot get them forward or get any sort of carriage for them until I have got a communication from the Foreign Office." Of course, I told him that by applying in the ordinary course, if the matter was perfectly in order, he would get a permit so that the goods could be shipped. I asked him the other day about the matter, and found that it had worked perfectly smoothly and satisfactorily. Has ever any country before established this practice of submitting what goods should be carried on the ships before they are put on board, to such an extent that big shipping companies will not undertake to carry the goods at all unless they know that they are not likely to lead to difficulties?
It is suggested that the system which has been established, owing to the interference of one Department or some other bungling, is not effective. Of course, it happens that a vessel is quickly released, but she is quickly released because of the undertaking she has given and because we know what is on board. Let it not be supposed that the question of what is on board is not from time to time carefully scrutinised as to whether or not her cargo coincides with the manifest. Every possible care is taken that we are not deceived. Hon. Members who have read their papers this morning will find an illustration of it in a statement which was issued that certain consignments which were said to contain hammers were found to contain revolvers and certain consignments of other articles were found to contain a small quantity of metal. Of course, that indicates a close scrutiny and an examination under orders sent them by the Customs authorities from time to time, and, therefore, every possible care is taken that no deceit is practised in sending goods forward. But, not unnaturally, perhaps some sailor who knows very little about these things may write home and say that many a time he has brought his vessel in and in a very short time she was allowed to clear and go forward. He may write that to his friends and possibly that is the way this sort of story arises, and that would easily account for it. But to say it is owing to the interference of the Foreign Office, who are trying to prevent the Admiralty carrying out their efficient work, is to say what is wholly and absolutely unfounded and untrue.
As the Foreign Secretary has said, the doctrine of continuous voyage is at present pressed to its fullest extent. Suggestions have been made that instead of pressing the policy we should establish a blockade. For my own part, I do not understand what the meaning of that term is. We are to blockade the ports of Germany. Does that mean that we are only to blockade the ports of Germany? And is that all we are to do? If so, we should be doing about one-third of the work we are at present doing. I do not mind what you call it, whether you call it a blockade or working under the Order in Council. Whatever your system is, let the system be one which is the most effective, and I am very anxious indeed not to criticise any figures which have been published on the ground that they have not been published for good purposes, because I am satisfied that everyone who could possibly contribute to better work being done, so that we may tighten the grip upon the enemy, is serving his country. But one has to try and think a little clearly before one gets to a solution of this matter, and one has to come to some sort of opinion as to whether or not what is suggested to us would be a better method than the one which we at present adopt. But when I say that I want to tell the House that a certain difficulty does occur. Wheher you are dealing with goods which are in transit under the name of a blockade, whether you are dealing with them under the present system, or however you are dealing with them, you must remember that your ultimate sanction for what you do with them is your Prize Court. None of the critics suggest that you can get rid of the Prize Court. You must ultimately bring in your goods and in some way or another succeed in getting an order for condemnation in the Prize Court. Whether you do it by means of what is called blockade or whether you do it by any particular doctrine of International law, does not matter at all. You have always to come back to the Prize Court, and when one sees suggestions made that all enemy goods ought to be brought in and put into the Prize Court, or enemy vessels ought to be pub into the Prize Court, I ask myself where are these enemy vessels? They are not trading across the Atlantic. Where are these enemy goods? They are not going across the Atlantic. Do you suppose that any merchant who is dispatching goods across the Atlantic sends them in the enemy's name, or that they are in enemy property when they start? Not at all. You do not suppose that a nation of such good commercial habits, not to say of such cunning, as the Germans would ever allow goods to be shipped in their own name and to appear in the vessel or in the manifest as the goods of the enemy! Of course not. What happens is that you find the goods, and the difficulty is to identify them. That is the real trouble. Deal with it through the Navy, deal with it through the Foreign Office, deal with it in any way you please, but you come back to your root difficulty, being what is the evidence which will satisfy the Prize Court and enable me to procure the condemnation of the goods. I know that, in the course of the years which have passed, there have been great developments in the system on which evidence is prepared for the Prize Court. In the old days it used to be held in international law that the papers of the vessels were conclusive evidence. That has long ceased to be the case, and a very little evidence will turn the scale and justify the Court in saying that the claimant must establish his case. In the first instance, you have always to consider whether you have got enough evidence which will justify your putting into the Prize Court these goods which may be suspect and about which you know very little.
The hon. Member (Mr. Leslie Scott) made one or two suggestions. He put them forward quite tentatively, but I do not think they would improve the present conditions. He said, in reference to this matter, that goods in excess of neutral requirements should be presumed to be for the enemy. If that is put forward as a rule it would certainly be a great development of international law. I quite agree with him that international law is something that is fluid. It would be quite wrong on our part to say that what was established and laid down by Lord Stowell a hundred years ago cannot and ought not to be altered. International law was much developed in the course of the war between North and South in the United States of America, and I think we also might be, as we always have been, pioneers in maritime law and international maritime law. So I come to the question as to whether or not we can do anything more to tighten up the system which at present prevails, and here I come to look at Article 35 of the Declaration of London. Although that Article has been abrogated, yet it has been abrogated only in certain cases which are laid down in the Order of 29th October. But Article 35 is only the conclusion of a series of Articles. I will read Article 34: enemy state or would be used for the armed forces of the belligerents. In the present War it has already been established by the Prize Court that the German authorities have control not only of matters of naval and military enterprise, but they have also got complete control over the civilian system and over all the civil authorities. Therefore, as a matter of fact, this distinction has been cast away.
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But the difficulty that we are placed in is one in which the United States found itself placed in in 1862. They had noted that a large amount of goods was going from New York to the Island of Nassau in the Bahamas—an English island—and goods were being shipped from Nassau over to Matamoros, in Mexico. They found, in other words, that the Confederate States were able to get a supply of goods from the island of Nassau, and they were determined to stop it. At first they had great difficulty in doing so. No international law at that time would justify the seizure or the stoppage of goods which were shipped, we will say, by an English merchant trading in New York to an island belonging to his own Government, although they might afterwards be picked up at Nassau and conveyed by other means to the Confederate States through the port of Matamoros. The United States did not hesitate very long as to what to do. They did not pay much attention to international niceties of that kind. Perhaps I may read what was done in their justification. It might possibly be useful for the Americans to consider their own previous conduct in the light of the difficulties in which we are placed to-day. An order was made on 23rd May, 1862, whereby the Customs of the United States refused clearances to all vessels which, whatever their ostensible destination, representative of the United States, was conveyed in a Note, and this is what Mr. Seward said:—
73,000,000 lbs.
They were held to be destined for the use of an enemy Government. They were going through Scandinavia, and passing on. It appears to me that by parity of reasoning we might approach this subject and take it up with the United States, and say that where the figures are so excessive as to lead to the Government's inference that the only magnetic influence that draws these large quantities of goods across the Atlantic into Scandinavia must be the needs and demands of the enemy, then in those cases, where it is proved on broad lines, we might ask that the onus of proving the innocency of the shipment should lie with the United States. Objection may be taken by some international lawyers to that view. But it is a development, and we ought to make developments in international law. All that it really means is this, that we should be altering our municipal system as to evidence. We should be altering it slightly. We have a perfect right, in defiance of any international jurist, to alter our municipal system of the way to get at the true facts of the case. In some countries they do not adhere so rigidly as we do to the system of jurisprudence, and put the onus of proof upon the prosecution or the Crown. In France there is a presumption against any prisoner. Instead of a presumption of his innocence, there is a presumption against him when he is brought before a Judge of First Instance. There are many other countries I might mention, where their system of jurisprudence does not as rigidly as ours does, enforce the principle that proof should be established by the Crown before the prisoner, or the defendant in a Prize Court, is called upon to prove his case. I think that upon the lines that I have indicated it might be possible to alter our own municipal system of law without any protest on the part of international jurists, because all that it means is that we desire to get at the facts of the case, and when we have got at the true facts of the case, it is perfectly easy to determine according to international law what the judgment should be. No international lawyers can prevent us getting at the facts in our own way, and once we have found the facts it is quite easy to see whether the goods are innocent or whether they ought to suffer condemnation. In the meantime the first step is rather difficult. Though one may have not only a suspicion, but something amounting to a belief, that the goods are really destined to the enemy, the initial step of your proof may be wanting, and you may not be able to produce it, and the Procurator-General may find a difficulty in preceding with the case in the Prize Court. If we could adopt some measures whereby we could more fearlessly proceed in cases where we have suspicion, and perhaps not more than that. I think a great deal more might be done. It is not a question of the difficulties created by the Foreign Office, but it is the difficulty of proofs and the difficulty of certainty in Prize Court proceedings that prevents it being possible to proceed in these cases which are merely cases of suspicion.
I hope that suggestion may be thought out by those who are in charge of these matters. A certain amount of experience which I have had leads me to believe that a good deal might be done if we modified our own municipal system to some extent, and I suggest this because I believe it will be far more effective than calling for a blockade, which one does not quite understand, or calling for some alterations which, as far as my experience goes, may lead to our doing less, and not to our doing more. The object of this Motion, with which I am in sympathy, is that the whole assistance of the House should be invoked towards doing something more to weaken our enemies. If, along the lines of the suggestions I have made, it can be found that there is a path that we can tread so that we can weaken the enemy, then I hope that path will be taken, or that any other suggestion will be followed. So far as I have seen suggestions and criticism, I confess that I have not been able to find in them any great hope that they would lead to any greater stringency, which we all so much desire.
The hon. and learned Member (Mr. Pollock) seems to infer that we should have difficulties in our Prize Courts owing to our system of jurisprudence, and to the fact that the onus of proof is placed upon the prosecutor. I think the difficulty is such that it can be got over, judging from the remarks of Sir Samuel Evans. Sir Samuel Evans has stated:— Affairs has addressed this House. I forecasted yesterday that he would have nine-tenths of the House against him when he began his speech and nine-tenths of the House in his favour when he had finished. I think that is what has pretty well happened. I look upon the right hon. Gentleman, however, with a certain amount of suspicion because of the past. I know that he got the Declaration of London through this House, and it was only the intervention of the House of Lords that succeeded in preventing the establishment of that International Prize Court which was essential to the Declaration of London, under which we should have had the South American Republics and great maritime Powers like Switzerland laying down the law for us as to what is a prize and what is not. I cannot forget that it was 381 days before we made cotton contraband of war, and that was largely the result of public pressure. Quite recently we have for the first time stopped the mails and searched them, and found rubber, copper, etc., in them It was only after seventeen months of war that we decided that German ships masquerading under the neutral flag would be seized if we came across them. It is useless to maintain that things are not going to the enemy, in view of what Lord Lansdowne said in the House of Lords about cocoa and the necessity for tightening up the blockade. It struck me that the Foreign Secretary, although he was successful in showing that certain figures—which were not used either by the Mover or the Seconder of the Motion—were unfair to him, was himself unfair in dealing with the figures. If he had been scrupulously fair, he would have pointed out that Antwerp and Rotterdam used to be large ports of supply for food for Germany, and it would have been only fair to take the enormous supplies credited to Holland that used to go through Rotterdam during peace in regard to the 1913 figures.
I think that the blockade is not as effective as it could be. I know the difficulties of the situation, and I also know the questions which would be likely to be raised in connection with the blockade in the Baltic, but I think that with the submarines that we have got we shall be getting quite as effective a blockade in the Baltic in answer to any objections which may be raised by America as the Americans themselves gave during the early parts of their Civil War. It was then held to be good law by the American Prize Courts that although warships were withdrawn from their stations for periods of six or seven days, or even more, that did not in any way invalidate the blockade. If our submarines have to be withdrawn because they are driven off, it would no more invalidate the blockade in the Baltic in the future than did the fact that the American warships were withdrawn from ports like Charlestown invalidate the blockade in the American Civil War. Moreover, America, during the Cuban War, declared a blockade of portions of coasts, and during the time that was taking place ships were going in to the North and South of Cuba. That did not in any way invalidate their blockade. There is another point which I wish to raise, and that is in connection with the attitude of neutrals with which the Foreign Secretary dealt. He might have cited an even stronger case. There is the case of Turkey. Not one particle of trade can go to the neutral country of Roumania, because Turkey prevents trade going there. No neutral can trade with Roumania at all, because Turkey will not allow any trade to go through the Dardanelles to Roumania. That is a very strong point indeed. All we demand is this—and I think that the general consensus of opinion in the House is in favour of it—that we should be allowed to put the neutral Powers of Scandinavia and Holland on the system of rationing, as the Foreign Office call it, by which they will not get more trade or greater supplies, than they used to get during average periods of peace.
With reference to what the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said about the Navy, I have never been one of those who claim that the Foreign Office were interfering with ships sent in as prizes. What I do hold is that the Foreign Office in framing their rules have, to a great extent, interfered with the action of the Navy. When the Government first declared that they were going to stop all supplies going in or out of Germany they might very well have applied a blockade with all the rigours of a blockade. That is to say, the penalties of the confiscation of ships and cargo would have been applied, as in the American Civil War, because that is the punishment which deters people from repeating the offence. If a ship and cargo are liable to confiscation two things result. They cannot get insurance, and instead of cargo and ship being possibly neutral owned they exact from the buyer the German, the full money for that ship and cargo, which are liable to be lost, and when the hon. Member for East Worcestershire (Mr. Leverton Harris) told the House that a great deal of the smuggling which goes on is due to the enormus prices, I cannot reconcile that with the figures of prices given in the "Board of Trade Labour Gazette." He said that it was possible for five vessels to take a voyage, and for four of them to be captured and have their cargo confiscated, and yet in the case of the fifth vessel to make a profit on the voyage. I can only find, taking the figures given in the "Board of Trade Labour Gazette" as to the average rise in prices in Germany—that the average rise in October in the price of food in Germany was 86 per cent. The only discount to be applied to this figure that I know of is that we have official prices fixed in Germany, and they are not the prices which would obtain in a free market. But I do not think that there is anything in those figures to lead one to suppose, except for actual contraband of war, that a profit so high is to be made as to make it possible to lose the ship and cargo in the case of four voyages, and yet to make a profit on a fifth voyage which is successful.
Yes, it would easily be possible.
I know that there is great fear of neutral action as to what will happen if we press our demands too far, but, having regard to what has happened in connection with the controversies between Germany and America, is it reasonable to suppose that we are going to find the neutrals suddenly threatening war with this country because we take high-handed action? Everything done in connection with this War points in favour of high-handed action. We have seen conciliation tried with Bulgaria and Turkey. Where are Bulgaria and Turkey now? We have seen high-handed action taken with Greece, and now we find the King of Greece giving a very different account of who is going to win this War from that which he gave previously. I venture to say that what will happen will be that the Foreign Office will require strong nerves, and will be deluged with paper for two or three months. I only hope that before it is necessary to reconsider whether we should modify our high-handed action, we shall have gained two or three months in cutting off supplies from Germany before we, or the Germans, begin the great spring offensive, and that will help us. It may be very bad policy and also worse strategy to quote Cromwell, the great statesman, in this connection, when he said, "None mount so high as they who know not whither they are going."
The two previous speakers have been what might be called professional experts, one a lawyer and the other a seaman, but as the Government have given a day for debate on this most interesting question, I, as a layman, venture to intervene for a few moments. I listened with the profoundest interest to the speech of the Foreign Secretary, who, I think, made a very good defence of himself against the figures which have been produced lately in the Press. But the Foreign Office must remember that the public have reason to suspect them of want of energy, owing to the fact that they art; still tarred with the brush of the Declaration of London, which they fought so hard to obtain, and that in the early days of the War they paralysed our naval strength by permitting for a time German Reservists to return to Germany on neutral steamers. I am glad that they did not continue that course long, and that we have at present in this country many very efficient Germans who left America and other places where they lived in the hope of fighting for their country, and whom our Navy prevented from so doing. It is difficult to say anything on the question of law where there are so many learned Gentlemen, but it does occur to me that international law has at the present moment practically been broken up altogether. The University of Copenhagen has given up its courses of lectures on international law, because it says that such a thing does not exist at the present time. Our lawyers must set their minds to making out of the fragments that remain a new international law which should meet our present requirements. All that the Americans ask for is that some legal colour should be given to any action which we may like to take.
There was one passage in the speech of the Foreign Secretary to which I listened with profound respect, and which I support most thoroughly—that is the passage containing the grave words which he addressed to neutrals. I by no means share the cheerful optimism of the learned Gentleman who seconded this Resolution, and of the last speaker, that there is no possibility of a neutral becoming an active enemy in certain conditions. At the same time, speaking as a taxpayer in this country, I should like to say that we must be, prepared to run certain risks. The last list of our casualties in this War shows that we have lost in killed 120,000 men, of whom 20,000 were killed at the Dardanelles. That leaves 100,000 of our soldiers killed by Germans. If we have killed man for man, we have killed 100,000 Germans. The War up to the present has cost us £2,000,000,000. Therefore every German whom we have killed has cost us £20,000, and if we are going to kill 1,000,000 of them the War will cost us £20,000,000,000 before we are done. In conditions such as those we must take risks, if by so doing we can shorten this War. The Foreign Secretary has pointed out to neutral countries very fully that the Germans destroy their ships, while we treat neutral ships with consideration, and their crews with humanity on every occasion.
If I make a certain proposition for the consideration of the Foreign Office, I hope that my Noble Friend (Lord E. Cecil) will not take it in ill part. It appears to me that the Allies in this connection are in the position of a great firm. They are all united together. It might perhaps lighten the duties of the Foreign Office if they passed on some of their correspondence with the neutrals to another member of the firm. I have a feeling in my mind that it would possibly save us considerable difficulty if France and America were to conduct the correspondence in regard to this particular question of blockade, and that the matter should be left in the hands of France. It is an unfortunate thing for us that all the neutrals seem to concentrate their hostility upon Great Britain. No doubt it is because our fleet of ships are doing the effective work. But, after all, our Fleet and our naval forces are merely the police for the whole Allied connection. The Foreign Office itself, I have no doubt, by arrangement could very effectively propose that France and America should negotiate together under friendly conditions, even in present circumstances. When the French condemned the "Dacia" and took it into port there was never any very great trouble about it, but if a British ship had done the same thing, and brought her into Liverpool, the yellow Press would have been thundering against us up to the present moment. I believe that the great bulk of American citizens are in our favour, but it cannot be denied that their repre- sentatives, the American politicians, have for years and years indulged in mischievous abuse of this country, and whenever occasion offers they at once twist the lion's tail as an effective measure. America's regard for France is a very old sentiment, and springs from its historical connection with our Ally. If it had not been for France the United States might never have come into existence as a separate Power.
America has had a small war with Spain, but, with that exception, we are the only European country with whom she has been engaged in active hostilities. American politicians always look at 1812; they forget their war with Spain quite recently. Those who know the circumstances of that war are aware that had it not been for the support and assistance which our ships gave the Americans in Manila, possibly the United States might have had a war with Germany at that time. Anyone who knows the real views of America will admit that if we had done to German ships what the Germans did to the "Lusitania" and other vessels, it is very much to be doubted whether there would not have been louder cries for war with this country than we have heard with respect to Germany. I submit that there is a sympathetic bond between the French Republic and the United States and if the correspondence were conducted between those two countries, I think that the very fact that the American Government had to write their dispatches in French would have the effect of cooling their anger, while I am certain that the sentiment of America would never allow her to" destroy the great Republic of France in order to put in its place the brutal military autocracy of Prussia. In this particularly dangerous War we have a right to take every step and every possible precaution for our protection, and I, therefore, make that suggestion to the right hon. Gentleman. I am inclined to think that the course I have indicated might well be followed with regard to Sweden. The people of that country are naturally more sympathetic with the French than with us, for their Royal Family came from France. I suggest that we should take more steps to have our views put before neutral countries through their Press. It came to my knowledge only the other day that a German gave £25,000 for a paper in a neutral country which was not worth £2,500, merely that he might have a means of spreading German views in that neutral country!
We have heard a good deal about imports being interfered with, but we have not heard so much about exports. I would like to ask the Noble Lord what is the position in regard to trade in Italy at the present moment? I have information, which I believe to be true, that enormous cargoes of foodstuffs and things of that sort are at present going from Brazil to Italy. My informant is strongly of opinion that a large quantity of coffee, among those cargoes, finds its way through Switzerland into Germany. I admit it is a very difficult matter to stop, but I draw the attention of the Foreign Office to the fact, in order to see if something possibly can be done to meet it. The question of exports from Germany has been treated rather lightly. I believe there is a school of politicians who say that it is not a bad thing that goods should be allowed to go into Germany because it brings their gold out, but I would remark that if there are these exports, then, of course, the drain on German gold does not take place at all. In the "Times" of the 24th January it was stated that the American official figures showed that they have received, in America, German imports to the amount of £8,194,537 during the first ten months of last year. As the German flag is off the seas, how is that possible? It means that the United States alone have received £10,000,000 worth of goods from Germany during last year. If these go to the United States, it is reasonable to suppose that goods from Germany go to other places as well. I have been informed, and I believe there is truth in it, that goods go from Germany into Italy, and that they are provided with labels, in some cases by firms in this country, as having been made in England, and are shipped from Italy to the East and other destinations. Italy, I am afraid, has only herself to blame if she chooses to rest under that suspicion, and to remain, as at present she is, at peace with Germany. There is another matter about which I should like to ask for information; it is in regard to steamers largely owned with German money, but which are sailed under neutral flags. Have we no right to interfere with those steamers? Supposing Germans built a steamer in Stettin, and handed it over to somebody in Copenhagen to be sailed under a neutral flag, have we no right to interfere? I have nothing further to say, except that I should like to join with the Foreign Secretary in the high words of praise which he accorded the officers and men of our Navy. Anybody who knows anything about what these men have suffered in the winter months on the North Sea knows very well that they have undergone the very greatest discomfort and danger. They do it without a murmur, and from their sense of duty. I think it is well that this House should express, as the Foreign Secretary has done, its appreciation of those men, of whose doings we hear so little, and to whose heroism we owe so much.
There is one outstanding fact which stands clear in all these discussions, and it is this that the House and country are determined that our sea power shall be used in the way which is most effective for cutting off the supply of all exports from and imports to Germany. I desire to address myself to two main points. The first is that in exercising our sea power we should adhere as closely as may be to established principles of international law or such adaptation and extension of them as the novel conditions of the twentieth century may require or justify. The second point is that, consistently with those principles, I believe that we can make our sea power a reality. When I speak of established principles of international law I am not putting forward any academic or theoretic view. It is not because I am in love with any juridical niceties that I put forward that view. It is a practical question. Let me say at once so far as Germany is concerned, she can claim no rights whatsoever. Germany has systematically and cynically violated every established rule of warfare, both by land, by sea, beneath the sea, and above the land, and she can invoke in her aid no civilised law or no practice of civilised nations. As against her we are justified in resorting to the severest methods of action, whether of reprisals or otherwise, in order to cut her off from commercial intercourse with the world. But Germany is not the only Power to consider. There are as the Foreign Secretary very properly and gravely insisted upon, neutral nations whose rights from the standpoint both of honour and of expediency we are bound to respect. I need not point out that in this War there are certain neutral Powers whose goodwill, for special reasons which are well known to every student of this problem, it is absolutely essential for us to retain. In order to retain that goodwill it is, to my mind at any rate, desirable that our action against Germany should be guided by accepted principles adapted to modern conditions. We cannot, of course, avoid doing injury to neutrals. In a great war like this neutrals must necessarily suffer injury, but I say this that no neutral can fairly object to the exercise by us of the severest naval pressure on Germany, even though involving grave injury on neutrals, provided we act in accordance with or a fair extension of all acknowledged principles.
I believe that under the law of contraband and blockade as properly extended to modern conditions, we find very powerful weapons ready to our hand, and weapons which will enable us to use our sea power to the full. The first observation I should like to make is that we should be careful to keep entirely separate and apart the law of blockade, and that of contraband. I notice that in all the discussions and in the public Press there has been certain confusion between the law of contraband and blockade, but in point of fact they are very distinct, and very different principles apply. A blockade, speaking broadly, has for its object the stoppage of the export and import of all goods, whether contraband or not, from and to an enemy country. This law of contraband is only concerned with the import into the enemy country of certain classes of goods which have been declared contraband by the belligerent. The law of contraband certainly presents a simpler problem considerably simpler than the law of blockade. The international practice as to contraband has undergone very considerable modification, as I think my Noble Friend will agree, during the last hundred years. That modification has been very largely due to the action of the American Prize Courts, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the course of the Civil War. The result of those decisions, which have recently been adopted by our own Prize Courts, is this, that when you have contraband consigned to a neutral port it will be condemned when it is shown that the ultimate destination of those goods is enemy country, or, in the case of conditional contraband, to an enemy Government or its armed forces. The recent case in our Prize Courts of the "Kim" is a striking illustration of the successful application of the law of contraband. I say that is a great weapon. We have greatly extended by some seven or eight or nine successive Proclamations our list of Contraband. If you contrast our present list of contraband with that laid downs in the Declaration of London you will find a very great and very significant change. May I say, in passing, that if we had been bound—fortunately we were not—by the Declaration of London, which was, recommended to this House some years ago, in the very first articles in the list which the Declaration of London declared could never be made contraband under any circumstances we find articles such as cotton, lubber and wool, three articles which we have now declared absolute contraband, and I am sorry to say we did not declare them contraband a minute too soon. Our list of contraband, though wide, is capable of still further extension, so as to include every possible article which can be of any use to Germany for the prosecution of this War. When we extend that list of contraband and apply our contraband law, and bring in all suspect cases into the Prize Courts, we shall have gone a very long way towards stopping the import to Germany of all articles of which it is important to deprive her.
The question of blockade is, I admit, a more complicated matter. At one time it was supposed that goods could only be captured under the law of blockade if the ship carrying the goods was on its voyage to or from a blockaded enemy port. As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for the Exchange Division of Liverpool (Mr. Leslie Scott) has pointed out, international law is not a law which is fixed once and for all time, a fixed code of international practice. International law is at living organism which must grow and be extended and applied according as the instruments of warfare, the modes of carrying on warfare, the instruments of civilisation, and science generally advance and are extended. Nowhere is this growth of international law more remarkable than in the region of the law of blockade. That law received a very wide extension in the great Civil War in the United States, and that extension was given to it by decisions of the Supreme Court which were highly adverse to us at the time—decisions which caused us as a neutral Power great injury, but in which it is important to remember we as a nation acquiesced. We are now, I think, entitled, both as against the United States and as against other neutral Powers, to invoke the aid of those decisions, which were adverse to us then, but are advantageous to us now. One of the great extensions of the law of blockade laid down by the Supreme Court, I think in 1865 or 1866, was that goods might be captured not only when on a voyage direct to a blockaded port, but when on a voyage to a neutral port, when it was shown that the ultimate destination of the goods was a blockaded port. In other words, you could not stop your consideration of these goods with the neutral port to which they were consigned, but you were entitled to look forward and see what was the port to which they were ultimately destined. It is quite true that the United States did not carry their decisions quite to their logical consequences, because while they condemned goods on a voyage to a neutral port when it was shown that the goods were destined to go from the neutral port to the enemy country by sea, they did not apply that principle when the goods were destined to go from the neutral port to the enemy country by land.
In view of the great extension of the railway systems of the world and of railway transport, and of the altered conditions of war, I think we are entitled to say, in legitimate extension of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States, that this doctrine of continuous voyage or continuous transport should be applied a little further than the United States Courts applied it. We are entitled to say that where there is a blockade and there are consigned to a neutral port goods destined for an enemy country, it matters not whether those goods go from that neutral port by land or by sea. They are in both cases in the like category and may be seized and condemned as being goods carried in breach of the blockade. That is the doctrine of continuous voyage or of continuous transport, as I think it ought more accurately to be called, which was applied to the law of blockade by the United States, and which now, I think, could legitimately be applied whether the transport from the neutral port is by sea or by land. As matters now stand, we are, as I conceive, greatly hampered in the question of blockade by our Order in Council of the 29th October, 1914. That Order in Council applied the whole of the Declaration of London with certain modifications, and adopted the rules there laid down as the rules to be followed by our Prize Courts during the present War. The Foreign Secretary this afternoon, in speaking of our action under the Order in Council of the 11th March, 1915, referred to the state of things which arose from that Order in Council as being a blockade. I think that he would find himself hampered, and perfectly unnecessarily, by that Order in Council of the 29th October, 1914, because the rules as to blockade which are laid down in the Declaration of London seriously conflict with the principles of blockade as we are now practising them. Therefore I suggest to my right hon. Friend that, in order to free ourselves from this wholly unnecessary embarrassment, we should in concert with our Allies rescind the Order in Council of the 29th October, and so free ourselves once and for all from the entanglement of that most pernicious doctrine of the Declaration, of London by which we are not and, I am glad to say, never have been bound.
May I sum up what I have to say in the way of suggestions which I respectfully submit to His Majesty's Government as to the steps that should be taken by this country in concert with our Allies in order to make our sea power more effective and to justify our action by the light of the accepted principles of international law properly adapted and extended. In the first place, as regards contraband, I suggest that we should tighten up and extend our list of contraband so as to include all articles of use to Germany, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of carrying on the War, and that, having done so, we should bring into the Prize Courts for adjudication all ships known or suspected to be carrying contraband for the use of the enemy. As to blockade, I suggest that His Majesty's Government should declare a blockade of the enemy's ports. It is perfectly true that care will have to be taken in the form in which that blockade is declared. It will not be a blockade precisely of the character that was known a hundred years ago in the days of Lord Stowell. It will have to be a blockade founded on the broad principle laid down by the Foreign Secretary this afternoon, that we are entitled by virtue of our sea power to stop the export and import of all goods from and to Germany; but I think it may be fairly called a blockade if we apply and extend those principles which were laid down as to the law of blockade, especially by the Courts of the United States in the Civil War. In applying that new law we can rely, and I think we are entitled strongly to rely, upon those decisions of the Supreme Court given in 1861–63 or a little later, and any legitimate extension or application of those principles. I suggest further that in order to regularise this blockade we should revoke the Order in Council of the 29th October, 1914, and, also, I would suggest, the Order in Council of the 11th March, 1915, and that we should issue in lieu of those two Orders a new Order in which the system of blockade which we intend to pursue should be clearly laid down for the benefit of our Prize Courts and of neutral nations. By these methods, coupled with and assisted by, as they will be no doubt, agreement with neutral Powers, such as are referred to in the White Paper issued the other day—an agreement which I hope will not in any way infringe the principle upon which our blockade will be founded—we shall be able, I trust, in accordance with the acknowledged principles of international law properly adapted and extended, to intercept—I will not say all, because it is impossible, but to intercept so far as is possible in the legitimate exercise of our sea power all those exports and imports from and to Germany of which she stands in need if she desires to win this War.
9.0 P.M.
I would like to record my satisfaction at the very strong speech which was made to-day by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. It showed considerably more strength than the utterances which I heard when I first entered this House. I am sure that it conveyed the whole feelings of the people of this country, of the people in our Colonies, and of our Allies, all of whom, I am quite sure, desire that the policy enunciated by the right hon. Gentleman should be carried out with firmness and vigour. All who have studied this matter carefully for months past realise fully all the difficulty to be met by the Foreign Office. There have been difficulties; and it still, of course, is a great difficulty for the Secretary of State to get neutrals to look at these matters from the same point of view to that from which the Allies look at them. There are, however, certain broad facts which justify our policy, and which, I should think, must be admitted by any fair-minded neutral. The first fact is that the victory of the Allies must be more for the lasting good of the world, and every nation, than the victory of the Central Powers. I believe that this is recognised by practically every neutral country, and the countries which, I think, recognise this most fully are the countries in the closest proximity to the Central Powers. They know very well, if the Allies are not victorious, that the liberties of these small Continental nations will very quickly be wiped out. Neutrals also must know that, in order for the Allies to win, it is absolutely necessary that the Allies should prevent Germany from using neutral ports as back-doors through which goods can be conveyed to within her own borders. Any fair-minded neutral must recognise that it is absolutely useless for the Allies, at great expense and trouble, to keep a mighty Fleet at sea month after month, and to close the front doors—the great ports—of Germany and Austria, if, in spite of that, unlimited quantities of goods necessary for carrying on the military operations of the Central Powers are allowed to enter those Central Powers through the back-doors of the neutral countries. The third point which, I think, every intelligent and impartial neutral must recognise is that it is impossible for the Allies to allow German agents to screen themselves behind neutral individuals, and under such screen to smuggle goods for Germany through the British Fleet and through the neutral country into Germany itself. That is what has been going on. Note what is said in the White Paper:— doing anything wrong. It is simple common sense, and must be recognised to be such by every intelligent neutral, and surely there are no more intelligent neutrals than the neutrals in the great and friendly country across the Atlantic? I believe that if such methods are put fairly to them they will fully realise that it is absolutely necessary in the interests of the world that we should pursue the policy enunciated to-day by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
There is one way in which the neutral countries can reduce the severity or inconvenience of any blockade which we have instituted, or may institute—that is, by the Governments and peoples of those neutral countries themselves being very strict not to allow goods, imported with the permission of the Allied Fleets, to pass over their frontiers into Germany. As a Back Bencher, I have not the least right to speak for the Government, or the country, but I think I am not far wide of the mark when I make this prophecy, that the more lax neutrals are in regard to sending, or allowing, goods to go across the German frontier, the more severe must be our blockade; conversely, the more particular they are to fulfil their obligations to us, the more anxious we shall be not in any way to inconvenience them. We have heard a good deal to-day about not wishing to inconvenience neutrals. I heartily agree with that, and so does everyone else. My hon. and learned Friend who has just sat down suggested, in circumstances such as these, in a world wide War like this, that neutrals were bound to suffer some inconvenience. But how small is that suffering! Belgium suffered! Serbia has suffered! Poland has suffered! Montenegro is suffering! When we think of these sufferings surely it is not too much to ask that a neutral country which is so fortunate as to be out of this terrible War should submit to the small suffering of being asked not to increase its profits abnormally and unduly at the expense of the blood and tears of the countries engaged in this War? The Allies are fighting not only for their own liberties, but also for the liberties of these very neutral countries! Now I believe that when the neutral countries come to consider the whole position fairly and impartially, and to consider where their true interests lie, they will believe, as some of us believe, that if our blockade is made a farce their fate will be a tragedy. That, I believe, will sink into the inner consciousness of some of those who are now resisting on the ground of some purely temporary inconvenience, and it is with the hope that when the neutrals throughout the world realise that we and our Allies are anxious mainly for the good of the world and all who are in it, and that we are carrying on this fight not from any motives of aggression, and not from any desire of domination, they will not resist the carrying out by us and our Allies of the policy which has been enunciated today with such force by the right hon. Gentleman, and which is supported with such enthusiasm throughout the whole of this country and the Colonies.
I shall only say a very few words in reply to the speech delivered by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. We all feel what a very interesting speech it was, and also how very important it was, at any rate in its later stages; but, speaking for myself, I thought the Foreign Secretary did not make quite so good a case even as he might have made of the Government policy. I do not think he made it perfectly clear, I do not say what the Government policy was, but, at any rate, what the machinery is by which the Government policy is being carried out. I shall make my remarks in the spirit in which the Foreign Secretary made his. He let fall an observation that it really did not matter very much if the Foreign Secretary were shot I do not want to put it quite so strongly as that, but, really, in these Debates, especially on a question of this magnitude and importance, I myself take very little interest, if I may say so, in the Government as a Government. I am not interested in censuring them or in praising them. I regard them as being placed there as the trustees of national administration in a great crisis, but really we want to get behind the Government, and behind Ministers, and we want to get the men who are really carrying out the policy of the country, and we have to think, not of the right hon. Gentlemen who sit upon that bench, but of the thousands of Englishmen all over the world who are at the present time engaged in this great struggle to strangle German trade.
I said that I did not think the Foreign Secretary had done justice to the case of the Government. I am bound to say I have not had time to examine the figures which were put forward in the newspapers this morning on the authority of the War Trade Department. But this remark I should like to make, why is it we do not have more of this information? Why was not this published before? Here we have had what the Foreign Secretary called all kinds of reckless statistical statements. Well, now, we have a Board of Trade, and we have a War Trade Committee, apparently also with statistical material, and surely, instead of allowing the country to "get its head," so to speak, in the promulgation or acceptance of these statistical fallacies—if we are to believe the Foreign Secretary—the Government might have avoided all that by analysing officially, and with their authority, what these different trade returns mean. These figures only appeared in the papers this morning, and I have not had time to examine them. I only know that the purely statistical problem involved in measuring the efficiency or inefficiency, as the case may be, of the Government measures is extremely difficult. I have just had taken out all the available official returns of the neutral countries. I think I may say I have had them all, and I have had them most carefully analysed.
I do not want to trouble the House with statistics. Personally, I hate statistics, and I do not think I have ever inflicted any upon the House, but I am going to state, without the use of a great many figures—I have them all here in my pocket, and any Member of the House is welcome to see them—my general impression of that statistical review. I think it is a valid test. I think the Foreign Secretary quite unconsciously, and quite unintentionally, created a somewhat inaccurate impression by the rather superlative manner in which he spoke of the fallacies contained in statements which have been promulgated. The case is not like that. It is not true that all the statements which have been made in the Press are wrong. It is not true that the Government has, if I may so put it, an absolutely clean bill of health. It certainly has not. I do not think my Noble Friend opposite would for one moment claim that everything has been done we hoped might be done at the present time. I say I have looked through the figures. I have had them all taken out, analysed, and arranged in periods. I am not interested in whether the Government was inefficient or efficient months ago. I merely want to get at the facts, and I think if you take the earlier parts of this statistical period, that is, the first six months of 1915, you will get a depressing sort of tale from the figures. I do not quite know what my hon. Friend meant by figures up to the end of last year, because I do not think such figures are available, but in the earlier part of the period there is no doubt whatever that an immense amount of stuff was going into Germany. Then, if you take the next three months, so far as my analysis goes, there was a considerable falling off, and in the next two months there was a still more remarkable falling off.
I am now taking the figures generally of the neutral countries, but if I separate the neutral countries the case of Holland is extremely remarkable. I will not argue the question of whether it is a case of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, but, undoubtedly, after the establishment of the Netherlands Overseas Trust, there has been a remarkable fall in the imports of Holland of different kinds of products. The awkward case in these countries is undoubtedly Sweden, but I think I must exercise discretion in discussing the case of Sweden. There is a great deal we might say with regard to Sweden, but there is a great deal it is not desirable to say, and I propose to leave the case of Sweden, which is very awkward statistically, but when you know the diplomatic complications behind it, I do not think the case is quite so bad as it looks. Anyhow, however you take it, there is no doubt that on the figures of 1915 there has been a steadily increasing stringency in what we may roughly call the English blockade. The Government are entitled to whatever measure of congratulation there may be about those things, but that is different to saying that the whole machinery of the Government is effective. Taking the figures as they are, there is undoubtedly an immense amount going into Germany still. I deprecate very much the extremely sanguine and optimistic statements made from the bench opposite about the economic position of Germany. I know a little about German organisation, and I say without fear of contradiction authoritatively that although in Germany at the present moment you have considerable distress, you really have not yet touched the German machine, and the German economic machine is more economic at the present time than it was at the beginning of the War. You may have a great deal of distress and starvation in Germany, but it is not until you have smashed the German machine that your economic remedies will succeed, and that is what we have to aim at. I want to wreck the German Empire on its economic and military side.
Now I come to the methods by which the Government is enforcing this blockade. Those methods are clearly set forth in the Resolution, using the term "blockade" not in the extreme technical sense, but in a sense which, perhaps, more suits the great changes in economic conditions, and using it in that more or less general sense, we have at present a combination of the blockade with the rationing system of neutral countries. If that process is not effective, then the method breaks down. If you fix the amount of trade you were to allow to Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden by the available figures, you had better declare an effective blockade at once and go to war with all neutral countries, because of the atrocious blunders you would make in your figures. You cannot do it that way. If you are to set up an effective rationing system you must have these agreements. I do not know how many agreements there are, and I have not seen the text of any of them, but I have a general notion of what is in some of them, and I am taking such steps as I can to find out how those agreements are working. It sounds so simple to say, as in fact we do say in the Resolution, "without interfering with the normal requirements of those countries for internal consumption." I think that is a beautifully worded phrase quite worthy of us, but I want to point out some of the facts in connection with it.
I do not know whether this will actually happen, but let us suppose that the Foreign Office appoints Commissioners to go to Denmark, or some other country up there, and arrange the proportion of trade which we will admit. The principle upon which they will work will be the Board of Trade Returns. These, unfortunately, do not distinguish in that detailed manner the imports of the different countries in a way which is desirable. When these Commissioners get there they are faced with the Commissioners of Denmark, who have got an entirely different set of figures. First of all, you have to settle upon what basis you are going to work upon. Then there are many other complicated questions. What is it that has been pointed out to these neutral countries all the time during the War. All the old channels of trade are blocked, established industries are destroyed, and new trades are growing up. New hopes are being formed, and new aspirations are being entertained by merchants and traders in all those countries. They are passionately anxious to get hold of certain commodities which they think are necessary, but they cannot do it. They then go and start in those industries themselves, and in some of the Scandinavian countries a great deal of capital has been enlisted in the foundation of new industries. They have had a great deal of capital from Germany, Austria and the belligerent countries, and they have started these new industries there. Countries like Denmark, Norway or Sweden have to import raw materials to feed these new industries, and what are we going to say about that.
I shall be very glad if my Noble Friend (Lord R. Cecil) can see his way to a settlement of these delicate problems in the immediate future. I do not believe that you can settle them upon a very exact basis, and you will have to get a number of practical men to do it. It is really not a question for the statisticians but for practical men of business whom you have won over by the method you have employed to support your policy. If you can do that then you can arrive at some working theory or basis which may be arbitrary, but it is something that will do. Now will that method, when you have got it established, prevent this trade with Germany if we wish to prevent it. I think the Foreign Office, on the figures which are available, make out a strong ease that that is a good method. I do not think it has been particularly effective, but I think they make out a case. Here you have thousands of men all alive with the instinct for economic gain. On one side of the frontier you have got one particular class. In the past generation, just after the Napoleonic Wars, it was a matter of scientific precision that you could state the amount of duty necessary for a struggling industry. But when you have got absolute prohibition on one side and death, ruin, and destruction on the other. I think the normal economic man as defined by all our ancient friends the economists would undoubtedly choose to run the risk of getting his goods into Germany. And that is so extensive that I do not believe you can absolutely stop this trade. You can reduce it to manageable limits, but you cannot stop it. The Netherlands Overseas Trust, as far as I know, are trying with considerable efficiency to do the work they have undertaken, but when you are dealing with a great number of merchants and traders you are bound to have a number of bad examples, and there have been some. My hon. Friend wants to know why there are so many fines. Having seen a little of the actual state of the case, I am rather surprised that there have been so few. They are not very many in proportion to the total amount of trade done. We have got to remember that we really cannot have amongst belligerents and neutrals a population of archangels. You have got to deal with ordinary men, a great many of whom will exploit the present situation to get rich.
Generally speaking, I am disposed to say that the Government have got a fairly good case for the success of the engine of warfare which the Foreign Office has devised. It wants tightening up, and you have got a great deal too many committees. One never knows when he has got to the foundation of responsibility under the Government at the present time. You go, let us say, to the War Trade Committee. What is the War Trade Committee? It consists of a number of representatives of other Departments, and each of these Departments is advised by other sub-committees. You thus go on and on, and you never find who is really responsible. If we are to work this modern engine of warfare which the Foreign Office has devised, we must have an efficient system of organisation and control here. The general impression one gets, and I have been round to a good many of these places, is that they are rather amateurish. If you compare the sort of organisation and method which we have here with the system which Germany has built up in the last few generations, it is rather fresh, rather new, and not always competent. If the Government want this system to work out well, I suggest that it is their business to get it under some organised control. Do not let us have so many overlapping committees. Do not let us have so many committees. Let us, if possible, have a real Department of economic war policy where you can get these things properly worked out and where you have a Minister who knows what he wants and how to get it.
You want to get rid altogether of the political factor and the personal factor in these things. In this War it does not matter two straws what individual, Government, or institution goes under. The one thing is to get the work done efficiently, and a man ought to be just as willing to sacrifice his position, his reputation, and everything he holds dear in the civil field in the cause of tins economic warfare as our officers and soldiers are to sacrifice their lives in the trenches at the present time. The one thing is just as important as the other. The sacrifice required is sometimes greater. It is a much more disagreeable thing to see a slow death to your reputation in carrying on unsuccessfully a field of administration than it is, perhaps, to be stricken down suddenly in the field. I want to see this spirit in the Government and throughout all our Departments. I am quite sure if we act in the same patriotic spirit and with the same regard to real efficiency that we demand, and rightly demand, in the military and naval field, the engine which the Foreign Office has devised with a great deal of trouble can be made to work with greater efficiency than it is working at the present time. I am not satisfied at the present time.
Personally, I have no desire to embark on a policy which virtually means fighting neutral nations. It is quite unnecessary. You have got to work with the neutral nations or else you have got to fight them. It is one thing or the other. I do not want to fight them. I think it would lead to very disastrous results in the whole field of our operations. I want to work with them, and I am fairly satisfied with the general principles of the Government policy in working with neutrals, but I do not think those principles are worked out and applied with the efficiency which we have a right to demand. I am not blaming anybody in particular; it is nobody's fault. We have to remember that we began this War with a House of Commons that was certainly not elected to carry on the War, with public Departments not organised for war, and with Ministers who had not gained their reputations by competency or efficiency in war subjects. We had that machine at the commencement of the War, and we have not altered it. We have got the same machine, and we have got to make it do the work we require in the greatest war of history. I think the success achieved has bean very remarkable; but I am not satisfied with the achievement. I want to press it on, and I want to make that note of efficiency the one note on which we conduct all our operations.
My hon. Friend in the exceedingly interesting and valuable contribution which he has made to the Debate has done very great justice to the truth of the general position. He has put it that the Government have greatly improved the position which obtained in the early part of last year, but that he is entirely unsatisfied with the position which obtains after that improvement has been made. That is a very fair statement of the position. It is very unfortunate that partisan controversy has been introduced into this subject. We get attacks upon the Government and then we get replies to those attacks, and what between the character of the attack and the reply it elicits the public is very likely to be misled as to the broad facts. The public is rather likely to be led to believe from reading the speech of the Foreign Secretary that no goods are going to Germany, which is clearly not the case. The observations made by my hon. Friend were entirely justified. While the position has greatly improved we have got no reason to be satisfied with it, and the House therefore is entirely justified in endeavouring to strengthen the hands of the Government, which I believe is the purpose of this Debate. Take, for example, the question of cocoa. The Government on cocoa issues a reply to the "Daily Mail," and so far as the reply goes it is perfectly accurate, but it does not give a broad representation of the facts as a whole, and is therefore likely to create a false impression. Take November and December, and compare 1913 with 1915. What do we find? We find that in the month of November, 1915, there was sent out of this country 9,000,000 pounds' weight of raw cocoa, whereas in November, 1913, which was a boom year for trade, less than 1,000,000 pounds' weight of raw cocoa was sent out. Take the month of December. The increase then was from about 1,000,000 pounds to over 3,500,000 pounds' weight. Obviously that is a condition of affairs which ought not to obtain, in view of the fact that the exportation of cocoa from this country to certain destinations was prohibited in July. The position can be remedied, doubtless, in the near future, but the point of the case as it stands, and the possibilities that are attached to it, are not made clear in the reply of the Government. That arises from the fact that you get a partisan attack, and the reply is made on the peculiar attack, and does not bring out the real broad facts of the case. It is true that an improvement has been effected.
But if I were to choose out of the available material the set of facts which would bring home to the mind of the House what improvement has been obtained, I should select the figures referred to by the Foreign Secretary in the American Trade Returns. The right hon. Baronet objected to those trade returns on the ground that one part of the stuff which left American ports was stopped by our ships, and that part of the stuff which left those ports to go to neutrals consisted of goods which in normal times would go to those ports from other parts of the world. There is truth in both these observations, but they do not alter the fact that the American trade figures have a good deal of instruction for us on the broad facts of the case. They show that in March last year, the date of the Order in Council, the exports from the United States to Germany, Scandinavia, and Holland, considered as a group, were worth 58,000,000 dollars in that single month. In 1914 the American exports to the same group amounted to 40,000,000 dollars only. That was a very bad position indeed, and those who think that the Government have done nothing, and that the position has got worse, may be invited to consider what happened after that date. By the month of June the monthly exports to the United States to this group had fallen from 58,000,000 dollars to 15,000,000 dollars, and in July they were just a little over 14,000,000 dollars. The House will see how ill advised are those who defend things as they are to take the whole figures for 1915. Obviously that defence carries them too far, because during the year 1915 a great improvement has been effected, and therefore those who defend them as a whole confess themselves ignorant of the fact that the figures at the end of the year are very much better than those at the beginning.
Unfortunately this must be added: In August the figures rose again. In September they rose still further, and in October, the latest figures I have, the exports from America to the group rose to 26,000,000 dollars. There, again, we get some variation in the position. The position, which was very bad last March, had improved very greatly by July, but in October, I regret to say, the exports from America to these neutrals had considerably increased. When these figures are criticised in detail various allowances have to be made in regard to them, but still I suggest the broad impression that they convey is the accurate impression. At the same time I would like to point out that our own exports to these countries were also very much larger. They cannot wholly be defended on the supposition that they represent captured German trade—I wish they did—and some of the increase is undoubtedly due to it. But can anyone suggest that the cocoa figures, and certain others which I might mention, represent captured German trade?
I pause to try and summarise what has been done. This has been done, and not enough has been made of it: The Government has a right to claim, as did my right hon. Friend the Chairman of the Committee concerned who spoke earlier this afternoon, the Member for East Worcestershire (Mr. Leverton Harris), that they had very greatly reduced the exports of Germany. I believe the exports of Germany, as a whole, are not more than 5 per cent., and certainly less than 10 per cent., of what they were in times of peace. That is a great thing to have done, and it is because of that great reduction that we have the drop in the value of the mark which has occurred in recent months. What can the House do in a Debate on this subject? I think all we can do is to strengthen the hands of the Government and to urge them to act in every possible direction. We cannot debate details openly here. The questions involved are too complicated and far too delicate for discussion here. In fact, the analogy is complete between commercial war and war on land and sea. Just as in this House we can urge the Government to bring every man and every pound to bear on the enemy on land and sea, we cannot—and it would be foolish to do so—dictate to them what military operations should be conducted. So in a commercial war we can urge them to make the blockade more stringent, and we can urge them to use every possible method to attain our end, but it is impossible to discuss many points openly.
Generally what we have to do is to reduce the imports into European neutrals to their normal consumption, as it existed before the War, with perhaps a liberal allowance for possible extensions of industries which they may desire to carry on or for other reasonable contingencies. That is what we should aim at. How it is to be secured in relation to each of the different neutrals is a very difficult problem. It is quite impossible to suggest, in my opinion, that the object can be secured by any particular large scale of operations. But certainly neutrals can believe this, that we will not only allow them to get these normal supplies, but we desire that they shall get them. It is not our wish that any neutral should suffer because of this War, and, therefore, I would go as far as to say that we should not merely allow these goods to go into neutral countries, but that the British Fleet should guarantee receipt of them, and that we should do everything we possibly can to see that they get their normal supply.
There is only one other thing I have to say. The position of America in this War is really a very favourable one. I do not know whether the House realises the enormous extent by which American trade has benefited by this War. Judged by the figures for October, the American exports have now risen to the extraordinary rate of nearly £800,000,000 a year. I ask the House to contrast that position with that which obtained in the American Civil War. when President Lincoln proclaimed a blockade. What was the effect? That blockade hit us—it hit our trade. Lancashire was reduced to destitution, there was reaction on the whole industries of the country, our exports fell, our unemployment increased everywhere, and, yet, although it was well known that the blockade was not complete, that it was only a paper blockade, we recognised it. I would like to quote what was said by a great American historian on the subject: of us, and that if she at this time is not called upon to make the sacrifices that we were called upon to make at the time to which I refer, that is surely all to the good from the American point of view. America can look on in this War, feeling that she has no cause to make sacrifices, and that over the Atlantic the Mother Country is fighting a battle which is really as much hers as it is ours.
I think that the Government have every reason to be satisfied with the course of this Debate. The subject has been debated in a manner which has proved that the Members of this House have the great national interests at heart, and I am very certain that nothing will be done to embarrass the Government and that we shall stand together as one man in the promotion of our national honour. If I might select one passage in the speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to which the House listened with even more pleasure than it did to all that speech, it would be the passage in which he compared the methods of Germany in dealing with the sea and with trade upon the sea, with the methods of this country. I hope that that passage will be read and widely read in every neutral country in Europe, and, more particularly, in the great country of the United States, which is so closely allied with us in many respects, and whose good will and sympathy we so highly value. With unparalleled effrontery the German wolf is accusing this country of troubling the pure stream of German kultur. The Kaiser, with the women and children who were drowned from the "Persia" almost in our sight, with their shrieks almost ringing in our ears, is appealing to neutrals to help him to establish what he calls the "freedom of the seas" upon his basis. I venture to think that every neutral country will vastly prefer the basis on which this country has dealt with trade upon the seas to the basis which has been signalised on the part of Germany by a series of outrages almost unparalleled in the history of the world. I felt very great satisfaction in listening to the Foreign Secretary's statement of the objects which he and the Government had in view, and particularly to his very definite and clear assertion that it must be remembered that belligerents have their rights as well as neutrals.
The present position with regard to German trade and our success in stopping it cannot be regarded as altogether satisfactory. There is a general feeling that too much gets through to Germany. I am sure the figures which the Foreign Secretary gave were listened to with much interest, and will carry great weight. They show that there has been a good deal of exaggeration. But still, making all allowances for that, the result remains that more goods find their way to Germany than is desirable in the interests of the speedy conclusion of the War. I entirely appreciate the difficulties which the Foreign Office may feel in rigidly enforcing the Order in Council of 11th March. No one who is not in the Government is in a position to judge accurately of those figures, but I am quite sure that the House is ready to repose confidence in the Govevernment's doing their best in all the circumstances, and having regard to the very diverse and sometimes conflicting considerations which must be taken into account. It has been suggested that other weapons might be employed against our enemies in this War in dealing with their trade, and two particular suggestions have been made with regard to which I desire to say a very few words. The first is that a blockade should be established. I cannot help thinking that some of the critics of the Government in this matter have done them scant justice. It is said, Why not follow the analogy of what was done by the United States in their great Civil War when they proclaimed a blockade of" the Coast of the Confederate States? Some of those critics appear to forget that there the United States were blockading the coast of an enemy, and that what we should have to deal with in this matter are mainly the coasts of neutral countries which are adjoining to Germany and through which goods find their way into Germany. Of what use is it to say, "Why should you not proclaim a blockade of the whole coast?" without a blockade of those neutral countries—a blockade of Holland, Denmark, and Sweden. What would you do by having recourse to this alternative policy which is suggested? A blockade of the coasts of neutral countries is out of the question. It would be absolutely contrary to international law, it would amount to an act of war, and it would go far to alienate from us the sympathies of countries who are inclined to be upon our side. It would be a blockade for which no precedent could be found in the history of warfare, and it would be an act which, when the matter comes to be fought out, very few would advise the Government to undertake.
The doctrine of continuous voyage has been invoked in support of the proposition that a blockade should be established, and it is said that in the decisions of the American courts precedents may be found which would help us to render such a blockade effective. I cannot help thinking there is a little confusion in this matter. The United States had proclaimed a blockade of the enemy ports in the Southern States. They found that a vessel was bringing goods to a British port in the Bahamas for the purpose of being tran-shipped into another vessel and then running the blockade in a Confederate port, and it was decided that those goods had been taken in the act of an attempt to violate and break the blockade which had been established and might be condemned. There you have a blockade of an enemy port and an enterprise which was meant to end in breaking that blockade. The goods were condemned, and I think there has been a large measure of approval of that decision. But how can you apply that to the case of such a port, say, as Rotterdam? When they come to Rotterdam they are not going to be transhipped and taken to any German port which has been blockaded at all. They are going to be put on the railway and taken into Germany. You cannot have a blockade of the railway terminus in Germany to which the goods are going. You can only blockade a port upon the German coast, and it appears to me that the analogy breaks down and that if we sought to apply the decision in the "Springbok" case and to propose that with regard to the consignments to such ports as Rotterdam, we should find that the analogy did not apply. It would be extremely difficult to say that it would apply in such a case as that, and that, of course, is the case with which we very largely have to deal. I agree that to some extent a blockade, if it could be established, in the Baltic might be very useful, with the fact of the American doctrine of transhipment, for the purpose of breaking the blockade, because if goods were being sent to Sweden for the purpose of being transhipped there and sent over to a German port of which an effective blockade had been established, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States would exactly apply. But at present no blockade in the Baltic has been established. It is, I think—and I submit this for the consideration of the Government—well worthy of deliberation whether a blockade of the German Baltic ports cannot be established, and then that doctrine might be of use in ascertaining our rights as regards the transmission of these goods to Germany.
10.0 P.M.
That is all I have to say with regard to the doctrine of blockade, but I wish to add a few words with regard to another weapon which has been suggested, both in the Press and, I think, in this House, as a very effective weapon for carrying matters against Germany in the matter of trade further than we have succeeded in doing under the Order in Council of 11th March, and that is the application of the doctrine of contraband. Contraband is either absolute or conditional. Where goods are conditional contraband they can be condemned as such only if it is proved that they are being transmitted for the use of the forces of the enemy country. That is a distinction which was established with regard to goods which are capable of perfectly innocent use, which might be used either for the support of the civil population or of the Army, and it was a reasonable enough doctrine in the days when it was established, when armies were relatively very small and when you could draw a tolerably clear distinction between consignments of provisions intended for the use of the enemy forces and consignments of provisions intended for the use of the civilian population. Circumstances have changed very much indeed since the days when that doctrine was established. We are now face to face with the spectacle of a whole nation in arms. You have not got a small Army with a great civilian population. You have a whole civliian population, as far as it is capable of bearing arms, enrolled in the ranks of fighting men. The distinction between conditional and absolute contraband is, to my mind, rapidly becoming obsolete, because it is difficult or impossible to distinguish between the two cases. You cannot make out, as you could in olden days, whether the goods are intended for the support of the civil population alone or are meant for the support of the Army. And you have this further feature in the present situation, that the German Government has assumed the control of all foodstuffs coming to the country. That makes all the difference in the world. Where you have all foodstuffs coming to Germany disposed of at the will and pleasure of the Government it is well worthy of consideration by the Government whether food should not be made absolutely contraband as well as all articles which are capable of use in war. These matters are all for the decision of the Government, and I recognise to the full that no one who is not behind the scenes and knows what the Government know can form an opinion very much worth having about it. But I submit that this point is well worthy of consideration in looking about to see whether we may not have need of some other weapon than that which, up to this point, we have been using.
Of course, there are some difficulties in the way of the application of the right to seize and to confiscate articles, even absolutely contraband, which are on their way to a neutral country. You want to make out that although the articles are being shipped to a neutral country really they are intended for transmission from that neutral country to the enemy country. If you can make that out, according to the doctrine of continuous voyage—which was first established by the Americans, so far as they were concerned, in their great Civil War, and which has now been, I think, generally adopted by all countries as correct—you can seize the goods as being contraband of war intended for the enemy country. The old idea was that the vessel in which the goods were carried must have been consigned to an enemy port, but, as has been pointed out in this Debate, circumstances have changed so vastly since those days that that limitation is no longer practicable and would no longer be reasonable. Therefore, that difficulty is out of the way in applying the doctrine of contraband with regard to goods intended for the enemy country. Then comes the question, How are you to establish that the goods are intended for the enemy country? It may be said with regard to any particular consignment that it is going to a neutral country, and it may be intended for use in the neutral country. How is the belligerent who has stopped the cargo to prove that it is really intended ultimately for transmission to the enemy country? In a great many cases you might establish by the surrounding circumstances what the ultimate destination is. There are many cases in the Prize Courts in which that intention of transmission to the enemy country has been inferred from facts, and the surrounding circumstances which showed what the real ultimate destination was. In many cases it is very difficult indeed. A strong case may be brought forward that the destination was an innocent one. But, whatever difficulties there may be in any one individual case, nothing will persuade me—and I think nothing will persuade hon. Members—that if you find a neutral country, adjoining Germany, importing a great deal more in the way of foodstuffs than was imported from all quarters, either from overseas, or from Germany, or from other belligerent countries, in time of peace—if you find that she is importing three times as much now, it would need a great deal to persuade most of us that those foodstuffs, or a great part of them, are not intended to find their way to Germany.
How are you to deal with the situation? Far the best way of dealing with it would be by agreement with the neutral countries. I understand from the speech of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs that the Foreign Office has been endeavouring to secure such agreement with neutral countries. That is infinitely the best way of arranging it. I do trust that the neutral countries with which we are concerned in this matter, the consignees of goods from overseas, will recognise that it is only right and reasonable that they should not make their country merely a sort of entrepot for the supply of contraband to the enemy country. Whatever they want for their own purposes they will get, but if they desire more, if they desire that they should have such a quantity of goods as will enable them to pass on a great part of them to Germany, then I think they will be taking an unreasonable attitude. I do trust that any position of that kind, if it has been assumed, will not be persisted in. Some arrangement might be arrived at for deciding what goods were, to be regarded as intended for a neutral country—really and genuinely intended for consumption in a neutral country. If we could get the Governments of neutral countries to undertake that they would guarantee certain cargoes as intended for consumption in their country the whole difficulty disappears. I cannot but hope that the neutral countries will follow in the path which already has been to some extent, as I understand, entered upon, of giving some security of that kind. The neutral countries must realise that we cannot regard it as tolerable that under cover of imports into neutral countries, and having regard to the difficulty in any particular ease of proving what everyone knows to be true in regard to a very large proportion of the goods imported into neutral countries, this transport of contraband of war into an enemy country should go on with impunity. I hope neutral countries will recognise that. I would like to express my appreciation of the attitude of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, when he pointed out that agreement with the Governments of neutral countries was eminently to be desired.
I think that the course of this Debate has been very satisfactory, and I trust that it will strengthen the hands of the Government in checking the import of such articles into Germany, and that it will lead the Government to consider whether they ought not to look about for other weapons for that purpose if they find that it is inexpedient for any reason—I recognise they are the best judges—to rigidly enforce the Order in Council of 11th March. I congratulate the Secretary for Foreign Affairs on the attitude that he has assumed in this matter, and on the speech that he has made, and I warmly hope that the result of this Debate will very much strengthen the hands of the Government in doing everything that is necessary in regard to this matter.
I should like to say at the outset how much I agree with what my hon. and learned Friend (Sir Robert Finlay) has just said, namely, that the Government have every reason to be grateful to the House not only for the tone of the Debate, but also for the large number of valuable suggestions, which I am quite sure the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will carefully consider, and which will, I am sure, lead to fruitful results. I am sorry that my hon. Friend the Member for Hereford (Mr. Hewins) is not for the moment in the House, because I wanted to say to him that if I were to single out any one speech out of the many useful and valuable speeches that have been made this evening, I should single his put as that which most completely expresses the view which I hold upon the whole of this problem. In listening to what he said I had that very disagreeable sensation, which perhaps hon. Members may have suffered from at times, of feeling that really there was nothing else that need be said upon the subject, and that I should be doing the best thing if I said nothing except merely that I entirely agreed with what the hon. Member for Hereford had said. There are, however, a few things which he left outside his speech which I will try to deal with. Hon. Members will allow me to say that this is the third considerable subject of discussion on this question of what one might call the blockade of Germany which has taken place in the last six or seven months. I think the Government has a right to say that, on the whole, it has no reason to be dissatisfied with the result of those discussions. The House will remember that there was a considerable amount of discussion a few months ago about cotton, and whether we ought to declare cotton contraband. The Government then pointed out that whether it, ought or ought not to declare it contraband, all cotton was in fact being stopped from going into Germany. And now I do not think that anyone really doubts that at the time those observations were made they were absolutely accurate and that no cotton has gone into Germany since the 1st June. Later there was considerable discussion about the Danish Agreement. It was a matter of congratulation to myself that this discussion raged very much more violently out of doors than in this House. We knew when the subject was being discussed in this House that it had been the subject of newspaper comment, but in all that discussion not a word was said in criticism of the Danish Agreement, though a great deal was said about. Denmark.
I rose several times.
I am sorry that the hon. Member had not an opportunity, because I should have been very glad to give some answer, and I think an answer that would have satisfied him. There was really nothing in any criticism made of that agreement. I hope that this discussion will have a similar outcome. At the same time I do not want for a moment to hold myself as saying that all things are perfect. That is not the case at all. I cannot imagine that anyone who has had anything practically to do with this subject, with its great complexities and difficulties, could expect that all things could be perfect. I agree most fully with everything that fell from the hon. Member for Hereford in that respect. All I want to say about the vehemence of the discussion of this matter out of doors is that such discussions really do not help the Government. Criticism and suggestion do help them of course, and they are quite legitimate. I am not saying—and everybody in the House will recognise it—a word of criticism of anything that has taken place in this Debate. In times of peace, of course, one of the great objects of the Opposition is to discredit the Government by every means in its power, because it takes the place of the Government if it turns the Government out. But in time of war that ought not to be the case. I do not think that I am saying that only because I am a member of the Government. I hope that I am saying it because I honestly believe it. If there are mistakes, by all means let us have criticism, and as far as the Foreign Office is concerned, I speak I am sure for my right hon. Friend as well as for myself, in saying that we value, and value very much, suggestions for improvements of such a business as this, a business of great complication and difficulty. But I cannot think that vehement attacks such as were recently seen in the Press really do any good, and undoubtedly they do divert the attention of all concerned to the preparation of defences which really are not so useful as preparations for making attack on Germany.
It is very unfortunate that I did not hear the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir H. Dalziel). It may be that what I am saying does not altogether apply to his speech, but I did not hear anything which I should describe as an attack on the Government. All the speeches, which I heard were making suggestions for the improvement of the Government policy. There were a good many of those, and I would like to say a word or two about some of them. My hon. Friend the Member for Hereford rather contended that we did not publish enough figures. I think that a very reasonable complaint, and we shall try to do what he desires by publishing more figures. I hope that that may be possible. I quite agree that nothing is gained at all by keeping these things secret. I believe with the hon. Member that on the whole the record of this policy has not been a bad one. I do not believe myself that there will be any reason whatever for concealing the figures, though, personally, there is nothing to be gained by publishing more figures. Certain Members had made an attack upon the Legation of Denmark. There was some criticism of what was going on in Denmark, and the Foreign Office was urged, some weeks ago to deal with the matter. My right hon. Friend decided that it was proper to send out somebody who was not connected with the Foreign Office in any way, but who had great experience in these matters. We requested Sir Alexander Henderson (now Lord Faringdon) to go out, and he was asked to see whether there was any truth in the suggestions and charges made against the Legation. I am very glad to say that I have had several long talks with Lord Faringdon, and he assured me that there is not a word of truth in these allegations. On the contrary, the Government are remarkably well served by their Ministers both in Norway and Denmark and at The Hague, and it is clear, at any rate, that there is no ground for suspicion. My hon. and gallant Friend (Commander Bellairs) said he had great doubt about the wisdom of my right hon. Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs having been a party to the Declaration of London. There are some people who cannot change their peace mind into a war mind, and I am afraid my hon. and gallant Friend has not yet succeeded in making that change. But the Declaration was five years before the War broke out, and criticism of it does not seem to have any logical or reasonable connection with the present circumstances. I think that all these considerations should be put aside, and that we should consider our policy and the way it is carried out without any recollection of past controversies in the time before the War began.
I come to a more serious matter, the question of the suggestion that we should declare a blockade. I know the difficulties of the subject, I can see a good many, and I have not seen any reason why we should make a change in our policy and establish what as the hon. and learned Member who seconded called a regular blockade. I can only say that those who are urging it strongly upon us might turn round and say, "You are putting yourself in danger; what you are doing might put you in a position of legal difficulty." I, at any rate, say I feel the greatest hesitation in supporting or accepting a change of policy in that matter. My right hon. Friend made another suggestion. He said, and with great truth from many points of view, that it would be a convenience if we were to declare a blockade of the Baltic ports. I am sure he will not expect me to discuss that question because it involves naval as well as diplomatic considerations. Perhaps he will allow me to assure him that it has not been lost sight of. He recommended—and I think, if I may say so, that there was a great deal of force in what he said—that we should extend contraband to sweep away the distinction between conditional and absolute contraband. That is a very interesting suggestion, and will be carefully considered. I am not sure whether he really advocated that we should rely on that and nothing else. I think, if that is the suggestion he was making, that he will see that as applied to the stopping of German exports that would be a very serious breach in our system of economic pressure.
Not to apply to exports at all.
You would require to have some other device to deal with exports. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will be good enough to think that over, and if there is any suggestion he can make in connection with it we shall be very grateful indeed for it. My hon. and gallant Friend said he thought the great thing was to be high handed.
I said it had been more successful so far.
When the hon. and gallant Gentleman said that I presume, as he wishes this country to be successful, that therefore he thinks we should be high handed. I really do not think that is a practicable proposal in connection with the problems with which we have to deal. I am sure everybody in this House recognises—I am not sure everybody outside recognises it—that one great fact about the position is this, that we are really trying, and trying as I venture to think with some success, something which no other nation has ever tried before. We are trying to blockade Germany through neutral countries, because all the precedents amount to is to show the principles on which we may rely to carry out that, but the actual proceeding of blockading one country through another has never been tried, and it is one full of novelty and difficulty. It really is not a case of high handedness at all. It is a case for great caution and great circumspection. You have this difficulty, that you have got to disentangle neutral from enemy trade, and anybody who has any acquaintance with modern trade conditions knows how enormously these various fibres of trade are intertwined and how enor- mously difficult it is when you have to define and absolutely separate one from the other and to make perfectly certain that you are really cutting away all the trade you want to cut away, and that you should not mistake for neutral trade something which is enemy trade all the time. If the Government had proceeded in dealing with that with violent high handedness, they would have simply courted failure. It is difficult to say it as frankly and as candidly as one would like to do, but I want to say that there are many ways in which we may lose the War. It is quite easy to make mistakes, and very serious mistakes, in a matter of this kind. If you do make them they may be so serious that you will not be able to recover from them at all. I do not want to dwell on that unduly, but I shall be very glad to discuss the matter in full with any hon. Member in private, and state everything I mean by these sentences. I am quite sure that anyone who looks at the matter impartially and tries to think exactly what the difficulties would be if he were given the responsibility of carrying out a policy of this kind, will agree that it is not a thing to be rushed at. You must proceed with caution and circumspection, carrying out to the full, as far as it can be carried out with due regard to the safety of the country, your essential policy of putting upon Germany all the economic pressure that you can, but never forgetting that you may pay even too high a price for that very desirable result.
I admit that the policy which the Government are trying to pursue was not created complete but has gradually grown. In the White Paper recently issued an attempt is made to give the House a kind of history of the various stages through which that policy passed. Undoubtedly the first step was an elaborate system of inquiry. We sought to ascertain by inquiry, as far as it could be done, whether a cargo or any part of it was really enemy cargo. A great organisation was established; an immense amount of information was collected; letters and telegrams were intercepted; in every possible way inquiries were made about the consignee and the conditions of trade in various countries. Every step was taken to try and ascertain whether each particular parcel of cargo was really going to the enemy or to a neutral. That led to very considerable results, but it was not perfect. The next stage was to obtain from the consignees stringent guarantees that they would not deal with the cargo improperly or hand on the imports to an enemy country. These guarantees were sometimes by individuals, but more often by associations or groups who were more easily dealt with, and against whom guarantees could be more efficiently enforced. That was not perfect. Then came the third stage, of more far reaching agreements with associations representing the whole trade of a country, as in the case of the N.O.T., the Danes, and one other country, which dealt with the whole of the problem or made an attempt to deal with the whole of the problem in a far reaching way. Unfortunately in every case the obligations of secrecy were imposed, and were rightly imposed, and it is impossible to go into details in public as to what exactly was done in those agreements. But they really represented, and this is what I wish to impress upon the House, a great advance in the history of the attempt to distinguish between neutral and enemy trade, and I believe that it is on the lines of such agreements there is really the best hope of perfecting the machinery and avoiding injustice. A good deal has been said in the case of neutrals as to the policy of providing that the import of any particular article should be limited to the whole requirements of the neutral country into which it is taken. The same suggestion has been made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for one of the Divisions of Liverpool. It is thought that that could be done by compulsion. It is one of the corner stones in the policy of the hon. Gentleman that you should say "so much of each article may be imported into each country, and no more shall be allowed." I venture to think that he has not really thought out how that would work practically. My hon. Friend the Member for Hereford very justly said that it would be an extraordinary difficult thing to do without agreement with and assistance of those who lived in the country, and those with some means of dealing with the actual trade conditions. I would like to say this—and this will meet the general argument: There would be enormous difficulty in carrying out that suggestion, apart from the danger of the irritation which I think such attempt would cause. There would be great practical difficulty in fixing that such and such an amount of every article should be allowed. Two or three ships come along apparently all right, but in fact, though you do not know it, their cargoes are destined for Germany. They are within the amount fixed. You let them pass, and you reach the full amount. Then comes along a ship with a cargo destined, and provably destined, for general neutral consumption. The case can be proved up to the hilt. You bring that cargo into the Prize Court. It seems to me that unless you can get some distributing agency in the neutral country to agree with you as to how this policy is to be practically carried out it is, I will not say impossible—it is very rare to say in war time that anything is impossible—but I see enormous difficulties in carrying it out.
I said that I recognised the difficulties were obviously very great, but I could not believe that they were any more insuperable than the same difficulties under the March Order.
Under the March Order they are exactly the same.
I agree; the one is no greater than the other.
All I am saying is that the proper carrying out of that policy—by far the best policy—I am not at all sure that I might not go farther, and say the only policy—is by agreeing with some central distributing body or Government of a neutral country. That is what I venture to think is the right policy for the Government to adopt. I agree with the hon. Member for Hereford that it is the best scheme that, at any rate, I can think of, or which the Government have been able to devise. I am asked about results. I do not want to boast. I do not believe that that policy has been a failure, but that it has had a large measure of success. I am encouraged not only by the reports—. one of which I propose to read to the House, an effective specimen of its kind—that reaches us from Germany; not only by those reports, because I agree that they only show distress—they do not show want—but I am encouraged by such instances as those given by Lord Faringdon. He went out with a perfectly impartial mind. Indeed, he told me quite frankly in regard to one port that he went there expecting to find a great deal that was wrong—or not quite right. He is, I understand, accustomed in his own business to deal severely with those things that he thinks are wrong. He pomes back and tells us, not that nothing is going through; that would be absurd! But he says that upon the whole, and so far as he can judge, not much is going Through the neutral countries. Something may have gone through a few months ago—I think it probably did. There are great attempts to get goods. You have the whole country filled with German agents trying to buy them. You have every kind of story flying about the town; every kind of accusation—the kind of gossip that comes in such circumstances in a very acute form—but his deliberate verdict was, as regards Norway, Denmark, and Holland, that, on the whole, though it was not perfect, it was not at all bad, and in his judgment comparatively very little—I do not want to put it too high—is now going through to Germany. I hope that is true. All I can say is that if we are to believe any figures at all, speaking generally, I think it is clear that things have improved. There are some black spots still. There are some articles as to which you cannot be sure that any improvement is taking place. I think there has been a recrudescence, if I may say so, owing to very large organised efforts made with great skill—I do not know whether it is going on, but there was a few weeks ago—in the matter of meat. I hope that is stopped. I hope we have taken the necessary measures to stop that. You are always getting every kind of effort made to get round your blockade. Great profits are made by so doing. Great capital resources are behind those who wish to do so. There is enormous inducement to do it. Great ingenuity is displayed; every kind of plan is devised in order to deceive you and take you in. We believe that, on the whole, we are stopping up each little hole in the dam as it takes place pretty soon, but, unfortunately, it does happen from time to time that a good deal of water doss run through before we have made the necessary repair. That is the kind of work you are necessarily engaged on in this connection.
I have here a list of results which are given to me—I believe them to be accurate—from which it is seen that a great number—I do not know whether it deals with every product, but it seems to me like it, and certainly every important product—and it shows a very considerable improvement in the last quarter compared with the average of the three previous quarters. For instance, I see that, with six or seven exceptions, and those, speaking generally, not the most important matters—coffee, tea, sugar and one or two others—there has been a decided improvement. In lard, for instance, there was a 57 per cent. improvement; aluminium, 72 per cent.; tin, 66 per cent.; animal oils and fats, 53 per cent; vegetable oils and fats, 59 per cent.; and oleaginous fats and seeds, 39 per cent improvement. Those are satisfactory so far as they go.
Will the right hon. Gentleman say with what preiod he is comparing?
The figures before me now are the imports during the last quarter compared with the average of the three preceding quarters. That is the comparison that is given to me. I need not trouble the House with a number of other items. I am not pretending there are not others not quite so good, but those are some of the most important, and the House will recognise that those I have cited are some of the most important, and they show a very decided improvement in the last quarter. That confirms very much what my hon. Friend the Member for Hereford (Mr. Hewins) said when he thought there was, generally speaking, an improvement going on. I agree that we are not entitled to rely too much upon the reports we get from Germany, but this particular report comes in a letter I have received, and which I believe is a genuine report, from somebody in Germany very recently. He says:
I do not want to say for a moment that we may rest and be thankful. This is a matter in which to rest means to go back. We have got to strive and struggle perpetually not only to keep our old machinery working at its full power, but we have to devise new machinery and make more perfect the distinction between neutral and enemy trading, and that is the real point on which all our efforts should be concentrated. My hon. Friend opposite and many others know quite well that we are not stationary. We are perpetually making improvements and alterations. The idea that the Foreign Office or those employed there sleep in armchairs in the corner of the room is an entire delusion. We do our best—I am not speaking of myself but of the very able and devoted public servants who work at the Foreign Office. They are at it for tremendously long hours during the day. They are never satisfied with what they have done and they are always anxious to do more. That is the spirit which animates the Foreign Office, and that is the spirit in which we shall continue to act. My hon. Friend said very truly that he would like to see improvements in the organisation of our machinery, and so should I. In this matter we have suffered, as we do in every Department, because we were organised for peace and not for war. We have had to improvise our whole organisation. I am not going to resume the discussion as to whether we ought to have been organised differently, but, whether we ought to have been or not, everything has had to be organised during the great stress of the War, and I am not disposed—personally I may be prejudiced—to criticise with undue severity an organisation which, in fact, has been brought into being under those circumstances. I agree that there are too many Committees. If there was only one in the world, I should think there were too many. I hate Committees and loathe them, but they have a strange attraction for my fellow countrymen. The first thing the Englishmen do when they want to get something done is to have a Committee formed. Very often there is a Council, a Grand Council, and an Executive Committee. None of them are the slightest use, and all of them would be much better suppressed, leaving the whole organisation to any one member of all the committtes combined.
Apply that to the Government.
How many Cabinet Committees are there?
I am not a member of the Cabinet, and I do not know anything about it.
But, I take it, you agree?
I do not agree or disagree. Still, of course, they have their advantages, because they secure the representation of different views. But merely for the purpose of carrying out executive work nobody doubts that the system of Committees is a very bad system. I quite agree that it would be much better if we had not so many, but I quite recognise that there are difficulties in doing without them. I shall certainly welcome my hon. Friend's co-operation if he can produce for the Government a full and considered scheme of how such a matter as this blockade and contraband ought to be worked out. I am all for any such scheme as that. I agree with him that in this matter we have got to throw all that we have got into the struggle. I agree that none of us must think twice of what is going to happen to our reputations or to our positions, or to our careers or any nonsense of that kind. We have got to work and do all that we can, and think ourselves jolly lucky that we are entrusted with any work on the country's behalf in such a crisis as this.
I wish to express my thankfulness to the Government for having given us the opportunity for this Debate so that the people of this country may be reassured that what is going on at the present time is really not as serious as newspapers are making out. Undoubtedly six months ago or more there was a great leakage of goods into Germany, and what was intended to be a blockade was not carried out in the way in which the country wished; but it is no good—it can be no good—in the present state of affairs to refer to the past. All the figures which refer to the past are misleading. We have to look at the figures as to the trade which is going on at the present day, and, as we have heard, these figures are eminently satisfactory. I for my part—and I think it is the general consensus of feeling in the House—am profoundly satisfied with the explanation of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in that great speech in which he told us and the people of foreign countries what is the real position. The policy which we have adopted of, as far as possible, placating neutrals and obtaining the best possible results without any friction is the only safe policy to pursue. The rationing system is apparently working well, and if we only had the co-operation of the Government as well as of the merchants it would work still better. This Resolution, as I read it, does not ask for the declaration of a formal blockade; it only asks the Government to enforce as effective a blockade as possible, that meaning that the present policy should be more strongly enforced, if it is possible to do so. The hon. Members who moved and seconded the Resolution appeared to wish this House to declare a most stringent formal blockade. I was rather astonished to hear the Mover—who said he was ignorant of international law—take such a line, but I was still more astonished that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Liverpool should say he wished to confiscate ships and cargoes and to have a blockade of neutral coasts. It is impossible to blockade the coasts of a neutral: the moment you do so there is war, and the very thing we have to avoid is anything like friction with neutrals, because when once we do put up their backs they will act together and simultaneously, and the danger to this country will be very great. They will not act individually; they will act together, and what would then be the position of this country?
I represent a Lancashire constituency. Can anyone think that any man in my Constituency would ever ask the Government to declare a blockade and compel America to go to war and cut off all our cotton supply, thereby producing such an awful state of starvation as we had in the early sixties? That, surely, would make any man pause before he advocated any, what I may call provocative policy which might drive the neutrals, and with them the United States of America, against us. How is it possible to blockade Germany effectively? In order to do it you must blockade the coast of Italy, because at this moment Italy is not at war with Germany, and there is a regular traffic between Italy and Germany, and, further, you must blockade Greece, because there is communication thence through Serbia into Austro-Hungary. The blockade would not therefore be in any way effective. I think hon. Members should remember, when the talk of America asking for a blockade and being anxious for one, that there are always two parties in America, one being always opposed to the other, and nowadays there is a third—pro-German party. I believe nothing would please the Kaiser more than that we should enforce a strict blockade in such a way as to enable America to turn round and say, "You state you are enforcing a legal blockade. What about the Baltic? You are giving Sweden preference. Sweden trades with Germany. And you are preventing our ships going in." Our position would be far worse than under present circumstances. I thoroughly approve of the policy of the Government, and I am sure, now that the country knows the truth, they will have confidence in the Government, and that in turn will help us towards winning the War.
It being Eleven of the clock, the Debate stood adjourned.
The remaining Orders were read and postponed.
New Member Sworn
Warwick Brookes, esquire, for the Borough of Tower Hamlets (Mile End Division).
Message Form the Lords
That they have agreed to—
Customs (War Powers) (Amendment) Bill,
Army (Suspension of Sentences) (Amendment) Bill, without Amendment.
Military Service (No. 2) Bill,
Trading with the Enemy (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill, with Amendments.
MILITARY SERVICE (No. 2) BILL
Lords Amendments to be considered tomorrow, and to be printed. [Bill 183.]
TRADING WITH THE ENEMY (AMENDMENT) (No. 2) BILL
Lords Amendments to be considered tomorrow, and to be printed. [Bill 184.]
Orders of the Day
Enemy Trade
Lord Kitchener ("Weekly Dispatch ")
Whereupon Mr. SPEAKER, pursuant to the Order of the House of the 3rd February, proposed the Question, "That this House do now adjourn."
The question to which I wish to direct the attention of the House for a few minutes arose at Question Time, when I put this question to the Secretary of State for the Home Department:
"Whether his attention has been drawn to an article in the 'Weekly Dispatch' newspaper attacking the Minister for War and, with malicious in uendo, suggesting that he is neglecting his duty; and if he will state whether this paper has been suppressed."
The answer to the question was in the negative. The issue arises as to the use that is made by the Administration of the powers under the Defence of the Realm Acts to penalise and deal with the Press. They are despotic powers. If they are used despotically and impartially, we might claim that they were lacking in wisdom, but if they are used despotically and partially the question of justice qua injustice arises. I think I can show that in the case of the weak the Government have used these powers, but that in the case of the strong it does not use them. Take the two instances as regards the weak journals. I would refer to what has happened recently as regards the "Forward" newspaper, which is a small Socialist paper published weekly in Glasgow. It has a considerable circulation, but it does not number its circulation in millions. Having published a report of a speech made at a meeting held by the Minister of Munitions, it was promptly suppressed, and the issue was seized at the direction of the Ministry of Munitions by the military authorities. Another instance was that of the "Globe" newspaper, which was similarly seized by the military authorities for having published a statement that the Secretary of State for War had tendered his resignaion. So much for the weak or less influential journals. Now for the stronger. Last Sunday the City walls, and in the country wherever this paper circulates—it has a very large circulation, we are told—were placarded by the posters of the "Weekly Dispatch" with the words:—
"The Mystery of Lord Kitchener's Position."
This refers to an article containing under the headline the words:—
"By our Special Political Correspondent."
The article refers to Lord Kitchener, and covers about a column and a half of the paper. Throughout that very cleverly written article is full of malicious innuendoes, directed to show the incompetence and blundering of Lord Kitchener, and it concludes by suggesting that he is going, and should go, to carry out other activities on the Nile. It says:—
"Like most men of advanced years, the War Secretary had begun to despise young men, hence his appointment of the oldest series of generals that ever headed an Array in the world's history. Pulled hither and thither by members of the Cabinet, each with his own expedition in his pocket, and by newspapers which urged this and that strategy, Lord Kitchener fell into the mistake of scattering the Army in almost every place where it is possible to put a British soldier, and, worst of all, nearly always where there were no German soldiers."
So much for the question of the Secretary of State's competency to conduct war. After dealing with Lord Kitchener somewhat in that strain, it goes on to say—and this is the paragraph to which I wish particularly to draw the attention of the House:—
"Professional politicians of the popularity hunting description still rouse a little cheer by reference to the former national idol; busy Press agents plant a paragraph here and there, but Lord Kitchener has other work on hand than to suppress such zeal on his behalf, and he must welcome the repose which he finds in rearranging his wonderful collection at Broome Park, the place he bought from the Oxenden family, near Canterbury, where he has made considerable structural alterations and where he spends most week-ends. However much repose Lord Kitchener may find, he is entitled to it. But to return to the point at issue. By far the greater part of his strenuous life has been spent in hot climates. When we remember that and when we see, too, that Egypt may demand a man who under stands the East thoroughly, it is not unreasonable to accept the largely held assumption that Lord Kitchener will again be found—and at no distant time—on the banks of the Nile."
So in that paragraph they exhibited Lord Kitchener to the world as a super slacker reposing in his week ends down at his mansion rearranging his magnificent collection. That paper has not been suppressed. The paper that merely suggests that Lord Kitchener has tendered his resignation is suppressed, but the paper that so exhibits him and says he is going is not suppressed. I suppose to bring a charge of incompetency against Lord Kitchener is a minor matter which would not be found fauit with, but if you exhibit him as neglecting his duty for his own ease I presume you are bringing the greatest charge you can bring against a soldier, and I should like to know what would be the effect upon our Allies when they see that description of the Secretary of State for War of Great Britain, or the effect upon the troops in the trenches. I am only pleading for equality of treatment. The same measure of justice should be dealt out to Lord Northcliffe's paper as is dealt out to the "Forward" and the "Globe"—wiser productions. The seriousness of this matter is that it is not a chance article. It is part of a vendetta which has been pursued by Lord Northcliffe against Lord Kitchener since the day when Lord Northcliffe found that the Secretary of State for War was not going to bow the knee to him and do his bidding. It has sprung from the time when they found that Lord Kitchener was going to endeavour to maintain the voluntary system of this country. I believe he would have maintained it if politicians had not led to that dispersal of forces which is attributed falsely in this article to him. It is part of a campaign carried on by Lord Northcliffe in his various papers to get the dismissal of the Secretary of State from his office. He has someone to put in his place, for I find this artcle says:—
"The Minister of Munitions has shown little deference for Lord Kitchener's dug outs."
I presume when the seat of the mighty is vacant Lord Northcliffe will say to the Minister of Munitions, "Go up thou good and faithful servant." But there is the position. Here is a newspaper proprietor, through his various papers, having carried on for a series of months a campaign against this great Minister of State for the purpose of drawing him from his office. It is permitted to go free, and smaller journals for far less grave offences are suppressed. I desire to know why there is no greater equality of treatment?
The hon. Member has put his case very moderately, and has put it on the proper ground when he says the House desires to know why there is not equality of treatment. With regard to the present attack, which I have not read but which I have since seen owing to the hon. Member raising it in the House, I agree with him that a great deal is said there which is detrimental to the position of Lord Kitchener. I do not venture an opinion myself as to whether Lord Kitchener's great services are being best used at the War Office or in the field; but it is perfectly obvious that, at any rate, he ought to be protected by his colleagues in the Cabinet from attacks of this kind. It is rather disconcerting to see that this kind of attack is leading to a great many others, and I have risen for the purpose of directing the attention of the Home Secretary to another article, which perhaps he may not have noticed, in this week's "World," written under the name of De Wend Fenton. In that article a malicious attack is made upon Viscount French. It is in the Library of the House of Commons if anyone cares to go and read it. There are things said in that article which, I think, are scandalous in view of the enormous services which Viscount French has rendered to the British Army and the British nation by his magnificent work on the Continent with the British Army. If the Government is exercising their Press censorship strictures upon a great many journalistic scoops of one kind or another and restraining these in various newspapers, some of which are quite legitimate, we think the Government ought to be more active in detecting and suppressing such articles as this to which the hon. Member for Hanley (Mr. Outhwaite) has referred, and this one to which I now direct the attention of the Home Secretary. I do not know whether he has seen it, but if not he ought to have seen it. It ought to have come before the attention of one of his officials, and ought to have been referred to him. It is not published by the same publishers as the other, but this is not the first time that an article of this kind has appeared in this paper Let the Press censorship, if it wants to be respected by those of us who want to respect it, deal out even handed justice if it is going to deal out justice at all.
I cannot share the desire of my two hon. Friends for a widespread suppression of newspapers.
I did not ask for a widespread suppression of newspapers. I asked for equality of treatment. Let all go free, or, if not, treat all alike.
Does my hon. Friend think that I ought to suppress the "Weekly Dispatch"?
Suppress the lies in it!
I asked my hon. Friend who has raised this question, presumably in order to condemn some action of mine, whether he thinks I ought to suppress the "Weekly Dispatch"? If not—and he gives no reply—I do not know upon what grounds he criticises me. If he has raised this matter in order to criticise some other action taken by some other Minister on some other occasion, I think it would have been better if he had made his case direct instead of in this indirect fashion, by a criticism apparently of some action of mine which he does not disapprove.
My point is this: I have asked why this paper was allowed to go free and other papers for a less grave offence were suppressed? I say that if the other papers were suppressed, this ought to be suppressed.
The hon. Member asks why the other papers were suppressed and and this goes free. He should ask my right hon. Friend the Minister of Munitions why a certain paper was suppressed, rather than ask me why I do not suppress a paper which he himself does not desire to see suppressed.
The action of the Government should be uniform.
The hon. Member quoted three cases, the "Forward," the "Globe," and the "Weekly Dispatch." He says that the first two were suppressed and the third not, and that the first two were weak and the third strong. But there is another very simple reason for discrimination between the cases, namely, that the action taken by and the articles published in the newspapers referred to were of an entirely different character. The Minister of Munitions has stated in this House that the reason why action was taken against "Forward" was because it was engaged in a campaign which was calculated to have the effect of prejudicing the production of munitions, and being detrimental to the success of our forces in the field. That is the ground which my right hon. Friend has given for the suppression of the "Forward." If my hon. Friends do not accept the explanation, then I suggest that the proper course is to make representations in this House with respect to the suppression of the "Forward," and not with respect to the non suppression of the "Weekly Dispatch." The "Globe" was suppressed, I think, with the general approval of the House of Commons, for the reason that it deliberately and repeatedly circulated an absolutely false statement, at a moment of great international tension, to the effect that Lord Kitchener was about to quit the War Office. The third case which is mentioned by my hon. Friends is that of a general criticism of the administration of a member of the Government. I can well understand my hon. Friend contending that any criticism of any Minister is so detrimental in regard to the country that it ought straight away to be suppressed. His confidence in His Majesty's Ministers is so complete that it might even carry him to the length of desiring to see the Executive suppress forcibly any criticism made upon any one of their number. For my part, I did not desire to see the powers of the Executive stretched so far, and unless it can very clearly be shown that serious detriment to the interests of the country is involved, I should be very indisposed to use any powers in my hands to prevent newspaper criticisms of the administration of any of my colleagues and also of myself, however unjust or malicious those criticisms may be. Unless it can be shown that there is injury done to the State I think that the wise course for the Government is not to use the powers conferred upon it under the Defence of the Realm Act or other Statutes, but to treat those attacks, if they are unjust, with silent disdain. In this particular case Lord Kichener can afford to treat with supreme indifference the article to which my hon. Friend has drawn attention.
My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has misconceived the grounds on which this discussion has been raised. It is the usual device of Ministers in a difficulty, and the spectacle of Ministers in a difficulty is becoming the normal spectacle in this House. He has referred to the two previous instances of newspaper suppression. In both of these the same issue arose. He has given a charac- teristically inaccurate account of the suppression of the "Globe." He has misstated, as has been done on every occasion, upon which that incident has been mentioned, the statement for which the-"Globe" was suppressed—that Lord Kitchener had tendered his resignation which had been accepted. The statement which the Home Secretary put into the "Globe" just now was the statement that was made in the "Evening News" and the "Evening News" was not suppressed. Fortunately, however, the "Evening News" is a newspaper which is owned and controlled by Lord Northcliffe, and the Government dare not suppress anything that is owned by Lord Northcliffe. We all know that the late Home Secretary wished to suppress the "Evening News," but the Cabinet would not allow him. In case I am accused of bringing in King Charles' head I will not say who it was who did not allow him, but it is now common property. That was a case in which we had a clear instance of selection, and anyone who talks about justice knows that justice depends upon equality of treatment. It is not enough to say that one man has done wrong and therefore ought to be punished, but that man will feel unjustly treated if there is another man who has done so and so which is worse and he is then let go scot free. That is the position of the "Globe."
That was the position of the "Globe." It was true that the Government made the "Globe" grovel on its knees, and got rid of the editor, but they never justified themselves. Nobody in this House believed in the case of the Government on the occasion of that Debate. It is true that the ex-Home Secretary, by begging for it round the House, was able to get some little support, but no man, unless asked and requested in this House, said a word on behalf of the Government on that day. The "Forward" is not to be prosecuted because they could not stand the cross examination in the Court on the speech of the Minister of Munitions in this House. It was a tissue of inaccuracies, and nobody knows that better than the right hon. Gentleman himself. What I put to you is this: Why do you select certain papers for punitive treatment and allow others to go scot free. The question is not answered. There is another case. There have been appearing for nearly a week, in a Glasgow newspaper, a series of articles calculated to do more than anything else to create unrest and to foment disturbance in the West of Scotland—a series of articles stating that the unrest on the Clyde is due to the distribution of German gold. Those articles appeared in the Glasgow "Daily Record," and were brought under the notice of the Minister of Munitions; but he has done nothing. The Glasgow "Daily Record" is owned by Lord Rothermere, another of that interesting family, who has gained a coronet by deluding public opinion.
This paper has been prosecuted on two occasions.
I know exactly the grounds, and my right hon. Friend knows that on one most important occasion it was the possession of a secret code, as to which the editor pleaded "Not guilty"; it was a colourable offence—purely a technical offence. All this is very serious; it is really a thing where public order is concerned, where the production of munitions is concerned; and if there is one thing more than another which is calculated to do harm, it is to throw doubt on the patriotism of the men working in the Clyde area. They resent it, and justly resent it. But the Government takes no action, and it does not intend to take any action. You had a series of articles of that kind making insinuations against the Labour leaders on the Clyde, that they were in the pay of the enemy in this country. Was not that calculated to endanger the public peace and order, and could it not have been prosecuted under the Defence of the Realm Act? Another Glasgow newspaper has taken up the matter, the "Bulletin," a Unionist paper. That is the only attempt to meet these disgraceful allegations. But the Government sit silent, and it allows newspapers belonging to a certain powerful organisation to pursue their course unchecked and unhampered. That is the charge against the Government. We know what happened. The late Home Secretary dealt with it. He was anxious to deal with the "Times," the "Evening News" and the "Daily Mail," but he could not get the Cabinet to act; and he came down to the House of Commons and exposed the helplessness of the Government. That was really the moral of his speech to the House on that celebrated occasion. He made a case for action, and we could only infer that his colleagues would not allow him to do anything. Why would they not? Because some of them are confederates—some of them agree with this policy; they agree with these attacks on Lord Kitchener, but they have not the courage to make them themselves. [An HON. MEMBER: "Quite right."] There are members of the Cabinet who agree that Lord Kitchener is an exploded force. If they believe that he is nothing better than a fallen idol, why have they not the courage to go and tell the people of this country that he "lacks superfluous on the stage"? No—they get the Northcliffe Press to do their dirty work. Yes they do; it is well known, and until the Government takes some action to show that members within their own ranks are not parties to this conspiracy everybody outside will believe it.
These are the things which the right hon. Gentleman has to take into consideration now that he has charge of this serious Department of the censorship. It has not been serious in the past; it has had its comic side. But it is a serious matter from the point of view of other newspapers which do not enjoy the favoured position which is granted to this powerful combination. Let the right hon. Gentleman show now that he has charge of this, that in spite of things within the Cabinet he is going to deal out even handed justice. After all, it will be by his administration in this Department more than anything else that his position in the Home Office will be tested. In no other Department of administration are his duties more difficult or more delicate. I do not want to say more about this, but the experience of those who have gone before him in this matter should certainly convince him that if he is to establish a reputation for even - handed justice in dealing with newspapers he can only do so by showing that when he takes action he takes action without fear or favour. We are dealing with his inaction at the present moment. I do not wish to see him suppress criticism. My own view is to have as free an expression of public opinion as possible, and to have as much criticism of the Government as possible. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] Yes; I believe it is for their good. What this Government has suffered from more than anything else has been absence of criticism. I admit some of us have done our best. We plead guilty to having been singularly unsuccessful in bringing them to a true knowledge of their shortcomings; consequently we welcome all assistance from the Press. But while we welcome fair criticism—criticism on public grounds—we think that these personal vendettas, conducted for purely sectional and not for national ends, should by every possible means be discouraged and exposed.
It being Half-past Eleven of the clock, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House, without Question put, pursuant to the Order of the House of 3rd February.
Adjourned at Half after Eleven o'clock.