House of Commons
Wednesday, May 17, 1916
The House met at a Quarter before Three of the clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.
COLLEGE CHARTER ACT, 1871.
Copy presented of Petition from Mrs. E. M. Sidgwick, widow, and others praying for the grant of a Charter to Newnham College, Cambridge, together with a Copy of the Draft of the Charter applied for [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
FIRE EXTINGUISHERS COMMITTEE.
Copy presented of Report of the Committee appointed by the Secretary of State for the Home Department to conduct Experiments to test the value of dry-powder Fire Extinguishers as compared with water and other "first-aid" appliances for extinguishing or effectively controlling Fires such as are likely to be caused by Bombs [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
HIGHLANDS AND ISLANDS (MEDICAL SERVICE) GRANT ACT, 1913.
Copy presented of Second Report of the Medical Service Board for the year 1915 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
SHOPS ACTS, 1912.
Copy presented of Order made by the Secretary for Scotland under the Act affecting certain classes of Shops in the burgh of Ayr [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
MILITARY SERVICE (CIVIL LIABILITIES) COMMITTEE.
Copy presented of Regulations made by the Military Service (Civil Liabilities) Committee, with the concurrence of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
WAR
ROYAL NAVAL DIVISION.
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the Royal Naval Division has now been transferred from the Admiralty to the War Office; and, if so, what are the reasons for making this change at the present time?
The Royal Naval Division has been transferred to the War Office. Its organisation is military, and it is as part of the military rather than the naval forces of the Empire that it has performed great deeds during the present War. The administrative convenience of the transfer is beyond question; and care has been taken to effect it without injury to the splendid tradition which this Division has already built up during the brief period of its existence.
HIS MAJESTY'S SHIP "SUFFOLK" (ROYAL MARINES).
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he is aware that the Royal Marines on His Majesty's ship "Suffolk" have been at their post for nearly three years without leave; and can he hold out any hope of these men obtaining leave at an early date?
I have more than once, I think, informed my hon. Friend that leave must depend upon the exigencies of the Service. I need not assure him that every care, subject to that, is taken to treat our men with consideration. In this particular case the statement in the question is not correct. A number of the Royal Marines in the ship in question have been relieved within the last twelve months, and it is hoped to relieve the remainder shortly.
HIS MAJESTY'S BIRTHDAY.
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether it is the intention of the Government to celebrate His Majesty's birthday by closing His Majesty's dockyards for the day?
It is proposed that Monday, the 26th June, shall be regarded as a closed day, so far as the bulk of the employés in His Majesty's dockyards are concerned. Such employés as are required to attend on that day to prevent urgent work from being stopped or delayed will receive extra pay in accordance with the usual Regulations.
TIME-EXPIRED MEN (ROYAL NAVY).
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether it is the intention of the Government to extend to time-expired men in the Navy the same bounties as are to be given to time-expired men in the Army called up under the Military Service Act?
Section 9 of the Naval Enlistment Act, 1853, enacts that in the event of His Majesty by Proclamation calling upon the seamen serving in His Majesty's Navy to extend the term of their services, any seaman to whom such Proclamation shall extend and whose term of service shall have expired at the date of such Proclamation, or may expire while such Proclamation shall continue in force, may be required to serve for a period of five years from the expiration of such term, and shall for such extension of service be entitled to such bounty as may be given by such Proclamation.
Under the Royal Proclamation of August, 1914, the bounty is denned as a "gratuity of three pounds ten shillings for clothing and bedding," and this sum, together with a special allowance of 2d. per diem "Detained pay," is being paid to all ratings entitled thereto under the Regulations governing the pay of men detained beyond the period of their engagements. Should these men complete time for pension during the War any additional service will count in augmentation of pension.
As regards time-expired seamen who are in receipt of pensions, the Admiralty has power, under the Naval Volunteers Act, 1853, to call them up whenever an emergency shall arise, and has exercised such power. The liability to be so called up is a condition under which they receive their pension. Time served while so called up will count towards increase of pension.
Having regard, therefore to the powers conferred on the Admiralty, it does not appear that there is any necessity to offer further special inducements of the nature referred to in the question.
ARMOURED CAR DIVISION.
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether certain officers belonging to the late Armoured Car Division of the Royal Naval Air Service have recently been transferred back to the Royal Naval Air Service; whether these officers joined the Armoured Car Service in the early stages of the War; whether, on joining the Royal Naval Air Service, they have been given seniority as dating only from the date of their actual transfer back; and whether he will take steps to provide that the seniority of these officers will date from the time of joining the Armoured Car Service and not from the date of their transfer to the Royal Naval Air Service?
Officers who have transferred for general service in the Royal Naval Air Service keep their original seniority. It is only those who enter for flying who are graded with the seniority of entry. In this respect they are treated exactly the same as officers of the Royal Navy who become flying officers.
Do they get any advantage from the time they have served with the armoured cars?
If they enter for the general service, yes; if for flying, no; then they are graded from the date of entry. That is the case also with the Royal Naval officers entering the flying
EAST COAST DEFENCE.
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the letter he addressed to the mayors of Yarmouth and Lowestoft, dated 8th May, was intended for publication in the Press; and, if so, whether it was submitted to the Press Censor before publication, seeing that it gave information to the enemy?
The answer to the first part of the question is "Yes." It is probably unnecessary to add, for the information of my hon. Friend, that a letter written for publication by the First Lord, and concurred in by the First Sea Lord, is not thereafter submitted for approval to any subordinate officer.
Can the right hon. Gentleman explain why the Admiralty instructed the Press Censor to suppress the reassuring article in connection with merchant tonnage and enemy submarines, pointing out that there was no cause for panic?
I cannot give an answer to that question. I would like to see the article first.
NORTH SEA FISHING.
asked the Secretary to the Admiralty whether he is aware of the ruin which is being caused to the little which remains of the fishing trade at Grimsby by the further restrictions as to fishing in the North Sea, lately issued by the Admiralty; is he aware that a number of the vessels lately engaged in fishing on this ground are unable to carry coals to take them further afield; and will he, if possible, withdraw these restrictions to enable these vessels to continue fishing and thus provide a supply of food for the nation?
I can assure my hon. Friend that restrictions as to fishing in the North Sea are only imposed when absolutely necessary.
STEAMSHIP "TELEMACHUS."
asked the Secretary to the Admiralty whether he can explain why the steamship "Telemachus," carrying a large quantity of cargo from Canada for a French port, was directed to Southampton, and her cargo discharged there and transhipped in other vessels to France?
The cargo of the vessel consisted mainly of two kinds: one, the lighter portion, which was on top, for discharge in France; the other, the heavier portion, which was at the bottom, for discharge in England. For good reasons, it was subsequently decided that the portion for discharge in England must be unloaded first. This involved the discharge of the whole of the cargo in England and the despatch of the part for France in another vessel. I do not suppose my hon. Friend will mind my saying that he is probably of the impression that in this case he has laid hold of another of his illustrations of alleged carelessness and want of foresight on our part. Neither do I suppose that he will be altogether reassured if I tell him it is not so.
Could not the two guns have been sent across in a vessel intended for discharge in a British port?
I cannot go into the reasons.
Is it because your case is so good that you cannot give it?
No; I do not propose to go into it.
Seeing that the First Lord of the Admiralty publishes his reasons, why cannot you do so?
AUSTRALIAN WHEAT SHIPMENTS.
asked the Secretary to the Admiralty whether he can now state which Government Department is responsible for sending Australian wheat in requisitioned or controlled British ships to Spain and the reason for sending this wheat to Spain instead of bringing it to the United Kingdom; and whether he will state how many British vessels have already delivered cargoes of Australian wheat in Spain and the total weight of these cargoes, and how many British steamers are loading Australian wheat or are on voyage to Spain, and the approximate weight of their cargoes?
The responsibility for these ships carrying wheat to Spain rests with the Commonwealth Government. I am not able to give the information asked for in the second part of the question.
Has the Commonwealth Government the right to send these ships?
BRITISH REQUISITIONED VESSELS.
asked the Secretary to the Admiralty (1) if he can explain why the steamship "Glenspean," on voyage from Canada to Havre, was kept lying idle in Cherbourg for about twenty-five days; and (2) whether he is aware of the delay experienced by British requisitioned vessels in French ports; and what steps the Admiralty propose to take to remedy this wasteful use of British vessels?
My hon. Friend must be aware that the delays to which he refers are due to congestion and to shortage of trucks and labour. The whole question is receiving the serious consideration of the Governments and Departments concerned.
Could not a little foresight on the part of the Government have obviated the sending of ships so soon?
RIVER PLATE PORTS COAL SUPPLY.
asked the Secretary to the Admiralty whether he can now state how he is going to supply River Plate ports with coal from the United States by requisitioned or directed steamers without making ballast voyages across the Atlantic, as recently stated?
My hon. Friend is, of course, aware that it is not practicable to allow the vessels in question to take coal from the United Kingdom. They have to make ballast voyages across the Atlantic, and the contrary has never been stated. The arrangement that has been come to is that by carrying coal from the United States to the River Plate ports in the first place the shorter voyage to North America instead of the longer voyage to South America is made in ballast, and in the second, useful and profitable occupation so far as possible is secured.
Is it not the fact that on the 4th May the right hon. Gentleman stated that these arrangements were made so as to obviate the making of a ballast voyage?
The question suggests that that was stated, but what I was asked then was that in sending coal to the River Plate ports we would keep in view the reducing of ballast voyages, and it was from that point of view I gave an answer.
PRISONERS OF WAR.
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has any further news which he can report upon the treatment of our prisoners in. Bulgaria?
My hon. Friend was informed, on the 15th May, that the last report from the United States representative, at Sofia, showed considerable improvement in the condition of the British prisoners of war at Philippopolis. We have received no further information in regard to this matter.
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he would ask the United States Embassy that in all visits paid by the members of the United States Embassy in Berlin to the camps in Germany where British prisoners of war are interned the exact weekly dietary given to the prisoners should be obtained?
The United States Ambasador was requested on the 10th May to ask the United States Ambassador at Berlin to furnish, if possible, a weekly statement of the diet supplied to all combatant British prisoners of war, both officers and men. Dietaries in force at various German detention camps have from time to time been obtained by members of the United States Embassy at Berlin on the occasion of visits to those camps.
As a very large number of people are interested in and very anxious about this question of the dietary of British prisoners, and have great doubt as to the amounts given at the present time, will it be possible to give them information upon the subject, in view of the great dissatisfaction which exists?
I entirely agree with my hon. Friend that it is very desirable that all information we can obtain about the condition of British prisoners in Germany should be given, and I shall take care that this suggestion is acted upon, as far as it can be acted upon in reference to our commitments to the American Ambassador.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether there has been formed any estimate which can be safely made public of the total number of prisoners of war of all nationalities in the hands of the enemy?
I think my hon. Friend has probably seen on reflection during the period which has elapsed since he put this question on paper that information as to the number of soldiers which any of the Allied nations may have lost as prisoners of war would more properly be sought from the Governments of those countries. I cannot think that it is any part of my duty to make any statement as to the numbers of officers or men the enemy may have captured from any of our Allies individually, or from them all collectively.
asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office if he is aware that, under present rules, a prisoner of war is not able to obtain food supplies by means of a direct remittance to his relatives from the amount standing to his credit, but must make an allotment of pay through the paymaster; and if he will favourably consider the advisability of granting facilities for a prisoner of war to make a direct remittance from his account current to his relatives in order that they may buy and forward food to him?
I am anxious to give all possible facilities. Perhaps the hon. and gallant Member will give me more particulars of the difficulty to which he refers.
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can arrange for the publication in neutral and, if possible, in other countries of the notice of the interview that he gave to Mr. Edward Price Bell, of the "Chicago Daily News," with a view to informing those countries of the objects and intentions of Great Britain in entering into the War against Germany.
I understand that the report of the interview has already been published very fully in the Press of many Allied and neutral countries.
Has the report of the interview been translated into the language of the countries in which it has been published?
I cannot say that offhand, but it has appeared in a very large number of newspapers belonging to neutral countries, and particularly, also, in Germany.
CHINA (REBELLION).
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has any information as to the present position of affairs in China, more especially with regard to the reported declaration of a financial moratorium; and whether energetic steps are being taken to safeguard this country's financial stake in the republic?
According to the most recent information received, the rebellion in China shows no sign of abating. With regard to the financial situation, it is reported that the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications have suspended cash payments, but it is understood that Chinese Government obligations will not be affected. Any steps which may become necessary and proper to safeguard British financial interests in China will be taken.
Does the financial moratorium apply to the whole of China or only the part covered by the rebellion when the rebellion is in progress?
I am afraid I must ask for notice.
DISTURBANCES IN IRELAND.
TRIALS BY COURT-MARTIAL.
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, with a view to the next Hague Conference, he will ascertain the opinion of neutral Governments, especially that of the United States, on the prospect of having an international convention adopted against the practice of executing wounded military prisoners, after trial and sentence by court-martial, as in the recent Irish rebellion?
The statement of the hon. Member does not appear to me to be at all a correct description of what has happened in Ireland. I am not aware of any reason for taking any steps with neutral Governments with a view to the next Hague Conference.
Can the Noble Lord mention any other country where wounded military prisoners are shot summarily?
I believe in all civilised countries people who are guilty of murder and treason are shot.
Is it not the fact that if that were the case some of those on the Treasury Bench would be shot?
Surely it is more merciful where a man is proven to be guilty to be shot, even though he be wounded, than to cure him and then shoot him!
IRISH VOLUNTEER TRAINING CORPS.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he has yet received particulars of the work done by the Irish Volunteer Training Corps at the rebellion on Easter Monday last; whether six men were killed and eleven wounded; whether they held Beggar's Bush Barracks for nine days; whether these men wore the green-grey uniform and the G.R. brassard similar to the English Volunteers; and whether the men who were on duty during those nine days will be paid and compensation given to the dependants of those killed and wounded in the same way as if they were Regular soldiers?
I have not yet received the information to enable me to answer this question.
DEATH OF KILKENNY MERCHANT.
asked the Prime Minister whether he is aware that a Kilkenny merchant named John Kealy, while being conveyed with thirty others from the gaol to the railway en route to Richmond Barracks, Dublin, under military guard, dropped dead in the street; whether this man was examined and attended to by the prison doctor; and did he certify him fit to be removed to Dublin?
This occurrence has been reported. No examination was made previous to the removal of John Kealy. He joined the other prisoners when ordered to do so en route to the station, and made no remonstrance or complaint.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Mayor of Kilkenny called the attention of the Governor to the condition of this man, and asked him to see if something could not be supplied?
That fact has not been reported to me.
POSTPONED QUESTIONS TO MINISTERS.
( in whose name stood Questions Not. 61 and 62, relating to the disturbances in Ireland ): I have been requested to postpone these questions. In acceding to that request, may I ask for a guarantee that no more labour leaders will be arrested?
I am afraid I cannot give a guarantee of that kind.
( who had given notice, of Questions No. 63, 64, and 83, relating to the disturbances in Ireland ): Mr. Speaker, you have passed over Questions 63 and 64.
I understood that the hon. Member had been asked to postpone them.
I understood that the hon. Gentleman had received a request to postpone Questions 63, 64, and 83. The information to enable me to answer them has not yet reached me.
I have not received the request.
Several of us have received requests from the right hon. Gentleman to postpone our questions, arid we have gladly acceded. At the same time I think we are entitled to know when we should put the questions down again, as our Constituents are anxious to get the information.
I am sure the hon. and learned Member realises my position in this matter. I am unable to issue either orders or instructions. All I can do is to get such information as I can over the telegraph wires. The wires are very congested, and it has been impossible for the War Office to obtain the information necessary to answer these questions. I hope that the situation may be relieved on the return of the Prime Minister, but I am not able to make any promise.
I gladly accept the statement of the right hon. Gentleman. But we are in receipt of hundreds of messages from all parts of the country complaining of the state of things that is going on; therefore I think it is only fair that our Constituents should know that at all events we are trying to elicit the information, but cannot get it. Does the right hon. Gentleman know when the Prime Minister will return?
I believe at the end of the week.
MESSRS. HARDY (ARREST).
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he can give any information as to the fate or the present whereabouts of Mr. Octavius Hardy, of 17, Belgrave Road, Rathmines, Dublin, and his nephew, Mr. Joseph Vincent Hardy, of Mount Prospect, Ballinasloe, landowner, both being well-known Unionists and Protestants, who were arrested on Easter Tuesday, at 17, Belgrave Road, because some old fowling pieces were found on their house being searched, and who have not since been heard of by their relations: whether the authorities have since returned the old guns to 17, Belgrave Road as being of no use; and whether, nevertheless, the Messrs. Hardy are still kept in prison or have been subjected to some graver fate by the military executive?
Would the hon. Gentleman postpone the question, as I have not been able to get the information for which he asks?
In view generally of the anxiety of the friends, will the right hon. Gentleman answer as soon as possible—to-morrow?
No, I do not think I shall be able to answer the question to-morrow. I should like very much to be able to do so. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will put the question down and take his chance. I may be able to get the information, but the hon. Gentleman will not be disappointed if I cannot.
NORTH KING STREET, DUBLIN.
had the following question on the Order Paper: To ask the Under-Secretary of State for War the name of the regiment and officers in charge in North King Street, Dublin, during the rising; whether he is aware that fourteen men, unarmed, and not connected in any way with the rising, were shot without trial and without any charge being made against them; and if, in the interests of justice and peace in Ireland, he will demand an explanation from those responsible for the incident?
This question, I think, is postponed.
May I inquire when I can put this question down again?
Monday or Tuesday—early next week.
MR. SKEFFINGTON'S LETTER.
asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will explain why the London newspapers to which Mr. Sheehy-Skeffington sent a pacifist letter a month before the insurrection in Ireland were not allowed to publish that letter; whether any Irish Members of this House were consulted and approved of the Government preventing publication of that letter; and, suppression being regarded in Ireland as confirmation of the intention of the Government to carry out a pogrom of Nationalists, whether he can now make any statement towards removing that impression?
There is no foundation for the hon. Member's allegation. No letter from Mr. Sheehy-Skeffington was submitted for censorship, and no newspaper was prohibited from publishing any letter from him. The letter has, in fact, lately been published, and its character does not, in my opinion, conform to the hon. Member's description of it.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say to what higher authority the editor of the "Daily Chronicle" sent this letter, a month previous to its publication, if not to the right hon. Gentleman or to the Censor?
Could we not put a cold-water tap on the hon. Member—he gets everyone's blood up?
The hon. Member refers to a recent number of the "Daily Chronicle," in which the editor stated that the letter had been sent to him but had not been published by him. He had, however, communicated it to a higher authority. I do not know to what higher authority, but it was not referred to me or the Censor.
CEYLON.
asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, seeing that no charge was made against Mr. F. R. Senanayaka, B.A., LL.B. (Cambridge), a barrister, elected member of the municipal council of Colombo, and landowner, arrested on 21st June, 1915, kept in prison until 5th August, and then released without trial on depositing Rs. 10,000, giving a bond for Rs. 50,000, and undertaking not to leave Colombo without permission of the military and police authorities, will he now say what the charge in that case was; whether any evidence against this gentleman was obtained from his employées, who, while he was in prison, were imprisoned for that purpose, and also released without trial; and whether any official serving under Sir Robert Chalmers in Ceylon at that time has accompanied him to his new post in Dublin Castle?
The circumstances of the arrest of certain persons, including Mr. Senanayaka, are explained in the correspondence which has been presented to Parliament. I see no reason to take any action in the matter.
The right hon. Gentleman has not answered the latter part of the question: whether any of these executioners have accompanied Sir Robert Chalmers to Ireland?
AFRICA (EDIBLE NUTS AND OIL SEEDS).
asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will state when the Report of the Committee appointed to inquire into the export trade in edible nuts and oil seeds on the West Coast of Africa will be presented to Parliament?
As I informed the hon. Member for Brecknock last Wednesday, I am at present considering the Committee's Report, and hope to lay it before Parliament at an early date.
MILITARY SERVICE.
MEN MEDICALLY UNFIT.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he has received from the Rugby Board of Guardians a communication calling attention to the cases of three single men, one of whom had suffered from tuberculosis for six years and for three years had been in receipt of out-relief; the second, who had been discharged as incurable from hospital, had done no work for two years, and had been on the rates for a year; the third, a case of a man who had been suffering for a considerable time from heart trouble and had been told by the infirmary doctor that he should remain in the infirmary; why these three men were passed for military service and called up; and what action he proposes to take?
I cannot trace the receipt of the communication from the Rugby Board of Guardians, and cannot, therefore, say whether my hon. Friend's information, as stated in his question, is correct or otherwise.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether, in view of the general desire on the part of men holding medical certificates showing them to be unfit for any kind of military service to know what' their position is, he will say whether these certificates are valid under the Military Service Act?
I would refer the hon. Gentleman to the answer I gave on the 15th May to the hon. Member for East Edinburgh and to some observations I made in Debate last night.
asked the Undersecretary for War whether a rejected man, if he holds Army Form B 2512a, the same endorsed, "Not accepted, medically unfit," and signed by the medical officer who examined him, also having had an armlet issued to him on the strength of the doctor's medical rejection, will be bound to reappear again after the passing of the Military Service Bill, or can he consider himself finished with by the military authorities?
I would refer my hon. Friend to the answer I gave on the 15th May to the hon. Member for East Edinburgh, and also to what was stated in the Debate yesterday during the Report stage of the Military Service Bill.
The right hon. Gentleman cannot give me a definite answer?
Well, Sir, I made a good many observations on these men last night; and the question, I think, does not lend itself to a simple answer of "yes" or "no." I would ask my hon. Friend to refer to my observations.
OFFICERS RESIGNED.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he will say if officers who have been found for various reasons inefficient in the discharge of their duties, and have been allowed to resign their commissions, become liable, if within the age limit, to be called to the Colours under the Military Service Act?
Yes, Sir.
GROUP SYSTEM.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War if the Group system under Lord Derby's scheme is still open; and, if so, up to what date will it be possible for married men to offer themselves under it for attestation?
Yes, Sir. The date of closing the groups is under consideration.
Will it be announced at an early date, so as to relieve anxiety?
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS.
asked how many conscientious objectors have now had sentences passed upon them by courts-martial; and how many have had a sentence of two years' imprisonment with hard labour inflicted upon them?
To answer my hon. Friend's question would involve obtaining returns from the various Commands which I am not prepared to ask for specially, but it will no doubt be rendered in the ordinary course.
asked if a conscientious objector who has net applied for exemption and has been sentenced for failing to join the Army when he was called up and who has lodged an application for exemption under Section 2, of the Military Service Act, is amenable to military law, having regard to the provisions of Subsection (5) of Section 3 of the same Act?
Applications for exemption had to be made under the Military Service Act, 1916, before the 2nd March. If a man did not apply for exemption, he would pass to the Reserve, and would be liable to be called up for service, and as from the time he joins or is handed over to the military authorities by the sentence of a Civil Court he is under military law.
asked the President of the Local Government Board if he is aware of the chaos into which the decisions of the Manchester Appeal Tribunal have been put by the action of the chairman in referring appellants on the ground of conscientious objection to the Pelham Committee; that in some cases he has omitted to make any reference to the Pelham Committee on the form handed to the appellant, although he has marked the forms retained by the tribunal to that effect, and that he has endorsed both forms as though the appellant had been passed for non-combatant service instead of certifying that they were exempted on condition of being employed in some work of national importance; that this practice has naturally led to confusion and injustice, and that a number of men who have been referred to the Pelham Committee by Judge Mellor have been arrested and fined as deserters, though the military representative admitted at the Police Court that the chairman of the Appeal Tribunal had by word of mouth referred the men to the Pelham Committee; that the Pelham Committee refuse to assist men referred to them by the tribunals; and, in view of the misunderstanding by the tribunals, appellants, and the military, will he at once issue instructions on the matter, pointing out that men given non-combatant service and willing to undertake work of national importance are exempt from military service?
My right hon. Friend is in correspondence with the chairman of the Appeal Tribunal on this subject.
asked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been drawn to the sentences passed on David John Evans and Thomas M. Thomas at Cefn on 4th May, imposing a fine of £10 and a month's imprisonment in each case for the distribution of leaflets against the severe treatment of conscientious objectors; whether it is to be understood that facts in regard to the treatment of conscientious objectors may not be made public in speech and print; and whether, seeing that it is not possible to urge the repeal of the Military Service Act without showing the alleged evils of its operation, the conviction of these men will be quashed, in view of his answer to the hon. Member for Elland on 17th January?
To advocate the repeal of an Act of Parliament is one thing, to advocate refusal to obey its requirements is another. It is because the leaflet in question appears to me to have the latter purpose in view that I am not disposed to interfere in the case mentioned by the hon. Member.
AGE LIMIT.
asked if, under the new Military Service Bill, men who have reached the age of forty-one before they are actually called up for service with the Colours will be exempt so long as the age is not extended?
The new Military Service Bill does not apply to men who have attained their forty-first birthday before they would otherwise require to present themselves for service with the Colours.
TRANSFERS TO RESERVE.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he can state the circumstances in which the Army Council will authorise transfers to the Reserve under Clause 10 of the new Military Service Bill?
The matter is under consideration, and an Army Council instruction will be issued at an early date.
PERSONS OF MILITARY AGE RESIDENT ABROAD.
asked if the War Office have a register of all British subjects of military age who, being liable to service under the Military Service Acts, are temporarily resident in countries outside the United Kingdom; and if notice will be sent to all these persons warning them of their duty to return home to discharge the obligations which Parliament has imposed upon them?
Notice papers will be sent to the registered address in this country of all people who are so registered, but the War Office do not possess the names and particulars of men who were not in the country at the time when registration took place.
Is it the intention of the Government, following the Continental practice, to confiscate the property of all men of military age who do not return to this country?
We are unaware of the ages of persons not resident in this country unless they have been registered. What I told my hon. Friend opposite was that we could not possibly send papers to persons who are not registered. To persons who have been registered papers will be sent, whether they are in this country or not.
Are not all these subjects residing in France already registered?
I am not aware of that, but I can quite believe it.
DISCHARGED PRIVATE (LIABILITY TO SERVICE).
asked whether a private in a Territorial regiment who was discharged as medically unfit a couple of months after the outbreak of War is liable to be called up under the terms of the Military Service Bill?
As the Military Service Act and the Bill stand, this man would be excepted.
WOOLWICH AND SANDHURST CANDIDATES.
asked whether a boy under the age of nineteen preparing for entry into Woolwich or Sandhurst is liable to be called up for enlistment under the Military Service Act, or will he be allowed to finish his course of study and allowed to remain unenlisted until he knows the result of his examination?
A boy who can produce a certificate from his headmaster stating that he is a bonâ fide candidate for admission to Woolwich or Sandhurst or one the Indian Training Colleges, and that he has a reasonable chance of success at the Army Entrance Examination, will not be called up to the Colours pending the announcement of the result of the examination.
OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS.
asked the Under-Sec retary of State for War the present position of officers in school Officers' Training Corps under the Military Service Bill; whether they will still be exempted from joining the Army under the recent War Office Regulation or whether they will be immediately liable for service?
Officers in the Officers' Training Corps have the same liability for service as other officers of the Special Reserve or Territorial Force. Their services are at the disposal of the Army Council.
Those whose ages bring them within the provisions of the Military Service Act have been required to undertake the Imperial Service obligation (A.F. E624) in order to retain their commissions.
I am not aware of any War Office Regulation other than that I have just indicated.
SOLDIERS IN BARRACKS.
asked the Under-Secretary for War, if he is aware that soldiers who live in barracks, but have to mess out, find it extremely difficult to live on the reduced subsistence allowance; and if, in view of the increase in prices, he will raise the allowance to its former level?
I would refer my hon. Friend to the answer which I gave on this subject on the 10th instant to my right hon. Friend the Member for Woolwich.
VOLUNTARILY ATTESTED MEN.
asked whether voluntarily attested men who have been rejected for combatant service are to be drafted into Non-Combatant Corps along with conscientious objectors; and, if so, why they are to be penalised in such a way?
No men other than conscientious objectors are to be appointed to the Non-Combatant Corps. If the hon. Member has any information which leads him to think any other course is being followed, perhaps he will communicate with me.
asked whether attested men who have attained the age of forty-one years before being called up are still liable for military service, or whether any step is taken to cancel their attestation?
I have already stated that if an attested man reaches his forty-first birthday before the date on which he is required to serve with the Colours, he will be left in the Reserve.
LOCAL TRIBUNALS (EXEMPTIONS).
asked the Under-Secretary for War if it is with his sanction that the military representative pressed the Skipton urban military tribunal to refuse exemption to a deaf youth, who had been certified as unfit for combatant service, on the ground that the youth would be more usefully employed as an officer's servant than in his own occupation as a warpdresser; and whether, having regard to the fact that owing to the shortage of warpdressers in the West Riding looms are kept standing and the production of woven fabrics seriously diminished, and in consideration of the plea of the youth's mother, who stated before the tribunal that her four other sons were serving in the Army already, he will direct the military representative to withdraw his opposition to this case?
I am obtaining a report.
asked the President of the Local Government Board if he has made any representations to the Manchester local tribunal upon its decision in a case before it on the 5th instant, where a farmer appealed for exemption for two men, one a young unmarried man, his nephew, the other a married man in Group 44, with five children, and, in the course of the hearing the farmer said he would agree to withdraw the appeal for the married man in Group 44 if exemption were granted to his nephew, and the tribunal gave exemption to the young unmarried man, his nephew, on that condition?
My right hon. Friend has no information respecting the case. There are, of course, other considerations besides marital conditions—such as occupation—to be taken into account in deciding whether a man should be exempted.
asked whether the circular to local tribunals, dealing with the exemption of men who are the sole head of their businesses, has been sent out in accordance with promise made to the hon. Member for Enfield?
The arrangement finally arrived at in connection with this matter was that an attempt should be made to deal with it by an instructional Regulation. The form of this, as well as of the other amendments to the Regulations which will be necessitated by the passing of the new Bill is being considered.
Is it a fact that attested men who are now being called up will come under this Regulation or instruction that they may claim its advantage?
I would not like to give a certain answer to that, but I think that is so.
With regard to single men in these positions whose claims on these grounds have been disallowed, will they have any opportunity of taking advantage of this new instruction?
I should like to have notice of that question.
asked whether an unattested. man who attains the age of forty-one years while his claim is before a tribunal is liable to be called up for military service?
The answer is in the negative.
NAVAL SERVICE.
asked if men coming under the Military Service Act will have the choice of volunteering for service in the Navy?
By Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Military Service Act the Admiralty is given the first call on men who express their preference for naval service in case their services are needed for that purpose. This provision will apply to men coming under the operation of the new Bill.
MARRIED MEN'S APPEALS.
asked the President of the Local Government Board whether his attention has been drawn to the decisions of certain tribunals to post pone the consideration of appeals of at tested married men to deal with them at the same time as with the appeals of married men arising from the Military Service (No. 2) Bill; and whether he will recommend all tribunals to adopt this pro cedure so that the appeals of married at tested men may be considered not earlier than those of married unattested men?
The suggestion is receiving the attention of my right hon. Friend.
PUBLIC BREAD SUPPLY.
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether any steps have been taken to ascertain the probable effect of the new Military Service Bill upon the supply of bread to the public; whether the National Association of Master Bakers and Confectioners have placed before the Reserved Occupations Committee a statement that unless steps were taken to retain bread bakers in their occupation the adequate supply of bread to the public would sooner or later become impossible; and whether the Board of Trade will make arrangements by which the whole subject can be discussed with representatives of the baking trade with a view to ensuring for the public an adequate supply of bread?
All bread bakers who were married on or before 2nd November last are already reserved, as well as single men over thirty years of age, and it is not proposed that the present reservation should be removed. In these circumstances, the fear of a shortage in the supply of bread owing to the new Bill appears to be unfounded, and I understand that the-opinion of the Reserved Occupations Committee is that no further reservation is required.
TERRITORIAL FORCE.
asked the Undersecretary of State for War whether his attention has been drawn to the drafting of men of provisional battalions, Territorial Force, to other than their county units, in contravention of Army Council Instruction 301 of 6th February, 1916; and, if so, what steps he proposes to take in the matter?
If my hon. Friend will permit me to say so, I would point out that I have answered at least twenty questions on this subject. I may, I think, therefore say that my attention has been drawn to it. Men from provisional battalions have been attached to units other than those which they originally joined. In these cases the Army Council exercised their power of attachment, which was necessitated by the requirements of the Service. As regards the latter part of the question, my hon. Friend will be aware of the provisions of the Military Service Bill now before the House, which bears on this, point.
RAILWAY SUPPLY DEPARTMENT (ENLISTED MINERS).
asked the Undersecretary of State for War whether he is aware that miners enlisted in Notts in October, 1914, in the 43rd Railway Supply Department, who were promised, and paid, 3s. per day down to December, 1915, then, without any reason being given to them, the 3s. was crossed out of their pay books and Is. 8d. inserted, and their pay at the same time reduced by that amount; and, if aware of this, will he say why this reduction has been made, and give instructions for the arrears to be paid and the conditions of enlistment observed?
These men were enlisted in error at 3s. a day, and as soon as the error was discovered they were given the option of continuing to serve at ordinary Army rates or of taking their discharge. So far as I am aware, all had been disposed of toy June, 1915, and no one of them should after that date have been in receipt of more than Army rates. I am inquiring into the statement that men were paid 3s. a day until December last.
Did not the hon. Gentleman give an undertaking on 28th March that where men were enlisted under a definite promise that promise would be kept?
That promise will be kept or the men will be given the opportunity of taking their discharge.
Did the hon. Member say they would have the opportunity of taking their discharge? I see no record of it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
I cannot charge my memory whether I said it on that particular date.
If these men take their discharge will they be conscripted under the new Bill?
I do not know.
ROYAL ARMY MEDICAL CORPS.
asked the Undersecretary of State for War whether the Royal Army Medical Corps doctors whose gallant behaviour at Wittenberg has been rewarded by His Majesty were volunteers for that particular work, or were detailed by the Germans to do it; and whether other British doctors in other typhus camps in Germany will be recommended for similiar recognition?
The three officers mentioned were detailed by the Germans for duty in the typhus camp at Wittenberg. I think my hon. Friend may take it that if other officers have done equally good work they will receive equal recognition.
COAL SUPPLY.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War if the War Office had come to any conclusion as regards the advisability of releasing, after they have had a satisfactory military training, experienced miners from Home-service battalions for work in the mines for a short period, so as to relieve the shortage of coal?
No man known to be an experienced miner is being enlisted except for service in Tunnelling Companies, Royal Engineers.
VOLUNTARY MILITARY HOSPITALS (MEDICAL OFFICERS).
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether, in view of the fact that it is now proposed to give commissions and grant military rank to officers of Volunteer corps, the War Office is prepared to grant similar privileges to medical officers in charge of voluntary military hospitals?
Commissions have already been given to all medical men doing work which renders military rank necessary. It is not proposed to recommend any further extension of the granting of temporary commissions in the Royal Army Medical Corps except under this principle.
MR. H. CHARLES WOODS.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War (1) whether he is aware that Mr. H. Charles Woods, formerly of the Grenadier Guards, is an acknowledged authority on Asiatic Turkey and the Balkan Peninsula and has obtained a certificate in the Turkish language; whether any steps have been taken, or will be taken, to utilise his services in some special direction where his peculiar knowledge of and experiences in the Near East may be of value; and (2) whether, in the face of public declarations by the Army. Council or by his then senior officers that he was inefficient as a regimental officer, that he never was a really efficient regimental officer, that he was never likely to be fitted to command troops under service conditions, and that his retention in the Service was not in the interests of the Army, Mr. H. Charles Woods, formerly of the Grenadier Guards, has been offered a commission carrying with it those very duties for which he is disqualified, namely, those of a regimental officer; whether it had been suggested to him that the best way of securing extra-regimental (special) work was to demonstrate his power and efficiency regimentally; and whether he was officially informed by the Secretary of the War Office on 28th February that no appointment was available in which his peculiar qualifications could be utilized?
I understand that Mr. Charles Woods has written articles in the Press on "Near Eastern Questions," and that he passed an examination in Turkish in July, 1907. He is not the only person who has written such articles or passed such an examination. This officer was told that his services were not required extra-regimentally, but he was informed that, if he put forward an application for regimental employment, a commission would be granted.
Does not that amount to saying that an officer who has been proved or stated to be regimentally inefficient would be received as a regimental officer, and one who has proved his efficiency in other respects will not be received to serve in those other respects?
No, Sir. What it really means is this: the officer might become regimentally efficient as a regimental officer and opportunity was given in order to demonstrate that.
FRIENDLY ALIENS (INTRENMENT CAMP).
asked the Undersecretary of State for War whether the War Office undertook to set up a separate internment camp for friendly aliens, i.e., Czechs, Poles, Alsatians, Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes, and others; whether anything has yet been done to carry out this promise; and, if not, whether he will now give instructions that it shall be carried out?
This special camp was opened on the 1st April.
REGIMENTAL SERGEANT-MAJORS (TERRITORIAL, BATTALIONS).
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether, in order that efficient non-commissioned officers of the Line battalions may be encouraged to transfer as regimental sergeant-majors into Territorial battalions, he will consider the advisability of raising the rank of regimental sergeant-majors of Territorial battalions to warrant officers, Class I., instead of Class II., as at present?
During the time regimental sergeant-majors hold that appointment in the Territorial Force they are regarded as Class I. warrant officers and are entitled to all the financial advantages of pay and allowances (including non-effective rights) according to that rank; and this applies, of course, to any non-commissioned officer of a Line battalion selected for transfer as regimental sergeant-major to a Territorial Force battalion.
Does the sergeant-major of a Territorial battalion hold the rank of first-class warrant officer or that of second-class?
The first class applies to non-commissioned officers of Line battalions who are sent to Territorial Force battalions. I could not answer the actual question put to me by the hon. and gallant Gentleman offhand.
SOLDIERS PHYSICALLY UNFIT.
asked what steps are being taken to release from service with the Colours men who are physically unfit for any sort of arduous military duty and whose return to civil employment is desirable in the interests of the Army itself and of the trade of the country?
Men who are physically unfit for arduous military duty but who can be usefully employed in the Army to relieve men who are under training to go overseas are retained in the Service for this purpose. There are at present insufficient of these lower-grade men to relieve from employments and fatigues all the fit men under training. Men who cannot usefully be employed in the Army are discharged at once, unless they are likely to recover soon.
Is the right hon. Gentleman taking steps to substitute women in the indoor departments?
Yes, I understand that many women clerks are employed.
DISCHARGED SOLDIERS (CIVIL EMPLOYMENT).
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that soldiers continually being discharged are kept waiting for periods varying from one to four weeks before being permitted to resume their former employment on the railways; and, having regard to the fact that during this period these men receive neither allowances from the Army nor wages from the railway companies, whether he is prepared to make arrangements whereby their Army pay will be continued until such time as they are able to resume civil employment, and so avoid the hardships at present experienced by men who have served their country on the battlefield?
Perhaps my hon. Friend would explain to me more fully the difficulty which he has in mind. The normal rule is that a soldier awaiting his discharge continues to receive Army pay and allowances until the actual date on which he is discharged, and it would be for him to arrange with his civil employers the date on which he takes up civil employment.
Is not the hon. Gentleman aware that men have been kept waiting a fortnight or three weeks to go into civil employment, and that in the interval they are getting nothing; and in some cases their families are suffering?
I am not aware of that. I do not quite understand the position. These men, I gather, have been discharged from the Army, and a period of two or three weeks elapses before they take up civil employment.
These men are discharged from the Army, and before their employers who had guaranteed them their jobs will re-employ them they are waiting another medical examination, which occupies two or three weeks. In the interval they are getting neither pension nor anything from the employers.
If the hon. Member will give me particulars of a case I think it will enable me to deal with the matter better.
I will do that.
OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS.
asked the Under-Secretary for War the reason for Army Council Instruction No. 787, of 12th April, prohibiting commissioned officers attached to Officers' Training Corps from wearing uniform except on the days when they are engaged on some military duty; and whether he is aware that these officers, although not on active service, are doing useful military work, and the fact of their not being allowed to wear their uniform except on the occasions stated in the order has aroused resentment?
My hon. Friend will see that some definite significance must attach to the wearing of uniform. The officers he refers to are not mobilised, and it would be wrong that they should wear uniform when carrying out their ordinary civil avocation. It has, therefore, been decided that the wearing of uniform must be confined to occasions when military duties are being performed.
Does not that apply to Members of this House?
Yes, Sir.
On the Treasury Bench, too?
NAVAL AND MILITARY SERVICES (PENSIONS AND GRANTS).
asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office (1) when the new Royal Warrant will be issued; and (2) whether it has yet been decided that dependants of men who die from disease aggravated by service with the Colours are to receive pensions on the four-fifths basis?
I hope that the Warrant referred to in these questions will be published very shortly.
Will my right hon. Friend say whether the Warrant will deal with the subject of the pensions of dependants on the four-fifths basis, because this is work that was referred to the Statutory Committee. I would like to know definitely whether the Royal Warrant will deal with these pensions?
Yes; it is proposed to deal with dependants' pensions and the men's pensions in the same Warrant, if that is the point
When will the Warrant be issued?
Very shortly, I hope.
You said that previously.
CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES (INCOME TAX).
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether his attention has been drawn to the statement issued by a well-known co-operative society to the effect that it would have no objection to Income Tax being levied upon the results of its competitive as distinguished from its mutual trade; whether, in view of this, steps will now be taken to ascertain how far this readiness to submit to taxation is shared by other co-operative societies; and what yield is expected in a full year from the Excess Profits Duty levied upon co-operative societies?
I can only refer the hon. Member to the numerous replies I have given on this subject, and especially to the answer which I gave to the hon. Member for the Edgbaston Division of Birmingham on the 14th October last, when I referred to the "insignificant amount of the average taxable profit per member" of these societies. That description is confirmed by the statement of the particular society to which the hon. Member has drawn my attention. As regards the last part of the hon. Member's question, sufficient data are not available on which to form an estimate.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the co-operative societies throughout England last year realised a profit of £13,500,000, and that only £1,500,000 was distributed to their shareholders?
Will the hon. Gentlemen add to that information the number of shareholders amongst whom the one and a half millions was divided?
Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that the Wholesale Co-operative Society itself does the bulk of its trade, not with its own shareholders, but in competition with private firms—at the present time by accepting Government contracts?
If the hon. Gentleman will give me notice of these various questions, I shall be happy to give an answer.
I have asked these questions previously of the right hon. Gentleman, and have never been able to get a satisfactory reply.
Will we ever be able to be done with this delay?
I do not know on what ground the right hon. Gentleman asks me that.
May I ask—
We have had this debated several times; we know both sides of it well.
WAR RISK PREMIUMS (ALLOWANCES).
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what instructions, if any, have been issued to surveyors of taxes concerning claims for allowances in respect of war risk premiums (aircraft, etc.), along with other insurance premiums, before payment of tax under Schedule A?
No instructions have been issued. War risk premiums are treated in the same manner as other insurance premiums paid in respect of the premises insured, but such premiums are not in any case allowable as a specific deduction before payment of tax under Schedule A.
BRITISH LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANIES (INCOME TAX).
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what was the total sum paid by British life assurance companies in the name of Income Tax; and what was the total abatement claimed by and allowed to taxpayers in respect of life premiums in each of the three years 1912–13, 1913–14, and 1914–15?
The information asked for in the first part of the hon. Member's question is not available. As regards the second part, the amount of the life insurance premiums relieved from payment of Income Tax for the years in question was as follows:— £ 1912–13 … 12,518,938 1913–14 … 13,304,633 1914–15 (partly estimated) … 13,850,000
WAR-SAVING CERTIFICATES.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the amount of application for the £l for 15s. 6d. war-saving certificates that have been issued up to 30th April and the amount of the certificates that have been redeemed?
The cash value of war-savings certificates issued up to the 30th April, 1916, was £2,109,181. The cash repaid in the same period in respect of certificates realised was £3,443.
Will the right hon. Gentleman take steps to replace this issue by one of a more attractive kind?
I think the response has been excellent.
FOREIGN TEA (IMPORT).
asked whether His Majesty's Government proposes to impose a duty on foreign tea imported into the United Kingdom equal in amount to the duty imposed on tea exported from India?
The answer is in the negative.
Will a rebate of the tax be given on tea grown within the Empire?
That is clearly a subject for debate on the Finance Bill.
FINANCE OF THE YEAR.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he has decided that it will be necessary to introduce a third Finance Bill in order to renew the tea and other duties, or whether he can make the necessary provision for the finance of the year in the Bill now before the House?
I fear I can at present add nothing to my previous statement on this subject.
Does not the absence of these duties from the Finance Bill make it absolutely necessary that there shall be some action? Will the right hon. Gentleman please tell us?
I can add nothing to the previous answers on the same subject, which have been very full.
FOREIGN LOANS (INCOME TAX).
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer under what Section of what Act of Parliament the Treasury issue instructions to the bankers and agents for foreign loans to deduct Income Tax at a higher rate than authorised by Parliament on payments of interest made after a higher rate has been imposed but for a period chargeable at a lower rate?
No instructions have been issued for the deduction of Income Tax at a higher rate than authorised by Parliament. As regards the assessment of Income Tax on foreign and colonial dividends and interest, I may refer my hon. Friend to Sections 88 and 96 of the Income Tax Act, 1842, Section 2 of the Income Tax (Foreign Dividends) Act, 1842, Section 10 of the Income Tax Act, 1853, Section 36 of the Revenue (No. 2) Act, 1861, Section 9 of the Revenue Act, 1866, Section 5 of the Revenue Act, 1868, and Section 26 of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1885.
LAND CULTIVATION (SUPPLY OF LIME).
asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Agriculture whether, in view of the lapse of the practice of liming the land in Wales and the West and North-West of England, and the consequent loss of fertility in those areas, the Board of Agriculture will arrange with the war agriculture committees, the Agricultural Organisation Committee, and other such bodies for an active propaganda in those districts where the land is most deficient in lime, and, having ascertained the requirements of the farmers, arrange with some central body for the purchase and delivery of a sufficient supply to the most suitable railway stations?
The Board are not prepared to take the action suggested, as most practical farmers are already aware of the advantages to be obtained from the use of lime. The Board have no reason to suppose that farmers are unable to make their own arrangements to satisfy their requirements, and under these circumstances are unwilling to take any action which would involve unnecessary use of rolling stock.
Will the Board of Agriculture make further inquiries into this matter?
The advantages of lime are clearly understood by farmers, and I do not think that action of the kind is necessary.
MALT (EXPORTS).
asked if more licences for the export of malt will be issued, or if the policy previously an nounced of stopping all exports of malt will be adhered to.
The exports of malt from this country are being very severely restricted, I am not aware of any announcement that they will be absolutely stopped.
Will the right hon. Gentleman refer to the answer he gave in this House on 9th December last?
I have done that very carefully.
asked if it is known for what purpose malt is used which is ex ported to Italy; and if malt is exported from Italy to Switzerland?
Malt exported to Italy is consigned to brewers for use in brewing. The export of malt from Italy is prohibited.
MEN CALLED TO COLOURS.
SCHEME OF RELIEF.
asked the Secretary to the Local Government Board whether he is now in a position to state the nature of the arrangements formulated by the Government for enabling those who have been called up or who will be called up for military service to meet their civil liabilities such as rent, rates, insurance, mortgage interest, house-purchase instalments, and school fees?
The general outlines of the Government scheme were described by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on the 25th of April, and subsequently included in the Report of the proceedings at the Secret Session. The details have now been worked out, but no material modification has been made in the scheme since the Prime Minister's announcement.
The scheme will apply to men (other than officers), whether married or unmarried, who have joined the Forces on or after the 4th August, 1914, or are members of the Territorial Force.
Assistance will be given to such men in cases in which serious hardship would be caused to them on account of their inability to meet their financial obligations by reason of their undertaking military service.
The obligations in respect of which assistance, in suitable cases, may be granted are: Rent, interest and installments payable in respect of loans (including mortgages), installments for the purchase of house, business premises, furniture and the like, taxes, rates, insurance premiums, and school fees. No application will be entertained for assistance in discharging ordinary debts.
The maximum amount of assistance which will be granted in any case will not exceed £104 per annum.
Applications for assistance will be made on prescribed forms, which will be obtainable at the Post Offices.
The application must be made by the man himself, unless he is serving abroad, in which case it may be made by any person who is authorized by him or who, in the opinion of the Commissioner dealing with the application, is a proper person so to act.
The applications will be investigated locally by Commissioners, who will hear the cases in private. The Commissioner will not decide the cases. It will be his duty to satisfy himself as to the accuracy of the statements made by the applicants, and to report with recommendations to the Central Committee, by whom the grants will be awarded.
The country has been mapped out into districts corresponding, so far as practicable, with the areas of the Appeal Tribunals. Different arrangements are being made for Ireland, where there are no Appeal Tribunals. Fifty-two Commissioners have been appointed for England and Wales, and twenty for Scotland, and are ready to enter upon their duties. Additional Commissioners will be appointed if it is found that they are needed to cope with the work expeditiously.
The forms of application are being printed, and will probably be available at most of the Post Offices by the end of next week.
Grants will, as a rule, be paid quarterly, and be made payable either to the applicant himself or to such person as he selects.
The grants will be subject to revision, and may be increased (subject to the maximum of £104 per annum) or reduced in accordance with any change in the circumstances of the applicant.
A White Paper containing the Regulations, together with the form of application and other particulars, is being issued, and, I hope, will be in the hands of hon. Members in the course of to-morrow.
With regard to the limit of £104, may I take it that that is irrespective of pay and allowances, including separation allowances?
Yes, my hon. Friend may take it that that is irrespective of separation allowance and pay.
Can this reply be circulated among Members?
The reply will be circulated in the ordinary course, and the White Paper will be available immediately.
Will the Commissioners be paid?
The Commissioners will be paid.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Prime Minister promised the House an opportunity of discussion when the White Paper was issued, and can he say whether the House will get that opportunity before the Paper is in the Post Offices?
That is a question which must obviously be put to the Prime Minister or whoever is acting on his behalf.
May I ask who is leading the House now? We had the assurance, and it is most important we should discuss the proposals before they come into operation.
Is the right hon. Gentleman able to state whether solicitors are to be employed in Scotland, instead of barristers and advocates?
Sheriffs-substitutes and advocates will be appointed in Scotland.
Does this apply to Territorial who were, mobilized on the outbreak of war?
Yes, it applies also to Territorial.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the Government have considered the advisability of substituting local committees instead of expensive barristers?
That has been considered, but there are several reasons why preference has been given to barristers. It was thought that they will act much more judiciously and much more expeditiously.
What will the salary be?
There have been already eight supplementary questions.
MUNITIONS.
CARPENTERS' STRIKE (DUBLIN).
asked the Minister of Munitions whether his attention has been drawn to the recent prosecution under the Munitions Act of sixty-three carpenters in Dublin who went on strike for an increase in their wages of 2d. per hour; if he is aware that the men's trade union served the masters' federation with notice by letter for this increase in December, 1915; that the masters' federation ignored the trade union's letter and did not reply for ten weeks; that the masters' federation refused to deal with the trade union's solicitor; that carpenters engaged in making munitions boxes in controlled shops were not interfered with; that the men prosecuted were not supplied with war badges and were not engaged specially for munitions-box making, portion of their time being spent on ordinary building work having nothing to do with munitions work of any sort; that the carpenters' trade union notified the Board of Trade on the 26th March that they were demanding an increase in wages; and that members of the masters' federation have expressed opinions that they would not have Board of Trade interference; whether he has seen the Board of Trade Return which states that the cost of food has increased 48 per cent.; if so, what steps will he take to compel the masters' federation to arbitrate on the men's demands for this increase in their Wages; and if he is aware that the men's trade union accepted an invitation from the Board of Trade to arbitrate?
My right hon. Friend's attention has been drawn to the dispute referred to by my hon. Friend. I am informed that a prosecution was undertaken by the employers, but that both parties to the dispute agreed within the past few days to leave all differences to the determination of an arbitrator agreed upon by them. I am further informed that the arbitrator has now made an award and it has been accepted by both parties.
ROYAL AGRICULTURAL SHOW (EXHIBITION OF IMPLEMENTS).
asked the Minister of Munitions whether, under his powers he has vetoed the exhibition of agricultural implements at the forthcoming agricultural show; and, if so, whether, seeing the importance of encouraging the use of labour-saving devices, due to the shortage of labour and the need of maintaining the Home supply of food, he will consider the advisability of withdrawing this veto?
It has been found necessary in most cases to prohibit the exhibition of machinery and implements in order to prevent the diversion of plant and labour from the production of munitions. The considerations suggested by the hon. Member were very carefully weighed before action was taken, and the question was fully discussed with the Board of Agriculture and the council of the Royal Agricultural Society. An exception was made in favour of the Annual Royal Agricultural Show at Manchester, where the exhibition of machinery already in stock lias been allowed on condition that no new machinery was manufactured for the show and no orders were taken for new machinery.
CONTROL OF DISTILLERIES.
asked for what purpose the distilleries of patent still whisky are to be stopped working on the 28th May; and if this order applies to the whole of the United Kingdom?
A proportion of the patent still distilleries will stop working on or about the 28th May, to enable them to be adapted under an agreement with the trade for important national purposes in connection with the War.
CLEARANCE LICENCES (FRUIT AND VEGETABLES).
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware of the delay that is now taking place in the issue of licensees for the clearance of fruit and vegetable baskets lying on the quays at Liverpool, Manchester, Hull, and other ports; is he aware that annoyance and irritation is caused by the failure to answer urgent letters concerning the issue of licensees; and will he therefore, in view of the near approach of the soft-fruit season, give the necessary instructions to the Department of Import Restrictions for a more expeditious issue of licensees for dealing with this class of perishable goods?
A number of licensees have been given, and will continue to be given, for such baskets as are urgently necessary for the handling of raw fruit. A certain amount of delay is at present inevitable in view of the pressure under which the Department of Import Restrictions is now working, but I am confident that it will soon be possible to deal more expeditiously with all inquiries. It must not, however, be assumed that persons who have imported prohibited goods without a licensee are entitled to have them released by the Customs on arrival in this country.
AIR SERVICES.
RESPONSIBILITY OF RAILWAY EMPLOYES.
asked whether the recent order issued by the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, Home Forces, in conjunction with the Railway Executive Committee, now throws the whole responsibility upon railway employés to use their own discretion during a hostile raid, but that the railways are to be kept working; and, having regard to the recent legal decision which denied compensation to a railway employé injured whilst on duty during the Hartlepool bombardment, whether he will, as president of the Railway Executive and in view of the order above referred to, make the necessary arrangements to ensure that compensation will be paid in cases where railwaymen are killed or injured as a result of enemy action whilst employed on the companies' premises?
I am considering this matter with the Railway Executive Committee, and I will communicate further with my hon. Friend in the course of the next few days.
RESTRICTION OF IMPORTS.
asked the President of the Board of Trade if he has considered the advisability of appointing an advisory committee, composed of representatives from trades affected, to recommend articles which should and should not be restricted?
I fear that this suggestion is not a practicable one.
asked the President of the Board of Trade if he is aware that the Customs' officials at Glasgow freely admit iron hinges to be imported, and the Customs' officials at Hull refuse to permit such goods to be cleared without licence; and whether he will bring the practice at Hull into conformity with the practice at Glasgow?
The importation of hinges is regarded as prohibited, and the Customs have now been so informed.
asked the President of the Board of Trade if he is prepared to consider restricting the import of such goods as cash registers, wringers, sewing machines, vacuum flasks, typewriters, and other bulky goods of similar nature not absolutely necessary for national welfare or war purposes, and withdrawing restrictions on tool and implement handles and other items not only necessary for national welfare but also for war purposes?
I will consider the suggestions contained in the first part of the question, and, as regards the latter, I would refer my hon. Friend to the answer which I gave on Monday last.
asked the President of the Board of Trade if he is aware that considerable doubt and uncertainty exists both in this country and abroad as to what are the articles the import of which is restricted or prohibited; and if he is prepared to issue a detailed list of restricted or prohibited imports, and see that such list is not only widely published in this country, but also published abroad, as well as circulated through Consuls in different countries, especially in view of the losses imposed on importers who may unwittingly ship goods which are prohibited?
All prohibitions, when announced, and such official interpretations as have been published in the Press, have appeared from time to time in the "Board of Trade Journal," which is regularly sent to His Majesty's Consular officers at all important posts.
GERMAN INTERNED SHIPS.
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he can state the number of German interned ships now in use for British trade; and if he will state the number, if any, that have been allotted for Irish trade?
Twenty-nine German steamers, which were interned in ports in the United Kingdom, are employed in the coasting trade. Coal has been carried by these steamers to Cork, but none of them trade exclusively to Irish ports.
NO-CONSCRIPTION MEETING (SOUTH FINSBURY).
asked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been called to the conduct of the police during a riot at South Place, Finsbury, on Saturday after a No-Conscription meeting; whether he is aware that men and women leaving the meeting were severely and roughly handled by a large crowd which had been allowed to collect, were pelted with stones and struck on the head with sticks, and subjected to abusive language even from the police themselves; and what explanation he can offer for the failure of the authorities to protect unoffending citizens and to preserve reasonable order in the public streets of the capital?
I have made inquiry, and I find that the City Police had made adequate provision for the maintenance of order. The police could not, of course, prevent the crowd from expressing their disapproval of the meeting vocally; but when the throwing of sand and oranges began it was at once stopped by the police, and they took steps to protect the persons leaving the meeting. So far as they know, no stones were thrown or sticks used, and no person made any complaint of being injured.
Shame! They ought to.
INTERNED AUSTRIANS AND GERMANS (EMPLOYMENT).
asked whether bakers of German nationality or extraction living in this country have been allowed to employ interned Germans or Austrians released for that purpose to work for them; and, if so, what he proposes to do to give British bakers an equal chance of obtaining workmen?
I would refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave yesterday to the hon. Member for East Berkshire.
Vivisection.
asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he is aware that the Imperial Institute cannot be lawfully used for any purposes other than those mentioned in the charter of incorporation and specified in the First Schedule of the Imperial Institute (Transfer) Act, 1902, or such other similar purposes as the Colonial Office may determine having regard to the commercial, industrial, and educational interests of the Empire; whether he is advised that such other similar purposes must be purposes ejusdem generis as those set forth in the said Schedule; and whether he is advised that experiments upon living animals are such similar purposes within the meaning of Section 3 of the said Act?
I have no doubt that these questions were fully considered when the University of London was put in occupation of a portion of the Imperial Institute building. I do not feel called upon to define the term "similar purpose" in the Act of 1902, and I do not admit that any breach of trust has been committed.
Has the right hon. Gentleman taken counsel's opinion on this matter, or will he do so, and is he advised that such experiments as those mentioned in the question are for similar purposes-to those set forth in the Schedule to the Act of 1902 within the meaning of the Act, because that is the whole question?
As I have already informed the hon. Member, these questions had to be considered at the time the arrangement was made with the London University. I could take no action except by evicting the university.
Do I understand that the University of London is entitled to break the law?
I hope not; but at all events it is not the duty of the Colonial Office to prevent its doing so.
Will the right hon. Gentleman take the opinion of the counsel of the Crown?
I can see no reason for taking such a step now.
Cab Whistles.
asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he has powers to prohibit the vise of cab whistles in the neighbourhood of hospitals and nursing homes; and will he say generally what are his powers, if any, in this matter?
No such power is vested in me, but a by-law made by various, borough councils makes it an offence to-sound a noisy instrument within a certain distance of a hospital after being requested to desist by a constable; and where this by-law is in force the police take action.
Congested Districts Board, Ireland.
asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland if he is aware that in the distribution of Flynn's Farm, in the Brosna district of county Kerry, parcels of land have been granted by the Congested Districts Board to persons who are already in possession of considerable farms, while claims made on behalf of the only three men in the district who have enlisted in the Army have been ignored; and if he will represent to the Congested Districts Board that in this and other cases a preference should be given to men who have served with His Majesty's Forces during the War? May I also ask what Minister is responsible for answering questions in relation to Ireland during the absence of the Prime Minister?
The Prime Minister has requested me, during the vacancy in the office of Chief Secretary for Ireland, to answer any urgent questions relating to Ireland. The Congested Districts Board state that they cannot supply this information unless further particulars are given as to the name of the estate, the name of the late tenant of the divided farm, and the names of the persons who state that their claims for land were not acceded to, though members of their families are on military service.
Will the right hon. Gentleman state what makes this question more urgent than the questions of earlier date to which no reply has been given?
As a number of my questions are postponed, may I ask whether the right hon. Gentleman will kindly suggest to the Prime Minister that while he remains in Ireland he should visit Cork, as he has visited Belfast, and that he should inquire for himself as to the actual state of things in order to prevent misunderstandings? That course would enable us to get rid of ever so many questions which we have no desire to go on asking.
The questions postponed are questions which would be more properly put to the War Office, as they relate to military matters I have no doubt that the Prime Minister will make himself familiar with the state of affairs in all parts of Ireland, and he will go where he thinks that circumstances make it desirable that he should go.
Will the right hon. Gentleman kindly submit my suggestion to the Prime Minister?
Yes, Sir.
ALEXANDER'S RESTITUTION BILL [Lords].
Reported, without Amendment, from the Select Committee.
Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.
Minutes of Proceedings to be printed.
Bill to be read the third time Tomorrow.
AIR SERVICE.
I beg to move, "That this House urges that His Majesty's Government should without delay take every possible step to make adequate provision for a powerful Air Service."
The House will see that I have made the Resolution on the Notice Paper as wide as possible. I wish to refrain from making anything in the shape of a party attack on the Government, and the Resolution will enable the Debate to be as wide as possible. I do not think that I have spoken on this subject since I moved an Amendment to the Address on the 16th of February last, about three months ago, and the object of my Motion to-day is rather to deal with what has happened from the 16th of February last up to the present time, and prove to the House that no real answer has been made by any Government Department to the contention I put forward in that Debate, that both our Air Services should be unified under a Minister responsible to this House. I have not thought it desirable to put that in my Resolution because I desire to make the discussion as wide as possible, but that will be the conclusion I shall be forced to arrive at before the conclusion of my speech. We have had nearly twenty-two months of War, but I do not propose to go back beyond the commencement of the War period, but I think that the Undersecretary for War will agree that whatever information the Government Departments had before that time, within two months of the beginning of the War the Army and the Navy knew exactly what the possibilities of the Air Services were; they knew what aeroplanes could do, and the early reports of our Field Marshal show conclusively the value which the Army in the field attached to the Air Services. They also knew very soon after the commencement of the War the possibilities of Zeppelin raids and what could take place when Zeppelins arrived over our shores. It is now fifteen months since the first Zeppelin raid, which occurred on 19th January, 1915. Twenty raids occurred prior to the last Debate, and in the intervening three months there have been a large number of Zeppelin raids, amounting in one case to no less than six consecutive nights when Zeppelins arrived over our shores, I do not say unmolested, but at any rate without being entirely brought to book. I must ask the House to allow me to make one or two quotations from speeches made by myself during the War, because I want to make it clear that my condemnation of the Departments concerned arises from the fact that they had ample and definite notice in this House and outside of the actual state of affairs, and I shall ask the House to say that Ministers who have not taken efficient steps in face of the warnings they have received shall not any longer be entrusted with that Service, and that some other Minister should be appointed to take over the duties in which they have failed. I will not go back further than July of last year. On 20th July I said: There has been no real development in the Air Service and in the possibility of what the Air Service can do. They are going on doing what they were doing twelve months ago. They are doing it better, I admit, but it is the same kind of work. There has been no real conception of the possibilities of aerial offence. That was ten months ago to-day. I am asking that there should be immediately provided a sufficiency of powerful fighting machines in order that the Zeppelins may never start from the other side of the North Sea. That was a demand made, not two months ago, but ten months ago, and the object of my speech was to get the Government to realise the enormous possibilities that there were in our Air Service from a fighting point of view. The Prime Minister intervened in that Debate, and he informed us that the Government would be grossly negligent in its duty if it did not make every effort both to extend the mechanical development of the aeroplane and to secure an adequate supply of pilots. Speaking with knowledge and authority, I say that at this moment it is being developed and expanded in every possible way, under the best auspices and the wisest guidance. The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. Tennant) also intervened in the course of the Debate and told us: A policy has been decided upon, and that policy is being carried out as rapidly as it possibly ban be."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th July, 1915, cols. 1351–3, 1367 and 1382.] I assume from the speech of the Prime Minister and the speech of my right hon. Friend the Under-Secretary that the policy that had been decided upon was a policy somewhat in accordance with the demand which I had formulated, because neither of those right hon. Gentleman got up and said: "The hon. Member for Brentford is talking nonsense as to the possibilities of aerial defence." They said nothing of the kind, but admitted, silently it may be, the demand that I had made, and both of them said that everything was being done to carry out a policy which I think I am entitled to assume was a policy somewhat on the lines I had laid down. I do not think I need quote my speech in November, but I pointed out that in the spring there would be an increase of aeroplanes and a recrudescence of aerial offensive on both sides, and I asked my right hon. Friend if he could not, with the assistance of scientific advisers, devote the intervening winter months to the preparation and completion of an up-to-date really powerful aeroplane engine. I asked him to devote himself to a powerful engine, in order that our aviators might go up and fight the Germans on a machine which was equal to the German machine. The right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty replied on behalf of the Government and told us, and I think quite rightly, that it all depended upon munitions. They are improving every day. They are much more formidable now than they were, and they will be much more formidable than they are. He promised us that there would be a much more formidable increase in munitions of war as applied to the Air Service. With regard to the absence of antiaircraft guns, the right hon. Gentleman said: The House must accept that as an unfortunate fact, which is being remedied, which has for months been in process of being remedied, is from day to day improving, and will get right I, hope, before a not very long time. That was six months ago and I am told that many months after that a wooden gun was put up at a certain place. It was admitted in a subsequent Debate that we were short of anti-aircraft guns. I want to call attention to another paragraph in the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty which shows, I think, an absolute misconception on his part of what an aerial offensive might become. He told us that the time might come when An aeroplane, starting from the shores of Norfolk, might become a menace and a terror on the banks of the Rhine. But that time is not yet, and there is no use our pretending that it is"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, llth November, 1915, cols. 1384 and 1387.] We had then been fifteen months at war, and he told us that some time or other an aeroplane might become a menace on the banks of the Rhine, but it was not yet. He would not, however, go so far as to say that it never would be in our lifetime. That is the kind of speech and the type of mind which is not suitable to the inauguration and completion of a great new system, such as our Air Service. Everything was being done both in July and November of last year. What was the defence in February of this year? I was dealing then with defence against Zeppelins by aeroplanes. My right hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for War assumed a complete surprise. He said that aeroplanes were intended for fighting purposes only, and not for defensive purposes against Zeppelin raids.
made an observation which was inaudible in the Reporters' Gallery.
I beg the right hon. Gentleman's pardon, I take this out of his speech. He told us that there were four purposes for which aeroplanes would be used, and he went on to say that they were never intended for defensive purposes against Zeppelin raids. This was a new proposal in February, 1916. My right hon. Friend had never heard of the "hornets" speech of my right hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Churchill) more than two years ago. I am not going to read it. The "hornet" is here, and perhaps he will be able to tell us something about it. More than two years ago my right hon. and gallant Friend knew that aeroplanes were to be used as an offensive weapon against Zeppelins. I cannot help thinking that the Under-Secretary would not have made this speech in February if he had realised that two years previously the First Lord of the Admiralty had told us that aeroplanes were to be used in a swarm as a defence against Zeppelins. At all events, the right hon. Gentleman opposite knew that thirteen months before aeroplanes had gone up against Zeppelins, and he knew that one Zeppelin at any rate had been successfully attacked by an aeroplane, and that it was at least possible that aeroplanes, could be a good defence against Zeppelin, raids. There is one more quotation I am going to make, and I hope it will be the last. I hope that arrangements will be made to render unnecessary these constant attempts to "ginger" the Government: We do not require a Debate like this; we do not require an Amendment to the Address; we do not require invective against the Government to make us put forth our best efforts."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th February, 1916, col. 109.] It seems to me that is exactly what the Government have required and needed.
4.0 P.M.
I really tremble to think what would have happened to the Air Service if, during the last few years, a small body of Members had not tried to ginger the Government. The First Lord of the Admiralty, in spite of his speech six months ago, in which we were told that the difficulty was being remedied and the guns were coming forward, comes down again and says, "We have not got the guns. The Navy and the Army have not got all the guns they want, and how can we expect that the aeroplanes shall have them?" I almost despair of trying to get the right hon. Gentleman to realise what is needed for our aeroplane service. He is splendid and the Board of Admiralty are splendid with regard to "Dreadnoughts" and naval affairs generally, but they do not realise the possibilities of this Air Service. I do not think they like it. They look at it as an excrescence on the Navy which will be got rid of sooner or later. May I give the House one or two instances with regard to the warnings the Government have had on this question of antiaircraft guns. Some three years ago a captain in the Royal Field Artillery wrote to the Board of Ordnance warning them that the anti-aircraft guns were not satisfactory. He put a proposal before them for an improved gun. He warned them that the pom-poms were of no use against Zeppelins or aeroplanes, and yet we have been using them and are still doing so in certain parts of the country. How did they treat that warning? A member of the Board wrote to him: Your invention is the cleverest that has come before the Board in my time. Do work at it and press it. After that he set to to improve the plans. He saw the Board several times, and was asked for drawings, and night after night after battles and fighting in the trenches he sat down in his dug-out and perfected his plan for an anti-aircraft gun. He came back home and worked at the Ordnance Board for six days. The Munitions Board wrote and asked if he could not be spared to stay over here and perfect his invention, and the Army authorities replied that he was needed at the front and they could not spare him in order that he might perfect at home this very important invention. He went back again to the front and was continually engaged in fighting until September or October last year, when he came back. He again went down to the Board about his invention, but it was of no avail, and when he got back to the front he wrote in exasperation, and said: Is the Army going to take up this proposal for an improved anti-aircraft gun? In six weeks time he got a letter in reply, and the answer was "No." I do not know whether his improvement is a good one or not. I am not here to say anything about that. The case is to be investigated by the right hon. Gentleman, but the fact remains that for nearly three years this improvement in anti-aircraft gunnery was before the authorities, and in the end the officer gets an answer in the negative.
Can the hon. Gentleman say what class of invention it is?
I am prepared to tell the Government what it is, but I do not think I ought to state it openly in the House. It is the invention of an officer who is serving at the front at the present time.
Perhaps I may be permitted to ask to what Board he wrote. Was it the Ordnance Board or the Board of Invention?
The Ordnance Board.
I understand that that is under the Ministry of Munitions.
Yes, and the Ministry of Munitions asked that this officer should be allowed to stay at home in order to perfect his invention. I am not going to suggest, and I do not suggest, that an improvement has not taken place in the Anti-Aircraft Service. A very great improvement has taken place in many respects. My right hon. Friend asked me during the last Debate to go over to Horse Guards and see the arrangements in regard to the defences of London. I went, of course, and I say unhesitatingly—I am not going to describe what I saw—very great improvements have taken place in regard to notification, telephones, and so on.
Hear, hear!
My right hon. Friend applauds the statement. It is only fair to say that the officer who showed me round pointed out with very great pride that all the improvements that had been made had been effected since January of this year. But we have been trying to get these improvements, not since January, 1915, but since January, 1914. That is my complaint. I admit that something has been done. If nothing had been done, why, good gracious, the right hon. Gentleman would have been hung up on a lamp-post long before now. I repeat a great improvement has taken place. But the point I am trying to make is that all through there has been delay of some kind somewhere. It is not easy for a private Member to put his finger on the exact Government Department and point out where the delay takes place, but the very fact that the arrangements for the defence of London with regard to Zeppelin raids were not put on an efficient basis until thirteen or fourteen months after the first raid took place is a condemnation of somebody in the Government. I am prepared to admit that the defence of London against Zeppelin raids is, as far as one can see at the present moment, very efficient indeed; but the very fact that it has been made efficient is a condemnation of somebody who was responsible or is responsible for the defence against Zeppelin raids, and the men and women who suffered six months ago from those raids are entitled to say to the Government, "The very fact that you have now put London in a proper state of defence shows that you are responsible for the deaths that occurred on the occasion of those raids."
But apart from London, as I think the House will admit, the position in the country is not nearly as satisfactory. The right hon. Gentleman told us that the whole country could not be fortified. That is perfectly true. But much more could be done than is being done by means of mobile anti-aircraft guns, if you have efficient anti-aircraft gunnery corps of a mobile character. Take that particular section on the East Coast from the Wash down to the Thames. I do not propose to set out the whole scheme, but I do suggest that some fifty or sixty decent guns, with decent searchlights, on mobile forms of traction, would be a sufficient defence against Zeppelins coming over. I put it to the right hon. Gentleman that that is not a new scheme; it is not a scheme I have adumbrated for the first time. It has already been put before the Government; it has been approved of by a gentleman in a high position who was responsible some little time ago for certain of the gunnery defences of London. Why has it not been carried out?
Who says it has not?
I do.
You are wrong.
What we want to know is, has it been carried out?
The right hon. Gentleman will have an opportunity of replying. I would like to tell him that a certain anti-aircraft gunnery corps, of which I spoke three months ago, is still in the Eastern Counties to-day armed with the same pom-poms and the same maxims. It is quite true they have had a certain number of new guns which were sent to them soon after the last Debate. These guns are machine guns, but if they are to be fired with the ordinary machine-gun ammunition they are of no use against Zeppelins. If they are to be fired with a particular class of ammunition, then I may tell the right hon. Gentleman they have not got that particular ammunition to this day. These guns were sent round to the Eastern Counties months ago to fire a certain form of ammunition which has not yet been supplied. I say, if there were an Air Minister who was responsible for that, he could be called over the coals in this House. Why should there be any necessity for this constant backwards and forwards sea-sawing between the Army and the Navy? Why should we really not know who is responsible? I want to go one step further with regard to these guns. I referred to them on the last occasion, and I am going to tell the right hon. Gentleman that if proper guns had been provided for the corps, in all probability Zeppelins would have been brought down six or eight months ago. Let me quote, with regard to one or two raids, the OFFICIAL REPORT. The raids were on the East Coast, and the Report says: Gun Commanders report that Zeppelin was a splendid target, and more powerful guns would almost certainly have caused considerable damage. I will not say publicly where some of these guns are at the present time, but I want to read to the House another letter sent to one of my colleagues. It is from a gunner, who wrote quite recently:— We feel strongly about the almost criminal folly of leaving a fairly useful and exceedingly well-trained body of men to kick their heels about, armed only with antiquated pom-poms and maxims, guns which, even if they were up to date, are perfectly useless for our purpose. The members of these corps, keen, eager, and anxious as they are to take their part in the defence of the country, complain that they have not yet been given the guns which the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty told us months ago were being remedied and pressed forward. The real trouble both here and abroad with regard to our Services is the lack of imagination in the official heads of the Services in this House as to the possibilities of what can be done with regard to air raids. My right hon. Friend has recently rather congratulated himself, as we have seen in the public Press, on our having brought down a number of foreign airmen. I am prepared to stand here and say we have not yet got command of the air at the front. In the earlier part of the War, it is true, we had, but that was due to the bravery of our men and in spite of the inadequate machines with which they were provided with which to beat the Germans. But here and now I say we have not got command. If the House will bear with me, I would like to read one or two extracts from letters in regard to this matter by men who are fighting. Here is one from the front: We have had further illustration of our not having the mastery of the air. Three days ago bombs fell all round our billets. Squadrons of Taubes came practically without interference in full daylight and returned when they had done to their own country. The German Fokker machine has been in active business for a very long time now—I suppose a year—and has of late increased and multiplied so far that its depredations have compelled the attention of the authorities. Such fighting machines as we have been in possession of until now have been fast enough in their way.
Is that from an Infantry officer?
Yes, from a captain in the Royal Flying Corps who has already received a Military Cross for bravery in this War. He was over here not very long ago, and he wrote a letter with regard to the condition of our flying grounds with regard to Zeppelin raids. Perhaps I had better not read the whole of the letter, because it might give information to the enemy, but with regard to the mastery of the air it gives no information of use to the enemy, and it is only right that the House should know the views of an authority upon this matter. This officer is flying every day. He says: At the front the tales you are told about our mastery of the air are known by all of us out here to be absolutely incorrect. We have not got the mastery. We have the pluck, we have not got the machines. It may soothe the British public's mind, but we airmen know the truth. That is not a satisfactory position. That is not really a position in which we ought to put our men, gallant as they are. This man is a gallant man, and is a Military Cross officer. Later than this and only the other day there was another case. A young officer went up to make a reconnaisance on one of our machines about which I have been complaining for months past. It was a good machine in its way, but was not suitable to meet the Germans because it was not fast enough. He went up to do his reconnaisance. He was above the clouds, he came back, and on his return said he had seen nothing. His superior officer said: Why do you not go beneath the clouds? They are only 3,000 feet? He said: No, Sir, not on this machine. If I had a fast machine I would go, but this machine is not fast enough, and it is too dangerous to do it at that height. After this discussion the superior officer said that he would go himself. He was a brave man. He went up, and within ten minutes he was shot dead.
( sitting below the Bar ): Shame!
That was because the machine was not sufficiently quick enough to enable him to escape the German guns.
I must inform the hon. Member for East Hertfordshire (Mr. Billing) that, as he is sitting outside the House, he must not make any interruption. If he wishes to interrupt, he must come inside the House, which is the proper place.
( from inside the House ): I was not aware that I was outside the House. I will exercise the privilege of remaining inside the House, so that I may maintain the privilege of making any comment I think fit.
That was why I informed the hon. Member, and asked him to come in.
Here is another letter, not sent to me, but sent to one of my colleagues on these benches: Will you take part in pressing upon the Government the necessity of supplying our airmen with higher power machines, so as to enable them to fight the German machines on equal terms. At present there are four German machines which are faster than the machines on which my son is every day being sent up. That letter was handed to me. Before I could use it, I wrote to the father and asked him whether I should be absolutely safe—he is a man occupying a high position, and his name would be well known here—in using that letter, and whether he could give the names of the four machines. He sent me a letter this morning giving the names of the four German machines, all of which are superior to the machines on which our men are sent up. I myself have been out to the front and seen the organisation of our Air Service there. It is splendid, I do not dispute that for a moment. The organisation is good, the men are good, and the machines of a type are good. They are magnificent machines, but they are not fast enough, and have not sufficiently high engine power. I saw any number of new machines, all of the same old type of machines that we used when the War began, with the same old engines of eighty-five, ninety, and ninety-five horsepower. What I have been trying to impress, time and time again, is that you cannot meet a German machine of 150 horse-power with an English machine of 90 or 95 horse-power. That is my whole case against the Flying Corps, as I told the right hon. Gentleman in private conference some time ago. What I want is to have someone in charge of the Air Service who will stop the making of these machines. My right hon. Friend knows that a contract was given a little time ago to an English firm for 1,000 90 horsepower engines. They are being pressed for delivery still. Why is not that contract scrapped at once and a new contract entered into, not for 95 horse-power machines, but for 200 horse-power machines? I know that there are other higher horse-power machines being built, but what is the good of turning out 1,000 engines of 95 or 90 horse-power?
Up till now our machines have been, maids-of-all-work. They have had to carry a pilot, an observer, one or two guns, ammunition, a few bombs here and there, photographic apparatus, and wireless equipment. No wonder they are called Christmas trees at the front. They are decked all over with all kinds of these things, and they cannot go more than the certain number of miles per hour they went at the beginning of the War. I have no time to describe them. My right hon. Friend knows the types of machines we must have if we are to win the battle in the air. We want at least four types, of machines, not in tens or dozens or twenties, but some of them in hundreds. These machines can be made in England. The other day I heard of an excellent machine, a new machine, which I am told is going to be made and which can go, as I have asked for years in this House it should be able to go, from Dunkirk to Essen and back again. The other day I asked a gallant young officer whether, if I could give him 100 machines capable of flying from Dunkirk to Essen and of bombing Essen or the Rhine bridges, he could find 100 pilots to volunteer to do it. The young fellow's eyes blazed up and he said, "Good God! Yes" The young men in the Flying Corps are anxious to do it. They only lack sufficiently high-power machines. We want these machines, not merely in scores, but in hundreds. There is no harm in mentioning the fact that one big firm in France recently had an order for 2,500 machines, and at the present time they have a thousand machines in reserve at their works which have not yet been delivered to the French Army. Who ever heard of an order of that kind being given to one of our British firms? Some English firms have told me that they could do more than they are doing, that they could put up bigger works and turn out more machines. It is not a lack of ability, it is a lack of imagination in high quarters.
I know that hon. Members may think I am a fanatic on this question, but may I ask the House to realise what the position would be if we had the command of the air at the front? I am not really so much concerned about the defence against Zeppelins here, because the real defence is at the front in Flanders and in Germany. If we had our proper defences there we should not hear much more of Zeppelin raids here. If we had the real command of the air in Flanders we should come very much nearer to ending the War. There would be no German reconnaisance, they would know nothing of what we were doing behind our lines, their artillery would be blind, they could not tell the effects of their gunnery, and they would not know where our batteries were. It is giving no secret away to say that one knows that the artillery fire is directed by the Air Service. If the Germans cannot tell where our fire comes from they send an aeroplane over to locate or spot one of our batteries. I will give an instance. A little time ago an aeroplane was hovering over one of our batteries—one of the officers told me this himself—and by a strange piece of good luck they got hold of the tune of his wireless, so that the battery actually heard this German machine wirelessing back to his own batteries the exact location of the British battery. An hour or two afterwards the battery was very heavily bombarded by about 150 shells. Naturally the Germans did not gain anything by it, because our men, knowing what was coming, got to ground, and the only actual loss caused by that bombardment was one thermometer, which was broken. That is how the fighting takes place. The aeroplanes communicate by wireless exactly where the batteries are placed. If we had the command of the air the Germans could be completely blinded.
Does the hon. Gentleman suppose that our aeroplanes do not do the same thing in hundreds of cases, as compared with the ten cases of the Germans?
Of course they do. The right hon. Gentleman either does not or will not recognise that my argument is directed to a heavy offensive movement which will give us command of the air. My complaint is that the political heads do not seem to realise what command of the air means. It would mean the blinding of the German Army. It would mean that we should have reconnaissance work, that we should see everything and be able to place our batteries exactly where we wished, and that we should be able to send raids on the German lines of communications, not merely with twenty or thirty aeroplanes—what I want is 500 to-day, 500 to-morrow, and 500 the next day. What would be the result of that? The absolute command of the air. The German lines of communication, the German, batteries, the German stations, the German trains, the German convoys, the German ammunition columns—everything would be bombed flat, and I want my right hon. Friends who are responsible for the Air Service to realise this, and to give the country at least the opportunity of trying whether it is feasible. It would, not cost much compared with the cost of the War. We are spending £5,000,000 a day. This could be done for £10,000,000. You may say it would not succeed—I believe that is the attitude of a great many people—but at least it could be tried, and there should be a possibility of trying it.
In conclusion, I want to ask whether we are to go on permitting those who have been responsible for the position of affairs up to date to still go on managing them or whether we are to have a new head for the Air Services? We have had Sir Percy Scott, Lord Kitchener, Lord French, Lord Derby, Lord Montagu and my right hon. Friend himself, and we see the position of affairs to-day. What we want is somebody who will take charge of the Services, who will amalgamate them and who will prevent friction, for friction does go on at the present time. We want somebody who will prevent competition in regard to the supply of machines, who will take charge of the factory which is spending over £10,000 a week in wages to-day, the factory whose head is paid the salary of a field-marshal. That factory is hated both by the Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Service, and it is a factory which many of our best flying officers regard as being a hindrance rather than a help, except from the experimental point of view, in regard to which it is doing quite good work. We are told by the public Press that something is going to be done and that some announcement is going to be made to-day. It is very difficult to speak of the possibilities or probabilities when we do not know what is going to happen; but I want to warn my right hon. Friend that no mere reconstruction of previous Committees will do any good in regard to this question. We do not want Committees, and we do not want a man of the eminence of Lord Curzon sitting as chairman of a Committee, perhaps two or three days a week, and thereby wasting his time, in the same way that Lord Derby and Lord Montagu wasted their time when they were on that Committee. Personally I desire to guard myself from supposing that Lord Curzon would not make an efficient Air Minister. The question is whether he is going to have the power which will make him an efficient Air Minister. I agree that we must have a civilian because if you put an Army man the Navy will not like it, and if you put a naval man the Army will not like it. May I appeal to the Government not to make another board or another committee, but to put some man in charge who will be responsible, some man with a, reputation to lose, and not a man who wants to make his reputation. It is going to be a dangerous and difficult business. It is going to be a business in which failure is quite possible, a business which a man would only take if he is prepared to risk his reputation for the good of his country.
I beg to second the Motion.
I cannot profess to the expert knowledge of my hon. Friend, but I desire to say a few words from the point of view of the ordinary Member. There has never been a time when the responsibility cast upon the ordinary Member is as great as it is to-day, partly because our numbers are very much reduced—gallantly reduced—by absence at the front, partly because the decisions are so momentous, partly because we run the risk, if we say nothing, of being joined in responsibility for serious trouble, partly because if we take the other course and criticise, or demonstrate what we think is going wrong we lay ourselves open to the attack that we are trying to hamper, or possibly defeat the Government. Therefore the responsibility of the private Member in these circumstances is a great one. I want it to be quite clear that the last thought in my mind is that any criticism of mine should in any way be calculated to impede the Government in their work. We all want to give more strength to the Government rather than the reverse. I think all who listened to my hon. Friend's speech must have felt that it is difficult for the Government to justify a good deal of what has been done, or not done, in the last ten or twelve months. With most of my hon. Friend's remarks I am entirely in agreement but with one in particular, and that is that this question of defence and offence in the air has got to be settled mainly at the front, and not in this country. We are all agreed about that. No one who has studied the strategy or the tactics of the War can doubt that for a minute. At the same time I want to say a word on a side of the subject which has not been so much emphasised by my hon. Friend. There is, undoubtedly, an uneasy feeling in many parts of the country with regard to the question of defence against air attacks, and it is desirable that that uneasy feeling should be recognised. We are told that the defences of London are now in a very much stronger position. We in London heartily welcome that state of affairs, but we are given very little information as the position of affairs in other parts of the country. We bear in mind the words of the Under-Secretary which he used on 16th February last: It is not really a feasible method of defence to say that all parts of this country are capable of protection against this particular class of warfare. To say that would be misleading the public. It is not possible. I represent a Constituency in Lancashire, where we are a good deal concerned about these words of the Under-Secretary. We feel some doubt whether possibly we may be a locality where those words apply, and when the fact that I was to take part in this Debate was announced, I received telegrams from the mayors of Salford and Manchester dealing with this very point. I will read one to the House. The Mayor of Salford wires: Salford inhabitants are very concerned as to air defences in this district. Hope you will urge Government to take adequate steps. I have received a similar telegram from the Lord Mayor of Manchester in considerably stronger terms. I will show it to the right hon. Gentleman, if I may. I will not read it, because it contains one or two statements which, I think, might possibly be characterised as conveying1 information which had better not be conveyed to the other side. But there is a very considerable feeling of uneasiness. Do not let anyone imagine I am suggesting there is panic, or anything of that kind, because there is not. One of the most gratifying effects of the Zeppelin raids in London was to show that, whatever happens, there will not be any feeling of panic. What we ask is that the Government should take all possible steps to secure us against attack.
Apart from the question of local defence, the position of the ordinary man in the street and the ordinary humble private Member is this. All these points have been raised over and over again—the question of a certain amount of apparently misleading statements to the House and the question of vacillation. For instance, in December and in January it was so difficult to find out who really was in charge—the Army or the Navy; the question of what sort of defence the higher authorities really have in mind as against Zeppelins—whether it is to take the form of Zeppelins of our own—they apparently never have been tried. It is true we have baby Zeppelins—sausages, so-called—but we have never had big Zeppelins. One was told at one time that the trouble was that the hangars were going to be very costly. Considering we are spending £5,000,000 a day, this question of whether Zeppelins or any other form of defence are going to cost £10,000,000 or £15,000,000 is really a bagatelle. Then also we bear in mind the promise of the right hon. Gentleman (Colonel Churchill), that: A contract has been made with Messrs. Vickers for one large and three smaller non-rigid dirigible airships. The rigid is approximately a Zeppelin of the British type. I am glad to see he is here to-day, and I have no doubt he will be able to deal with that promise. The promise was undoubtedly made, and it carried a certain amount of comfort to the breasts of a good many of us, but as far as I am aware nothing in the way of a Zeppelin fleet has really ever been contemplated. Then there is the question of the guns—either no guns, or not sufficient guns—maxims and pom-poms. I do not want to give details—I have had a good many letters relating to these matters—but what has been said already quite establishes the position that either the guns are not there or they are not guns of the type which are really efficient for the purposes of defence. Then we have the difficulty about the aeroplanes themselves—the type of engine. I, too, like my hon. Friend (Mr. Joynson-Hicks), went to the front and visited a battalion, with the raising of which I was connected, and the same impression prevailed in that portion of the line which I visited, that our machines are not really of the efficient type which we ought to purchase, and in which we ought to send our gallant men up. There is the question of co-ordination and co-operation between the two Services, to which attention has been drawn so often. Surely by this time we as a business nation ought to have been able to deal with that difficulty. It is a matter of common knowledge that Lord Curzon has had an inquiry and something is going to be done. We are all waiting anxiously for the announcement of what is going to be done. But surely we are entitled to say this to the Government: "It was perfectly open for you to have done this ten or twelve months ago. The-reason for doing it was just as urgent then as it is now," and without doing or saying anything which can impede them in the course of their conduct of the War, we urge them to put an end to this kind of proceeding with regard to the whole Service. We urge them to definitely adopt an energetic, a large, if you like an expensive policy, but at any rate a policy which will give us the best means of offence and defence, and which will enable us to feel that when our magnificent and heroic Flying Corps go up and undertake their perilous task, they are flying in machine which are the best that money and brains, can produce.
The hon. Member (Mr. Joynson-Hicks) has given the House a historic survey of a good many discussions which have taken place in this House and warnings which he himself has given to the Government as to the desirability of taking further steps for the improvement of the Air Service of the country, and he complained that a speech which he had made on 16th February, which was one of his greatest triumphs, has received no answer. If I were not, to use the classic language of the motor trade, a shock absorber, I should really fee surprised at that statement. I have received so many similar shocks from various quarters of the House that I may well claim that title. Indeed, I have made many speeches since 16th February on the subject, and I should like the hon. Member, who I am afraid was ill at the time, to look at one of them—I am not fond of quoting my own speeches; he has a greater taste for that than I have—which I made on the introduction of the Army Estimates at the beginning of March, when I described at great length what had been done, what improvements had been achieved, what we could hope for and the difficulties which we had actually overcome. Since then the hon. Member (Mr. Billing) has, on two or three occasions, attacked the Government, and it has been my duty—not always a pleasing one—to respond, and, I think, I have given the House a very great deal of information on this subject. I am a little surprised that the hon. Member (Mr. Joynson-Hicks) should not have been a little more handsome in acknowledging the improvements which have been made. He was handsome—I do not want to mislead him as to what my feelings are—as to the development of what has been done at the Horse Guards, with regard to information and, I think, to guns, but, with regard to other matters, I do not think he was quite fully appreciative, from my point of view, of the successes which have been achieved. There has been this vast extension and enormous development in our Service. Another complaint which is made, and which the hon. Member made long ago, that we have done nothing, is really very wide of the mark, and will not bear examination for a moment. I have one other complaint against my hon. Friend, and that is that he brings forward statements from various sources, letters and so forth, making complaints and allegations which he must know, if he reflects, it is impossible for me to answer. Not that there is not an answer, because there is, but it is impossible for anyone with a responsible position in the Government to divulge facts and give information which it would be very undesirable to give. I do ask the House to believe me when I say it is not a subterfuge, and that there are many things which I could say which I ought not to say, and which it would be very improper for me to say. That is a genuine grievance which I have against my hon. Friend. Of course the House will realise that if I have to choose between incurring a certain amount of odium; and giving information to the enemy, I would rather receive all the odium which may fall upon me.
The hon. Gentleman dealt in some detail, and I am afraid it is necessary for me to go into it, with what has been done at home. I would like the House to realise that the system of warnings which has been set up and which we have adopted for Home defence is now complete. We can tell in any place in the country what is anticipated. In regard to guns and lights, which was a point dealt with at considerable length by the hon. Gentleman, I do not want to say that we have all the guns we want—I cannot say that—but I say we are getting them, and there has been a very great improvement. On this point I may say that I do not think it is at all proper for persons who are in the employment of the State to make the kind of allegations which have reached my hon. Friend. I think that is a kind of thing which ought not to be encouraged. Complaints by serving soldiers, complaints by persons in the service of His Majesty, ventilated in a manner and used as a stick with which to beat the Government—surely that is not a thing which ought to be encouraged.
I think my right hon. Friend is a little unfair. I have not used this as a stick to beat the Government. I have not brought up a Vote of Censure to-day. I have put on the Paper a very wide Resolution and my sole object, without party considerations, is to improve the condition of the Air Service.
I withdraw that, if my hon. Friend wishes me to do so, and if he takes exception to what I say. Let me say, not a stick to beat the Government, but arguments and statements made for the encouragement of the Government. At any rate, I do not think that we ought to encourage these sort of statements from people who are in the service of the Crown.
How are we to get the information?
One statement made by the hon. Gentleman to which I take exception is that the mobile guns have not been adopted by the Government. He is quite misinformed if he thinks that is so. Again, I say I cannot go into details of what we have got; it would not be proper. Suffice it, that the hon. Member is misinformed on that subject. I do not say that we have got all we want. I do not wish to mislead the House. I can state, however, in regard to guns and gunnery, that we have established a school of gunnery for officers, with a special course of instruction. We have various types of guns in use, and men are trained on guns which they will use. I understood the hon. Gentleman to say that was not so. I do not know whether I have misunderstood him.
I never said anything of the kind.
I understood the hon. Member to say that the officers were trained in the use of guns which they would not use.
I never mentioned anything of the kind.
Perhaps the hon. Member will forgive me. I could not catch what he said. The hon. Member dealt at considerable length with the command of the air. He said that we utilise our flying machines for every kind of purpose; that we use one machine for all purposes. He really is mistaken there. We have various machines—machines of every kind. I do not know exactly what the hon. Gentleman means when he uses the phrase "the supremacy of Great Britain in the air." If he means that no German machine shall be allowed to go up into the air at all I think he is asking for a very great deal.
The right hon. Gentleman asks me what I mean. I mean in regard to the air exactly what everybody means by the supremacy of the British Navy on the seas.
I do not want to say what I do not think is absolutely true, but I do say that it is very far from the truth to state that the Germans have got the supremacy of the air. I believe, on the other hand, that we have a very large measure of supremacy of the air, and that in the great majority of combats which take place in the air we are the winners, and not the losers.
Hear, hear!
As to reconnaissance and wireless, the hon. Member told the House an interesting story, which is one of the commonplaces of every-day action in hundreds of instances by our machines. We do an infinite amount more reconnaissance work than the Germans have ever done in spotting artillery. I am informed that we have at the present moment two types of aeroplanes faster than anything possessed by the Germans, and we have two other types as fast as their fastest. I make the hon. Gentleman a present of that and ask him to investigate it and see if it is not true. That is the information which is given to me. If these are facts, and I believe them to be true—
How many have you?
I am not able to give that information, nor do I think it desirable to do so. We have, however, two types faster than anything the Germans have, and we have two types as fast as their fastest, forbye, as they say in my country.
Two types faster than the fastest possessed by the Germans?
Yes. I want to say another word in regard to what my hon. Friend said about landing grounds. He made a complaint, when he spoke on a previous occasion, that we had not a sufficient number of landing grounds for night flying. Probably he did not say that to-day, because he knows that that defect—if it were a defect—has been remedied. We have a sufficient number of landing places. Arrangements have been made and are made by those who are practical flyers, and they use the grounds at night. We have provided these facilities with the approval of the pilots, and if my hon. Friend thinks that that is not a correct statement, and is a too sweeping statement, we are quite prepared to have the matter inquired into by the Committee of Inquiry which, as the House knows, has been set up. Before I pass to the statement of what we are prepared to do, I cannot pass by in silence the correspondence which I have seen in this morning's newspapers in relation to that matter. The hon. Member for East Herts (Mr. Pemberton Billing), on whose charges I asked the Prime Minister to set up a Committee of Inquiry—a judicial body, as I called it at the time I announced it—declines to give evidence before the Committee on two or three grounds. One ground, that the Committee does not include an inquiry into the Royal Naval Air Service, as to which my right hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty may have something to say. Secondly, on the ground of the composition of the Committee of Inquiry. Thirdly, because, I think, he was not consulted as to the composition of the Committee, and as to the gentlemen who were asked to serve upon it; and, fourthly, because it is proposed that some parts of the evidence should not be given to the public. In regard to the composition of the Committee I am responsible, and if anybody has any ground for complaint let them lay it upon me. I said at the time that I would set up a small judicial body to investigate certain charges of murder. I have done my best to obtain the most reliable gentlemen accustomed to sift evidence, to be helped and guided in mechanical, engineering, and technical difficulties by two engineers of great experience and great ability, and I cannot see how it would be possible to improve the composition of that Committee.
Quite easily.
made a remark which was not audible in the Reporters' Gallery.
I regret that I did not consult my hon. Friend the Member for East Edinburgh. If I had done so, perhaps I should have got something valuable.
You should have consulted the House.
It has been suggested to me that some of our practical flying men ought to have been put upon the Committee. I would ask the House to consider what that means. What practical flying man is there who is not rendering much better service to the State at the present moment than by sitting on a Committee of Inquiry to investigate charges made by a Gentleman who has lately been added to the Members of this House?
Mr. BILLING rose—
He won a seat anyhow.
Yes, and my hon. Friend has even won a seat.
again rose—
The hon. Member is not entitled—
On a point of Order—
Sit down!
On a point of Order—
I must inform the hon. Member that he is not entitled to rise and to interrupt any other hon. Member during his speech unless he wishes to raise a point of Order. If he wishes to raise a point of Order, I will hear what his point of Order is. I must also inform the hon. Member that when I am on my feet he is out of order in rising, and if he insists in standing when I am on my feet I shall have to call upon him to withdraw.
On a point of Order. I would like to know whether it is in order for the right hon. Gentleman to use this opportunity of adding to the already very regrettable methods adopted by Sir John Boraston and others of casting innuendoes at me for having been able to defeat the two party machines?
The hon. Member will have an opportunity later on, of which he will avail himself, no doubt, as he has done in the past, to making such charges and replies as may seem good to him.
5.0 P.M.
I am a little surprised at the hon. Gentleman's remark as to innuendoes. I made a most plain, straightforward statement, that the hon. Gentleman was lately added to the Members of this House. I do not know on what ground he takes exception to that statement of fact. Before I leave this question of superiority in the air, I would like to say that the Fokker machine which was captured not very long ago was a new machine, and, of course, been tried by our own airmen. I could give, and will give the hon. Gentleman in private, the information which we obtained from our own pilot himself. I have refrained from doing that for obvious reasons, but I will give just two sentences of what our own pilot, who flew the Fokker machine, said: The speed of the machine is practically the same as that of an 80 horse-power Morane scout with deflector propeller, but the climb is not nearly so fast. The pilot who flew it to-day reported that the lateral control is not good and that the fore and aft control1 is distinctly bad. It is stated that it is a difficult machine on which to teach pupils to fly. When the interruption occurred I was dealing with the composition of the Committee. I only want to say one other word about that—that pilots who are now engaged in the fighting services ought not to be taken away from those important services to sit upon a Board or Committee, and, moreover, it would not surely be in accordance with our ideas of what is correct in matters of discipline in the Army to place a junior officer to sit in judgment upon a superior officer. The question whether all the proceedings of the Committee can be conducted in public or not is a matter for the chairman to decide. It might be very important that secrets which might be of assistance to the enemy should not be allowed to leak out.
No doubt the House is impatient to know what it is we propose to do. It has been arranged that an Air Board shall be constituted on the following lines: It shall be composed of a president, who shall be a Cabinet Minister, with a naval representative, who shall either be a member of the Board of Admiralty or shall be present at its meetings when matters connected with work of the Air Board are under discussion. There shall be an additional naval representative, who need not always be the same individual. There shall be one military representative, who shall be a member of the Army Council, and an additional military representative, who need not always be the same individual. There shall also be a member of independent administrative experience, and a Parliamentary representative in the other House from the House in which the president sits. The Board will be an advisory board in relation to its president. That is, its decisions will not be arrived at by voting. The Board shall be free to discuss matters of general policy in relation to the air.
Will the right hon. Gentleman mind reading out the powers rather slowly, so that Members may take notes?
Certainly. The Board shall be free to discuss matters of general policy in relation to the air and in particular combined operations of the Naval and Military Air Services, and to make recommendations to the Admiralty and War Office thereon. The Board shall be free to discuss and make recommendations upon the types of machines required for the Naval and Military Air Services. If either the Admiratly or the War Office decline to act upon the recommendations of the Board, the president shall be free to refer the question to the War Committee.
Will he be bound to refer it?
Presumably he would not. The Board shall be charged with the task of organising and co-ordinating the supply of material and of preventing competition between the two Departments.
Will the Board have executive power?
The Board shall organise a complete system for the interchange of ideas on air problems between the two services, and such related bodies as the (Naval) Board of Inventions and Research, the Inventions Branch of the Ministry of Munitions, the Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, the National Physical Laboratory, and so forth. The Board shall have a secretary to assist in the conduct of the business that comes before it.
Who will control the money?
They will get all the money they require voted in this House.
I do not know whether my right hon. Friend will answer a question to elucidate the basis. Suppose the Air Board wish to order a thousand machines of a particular type, which the Admiralty or the War Office do not agree to, have they power to do it, or have they not?
If there is the disagreement which my right hon. and gallant Friend suggests, the decision would rest with the War Committee. The War Committee would give their instructions through the Ministry of Munitions, and—
They have not the executive power apart from agreement with the War Committee. The War Com-authority of the War Committee?
That is so. The Prime Minister invited Lord Curzon to accept the presidency of this Board. Lord Curzon has accepted that offer. Lord Sydenham has also accepted the invitation to become a member of this Board, and my hon. Friend the Member for Rugby (Major Baird) will represent the Board in this House. I hope that the House will realise that this is a different proposal from that which was suggested by the hon. Member for Brentford in his speech. This is not a method of finding a way out at all. This is a real Board accessible to the War Committee, and consisting of responsible persons, with far greater powers and authority than any body which has hitherto been created to deal with the Air Services. It could pick out larger questions than the Air Service generally. The old Committee was confined in its powers to material. This body will have much more important powers. It will not only have the powers which I have read out, but it will charge itself with larger and wider questions of thinking out the possibility of developing its own body, possibly with a regular Department under it, such as has been suggested in various quarters of the House—what is called an Air Ministry. It has been thought that during the process of a great war the difficulty and the dislocation and friction involved in setting up an Air Ministry now would be too great for us to embark on. I hope that the House will realise that this is an important step which has been taken, and will agree with the Government that the best results are to be hoped for from it.
The House will have heard with some feelings of disappointment the announcement of my right hon. Friend of the change which is proposed by the Government. After the many months that this matter has been under discussion, and the repeated post-ponements in bringing it before the House, we had hoped that a real solution, or a real effort towards a solution, would have been set forth in the Government statement. In the choice of a man, no doubt the Government is well advised. The Air Services have long needed the guidance and the aid of some personality of first-rate eminence versed in public affairs, and with adequate influence in the Cabinet. This they will find in Lord Curzon, but Lord Curzon, without adequate powers, will not succeed in altering the present state of affairs, and in the choice of a policy, judging by the impression made upon me by the statement to which we have just listened, the Government have followed no principle whatever, except the familiar principle of postponing until the last possible moment and then following the line of least resistance. I propose, before I sit down, to endeavour to make a rather closer examination, as far as it is in my power to do so, of the proposal of the Government. Before however, I come to this, I wish to clear out of the way some points of a general character on which much misconception has long existed. I have never yet had the opportunity of addressing the House on the subject of air and air policy. It is a matter with which I was at one time much concerned, and for which I am continually criticised, and if I go back into the past a little, craving the indulgence of the House for that purpose, it will be because a knowledge of the past is necessary for a comprehension of the present position, and also because I desire to establish my own credentials for offering further counsel to the House upon this question. First of all, we have never had from the Government a plain statement of how it was that the Admiralty came to be responsible for aerial Home defence. I have always wondered why the First Lord of the Admiralty has not been able to make such a statement. It could be done quite shortly, and it is necessary for a fair appreciation of the present position.
It is commonly supposed that the Admiralty before the War, at some distant period, more or less distant period before the War, under my impulsion rushed into the business of Home defence, snatched it away from the proper authorities, and then mismanaged and neglected it. That is not the truth. The contrary is the truth. Until a month after the War had begun the sole responsibility for the defence of all vulnerable points in England, by gun fire, seaplanes, or any other method against aerial attack, rested with the War Office. The only exception to this was that at a conference between the heads of the War Office and the Admiralty, on the 19th November, 1913, it was agreed that where a vulnerable point was in close proximity to a naval air station the naval aeroplanes would also be available. But even this position was challenged by the General Staff as late as the 21st July, 1914—that is to say, on the very eve of the War, though not that we had any reason to expect an immediate outbreak. At that date a meeting took place of a Committee appointed to regulate the relations of naval and military aeroplane and seaplane bases, and at that meeting the representative of the War Office—the War Office was then in charge of the present Prime Minister—claimed for the War Office the sole responsibility, not only in regard to everything inland, but also in regard to naval ports and vulnerable points of all kinds, even those of exclusively naval interest. Notwithstanding these views, which in principle are quite sound, so far as the integrity of Home defence is concerned, the War Office had not, up to the time of the declaration of war, provided any aeroplanes for Home defence. They had limited themselves exclusively—
ROYAL ASSENT.
Message received to attend the Lords Commissioners.
The House went, and, having returned,
reported the Royal Assent to, 1. Local Government (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1916. 2. Courts (Emergency Powers) (Amendment) Act, 1916. 3. Summer Time Act, 1916. 4. Edinburgh Corporation Order Confirmation Act, 1916. 5. Gas Orders Confirmation Act, 1916. 6. Burnley Corporation Act, 1916. 7. Weston-Super-Mare Grand Pier Act, 1916.
Question again proposed, "That this House urges that His Majesty's Govern- ment should without delay take every possible step to make adequate provision for a powerful Air Service."
I was just pointing out, when our proceedings were interrupted, that, until a month after the declaration of war, the Admiralty had no responsibility whatever for Home defence against aerial attack, and that the War Office claimed, on grounds of principle, sole responsibility for the duty of Home defence. Notwithstanding these views, the War Office had not, up to the time of the declaration of war, provided any aeroplanes for Home defence, but limited themselves exclusively, and as a matter of prior urgency, to the development of the Expeditionary Squadron, and, on the outbreak of war, practically all the Army aeroplanes were sent abroad. I do not say they were wrong in this at all. The dispatch of the squadron for the Expeditionary Army was a matter of vital urgency, but the consequence followed that not only were there no aeroplanes available for guarding all vulnerable points, but none could be found even for the temporary purpose of watching this coast during the passage of the Army to the Continent. The guns which were available then—it is almost laughable, and there is no harm in saying now what was available nearly two years ago, when the whole situation has altered—which were available at the date when the Admiralty took over this duty, I think, were five Service guns and a small number of those quite useless "pom-poms," which have been referred to, with, of course, suitable ammunition for them. That was the state of affairs up to the month after the Declaration of War.
At this point in the argument which I am going to submit it is necessary for me to refer to the extraordinary difficulties before the War of getting money for aerial defence. The Navy and the Army are old and powerful institutions. Behind their demands for money there are organised forces both in the Press and Parliament, and not only are there organised forces of opinion, but the demands of those two established Services are embodied in the shape of large institutions and establishments which must have full activity, and which must be maintained by Parliament whatever its passing mood may be. Nevertheless, the Admiralty, in the years before the War, had to fight continually to secure the necessary increase, and the Army was hard put to it even to hold its own. But the air was entirely new, and, apart from a few newspapers, and the praiseworthy exertions of a few Members of Parliament, there was no real backing behind any request for money, other than the personal influence of the Ministers at the heads of the fighting Departments. It was always open to anyone to deride aviation as a silly fad, and as another means of draining money from the public purse. Nor was this a sphere in which powerful expert opinion or an accepted body of doctrine were behind the Minister. When General Seely and I went, in 1911 and in 1912, respectively, to the War Office and the Admiralty, the Military Wing was in its infancy, and the Naval Air Service was represented by half a dozen aeroplanes and pilots, and the débris of the airship "Mayfly," which had just broken its back. Soldiers, sailors, and civilian Ministers all started, more or less even, to explore new regions and to endeavour to build up the new arm of the air, and that in less than three years the powerful, efficient, and skilful Air Services with which the Army and Navy began this War were brought into existence was the result of a ceaseless struggle for money and constant personal effort on the part of the Ministers, and devoted and tireless labours on the part of their assistants, General Henderson, Commodore Soutter, and others like Colonel Sykes and Commander Samson in the domain of action. I never had any opportunity of speaking in the House on this subject before, but I am at least entitled on behalf of General Seely to point to the statement which the Under-Secretary for War made on the last occasion in which he spoke in this House when he said that at the beginning of the War we had the supremacy in the air, and indicated that since then this situation had been altered to our disadvantage.
It is pitiful and ludicrous to look back now upon the shifts to which we were put to obtain the necessary money for the air, and it was out of the difficulties of getting the money that the duality originally largely arose. It is always easier for the Navy to get money than the Army. Our Estimates were enormous and increasing, and £100,000 more or less escaped the severe scrutiny from which the Army Estimates suffered. Our Estimates passed each year as the result of a trial of strength between great political forces. After each crisis has been surmounted there was always a period of exhaustion in which readjustment of the subjects was possible. And in those days the repair to the naval hospital or the matter of coastguard cottages used very often materialise in a fleet of aeroplanes or some other necessary portion of the Flying Service. Those are the facts before the War. I began as early as 1912 to develop the Aeroplane Service outside our normal Admiralty sphere, in order to supplement from another set of Votes the inadequate credits which the War Office succeeded in obtaining. Of course we see now the evils of duality, but at that time the object was to get as large as possible an amount of material and number of airmen into existence in the time available. The naval authorities, although always rather reluctant to add to the ordinary demands of the Navy Estimates, were increasingly anxious about the undefended state of the dockyards and naval vulnerable points, and thus almost clandestinely was built up at the Admiralty an Aeroplane Service of our own which, when the War broke out, so suddenly and so unexpectedly, had already attained respectable dimensions. It was well that we did so. At the outbreak of the War the whole of the War Office went off to the War, taking the whole of their aeroplanes with them, and nothing remained in this country but the Naval Air Service.
A month after the War had begun—3rd September, I think, was the actual date—Lord Kitchener asked me whether the Admiralty would undertake the general duty of Home defence against aerial attack. He pointed out that all his efforts were concentrated on the equipment and maintenance of the Expeditionary squadrons, and that he had practically no resources in guns or aeroplanes for Home defence. The Admiralty, on the other hand, had a considerable supply, with which, in fact, though without formal authority, we were already guarding the vulnerable points of special interest to the Navy. Under the circumstances, I thought it my duty to comply; but I was careful immediately to define on behalf of the Admiralty the limits within which we would accept responsibility. I therefore drew up a printed memorandum, in which I set out the total resources we could spare without prejudice to the paramount needs of the Fleet. I pointed out that those resources were wholly inadequate and unsuitable, but I undertook to do the best we could with them, and to take the necessary steps to increase them as soon as possible. I carefully stated that the Admiralty could not be responsible for Home defence, but could only be responsible for doing the best possible with the material available. On this basis, which was formally accepted by the Government, the Admiralty undertook, very reluctantly for the most part, the thankless—and as it seemed then almost hopeless—task, for the time being. Our available guns and aeroplanes were forthwith disposed to what we considered the best possible advantage, and overseas air bases in France and Flanders were established, and those have proved an effective and almost absolute parry to the attack of German Army Zeppelins coming from Belgium and the Rhine. The series of offensive enterprises against the Zeppelin sheds began, and on this quest, in spite of their slender resources, the naval arm went to Dusseldorf, to Cologne, and Friedrichshafen, on Lake Constance, and even to Cuxhaven, in the North Sea. Six Zeppelins, it is believed, were destroyed either in the air, or in their sheds by a handful of naval pilots acting, what the First Lord of the Admiralty would now call, "outside their normal sphere." It would be hard to show that all allied airmen and pilots had during all the War succeeded by this method in destroying so many. Moreover, within a few-weeks of the Admiralty becoming responsible very large orders were placed for aerial guns and the proper kind of ammunition, and searchlights, and immense orders were distributed for aeroplanes to the utmost productive limit of every aircraft factory in any part of the world not already occupied with Army work. None of those orders matured during my tenure of office, but they all must have come to hand many months ago. Such were the circumstances in which the Admiralty became responsible for Home defence, and the manner in which we endeavoured to discharge that responsibility, and I think I am justified in telling them to the House and to the country.
The story which I have outlined acquires-deeper significance when the general conditions of aerial warfare are considered. My hon. Friend the Member for Brentford (Mr. Joynson-Hicks) has twitted me this afternoon with my phrase about "hornets" I am very glad to come to the "hornets." The main defence of England against Zeppelins has consisted since the War began in that formidable "swarm of hornets" of which I spoke in 1913—that is to say, aeroplanes with skilful pilots held ready with bombs and guns to attack any Zeppelin which approaches our shores. This defence has been effective, up to date, in preventing any attack by Zeppelins coming here by daylight, or even by moonlight. Thus for the whole of every day and for a large proportion of the hours of darkness complete protection has hitherto been afforded. It was hoped that even in the dark nights the aeroplanes would be able to act effectively against Zeppelins. This hope has not been realised, not because aeroplanes cannot fly at night, not because the aeroplane is not fully a match for the Zeppelin once the encounter is joined, not because properly lighted landing grounds cannot be arranged, but because it has proved very difficult indeed, and almost impossible, to find the Zeppelin in the dark But apart from this, and this is a very important exception, apart from-this exception the conclusions which I stated to Parliament, in a perhaps dangerously picturesque form, have been justified. They are no more vitiated by the occasional raids which have taken place in the dark hours than the strategic conclusions which fix the War station of the Fleet have been vitiated by the occasional chance raids which take place from time to time on our Eastern coast. Twenty-five or thirty days, during the whole of these twenty-two months of war, Zeppelins have raided our shores, and it is to the presence of aeroplanes, at the, outset entirely provided by the Naval Wing, in the absence of Army machines abroad, that the immunity from Zeppelin attack which Britain has enjoyed on the other 600 days and nights is almost exclusively due. But for the aeroplane service we had created before the War there would have been nothing to stop Zeppelins from raiding us every fine day; and if they were able to come in daylight they would be able to find their way with certainty to the vital and vulnerable military points—to our arsenals, to our magazines, to our oil tanks, to our dockyards, to our munition works, and to drop their bombs with accuracy and deliberation from altitudes beyond the reach of any anti-aircraft gun which, at any rate, existed during the first year of the War. Our aeroplane defence has restricted Zeppelin attacks to a few nights in certain months, and even then those attacks can only be delivered erring and almost blindfold. The proof of the triumph of the aeroplane is that after twenty-two months of war no object of any military or naval importance among the thousands which exist scattered broadcast throughout the country has yet been struck by any Zeppelin bomb. In fact, from the purely military point of view—that is to say, from the point of view of what affects our war-making capacity—the aeroplane defence has so far proved absolute. Even as regards the civil population it has been, and is now, effective over 95 per cent, of the time. This truth is incontrovertible. Panic may resent it, ignorance may deride it, malice may distort it, but there it is.
The second defensive method against Zeppelins is the fire of guns. Within its restricted area, and to a limited degree, this method also has proved effective. But the fire of guns cannot be generally available. Important military points can be so defended. Dockyards, arsenals, the seat of Government, and even perhaps London itself, can be to some extent protected by guns, but the whole country cannot be protected by guns, even by mobile guns. There are not enough guns in the world to do it. It would indeed be a serious danger if the Government were induced by clamour to use anti-aircraft guns for the defence of vague residential or industrial areas. They should be strictly confined to defending points of special importance, and no undue demands must be made which would divert or dissipate our resources in this respect. I hope the House will make the Government feel that they will find in the House of Commons effective support against any reasonless clamour, however natural it may be, as long as they are shown to be adhering to the sound lines of military thought and action.
I wish to refer for a few moments to the question of British construction, to which reference was made by the hon. Member who seconded the Motion to-day. Before the War the policy of the Admiralty was to build airships, both rigid and non-rigid, only for training and experimental purposes. We wished to keep abreast of and informed about the development of airships. We wished to have practical experience of them. We wished to have a nucleus both of personnel and of matériel which could, if necessary, as the development of the art showed need, be expanded and elaborated. But we did not attempt to rival Germany in this sphere, or to build fleets of airships on which we should rely to play an effective part in our system of naval defence. On the contrary, we looked to the aeroplanes and the seaplanes operating from the shore or from ships to afford us our old characteristic effective counter-measure. In war, if you are not able to beat your enemy at his own game, it is nearly always better to adopt some striking variant, and not to be content merely with doing the same thing as your enemy is doing, only not doing it quite so well or on quite so large a scale. That was the policy deliberately adopted in 1911 and in 1912 and consistently adhered to by the Admiralty; and in my judgment, as far as I can see at present, the teaching of nearly two years of war has not proved that view in the main to be unsound. I shall in a few minutes offer the House some reasons in support of this view, which, after all, was shared by France, who, like ourselves, before the War declined to follow Germany in the wholesale construction of large rigid airships.
But I must now, in giving the story of our airship position, mention the military airships. Up to the end of 1913 the Army also had an airship establishment, consisting of a handful of competent officers and three or four little field airships. Although our Naval Airship Service was purely experimental, its scale was much larger than that of the Army, and it already amounted, I think, to ten or a dozen airships of various types, some quite large, built, building, or projected. It was decided, I think in January, 1914, in the interests alike of economy and of efficiency, that the Airship Service should be unified, and be a purely Naval Service. The Army airships, with their appurtenances, were handed over to the Admiralty on the understanding that whatever airships were required in future for the Army for military purposes, for Home defence for which the Army is responsible, or for the Expeditionary Force, should, on the demand of the War Office, be built and maintained by the Navy and held ready for Army use. That was the arrangement. Up to the outbreak of War no demand was made by the War Office on the Admiralty for airships for either of those purposes, nor since the War began, so far as I know, has any such need been felt by the responsible military authorities. It is part of my submission to the House that the decision of the War Office not to call on the Admiralty for a large programme of airships, either for Home defence or for the Expeditionary Force, was right.
Let us look into this. No responsible officer at the War Office or at the Admiralty whom I ever met before the War anticipated that Zeppelins would be used to drop bombs indiscriminately on undefended towns and the countryside. This was not because of any extravagant belief in human virtue in general, or in German virtue in particular, but because it is reasonable to assume that your enemy will be governed by good sense and by a lively regard for his own interests. What more mischievous policy to her own interests could Germany pursue than to infuriate large populations against her without being able to injure their war-making capacity? But even if the military authorities responsible for Home defence had known beforehand that this form of attack was going to be made by German Zeppelins, it is not clear to me what preparation they could have made which would have guaranteed absolute immunity to the general public. A fleet of British Zeppelins, for instance, would be no such guarantee. The area open to attack is so large and so various that the assailant would always be able to arrive at the selected point in superior force. All he seeks to do is to drop bombs through the blue upon wide inhabited areas and then escape. The defending airships, on the other hand, would have a very different task, namely, to concentrate on any point in superior force, and then to find, catch, and bring to battle a few dark shapes swiftly moving through clouds and mist, with a free choice of direction and altitude. The invaders would aim at a stationary and located target measured in hundreds of miles. The defending airships would have to aim at a moving and uncertain target measured in hundreds of feet. But who is to pretend that it was in our power, even if we had begun, say, in 1912, to create a Zeppelin fleet approaching in quality or numbers the German Zeppelin fleet—the product of ten years' expense and experiment on the most lavish scale. Why, Sir, even if any Government had entertained the project—and no Government I have ever seen would have done—even if any Parliament had voted the funds necessary, we could not have hoped to compete with Germany successfully in rigid airships in the time available. We had not the art, we have not the native stores of aluminium which would be accessible in time of war. Our attempts to build experimental machines have been baulked until some months after the beginning of the War by continuous delay and disappointment. Nearly 100 aeroplanes and their sheds can be obtained for the price of one Zeppelin and its shed. What folly it would have been for us to have squandered the hard-won, grudged, and exiguous money which had to be secured for air defence on Zeppelins, fewer in number, inferior in type, and certainly ineffective for the purpose in hand—the defence of the civil population from Zeppelin raids.
6.0 P.M.
What would our situation have been at the sudden outbreak of war if we had been found with a handful of these frail and feeble monsters, so easily broken by the accidents of weather, instead of with an Army Aeroplane Service, out of which the immense expansion of the present time has developed, or of a Naval Wing which in the emergency guarded securely every vital point in our Islands, and set the military free to go abroad? We should indeed have thrown away the substance for the shadow. We are all surfeited nowadays with that kind of wisdom which comes after the event, but I do not in the least shrink from applying that unfair test to the policy pursued by the Admiralty and the War Office, partly under my responsibility and with my full agreement, in regard to the building of a Zeppelin fleet before the War. Suppose by the stroke of a wand we could step back with full knowledge to the year 1912, and suppose that the £8,000,000 or £10,000,000 necessary to establish a good Zeppelin fleet were placed at our disposal as an addition to the ordinary Estimates which were, in fact, voted. Should we be wise to build one? With £10,000,000 you could have had sixty or seventy submarines; you could have had fifty destroyers; you could have had another twenty-five light cruisers; you could have had an Aeroplane Service of absolutely overwhelming strength; you could have had 2,000,000 rifles, which would, perhaps, have meant 3,000,000 more men in the field during the great struggle of last autumn; you could have had 1,000 heavy guns, which, applied in the earlier stages of the War, might have ruptured the German lines in France. Is it not clear that, even if we are going to use the light of our present knowledge on the decisions which should have been taken before the War, a great many other competing things would have had to be considered before we came to the question of spending £10,000,000 on Zeppelins? Are we quite sure, after twenty-two months of war, that the Germans themselves might not have made a more formidable investment of the large sums of money which they have spent on their Zeppelins? At any rate, the story is not yet finished. Events unfold from day to day, and I, for my part, am quite content to await the final judgment which will be passed on these matters when the War can be surveyed in retrospect as a whole. The true remedy—and the House will pardon me if I give my views upon the subject, because I have been in this business from the very beginning—the true remedy and the only radical cure for Zeppelin raids is either to attack the German Zeppelins in their sheds with aeroplanes, or to station squadrons of aeroplanes at some point, or points, overseas where they can intercept the German Zeppelins during daylight, either going or returning. The second policy, as I have pointed out to the House, was adopted with complete success in September, 1914, by the Admiralty, so far as the German army airships coming from the Rhine or from Belgium were concerned, by the establishment of our naval stations in France and Flanders—I need not mention them by name, but the House knows pretty well where they are. In so far as that policy can at any time be extended to airships coming across the sea it will produce equally decisive results. As to the first remedy, an attack on Zeppelin sheds, I can only repeat what I said three months ago—why has it been discontinued? Why, after a whole year of limitless money, of accumulated experience, and of multiplying resources, has it not been possible to continue this system of attack upon the enemy's air bases? Why has it not been possible to construct the special types of machines that may be required for each particular objective? This has a great bearing upon the proposal which the Government has just put before us. In my opinion the reason is that this subject has not in the last year been studied from a commanding point of view by anyone who was able to give his whole time and attention to it. No doubt the difficulties have increased, and the enemy's means of defence is continually improving. All the more condemnation to you, I say, for losing so much valuable time, and perhaps for letting such precious opportunities slip by! But there are two other forms of Zeppelin activity which must be considered. They are purely naval in their character. I should not be treating the subject with fairness if I omitted them, and I see no harm in discussing them, because it is absurd to suppose that the Germans are not fully alive to the obvious uses of the Zeppelins which they have made their speciality. What is important is that we should be alive to the counter-measures which are necessary, and which are within practical reach.
First of all, there is the unrivalled power of the Zeppelins for long reconnaissances at sea. I agree with the First Lord of the Admiralty in wishing that at the outset we had been provided with a certain number of rigid airships and sheds which could have supplemented and aided the control exercised so well by our squadrons and flotillas. The repeated failures and disappointments in regard lo the construction of these vessels was one of the reasons why we had none of them available at the outbreak of the War. I do not quarrel at all with any efforts which the First Lord may make in the direction of supplying this lack now that money is no longer an object. Whether any good result will be achieved will depend, of course, on the length of the War. But I urge the representative of the Admiralty present not to delay on that account the energetic development on a great scale of seaplanes. and especially aeroplanes, operating from ships specially adapted or from existing war ships. This policy, which was our original policy, would have provided, and will still provide, a very good substitute, almost immediately obtainable, even for reconnaissances. It is still more true in regard to the second possibility of Zeppelin action, namely, the observation of the fall of shot in the long-range stages of a naval action. It may be well argued that this can be done much more accurately from a great height than from the masts of ships. This raises an important consideration. If you have developed the use of the fast aeroplane at sea, the launching of these from the decks of warships, and the picking up of them afterwards by other vessels, then it will be possible to drive away all Zeppelins from the neighbourhood of our Fleets which are in movement or action, and to destroy any that attempt to approach them. If, on the other hand, you have neglected this obvious and important field, or only de- veloped it half-heartedly; if you have always contented yourselves with bewailing the absence of rigid airships of your own, and of waiting till you have constructed them, then a serious and preventable disadvantage will have been incurred—a disadvantage which I am bound, however, to state ought not in any circumstances to make a decisive difference, having regard to our margin of superiority. Still, this disadvantage is one which ought to be remedied at the earliest possible moment.
I venture to bring these general conclusions and suggestions to the notice of the House because I have noticed that controversy in these matters proceeds so frequently on wrong lines and at cross-purposes. Take, for instance, the case of the Committee which has been appointed to examine into the charges of the hon. Member for East Herts (Mr. Billing) The Member for East Herts makes a speech in this House, and in it he used the word "murder." Well, Sir, that is not a charge of murder! "Murder" is an expression which is frequently used by Members of Parliament when they are angry. To take up the time of a judge of the High Court and a number of important persons in setting up a Committee to try to score off a private Member of Parliament whose activities—[Interruption]—at any rate, that is the reason which the Under-Secretary gave. The hon. Member made charges of murder. I believe it is a well-formed Committee for the purpose in view. But, as a matter of fact, the hon. Gentleman, so far as I can gather, was leading the Government to suppose that what was needed was an increase in the factor of safety in the machines. I have met many persons of great competence on this subject who think that one of the mistakes we made at the beginning of the War was in not immediately reducing the factor of safety. You may make a perfectly safe machine which the enemy can certainly hunt down and out-manœeuvre. Peace-time risks in aviation naturally tended to the reinforcement to the factors of safety, because people were shocked at the accidents which took place. When the War began other dangers far more terrible than the incidence of ordinary breaking strain and the occurrence of accidents supervened. I have heard that there is a great deal to be said for action in the direction of the relaxation of the factors of safety in constructing machines, in order to get speed and climbing power which will save the life of the pilot in a hard fight. I only say that to illustrate that we are very much at cross-purposes in these matters. I quite understand the Government being—
On a point of Order. [Interruption.]
I have pointed out to the hon. Member for East Herts, more than once, that he is not entitled to rise and interrupt hon. Members in the course of their speeches. If he has a point of Order to raise he is entitled to raise it, but he is not entitled to rise and ask questions, or to give explanations. He must wait.
He wants a little advertisement.
May I put my point of Order? If an hon. Member of this House makes a statement about another Member that is not true, is the aggrieved Member not allowed, in a way which I believe is customary for right hon. Gentlemen on the Front Benches, to rise and correct that Member?
Certainly not, in the middle of a speech.
I am not in the least desirous of getting into a controversy with the hon. Member. On the contrary I was about to say, when he interrupted me, that I can quite understand the Government being vexed with his varied excursions and activities. I cannot, however, understand their having gone the length of elaborately setting up the cumbrous machinery of a judicial Committee of Inquiry, which will waste the time of a great many hard-worked people at the present time, for the purpose of coping with statements made in Debate by a private Member. I come now to the proposals of the Government, so far as I have been able to gather these proposals from the statement made to us this afternoon. My right hon. Friend was good enough to read them out very slowly, and permit me to take them down. I will venture to offer to the House the observations which occurred to me upon them. The difficulties from which our air organisations suffer arise from two causes—first of all, the duality of effort and organisation and the friction resulting therefrom. I have explained to the House how it was that the two Services started in the early days. That friction and want of co-ordination has resulted, and on a greater scale as the scale of their operations increased, cannot be denied. I am not fond of giving instances, but I must give one which came under my own personal notice. Shortly after I left the Admiralty the resolve was to navalise the Naval Wing of the Air Service. It was to be navalised from top to bottom, although it was almost entirely staffed by young civilian privates. In the pursuit of this general policy of navalisation, the speedometers in the machines, by which the rate of flight was regulated and the position of the aeroplane located, which were in miles, were all converted into knots. The result over in France and Flanders, where we have numbers of aeroplanes continually flying, was that you had the speedometers in knots, while the maps which the men were using were in miles or kilometres. The naval pilot, with perhaps a Fokker machine in the air above him and bursting shells below him, had to go through a careful, elaborate, and difficult calculation to convert the miles into knots, or vice versâ , to verify his position. That is a typical instance of a hundred small points of friction and petty friction arising from the undue particularism which we had hoped the Government would make proposals finally to remedy. That is the first of the diffities, and the duality and friction arising therefrom.
The second and much more serious was the lack of any commandng initiative and design and overriding authority in affairs of the air. Neither of these difficulties will be remedied by the proposals which have now been made by the Undersecretary, so far as I understand them. They seem to be a mere attempt to parry the demand for an Air Ministry by setting up another Advisory Committee with Lord Curzon, instead of Lord Derby, at its head. There is, I gather, to be a Joint Board, and the members of this Board may advise the president, but he need not take their advice, and the president may advise the Admiralty and the War Office, but they need not take his advice. They need not take his advice whether it is, what you may call, advised advice or unadvised advice. If it should be unadvised advice they are very unlikely to take it, because they would have had their own representative, a member of the Army Council or the Board of Admiralty, on the new Board, and if he has dissented from the advice offered by the president, he will, of course, have every opportunity, being first in the field, of converting the Department's council or board to the views which he holds. Then we are told that the Board is very like the rest of us—like the hon. Member for East Herts—free "to discuss matters of general policy in relation to the air," and to interchange ideas. And if their advice, suggestions, recommendations, etc., bear no fruit with the two fighting Departments, who, after all, are busy carrying on the War, and apt to give rough answers on these matters, then the president, I understand, may complain to the War Council—
May offer advice.
May refer to the War Office, of which he is not a permanent member, though the two Ministers with whom he may be in difference are permanent members, and these two will, of course, on a difference arising, be supported by the whole massed weight of their two respective Departments, headed, no doubt, by the member of the Air Board representative of each Department. That does not seem to me to amount to very much of a forward step. Even without this top hamper it would, I suppose, have been open to Lord Curzon, as a Cabinet Minister, "to discuss matters of general policy in relation to the air," and even to interchange ideas and make suggestions about these matters, and to raise them in the Cabinet, and to persuade the Cabinet to come to a decision, or even to persuade the Cabinet to refer them to the War Council. Even without any action by Lord Curzon, it would have been possible, I suppose, for the Secretary of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty to have come together, and to have arranged a common policy for the settlement of these difficulties, or to have set up, if necessary, a standing Interdepartmental Committee to adjust the points of friction between the two services, and to prevent overlapping in the purchase of machines. Such a Committee, with the good will of the Departmental chiefs, would, I am sure, achieve far more than any outside body with doubtful powers and critical faculties. I know the public Departments, and especially the military Departments, of this country well, and I know what their atti- tude is towards a body which has the opportunity to inquire, to criticise, to offer advice, and to make complaints, but which has not the right to their allegiance and the power to exact obedience to orders. Either the arrangements now proposed will lead to nothing effective, which will be the case if Lord Curzon shows the great qualities of tact which are likely to be required of the holder of the new office which is created, or—I say quite frankly—they seem to me likely to lead to a first-class row. If he is going to make his work a reality, it is perfectly clear there will be very great differences, and much friction—the friction which you have been unable to overcome yourselves in making these proposals—will be created. In both cases, whether they produce no result, or whether they lead to trouble, they will lead to delay in arriving at a proper organisation for the air, and a wholehearted policy.
Can anyone feel that the proposals are put forward by the Government in the sincere belief that they will really open the way for the conquest of aerial supremacy for this country? Yet I cannot think it difficult. No doubt we shall hear from the Government of the difficulties that stand in the way of an Air Ministry, of the resistance of this and that highly-placed official, and the prejudices of the Departments. No doubt we shall be told of the practical difficulties of calling it into existence in the middle of a great war, as if far greater difficulties have not been overcome, and far greater prejudices worn down, in the creation of a Munitions Department. I cannot think it difficult myself either to devise or to bring into operation a unified organisation, or to divide on natural and well-marked lines the services of training and supply on the one hand, from the tactical employment of units afloat and in the field on the other hand. I proposed to the Prime Minister a scheme on those lines nearly a year ago. I agree that a complete amalgamation may not be possible at a single stroke, but the formation of an Air Department with real responsibility and real powers is an urgent and indispensable preliminary. No one can doubt that ultimately—and the sooner the better—the Air Service should be one unified, permanent branch of Imperial defence, composed exclusively of men who will not think of themselves as soldiers, sailors, or civilians, but as airmen, as servants of the new arm, as servants of an arm which, possibly, at no distant date may be the dominating arm of war.
Let the House remember how vital this matter is. I agree entirely with what was said by my hon. Friend who made this Motion to-day. Complete, unquestionable supremacy in the air would give an overwhelming advantage to the artillery of the Armies that enjoyed it. It would confer the greatest benefits upon the Fleet that enjoyed it. You have not got, in spite of what the right hon. Gentleman has said, that complete supremacy now. You have not even got equality. On the contrary, in many respects the Germans have the advantage, and you have lost the superiority which, at the outbreak of war, it was admitted we possessed. But you can recover it. There is nothing to prevent your recovering it. At sea, the increased power of the defensive in mines and submarines has largely robbed the stronger Navy of its rights. On land, we are in the position of having lost our ground before the modern defensive was thoroughly understood, and having to win it back when the offensive has been elevated into a fine art. But the air is free and open. There are no entrenchments there. It is equal for the attack and for the defence. It is equal for all comers. The resources of the whole world are at our disposal and command. Nothing stands in the way of our obtaining the aerial supremacy in the War but yourselves. There is no reason, and there can be no excuse, for failure to obtain that aerial supremacy, which is, perhaps, the most obvious and the most practical step towards a victorious issue from the increasing dangers of the War.
I venture, with great diffidence, to intervene in this Debate, and, indeed, it has so far been in the hands of those so competent to deal with the matters under discussion that everyone will feel some anxiety in joining in the argument. I do not propose to follow my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee (Colonel Churchill) over the extremely interesting part of his speech which dealt with the defence of the country against Zeppelins, beyond saying that I had already thought that the attacks upon him in that respect were of an exaggerated kind, and that the policy pursued was one that could be justified by the consideration that we are defended in time of day completely and in time of night partly. The only single observation I may add to what he has said is that I believe I express the better opinion among flying officers when I say that an aeroplane at night is of less value even than my right hon. Friend represented. He said, and of course with perfect truth, that you can make a landing ground on which it would be possible to descend, but, if you send up aeroplanes at night, the air is so large that the aeroplane may very rapidly pass out of sight of the landing ground, and find itself hopelessly lost, and may be obliged to descend in total darkness, with the certainty of smashing the machine, and with the probability of serious accident to the aviator. Therefore, I really believe it is unwise to use aeroplanes at night for defence against Zeppelins. There is the additional difficulty that, if you have landing grounds lit up, you must have them more or less near towns, where you do not want Zeppelins to drop bombs. The landing-place, of course, is abundantly visible to the Zeppelin, and is very likely to draw just that amount of attention which may lead the Zeppelin to drop bombs on the neighbourhood, and bombs on the very ground you are anxious to defend. Something like that has happened quite recently. I really believe we ought to recognise the immense value of aeroplanes, and their immense superiority over Zeppelins by day. They are far more handy, far more capable of manœeuvring in a fight between aeroplanes and Zeppelins by day. But at night the superiority must depend upon anti-aircraft artillery, and it is not, therefore, a problem of aviation at all. It really depends on the artillery.
But I was anxious rather to deal with the very interesting speech of the hon. Member for Brentford and the last few sentences of the right hon. and gallant Member for Dundee in dealing with the position as it stands at the front in Flanders, and of the respective powers of the German and British Flying Services there. I confess I think the hon. Member for Brentford makes a mistake in relying to the degree he does on statements made by officers at the front. First of all, when he relies on the statements of officers who are not flying officers, their opinion is really not so good as his own here at home. They are generally wholly ignorant of the subject, and have not the smallest conception of what aeroplanes can do or not do, and scarcely any conception of the utility of aeroplanes, and their opinion is altogether of negligible importance. Such a theory as that it ought to be possible to prevent a German aeroplane from flying over the British lines is extravagant. Of course, the German aeroplanes must be able to go over the British lines, and it is obvious that the argument may be inverted, and if it be a proof of superiority to fly over the lines of your enemy, we have that proof in much larger measure than the Germans.
My hon. Friend quoted a very interesting story from a flying officer. Flying officers have abundant knowledge, but they are usually, though not invariably, young men, and they have, of course, the defects of young men. If I had the honour of being an acquaintance of the officer from whom the hon. Member quoted to-day I should like to ask him one or two questions. All young men in all circumstances generally begin by representing that everything is very badly done in the Service to which they belong. Then you go on to put a question craftily, so as not to disturb their amour propre , and they at once turned round and begin to argue on the other side. The hon. Member for Brentford quoted the case of a flight commander in the Royal Flying Squadron as saying that the Germans had the superiority. I should have asked that officer, "Does that mean that the Germans can do a lot of things that we cannot do?" and I think he would have said "No." Then I would have gone on to ask, "Does it mean that we cannot do anything the Germans do not do?" and he would have replied that we do long reconnaissances. Unless things have changed very much within the last month we carry out habitually long reconnaissances that the Germans never attempt at all. I was for three months twenty-five miles behind the British lines, and I never saw a German aeroplane at all, except one that was captured and brought in. If I had been twenty-five miles behind the German lines I should have seen an abundance of British aeroplanes flying.
The hon. Member spoke of the command of the air, and he went on to explain that by command of the air he meant the same sort of command as we have of the sea. There is, however, this fundamental distinction. The air has three dimensions and the sea has only two. The sea has a surface, on the top of which you can swim. In so far as the sea has ceased to be a matter of two dimensions, we have ceased to have complete mastery of the sea. We now have a submarine which goes down into the third dimension, and we cannot prevent German submarines going where we would rather not have them. Just the same this is true of the tactics of flying. The air is so large that you cannot possibly prevent the Germans flying to some extent over our lines, and the best weapon against them is not really aeroplanes in the main but anti-aircraft guns. The best way of protecting a particular point is to have anti-aircraft guns. The Germans advertise their brilliant officers much more than we do, but we have plenty of officers who do achievements quite as good as those quoted so much on behalf of the Germans. Apart from those two or three very brilliant German officers, I am sure our flying officers would be ready to say that they are more afraid of the anti-aircraft guns than the fast machines of the Germans It has been stated that the Germans have the fastest machine, but I have heard confident statements in the opposite direction. I do not know what is the present state of our aeroplane resources, and no doubt they have been very considerably improved during the last two or three months. Nevertheless, I venture to caution those who are unfamiliar with the subject against believing too readily any statement about the speed of an aeroplane, because that is an exceedingly difficult thing to ascertain. If you could have an aeroplane flying over a measured mile at a short distance above the ground, and time it with accurate stop watches, you might be able to form a fair estimate of its speed, but if all you have to rely upon—and that is generally the case in war—is the impression produced on the mind of another pilot flying in the same neighbourhood as to the relative speed of the two machines, it is evidently an extremely hazardous source of information as to the speed of the machine. If you are considering speed you must know whether both the machines you are making a comparison between are flying level. If there is the slightest inclination downward in the case of one of the machines, of course it will be faster than the other; and it is almost impossible for a pilot flying in another machine to tell whether there is a slight inclination in his own machine or in the other. If they fly side by side for some great distance, it is easier to form a judgment, but even in these conditions it is extremely difficult to form a certain estimate of the relative speed of two different aeroplanes.
When we hear it confidently stated either on the one side or the other that we have, or that the Germans have the fastest aeroplane, it must always be accepted with a certain degree of reserve. It must always be recognised that in a large number of cases you are relying upon the hasty impression of the pilot who comes back saying that the aeroplane he has taken a fancy to is very much better than the Germans produce; or on the other hand, he may get the impression that every thing is going to the dogs, or at another time he may say that there never was such a machine as the one he has been flying in. No doubt it was the case that in the last month of last year the Germans had one or two very fast machines. There was such a consensus of opinion upon this point that no one would deny it, but when you have said that you do not necessarily convey a very serious degree of censure upon the War Office or whoever is responsible for providing machines for the Royal Flying Corps. Consider how extraordinary rapid has been the development of aeroplanes in the last two years. The hon. Member said that we were still using the same kind of aeroplanes as we were using at the beginning of the War, but he is quite mistaken about that.
I was referring to the speed of the machines used principally for reconnaissance purposes, which still have the same engine and the same horse-power, and they go 75 miles an hour.
I know the machine the hon. Member means, but three months ago, at any rate, it had a more powerful engine, and it may have a still more powerful engine now, and I know it has been more urgently sought for. The machine he refers to had an engine 20 horse-power faster than the engine with which that machine was first used at the beginning of the War. I dislike speaking about myself, but when I first went to Netheravon as a pupil, on the 1st of January, 1915, there were a number of machines there. They were the fashionable machines of the hour, used by our brilliant young officers there. Not one of those machines was in use when I went out to France in September of that year. I think there were one or two hanging about, but they were got rid of at the earliest possible moment, but not one of those types of machines was in use at all. It is extremely difficult, when a science is making progress at that tremendous rate of speed and making improvement, to judge at what point you ought to put in your large order. It is quite true that aeroplanes are used up very much more rapidly than the general public suppose, and the life of an individual machine is very short. Even allowing for that, anything like orders for thousands would have been insanity, because long before you had used up your aeroplanes a new type would have come in. People always say you can apologise for anything, but the broad fact remains that in the second stage of the War you were caught napping, and the Germans made progress quicker than you did.
I think they did that in the second stage of the War. That was not on account of indifference or negligence, because it was always a matter of the most keen anxiety to get the fastest machine and the best engine and develop it as rapidly as possible. All the resources of France were put under contribution for this purpose, and we even went as far as Spain and Italy seeking improvements in aeroplanes and engines. We also went to America, and machines were brought over to try in this country. It would be the most extraordinary injustice to those in control of the Flying Corps to suppose that they were unaware of the difficulties arising through the German improvement, or to say that during the last six months of last year they were not making the most strenuous efforts to meet those conditions. My right hon. Friend has told us that in those efforts we have been successful, and we have developed a machine faster than the German machines, and well able to cope with German resources. It is not satisfactory to rely only upon the experience gained at our training centres, and you have to test all new apparatus on the field of action itself. I think the officers in high command of the Flying Corps deserve signal praise for this, that they have given the best possible opportunities to all officers in the Flying Corps to suggest and develop improvements in France, and try the various improvements in armament and the like. In this respect, I am glad to say, there has been a total absence of an atmosphere of red-tape.
Improvements have been suggested by this officer and that, which have turned out well, and our equipment now is much better than anything the Germans can show. We hear a great deal about fast engines and things in regard to which the Germans are said to excel, but we do not hear anything about the things in which we have the superiority. I do not think I am committing any breach of confidence in saying that our photography is better than the Germans'. I do hope the Government will take every opportunity of recognising the extraordinarily good work which has been done in photography by the Royal Flying Corps. Then, again, in the matter of machine guns we have a decided superiority. I am speaking of what I have heard officers say and what I have heard foreign officers say as well, when I say that the Lewis machine gun is admired all over Europe, and that our Allies join with us in thinking that it is the best machine gun for that type of work in Europe. We ought to hear these things, and then we can balance them against the things in regard to which it is said the Germans are superior.
We have heard, not perhaps so much today, but on previous occasions much of the unhappy accidents that sometimes take place. There is no more painful thing in the world than these accidents, because they not only cut off young and gallant lives with the tragedy that attaches to the losses of war but with the additional tragedy that it seems such a waste, not at the hands of the enemy, but through the mere operation of accidents, that such valuable lives should be lost. Of course, it is almost impossible to show what is the exact cause of the accident, because it takes place hundreds and sometimes thousands of feet up; more generally hundreds, but at a very considerable height from the ground. The machine is smashed, the officer is killed, and no one quite knows what did take place. No one can quite tell what exactly was the cause of the accident, but the common cause alleged is that either some mistake was made by the aviator, in which case, of course, no one is to blame except the man himself, or that there was some failure in the engine. The hon. Member for East Herts (Mr. Billing) produced a very large number of accidents. I went through the report of his speech, and as far as I have been able to examine them almost all of those that resulted from any defect in the machine were cases of engine failure.
I do not believe there is an officer in the Flying Corps who would not say that it is almost an impossibility by any ingenuity to make sure that there will be no failure of engine in the air. but if the officer makes no mistake in the vast majority of cases it is usually possible to come down without smashing the machine, and almost always without hurting himself. Very often, however, the officer does make a mistake. He tries to get in to some place which he thinks is a better landing-place, he banks too largely, and, his machine not working properly, it is dangerous, and a very considerable number of accidents take place in that way. No one, of course, likes to reflect upon the aviator and point out to his relatives that, however sad the accident may be, it is mainly his own fault, and the relatives not unnaturally get the impression that it is due to defective apparatus. The real honest truth is that it is due to a mistake such as anyone might make and the apparatus in the ordinary sense is as trustworthy as it can be made. If it be not trustworthy, the officer immediately in command, and not the War Office, is to blame for sending up the aviator with an engine dangerously defective. The actual responsibility lies with the immediate commander of the officer who meets with the accident. It is his business not to allow his subordinate to go up if the machine is not in proper order. The blame, on the other hand, may lie with the aeroplane mechanic who reports the aeroplane fit for flying when it is unfit, but in no case can I possibly imagine that any responsibility lies with the central authority at the War Office, or whatever person is directly responsible to this House. It is evidently outside their responsibility altogether.
The conception that there is indifference to human life and indifference to accidents among the higher officers of the Flying Corps is a mistake so flagrant that if the subject were not so serious it would be a ludicrous mistake. I could make the House laugh if it were respectful to do so by describing the state to which the Headquarters staff of the Flying Corps is reduced when an officer who is expected to arrive does not arrive, by describing how agitated they become, the degree of irritability they develop, and the telegraph messages which are frequently sent over to France. I have sometimes been tempted to say, "Whether the young man is in the Channel or not, we cannot do anything now," so great is the distress and anxiety which are evinced. If I appear to deal with it flippantly, it is because there are such a very large number of cases where the officer turns up with nerves tranquil, having suffered nothing more perhaps than the discomfort of having had to sleep at some French inn. That happens over and over again. There really is no truth in the suggestion that gallant lives of officers of the Flying Corps are sacrificed to anything except the necessities of the War.
The hon. Member for Brentford told a very interesting and picturesque story of an officer who went out flying and found the clouds too low. He flew above the clouds, and, not being able to see he came back to say so. His superior then told him to fly below the clouds, which were 3,000 feet up, and he declined because his machine was too slow. His superior flew, and was shot by an anti-aircraft gun. That is the story. I should like to have some cross-examination. I do not want to hurt the hon. Member's feelings, or the feelings of any person, but I think there honestly must be a little mistake. That is all my suggestion. I suppose, theoretically, there is a slightly greater risk in flying over anti-aircraft guns at 3,000 feet in a slow machine than in a fast machine. At any rate, to fly at 3,000 feet over antiaircraft guns is extremely dangerous, and, if it was done, it was an extraordinarily brave thing to do. I have heard of it being done in cases, but it is extremely risky. The commander would seem to me to be the squadron commander, but, according to the rules, squadron commanders do not fly, so I do not know how he could have flown at all. It is conceivable that it might have been the flight commander.
The truth is that as against anti-aircraft guns the fast machine would gain very little. What do you mean by a fast machine? You do not mean a machine that always, as against the ground, makes a certain speed. You mean a certain machine that flies at a certain pace compared with the air surrounding it. The fast machine always goes slow against the wind. It must do so. Therefore, if this officer flew out with the wind he would have to fly back against it, but if he flew out against it he would fly back with it, but in either case he would have one journey slow, however fast his machine. Therefore, I cannot believe that the fast machine has the importance which my hon. Friend attaches to it, when you are considering the question of danger from anti-aircraft guns. It has the greatest importance when you are considering the possibility of attacks by hostile aeroplanes. It is a most important consideration as between two aeroplanes. As to flying over anti-aircraft guns, I do not believe that it would make any very substantial difference. I cannot help suspecting, therefore, passing as the story must have done through several mouths, that the hon. Member has fallen into a misapprehension. In any case, the slower machines are not ordinarily used now, and have not been for some time past, for flying far over the German lines. The normal use of the slower reconnaissance machines is for Artillery work, flying along the lines, spotting Artillery on the enemy side, and directing the Artillery on our side. For some considerable time past the faster aeroplanes have been used for reconnaissance work such as the hon. Member has been describing, and therefore I feel that the whole story commands further investigation.
There are two ways really of judging of the efficiency of the Royal Flying Corps. You can take them point by point and incident by incident and you can examine each particular allegation, and you can have a highly technical discussion about the power of machines, the stability of aeroplanes, and the like. Let me say this. The much abused slow machine has done a wonderful service to the Flying Corps in its extraordinary stability and its ease of flying, and, consequently, the confidence which it gives to the young pilots in doing their work. You can have that sort of technical discussion, but you cannot usefully have that sort of technical discussion in this House. To begin with, I do not know how many Members—perhaps I should not be wrong in saying that there are no Members—who can properly engage in a technical discussion of that kind. I am sure that I could not deal with it as it ought to be dealt with. You can, on the other hand, take the broad outline of the subject and say that for the purpose of the scrutiny and control of the House of Commons we cannot go into details, we cannot determine questions about engines and the power of engines, we cannot judge of all the technicalities of aeronautics; we can only look at the main efficiency of the Royal Flying Corps in comparison with the efficiency of other Flying Corps.
I say with confidence that there is no Flying Corps in Europe, or in the world, therefore, that does more than our Flying Corps. You may say, and no doubt it is true, that it is largely due to the gallantry of the pilots. Nothing, I think, in the world is more stimulating than to turn up the tales of the aerial combats as they come in. They are just simple narratives of the facts of these combats in the air, but they have a degree of individual interest which has been wanting from warfare for six or seven hundred years. You have the thing as much a combat between two individuals as it used to be in the days of knights of old. You read the legends of King Arthur, or the account in the "Talisman" of the contest between William of Scotland and Saladin, but you come across nothing more individual than these battles between one aeroplane and another and one pilot and another You have in addition, of course, all the romance and all the excitement which comes from the reflection that this was all done when flying at 80 or 100 miles an hour thousands of feet above the ground. Nothing in fiction is so inspiring to the imagination or so touches the heart as these thrilling dramas of courage and dexterity played without spectators. Therefore, it is impossible to speak too highly or with too much respect of the gallantry of the officers of the Royal Flying Corps, but I think it is ungenerous to those who provide the machines to assume that it is all due to the gallantry of the officers, and that nothing is due to the efficiency of the machines. These machines—my hon Friend knows them very well—if you look at them, are marvels of finish and ingenuity, and marvels of the resources of mechanical ability in dealing with the great difficulties of the air problem. I am persuaded, therefore, that the question you should ask fairly is simply this: Do we do more than the Germans? The answer is, Yes, we do. Is there anything the Germans can do we cannot do? There is nothing the Germans can do that we cannot. That is sufficient, I think, for such an assembly as this to justify the verdict, not that there is no occasion for improvement, not that there is no opportunity for criticism, but it is sufficient to justify the verdict that, taking all considerations into view, our Royal Flying Corps is the best and most efficient in the world.
7.0 P.M.
The cheers we have just heard indicate that hon. Members have listened with even unusual pleasure to the speech of my Noble Friend (Lord Hugh Cecil), a speech which showed all the usual charm of manner and style which we are accustomed to in him, but which had, if I may say so, more than is always the case, that element of common sense which has not always been conspicuous in our air debates. The Prime Minister has asked me, as a member of the War Council, which is responsible for the decisions the Government have come to in this matter, to take part in this Debate this afternoon, and my chief purpose is, of course, to give the House as clearly as I can the reasons-and we thought they were weighty reasons—that brought us to the conclusion that, on the whole, the plan on which we had decided was the best. But before dealing with that I should like to say a few words about the kind of criticism of our Air Service generally, of which we have not heard so much so far this afternoon, but of which I have listened to a great deal in the past. On the occasion of the last Debate, in the few remarks which I made then, I said that, after the examination I had given to the subject—and I had considered it greatly—the conclusion to which I had come was that the service was infinitely better than I expected. That impression remains on my mind now more strongly than ever.
I think it is confirmed by the incident referred to by my right hon. Friend opposite, and also by my right hon. Friend near me—the decision of the hon. Member for East Herts (Mr. Billing) in regard to the Commission of Inquiry which was set up to meet in the main his charges. My right hon. Friend opposite showed very clearly, and with much dexterity, that in dealing with the hon. Member for East Herts he was in a difficulty. He had to justify all the preparations he made to deal with these raids which are the complete staple of that clamour we have heard in connection with that service. His method of doing that was perhaps quite satisfactory, but it is not the method to which we are accustomed. The right hon. Gentleman told us, not of the nights on which the Zeppelins came, but of the other 360 nights on which they did not come, and, in justifying his own previous methods in dealing with them he laid down the very satisfactory doctrine to him that his strategy was not in the least proved to be wrong, because the Zeppelins were foolish enough to come in the night instead of in daylight, and because, in addition., the Germans had been so foolish as to adopt a course which was obviously not in their own interests. That may be an explanation, but it is not the kind of attack which has been made on the Government.
As regards the inquiry the right hon. Gentleman said something with which I do not agree. The Government did not wish an inquiry. It is quite obvious that its strong motive was to avoid it, as it would occupy time which could better be devoted to other work. What was the justification for granting it? It was that a Member of this House, with all the responsibility of being a Member, made charges, not using the word in a loose sense, which implied that the men in charge of this service, and at the head of it, were, through criminal indifference, negligence, and incapacity killing men. Just imagine what the fathers—and I am very interested in this myself—what the fathers of these boys would think when they hear of their deaths, and find it stated on that kind of authority, with no strong attempt made to disprove it, that lives have been thrown away. I think it is something which the Government in justice to the men responsible for the service were right in doing. That kind of charge can be made in this House as everybody knows without the possibility of answering it. You cannot go into the details. The hon. Member was offered the opportunity of going before a judicial tribunal, which would be trusted, I venture to say, by every business man in the country and in this House with the sifting carefully and impartially of any evidence, technical or other, brought before it. But the hon. Gentleman declined to proceed further. Perhaps he is right. That depends entirely on the badness of his case; but I must say for myself—I cannot judge as well as him—it must be a very bad case indeed if it would not be in a better position after going before that Court than it is now.
In judging as to the quality of our Air Service, it all depends on the standard you set up. If what anyone has in his mind is the best possible service under the best possible conditions we could have, then obviously our service leaves a great deal to be desired. But if the standard is a comparison either with our enemy or with any of our Allies, then I am prepared to say, as my Noble Friend said just now, that our service is unquestionably far better than that of the enemy, and, as I believe, equal—I should say it is more than equal—to that of any of the combatants engaged in the War. What is the test? From the beginning of the War we had what is called—I do not know whether the term "supremacy of the air" is an exaggerated phrase, but it was understood as meaning that the enemy did not dare show their faces at all, and that we had a great superiority in the air. That has continued down to the present moment. But at the end of last year, or the beginning of this year, our airmen, for the first time—they had hitherto made reconnaissances with comparative impunity, hardly ever being attacked—suddenly found that these Fokker machines were waiting for them, and we had heavy casualties. It is perfectly true that the men who were doing reconnaissance work were on inferior machines to the best German machines. But they had never been accustomed to being attacked, and although it is not the intention of those who direct the Air Service that men on that kind of machine should fight, being armed only to protect themselves, yet you could not prevent them fighting. They tucked up their wireless, and went for the enemy wherever they found him. The result was that we had a considerable number of casualties.
But there never was a time in this War when the Germans had a machine which was better than any of our machines, and when they had not a machine which was not worse than the worst of ours. That is the position. The difficulty was not got over by suddenly inventing new machines, but it was got over by our realising that the Germans were waiting for our men on these slow machines, and by sending other machines, fighting machines, to escort them. Now reconnaissance work is done by us with a frequency and regularity of success which is not even attempted by the Germans. The truth is our aeroplanes crossed the German lines oftener than they crossed ours. I have had to get some evidence which goes to prove it, and I have had taken out a return of all those combats of which my Noble Friend spoke so eloquently just now, which took place between the 7th July and the 14th April. Of course there were many casualties that were not the result of real combats. In this period of these contests there were 478, and of these sixty-three only took place on the British side of the line. In them thirteen German machines were brought down and not a single British machine at all. Of course we lost in fights on the other side of the line and over the trenches a large number of machines and men. But we do not know what the enemy lost. These figures, I think, clearly show the truth of the statement I made to the House that we do use the Air Service for military purposes to a far greater extent than the enemy.
The next charge made against ourselves was in connection with the machines. It is obvious to anyone if you compare one type of machine with an entirely different type it is easy to make out a case that we are entirely outclassed. That is what is being constantly done. This reconnaissance work is done with a slower machine, and in any case, even if you had fast machines, the fact that they have wireless and photographic apparatus makes it a necessity that they must be slower than the machines which are doing nothing but fighting. These machines, then, are slower, but the talk about Fokker machines being superior to any of ours, was absolutely untrue at the time it was made. I am not speaking now of the rate of speed in the air. Fokker machines have been captured, and one of them is being used regularly by our airmen. It is a fact, I am told not only by the heads of the Air Service, but by independent authorities, that we have machines—a number of them of at least two types—which are distinctly superior, from every point of view, to the Fokker, and there are other types which are at least equal. All this idea that we are behind is wrong. I should like further to say this—it would be well if the House could realise to what extent this service has grown. I cannot obviously give the figures, but I will point out two things. In the first place, to enable the service to grow, you have to have simultaneously aeroplanes, parts of aeroplanes, engines, mechanics, and pilots. These all have to be kept going simultaneously. To train pilots alone was difficult. There was a great temptation all through the War to send the largest number of trained pilots to the front, but to have done that would have prevented you developing the pilots here at home. The result of reversing the process, and of making sure that you are training pilots here, is that now we are turning out every month a larger number of trained pilots than the total number that was available from every source when War broke out on the 4th August, 1914. That is all I wish to say on that subject. I have rather a difficulty in saying it, because it seems to imply that if you defend a force in this way you are perfectly satisfied. That does not follow. All that I wish the House to realise is that the impression which has been sedulously created, that the Service has been muddled throughout, is entirely wrong, and that if you wish to find mistakes and errors in connection with the carrying on of the War, I am certain that it is not in the Air Service that the greatest number of these mistakes will be found.
I come to the main object of the remarks I am making to-day, that is, the proposal the Government has put before the House. In considering what should be done we had three alternatives only before us. One was, without changing the two Services, to do our best to develop them on their present lines. The second was to appoint a fully fledged Air Minister; and the third was, seeing that there is a joint Service, to try to get it used jointly by means of a joint board which would get the best out of both. There was a good deal to be said, in the middle of the War, for adopting the first course and trying to develop more rapidly on the present lines. In this connection what has happened in France should be very instructive to us. It is not encouraging. Before the War, in France the Air Service was entirely in the hands of the War Office; it was in the hands of one man, well known in connection with this subject, Colonel—now General—Herschauer. A year before the War a very strong agitation took place in the French Press, a large part of which was due to the dissatisfaction felt with him by the makers of aeroplanes. Owing to that agitation he had to give up his work. When the War broke out, he was called back and again took over his old duties. That went on until September of last year. Again an agitation was raised against him—it was precisely of the same kind we now have about the air muddle and all the rest of it—and the agitation always became the most effective when there were Zeppelin raids. The agitation was made against him, and he was driven out of his post once more. Now the French Press, at least part of it, has had its way. They appointed a full-blown Air Minister, who was, as it happens, an able man. M. Besnard. He appointed a committee, consisting entirely of men who were experts. That lasted for exactly five months. Another Zeppelin raid came, and the attack began all over again. The Air Minister has been turned out, and they have reverted to precisely the same position in which they were at the begin- ning of the War. That is not an encouraging example. I do not suggest that the French Service did not go on while all that was happening, but it cannot be good to be always pulling up a plant by its roots. The lesson there has been for us to develop on present lines. There is this difference between the French and ourselves; their Service is not a joint Service like ours, it is largely an Army Service, and an arrangement which is perfectly good for France, with its one Service, becomes not so good, and perhaps bad, when you are dealing with two Services, which ought to work together in the best possible way.
We rejected the proposal of leaving it as it is. The next question is that of an Air Ministry. My right hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Churchill) said that we, the Government alone, were standing in the way. As I listened to his speech I could not help wondering what terrible thing had happened in the five months since he left the Government. I think the air problem was there then. It has not arisen since. I would like to say for myself, and I believe for the whole Government, that we had no prejudice whatever against an Air Minister. We are not so foolish—at all events, I have had sufficient experience of the House of Commons not to be—as not to know that if we had announced an Air Ministry it would have been what the House of Commons and the Press would have liked. There is no earthly reason why we should not have done it just as much as what we are doing, if we had thought it as good for the service of the country. We did not. Again, I do not really understand my right hon. and gallant Friend. I am not speaking at all to make a controversial point; I want rather to try to let the House understand the motives which actuated the Government in the proposals they have put forward. I really do not understand my right hon. and gallant Friend. He is in favour of an Air Ministry. Did that never occur to him as a good thing earlier, when he himself was a Member of the Government?
I put before the Prime Minister early in June of last year some proposals of this character.
If I remember correctly, that was after the right hon. and gallant Gentleman had left the Admiralty.
Oh, yes!
I really do not understand my right hon. and gallant Friend. If there was one man who, if an Air Ministry was the right thing, had the power to establish it, it was my right hon. and gallant Friend. When the War broke out every Department was over head and ears in work. It is quite true, as my hon. and gallant Friend said, that Lord Kitchener was glad to leave the defence of London to him, because they were all overworked. If at that time he had thought an Air Ministry was the right way of doing it he would have had no difficulty in carrying it out. But there is more than that. When my right hon. and gallant Friend was at the Admiralty there was a joint Air Committee, and the two branches of the Air Services had but one name—the Royal Flying Corps, with a naval and military wing. When the War broke out my right hon. and gallant Friend did, what probably on the whole he was justified in doing. He had one Department in his own hands, and he showed great energy in developing it in the best possible and the most practicable way. But instead of saying then that an Air Ministry with these two services was the right solution, he, for the first time, gave a new special name to the naval wing of the Royal Flying Corps and, instead of making it a joint service, so far as his own action was con, cerned, it was to separate the two services more than ever they had been separated before.
I have not refreshed my memory, but I think the Royal Naval Air Service was a name started before the War.
I have not looked it up either, but I think I am right. Every Member of the House must realise that there are great objections in the middle of a War to starting a new service and uprooting everything that has been done. That must be obvious. Even although the advantages will be greater later on, I do not think there is anyone who will doubt that during the period of transition, when you are doing away with the old arrangements, the result will be that the service will suffer for the time being. In this War we cannot afford to let it suffer even for the time being. The idea of those who advocate an Air Ministry so freely is that there is an analogy with the Ministry of Munitions. There is nothing of the kind. The Ministry of Munitions had difficulties enough to contend with, and I do not think they would have been overcome without great energy on the part of those who were carrying out those duties. But that was a simple problem compared with this. It was taking away from the War Office one branch of War Office work. The business of the Ministry of Munitions is to supply material. It has not to use that material, and it has not to direct the policy and the way in which that material is used.
Remember this! At this moment and for a long time to come, however rapidly you develop the Air Service, the great bulk of the work in the air will be done in connection either with the Navy or with the Army. There is the policy. Now surely, and this is a very strong reason in the middle of a war, it is not very wise to upset all that, to take away the training of the men, for instance, from the Army, who are doing it, and who, I think, are doing it well—to upset it all and put down something new, in the belief that later on you will get better results. I do not think that is a good plan. What is the alternative? Here I am free to say to the House—after the criticisms directed against our proposal and the way in which it was received in many quarters of the House, I say it more readily—I am not defending this proposal from a brief without believing in it myself. My right hon. and gallant Friend smiles. He knows perfectly well that in every Government decisions are taken in which everyone does not agree, but, as it so happens, this seemed to me from the first the best method during the War of trying to deal with this question. Will the House look at it? Is it not common sense? Here you have two services dealing largely with the same materials, and, to some extent, in the same way. Is it not the obviously right course to try to get these partners to work together, to use every possible force to compel them to work together, and so far as I am concerned, even if I believed that an Air Ministry was the right thing in the end—I think an Air Ministry may come out of it—I should say the right way to get it is to make some arrangement of this kind, to let it grow and to gradually let it absorb more and more the work of the Air Services. That is my belief. That is the proposal. What are the grounds of criticism that have been made against the present system. Indeed they are obvious to anyone who considers them. In the first place, if you have the two services there is likely to be overlapping and competition in buying material. That is bad, in my opinion, not merely because of the waste of money and the raising of prices, it is bad because you will not get the biggest output by that course. That is the first thing one would wish to stop. This Board really has complete power to put a stop to that. Let me deal with the kind of criticism the right hon. and gallant Gentleman made against the Board. I really thought it was not worth while. The substance of it was that there will not be voting at this Council, and he thinks that is a wonderful thing. That is the system on which every one of the Government Departments in this country is carried on now. It is the head of the Department which represents the view of the Department. The idea that the president will take one view and both the services will take a different view is an absurdity. What will happen very likely is that one service will take one view and the other another and he will overrule them. The object of not having a vote is, if possible, not to crystallise the hostility of the two services.
Then you come to what my right hon. Friend says about the chairman only having power to make recommendations; that Lord Curzon, as a member of the Cabinet, could make recommendations now; that he is free to make recommendations and that he has a free hand to bring them to the War Council. The powers which we give by this Resolution are these: That this new Board, which is a Joint Board of the two services—and that is the essence of it—with an outside chairman who is a Cabinet Minister, shall be expected to go into all air problems and to make recommendations to the two services. And then what follows? If these recommendations are not carried out, the president has the right of at once taking them to the War Council, who will give a decision, and whose decision will be final. It is quite obvious, I think, that if the two Departments have made up their minds that they regard this Board as the fifth wheel to the coach, as something which ought not to be there, as an enemy, this scheme cannot succeed. That is quite certain. But the essence of it is that the Board, in essentials, represents the two services. It has on it the men who are best qualified to speak for those services in their Departments, and surely it is not unreasonable to hope that when these subjects are discussed by such a Board they will come to an agreement in a way they could not in any other way, and that they will look upon the decisions as the real method of carrying out the policy; in other words, that more and more this new body will have allocated to it all the duties, so far as they can be performed, even of an Air Ministry. That is the object of the proposal.
The next kind of criticism which was made in the old days was about allocating machines. That is very important, too. So long as it is the case, as it is to-day, that neither Department can get as many machines as it wants, what follows? They struggle with each other to get them. It does not mean that there is ill-will between the two Departments, but each knows it can make good use of the machines, and each tries to get them. How is that to be settled? Surely the obvious way is by having a Board like this with an impartial arbitrator, who shall say, "The Navy needs these, the Army needs those," and that they shall have them unless the War Council decides it is a bad arrangement, and it is reversed. But the reverse, surely, of what my right hon. Friend suggested will happen. He says the War Council, because the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War are on it, will overrule the Committee. Both the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War have approved of this proposal. The fact that they have approved of it means that so far as they are concerned they mean to make it a success, and in addition the War Council would not agree to such a proposal unless they have intended to do what they could to make it a success, and therefore you may start certainly with this presupposition that the sympathies of the War Council will be with the new Committee which has been set up.
Then another kind of criticism which is made—and it is a very strong one—is in regard to services which are neither naval nor military—joint services—what, for the sake of a short phrase, I may call long-distance raids. Perhaps it is a very bad arrangement that each Department should be carrying out these and planning for itself independently of the other, and one of the instructions which are given to this Board specially states that they are to devote themselves to considering that class of work. In other words, their duty will be to assist in every possible manner in organising these joint operations and making the best recommendations for carrying them out. If hon. Members will look at the difficulties of the present position, and will ask themselves what better plan is available, and when they make criticisms about this, ask themselves would not the same criticism apply to an Air Minister or any other method adopted, I am satisfied they will come to the conclusion that this plan has two great merits. It has the possibility, and I hope more than that, of developing the service in a way it has never been developed before, and it has this further merit, that it does not interrupt the work which has been going on now, but will speed it up at the worst and make it better than it is at present.
Another great object in my mind in getting this arrangement made is this. It is perefctly true that not only imagination but a keen interest in a subject like this is required to develop it in the best and most rapid way. I have thought from the beginning, though I did not see exactly how the matter was to be met, that in the nature of the case neither the First Lord of the Admiralty nor the Secretary of State for War can possibly devote their minds to a subject like this in a way in which it could be done by a man who had no other large duty to discharge. We have got in this arrangement a man whose duty it is to do it, and I think the best answer really to the criticism that the Board will have no power is that the man who has accepted the presidency of the Board has done it with the belief that he can do good work in it, and no member of the Cabinet or anyone of my acquaintance would have been less likely to undertake a position of such great responsibility if he thought he had not the power necessary to enable him to make a success of it. I do not know that I shall say more about all the details of the arrangement except this: It is just the conclusion to which the War Ministry came as to the way this ought to be done. About all these details you can find any amount of fault if you start with the supposition that the thing is not going to have goodwill. Take, for instance, what was said as to the power of spending money. That is quite true. It would be far better financially if the Air Ministry had a spending department of its own. But, as a matter of fact, if they agree on anything they are going to carry out there is not the smallest difficulty in getting orders placed by the other Departments and the financial arrangements made.
It would not, I think, be proper for me to say anything in praise of Lord Curzon, who has accepted the presidency of this Board, but I ask the House what are the qualities they would like to see in a man in that position? Certainly I should like to see a knowledge of the subject, but I do not think I would put that first. If you could get a man with other qualities, who was also an expert, it would be the best arrangement, though I know that is not agreed to by everyone, for our whole political system rests on the assumption that the man at the head of every Department must be an amateur in connection with it. I do not say that a better system is possible, but I do not go the length of believing that if you have a man of equal administrative capacity, equal ability, and not an amateur, that would be a better man than a man with the same qualities who does not know the subject. It may be said this is a Board of amateurs. So it is. But the very first thing Lord Curzon will do will be to make use of the best expert advice he can get, and in the best way he can utilise it. He has already spoken to me about methods he proposes to adopt to make use of it, but I will say nothing about that. What, apart from expert knowledge, are the qualities needed? I think the ones I would put first are brains, driving force, administrative capacity, and administrative experience. I think these are the qualities which will be most useful, and the result of this Board will be that this service will be treated as something by itself, as something to be fostered by itself and to be pushed forward with the utmost rapidity. Another quality is personality. There are different degrees of influence even in the Cabinet—I am sure I am not coming under the Defence of the Realm Regulations—and therefore it is essential that a man should have a certain amount of personality. I do not think there is anyone who knows Lord Curzon who will deny that he has a fair share of all the qualifications I have put before the House. I cannot possibly imagine any motive other than public spirit and a desire to do some service to his country at this time which would induce either Lord Curzon or any- one else to undertake this job. The very kind of criticism which has been directed against him showing the difficulty of it would be enough to deter most men from it, and we can judge really of these things by ourselves. Judging by myself, I say I can imagine no office under the Government which I would be less willing to undertake than the post which Lord Curzon has accepted. I do not think it is asking too much of the House or the country to say that they should recognise these facts and give him their good will in starting on his arduous enterprise.
I regret exceedingly that this Debate has touched on personal matters. It was not my intention to refer to them in any way whatsoever; but the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Tennant) has seen fit to refer in a very sneering and exceedingly unpleasant manner to myself and to my presence in this House, suggesting that I came quite unwanted. I think I can bear that out, and a great number of the Members of the House are quite prepared to substantiate that statement. The extraordinary disorder which takes-place in the House when I rise, sometimes in order, sometimes out of order, gives me to understand that the right lion. Gentleman had at least the sympathy of the House in making the statements which he did. However, I do not think that anything will make me believe that it becomes the dignity, even of a very junior officer of the Government, to make such statements in this House. I had some difficulty in entering this House, but I came here with a very fixed and definite purpose, and it is my intention to carry that purpose, I trust, to a successful conclusion. No amount of annoyance in this House, no amount of slur and insults from the Treasury Bench, and no amount of attack in the newspapers, will alter me one iota from my intention and my goal. I think it is necessary to make this statement. It has been suggested that, either through cowardice or some other reason, I have refused to appear before this Committee of Inquiry. I do not want to deal with this Committee: it has dealt with itself: its fallacy is so perfectly obvious to any right-thinking man that there is no occasion in the public interest to discuss it. As to what this House thinks or what the Treasury Bench thinks does not trouble me that—[ snapping his fingers ]. I have for this House immense respect, and I have great respect for the ruling of the Chair, but as to the Treasury Bench my respect is limited absolutely to that respect to which they have entitled themselves, and which in many cases, in my opinion, is a negligible quantity. So we can deal with the position as it really is.
The reason why I did not appear before that Committee I have already given. I stand on the floor of this House a late member of the Royal Naval Air Service. Do not let us confuse ourselves here, because the chaos in the Service has gradually leaked out of the Service until it has confused not only this House but the British public. There is a Royal Naval Air Service, and there is a Royal Flying Corps. The Royal Flying Corps is in itself the only recognised corps in which there are two branches, the Naval and Military Wing-If any hon. Member cares to get the Army List he can read it for himself. I made charges against the Royal Flying Corps, and those charges include the Naval and Military Wing, but the majority were against the Royal Naval Air Service. There are cases which I brought against the Royal Flying Corps, and I am prepared to substantiate every statement I have made in this House about it, but I will substantiate those statements in the presence of men who understand what they are talking about. If they want to make it a legal point and a question of tripping me up on evidence, perhaps they would be so gracious as to afford me the assistance of some counsel, in view of the fact that they have briefed, I understand, the greatest counsel on evidence they can find. In that way they have rather stolen a march over me. However, I am sure that there are other counsel in this country who will be able to deal with this position upon the point of evidence. If they were willing to grant me the same advantage which they possess I do not mind considering that point in the one count. On the other count I believe I am right, although I speak in absolute ignorance of evidence. I am a student of the Bar, but if I thank my Maker for anything it is that I never allowed myself to be called to the Bar, because the lawyer politician in this country has brought great discredit, and I say it without fear of contradiction, upon the whole of this House, both inside the House and outside it. We find nothing but Committees full of lawyers, and jobs, jobs, jobs, right, left, and to the centre, until it disgusts clear-thinking people in this country. [Laughter.] Hon. Members laugh. You can laugh; it may be a laughing subject to you, but although it may be a laughing subject to you, it may yet prove the ruin of our country. On that count, at least, it is not a laughing subject. These men, these Gentlemen, these right hon. Gentlemen, have fought across the floor of the House of Commons for years with nothing more fierce than words. Let them face practical issues.
I have had some little experience. I was to have been allowed to appear before this Committee. I was going to be called on points of evidence about a murder charge. Notice the extremely ingenious methods by which the lawyer politician seizes on a more or less grammatical word. I am not the only Member of this House who suggested that, and I do not withdraw in any sense what I meant when I used those words. I reiterate that statement.
Go and prove it before the Committee.
It has been suggested that our men are being sent up into the air with machines which are not capable of performing the task which they are called upon to perform. I repeat that statement. I have listened with interest to some of the speeches in this House, and with amazement and sheer despair to others. The Noble Lord (Lord Hugh Cecil) suggested this afternoon that when flying at 3,000 feet it did not matter at what speed you might fly relative to the ground, because the speed was constantly relative to the air, and it did not matter whether the machine was fast or slow if you were flying over anti-aircraft guns. That shows an amazing lack of practical experience. Assuming that a machine is starting to go on reconnaissance over the enemy's line, and the machine is capable of flying at eighty miles an hour. The ground, of course, may be still, but there is a forty-mile head wind into which the machine is flying. The result is that the forward speed of the machine is reduced to forty miles an hour over the ground. Therefore, the gunner makes his corrections accordingly for a flight at forty miles an hour speed. Assuming that the wind is fifty miles an hour, and the machine the man is flying has only approximately fifty miles an hour speed, which is not a very common occurrence, but it is certainly possible, it means that the poor aviator has to stand quite still in the air while the gunner is shooting at him, and he never gets any forwarder. If the wind is fifty-one miles an hour, the aviator is proceeding homewards backwards at the rate of one mile per hour. To suggest that speed is not of the utmost importance to our machines is simply misleading the House. The Noble Lord suggested that it is difficult to tell the speed at which a machine flies. All I have to tell him is this, that if you are in an aeroplane which can only do seventy miles an hour, and another aeroplane is at your tail which can do ninety miles an hour, you very soon discover it, and the excuse that you could make that the other machine was faster would be perfectly true. The most essential thing in an aeroplane is speed in climbing. If you have speed in climbing you always have the advantage, although the machine may be faster. If you have the climb in hand you can generally beat the aeroplane you are engaged with. All these matters are more or less technical, and should not form the subject of this Debate, but they have been raised. Of course, it is very nice to raise one or two points, which gives the impression of some sort of superior knowledge to those who are listening.
You have never done any flying in the face of the enemy.
The point is this: If we have in this country, and we have in this country, the best machines, and some of the best engines, and if we continue, on the other hand, to build machines of design which the Government officially decides, and if we continue to order in large quantities engines which are in the opinion of experts in this country inefficient, then I say we are guilty of supplying our officers with machines that are inefficient, and if they meet their death in consequence of not having the best material, it is very difficult to find a word with which to describe the behaviour or the conduct of those people who are primarily responsible. In regard to a question which I put to the right hon. Gentleman with reference to 2,500 of what are called R.A.F. engines—Royal Aircraft Factory engines—which were ordered quite recently, I got the usual evasive reply that one gets from the Treasury Bench, that the Aircraft Factory did not order them. If they did not order them, all I have to say is that the officer who is responsible for ordering them must carry the entire blame. These engines are of eighty or ninety horsepower. The engines in question have proved something in the nature of a failure, and they were ordered in large quantities before they had been properly tested. When they came out, the cylinders, which are the most vital parts of the engine, and really should last for the normal life of the engine, were found to be so faulty that they were constantly cracking and constantly breaking, and the result was that these cylinders, which should last the life of the engine, have been obliged to be put on the Army list as consumable stores. On the question of whether it is an act of criminal negligence to send a man out in an aeroplane with an engine fitted with a cylinder of that sort, I leave it to the House. What has been the result? The Noble Lord said there was no need for an accident through engine trouble if the pilot took charge properly. These cylinders are held down, instead of, as in the French Renaud design, by an arrangement which equalises the distribution of the mixture and allows for the expansion and contraction of the metals—are held down by four bolts, with the result that there is unequal expansion and contraction. The result is that the effect of the mixture is weakened by the intake of air. The carburettor catches fire and in many cases the machine catches fire, and the pilot is burnt to death. When we have proved once, twice, or three times that this is likely to happen, and when you ask a man to go up with one of these engines in front of him, practically telling him that he may be roasted in the air, it is not encouraging to the pilots in the Service or to any young ones who may be contemplating joining.
8.0 P.M.
This is as far as my charges are concerned. This Committee is not constituted properly, and they have not the full terms of reference. The First Lord of the Admiralty says, "I will not have an inquiry in my Department" Why? I have been sixteen months in the Royal Naval Air Service, and I can give what even a legal-minded gentleman would have to admit was purely clear evidence about the Service. I can imagine hearing the right hon. Gentleman saying, "What, are you going to take the evidence of this officer and make it into a whip to thrash the Government with, or a stick to beat the Government with?" I think the Government stand in urgent need of that. I think that any stick would be justified, providing we get reform, providing we get something done, which it seems very difficult to get done. This is a Committee which I suggest is a packed Committee. It is the old, old story. They endeavour to discredit me, but that fell through. Then they say, "We will employ men like Sir John Boraston to write foul letters," which I have read to the House, and there has not been a member of the Treasury Bench who has had courage enough to get up and deny this foul electioneering trick. "Well, he gets us in spite of all. Then he comes to the House. We will ignore him." I have endeavoured in the interest of the services not to be ignored in the House of Commons. "He will not be ignored. We must discredit him. All the papers which support us outside must do what they can to hold him up by personal abuse, and any little assistance which we can give will be given." Then I make a statement which had the fortunate result of bringing about more reforms in the Royal Flying Corps in two months than had ever been effected since its inception. Since I came to the House a certain officer was sent for. He is a complete stranger to me. I never met him. I know nothing of him. I have heard his name mentioned so freely during the last few months that I feel that I know him personally. The reforms which he has brought about in two months would justify anything that I have said or that any man has said in this House. He has completely reconstructed the Royal Flying Corps. He has turned it from a shambles and chaos into some sort of reasonable body. I am referring peculiarly to the Army Department.
The service in France has made a very good show with very bad material. He has reconstructed the whole of the War Office side. They have given him, considering his rank, a very free hand. They asked him to save them from themselves, and nobly he has done it. I heard this not from himself, whom I have never met, not from his superior officers, but from junior officers serving under him. The testimony from the men serving under him is the best testimony that an officer can get. Then I continue my attacks on the Government, and so they say, "We cannot discredit him, or do anything with him. We will side-track him. He has got a certain amount of energy. He is always doing something. We will side-track him." Then they appoint this, I was going to say, comic committee of lawyers, able lawyers, and a gentleman well versed in steam turbines, and another gentleman whose father, I believe, laid the Atlantic cable, and who is an eminent civil engineer, and they expect me to appear before these legal luminaries without any counsel, or any satisfaction whatsoever in their findings, nor would the country have any satisfaction. I am very sorry if the Government think that I am going to be led aside to dissipate any energy which I have, and which I am putting into the job which I am doing, by such foolish tricks. If they think they are going to put up legal Aunt Sallies of this description to alter my determination they are mistaken. If they care to have a committee consisting of a judge and twelve mechanics, twelve ordinary mechanics who know their job, who are not looking for any cash or kudos, and they care to ask me to appear before that judge and twelve mechanics, I will do it with pleasure, and prove my case. With that I must leave my relationship with the Government. I am sorry that I have had to trouble the House in my efforts to put that matter straight.
As regards the other committee, I still refer to it as a committee. They have changed its name and called it a board. I suppose that if they get driven into another corner they will change its name and call it a council or something, but we do not get any "forrader." The whole cause of all the trouble in the Flying Service is the friction which must inevitably arise between the senior and junior branches. The senior branch of the Flying Service, that is the naval branch, naturally feels that it is the senior branch, and the military wing naturally feels that it is the junior branch. That is responsible for a certain amount of friction, and must always be so. But the duties are so very distinct that it is quite possible, and I have always been in favour of it, for the duties to be carried out by the proper service officers in the respective services. There are certain duties which a naval officer knows how to carry out, and others which a military officer knows how to carry out. Above all there is the need for that which I should have thought the Government could have seen by now. It has been pointed out to them so many times that one does despair of them ever facing the proposition, and grasping the nettle, without which they will never get forward, and certainly never equal such an efficient nation as we are up against.
Notice taken that forty Members were not present. House counted, and forty Members not being present the House was adjourned at Seven minutes after Eight o'clock till to-morrow (Thursday).