House of Commons
Tuesday, May 23, 1916
The House met at a Quarter before Three of the clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.
PRIVATE BUSINESS.
Swansea Harbour Bill [Lords],
Read the third time, and passed, with Amendments.
Imperial Continental Gas Association Bill [Lords],
As amended, considered; to be read the third time.
Local Government Provisional Orders (No. 7) Bill,
"To confirm certain Provisional Orders of the Local Government Board relating to Westhoughton and the district of the Swinton and Mexborough Gas Board," presented by Mr. HAYES FISHER; supported by Mr. Long; read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, and to be printed. [Bill 44.]
Land Drainage (Feltwell) Provisional Order Bill,
"To confirm a Provisional Order made by the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries under the Land Drainage Act, 1914, relating to Feltwell New Fen District and Feltwell Fen Second District, in the county of Norfolk," presented by Mr. ACLAND; read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, and to be printed. [Bill 45.]
PRISONERS OF WAR (MISCELLANEOUS, No. 16, 1916).
Copy presented of Correspondence with the United States Ambassador respecting the treatment of British Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians in Germany (in continuation of Miscellaneous, No. 19, 1915) [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT.
Copy presented of Interim Report of the Departmental Committee on Approved Society Finance and Administration; and Correspondence thereon [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
SHOPS ACT, 1912.
Copy presented of Order made by the Council of the undermentioned local authority, and confirmed by the Secretary of State for the Home Department:—
County borough of Huddersfield
[by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
INDICTMENT (CRIMINAL INFORMATIONS AND INQUISITIONS) RULES, 1916.
Paper laid upon the Table by the Clerk of the House:—Copy of Rules relating to Criminal Informations and Inquisitions, dated 23rd May, 1916, under the Indictments Act, 1915, made by the Rule Committee established under the Act [by Act].
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.
WAR.
WELSH LANGUAGE (SOLDIERS' LETTERS).
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he is aware of the action taken by the military censors in France in regard to letters written in the Welsh language by Welsh soldiers serving at the front; whether his attention has been drawn to the particular case of a letter written by Private D. A. Jones, 35,250, in Welsh, to a relative in Wales, which was censored upon the ground that a letter written in Welsh is not allowable; and whether he will give an assurance that arrangements will be made which will prevent the censoring of such correspondence in future?
The Regulations with regard to censorship of letters written in the Welsh language are quite clear and satisfactory. They are as follows:
All ranks in France have been informed that letters are permitted to be written in the Welsh language and this privilege has been made known in Wales through the vernacular Press.
Letters written in Welsh do not differ from letters in any other language in regard to liability to censorship. They may be censored either regimentally or, if contained in the green envelope, at the Base. In case of difficulty they may be transferred to the London Censorship for examination.
The action of the military censors in France is governed by the censorship regulations for troops in the field. It is there laid down that letters in Welsh which cannot be censored regimentally should be sent under cover to the Chief Postal Censor, War Office. There are censors both at the Base in France and at the War Office, who are able to read letters written in Welsh.
I am obtaining a report upon the particular case to which my hon. Friend draws attention in the question. It will thus be seen that letters written in Welsh are not exempt from censorship, and it is certainly not the case that there is a prohibition against letters being written in Welsh.
DISTURBANCES IN IRELAND.
DUBLIN LABOUR PARTY (CHAIRMAN).
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he will grant a sworn inquiry into the circumstances of the death of Councillor Richard O'Carroll, secretary of the Dublin Bricklayers' Trade Union and chairman of the Dublin Labour Party, who it is alleged was unarmed and was shot without trial?
No, Sir, I do not think there is a case for inquiry. Richard O'Carroll took an active part in the rebellion and was wounded during the fighting on the 26th April. He was armed. He was taken on that day to the Military Hospital, Portobello Barracks, and died of his wounds there on the 5th May.
ARRESTS.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he is aware of the dissatisfaction that is being caused in all parts of Ireland owing to the whole-sale arrests of those of the labour and Gaelic movement; and what steps, if any, are being taken to limit the arrests of innocent persons?
Every care is being taken to limit the arrests of innocent persons. The idea that there is any discrimination against persons connected with the labour movement is without foundation.
What are the grounds for any movement whatever against men simply because they are connected with labour movements or the Gaelic League; what authority is there to hold such men suspect, and in times of excitement shoot them out of hand?
I think it is a mistake to suppose that there is any discrimination against persons connected either with the Gaelic movement or the labour movement. Persons under suspicion would be arrested, no matter what movement they happened to be connected with.
asked whether Miss Mulhall is still in prison for having waved her hand to the Countess Markiewics passing in custody; and, seeing that this lady had neither knowledge of nor connecton with the insurrection, when will she be released and what amends will be made to her for imprisonment?
The hon. Gentleman's information is very much out of date. Miss Mulhall was released on the 8th May.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that a large number of the members of the Dublin Trades Council have been arrested and are being detained for the past fifteen days; if there is any charge against them besides being advocates of the working classes; and if he will order their immediate release or trial so as to enable them to carry on their labour duties?
These cases are being investigated with the utmost rapidity.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that James Sugrue, Cornelius Jones, and Patrick Landers were arrested at Listowel on Tuesday night, the 16th instant; will he state on what grounds were they arrested, and what charge, if any, has been preferred against them?
These three men have been discharged.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that Joseph O'Leary, of 11, Tremadoc Road, Clapham, London, who is spending his holidays in Ireland, was arrested on Tuesday, 16th May, in Dublin, and detained since in the Bridewell; whether he will say why Joseph O'Leary was arrested and detained; what charge, if any, has been made against him; and whether his release will be ordered immediately?
This case is receiving immediate attention.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this man attested under the Derby scheme and was rejected as being unfit for service?
asked on what grounds James M'Elligott, clerk in the Local Government Board, Dublin, has been arrested and deported to England; whether he is aware that this young man has an unimpeachable character; whether he is aware that James M'Elligott's mother's health is in a precarious condition as a result of her son's arrest and deportation, and that she cannot get any information about her son; and whether his release will be ordered at once?
I cannot at present add to what I said yesterday.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say why this man was refused permission to see his brother on Friday last at Stafford Gaol?
If the hon. Member will give me the name and address I will see that he has access to his brother.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say when I can get any information with reference to this man, who had no connection whatever with the Sinn Fein movement? He has now been under arrest for three weeks, and surely during that time the Government authorities ought to have got sufficient knowledge of his movements?
I am endeavouring to get information, and I cannot reply until I have got the actual answer.
The following question stood on the Notice Paper in the name of Mr. T. M. HEALY: 34. To ask the Under-Secretary of State for War if, out of thirty-five young men arrested in Mitchelstown by the military on 8th May, five are detained, namely, W. Casey, J. Hannigan, D. Roche, and the brothers O'Sullivan; have these men been removed to Cork and then to Dublin in custody, although all arms were surrendered and no incriminating documents or matter were found upon them; are their relatives left without any knowledge of their whereabouts and denied the opportunity of procuring their defence; have any of them been deported to England; if not, are they to be tried, on what charge, and where; and is any opportunity to be afforded them of consulting a solicitor or making a defence?
I have been asked to postpone this question again. It has been on the Paper for more than a week, and the right hon. Gentleman has not answered it. Why keep these men in prison? How would you like to be kept in prison yourself?
I have already made representations that I may be supplied with the earliest possible information, and I cannot do more.
asked the Prime Minister whether, having regard to the fact that the people of Mayo County took no part in the recent insurrection and have shown their strong disapproval of it, he will have the cases of young men arrested in Westport district, most of whom are now imprisoned in Wandsworth Military Detention Barracks, investigated forthwith. with a view to their immediate release when it is found that no criminal charge can be substantiated or even laid against them?
These cases are being investigated with the utmost rapidity.
asked the Prime Minister if the Lord Lieutenant will authorize the exhumation of the bodies of the citizens of Dublin shot without trial, so that an inquest may be held and indictments presented against the guilty parties; and will the military furnish the relatives with the place of burial in each case?
I am not aware upon what evidence my hon. Friend bases his question, or the charges which it suggests. If he will furnish me with such evidence I will see that it receives the most careful examination.
May I ask the right hon. Gentleman upon what ground Mr. McIntyre was shot, upon what ground Mr. Dixon was shot, and upon what ground Mr. Sheehy Skeffington was shot? I understood the right hon. Gentleman to say that a public investigation was to be held. Perhaps I may be allowed, as a matter of personal explanation, to say that a remark of mine yesterday would appear to throw a slur upon the practice generally of courts-martial, I desired to throw no such slur. I desired simply to make the objection I did make to investigatng these cases by the method of court-martial.
My hon. and learned Friend was, I thought, aware that the three cases to which he has referred are now the subject of public inquiry by court-martial.
Only last night I received from Mrs. Skeffington's solicitors a statement that they could get no information whatever from the military authorities on the subject of the alleged inquiry?
Will my hon. and learned Friend send me the letter?
I am not sure that I kept the letter.
COURT OF INQUIRY.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War the name of the regiment and officers in charge in North King Street, Dublin, during the rising; whether he is aware that fourteen men, unarmed, and not connected in any way with the rising, were shot without trial and without any charge being made against them; and if, in the interests of justice and peace in Ireland, he will demand an explanation from those responsible for the incident?
What the hon. Member asks for in the last part of this question has already been arranged—that is to say, a Court of Inquiry is being held to investigate the occurrence and all circumstances of the case.
Is it a Military Court of Inquiry, and private?
It is a Court of Inquiry ordered by the military authorities, but not necessarily a military inquiry.
Will it be a public one?
That I cannot say.
Otherwise it will be a farce and disgust people.
I hope not, Sir.
PRISONERS AND THEIR RELATIVES.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War if there be no military necessity for prolonging the anxiety of Irish people regarding their missing relatives, dead, imprisoned, or deported, in connection with the insurrection, whether the names of all who live, indicating where they are, will be communicated direct to their relatives or published in Dublin and provincial newspapers without further delay; whether the prisoners will be allowed to see their relatives in accordance with the Prime Minister's promise; whether elderly prisoners, having no connection with the rising, such as Mr. John Sweetman, a former Member of this House, will be released on giving security for appearance when required; if detained, whether they will be given, or allowed to procure from their homes, a bed and some clothing; and whether all women and boys under seventeen years of age now detained in connection with the same event will be released forthwith?
I can assure the hon. Member that every endeavour is being made to expedite these investigations. Prisoners are allowed to communicate with their relatives, and lists of prisoners under detention are being published daily in the Irish newspapers. As regards the last part of the question, as I stated yesterday, a general statement is to be made as to the disposal of the prisoners who have been arrested and deported.
When will that statement be made—we are anxiously awaiting it?
I understand in two days.
IRISH VOLUNTEERS.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War if he is now in a position to say what terms P. H. Pearce, commander of the Irish Volunteers, proposed or asked before he surrendered?
P. H. Pearce neither proposed nor asked for any terms before surrender.
DR. KATHLEEN LYNN.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether Doctor Kathleen Lynn is still in prison in Dublin for having attended to wounded Irish Volunteers; of any other offence has been charged against her, will he say what it is; whether she attended the wounded on both sides indiscriminately; and whether he is aware that her sole connection with either side was as a doctor?
The hon. Gentleman's question contains a number of assumptions which I cannot either support or contradict until I have received the results of the investigation which is now being made. Doctor Kathleen Lynn is still detained in Dublin. I am obtaining further information in this case and also on the points raised in a question of which the hon. Member for the Harbour Division of Dublin gave my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister private notice this morning.
Will the right hon. Gentleman, before giving this information, ascertain from Dr. Kathleen Lynn her connection with the matter?
No doubt evidence on the matter will be taken in the course of the inquiry.
Will the right hon. Gentleman stop the deportation proceedings about to take place this week of Red Cross workers in connection with this movement? I understand that Lord Derby—
The hon. Member is now making a statement.
If I may answer the hon. Gentleman's question preceding his statement, I would say that certainly I shall report to the Government of Ireland that that is a desirable thing to undertake.
PRISON TREATMENT.
asked (1) what military or other advantage is expected to accrue from needlessly enforcing filthy and unsanitary conditions on Irish insurgent prisoners; what need there was for leaving them eighteen hours a day without a drop of cold water to drink; why no adequate provision was made for necessary evacuations; why access to a water closet was denied for twenty-five hours; why elderly men, required to sleep on flagstones, were not allowed to procure beds or rugs from their homes; why permission to see friends, though promised in this House, has not been accorded to them; whether independent doctors are allowed to examine the health conditions in which all the prisoners are kept, to question on that subject any they may desire to question, and to record their opinions; and (2) what advantage was or is expected to be derived from starving numbers of military prisoners, crowded together like cattle in transit, in cold, hunger, and filth; compelling them to sleep on cold flagstones, with neither bed nor covering; putting looters and thieves in amongst them for their humiliation, and taking their finger prints as if they were ordinary criminals; and whether this treatment has been carried out under the supervision of Max Green, chief gaoler of Ireland?
asked the conditions of the prisons in which Irish prisoners are detained; whether the sanitary arrangements, the food supply, and sleeping accommodation would pass the public health authorities; and if the prisons will be open to the inspection of public health authorities?
I understand the wording of my question (No. 13) has been somewhat improved, but the question is based on the experience of persons who underwent this treatment, and will the right hon. Gentleman please answer it on that basis?
The assumptions contained in Question No. 27 are not in accordance with facts.
Undoubtedly the conditions which arose at the time of the general arrest of the rebels were uncomfortable, but those conditions do not now exist. I would also refer the two hon. Members to the reply given yesterday to the hon. Member for Salford by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, which was based upon his personal experience. I can further assure the hon. Members that everything is under strict medical supervision; that a representative of the Public Health Societies has already inspected these detention barracks, and that all proposals put forward by him have been carried out.
Does the right hon. Gentleman deny that the finger prints of these rebels have been taken, and that ordinary criminals have been let in among them, as stated in Question 27?
Yes; that is denied.
Is there a single word you are getting from Dublin which is not false?
This is not the time for such statements.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I visited Wakefield Prison yesterday, and had an interview with almost all the people of my Constituency who are interned there, and that they requested me to make public the fact that they regard themselves as being well treated?
This does not arise out of the question. The hon. Member is making a series of statements.
The question I have to ask bears very strictly upon the answer that is given. People of my Constituency want to know if the right hon. Gentleman is aware that last week they made public the fact that they are well treated, with every consideration by the staff of the prison?
But Wakefield is not Dublin, though.
Will the right hon. Gentleman allow other Members of this House to visit any prison he pleases in the United Kingdom?
I will give that my consideration.
What is the reason for this discrimination between Members of this House?
Can the right hon. Gentleman relieve the punishment of solitary confinement? That is the only complaint I have made on my part, and I can verify the statement made by the hon. Member.
NURSE KEHOE'S DEATH.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War why no inquiry has yet been held into the shooting of Nurse Kehoe by soldiers while she was attending to the wounded in the South Dublin Union; on what grounds the military authorities intimated to Miss Kehoe's relatives that they would be well advised not to demand an inquiry; can he say what risk they would incur by demanding it; and whether, in the circumstances, a public inquiry into the death of Nurse Kehoe will be held while the facts are fresh in the minds of witnesses?
The hon. Member is mistaken. A careful inquiry into this case has been held and all the witnesses who could give information have been examined. The conclusion arrived at is that Nurse Kehoe was shot accidentally during the fighting. I would add that the military authorities never intimated to Miss Kehoe's relatives that they would be well advised not to demand an inquiry.
Has the right hon. Gentleman made any inquiry in this case but from the military?
I make my inquiries from the Irish Government.
There is no Irish Government.
IRISH MEMBERS' VISITS TO PRISONERS.
asked if the Irish Members wishing to see prisoners alleged to be rebels will be granted facilities for visiting them with a view to obtaining the immediate release or trial of those who are innocent?
Yes, Sir, every facility is given and has always been given for such visits in accordance with the regulations for detention barracks. The steps to be taken to secure release of individuals have also been made public, and were stated by me in this House last week.
Can the right hon. Gentleman tell me why I have been refused permission to see one of these prisoners, although I have had a pass?
I will see my hon. Friend after questions.
Why was Mrs. McDonald not allowed to see her husband?
I am not aware of that.
It is only one of hundreds of cases.
REGIMENTAL LOSSES IN DUBLIN.
asked the Prime Minister if he will give a day for the discussion of the Motion standing in the name of the Member for East Nottingham—
"That this House expresses its deep sympathy with the bereaved relations of brave officers and men of the 2/7th (Robin Hood) and the 2/8th Battalions Notts and Derby Regiment (Sherwood Foresters), who voluntarily enlisted in order to fight for their country against foreign enemies, and have been cruelly and treasonably slain during street fighting by Irish rebels in the United Kingdom." [ Sir J. D. Rees. ]
No, Sir; I doubt if this is necessary. I have already expressed the deep sympathy of the House with the bereaved relatives of these gallant men.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the hon. and learned Member for Cork (Mr. Healy) has said that these very heavy casualties were due in a great measure to a wrong route being selected by the troops, and will he answer if I raise the matter on the Vote of Credit?
I am afraid I have no information myself, but I can procure it.
BAD HOUSING AND LOW WAGES.
asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that bad housing conditions and the low rate of wages paid to the working classes are the principal causes of dissatisfaction in Ireland; and if he will state what steps, if any, the Government will take to remedy this evil?
I would refer the hon. Member to the reply given to his similar question on the 17th instant
TRIAL OF PROFESSOR OWEN MACNEILL.
( by Private Notice ) asked the Prime Minister whether the report is correct that Professor Owen MacNeill is being tried by court-martial in camera ; if so, what is the statutory authority for this procedure; and whether he will immediately order the trial to be made public and Mr. MacNeill's evidence to be taken by civil commission of inquiry?
I only just now received notice of this question. I believe it is the case that Professor MacNeill is being tried by court-martial. The proceedings are not public. The statutory authority is the Defence of the Realm Act—
What Section?
The Section of the Act under which many of these trials have already taken place. No trial has taken place in Ireland except under the authority of the Defence of the Realm Act.
Then you must be in a very bad way!
In view of the fact that nobody else apparently but himself can find this power in the Act to which he refers will the right hon. Gentleman give me the Section under which it is conferred?
No, Sir, but if the hon. Gentleman will put down a question to the Attorney-General, he will supply him with that information.
MILITARY SERVICE.
EXEMPTIONS.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether a man who has not attained the age of forty-one, but who has received his discharge from the Army after completing his term of service, is entitled to appeal for exemption on the grounds set forth in the Military Service Act, 1916?
Yes, Sir. A man who has been discharged from the Army on the termination of his period of service, and who, under the terms of the Bill at present before Parliament, is required to rejoin, is entitled to apply for exemption under the provisions of the Military Service Act, 1916.
FIELD PUNISHMENT.
asked whether the rules for field punishment which provide that an offender may be kept in irons— i.e., in fetters or handcuffs or both fetters and handcuffs and may be attached for a period or periods not exceeding two hours in any one day to a fixed object and that straps or ropes may be used in lieu of irons, but not during more than three out of four consecutive days nor during more than twenty-one days in all—are intended to authorise the punishment known as crucifixion, in which the arms of the offender are fastened outstretched while the feet of the offender are sometimes raised above the ground; and whether they also authorise an offender being fastened to a cart-wheel with feet and arms extended?
The rules for field punishment do not contemplate such procedure.
Does such form of punishment never occur, then?
I cannot answer that definitely; I only say they do not contemplate it.
Will the right hon. Gentleman ascertain whether these punishments are ever being imposed on men who are resisting orders on conscientious grounds?
I should think it is highly improbable, but I cannot answer for it definitely without putting a question.
Will the right hon. Gentleman make inquiries?
I am very much disinclined to do that.
ARMY EXAMINATIONS (BOYS OF EIGHTEEN).
asked whether boys who attain the age of eighteen next August will be precluded from entering for the Sandhurst or Woolwich examinations which are held in November, and from studying for these examinations in the intervening months?
I would refer my hon. Friend to the answer I gave on the 17th May to the hon. Member for Devonport.
WIDOWERS WITH CHILDREN.
asked what is the position in respect of liability to military service of a widower with children dependent on him, having regard to Clause 1, Sub-section (2), of the Military Service Bill and its bearing upon the principal Act?
A widower with children dependent on him was treated by the principal Act as a married man. The Bill now before Parliament applies to married men and by consequence also to widowers with children dependent on them.
Is the right hon. Gentleman sure that the wording is as clear as the intention?
I think so.
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS.
asked where the seventeen men who were taken last week from the military prison at Harwich to Havre are now placed; whether these men, or any of them, are still refusing military service; and whether one of them, H. F. Brewster, has recently been sentenced to twenty-eight days' field punishment, and for what offence?
I regret that I am unable, as I have already stated, to give information as to the situation from day to day of individual soldiers, and I am consequently unable to answer the inquiries contained in the question.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether any other men who are resisting orders have been just sent to France since these seventeen?
I gave the House and my hon. Friend in an answer about three or four days ago the latest information I had from France to the effect that the Non-Combatant Force which had arrived there was doing very well, and there was no trouble with them at all.
Did not the right hon. Gentleman's answer refer to the Non-Combatant Corps who accepted non-combatant service? My question refers to those men who are still resisting orders on conscientious grounds.
It was alleged that among them was a body of men who had resisted non-combatant service, that they had been sent to France for that reason, and that that was one of their grievances. I was informed by the Adjutant-General in France that there was no trouble at all.
The trouble alleged is not in regard to the main body of those who had accepted non-combatant service, but a certain number, seventeen, who have refused any form of military service, and who were taken, some of them without uniform, to France?
The hon. Member is now making a speech.
asked the Under-secretary for War whether men who have been deemed to be enlisted under the Military Service Act, but have consistently protested that they cannot conscientiously undertake military service and have been taken against their will to France, will be subjected to field punishment for continuing their refusal?
This depends on the nature of the offences they may commit.
IRISH DOMICILE.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he will inquire into the case of Daniel Collins, a native of Meelon, Bandon, county Cork, who, on the occasion of one of his periodical visits to Manchester during Easter week, was drafted into the Army; whether he is aware that this man has but lately been discharged from the hospital where he was under treatment for appendicitis but could not be operated on owing to the serious condition of his heart and lungs and general low condition of health; whether he has been drafted to Naas depot, county Kildare, No. 26,818; and, being of Irish domicile, whether he will have the man immediately sent back to his home?
I have some information on this case, but I have had to refer it back for further inquiry as to the man's proper domicile. When the man was before the medical board he was found to be of exceptionally good physique and was passed for general service. He was posted to the regiment in which he expressed the desire to serve, namely, the Dublin Fusiliers.
PHYSICAL STANDARD.
asked what is the standard of chest measurement, and what is the weight for height for men now being passed for general service?
I understand the hon. Member is referring to those enlisted for the duration of the War only. The details are too numerous for me to give him the information he seeks in an answer, but I am sending to him a printed paper, and I would also refer him to Appendix 2 of the Recruiting Regulations, 1912.
SPECIAL ALLOWANCES (SOLDIERS).
asked what is the estimated total cost for the present year of the special allowances proposed to be made to soldiers under the new scheme of the Local Government Board?
I fear that it will be impossible to frame an estimate until some experience of the working of the scheme has been gained.
Can we have any estimate of the cost before we discuss the Budget?
I am afraid it is quite impossible to give any reliable estimate as to the cost to the State.
Can the Government spend this money which they have not estimated for, which must amount to something between £30,000,000 and £50,000,000, before they have the permission of the House?
I hope my hon. Friend has exaggerated the amount, but it is quite impossible to give a reliable estimate.
LABOUR IN INDUSTRIES.
asked the Prime Minister if the conclusion to which the Government came on the review of the situation by the Cabinet Committee, that 200,000 unattested married men could be spared to the Army from industry, was arrived at by settling the minimum numbers of men necessary to be retained in each of the separate trades; and if he will inform the House whether it is proposed to issue any instructions to the tribunals setting out the number of men that should be enlisted, having regard to the number already obtained in the district under their supervision, so as to avoid the depletion of labour in industries which are discharging responsibilities essential to the prosecution of the War?
With regard to the first part of the question, I must refer my hon. Friend to the answer given him by my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade on the 16th May. With regard to the last part of the question, the Government are of the opinion that their present arrangements provide against the danger to which my hon. Friend refers.
WEST SUFFOLK APPEAL TRIBUNAL.
asked the President of the Local Government Board whether at a recent meeting of the West Suffolk Appeal Tribunal, held in the Shirehall, Bury St. Edmunds, the chairman, Lord Bristol, in dismissing a case in which an employer applied for the exemption of a blacksmith in his employment, said that the time was approaching when the Government would take steps to organise industrial conscription; on what authority such a statement was made; and whether he will cause inquiry to be made?
My right hon. Friend is not aware of the statement to which reference is made. The Government have no intention of introducing industrial conscription.
ABERAVON TRIBUNAL.
asked the President of the Local Government Board whether Councillor James Price, a miner and Labour representative on the Aberavon Town Council, has been a member of the Aberavon Tribunal and has performed his work with fairness and impartiality; whether he is aware that because Councillor Price presided over a meeting against Conscription the recruiting officer for the area, backed up by the military representative to the Aberavon Tribunal, has demanded that Councillor Price should resign his seat on that tribunal, and that the recruiting officer insisted that Councillor Price had broken the law by presiding at a meeting against Conscription; whether there is anything in the rules and regulations to justify this action; and, if not, what action he proposes to take?
My right hon. Friend has not received any information respecting this matter, and he does not think it necessary, on the evidence before him, to take any action. He has not received information that Councillor Price has ceased to be a member of the tribunal. It is, of course, desirable that members of tribunals, whatever their personal opinions, should refrain from any action which might possibly appear to throw doubt on their impartiality.
Does that apply to both sides or only to one side?
That certainly applies to both sides.
COLONIALS (DOMICILE AND CITIZENSHIP).
asked the President of the Local Government Board if he will define the position, under the new Military Service Bill, of Colonials who have been resident for some time in the United Kingdom; what term of residence for business or other purposes in this country on the part of Canadians, Australians, or South Africans would make them eligible for service under the Bill; and whether, in the case of Colonials temporarily resident in the United Kingdom, and who may be exempt from the provisions of the Bill, he will extend to them the same consideration as to Americans and Danes, leaving the question of their domicile and citizenship to be decided, hot by public tribunals, but by the Colonial High Commissioners resident here, whose certificates would guarantee exemption?
The position of persons from the Dominions residing here, apart from age and other questions, depends on whether they are or are not ordinarily resident in this country. No definition of ordinary residence in terms of time can be given. The question is one of fact, which, if in dispute, can only be decided by a Court of Law. My right hon. Friend the Secretary for the Colonies has been in communication with the Army Council with a view to the military authorities accepting certificates from the Colonial High Commissioners with respect to persons from the Dominions whom the High Commissioners consider to be exempted from the Military Service Act.
PROPOSED MEDICAL BOARD (SWANSEA).
asked the Under-Secretary for War whether his attention has been called to the representations made by the Swansea Corporation, the chairman of the Glamorgan County Council, and of the West Glamorgan Appeal Tribunal in favour of the appointment of a medical board at Swansea; whether he is aware that real hardship is being caused to men desiring to be properly classified who have to travel forty-five miles to Cardiff for medical examination; and whether, in view of the large population in and around Swansea, he will immediately set up a competent military medical board in that town whose decision shall be final?
The matter to which my right hon. Friend calls attention has been referred to the Western Command for consideration, and it is hoped that a reply may be received in the course of a day or two.
VOLUNTEER TRAINING CORPS.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he has had any offers of the services of any Volunteer regiments; and, if so, whether the services of any such regiments have been accepted, and will he state the names of any such regiments?
Yes, Sir, certain offers of service have been made to, and have been accepted by, the King. It is not considered desirable to make public notification of the regiments accepted until the form of enrolment for Volunteers has been decided. It is hoped that this may be settled in the course of the next few days.
Why have the services of the Cheshire Volunteer Regiment, comprising 9,000 men, which were offered two months ago, not yet been accepted?
It is not considered desirable to make public notification of a particular unit; therefore I am unable to give the hon. Member an answer.
Will not the right hon. Gentleman inform the authorities of that particular regiment privately through the ordinary channels?
Oh, yes, they will undoubtedly be informed.
They have not been.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he has assigned to any special department of the War Office the administration of the Volunteer Force; and, if so, to which department?
The administration of the Volunteer Force has been assigned as a temporary measure to the department of the Director-General of the Territorial Force, which will in this matter work under the Adjutant-General.
asked whether, when the services of the county Volunteer regiments have been accepted, such regiments will communicate direct with the War Office on all matters of administration and discipline, or will they communicate through the Central Association of Volunteer Training Corps?
An announcement on this matter will be made in due course. The exact procedure to be followed is still under the consideration of the Army Council.
asked the Prime Minister whether, seeing that the military authorities are entrusting the Volunteer Force of the United Kingdom with various important duties, the Government will make an appeal to all men over military age, or disqualified from joining the Regular Army, to enrol in this force, so as to increase their num- bers and relieve more Regular troops for service abroad; and whether, in order to encourage the movement, he will make it clear that the Government attaches importance to the force and desires the men to volunteer for the duties entrusted to them?
The Volunteer Force has in several cases given valuable assistance to the Army in many ways, and the Government hope that men disqualified for Regular or Territorial Forces, if not employed on duties of national importance, will join the Volunteer force and in it be available for necessary services.
TERRITORIAL FORCE.
asked whether recommendations for the award of the Territorial decoration for officers and the Territorial Force efficiency medal for noncommissioned officers and men of the Territorial Force when serving with an Expeditionary Force, are to be held in abeyance during the period of the War; whether these decorations and medals are given for stated periods of service with good conduct, and are in no way given for war service; and, if so, what is the reason for suspending the giving of them to those men who are serving with an Expeditionary Force while they are still being given to those men who are serving at Home?
The comparison in this matter is rather between the position of Territorial officers and men serving with the Expeditionary Forces and Regular troops serving in these Forces, than between Territorial troops serving at Home and those serving with the Expeditionary Forces. The Grant of the Territorial decoration and Territorial Force efficiency medal is being held in abeyance in the case of those serving with the Expeditionary Forces, because it has been thought desirable to put all members of the Expeditionary Forces on one footing.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that that is hardly understood by those Territorials serving abroad? Some of them feel that they ought to be getting these medals.
The hon. Member is making a statement—he is not asking a question.
Perhaps I may be allowed to say that I hope the hon. and gallant Gentleman will make it clear to those he spoke for what I have just said.
SOLDIERS' LEAVE (RAILWAY PASSES).
asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether his attention has been drawn to the case of soldiers home from active service, especially in Egypt and the East, who, owing to some misunderstanding or mistake, have received railway passes only as far as London, though their homes are in Scotland; whether in every case leave carries with it the right to a free railway pass to the soldier's home; and whether he can take any further steps to make clear to soldiers what their rights in this respect are?
When this special leave from the front is given it carries a free travelling warrant to the man's home. I think this is so generally understood that no further steps to make it known are called for. The railway transport officers at the London termini have power to alter the destination on the railway warrant in cases where they are satisfied that this is necessary.
SOLDIERS' RATIONS.
asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether, since the year 1914, the allowance paid in lieu of rations to soldiers on the lodging list has been reduced from 2s. to 1s. 9d. and since last month to 1s. 7d. per diem; whether, when billeted, the householder is now paid 17s. 6d. per man per week, composed as follows: 1s. 9d. for rations and 9d. for lodging, fuel, and light per diem; whether, when drawing consolidated family allowance, the rate allowed to the soldier himself in lieu of rations is still 1s. 9d. per diem; and, if so, whether, in view of the increased cost of food, he will consider the desirability of continuing the allowance of 1s. 9d. per diem to soldiers on the lodging list in the Woolwich district and elsewhere?
The facts are as stated, but the general allowance in lieu of rations is now 1s. 7d., and I am afraid it is impossible to make any special arrangements for soldiers on the lodging list.
What justification is there for reducing the rations allowance when food prices are increasing?
The justification is that the ration itself has been reduced. The meat rations have been reduced a quarter of a pound and the rations allowance by 2½d.
asked if the ration allowance to commissioned officers was reduced from 1s. 9d. per diem to 1s. 5½d. per diem in 1915; and whether it has since been increased to 1s. 9d. per diem?
In those cases where officers, to suit their own convenience, elect to take a money allowance instead of the ration in kind, the cash allowance was reduced in 1915 from 1s. 9d. a day to 1s. 5d. Following on a reduction in the ration is has been further reduced to 1s. 3d.
FINANCE BILL.
DEATH DUTIES (GRADUATION).
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether any estimate has been formed of the effect upon the public revenue of improving the graduation of Death Duties upon the capital of estates in accordance with the principle underlying the provisions of Section 22 of the Finance Bill affecting income?
My hon. Friend is no doubt aware of the provision in Section 13 of the Finance Act, 1914, the cost of which was estimated at the time of its introduction to be about £40,000 in a full year. The preparation of the statistical details from which the actual result might have been calculated is part of the work with which it has been necessary to dispense with a view to economising statt.
MOTOR-CAR DUTIES.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he is aware of the feeling of injustice among persons owning low-paced cars used for the purposes of their business that they should be charged the same rate for their cars as persons using high-priced cars purchased for pleasure; and if he will consider if it is possible to make some differentiation?
As I have already explained, I am considering all questions relevant to the Motor Car Duty, and I hope to make a statement on the Committee stage of the Finance Bill.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that these cars have gone up very largely in price?
When the right hon. Gentleman is considering this question, may I ask him not to assume that all low-priced cars are being used for business and the high-priced cars all for pleasure, which is certainly not in accordance with the facts?
That is an assumption which I should never make.
Will the right hon. Gentleman consider this tax upon cars from 16 to 26 horse-power, which are very largely used in Ireland for business purposes?
That is one of the points I have in mind.
Will he consider the cases where the tax has been raised from £6 to £18?
That is the same question as that raised by my hon. Friend.
MUNITIONS.
BAD LANGUAGE REGULATION.
asked the Minister of Munitions whether his attention has been called to a case in which a workman employed by Messrs. Hewitt and Kellett, of Bradford, applied to the Court for a leaving certificate on the ground that a member of the firm had employed towards him constant bullying and bad language; whether he is aware that this workman drew attention to a notice posted in the works that any employé using bad language to a superior is liable to a fine of £3 at the Munitions Court; whether this regulation has been officially sanctioned by the Ministry of Munitions and, if so, whether he will take steps to render an employer or foreman liable to monetary penalties who uses improper language toward an employed person?
My attention has been drawn to reports on this case, in which, I understand, the workman was refused a certifi- cate. The model rules sanctioned by the Minister, which can alone be the ground of prosecution before a Munitions Tribunal, provide that no person employed shall "use abusive language in or otherwise interfere with or annoy any other person employed in the establishment." This would apply to all persons employed in the establishment, including foremen. I will make inquiry to see if, as appears to be suggested in the question, the rule posted by the firm differed from the model rule. It is open, of course, to the man, if he so desires, to see whether there are grounds for appeal.
BRADFORD MUNITION TRIBUNAL.
asked the Minister of Munitions whether an employé of Messrs. Hewitt and Kellett, of Bradford, applied en 4th May for a leaving certificate before the Bradford Munitions Tribunal on the ground that he had become skilled as a steel-cutter and could do work more to the national advantage than his employment as a labourer, and that the application was refused, and that the chairman informed the applicant that if he left his employment he would be unemployed for six weeks, and might in the meantime be forced into the Army; whether it is with his sanction that the Munitions of War Act should be reinforced in this way by the Military Service Act; and whether he will cause inquiry to be made?
My attention has been called to this case, and I am making further inquiries.
WAR SERVICE BADGES.
asked the Minister of Munitions whether he has requested certain firms to send in lists of their employés, indicating those who are essential and those who may be sent into military service; whether his attention has been drawn to the fact that in some of these lists men who are quite close to the limit of military age have been indicated as available for service whilst much younger men have been indicated as being essential to the business; whether, in some instances, the men indicated as available for military service seem to have been selected on account of their political opinions and trade union activities; and whether anything can be done to see that military and industrial considerations alone are to determine the making up of these lists?
Inpectors of the Ministry are now visiting works to which war service badges have been issued with a view to ascertaining whether badges are being held by men who appear to be more urgently needed in the Army than for munitions work. With a view to facilitating their inquiries these inspectors have in some cases asked firms to supply them in advance of their visit with a list of badged employés. My attention has not been called to any cases in which a firm has attempted to secure the release of men on account of their political opinions or trade union activities, but special instructions on this point have been issued to inspectors with a view to preventing any such attempt from being successful if it were made.
DEPORTED WORKMEN (ALLOWANCES TO FAMILIES).
asked the Minister of Munitions the amount of the allowance paid weekly to the families of the workmen deported from Glasgow by order of the Ministry of Munitions and the military authorities; the nature of the undertaking into which the workmen must enter before they can obtain employment; and whether the alternative to their entering into such an undertaking is that the workmen shall remain away from Glasgow under circumstances which deprive them of work and wages?
The allowances paid to the families of the men in question vary from 10s. to 15s. a week. The men are not required to sign any undertaking before obtaining employment in the towns where they now are.
CLYDE DILUTION COMMISSIONERS.
asked the Minister of Munitions whether the Clyde Dilution of Labour Commissioners have completed their inquiry into the circumstances leading up to certain disputes on the Clyde and to the deportation, without trial, from Glasgow of certain workmen; whether the Report of the Commissioners has been forwarded to the Ministry of Munitions and whether it will be made public; and whether any opportunity will be afforded to the deported men to disprove, if possible, the charges made against them?
As I stated on 12th April, an inquiry was undertaken by the Clyde Dilution Commissioners into the causes and circumstances leading up to the strike at Beardmore's, Parkhead. The completion of the inquiry was delayed by the illness of a material witness, but I understand that the Commissioners are now considering their Report. When the Report has been received, my right hon. Friend will consider what action he should take thereon.
Will the evidence in this Report be published when it is completed?
I will be able to say what will be done when I see the Report.
Will the precedent set in the case of Lord Balfour of Burleigh's Report on Discontent on the Clyde be followed with reference to this Report?
made a reply which was inaudible.
CO-OPERATION WITH ALLIES (PORTUGAL).
asked the Prime Minister whether Portugal is receiving financial support from this country in her participation in the War; if so, to what extent; and whether he can indicate the directions in which the Portuguese Army and Navy are co-operating with the Allies?
It would not be in the public interest to specify the precise part to be played by Portugal in defeating the common enemy, but the hon. Member may rest assured that the Portuguese Government are acting in the closest co-operation with His Majesty's Government.
May I have a reply to the first part of my question?
No, Sir; I have nothing to add to my answer.
MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT (CENSORSHIP OF LETTERS).
asked the Prime Minister whether he will co-ordinate the practice of the Admiralty and War Office with reference to the censoring of letters addressed to Members at the Palace of Westminster?
Yes, Sir, I will arrange that this shall be done. I am anxious that it should be done.
In what sense?
In the Admiralty sense.
asked the Prime Minister (1) whether he can state definitely whether all letters addressed to all Members at this Palace of Westminster, coming from North and South America, are subject to be opened by the Censor, or whether discrimination is shown; and, if so, the reason for such discrimination and, if no discrimination is displayed, the object of censoring such letters; and (2) whether letters written by Members of this House, and bearing their names upon the envelopes, handed personally to the postmaster in the Inner Lobby for postage to North and South America, are opened by the Censor; and, if so, the object of this censorship?
The only discrimination is in favour of those who habitually conduct official correspondence. It is not considered in the public interest that confidential official communications should be read by others than the person to whom they are addressed. It is a mistake to suppose that the fact of a letter having been opened by the Censor constitutes any reflection on the character of either the writer or the recipient. The object of the censorship is to prevent the enemy making use of any indiscretions which may be contained in them. Experience shows that even the best-intentioned persons are occasionally guilty of such indiscretions.
HORSERACING DURING WAR.
asked the Prime Minister whether His Majesty's Government, having regard to the feeling throughout the country against the continuance of horseracing during the War, coupled with the necessity for restricting the consumption of petrol and minimising the repairs to motor cars used for purposes other than those in aid of the naval, military, and munition services, will take immediate steps to prohibit such racing until after the conclusion of the War?
I must refer the Noble Lord to the answer given to the Member for North Devon by the President of the Board of Trade, on the 9th and 11th instant, as embodying the conclusions of the Government on this matter.
Does not the right hon. Gentleman and His Majesty's Government see the incompatibility of preaching public economy, and urging munition workers to do their utmost in the interests of the State, sanctioning prosecutions and in some cases fines for wilful disregard of the advice in regard to working, and at the same time giving public sanction to the most extravagant, alluring, and expensive form of public amusement?
Running our own horses!
I would refer the Noble Lord to the answer of the President of the Board of Trade, who went into all these matters on the 9th and the 11th of May.
Could the right hon. Gentleman state what is the reason why there should be an increase in the number of race meetings this year as compared with last year?
Is the Prime Minister aware that since May, when the Cabinet discussed this matter, the Government have themselves bought racehorses, which they are running?
May I ask if it is not possible to devise some other means for training horses for military and national use than race meetings?
Will the Prime Minister take the sense of the House on this question? Has he any doubt whatever that practically the large majority of this House is in favour of the proposal contained in the question?
I am not at all sure what the sense of the House is on this matter.
Will you take the sense of the House?
May I ask whether horseracing is not an amusement in which large amounts of capital are wasted?
COALITION GOVERNMENT (CONSTITUTION).
asked the Prime Minister whether, considering that the primary condition of a Coalition Government is the acceptance by all parties concerned of a full and complete share of responsibility, he will now so reconstitute the Cabinet as to give the Unionists, who number 287 in the House of Commons to the Radical party's 260, and hold only nine out of the twenty-three seats in the Cabinet, the proportionate representation and responsibility to which they are entitled?
No, Sir, I do not propose to make any such change.
MEN CALLED TO COLOURS (CIVIL LIABILITIES).
asked the President of the Local Government Board how the Derby attested men can appeal for settlement of allowances; and when and where?
If, as I assume, my hon. Friend has in mind the scheme for special assistance to enable men serving with the forces to meet their civil liabilities, I would refer him to the statement made by me last Wednesday and to the White Paper subsequently issued.
asked the President of the Local Government Board whether he is in a position to state the names of the Commissioners for Wales appointed to investigate cases of hardship arising out of the civil liabilities of men who have joined the forces?
The Commismissioners appointed for Wales are Mr. Milner-Jones, Mr. Evans Morris, and Mr. David Rhys. The first two are revising barristers.
Can my right hon. Friend say if the House of Commons ever gave the Government permission to appoint any Commissioners?
I do not know whether the House of Commons ever gave permission, but I think the Government have the inherent power to appoint such Commissioners.
Can the Government appoint Commissioners at a salary on the basis of the White Paper which they have issued without it being discussed by the House or the House passing the money which is to be paid?
Mr. HAYES FISHER rose— —
I do not want the opinion of the Local Government Board. I ask the question on a point of Order.
No point of Order can be raised during questions.
asked the President of the Local Government Board if the special allowances proposed to be made to enlisted men under the new scheme of the Local Government Board will apply to men in the Navy as well as in the Army?
Yes, Sir.
SHIPPING PROBLEM.
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he invited the editors of London newspapers to meet him on Wednesday, 3rd May; and if he will state the object of the meeting and what transpired thereat?
Yes, Sir; the object of the meeting was to discuss and explain certain aspects of the shipping problem.
Will the right hon. Gentleman take an early opportunity of giving some full information to Members of this House?
Yes, Sir, I shall welcome the opportunity for full discussion of the shipping problem when it arises.
BARLEY AND MALT (EXPORTS).
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, although the exportation of barley and malt to all foreign destinations is prohibited, considerable quantities of both products have been and still are being exported to foreign countries; if so, will he state what such quantities so exported are for each period of four months ending 30th April, 1914, 1915, and 1916; and whether exports of these products are now not only to be prohibited but also prevented?
The exports of barley and malt from the United Kingdom to foreign countries in the three periods mentioned were, respectively: Barley, 2,677 tons, 12,038 tons, and 14 tons; malt, 2,207 tons, 10,736 tons, and 7,132 tons. The policy which it is in the national interest to pursue in regulating the issue of licences is constantly under review, and is being specially considered at the present time in connection with the restriction of the output of beer—but I can at the moment make no further statement upon it.
FROZEN MEAT (IMPORTS).
asked the President of the Board of Trade the total number of steamers, British and foreign, other than steamers fitted for the conveyance of frozen meat, which entered United Kingdom ports during the last twelve months for which he has a record, and the date thereof; and what percentage of the total the foreign vessels were?
In the calendar year 1915, 13,200 British steamers, with an aggregate net register tonnage of 22,632,000 tons, and 12,550 foreign steamers, with a total tonnage of 9,900,000 tons, entered with cargo from abroad. The foreign steamers were thus 48.7 per cent. of the total number, and their net tonnage was 30.4 per cent. of that of all steamers entered with cargo. These figures include the steamers equipped for the conveyance of frozen meat, which cannot conveniently be separated.
In view of the fact that only 75 per cent. of the total trade was carried in British ships, cannot the Government consider the desirability of opening a compassionate fund for British shipowners?
Can the right hon. Gentleman ascertain the tonnage of the meat trade steamers?
I will inquire.
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that several American-owned freezing companies in the Argentine and Uruguay are buying cattle from German sellers, while British companies are, by our Government restrictions, prevented from so doing, with the result that American freezing companies, through absence of competition for these cattle, are able to buy them at cheaper prices than the British companies, who are restricted to buying from British or neutral sellers; whether a great portion of the German-owned animals purchased by American freezing companies are brought to this country in the form of frozen meat and purchased by our Government; whether the meat from these beasts bought from Germans is sold to the British Government at a lower price than the British freezing companies sell at; and, if not, whether he can adopt measures which will prevent prejudice to the British-owned meat companies?
My information is that the British meat companies in the Argentine and Uruguay are not limited in their purchases of cattle as compared with the American companies owing to any Estancieros being on the list of prohibited firms. There is no condition in our contracts with frozen meat companies as to the source from which they obtain cattle and the same prices are paid to all our contractors for the same description of meat.
Will my right hon. Friend make inquiries as to the purchase of cattle by these American companies from German sources?
I have made inquiries and the results are given in my answer.
RIVER PLATE WHEAT TRADE.
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether the British Government restriction imposed upon British steamers loading in the River Plate that they shall reserve from 50 per cent. upwards of their total cargo capacity for the carriage of wheat to this country has resulted in neutral steamers obtaining some 20s. to 30s. per ton higher freight for full cargoes of maize to the United Kingdom than British steamers?
The Requisitioning (Carriage of Foodstuffs) Committee, who are entrusted with the provision of tonnage for the importation of wheat have requested the liner companies to reserve for the present an average of 50 per cent. of their available deadweight capacity for wheat. I am aware that maize is able to pay a higher freight than wheat, but it is necessary to import a certain amount of Plate wheat to this country.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in a recent case a percentage of 75 was insisted on, with the result shown in the question?
I shall be happy to have that case brought to my notice. It has been necessary to insist on a large proportion of liners' space being reserved for wheat in order to keep up our stocks here.
But is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that it is not always obtainable?
WOOL YARN (EXPORT LICENCES).
asked the hon. Member for the Oswestry Division, as representing the War Trade Department, if he will make arrangements to notify applicants for licences to export wool yarn whose applications have previously been declined when the embargo has been removed and their applications for licences may be resubmitted or whether, as an alternative, he will arrange to publish an announcement in the "Board of Trade Journal" whenever licences are again being issued after an interval during which they were not issued, in order to prevent forestalment by firms of exporters who have special facilities for obtaining early information of the decisions of the Department as to the issuing of licences?
( representing the War Trade Department ): The applications for licences for the export of wool in its various forms number about 400 daily, and it would, therefore, be impracticable to advise each applicant as to the circumstances which affect the grant or refusal of licences or the temporary holding up of applications, but such information on the subject as can be given is published in the "Board of Trade Journal." I may add that licences are now being granted for the export of wool yarn subject to certain conditions, of which the particulars were published in the "Board of Trade Journal" of 13th April, on pages 82 and 83.
INTERNED GERMANS (EMPLOYMENT ON NATIONAL WORK).
asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if, in view of the demand for labour, he will take into consideration whether a certain num- ber of those subjects of enemy countries who are interned could be employed, under adequate supervision, in work of a national character outside the internment camps?
This matter has already had a great deal of consideration. The hon. Baronet will bear in mind that the British Government is precluded by The Hague Convention from employing prisoners on work having "any connection with the operations of the war"; that British workmen object to working side by side with Germans; and that it is difficult to find the greatly increased number of guards required to supervise men working out of camp. Combatant prisoners, however, are being employed in parties under guards in France on labouring work, and arrangements have been made for them to be employed in the same way in this country. Civilian prisoners in the Isle of Man are doing quarrying, road making, and peat cutting, and growing vegetables for the camps; while a beginning has been made of the employment of suitable men in other parts of the country on agricultural work. Other schemes are being formed. I would also refer my hon. Friend to the statement made by Lord Newton in another place last Thursday.
METROPOLITAN POLICE (PENSIONS).
asked the Home Secretary whether pensioned police officers who have been called up for service during the War in the Metropolitan Police Force are paid their pensions as well as the ordinary pay of the police rank they are now serving; will he state the number of time-expired constables and officers who have been retained in the Metropolitan Police Force since August, 1914; and will he arrange that these time-expired men shall be treated on exactly the same lines as regards pay as the pensioned officer who has been recalled for service?
The pensioned police officers now doing police duty are volunteers, and were under no obligation to rejoin. They draw their pensions in addition to their police pay. If my hon. Friend will state whether he desires to know the number of constables and officers who having completed twenty-five years police service would, in time of peace, have been entitled to the lower scale of pension, or the number who, having completed twenty-six years, would have been entitled to the higher scale, but who have been retained in the force, I will obtain these figures. They cannot be given pensions while retained in the force and receiving full pay.
May I ask whether it is considered that the increase of the lodging allowance to single men is proportionate to the increase in the cost of food and lodging since the War began?
I must ask for notice of that question.
NATIONAL DEBT.
asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether he can now state the amount of the National Debt, the amount of Consol Debt recently converted under the conversion scheme, and of the 3½ per cent. War Loan, and the total amount of Treasury Bills and Exchequer Bonds now outstanding?
Final figures for the year 1915–16 are not yet available. The total nominal amount of dead-weight debt on 31st March, 1916, was approximately £2,140,800,000. As regards the amount of Consol Debt converted, I beg to refer to the answer given to my hon. Friend the Member for Wigan on the 15th instant. For further particulars as to the debt at 31st March I must ask my hon. Friend to await the publication of the usual accounts. The amount of Treasury Bills outstanding on the 20th instant was £660,698,000.
WILFUL MURDER TRIALS (PLEA OF AUTREFOIS ACQUIT).
asked the Attorney-General whether a plea of autrefois acquit has been pleaded on a trial for wilful murder where the acquittal was that of a military tribunal after the Proclamation of martial law?
I am unable to trace any case in which such a plea has been pleaded in the circumstances mentioned in the question.
WAKEFIELD INTERNMENT CAMP (FLASH-LAMPS.)
asked the Under-Secretary for War whether the War Office has yet received the information in response to the inquiries which he has made concerning the obtaining of flash-lamps by a German prisoner of war interned at Wakefield; and whether he can now say for what purpose these flash-lamps have been used by a German prisoner interned in this country?
The prisoners who are interned at Wakefield were permitted to obtain a certain privacy by hanging curtains between their beds, and I understand that in order to obtain light in these extemporised cubicles some electrical apparatus, including a small number of pocket lamps of very small power, was obtained. These temporary installations were, however, considered dangerous on account of the possibility of fires, and they were removed some time ago.
Margarine (Fraudulent Trading).
asked the Secretary for Scotland whether his attention has been called to the resolution passed by the Grocers' and Provision Merchants' Association of Glasgow to the effect that all sellers of margarine should be registered; and whether, in view of the frequent prosecutions rendered necessary by the practice of passing off margarine as Irish butter in Glasgow, steps will be taken to put an end to this fraudulent method of trading?
The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. As regards the second part, I have not received practicable suggestions for any form of action that is likely to be more effective than the frequent prosecutions to which my hon. Friend refers.
Ceylon (Charge of Shooting).
asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will specify the offence, if any, for which two European planters, dressed in khaki, on the 5th June, 1915, entered a field at Pethavila, Ceylon, in which a woman, Appallagoda Aratchige Subarath Etana, was collecting a kind of vegetable, and without trial or charge shot at and killed her; whether the two men in khaki have been tried or any inquiry held; and whether Sir Robert Chalmers, then Governor of Ceylon, now Under-Secretary for Ireland, will be asked for an explanation?
I have no reason to believe that the facts are as stated by the hon. Member. I do not propose to call for an explanation from Sir R. Chalmers.
The right hon. Gentleman has not answered the first part of my question. I asked for what offence, if any, was this woman shot?
I have no reason to believe that there is any truth whatever in the whole story.
Scientific Experts (Pay).
asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether his attention has been called to a communication received by the Colonial Office from the British Science Guild, dated 12th March, 1915, representing that it would be proper and advisable for all Departments of the Imperial Government, or of municipalities within the Empire, to make it their invariable rule and practice to pay scientific experts of all kinds for assistance rendered by them, either at committees, or by letter, or in any other way, such payments to include not only refunds for travelling expenses or other out-of-pocket expenses or maintenance, but also a proper fee for the professional assistance rendered; and whether he will appoint a Committee to consider and report upon these proposals of the British Science Guild with a view to an equitable settlement of the matter?
I have seen the communication in question and, so far as the Colonial Office is concerned, I agree with my predecessor in thinking that there is no sufficient ground for modifying existing arrangements. The second part of the question does not, therefore, arise.
NEW MEMBERS SWORN.
William Frederick Hicks Beach, Esquire, for County of Gloucester (Northern or Tewkesbury Division).
Colonel William Hall Walker, for South-West Lancashire (Widnes Division).
BILL PRESENTED.
Naval Discipline (Delegation of Powers) Bill,—"to amend the Naval Discipline Act with respect to the powers and duties of the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet during the present War," presented by Dr. MACNAMARA; to be read a second time To-morrow, and to be printed. [Bill 46.]
MESSAGE FROM THE LORDS,
That they have agreed to—
Military Service Bill, with Amendments.
That they have passed a Bill, intituled "An Act to authorise the Aberdare and Aberaman Consumers Gas Company to raise additional capital, to convert their existing capital, to construct new works, and for other purposes." [Aberdare and Aberaman Gas Bill [ Lords. ]
MILITARY SERVICE BILL.
Lords Amendments to be considered Tomorrow, and to be printed. [Bill 47.]
ABERDARE AND ABERAMAN GAS BILL [Lords].
Read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
Ordered, That the Proceedings on Government Business be not interrupted this night under the Standing Order (Sittings of the House), and may be entered upon at any time though opposed.—[ The Prime minister. ]
SUPPLY.
SUPPLEMENTARY VOTE OF CREDIT.
STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER.
Order for Committee read.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
The Supplementary Vote of Credit to which I am about to ask the assent of the House is the eleventh Vote that I have proposed since the War began and the second for the current financial year 1916–17. In submitting to the House the relevant facts and figures I shall confine myself strictly, in the first instance, to the financial necessities of the country, and I shall not enter on this occasion into anything in the nature of a general survey of the military or strategical situation. On 21st February last the House voted the first Vote of Credit for the current financial year, amounting to £300,000,000. The sum which we are now asking the House, by way of Supplementary Vote, to add to that is again £300,000,000, so that if the Vote I am now proposing is agreed to the total sum granted by the House for the current year will be £600,000,000. It may be useful to recapitulate the figures of the Votes of Credit since the outbreak of the War. They fall now into three financial years. For the first year, the financial year 1914–15, three Votes were taken, amounting in all to £362,000,000. For the second financial year, 1915–16, the Government proposed and the House of Commons agreed to six Votes, amounting to an aggregate of £1,420,000,000. If to those two sums are added the £600,000,000 which, if this Vote is assented to, will be the authorised expenditure so far for the current year, the aggregate of all the Votes of Credit since the outbreak of the War, up to and including that now under consideration, becomes £2,382,000,000.
Turning to the current financial year, the Vote of Credit out of which since 31st March war expenditure is being met is the one passed on 21st February for £300,000,000. I will therefore begin my review of the progress of expenditure from 1st April, the opening day of the current financial year, which has this advantage, that I am able to dispense on this accasion with the complicated adjustments which were found necessary in the year now closed, and particularly in the latter half of that year. When I last addressed the House on 21st February, dealing with the period which the Vote of Credit then under consideration would probably cover, I pointed out that up to that date the average daily expenditure from Votes of Credit for any given period had not, on our late experience, and after making all necessary adjustments, exceeded £4,400,000 a day, and I added that as far as could be seen at that time it was not in any way probable that the expenditure from the Vote of Credit would rise above £5,000,000 a day. That rate of £5,000,000 was indicated by me as a maximum which it was not anticipated we should reach, but I added that if a daily rate of expenditure of £5,000,000 was assumed the Vote which I then proposed on 21st February would last for sixty days—that is to say, from 1st April till the end of May. In the course of the Debate which then took place some criticism was directed against what my right hon. Friend (Mr. Lough) described as "this £5,000,000 a day statement."
made an observation which was not heard in the Reporters' Gallery.
Not at all. A rough and compendious expression. The complaint was made in some quarters that the Treasury forecast of expenditure on the Vote of Credit had been exaggerated. My right hon. Friend, I think, made that complaint himself. I should like to make one or two general observations on that point. The first is that under present conditions, with an expenditure of this magnitude, it is exceptionally difficult to make any forecast which can be taken to be accurate of the expenditure which is likely to be incurred in any comparatively short given period. The shorter the period the greater the difficulty. The outgoings fluctuate considerably week by week, and in some weeks we have actually expended more than £5,000,000 a day. The second observation which has to be made is this: Any estimate must of course allow a margin for contingencies, and when we frame our estimates on the basis of a daily rate of expenditure, the aggregate margin necessarily becomes greater than it would be in the case of an estimate based on a weekly or monthly period, and, as I have said already, on the occasion of every statement relating to Votes of Credit I have always given the House full figures showing what has been the rate of expenditure up to date, and in making a forecast of the future the sum of £5,000,000 has been always treated not as the probable but as the maximum figure. Now let me see how far the forecast which I made last February has been borne out by the results. The period from 1st April till 20th May, the last complete week, covers fifty days, and in that time the expenditure from the Vote of Credit, as far as it can be ascertained at present, has been nearly £241,000,000. It follows that the daily average expenditure has been £4,820,000. That is the highest average expenditure we have reached since the War began as yet over any consecutive period, and the figures, I am sorry to say, show that the rough estimate which was given in February last was not overstated to any substantial extent.
4.0 P.M.
Perhaps I may remind the House at this point that the true expenditure for the last financial year, 1915–16, dividing it into periods up to 17th July—1st April to 17th July—was at the rate approximately of £2,800,000 a day; from 17th July to 11th September it rose to approximately £3,500,000 a day; from 11th September to 6th November the average was £4,350,000 a day; and, as I said when speaking last February, between 7th November and 19th February the daily average was between £4,300,000 and £4,400,000, after adding the actual expenditure in that period due to the Bank of England in respect of advances to various Powers, which had not yet been repaid, and which would in due course be discharged out of the Vote of Credit. In the period between 19th February and 31st March those liabilities were discharged, with the exception of a sum of £12,000,000, which has been paid off in April of the present year. These payments increased the actual cash expenditure from the Vote of Credit towards the end of the last financial year. They were properly attributable to earlier dates, and were allowed for in the figures of the average expenditure relating to those earlier dates. After that adjustment the true expenditure between 19th February and 31st March was appreciably less than in the previous month. Comparing our experience of the present financial year, so far as it has gone, with the year which closed on 31st March, the highest average expenditure for any considerable period in the last financial year was between £4,300,000 and £4,400,000 per day, whereas in the fifty days which have passed since 1st April we have reached £4,820,000 a day—as the House will see, a very substantial rate of interest. I will explain under what heads the expenditure has taken place. I am dealing now with the period 1st April to 20th May. The first and, of course, the largest item is in respect of the Army, Navy, and munitions—£149,000,000. The second item, loans to Allies and Dominions, amounts to £74,500,000, or half the amount expended upon the Army, Navy, and munitions. The third is for food supplies, railways, and miscellaneous items, in regard to some of which it is not desirable at the moment to state precisely what they are. The total amount under that head is £17,500,000, making a total of £241,000,000.
The loans to the Allies and Dominions can be repaid.
I hope and believe they will, but we have got to find the money. What I am trying to explain to the House is what we have actually to expend and what we have to get from the Exchequer. That is what is material to the Vote of Credit. What will come back to us after the end of the War, in few or many days, is another matter. What I am giving is actual out-of-pocket outlay. During these fifty days the actual out-of-pocket outlay amounts to £241,000,000. It follows, therefore, as the House will see, that there has been a not inconsiderable growth in the rate of expenditure since I last addressed them on the 21st February. As I have already said, that expenditure includes the repayments of advances by the Bank of England, which were really provided in the previous year, and eliminating that, which really ought not to be charged against the present year, the daily average expenditure is reduced to rather less than £4,600,000 a day. Even this shows a very serious increase over the figures of the average daily expenditure which have previously been given to the House, and it is an excess over the Budget Estimate of the Vote of Credit for the whole year. So far as regards the Army, the Navy, and munitions, the expendture in the fifty days in question has been on the average just under £3,000,000 a day, which is slightly less than the average expenditure per day when I last addressed the House, when it was just over £3,000,000 a day.
So there has been no rise but, on the contrary, a slight diminution in the daily expenditure upon what I may call the fighting services of the Crown. The growth in the average daily expenditure occurs entirely, or almost entirely, under the head of "Loans to Allies and Dominions"—mainly under that, and to some extent under the miscellaneous items. I need not, except in a passing sentence, do more than once again impress upon the House and the country that one of the great contributions which we are called upon to make, and which we should be glad to make, towards the prosecution of our common cause is the financial assistance which we are able to render and which we feel it our duty to render not only to our own Dominions, but to our Allies. Without that assistance it is perfectly true to say that the great combined operations, in which we are all taking our share, could not possibly be prosecuted with efficiency and success. I do not believe for a moment that the House of Commons will grudge—though the actual daily expenditure upon our own fighting forces has not increased—an addition, which is to come out of the British Exchequer, in order that the whole composite financial, military, and naval fabric, upon whose co-operative work the success of our joint efforts depend, can be kept in complete, efficient working order. In our opinion we ought to continue to the utmost of our ability, by advances as well as by actual naval and military operations, the common task which we and our Allies are together discharging. I must say—I am bound to say it in the present circumstances, lest anticipations to the contrary may be entertained—that we cannot hope, so far as we can foresee, any sensible dimunition in the average in the expenditure upon loans to our Allies and Dominions. That is a summary of the heads under which this gigantic sum has, during the fifty days of the present financial year, been expended. The balance which we still have in hand of the Vote of Credit already granted by the House in February will, at the existing rate of expenditure, which it is to be assumed will continue at £4,800,000 a day, last until about the 2nd June. We are now at the 23rd May, so that is practically another ten days. As regards the Vote of Credit of £300,000,000 which I am now submitting to the House, on the basis of the facts and considerations which I have put forward, it would seem unwise to estimate for an expenditure on a lower daily rate than £4,750,000 for the present. I think that is a fair and a safe estimate, and I do not think it is over-generous. At that rate of expenditure the Vote of £300,000,000 now proposed will last approximately until the middle of the first week of August.
I hope I have made clear to the House the financial situation as far as this Vote of Credit is concerned. I will not enter, at any rate until we have heard what is said in the course of the Debate, upon any considerations of a more general character. This is the eleventh time it has been my duty to ask the House to make provision for the conduct of the War. Of one thing I am absolutely certain, and it is that that provision will be made as readily, as generously, and with the same confidence in the justice of our cause, and the same belief in its triumphant issue, as every preceding Vote from the first day of the War has been accorded by the House.
This is the first time in my Parliamentary experience that I have been called upon to follow in Debate my right hon. Friend, and I am glad that I am not led to do so in any hostile sense. Certainly it is not my purpose to resist or oppose in any way the financial demand that he has made upon the House. The House is rightly resolute, and the country is resolute, that the Government shall have in the most convenient manner and with the least possible delay all the sums that may be required, the great sum now asked for, and any others which may subsequently become necessary, to the utmost limits of our resources. The occasions of these Votes of Credit afford to Parliament an opportunity of reviewing various aspects of the general position in the progress and conduct of the War, and we should fail in our duty if we did not take proper advantage of them as they arise. The right hon. Gentleman has not entered upon any discussion of the main situation, and from some points of view that is to be regretted because his statements on these occasions have always the advantage of concentrating the minds of the nation upon the supreme issue, too often obscured by passing episodes, and also they have on many occasions rendered encouragement to the Allied Powers with whom we are co-operating. But the right hon. Gentleman has made no reference to these matters, and I shall only make a very brief and general observation on the main strategic situation. It is this.
It is unreasonable for people to expect that the War will turn decisively and suddenly in our favour at the present time. The contending Armies are far too evenly matched at the present time for that. We believe ourselves the strongest. We know we have a certain substantial preponderance in numbers, but against this must be set the advantage which our adversaries have in their central position, the great advantage they have in the unity, the superior unity, of their war direction, now concentrated in two or three minds, and, finally, the advantage which cannot be accurately be measured, though it is certainly very great, of having been able throughout the course of the conflict to retain the initiative. There is very little in it if you survey the forces on each side at the moment. We have, however, Reserves actual and potential, behind our lines far greater than those which we believe to be at the disposal of the enemy, and it is upon the use and development of those Reserves as they become available that our confidence in our final victory may justly be reposed. The great energy and even frenzy with which the Germans and Austrians are now attacking at so many points of the line is a sign and a measure of their enormous strength, but it may also be some measure of their profound anxiety. But for the present numbers of men and formations actually engaged do not show those great differences which are necessary nowadays to give decisive results on the fortune of the general war.
The right hon. Gentleman in his speech confined himself exclusively to finance and accounting. I wish to dwell mainly on the men who are paid and maintained with the money which Parliament is asked and is willing to vote. I desire to make a general survey of the supply of men for our field Armies. I desire to examine some of our available sources, and the use now made of them by the Government and the War Office. I should like to draw attention, first of all, to the revolutionary change in the point of view from which all questions affecting the supply of men must be studied, which has been wrought in our forces, by the passage of almost universal compulsion. The change is fundamental and complete, and it is vital that its scope should be realised by all concerned, in order that the beneficial, far-reaching reaction in other directions which will result from it may be turned to the fullest profit and advantage. It affects first of all, of course, our own Army and our own people, but it also affects our relations with our Allies and our relations with our great dependencies in Africa and in Asia. We have now reached a point when the need of the State is so grave that it has been necessary to compel by law to serve in the field the willing and the unwilling, the married and the unmarried, the young student and the old war-broken soldier, the head of a business and the father of a family. It has been found necessary, subject to the working of the tribunals to make all these different classes liable to serve in the field, and Parliament would not have taken these measures if it had not been convinced that they were indispensable to preserving the life of the State in the most serious and deadly crisis in its history. It seems to me that two propositions follow from that fact. First, that the best possible use should be made of all the men who are taken.
In what way?
I am going to explain in what way. And, second, that every other possible source should be simultaneously used to its utmost extent. This is not a matter, nor is this a time, in which prejudices or preconceived opinions, whether of politicians or of military men, ought to sway us in deciding upon the right course to adopt. After all, military men have their prejudices just as much as politicians. This War, like other desperate struggles, will be settled by the supply of men. This is now coming nakedly to the front, because the difficulty as to the supply of munitions, which has hitherto proved a limiting factor, is gradually passing, and will soon pass away during the currency, at any rate, of the present year, and if the Germans are to be beaten decisively, they will be beaten like Napoleon was beaten and like the Confederates were beaten—that is to say, by being opposed by superior numbers along fronts so extensive that they cannot maintain them or replace the losses incurred along them. I do not intend to deal with the numbers affected by the Compulsion Act or any other sources remaining in the civil population. That is ground familiar to this House, which has followed the long Debates which preceded and accompanied the passage of that measure, and I do not wish to trespass upon it again. But, apart from that, apart from all the sources of the population not now in uniform, and the sources of this country, it would appear that there are several important sources from which we may draw supplies of men for the fighting line. I shall proceed to examine five large reservoirs of men which are capable of being drawn upon scientifically and systematically to feed the necessities of our fighting lines. I say our fighting lines advisedly, because the first part of the argument which I am asking the indulgence of the House to be allowed to unfold to them is that our fighting troops do not bear any due or any sufficient proportion to the total numbers of our Army. That is the first proposition with which I start, and therefore I select as the first of our reservoirs for examination this afternoon our armies already in the field.
The first thing that strikes a visitor to our Armies in France or in Flanders—and I make no doubt that our armies in the East exhibit a similar condition—is the very large number of officers and men in the prime of their military manhood who never, or only very rarely, go under the fire of the enemy. In fact, you perceive one of the clearest and grimmest class distinctions ever drawn in this world—the distinction between the trench and the non-trench population. All our soldiers, all our officers, are brave and honest men. All are doing their duty, a necessary duty, and are ready to do any other duty which they may be asked to perform. But the fact remains that the trench population lives almost continuously under the fire of the enemy. It returns again and again, after being wounded twice and sometimes three times, to the front and to the trenches, and it is continually subject, without respite, to the hardest of tests that men have ever been called upon to bear, while all the time the non-trench population scarcely suffers at all, and has good food and good, wages, higher wages in a great many cases than are drawn by the men under fire every day, and their share of the decorations and rewards is so disproportionate that it has passed into a byword. I wish to point out to the House this afternoon that the part of the Army that really counts for ending the War is this killing, fighting, suffering part.
This War proceeds along its terrible path by the slaughter of Infantry. It is this Infantry which it is most difficult to replenish, which is continually worn away on both sides, and though all the other services of the Army are necessary to its life, and to its maintenance—and I am not in the least disparaging their importance and their value—it is this fighting part that is the true measure of your military power, and the only true measure. All generals in the field make their calculations in rifles, but my right hon. Friend knows well how immense is the disparity between rifle strength and rations strength. We have suffered together disappointment in hearing that Armies, so imposing on paper, so large in numbers when they left our shores, were whittled down by calculations of rifle strength by the generals on the spot to two-thirds or even a lesser fraction of their total number. Like him, I have rebelled against that calculation in the past, but, nevertheless, I have become convinced that it is really the true and proper method of computing your war effort at a given moment. Every measure which you can take to increase the proportion of rifle strength to rations strength will be a direct addition to your war power, and will be just as direct an addition to your war power as if you ordered new classes of recruits to join the Colours. Nay, more, it will be a net addition and not a gross addition to your war power. If I may use the language of business—and after all this War is becoming in many aspects to resemble a vast though hideous business—I would say that the rifle strength actually under the fire of the enemy is the dividend. Everything else of the whole vast military effort may be classed as working expenditure, the result of which is the production of war power. The object of the Army is to produce war power. Everything else that takes place leading to the lining up of men in battle is the preliminary steps by which the final result is achieved.
I will proceed to illustrate this theme. The first thing which I desire to submit upon it is that the most wasteful method that can possibly be adopted is to keep battalions below strength. Unfortunately this has been and is still the case in a large number of units at the front, and as my right hon. Friend knows, it is one of the great causes of the misfortunes that overtook our Armies at Gallipoli. Keeping battalions below strength is a sheer waste of man power. Before your battalion lines up along its parapets to face the enemy it is necessary to deduct nearly 250 men who are employed on the transport, signalling, and orderly services, and as stretcher bearers, clerks, servants, cooks, musicians, road wardens, and brigade and divisional employés. I do not wish to get into an argument with any military expert who may be here as to the exact number, or how it is founded or calculated. Call it 250, or call it 200 if you will. It is suffiicent for my argument. The point I am submitting to the House—and though it looks a small point, it lies at the root of your efficient military organisation—is that there is a fixed reduction irrespective of the strength of the battalions. To use a common phrase, the overhead charges are the same for a weak as for a strong battalion. Therefore, after a certain point has been reached, every available man is pure gain to the rifle strength.
If we assume—and it is a pure assumption—that the battalions in France average 900 strong—I do not know whether it be more or less—with a rifle strength of 650, and if you add to each battalion additional men making the battalion up to a total strength of 1,200, the addition to the rifle strength of the Infantry which would follow from that step would amount to nearly 50 per cent., or nearly half as much again, because you would raise the rifle strength from 650 to 950. If we assume that there are 500 battalions—again it is a pure assumption; I am not attempting to indicate what the number may be or whether it be greater or less—in the Army in France, and we were to add to each 300, that would be a total of 150,000 men. Thus, for an addition of 150,000 men, you would have added nearly 50 per cent. to the fighting strength of your Army, which we have been told by the Prime Minister is well over 1,000,000 strong. I think that should be very carefully considered by all who take an interest in our military organisation at the present time. It would merely be an extension of this principle: Supposing you were to raise the brigades, in each division from three to four; that would be merely an extension of the principle of developing the rifle strength and the Infantry strength—which is the part which counts—to the highest possible proportion compared with the number of mouths you have to feed and the men you have to pay. But I do not propose to go into that question of additional brigades, because it would undoubtedly produce reactions over the general machinery of supply and transport, and would be very complicated, though it would, I believe, show a very substantial profit in the resulting war power. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, some time ago, put the military effort of the British Empire at 5,000,000 men. That, I think, was the total military effort, and, of course, he included not only casualties but the Navy and the garrisons in India and elsewhere. But the fact remains that he did place before the House, for its contemplation, the broad figure of 5,000,000 men, representing the war effort of the country.
The simple calculation which I have laid before the House raises the impression in our minds that this general figure may not be a very representative way of estimating the war effort of the country. Where are these 5,000,000 men? Certainly they are not, and never have been, in contact with the enemy. What has been done, what is being done, with these vast numbers, equalling, certainly, the whole military effort at the present moment of Germany? Obviously we cannot test this by studying the position of our troops on the different fronts. That would reveal our position. But there is a method by which we can easily test the war effort actually involved. We can test our war effort by measuring the war achievement, and war achievement can be measured by the number of the enemy forces we are holding up on our respective fronts. We have only to measure the number of enemy divisions that we believe we are holding opposite our Army at different points to see what we are actually doing in the land war, and what proportion of German and Turkish troops we are actually wearing down and holding up. From the Somme to the sea it has been calculated, and has been stated publicly, that there are about thirty-five German divisions opposed to our Army. Do not let the House underestimate that remarkable fact, so wonderful when we think of our military organisation before the War, but neither must we overrate it. In Syria there are three or four Turkish divisions, in Mesopotamia perhaps half a dozen, or perhaps one or two more. I do not know how to bring Salonika into the calculation, because, after all, that is political and not military; but so far as it is possible to compute these matters it is fair to say that there are in front of the British Armies, in all theatres, about forty-five Turkish and German divisions; and 20,000 men per division would be 900,000 all told. Of the 20,000 there have to be taken into consideration the troops on lines of communication, and therefore the actual force in contact is, in effective rifle and artillery strength, about half that number, say half a. million men. If that is the total military effort of 5,000,000 men it is evident that, after every conceivable deduction has been made, there is a large margin not yet usefully applied to the prosecution of the War.
The object of my argument is to suggest to the House that this ample field is one which we are bound in duty and honour to explore and to deal with, so as to free every serviceable man that can by any process of substitution or organisation be recovered, and put him to lengthen and to strengthen the fighting line. It is very difficult for a private Member to make a constructive suggestion. I am going to run that risk, and I do so in the hope that it may be carefully studied by those who have power and grave responsibility at the present time. The conclusion upon which this part of my argument stands is that the establishment of each battalion should be raised to 1,200, and every endeavour should, in the first instance, be made to free the men required, the fit and efficient men, in the prime of life, who are employed behind the front on work which could equally well be done by older men, by recovered wounded men, and by medically unfit men, and to some extent by natives. I apply this argument to all Services behind the lines without exception, but particularly to the Army Service Corps, hospital staffs, apart from the specialists and medical officers, to transport of all kinds, and motor transport. I say to the Government that the employment of every able-bodied man, particularly men between twenty and thirty years of age, in France or Flanders, behind the lines, should be the subject of individual consideration with a view to his liberation for the front, and his replacement by an efficient substitute.
Let us take another consideration. I find, again giving rough figures, that there are in the Army at the present time something like 200,000 officers. Every officer has his servant, making 200,000 servants, and probably there are 50,000 grooms in addition, bringing the number up to 250,000 servants and grooms. That is an Army in itself. These are points which are really worthy the care and attention of the House to study and to reflect upon. How many of these are in their prime of life? How many of them should be replaced with substitutes? How many should be replaced by natives? Remember that every man saved counts. It may be said that they are included in the fighting strength. They are, but they do not count in it. Then there is the question of the great mass of Cavalry, which have been kept all these months, now years, behind the lines in France and Flanders. Although the whole front, from the mountains to the sea, is wired and entrenched, this great mass of Cavalry have never struck a blow, and for at least eighteen months they have served in the trenches as Infantry. Is not that a matter which the military advisers should carefully reconsider, having regard to the enormous cost of the War and the immense strength of this force and its great value if employed in other directions? In these Cavalry regiments you have the cadres of three divisions, equal to the finest battalions that could be named, equal to the finest battalions of the Guards; you have all the Regular non-commissioned officers, warrant officers, and trained professional troops, with the full complement of officers, when officers are so scarce, with which you could fill up the regiments that now go into the trenches and add to our strength. You would be able to obtain recruits or men from other formations to add to those battalions, so that you would be able to raise a force of the highest possible quality at the very time of the process of degeneration of the Infantry strength which must ensue in both the contending armies. Although in the early stages young troops can storm the trenches, yet in the confusion which arises in the second or third stage of the fight, you want supplies of men with officers and warrant officers, and everything which is absolutely necessary, if you are to reap the result achieved by the gallantry of the first assault. I think that is a matter which ought to be carefully considered.
There is one other aspect of this question as to the use of the men at the front to which I venture to refer very guardedly. I think the question arises whether, in a war which is so very largely one of attrition, we should continue to hold indefinitely for months those posts which are of no vital consequence, where our men are at a disadvantage, and where, owing to the superior position and artillery of the enemy, the proportion of our daily loss is very much higher—sometimes calculated to be three or four times as great as that of the enemy. There is one part of the line where, it is said, the Germans have orders not to try to push our men out, in order that they may be able to reap the daily toll which has been so profitable to them. I suggest that this is a matter which requires very careful attention on the part of those here and elsewhere who are responsible; and I presume that the military authorities have been made aware by the Government that no reproach would be made against them if they chose for good reasons in any particular case to redress and readjust their lines at particular parts where our men are suffering undue loss, owing to their inferior position. All these matters are of very great consequence. The nation has given itself to the Government and to the War Office, and we are bound to follow with the utmost attention their fortunes at the front. How do the Germans find the men to keep up their forces in the field? All the military calculations and the calculation of unofficial writers, have been vitiated by the continuing force and power which the enemy supplies. That may be because the Germans have studied in this time and pressure of circumstances, with the utmost refinement, all these problems of using men where they could develop the greatest possible proportion of fighting strength to the number of men fed and employed. I was told the other day of a circumstance which sounded very extraordinary, that the Germans were now forming several battalions of men with heart disease, and at first sight your optimist will say they must be at their last gasp; but the very sinister reflection may be that if they were at their last gasp they would know how to utilise it to the full. At any rate, the use which you should make of this power of compulsion, this absolute power which has now been given, is to have every fit man in his place, so as to secure the maximum development of war power.
The second reservoir to which I wish to draw the attention of the House and of the country is the Army at home. The effect of compulsion on the Army at home is deep and comprehensive. It produces an entire reversal of the standpoint from which the War Office must regard the supply of men. Hitherto during twenty-two months of war the task of the War Office has been one of extreme difficulty. They never knew what men they were going to get nor when they were going to get them. At one moment hundreds of thousands of men presented themselves, pouring in many months before they could be armed or trained, and at another the falling off in recruiting inflicted serious injury on the Armies in the field, and all along men had to be accepted as and when they presented themselves, irrespective of when they were needed, when they could be handled, or whether they were the men best suited or the men who could best be spared. The War Office could not turn away even the most doubtful class of recruits without running the risk of discouraging the whole process of voluntary enlistment and without running the risk of being immediately charged with not loyally endeavouring to work the voluntary system, and they could not refuse men even though the men could not be equipped for many months for fear that later on those men would not be willing to come. The result has been a very large accumulation in our depots, in our hospitals, in our camps, in our training schools of men who have never been and will never be fit to put in the field, but who are nevertheless withdrawn from productive employment and borne on our pay lists and our rations strength. I am told —the Government know whether that is correct—that there are scores and scores of thousands of men in hospital who have never been and will never go to France or Flanders.
With the advent of compulsion, all this can be absolutely stopped, and it should be possible to organise scientifically the whole of our available resources. No man should be retained who is not going to be of use. There is no need to try to swell mere numbers now for paper purposes. No man need be taken until he is required, and no man should be taken who can do more to beat the Germans by staying at home than by serving as a soldier. I have never looked on compulsion as a means to sweep a vast mass into the military net, though it is perhaps the only way in which large aggregate numbers can be obtained. I have regarded compulsion not as the gathering together of men as if they were heaps of shingle, but the fitting of them into their places like the pieces in the pattern of a mosaic. The great principle of equality of sacrifice requires in practice to be applied in accordance with the maxim, "A place for every man and every man in his place."
Those are copybook maxims.
I hope those simple copybook maxims may receive the attention of the authorities during the next few weeks and months. Absolute fluidity should be insisted upon in regard to the supply of men, by which I mean that men must be available for all purposes that they are considered fitted for. The military authorities have no motive for transferring men from units where they have local regimental associations and where they are living with comrades. On the contrary, their interests are the other way, because they know that local associations and regimental feeling have a definite value for war. But the keeping of all formations at the front up to the fullest establishment, and I venture to think the higher the establishment the better, must claim and receive priority over all sentimental or personal considerations.
The numbers in khaki at home at the present time are very large, how large I do not know or seek to know. But we see them everywhere. You have only got to go about the country to see great numbers of men in the prime of life who are all on our pay lists. If we say between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 we shall foe taking limits which are certainly not likely to be incorrect, and to those will soon be added the conscripts who will be brought in by the new Act. And from this pool are being continually taken drafts and reinforcements for the front. But what of the pool itself? What of this great pool of men through which the recruits are passing from the civil population to the Armies in the field. Do we really need to keep such an immense number at home for training and drafting purposes? The total military effort of 5,000,000, or 4,500,000, or 3,500,000—I do not care how much you put it—at one end, and the actual war resultant of 500,000 enemies engaged actually in contact in the field, is a fact so striking, and the disparity is so large, that the continued attention of all who think about the means of securing victory in this War should be directed to it. It is very hard for civilians to believe that so small a result of all the great numbers we dispose of is really the last word in military organisation. I am sure I am expressing a widespread and well-founded opinion, not only in this House but outside, when I say that there is a very large margin at home of men, not now allocated to general service abroad, who should and could be made available for raising the strength of the units in actual contact with the enemy. I do not think we ought to rest content with general assurances that all that is available is being done. I have not the slightest doubt that it will be stated that all these points have been carefully considered, and action has proceeded upon them. I do not think we ought to rest content with general assurances of that kind. The case of every man, the employment of every man now in uniform, should be subjected to at least as severe a scrutiny as the case of every man not yet joined.
I wish to submit the argument in its completeness. How many men are needed for Home defence against invasion? That is not a question which I expect the Government to answer, but it is a very pertinent question with regard to the relation between our Armies in the field and our Army at home. When the War broke out, or the day before, the 3rd of August, the Council which was summoned asked what the Admiralty opinion was. The Admiralty opinion had been formed, like the War Office opinion on this question, as the result of four years' consideration in the Committee of Imperial Defence, and we were able to say, on behalf of the Admiralty, "Send all the Regular soldiers out of the country—not four but six divisions; their transport to France can be arranged and the security of the island in the interval guaranteed." At that time the Territorials had only just been called up, and certainly it was a risk only justifiable in comparison with other risks of a still more imminent character. But since those days everything that has happened has tended to consolidate the position of this country in regard to invasion. First of all, our naval resources have increased. Submarines—to count actually and not relatively in this matter, and I mean that the fact that the enemy's submarines may have increased at the same time does not vitiate the advantage you get from the actual increase in your own submarines. If the programmes which were in progress have been maintained, the Meet should be stronger not only actually but relatively too. In the second place, our defensive arrangements and our knowledge of how to perfect defensive arrangements have vastly improved every day that has passed since the beginning of the War. Now that those arrangements And that organisation are under the care of Lord French, with his vast experience of the actual conditions of modern war, we must recognise an immense improvement and consolidation of all our arrangements there.
Finally, and the third point on which I think we should repose confidence, is that the kind of warfare which has developed in this War is the least well suited to an army throwing itself hurriedly on a shore and maintaining itself with a precarious line of oversea communication. What is the form of warfare? It has been shown in every theatre. In a few hours with trenches, with barbed wire and machine guns, a position can be created to force which you must bring up not field guns but great masses of very heavy guns. And of all the armies who rely on this method Germany is the one which relies most and which would be most helpless without it. I think all those considerations should protect us from any panic fears which may alarm the people in this country, or from what is much more serious—to prevent the proper distribution of our military resources. I venture to think that the number of men allocated to Home defence should be continually the subject of regular scrutiny and that every effort should foe made, without damaging the units to which they belong, to release young men between twenty and thirty from being definitely assigned to Home? defence and give them the oppor- tunity to join their comrades in the field. We hear a great deal, and this is the moral of what I have been saying to the House, about "comb this industry," or "comb that," or "comb this Department or that," but I say to the War Office, "Physician, comb thyself."
5.0 P.M.
I come to my third reservoir, namely, the Armies in the East. We have the Army in the field, the Army at home, and the Army in the East. The Armies in the East are very large; we need not inquire exactly how large. The Germans must know accurately how large they are. It is sufficient for us to say that the Armies in the East must recently have been in the neighbourhood of half a million. What have they been doing all these months? What are they doing now? We have a great Army in Egypt. What is it doing? Who is it fighting? We have another great Army at Salonika. What is it doing? Who is it fighting. Who is it going to fight? Who can it get at to fight, except the Bulgarians, who do not want to fight? The story of the steps which have led to the accumulation of these great forces in the East would be incredible if it were not true. Parliament should at the proper time require the fullest information and the publication of documents, but the study of the past belongs to the future, though I hope to the near future. Used in time, and sent in time, there is no military object in the Eastern theatre which the forces which are now accumulating in the East could not have achieved. But what have they done? What are they doing? Are they threatening Constantinople? Are they helping the Grand Duke? Are they relieving the pressure upon Verdun? In all these tremendous events they have borne and are bearing absolutely no part. The Government is open to obvious and serious criticism everyday that passes without these forces being made to play their part against the enemy. Whatever mistakes have been committed in the past, a new mistake is being made every day that these forces are left out of gear and out of action. The Government is bound to dispose of these forces so as to put them in contact with the enemy, so that they will be fighting and killing the enemy. How and where they are put is, of course, impossible to speculate or discuss here. That is a matter for the executive and its military advisers. But every day that these Armies are discovered sitting behind their defences and not holding their fighting weight in the conflict, there is a gross and grave misuse and maldirection of our limited military resources, for which there can be no excuse and no adequate explanation. All these matters must be considered side by side with the fact that we require every available man, and that we are inflicting, and rightly inflicting, great hardship on individuals all over the country in order to carry on the War effectively.
I now come to my fourth reservoir, and I hasten to assure the House that I am approaching the end of my labours. The fourth reservoir seems to me to be Africa. What part is Africa going to play in the present struggle? The Allies, and particularly Great Britain, dispose of practically the whole of the Continent of Africa. There are French Colonies, there are German Colonies, there are British Colonies, there are Belgian Colonies, there are Portuguese Colonies. Beyond those, there is hardly any left. What would the Germans do if they had Africa in their possession? We know what they are doing with native troops in East Africa. A small force of German settlers and Reservists organised very effective native levies, which exposed us to the need of making very considerable exertions to overcome them. What are the French doing now? The French African Empire is much smaller than that over which we rule. I am told—of course, it is a purely unofficial figure—that the French are employing, or intend to employ, in the line in France nearly 100,000 men from Africa. At any rate, there are a great many to be seen at all parts of the front. Does the right hon. Gentleman think that that is not a probable figure?
I cannot say.
Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman may have the curiosity to inquire and see. It is certainly a point of importance in this matter. What are we doing, with incomparably greater resources than the French, and with experience far greater than that of any other country in the handling of native races? We are doing nothing at all. Let us project our minds ahead and think what historians of the future would write if they were writing a history of the present time and had to record that Great Britain was forced to make an inconclusive peace because she forgot Africa; that at a time when every man counted, when every man was needed and the greatest hardships were imposed, the Government of Great Britain was unable to make any use of a mighty continent which sea power had placed at the disposal of herself and her Allies. It would be incredible; but it is taking place. Yet negro soldiers fought for freedom on the side of the Union Government, and fought exceedingly well. Consider all the other services in the Army which might be rendered by natives, thereby releasing white men in full efficiency for the fighting line. Their interests are identical with ours. The result of this War will settle the fate of the African population as much as it will our own. Nine months ago, when I was a member of the Government, I urged upon the Colonial Secretary formally that some steps should be taken in this direction. I suppose I shall get the same answer to-day as I got then—the difficulty of getting interpreters in sufficient numbers, officers speaking the language, taking so long to organise, depending how long the War is going to last, etc. But suppose we had begun then. We should have some results already, and we should have larger results in prospect. Why should we not start now in time for the campaign of 1917? If peace comes in the interval there will be sufficient reason to rejoice on other grounds.
I urge the House not to take "No" for an answer. Remember all the time the other men you are taking; remember the cases that you have in your own mind; and insist upon this resource being used and the difficulties overcome. I can imagine a great place of arms being created in Egpyt, where the climate is suitable, where African troops raised in various parts of the Continent would be assembled, drilled and trained, and then passed into the war as individuals or as units in whatever capacity they were best fitted for, and in whatever theatre of war and against whatever enemies the climate and their religion rendered it most suitable for them to be employed. I would not venture to put such an argument to the House but for the grave situation. I say to myself every day, What is going on while we sit here, while we go away to dinner, or home to bed? Nearly 1,000 men—Englishmen, Britishers, men of our own race—are knocked into bundles of bloody rags every twenty-four hours, and carried away to hasty graves or to field ambulances, and the money of which the Prime Minister has spoken so clearly is flowing away in its broad stream. Every measure must be considered, and none put aside while there is hope of obtaining something from it. [An HON. MEMBER: "All for a gamble!"] The hon. Gentleman had better wait until the whole of the story is made public. At any rate, what the French can do we can do. Suppose, after all, I am wrong. Suppose there is not any large resource here. Suppose you get only 100,000 men for your theatres of war. Is that nothing? Suppose you get only 20,000 men. Is that nothing? In this War you will find that at the very best you will have to pay a life for a life. Every man counts, and his case must be counted against the case of someone whom, perhaps, you know.
The fifth reservoir is Asia. Our own Possessions and those of our Allies, with the sea power which is at our disposal, give us the means of using the great resources of Asia. What part is India going to play in 1917, if the War should be continuing then? We all read the moving account given by Lord Hardinge of the wonderful loyalty shown by India in the crisis of the early days of the War. The fate of India is at stake as much as ours. It is impossible that England should lose this War and the government of India remain unaltered. It must pass to the conquering Power. I said that the fate of India is at stake as much as ours. It is more at stake than ours. No white race would ever be treated by Germany after she conquered in the way that Germany would treat the natives of India. Zabern would be no measure of the kind of culture that would be meted to India if she fell into the hands of the German Power. The part played by the Indian troops in 1914 and 1915 in France was glorious. They held positions for the holding of which no other resources were at the time available in the Allied Armies in the West. They fought with the utmost heroism and effect. They acquitted themselves admirably both in defence and in attack again and again and yet again in the—for them—most depressing conditions of climate, and against a most terrible foe in the height of his military efficiency. There were the Gurkhas at Gallipoli, storming the foot of Sari Behr side by side with their Australian comrades, thereby creating a reputation throughout Australia which will never be forgotten. The wet wintry weather in Flanders, the pouring rain and mist, the undrained trenches, deep in mud and water, were a heavy and cruel burden for the Indians. But this War will probably not be settled by events which take place in a winter campaign. It will probably be settled after events which have taken place in a summer campaign.
What is there to prevent you, if you start now—munitions are not going to prevent you—from having ten or twelve new Indian Divisions or their equivalent ready to throw in in 1917 wherever they may be most effective and most needed? Are you really going to allow the fate of India to be settled in this world struggle while she is represented only by the Tigris Corps, whatever it is, and a few detachments at other points? Three hundred and fifteen millions of people and less than 100,000 men in the line! It is a wrong to India; it is a wrong to Europe. I say to the Government: Do it! Do it now. Do it at once. Start to-night. Make the plans for your Indian Army of 1917. If they break down, if after all your efforts you find that no very great result could be obtained, at any rate you will have assured yourselves that there was no aid to be found in that quarter. But, I say, begin now. No doubt there are many difficulties. No doubt the life energies of your best Anglo-Indians would be tapped. No doubt great toils and labours would be required. Never mind; the sword of India ought to be thrown into the scale at the decisive moment of this War. Taking a prosaic and cool view of the situation, of all your chances, and of all your prospects, you are bound to have a large Indian Army ready to bear its part in the final culminating shock. Here let me point to the great difference which has been made by the enactment of national service in this country. If we were keeping our manhood out of the struggle and trying to get it fought for us by subject races and mercenary armies, all the old arguments and reproaches with which history is familiar would apply. But when we are engaging every class, when the last man and the last shilling are to be claimed, we have a right and are bound to claim similar exertions, or whatever exertions are possible, from the dependencies which share our fortunes. The doctrine of equality of sacrifice is not limited by the confines of the United Kingdom.
I have now finished my survey of the resources of men—a survey which, I think, deserves the careful attention of those who are responsible. There is only one more point about the man-power to which I wish to refer before I sit down. Many of our difficulties in the West at the present time spring from the unfortunate offensive to which we committed ourselves last autumn. My right hon. Friend knows that this is no new view of mine taken after the event. Let us look back now. Only think if we had kept that tremendous effort ever accumulating for the true tactical moment. Think if we had kept that rammer compressed ready to release when the time came—if we had held in reserve the energies which were expended at Loos, Arras, and in Champagne—kept them to discharge at some moment during the protracted and ill-starred German attack on Verdun! Might we not then have recovered at a stroke the strategic initiative without which victory lags long on the road? Let us not repeat that error. Do not let us be drawn into any course of action not justified by purely military considerations. The argument which is used that "it is our turn now" has no place in military thought. Whatever is done must be done in the cold light of science. We must not be deflected by any sentimental argument from whatever is thought to be the right course on military grounds. We mean to spend all we have in this quarrel, and we have only to consider how it may be best employed. In this connection let us never forget that the development of the full war-power of Russia is necessarily slow, and that it has not yet reached its culminating point. For one man Russia had in her line at her worst period last year she has now certainly two, and possibly three. For one man she can put into the line to-day she may perhaps be able to put two into the line next year. The whole world is available for the equipment of the manhood of Russia. When you are able to gather round the frontiers of Germany and Austria armies which show a real, substantial preponderance of strength, then the advantage of their interior situation will be swamped and over-weighed, and then the hour of decisive victory will be at hand. This hour is bound to come if patience is combined with energy, and if all the resources at the disposal of the Allies are remorselessly developed to their extreme capacity.
The right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down has made a speech which has covered a great deal of ground, and has, I venture to say, con- veyed various impressions to various Members. So far as the right hon. Gentleman desires that his advice and proposals should enable the Government to prosecute the War with greater vigour and energy to a more successful issue, I do not think any of us will be disposed to complain. I interjected a remark, to which I think the right hon. Gentleman took some exception, to the effect that he was giving us a number of "copy-book maxims." That remark was perfectly true. The right hon. Gentleman has asked a great many questions, and he has put forward a good many proposals. It is easy, and possible, for all of us, no matter on what side of the House we are, no matter how ignorant we may be on military subjects and in actual military experience, to put forward proposals to the Government. I submit, however, that when we come to weigh up the whole of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman in relation to the problem which is now before us, we shall find one or two plain things which cannot be gainsaid. First of all, I think he is entirely wrong in submitting that at this moment it is a question of man-power. Reservoirs of man-power, according to the right hon. Gentleman, are perfectly open, and we all know them. The man-power of Russia is immense. But what is it that really prevents all this man-power being used? It is not lack of energy on the part of the Government. It is the fact that for every one of these men you have to get supplies, training, munitions, and to create an organisation which is not in existence. When you take the main point of the right hon. Gentleman, I must say that with much of his criticism of the position I agree. I myself have been in France, and one thing that struck me there was the exceedingly large number of men behind the line. I wondered what they were doing there, and what possible influence they were having upon the progress of the campaign. Take the mass of men we have got now. It is one of the problems how to use them to the very best advantage. When the right hon. Gentleman talks about emptying these great reservoirs of men and bringing them into the organisation, he will see, if he considers, that the mere creation of numbers, and the bringing of many men together will only at the present moment result in creating a larger Army with no more effective power upon the War than can be brought about by the present forces. So far as his observations related to making a better use of the Army I agree with much that he said.
There is another point in regard to this to which I should like to refer. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of rifle-power and ration-power. What I would like to find out from him is this: After all there is in France the possibility of employing in the actual front only a certain number of men. However much you multiplied your rifle-power you can only put so many men into the trenches at once. I assume that there are in the front line trenches, and held in reserve, the actual number of men required to defend those trenches; so that our rifle-power, so far as the line itself is concerned, is quite fully in evidence with the men who are already there. So far as the defence is concerned, that seems to me to be adequate. If that is being done from a defensive point of view I consider we are holding our own. When it comes to the offensive we are talking about another matter. So far as rifle-power is concerned, I quite agree that it would be a great advantage to the Army, and to this country, if it could be increased in very much larger measure than it is at the present time in the number of men who are to be employed in the actual fighting. I want to make one other point. The right hon. Gentleman talks about increasing the Armies from Africa, by the employment of Indians, and so on. I would like to know what kind of Vote of Credit we are going to have in this House if that proposal were adopted? We are being asked on this occasion to vote £300,000,000. We are spending at the rate of nearly £5,000,000 a day. The mere creation of larger Armies, whether they be of our own or of other nations, will add to the burden which is already as great as we can afford to bear. In my opinion, if rightly used, the money and the forces which are at our command will end in securing to us the victory which all of us so much desire.
I am not a military critic. I have not seen military service like the right hon. Gentleman. But I must confess that, after I have listened carefully to his speech, while I agree that he is wise to press the Government to the fullest possible effort in carrying on this War to a successful conclusion, I cannot say that in the contribution the right hon. Gentleman has made this afternoon he has said anything that will help very much, except the one point to which I have referred. In regard to some members of the party to which I belong, while outside the House they have on many occasions criticised the Government, while they have not helped recruiting, there is one thing they have never had the courage to do, and that is to refuse the Votes of Credit, or to vote against a Vote of Credit which at any time has been proposed to this House. This observation also applies to the numbers of men. Therefore we may take it that so far as this House is concerned now, and I venture to say so far as the country and the Empire is concerned, the Government can rely upon all support if the Government will—as I believe they are doing—use the forces at their disposal to the highest possible advantage. For my part I cannot see, even if the plans which the right hon. Gentleman has suggested, and the reservoirs which he says can be emptied are emptied, how without shipping, without munitions, and with many of the problems as they are, we can do any more than we are doing to win a final victory for this country.
In my first words I must take exception to, and express my total disagreement from, the opinion of the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down in regard to the effect of the speech to which we have just listened of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee. In my opinion the right hon Gentleman has rendered many great and varied services during the course of this War. None has been of greater value nor of more far-reaching effect than that bold statesmanlike utterance to which we have just listened. I will say, too, not only statesmanlike, but soldierlike, and this latter characteristic is perhaps that which appealed to me more strongly than any other. The first effect of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman was, it seemed to me, to sweep away some of those clouds which have constantly hung over the Debates in this House ever since the War began. In the last six months we have had endless Debates on the military situation which have always turned round to the question of men. We have constantly had statements based upon figures which, if we were given, were invariably given, in round numbers. We have been told of 3,000,000, 4,000,000, 5,000,000, and 6,000,000 of men. No one, however, has ever until to-day given the House any sort of conception as to how the men, whatever the number might be, have been distributed, and have been made use of for the purpose of carrying this War to its conclusion.
In the course of those Debates it has been impressed upon me very strongly, and by no one more strongly than the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Walthamstow (Sir J. Simon) in a speech which he made in the early part of March, I think, when discussing the Vote for men, that what has been lacking since the beginning of the War has been any definite policy with regard to the War, with regard to the Armies we were going to raise, the way we were going to maintain them, and what we were going to do with them when we got them, and I have not hesitated to express my opinion as to the cause of it. The cause is—and I say it again—that there has never been the co-ordinating, authoritative presence of a strong and capable Secretary of State for War. The Secretary of State for War, as I have understood the office, is the person by whom the policy of the Government—the large policy, the world policy, as you may call it—should be translated into military action. We have never had any indication that there was that connecting link between the policy of the Government and the operations that were being carried on by the military command, and that is, I submit, shown very strongly by the speech to which I alluded just now of the right hon. and learned Member for Walthamstow. In the course of that speech, not once, but I think four times, he asked what was going to be the strength of our Army. The right hon. and learned Gentleman only a few weeks before had left the Cabinet. Surely one would expect that a member of the Cabinet would have known or formed some conception of what the ideas of the Government were as to the raising of Armies, as to the number of men that would be required for those Armies, and how they were to be maintained. Yet we have the right hon. and learned Gentleman, who has just ceased to be a member of the Cabinet, stating in the clearest possible terms that he had no kind of conception as to what our policy was in regard to the Army.
Then when some of us tried to impress upon the Government the need for taking other steps than those which have been followed for the maintenance of the Army, and so organising the supply of men that we should be able, as the right hon. Gentleman opposite so well expressed it, to put each man into his right place, to fit together the puzzle of a large number of men, so that you have every piece in its place by means of a system of national service, we had thrown in our faces the argument based upon those round numbers which were made use of in this House. We were told, "You have got 5,000,000 men; what can you want to do with more men? You are simply compulsionists for the sake of compulsion. You are trying to get all the men away from the other services which are necessary." That was not our object, and I was pleased to hear from so high an authority as the right hon. Gentleman that we have at last succeeded in getting, not the complete national service I should have wished to have seen, but still something in that way; and in doing that we have, at any rate, succeeded so far that it will be possible to place each man in his proper place, so as to get the greatest possible collective impulse towards carrying on the War.
I should like to touch upon two of the reservoirs which the right hon. Gentleman spoke of with regard to the supply of men. I do not go into the question of those distant countries from which he thinks we might draw an appreciable force. I agree with every word he said. But I should like to say a few words with regard to the distribution of men both abroad and at home. It has been certainly present to my mind all through this War that there was a great waste of force owing to our adherence to what has been one of the vices at all times in the British Army, that of permitting a constant drain from the fighting force of a unit into various services which, in other armies, are designated as non-combatant services, and are provided for generally otherwise. It is impossible to get any accurate measure of what you will do with an Army in the field unless you have your units placed as a fighting force, and enable them to perform their duty as fighting units, and it has been well known for months and months in this country that all the units at the front were woefully depleted. There were two reasons for it. The first was that system, which the right hon. Gentleman so well explained, of withdrawing men for various services which ought to be provided for in the majority of cases from elsewhere—from inferior troops, so as not to weaken the fighting strength of the units. The other cause of it was the absence in this country in our depots of the men coming forward to make the drafts and to fill up those units. It was a notorious thing at one time.
I myself, with certain other hon. Members on both sides of this House, endeavoured in the autumn of last year to lay our views before the Prime Minister, because we knew from figures which were in my possession, and which I had every reason to trust, that our supply of men for drafts was wholly insufficient to meet the requirements which were constantly going on, and which the casualty lists day by day bore out. But it was impossible to get such views as those even listened to, much less acted upon, because hon. Members, no doubt with excellent intention, were urging the necessity of keeping up the industrial strength of the country. There is not any reason in the world why the maintenance of an efficient Army in a great war like the present should necessarily destroy your industrial strength, because you have an immense number of men who are over military age, some below military age, and others of military age who are really unfit to serve, but who can well carry on the industrial work of the country. Besides that, we have seen the wonderful development of female labour, and we have only got to go to France to see what is done. But here, unfortunately, hon. Members on these benches prevailed, and until quite recently the situation has not been faced, and therefore we have lost nine valuable months. I can say for myself that I have been working at this for more than a year, trying to get adequate attention given to it by those in charge of the War Office. It is astounding to me that if we have a Secretary of State for War in time of war as we have in peace—it seems to me we have not—those questions which we urged so strongly, and at every possible time we could, upon the responsible members of the Government, should not have been brought forward by that Minister who was properly responsible for the supply of men.
One reason why the supply of men drawn from the home reservoir is not, as the right hon. Gentleman said, and I agree with him, what it might be, is that there has been, side by side with the absence of a powerful and a strong direction of military policy, a drawing in and a centralising of executive functions in the War Office, which has absolutely weakened the military effort of this country. There are spread all over the country an enormous number of men who have been collected by every device that was possible under a so-called voluntary system, those who are now being brought in under a more or less compulsory system, and those shortly who will be called in by a wholly compulsory system. Those men are scattered about all over the country in large camps, but it is extraordinary, if one goes through the country and has anything to do with the military arrangements, to see how the powers of the so-called commanders-in-chief have been crippled by the centralising influence of the War Office. The result is that, instead of the local commanders being held responsible for the men within their districts, and having to organise them, and dividing up those large masses of men so that each one can be dealt with separately, and you can make sure of getting the best material out of each, the whole of the direction of that is done from the central office in London. The result has been seriously to weaken the whole military system of this country, by weakening the sense of responsibility in higher officers, and by the impossibility of an office such as the War Office in London dealing with a number of organisations multiplied ten or twenty times beyond that with which it was ever supposed it would have to deal. I do not propose to go further into the many very interesting things which the right hon. Gentleman touched upon. I will only repeat that in my opinion the great weakness has lain in the absence of that directing power which is given under Statute to the Secretary of State for War in time of peace, but which has not been exercised in an adequate and effective manner in time of war. We have been at war without a Secretary of State for War. I once more thank my right hon. Friend for having brought this matter forward with the courage and clearness and whole knowledge that he has gained in service abroad, and I am quite sure when that is read throughout this country it will have a very great effect.
The hon. and gallant Gentleman has once more attacked the administration of Lord Kitchener. I think we all agree that under Lord Kitchener's administration there have been mistakes which may be attributable to Lord Kitchener or to the Government. One thing is certain, that Lord Kitchener came into office after the War had broken out, and he had to accept the machinery which he found there. Had he organised that machinery as he would have preferred when Lord Rosebery put forward the demand several years before the War that Lord Kitchener should be appointed to the War Office, he would have organised matters as all war machinery has been organised where one general is responsible for the strategy and another is responsible for the supply of men and munitions. Past history has shown this to be necessary. It was the system by which Germany won the Franco-German War, in which Moltke was responsible for the strategy and Von Roon for the men and munitions. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee made a speech which was exceedingly stimulating and interesting, and which I hope will prove stimulating and interesting for His Majesty's Government. I did not agree with what the right hon. Gentleman said about the Navy in a past speech; in fact, I disagreed with almost every point. But I am glad on this occasion to be able to say as respectfully as I can how much I appreciated the right hon. Gentleman's remarks on this question of the reservoirs of men we need in order to win this War.
There are only two limiting considerations I will make to the remarks he gave us. The Government have experienced a very considerable loss of shipping in this War, and we have to meet a very big demand on the part of the troops at the front in France. If we are to bring the Indian troops to France during the summer months, and take them back, as has been suggested, during the winter months, the demands on our shipping will be out of all proportion, perhaps, to the gain that we shall get. It is quite conceivable that the Government, in choosing seventy divisions as our ideal, are hampered by a grave scarcity of officers, and they may not be prepared to provide officers for a very much larger number of fighting men at the front. On that point I do not know, but I suggest that that may be a consideration. In all other respects I agree with the motto the right hon. Gentleman evidently works upon, and that is that he prefers mobility to anything else. We want mobile troops and mobile ships in order to strike quickly at the enemy, and it is no use keeping great bodies of men at home in this country for the purpose of repelling an invasion when that invasion will never come off. It has been the view of naval officers from the first that the invasion of this country, especially in this War, is a sheer impossibility, and yet we have vast bodies of troops locked up in this country.
With the single line of railway at the disposal of the Turks for invading Egypt, with the interior positions we possess in the Eastern Mediterranean for our shipping, with an accumulation of men, say, at Cyprus, where they could have threatened many points, it is difficult to believe in the serious invasion of Egypt apart from a raid on the Suez Canal. I notice the wise precaution the right hon. Gentleman took when he made his very able survey, for he did not attempt any forecast. We have had forecasts from the Government and from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, and many of them have proved to be wrong. In regard to the provision of troops, I cannot help thinking that the Government did not provide the troops in the early stages of the War because they had made, one and all, an erroneous forecast as to the length of the War. Lord Esher, who has been a member of the Defence Committee for so many years, wrote a letter to the "Glasgow Herald," in which he stated that he had enjoyed close friendship with every one of our leading statesmen and he knew as a positive fact that one and all of them, except Lord Kitchener, had made the erroneous forecast that the War would be over in anything from three to nine months, and it is on that forecast, and subsequent forecasts of the War coming to an end, that we so long refused to face the necessity of compulsion.
The right hon. Gentleman spoke of how to get more men, and I cannot understand how it is that we are not able to get more men. There must come a period at which it is absolutely certain that the loss of human life in Germany will have reduced the man-power of the nation to the level of our own. Anyone who makes the calculation will find that it is not the number of soldiers but the available man-power of Germany which has been reduced practically to the level of our own owing to the very much larger losses which the Germans have incurred. [Mr. G. D. FABER dissented.] I am prepared to go over the figures with my hon. Friend if he likes. Germany, according to the Russian estimate, is keeping 170 divisions in the field, and we are aiming at only seventy divisions. Why is there this very large discrepancy of 100 divisions? The Prime Minister has told us that we have greater obligations elsewhere, and that is true. He said we have to maintain the sea power of our country, the Navy, the mercantile marine, and finance. I cannot see, in connection with finance, that our obligations are very much greater than Germany. Surely Germany is financing her Allies, Austria, Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria, and those demands must be quite in proportion to our own. At any rate, the difference will not be very serious.
As regards the Navy and the mercantile marine, we know that about one million men are employed upon naval shipbuilding and the other requirements of the Navy, which include, I imagine, the mercantile marine. We know that the men employed on munitions are more than double that number. The provision of munitions is the important factor, but we also know that Germany is producing from six to seven times as great a quantity of munitions as this country. Therefore the working power of Germany must be greater than our own with regard to the War, apart from the provision of soldiers altogether. That brings us to the old point—business as usual, or the silver bullet. We are keeping all these men back for business as usual, or for the provision of silver bullets. I cannot understand the sense of proportion which tells us that those £400,000,000 worth of exports cannnot be seriously cut down without any great loss to the country in a War which is costing £1,500,000,000 a year. The right sense of proportion would be to sacrifice some of your exports and get the men into the Army, with a view of ending this War as quickly as possible. We must get those men, and there is no other reservoir from which the men can be got among the Allies
If you turn to France, she must soon get to the point when her reserves must be depleted or she must shorten her front. If you turn to Japan, the people will not allow Japanese troops in any large quantities, or at all, to be sent to Europe. If you turn to Russia, it is not a question of men, but of munitions, and the only way you can get the men to the Western front is by employing the munition ships to bring back men, and I have wondered why this method has not been adopted. There is no reason why, if you carry munitions to the men, you should not bring back men to the munitions and organise them in depots in England and France. By a process of exhaustion we conclude that this country must provide the men that are required.
While the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee was speaking about altering our front so as to avoid a loss of men, I could not help thinking that that was the case in connection with Gallipoli, for which he was largely responsible. The Prime Minister told us, when he was defending the Gallipoli Expedition, that we were tying up a very large body of men there, and that, but for the presence of our troops in Gallipoli, Bulgaria would have come into the War much earlier, the Turkish troops would have been available to overwhelm the Russian forces in the Caucasus, and they would have been able to overwhelm our troops in Mesopotamia and to invade Egypt. When I heard that statement my mind went back to another earlier speech by the Prime Minister on a Vote of Credit, in which he asked the House for a limitless stock of patience and a sense of perspective, but if he had consulted a small scale map he would have seen that it would have been impossible to use those troops on those immensely distant fronts, with no railways to serve them except for a small portion of the distance, through mountainous countries, in the way he had suggested. Shortly afterwards the Prime Minister sent General Munro to report upon the Gallipoli Expedition, and then we got the true perspective. The general told us that— Our entrenchments were dominated almost throughout by the Turks. The force, in short, held a line possessing every possible military defect. They were much enervated from the diseases which are epidemic in that part of Europe in the summer. In consequence of the losses which they had suffered in earlier battles there was a very grave dearth of officers competent to take command of men. And, most important of all, giving an unqualified contradiction to the Prime Minister's statement of the advantages secured by inserting in his dispatch these words: It was obvious that the Turks could hold us in front with a small force and prosecute their designs on Bagdad or Egypt or both. 6.0 P.M.
It is obvious, so far from holding up a large force of Turks, that a small force of Turks was holding up a very much larger force of British troops. That is a very grave instance how we can waste and dissipate our resources through erroneous strategy in this War. There is one other very important point with which I wish to deal, and it is the idea that the unity of the Cabinet is essential to win this War. The Prime Minister has repeatedly used that phrase. We were at one period, if we go back to the Seven Years' War, in danger of losing a war, and it was by Chatham going against that idea of unity in the Cabinet—instead of being half in and half out of the Cabinet to use the phrase of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, it was by being one-tenth in the Cabinet and nine-tenths out of it—that he brought about the downfall of the Cabinet, and was able to form a Government in which he concentrated foreign policy, Navy and Army, in his own hands, and with Anson to advise him on the Navy and Livonier on the Army he was able to bring that war to a more successful conclusion than probably any war in British history. If we are always to insist on unity of the Cabinet and the unity of this House, the Prime Minister will for ever be studying the convenience of a small party in this House, described as the "Simonites." I do not think in the past history of this country that we ever studied what the Jacobites wanted, and I suggest to the Government that they should not study what the "Simonites" want.
I wish to draw the attention of the House to the question of finance connected with the War, because, after all, that is really the most germane question to the Vote now under discussion, namely, whether we shall authorise the Government to advance another £300,000,000 towards the expenses of the War and whether we shall authorise them to go on spending at the rate of £4,750,000 per day. It is very difficult indeed for a private Member to bring forward instances of Government extravagance, because he has not the means of finding out where the waste takes place, though I think most Members will agree that, at any rate, at the beginning of the War very great extravagance and open-handed prodigality did take place in almost every one of the Government Departments. I wish to draw attention to a few instances of what I consider to be Government extravagance which I have elicited in the course of questions to Ministers. These cases of extravagance cannot be recalled, and the money must be written off as bad debts, but I hope to find some support from hon. Members in order that in future we may have a little less extravagance. I object in toto and entirely to the system of putting our contracts on the basis of paying to the contractor a percentage on the amount that the work costs. The only exception I make, and I think it is reasonable, is in the case of repairing contracts under the Admiralty, where undoubtedly speed is a supreme consideration. If it does cost 50 per cent. more than it would under the tender system, still I think the Admiralty is justified in going to almost any expenditure in order that their ships may be repaired at the quickest possible moment. I think I shall carry most Members with me when I say that I can see no necessity now for going on with a system which may have been necessary at the beginning of the War, when we had to build an enormous number of camps and when we had to obtain large quantities of stores for the armed forces of the Crown. It is now absolutely unnecessary and wasteful, and it causes this country to spend much more money than it ought to do.
Let me take the case of the War Office, first of all. I understand that the War Office is paying on contracts now in existence an average of 9 per cent. on the net cost to the contractor. I submit that is far too large a profit to allow to the contractor. He runs no risk at all. He brings the cost of the material into the account. He is allowed his establishment charges and to state what his wages sheets are, and then on the sum total he is allowed on the average 9 per cent. for his trouble. I submit that is very much too large, and I should be interested to know when we come to it how much larger a percentage has been paid to the contractor who built the camps all up and down the country, and whose contracts amounted to £7,000,000 or £8,000,000. The Admiralty, I understand, allow 10 per cent. on the actual wages to the workmen while they are on Admiralty work, and the contractors are also allowed to add the actual net cost of the material used and establishment charges. That is for new construction. Here, again, there is no risk. The contractor is covered for everything, and yet he is allowed 10 per cent. profit on the sum total of the money charged. Let us consider for a moment what an inducement it is to extravagance. The contractor does not mind, so long as he gets the workmen, whether he pays him £1 or £3. All hon. Members have in their minds cases of workmen who have been taken off work for which they were getting £1 or 30s., and put on work under Government contracts, and, without asking for it, given £3 per week. I do not object to any reasonable rise in wages in order to induce workmen to take up Government work, but there is no earthly reason why you should double wages. The Board of "Works is rather more reasonable. They only allow their contractors 7 per cent. But there, again, there is no risk involved, and I submit that it is an unduly large profit. I hope, therefore, that I may have the support of other hon. Members, who will join with me in urging upon the Government that the time has now come for ceasing this form of contract except in the case of repair work for the Admiralty. I understand from answers given that the Government do not intend to give up this form of contract, but are perfectly happy in going on in the same way as they did before the War.
Let me give another instance where, if my information is correct, a little adaptability on the part of the War Office and a little business foresight would have saved this country a large sum of money. We have some 20,000 motor vehicles in France, or more than half the total number of vehicles, apart from motor cars, that existed in this country at the beginning of the War. It was necessary at the beginning of the War that the Government should have power to requisition all vehicles for Government service, and in pursuance of this power they requisitioned hundreds, and I think thousands, of omnibuses belonging to the London General Omnibus Company, and they had to pay a pretty smart price for them. I am informed that the London General Omnibus Company, at the beginning of the War, would have agreed to almost any proposition that the War Office had put forward, because, owing to their omnibuses being taken off the streets, they were afraid that they might lose the practical monopoly which they had by another company being formed in the near future, and that they would have to start all their business operations over again. They therefore came to the War Office and begged that some arrangement might be made similar to that which was made with the railways, namely, that the War Office would take over their vehicles and guarantee them the average of their dividends for the last three years preceding the War. The War Office refused entirely, and said it was outside their line of business. They preferred to go on requisitioning, much the same as they would if they took a farm from any hon. Member of this House. What has been the result? If the proposition made by the company when they were in a hole at the beginning of the War had been accepted, in 1914 no money would have been paid to the company; in 1915, I am informed, some £30,000 would have been paid; and this year, as far as one can judge, very little more on the average would be paid; whereas, if my information is correct, we have already paid the company for vehicles requisitioned £430,000, and more is still due. If this is correct, I submit that it shows a very great want of foresight on the part of the War Office, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will inquire into the matter. In the supply of machine guns, to take another matter, we might with a little management, if my information is correct, and I have no reason to doubt it, have saved £400,000 on an order which has been placed abroad. I will not mention the particular form of machine gun, but no doubt the right hon. Gentleman will have it in his mind. It is a gun which is now being manufactured in large quantities for ourselves and our Allies, and it has proved a very efficient weapon of war.
Do you mean the Lewis gun?
Yes. I am told that last December we placed abroad a large order for these guns, and that £1,400,000 was the price to be paid. There is no earthly reason why a particular big firm in the Midlands should not have been given that order. They could perefctly well have turned out the gun in the same time as the firm in the United States, and they would have executed the order for £1,000,000.
The hon. Gentleman cannot expect me to deal with a matter which does not come within my Department.
I quite appreciate the position of the right hon. Gentleman, but an hon. Member of this House cannot be expected not to bring forward cases where money might have been saved because the representative of the Ministry of Munitions chooses to be having his tea.
I was not complaining. I was only stating that being a matter for another Department, the hon. Member could not expect to get an answer from me.
I quite understand the right hon. Gentleman cannot carry all that in his mind. I am told that the answer may be that we are short of men here, that in England we have not sufficient skilled workmen, that we cannot provide them for making these guns, and that the order must, therefore, be sent abroad. My answer to that is that we have got a considerable number of skilled men here who are making things we could get more cheaply abroad—for instance, motor cars. We have a large number of men employed in making cars who could well be switched off on to making machine guns, and we could buy the motor cars considerably cheaper in the United States. It only wants a little business thought. Each Department should not work in a watertight compartment. One Department would die sooner than communicate with another. We had an instance of that only the other day, When the Admiralty neglected to communicate with Dublin Castle. I put it to the right hon. Gentleman whether it is not reasonable to ask him to inquire into this matter? If these orders cannot be cancelled, at any rate let him see to it that these things shall not occur again.
Just take the two small questions—matters only involving a few thousand pounds; in themselves they are quite unimportant. The first is the case of the Eastern Command Headquarters in Pall Mall, and the second is the instance of the enormous house in Norfolk which has been taken for the General Officer Commanding the Northern defences. Why should it be necessary for the Eastern Command to be housed in that large building in the most expensive street in London, opposite the Guards' Club in Pall Mall? Surely, if it must be in London, which I do not admit, some less expensive building might have been obtained. Again, take the Norfolk Headquarters. Why for a General Officer Commanding, with a staff of ten or twelve officers, should you have taken the largest country house available? Why should you have requisitioned it under the Defence of the Realm Act? It contains eighty or ninety bedrooms, and you are bound to pay a thumping rent for it. You will have stripped it of all its costly furniture, and you will have to pay for the repair of the roads cut up by your motor traffic. It will cost the nation at least £10,000 a year. A decent-sized farmhouse, or a manor house, such as are to be found in abundance in the district, would have done equally well. I could give many more instances of the same sort, but I will not weary the House with them. I appeal to the Government, when they come down for these enormous sums of money, to try and control, not the heads of Departments, but the second or third heads, who are the people who spend the ratepayers' money, and who do so in reckless fashion, because they know they will not have to answer in this House. The heads of Departments are extremely busy people, but I hope the right hon. Gentleman will consult them and see if some sort of economy cannot be introduced.
I should like to revert for a moment or two to questions raised by the right hon. Member for Dundee (Colonel Churchill) in the speech which we have had from him this evening. On some of the points which he advanced I am in thorough agreement with him, and am prepared to support him in every way I can. For instance, when he asks that the establishment of the battalions at the front should be raised from 1,000 to 1,200, I support him. He pointed out how 250 men of a battalion were taken away for non-combatant service, and I agree with him: that the strength of the battalion should automatically be raised to 1,200, so that we may have its full fighting strength in the trenches. The right hon. Gentleman also referred to the various reservoirs of men, and pointed out that at home, and especially about London, there are very large numbers of young, active men driving transport lorries and doing other non-combatant work. It makes one wonder why these young and active men are not at the front, instead of doing work in London and other places which might be equally well done by men over forty years of age.
The right hon. Gentleman touched on the remaining reservoirs abroad—in Africa and India. I quite agree with him that we ought to draw into our scheme every race and nationality that we have subject to us. I say nothing about the self-governing Dominions. They have done wonderfully well. We have seen the English officials in our Crown Colonies coming here, and contingents have been encouraged in every Crown Colony. We cannot expect these Colonies to be loyal unless we draw them within our sphere and get them to realise that they are part of the Empire; and just as the West Indies has sent their contingents I should like to see contingents from Malta, Cyprus, and Egypt and from every Colony with which we have anything to do. There are our African Colonies. We could take the men to Egypt and train them there for military work. That is an uncommonly good suggestion, and I should like to see it carried out. We have seen what the French have done with their Sengalese troops. They are fighting everywhere, and I see no reason why the British Empire should not bring about the same result with East African and South African troops. We know what grand fighting races they are. Take the Zulus. We have fought them many times. So we did the Sikhs. We fought them, and see now how they are fighting for us. I see no reason why we should not get the Zulus as well to fight for us. We could take them to Egypt and train them there, and then send them to where they would do good service. We should not retain them as an armed force in their own country. We should not keep them permanently, but there is no reason why we should not train them to serve abroad for the duration of the War.
Then there is the question concerning India. I think myself that the Chiefs of the Native States have done extremely well. They have behaved magnificently. They have placed their money and their resources at our disposal. It is not of them that I complain; there is no reluctance on their part. But I do think that sufficient has not been done in British districts. We here in England are raising four millions of men out of forty millions—that is, one man out of every ten of the population. In India the late Viceroy (Lord Hardinge), the present Commander-in-Chief, and the present Financial Member of the Government of India, are the three men who seem not to have risen to the occasion in India. I had occasion to refer to that last November, in connection with Mesopotamia and the want of troops there. Here is the Financial Member of the Council boasting that in India they have only an Income Tax of 1s. with a maximum of 1s. 3d. in the £, while we here are paying 5s. with a maximum much over that, and will probably have to pay a great deal more. India is perfectly willing to bear her share, and the more she shares in the national burden, the better it is. I do not think it right for the Financial Member of the Government of India to boast that he is saving India taxation when she is quite willing to bear her proper share. We know the Army has been starved in everything. We know that in Mesopotamia there was a failure to send enough troops.
Large forces might easily have been raised in India. In connection with recruiting I think that the Commander-in-Chief has not risen to the occasion. He has made no use of the civil authorities. In England the whole of the municipalities throughout the country have joined in forming recruiting committees, but at the present moment in India that work is left to a few young British officers. People in the country have not been brought into the Army in the way they should have been, and that is why I say the authorities in India have not risen to the occasion. I know it is objected that we have neither officers nor equipment there. But the equipment is being made, while as to officers we went through the Mutiny with Irregulars. We had very few English officers at that time, and I showed myself how Irregulars could be raised again now. They do not want all British officers; they do not want British uniforms. They would do well providing they have one British officer. The authorities have no imagination in India at the present time, or they would have done much more. We do not want the complete equipment down to the last button; we want to make use of the material we have got there. In these matters I heartily support the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, and I hope sincerely that his suggestions will be taken in hand, that the Finance Minister will not think that his only object is to save India extra taxation, and that the Commander-in-Chief and the present Viceroy will make use of the supply of material which is available there for the Empire.
I am glad to see the representative of the Navy in his place, and I wish to ask him if he will now tell us what is the present state of the Prize Bounty Fund and prize money due to the Navy, and when he hopes to be able to pay it out. There is great anxiety throughout the Naval Service about this. The right hon. Gentleman has told us that the money cannot be distributed until the end of the War. I ask him to put that idea out of his mind altogether. Let him pay an interim dividend, and raise the hopes of the men that they are really going to get something. Will he explain how it is we see in the papers that enormous sums have been deducted from the money due to the Navy for legal fees and expenses? Let us have an assurance from the right hon. Gentleman that these legal fees and legal expenses are not to be taken from the money legitimately due to the officers and men of the Navy. Let them be assured they are going to get the money they have really won. There is great anxiety about this matter, and I therefore hope the right hon. Gentleman will tell us how the fund stands at present, when it is going to be distributed, and when the first interim dividend will be divided among those entitled to it.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee (Colonel Churchill) made a very interesting speech, and I think this House and the country owe him a debt of gratitude for the fresh light he has thrown on many matters connected with the Army. With one suggestion made by the right hon. Gentleman I entirely agree, and that is that the battalions at the front should be brought up from their present strength to a strength of 1,200, or thereabouts. That would make a great difference from many points of view, and it certainly would add to the effectiveness, and probably give the troops of the line more rest than they at present enjoy. Another suggestion made by the right hon. Gentleman in connection with the reservoirs to which he made allusion was that the Cavalry divisions at present at the front should be dismounted and that the present regiments should be turned into Infantry battalions of the strength up to which the Infantry battalions there now should be brought. I can imagine the storm which the right hon. Gentleman's suggestion would arouse throughout the Cavalry in France. That would not matter so much if the policy were a sound one, but, with all deference to the right hon. Gentleman, I cannot think that it is sound. It is too early in the War, if I may use that expression, to say that Cavalry will not be needed at some moment or other in a particular theatre of War. I know very well, from experience, how soon dismounted Cavalry become totally unfit to do work as Cavalry after they have been a certain length of time in the trenches. Therefore, with all respect to the right hon. Gentleman, I hope the Government will not adopt that particular suggestion.
The right hon. Gentleman also alluded to certain portions in the line in which there are from day to day many casualties and from which he said it might be possible, without detriment to the military position, to retrace our steps. That sug- gestion deserves very full consideration indeed from the Government. No doubt there are sentimental considerations for holding on to this or that particular portion of the line, but we should not be governed entirely by sentimental considerations. The military situation is the only consideration that really counts, and the Government ought not to allow sentimental considerations to weigh in any policy they may determine to adopt in that respect. The right hon. Gentleman made certain remarks regarding the disposition of our forces in the East. He asked, "What is the great Army in Egypt doing; what is the Army now assembled at Salonika doing, or what is it going to do?" If I correctly interpret his remarks, he suggested that all our forces in the Near East should be withdrawn and employed in a different quarter.
expressed dissent.
It is a very difficult thing for anyone, either in this House or in the country, to criticise what I may term the larger strategic operations of this War without a full knowledge of the facts. I do not suggest the right hon. Gentleman has not a full knowledge, but if he has a larger knowledge than anyone else it is, of course, due to certain things to which I need not allude. But there are hon. Members in this House, there are people outside, and there are journalists in the Press, who, without a full knowledge of the facts, criticise this or that operation. It is quite impossible for anyone without inside knowledge to know what effect a particular operation in a particular theatre of war has had upon the general conduct of the War, and whether it has had a successful effect or otherwise, unless he knows everything that it is necessary to know in connection with the general strategic situation. I feel sure that certain of the right hon. Gentleman's remarks will be taken up tomorrow in a section of the Press, and that they will be used as a weapon with which again to beat the Government for particular operations which have been conducted in the Eastern theatre of war. I say that because the right hon. Gentleman, knowing more, perhaps, than other people, is able to bring to bear more accurate criticism than the ordinary individual. That, if I may say so with all respect, is why he should have been somewhat guarded in criticising, seeing that other individuals have not had the same opportunities as himself for access to the facts about this War.
Perhaps I may be allowed to reply to the questions put to me by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Melton. (Colonel Yate) with regard to the distribution of prize money and prize bounty in the Navy. I think I can do so quite shortly, and, I hope, simply. The position with regard to the distribution of prize money to the Navy is this: that instead of, as in the past, making the award of prize money to the actual captors, the net value of the prizes taken will be pooled and distributed among the whole of the Fleet engaged in this War at the close of hostilities, under a scale of distribution to be approved. This change in the method of distribution, which I know has the complete concurrence of my right hon. Friend who was then the First Lord of the Admiralty (Colonel Churchill), is considered to be more fair all round. It gives the men engaged in fighting the enemy just the same chance of an equal share as the men guarding the trade routes. Besides, in these modern days, liners of very great value might conceivably have been captured by craft carrying a comparatively small personnel, therefore the all round share system seems fairer. This system of pooling, which is the new basis of distribution of prize money, as my hon. and gallant Friend will see, necessarily makes the distribution from time to time—which would have been possible if we gave prize money to the actual captor—impossible. Much as I should like it, and all of as would like it, I do not think it is at all possible to declare what he calls an interim dividend, because of the system of pooling of distribution throughout the whole of the Fleet as I have described it. Even if this were not so, the new conditions of naval warfare, the participation of Dominion ships in naval engagements, the existence of Prize Courts throughout the Empire and so on, all these things make periodic instalments or interim dividends of prize money practically impossible, much as we should like to make them.
Under the new system of pooling, supposing a man is a fortnight in the Service and is then invalided out, would his share be the same as that of a man who is in the Service throughout the whole of the War?
I think that is one of the points we have to consider very carefully and one not to be lost sight of. We shall consider whether he will get the usual unit which those who are engaged during the whole period of hostilities will get or some smaller unit. That is not yet decided.
If you secure the issue of an interim dividend, would there be any difficulty about it?
I am afraid it is practically impossible under the system of pooling in which all are to share. The point shall be looked into again, but I think the periodical instalment system for prize money is out of the question. As regards the charges against the Fund to which the hon. and gallant Gentleman referred, of course it is our wish and desire that they should be kept as low as possible. As an evidence of that, I may point out that under the old conditions the ships' agents were entitled to a commission of 2½ per cent. on the net proceeds of the prize. We propose to dispense, as regards prize money, with ships agents altogether. I mention that as evidence of our desire to keep the charges as low as possible.
As to legal expenses, we saw a case in the papers last Saturday. Will those expenses all be charged against naval men or against the Government?
There are certain charges in respect of sales, and so on, which are inevitable, but it is our desire that they should be kept as low as possible. I come to the second question raised by my hon. and gallant Friend as to how prize bounty stands. This is very much more simple and follows broadly the old lines. Prize bounty represents an award from Treasury funds equal to £5 per head of the personnel of the enemy warships sunk or captured to the crews of His Majesty's ships taking part. That award is made under a scale of distribution, and for the purposes of this award the scale of distribution has been determined by Order in Council, and was published in the "Gazette," of 29th February, of this year. The Fleet have beer, instructed to send into the Admiralty any applications they may have to make for prize bounty, with which only I am dealing now. We have a number of these in our possession already. As soon as each case is complete in respect of the claim for bounty, the ships' agents, who do come in here, will be put in possession of any essential information in our possession as to the number of the ship's company, and so an, so that the claim may be presented to the Prize Court. Here, again, I am afraid the award may be restricted by a consideration which I must mention. Before the case is presented to the Court we have to decide whether there is any objection, from the point of view of the public interest, to the full disclosure in public—that is what it comes to—of the details of any given action. Subject to that, which is the only consideration which would cause us to hang up any particular case, we shall, of course, allow every claim to be laid before the Court, and we shall instruct the Accountant-General's Department to make the payment thereafter without delay in every case where award is given by the Court under the scale of distribution to which I have already referred. One case has already been decided by the Prize Court, namely, the claim of the "Carmania" for the destruction of the "Cap Trafalgar." The Prize Court has awarded a sum of £2,115, and all the necessary steps have been taken to distribute this sum under the scheme of distribution to the officers and crew of the "Carmania." At least two other cases are being prepared for submission to the Court by the ships' agents. I will deal with the question put by the hon. and gallant Member (Commander Bellairs) as to the case of men who may be only a short time in the Service. In respect of men who may die, both prize bounty and prize money form part of the estate of an officer or man, and if not paid to the officer or man himself is paid to his legal representative. I hope I have satisfied the hon. and gallant Gentleman how the matter of prize money and prize bounty stands.
I am prepared to leave strategy to the strategists, naval or military, real or ideal, actual or imaginary, and I do not propose to touch upon any of the questions which they have raised, nor will I, as I had intended to do, trouble the Under-Secretary for War with the question of fighting in Dublin, because the Prime Minister gave me a very sympathetic and satisfactory answer to-day. I will pass from the subject merely remarking that the description of what happened there as a featherbed rebellion has caused great distress and indignation in the county from which the Sherwood Foresters are recruited, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will in concert with the Prime Minister inquire into the statement made by the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. T. M. Healy) that the regiment took the Loophole road instead of the Broad road, and therefore incurred these crushing casualties so that we may know in Nottinghamshire what are the facts regarding this matter. It is admitted on all hands that these two battalions behaved under most difficult circumstances—young and inexperienced troops—with the utmost gallantry and it is desirable that we should know what actually occurred on this occasion.
With that remark I leave the subject, and only wish to refer for a minute to what was said by the right hon. Gentleman (Colonel Churchill). He was of opinion that India had not played its part in regard to the War, and my hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Yate) seemed entirely to accept that view. I accept it in so far as I do not think the Indian Government have given the pecuniary assistance they might have done, and as the late Viceroy has said that the enemies of British rule are not to be found amongst the intellectuals of India, I do not know where they are to be found, and I think more Indian troops, if they were wanted, might have been spared for Mesopotamia or the French front. I do not pretend to know whether those troops are so suitable for use in France and Flanders as elsewhere, but the authorities have made the experiment. I give them credit for having made it, and I am prepared to believe that they have some reason which actuated them in the distribution of the troops, and I am not joining at all in attacking them on that ground. I should like to see greater use made of the gallant Indian Army, particularly in all operations in the East and in Egypt. I thoroughly agree with the right hon. Gentleman (Colonel Churchill) that more efforts might be made to make use of the material in Africa. With one portion of Africa I have intimate connection. In the Protectorate of Nyasaland I am convinced that many gallant and useful troops can be raised—in fact, they have been raised—and have been officered by planters and the employés of various companies operating there. They have covered themselves with distinction in the field, and have proved to be brave troops. They fight well with their English leaders, and I think in that direction, certainly, a great deal might be done to develop the resources of the Empire and to bring them all to bear in this great crisis. I did mot altogether agree with the Indian Finance Minister when I saw him congratulating himself upon the low taxation which prevails in India at a time when the Home Country is taxed so desperately, and necessarily and properly, in order to carry on the War. In Southern India I feel certain troops could be spared wholesale. There is really no danger there which would be incurred by sending more troops, if they can be usefully employed, to Egypt or Mesopotamia, or other areas of the War. As regards Upper India, it is not so clear that the country might be denuded of troops, or indeed in Bengal, but I believe more native troops could be spared, and I join my right hon. Friend (Colonel Churchill) in hoping that every effort will be made to enlarge the contribution in men and money of the Indian Empire to the largest possible extent. I am not attacking the Government on this point at all. I believe they have made a bold experiment in sending to France the troops they did, and I am prepared to believe that there, and in Mesopotamia, a country with which I have some personal acquaintance, there have been reasons for their action in withdrawing them which have perhaps not been made public, and that it is unwise of us to join in wholesale criticism without being aware of all the circumstances of the case.
As regards the speech of my hon. Friend (Mr. Ashley) and what he said about economy, with which I heartily agreed, I very much regretted that amongst those economies there is not going to be a resort to premium bonds, which would certainly be a great source of profit and economy, and which I believe are not adopted merely for pedantic and sentimental reasons with which I have no sympathy whatsoever. One other word and I have done. I wish the Government would reconsider the appointment of barristers in order to examine claims for financial assistance on the Civil Liabilities Committee. I am not objecting to them at all because they are barristers, but I think sixty-six barristers cannot possibly deal with this work, and that the tribunals themselves would do it far better, and could do it pari passu with their other work, to which it immediately relates, and I earnestly hope the Government will reconsider that point, and that the House will not consider that I have entered too much into detail on this day, which, I believe, it is desired to devote as far as possible to the larger aspects of the War.
I desire to intervene in order to strike what I think is a new note. The right hon. Gentleman (Col. Churchill) seldom rises without saying something original and striking, and one remark of his, I think, is important, that in regard to events which are actually passing under our eyes we should endeavour if possible to obtain the historical perspective, so as by that means to acquire the necessary impartiality and objectivity and scientific judgment which will enable us to form a correct opinion of the events which are now transpiring. If anyone would acquire something of that historical perspective, I think nothing would be more remarkable than that in the midst of this, the most terrible war of human experience, and at a stage which is rapidly becoming decisive, the House of Commons is entirely listless, not with the confidence of men marching on to victory, but rather with the listlessness of men who see no prospect of victory, but find no escape from the dilemma in which they are placed by the incapacity, proved again and again up to the hilt, of those who are directing the War from that Front Bench. The figures which have been quoted by the Prime Minister are almost amazing in their importance. What is the result? It is disaster on every line on which British troops are fighting. This must be brought home, if not to the minds of Members of the House, at least to the minds of citizens of the country, so that they can bring the necessary pressure in order to shake the Cabinet out of the lethargy into which it has lapsed. That result has been due not to any failure on the part of the soldiers, for they have shown a valour and intrepidity worthy of the best days of the national history; it is evidently due to lack of leadership on the part of those who have controlled the War. The right hon. Gentleman said that the initiative which the Germans have displayed might be the result of dash on their part, or it might, on the other hand, show a certain anxiety as to the final result. If lack of initiative were the proof of any higher philosophical qualities, this country would be able to balance the material success of the Germans by the favourite cry which is heard after an election is lost, that the moral victory was ours. If those ideas prevail that will be the only kind of victory which will grace the annals of this country during this War.
On every front again we have this extraordinary condition presented that the whole operations of the campaign are con- ducted without any concerted plans at all, but in a sort of haphazard fashion, as if our military leaders, or the members of the Cabinet who are directing the War, were unable to use any foresight, even such as is given to ordinary men, and never observed any fact or any incident till it struck them in the face, and that then they had no other resource except surprised indignation. They are helpless, drifting, devising makeshift experiments in campaigns with which they present the country and this House. It is one of the most disastrous features of these disastrous campaigns that a great many of them have not been military campaigns at all. They have simply been political campaigns to throw dust in the eyes of Members of the House.
7.0 P.M.
Take, for instance, the Balkan campaign. Those who have criticised the Government are often twitted with being wise after the event. Long before that event there were many men—I may mention myself amongst them—who clearly foresaw the whole sequence of the events which followed upon the massing of the German troops upon the Danube, and who saw months before, while there was yet time to save the situation, that the best line of attack was upon the Danube, striking at the most vulnerable and most undefended parts of the German Empire. If at a certain period we had had the foresight not to desert Serbia in the cowardly way in which she was deserted, but, responding to the true soldierly instinct, had rallied to her aid in her distress, and placed a million men upon the Danube, not only would you have menaced the very heart of Germany, but you would have secured the adhesion of Bulgaria, of Roumania, and of Greece, and would have transformed the whole face of this campaign. That is what I say now, and it has been verified by every incident of that disastrous campaign, and that is what I said months before it was too late to make it a reality. The right hon. and gallant Member for Dundee has said from his own experience that the resources we have have not been properly employed. Again, that is through no fault on the part of the men, but evidently through fault in the leadership. I know very many men who have served months in the trenches who, through the way in which they are employed, have the fine edge worn off their zeal and enthusiasm by a continual round of corvées, of almost uselss tasks, at which they are kept under the old spirit of routine, so that even some of the bravest men have lost the necessary dash and keenness.
There again, if that problem had been properly tackled the remedy would have been found. The one principle for the selection and promotion of officers should be their merit in the field; testing them by actual results. That infallible standard should be applied, beginning at the very highest, Lord Kitchener himself. I do not propose now to traverse the career of Lord Kitchener during this War, because there will be a separate Debate on his salary. But when we do gain the historical sense, when we are able to read of all these events with historical objectivity, the one disastrous man will seem to have been the Minister for War, whose blunders are worthy of the swollen reputation he had acquired. Why is he there? Is there one member of the Cabinet who, with perfect sincerity, would defend that appointment and say even now that he is the best man in the best place, and that he has justified his selection? If any man in the Cabinet dared to rise in his place and defend such a statement, how would he meet the accusation that this great man, who was proved such a wonderful success, has been robbed of his attributes one by one until nothing is left to him now as a military adviser or war director? Ministers themselves, by their acts, have been the severest critics of Lord Kitchener, but by their cowardice they have failed to proceed to the final step which would reassure the country, not only because of the removal of Lord Kitchener, but by showing that there were men at the head of the State, men who could replace him by a man of energy and power and brain.
I do not propose to follow out in detail the criticism and blunders of the Government. It woud take too long. Moreover, the opportunity will be presented later, for there will be many Votes of Credit, each one resulting in the same futile attempts and the same futile results. On the occasion of the Air Debate we had a spectacle of the same kind of tacit conspiracy to shield all manner of failures and inefficiency in this House. I am not speaking now as one who is wise after the event. Months ago in this House I advocated a course of action which the Government have fully justified, because months afterwards they have realised it, though in a very weak and faulty imitation.
I insist upon this point, which I have raised before, that for the conduct of this War we want not the tricks and subterfuges of lawyers, accustomed to specious arguments, to convince assemblies of men, but we want men who have been trained to face realities. We want men of the minds and training of engineers, for example, whose works are tested not by courts and juries, but by the forces of Nature themselves, and who by virtue of their training have an innate sense of responsibility and reality. These men can be found. In answer to the usual query, "Who would you put in the place of the present men?" I may say that I can furnish names, but not on this occasion. I will turn that reply, and I will say, "If that be your last argument, and if the men now representing you are the best available in this War, then already you have sealed your doom." These men have written a record which will remain long imperishable. That record is the handwriting on the wall. One by one the avenues of victory have been closed. One by one the resources of the Empire have been frittered away or made of small importance. Only a few means of success now remain, before the adamantine gates of fate close. What we want is a plan, well based, well thought out, pointing to ultimate victory, and pursued with resolution and coherence, step by step, until its final accomplishment. During all these twenty months of war no shadow of such a plan has been given us.
Now the right hon. and gallant Member for Dundee puts forward as the best finish to this campaign a war of attrition. That is to say, whereas we have spent now over £2,000,000,000, if we are to continue fighting upon these lines it will mean spending £10,000,000,000, and even then, I believe, with no attainable results. I say that to come to that conclusion and to present that impasse is a shameful result of the work of a Government which has been occupied all these months, with all the resources of the Empire, conducting a war against rivals of such great organising power and such great military spirit. We want a plan. We have the men. The common soldier is superior as an individual to the German soldier, and I believe there is enough brain in this country if we can find it. We must find it, and bring the best men to the fore, so that throughout every rank the one principle of promotion will be that of Napoleon himself—"La carriere ouverte aux talents" ("the career open to talents"), so that the common soldier can feel that he carries the marshal's baton in his knapsack. That principle should be carried out rigorously, because the very life of the nation depends upon it. Every leader must "make good," as the Americans say, and must be tried by the one standard of results. If he fail to achieve those results he should be replaced; a new man should be tried, that one who is the most likely and the most available, and if he fails he should be replaced, and so on by a rigorous process of continual selection right throughout the ranks until you are sure that the men who are leading are the best available men, and that they will have the confidence of the common soldier. In place of that clear, coherent plan the Government has presented us once more, as they have so often done, with that wonderful picture in which their effigy might be exposed—a sort of cross between Fabius Maximus and Micawber. There will be other opportunities of trying to do what I have done on other occasions, namely, to instil into the Government some foresight, some courage, and some energy.
To bring this War to a triumphant issue it is, above all, necessary at the present moment to conserve the financial resources of the nation in every possible way. We have in to-day's Vote of Credit brought up the total of our Votes of Credit to the gigantic sum of £2,382,000,000. The Chancellor of the Exchequer told us the other day that the estimated National Debt at the end of the present financial year would be no less than £3,440,000,000, including the £800,000,000 lent to our Allies. The deficit still to raise after this £300,000,000 Vote of Credit for the current year alone is £723,000,000. The expenditure is estimated at £1,825,000,000, less the £502,000,000 of taxation revenue, which leaves £1,323,000,000. Towards that we have two Votes of Credit of £300,000,000 each, leaving Votes of Credit in the year ending 31st March still to be brought forward of no less than £723,000,000. We are entitled to know, in face of this enormous and unprecedented expenditure, what has been done recently to secure that the taxpayers of the country should get better value for their money. There is no question whatever that untold millions have been wasted in the various Departments of the State during the conduct of this War, in mistakes they have made in the buying departments and otherwise, especially in connection with the mishandling and lack of expert management in controlling and directing the operations of the huge fleet of mercantile marine steamers of eight or nine million tons for naval and military and other Government purposes. I have brought before the Admiralty the question of insurance. They take war risks, and I suggest that they should take also, by the same machinery that they arrange the war risks, total loss risks on the whole of the shipping that they now employ. I say unhesitatingly, on the judgment of some of the greatest marine insurance experts in the Kingdom, that they might have effected a saving of anything from £1,000,000 to £2,000,000 a year if they had adopted that suggestion, and the only reason against adopting it was that they had not got a department to work it. The same machinery that deals with war risks could also deal easily with total loss risks.
The great important question facing the nation is, how can we lessen expenditure without lessening efficiency, and how can we increase the margin of our national income available for taxation and loan. The nation as a whole even to-day has not realised the urgent necessity which there is for the strictest economy in every department of the public service and in private life, and I have to complain that the Government seem themselves not to have realised the urgent necessity, and that we do require and ought to have from them a lead in this matter of a kind that they have not hitherto given. We had committees appointed, and when we are asked to vote £300,000,000 more for the carrying on of this War, we ought to have had from that bench a definite statement as to what has been the result of the appointment of the Economy Committees in connection with the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Ministry of Munitions. It is high time that those Committees reported the results of their efforts to retrench and save a waste of public money, but not a word is vouchsafed to us. What is the use of appointing Committees of this kind if you do not follow the matter up and get to know from them how far they have found on investigation that money could be saved and what economies they could effect? I think that we ought to-night to have a definite statement under those heads. There was another important committee appointed which simply played with the question, and expenses amounting to only 4 per cent. were cut down. If that is to be the measure of the economies which we are to practise in face of the enormous expenditure, the financial position in this country will prove to be most serious.
We cannot beat Germany in the matter of economic exhaustion. She has no imports to pay for, except a few that she smuggles in. A printing press is turning out twenty, ten, and five Mark notes, without any regard to gold reserve, but simply guaranteed by the German Government and accepted as legal tender by the people in the German nation. Why, on those lines, how can she ever suffer financial exhaustion, so long as the War goes on? When the War is over the financial collapse will be such as the world never knew before. But during the War, so long as the people are perfectly willing to accept as legal tender between themselves these notes, multiplied simply by working a printing press night and day, what hope is there of beating Germany by economic exhaustion? What we have got to look to is to prevent this nation suffering from economic exhaustion, and that can only be done by a very different and more stringent policy than that which has yet been employed by the Government. The practice of economy, both public and private, has been urged in some eloquent speeches, but the result has been practically nil. What we need to-day is that compulsion should be applied. Take the question of our excess of imports over exports. We sold all our American securities to square that to a considerable extent during the last six months; but we are to-day importing at the rate of £700,000,000 a year more than we are exporting. Our American securities are gone. How are we going to discharge those obligations, as regards the excess of imports over exports, say, six months hence? The situation is most serious, and the only way to reduce that seriousness is that the Government should have courage, and should at once stop the import into this country of everything that is not needed for the national life or the prosecution of the War.
They could have reduced the imports very substantially by pursuing a strong policy of that nature, but they have not the courage to shut out the expensive furs that the ladies wear, and all the expensive garbs and hats, and the feathers that are got by the cruel slaughter of the most beautiful birds in the world, such as the birds of paradise. The Government are too much under petticoat government to effect substantial economies by shutting out luxuries of those descriptions. Look at the shop windows of London, and is there any sign of war? Is there any sign of national self-denial and the practice of rigid economy? I never saw the windows decked with more beautiful articles of luxury than they are to-day. But, after all, this question is absolutely vital if we are to conserve our financial position. We meet taxation willingly, even £500,000,000 a year, but we cannot be taxed 10s. in the pound by Income Tax, Super-tax, and other taxes and also have money for war loans to the same extent. The danger is that we are going to spend enormous amounts of our pre-war capital. We should meet the expenditure of the War to the greatest possible extent out of the income of the year. What is going to happen at the end of the War if we decrease our pre-war capital? It means that when we need further capital to extend business, to manufacture increased commodities, to pay our debts abroad, we shall not have the capital to employ in the conduct and extension of that business. We have to raise this year £1,700,000,000 to clear us to the 31st of March. We were told to-day that we have got £660,000,000 of Treasury Bills towards that. What is the use of that as a permanent arrangement? The moment that the end of the War appears in sight, how many of your Treasury Bills will be redeemed—Treasury Bills at three, six, and nine months? Practically none. The shipowners will say, "We want our capital back to rebuild and replace the ships that have been lost." Other manufacturers and people in other industries will say they need to reconstitute their business and expend fresh capital to do an increased business. If we are going to conserve our economic resources, what we ought to do is to raise the money for this Vote of Credit and for other Votes of Credit by long-date loans free of Income Tax. The fact is that unless we have long-date loans in place of those Treasury Bills—why, the Treasury Bill arrangement was never intended to be used in the wholesale fashion in which it is used; it was never contemplated that they would borrow under that sanction—
These technical matters are really more relevant to a Finance Bill than to this Vote, which is concerned with the spending of money and not with the raising of it.
I beg your pardon. I had in mind the saving of money by raising it without delaying the issue of a loan, but I quite appreciate your correction that it does appear to come more properly within the Finance Bill. But another way of assisting our finances would be by the increased production of food at home. It was discussed last night, but it does not seem to me that we are at the end of our resources, and with good will all round, and the proper employment of women and children, we might increase the food production at home.
I really fail to see the relevance of that. This proposal is to give a Vote of Credit of £300,000,000 to the Government to carry on the War. Anything arising from that can be referred to, but these other matters are of wider and more general application.
I thought that we were entitled, when we were asked to sanction the Government spending £300,000,000 before any taxation to raise it has been imposed, to ask how they proposed to raise it, or how they proposed to shape our finance, in order to enable us as a nation to bear the total accumulated amount of the different Votes of Credit. At any rate, I presume that I was in order on the question of the reduction of expenditure on the Army, Navy, and Minister of Munitions Department, as by that course the Votes of Credit would be reduced. We certainly ought to have a Report from the Committee appointed to try to get retrenchment in connection with the Ministry of Munitions. There is no question that we are paying the United States probably £2, if not £3, for every pound's worth of munitions of war that come over. Surely we ought to know, when we are granting the Government the power to spend £300,000,000, what is to be done in that respect. The question of effecting economies and getting more value for our money is what I had mainly in view. It is necessary for the Government to give us a lead, and I hope that we shall have more information given to the House as to what steps are being taken with this most important object in view, and that we shall have some assurance that these Committees that were appointed have not all been allowed to go to sleep.
I do not propose to follow the hon. Member who has just spoken. The hon. Member who preceded him completely misunderstands the position. He talked about the British House of Commons sitting listlessly, and he spoke about the English people being listless. He is quite wrong in that. I would suggest that the hon. Member did not show the best of taste in attacking the Secretary of State for War.
On a point of Order. The hon. and gallant Member has made a point that I have no right here to attack the Secretary of State for War. That point has been made before. I would like a ruling on that point, as to whether a Member here has not a perfect right, if he feels it his absolute duty, to attack the administration of any member of the Cabinet, whether he be represented in this House or not.
The hon. Member is entitled to attack anybody or everybody except those whose salaries are on the Consolidated Fund. Those he cannot attack.
I venture to suggest that the hon. Member for Clare was not in the best of taste in attacking the Secretary of State for War, more especially as fifteen years ago he was fighting against him in arms. I leave that question and proceed to the few remarks which I wish to make to the House. We have been reminded this afternoon that one person in every ten of our population is under arms. That is the reason why a very great proportion of the large sum which is to be voted will be for the upkeep of this enormous mass of men—nearly 4,000,000. The point is whether we are getting the best value for our money from these soldiers, and, further, is the Army at the front getting the best value in the way of recruits for which we are paying so much. I do not believe that in a single army, whether it be German, French, Italian, Russian, or our own, are the officers satisfied with the quality and training of the recruits gent out to them. Every army has complaint to make of the recruits not having been sufficiently trained, and so on. A couple of months ago there came officially before me a com- plaint from an officer commanding at the front about a draft of recruits which had been sent out to him. His communication was of a sarcastic character, his report on the draft being as follows: They certainly cannot march. I do not think they can shoot; some of them cannot eat, but I understand they often sleep. Of course, there are difficulties to be encountered where it is the task of the battalion to supply drafts to three battalions at the front, which are, at the particular moment, losing men every day. The draft to which I have referred, consisting of twenty men, was the only draft that could be sent out; they were the only men available in the drafting battalion. Of the 650 men in the reserve battalion half the men were rejects, men unfit for foreign service, and left behind when the other battalions went to the front. The other half consisted of raw recruits, and there were really no properly trained drafts in that drafting battalion at all. It is ancient history that the Kitchener Army was a new Army formed without a reserve, for in the early days of the War there was a rush to create new battalions of the New Army, individual action being taken, and committees being formed, all patriotically inclined to raise battalions, with the result that battalion after battalion was raised without anything being done for reserve at all. Hon. Members know that a drastic method was adopted, and that the Kitchener Army was divided into Kitchener Armies 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5; and in regard to the Kitchener Army 4, it was transferred into the Reserve, and all its battalions became drafting battalions. I need hardly remind the House of the disappointment which was caused to many officers who were commanding the units in this fourth Army, for naturally they were expecting to be at the front in a few months. Many a gallant officer was disappointed at that time.
What I want to impress upon the Committee is that a drafting battalion is a drafting battalion and is not a battalion for Home defence. The two are totally different, but there is a general inclination to mix them together, and that, to my mind, is the main cause of the trouble which has arisen. I remember very well that one morning I was asked to inspect a draft of men sent to this particular drafting battalion. It was a draft of forty men, many with one eye some with only one eye and the other very bad; some lame; one I called forward, as he appeared to me to be the only well-set-up man fit to go to the front, had one leg shorter than the other. Such men as these ought not to be in the drafting battalion, where they are totally out of place. Some few days after another draft of recruits was sent, and I was asked by the senior officers of the unit to address them. They were paraded, and I told them that they would have to learn the duties of a soldier, as in a very few weeks they would find themselves in the trenches alongside their comrades, and fighting for their country. The sergeant-major touched me on the shoulder and, begging my pardon, informed me that the men I was addressing were only for Home service, and not one of them for foreign service. I asked why they were sent to a drafting battalion which had to train recruits for service at the front. He answered me, "If you do not know, I do not know." These men were only fit for garrison service, and yet they were all dumped down on this drafting battalion. Of course, amid all these difficulties, we have to keep trying to train enough recruits to feed three battalions actively engaged at the front. Recruits now can only be given a few weeks' training—I will not say how many weeks, but only a few—in which to learn them the trade of a soldier, to form fours, to use the rifle, to shoot, to bayonet, and to bomb. All that has to be done in a few weeks, though ordinarily it should take at least a year. It is positive cramming, all done in a short time.
So long as that is the case, the recruit, when intended for service abroad, ought not to be detached from his training for anything whatsoever. Mark what happens. If the recruits find their way into one of those battalions where part of the work is garrison work and part the training of recruits for the front—if they get into one of those half-and-half battalions, in the case of a great many of them their time, which ought to be devoted to the bayonet, to learning to shoot, and to bombing, and so forth, is, as a matter of fact, occupied in garrison duty, while young recruits, who have never fired a shot out of a rifle, are put to guard very important posts, where they might have to use the rifle which they do not know how to handle; other recruits are put on picket guard on the country roads. Each recruit ought to be kept to the work which is to fit him for service at the front in the few weeks which are allowed for his training. I submit that you must differentiate wholly between the recruit who is intended only for garrison service at home and the young soldier who is fit for active service, and who has only a few weeks in which to cram all his training for the front. You must put the soldier who is going to serve at the front in the training camp, and you must put the soldier who is intended only for Home service in a garrison town. Until you do that you will undoubtedly have a great deal of waste. I have alluded to the number of men who are rejects and left behind. In a great many places they are not worth keeping in the Army at all—men who are lame, or have only one eye, or have very bad varicose veins, or flat feet, and things of that sort. I submit that it would be better to get these men out of the Army as soon as possible, and put them into the Military Reserve, if you like. If we were any other nation except what we are, such men would be at once employed in munition work or railway work. We should try to make it easier to get these men out of the Army, and not to waste money on them. I am convinced if the Secretary of State for War will consider these two or three points which I have raised we will get better value for our money than has been obtained so far.
Since I became a Member of this House I have not, as hon. Members are aware, frequently interposed in its Debates, and I would not have intervened on this occasion had it not been that I feel impelled to do so by the criticisms which have been offered by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee. For some time there has been a cry for an effective Opposition in this House. I think the contribution which he made in the Debate this afternoon is worthy of the very closest attention of the Government. He dealt with the Army in the field, and how it could be much better organised and more efficiently displayed, and with the Army at home. On that, point, as one who has been fortunate enough—shall I say?—to see actual fighting and to have run certain risks, I have felt for some considerable time that the organisation of the Forces at home needs some attention. To the civilian mind it is a disturbing feature to see on every station platform and almost at every country lane and street soldiers walking about with evidently nothing much to do and having a very fine time of it. I think as a layman that something ought to be done if we ever intend to make this projected onslaught, this great effort which is to be made, and it seems to me we have sufficient men at our command to set about this particular work. The right hon. Gentleman pointed out some of the mistakes and deficiencies the Government had displayed, and in fact suggested to me from his remarks that the Government did not feel the responsibility they ought to feel in the conduct of this War. Nobody ought to feel more the gravity and seriousness of the military and civil situation than those on the Government Bench. When we are talking of their inefficiencies and incapacities and blunders such as are sometimes alleged, we ought to say to ourselves at the same time—what is the alternative? Have you the men to put in their place more capable of doing so? I believe that those who criticise the Government or its mistakes should be prepared with the substantial alternative. The hon. and gallant Gentleman who spoke last went into a great many details about the training of troops, but it seemed to me that his remarks would be more appropriate addressing troops than this House unless he was making the point that we were not doing what we ought to do in a scientific and organised manner to prevent waste in the subject of which he was speaking.
I rose to emphasise one point made by the hon. Member for Stockport (Mr. Wardle). Notwithstanding differences among the Members of the Labour party—and there have been acute differences, as the House will have observed—my hon. Friend was absolutely correct when he said that on any of the Votes that had been brought before the House with regard to the financial supply for the Army and other military necessities, that there had never been an attempt to discountenance anything that came forward in that respect, but that the party unanimously supported those Votes of Credit as they came forward. On that point, I think, there has been absolute unanimity in the Labour party. The hon. Member for East Clare (Mr. Lynch) made a gratuitous and uncalled-for attack upon the Minister for War. I am sure that the Minister for War feels the seriousness and great responsibility of his task, and that it is not possible to conduct it without making mistakes. He does not, I am sure, and I hope no one in this House does, claim to be infallible. Mistakes and inefficiencies are associated with us all. I have always said and believed that forty years' preparation needed some competing with, and that is what we are too apt to forget. The working classes of this country are bearing their share of the burdens of this War in a way which deserves the acknowledgment of the Government and of this House. I believe they are prepared still to bear the burden and do their duty in this great time of trouble. Some of us have visited the great works of this country and spoken to the men as to the necessity of putting their whole life and energy into the work for the larger output of the necessities of war. We have found that very much good has been done by those efforts, and the acknowledgments made yesterday by the Minister of Munitions when he called us together were ample reward for all of us, especially when we found that there was such a large increase in the output of munitions by reasons of those efforts and the efforts of the Ministry itself.
I think when criticisms are offered like those of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee that they are entitled to an answer, and no doubt in due course an answer will be forthcoming. I have only voted once against the Government since I came here, and I hope I am not going to have—shall I say?—the personal annoyance of having to vote against them again, but if they deserve it I hope I shall have courage enough to do so. Those who say that Ministers are in the habit of making mistakes should substantiate and prove their case. The hon. Member for East Clare did not advance a single argument to substantiate his attack on the Minister for War. I think hon. Members ought to realise that the Government are doing their best and they ought to uphold the Government in everything they are trying to do for the successful prosecution of the War. Nobody would suggest that they do not desire, and that they are not seeking by every means in their power, to secure complete victory over our enemies. I have had the opportunity of travelling in most of the towns and cities of Germany, and I know German life among the working classes and can pretty well judge of their feelings at present. Anyone who has been in direct touch with German industrial life and who comes forward and tells me that the British workman could live as well under German rule as under British rule is a stranger to the truth, or, at any rate, is pulling the truth to pieces. I think we ought to do everything we can as Labour representatives to stimulate the working men of this country to believe that their liberty is simply given to them and to the fact that the State is their great protector, and that therefore that which the State has given to them they should seek to do all that they can to preserve and maintain and uphold. I am a truce Member; I follow a very excellent colleague and friend, and I hope that I shall do my best, like him, to win the confidence and sympathy of the House.
Question put, and agreed to.
Supply considered in Committee.
[MR. MACLEAN in the Chair.]
SUPPLEMENTARY VOTE OF CREDIT, 1916–17.
Resolved, "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £300,000,000, be granted to His Majesty, beyond the ordinary Grants of Parliament, towards defraying the Expenses which may be incurred during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1917, for General Navy and Army Services in so far as specific provision is not made therefor by Parliament; for the conduct of Naval and Military Operations; for all measures which may be taken for the Security of the Country; for assisting the Food Supply, and promoting the Continuance of Trade, Industry, Business and Communications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk, the financing of the purchase and re-sale of foodstuffs and materials, or otherwise; for Relief of Distress; and generally for all expenses, beyond those provided for in the Ordinary Grant of Parliament, arising out of the existence of a state of war."—[ Mr. Montagu. ]
Resolution to be reported to-morrow (Wednesday); Committee to sit again Tomorrow.
SUPPLEMENTARY VOTE OF CREDIT.
WAYS AND MEANS.
Considered in Committee.
[Mr. MACLEAN in the Chair.]
Resolved, "That towards making good the Supply granted to His Majesty for the service of the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1917, the sum of £300,000,000 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom."—[ Mr. Montagu. ]
Resolution to be reported To-morrow; Committee to sit again To-morrow.
BRITISH NORTH AMERICA BILL.
Read a second time, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House for Tomorrow.
The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.
FINANCE (EXCHANGE OF SECURITIES).
Committee to consider of authorising the Treasury to provide for the issue of new securities for the purpose of the exchange of securities issued under any War Loan Act passed during the continuance of the War and for the cancellation of the securities received in exchange in pursuance of any Act of the present Session dealing with Finance.—( King's Recommendation signified. )—To-morrow.—[ Mr. Gulland. ]
Whereupon Mr. SPEAKER, pursuant to the Order of the House of the 22nd February, proposed the Question, "That this House do now adjourn."
Question put, and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at Five minutes after Eight o'clock.