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Commons Chamber

Volume 93: debated on Wednesday 16 May 1917

House of Commons

Wednesday, May 16, 1917

Private Business

Local Government (Ireland) Provisional Orders Bill,

Read the third time, and passed.

Electric Lighting Provisional Orders Bill,

"To confirm certain Provisional Orders made by the Board of Trade under the Electric Lighting Acts, 1882 to 1909, relating to Epsom Rural District (Extension), Featherstone, Garforth, Horbury, Otley, Penistone, and Rawdon," presented by Mr. GEORGE ROBERTS; read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills and to be printed.

Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction for Ireland

Copy presented of Sixteenth Annual General Report of the Department for the year of 1915–1916 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

Public Trustee

Copy presented of Ninth General Annual Report of the Public Trustee [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

Representation of the People Bill

Copy presented of the Appointment of Commissioners for the Representation of the People Bill, Redistribution of Seats, Boundary Commission (England and Wales) [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

Ireland

Copy presented of Letter from the Prime Minister regarding Ireland [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

Oral Answers to Questions

War

Royal Navy

Royal Indian Marine Officers

asked the Secretary of State for India whether, considering that the status of Royal Indian Marine officers is senior to officers of the Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve of equivalent relative rank, and that the officers of the last two Services receive commissions bearing the King's Royal Sign Manual, commissions bearing the King's Royal Sign Manual may now be similarly granted to officers of the Royal Indian Marine?

I am in communication with the Admiralty on this subject and can in the meantime make no statement.

His Majesty's Ship "Cornwallis."

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, in view of the lapse of time, whether he can state if a court-martial was held as to the loss of the battleship His Majesty's ship "Cornwallis" on the Mediterranean station; and, if so, what was the verdict?

A court-martial was held on the 16th January last for the trial of the captain and the surviving officers and crew. The Court found that no blame attached to any of them.

Was the question gone into as to the order which the "Cornwallis" received to proceed to a certain square in the Mediterranean without escort, and that there she was met by German submarines?

Coast Watch Patrol

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he can state the cost of the coast watch patrol per mile per day; and whether those in charge of stretches of coast line are mainly drawn from the retired list of the Navy?

The approximate cost of the coast watch patrol—which it will, of course, be understood is a land patrol, and must not be confused with the work of patrolling the coast sea-wise—is at the present time about 2s. per mile per day. It is made up of officers' pay and allowances, coastguard ratings pay, civilian watchers' pay, rent and fuel of watch huts, and the cost of overcoats and boots. With four exceptions, the officers in charge of stretches of the coast line are drawn from the retired list of the Navy.

His Majesty's Ships "Cressy," "Formidable," and "Hampshire."

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, in view of the failure to hold courts-martial in the case of such questionable losses of warships as the three of the "Cressy" class, the "Formidable," the "Hampshire," with Lord Kitchener on board, and of certain ships which blew up suddenly, whether he will now restore the rule invariably followed for several centuries up to the year 1907 of bringing the survivors to a court-martial whenever a warship is lost?

I can only repeat the answer given on 10th November, 1915, to my hon. and gallant Friend by the present Foreign Secretary, then First Lord of the Admiralty, to the effect that the tradition of the Navy is that whenever a ship is lost a court-martial should be held on the survivors, and that we desire to adhere to the spirit of that tradition as far as public interests and the conditions of modern naval warfare will allow.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that since that answer was given there have been many cases of lost ships like the "Hampshire" in which no court-martial has been held; and does the Admiralty propose to hold courts-martial in those cases at some future dates?

The last part of the question I cannot answer, and I cannot go beyond the reply I have already given.

I beg to give notice that either to-day, or by arrangement on the Adjournment for the Whitsuntide holiday, I will draw attention to this subject.

Why was it only an inquiry into the case of the "Hampshire" and not a court-martial; and was the evidence at the inquiry not taken on oath?

The evidence was not taken on oath. The reason why it was not a court-martial was given at the time, and also the results of the inquiry.

Zeebrugge

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the officers responsible for the policy which delayed a sustained naval and air offensive at Zeebrugge are the same who were responsible for directing the recent bombardment of that enemy base?

The hon. Member appears to be endeavouring to develop, in the form of a question, an argument based upon an entirely erroneous premise. It is incorrect to assume that there has been any change in the policy.

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman to answer my question in so far as it refers to whether there has been a change in the command that has affected the Naval Air Service operations abroad?

It is incorrect to assume, as the hon. Member now does again, that there has been any change in policy.

I said that there has been no change so far as I know. If the hon. Gentleman wants the matter further elaborated, he must give me notice.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that the late First Lord of the Admiralty stated in this House that he refused to make a naval bombardment of Zeebrugge?

Air Services

Armed Seaplanes (Food Ship Protection)

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he will consider the immediate construction of a number of armed seaplanes, specially designed for flying in rough weather at a slow speed and low altitude, for the purpose of meeting in-coming food ships within a given radius and convoying them into British ports?

We have already seaplanes which are capable of undertaking the work which my hon. and gallant Friend suggests, and, in point of fact, have undertaken it as opportunity has arisen.

Will the right hon. Gentleman consider the advisability of having regular trade routes for these particular machines to meet these boats, and not leave it to chance?

I think the hon. Member may well leave this to those who have the work in hand.

Royal Flying Corps (Captain Ball)

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he has any information as to the fate of Captain Ball, D.S.O., Royal Flying Corps; and will he say what type of machine he was flying at the time he was reported missing?

I am sorry to say that the War Office has no further information about the fate of this gallant officer. It is not considered desirable to mention the type of machine which he was using.

Is it not a fact that this officer requested continually not to be forced to cross the line on this particular type and design of machine, and that the forty-two German machines he brought down were in nearly every case with a privately-designed machine, and the first time he was sent over on this other type he was lost?

I can scarcely believe that could be true. I know that this gallant officer never questioned any orders that were given.

Will the hon. Gentleman make inquiries into the allegations made by the hon. Member (Mr. Billing)?

Because this gallant officer would not refuse to obey any orders, should we not be the more careful not to give him bad orders?

I understand that no complaint has ever been received of him ever having had bad orders.

Commercial Aeronautics

asked the Prime Minister whether it is proposed to include in the new Air Committee, formed to consider the development of our Air Services for mail and commercial purposes after the War, representatives from recognised aeronautical and commercial institutions; and, if so, what steps are being taken to this end?

The Prime Minister has asked me to answer this question. The composition of this Committee, which will be announced at an early date, will, I think, be found to be fully representative for the purpose of considering, in all their aspects, the questions involved in the reference.

Military Service

Indian Army

asked the Secretary of State for India whether he can now state what are the better rates of pay to be granted to officers of the Indian Army wounded or on sick leave from field service; and, if not, what is the cause of the delay?

I am awaiting a reply to proposals made to the War Office, and until I receive it can make no statement.

I am unable to say. I must be responsible for only my own Department.

Conscientious Objectors

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War if the military authorities gave any instructions that the finger-prints of Mr. Coult, a conscientious objector who was tried at Pontefract Police-court and handed over to the military, should be taken?

I have no information as to this case, and there are hardly sufficient details at present to enable me to inquire. If my hon. Friend will give me more particulars and the date I will call for a report.

Will the hon. Member inform the House whether finger-prints of Members of the present Government have yet been taken?

Am I to understand that finger-prints have been taken in this case and that this practice is being carried out?

I am not sure that it is being carried out, but I will make inquiries and tell the hon. Gentleman later on.

asked the Prime Minister whether some Government employés, much against their wishes, are compelled to work in the same room as conscientious objectors; and, if so, whether he will have this arrangement altered?

There are three cases in which Civil servants sit as supervisors in rooms occupied by conscientious objectors, and no complaint has been received from any of these officers. I am not aware of any other cases.

asked the Home Secretary whether Mr. A. Chappell and Mr. Ernest Rudman, conscientious objectors, have been moved from Mutley Prison, Plymouth, to Exeter Prison, handcuffed and in chains; and, if so, will he explain why this treatment is applied to conscientious objectors?

As eight prisoners, including these two, were being removed at the same time, the light chains, which are worn to prevent escape, were used.

Has the hon. Gentleman's attention been drawn to a cable from Petrograd saying that one of the reasons why the Russian democracy is turning against this country is — [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"]

Royal Field Artillery (Gunner C. Sim)

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War, whether he can now state the result of his inquiries into the case of Gunner Charles Sim, No. 193261, Royal Field Artillery?

A report has just been received, but I have not yet had an opportunity of looking into it. I will do so as soon as possible and communicate with my hon. Friend on the matter.

Medical Examinations

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether, in the case of a man who voluntarily submits himself for medical examination before the expiration of the year, provided for in Section 1 (4) of the Military Service (Review of Exceptions) Act, and is found to be unfit for military service, he will forthwith receive discharge from liability for service under this Act?

Owing to the present very great pressure on the medical boards it is impossible to set up at present a system of anticipatory medical examinations in connection with the Military Service (Review of Exceptions) Act. It is hoped, however, as soon as may be, to afford facilities for men who desire to be medically examined in advance of the date on which, under the Act, they would be liable to be called up for re-examination, and where under such authorised anticipatory medical examination, a man is found to be permanently and totally disabled for military service, he will receive a final discharge in accordance with provisions of the Act.

Farmers

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether the West Riding War Agricultural Committee have drawn the attention of the War Office to the case of Frank Taylor Hind and Fred Vincent Hind, farmers, of Selby, who have been called up for military service; and whether, in view of the importance of food production for national safety, he will take steps for the release of these men?

Full inquiry was made into these cases before the men were called up for service. The report received was to the following effect: Frank Taylor Hind was joint tenant along with two brothers, William and Sydney, of Moss Farm, extending to 102 acres, although in his application for exemption he stated that he was sole tenant of 51 acres of the farm. Frederick Vincent Hind was joint owner along with two brothers, Frank and Sydney, of Thorpe Lane Farm, extending to 55 acres, although in support of his application for exemption he stated that he was the sole owner of the farm. In both cases the applications for exemption were dismissed by the local tribunal, and their decisions were affirmed by the Appeal Tribunal. The tribunals, which are mainly composed of practical agriculturists of large experience, were satisfied that after calling these men to the Colours there would be sufficient supervision and labour on the farms, and the agricultural representative on the Leeds Appeal Tribunal issued a written note to that effect.

Military Representatives

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether the War Office have recently appointed a number of barristers and solicitors over military age to commissions for special duties as military representatives; and whether the pay granted in these cases is £250 per annum and 15s. per day allowances, whereas the pay of the ordinary military recruiting officers as captains in the Army is £205 per annum and 4s. 9d. a day allowances?

It is frequently necessary to appoint civilians to temporary commissions for recruiting duties. They are usually given the rank of lieutenant. Some of these officers have been detailed to act as military representatives, but they receive no extra emoluments in respect of this duty. The total pay and allowances of a lieutenant amount to £233 per annum, of a captain to £310. I do not know of any cases of pay at the rate quoted in my hon. Friend's question.

Are we to take it that the pay is just the same whether they are permanent officers or not?

Cases Under Inquiry

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he will have full investigation made into the case of William Anderson, of 41, Well Lane, Sheffield; whether he is aware that this soldier was discharged as medically unfit for further service, on 30th July, 1903, from the 3rd Coldstream Guards, after serving two years and 351 days; that on the outbreak of war he offered his services on six different occasions and was refused each time on medical grounds; that he voluntarily attested on 19th January, 1916, and, on being examined, was found to be totally unfit for any category of military-service; that he was recalled for medical examination on 19th January, 1917, and passed B 3; and that he received his calling-up papers for 2nd February and was compelled to leave his work, although he was actually at the time on the panel and had his doctor's letter stating him to be unfit; whether he is aware that this man was placed on the substitution scheme and was sent home again as they refused to enrol him; that he reported again in a month's time and again was refused for substitution work; and that, although he asked to be put back into his medical category, this was refused, so that he was unable to do soldiers' work and unable to get his discharge papers so as to be perfectly free to take up light industrial employment; whether he can state what financial provision was made for the man, his wife, his mother, and his three children during this time; and what action has now been taken concerning him?

My hon. Friend has been in communication with my Noble Friend the Secretary of State about this man. The latest information in the War Office is that he was working with Messrs. A. Anderson and Sons. Before I can give any further answer it will be necessary to make further inquiries, and I will inform my hon. Friend of the result.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War if he will state why Private E. H. Moore, No. T.R.5/45,314, A Company, 81st Training Reserve Battalion, Low Fell, Gates-head-on-Tyne, who enlisted on a motor transport, Army Service Corps, but was compulsorily transferred to another service, has not been permitted to join his own Territorial Regiment, the 12th Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, stationed at Finner Camp, Ireland, although his application has been before the War Office since 6th April; and why this man is obliged to wear a conscript badge, seeing that he enlisted voluntarily in Ireland?

I am making inquiries about this case, and will inform my hon. Friend of the result as soon as possible. I am not quite clear to what the reference is in the last part of the question.

Timber Workers (Scotland)

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether a report has been called for from the Scottish Members of the Advisory Committee to the Director of Timber Supplies on the effect upon the output of Home Timber of calling up men employed as engine men, saw millers and hauliers, and if not, whether such a report will be called for and temporary exemption granted until the report has been received and considered?

I understand that no special report has so far been called for from the Scottish Advisory Committee, but the one member of that Committee who is specially concerned with the production of home-grown timber has been in consultation with the Department of Timber Supplies on the subject of recruitment. With regard to the last part I am hoping that I may be in a position to give my hon. and gallant Friend further information to-morrow.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the timber trade are firmly convinced that if these requirements are made upon them they will be wholly incapable of meeting the extraordinary demands for timber that are now made upon them for military purposes?

As my hon. Friend knows, the War Cabinet decided that all men under a certain age should be called up, and as he knows, too, a further concession was made to the timber trade in Scotland that no man over twenty-three should be called up. As I stated to my hon. and gallant Friend, Colonel Stirling, the whole matter is being reconsidered, and I hope to be in a position to make a further reply tomorrow.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the War Cabinet also decided to save tonnage by increasing the cutting of home-grown timber, and has the War Cabinet ever tried to reconcile those two decisions?

Naval and Military Pensions and Grants

Weekly Allotment

asked the Secretary to the Admiralty what ratings are included in the official estimate that the average weekly allotment of the men of the Fleet amounts to about 12s. 6d.; if he will give the maximum allotment possible to each of the main ratings; and whether the way in which the men endeavour to meet their domestic obligations is held by the Admiralty to constitute in itself a reply to the request for increased pay?

The answer to the first part of the question is that the 12s. 6d. a week was based upon the amount of allotment made by those making allotments through the Admiralty in all the ratings from boy, ordinary seaman, and stoker up to the highest grade of chief petty officer. The men making provision for their dependants by other means than the weekly allotment are not included in the calculation. Neither are the warrant officers.

As regards the second part of the question, the maximum amount that a man in any particular rating may allot depends on the actual amount of pay that he receives in that rating, but the following are typical scales:—

Appeal Tribunal

asked the Pensions Minister whether he can now give any information as to the date on which the Appeal Tribunal for men claiming pensions instead of gratuities will be set up and as to is composition?

I cannot yet say definitely when the proposed tribunal will be set up, nor has it been possible to decide who will preside over it, but I hope to obtain for this purpose the services of a retired judge. The Admiralty and War Office and the Royal Colleges of Surgeons and Physicians have each nominated a member, and these, with a representative of labour, will constitute the personnel of the Court.

Is not this far too elaborate an Appeal Tribunal to which soldiers, who are working men, will have to take their cases?

Civil Services (Directorships)

asked the Secretary of State for India whether the Regulations of his Department forbid any Civil servant or judge under his control from adding to his income by holding paid directorships of commercial or other companies either at home or in India?

Officers of the Indian Services may not without special sanction take part in the management of any company. Officials of the India Office establishment are under the same rules as other branches of the Home Civil Service.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether any of the Civil servants or judges under the control of his Department are permitted to add to their income by holding paid directorships of commercial or other companies?

All salaried public officers are prohibited from directly or indirectly being connected with any company which might bring their private interests into real or apparent conflict with their public duties, or in any way influence them in the discharge of their duties. In all cases of doubt as to the application of this regulation a public officer is required to submit the case for the Governor's decision.

Canadian Training Camps (Canteens)

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether no wet canteens are permitted by the Department of Militia in training and other camps in Canada; and if he can state whether it is the Department of Militia in Canada or the War Office who are responsible for the introduction of wet canteens into the camps occupied by Canadian troops in this country?

I have received a report on the matter, and I am informed that the Department of Militia and Defence, under the direction of Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Hughes, discontinued the wet canteens in the Militia Training Camps in Canada, but wet canteens were permitted in the permanent corps barracks. In view of the general adoption of prohibition in practically all the Canadian Provinces, I am told it is presumed that wet canteens will not be re-established. With regard to the second part of the question, it would appear from the records in charge of the Headquarters, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, that the wet canteens were first introduced in the camps occupied by the Canadian troops at Salisbury with the approval of the British Army Council, on the request of Major-General Alderson, then commanding the Canadian troops, and not at the request of the Canadian Government. I understand that this change was made in the interests of discipline.

May I ask if the introduction of these wet canteens has contributed to the physique and general morale of the men?

Leather (Boot Repairs)

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he has received communications from a number of the members of the Co-operative Boot Managers' Association asking that a number of 10-lb. to 12-lb. leather bends should be released so that they may be able to cope with the demands of their customers to have their boots repaired; and whether he proposes to take any action in the matter?

Such a communication has been received and is under consideration. I hope that a decision will be announced shortly.

May I ask that not only the position as to this particular request but the general problem of leather for repairs, particularly amongst the artisan classes, should be considered at the same time?

Military Service (Review of Exceptions) Act

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War if he will state definitely that no sailor or soldier in receipt of a pension for wounds incurred through service has been, or will be, called up for re-examination under the Military Service (Review of Exceptions) Act; and will he state what class of pensioned men have been, or will be, called up for re-examination under that Act?

The Military Service (Review of Exceptions) Act, 1917, expressly defines the limits within which notices requiring re-examination are sent to discharged soldiers or sailors. In order to avoid error, the form of notice bears on the face of it a statement that it does not apply to any officer or man who has left or been discharged from the naval or military service of the Crown in consequence of disablement if the disablement has been certified under the authority of the Admiralty or the Army Council to be the result of wounds (including injury from poisonous gas) received in battle or in any engagement with the enemy or otherwise from the enemy, or in consequence of neurasthenia or allied functional nerve disease if so certified by a special medical board to be the result of naval or military service in the present War. For a man who considers that he falls within this exclusion, a form of claim is printed on the back of the notice which is to be returned to the recruiting officer in order that inquiries may be made.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that discharged men are being called up before the statutory period allowed has elapsed?

I have no knowledge of any particular case, but if the hon. Gentleman supplies me with particulars I will inquire.

Can the hon. Gentleman say why he has avoided any reply to the question as to the number of men in receipt of pensions who have been called up?

Questions

Hay

asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office if he is yet in a position to state whether the Government intend to purchase Irish hay this season for the Army requirements?

Until the crop is known I am afraid it is not possible to state definitely what action the Department will take, but, as I have already informed the hon. Member, it will probably be necessary to purchase Irish hay this season.

Can the hon. Gentleman say whether there will be different arrangements as regards hay, both in Ireland and Scotland, than those which prevailed last year, because owing to the conditions which prevailed last year farmers are refusing to produce hay?

I think the general scheme will remain the same. I hope there may be some improvements in detail.

Has the hon. Gentleman not received representations from Scotland showing what I have stated to be correct?

I have received representations from Scotland, but I have not received representations to show that the action which farmers are taking is so widespread as the hon. Member seems to think.

Timber Supply

asked the President of the Board of Agriculture, if he will say what steps are being taken by the Home Grown Timber Committee to measure timber as and when purchased prior to passing through the saw mill and being used or sold; and what is the reason of the recent resignations and changes of personnel?

The Home Grown Timber Committee has ceased to exist. But most of its staff remains in the employment of the War Office, and, so far, no changes of importance have been made in the procedure which the Committee followed in estimating quantities and fixing values of standing timber. The general rule is that quantities are settled not by measurement but by estimation, although in some cases timber has been purchased on terms which leave payments to be determined by actual measurements taken after felling. The amount of timber purchased is checked by comparison with the out-turn of the mill in which it is converted. The recent changes of personnel affect two officers only of those who were on the staff of the Home Grown Timber Committee.

The Home Grown Timber Committee has been dissolved. The business which was done by that Committee has been transferred to the Director of Timber Supplies, a member of the War Office.

Has the Director of Timber Supplies powers in relation to the transport of timber, say, pit props and mining timber?

No, Sir. That is a matter of arrangement between the Timber Supplies Department and the other Departments concerned.

Is it not a fact that a leading railway official who was a member of the Home Grown Timber Committee resigned as he was dissatisfied with the way they carried on their business?

asked the Secretary to the Board of Trade whether, seeing that the stock of foreign imported timber in this country will soon be exhausted, and that at least a limited supply of the same is absolutely essential, he will give instructions for the withdrawal of the embargo on the importation of soft timber from Norway and Sweden, provided such be carried on neutral bottoms?

The War Cabinet has authorised the Board of Trade, in communication with the Army Council, to licence the importation of timber from the countries of Scandinavia in neutral vessels when the timber so imported will not displace cargoes of foodstuffs or certain other commodities.

Conscientious Objectors

asked the Prime Minister whether Mr. O'Reilly was requested by Mr. Strominger to transfer his services from the Metropolitan Munitions Committee to the National Health Insurance Commission (England) and was not told that he would have to supervise the work of conscientious objectors; and, if so, whether he will reconsider his decision as to refusing to offer Mr. O'Reilly other employment?

On the recommendation of the India Office Information Bureau, Mr. O'Reilly, who was then understood to be unemployed, was interviewed with a view to appointment in a temporary clerical post under the Insurance Commissioners. When it was found that he was already employed by the Metropolitan Munitions Committee he was informed that he could not be transferred without the consent of that committee. He was not requested to transfer, but voluntarily applied to be released by that committee in order to take up this employment at a higher rate of remuneration. Conscientious objectors were not at that time engaged on National Insurance duties, and no question of checking their work, therefore, arose. For the reasons I have already given, in reply to previous questions by the hon. and gallant Member, it is not proposed to offer Mr. O'Reilly other employment.

Is it not a fact that Mr. O'Reilly was asked by Mr. Strominger, an official, to transfer because the Government wished him, and is it considered just that a man who transfers his services for the benefit of the Government should be punished, turned out of his employment and refused other work because he refuses to supervise conscientious objectors when his own people are in the Army and the Navy?

The information I have given to my hon. Friend in my answer is not according to the statement he has made. My information is as I have given it.

Will the hon. Gentleman answer the question whether Mr. Strominger, an official, was the gentleman that asked Mr. O Reilly to transfer his services?

Is Mr. O'Reilly under military age or under fifty? Cannot he solve the problem by volunteering?

I do not know as to the question of age, but I think he is considerably over fifty.

Imperial Conference

asked the Prime Minister whether the Imperial Conference has considered the question of naturalisation law; and whether he can now make a statement of the Government's intentions in regard to legislation on this subject?

The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative, and it is hoped shortly to publish a Blue Book containing the proceedings of the Conference on this and other subjects. I desire to await further communications with the Dominions before making any statement on the matter.

Will the expected communications be in reply to communications from the Government?

They are as a result of the Conference. The representatives of the Dominions were not able to take action, or to recommend action, until they consulted their own authorities.

In this case and in reference to the contemplated changes in our naturalisation laws, was it borne in mind, and will it be borne in mind, that a German spy sits in this House of Commons as a Member of. Parliament under the present system of naturalisation?

All that, as a matter of fact, was before the Conference, and will be borne in mind.

Admiralty Appointments

asked the Prime Minister if an early opportunity will be given for discussion of the changes in the Board of Admiralty?

Employment Exchanges (Ireland)

asked the Prime Minister whether it is with his knowledge and sanction that Employment Exchanges in Ireland are now being used to induce workers, skilled and unskilled, to come to this country, where, after a few weeks on Government or controlled works, they are discharged without cause or notice, and twenty-eight days later, notwithstanding exemption cards, are conscripted for the Army, the Employment Exchanges in Ireland being again used to fill their places with men to be treated in a similar manner; whether all the Irishmen thus treated will be released and allowed to return to Ireland?

My right hon. Friend has asked me to reply. The statement in the question is, so far as my information goes, absolutely unfounded.

Eastern Front (Russian and German Forces)

asked the Prime Minister whether he can give this House any information as to the conditions prevailing between the Russian and German troops on the Eastern Front?

There is nothing to add to the official communiqués which are issued daily by the Russian General Headquarters.

Are the Government in a position to contradict the statement in the Press that German and Russian troops are fraternising on the Eastern Front?

Miners' Federation (President's Speech)

asked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been called to a speech made by Mr. Smillie, president of the Miners' Federation, at Newcastle, on Saturday, in which he stated that the Government could be moved if the people showed themselves united, but if it would be moved why should they not do what the Russian people had done, and added that the revolution took place owing to official shortage of food; will he say whether any action has been taken against Mr. Smillie; and, if not, whether the Government will protect the public from the operations of food gamblers?

The answer to the first and third parts of the question is in the affirmative, and to the second in the negative.

I beg to give notice that I shall raise this question on the Consolidated Fund Bill to-day.

Mercantile Marine (Decorations)

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether officers and men of the mercantile marine mho are not members of the Royal Naval Reserve are eligible for the decorations of D.S.C. and D.S.M. as a reward for bravery and resource in endeavouring to save their vessels when attacked by the enemy?

Yet, Sir. Officers and men of the mercantile marine, whether they are members of the Royal Naval Reserve or not, are eligible for the naval decorations of D.S.C. and D.S.M. in recognition of their unexampled zeal and devotion to duty shown in carrying on the trade of the country during the War. A number of these decorations have already been conferred.

Can the hon. Gentleman say, in regard to these decorations, whether his Department or the Admiralty will recommend the officers to receive them?

British Trade Corporation

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he can undertake that the British Trade Corporation will not be allowed to begin business until its charter has received the approval of the House of Commons?

Do I understand, then, that the Corporation has already begun business before the authority of the House of Commons has been obtained?

The hon. Member will have a full chance of discussing the matter to-morrow.

If the hon. Gentleman cannot give an undertaking to the House of Commons how is it that an official or a member of the Ministry could give authority to a corporation outside the House to commence business?

I have given no authority; but the matter can be fully discussed to-morrow.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if the charter granted to the British Trade Corporation will give to it anything like a monopoly in any part of the world, or if other reputable banks or trading corporations having similar objects and complying with the same conditions will also be granted similar charters, if they so desire, either for the whole world or for this or other specified country or countries?

My right hon. Friend has asked me to reply to this question. The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative. As regards the second part of the question, any applications for Royal Charters which may be received from other banks or trading corporations will be dealt with on their merits.

Petrol Supplies

asked the Prime Minister whether he will consider the possibility of bringing under the survey of a single authority any restrictions on the horse-power and the petrol supply of persons requiring means of transit for the discharge of the duties of local government, so as to avoid the risk of their complete demobilisation by the independent action of separate authorities?

The Prime Minister has asked me to reply to this question. The hon. Member may rest assured that the need for maintaining, as far as possible, The necessary facilities for the discharge of the duties of local government and of other public services will not be lost sight of.

Can my hon. Friend say whether the Government are willing to deal with this question systematically by arrangement with the Association of Municipal Corporations, the County Councils, and the other local authorities, so that these may not be fettered by the inconsistent action of the different authorities, and in order that those who have local government work to do may know authoritatively that they can get the means to do it?

Munitions

Workers' Holidays

asked the Prime Minister if his attention has been drawn to the period which has elapsed since the munition and other war workers have had any holiday or change from their work; and, seeing that their health and the quality of their work will suffer if they continue to work through this summer and next winter, will he in concord with the various departments, arrange that each factory shall close for a period of ten days during July, August, or September, and arrange that the workmen and work-women will be encouraged by special trains, to be run for them alone, to take holidays at the seaside and get a change to enable them to do better work afterwards?

I have been asked to reply to this question. I would point out that, in accordance with the decision of the Government there was no interference with the Easter and corresponding spring holidays, except in the case of individual establishments whose output was urgently required. It has recently been announced that a similar course is to be adopted in regard to the forthcoming Whitsun holidays. My right hon. Friend is carefully considering the whole position, but my hon. Friend will realise that the two controlling factors are the military situation in France and the difficulties of railway transport at home.

I am sorry that the Prime Minister could not answer; but I should like to ask, does not the hon. Gentleman consider that the increased efficiency which would follow from the holiday would more than make up for the actual loss of the particular time?

I thoroughly agree with the general statement, but it is obviously bound to be controlled by the two factors I have mentioned.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the Admiralty have taken off the usual vessels running on the Clyde. Will he see that that is put right?

Munitions Inventions Department

asked the Minister of Munitions whether a percussion grenade asked for by the War Office about eighteen months ago has yet been supplied to the Army; whether a percussion grenade submitted to the Munitions Inventions Department in February, 1916, has been put to the severest and most exhaustive tests by the Inventions Department since that time with most satisfactory results; whether he is aware that this grenade has been tested at two bombing schools and that the chiefs of these schools have made most satisfactory reports upon it, the report of one of them stating that its mechanism was perfect; whether he is aware that the scientific expert of the Department has declared its great superiority over any other percussion grenade and stated that it fulfils all the conditions laid down by the War Office; whether this grenade has been condemned by the Designs Department on only two tests made by a subordinate officer; whether the Designs Department recommended another percussion grenade which has proved to be a failure; and, in view of these facts and of the urgency and importance of providing a percussion grenade that will be safe to the throwers and otherwise effective, he will have the matter impartially inquired into without further delay?

It would not be in the public interest to give a detailed reply to this question, but I cannot be taken to admit the accuracy of the statements made by my hon. Friend. I may say, however, that certain defects were found in connection with the grenade referred to by my hon. Friend, but efforts are being made to remedy them. No grenade, however, can be passed for service which is not found acceptable to the Army in the field.

Is it not a fact that this invention has been highly recommended months ago by your own Investigation Department?

Will the Inventions Board ever use or accept anything practical or anything of any use?

I beg to give notice that I will raise this question again at the earliest possible opportunity.

Labour Disputes

asked the Minister of Munitions whether, in view of the importance of public opinion in the settlement of labour troubles, he will direct that the utmost publicity shall be in the future given in the early stages to disputes between employers and workmen in this country during the War?

The question of publicity with regard to the various phases of the labour situation is engaging the serious attention of the Government.

That is precisely one of those questions in which it is impossible to lay down hard and fast rules applicable to all circumstances at all times.

Has the hon. Gentleman's attention been called to the statement made by the Minister of Labour that when representatives of the strikers sought to interview him he announced that he would refuse to see them, and are these Prussian methods likely to promote harmony, as they close up the legitimate means of redressing grievances?

The hon. Gentleman is in error. What my right hon. Friend refused to do was to meet men who came to him without the authority of properly constituted trade unions.

Will the hon. Gentleman take care that Ministerial statements with regard to labour troubles in future are accurate, so as not to give the impression that Ministers take sides against the men?

Controlled Establishments (Bonus to Clerks)

asked whether, in view of the importance of preventing any feeling of injustice in the minds of all classes of war workers, he will award the same war bonus to clerks and others employed in controlled works as that recently granted to railway clerks?

My right hon. Friend sympathises fully with the position of the clerks in controlled establishments, and since the recent general award of the Committee on Production in the Engineering and Foundry Trades, has sanctioned very many proposals to extend that award, or to make corresponding advances, to the clerical staff. But at present he has no power to order the payment of such a war bonus. The proper course for the clerical staff is to come to an agreement with their employers—as has been done generally—or failing agreement, to apply for arbitration.

Munitions Act Amendment Bill

asked the Minister of Munitions, inasmuch as the interests of women workers may be affected by the Munitions Act Amendment Bill now before the House, whether any woman representative of organised labour has been appointed to sit on the consultative Committee now considering the Amendments to the Bill; and, if not, whether he will take steps to, ensure the appointment of a woman representative of organised labour?

The Committee to which the reference is made by the Noble Lord was not set up by my right hon. Friend, but by the unions themselves with which he conferred last Friday on the labour situation. The members of the Committee were nominated and elected by that conference. I have already explained to the representative of the women workers that I should be willing to consider any proposals for Amendments from any representatives of women workers.

Women Workers

asked the Minister of Munitions whether he is aware that a notice has been posted in the premises of Messrs. Strachan and Henshaw, Whitehall Ironworks, Bristol, asking whether the women are by slacking going to allow their husbands and brothers to be slaughtered for want of shell; and, seeing that the women workers resent this imputation, whether, to promote good feeling between employers and employed, he will direct the notice to be removed?

My attention has already been called to the action of this firm in posting the notice referred to in their works. I have inquired into the matter, and find that the local representative of the Ministry of Munitions has on three separate occasions remonstrated with the firm, but that they refuse to remove the notice. I have no power to compel the firm to remove the notice complained of, but I cannot too strongly deprecate action of this nature, which seems likely to give offence to women workers who are rendering most valuable service to the country at the present time.

Income Tax

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether his attention has been called to the demands by surveyors of taxes that for purposes of Income Tax and Excess Profits Duty all stocks and stores shall be taken at cost or market value, whichever is the lowest; and, looking at the fact that many traders have been in the habit of taking their stocks and stores below cost price or market value, whether any determination has been arrived at as to dealing with the surplus values of such stocks and stores now created, looking at the fact that part of the surplus arises prior to the War, part in the period when 50 per cent. Excess Profit Duty is payable, part in the period when 60 per cent. Excess Profit Duty is payable, and part in the period when 80 per cent. Excess Profit Duty is payable; and there are also differences as regards the appropriation of values in the cases of controlled companies as respects their periods of assessments; and if he will consider a general principle that manufacturers shall be at liberty to charge against excess profits sums necessary to reinstate stocks to the pre-war level of each company?

Having regard to the variety and complexity of the circumstances affecting the valuation of traders' stocks and stores, I fear that it is impossible to deal with the questions raised by my hon. Friend within the limits of a Parliamentary reply, but if he will bring to my notice any particular case of hardship I will have inquiry made.

Trade (Financial Facilities)

asked the President of the Board of Trade when the evidence taken before the committee appointed to investigate the question of financial facilities to trade will be published?

Is it really proposed to ask the House of Commons to give a decision in this matter without any evidence whatever?

My right hon. Friend will find full evidence in the charter. I have never been previously asked for this. It is purely a question of economy that the evidence has not been published.

Is it not the case that the Government intend to ignore the House of Commons in this matter altogether?

Coal (Supplies for London)

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether the Coal Controller has yet considered the steps to be taken for supplying and storing sufficient stocks of coal in London for the next winter season; and, in view of the experience of last winter, will he at once arrange a conference with the London County Council and the borough councils so as to take immediate action in order to prevent a repetition of the distress of last winter in London owing to the scarcity of coal?

The Controller of Coal Mines is considering this question fully, and proposes to communicate with the local authorities when his inquiries are further advanced. No time is being lost in the matter.

As we are in the month of May, is there any chance of anything being done in connection with the coal supply around London?

Kitchener Memorial Fund

asked the right hon. Member for the Osgoldcross Division, as representing the Charity Commissioners, whether he is aware that the committee of the Kitchener National Memorial Fund consisted of three persons, one of whom, the Duke of Norfolk, is now deceased, while another, the Duke of Devonshire, is now Governor-General of Canada; and whether, in these circumstances, he will consider the expediency of the committee being reconstituted and enlarged?

The hon. Member is under a misapprehension as to the constitution of the committee of the fund referred to. The Regulations made by the Charity Commissioners, and approved by the Secretary of State, under the provisions of the War Charities Act, 1916, require that the register of every registered charity shall contain, inter alia, the names, addresses, and descriptions of the chairman and two other members of the Committee. The entry of three names only in the register does not therefore imply that the Committee consists of not more than three members. In the case of the fund referred to, the committee or council at present consists of forty-one persons.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I have taken my information from the official paper placed in my hands, and would it not be desirable that some other members—acting members—of the Committee should take the place of those three, one of whom is deceased, and the other cannot act.

Those three names are really only given as a matter of form, and I have ascertained there are twelve or fifteen attending.

In case of persons desiring to know through this register who are important members of this Committee, would it not be desirable to have the names of persons who are actually acting, in view of the great importance felt by all persons concerned with war pensions work of knowing how far the Kitchener War Memorial Fund can help, and to whom to apply with regard to it?

All those names are recorded in the printed paper I hold in my hand, and an application to the Commissioners will always receive a reply.

Irish Prisoners

asked the Home Secretary what steps are being taken to improve the conditions of the Irish prisoners; if he will say whether any report has been made as to the health of Countess Marckiewicz; and if he will say when she is to be released?

I have nothing to add to the previous replies which I have given to those questions except that a recent report shows that the Countess is in good health.

asked the Home Secretary, since he refuses to concede to the Countess Marckiewicz, Irish political prisoner at Aylesbury, under sentence of secret court-martial, the particular amelioration promised by his predecessor, whether he will now, after a year's exceptional punishment, allow her to be removed to an Irish prison; and, if not, in view of the small value of any work she is capable of doing, whether he will release her from it and allow her to practice drawing, painting, and writing?

The answer to both questions is in the negative. I may say, however, that my right hon. Friend has not refused anything which his predecessor promised, and that the Countess Marckiewicz is allowed facilities for drawing and writing.

asked the Home Secretary if he will state the daily diet given to the 121 Irish political convicts in Lewes Gaol before the intervention of the Food Controller, and the daily diet given to them now; whether they are allowed to allocate or exchange the articles of food among themselves to meet the requirements of different constitutions; whether, in view of the facts that their offence is political and their trial secret, supplementary food sent to them by friends will be allowed to reach them; and, if not, whether an independent doctor from America or any other Allied State will be allowed to visit Lewes Prison to study and report on the condition and treatment of these men?

The dietaries which provide different food for each day of the week are too long to be given in reply to an oral question. Prisoners are not allowed to allocate or exchange articles of food among themselves and food cannot be sent in from outside. With regard to the last paragraph of the question, I have nothing to add to previous replies on this point.

Will the right hon. Gentleman answer the paragraph before the last—whether, in view of the condition of these people, supplementary food sent in by their friends will be allowed to reach them?

Enemy Businesses

asked the Home Secretary whether any alien enemies resident in the United Kingdom are allowed to carry on business in this country; and whether his Department knows of any case in which a British subject, not a renegade, is allowed to trade in Germany?

My right hon. Friend has asked me to reply to this question. As regards the first part, the answer is in the affirmative. The statutory provisions under which Orders are made for the prohibition or winding-up of enemy businesses are those of Section 1 of the Trading With the Enemy Amendment Act, 1916. I have no precise information as to the latter part of the question, but I will make inquiry and let the hon. Member have such information as I can obtain.

Government Employes (Warbonus)

asked the hon. Member for Worcestershire (Bewdley Division), in view of the fact that the Government is regarded as the model employer, why the recent war bonus has not been granted to employés whose salaries are between £250 and £300 per annum; and whether he is aware that banking and insurance institutions as well as public bodies in general have, owing to the increased cost of living, raised the salaries of employés whose pre-war rate of remuneration was considerably over £300 per annum?

The war bonus to which the hon. Member refers was awarded by the Conciliation and Arbitration Board for Government Employés, to whom the claims made on behalf of numerous classes of Civil servants were referred by His Majesty's Government. The Board examined the whole question with great care, hearing the evidence both of the applicants and of the Government Departments concerned. Effect is being given to their award, and I am not prepared to reopen the matter by discussing its merits in any particular.

Licences Compensation Commission

asked the hon. Member for Worcestershire (Bewdley Division) whether the Licences Compensation Commission appointed for Scotland have awarded to Mr. Joseph Doyle, 401, Govan Street, Glasgow, the sum of £400 as compensation in respect of loss through the action of the Central Control Board; has this claim been laid before the Treasury; and, if so, why do they refuse or delay to pay it?

Racing (Prohibition)

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food whether, in view of the dearth of supplies of oats in many districts, he will maintain the prohibition of all racing until such time as he can assure the House that oats are available in sufficient quantities at a comparatively reasonable price for human food and for working horses?

I have nothing to add to the replies already given to similar questions on this subject.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that every public body in Ireland, irrespective of creed or politics, passed resolutions protesting against the destruction of an industry which is one of the oldest left in Ireland, namely, horse-breeding, and will he take care that the interests of the people are considered rather than the interests of faddists?

Yes, sir; I am quite aware that the Celtic race are fond of racing, but considerations of human food must take priority of racial prejudices.

In view of the statement made by the Prime Minister that there were only ten weeks' supply of cereals in this country, will he take steps to see that a portion of that food is sent to the people of Donegal?

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that for the continuance of racing in this country one single cargo of oats is sufficient; is he also aware that for the last three months ships laden with wild animals have been coming to this country; and does he think this is in the interests of this country at a time like this?

I am not aware of the arrival of wild beasts in this country. The whole matter is now under the consideration of the War Cabinet.

Was not the whole of the question whether there is a sufficient quantity of oats in this country considered before racing was definitely stopped?

Is the hon. Gentleman not aware that Lord Derby stated that this action was taken in consequence of the pressure of public opinion and not in the national interest, and can he say what was in Lord Derby's mind?

Food Supplies

Meat

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food whether his attention has been called to the increased retail prices charged by butchers for meat during last week-end in London; and whether, in view of these constant increases in retail prices and the stocks of meat held in London, he will consider as to issuing an Order to prevent wholesale or retail meat dealers from increasing their rate of profit during the remainder of the War?

I am aware that there has lately been a considerable increase in the retail price of mutton, but the price of beef does not differ materially from that which ruled a month ago. The question of controlling the supplies and prices of meat is now under the consideration of the Food Controller, in consultation with the Board of Agriculture.

Does the hon. Gentleman also know that the price of bacon has been considerably increased?

Railway Workers (Ration Orders)

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, whether he is aware of the condition attaching to the work of some classes of railway workers who, on occasions, are away from home for varying periods of several days; and whether, in making any ration orders, the Ministry will bear in mind these circumstances and make provision for men who may unexpectedly have to work away from home for longer than the usual period?

The hon. Member may rest assured that the point raised by him will be borne in mind should any compulsory system of rationing be introduced. On the Committee about to be formed to consider questions incidental to compulsory rationing, labour interests will be adequately represented.

Sugat

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food whether he has received complaints from the Long Eaton Working Men's Co-operative Society in regard to the distribution of the supplies of sugar; whether he is aware that the normal supply of 110 bags after being reduced to fifty-nine bags has now been reduced to thirty-eight bags, despite the increase in the number of munition workers; and, in view of the fact that the society will presently be unable to supply even a ¼lb. per head and the dissatisfaction being created, will he say what action he proposes to take?

The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. The reduction from 110 bags to fifty-nine was on the usual basis of 50 per cent. of the 1915 supplies. I am making inquiries as to the cause of the further reduction mentioned by the hon. Member. Long Easton is one of the districts for which the Sugar Commission have ordered additional supplies, in view of the temporary increase of population due to the influx of munition workers. It is hoped that by this action all cause for dissatisfaction will shortly be removed.

Can the hon. Gentleman say whether the Committee that was set up to investigate the better distribution of sugar has made its Report, and, if so, whether the Report will be made known?

The Committee has made its Report, and, if it is desired by the House, no doubt it can be laid on the Table. I should like to mention, in regard to sugar, that there is an abnormal shortage of sugar at the present time, and it is very difficult for the Sugar Commission to supply all the wholesalers with their usual quota.

Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman again consider my suggestion that he should suggest to the male population of these Islands the desirability of giving up the effeminate habit of having sugar in their tea?

I think that is an admirable suggestion on the part of the hon. and gallant Member and fully accords with what, no doubt, has always been his motto, "Women first."

Potatoes

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food what steps have been taken to regulate and conserve the crop of potatoes which is anticipated in order to prevent a glut, which would lead to gambling in the market and subsequent shortage?

No such steps have been taken, as it would be premature at present to decide how best to regulate and conserve the 1917 crop of potatoes until some estimate can be formed of the quantity and condition of the crop. It would be obviously ridiculous, until we know what the crop is going to be, to decide to what extent we should conserve prospective supplies.

Does not the hon. Gentleman think it advisable to act before, rather than to wait before, the gambling starts?

Pheasants

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food if his attention has been called to the conviction of Mr. William Pickering, a farmer, at Bourne, Lincolnshire, for shooting one pheasant out of seventy-four which devastated a field of peas and a field of wheat; whether he has issued the promised Order authorising the owner of agricultural land to have a current right of killing pheasants on the same lines that they have of killing ground game; and, if so, can he say how it was that Mr. Pickering was convicted and fined 10s. for so doing?

The following questions also stood on the Paper:

asked the President of the Board of Agriculture if his attention has been drawn to the case of Mr. William Pickering, a farmer, convicted at Bourne, Lincolnshire, and fined 10s. for shooting a pheasant; whether he is aware that Mr. Pickering stated that he counted seventy-four pheasants on a field of peas, the seed for which had cost him £40, and that the pheasants had spoilt a 4-acre field of wheat; and whether he will issue an Order under the defence of the Realm Act making it legal for farmers to shoot any bird or vermin which destroys prospective food which will be needed for human consumption?

asked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been called to a complaint that certain Lincolnshire magistrates have fined a farmer because he shot a pheasant which was eating the seed (peas) in his field, for which he had paid £44; whether he will make inquiries into the matter and state the facts of the case, including the names, positions, and occupations of the magistrates who decided the fine; and whether any of them and, if so, how many of them are landowners?

I will reply to these question together, by referring my hon. Friends to the answer which I gave to the right hon. Member for the South Molton Division yesterday. Inquiry is being made to ascertain the exact facts of the case.

Shipping Losses

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Shipping Controller whether the Government has any record of a vessel with a cargo of grain large enough to feed the population of Cornwall for two months being torpedoed or mined outside Bristol after having been in port, and of one or more grain vessels fully laden sunk in the English Channel after having been in port, and of another similarly lost off Land's End; and whether any steps have yet been taken to provide for the discharge of food cargoes as soon as they arrive in a British port?

I have been unable to trace any record of the loss of a vessel in the circumstances described in the first part of the question. No record can be found for some considerable time back of any vessel having been torpedoed or mined outside Bristol. I am aware of one case of a grain vessel lost in the Channel in the manner stated and of another lost off Land's End, but in the latter case the vessel had not been in port. As I have already stated in reply to previous questions, the policy indicated in the last part of the question is that which is followed wherever facilities available permit, and all practicable steps will be taken to develop those facilities.

May I ask if it is not considered very undesirable by the Government for hon. Members to mention the name of any port where a disaster or a supposed disaster is supposed to have occurred?

I am very glad my hon. and gallant Friend has asked the question. I am, of course, not desirous of concealing facts or refusing information, but I do beg of hon. Members who put questions of this sort upon the Paper to say "a certain port," and to give me privately the name of the port.

West and North Donegal

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland whether he has received reports from all the responsible officers of the Government in Ireland that a very grave state of affairs has arisen in West and North Donegal owing to the absence of food supplies; whether it is true that the stock of potatoes has run out in many districts, and that neither Indian meal nor flour can be purchased from the retail stocks or from local mills, and that unless supplies reach the district immediately famine will be imminent?

The statements in the question are of an alarmist character, which I think is not warranted by the facts. Action is being taken for the maintenance of the necessary supplies, and will continue to be taken both in this country and in Ireland.

Will the right hon. Gentleman state what the particular action is with reference to Donegal?

No, Sir. I do not think it is advisable that I should particularise the action, as that statement might, in some particulars, tend to help its defeat.

In view of the fact that the right hon. Gentleman thinks that the question is an exaggeration of the conditions that exist, has he made inquiries into the condition of the people?

Of course, I could not have given the answer if I had not made the closest possible inquiry. Two of the leading members of the Irish Executive have been in Donegal within the last ten days dealing with this matter, and I have received their reports. I speak with a sense of responsibility of a grave statement such as the hon. Member causes to be circulated in the Press. The judgment at which I have arrived is that which I have stated in a considered answer. I can assure all my hon. Friends that no step will be spared to do whatever is necessary to secure that the people in Donegal, if there is any interruption of the supplies, shall find that interruption removed, just as the interruption in the supplies of fodder, which was due to an unfortunate season, was, as the hon. Member for Donegal knows, removed quite lately on the very proper representations which all the Members for Donegal made to the Irish Government.

Will the right hon. Gentleman inform the House when supplies of food will reach Donegal? That is the question.

No, Sir I think I shall satisfy the Members for Donegal with the action I shall take.

Irish Women's Franchiseleague

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland whether it was by his direction that a memorial device displayed at the offices of the Irish Women's Franchise League in Dublin on the first anniversary of the murder of the late Mr. Sheehy Skeffington was removed by the police; and the reason for its removal and the statute under which is was done?

Questions

Deportees from Ireland

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, now that two of the Irishmen banished from Ireland last February without trial or accusation have been released without explanation, compensation, or apology, whether the order similarly banishing Dr. M'Cartan will be revoked to enable him to discharge the professional duties for which he has been elected in Ireland; what compensation Dr. M`Cartan is to be paid for losses imposed upon him for no stated reason; and whether all the deported men will now be allowed to return to their homes and business?

The orders for the residence out of Ireland of Dr. M`Cartan and others cannot at present be revoked.

Press Censorship (Ireland)

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland whether, in view of the fact that the censorship in Ireland is controlled by the Civil power, he will say where the Censor finds statutory authority for re-writing matter coming under his notice and giving it a sense opposite to that clearly conveyed by the original, as he has done with a recent letter of the Bishop of Limerick; and whether he or the Censor has yet apologised to the bishop for that alteration?

Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware of the falsified edition of the Bishop's letter published by the Press Censor?

I have answered the question. The imputation upon the Press Censor is wholly unfounded.

Will the right hon. Gentleman inform the House how he alone is not aware of a public fact?

Provisional Government, Russia

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the fact that the "Times" newspaper on the 11th April published a telegram from its Petrograd correspondent stating categorically that the Council of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, whose representatives are in the Provisional Government, desires to upset the Government and to bring about the defeat of the Russian armies and a dishonourable peace, and in view of the fact that this false statement has compelled the issue of an official denial from Petrograd and by its publication in other countries has prejudiced the position of the Provisional Government and the cause of the Allies, he proposes to take steps to suppress the foreign circulation of the "Times"?

I am informed that the statement which is referred to by the hon. Member has produced a bad impression in Petrograd. It is right, therefore, to say that' the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates has hitherto been working in cooperation with the Provisional Russian Government to maintain order, and His Majesty's Government have no reason to believe that the Council has ever favoured a dishonourable peace. His Majesty's Government do not propose to adopt the measure suggested by the hon. Member.

In view of the venomous attack made by the "Times" on the new régime, will the hon. Gentleman make inquiries in Petrograd as to the extent to which the "Times" was subsidised by the late Government by way of its special supplement?

Will the right hon. Gentleman make representations to the responsible people to see that the "Nation" is sent to Petrograd to do away with the bad effects of the circulation of the "Times" there?

Perhaps my hon. Friend will convey the suggestion to my Noble Friend himself.

Foreign Office (Officials and Directorships)

asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the Regulations of his Department permit officers or judges in its service to add to their incomes by accepting paid directorships in commercial or other companies either at home or abroad?

The Foreign Office is governed by Clause 17 of the Order in Council of January 10th, 1910, regulating the employment of persons in the Civil Service of the Crown, which provides that no officer shall be allowed to accept any part in the management of any society or any trading, commercial, industrial or financial firm or company which would require the attendance of such officer at any time between the hours of 10 a.m. and 6 p.m. Members of the paid Consular Service are similarly prohibited by the Regulations from takng any part in the promotion, direction, or registration of public companies, banking institutions, loans or mining transactions except under special permission obtained from the Secretary of State. The same would no doubt be considered applicable in the case of judges, but I am not aware of any case in which such permission has even been asked.

Are we to understand the judges under the Foreign Office are not allowed to take directorships in trading companies?

Government of Ireland

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether it would be possible for arrangements to be made for the communication alluded to yesterday as about to be addressed to the leaders of the Irish parties to be issued as a White Paper?

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House, in view of the fact that the document, which we were told yesterday would be communicated to certain Members of this House, has not been communicated, whether there has been any new change in the intentions of the Government with reference to the publication of this matter?

No, Sir. I said yesterday that it would be communicated in the course of to-day. I did not anticipate then that it could be given before this afternoon, when it will be sent to the Gentlemen to whom I referred. With regard to the question of my hon. Friend (Sir H. Craik), the Government have decided to take that course, and to put it into the hands of Members as quickly as possible, not later than to-morrow morning.

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman, to clear up some doubt that exists, whether on Monday the Prime Minister himself will state in this House the policy of the Government on the Irish question?

I said yesterday that the Prime Minister had the intention of making a statement on this subject on Monday. There is no reason to fear that it will be necessary to postpone it.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say in what form it will be brought before the House?

I have not considered that, but probably the simplest form will be for some Member to move the Adjournment of the House.

Will not the Prime Minister himself move and make his statement, or are we to understand that some other Minister will move it?

Perhaps I may be wrong. I thought the ordinary procedure was that another Minister made the Motion so that business could proceed, but if, as I believe will be the case, the Prime Minister begins, of course he will make the Motion.

Will the Government consider the advisability of releasing Mr. Joseph M'Guinness?

Representation of the People Bill

asked the Secretary for Scotland whether he is in a position to give the names of the Boundary Commissioners for Scotland under the Representation of the People Bill?

Yes, Sir. Lord Dundas and Sir James Patten Macdougall.

Lord Dundas and Sir James Patten Macdougall have been good enough to agree to serve as Boundary Commissioners in Scotland. They will replace Sir Thomas Elliott and Sir Samuel Provis upon the Boundary Commission when it proceeds to deal with redistribution of seats in Scotland.

Questions by Members

On a point of Order, Mr. Speaker. On Monday last I handed in the following question to the Table: "To ask the Prime Minister whether his attention has been called to the recent riot at Gillingham, when the premises of the International Stores, with which the name of the Food Controller is so intimately bound up, were raided and destroyed; whether any action has been taken against the rioters, and whether the Government has any information as to the reasons for this riot?" The question has been refused at the Table. Perhaps you will tell me why?

The hon. Member should ask the Watch Committee of the district. The great boast of England is its system of local self-government.

Education (Ireland)

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what amount the Treasury has allocated for increased Grants towards primary and intermediate education in Ireland corresponding to the increases towards those services in this country?

My right hon. Friend has asked me to reply to this question. I am not able to add anything to my previous answers.

I have not asked the right hon. Gentleman. I have asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer to give the amount in this case.

Prison Regulations (Underclothing)

asked the Home Secretary whether the regulations of the Prison Commissioners do not allow prisoners to have any change of underclothing for sleeping; whether prisoners are obliged to wear the same underclothing continuously day and night for a fortnight; and, if so, whether this practice has been sanctioned by the medical advisers of his Department?

Night garments are only issued to female prisoners. All prisoners are supplied with a cotton shirt, which is washed weekly. It has never been the practice to issue night garments to male prisoners, and the medical authorities of the Department do not consider any change in this respect necessary.

Should not prisoners be encouraged to maintain or acquire cleanly habits?

I understand that the prisoners are under very great obligation to keep themselves clean.

Why should not they be allowed to have a change of garments, and wash them? Will the right hon. Gentleman consider that suggestion?

Prison Warders (Ireland)

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland what action he intends to take regarding the pay of Irish prison warders; if he has any reply to make as a result of the deputation which waited on him about two months ago; whether he has fulfilled his promise to personally investigate this case during the Easter holidays; and whether he will recommend that the existing Irish prison warders will now be placed on the some footing regarding pay as the English and Scotch warders, seeing that the other conditions of service are identical?

I have investigated this case. An announcement of the result will be made with as little delay as possible.

Military Service (Conventions With Allied States) Bill

Debate on Amendment to Second Reading [15th May] to be resumed To-morrow.

Private Business

Ebbw Vale Urban District Council Bill,

Reported, with Amendments; Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.

Bill Presented

ROYAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER RESERVE BILL,— "to extend during the present War the term of service of members of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve," presented by Dr. MACNAMARA; to be read a second time To-morrow, and to be printed. [Bill 51.]

Orders of the Day

Business of the House

May I ask the Leader of the House whether he proposes to ask us to sit on Friday?

As I said yesterday, we had intended to sit on Friday, but my Noble Friend the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Edmund Talbot) tells me that the business we proposed to deal with then has a very good chance of being got through next week. In that case we shall not ask the House to sit on Friday.

When do the Government propose to take the Report stage of the Munitions of War Bill?

Can the right hon. Gentleman say when he proposes we should adjourn for Whitsun?

Consolidated Fund (No. 3) Bill

Order for Third Reading read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read the third time."

Peace Terms

I beg to move, to leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add instead thereof the words "this House welcomes the declaration of the new democratic Government of Russia, repudiating all proposals for imperialistic conquest and aggrandisement, and Balls on His Majesty's Government to issue a similar declaration on behalf of the British democracy, and to join with the Allies in restating the Allied terms in conformity with the Russian declaration."

4.0 P.M.

Since the last occasion, three months ago, when the question of peace terms was raised in Debate from these benches, two events of profound importance have occurred—the democratic revolution in Russia and the entry of America into the War. No event in our generation has so thrilled the world as the Russian Revolution. It has given us a new hope in democracy and revived our faith in Internationalism. It has given us a hope that the War aims which have been declared by the statesmen of the various countries—the maintenance of civilisation and the triumph of democracy—are going to be realised in the only way in which these ideals and aims can be realised, that is, by the peoples of the different countries. The British House of Commons, on the Motion of the Government, has passed a Resolution welcoming the Russian Revolution, and in doing so it has repudiated the old Russian order. The new Russian Government is different in all respects from the old order. It is different in its policy, in its aims, in its ideals, in its constitution, and in its personnel, and therefore if the British Government is going to maintain the Alliance with the new Russian Government it will be necessary for this Government to put itself into line with the policy of the new democratic Government of Russia. The Russian Revolution at once necessitated a declaration of a new war policy on the part of the Provisional Government, and we are raising this Debate because we desire to know from the British Government what its policy is in regard to the new condition of things in Russia. We want to know whether it regards the treaties which it made with the old order in Russia as being still binding or as having been rendered void by the Revolution which has taken place. We want to know also whether the British Government accepts the declared policy of the new Russian Government in regard to war aims.

I need say little about the character and the policy of the old Russian order. It was frankly Imperialistic. We were made publicly aware near the end of last year by a declaration made in the Russian Duma of the fact, of which some of us were fairly well convinced before, that for some time a secret compact had existed between Great Britain and Russia conceding to Russia, in the event of an Allied victory, certain territory, including the occupation of Constantinople. When that declaration was made we heard the first rumbling of the coming Revolution. It became quite evident that this frankly announced policy of Russia's Imperialistic aims in the War was not accepted by the democratic representatives in the Duma. Twelve of them were sus- pended, amongst them Kerensky, who is now a member of the Provisional Government, and the President of the Workmen's Council. We have here the real inwardness of the Russian Revolution. No doubt other factors entered into it, but the real inspiration and motive of the Russian Revolution was the objection of the democracy of Russia to the continuation of a war for Imperialist and aggressive ends. The Workmen's Council, composed of delegates of the workmen and soldiers, made the Revolution. They set up the Provisional Government. They controlled the policy of the Provisional Government. The very first thing of any international importance which the new Provisional Government did was to issue a declaration repudiating all desire of territorial acquisition and all Imperialist aims—a policy which has been summarised in the formula "no annexations and no indemnities." I will quote a short sentence from the declaration of war policy issued by the Provisional Government on 10th April last: democracies in the Alliance. There is no doubt whatever that the views of the French democracy coincide with those which have been expressed by the Russian revolutionaries. There are in France, and have been since the outbreak of the War, two sections of the French Socialist party, what is called the majority and what is called the minority. I think it is certain that what is called the minority is in reality the majority. In all their councils the vote is practically equal, and the majority get the small majority they obtain only by the votes of delegates who have no credentials and who are refugees from the invaded parts of France. But there is no difference at all, between the majority party and the minority party among the French Socialists in regard to war aims. They both, in a very remarkable manifesto, united in approving of President Wilson's declaration of a league of nations, of no domination and of no imperialistic annexation. The French minority party have taken up from the outset of the War identically the attitude of the Independent Labour Party in this country. In Italy since the outbreak of the War, or since Italy's participation in the War, the Italian socialist movement, which is particularly strong, has been saved from acute division. The Italian socialist movement is practically united in its opposition to the War. In Belgium, where the circumstances are peculiar and where one cannot naturally expect an anti-war attitude, the Belgian socialists and the Belgian labour party have also repudiated a war of imperialistic annexation, and in the same manifesto they repudiated the proposals of the Paris resolutions. They have declared for universal free trade. The Roumanian socialists have taken up an international position upon this question.

If we turn to the enemy countries we find that Bulgaria has already its socialist delegates on their way to Stockholm. In regard to Germany there have been, as we all know, divisions in the great Social Democratic party, the greatest socialist party in the world, which at the last general election polled about 5,000,000 votes—votes which I believe were more anti-militarist than dogmatically socialist. There have been divisions between them, but never about peace. There are no fundamental differences between the two parties in Germany as to the kind of peace that ought to be established at the end of this War. There are no differences between the two parties as to the urgency of that peace. We see in the papers this morning, accompanying the speech of the German Chancellor, a speech of Herr Scheidemann, the leader of the majority of the German social democrats, in which he reiterates what he has often said that there must be no annexation, and that what is French and what was French must remain French. Yesterday he made a passionate appeal for peace, and he declared that unless the German Chancellor makes a definite declaration of war aims repudiating all annexations, if in the event of France and Great Britain supporting the declaration of the Russian Provisional Government, and the German Chancellor refusing to follow, then there will be a Revolution in Germany. That I understand is a consummation which our Government have been hoping for for a long time. They have now the means of bringing about that desired Revolution. Let them accept the war policy of the democratic Government of Russia, and let France do the same, and the consequences, I can assure the right hon. Gentleman, upon Germany will be far reaching. I said there was no practical difference between the two divisions of the German social democratic party. The majority have laid down in some detail their terms of peace, which include the restitution of all conquered territory, compulsory international arbitration, the restoration of Belgium, Roumania and Serbia, the future of Russian Poland to be decided by a plebiscite—[An HON. MEMBER: "Only Russian Poland?"]—a free port for Serbia on the Adriatic, and the rectification of the frontiers of Loraine. That does not include everything that I and many others would like to see, but it is a fairly good basis on which to begin the discussion of peace terms. It is a minimum and not a maximum. I mention these facts to prove the statement I made that the position which has been taken up by the democratic Government of Russia is a position that is accepted by and particularly endorsed by the democracies of all the belligerent countries. Just as the late Russian Government did not represent the views and desires of the Russian people, so those Governments which are pursuing a different war policy, whether they be Governments of the alliance or Governments of the Central Powers, are not representing the will and desire of the peoples of their respective countries.

The Revolution came first in Russia, but it will not stop there. If our Government's Secret Service information is good, they know better than I can tell them that in one of the countries of the Alliance the people are on the verge of revolution to-day. I repeat, that the revolution will not stop with Russia. It will come in every country. The Russian government have appealed to the peoples of the billigerent nations asking us to press our governments to come into line with them. The Allied note of last January has been rendered quite obsolete by the Russian Revolution. I have never been able to ascertain who would accept the responsibility for the authorship of that note. Nobody appears willing to admit paternity. It was stated in the newspapers at the time that it had been drafted in Russia. If that be so, then it expresses the War policy of the government of Russia which has been overthrown. The Allies are, therefore, no longer committed to it. The situation in Russia has made it necessary that a new Allied Note should be issued which repudiates all imperialist aims and which will declare—to use a formula which I hope will be defined a little more closely later—for no annexation and no indemnity. The difference which occurred between Miliukoff and the Workmen's Council a week ago brought to light the fact that there are other secret treaties in existence than the one that was exposed by Trepoff at the beginning of last December; but these Miliukoff refused to disclose. They cannot much longer be kept secret, now that the workmen have taken their part in the responsible government of Russia. These secret compacts were made with the Romanoffs, and new Russia repudiates them. Compacts made with a government which has been overthrown by a revolution cannot be binding. They are null and void by that fact, and for the Alliance to attempt to stand by compacts into which they entered at the request of a government which has been overthrown —I invite the serious attention of the right hon. Gentleman to this—is to invite disaster of a most terrible kind. The Russian Revolution has changed everything at home, and things abroad cannot remain as they were before. There must be harmony between things at home and things abroad. You cannot have democracy established within a country and that same country pursuing an anti-democratic policy abroad. The Russian Revolution is a revolt against the old order and practice of international diplomacy. It is the end of all the intrigues and conspiracies which have been carried on in Courts and in the chambers of diplomatists. One thing our Government may be quite certain about is that the new democratic government of Russia will not tolerate the practices which it had to endure under the old regimé.

The old Allied note was the child of undemocratic diplomacy, and it has had the most disastrous results. I have no doubt that it is in a measure responsible for the very unfortunate speech that was delivered by the German Chancellor yesterday. It stiffened Germany. It increased the power of the militarist class in Germany. The interpretation that I place upon the Chancellor's speech of yesterday is this, that the division between the two schools in Germany, between the liberal element and the militarist class has become so acute that the Chancellor is afraid to side either with the one or with the other. He refused yesterday to give a word of encouragement to either. Our Government have never declined in the words of any responsible statesman, so far as I call remember, to recognise a democratic Germany, or to negotiate with a German, people who had rid themselves of their militarist class. But they have never pursued that policy. I think the greatest mistake our Government has made has been that they have not deliberately pursued the policy of dividing the two sections in Germany—of alienating the democracy and the militarist class. Instead of doing that they have cemented the alliance of the two in what they have believed to be a War of national defence. Nothing has done more towards that end than the unfortunate Allied Note of January last. I candidly admit the force of the statement that a War which was entered upon without any idea of territorial aims may so develop that it is necessary if its objects are to be attained that there shall be a readjustment of territory; but the Allied Note was a great deal more than that. The Allied note was imperialism and conquest naked and unashamed. It was not restitution and security. It was conquest and domination. We all admit that.

In every line of it—in its proposal to dismember the Austrian Empire. Surely I need not quote what is within the knowledge of every hon. Member of this House. "Territorial readjustments which will be necessary after the War." In reply to the invitation of the right hon. Gentleman just now, when I spoke in this House three months ago I dealt with this matter. I gave at least a dozen quotations, pointing out what was declared as the object of the Allies in reference to the territory which was in the possession of one or other of the Central Powers and their Allies before the War. I need not pursue that. The interjection of the right hon. Gentleman only shows how little he knows of the interpretation which has been placed upon this Note.

The Government are only responsible for its terms and not for the interpretation put by our enemies upon the Note, which is what the hon. Gentleman appears to be concerned with.

Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether he has received the approval of President Wilson for the terms of the Allies' Note? We are informed that President Wilson has refused to enter into the compact of the Allies.

Refused to enter into the pact of London—then the newspapers have been again misinformed. Has he entered into it?

We have heard more than once of a policy of no annexation and no indemnities. A formula has both advantages and disadvantages. It has the advantage of gaining for its support a very large number of people who all feel perfectly at liberty to place what interpretation they like upon it. In using this phrase we give the Government the excuse, I suppose, not to sub- scribe to it, or at any rate to place their own interpretation upon it. But I do not think they are justified in doing that. They are certainly not justified in doing what a member of the War Cabinet, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Barnard Castle (Mr. Henderson), is reported to have done, in an interview which he has given to a Russian newspaper, where he says that he interprets the formula "No annexation and no indemnities" in this way—these are not his exact words, which can be quoted if necessary, but in effect he goes on to say that we must grab as much as we can and we must keep all we grab. That is the right hon. Gentleman's interpretation of "No annexation." But there is no difficulty in interpreting this phrase if you will only be fair. It means what President Wilson says, that we do not enter into this War for any material gain. We desire no conquests and no dominions. We seek no indemnities for ourselves and no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make.

What is meant by this? I am quite sure that what the Russian Provisional Government means is that no country shall continue after the War to hold by the sword what it has gained by the sword during this War, and that no territory shall be transferred to any Government except by the will of the people who are transferred. That brings us up against the statement that we will make no peace with Germany, because the word of Germany cannot be trusted. Were we to accept that, then we might abandon ourselves to despair. There is nothing but war before the world. I cannot accept that. I believe that there is proportionately as strong an anti-militarist sentiment, as strong a desire for peace, as strong a desire to establish some kind of system which will avoid future wars in Germany as in any other country that you can think of. Herr Scheidemann said yesterday in the, Reichstag that 99 per cent. of the people of Germany were looking to the establishment of universal peace. I do not know if the right hon. Gentlemen opposite approves of the idea of a league of nations. There was a remarkable meeting held in London two days ago to discuss this question. You cannot have a league of nations which does not include the Central Powers, because a league of nations which did not include them would be a league of nations against them, and you can never have a league of nations except upon very stable conditions. The possibility of a useful league of nations after the War will depend upon the terms of settlement of this War, and the kind of settlement that we are going to have, and that we contemplate, will be the kind of settlement which the democracies of the belligerent nations are going to have. Make no mistake about it, it will be a peoples' peace. This War is not going to be settled as other wars have been, by statesmen whose incompetence or criminality made the War. This War is not going to be settled in the secret chambers of diplomacy; it is going to be settled by the democracies of the different countries. This War is going to sweep away for ever, in the settlement of the War, all those old methods employed in secret diplomacy, capital using diplomacy, which have been responsible for wars in the past.

The Workmen's Council have sent an invitation to all the Socialist parties in the world to meet them soon in International Conference. This is an event of the greatest significance. This conference will be the embryo of the parliament of man. It will be attended, if the governments of the different countries are wise enough to give passports to delegates, by representatives of the Socialist movement in all the countries of the world. We have heard of minorities, minorities in the Socialist Party in the different countries. These minorities will not be a minority at Stockholm. There will be little division there, and I do want to say with the greatest emphasis possible that if the British Government be wise, if the governments of the Allied Powers are wise, they will accept this invitation to the workmen's council as a heaven sent means of extricating themselves from the awful position in which they are now placed. It is the only way in which the War can be settled. It is not for me to say what the decisions of this conference will be, but I think I could state them with a tolerable degree of accuracy. In the first place this conference will be international. Delegates who attend that conference will be men who have developed what the Noble Lord the Member for Oxford University described as eloquently last Monday at the League of Nations meeting as the higher morality which considers its obligations to humanity greater than its loyalty to any one country. That would be the governing spirit of the International Conference. While, as to policy, its policy will be to secure such readjustment of territory as will remove one cause of war, namely, resentment at being subjected to an anti-racial alien rule. I do not say, and nobody can say for a moment, that it would be easy to re-draw the map of Europe and to make race and governmental area co-terminus. It will be a very difficult problem, but if there be the spirit to do it it can be done.

Another decision to which this conference will come will be this: I am sure that it will announce a policy which will try to remove as far as possible financial and commercial competition as a cause tending to produce war. There are many causes of war—the ambitions of ruling dynasties or of militarist classes, race, religion; but in these modern times the most fruitful cause of war is commercial competition, the desire for new markets, the use of foreign policy and diplomacy as a means of aiding interested financial groups in the different nations. Without universal free trade, I am afraid, this will always remain an invitaion to and a possible cause of friction between nations. The Conference will speak with one voice upon that question. They will speak unanimously in favour of free trade and the open door for the commerce of nations. That Conference will repudiate the old doctrine of the balance of power, which the late Prime Minister so truly described as a precarious equipoise, and for leagues of nations against leagues of nations it will substitute a league of nations, and, as has been pointed out by the German Socialists, it will advocate the establishment of international arbitration for the settlement of all disputes. And the Conference will also declare for the abolition of the method of secret diplomacy. It is a monstrous thing that the people of the country should be committed to war, and should be driven into war and have to sacrifice their lives because of commitments made by governments of which they were previously altogether unaware. National diplomacy will have to be free and open in the future. Parliaments will represent the people and will have to ratify agreements before agreements can have effect. There is one other matter, about which we have heard very little during the War. We heard a good deal about it in the months preceding the War owing to the disgraceful disclosures which were made—namely, financial interest in the manufacture of armaments. We shall have to remove that altogether. Now, roughly speaking, this is the kind of peace that we want. It is the kind of peace which those of us who have had to bear the charge of being unpatriotic have been working for. This is the kind of peace which we want. This is the kind of peace which Russia wants, and the kind of peace that the people of every country in the world are longing for. The Government have had many opportunities in the past of bringing this War to an end. I am afraid there are few signs of greater wisdom on their part. There appears to be no evidence that they are using other means than the brutal weapon of slaughter to achieve their ends. That way will never bring peace. It is only by the exercise of reason and commonsense that peace will be achieved. The awful lists of casualties now appearing every' day in the newspapers indicate something of the terrible anguish and suffering now being endured, and it is because of that and because I believe there is now a hopeful opportunity of bringing this War to an end in such a way as will realise the objects for which we entered it that I do pray that the Government will not reject this present opportunity but that they will put themselves into line with the new democracy of Russia, which expresses the longing and the hope of the democracies the whole world over.

I beg to second the Amendment which has been moved by my hon. Friend. When this War originally broke out I supported the Government of that time in the action which they took, and if I were convinced that it was now necessary to continue the War for the original purposes for which we entered it I should support them still; but I have noticed as the years have gone on a gradual emergence from behind the original issues of the War of a series of new issues which never received, and Mr. Speaker, I believe never would have received, the national assent. My hon. Friend referred to the dismemberment of Austria. If the Allied Note does not mean the dismemberment of Austria then it should have been so stated as to render that interpretation impossible. The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs has just stated that that interpretation with regard to the dismemberment of Austria was put upon the Note by nobody but our enemies. He has made a mistake. That interpretation was put upon the Note by—

I said the statement of the hon. Member for Blackburn was adopting, as he usually does adopt, everything that our enemies say.

I do not think the Noble Lord can recollect that the interpretation which the hon. Member for Blackburn has adopted was an interpretation put upon that Note by the present Foreign Minister for Russia, M. Miliukoff. I have not the extract with me, but he will see that it is an extract from an article by M. Miliukoff in his own paper, in which he not only proposes to divide Austria up—and he says the Note means that—into three, four or five separate states, but being confronted with the fact that Bohemia will in that case be a land-locked state, he also proposes to cut a corridor 100 kilometres broad and 200 kilometres long, straight through Austria, in order to connect Bohemia with the sea. Another item against which I wish to protest is Constantinople for Russia. Then there is the proposal that France shall have not only that part of Alsace Lorraine which desires her rule, but, quite irrespective of local desires or interests, also those parts which have given no proof that they wish to change their allegiance. The proposal that this War shall lay the foundation not of a league of peace, but its opposite: the economic strangulation of Germany; that Germany shall be dispossessed of every colony over the seas—what have all these things to do with the defence of the weak against the strong, or the rights of small nations or any other single one of the objects for which hundreds of thousands of our own men have been sent overseas to die? When this subject was debated in this House a few weeks ago those who expressed such views as these were like voices crying in the wilderness. That is not so any longer. We are now supported by forces far mightier than we ourselves could ever have called into being. The Revolution in Russia means, I believe, the beginning of the end of the War. The Council of Soldiers' and Workmen's Delegates which now control the Government of that country takes on this question the same view as my hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn—in fact, takes a view which is a great deal more extreme. A new situation has arisen. The whole centre of gravity has changed. I do not expect that the first proposal for peace will be made by this country or by Germany, but it is now certain that a movement for negotiations, a formal and official lead in the movement for negotiations, will be taken by Russia. This Amendment suggests that it would be wise of the Government to make up its mind that when that lead comes this country will not be a resisting party. After all, what harm can this country come to by entering into negotiations? What harm would it do her? The Prime Minister, speaking in this House last December, in reply to the German Note, said that to enter into negotiations would be to put our necks within the noose. I do not see why that should be so. Just look at the position. Austria, from all the evidence that we have, is as anxious for peace as Russia herself. As to Germany, what is the position there? The people of Germany are told and believe that they are fighting for their existence. I do not myself believe that any people would be willing to undergo the starvation and slaughter which they are called upon to endure unless they thought they were doing it for some noble and honourable cause. Supposing in these negotiations Germany puts forward immoderate demands such as her Junkers wish her to do. She would not obtain the support of a single member of the Conference, even of her allies, and if she persisted in the demands and the Conference in consequence broke up, then I think, from what we know of the internal conditions of that country, she would find it impossible to hold her public down, and, moreover, she would emerge from that Conference without the Austrian Empire at her side. What, then, are the difficulties? Why do not we do it? What are the real difficulties in the way which prevent this country from entering into negotiations? The House knows what they are. They have to be faced. This country is not fighting this country alone, and it has obligations and commitments to its Allies; but here the Government has at this moment got within its grasp the golden opportunity of the War. The greatest of these difficulties arose from the desire of Russia for Constantinople. She is on the brink—she may have done so formally already—of abandoning that ambition. I think, Mr. Speaker, that the next movement lies with this country, because we hold the key of the situation in our hands. The key of the situation lies in our conquest of the German colonies. If we insist on retaining our hold on the German colonies, then we can do nothing, for, of course, we shall have no right to ask our Allies, either Russia or any other of our Allies, to modify their demands. I do not see that the problem of the German colonies is so insoluble as it has frequently been depicted as being. I agree we cannot go back to the status quo, but it seems to me that the War affords an opportunity of a general rearrangement of the colonial spheres between the Great Powers on a plan which would be more convenient to all those Powers, and at the same time enable us to satisfy the special demands of South Africa and Australia.

5.0. P.M.

If by a plan like that this country would modify, its ambitions then it will have the right to approach Allies with a view to modifying theirs, and this obstacle on our side to the opening of negotiations would no longer block the path. If we do not do this, what is the alternative? The alternative is to go on with the War until all the Allies can satisfy all their demands. That is really the alternative. I can quite see from the point of view of the Foreign Office and the Government that this is the line of least resistance, the easiest thing to do for the moment, but are there no other difficulties? I believe the difficulties involved in going on with the War for such a purpose as this are greater than the difficulties which will be involved by facing our Allies on this question now. What does going on with the War for such objects as these mean? It means that the country is to settle down into a long-drawn out War of attrition. It means that grim exchange of a life for a life till the European resources are almost exhausted; but the calculation on which we depend is that if we will only hold out till some time in 1918 then victory is certain, because the United States with its unexhausted resources will come upon the field, and being the only Power left with any large number of fit, wholesome, unslaughtered men, it will be the arbiter of the World and will award the victory to us, with the German Colonies for ourselves and their particular desires for each of our Allies, and then civilisation will be secure. I must say that this is a very grim and ghastly calculation, and I believe that from the beginning to the end it is the wildest and most fantastic gamble.

It all depends upon the assumption that for such purposes as Colonies and conquests the peoples of Europe are going to allow their rulers to bleed them white, and I do not believe they will. I do not believe that the people of Russia, on the brink of abandoning their claims to Constantinople, are going on fighting till 1918 in order that we may add 700,000 square miles to the British Empire. I cannot speak with the same certainty of Italy and France, but I am sure of this, that the public utterances of President Wilson make it perfectly certain that when he does become, if he does become, the arbiter of the world he will never consent to be an instrument for such a policy, for he has over and over again said that a policy for the acquisition of Colonies and of conquests will destroy before it is born the League of Nations on which his mind is set. My view is that the whole of this calculation on which you are justifying the slaughter by which you hope to obtain this acquisition is a gamble, the foundations of which are already at this moment crumbling under your feet. This Amendment suggests the first and the most important fact which we think the Government should now take notice of. Last week the Council of Soldiers' and Workers' Delegates issued a manifesto addressed not to the enemy but to its Allies. I think that is a manifesto which should be noticed. It calls upon the Council now governing Russia, and it calls upon the Governments of the Allied States. I say it is a call to the Government of Russia, because the hon. Member will have seen from the morning papers that the Council has agreed to become part of the Government. If I may put it more exactly, as recent events have shown, the Council of Soldiers' and Workers' Delegates dominates the Provisional Government, and if it has done so before it will do so to a larger extent from this time henceforth. I wish to read the invitation this Council has now addressed to the Allied Governments of the World: nobody can. What I do say is that if the Government will make the declaration which we ask they will have taken steps to find out, and to go on with this War, to continue offensive after offensive, for us deliberately to make up our minds that we are going to send to the slaughter hundreds of thousands more of our young men, and to do that without even trying to find out what I have indicated, is a crime in which we must refuse to take any part.

The Motion the House is asked to adopt is one which in principle most of us would probably agree with, not because we believe in a premature peace with Germany, but because we believe that the peace and progress of the world depend much more upon the association of Western democracy with the new democracy than upon any other factor in the War. But despite my agreement with the hon. Member in principle, I have one or two reasons to give why I cannot vote for it. In the first place, it seems to me that, coming just at this moment, it is highly inopportune for two reasons. My hon. Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Lees Smith) told us, I think it was he who told us, but there was the same suggestion in both speeches, that at this very moment the Imperial Chancellor has been forced by circumstances, we will not inquire by what circumstances, but by domestic circumstances, to refrain from pronouncing a definite policy for Germany. He confessed that yesterday he was unable to expound the national policy of Germany to the national representatives of Germany. If that is the case, what does it mean? The hon. Member for Blackburn knows quite well what it means. It means that if, looking at the equilibrium of forces in Germany at this moment, he chooses this very moment when, from the German point of view, the question of success or failure of the submarine campaign is still hanging in the balance, and when the Germans think that the balance is in their favour, to ask the Allies to restate their terms. I take that objection, because throughout this War I have been a whole-hearted supporter of the principles for which we engaged in it. I am not quite sure that I can include the hon. Member for Blackburn in that category, but he is perfectly at liberty to dispute my judgment in that matter if he chooses. I heard him resent the intervention of the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs a few moments ago, and though I was quite aware that there was an obvious misunderstanding between him and the Front Bench, yet I feel bound to ask has he not given some reason for that misunderstanding; does he, with his fellows, still claim to support the principle of small nationalities in this War and the future of democracies, and so on? Have they shown any great desire to prosecute the War in order that those principles may be established, and that the nationalities might enjoy them?

No, certainly not. Because we do not believe that the prosecution of the War is the way to attain that object.

Then my hon. Friend does not believe that there was any sensible German danger to Europe, and that there is no room for two opinions in that point. If he takes that ground, he is perfectly at liberty to say that, while he supports the principle of nationality and freedom in Europe, he is not prepared to go to war for it. I take issue on that point, as I have done all through the War. I think my hon. Friend, as a supporter of the Union of Democratic Control, would have done a far greater service to their principles if he and they had accepted what, during the first two years, at all events, to a great extent they did practically enforce in this country, that we must prosecute the War before you can establish those principles. As to the situation of the War at this moment I am not going into military polemics with my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Lees Smith), who said that it is a gamble to continue military operations. I doubt whether he or I can be a judge of that issue. My own impression of such operations as I have knowledge of is that the Germans are gambling on the strength of the submarine campaign, and that it is a very great mistake for us to encourage them in that gamble by proposing to alter our terms, or letting them think that any alteration in our terms is to be made. And if it is to be made in response to the Russian Revolution, let us be quite sure that the Russian revolutionaries themselves have made up their minds on the point. No doubt my hon. Friends may say that it would assist the Russians if they saw that there was a similar uprising of radical and democratic opinion in this country. Perhaps it might, but it is premature to ask the British Government to proclaim publicly what changes have occurred in its opinions and policy owing to the Russian Revolution, before the Russian revolutionaries have themselves quite made up their minds as to what that Revolution means in relation to Russian foreign policy.

I cannot do better than notice the two mottoes which are at present before the House. There is the motto on the one hand, "No annexation," and there is the motto on the other hand, "No peace with the Hohenzollerns." In regard to the motto, "No peace with the Hohenzollerns," I particularly want to elicit from my hon. Friend some comment upon a campaign which has been conducted in this country by a certain group of newspapers who publish articles under that title. "No peace with the Hohenzollerns" entails two things, both equally foolish. It entails the idea that you can by alien interference with the democratic concerns of a great country like Germany encourage the German people to adopt your view of public affairs. Anybody who knows the history of the world or the nature of the German people knows that that is simply crying for the moon. But the cry of "No peace with the Hohenzollerns " interests me more in another aspect. It will be observed that those who have raised it are the very people who say that you cannot divide the German people from their rulers. When they tell us that, and when I argue the question with them they suggest that there is a very large section of the German people who do not see eye to eye with their rulers in imperialistic policy. They say, "There is one Germany, united for the purposes of war and for the purposes of peace, represented by its figurehead, William II., and administered and led by the army and the bureaucracy." If you agree to say, "No peace with the Hohenzollerns," that means no peace with Germany, and that is a dilemma from which there is no escape. Therefore I hope that my Noble Friend in his reply will make some comment on that policy, which I think is receiving spurious publicity owing to the nature of the newspapers in which it is advocated; not that I believe the British people have been hoodwinked by that particular policy, because I am quite sure they begin to understand that there is not a single country in this War which represents such complete and unbroken unity as that which the motto suggests.

Let me come to the general question of no annexation. Again we are faced with the difficulty of being faced by a label. Let us tear off the labels and try to see the facts as they are. My hon. Friend the Member for Northampton proclaimed his general adhesion to the principle of no annexation and no indemnity, but he admitted that in the case of Armenia the Russian Revolution had already modified the hardness of the principle of no annexation. But if you make an exception of Armenia as vital, surely there are other parts in the Turkish Empire which are equally vital, and if you are going to allow annexation of Armenia for the sake of relieving the Armenians, there are the cases of other populations which have suffered from Turkish misrule. What, for instance, is going to be done with the Jewry in Palestine? Can my hon. Friend say that Russia may go to Armenia in order to relieve the Armenians who have suffered under Turkish misrule and to save them from further misrule, but that the British Empire or America, or any other Power, may not go to Palestine to do the same thing? You have to settle these questions before you can begin to proclaim principles like that of "no annexation." The more one examines the principle of no annexation the more one sees how it breaks down in face of the facts, and I hope my hon. Friends will not pin their faith entirely to it. Let us come a little nearer home than Palestine or Armenia. Let us come to the application of the principle of no annexation in the Balkans and in Austria-Hungary. A good deal has been recently said, both in the Press and in this House, in support of the same vaguely considered idea of a separate peace with one or other of our enemies—Bulgaria, Turkey, or Austria—Hungary. Let me take the question of Bulgaria. I ask myself can you have a separate peace with Bulgaria without having a separate peace with practically everybody else in the War? Can you from the military point of view, and acting under this spur of military necessity, in order to detach one or other of our enemies from the present block that faces us—can you in dealing with any one of our enemies, satisfactorily do so without raising a great many others? If you enter into backstairs negotiations with Bulgaria, that means that you are going to detach not only Bulgaria but Turkey. [An HON. MEMBER: "Not necessarily!"] My hon. Friend says not necessarily. How does he suppose that Turkey could maintain herself against the combined British and Russian attack if these communications from Germany are kept open? If you deal with Bulgaria you detach Turkey. You have to make up your mind on this question, and the questions of Armenia, Mesopotamia and Palestine. You have not made up your mind on any of these questions. On all these questions you have accepted the advice of soldiers, who, seeing all their commitments, think it advisable to detach Bulgaria, Turkey, or any other enemy from the block of the Allies. You have to take into consideration the ultimate political meaning if these detachments were to happen.

Let me take the question of Bulgaria. To give satisfaction to Bulgaria you must allow her annexation. You can do it in no other way, taking annexation in the sense in which it has been used. You must allow her to annex a part, if not the whole, of the disputed area of Macedonia which was the subject of previous engagements in 1912. But if you do that, you immediately arouse the suspicions of the Serbs, and not only suspicions but something resembling violent hostility. I am not going to suggest that there appears to be any particular national right in this case, and I do not think my hon. Friend the Member for North Norfolk (Mr. Noel Buxton) will maintain it.

Then my hon. Friend would maintain it against the judgment of most people on the spot. The general judgment arrived at on what the French call the question Macedoine, is that neither the Bulgar nor the Serb nor the Greek, nor any other race, can claim to have a right to the territory. The view is held that in any given village, town, or province, under a given administration, whether Bulgar, Serb, or Greek, the people would adopt the nationality of that administration before the lapse of many years, and that seems to me to prove the fact that there is no distinct nationality involved in that dispute. Let us suppose, for the sake of my argument, that you are prepared for a Bulgarian nationality in the disputed area of Macedonia. In that event, you would immediately collide with one of the most cherished aspirations of the Serbs—not an inspiration but an actual territorial possession of the area. It was given to them after the second Balkan War, and is regarded as Serbian territory. There is no other way of solving it except realising that the Serbian aspiration is towards unity with their fellow Slavs, the Jugo-Slavs, in the four or five provinces of the Hapsburg Empire. Unless you do so, there is no hope of getting the Serbs to agree to the cession of part or the whole of Macedonia to the Bulgarians. Therefore, as I said before, we must treat the whole Balkan question as one problem. We cannot detach one part, and say, "We will arrive at a basis of territorial settlement with you, without concerning ourselves with the rest." I am persuaded of this, that the only method by which you can arrive at a satisfactory Balkan settlement is by treating all the Balkan States as hanging together and having a solidarity of interests. The possibility of a permanent territorial settlement in the Balkans implies a disturbance of the present Austro - Hungarian monarchy. I deliberately say "disturbance," because other persons who are hostile to the policy I have espoused have used the word "dismemberment." What do we mean by dismemberment? Are you going to class the Treaty of Frankfort of 1871, by which Germany, solely and simply by force of arms, took Alsace Lorraine from France, as the same process by which the province of Venetia was released from Austrian rule? Are you going to class that with any of those great national movements which have led to the extension of territory over the national areas lying alongside? If you do draw the distinction, on which side of the dividing-line does the question of Austria-Hungary fall? Are you looking at it solely from the dynastic point of view of the Hapsburgs, from whose point of view, and from whose point of view alone, it is dismemberment, or from the point of view of the Serbs, or of the Roumanians, or of the Italians, from whose point of view it is the rescue of persons of their own race from alien rule. We must settle questions of that sort before we can really know what our terms mean.

I put this to my hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn. Yesterday was the fifty-seventh anniversary of one of the great battles fought for freedom in this world. That was Garibaldi's great success in Sicily. There began the process by which ultimately, with Mazzini, as the preacher of the great Italian ideal, and with Cavour as the engineer and architect of Italy United there began the process by which Italy United ultimately obtained freedom, and yet at every step of that process it was annexation, annexation, annexation. The process is exactly the same, and the enemy that the Serb is fighting to-day is the very enemy Garibaldi defeated in all the great battles of his campaign for Italian liberation. The enemy is the same, the goal for which we are fighting is the same. Are you going to deny that simply because half a century has passed, and are hon. gentlemen who for the time being have adopted internationalism instead of nationalism as their programme going to contend that because Serbia stands in relation to her kinsmen who are under alien Hapsburg rule across the border as Garibaldi stood towards his kinsmen under the same rule that some distinction has come in between and that you are not to judge them by the same criterion and give them the same opportunity of liberation? The only explanation, if you refuse so to judge, is that you have adopted internationalism and that you think that that can now supersede the old nationalism of Garibaldi, that nationalism which set up half the great nations of Europe. The only answer to that, I am sure, is that you cannot have a world of internationalism except on a basis of satisfied nationalism.

What my hon. Friends, or some of them, seem to do is to take a leap from the situation in which the world found itself just before the War to some future ideal situation in which the international organisation of the world will be a reality and in which we shall have some universally respected tribunal to which any nation that is aggrieved can go and be assured of justice. They do not seem to realise that between the old world before the War and the new international world of their dreams there lies the whole settlement of the territories of Europe. They scoff at those of us who have been endeavouring during the last two and a half years to persuade the people of Great Britain that unless they are prepared to study these geographical and territorial questions they will be at a hopeless disadvantage with our enemies when the time comes for settlement. To be sure when we hear that the Russians have adopted the principle of no annexation and in the same breath say they are opposed to what they call the dismemberment of Austria we must ask them whether they have adopted the principle of nationalities, or whether they have not. I do not wish to raise nationality into a fetish, but as I have said, and hon. Members opposite apparently agree, until you have settled, these nationalities, and especially in Eastern and Central Europe, and have released them from alien rule, you cannot possibly realise the international world of your dreams.

The hon. Member who has just spoken pointed out that the hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr. Snowden) had done a national disservice by bringing forward this Motion at this particular juncture, because in this House we have to do with practical affairs, and at no time ought we, if we wish to maintain the position of Parliament, to be more practical than in the crisis of a war. We have to consider not merely the academic terms of the Resolution which the hon. Gentleman has put down, but also its practical effect. There have been times even during this War, when the practical effect would not have been what it would be now were we to carry the Resolution which the hon. Member asks us to carry. He brings that Resolution forward at a time when we have been challenged by our chief enemy on the chief region where we can be challenged with effect, on the ocean. Until the result of the submarine war is visible to all the world, it would be folly, it would not be in the best interests even of the very causes which the hon. Member has at heart, were we to give way, or to appear to give way. We have got to see that submarine challenge defeated before we can think of negotiation. Look at other points. The United States has just come in. If we were to carry this Resolution at present, we should indicate to that great democracy, which has just joined into this War assimilating itself with our cause, that at this very moment there was a division of opinion in this country. Then what is the effect in regard to Russia? The hon. Member has rendered us a great disservice, because he must know the last thing that anyone wishes in this country or in this. House to do is to dissociate ourselves from what is best and highest in the great Revolution that has taken place in Russia. But there are differences of view as to practical policy in Russia at the present moment. There are those who feel so strongly in regard to the practical course before Russia, that they have gone the length of resigning. General Brussiloff and the War Minister, men who brought about this Revolution, are differing now from certain of those who have come into the Revolution, as to the course of policy, and the hon. Member by this Resolution is identifying himself not with the Russian democracy, but with particular parties in that Russian democracy, and at this moment it remains to be seen what will be the final view of the Russian democracy, not on general ideals, but on the question—the practical question—of the immediate conduct of the War.

I say that the effect of the hon. Member's Resolution, were it adopted by this House, would be something quite other than the mere academic terms in which it is published. The effect of it would be to throw confusion into the very practical matter of the conduct of the War. When we come to consider those terms, and look at them closely and try to get a meaning out of them, it is very difficult to do so. "Imperialistic conquest and aggrandisement." Why, every word of that description begs questions. What is "Imperialistic conquest"? Who is going to tell us what is "Imperialistic conquest" and what is not? Are you going to say, for instance, that were Roumania, our ally, to include within her boundaries those of Roumanian race, that that would be "Imperialistic conquest and aggrandisement." I fail to understand what the hon. Member precisely means as to the course he would have us to follow against the course which the Government thought well to follow in the Note which was issued in reply to President Wilson. Is the hon. Member prepared to say—I think he did even say, although I do not think he went down to cases—that that Note indicated any Imperialistic conquests? The two great cases which his Seconder took were the dismemberment of the Austrian Empire and what was to be done with the Colonies we had acquired from Germany after the War. With regard to that, Austria is not a nation. I hope my hon. Friend will accept that. It contains various nations, various parts of nations, but the most extraordinary thing about Austria, and that which is the key of the whole difficulty in which we are placed at the present time, is this, that Austria contains, with a single exception of the Magyars, not one complete nation. The Austrians themselves are a por- tion of the German nation, the Poles are partly within Austria and partly without, the Roumanians partly without and partly within, the Jugo-Slavs partly without and partly within, and the Italians partly without and partly within. The fundamental difficulty in the map of Europe which has brought about this War is the fact that Austria is something quite different from any other of the States of Europe. It is merely a dynastic group of properties, held like the properties which the dynasts of the eighteenth century used to hold. It is idle to apply to any dismemberment of that monarchy the term "Imperialistic conquest." I do not believe that the Russians intend that. I cannot believe that the nationalist democracy at Petrograd wish to maintain the enslavement of their brother Slavs in Jugo-Slavland and in the other portions of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

Does the hon. Member suggest the dismemberment of this Empire, as he describes it?

I do not care how it is described. If we can bring it about, I do frankly suggest it. I say this: Having been compelled to go into this War by that great threat constituted by the German system of Empire in South-Eastern Europe, we have a right, having spent all we have spent in this War, to secure, if we can, a capital operation which shall prevent Europe from again being plunged into the horrors into which we have been plunged. I say also that our Government was perfectly right in issuing not vague prescriptions, not vague self-denying ordinances, but a definite and a clear statement of what are our aims in this War. One of the foremost of those aims must be to secure a resorting of the peoples of South-Eastern Europe in such a way that South-Eastern Europe shall be built of bricks and not of pieces of bricks; that we may have a structure which is strong and based on nationalities, and not a mere heap of peoples kept together by military control. I fail to understand the aim of the hon. Gentleman opposite if he is not aiming at causing confusion in the councils of this country and of the Allies. I do not believe the object of the hon. Gentleman is indicated by the terms of his resolution. I believe the terms of this resolution have been carefully put together, but that the real object at which the hon. Member aims is to obtain an international Socialist conference which shall cut at the roots of nationality in Europe, and which shall give us in Europe a distinction, a horizontal distinction, instead of the distinction which we have between the nations. That, I believe, to be the object of the hon. Member. I believe that object is hostile to the established system of society.

I am all in favour of a movement towards democracy. I am all in favour of frank democratic conduct of international affairs. I think that our secret diplomacy ought to cease. I believe, however, that the actual bargaining must be conducted by men who are empowered to hold discussions and to try different solutions without being interfered with by ignorant people, and by the Press. As regards the general aims of our international policy, I believe that every democracy ought to discuss them openly, to state them openly, and ought to be consulted before we are committed to war. Frankly, I accept that; but I say that the hon. Member, in trying to impede the conduct of this War, is not going about this matter in a very practical way to achieve his end. What is our difficulty? What is it that has prevented us from having that open conduct of international affairs? The fact is that you have co-existing in this world, and in this Europe, both autocracies and democracies, and if your democracies are to hold their own against a Germany, against an Austria, against a Turkey, against secretly scheming autocracies and bureaucracies, then, in sheer self-defence, it is essential that we should equip the Governments of those democracies with some of those powers, not in themselves desirable, and we hope avoidable in the future, but absolutely essential now if democracies are not to be crushed by the autocracies. That is what has very nearly happened. Let us not forget what has very nearly happened.

During the twenty years before this War the War was prepared. A conspiracy against Europe was steadily progressing, partly in secret and partly under our very eyes. You could not persuade the democracy of this country that that was so, and for the very simple reason that fundamentally democracy is good, fundamentally democracy means well. Therefore, democracy is in no position to cope with the wiles, calculations, and organisations of autocracies and bureaucracies. If, therefore, the hon. Member desires to bring about a really democratic condition of affairs in the world, a condition of affairs in which we shall not again be committed to war, if he wishes to bring about a condition of things in which international affairs are discussed by Parliament as publicly, openly, and as frankly as are national affairs, then the hon. Member must, first of all, see to it that we are dealing with democracies all over the world, and that we have not got amongst us autocracies capable of ruining the democracies. When I look at the question again it seems to me that the hon. Member generally forgets that it is not the academic terms of his resolution, but the practical effect of what he is seeking to bring about that matters. Those of us who seek to prosecute this War to the end have fundamentally similar objects to what I am sure the hon. Gentleman would ascribe as his objects. Our objects are to get a democratic and a stable Europe. We differ from him as to the methods. The hon. Member thinks you are going to do it with the methods which failed in 1848. In 1848 those concerned had the same magnificent stimulus, the same splendid ideals on the part of the untried democracies that you have to-day in the newly-liberated portions of Europe. They failed. What was the result? Bismarck stepped in, and on that failure you had the whole structure reared which has brought about the present ruin in Europe. It were ten times better from that point of view that the Revolutions of 1848 had never taken place than that you should have reared upon their failure and disaster the Prussian system which has produced the present position. Our aim in this country is to produce something other than the present situation. We welcome the Russian Revolution, notwithstanding its unsteadying effect upon Europe, which, at the present time, is rocking under these gigantic events.

We are the strong nation. We are the nation of liberty. We are the nation protected by the sea. We are the nation which to-day has in this Europe the maximum of man-power. We have not had to spend our blood in the way France did in defending us at Verdun. Europe is looking to us to hold steady the system at the present time in the last great struggle of Germany which is shaking us. We have a responsibility, therefore, vis-é-vis with the Russian Revolution which it seems to me the hon. Member forgets. I admit the splendour of the ideals and the grandeur of the future of Russia. But let us here go cautiously, as befits those who stand on a stable basis, and on whom all these new elements must rest. So the hon. Member, in asking us to pass this Resolution, should remember that it would have quite a different effect to that which he imagines, and in his action he is rendering a great disservice both to this country and to the Allies. I earnestly trust that the hon. Member will be heavily defeated in the Lobby, if he dares to take it there. The hon. Member who seconded the Amendment repeated the expression, "No annexation, no indemnity." One word on the other side of annexation—the annexation of the German colonies. Again let us go down to facts. Do not let us remain discussing in general terms. Does the hon. Member imagine that South Africa will be more peaceful if we surrender back to Germany South-West Africa? Does the hon. Member imagine for a moment that Australia would consider herself in a safe condition after surrendering to Germany bases for naval occupation? Is he prepared to return the Arabs of Mesopotamia to Turkish misrule? Is he prepared, if he can help it, to return Armenia to those who, as Lord Bryce said, had committed perhaps the greatest crime against a nation in the history of all times? Is this to go unpunished? Is morality not to be enforced by international sanctions as it is enforced within the nation? I venture to say that if you judge by hard individual facts these general statements lose their meaning. Then the hon. Member who seconded referred to the fact that there should be no indemnities. I recently went over the ground in France which had been laid waste, not as a military necessity, but wantonly, by the retiring German Army. I saw there tens of thousands of fruit trees cut down but poplars standing along avenues where they might have sheltered troops. There was no military excuse for this devastation of the country. I saw the conditions that ruled there. If you are not going to enforce indemnities for crime of that kind, then you have passed to a condition of things which would not be practical. It is all very well to talk in the language of angels! We are dealing with men who are very far removed from the angels!

What about an indemnity to Belgium? That country will require reconstruction. Is there to be no restitution made by those who have brought about the present condition of affairs? It seems almost absurd to talk within these walls of "No indemnity, no annexation." Let us get down to practical matters, and hon. Members will find it means that you cannot possibly apply the suggested considerations. The hon. Member referred to the Paris Resolutions, and to the fact that we were contemplating the strangulation of Germany. Just in proportion as we fail to defeat Germany at the present time will it be necessary to enforce economic control on her afterwards. The resolutions in Paris were war measures. They were a Proclamation to Germany of what we intended to do if she continued her policy of "peaceful penetration," as it was called, but which was merely the anticipatory portion of this very War. War measures! If the hon. Member wishes to get to his condition of universal free trade, then let him so defeat Germany that these things will not be necessary. We have had enough of that wishy-washy philanthropy for the last fifty or sixty years. The actual idea of those who began free trade was that this country would, by persuasion, induce the world to trade with her. The result is this War. Let us go on more stable sentiments. If the hon. Member's real object is to produce peace afterwards, if his real object it to render such measures unnecessary, then let him see to it that he does not leave this task before the task is actually finished.

I say quite frankly that what we shall do at the end of the War depends upon the situation of Germany at the end of the War. If we are dealing with the Hohenzollerns, then we must deal with them according to the whole lesson given to us by their history. I merely conclude by saying that I do not believe the hon. Member himself attaches any importance to those academic phrases which have been thrown out in a fever of enthusiasm in the first moment of the Petrograd Revolution. I believe his real object is to associate himself with the movement going on in Europe which in my belief would lead to general disorder and anarchy. His object is to strengthen those elements in Russia which would lead to that anarchy and disorder, and if he can, to introduce similar difficulties into other countries. For that reason I hope the House will give the hon Member a severe lesson in the Lobby.

6.0.P.M.

I think the House listened with a great deal of pleasure to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Perth (Mr. Whyte) where he came face to face with some of the most difficult but practical issues that this War is raising. Those issues must 6.0 P.M. be faced. It is no use talking about peace if you do not face them. My hon. Friend seemed to go on to assume that those of us here were not facing them. I think he is profoundly mistaken when he says, for instance, that certain hon. Members—I think he means us—scoff at the idea of the historical basis for nationality. As a matter of fact, for a great many years before this War started we had been trying to get Great Britain to understand the pressing nature of national problems. We created foreign relations committees before the War. Be our measure of failure as ample as it may have been—and I am afraid it was very ample—my hon. Friend must not attach to that the very wrong accusation that we are either indifferent to these national problems or that we scoff at them. The only question we put to him is this. Granted all that has been said, what possible hope is there that these admittedly difficult questions are to be settled by the War? When you have got your heel on the German neck you have still to face those problems. The mere crushing of your enemy by force of arms is not going to solve the difficulty between Serbia and Italy, the difficulty between the Italian race and the Jugo-Slavs. The mere defeat of Germany is not going to settle the difficulty of Armenia or decide finally the position of Turkey in Europe or Asia. That is a problem that ought to be faced a little more intimately than it has been faced by those who have been indulging—not my hon. Friend—in very flamboyant general phrases about this, that and the other thing.

At the present moment the difficulties raised by the War have taken a special complexion, given to them by the Russian Revolution. Now my hon. Friends have put down an Amendment to the Third Reading of this Bill and used in that Amendment words originally used by the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council in Petrograd. I do not know that they would have chosen them if they had had the writing of them themselves. I certainly should not have chosen them, but they do touch the Russian psychology. Now that is the important thing. You can build up the details of your peace, and those details may be acceptable, but if you cannot lay the foundation of mutual confidence, then your War will go on and you will never get peace at all. Now, in order to get into confidential communication with the Russians, you must put yourselves into sympathetic relation with the Russians; you must understand their minds. It is not enough to say, as my hon. Friend has said, there is this problem, that problem, and the next problem. You must first of all say to them, "Have you any suspicions of us, and, if you have, let us clear them away? " If you do not succeed in doing that, then the rest of your work is wasted. Now the intention of this Amendment is to get at the preliminary suspicion. My hon. Friends have sacrificed the accuracy of detail in order to get right at the foundation, the existence of suspicion. What has happened in Russia What I propose to do is to confine my remarks to the Russian situation as I see it and understand it. The Workmen's and Soldiers' Council, which I shall call the Workmen's Council for brevity's sake, is practically the Government of Russia at the moment. Its entry into the international field has created two differences. First of all, it is determined that peace negotiations shall be more direct between peoples and peoples than they were before.

You have this extraordinary phenomenon: The Chancellor, speaking in Germany yesterday, said in effect, "Although I represent the German nation, I am not going to tell the German nation what is in my mind." That is a very nice state of things to come to in the twentieth century! Then we, on our part, put our names to an Allied Note which was not communicated to us. Our people do not understand it. It was a cheque drawn in our name, and we have to honour it. Therefore the Russian Workmen's Council sees that a tremendous war is being waged in Europe to-day and that the great mass of people mostly concerned with that war are least concerned with the diplomacy underlying, war, and that is why they issued this manifesto and make those requests, to which reference has been made, to the whole of Europe. The second difference—and it is with this difference that the Amendment mainly concerns itself—is this: The Russians say, "No annexation," and then hon. Members here ask what is the meaning of that. The point is, what does it mean to a Russian? What we have to do at the present moment is to get into touch with the Russian. It means this for the Russian: Until the time of the Revolution, so far as Russian Tsar policy was concerned, it was Imperialist. It was aggrandisement. It was adding territory to territory and State to State with practically no limitation. The Russian Workmen's Council, when it uses the expression "annexation," means annexation in the old Russian Imperialist sense. Do not let us make academic speeches about it. It is an indication on the part of the Petrograd Workmen's Council that, so far as its part in the War is concerned, it wants to make it perfectly clear that it has abandoned the old Russian Imperialist policy of annexation without reference to the people concerned. That is all. Therefore, when my hon. Friend opposite refers to annexation, he is not using the word in the sense that the Petrograd Council is using it.

You first of all have to establish a confidence that that is the intention. That confidence is not now established, as I will show, between Russia and this country. Get your intention established and accepted, and then face your problem. That is all I have to say on the subject, and I believe it is a commonsense view. With reference to Armenia, Kerensky was convinced that Armenia should not go back to Turkey, because the continued dominance of Turkey over Armenia was against every principle that is contained in the manifesto—namely, the principle of free nationality and race—and Kerensky said that if it were necessary to establish the independence of Armenia, Russia might assume some political and diplomatic interest, guaranteeing the country as a self-governing State. They were perfectly prepared for that. Therefore, do not let any hon. Members assume that the disruption of the States that are only artificial States and the bringing together under one form of government disrupted nationalities would be deemed by Russia as annexation, because, as a matter of fact, that is precisely what the Russians want; and they believe, moreover, that the policy that they christen annexation is the policy which has been responsible for this breaking-up of States and this separation of peoples into unnatural divisions. If my hon. Friend had only made that speech of his to the Petrograd Workmen's Council, he would have been hailed as a great advocate of the principles which they are trying to proclaim to the world by the use of the very expression to which he takes objection.

I quite agree with the hon. Member who preceded me that he would be a very rash man, and I think a very ignorant man, who would say too much about the Russian Revolution. It has been the most extraordinary manifestation of a spiritual power and moral force that we have known in our generation. It has come upon our minds in the same way as the day dawns after dark, but we know quite well that in this world, particularly at the present moment, that kind of dawning is subject to the most tremendous changes and risks, and I think it would be well to remember that this Revolution might be swamped by forces which itself has created, and by forces, on the other hand, which would never have accepted it, nor ever will. Therefore this country will honour itself by going out of its way to, persuade the Russian people that it is. with them heart and soul, at any rate, in these great spiritual and moral ends which they have put before them, and which they have embodied in the manifesto from which those words have been extracted. But we must admit that the Revolution, has not been understood in this country. We must admit that great mischief has been done in this country to the Revolution by certain organs of the Press. Much suspicion exists in Petrograd as to the policy of this country, and British opinion has been much misrepresented. This House will probably remember what happened in the case of the representative of the "Times" who was responsible for the earlier accounts of the Revolution and who wrote certain statements about men, some of whom are friends of mine, which were most disgraceful and disreputable and absolutely untrue and unjust in every way, unjust in fact and in spirit. This man has been excommunicated by his Russain colleagues. Newspaper after newspaper has published the same kind of thing. I am sorry to find in the Russian Press a report of a speech made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer here which has caused a great deal of concern. The fact of the matter is that everybody who is worth quoting in Germany or in Russia, at the present moment is being quoted in the interests of certain sections.

I think that is an exaggeration, as my opinion is that the Prime Minister is an easy first. But what is the use of intelligent men paying any attention to these things? If anybody is worth quoting there is always somebody, when war passions are high and when unscrupulous blackguardism has far too much authority and influence in all nations, who will misquote speeches, and unfortunately the Chancellor of the Exchequer was misinterpreted with very bad results in certain Russian papers. The effect of it all is this: If we cannot establish a complete sympathy between ourselves and Russia we are facing the grave danger of Russia making a separate and an independent peace with Germany. That is the danger. I am certain that I am right when I say that the making of a separate peace is not essentially part and parcel of the policy of the Workmen's Council. As a matter of fact, it is the very opposite. It is unthinkable that a people who have emancipated themselves from Czardom are going to put their hands into their pockets and allow Kaiserism to take the place of Czardom. It is unthinkable. Of course, it may happen if the Russian people have cause, or, having not cause yet feel that our policy is not sympathetic to the policy in favour of which they have declared themselves. Then they may in despair make a separate peace and yield to the undoubted machinations that are in operation in Petrograd and elsewhere at the present moment.

The other danger is the internal danger. At the present moment there are forces in Russia making for internal disruption, and they are very strong and very powerful and serious, and if the Russian people go back into chaos, particularly armed chaos, Russia is not going to be of much use in establishing a democratic peace at the end of the War. Therefore I hope it will be part of our Government's policy to make Russia understand us, and also to help the Russian Revolution to maintain itself against its internal foes. Russia's own democratic view of her function is that she ought to put herself at the head of European democracy. She does not want a separate peace, but she wants European democracy to understand the issues of the War, and she wants to have a real voice in the settlement after the War. Why not encourage that view? Hon. Members who have read the interview which M. Kerensky gave to the British Labour Deputation, which is still in Russia, will have noticed that he said to them, "Go home and tell your people not to pursue Imperialistic aims." That is an indication of their policy in this matter. It may be that hon. Members resent that, but this is no time for resentments; it is a time for understandings. The fact that M. Kerensky said that, shows that he has a suspicion, and in expressing his suspicions the Minister of Justice did not wish to do a thing hostile to this country, but he wished to defend European democracy, and he asks us to make our position perfectly clear so far as Imperial aggrandisement is concerned. He has said to the Germans, "We are your enemies, but we want to be your friends on conditions. If you come and threaten our Revolution we will meet you with arms, but at the same time do you not think it would be far wiser for you if you copied in Berlin what we have done in Petrograd?" Therefore the Russian democrats have adopted the political method, and not the military method, and at the present moment they are putting more emphasis upon the political than upon the military method, in order to straighten out all the difficulties which the War has brought on Europe and which the War will not settle if left to itself.

The third thing they have done is this. They have asked that representatives of all the Socialist bodies in Europe should go and consult with them as to the future. I hope that when steps are taken to meet the desires of the Russian Workmen's Council and practically the Provisional Government, the Noble Lord will look upon this proposal with sympathy, and with this fact in mind, that it is the duty of this country at the present moment to see that all views which are good and which have the well-being of Europe as an object, irrespective of whether he agrees or disagrees with them, will have a chance of being put into a common pool and discussed with other views so that in the end something will emerge which will really meet the complicated difficulties of the situation. The Russian Workmen's Council wants that done, and it is very anxious not to maintain divisions amongst the democracy. I hope this Government is not going to do what would be a tremendously foolish thing to do, and which would be a tremendous evil thing as well, and refuse what the Petrograd Workmen's Council have asked should be done, that is to send over a representative deputation. My hon. Friend (Mr. Whyte) dealt with the details of his programme and the Russian democracy are doing exactly the same thing. The Belgians are doing the same thing, too, at the present moment. Negotiations are going on between sections of the working classes and the socialists of Belgium, and one of their representatives is now at Petrograd. The Noble Lord also knows that a representative has gone from Paris and is now in Petrograd, in fact, one of his speeches has appeared in our papers. What is the meaning of all this? What is the use of keeping this House in darkness about these matters? What is happening is this: the details in which my hon. Friend opposite appears to be so much interested are being discussed and talked over and drafts are being made of possible settlements. Those drafts are being discussed for the purpose of making the real settlement of this War which will give the whole of Europe adequate security in the days to come, so that this abominable crime will not again be forced upon Europe from any quarter. The Petrograd Council have decided to summon an International Socialist Congress. The hon. Member for Glasgow (Mr. Mackinder) talked about this being a class war, but he can talk in that academic way as much as he likes, for these are days in which we have to face facts. It is a fact that these men are Socialists, and it is a fact that at the present moment the only great international political movement that can begin a real peace movement is the International Socialist Party. There it is and nothing else exists. There is no such international organisation of any other great party.

I hope my hon. Friend is not going to base his peace on finance. I was dealing with a basis on peace. In every country in the world which has any industrial status you have this phenomena. You have National Socialist organisations linked together into an International, and this organisation is being brought into operation by the Petrograd Workmen's Council in order to discuss the terms and conditions of peace. I hope the Government is going to allow this to be done. Surely it is all to the interests of Europe, and more particularly to the interests of our own country and the men who are dying for us, that not a single one of them should be asked to die unless it is absolutely necessary. If this organisation, or this conference, that Russia now wants is going to do anything to establish, say, in Germany, a democracy, and to clear away misunderstandings, and to get the people to grasp what they are fighting for and how they can get it, what is there that will justify the Government refusing to allow an opportunity to be given to the power of reason to make peace instead of trusting only to the uncertain power of war. I hope, therefore, that the conference will be allowed, and that all facilities will be given by the Government to delegates appointed to it. In asking that I do assure the House, as I have said already, that this stupid tittle-tattle, believed in by people whose credulity is out of all proportion to their reasoning, that these are mere German wire-pullings, is absolutely ridiculous. Who was to preside over the Stockholm conference which has been condemned so much? I venture to say that the Noble Lord will agree with me when I say that of all leaders of political parties in the neutral States of Europe Mr. Branting has been the most loyal to the Allied cause. I have conversed with Mr. Branting, and I know his opinions. That man was going to preside over this "pro-German" conference, and not only that, but he was going to gather information from the delegates during ten days before the conference opens, in order to find out the state of mind of the belligerent nations. The whole thing is non-sense, and should receive the strongest condemnation of every right-thinking man. I have ventured to say that of the Stockholm conference because I do know what is going on, and newspaper writers seem to have distinguished themselves by not knowing anything about it. I know quite well that the circumstances of this Debate are very unfortunate, and that it is awkward to move an Amendment like this to the Third Reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill; but Members will know that my hon. Friends are using the forms of the House in the only way that they can be used. I hope hon. Members will not examine with microscopic exactness the words of the Motion. We want to make it quite clear to the people of Russia that we do share their sentiments on this matter, and sharing their sentiments we can begin to discuss how far they are to be applied and how far the practical problems of the world modify them and twist them into the actual circumstances of the world. This War is to be ended by an abiding peace only if there is a spirit of good will. Perhaps this House will allow me to finish by referring to an incident which happened to my own self once. I went out to South Africa in 1902. I found myself one night under a roof that had been battered and broken and smashed by our Army. I was the guest of a man who had some very precious domestic possessions, including a very fine classical and legal library. He took me by the hand when I went into his house and, almost broken-hearted, pointed out to me how his books had been used during his absence and how the leaves had been torn out and left charred and burned, having been used for lighting pipes and cigars by the soldiers. My heart was full of indignation because in those days I was called a pro-Boer and I had suffered the humiliation and indignity of having meetings broken up, and his heart was full of indignation because he had been leading against us in the field and had been one of the most successful generals against us and his cause seemed lost. My host in 1902 was your guest of last night within these walls. [Cheers.]

I appeal to this House to recognise the change the Russian Revolution has made to Europe. There is now a great opportunity of showing the same spirit, the same good will and the same determination to settle this War in the way that the South African situation was finally straightened up, and which enabled a very distinguished Boer general to become, in the short space of fifteen years, a very honoured guest of the British Parliament.

The speech to which we have just listened was, if I may say so without impertinence, couched in a tone which was well fitted to the gravity of the occasion, and was certainly open to no criticism so far as its tone and expression were concerned from anyone sitting on this bench. The hon. Member began his speech by saying that the object of this Amendment was to get rid of suspicion in the mind of the Russian Council of Workmen. I quite recognise the difficulties raised by the forms of the House, but the hon. Member will recognise that it is a little doubtful whether to put down an Amendment to the Third Reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill, an Amendment which must be rejected if the business of the country is to be carried on, is really a very good way of allaying that suspicion. Here is an Amendment couched in words, as the hon. Member has told the House, taken from pronouncements by the Council of Workmen. It must be rejected by the House, and it may cause some difficulty in Russia when that fact becomes to be known. I do not believe that there is anybody in the House who would seriously quarrel with the Amendment as explained by the hon. Member for Leicester (Mr. Ramsay Macdonald). We, at any rate, have constantly said—my right hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Asquith) has said so on more than one occasion—that we entered upon this War with no scheme—what is it?—of Imperialistic conquest or aggrandisement. There was no such idea in the mind of any single British citizen when we entered upon this War, and though I am not wishing to descend to verbal criticism, I am not quite clear what is meant by the exact phrase of Imperialistic conquest and aggrandisement. I do not think it would be going too far to say that at the present stage of the War it is equally true that no one desires anything of that kind.

I am bound to deal with this Amendment not only as expounded by the hon. Member for Leicester, but also as expounded by the hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr. Snowden), who introduced it, and who, as the Mover, as indeed was quite proper, made the more important and more elaborate speech. If the object of the hon. Member was to conciliate opposition and promote agreement in this House, I cannot say that I think the phrases and the tone which he adopted were those which were precisely most calculated to achieve his object. In particular, the hon. Member, if he will allow me to say so, was perhaps afflicted with the disease of omniscience during the greater part of his speech. He told us, for instance, that the Italian Socialists were all united.

No. I said that, though there had been divisions in their ranks during the War, they were now practically united.

Well, practically united. I always understood that there were two very distinct parties among the Italian socialists, the independent socialists, and the official socialists, and that the independent socialists were as warm adherents of the warlike policy of Italy as any Italian subjects who could be found. I do not want to discuss the internal politics of an allied country, but I believe it to be an entire delusion to suppose that the weight of Italian socialist opinion is of a pacifist description. He also seemed to be very confident as to the exact desire and policy of the German socialists. I am sceptical. He said he knew exactly what Herr Scheidemann meant and said. It is very difficult to know what Herr Scheidemann means or wants, if you are only to go by what is reported in the Press. He read out a statement—I do not know exactly where it came from—of the policy which I understood him to say was the policy of the German socialist party as a whole. My recollection of Herr Scheidemann's speech is very much less definite than that. All I know about it, and all I know about the majority of the Socialists in Germany, is that so far they have supported their Government right through, that they have refused to condemn even the worst atrocities, and that they have made no protest against such things as the Armenian massacres; and I see no reason whatever, so far as their public action is concerned, to distinguish between what they have done and said and what has been done and said by the rest of the German nation. There was one other observation which he made. He said that he thought that the agreement for the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia—I am not sure whether I apprehended him rightly, but he will correct me if I did not—was the origin of the Russian Revolution. I really cannot think that he meant that.

Really, if the right hon. Gentleman had intended to reply to the observations that I made, he might have listened to me a little more carefully, because so far every reference that he has made to what I said has been quite inaccurate. What I did say was that the declaration by Trepoff in December of the secret treaty with regard to Constantinople was the first rumblings of the Revolution.

According to my reading of what has happened in Russia, it would be difficult to imagine anything more grotesque. The hon. Member then went on to ask the Government two questions. The first question was: Are the old treaties—by which he means, I understand, the treaty concluded with Russia before the Revolution—still binding on this country? Well, Sir, they are binding upon this country. There is no doubt about that. It is, of course, possible for the new Russian Government to say that it does not wish that any particular engagement which we have undertaken on behalf of Russia shall be fulfilled. They can release the rest of the Allies from any particular undertaking, but until that is done we are bound in honour to carry out our engagements not only with Russia but with the rest of the Allies. I should be very sorry indeed if there was any doubt thrown by any reasonable politician in this country on that principle, which I regard as the foundation of good faith and the foundation of the possibility of sincere dealing between one country and another. I was asked—this is the real substance of what the hon. Member and, indeed, all of those who support the Amendment have said—do we accept the declared policy of the new Russian Government? I am going to do my best to answer that. I want, in the first place, to say that I was exceedingly glad to hear from the hon. Member for Leicester a very eloquent passage in which he described the work and methods of the Russian Revolutionists. My colleagues, who are more influential than I am, have often expressed the feelings of the Government with regard to the Revolution. There is no difference in any part of the House in regard to that. Whatever there may be in store for Russia in history, she will, at any rate, have the credit of having carried through, by practically the unanimous wish, so far as an outsider is permitted to judge, of the whole of her people and of every class of her people, a revolution which has been stained with far less bloodshed than any movement comparable with it in size. I am anxious to make that clear, because, of course, in dealing with this declaration possibly some phrase might escape me which would appear to be a criticism. I am anxious to avoid any chance of that being said. It is quite true that the phrase which is thought to crystallise the new policy is the phrase, "No annexation and no indemnity." The hon. Member for Leicester says that the word "annexation" is a mistranslation, or at any rate a completely wrong version of what is meant. I am disposed, so far as I can form a judgment, to agree with him. But it is well to realise what the real policy of "no annexation" would mean. Just consider what it really would mean. Take Arabia. Arabia has declared its independence from Turkey. I do not know whether that would amount to an annexation of territory. [An HON. MEMBER: "That is independence!"] No human being would suggest that we should use our power or influence to place Arabia again under the domination of Turkey. Take Armenia. I do not know whether it is yet realised what Armenia really meant and what crimes were committed upon Armenia. Here is a statement which says:

"Of the 1,800,000 Armenians who were in the Ottoman Empire two years ago, 1,200,000 have been either massacred or deported. Those who were massacred died under abominable tortures, but they escaped the longer agonies of the deported. Men, women and children without food or other provisions for the journey, without protection from the climate, regardless of age or weakness or disease, were driven from their homes and made to march as long as their strength lasted or until those who drove them drowned or massacred them in batches. Some died of exhaustion or fell by the way; some survived a journey of three months and reached the deserts and swamps along the middle Euphrates. There they have been abandoned and are dying now of starvation, disease and exposure."

I am afraid they are dead now, because this was written some months ago.

"A recent report tells of a group of survivors at Abu Herrera, mostly women, children, and a few old men who had been without food for seven days."

Any change, even the most Imperialistic annexation, would be of benefit to the people who suffered such crimes as that. Take the case of Syria and Palestine. Although in Syria the numbers are not so great, yet there, in substance, the same thing has taken place.

May I read to the House a description given by Dr. Hoskyns, the head of the American Mission at Beirout:

"His description of the situation was appalling and confirms all our reports: The people of the Lebanon and the Syrian Moslems subjected to an absolutely ruthless reign of terror since eight months ago, and being starved to death. A conservative estimate was 80,000 in the Lebanon killed in this way when Dr. Hoskyns left, and the rate of deaths was growing by geometrical progression. All the leading men deported, hanged, or in exile, with their properties confiscated and their relations in the hands of the Turks."

I could read a great deal more. I have just been reading the same story quite recently about the Jewish population in Palestine. I confess I have some hesitation in denouncing annexation if it means, as one hon. Member seemed to think it meant, that no territory which has been taken by force during this War is not to be restored to its original owners. If that is what is meant, then I am certainly unable to accept the policy of no annexation. If the phrase is used in the sense described by the hon. Member for Leicester, then I quite agree that a very different state of things arises, and so far as I am concerned I shall have very little objection to subscribing to the principle there enunciated. The favourite example referred to is that of the German African colonies. I do not want to be misunderstood. I do not say that we attacked the conquered German African colonies in order to rescue the native from misgovernment. We did it as part of the War against Germany. I do not say—because I have as profound a horror of war as any hon. Members who have spoken—that it would have been right in any circumstances to go to war in order to rescue the African population from misgovernment by Germany. The horrors of war are so great that I should myself hesitate to recommend entering upon a war for that kind of purpose, because, on the whole, the balance of misery would probably be against it. But, having rescued them, are you to hand them back? That is a very different question which requires to be carefully considered. Just let me read one or two descriptions, because I am not sure that this is always realised. This, for instance, is from a description given to us this year as to the treatment of carriers in German East Africa:

"The treatment of carriers lately by the Germans has been terrible; their carriers include our Indian soldier prisoners of war, and many wretched villagers, young boys, old men and women—in fact, they catch those who cannot run away. They chain them together and just work them until they die of starvation and exhaustion. In following upon Wahle's track from Walangali to Lupembe we kept finding dead and dying carriers. Nor after an action do they trouble any more about their wounded Askari, but just leave them to die."

That is not the only case. I have here the admission of the state of things in German East Africa. I will not read it. It is very little different from what I have read. That is not the only thing. That is not anything new. That has always been the way the Germans have treated the natives. I will not weary the House with many quotations, but let me just read one more. This is one from a report made in 1909, long before the War, with regard to German South-West Africa.

"The great aim of German policy in German South-West Africa as regards the native, is to reduce him to a state of serfdom, and, where he resists, to destroy him altogether. The native, to the German, is a baboon and nothing more. The war against the Hereros, conducted by General Trotha, was one of extermination; hundreds—men, women and children—were driven into desert country, where death from thirst was their end; those left over are now in great locations near Windhuk, where they eke out a miserable existence; labour is forced upon them and, naturally, unwillingly performed.

Again with the Hottentots—their treatment is still more barbarous, as the Germans are fully determined to root out that race, lock, stock and barrel. As one example of their treatment, I will quote what happened during the War on Shark Island. This small island was divided across by high barbed wire, and as many Hottentot prisoners as could be got were shut in here. These literally died of starvation and exposure, and daily a wagon was sent across and returned laden with corpses:"

I do not know, of course, and it is impossible to say what we may not be forced to do at the end of the War, but if there is any measure of success, I confess I should regard with horror the idea of returning natives who have been freed from a Government of that kind. These are the extreme cases. They are not the only cases. What about Poland? I think we are all agreed that it is desirable to set up an independent Poland. Is there to be no annexation there?

Broadly I agree, if that is what you mean, but annexation has not that meaning in the English language, and we are discussing an English Debate. I only want to get things perfectly clear.

I am afraid the hon. Member has not followed my argument. The hon. Member for Blackburn will bear me out that he certainly said he thought it was conveniently summed up in the phrase "no annexation and no indemnity." I will not elaborate the case of Poland, because we seem all to be agreed; but what about Alsace-Lorraine? Are you to say really that Germany, having taken two provinces from France, they shall not be restored. Take Italia irredenta. Are we really to commit ourselves to the proposition that, under no circumstances, would we restore to Italy provinces populated by Italians? I should regret any acceptance of short, misleading phrases. The hon. Member (Mr. Whyte) referred to another phrase, "No peace with the Hohenzollerns." There is a great deal in that that is very attractive to any ordinary British mind, but at the same time I agree with him that it is too attractive to be quite true—at any rate, to be quite prudent as a definition of national policy. It is one thing to be against conquest which without reason and against the will of the population transfers territory from one sovereignty to another.

There is no purpose of transferring Ireland to another sovereignty. I sometimes wish there was.

I apologise and withdraw anything I have said. All I wish to press on my hon. Friend below the Gangway and those who are attracted by these phrases is that, after all, it may be quite true, as I said just now, that it would not be a good ground to go to war to accomplish acts of justice and reparation such as I have described, yet, having attained them by war, it is quite a different thing to ask us to resign and abandon fruits which everyone must recognise are in themselves desirable achievements. That is the limitation which I should wish to put upon my assent, as far as it is assent, to the phrase, "No annexation." Then about no indemnity. I am not quite sure that I understand what is meant by that, but for us to talk about not wishing for any indemnity seems to me perhaps a little more difficult. What about Belgium? Does the hon. Member say no indemnity for Belgium?

No, we have repeatedly, in former Debates, expressed our view of that matter, and we have always demanded as an essential part of any settlement the restoration of Belgium, not only restoration of its independence, but the restoration of all the damage that has been done.

Then what about Serbia? Does the hon. Member's principle cover Serbia also? And what about the Northern provinces of France? Those are all covered, I understand. Are we to rule out definitely all reparation for the destruction of peaceful merchant vessels by submarines? I am certainly not prepared to do that. Therefore, I should like to know exactly what these phrases mean before I give my assent or the assent of the Government to their adoption. Then the hon. Member said the Allied Governments should re-write their reply to President Wilson and issue a Note in very different terms, and he proceeded to give what appeared to me to be the description of the Note which I have read in German papers, but which is altogether at variance with the terms of the Note itself.

The interpretation I put upon the Note was that put upon it by M. Miliukoff, the Russian Foreign Minister.

I have not got what M. Miliukoff said before me, and I should like to study it before I accept the interpretation of what he said. The Note only deals with this part of the question in a very few lines. I should like to know which of the statements in what I am going to read are disagreed with by the hon. Member:

"These war aims will only be set forth in detail, with all the compensations and equitable indemnities for harm suffered, at the moment of negotiation. But the civilised world kuows that they imply, necessarily and first of all, the restoration of Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro, with the compensations due to them.—',

So far I understand there is no dispute.

"The evacuation of the invaded territories in France, in Russia, in Roumania, with just reparation.—"

No dispute yet, I imagine.

"The reorganisation of Europe, guaranteed by a stable regime, and based at once on respect for nationalities and on the right to full security and liberty of economic development possessed by all peoples, small and great, and at the same time upon territorial conventions and international settlements such as to guarantee land and sea frontiers against unjustified attack: the restitution of provinces formerly torn from the Allies by force or against the wish of the inhabitants.—"

These are the general aims. I am waiting to hear which of the general aims are in dispute.

"The liberation of the Italians, as also of the Slavs Rumanes, and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination—"

All that is said is the liberation of these races from alien domination, and the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks. Then, I suppose, we come to the one statement which is objected to by the hon. Member.

Then the hon. Member (Mr. Lees Smith) said we ought to enter upon negotiations. I thought my hon. Friends (Mr. Whyte and Mr. Mackinder) answered very well that at this moment it would not be desirable for us to ask for terms of peace from Germany. There is a well-known French saying—it arose on a discussion with regard to capital punishment, and the reply was, "Que messieurs les assassins commencent!"—let the murderers begin. But certainly, to judge from the German Chancellor's speech, there is no inclination on the part of the Germans even to state what terms of peace they are ready to accept. I am not going to say much about that speech. As far as I can see, what is happening in Germany now is what has happened in every domestic crisis in that country for the last forty or fifty years. We have had it over and over again. A popular movement, a popular demand for some reform or some act of justice, an appearance by the Government that they are going to yield or make terms; a protest, generally couched in very offensive terms, from the Junker party, and the immediate surrender by the Government to the Junkers. That appears to me to be exactly what has happened and what is the real meaning of Bethmann-Hollweg's speech in the Reichstag the other day, and until that spirit has been exorcised from Germany it appears to me to be ludicrous, apart from its want of dignity, to suggest that we should ask for terms from the German Emperor. The hon. Member (Mr. Snowden) said that Russia's mind was now on peace. I believe all our minds are on peace. There is no man who likes war, unless he is a lunatic fit only for an asylum. But we, at any rate, of the Allies are determined not to accept a peace which will be no peace. It must be peace, just and durable. The hon. Member spoke warmly of the project for a league of nations. I am a great adherent of the idea of a league of nations, but before you can hope to establish such a league, before even in the most sanguine mind there can be the slightest expectation of its success, you must first establish a sound, just, equitable peace. The hon. Member quoted some phrases about patriotism used by an hon. Friend of mine. I think the last word on that subject was said by Miss Cavell when she was under sentence of death. She said, "Patriotism is not enough." I agree. You do not want less than patriotism. You want more. You want to add to it—and this must be the foundation of any peace that we make—justice, chivalry, respect for obligations, and respect for the weak; and if we can secure a peace founded on those central doctrines, I shall be glad to co-operate with any hon. Member of the House to erect what barriers may be possible against the recurrence of a devastating war such as this.

While I entirely agree with my Noble Friend that it is unfortunate, owing to the defects in our forms of Parliamentary procedure, that it should have been at all necessary to move an Amendment to the Third Reading of a Bill which I am sure the House desires to see passed with unanimity, yet I think I am also in agreement with him when I say that I think this has been both a useful and an instructive Debate. I do not refer so much to the excellence of some of the speeches to which we have listened, though perhaps I may refer without being invidious—because they represented, it seemed to me, with admirable cogency and moderation divergent points of view—to the speech of the hon. Member for Perth (Mr. F. Whyte), one of the most interesting speeches to which I have listened for a very long time, and the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester (Mr. Ramsay Macdonald). But what to me—and I think to the House—is more important is that, in my judgment, after listening to most of the speeches that have been made, they appear to me to show not an acute division but a general agreement upon principles in all quarters of the House. I agree with my Noble Friend that it would be most unfortunate if the impression were to be conveyed by the rejection of this Amendment to our friends in Russia that we were in any way abating the sympathy, the intense sympathy, with Which we have watched the progress of that memorable Revolution in which the Russian democracy has, we hope, firmly and finally emancipated itself. With the objects of that Revolution, and in the main, so far as outsiders can judge, with the methods and procedure by which it has been carried out, the people of this country have felt, without any appreciable division, complete and lively sympathy and accord. I think we may go further—I am sure we can go further—and say that we are equally in sympathy, so far as we understand and realise them, with the general purport of the announcements which the new Russian Government has made as to their views on the aims of the War and the conditions of a durable peace.

The phrase to which my Noble Friend has adverted, "No annexation," which appears in some of the Russian declarations, has, perhaps through the imperfection of the international vocabulary, not in my opinion been perfectly or generally apprehended. I do not believe myself that it was used in any different sense by the responsible leaders and rulers of the new Russian régime than the sense in which we should be prepared to subscribe to it here. Let me supplement, if I may, what my Noble Friend has so admirably said, by pointing out to the House the different senses in which that ambiguous phrase may be interpreted and understood. After listening to this Debate, I think the House will find that there are at least four different senses in which the word "annexation" in this connection may be properly employed. In the first place, there may be annexation, and there will be annexation, if tins War is to result in a durable and honourable peace, which consists in the emancipation of enthralled and oppressed populations from the despotism and sufferings under which they have hitherto laboured. My Noble Friend has given a concrete illustration of that form of annexation. Not only is it legitimate; not only does it commend itself to our conscience and to our intelligence but the purposes for which we drew the sword in this War would either not be accomplished at all or accomplished most inadequately unless annexation in that sense of emancipation were thoroughly carried out by the Allies. That is the first sense in which the word may be understood, and I am perfectly sure that neither my hon. Friends who sit below the Gangway, and who are responsible for this Amendment, nor, as I believe, the members of the new Russian Executive, would for a moment protest against annexation which was needed for that purpose.

There is a second sense, or rather a second purpose, in which it seems to me that annexation is not only legitimate, but necessary, and that is for the union of artificially separated nationalities. For that purpose it is not necessary to show—though you generally can show—that the separated part is suffering from actual oppression. Take the case of the Trentino, what is called Italia Irredenta. I do not know that there is any special case to be made out of actual misgovernment in the Trentino. The laws are probably fairly just and equitably administered, but we should be false to all our traditions, as well as to the declared objects on which we embarked in this struggle if we were prepared to deny that annexation which is needed for the purpose of bringing together into a coherent political entity and unity all the people who are artificially separated, but who in religion, in race, and tradition are one, is annexation of a kind which need not trouble the conscience, but which is indeed required to satisfy the dictates of the conscience of the civilised world. There is a third sense in which it appears to me that annexation may well be justified. It may be needed—I am purposely not going to survey the actual field of war for the purpose of selecting concrete instances of annexation —for the purpose of the transference of sovereignty or territory which may be needed for the purpose of maintaining strategic positions which are shown to be necessary not for aggression but for the purpose of self-protection and defence against future attack. I purposely guard myself by saying that it can only be justified if you can show from the experience which you have gained in the War that unless you hold these positions you are liable, and constantly liable, to aggression yourselves, and to the necessity of drawing the sword, which is what we all want to avoid. I agree you must be most scrupulous and careful in the application of that principle, but that there are and that there may conceivably be cases in which the transfer of territory would be justifiable for that purpose seems to me to stand for common sense. All these three forms of annexation may be perfectly legitimate, and when the Russian Government protest that we should join them against annexation it must mean annexation in the limited sense of the fourth sense in which I suggest the word may be used, namely, conquest for the sake of expansion of territory and of political and economic aggrandisement. With regard to annexation in that sense, I believe there is no man in this House or in this country, and I am certain there is no Power among the Allies who is prepared either to practise or to justify it.

Is there then, really, when the ground is explored and these ambiguities are removed, any practical difference between us and still less between us and our friends of the democracy of Russia in regard to the general lines on which peace should be considered? I do not believe there is. I adhere, as far as I am personally concerned—and I believe that when I used the language which has been quoted I was expressing the opinion not only of the Government but of the country—to the short and summary formulation which I made within the first two or three months of the War of the purposes for which we were fighting. I agree with my Noble Friend that, so far as I can discover, there is no substantial, and I doubt whether there is any verbal discrepancy, between that general summary which I then gave and the more detailed terms of the Note which was presented by the Allies. I am sure that on the concrete translation of the two things into practice there will be no difference. So long as we can confine ourselves within these limits which proved themselves at the time, and I am sure as the War has gone on, have proved themselves with increasing force to this country, to the Allies and now to America, and indeed to all the civilised world, absolutely essential for the future conduct of international relations, I am perfectly certain we can pursue the War with a good conscience, and regard a peace based upon that foundation as the only kind of peace which will justify the sacrifices which we and our fellow countrymen have made.

I will only add this, that I share to the full the views which my Noble Friend expressed that, subject to those limitations, there is no effort which we ought to spare, or which believe we shall spare, to obtain a prompt and a lasting peace. I read the speech which is reported in the papers to-day of the German Chancellor, I am bound to admit with surprise, with disappointment, and with profound regret, which appears to me to indicate that after an intestine struggle in which the forces have been sharply arrayed in conflict one against the other, those who are responsible for the conduct of German policy have abandoned finally the counsels of moderation and reason, and are determined to pursue to the end the wicked nefarious course on which three years ago they deliberately embarked. There is no sign of abatement or relaxation. So long as that is the case, we should be false to the cause which we took up, and, what is to my mind even worse, we should be treacherous to the memory of those who have died and are dying to make that cause triumphant, and we should be guilty in a double sense, if we allowed ourselves to falter or relapse by a hair's breadth in the determination to pursue the struggle and in our readiness to encounter willingly and gladly the increasing sacrifices which it will demand.

The Horse has listened with the greatest pleasure to the two speeches which have just been delivered. I confess myself that I prefer the speech of the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs to that of the Leader of the Opposition. It appeared to me that the question which is really before us today was more apparent in the speech of the Under-Secretary. We must remember that to-day our gallery is the Council of Workmen and Soldiers Delegates of Petrograd. They are the people to whom this Debate will be addressed, and it is their decision upon this Debate that is of vital importance to the British Empire. I hope that my hon. Friends opposite will not pursue this Debate to a Division, not because I mind in the least if they get their half-dozen or dozen men into the Lobby with them, but because I know that no sooner will the Division be taken than the news will be wired over to Russia, that only a half-dozen or a dozen men in this House agreed with the Russian position, taken up in their declaration, and no news could be more fatal to our prospects in this War. It is our business to remember that every word which we say now is addressed to Russia, because of the critical position existing at the present time. We must realise what it will mean in carrying on the War if Russia effects a separate peace. We shall not merely have the whole strength of the German Army against us on the Western front, we shall have to bear the weight of an offensive immeasurably greater than any offensive to which we have been subjected hitherto. The mere fact that if Russia makes a separate peace the whole food supplies of Russia will be thrown open to Germany, thereby enabling her to carry on indefinitely, is a fact of enormous importance and vital seriousness to this country at the present time. Therefore, I do beg that the Government will see, if not by speech in this House yet through the ordinary diplomatic channels, that an assurance is conveyed to the new Russian Government, which is now in coalition with the Council of Workmen and Soldiers Delegates of our appreciation, not merely of the Russian Revolution—of course, we all agree with that—but of our agreement with the statement of the terms for which they and we are fighting this War.

I thought that all that part of the Under-Secretary's speech which dealt with the word "annexation," the liberation of the people who wanted to be liberated, and even his argument on colonial so-called annexation, was better framed to meet the needs of the situation than the statement of the case as read out from the minute which was sent to America some four months ago. It is not merely the question of clearing the Turks bag and baggage out of Europe, which to my mind is dangerous. There were also, as is perfectly well known, the support which it gives to the Junkers in Germany in their assertions that we demand the break-up of the Austrian Empire. I listened to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Perth (Mr. Whyte) and the hon. Member for Glasgow with great pleasure. They took one back to the old days of '48. I too—

I have absolutely no patience with the school which says no peace with the Hohenzollern. The right thing to do is to show the German people that they can have peace now on decent, honourable terms, that we shall look upon their needs from the point of view of justice and chivalry, and without ideas of self-aggrandisement, and once the German people believe that they can get peace on those terms we shall have in Germany the move which we all look for as an outcome of this War. Herr Scheidemann has said in the Reichstag that if England and France would agree to the Russian terms there would be a revolution in Germany if the German. Government did not accept those terms. I want a revolution in Germany more even than I want German East Africa. I am prepared to fall in with Herr Scheidemann's views as far as possible in that direction, so that we may induce a sufficient number of the Majority Socialists in Germany to drift over into the Minority camp.

I come to the real difficulty of the situation. As the late Prime Minister said, all of us in this House have debated the War to-night from a more united point of view than has ever before been the case. There has been more agreement in all the speeches, except perhaps in the speech of the hon. Member for Glasgow, but the general consensus of opinion is that it is our moral duty to agree with the Russian terms, and at the same time there is the feeling that the extension of our Colonial Empire is absolutely necessary for the benefit of mankind. In some of us it is strong and in some of us it is weak, but it is present in the speech of the hon. Member for Blackburn, just as in the speech of the hon. Member for Glasgow.

We all hate to give up what we have won. We all have a desire to base ourselves on right and justice and somehow to combine the two. It is English, and it. has made our Empire in the past, and I feel that it would require an enormous amount of self-sacrifice on our part to say now, "We will give back to Germany all the German colonies. We will surrender what we have won in order to make peace." It is a sacrifice, but if it is necessary to end the War I am prepared to contemplate it if necessary; but I think that there is a way out. We know that we do not want to give back the native races to German rule. I suppose that there is no one in this House who is more of a Negrophile than myself, and I should hate to see the natives of German East Africa handed back to German rule. Even more should I hate to see the Herreros, the Hottentots, or the people of the Kameruns put back under German rule. But I think that most of us have a still stronger objection to handing back these German African colonies. We know—they have told us often enough in Germany —that this is only the first punic war, and we are the Carthagenians. If that is so, it does behove us to see that we do not start the next war without the advantage with which we started this War. We are terrified, and every Englishman must be terrified, lest they should build up in these German colonies overseas submarine bases which would wipe out our colonies throughout the whole world at the beginning of the next war. The position did not exist at the beginning of this War; but it does exist now, and that is the real basis of our fear of giving back the German colonies. There is also, particularly amongst those who have fought with the black troops in German colonies, the real fear that they might build up a black army, which might walk through Africa. Undoubtedly the Askaris in East Africa were the most formidable forces of black troops that I have ever seen, and most of the people who have fought with them would agree with me on that point. Both these dangers are before us.

Is there not a possibility of safeguarding the situation and yet safeguarding the face of the German nation by internationalising the tropic colonies in Africa? It seems to me that if the Germans gave up the same area as we gave up, and the French gave up, and also the Belgians, and the Portuguese, possibly, and you put that area as a belt right across Africa, under international control, preferably with an American executive head so that every nation could trade alike in that area and the blacks would be treated with the greatest possible consideration, as they always are treated by the Americans—because after all the Philippines are possibly better run under America than are the best of our Colonies—you will safeguard the native races and at the same time prevent that scrambling for raw materials coming from tropical Africa which exists at the present time. That is a solution which I think we may regard as a possibility, provided that the War does not go much more successfully than it has been going latterly—a possibility of getting fair terms of peace, which would satisfy the Russian democracy, the people of Germany, and at the same time not be a danger to the British Empire.

I am sure the House will agree with the hon. and gallant Member who has just spoken that we must be grateful, whatever our views on this question may be, for the very large measure of unanimity in all quarters of the House on some of the most important aspects of the subject under discussion. I am quite sure, for my own part, that if the Noble Lord, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, could have only put what he was saying into a little different language, on most points he would have been able to meet the hon. Member who moved the resolution in the way which he desired. His objections were chiefly to words which are not in the resolution and which are capable of interpretation in various senses. It was quite clear from his speech that he personally, and as he told us, the whole country, agreed in desiring to repudiate any distorted motives of imperialistic aggrandisement and selfish conquest. What I do feel we need to make clearer is that this object which we all have in view—a just peace which shall be for the good of Europe and the world, as well as of our own Empire—should be really understood not only by the great democracy of Russia, but by the growing mass of opinion in Germany, which is making itself more and more vocal as the months go by. The late Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith) alluded to a speech recently made in the Reichstag by the German Chancellor. I think we must all agree with him in regretting that the Chancellor was not able on that occasion to make clear that he also did not stand for any selfish policy; but it was quite evident that although he was not able to make the declaration which we should have wished, which would have brought peace nearer, he did not dare, on the other hand, to make a contrary declaration. He was balancing between two parties and trying to say nothing which should offend either, thus leaving the door open in the future for a more satisfactory statement. It is clear from his speech that he and the German Government were using, and still more the German militarist party were using, the uncertainty which still prevails in the minds of the German people as to the real object of this country, as a reason for encouraging the German people to go on with the War. If only the German people could know what is in the minds of our leaders, if only they could understand the real object—which every speaker in this Debate has endorsed —which we have before us, can anyone doubt that peace would be made appreciably nearer?

What we are asking is that the Government should make just this clear declaration, which has already been made in Russia, which shall strengthen the hands of all in Germany who are longing for a just peace, who are realising the wrong of a continuance of this War, and who are glowing indignant with everyone in their own country who insists that it should go on until there is some great victory. We can do nothing but good by making some such declaration. I do not wish to traverse the ground that was taken by the Noble Lord in his speech. It would be easy to follow point after point, but I do wish just to say that I am quite convinced that those who put their names to this Resolution did not mean to imply that the policy which they advocated would not mean the liberation of these subject and brave people of whom we speak. We all unitedly desire their liberation and freedom. If it were a suitable thing that one should go over each point seriatim, we could easily show other ways in which one after another of the difficulties which have been raised could be met without giving to the German people the notion that we intend to dismember their ally, Austria, or to crush their nationality and fetter them for the future. The German Chancellor has told his people in the Reichstag that their sons are fighting for the existence of the nation. Now that is an absolute misunderstanding of the position because no one here wishes to question the existence of German nationality or their right to a noble and great part in the fellowship of the nations of the future. Let us do our best now to remove that misunderstanding.

I think it is a thing for which we must be profoundly thankful that we should have had so little to-day of ill-feeling in any quarter of the House, because one knows that a theme like this must stir the very deepest feelings when we realise the immense sacrifice which has already been made, and that hardly anyone in this House has not been touched by the sorrow that has fallen on home after home throughout the country. I am glad that we have been reminded that the objects which the Russian people have sent forth to the world in their manifesto—the objects which this Resolution sets forth—are entirely in harmony with the noble ideals which the brave men who have fallen went forth to maintain. We know that at the outset of this War men went out to protect the ideals of justice and freedom, to protect small nations from oppression, to protest against the forcible annexation of one people, against its will, by a greater, and now after years of darkness there has come to us a great gleam of light. First of all, there are the noble series of manifestoes made by President Wilson, culminating in the great address in which he announced the entry of the United States into the War—a series of manifestoes which recall to us the memory of the early days and the great ideals with which England went into the War—and point us to the great ideal to be wrought out in the future, the ideal of a league of nations to defend the right and prevent injustice and avoid the futility, the cruelty, and the wrong of future wars. Then there came the still greater gleam of light in the news of the Russian Revolution, which sent a thrill of joy through the heart of every democrat, not only in the Allied countries, but, I believe in Germany and Austria, too, and which gave a new hope to the world because, as has been well said already, the Russian Revolution was a manifestation of a great spiritual force. It was an assurance to the world that spiritual forces—the forces of great ideals—are stronger than the power even of the most corrupt and formidable despotism—the despotism which they overthrew.

8.0 P.M.

Surely we should restate now, if not by a declaration across the floor of the House, in the near future by a carefully-worded manifesto, the aims and objects which the Allies have in view, in the light of these two new great facts—namely, the entry into the War of America in order to maintain justice and establish a league of nations, and the equally great and helpful fact of the Russian Revolution. which has removed from the minds of the German people the menace which they constantly had before them that if they did not go on fighting their civilisation would be overwhelmed by an autocratic power which represented to them all the forces of darkness. The German democrat no longer fears Russia. His reason for continuing the fight has very largely disappeared, and it will entirely disappear if France and Great Britain and the other Allies can join with Russia in the declaration which she has made. I think this Debate itself has shown that the Allies' terms as announced in the Proclamation of January were so vague that they were inevitably understood in different senses in different countries and by different schools of thought. I must admit that I myself read them still in a different sense from that of my hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr. Snowden). I do not consider that they necessarily mean the dismemberment of Austria. I have never considered it, and I rejoice to think that there was sufficient vagueness in the terms to make it possible for the Allies not to insist on the Russian occupation of Constantinople, which was the interpretation at the time placed in Germany upon the Note as issued in January. Those two instances alone show how much misunderstanding there has been which can be removed, and which ought to be removed. But with the coming of Russia to its freedom the need for vagueness in the Note has very largely disappeared. It was necessary no doubt that the Note should be put forward in a form which would cover both the maximum and the minimum terms that the Allies had in view. The maximum terms they had in view before the Russian Revolution were necessarily, in order to meet the demands of the Czar, far higher than they need be now. That is a fact that must be taken into account, and it ought to be realised in Germany and in Austria as well as here. But I want, if I may, not just to deal with the urgent need for such a restatement in the light of these facts, but to speak of the still greater need for an effort to get a mutual understanding, to dispel the misunderstandings that are born of hatred and ill-will, in the light of the bitter need of Europe.

We realise too little here in this country, far from the actual scene of war, what the awful suffering means in the countries in which war is going on, the terrible loss of life which was alluded to only the other day by General Smuts when he told us that 8,000,000 men in the prime of life had already fallen. And if we think not merely of the 8,000,000 who are dead, but of the equal number who are maimed and blinded and mutilated, and the still greater number seriously wounded, we can draw for ourselves a faint picture at least of the misery and the anguish that the continuance of the War must mean in countless homes all through Europe. The peoples of these countries do not want to go on paying this terrible price for the fulfilment of the wishes of their statesmen and leaders. The widows and mothers, the wives and lovers, who are voiceless and voteless, are bearing perhaps the heaviest share of the burden, and if by a clear statement of our position we can shorten by one day the continuance of this horror, surely it is our duty to do it. The situation to-day is singularly like the situation which menaced the civilisation of Greece 2,000 years ago. There came a tima in the middle of that war when there was an opportunity for peace, when the envoys of Lacedæmon pleaded with the democracy of Athens that they should have a just peace, and make terms on fair conditions, and the words that they used ring across the centuries still, and they surely bring a message to us in our need to-day. I quote from Thucydides: started on its journey downhill, and were unable to control, and only imperfectly able to guide. On one side of them is a precipice. They cannot see the bottom, they cannot see the goal for the turning in the road, the car goes quicker and swifter, and they know not whither. Or perhaps they are like some student of the black art, who has conjured up by use of some book of spells, which he does not fully understand, evil spirits out of the darkness; they threaten and rise menacingly around him, and he has not the spell and cannot find the spell which will send them back to the hell from Which they have come. But surely we are not held absolutely slaves to the circumstances which surround us. The Russian Revolution itself gives us hope for the future. It gives us hope for the power, the creative and constructive power, of the forces of goodwill, the spiritual forces that are latent in the hearts of men, which are present in the warring armies in all the contending peoples, and will help us to build up that commonwealth of the nations, that free league of peace which President Wilson has advocated. I hope that the Government will see clearly that this country, too, like its Russian sister, trusts these noble and free forces of freedom, that we here seek no unworthy peace, but a noble and a generous peace which shall be for the good not merely of our own country and our own Dominions, but for the good of the whole of Europe and the whole world, which shall make it possible in future for all the peoples who unite in it to be banded together in the bonds of a fraternity which is based upon justice. If we can do that, out of the darkness and misery of this War we may go forth into a new era not only for our own country, but also for humanity.

In the Debate to-night. between my Noble Friend the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs and the hon. Member for Blackburn as to the exact meaning of the word "annexation," it seems to me the point between these two Gentlemen was this, that our common desire is that after this War no white race should be put against its will under the domination of another white race. I quite agree, of course, that that is and must be a subject of strategic consideration. But roughly, I think that proposition holds good, and it holds good especially in the East. Following on the heels of that there are two other things that seem apparent to me. Firstly, that the nation that is really going to win this War is a nation that is not going to have a revolution, and, secondly, if the Governments concerned can neither win the War nor finish the War, then ultimately the War will be ended by the action of other people or the Socialists. There is one other point which struck me as of importance, and it is that if a vote were taken to-night it would be something in the nature of a vote of censure against the Russian Revolution. We all of us here have the greatest sympathy with the Russians, whose minds are fired with the ideals before them, and I am quite sure that the last thing the hon. Member for Leicester would desire would be anything of that nature. If this War is to produce different results from other wars, it will have to be characterised by a very different ending. There is a low type of animal organism, such as the octopus, which can be cut in pieces and the separated parts still continue to clutch at objects. A Government is a body which mostly looks to the immediate necessity, and not to the future In any Government things are modified by Christianity and charity—that is to say, that in your domestic policy you have such things as old age pensions and elemosynary legislation—but when it comes to dealing with foreign affairs you have a pure-bred troglodyte, purely the spirit of the rapacious animal. If we mean that this War shall not breed other wars, you will have to consider peace from a point of view very different from what has ever been adopted before.

We have heard the argument to-night with regard to the possibility of returning the Colonies to Germany. I do not suppose that there is a Member of this House who would want to put back any of the black races under any of the tyrannies from which they suffered before this War broke out. I admit it is a question I have not studied a great deal, but it seems to me that the essential point between ourselves and the Colonies and Germany is that when this War broke out the Colonies and Dominions of the British Empire had the choice of coming in or staying out, and they came into the War. Take the case of South Africa. South Africa had been at war a very short time before, but she came into this War, I do not suppose from sheer love of us, but she entered it from large-hearted motives, and I do not believe that she came in because she wanted to win territory. I believe that aspect of the question has not been sufficiently considered in this country. Our object in this War must be to give peoples the Governments they desire. We have heard a great deal to-night about breaking up the Austrian Empire; but I must say that references of that character simply tie the hands of our fighting men, and politicians should remember that it is not words which are going to settle the War. In regard to the question of the breaking up of the Austrian Empire, let me remind the House that there are many nationalities in Austria who certainly do not like their Government but would yet prefer to have one of their own choice rather than have one appointed over their heads by the Allies.

I do not think anyone can have listened to this Debate without welcoming the sincerely friendly tone and the measure of agreement in intention if not in fact which the various speeches have shown. Still, I confess that I was profoundly disappointed when the Noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in spite of the friendly tone of his speech, was unable to give us some greater assurance of a new and revised declaration of policy than he did. I do not believe that the people who say that a new declaration is necessary realise how enormously the vast changes that have taken place in Russia have affected and altered the situation in Europe generally. It is not merely that they have changed the diplomatic situation, as undoubtedly they have, but the mere abandonment of the claim to Constantinople is obviously a change in the diplomatic situation; and, to that extent, Russia has rendered the Note of the Allies to America out of date, because that Note included Constantinople, and the interpretation put upon it by the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs clearly shows that not merely the diplomatic situation has been changed, but that it is also true that the Revolution in Russia has brought about a complete change in the spirit underlying the peoples and nations affected by this War. Everywhere it seems to me that a new spirit is abroad; everywhere people whose relations, husbands, sons, and brothers, are fighting in this terrific War, are asking themselves what are the ultimate objects which make the continuance of this War necessary? What is it that prevents nations who are now at war from coming to an honourable and a lasting peace? Nor is it surprising that the question should be put with the new spirit that is now arising in Europe Just consider the length of this War, and the suffering which it has entailed. It is now over a thousand days that this War has gone on. For a thousand days men have been giving their lives at the rate of 5,000 a day. That is the calculation which is made; that is the cost in human life that takes away the best youth of Europe. In all the thousand days not a day has passed without bringing a calamity to some home, and not a day without its fresh list of killed and wounded men, and each day has brought us fresh evidence of the horrors that are continually going on; and all through that long period of a thousand days and more there probably never has been a calamity equal to or comparable with the calamity of this War; and I say it is not surprising, therefore, that people should now be saying to themselves: What is it which makes necessary the continuance of this War? Is it really, as the Allies say, a war for the freedom of human beings, or is it possible that, like the wars of old, the War in which we are now engaged is a great struggle chiefly to gain power? Is it really dictated by lust of conquest, or by a desire of territorial aggrandisement?

It is for that reason I think that at this moment a declaration made by this country, in conjunction with our Allies, would be of enormous and incalculable value in showing what is the spirit that underlies this War. It seems to me, whatever you may say about the declarations which have been made in the past by my right hon. Friend who was Prime Minister when the War broke out, or made last January by the Allies, and whether you agree with those declarations or not, if they were correct at the time they were made they, are entirely out of harmony with the democratic spirit that has arisen right through all the countries of Europe. For that reason, in order to put this country into touch with the democratic movement, especially with the Revolutionary movement in Russia, I think that a declaration of our general policy as to the intentions. of this War and of the conditions upon which peace is possible ought now to be made. I do think it is upon Great Britain the primary responsibility lies, because it is undoubtedly the fact that Great Britain has become the protagonist of the Allies in this War. The War was started very largely because of our connection with France and ultimately with the old Russian Government. That is what originally really technically brought us into this War. We came in therefore indirectly, not as a primary combatant, but because of our entente with France and with the old Government of Russia. To-day there can be no doubt at all that on the one side you have Germany and on the other side you have Great Britain as protagonists in the War. With the tremendous naval strength of this country and the enormous Army we have created, which Army and Navy have performed such magnificent and gallant deeds, and with the tremendous financial strength we have shown, Great Britain has become the centre of the Alliance. Therefore, it does seem to me that it is upon the Government of Great Britain that the obligation rests of stating clearly, fairly, and plainly to the whole world what are the aims and the reasons which make this War necessary, and what are the conditions upon which in our judgment an honourable and lasting peace can be secured. We ask in this Motion that that declaration should be along the lines of the declarations already made by the Government of America and by the Government of Russia. I do not want to read those declarations in detail, but let me remind the House of what are the main phrases, because it is not a mere declaration against annexation or indemnity that we contemplate. We ask a declaration of the soul and spirit and intention which animates the Allies in carrying on this War and which makes us believe that the War is necessary. The United States said: made by the United States and by Russia, and it would be, in my opinion, of enormous advantage that such a declaration should be made at the earliest possible time. A declaration for that reason in that sense is necessary, in the first place, for the sake of opinion at home. No one can read what is said every day in the Press, or can even listen to the Debates that take place from time to time in this House, or go into the churches and listen to what is said by ministers from the pulpits without seeing what an enormous difference of opinion there is as to the objects for which this country is now engaged in war. I think that that difference of opinion is in itself extremely undesirable. It is desirable that there should be an authoritative expression of opinion as to what really are the objects at which we are aiming. Let me take two points. Is there any truth for the suggestion which is made here at home and continually in Germany that we aim in some way at upsetting the internal government of Germany, or that we want to get rid of the Hohenzollerns, and that what we are really aiming at is against the national independence and integrity of Germany?. Is that the object? I do not believe it is. I believe we are engaged really in a war of defence. Whatever the crimes of Germany may have been, and no one feels stronger about that than I do, and whatever the crimes of the German Government may have been, we are not concerned in exacting vengeance for those crimes by attempting to conquer in the old sense Germany as a State. We are not engaged, or we ought not to be engaged, in the humiliation of Germany, except so far as it is necessary to attain the objects for which I believe we went into the War—that is to say, the restoration and reparation to Belgium, the security of France, and various other objects spoken of in debate to-day. But whatever it be, it would be of enormous advantage to hear it authoritatively stated by the British Government.

Take the other question already referred to, the proposed dismemberment, or partial dismemberment, of the Austrian Empire. How far are we authoritatively committed or not committed to that as part of the policy of the Allies? For myself, I can imagine nothing which seems to me more impolitic, more foolish, more mad, than to make fresh trouble for ourselves by any dismemberment of that kind. What would dismemberment, or attempted dismemberment, mean? It would mean probably that we should have a new united central German Power ranged against us at a future time and trying to recover its position. It would put the Austrian Empire, or what was left of it, and the German Empire together in indissoluble unity and desire for vengeance. I do not think that that is an object that any set of statesmen ought to contemplate. We have troubles enough already without putting the dismemberment of Austria as one of the objects of this War. If that is not an object why should not the Government authoritatively make a statement to that effect? It is quite true that many of the Germans believe, rightly or wrongly—and as I read the English Press I cannot say that they have not some ground for this belief—that we are out in a sense to destroy their national existence. Many of the Austrians believe that the Allied aim is dismemberment of their Empire. The new Russian democracy are very doubtful, as I know from communications I have received, as to what are, or may be, the real aims of the Allies in these matters. On all these grounds it seems to me that a further declaration is required.

It is quite true there are great difficulties and dangers in making any such declaration. There are all sorts of questions that have to be faced. They have been described this afternoon at great length in Debate. For instance, what is meant by "annexation." As a matter of fact, the word "annexation" never occurs in the Amendment which has been moved. My hon. Friend was quite right in pointing that out, and that the Debate has turned on the meaning of a phrase which, after all, does not occur in the Amendment. What is the meaning of the phrase "annexation"? I am quite ready to admit that whoever may make a declaration in such a complicated matter will be faced with great difficulties and dangers. There is the difficulty of saying what we mean with regard to Alsace-Lorraine. Do the aims of the Allies necessarily mean that the Allies, before they make peace, must be assured that the whole of Alsace-Lorraine is to be restored to France? What about the parts of Alsace or Lorraine they wish to be restored to France which are essentially German? There are questions like that which have to be considered. There are the questions of the Colonies. I quite agree with all that has been said that we could not properly consent to put the German colonies back under a rule which was concurrently tyrannical and unjust. Here, again, there are difficulties which have to be faced, though I must say that, in my view, my hon. Friend who seconded the Amendment gave a general indication with which I find myself in entire agreement as to the sort of declaration that might be made. Whatever the dangers and difficulties of making a declaration, what I would ask the House is —I urge this point—are there no dangers and difficulties in silence? I myself believe that there are very great dangers in keeping silence at the present time. I myself believe that there is a very great and serious danger in regard to Russian public opinion, if once it is persuaded that this country is not in harmony with the general renunciation of conquest which has been made by the Government of Russia and the Government of the United States, there will be a movement for a separate peace between Russia and Germany which the Provisional Government might find it very hard to resist. At the present moment the Russian democracy looks to this country for a lead in these matters—or it has done up till lately—and it would be a deplorable thing if, after all that has been said in Russia with regard to the renunication of conquest and the new spirit in this War, we in this country should have nothing to say but repeat those old declarations made at the beginning of the War, which, at any rate, are out of date, and I believe are out of harmony with the new spirit in Russia. Then there is the influence which a declaration might have, and which I believe it would have, upon opinion in the enemy countries —in Austria and Germany. The German Chancellor in his speech yesterday was able to say that originally used at the beginning of the War by the late Prime Minister, the phrase:

I think the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down has put in very apt words the feeling which animates a great number of us who are in full sympathy with this Amendment, and that is, while we entirely subscribe to the Amendment, we have some doubt as to whether any advantage would be derived from pressing it to a Division. I think that the two hon. Members who raised this question in this Debate have done, if I may say so, a great service, and I think they have got their reward in finding that nearly every speech, perhaps with only one or two exceptions, has supported them, and supported the views expressed in that Amendment. It is quite true, as my hon. Friend below me says, that the Debate has turned largely on the word "annexation," but I think the speeches of the hon. Members who proposed and seconded the Amendment, and, I think, every other speech in support of it, have very specifically and definitely explained that annexation in the narrow sense of the word is not intended, and, in fact, is not included in the Amendment itself. The Amendment "welcomes the declaration of the new democratic Government of Russia, repudiating all proposals for Imperialistic conquest and aggrandisement." Even the Noble Lord himself, and the late Prime Minister, very specifically went out of their way to say they had no sympathy with anything in the shape of Imperialistic conquest or aggrandisement. Why then, could not the Noble Lord accept the Amendment. There is no case to argue against the Amendment. When one rises to speak, one can only more or less repeat what has been said already in favour of the Amendment, and when, as I say, most of the Government spokesmen and the Leader of the Opposition agree with the Amendment, I do think we may reasonably look forward to this very useful action on the part of the movers of this Amendment bearing fruit in the near future.

A considerable amount of reference has been made to the recent debate in the Reichstag. I think that there also we can in a sense understand why the Imperial German Chancellor made the speech which he did yesterday with reference to this very question under discussion. Considerable reference has also been made to the last Note which was presented by Germany to this country in December last, and to the misinterpretation of the Allied Note in reply to that dispatch. There may be differences of opinion, and the Noble Lord apparently repudiated the idea which was supported by the hon. Member for Glasgow that this country demanded the dismemberment of Austria. While there may be differences of opinion as to the interpretation of that Note, there was one gross inaccuracy—an inaccuracy in a statement of fact in our reply to which reference has been made before. I ventured myself on a previous occasion to refer to it, and I think a useful purpose may be served by again referring to it. It was said that Germany when she originally made that offer claimed a victory. The actual dispatch of last December from Bethmann-Hollweg, as anyone who will take the trouble to read it will find, is a most moderately-worded dispatch. The reply by the Allies to that dispatch, if my memory serves me aright, stated that it was impossible for us to enter into any negotiations because they would be sterile for two reasons: first, that Germany bad put the responsibility for initiating the War upon ourselves, and, secondly, we stated in our reply, that Germany had claimed a victory. That is grossly inaccurate, because there is not a single word about victory in the original dispatch from Germany last December. The nearest approach to anything in the way of the word "victory" was a statement to the effect that Germany had victoriously repulsed attacks. I mention that to show that, if we desire Germany to make some advance to us, we must be accurate in our statements, and not attribute to the view of Germany that which is really not the case. Surely we cannot expect Germany to send offers of peace by every mail if we repudiate her first offer with scorn, and if our reply contains inaccurate statements. If one takes the trouble to study both the offer of Germany to this country and our official reply, it will be found that I am correct in stating that we made a gross and inaccurate statement in our reply.

But we have to deal now with the position as it presents itself to-day, and the late Prime Minister and the Noble Lord both expressed themselves, if I may say so, in much more moderate terms. Both of them expressed a desire for that to which no one in this House or the country could be opposed, namely, the advent of an honourable peace. This Amendment is for the purpose, as I understand it, of clearing the air. It is for making the position easier for the approach to a conference, where all those other points could be discussed, which, in the nature of things, I admit, are most complicated and most difficult to settle on the floor of the House of Commons. We might debate here for a week the enormous, complicated questions which are embraced in this world tragedy and never come to an agreement. Therefore, it seems to me, that no useful purpose can be served by offering one's opinions about what ought to be the best form of Government for Austria-Hungary, or what is the best settlement of Alsace- Lorraine, or what ought to be the amount of indemnity, or the proper solution, for reparation to Belgium.

We all in the main agree with the definition laid down by the late Prime Minister, with the exception of the misinterpretation of what was termed the final destruction of Prussian militarism. That may have led to the prolongation of the War, because it gave a wrong impression, but of course that is a matter for Germany to decide, and we cannot prevent what has happened unless we take over Germany and occupy that country. Consequently all this is a waste of words, because it is a matter of internal administration in Germany. If in the main we are agreed as to the principal object of the War, and if Germany, as she has over and over again stated, wishes to discuss the question of the termination of the War, I think that gives us a basis for a conference for the purpose of finding out what are, in the main, the bones of contention between us. I know it is an enormous and colossal subject, but I think there is some substance in the argument of the German Chancellor when he says that for us to fire off notes from the housetops is likely to lead to a prolongation of the War. I do not believe it is possible for the House of Commons to settle so large and complicated a problem, but at any rate we may adumbrate some of the principal points, but if we attempt to go into details or to lay down in specific terms what they stand for, that is rather likely to hinder a settlement. The hon. Member for Perth (Mr. Whyte) raised some interesting points of detail, but it is a very difficult problem to state publicly what you will take and what you will only take. I agree with hon. Members who have spoken against secret diplomacy, but there is something to be said for an effort if you can settle upon the main points, because the details may be worked out at a conference afterwards. While I entirely agree with this general declaration, which does not go into detail, perhaps the next step would be a conference where details—

I must call the hon. Member's attention to the fact that, probably quite unconsciously, he is repeating many times over the same sentence.

I was most anxious to press that point of view on the House, because I believe it is a practical way out of the present difficulty. The question of the German colonies has been touched upon, and I would just like to quote what General Smuts said last night upon this subject. He said:

Those of us who were present last night and who heard that brilliant and able speech by General Smuts will agree that in the main it gives us a lead as to what ought to be the principle animating us in coming to a settlement. We can decide what we shall retain and what we shall give away. We stand for a peace brought about by negotiations. General Smuts, in that speech, also believes that peace can only be brought about by negotiations. I will read a quotation from Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, which is particularly interesting at this particular moment: that means that there must not be an adjustment of frontiers, as there is bound to be when the terms come to be adjusted. I think enough has been said to show that there is a concensus of opinion that we are all anxious for an honourable peace, and we do not wish to support aggression in any form. If that is the opinion of the great peoples of this country and the other belligerents, then I believe peace is within a reasonable distance of being achieved.

It appears to me that we have still to keep before our minds the fact that we are faced with the most unscrupulous and determined enemy that ever fought in war. Our problem, is, first to win the War, and, secondly, to win it with as little cost in life, and money, and time as possible. There are public utterances that tend to prolong the War, and, on the other hand, there are public utterances that tend to shorten it. The public utterance, "No peace with the Hohenzollerns," tends to lengthen the War, because it tends to harden the resistance of our enemies. That is an extremely foolish thing to do, and that is an extremely foolish statement to make. Another general pronouncement that was made a little time ago was that under no conceivable circumstances would any colony be handed back to Germany. That was an extremely foolish announcement to make. I do not say that I am prepared to give one single colony back to Germany. I think it would be extremely difficult. It would be difficult to give back South-West Africa. South Africa is too much concerned in that. It would be extremely unpalatable to give back Samoa. New Zealand has made sacrifices for the War, and New Zealand would say, "We have conquered this particular territory, and we want to know whether we are to be consulted on this particular point or not." So it is with New Guinea. It is a matter for discussion. It is a matter in which other people who have made sacrifices have to be consulted. I am not, therefore, prepared to say whether any colony should be given back to Germany, but I am prepared to say that it was an extremely foolish thing to make that announcement before the terms of peace came to be considered at all. There are foolish statements made in the Press. One stupid paper issued a circular to Members of Parliament, wishing to know what we should do with the Kaiser. That was an extremely pernicious campaign. Statement after statement was made, and the paper was full of suggestions of what we would do with the Kaiser. The folly, the stupidity, and the unpatriotism of that struck me at the time, and it ought to be condemned by everybody, and should not appeal to the most insignificant gutter press.

There are, on the other hand, public announcements that tend to shorten the War, and I presume that the object of the Amendment is to get some public announcement that will tend in this direction. I start with the assumption that we must win this War, for we are not only faced with the most unscrupulous enemy we have ever fought, but we are faced with an enemy who will start immediately the War is over preparing for a subsequent war. We have discovered the nature and the practices of Germany, and we have to assume that unless Germany is defeated now, she will have to be defeated later. It is therefore economy in life, in time, and in money to defeat her now. I am not out primarily to defeat Austria, Bulgaria, or Turkey. These countries are simply incidents in the War, for they are no danger to us hereafter. Turkey would be no danger to the British Empire and could hardly be, no matter what peace was negotiated. Nor would Bulgaria. Germany is the danger, and she must be bound fast by a conclusive victory now. The question is, How cheapest and soonest can we defeat Germany? We could strike a staggering blow at Germany now by detaching either Bulgaria or Turkey or both. There is nothing that is within our present reach that would strike such a staggering blow at Germany now and so thoroughly complete our victory and shorten the War. Is that possible? I wish to address myself to that question. Can we do it either with Bulgaria or Turkey? Germany knows the advantage of detaching one of our Allies. She knows that if she can detach Russia she can bring all her forces from the East to the Western Front. She knows that to detach Russia would be to enormously increase her chance of winning the War. The hon. Member who has just sat down (Mr. D. Mason) read some pious utterances from the German Chancellor. I am surprised that he even thought it worth repeating them. They are absolutely insincere. What Germany wants is not the benefit of Russia, and not the continuance of the Russian Republic; she asks herself only one question, and that is the ques- tion I am asking to-night—How can I win this War and how soonest? She believes that she will have a better chance if she can get rid of Russia than by anything else that can happen.

I think "winning a War" means getting yourself into such a military position that you can dictate terms of peace to your enemy. I should consider that winning this War. I want to take a lea out of Germany's book. I want to weaken Germany as she wants to weaken us. We have attached all the great free countries to our own banner. The great American Republic has come in, and I repudiate the suggestion made by the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Lees Smith) that we entered the War, or could be suspected by anyone but the Germans of having entered the War, for the purpose of conquest. No one who has followed the history of the War or our own history and tradition can accuse us of that now. Certainly the President of the United States does not for one moment suspect that that is the policy of this country. It would be entirely inconsistent with every utterance that he has made upon the aims and the objects of the War and the aims and objects of the United States in coming into the War, if that were his view. It certainly is not his view. His view is that we stand for higher motives than that; and he, with the high ideals which he expressed has been able consistently to join with us.

What are the chances of detaching Bulgaria? Bulgaria can be bought or sold. I am not suggesting that we should buy her, but she has nothing comparable to Germany to fight on for. Germany must fight to the last extremity, to the last ditch, and to the last man, because she is fighting for her military existence. Bulgaria need not. The position has vastly changed since the Russian Revolution. The Bulgarians had their sympathies with the Russians before, but their sympathies are infinitely stronger now, and the first thing we ought to ask ourselves is this: Is there anything we can do in order to bring about a detachment of Bulgaria from the Central Powers? I think that might be accomplished through Russia. The hon. Member for the St. Augustine's Division (Mr. R. McNeil) has told us that Bul- garia is so iniquitous and Turkey is so full of infamy that he would not entertain a suggestion of a separate peace. If we were setting ourselves out now to assess the punishment that should be meted out to each of these countries or to examine the merits of these countries, I could understand that point of view, but it is not our function to mete out punishment to every delinquent in Europe. We have to accept the fact that peace must be made sooner or later with Bulgaria and with Turkey, and, if we can bring that about earlier rather than later, we can shorten the War and profit thereby. There is no doubt whatever that Turkey is getting dissatisfied with the help that she is receiving from Germany. We have made advances in Mesopotamia, and the Turks are pressed on all sides. Now that the Russians have repudiated any wish to possess Constantinople it opens up the way for at least a suggestion that our terms would not be so exacting as they would have been formerly. There are, as I said, public utterances that tend to lengthen the War. I think the statement in the manifesto to America in response to her request for the terms of the belligerents that the Turks must be driven out of Europe was an extremely foolish statement. Even if you intended that that should be one of your aims and that peace should not be concluded until it was consummated, it was a tactless thing to say. If that were put in in order to satisfy Russia, surely it cannot be necessary now if Russia has weakened on that particular point.

The suggestion I have frequently made, and which I think would be an encouragement to Turkey and Bulgaria to sue for peace, is that a public announcement should be issued by the Allies jointly, to the effect that no terms of peace would be discussed or concluded with Germany on behalf of Bulgaria or Turkey, but that each of those countries must appeal separately. If you suggest to Bulgaria that it is no use her waiting for Germany and that she must appeal separately, you encourage her to make that appeal sooner than she otherwise would. If she thinks she must wait for Germany to make peace on her behalf she would wait longer and fight longer. If that public announcement proves fruitless, it certainly does no harm, because it is apparent that in any case we cannot make peace with Germany on behalf of Bulgaria or Turkey, and that even when Germany is ready for peace, the terms imposed on her must be different and much more severe than those imposed on any of her Allies because she is the danger of the future. We are fighting a war of defence, and the terms of peace must be such as to guarantee us against future attack. We require no such guarantee from Bulgaria or Turkey. The Noble Lord who replied for the Government very effectively to those who suggested a peace conference, or any attempt to re-state our terms of peace, fell into the same error as the hon. Member for the St. Augustine's Division did on a former occasion, by describing the atrocities in Turkey and Bulgaria as a reason against a separate peace. It is not our function to punish with the lives of our men those countries for those crimes. Any reform or regeneration that is destined to take place in Turkey and Bulgaria must be from within. It is neither our function nor our duty, nor could it be effective on our part, to mete out punishment because of those crimes. It is a reason why we should protect the races subject to Turkey from further brutality, but it is no reason why we should withhold a separate peace treaty from them. To assess the amount of punishment to be meted out to them, or to fix the merits or demerits of those particular countries, is not our particular function. We cannot wait for that. We must sooner or later have terms of peace with them. If some attempt were made to give those countries to understand that peace terms would be concluded separately with them, in which they would be looked upon more as sinned against than sinning, we might encourage them to appeal sooner, and we should split up the Central Powers and shorten the War.

Here, again, there is an opportunity of so modifying our public utterances that we might encourage Turkey to sue for peace. I am not suggesting that we should appeal to Turkey for peace, or that we should suggest it to her, but I think that our public utterances should be such that she herself would be encouraged to appeal to us for a separate peace, and that she should be made to understand that if she did so, whatever terms might have been imposed upon her before the Russian Revolution, they will not be so severe now. If those public utterances were made, I feel perfectly satisfied that they would encourage, if not bring about an earlier appeal than otherwise would be the case.

The hon. and gallant Gentleman who has just sat down expressed a very reasonable desire to withdraw from the alliance with Germany, her allies, Bulgaria and Turkey, and, if possible, Austria. I do not know whether that is a possible prospect. The reason why this Amendment has been put down by myself and my hon. Friends is largely because of the very serious view we take of another possibility—I do not say probability—a separate peace between Germany and Russia. I do not believe that to be Possible in the immediate future, but I believe that unless this situation is dealt with carefully and wisely, and with real knowledge of what the Russians want, it may come to that. If I may say so, it is the intensely patriotic desire not to find our country in the position of having to continue this War without our great Ally that we wish the House to seriously consider the question we are bringing before it. Several times during this Debate some difficulty has been raised with regard to what the question of annexation means. There is not the slightest doubt what the Russians mean by not wanting a war of annexation and conquest. They have expressed it many times in the most explicit manner, and by reference to certain definite questions in which they are concerned. I quote, to begin with, M. Skobeleff, who said the other day In the same speech later on—I will not quote any more at this moment—he repeated that they were opposed to a separate peace. What has occurred in Russia is a well-marked change of policy of a very definite kind. And it is the more marked because of the desire of M. Miliukoff, the Foreign Minister, to adhere to the old policy of the provisional Government. It really is refreshing to find a country in the world in which the politicians on both sides really say what they mean. Here M. Miliukoff says quite frankly to the world, "I am still out for conquest. What we want is Constantinople for Russia. What we want is the break up of the Austrian Empire." Like the good democrat he is, he speaks his thoughts and, although a good many of us do not agree with him, for that honesty of his we applaud him. That is clear on one side. He at present is the weaker force in Russia. There is equally no mistake about the Provisional Government and about the view of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates who inspire the policy of that Government, and insist on their following the policy which they want.

The last thing that has happened in Russia is that the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates has decided to join the provisional Government, and in doing so it has made the terms on which it joins that Government lucidly clear. It says that it joins on these terms— throw over the cause of democracy in the rest of the world, and it is not because there is a likelihood of anarchy in the Russian Army. If there is a separate peace made by Russia it will be because, at the invitation of the Russian democracy, the Allies refuse to repudiate those ideas of annexation and conquest which they are requested to repudiate by the Russians, because they refuse to call in reason and diplomacy to aid military effort, and because they in effect say to Russia, "If you want to negotiate you may negotiate, but we will not negotiate with you." It will be the fault of our Government and of the Allies if we do not share with Russia in the negotiations which, by all that we can see, they are determined to have with the Germans—determined to see if this War cannot stop before they ask their country to go on fighting.

I am not quite certain that all our people fully appreciate the great force that exists at this moment in Russia in the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates. The assembly of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates is a very remarkable assembly. It is the only assembly in the world in which the soldiers who are at the front are represented. I do not know how many members of the House saw a very remarkable photograph in the "Graphic" about a fortnight ago. I do not think it was in any other paper. It was a photograph of this assembly of 2,000 soldiers and workmen. I noticed two remarkable things in that photograph. First of all they were all young men—everyone of them—none of the greybeards who are sending others to fight all the world over elsewhere. The other thing about them was that they were almost all soldiers, as far as one could tell by their dress—representatives of the soldiers at the front and elsewhere. Much the greatest fact in the political world anywhere to-day is that this assembly, where the soldiers are directly represented, wants, not indeed peace at any price, not a separate peace for Russia, but peace by negotiation at once; and it wants, as a means of getting peace by negotiation a declaration repudiating annexationist aims from all the Allies as well as from their own Government. I believe the Russian Revolution will very soon be found to have torn off the mask from all the other Governments. It is no use issuing notes like that of 10th January, which are capable of double interpretation. I agree with a good deal of what was said by the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs when reading out that Note. He said, "What can you disagree with in that Note?" It depends upon the interpretation. The Note was so vague that it is capable of more than one meaning in its most important Clauses. The Clause about Constantinople did not say that Constantinople is to be given to Russia, but every German, every Austrian, and every Turk reading it knew well enough that, there being a treaty between this Government and Russia to the effect that the War should be carried on for the purpose of giving Constantinople to Russia, that Note must be interpreted in the sense of continuing the War in order to get Constantinople for Russia. The interpretation of the Note is just the point. That is what the Under-Secretary did not fully realise. And what has British democracy got to gain by not saying "ditto" to Russian democracy at present, saying it openly and without any saving clauses or doubts? Why should it hesitate? First of all, how many Englishmen had not really a sense of relief at learning that the possession of Constantinople is no longer an ambition of the Russian Government? There was never the slightest indication that public opinion in Great Britain favoured the policy of giving Constantinople to Russia. The unpopularity of the project was so well known that for eighteen months our Government concealed the fact as best it could that it had made a secret treaty with Russia to hand over Constantinople, and it is a pity that now that the Government need no longer be dragged at the heels of the Imperialist ambitions of the Czar it cannot welcome and proclaim its emancipation and tell the Russians that it is glad they have repudiated their old ambitions. That is the kind of thing we wanted from the Under-Secretary to-day. Why could he not do it? He asked, what did "no annexations" mean. I quote again from Skobeleff: principle, but the question is what does that really mean. What does it mean to our enemies? I quite agree that it is capable of a double interpretation. There are two ways of dealing with people who are oppressed. You can either give them complete independence or what we propose to do with the oppressed Irish people, give them self-government within the ambit of our Empire. What should we think, or what do we think when the Germans suggest that Ireland, in response to this principle, ought to be broken off from the British Empire? We shrug our shoulders and say it is absurd. The Germans say the same thing about what we propose for the Austrian Empire.

There are two solutions for the Austrian Empire. There is a solution for the greater part of it of self-government, a solution of which, according to report, the present rulers of the Austrian Empire are themselves thinking favourably. That may or may not be so. If anyone says to me, "Let the world in the case of these nationalities make up its mind to give them guaranteed Home Rule, be they Irish or Czechs-Slovaks," there is something in that. But what we are asked to do, until the interpretation is repudiated, is to go on fighting Austria until Austria is broken up, and to go on fighting very likely for years, in order to get independence for these nationalities, which is quite a different thing, and very likely absolutely unnecessary, and, for all we know, not what they would prefer, to self-government within the Austrian Empire. What I want to impress upon the House is that this is the interpretation which that Clause in our terms is taken to mean in Germany. I have been watching the reports of the German papers that come into our papers, and I notice that it is not only the jingoes in Germany who say this Note of l0th January makes it impossible to think of peace, but it is the people who want peace in Germany, and who want a reasonable peace, that say it also. I am only going to illustrate my point by reading two short quotations from two men who are very well known. One, Mr. Theodore Wolff, is very well known as taking an extremely moderate line in Germany. This is what he says:

The question of the German colonies which have been conquered by us is a matter of great importance. The giving back of these colonies present difficulties to many of my fellow countrymen. When I say that, I am not speaking of those who think it traditional to end the War with an enlargement of the British Empire. I am not thinking of the jingo enthusiasts for annexation, of whom there are many in this country. I am not speaking of those who set the ideals and practice of British Colonial government so high that they think it our mission to keep whatever the gods give us in the way of native races to govern. I am thinking of those who say, "These German colonies have been conquered by our own Colonial fellow subjects, and how can we give them back?" Nobody can fail to see the difficulty. There is not one of us who does not see what a great difficulty that is, but that cannot efface the fact that the keeping of the conquered German colonies makes this War for us a war of conquest just as much as the keeping of captured Antwerp makes it a war of conquest for Germany. I want to emphasise the suggestion made by the hon. and gallant Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Commander Wedgwood), and that is that the repudiation of any intention on our part to keep the German colonies as con- quest does not necessarily imply giving back at the end of the War exactly the same pieces of territory so as to recreate exactly the same condition of things. It is not like the question of Belgium, where there is a white race with a long historic past. Obviously Africa is a place where there is possibility for bargaining and adjustment. It does seem to me to be a matter worthy of consideration for British statesmanship whether some other treatment of the whole African problem is not possible than dividing it into rigid, national possessions. You have in the centre of Africa a huge tract of country, the largest area of the whole, where the white men only live sparsely, unhealthily, and temporarily. An attempt was made in the Berlin Act of 1885 to neutralise all that great territory in the case of a European War, but the neutralisation has been incomplete and ineffective. But there is no reason why real neutral international guarantees should not be obtained. By the Berlin Act the open door for all traders of all nations was laid down for great tracts of Africa. That, too, was ineffective and incomplete, as the gloomy story of the Congo reminds us. But there is no reason why that should not be made a reality. The point is this, that if you begin to apply the international idea to a large part of Africa, as it can be well applied, the jealousy and anxiety of different nations to possess particular tracts of it is largely eliminated. By the general announcement of such a policy there will be far greater readiness on the part of different nations, Germany or ourselves, to consider the adjustment of boundaries which may settle these difficult questions at the end of the War. I am certain that it is a thing which we ought to consider.

I have spoken about a number of details and I come back now to the general question. There has been a speech by the German Chancellor during the last forty-eight hours—a very lamentable speech. It consists of the excuses of a politician for not stating the real aims of his Government in the War. It is a thoroughly bad speech, but that constitutes no excuse for silence on the part of our Government, for not making it perfectly clear where they stand. Rather it imposes on them a higher obligation to do it, and it gives them a fine opportunity. How fine that opportunity would it be if they would only take it! I think that my hon. Friend who moved this Motion quoted from the speech of Herr Scheidemann, which came, I think, before the German Chancellor's speech. I am not sure whether he gave the actual words. I wish to read them. Herr Scheidemann, the leader of the Majority of the Socialist party, has been said to-day by the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs to have supported his Government right through. He has been a supporter of the War, and has been preached in our papers as being a humble vassal of the German Government. It is not the view I take, reading his speeches, but still that is the view put forward. What he said was this:

The German Press discusses these matters quite as freely as ever our Press does, and I know that in this country, in spite of the censorship of our Press, there is a great deal of discussion and a great many opinions are expressed that never get even in the freest portions of our Press. Two days later the Leader of the House said very wisely that no blow we might deliver would be so fatal to Germany as the detachment of one of her Allies. I think that it would be much more fatal if we could secure the detachment of the sentiment of the German people. Here you have from the spokesman of 5,000,000 German workmen the announcement that if only they knew that we were not out for annexation and conquest, there would be revolution in the land. Take that to be as exaggerated as you please. It means that there would be discontent with the German Government, so deep that the Junker power would not last very long. I believe that the time has come for bolder diplomacy. For another reason, I believe that even in this country, although it is not so expressed in the newspapers, the time is fast coming when the faith in arms alone will break away. I know that there are a great many of our people, perhaps most of them, who still cling to the idea of a complete victory. I may say this quite boldly, because never for the last eighteen months have I been silent about my view. I have said that I thought the War was a deadlock, and so would remain. I have said so for eighteen months, and it is now where it was eighteen months ago, and I believe that eighteen months hencé, from the military point of view, it will be where it is now. For this reason, that at this stage of the War I do not believe that there is a great nation in Europe that has enough elasticity to win a great victory, though it may have organisation and patriotism to stave off a serious defeat.

And, after all, we must all be beginning to have our suspicions. Time after time the prophets are always wrong. Every time there is a push, every time there is a great offensive, we are going to break through, and yet it is always the same. Hundreds of thousands of men are dying, and the War is no nearer its end. I watch the inauguration of the great offensive with the certainty that scores of thousands will die during the summer, and that the essential military position will not be altered. But even suppose I am wrong, why should not we declare our whole policy, repudiate the things that we ought never to him at, and declare that we are not out for annexation and conquest? I have not much classical education, but I was reading Greek history the other day. One of the world's greatest tragedies is the ruin of Greece, and the perfect flower of its full civilisation, by the prosecution to its ruthless finish of the Peloponnesian War. Yet there were warning voices who spoke even then to Greece. Listen to these words, the words of some wise Spartan whose advice was not taken:

The hon. Gentleman who has just sat down represents the views of a small section of this House, and as some seven or eight Members in his party have already given their views on this subject I hope the House will permit me to put forward one or two considerations from a somewhat different standpoint. I think the House will be very ready to acknowledge that in the majority of the speeches delivered from that bench to-day hon. Members have displayed a somewhat different tone to that of speeches uttered earlier in the War, and I think we can say that their speeches have been couched with a greater consideration for the feelings of their countrymen than has frequently been the case in the past. To that extent I think the whole House can congratulate itself. The hon. Gentleman who has just sat down drew a fine picture of the soldiers' voice in Russia, and described how the Government in Russia was the only Government in the world in which the soldier's voice was represented. I venture to think that that is also, unhappily, at the moment, very true of this House. This House, unfortunately, is absolutely out of touch at the present time with His Majesty's Army and Navy, and if it were not out of touch with them I can assure the hon. Gentleman that when he deliberately prophesied that, however many times the British Army may engage in the offensive it will engage in defeat, he will find himself out of sympathy with the whole British Army.

The hon. Gentleman said the offensive could not succeed and that there could not be victory. After the offensive has been taken and it is not successful, what is that but defeat? Let me say one word in that connection. Every offensive since Neuve Chapelle and Festubert, since we have had the ammunition, has had a very marked and decisive value from the joint point of view of morale, man-power. and all those other factors which go to make up the war position of the combating Powers. Until the great offensives to which the hon. Gentleman has referred, those of Loos, the Somme, and Arras, there is no doubt that the German Army thought, like the hon. Gentleman, that they could not be beaten. Now they have no such feeling. In fact, the whole German Army is well aware of the fact that if this pressure can be kept up, at any rate, they cannot stand it for all time, and all they are hoping is that something will turn up to end the War before they are put to a much greater test. I say that only in passing from that matter, because I thought the hon. Gentleman's comment needed criticism. The hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr. Snowden) in his speech made a very great deal of the fact that it was the announcement of the ambitions of Russia, of her aspiration in the direction of Constantinople, which really made the Revolution effective; it was the first rumbling which sent revolution right through Russia. I am sure the hon. Gentleman believed that that was so, but I think that anybody who has been brought into contact with any Russians, whether they be revolutionaries or whether they be those in favour of the old regime, must acknowledge that through all classes in Russia it has been for many a long year a national aspiration that Russia should control Constantinople instead of Turkey. I cannot think that the hon. Gentleman, if he was really conversant with the facts, would suggest that that declaration had anything to do with the strength of the Revolution. The Revolution was against absolutism, against an absolutism which has allied itself with the Power which was fighting the Russian nation. The Revolution was against Prussianism in Russia. These were the real forces of the Russian Revolution, and to suggest that because some Russian people discovered that their diplomatists had envious eyes in the direction of Constantinople when the whole Russian nation hoped that that was one of the things that would emerge from the War is, I think, to be on completely wrong territory. If Russia, as the hon. Member for West Leeds (Mr. E. Harvey) suggests, is to abandon Constantinople, and to that extent desires no annexation, it is not necessary for the hon. Gentleman to come and declare Russia's policy in this House. We shall know soon enough what is the real opinion of Russia. Unfortunately, we see such quick changes going on in Russia that it has really been extremely difficult to find out if the Coalition Government, desirous as it is of representing Russian opinion, has yet had time really to collect the views of the whole Russian people on this subject which has always been of absorbing interest to them. I think, therefore, that it would ill become this House to lay down any marked principle at this moment of effervescence in Russia, and that we should wait for Russia to convey that opinion to us through her diplomatic channels, which we hope are now of a far purer description than before, rather than that we should lay down the true meaning of that question.

There seems to be a great deal of difference of opinion between the hon. Gentlemen as to the use of the word "annexation." The hon. Member for Leicester (Mr. Ramsay Macdonald) told us that annexation did not mean what we meant by the word. Surely it would have been better if at an earlier stage he had removed that impression from the whole of his speeches in order that we should not imagine that the word contained in the Amendment meant annexation in the form which has been described. As a matter of fact, the formula, "No annexation, no indemnities," is the motto which hon. Gentlemen opposite are asking this country to pin itself to. Yet while they are doing that they admit that annexation does not mean what they would like it to mean, and the consequence is that it is up to them to invent a new word which will more nearly fit the exact meaning as applied by the Soldiers' and Workmen's Council in Russia. In this connection I personally—and I expect most of the Members of this House—will not be too ready and too much in a hurry to declare a policy for Russia on this subject as if it were a final and settled question in Russia itself. Give Russia time. Let her have a few weeks or a month to try to work out her destiny. After all, the Coalition Government has only been formed within the last few days. Give her time to make a truly national pronouncement, and do not let us try to hurry her by suggesting that she is out for aspirations which may not necessarily be the aspirations of Russia. I should rather hesitate to hand over the fate of Russia, even to hon. Members opposite, who at times have not been able to understand the aspirations of their own country. The hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr. Snowden), in his speech this afternoon, laid a great deal of stress upon the fact that a conference was going to be held at which a minority of the Socialists of different countries were going to take part, and he made no argument about it. He confessed they were the minority in various countries. Now very small minorities of nations —.

May I explain? The hon. Gentleman seems to be under the impression that only minorities of the Socialist party will be represented, but the majority will be represented there also, and minorities may, when they are put together, be a majority.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his explanation, but it does not alter the fact that in every single instance the representatives who go to that conference would be the representatives of a very small minority of each particular country.

Does the hon. Gentleman suggest that if he goes he would represent anything but a very insignificant minority in this country? So I think it is agreed in the case of most countries. No one can say that a single delegate of the belligerents will go to that conference, as really representative. It cannot even be proved in the case of Russia, because the energetic representatives in Petrograd at the present moment, true patriots as they are, will necessarily represent the views of the majority in Russia. From every point of view that we look at it this is going to be a conference between strong, powerful, but nevertheless numerical minorities of different nations. That being the fact, I submit it would be improper for us to take any part in that conference, and I hope hon. Gentlemen will not endeavour to press the idea that they should take part in that conference. After the speech of the Imperial Chancellor of Germany I think it would be a happy thing if we could get something more definite from the Socialist bodies in Germany; but I do not believe that the people of this country will really appreciate any of the representatives of the views held by the hon. Gentlemen opposite going to that conference to meet the representatives of the German nation at this time. After all, you are not going to help your views forward in this country by seating round a table people who have not repudiated, and that is the real point, the crimes of the German nation, and I hope the hon. Gentlemen will think very much before they suggest taking any part in such a conference. Let them discuss with the Socialist Allies, let them get together the internationalism of that half of the world, and see if they like to put forward certain proposals on behalf of the Socialist Allies; but do not let them be guided by Socialists who have not had the courage to stand up against the barbarity and the criminal behaviour of the Germans, both on the field of battle and on the high seas. Now I think the hon. Gentlemen will have to recognise that, taking the views which have been put before us here this evening, they do represent a very small minority of the people of this country. I am told, although they apparently represent a minority, there is a larger body outside; but the only time the matter has been put to the test in constituencies the verdict against them has been overwhelming. I think the last occasion was when Mr. Pethick Lawrence stood for a constituency in Scotland, and I believe his votes were only about 300 out of the whole constituency, and yet he was a whole-hogging pacifist who would immediately open negotiations with the German people. It is quite clear that this country does not desire any action in that respect, so I hope hon. Gentlemen will not push this matter further.

May I say a word with regard to the question of "no annexation"? I want to ask the Member for Blackburn (Mr. Snowden) whether it is really no annexation. It is a very important point in many respects, and there was not a great deal which divided the House on this question. We want to know precisely where we are. The hon. Gentleman will not deny that this War began with the last Franco-Prussian War. He will not deny that there was not likely to be any rest in Europe so long as the annexations of that war remained. Does he regard Alsace-Lorraine as annexation? Would he regard the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France as annexation? If so, of course it is no use talking any more about it, but it seems to me that if he could explain a little more fully what he meant by this policy he might be able to get a little more forward. I venture to think that there is no one, certainly no one who has had the honour of fighting in France, who knows what we owe to the Frenchmen, who would tolerate the suggestion that we should conclude the War without restoration of the lost provinces of France back to that country. With regard to the great colonies, the hon. Member for Leeds (Mr. Harvey) said that it might be very useful to give up altogether any idea of returning the whole colonies to Germany. Has anybody in this country, any large body of opinion in this country, ever dreamt of handing them back? He said that though it might be difficult to do that, we might hand back half of them to the German nation, so that he regards annexation in itself not weak or wrong, so long as you do not have too much of it. I think he came off his lofty pedestal when he made that suggestion. But, as he said, it is really a question which largely concerns the Dominions overseas, and anyone who heard that wonderful speech last night by the gallant General from South Africa (General Smuts) will realise that it would be intolerable for us in this country to dream of handing back German South-West Africa unless it was the eminent desire of the people of South Africa, who made such sacrifices to conquer that colony. May I add a word to what the Noble Lord said with regard to the German treatment of natives. There has been a discussion of various stories with regard to South Africa, and I believe this is an absolutely true story which I am going to relate. In Cape Colony, not very long after the War broke out, there was a certain minister of religion who got up and spoke to a vast crowd. He said, "I have decided, now that I see the possibility of freedom, now that I see the opportunity of going into German territory, to shake the dust of British rule off my feet and go up there under a flag where I shall find greater liberty." As a matter of fact, he went up into the country where the Herrero campaign was going on, and several thousand Boers volunteered to go into that campaign. One of the things that we have got to be very profoundly thankful for, indirectly for this Empire, was the Herrero Campaign, because the vile treatment of the natives by the Germans right through that campaign convinced these thousands of Boers who went up to fight the Germans that British rule was at any rate far wiser and far more just than any German rule in South Africa, and the same minister of religion came back to Cape Colony and proclaimed that he had made an error, and repented having shaken the dust of British rule off his feet, and he came back there because he saw that there was true liberty. That being the fact, the hon. Member for Blackburn, although it would be somewhat difficult to do, suggested that it might be possible to have an election amongst the Herreros, or any other natives. It would be very difficult to get their opinion. Already in what was German territory in Africa the natives desire to remain under the British rule. The words of the hon. Member's Amendment refer to "aggrandisement" and "Imperialistic." I put it to the hon. Member for Blackburn and his colleagues that these words, with "annexation," sum up the reasons why the Germans went to war. Anyone who has made the smallest study of German foreign policy—a policy which was advocated by no less than seven hundred different writers for three years previous to the War, and whose writings had an enormous sale among the German people —knows that it was a policy of expansion and aggrandisement. I put it to the hon. Member for Blackburn and those who think with him that if the German armies are successful in this War we shall have a solid block, a Germanic federation running right through the Balkans and Turkey in Europe and Turkey in Asia, and no peaceful solution for the world will be possible so long as that threatening blow is aimed right through the peoples of the Western civilisations. That being the fact, we can only come to the conclusion that it is not wise to discuss these questions in this manner. A Debate of this description encourages the Germans, who will not realise that this country is absolutely solid and united. Even hon. Gentlemen who have spoken in support of the Amendment have deplored nearly every single action of our enemies in this War. This country is really remarkably united, so united that its representatives can afford to allow these hon. Gentlemen to get up on those benches and, without interruption, make speeches which we know are absolutely contrary to the opinion of the mass of the people of this country. If these speeches continue, they will do very little harm in this country, but they may do a great deal of harm in Germany, where the influence of these hon. Gentlemen is not understood, and where it may be thought that they have a greater power in this country than they really hold. It would be well if this Amendment were withdrawn. If it is taken to a Division a number of hon. Members who may agree to some extent with hon. Gentlemen opposite will be compelled to vote against it. Therefore its supporters would not get a true verdict even from their own point of view. It would be far better not to try and give a wrong impression at the present moment to our Allies in Russia. With regard to the League of Peace, can anyone hope to find a practical solution of our troubles in that way? What does a league of peace mean? It means that you are going to have all the organised forces of the world to join a league for maintaining the peace of the world. To do that you will require to have police on land and sea. I think the mere fact that you have got limited police forces of that description puts us precisely in the same position in the future as to-day. Suppose every country has the right to have an armed police force of a hundred thousand men, and under such an arrangement Germany would have that number, and Bulgaria and Austria and Turkey each a hundred thousand. All those countries are more or less contiguous. I venture to think, until mankind has become absolutely perfect, there is always the danger of those four countries uniting their four police armies. That obviously could be done so quickly that no other combination could possibly form to defeat it. It is not the same precisely with the policing of the seas. Suppose you had one capital ship and two destroyers for each country, since they would have to be treated on equality merely, would it not be possible to amalgamate those forces. I put this forward because I think we are sometimes rather inclined to imagine that the internationalism, which is put forward by some hon. Members, is a panacea, and thereby we get on dangerous ground. I believe that the only way in which you are going to get anything like a universal standing peace is to make this War so conclusive that such a thing is never going to happen again. I think that possibly the entry of the United States, which the hon. Gentleman has forgotten, may possibly help to make that conclusive decision. You have got now the whole of the free democracies ranged on one side.

There is, it seems to me, a duty to ourselves in this matter. The minds of some hon. Members are always on the other side of the water, in Germany, Austria-Hungary, in the Balkans, and their thoughts seem almost entirely to be occupied with this question of European diplomacy, but we have got a duty to ourselves and to our Empire, to our country, to our dead, and that duty surely lies in, this direction—what is best for England, what is best for the Empire as a whole? How can we leave our country stronger and better than it was before? Whilst doing everything we possibly can to fulfil our obligations to our Allies, our first duty obviously must be to our own country and Empire. We have been forced into the War absolutely against our will. It is up to us to see that it is not possible for our enemies to be in that. same position for cutting our communications for penetrating right through our countries by what is called peaceful penetration, which was really the beginning of the War. The only thing which astonishes many of us is why Germany was not content because she was going to beat the world by economic penetration, as proved in a thousand ways. Nevertheless, we in this country are absolutely determined that we are not going to go and immediately hand back the only thing we can gain out of this War at all. The hon. Gentleman who says that we did not go out for territory states what is perfectly true. We had no army, and never intended to go to war, and we reduced our Fleet and made every sort of suggestion to our present opponents to meet them, but we were never received in the same spirit by the German nation. We have been forced by the Germans to suffer colossal loss in life and in treasure such as no man ever dreamt of in the past. It is simply inconceivable that having been drawn into that position we should take up the view point that we have nothing to ask in return. Is this country going to be bankrupted, and, after having, by the valour of its sons, taken into its possession certain territories which were being misgoverned by the German people, having liberated other great sections of the world, not going to say. that this is to be set off as against a reduction of the great debt into which the Germanic empires have forced us? Are we not determined to see that that little compensation is given for all our colossal losses, and that we are to be made secure against this sort of thing in the future? That we are going to be no party to any kind of suggestion which will force our Dominions to hand back to their enemies, whom they know much better than we have known—because they have been on their frontiers—these territories by which alone it is possible to find payment of a fraction of the cost of this War in the days to come.

The eloquent speech to which we have just listened illustrates a point of view which may be very different from ours with regard to method, but which I do not think differs very much from the ideal of patriotism which we have as well as the hon. and gallant Member who has just sat down. He has set up a very high ideal of patriotism. I can assure him that there are people who are in agreement with that ideal but who think it can be produced by a very different method from those which he advocates. In the early part of his speech the hon. and gallant Gentleman laid a great deal of emphasis upon the victory which would shortly be ours. I do not for a moment wish to express any opinion as to whether the victory is in sight, or whether it is far off. I should, however, like to insist upon this point: Why should our terms vary with the degree of victory that we gain? Should not our terms be the best possible terms for the future peace of the world irrespective of victory? Whether or not we reach that victory surely we ought not to have a sliding scale of terms which varies with the degree of our victory? If we have that is to admit that the greater the victory the more aggressive may be the terms which we desire to reach, and that, I think, is not in conformity with the professions which have been made by His Majesty's Government.

We have heard a very great deal during the interesting Debate of to-day as to the extremely complex character of many of the questions which have got to be settled when this War is brought to a close. Those who do not see eye to eye with us have not shown that by a continuance of the War any of the problems are likely to become easy. Problems, if they are complex, will be just as complex in two. years' time, if not more so, than to-day. The hon. Member who has just sat down touched upon one problem, and in such a way as to show that he regarded it more or less in the light of a cry that had been brought forward and should be answered simply by. a negative or an affirmative. He mentioned the instance of Alsace-Lorraine. He said there could be no doubt that as a result of this War Alsace-Lorraine would be handed back to France. Alsace-Lorraine is not a detachable part of the map which has to be handed to the conqueror when Germany and France are at war! The French and the Germans have been fighting for Alsace-Lorraine ever since the year 800, and it is because statesmanship has always treated this question as if it were a matter of two provinces which could be handed over to the conqueror that that quarrel exists still. If we are going again to say that if France is victorious these provinces are to be handed once more back to France, you are only sowing discord and dispute between those two countries in the future. It is not an easy matter of that sort at all. There are the racial question, the language question, the religious question, and the economic question, as well as the strategic question, all to be taken into account. It is an extremely complex question, and it cannot be solved offhand by saying these provinces are to be handed back to-France.

I listened with very great attention to the reply of the Noble Lord who speaks on behalf of the Foreign Office in this House. I hoped very much that we should have from him something of a definite character. The world is waiting while the Governments are looking for some formula which will allow them an escape from this tragic dilemma into which they have drifted. We are waiting for some Minister to find a form of words which will satisfy his Allies and his enemies so that negotiations shall be started. It is a matter of a formula which is being waited for, and I must say I am very much disappointed in the part up till now which our country has taken in regard to negotiation. We have never had really any inspiring declaration on behalf of His Majesty's Government. True, we have had phrases that have been repeated, such as the "knock-out blow," "never sheathing the sword" and a phrase that fell from the Noble Lord to-day—perhaps the most unfortunate phrase of all—when the Noble Lord, making a quotation, said, "Let the murderers begin." Such a pronouncement—a serious pronouncement—from this Government, from the British Empire to Europe at a moment of this sort is, in my opinion, most unfortunate. It is true the Noble Lord, in dealing with the Amendment which has been brought forward by my hon. Friend, grudgingly acknowledged that this was not a war of Imperialistic conquest and aggrandisement on our part either when we entered it or now; but he made no clear declaration as to what our aims were, and, in reading out the Note to President Wilson, he seemed to think that it was not capable of misinterpretation. It appears to me that in this critical and tragic business a pronouncement ought to go out from the Government which is incapable of misinterpretation. I do not think that is asking very much. The Noble Lord said that the terms in our Note to President Wilson were perfectly clear, but they have been misinterpreted, and they are being misinterpreted. In the German Chancellor's speech—

That is precisely what I mean. The German Chancellor said: just like to say a word or two on that subject. I consider that there should be no recognition of the right of conquest as a basis in arriving at a settlement. I do not think the fact that Germany has conquered Serbia, Roumania, Montenegro, as well as Belgium and Northern France gives Germany the very smallest right to any of that territory, and I think that I shall carry most people with me in making that assertion, and in applying that principle to Germany I am also prepared to apply it to ourselves. I think that it is only fair, and my interpretation of no annexation is that while there must naturally be not a return to the status quo but certain territorial readjustments, frontier alterations, and respect for national aspirations, and very likely extensive readjustments of territory, will become necessary, but they should be based not on the right of conquest, not because we have conquered these places, but because we desire a settlement in future which will be a real and lasting settlement and bring about peace in Europe. That is my interpretation of no annexation.

The Noble Lord quoted the case of Armenia and Russia, but I should say that, in the readjustment when it comes to peace there can be no question that Armenia should be removed from the yoke of Turkey. When we come to the partition of the Turkish Empire I think you will find many problems which will be very difficult to solve. The question of Palestine and Syria are by no means so easily solved as most people suppose, and they cannot be solved on the same basis as the problem of Alsace and Lorraine. The sympathies of the Druses and the Syrians are very largely British and they have particularly a great affection for this country, and yet our absorption of Syria and Palestine might not be looked upon with favour by our Allies. We have got to think of these problems. We have to consider what these partitions mean. I do not see that there can be any objection at the earliest possible moment to laying down a principle on which to base our claims in the future, and that principle should not be the right of conquest, not the principle that because we have conquered these countries therefore we must keep every square yard of them, but a renunciation of all that we have obtained by force and a readjustment by negotiations of Africa and Europe in such a way as to secure a durable and lasting peace in the world. The hon. Member who last spoke said that these Debates do harm, and other people have accused us of helping the Germans by our speeches. Let me just examine that for a moment. What effect has anything that I or hon. Friends of mine may have said and that has been quoted in Germany had? Has it had the effect of strengthening the war party in Germany? It has the effect of strengthening moderate and pacific opinion in Germany when they know that in this country there is sympathy and some reciprocity. What is it that really helps Germany? It is the extremist utterances. It is the knock-out-blow speeches which cement all shades of opinion in Germany together in one purpose to defend their Fatherland. There is no question about that. The mistake the Government have made all along is that they have not detached or sought to detach German moderate opinion, but just at the moment when that moderate opinion has been showing strength and has been making an effort to put the drag on the Junkers and the militarists, then by some speech made by somebody here the whole German Empire has been united against us. If any of us wanted to go and consult with those of like opinions in France or in Italy or in any of the neutral countries we should be forbidden passports, and yet it is on the sympathy and the good will of the progressive parties in all the countries of Europe that the future of Europe depends. These military alliances are very ephemeral, and when you get to the complex question of peace settlement you find that there is no identity of aim and that you are likely to find friction among the Allies. At such a moment you want to fall back upon those sections of opinion who have identity of aims, and to prevent them by drawing rigid barriers between the countries from ever communicating with each other is very short-sighted and unnecessary.

Most of us have been very much disappointed with the Noble Lord's speech. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] Instead of making a pronouncement of a high ideal and lofty purpose which this country should follow, and to which this country should aim in the future, he just grudgingly acknowledged that we were not out for Imperialistic conquest and aggrandisement. Certainly, so far as I am concerned, I should like to divide the House, and there are many who are in agreement with me. But I find that there are many in the House who are in sympathy with our views who consider that the opportunity afforded by the Third Reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill is an unsuitable one. It is the first time that we have put down an Amendment on Credits for this War, and it is the first time that a body of opinion has shown itself in this House in opposition to Credits in this War. In the absence of a clear declaration and a stronger and more affirmative declaration than the one we have had, I should certainly be inclined to divide against the credit. But what we must consider also is the effect that a vote of this sort will have in Russia. We have to see the exact effect of a vote in Russia. We do not want any misleading effect to be given to Russia. However small our numbers might be, if we went into the Division Lobby, it would not in the least harm us or the enormous growing body of opinion that is behind us. [HON. MEMBERS: "Where is it?"]

There are other considerations. It would be very unfortunate for it to go to Russia that His Majesty's Government were unsympathetic to the ideals which they have set forth in their pronouncement. Other opportunities will arise when the Government may be able to make a more emphatic pronouncement than they can make to-day. I admit that the German Chancellor's speech does not give any hope, but let us not wait on the German Chancellor. Let us brush him aside, and let us make a pronouncement on our own account. After all, in the speech that he made that is reported to-day this sentence occurs—even though he said that he was unable to make any direct pronouncement—

"We are not fighting now against almost the whole world in order to make conquests, but only to secure our existence and firmly to establish the future of the nation."

Gradually, one by one, the nations are showing, under the pressure of the people behind them, that they do not desire aggrandisement and conquest. I cannot help feeling that this great pressure of the people is growing. [Laughter.] Hon. Members may laugh at it as much as they like. Thank goodness, the pressure of the people in democratic countries ultimately counts, and in the long run the world will find that a peace will be made over the heads of the Governments and Ministers by the peoples themselves.

rose in his place, and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put."

Question put, "That the Question be now put."

The House divided: Ayes, 238; Noes, 32.

Division No. 39.]

AYES.

[10.58 p.m.

Agnew, Sir George William

Edge, Captain William

Marshall, Arthur Harold

Ainsworth, Sir John Stirling

Edwards, Sir Francis (Radnor)

Mason, James F. (Windsor)

Allen, Arthur A. (Dumbartonshire)

Elverston, Sir Harold

Meux, Hon. Sir Hedworth

Allen, Rt. Hon. Charles P. (Stroud)

Fell, Arthur

Meysey-Thompson, Colonel E. C.

Amery, L. C. M. S.

Finney, Samuel

Mond, Rt. Hon Sir Alfred M.

Archdale, Lieut. E. M.

Fisher, Rt. Hon. H. A. L

Money, Sir L. G. Chiozza

Ashley, W. W.

Fisher, Rt. Hon. W. Hayes

Montagu, Rt. Hon. E. S.

Astor, Hon. Waldorf

Fitzroy, Hon. E. A.

Morgan, George Hay

Baird, John Lawrence

Fletcher, John Samuel

Morison, Hector (Hackney, S.)

Baldwin, Stanley

Forster, Henry William

Morison, Thomas B. (Inverness)

Banbury, Rt. Hon. Sir Frederick G.

Galbraith, Samuel

Munro, Rt. Hon. Robert

Barlow, Montague (Salford, South)

Gardner, Ernest

Neville, Reginald J. N.

Barnes, Rt. Hon. George N.

Gelder, Sir William Alfred

Newman, John R. P.

Barran, Sir John N. (Hawick Burghs)

Gibbs, Col. George Abraham

Nicholson, Sir Charles N. (Doncaster)

Barran, Rowland Hurst (Leeds, N.)

Gilbert, J. D.

Nicholson, William G. (Petersfield)

Barrie, H. T.

Goldman, C. S.

Nield, Herbert

Bathurst, Col. Hon. A. B. (Glouc., E.)

Grant, James Augustus

Norman, Sir Henry

Bathurst, Capt. Charles (Wilts, Wilton)

Greenwood, Sir G. G. (Peterborough)

O'Neill, Capt. Hon. H. (Antrim, Mid)

Beale, Sir William Phipson

Greig, Col. J. W.

Orde-Powlett, Hon. W. G. A.

Beauchamp, Sir Edward

Gretton, John

Parker, James (Halifax)

Beck, Arthur Cecil

Griffith, Rt. Hon. Ellis Jones

Parkes, Ebenezer

Bellairs, Commander C. W.

Guinness, Hon. Rupert (Essex, S.E.)

Pearce, Sir Robert (Staffs, Leek)

Benn, Arthur Shirley (Plymouth)

Gwynne, R. S. (Sussex, Eastbourne)

Pease, Herbert Pike (Darlington)

Bentham, George Jackson

Hall, D. B. (Isle of Wight)

Pennefather, De Fonblanque

Bentinck, Lord H. Cavendish-

Hamilton, C. G. C. (Ches., Altrincham)

Perkins, Walter Frank

Bird, Alfred

Hamilton, Lord C. J. (Kensington, S.)

Peto, Basil Edward

Blair, Reginald

Hanson, Charles Augustin

Philipps, Captain Sir Owen (Chester)

Boles, Lieut.-Colonel Dennis Fortescue

Hardy, Rt. Hon. Laurence

Pollock, Ernest Murray

Boscawen, Sir A. S. T. Griffith-

Harmsworth, Cecil (Luton, Beds)

Pratt, J. W.

Bowden, Major G. R. Harland

Harris, Henry Percy (Paddington, S.)

Pretyman, Ernest George

Boyton, James

Harris, Percy A. (Leicester, S.)

Price, Sir Robert J. (Norfolk, E.)

Brace, Rt Hon. William

Herbert, General Sir Ivor (Mon., S.)

Priestley, Sir W. E. B. (Bradford, E.)

Bridgeman, William Clive

Hewart, Sir Gordon

Quilter, Sir Cuthbert

Brookes, Warwick

Hewins, William Albert Samuel

Radford, Sir George Heynes

Broughton, Urban Hanlon

Higham, John Sharp

Raphael, Sir Herbert H.

Brunner, John F. L.

Hills, John Waller

Ratcliff, Major R. F.

Bryce, J. Annan

Hinds, John

Rea, Walter Russell (Scarborough)

Bull, Sir William James

Hohler, Gerald Fitzroy

Rees, G. C. (Carnarvonshire, Arfon)

Burdett-Coutts, W.

Holt, Richard Durning

Roberts, Charles H. (Lincoln)

Butcher, John George

Hope, James Fitzalan (Sheffield)

Roberts, George H. (Norwich)

Cator, John

Horne, Edgar

Roberts, Sir J. H. (Denbigh)

Cautley, H. S.

Howard, Hon. Geoffrey

Roberts, S. (Sheffield, Ecclesall)

Cawley, Rt. Hon. Sir F. (Prestwich)

Hughes, Spencer Leigh

Robertson, Rt. Hon. J. M. (Tyneside)

Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)

Hunt, Major Rowland

Robinson, Sidney

Cecil, Rt. Hon. Lord R. (Herts. Hitchin)

Jackson, Lieut.-Col. Hon. F. S. (York)

Rowlands, James

Chaloner, Colonel R. G. W

Jackson, Sir John (Devonport)

Samuels, Arthur W.

Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J. A.

Jacobsen, Thomas Owen

Samuel, Rt. Hon. Sir Harry (Norwood)

Clough, William

Johnston, Sir Christopher

Samuel, Rt. Hon. H. L. (Cleveland)

Coates, Major Sir Edward Feetham

Jones, Edgar (Merthyr Tydvil)

Samuel, Samuel (Wandsworth)

Coats, Sir Stuart A. (Wimbledon)

Jones, Henry Haydn (Merioneth)

Scott, A MacCallum (Glas., Bridgeton)

Cochrane, Cecil Algernon

Jones, J. Towyn (Carmarthen, East)

Smith, Rt. Hon. Sir F. E. (Walton)

Collins, Godfrey P. (Greenock)

Jones, William S. Glyn- (Stepney)

Smith, Harold (Warrington)

Collins, Sir Stephen (Lambeth)

Joynson-Hicks, William

Spicer, Rt. Hon. Sir Albert

Collins, Sir W. (Derby)

Kellaway, Frederick George

Stanton, Charles Butt

Compton-Rickett, Rt. Hon. Sir J.

Kerr-Smiley, Peter Kerr

Steel-Maitland, A. D.

Cooper, Sir Richard Ashmole

Kerry, Earl of

Stirling. Lieut.-Col. Archibald

Coote, William

Kinloch-Cooke, Sir Clement

Strauss, Edward A. (Southwark, West)

Cornwall, Sir Edwin A.

Knight, Captain Eric Ayshford

Sutton, John E.

Cory, James H. (Cardiff)

Law, Rt. Hon. A. Boner (Bootle)

Swann, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles E.

Craig, Colonel James (Down, E.)

Layland-Barrett, Sir F.

Sykes, Col. Alan John (Ches., Knutsf'd)

Craik, Sir Henry

Levy, Sir Maurice

Terrell, Henry (Gloucester)

Croft, Lieut.-Col. Henry Page

Lewis, Rt. Hon. John Herbert

Thompson, Rt. Hon. R. (Belfast, N.)

Currie, George W.

Lloyd, George Butler (Shrewsbury)

Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton)

Dalrymple, Hon. H. H.

Locker-Lampson, G. (Salisbury)

Toulmin, Sir George

Dalziel, Davison (Brixton)

Loyd, Archie Kirkman

Walker, Col. William Hall

Dalziel, Rt. Hon. Sir J. H. (Kirkcaldy)

MacCaw, William J. MacGeagh

Ward, A. S. (Herts, Watford)

Davies, Sir W. Howell (Bristol, S.)

M'Kean, John

Wardle, George J.

Denniss, E. R. B.

McMicking, Major Gilbert

Wason, Rt. Hon. E. (Clackmannan)

Dickinson, Rt. Hon. W. H.

McNeill, Ronald (Kent, St. Augustine's)

Watson, Hon. W.

Dixon, C. H.

Macpherson, James Ian

Watson, J. B.

Dougherty, Rt. Hon. Sir J. B.

Maden, Sir John Henry

Weigell, Colonel William E. G. A.

Du Cros, Arthur Philip

Magnus, Sir Philip

Weston, J. W.

Duke, Rt. Hon. Henry Edward

Mallalieu, Frederick William

White, J. Dundas (Glasgow, Tradeston)

Duncan, Sir J. Hastings (Yorks, Otley)

Marriott, John Arthur Ransome

Williams, Aneurin (Durham, N.W.).

Williams, John (Glamorgan)

Wilson-Fox, Henry

Younger, Sir George

Williams, P. (Middlesbrough)

Winfrey, Sir Richard

Yoxall, Sir James Henry

Williams, Thomas J. (Swansea)

Wolmer, Viscount

Wilson, Rt. Hon. J. W. (Worcs., N.)

Wood, John (Stalybridge)

TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—

Wilson, Captain Leslie O. (Reading)

Worthington Evans, Major Sir L.

Lord Edmund Talbot and Capt.

Wilson, Lt.-CI. Sir M. (Beth'I Gn.,S.W.)

Yate, Colonel C. E.

Guest.

Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)

Yeo, Alfred William

NOES.

Anderson, W. C.

Lambert, Richard (Wilts Cricklade)

Outhwaite, R. L.

Burns, Rt. Hon. John

Lundon, Thomas

Ponsonby, Arthur A. W. H.

Chancellor, Henry George

Lynch, Arthur Alfred

Richardson, Thomas (Whitehaven)

Clancy, John Joseph

Macdonald, J. Ramsay (Leicester)

Snowden, Philip

Cullinan, John

Martin, Joseph

Trevelyan, Charles Philips

Duffy, William J.

Mason, David M. (Coventry)

White, Patrick (Meath, North)

Flavin, Michael Joseph

Meehan, Patrick J. (Queen's Co., Leix)

Whitehouse, John Howard

Harvey, T. E. (Leeds, West)

Morrell, Philip

Whitty, Patrick Joseph

Hayden, John Patrick

Nolan, Joseph

Hazleton, Richard

O'Leary, Daniel

TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—Mr.

Keating, Matthew

O'Neill, Dr. Charles (Armagh, S.)

Lees Smith and Mr. Jewett.

Kelly, Edward

O'Sullivan, Timothy

Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question," put accordingly, and agreed to.

Main Question again proposed.

One element which has been introduced into the whole international situation which qualifies considerably the chances in favour of the Allies is the entrance of the United States of America into the War. The famous phrase that the New World had been brought in to redress the balance of the Old was never more true than on this occasion. Without the entrance of the United States into the War the Allies were face to face, if not with defeat, at least with stalemate, which would have been equivalent to defeat. The ultimate result of the War is no longer in doubt. The Stars and Stripes were never made to float over a defeated people. Though I think that a considerable time will still elapse before the Allies can carry out the-full extent of their programme, yet I feel that the final issue, the fall of Imperial Germany, is even now assured. Nevertheless, as far as the Allies are concerned, the situation at present is not only bad, but one which points to some deep-seated defect in our organisation. From time to time in this House we have had congratulations about success on this front and on that front, either on the Western Front or in Mesopotamia, but after three years' fighting we are entitled to ask what, in view of the total resources at the command of the Allies, is the present situation with which we are face to face? After three years' desperate fighting we see that Germany is still solidly seated in possession of her conquests. Lately we have had illuminating speeches in this House, notably from the right hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. Churchill) and from the Prime Minister. The right hon. Member for Dundee has the faculty of seizing the interest and attention of the House, and I am one who admire, at any rate, that which is his chief recommendation—that rhetorical skill and power with which he so hypnotises the House that they sometimes accept very inferior arguments. He has a bold, adventurous, and brilliant mind, and very often his daring raids on possibilities are very insufficiently supported by solidity of thought or acquisition of scientific knowledge. There is this remarkable characteristic of his mind, that, whereas he often advances very valuable and illuminating ideas, he is the next minute saying something on which he was caught out the day before, and he is incapable of recognising between a valid, real, and useful idea and one which will not bear examination. One of the ideas which he put forward for dealing with the submarine war was this: that the Allies, particularly England, should build boats which could not be torpedoed. That idea seemed to find favour with the House. It is a very difficult problem to solve—as to whether it would be possible to build a ship which could not be torpedoed, even with the torpedoes at present used by the German submarines. Just imagine the nature of such a proposition, and just imagine the character of the suggestions which arise from the Front Bench when it is put forward as a solution of this great submarine menace, that it would be possible even now to begin the design and construction of ships which would be proof against torpedoes! Because the problem would be then represented in this way—that the Allies, for their part, and England in particular, must build torpedo-proof vessels, while the problem on the German side would be simply to adapt their torpedoes to meet the new vessels. When once stated in those terms the absurdity of the proposition simply leaps to the eyes. We had another brilliant suggestion, which was this: that the campaign might possibly be ended from the other side of the world, of which we see the encouraging beginning in the successes in Mesopotamia—

On a point of Order, Mr. Speaker. I want your ruling as to whether it is in order for us to discuss openly matters referred to in Secret Session?

Hon. Members must exercise their own discrimination with regard to that. Plain speaking is allowed here, and it would be difficult for me to stop any hon. Member if he was saying anything indiscreet. He must use his judgment. I have no power to stop him.

In reply to that, I am obliged to offer this explanation: If you, Mr. Speaker, yourself think that at any time I am entering upon ground which in the least degree gives away any secret known to this House, if it is not known outside, I will immediately terminate my remarks. I have only been speaking on matters which have been referred to again and again, not only in the Secret Session, but in the Press, the facts of which remain clear to the whole world. One has reference to the Mesopotamia campaign. If it be thought that it is possible to terminate the War in that way, I am one of those who now are beginning to think that if the War is fought to its legitimate finish, in view of the enormous distance to be traversed and of the difficulties of transport, we must look forward to years of fighting as hard as any that has taken place. That may be a situation to be faced. We may have to brace up our energies and use up our resources to that end. I believe it correct to say that the United States, in entering upon this War, has drawn all its plans and counted its men for a long and desperate campaign, of which that may open out one of the avenues to victory. If it be thought possible formally to terminate this War by the beginnings opened up by the Mesopotamia campaign, if that be thought possible to eat up the German Empire by that means, beginning at one end, marching on through Asia Minor to Constantinople, attacking and seizing Constantinople, overcoming the Turkish Empire, marching on through the Balkans and reaching the German Empire in that way, there is an easy solution on the lines of that argument, and there is an easy solution which is being neglected by the Government, and that is as regards Salonika. Members who have studied the question have brought up an objection to that campaign, and have given reasons which, in the ordinary sense, would be almost overwhelming, and so great are the difficulties of finding a successful issue to the campaign viâ Salonika that some of the greatest experts of the British Army, and I think I am right in saying the Chief of the General Staff, is himself opposed to that campaign. I should like to put this question to those who hold that view and still maintain faith in the Mesopotamia campaign. Is there an element of difficulty in the Salonika Campaign which will not be met with in far greater force in the Mesopotamia Campaign? If the difficulties of the Salonika Campaign are such as to make victory impossible by that route, therefore for a stronger reason it will be impossible to gain victory by way of Mesopotamia and Asia Minor. Nevertheless, if the Allies are going to fight the campaign through to victory by military force, Salonika may be the one alternative left. Look for a moment at what is happening on the Western side. Look there, not with the idea of throwing a mirage before your eyes, not with the idea of appealing to the public by a false optimism, but with a desire to see the elements of that problem as they are in their naked reality. What do we find there? We find, after several weeks' desperate fighting, that the famous Siegfreid line of the Germans is a reality, and there has been most desperate resistance. If, then, we find that that country is impregnable, we cast our eyes over the whole sphere of the campaign, we see that up to the present, after nearly three years' fighting, the Germans are still solidly fixed and immovable over a greater part of their conquests, and there is no reason for any attrition. It is one of the arguments put forward in the question of food, which, I think, will be found to press more hardly on others than on them. Why should they be unable to continue this War for another three years?

That being so, some other way out must be found, and there, I believe, is the one great advantage of the incoming of the United States, who will provide that of which there has been so marked a deficiency—namely, the quality of brains. Finding that the Allies have made such inadequate use of all the resources at their command, I ask on whom falls the responsibility? I find, for one, the Prime Minister. I was one of those who looked forward to definite power with great hopes and expectations, which have been disappointed. [HON. MEMBERS: "No, no!"] Recently, in speaking to some trade unionists, he spoke of the necessity of audacious conceptions. His only audacious conceptions have been the stoppage of the "Nation" and the passage of Tariff Reform against the will of the people. He has paraded before the public, and he has got the great art of stimulating policy. His talents are Germanistic, and his instincts are Germanistic. He has great power of imagination, but this problem of a power like Germany is like the problem of dealing with the forces of nature. No rhetoric, no forensic words, no tricks of lawyers, and no Parliamentary dodgery can affect that. You must come down to the reality. In place of a man of that character, what we need is a great leader of opinion at a great crisis. We need a man who can build up, a man of great organising power, and a man who can see problems in their essential realities, and establish means by which to realise, step by step, a solution of them. These are the qualities which are demanded from the leader of a nation, but so far in the right hon. Gentleman they have been conspicuously absent. There is no one phase of government, either in the military sphere or in any other sphere, either in dealing with Ireland, or America, or Russia, where we have the imprint of a great and forceful man, with victory in his inceptions and thoughts.

I will proceed to make one or two definite and concrete suggestions. Some time ago I suggested that there should be a change of the Higher Command at the Western Front, but the suggestion met with great opposition in this House. A few months afterwards that suggestion which so greatly shocked the House was justified, although it perhaps has not been published to the world; but I read a declaration of M. Ribot, the French Prime Minister, that General Nivelle, at the time head of all the French troops, was to command the entire lines in the West. But General Nivelle himself is being tried by the same standard of realities, by the command of success, and, in spite of qualities as an audacious leader of forward action, has not been found possessed of the necessary qualities not to beat the Germans in actions in which no new ideas are brought forward, but to evolve some new ideas and to put them into action, which would give us the assurance of victory. Luckily, although in this country we are deficient in brains, France, at any rate, has risen to the necessity of securing the best men in the country in the direction of the War. It so happens that a man, himself one of the greatest men of science in Europe, a man who is singularly endowed for dealing with problems of this kind, cold judgment and rapid decision, to put into effect the direction which his scientific mind indicates is Minister for War. I refer to M. Painlevé, who has not been discontented with General Nivelle as a leader of men, but seeing that, however great his military qualities may be, the success of his leadership has been impossible, has replaced him as the leader of the Armies at the front by General Pétain. That is precisely the kind of action which I recommend to this House, and I will insist on recommending it again and again until the force of the reasons that I give will drive common sense into the minds of members of the Front Bench. In place of a man with the calibre of M. Painlevé as Minister of War, we have here as Minister of War an estimable Gentleman, a very popular man in the country, a great owner of racehorses, but certainly at this time of crisis, where every blunder is counted not merely in loss of position but in the lives of thousands of brave men, this is not the time to place on the one hand the reputations or the feelings of individuals, and on the other the safety of the forces at the front. In view of the blunders which have been made in the military situation and in view of the deplorable impasse which we have reached, when without the assistance of America victory is no longer possible. I think that the Prime Minister should have replaced the Minister for War by someone more capable, even as is done in France; and if he has not either the courage or the grit or the capacity of leadership to effect such changes, he himself can go, as he has been tried in that scale and found wanting. That principle should be carried out right through every department, the one gauge and criterion being success in the carrying out of the operations with which such a man has been entrusted. If that had been adopted from the first we would now be faced with a very different situation after three years of war, from that with which we are now confronted. Even now, in spite of the very serious times in which we are placed, we find one of the problems which has been before the minds of responsible officers in the Navy years before this War broke out—that is the submarine menace—beginning, with a view to finding not the commencement of a solution but the means of ultimately obtaining that solution. That is not only a humiliating situation but it will afterwards be judged in history as one of the signs of the kind of decadence which has seized the governing circles of this country. It was said that we must attack on the Western front; that we must send men to be shattered against that almost impregnable wall; that we must sacrifice men not only by thousands and tens of thousands, and ultimately by hundreds of thousands, because Russia had been so exposed by this change of regime that an attack by Russia would be fatal to the whole system of the Allies. I am one who believes that the change of regime has been a message of hope to the Allies, because nothing that we now know as to the government of the old regime in Russia — [HON. MEMBERS: "Divide, divide."] Yes, I know, but I mean to say what I have to say. [HON. MEMBERS: "Divide, divide!"] The old regime was governed not so much by consideration of the aims and successes of the Allies as by the necessities of the trust of kings. It does foster to its own detriment, and the detriment of the cause of the Allies, the Salonika Expedition. So far from it being a danger or a menace to this country that the Germans should attack Russia on the Eastern front it would be an act which, in my opinion, would stimulate the Russians to resistance, and would bring out to the full the great extent of her resources, and would be a reply to—[HON. MEMBERS: "Divide, divide!"] The country would be in danger, and with Russia, as with France, that danger would rally all her sons to her aid. [HON. MEMBERS: "Divide, divide!"] This is that inevitable, indomitable Republican spirit.

Divide, divide!

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the third time, and passed.

The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.

It being half-past Eleven of the clock, MR. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at Half after Eleven o'clock.