Skip to main content

Commons Chamber

Volume 96: debated on Tuesday 24 July 1917

House of Commons

Tuesday, July 24, 1917

Private Business

Private Bills [ Lords ] (Standing Orders not previously inquired into complied with), —Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in the case of the following Bill, originating in the Lords, and referred on the First Reading thereof, the Standing Orders not previously inquired into, and which are applicable thereto, have been complied with, namely,—

Richmond (Surrey) Electricity Supply Bill [ Lords ].

Ordered, That the Bill be read a second time.

Colonial Bank Bill [ Lords ] (by Order),

Third Reading deferred till To-morrow.

Glasgow Boundaries Act (1912) Amendment Order Confirmation Bill,

"To confirm a Provisional Order under the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1899, relating to Glasgow Boundaries," presented by Mr. MUNRO; and ordered (under Section 7 of the Act) to be considered To-morrow.

Welfare of the Blind

Copy presented of Minutes of Evidence taken before the Departmental Committee on the Welfare of the Blind, with Appendices and Index [by Command] to lie upon the Table.

Colonial Probates Act, 1892

Copy presented of Order in Council, dated 17th July, 1917, applying the Colonial Probates Act to St. Lucia [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.

Naval and Marine Pay and Pensions Act, 1865

Copy presented of Orders in Council, dated 17th July, 1917, approving Memorials of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty praying sanction to the establishment (1) of. the Rating of Chief Sail-maker; (2) of Petty Officer (Special Service) and Stoker Petty Officer (Special Service) [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.

Universities (Scotland) Act, 1889

Copy presented of University Court Ordinance, No. 59 (Glasgow, No. 18) (Foundation of the Chair of William Jacks Modern Languages) [by Act]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 115.]

Assurance Companies

Copy presented of Statements deposited with the Board of Trade under Section 7 (1) of the Assurance Companies Act, 1909, during the year 1916. First, Second, and Third Schedules [by Act]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 116.]

Copy presented of Statements deposited with the Board of Trade under Section 7 (1) of the Assurance Companies Act, 1909, during the year 1916. Fourth and Fifth Schedules [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.

Industrial Unrest (Commission of Inquiry)

Copy presented of Reports of the Commission of Inquiry into Industrial Unrest for (1) the North-Eastern area, (2) the North-Western area, including a Supplemental Report on the Barrow-in-Furness district, (3) the Yorkshire and East Midlands area, (4) the West Midlands area, (5) the London and South-Eastern area, (6) the South-Western area, (7) Wales, including Monmouthshire, (8) Scotland [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

Oral Answers to Questions

War

Field Punishment

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that Private Ernest Richard Bowyer, No. 290739, 1/7th Battalion Welsh Regiment, belonging to North Sal-ford, but now stationed at Marton Hall, Yorkshire, has lately been punished by being confined to barracks without pay for one month and given field punishment No. 1, which means being handcuffed and tied to a tree for two hours each day; whether he is aware that this young soldier is only sixteen years of age and three months, and has served a year with the Colours, and that his offence was that he overstayed his first leave; and whether he will take steps to prevent punishments of these kinds to lads of sixteen years of age?

I have not been able to complete my inquiries into this case, as it is proving very difficult to arrive at the facts. There appears to be ground for believing that Bowyer was incorrectly registered as being eighteen when he was under that age.

Do I understand that this savage punishment of boys is necessary to maintain discipline in the Army?

I can only remind my hon. Friend of what I have said in my answer. We are making careful inquiries into the whole case.

Is it possible that this takes place with boys of eighteen? If the hon. Gentleman does not care to reply, I will raise the matter on the Vote of Credit.

Has it not been said that field punishment No. 1 is never given in this country; will, therefore, the hon. Gentleman inquire why it has been done when the War Office have stated that it was never done?

I have myself stated in the House that this punishment was not used in this country; consequently I am taking great pains to inquire.

Kut (Guns Recaptured)

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether the British guns captured by the Turks at Kut-el-Amara and recaptured by General Sir Stanley Maude at Bagdad, were employed by the enemy against our troops or were rendered useless by General Townshend's Force before the Kut garrison surrendered?

The guns in Kut at the time of the surrender, thirty-five in number, were rendered useless by the garrison and thrown into the river. They were salved by the Turks, and have all been recaptured by Sir Stanley Maude.

Were the guns useless for offensive purposes when the Turks got them out of the river?

Military Service

Rejections

asked the Under - Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that Lionel May, of Bath (enrolment No. B 2/27,806), who offered to join the Army in the early days of the War and was rejected three times, was called up on 17th November, 1916, was again rejected from active service and was sent back for substitution; that this man was, on 24th January, 1917, sent to Avonmouth, that owing to exposure to cold and damp he fell ill, after three weeks returned to Avonmouth, and was then sent to Northwich, where he again fell ill, and was discharged as unfit and suffering from valvular disease; and, seeing that this man still has £2 12s. 6d. owing to him as subsistence money which he has been unable to obtain, that he has not had any reply to letters he has addressed to the War Office, and that he is still under the doctor's care and has only 10s. per week State insurance money to live on, will he say what action he proposes to take?

If Mr. Lionel May, of Bath, actually served in the Army and was discharged therefrom as no longer physically fit for service, the award of a pension or gratuity would be dealt with in my Department, and if the hon. Member will inform me as to Mr. May's former unit and regimental number I will have the matter inquired into and will let him know the result as soon as possible.

asked the Undersecretary of State for War if his atten- tion has been drawn to the case of Private. J. E. Bottomley, No. 291, 3rd Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Duke of Wellington's, Regiment, North Shields, a weakling from birth, rejected four times as being totally unfit for the Army, called up a little over two months ago and passed into class A, broke down almost immediately. is now in Class C2, and is serving in the regiment in a menial position; and whether, in view of his father being a contractor and able to put him to Work of national importance that would not be beyond his strength, he can see his way to secure his release?

This man is reported to be of a marked neurotic nature and suffering from neurasthenia. He was brought before the first available travelling medical board after joining his unit and his category was lowered from A to C2. The correspondence has now been passed to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief for his information with a view to the man being brought forward for discharge. Further inquiries are being made as to the Board which passed him A.

Qualified Dispensers

asked whether at the present time qualified dispensers employed as such are serving in the Royal Army Medical Corps as privates, or is it the custom to advance them in rank when so serving?

There are qualified dispensers serving in the Army as privates, and they have the same opportunities for promotion as other men in the corps.

Cases Under Inquiry

asked the Undersecretary of State for War whether his attention has been called to an incident in York Station on the 16th instant, when about 11 p.m. an officer seized a mug of hot coffee from a soldier's hand, and, without any warning or provocation, poured the contents over the man's bare head and down his neck; and what steps have been taken to deal with this officer?

As I informed my hon. Friend the Member for West Ham yesterday, inquiries are being made into this matter, but I am not yet in a position to answer.

Is not the hon. Gentleman aware that I gave him a week's notice, so that he would be prepared with an answer—when shall I put the question down again?

I hope my hon. Friend will give me four or five days; it is not my fault.

Unarmed Soldiers, Ireland

asked the Undersecretary of State for War whether the insults and in some cases attempts at injury to soldiers in uniform, which have become frequent in Ireland and which are perpetrated with impunity, have been under the attention of the Army Council; and will he say whether adequate steps have been taken and orders issued by the Irish Command, in conjunction with the Irish Government, to defend isolated parties of unarmed soldiers from the risk of molestation?

I called for a report yesterday from the local military authorities, and will communicate with my hon. and gallant Friend as soon as I am in a position to do so.

If my hon. Friend will put down the question for Wednesday of next week, I will try and give an answer.

Medical Examinations

asked the Undersecretary of State for War whether an Army Council Order was issued on 20th December, 1916, instructing commanding officers, in consultation with their unit medical officers, to raise the categories of soldiers in suitable cases; whether, in view of the relative positions of commanding officers and medical officers, this Order in practice left this decision frequently in the hands of a layman; whether he is aware that under this Order men have been passed for drafts whose physical condition had previously resulted in their being placed in low categories or totally rejected; and whether this Order will be rescinded in view of the need of safeguarding the soldiers' health?

I think that my hon. Friend is under a misapprehension as to the operation of the Instructions to which he refers, as practically no complaints as to the physical condition of drafts are being received.

As the Instruction is stated in the question, does, the hon. Gentleman think it suitable that the authorities should leave it to a layman to decide whether or not a man is fit?

I do not understand that the authority is left to a layman. The Instruction clearly points out, as I understand, that the authority should be in the hands of the medical officer.

Will the hon. Gentleman publish the Instruction in the OFFICIAL REPORT, and in addition to the answer?

Medical Men (Utilization of Services)

asked, the Under-Secretary of State for War whether there are eminent medical men, some of them having special recommendations for surgery by the Scottish War Emergency Committee of the War Office, stationed at Salonika, in convalescent depots, and other such places in Greece, where their skill is quite unutilised and where medical men of one or two years' standing could quite satisfactorily accomplish the work falling to these eminent doctors; and, if so, can his Department see their way to the utilisation of this skill to greater advantage by transferring it to France or some other active front?

The authorities concerned are always informed of any special qualifications possessed by medical officers proceeding abroad, and it rests with the General Officer Commanding to employ them where and how they may consider them of most benefit to the service. It is necessary to have such men as are referred to in the question available in a theatre of war, where at any moment serious fighting may break out with severe casualties as the result.

Does not my hon. Friend think that it would be good management to have this skill in the best places for the nation?

I think I have fully answered that point in the question. It may be that at certain times, at any given time, eminent doctors are at work at convalescent hospitals; but they are at the nearest available spot to where there may be serious casualties.

Conscientious Objectors

asked the Understated in the question, does the hon. James Blackman, No. 38745, Labour Battalion, Northamptonshire Regiment, a conscientious objector, was sent to France; whether he has yet been returned to this country; and can it be stated where he is now?

James Blackman is the fifth man referred to in the answer which I gave my hon. Friend on the 14th June. I have no information that there is any change in his situation as I described it.

Absentees in Ireland

asked whether any steps have yet been taken in regard to the number of shirkers who have crossed to Ireland to evade military service; and whether Irishmen of military age openly say it is no inducement to enlist while these shirkers are left to step into their places?

Full instructions tightening up former procedure were issued in May last as to the procedure to be adopted for dealing with absentees under the Military Service Acts, 1916 and 1917, who had proceeded to Ireland for the purpose of evading their obligations under the Military Service Acts, and a copy of the Instructions, Army Council Instruction No. 817 of the 19th May, 1917, may be seen in the Library. Action has been taken under the Instruction, and in several cases men who had proceeded to Ireland have been brought to this country, and, having been dealt with by a Court of Summary Jurisdiction, have been handed over to the military authorities.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that there are hundreds to be seen in Dublin cinemas every night, and cannot he get more than a few back?

I am informed that of those who could be brought back substantially all have been brought back, and, as I have stated in my answer to the right hon. Gentleman's question, they have been handed over to the military authorities.

What length of residence in Ireland gives exemption—two years, or what?

I think the test is whether any Irishman has been ordinarily resident in this country. If an Irish-man has been over here for many years the Civil Court, I think quite properly, find him an ordinary resident in this country.

Supposing an Englishman has been resident in Ireland for two years, would he be liable?

I cannot answer that question because it is purely a question for a Civil Court of Summary Jurisdiction.

Harvest Work

asked whether there is an inadequate number of soldiers at Shrewsbury to supply the help being asked for by farmers for harvest work in the district; and, if so, will he take steps to remedy this state of things as soon as possible?

Representations were received from the Agricultural Executive Committee for Salop that the number of soldiers sent to Shrewsbury to assist with the hay harvest was insufficient to meet the demands being received from farmers, and arrangements were made for 150 more men to be moved to Shrewsbury. These have now arrived. An additional 175 soldiers are arriving at Shrewsbury during this week.

Can the hon. Gentleman say if these men have a knowledge of agriculture?

Naval and Military Pensions and Grants

asked the Undersecretary of State for War whether his Attention has been called to the case of Mrs. Wilson, the widowed mother of Private F G. Wilson, No. G163,611, 13th Company Royal Fusiliers, and of the late A. E. Wilson, killed in action in July, 1915, both of whom allotted 3s. 6d. to their mother; whether he is aware that Mrs. Wilson is receiving a weekly pension of 3s. 6d. on account of her dead son and 2s. 5d. dependant's allowance on account of her son, Private F. G. Wilson; whether he is aware that Mrs. Wilson appealed against the assessment late in December, 1916, or early in January, 1917, was summoned before the London Pensions Committee in March, 1917, and has not yet heard the result of the appeal made seven months ago; whether he can say why no answer has been sent to the letters addressed to the Departments concerned by the London local war pensions committee; and whether, having regard to this delay, the case will now be at once dealt with?

This case had to be referred to the Appeals Committee, presided over by my right hon. Friend the Member for St. Pancras North, and proved to require a somewhat lengthly investigation. That Committee has now given its award, and an allowance of 5s. will be paid immediately with effect from the date of appeal.

asked whether, in the case of a number of men who have been invalided out of the Navy and Army for tuberculosis, it has been decided that the disease was neither caused by nor aggravated by service and that in consequence these men have received no pensions but only gratuities under the new Royal Warrant; if so, whether he is prepared to have these cases reviewed in order to ascertain whether there was at least aggravation; and if he can state what is the present policy of the Department in tuberculous cases?

The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. As regards the second part, in any case in which it can be shown that there was aggravation the award will be reviewed. As regards the third part, the policy of the Department is now to treat tuberculosis as in the majority of cases attributable to or aggravated by war service, and there is no doubt that many of such cases which were ruled out for pension earlier in the War will be accepted on review.

Will the right hon. Gentleman be able to reconsider the cases of the dependants of the men who have died from this disease?

I should say that they would Certainly be eligible for re-examination for pension or some other form of relief.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say, in the case of men who are suffering from tuberculosis and are discharged from the Army and the Navy, seeing that they were accepted as fit, what has been the cause of the disease from which they are now suffering?

My right hon. Friend is the Minister of Pensions, and I am asking him how he as Pensions Minister makes up his mind as to how a man contracted the disease of tuberculosis seeing that he was accepted for the Army or Navy as fit? Where does the right hon. Gentleman think he got the disease?

I believe the assumption was, up to recently, that a man could neither get or have this disease aggravated in the War, and that consumption could not be attributable to nor even aggravated by war service. The assumption now is quite the contrary, and if a man is found to be suffering from phthisis the assumption is that if he has served a few months, say three or four months, that his consumption is attributable to or was aggravated by war service.

Distinguished Service Order

asked the Undersecretary of State for War whether the Distinguished Service Order was established for recognition of distinguished service in the field of war; if so, has the Order been given during the present War to officers who have not been in any of the war areas but have remained in staff appointments at. Home or in India; and whether it is now the intention of the War Office to give this Order for other reasons than actual service in the field?

The Distinguished Service Order was established for the purpose of rewarding individual instances of meritorious or distinguished service in the field, or before the enemy, and there is no intention to award this distinction for any other reasons. It has only been awarded for service in the United Kingdom during actual hostilities.

I do not think so. I think my answer clearly covers both those points; it has been awarded abroad and in this country.

There have been cases where the military authorities thought it should be awarded here—when this country was being attacked.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that one of the cases where the award was given was that of a gentle man in France who had only served in the Post Office there?

No. I am not aware of that, but if my hon. Friend will give me the the case I shall certainly inquire into it.

As a matter of fact: do not men get the D.S.O. who have never seen a shot fired?

Donington Hall (Escape of Prisoners)

asked the Undersecretary of State for War whether he will give the number of officer prisoners at present in residence at Donington Hall and also of their servants; and what number of men of the Royal Defence Corps are detailed for duty to act as guard?

I am informed that there are 389 officer prisoners of war at present at Donington Hall, and 115 prisoners of war as servants. The strength of the guard is 173 all ranks.

Would it be possible to strengthen the guard, seeing they are elderly men?

No, there is one in five, and that is generally regarded as a sufficient allowance.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the standard of guards for the prisoners' camps is much higher and more numerous than in other belligerant countries—that is so?

asked the Undersecretary of State for War whether the Court of Inquiry into the recent escape of enemy officers from Donington Hall has sat and reported; and, if so, can he give its findings?

Enemy Air Raids

Air Mechanic (J. O. Jessop) Killed

asked the Undersecretary of State for War whether he is aware that in the evidence given at the coroner's inquest at Dartford on Lieutenant Salmon, who was killed in the air raid on 7th July, reference was made to an airman who was shot in the neck and killed at the previous air raid; can he say how it occurred and where; and is there any reason why this man's name should not be known?

First-class Air Mechanic 25501 James Oliver Jessop, R. F. C., was killed in action during an air raid on 4th July. His name appeared as "mentioned in dispatches for gallant and distinguished service" in the "London Gazette," and was published in the Press on 18th July.

London Defences

asked the Undersecretary of State for War whether the gunners in charge of the anti-aircraft guns in and around London on the occasion of the last air raid were provided with adequate sighting arrangements to enable them to distinguish the British from the German aeroplanes; whether an inquiry has yet been made into the circumstances surrounding the loss of the British aeroplanes; and whether he is satisfied that they were not shot down by our own guns?

Telescopes are provided for the purpose of identifying aircraft. None of our machines were shot down by our guns on 7th July.

As the result of this provision, did the War Office ascertain there were only twenty German machines on that occasion?

asked the Prime Minister upon whom the responsibility rests for ordering the transfer of a large number of our fighting machines to France during the week ending the 7th instant, thereby depriving the citizens of London of the protection which otherwise would have been available during the air raid which resulted in the sacrifice of a great many lives; and will he also state the action it is proposed to take in this matter?

I cannot add anything to the statements made on this subject in Secret Session on the 9th July.

Public Warnings

asked the Home Secretary whether, in view of the fact that it is absolutely impossible to give public warning to all places threatened by enemy aircraft, he will abandon all schemes which have only the effect of giving pleasure to the enemy and satisfaction to panic-mongers?

I am fully aware of the difficulties in the way of arranging to give public warning of the approach of enemy aircraft in all places threatened with attack, but this does not appear to me to be a sufficient reason for not giving warning when that can be done. I do not think that any scheme which I have approved falls within the description in the last part of the question.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that if the alarm which was given on Sunday had been given on a week-day, when the streets were crowded with people, it would have caused very great disaster?

Questions

East Africa Operations

asked the Undersecretary of State for War whether General Northey's dispatches concerning the operations of the Rhodesia-Nyassa-land columns in German East Africa have yet come to hand; and can he give any reason for the delay, seeing that General Smuts, in a dispatch published last January, referred to the vigour and ability with which their operations had been conducted and added that the full story of them would be told in General Northey's own dispatches?

The first dispatch rendered by Brigadier-General Northey, addressed to the Governor-General, Nyas-saland, and forwarded by the latter to the Colonial Office with a covering dispatch, has just been received, and will be published in due course.

Indian Army

asked the Undersecretary of State for War whether an appointment has recently been made to a high military command in India with a view to carrying out the reform of the Indian Army; and, if so, can he state the name of the person so appointed?

asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether the conference between the India Office and the War Office regarding the grant of better terms of pay to sick and wounded officers of the Indian Army sent home from field service has yet met; if so, with w hat result; and when an announcement may be expected?

Yes, Sir; meetings have been held, but I am afraid no decision has yet been reached.

Royal Military Academy, Woolwich (Cadetships)

asked the Undersecretary of State for War whether cadetships for the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, are awarded on the results of a competitive examination; whether there were more than 400 candidates for the March examination, of whom 109 were awarded cadetships; whether sixteen of these were not even in the first 150; and whether he can give any reason why the sixteen in question were passed into Woolwich over the heads of others who had beaten them in the examination?

May I ask whether these fifteen nominations were given to two particular schools?

I cannot say that, but I understand they were given to certain public schools which in peace time had Officers' Training Corps.

Does my hon. Friend think it is encouraging to the successful students that they should see others pass over their heads?

No; but I think I should point out—and I think the sense of the House will realise what I say is true —that you do often find that men who are very capable leaders of men are not able to pass examinations.

No; my hon. Friend is quite wrong in stating that. There is a nomination committee, of whom, I believe, my hon. Friend's colleague the hon. Member for Glasgow and Aberdeen Universities, is a member, who look carefully into claims put forward by head masters on behalf of boys who have shown themselves not only capable in fields of sport, but in other things.

I believe all head masters of schools who in peace time had control of Officers' Training Corps were given permission to nominate candidates.

Shell Shock

Treatment of Sufferers

asked the Minister of Pensions whether his attention has been drawn to an appeal for money issued on behalf of recuperation hostels for sailors and soldiers invalided from His Majesty's Services with nerve strain, and signed "Frederick Milner," in which it; is stated men have been, and are being, invalided out of the Service in large numbers with no prospect before them but the workhouse or asylum, or a miserable existence as a burden to themselves and their relations; whether this statement represents the position of these men; and, if not, whether he can state what action as regards pensions, gratuities, treatment, and training have been made for men invalided owing to shell shock?

I am aware of this appeal, but have ascertained that it was not seen by Sir Frederick Milner, whose signature it purports to bear. The terms of the appeal do not accurately represent the facts with regard to men invalided out of the Service on account of nerve strain. Recognising the special difficulties presented by neurasthenia and shell shock, a special medical board was empowered to deal with all such cases, and award pensions or gratuities to them. This Board has set up branch boards in Scotland and Ireland, and members of it have been visiting at intervals some fourteen towns for the purpose of examining men reported to them. Cases of neurasthenia and shell shock which were invalided out of the Service before the special Board was instituted are entitled to be re-examined by the Board at all times, and Local War Pensions Committees have been specially instructed by circular to report to the Board, with a view to re-examination, any case which in their opinion is not being suitably treated.

All cases of men invalided from shell shock are granted either pensions or, in the event of less serious cases gratuities, but in either event they are entitled to treatment or training under Article 6 of the Royal Warrant. I have given special attention to these cases. Provision has been made for their treatment in an institution with 105 beds established at Golders' Green, where training and practice in intensive culture is being provided. The Golders' Green accommodation is about to be increased by fifty beds and other suitable accommodation is being sought in the neighbourhood of London. On the 21st inst. a hospital for fifty of these cases was opened near Belfast. At Leeds 100 beds are being provided and at Leicester another 100. Men are also being sent on the recommendation of the special Board to recuperative work on farms in Essex.

I hope, by these institutions, increased to any extent that may prove necessary, to carry out with State funds the objects of the appeal to private charity referred to in the question.

Will the Government take steps to provide an institution to give either monetary assistance or to find employment to men who have fought for their country and find themselves destitute?

The Government have taken steps, and are providing pensions and payment for training or treatment in such institutions. The Government would in the last resort no doubt build institutions, but we cannot get them built just now.

Is there an institution for men who find themselves destitute where they can either ask for monetary assistance or apply for employment?

If there are men destitute then there is something wrong; their cases ought to have been dealt with, and they should not be destitute, but that is another case altogether from the case referred to.

May I ask whether men suffering from shell shock are being sent to lunatic asylums, and whether the right hon. Gentleman thinks that is the best kind of treatment?

The men suffering from shell shock in this question are being sent to places where they can be treated. If there are any mental cases or any insane men, as the result of shell shock or anything else, they are suitably provided for.

Is it not the case that they are discharged with a view that they may enter pauper lunatic asylums?

I cannot say anything about the "view" about discharge. We do not discharge them. We deal with them in institutions. These institutions happen to be lunatic asylums provided out of public funds, but these cases are treated not as pauper patients at all. Special terms are made on their behalf. They are treated as private patients without taint of pauperism. They are paid for at special rates by the Government. Payment is made for special creature comforts and allowances made to wives and families on the widow and children scale.

Questions

Shipping Freights

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Shipping Controller (1) whether, when the rate of freight on the bills of lading is greater than the freight paid to the shipowner, the receiver of the cargo pays the bill of lading freight to the agent of the steamer; if so, who gets the difference; (2) for what reason it is the practice of the Ministry of Shipping, or those who act for it, to have bills of lading for wheat or other grain made up at rates in excess of the rates paid to the companies owning the vessels in which these cargoes are brought to the United Kingdom, firstly for Government account, and secondly for private consignees?

In the circumstances mentioned the receiver of the difference is His Majesty's Government who, in the case of cereals, to which special reference has been made in previous questions, take account of the difference in fixing the selling prices of grain, which is so adjusted as to hand the difference back to the grain consumer.

Is the higher price of the loaf attributable to profiteering by the Government?

There is no profiteering by the Government. The Government does not make a profit, but if they did it would go into the Exchequer and help to pay for the War.

If the Government actually receive a higher rate of freight than is entered on the bill of lading, in what form is it paid back to grain merchants?

The method is that the Royal Commission on Wheat Supplies in rendering the account to the purchaser of the grain makes an allowance for the price which the purchaser has paid as the rate of freight.

Is it the average rate of freight that is taken in making up up the account or the particular freight for a specific ship?

The rate paid by the consumer is the average cost of the grain and the average cost of the freight.

Seeing that the rate of freight, according to the hon. Gentleman, is the actual Blue Book rate which the merchant pays for his wheat, can he explain why the loaf is so dear?

Food Supplies

Potato Spraying

asked the Secretary for Scotland whether he is aware that potato-growers in Scotland are unable to procure potato-sprayers for prevention of disease in this article of food; that when the English Board is applied to they refer Scottish applicants to the Scottish Board of Agriculture; that the latter Board declare to applicants that it is not proposed to make the scheme of distribution of these applicable to Scotland; and whether he will take any action in this matter?

My hon. and learned Friend is misinformed. The Board of Agriculture for Scotland have secured a supply of potato-sprayers, from which they have been able to meet all demands up to date. Applications for these machines should be addressed to the Board.

asked the President of the Board of Agriculture whether the Board are quite satisfied that they are safe in recommending the spraying of potatoes with sulphate of copper; and if he is aware that the same result could be obtained, as far as the preservation of the plant is concerned, by the use of paraffin and water at a far less cost while at the same time it would be absolutely harmless?

Sulphate of copper has been used in mixtures for spraying potatoes for many years in many different countries, with extremely beneficial results. Experiment and experience have made it certain that copper-sulphate mixtures are the best-known fungicide for the prevention of late blight in potatoes, and the Board are not prepared to recommend the use of paraffin and water instead.

Motor Tractors

asked whether, in view of the demand by farmers for tractors for the harvest and autumn ploughing and the inability of the Government tractor departments to meet this demand owing to the insufficient number of tractors available of the pattern adopted by the departments, he will give instructions that the farmers are to be permitted to purchase any machines they can get; and whether instructions will be given to the Ministry of Munitions to take advantage of the 500 tractors, complete with ploughs, which have been offered for immediate delivery by the Whiting-Bull representatives in England, and which can be ready for use in time for the harvest?

In reply to the first part of the question, the Board have consistently encouraged farmers to purchase any efficient and available tractors for their own use, and will continue to do so. As regards the Whiting-Bull tractors, the Board is informed by the Ministry of Munitions that only some twelve of these tractors have actually been delivered in this country, and as at present advised they are not prepared to purchase themselves the large numbers of these tractors which the hon. Member declares are available.

Is my hon. Friend aware that for over nine months 500 of these tractors have been lying at New York, whilst there are purchasers here for them and the Government stepped in and prevented them coming over, and can he say if their action is dominated by consideration for the Ford interest?

Is it not a fact that I called the attention of the Board of Agriculture to this matter months ago because farmers were wanting these tractors?

The information that I get from the representatives of the Food Production Department is that these tractors are not satisfactory. We have not had good reports about them.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that Reports have been published, by his own Department saying that they are completely satisfactory?

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that a trial of these tractors-took place as recently as 7th July at Bickley, in Kent, and that the report was satisfactory?

Perhaps the hon. Member will allow me to read a report that I have received from the representative in my own county of Northamptonshire—

"The two chief faults are—lack of power and its unfortunate design; both these tend to make it impossible to work steadily or satisfactorily on anything but the most level and moderately light ground."

Another representative in the county of Devon reports:

"The Bull tractors seem to be unworkable, and what little work they do very unsatisfactory.… The Bull tractor recently working in the parish of Ottery St. Mary has given a lot of trouble, and the farmers will not have it on their land."

If the farmers are willing to pay for them, what right have the Government to step in and prevent them?

We do not step in and prevent them. There are only twelve in this country.

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Agriculture, whether the building of the M.O.M. (Ford) tractor has been abandoned; how many of these tractors have been guaranteed for the harvest and autumn ploughing; whether there will be sufficient M.O.M. tractors to do the farmers' ploughing and also the Government's work; and, if not, whether instructions will be issued to farmers to purchase any machines they can get?

No, Sir, the building of the Ford tractor has not been abandoned, but, owing to the demands made upon the Ministry of Munitions for other war material, that Department has found it impossible to carry out their arrangements with the Board for the manufacture in this country of 6,000 tractors of this type. An order has consequently been placed in America for the manufacture of these tractors, delivery of which on a large scale should begin in October next. In the meantime, the Board has purchased a large number of other American tractors of certain types which have given satisfactory results and every effort is being made to hasten their delivery. In addition, practically the whole output of British-built tractors has been taken up by the Board.

Is it the case that it is the representative of the Ford Company who has to decide between all British interests in this country, and is the hon. Gentleman aware that the farmers generally are very dissatisfied that the whole question should be in the hands of an American representative?

I am afraid that I must dispute what the hon. Gentleman says about the farmers being dissatisfied. I do not think that they are dissatisfied.

Is it the fact that he was adviser to the Board of Agriculture at the time the question was brought before the Board some months ago?

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Whiting-Bull Company have established works at Mespil Road, Dublin, capable of turning out immediately 2,000 tractors and 10,000 next year; that this company has a large number of tractors ready for immediate delivery; and will the Government give equal facilities, to the Whiting-Bull Company for importation and disposal of their tractors as are given to the Ford Company?

Our Food Department do not report well on these tractors. They prefer the other type.

Bread

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food if he is aware of the difficulties the bakers in all parts of London are labouring under to produce good eatable bread on account of the bad flour supplied to them by the master millers; if the present flour mixture tends to ropiness in bread, renders it unsound and difficult to keep, and is the cause of much waste; that during the hot weather quantities of bread have to be destroyed by the sanitary inspectors as being unfit for human food; if a number of bakers purchase imported flour at an enhanced price and mix it with the Government flour and so produce a better class of bread to be sold to the well-to-do people; if all the imported flour was mixed by millers with the present G.R. flour and one standard of flour obtained for all it would be the means of preventing waste, place all on an equality, and produce better keeping and eating bread; and if he will take action in the matter?

On the first three points raised by the hon. Member's question I have nothing to add to the answers already given. As regards imported flour, I am not aware that this is exclusively or mainly used for bread consumed by the wealthier classes. The demand appears to come indifferently from all parts, including the mining and large industrial districts, and the flour is impartially distributed so far as the supply extends.

As I have already explained, having regard to difficulties of supply and transport, it is impossible to secure an even distribution of all ingredients each week so as to produce a standard flour. The 9d. loaf will make it impossible for private holders of white flour to operate at a profit, and as a matter of fact the stocks of white flour in private hands are now very small. I may add that the whole question of imported flour—which is not white flour, but pure wheaten flour—is under consideration.

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food whether, in view of the fact that some bakers put much more substitutes into wheat flour for making bread than others, and that, although this is more profitable to the baker, it results in unpalatable and unwholesome bread, he will have the percentage of substitute laid down at not more than 25 per cent.?

It has already been stated in the House that the admixture of permitted cereals is effected not by the bakers, but by the millers. It follows, therefore, that the baker's profit cannot be influenced by the percentage of substitutes allowed. Only in exceptional circumstances does the admixture of substitutes amount to so much as 25 per cent.

Is it a fact that they are allowed to go up as high as 50 per cent.? Would it not be much better if matters were equalised and the millers were obliged to provide flour with not more than 25 per cent. of substitutes?

On that point I should be obliged if the hon. and gallant Gentleman would put down a question.

Sugar

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food if the quantity of fruit in the Isle of Wight is always very much in excess of the quantity required for individual domestic use and that it has always been sold in the form of jam to the inhabitants of the towns in the island; if persons interested have been informed by the Ministry of Food that sugar would only be supplied for jam for domestic consumption, and that in consequence a large amount of valuable fruit will be spoilt and much pecuniary loss suffered by the growers of fruit in the island; and if he will explain the reason for this action?

The sugar allotted for the domestic preserving of fruit was in addition to, and not in substitution for, the amount supplied to manufacturers of jam. There seems no reason why fruit grown in the Isle of Wight should not reach the inhabitants in the form of jam as heretofore.

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food why sugar released for preserving soft fruit only reached a number of small retailers in the Isle of Wight about 10th July; and whether he is aware that most of their customers' fruit had gone rotten through being kept waiting so long for the sugar?

All arrangements for the release of sugar for preserving soft fruit were completed before the end of June. The delay referred to was probably due to the time unavoidably spent in transporting sugar to the Isle of Wight either from the refinery or from the port of landing.

Why was it that this delay was inevitable in the case of the Isle of Wight?

Is it not the fact that enormous quantities of soft fruit has been lost all throughout the country, and not only in the Isle of Wight, by reason of the want of sugar?

Oatmeal and Rolled Oats

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food if the approximate wholesale price in London of oatmeal and rolled oats is 42s. and 44s., to which 2s. per cwt. must be added for carriage to the Isle of Wight, which makes the cost to the retailer there 44s. and 46s., respectively; whether the price fixed by the Food Controller is at. the rate of 6s. 8d. per cwt., which therefore only leaves to the retailer a profit of 2s. 8d. and 6d. per cwt., respectively; and whether he will consider the desirability of fixing a price that will afford a fair living profit for the retailer?

The wholesale prices in. London yesterday of oatmeal and rolled oats averaged 40s., which, allowing 2s. for carriage, makes the cost to the retailer and in the Isle of Wight 42s. and not 44s. and 46s. as stated in the question. The retail price of 46s. 8d. fixed by the Food Controller leaves a profit of 4s. 8d. per cwt., which cannot be considered unduly small for this particular class of trade.

Tea

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food if controlled tea has to be sold at 2s. 4d. per 1b.; whether, seeing that the sale price in bulk is 2s. Id. per lb., that the wholesale blenders add about Id. per lb., making the cost to the grocer 2s. 2d per lb., and that the latter has to weigh it out in 2-oz. and ¼lb. lots net weight, which means a loss on every turn of the scale if he gives correct weight, all of which has to come out of the profit of 2d. per lb.; and whether he proposes to take any action in the matter?

The present scheme provides for 30 per cent. of imported tea being sold at 2s. 4d. per lb. and the prime' cost out of bond for this quality is 11d. to 1s. The wholesale merchants can purchase at Is. 11¾d. per lb. and the cost to the grocer is 2s. 1d. to 2s. 1½d. The grocer thus gets a fair margin of profit. It should be borne in mind that in the tea trade the margin of profit is invariably smallest on the lowest-priced teas.

Eggs and Poultry

asked the Prime Minister whether the British Government has placed a contract in America for 24,000,000 eggs and for 80,000,000 lbs. of poultry; and, if so, whether he will give the poultry industry of the United Kingdom a fair opportunity of success in their efforts to supply the British market by importing from America or elsewhere poultry food at a reasonable price?

I have been asked to reply. The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative; the second part does not therefore arise.

Has there been any contract for any large amount placed in America for eggs and poultry?

Cheese

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food if Government cheese costs the retailer 1s. 2d. per lb. and must be sold by him at 1s. 4d. which leaves him 2d. per lb. profit, to gain which the cheese has to be paid for in seven days from the date of invoice; if he must run the risk of perhaps two or three pounds short weight for which there is no redress, and must bear the waste in cutting up in small pieces and the loss in weight by drying, which in new cheese is very considerable; and whether he proposes to take any action in the matter?

My hon. Friend has asked me to reply to this question. The question of the proper allowance be made for shrinkage of weight is now under consideration.

Questions

Glasgow Boundaries

asked whether it is proposed to introduce a Bill to amend the Glasgow Boundaries Act in order to postpone the re-division of the wards of the city until 1920; whether he is aware that there is local opposition to this proposal, the opinion being that any postponement should not go beyond the year 1918; and whether, before definitely deciding to promote the Bill referred to, he will fully consider the reasonableness of this opposition?

The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. My right hon. Friend the Secretary for Scotland has given notice of a Bill to confirm an Order under the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, which provides for such postponement. As regards the remainder of the question, I would remind my hon. Friend that under the procedure applicable to such an Order opportunity is given to objectors to petition against it, and to have their case heard locally by a Commission composed of members of the two Houses. The only opposing petition having been withdrawn, the Order is now proceeding as an unopposed Order, and my right hon. Friend has no reason to suppose that there is any substantial local opposition to its provisions.

Will the hon. and learned Gentleman state whether these arrangements in regard to the re-division of the words are being communicated to the Boundary Commissioners?

That will be a matter for the Boundary Commissioners. I have no doubt that they will take every opportunity afforded them of obtaining all the relevant facts connected with the proposed re-devision of the wards of the City.

Will the hon. and learned Gentleman see that they are specially communicated to the Commissioners?

I will communicate with my right hon. Friend the Secretary for Scotland on the subject.

Trading After the War (Germans)

asked the Prime Minister if he will introduce a Bill to prevent Germans from entering into business in this country after peace is declared?

I do not think that the time has yet come for dealing with this and similar questions.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is great public anxiety about this question, and will he not declare the attitude of the Government towards it and inaugurate a policy that will prevent these men who are working underground from beginning to start work as soon as the War ends?

I am afraid that I can say nothing more. I do not think that the time has come for stating what we are going to do after the War.

Reconstruction

Sub-Committees

asked the Prime Minister whether the Report of the Forestry Sub-committee of the Reconstruction Committee can be published, as was the corresponding Report of the Agricultural Sub-committee?

I would refer the hon. Member to the reply which I gave to a similar question yesterday by the hon. Member for South Kerry.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in Scotland there is very great interest indeed in this subject, in view of the extraordinary devastation of woodlands, in many cases prematurely?

Yes, I am aware of that. My hon. Friend knows that these Sub-committees were appointed with the idea that they should be confidential, and it is only in exceptional cases that the Reports will be published. That is going to be considered by the Cabinet.

asked the Prime Minister what public reason there is that the names of members of Sub-committees appointed by the Reconstruction Committee should not be made public; why the references to the Sub-committees should also not be published; and whether, in view of the interest in local government in this country, he will now state who are the members of the Committee appointed to consider local government after the War and the references on which the Committee are acting?

I cannot add anything to the answer which I gave to a similar question by the hon. Member for North Somerset on 16th July.

Are we to understand that the public are not to know who are considering these questions of reconstruction of local government and other matters?

So far there has been no change in the policy adopted when this Committee was set up. It was then considered that it should be confidential, and that the names, except in exceptional cases, should not be made public.

Are municipalities, London in particular, represented on this Committee?

Not as municipalities. The members are chosen for their personal qualifications.

Shall we be able to raise the question of the reconstruction schemes on this Bill when it is introduced?

That will depend upon Mr. Speaker. I suggest that it would be more useful to raise it after the Bill is passed and the Minister is here.

Ministry of Reconstruction

asked the Prime Minister if he will state the powers and authority which it is proposed to confer on the newly appointed Minister in charge of reconstruction; and whether in connection with the reconstruction of trade after the War the Minister in question will be committed by the Government to a policy of a tariff on Foreign imports for the protection of British manufacturers?

As regards the first part of the question a Bill will be brought in immediately creating the Ministry. The answer to the last part of the question is in the negative.

Will the right hon. Gentleman state what the duties of this new Ministry will be?

If, as I expect, the Bill will be introduced this week, perhaps the hon. Member will wait and see what it does.

Does the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Hoxton (Dr. Addison) hold any office at the present time?

He has been appointed Minister of Reconstruction, but he is not entitled, I understand, to sit in the House until the Bill has been passed.

Employment During and After War

asked the Minister of Labour whether any and, if so, what provision is being made for the finding of civil employment after the War for the number of men for whom employment has been found in munitions and other urgent Government work which may be expected to cease when the War is over?

The Ministry of Labour have under their consideration at the present time, in conjunction with the Reconstruction Committee and the Ministry of Munitions, the provision to be made for finding civil employment after the War for both men and women engaged on munitions and other Government work who may be expected to be discharged at the end of the War.

Are they likely to present the Report, or, at least, the reference to the Committees, or the scope of their work?

I do not think I can say about the Reconstruction Committee whether they will make a Report or not. They do not come under the Ministry of Labour.

I mean the scope of the inquiry, and such a scheme as is suggested but not described?

asked the Minister of Labour whether the number of 52,724 men placed in employment through the Employment Exchanges includes partially disabled men; and, if so, in what proportion?

The number 52,724 includes all partially disabled men who have been placed through the Employment Exchanges in their first situations since their discharge. While I cannot inform my hon. Friend as to the precise number of partially disabled men included in the figure mentioned in the question, I think he may safely assume that most of the men to which it relates were partially disabled in one way or another.

Air Services

Aeroplane Construction

asked the Prime Minister whether the Government can form any estimate of the monthly output of aeroplanes in Germany; and, if so, whether they are keeping pace with that output?

The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative. As regards the last part of the question, it is not so much a question of keeping pace as of producing machines in the greatest quantity possible.

Are the Government satisfied that there are sufficient aircraft in this country to prevent a repetition of what occurred the other day?

The Government are satisfied that they are doing everything in their power to meet all possible needs.

Has the right hon. Gentleman ascertained that the Germans, are abandoning the construction of Zeppelins in order the better to concentrate on aeroplanes?

I do not see what difference that will make. If we are producing all we can produce, whatever the Germans do, we cannot do more.

Mesopotamia Commission

Lord Hardinge

asked the Prime Minister whether the refusal to accept the thrice-proffered resignation of Lord Hardinge was the act of the Foreign Secretary; and whether the decision not to accept Lord Hardinge's resignation was decided, or confirmed, by the War Cabinet?

It was, as has already been stated, the Foreign Secretary who refused to accept the resignation, but, as I stated on Wednesday, this decision was confirmed by the Cabinet.

Did the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs threaten to resign if this was not carried out?

No, Sir. So far as I know, my right hon. Friend made no such statement.

Questions

Soldiers and Sailors (Land Settlement)

asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the fact that there are now 326 applicants for plots of land at Wandsworth which cannot be found for them, he can say how land is to be found for the many thousands of sailors and soldiers requiring land after the War; and what practical steps are being taken at the present time to provide suitable land, houses, and buildings for these men?

The Borough Council of Wandsworth have been very active in providing allotments for the townspeople in their district; 4,500 allotments have been so provided, and the demand for others is at present unsatisfied to the extent which the hon. and gallant Member indicates. I do not see that the question of the provision of agricultural land, houses, and buildings for ex-sailors and soldiers has any connection with the demand for allotments in the London area, but if the hon. Member will put down a specific question on the point, or see me privately, I shall be glad to give him what information I can.

Does not the hon. Gentleman know that houses and land have been provided by the Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia and Canada, and why cannot this Government do some- thing for their own people? Will it not be too late to leave the matter till after the War?

We are already doing something. We bought an estate of 1,500 acres yesterday.

Comite Permanent International D'action Economique

asked the Prime Minister whether there has been set up in Paris an international committee known as the Comité Permanent International d'Action Economique; and, if so, by what authority and on what date it was constituted, what are its functions, what countries are represented upon it, and the names of the members composing the said committee?

The answer to the first part of the qestion is in the affirmative. The Committee was appointed by the Allied Conference held at Paris on the 28th March, 1916. Its functions are entirely advisory, and it acts as a clearing house in the distribution to the Allied Governments of information and of decisions of principle in regard to contraband and blockade matters. The countries represented are Great Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Russia, Japan, Portugal, Roumania, and Serbia. Great Britain is represented by a member of the staff of the British Embassy at Paris. I am not in a position to give the names of the representatives of the other Powers.

War Cabinet (Sir E. Carson)

asked the Prime Minister whether the appointment of the Member for Dublin University as a member of the War Cabinet without portfolio carries with it any salary; and, if so, what amount?

asked the Prime Minister whether the right hon. and learned Member for Dublin University will receive as Minister without portfolio, any salary; if so, to what amount; and if a Supplementary Estimate for this purpose will be shortly introduced?

The right hon. Gentleman is in receipt of a salary of £5,000 per annum, for which a Supplementary Estimate will be presented in due course.

Employment Exchanges

asked the Minister of Labour whether in the number of 52,724 men placed in employment through the Employment Exchanges are included the substitutes supplied by the Employment Exchange Department?

The number 52,724 represents the number of discharged sailors or soldiers who were placed by the Employment Exchanges in their first situations since leaving the Army and so includes any such men placed as substitutes. But these would be exceedingly few in number. By far the greatest number of substitutes have been obtained from among the Army Reserve, munition workers who are soldiers permitted by the War Office to undertake civilian work without formal discharge from the Army. These are not, of course, included in the figure of 52,724. A further number of substitutes have been obtained from the ranks of civilian labour.

Censorship (Members' Letters)

asked the Prime Minister whether letters from the United States addressed to Members of this House are opened by the Censor; and, if so, for what reason?

The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. The general reasons for censoring letters are given in Command Paper 7,679, published in 1915. It is not practicable to exempt from censorship the correspondence of Members of the Houses of Parliament without delaying the delivery of letters to the general public.

If the Government do not trust Members of this House, why do they divulge State secrets in Private Sessions?

May I ask that this question may be reconsidered in view of the offence it gives to American correspondents?

I understand that it gives no offence at all. The question was most carefully considered, and it was the general opinion that this House should not be excepted.

Rebellion in Ireland

Dublin General Post Office

asked the Postmaster-General when the Government propose to start rebuilding the Dublin General Post Office?

I fear I can add nothing to the reply which I gave on the 12th instant to a question on this subject asked by the hon. Member for Meath.

Why is it that buildings destroyed in this country by air raids can be put up in a few months, whilst no attempt has yet been made to re-erect buildings in Dublin which were destroyed eighteen months ago?

There are a great number of things demanding consideration, among them the desirability of making the Post Office at Dublin more up to date, which will necessitate the acquisition of neighbouring property, and the negotiations are not yet completed.

Questions

British Prisoners at Ruhleben

asked the hon. Member for Sheffield (Central Division) if he is aware that the British prisoners at Ruhleben are suffering great hardships; that the parcels from this country are received rarely and irregularly; that their spiritual and bodily needs are great; and will he say what steps he will take to improve these conditions?

We recently received information from a private source that there had been an interruption in the delivery of parcels at Ruhleben, and immediately asked the Netherland Minister at Berlin to send a representative to the camp as soon as possible to investigate the matter.

With regard to the general conditions at the camp, I should like to say that considerable quantities of requisites for educational purposes and for games have been, and are being, sent to Ruhleben, which should help to relieve the inevi- table hardships and monotony of internment. In regard to the spiritual needs of the prisoners, the visits of Mr. Williams were temporarily suspended in consequence of some alleged irregularities; but, upon the question being raised by our delegates at the recent Conference at The Hague, General Friedrich undertook to reconsider the matter on his return to Berlin.

Cannot my hon. Friend make further representations to the neutral Minister who pays attention to our affairs there to make a further report, and hear from him exactly how things are going on?

That is exactly what is being done, but sometimes matters do not go much faster in foreign official channels than they do in British.

What progress, if any, is being made with regard to the exchange of these prisoners?

I dare say the hon. Member knows that a provisional agreement was concluded at The Hague which, to some degree at any rate, affects this question, but, unfortunately, we have not yet heard that the German Government has ratified it.

Miss Howsin (Internment)

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department for how long Miss Hilda Howsin has now been interned under the Defence of the Realm Act; whether there would be any danger to the public security if she were now liberated; and, if not, what limit the Government proposes to put to her internment?

Miss Howsin has been interned since September, 1915, and will be released as soon as this can be done without risk to the public safety.

Leon Menasche and Company

asked the Home Secretary whether, having regard to his reply to the House on the 20th December last, to the effect that Messrs. Leon Menasche and Company, a firm of alien enemies of Turkish nationality, had no authority to trade in this country, he is aware that such firm still continues to actively engage in business as diamond merchants to the detriment of British traders and those of Allied nationality; if he will state by whose permission M. Vitali Menasche has been authorised and permitted to visit Manchester and other northern towns in pursuit of his business as a diamond merchant within the past month; and if he will consider whether this person should be reinterned or placed on work of national importance, so that he may be kept under proper observation and control?

In answer to the first of the question, I would refer my hon. and learned Friend to my reply of the 20th December last, the effect of which is not accurately stated in the question. I understand that since the date of my reply the question of winding up the business of this firm has been before the Board of Trade, who have decided not to wind up the business on the ground that the partners, although Ottoman subjects, are Spanish Jews and refugees from Antwerp, and are without Turkish sympathies; the Board have, however, appointed a supervisor of the business. I am informed that Vitali Menasche has on two occasions received permission to visit Manchester on business. He has signed a form offering to engage in work of national importance, and this offer has been referred to the National Service Department.

Did my right hon. Friend, before framing his answer, take into his confidence the India Office and the Foreign Office to find out whether these gentlemen travelling in Ceylon and India have not done an immense amount of harm to this country in relation to giving information as to our doings?

No; I did not consult those authorities. If my hon. Friend will give me any information to the effect he mentions in his supplementary question, I will, of course, make investigation.

Government of Ireland Convention

Government Nominations

Can the Leader of the House make any statement with regard to the members of the Irish Convention?

The Government nominations to the Irish Convention are as follows:

The total number of acceptances of membership to date is ninety-five.

I am sorry. I really cannot answer that. Perhaps the hon. Member will put down a question.

Questions

Catholic Elementary Schools, Glasgow

asked the Secretary for Scotland whether he can state the total average salaries paid to male assistants and female assistants, excluding infant mistresses, respectively, in the nineteen Catholic elementary schools in Glasgow?

The average salaries of the certificated assistant teachers in the schools referred to by my hon. Friend are: Male assistants, £97 11s. 9d.; female assistants, £77 4s. 9d.

Can the hon. and learned Gentleman say whether these disgracefully low salaries have been taken into account in the allocation of the equivalent grant for Scotland?

I am sorry that I cannot personally answer that question, and perhaps my hon. Friend will put his question to the Secretary for Scotland.

Is it not the case that in the allocation of this grant it has been allocated not only to school boards, but also to managers of other schools?

I rather think that is the case, but I should not like to say so without inquiry.

Sheriff Principalship, Lanarkshire

asked whether, in the recent appointment to the sheriff principal-ship of Lanarkshire, there was an applicant of longer and more acceptable service as sheriff whose only disqualification wa3 that he had belonged to the solicitor branch of the legal profession instead of to the advocate branch; and does he at any time during his regime propose to recognise in his appointments the solicitor branch of the profession?

My hon. and learned Friend can hardly expect me to enter into a discussion on the relative merits of persons whose qualifications and claims for any particular post have been under consideration. It is obvious that no categorical answer can be given to the second part of the question.

Will the hon. and learned Gentleman celebrate his advent to the Front Bench by showing more large-mindedness in the appointment of sheriff substitutes?

House of Commons (Ladies' Gallery)

asked the First Commissioner of Works whether, considering the feeling in the House in favour of removing the grille in front of the women's gallery, he can now state when the opportunity will be given to Members to vote on the question?

I have consulted my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who hopes to give an early opportunity to Members to vote on this question, but he is not yet in a position to fix a day.

Why could not this supplementary Estimate have been included in the Civil Service Supplementary Estimates which have already been laid on the Table and are to come before the House before the Recess?

Could not the right hon. Gentleman arrange that we should take a decision on this Vote without any discussion—[HON. MEMBERS: "No!"]—as the matter has been debated more than once?

Gosfield Elementary School, Essex

asked the President of the Board of Education, whether Miss Baker, head teacher of Gosfield Elementary School, Essex, has complained to the local education committee that children were to have been taken away from school to Ascension Day service without notice being previously given in the school, and that she has suffered attacks in consequence; and whether he will use his powers to reduce grants to stop the growing practice of ecclesiasts to victimise teachers?

I am informed that the headmistress has made no such complaint as the hon. Member suggests, though she has complained that her own action on the occasion has been misrepresented. I do not find in this case any foundation for the suggestion contained in the last part of the question.

Personal Explanation

With the leave of the House I wish to make a personal explanation. Last night, speaking on the Corn Production Bill, I described the condition of agriculture at the end of 1916 as a justification for the measure. In making that point, I did not desire to attack or even to criticise the late Government, and hoped that I had said so; but, in stating the difficulty of obtaining tractors, I fell into the error of, at all events, implying that the applicants for £350,000 for tractors from America by the Board of Agriculture was refused by the late Government. That was not the fact. The final letter from the Board of Agriculture specifically asking the Treasury for this authority was sent in on 9th December. My right hon. Friend opposite left, I believe, on the 11th. The Treasury, in its reply, asked to defer the question until the following month owing to the difficulty of making payments to America. On 21st December I spoke to the present Chancellor of the Exchequer on the subject, and he agreed to sanction the expenditure. A formal letter authorising it was sent from the Treasury on the 23rd. I greatly regret that I should have made this mistake, and I beg to offer the right hon. Gentleman opposite my apologies in the fullest and frankest way.

Public Petitions Committee

Second Report brought up, and read; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.

Message from the Lords

That they have agreed to,—

Wesleyan Methodists (Appointments during the War) Bill, without amendment.

Military Service (Review of Exceptions) Act, 1917,—The Lords give leave to the Right Hon. the Earl of Derby, E.G., to attend in order to his being examined before the Select Committee appointed by this House on the Military Service (Review of Exceptions) Act, 1917, his Lordship (in his place) consenting.

Orders of the Day

Business of the House

We propose to take the Committee stage of the Consolidated Fund Bill, which is purely formal, and afterwards the Bill for the Reconstruction Ministry, and perhaps some smaller measures.

Supply

Supplementary Vote of Credit

Considered in Committee.

[Mr. WHITLEY in the Chair.]

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £650,000,000, be granted to His Majesty, beyond the ordinary Grants of Parliament, towards defraying the Expenses which may be incurred during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1918, for General Navy and Army Services in so far as specific provision is not made therefor by Parliament, for the conduct of Naval and Military Operations; for all measures which may be taken for the Security of the Country; for assisting the Food Supply, and promoting the Continuance of Trade, Industry, Business and Communications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk, the financing of the purchase and resale of foodstuffs and materials, or otherwise; for Relief of Distress; and generally for all expenses, beyond those provided for in the Ordinary Grants of Parliament, arising out of the existence of a state of war."

I rise to move the Vote of Credit, of which notice has already been given. The amount is £650,000,000, which exceeds by £150,000,000 the largest sum previously asked for in this House. I fully realise that it is my duty to justify to the Committee a demand of this magnitude, and I think the Committee will under- stand the position better and will be in a better position to deal with it when I have analysed in the usual way the expenditure out of the Vote of Credit up to the present time. The last. Vote of Credit was moved by me on the 9th May. It was for a sum of £500,000,000. I then anticipated that this amount would carry us on until the first Saturday in August. On Saturday last, the 21st of this month, the unexpended balance was £89,000,000, and, at the rate of expenditure during the last few months, that will enable payments to be made up to the exact date that was anticipated when I moved the last Vote of Credit. Hon. Members will recall that when I moved that Vote they were surprised, and I think I may say shocked, to find that the average daily expenditure for the first thirty-five days of the new financial year had exceeded the Budget Estimate by no less a sum than £2,000,000 a day, although that Budget Estimate had been given to the House only a few days before. I then pointed out that there were in that expenditure abnormal items to be taken into account which, to some extent, I explained. I added then that it would be well understood by all interested in the subject that so short a time would not enable us to make a fair estimate of what the average expenditure would be throughout the whole of the year. To some extent that anticipation then expressed has been justified. The expenditure for the subsequent seventy-seven days covered by the last Vote of Credit has fallen, compared with the expenditure of the first thirty-five days, to the extent of £1,000,000 a day, but, even so, that means that the average daily expenditure has still exceeded the Budget Estimate by no less a sum than £1,000,000 a day.

It seemed to me that by far the most important thing was to find out exactly where this increased expenditure had occurred, and, as far as possible, to give an explanation of it. I feel certain that the Committee will regard that also as a most important matter in connection with the Vote I am now moving. Therefore, as for the reason which I have given, that it is not wise to take a short time, instead of analysing the figures for the last seventy-seven days, I shall take them for the whole 112 days, since the beginning of this financial year. In doing so, I find that the average daily expenditure, estimated for in the Budget, was £5,411,000. The total expenditure for these 112 days is £6,795,000 per day. That is to say, there is an average daily excess of £1,384,000. Let us now examine in what direction this excess has occurred. It has occurred in the item for the Army, Navy, and Munitions Vote to the extent of £506,000 per day; the advances to Allies and Dominions represent a daily increase of £569,000, while miscellaneous items account for another £309,000 per day, making the excess of £1,384,000. Though I think it is by means of daily averages that the Committee best realises the position, I think it will be simplest in examining this excess to take the total amount. I have, therefore, taken the amount estimated in the Budget for the period covered by these two Votes for the 112 days and compared that with the actual sums expended. I find that the total excess in that way is £155,000,000. Of that total, £63,500,000 is represented by advances to our Allies and Dominions, and the balance of £91,500,000 comes out of our own services. Perhaps it would be well to explain that in dealing with this subject, and in estimating in what direction the increase has occurred, it is better to ignore the divisions of our own services, because in certain circumstances expenditure which at the time of the Budget Estimate was intended to apply to one branch of the service has been changed to another branch of the service. The most important example of that, as the Committee will understand, is in regard to shipping expenses incurred by the sinking of ships. At the time when the Budget Estimate was framed it was intended that this should be borne on the Army Vote in the case of ships running for the Army and on the Navy Vote in the case of ships employed by the Navy. But it was found more convenient—and this course has been adopted—to throw them all under the Shipping Ministry, and, therefore, bring them under the Miscellaneous Head. Consequently, in dealing with the excess, I shall treat all the three services as if for this purpose they were one.

4.0 P.M.

Of the total excess £63,500,000 is accounted for by increased advances to our Allies and Dominions. Perhaps some hon. Members will remember that in making my Budget statement I said that while it was impossible to make any estimate in the real sense of the word that could be regarded as an estimate at all, it was especially difficult to make more than a guess in regard to the advances to our Allies and Dominions, especially our Allies. The reason for the difficulty of forming any estimate will be apparent to the Committee. On the one hand we knew that the demands on the part of our Allies had been steadily growing, and growing of necessity, and, therefore, we might have expected a steady increase in the expenditure due to this cause. On the other hand, the United States of America had just entered into the War, and we had every reason to believe, a belief which has not been disappointed, that the burden of the financial service of the War would be shared by the Government of that great country. I regret to say, however, that I have been to some extent disappointed in finding that in spite of this fact our advances to the Allies have steadily increased, and I should like this Committee and the country to understand exactly the principle on which, since the beginning of the War, we have acted in regard to this matter. We have held from the first—and it is true of the three Governments which were responsible for the conduct of the War— that it was not a question of our fighting by ourselves, or of our considering solely what should be done for our own forces. We have held that in reality it was one campaign that was being waged, and that what we had to do was to assist by every means in our power the general conduct of that campaign, involving as it did assistance to our Allies as freely as money spent upon our own services. The result of that was that from the beginning this country has borne the whole of the expense of supplies of all Allied countries which were produced in the United Kingdom, and more than that, up to the time of the entry of America into the War it also bore, in the case of some of the Allies, the whole of the expenditure outside of their own country, and in the case of all of them some part of the expenditure out of their own country. The Committee will see, therefore, that the burden which we assumed was one of great dimensions, and was one which, I think, we may claim as an example of unselfishness in the conduct of the War and of realising that we were fighting with our Allies and not merely a battle of our own.

When the United States Government entered into the struggle we realised that a great change had come in the financial strength of the whole alliance. President Wilson was slow, and in my judgment rightly slow, in bringing his country into the vortex of this terrible war. But having come into it, he has shown by his speeches in the clearest way that he is determined to throw the whole weight of the nation, of which he is the head, into the scale. I am sure that though of course it takes time to make financial arrangements of the kind which are necessary in a case like this, though we ourselves at the beginning of the War would certainly have found it impossible to make the arrangements which afterwards we were able to carry out, though that is true, I am satisfied that President Wilson, and the great nation that he represents, will deal in this matter with the same spirit of generosity or rather of realising what the whole issue means, as has been shown by this country, and that we can rely on receiving in the United States the resources which are necessary to pay for supplies of all kinds which are required by the Allies in that country. Indeed, it is an open secret that we have spent so freely of our resources that those available for payments in America had become nearly exhausted when our great Ally entered into this struggle. And obviously the extent to which supplies of all kinds can be obtained from the United States will depend largely on the ability (for I am sure of the goodwill) of the United States Government to meet the demands that are made upon it by the Allies.

As I have said, I was disappointed that owing to the growing needs of our Allies there has been no falling off in our advances to them, and perhaps the Committee would like to know exactly what the total of these advances now amounts to. For the period covered by the two Votes of Credit, 112 days, to which I have referred, the amount of indebtedness incurred in this country by our Allies is £197,000,000 sterling. I am, however, glad to say, not as indicating the good will of our Dominions, for that never was in any doubt, but as indicating their powers, their financial resources, only £4,000,000 has been advanced to the Dominions of the Crown. If to the previous amounts advanced we add the £197,000,000 for the Allies, it makes the total advances to Allies £1,025,000,000, and the total advances to our own Dominions becomes £146,000,000 only.

I think that I have shown to the Committee the extent of our obligations, and the way we have fulfilled them in this respect, and the excess to which I have alluded is one which, as I said earlier, it is almost impossible accurately to estimate; but it is an excess which so long as this country determines to carry this War to a successful termination represents expenditure which will be grudged by no one in this House or in the country. It accounts for £63,500,000 of the total excess of £155,000,000. The balance is £91,500,000. I shall now explain to the Committee in what direction this excess has taken place. There is an excess in the amount spent on munitions over the Estimate for this period of £12,000,000 sterling, and I am glad to say to the Committee that this excess is not represented in any degree by a rise in prices. It is a natural thing to suppose that with the inflations of every kind now going on our Estimates are swollen by this cause alone of a rise in prices. I have made the most close inquiries into this subject. I have received, from the Ministry of Munitions, not only a Report, but evidence which convinces me that owing to improved methods of production, owing to the economy in the way in which works are run, the actual cost per article is less than it was at the end of last year, and we must look upon this £12,000,000 not as an increase of cost, but as an actual increase in the volume of munitions which we have available for our own troops; and I am glad to add that out of the surplus we have on many occasions sent assistance to our Allies in regard to this matter.

The next item accounting for this increase is £15,000,000 added to miscellaneous services. This is almost entirely an increase in the amount spent on food, but I shall have something to say on this a little later. There remains a balance of £64,000,000, and practically the whole of that is represented by increased Army expenditure. I have obtained a complete and detailed analysis of all the items in which this excess has occurred. Though I am sure that it would be very interesting to the Committee I do not think that it would be right to give them these details, but I can give an indication of the cause of the increase. By far the largest part of it is represented by money spent upon goods purchased by the War Office which will be resold, or on service for which we shall receive repayment. This is money that we cannot regard as expenditure in the ordinary sense of the word, and I shall deal with this more in detail in a few minutes. Of the balance, part of the increased expenditure is due to the fact that we have made greater payments to India for services rendered in connection with the War. This means, of course, that a larger contingent has been got from India than was expected at the time the Budget Estimate was framed. In addition to that there has been a slightly increased expenditure on aeroplanes. This is due, of course, to this fact alone, that output has increased more rapidly than was anticipated at the time that the Budget was framed. In addition, there is another— and this is the heaviest of these smaller increases—increase which is due to a cause which people will regard, as I do, with great satisfaction. At the time the Budget Estimate is framed the expenditure on the Army must, of course, be based on the total number of men with the Colours. At that time the Estimate for the coming summer offensive was based on casualties somewhat similar to those which occurred last year. As the Committee know, so far that result has not been obtained. Casualties, fortunately, have been much lower than they were at the end of last year, and whether or not that fortunate circumstance continues we have at all events reason to be thankful that it is true up to now, and it is one of the items which account for this increase in expenditure.

But, as I said, by far the largest part of this increase is due to money which is spent on articles which are to be resold and items which will be recoverable, and I shall give the Committee in detail the items that ought not to be regarded as expenditure but which represent money paid during these 112 days which will be recoverable later. Of these the first item to which I have to direct the attention of the Committee is the sum of £15,000,000 advanced to the Dominions and payable by them. This is not a question of a loan. It arises in this way. We here pay in the first instance certain expenses of the Overseas Dominions in Europe. They are paid over here and gradually and quickly they are repaid by the Dominions affected. But the net result of the 112 days to which I have referred is that £15,000,000 more has been spent than has been received. This is being accounted for all the time, and it may be safely assumed that the great bulk of this £15,000,000 will come' back during the current financial year, and, of course, there is no doubt but that it will come back in the ordinary course as the campaign progresses. Then there is another item of £7,000,000 about which there can equally be no doubt. As the Committee knows, the expenditure accounted for in Votes of Credit consists of the amounts handed out from the Exchequer here, of which a large part is given to sub-accountants, not only in this country but with all our Armies. We find that the amount advanced and still unused by the sub-accountants has exceeded the amount estimated at the beginning of the financial year by a sum of £7,000,000. This amount cannot be regarded as real expenditure.

Now we come to the other items which make up the biggest expenditure, which I do not regard as having been actually incurred. In the case of the War Office there are items representing the purchase of commodities, of which the largest is wool, amounting altogether to £21,000,000. The excess of £15,000,000 on Miscellaneous items to which I have referred is mainly for the purchase of food. These two items together make £36,000,000. Of course, as the Committee realises, even in the case of wool, though it is being largely used for the supply of Army clothing, it cannot be regarded as expenditure from this point of view, because the Army contractors buy it from the War Office and the War Office pays the contract price for the material they buy in exchange. This, therefore, is an item which is simply paid now and will be recovered later. That is true also in regard to the £15,000,000 which, as I have said, has been spent mainly on food. I dare say that the Committee will be inclined to be a little sceptical as to this expenditure, which I tell them will come back again. They will judge when I have finished to what extent the scepticism is justified. I have made the same observations before, and the result is that with each new Vote of Credit, instead of the money coming back, a larger amount seems to be expended. But if the Committee will consider it, they will see that in existing circumstances that is inevitable. The position is precisely the same as that of a business firm in ordinary times carrying out its transactions. If a certain expansion of business comes, and the firm is carrying on its trade with the same capital as before, no matter how profitable the turnover may be, the result is that, as the expenditure for the moment exceeds the receipts, it finds itself short for money. The result of that is that the goods which people engaged in trade purchase are to a large extent limited, and are frequently brought to an end by the inability to get credit, and in that way prices are prevented from rising. In reality this is practically the same position. So long as this business is being carried on by the State, so long as they are making purchases and increasing stocks to a greater extent than they are making sales, there must be this increase in expenditure. But it will come back, and you may take it from me that the balance will begin to redress itself when for the first time stocks, instead of steadily increasing, begin to go back again. With this explanation, I hope the Committee will agree with me in the conclusion to which I have come, that all the items that I have mentioned cannot be regarded as real expenditure in the ordinary sense of the word, but an expenditure which will come back again as certainly as anything else in connection with our Budget Estimates.

The items which I have named amount to £58,000,000, and if you deduct this from the £91,500,000, there remains a balance of £33,5000,000. That is the net increased expenditure, apart from the advances to the Allies, and it represents an amount approximating to £300,000 per day. I should have been glad if it had been possible for me now to give an estimate as to what the expenditure is likely to be for the rest of the year. It is obvious to the Committee that the Budget Estimate must be exceeded. But I would remind the Committee—those who have followed these transactions do not need to be reminded—that not only in my case, but in the case of my predecessors, on the occasion of every Budget statement, it was indicated that the Estimates were not Estimates in the ordinary sense of the word, and that they could only be regarded as guesses. If the Committee will consider, that must be so. At ordinary times the Treasury Estimates have been remarkably accurate, but then the Treasury officials know exactly what we were going to buy. In this case that has not been the fact. So far as war supplies have been concerned, the object of every Government responsible for the conduct of the War has been to get the greatest supply which it was possible to get, and therefore the Estimates which were made depended altogether upon the production which could be made available, and that accounts very much for the expenditure. But that, also, must be evident to every member of the Committee. Last year for instance, in 1916–17, the Budget Estimate was exceeded by £373,000,000, or more than £1,000,000 a day. I say that it would be idle to give one Estimate when the Budget was introduced, and to give another now. It is quite evident, as I said, that the Budget Estimates must be largely exceeded, mainly on account of the advances to the Allies, and I should not be surprised if, at the end of the financial year, we do not find that the excess somewhat approximates to that of the last financial year.

The only other figure which I think worth while to give to the House is the total amount of the Votes of Credit since the beginning of the War. If I give them for each year the Committee will recognise the ascending scale of expenditure. For the first year of the War, 1914–15, the total amount of the Votes of Credit was £362,000,000; for 1915–16, £1,420,000,000; for 1916–17, £2,010,000,000, making a total up to the end of the last financial year of £3,792,000,000. If you add to this the Votes for this year including the Vote of Credit for which I am asking to-day, that makes an addition of £1,500,000,000, making a total amount of Votes of Credit from the beginning of the War of £5,292,000,000. I do not think there is anything we can say in regard to these figures which has not been said already, either by myself or others in responsibility. The first lesson these figures on this scale should teach is that the money should not be spent unnecessarily. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] These cheers remind me of what I have already noticed in discussions of this subject. In connection with the Budget there is an assumption that the official mind is indifferent to expenditure of this kind. I can assure hon. Members that is not the case. In this respect I am reminded of the story of Louis XVI. shortly before the Revolution. The story is that on one occasion, in going through Paris, there was something in the arrangements of which he did not approve, and he said to his companion, "If I were the police I would not permit it." That must be the feeling of every Minister in a responsible position. Our power is limited, and all that I wish to impress upon the Committee is that our desires are as strong as those of private Members of the House to avoid unnecessary expenditure.

A short time ago a Committee was set up by the Government to go into the question of expenditure. I said then that the Government were perfectly willing to see the Committee set up. We have found that Committees set up by the Cabinet to go into departmental expenditure did useful work in this direction. I have given to the House the terms of reference to this Committee; I have seen the names suggested for it, and I have every reason to hope that this Committee will do work which will be useful to the nation, as well as the Government. When I entered upon my present office I received Reports from the three great spending Departments of the State, and I was agreeably surprised to find the system adopted in regard to cost and in regard to purchases under all the contracts made. I venture to make this prophecy, which, however, may prove to be false, that in a very short time— though I do not for a moment suggest that there is no room for great improvement—this Committee will, on the whole, be agreeably surprised to find to what an extent, as compared with the early days of the War, real control has been attained in the spending Departments. It is only right that the House of Commons should have an opportunity to judge of this matter, and, if it is found to be wrong, nobody will more welcome the result than the Chancellor of the Exchequer responsible for expenditure. I have observed that these figures cannot be taken to suggest anything new to be said about them. On the first occasion when I moved the Vote of Credit in this House I expressed the view that expenditure at the rate then going on could not be continued indefinitely by this country. That is obvious. But in the conduct of war everything is relative, and I said then also that, though we could not continue it indefinitely, I was perfectly certain that we. could continue it longer than our enemies. Now that we have had thrown into the scale on our side, or on the side of everything m which we and our Allies believe, now that we have thrown into the scale the country with the greatest resources in the world, it is still more true to say that it will not be the want of money which will prevent us securing the victory to which we all look forward.

We are asked to vote the sum of £650,000,000, and if I was right in what I understood my right hon. Friend to say, it is anticipated that the expenditure on the Vote of Credit will amount to something like £7,000,000 a day, and that this sum of £650,000,000 will last for a little over ninety days. Nobody can fail to be struck by the amount of this total. We have to remember that this represents expenditure only out of the Vote of Credit. In estimating our total expenditure we have to add the very large amount that we must spend on interest on debt, and the expenditure which we make upon all other services which are not dealt with out of the Vote of Credit. At the present time, the additional expenditure not in the Vote of Credit is something between £700,000 and £800,000 a day. Before the end of the War it will automatically have risen to upwards of £1,000,000 a day, owing to the increased debt charges. Consequently we have to look forward to a total expenditure of upwards of £8,000,000 a day before we conclude the present financial year. I say at once that I have not made in that calculation the deductions which my right hon. Friend has brought to our notice in regard to the expenditure which will be repaid. But even making all allowances for such deductions there is no doubt that on the present scale of irrecoverable expenditure, other than advances to the Allies, we shall, before the end of the financial year, be spending close on £8,000,000 a day. My right hon. Friend urged, and we shall all agree with him, that money should not be spent unnecessarily. But, with great respect, I am going to put a proposition of a slightly different kind to this House. We have always proceeded, and when I say "we" I mean the nation at large, upon the assumption that provided the money is properly spent and for a useful object, all money spent in the prosecution of the War is well spent. The underlying theory is that it does not matter how much money we spend on the prosecution of the War, because expenditure cannot in itself be injurious during the War, however injurious it may be after the War, by throwing upon us a load of debt which we might have difficulty in bearing. I look upon that view and that opinion as fundamentally mistaken. I believe that expenditure beyond a certain limit during the War is not beneficial on the whole in carrying on the War, but is injurious. I will state my reasons for that view. If a nation spends beyond a certain limit within its capacity, it can only find the money for that expenditure by a process known as inflation. We all know what the effect of inflation is. The effect is not obvious, but it is well understood. The effect is a general rise in prices. May there not come a time when the forcing up of prices beyond a certain point by inflation, when such increase of prices may have an injurious effect in the conduct of the War?

We have just seen in the Press a summary of the Reports, which have not yet been circulated to the House, of the Commissioners who were appointed to inquire into the causes of labour unrest. Foremost amongst the causes of labour unrest, they tell us, is the general rise in prices. As the Chancellor of the Exchequer said with great truth in a recent speech, at this stage of the War, before everything else, the duty of the nation is to maintain its morale. We have got to see the War through. Could anything be more injurious to the nation, and to the morale of the nation than labour unrest? It is inevitable that we are driving certainly on to further and greater labour unrest so long as we continue in a course of conduct which must lead to an ever-increasing rise in prices. It is so easy to slide down the descent of increasing expenditure. My sympathies are with the Chancellor of the Exchequer absolutely and entirely. I am sure the Treasury are fully alive to all the evils that must result from excessive expenditure. I am sure the Chancellor of the Exchequer is as aware as I am that there must be, and he has stated it in his speech to-day, a limit to this increase of expenditure. What is the position that the Chancellor of the Exchequer finds himself in, both in relation to the Departments and in relation to this House and in relation to public opinion outside? A Department comes forward with a demand for more expenditure. It can prove completely to its own satisfaction and completely to public satisfaction that the expenditure is useful and that the money will be economically spent. If the Chancellor of the Exchequer refuses to give consideration to the proposal, instantly this House and the public will be set in array against him. He will be told that the parsimony of the Treasury is destroying the efficiency of our gallant sailors and soldiers in the conduct of the War. It has been said again and again. What can the Treasury do? What can the Chancellor of the Exchequer do? He can only appeal, as I am appealing now, to public opinion here and outside that there must be a limit to this expenditure of eight millions per day.

I will give my hon. Friend a direct and perfectly clear answer. I said that there is a total limit of expenditure beyond which you cannot go without forcing prices up to a point which will cause unrest, intolerable unrest, amongst our people. When you have estimated what that total limit is, you must choose the services upon which you will expend your money. But, my hon. Friend says, munitions must not be stinted. I agree with him, but it is no good having munitions beyond what you can use.

I do not say we have, but there is no use in having munitions beyond what you can use.

I do not want to raise this question in any controversial spirit of. any sort or kind.

My anxiety in this matter is purely and simply to help the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Treasury in putting a stop to a scale of expenditure which is positively dangerous to us in the War. That is the sole argument that I wish to use. I wish to say that the Chancellor of the Exchequer ought to be helped as to the choice of the Services upon which we can afford to spend money which is strictly limited in its total amounts. I have not touched upon the question of what will be the effect after the War. Do not let us blind ourselves to certain consequences. Our revenue to-day is something less than £2,000,000 per day. If we expend £8,000,000 per day, it means that an expenditure of £6,000,000 per day has got to be met out of loans. Six millions per day over the whole year represents for interest and a very moderate sinking fund a permanent Income Tax of 3s. 4d. in the £. We have already an Income Tax to meet our needs at the present rate and future charges up to the end of the present financial year, and obviously that Income Tax, I assume, will not have to be raised in the course of the present financial year. If it goes on for another year at that rate you have got to add 3s. 4d. to 5s. as a permanent Income Tax charge. We look forward to a future after the War in which our trade and industry, having learned many lessons in the course of the War, will develop to a degree of prosperity and strength which we have not known heretofore. But I hope that hon. Gentlemen who take the view that no matter how great the expenditure in the War, it is always good expenditure, will remember that our trade and industry hereafter must be terribly crippled by an Income Tax of anything like 8s. in the £. Therefore, while I do not put that forward as the foremost consideration, I do put it as a consideration we must bear in mind when we are looking into the expenditure which we are incurring at the present time.

It may be asked, what do I propose, what would I do?—a very reasonable question to put. My answer is a very simple one. I will in this House and out of it support the Chancellor of the Exchequer when he finds it necessary to take unpopular steps to curtail expenditure. I cannot curtail the expenditure; I have no authority. I did my very best to do so while I had authority. But now I will help him to the utmost of my power, for I recognise the danger that we run from rising prices I have said it again and again, and I do not think it can be too often repeated, that the cause of that rise in prices is not whatever people think, in the main profiteering, and those who look to the profiteer are running upon a false scent. The main cause of the rise of prices is the inflation due to the high expenditure. The remedy is to be found in close control of that expenditure. No Chancellor of the Exchequer can apply that remedy without assistance from public opinion. In this House and out of it, it is our duty to stand by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and to support him when he endeavours to exercise control over expenditure. There has been a recent proposal, to which my right hon. Friend did not refer, to keep the loaf by State assistance at 9d., no matter what the cost may be, that is, that the 4 lb. loaf is to be sold at the national charge at 9d. At recent prices of wheat that entails a loss to the Exchequer of something like at the rate of £33,000,000 per year, or equiva- lent to 1s. Income Tax. The effect of artificially lowering the price of one article of food while leaving other articles of food at their ordinary price rate is obviously to direct consumption on to that article which is below the normal rate, and we shall probably see an increased consumption of bread as a result of the artificial depression of price. Whether that is wise as a war measure I am unable to say, but I should have thought that there might have been some question of shipping and freights to be taken into account before attracting public consumption in an exceptional degree to the particular article of bread. Are the Government quite sure that policy is a wise one? We are collecting from the working classes, from all classes in this country, a very considerable amount in the way of taxation. We tax their sugar and tea, their beer and tobacco, and their spirits and other articles, to an amount very largely in excess of £38,000,000. If it is desired to return £38,000,000 to the working classes —the mass of the people—the simplest way to do it is to remit taxation to that amount. It seems to me to be very bad economy to collect with all the machinery of taxation a sum of £38,000,000 from the working classes with one hand, and then with the other hand to repay it to Them through a reduction in the price of the loaf. Once we begin selling articles at the expense of the State below their cost price, who knows where it is going to end? I, for my own part, if by any machinery of trade or of shipping we can cheapen the price of bread, or by using substitutes, or in any other way, nobody would be more pleased than I should be to see every such method adopted. But I do hesitate when I see this method of selling food below cost price begun by the State as a new adventure in the country

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman how he makes it out that if we reduce the price of bread to 9d. it works out at a cost of £38,000,000, when it means only a 1d. per head for every man, woman, and child in the country? If the 41b. loaf is sold at 11d. and brought down to 9d., it means a 1d. a head for every man, woman and child in the country.

I understand every 1d. on the loaf means an expenditure of between £12,000,000 and £13,000,000. I am advised those are the figures. If I am wrong I should be very glad to be corrected.

I see that my hon. Friend who was lately in the Food Controller's Office—and I congratulate him on the admirable work he has done— confirms me in the statement that every 1d. on the loaf means a cost of between £12,000,000 and £13,000,000. Perhaps I may ask my right hon. Friend if he puts the loaf down, if he sells the loaf at 9d., what price does he propose to pay the farmer in this country for his wheat? As I understand it, a 9d. loaf corresponds to a cost of wheat of about 60s. a quarter. The present maximum price paid to the fanner is 78s. per quarter. Is it proposed to continue to pay farmers 78s. a quarter for wheat?

I cannot give the figures, but, of course, that is taken into account, and before a change is made the price to be paid will be announced.

Then it will mean a difference of price to the farmer for wheat. All my calculations on the reduction in price of 3d will fall to the ground if the farmer is not to get 78s., but a price of 60s. a quarter, which is, I understand, the price corresponding to a 9d. loaf. We know the loaf now corresponds to a price of about 80s. per quarter. I am not an expert in the matter, but these are the figures given to me. Of course, the whole question will take a different character if it means that the farmers wheat is to be commandeered at 60s., and that the loaf is then to be sold at a price corresponding to 60s. a quarter for wheat. Of course, there will be a loss upon the imported foreign wheat, but it will entail a very much reduced loss if our domestic supply is obtained at a price of 60s. per quarter. However, that is one of the steps for which we are all aware a great many arguments may be used on both sides. While in the first part of the observations with which I have troubled the Committee I have dwelt upon the danger of labour unrest due to high prices, it is obvious that it would be inconsistent if, in the second part of my observations I left that aspect out of view. I have no doubt that the Government is solely actuated by the desire to avoid labour unrest, and that they started on this method of reducing dissatisfaction among the working classes in order to avoid the consequences of the dissatisfaction due to other causes. My advice to the Government, if I may tender it with great humility, is: Remove the prime cause of labour unrest. See that your expenditure is kept within limited bounds. If you do that, you will never have to adopt any of these devices, such as an artificially cheap loaf. But if you do not, you will be inevitably driven from one device to another down the well known descent which ends in national— I was going to say bankruptcy, but certainly in the breakdown of all our civil arrangements. I would desire, in conclusion, to the utmost of my power to strengthen my right hon. Friend's hands in the struggle which I know he must have with the various Departments of Government, always pressing him for further expenditure of money.

I am sure the House will have listened with great satisfaction to the vastly greater recognition that there is to be found, both in the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and my right hon. Friend who has just spoken, of the grave financial situation which confronts this country at the present time, and especially looking towards the future and the almost certain prolongation of the War. I do not believe that, even if the Income Tax be raised to 10s. in the £, the people of this country would not willingly face the burden of that huge impost if the money raised by the taxation is absolutely necessary for the successful prosecution of the War. But we have a right, in face of the present financial position, to ask that not only the efforts that have been made, but immensely greater efforts, should be made in every spending Department of the State to secure to the taxpayers of this country a better value for their money. It is stupendous and almost incredible that we should have had Votes of Credit already during this War to the extent of £5,292,000,000. That is bad enough, but I think a graver fact is that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should have to tell the Committee to-day that in the first 112 days of the present financial year the expenditure has exceeded the Estimate made so short a time ago by nearly £1,400,000 a cay. He tells us that the excess expenditure in these 112 days is £155,000,000. If the same rate of expenditure is continued for the whole of the financial year it means no less than £500,000,000 additional expenditure to be added to the Estimate of £2,290,000,000 in the last Budget. The gigantic expenditure, therefore, will arise for the year 1917–18 of not less than £2,790,000,000. Less £638,000,000 estimated income, that leaves no less a debt on the 31st March next than £6,000,000,000 sterling. That must give pause even to the most optimistic financier in this country; and, as the ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer has so well stated, it entails upon posterity a permanent expenditure of the most serious character. Now we are told there is to be a Select Committee to inquire into all these spending Departments of the State and what steps can be taken to effect economies. That is a step in the right direction, but I wish that not only the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, but also my right hon. Friend the ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer had earlier in the War recognised the position that we were bound to reach. There is no use now in going back to show how untold millions have been needlessly wasted in the public expenditure of this country during the War. It is a trifling case, but I had this case brought to my notice only two or three weeks ago just to illustrate how money is still being needlessly wasted. A clerk in an office was examined medically and classed C 3. He was examined a second time and classed C1— fit for clerical work.

However, he was dispatched to Bath for clerical work, and when he arrived there there was only one position to fill. But what did he find to be the case?—that eighty-three other men had also been sent to Bath to fill the same position, some of them coming from as far as Glasgow, and the whole of their time and the whole of the cost involved in their travelling and other expenses wasted. That is a trifling matter compared with the huge expenditure that is going on, and I only mention it as a recent incident which shows that a great waste of money is still going on.

My Friend behind says there are thousands of cases like that. I am perfectly certain it is not isolated, but that there are thousands of similar cases all over the country. I am bound to say it is absolutely essential, unless we are to face a financial situation after the War that will absolutely prevent our rapid economic recovery, that a great change should be made. The present position, with an expenditure of nearly £7,000,000 a day, is the more disappointing because of three reasons. The whole of the shipping of the country has been commandeered at Blue Book rates, and therefore all the difference between Blue Book rates and the high freights previously charged is now saved; coal is requisitioned by the Government practically at their own price, and, further than that, the Government have control of transit on railways to some extent. Again, we understand that the munitions of war which are supplied to this country from America are not in the future to be sent at the extravagantly high prices previously charged, but are to be supplied at reasonable prices to be fixed by the American Government. I want to draw the attention of the Committee to these facts, and to show that this enormous rise in expenditure is taking place in spite of the saving now effected by lower freights, by lower coal prices enforced by the Government, and by the lower prices for American munitions. When considered from that point of view, the matter becomes even more alarming. I give every credit to the present Chancellor of the Exchequer for having as earnest a desire as I or any other Member of this House has that the money of the taxpayers of this country shall not be needlessly wasted. We want stronger and more drastic steps taken immediately in every spending Department of the State to enforce greater economy; otherwise what will be the final result when we arrive at the end of the War, which, it is feared, may yet be a long way off, when we find this huge National Debt piled up, and when we are faced with an enormous annual expenditure for interest on the Sinking Fund debt and for pensions?

I very much fear we shall have to face an annual Budget of £800,000,000, and possibly an Income Tax of 8s. or 10s. Where, then, is the money to come from for reconstruction and to replace our shipping losses? Where is the money to come from for the necessary developments of trade and industry in this country after the War, developments which will be absolutely requisite for our economic recovery? We must look at the matter all round; we must realise the position in which we shall be placed. The Chancellor of the Exchequer will have to borrow. We started this year with £400,000,000 short borrowings. The last Loan did not pay off the then floating Treasury Bills. The Exchequer Bonds and War Savings Certificates amounted to £350,000,000, there were £400,000,000 short-date borrowings, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, at the end of the year 1918, will have to raise by borrowings, short or long, the sum of £2,300,000,000. Where is it coming from? We cannot pay these high rates of taxation; we cannot have freights cut down and coal prices reduced and at the same time get money put into the new War Loan. The question is how are we going to foot the Bill when it comes in? How are we going to provide the money we need for the conduct of the War? That is a problem of a most alarming character, and I feel thankful that, at last, this Committee of the House of Commons begins to realise the gravity of the financial situation. I believe that this Debate to-day will be the first step, and a very strong step, in the direction of securing better value for our money than any Debate we have had on any previous Vote of Credit.

I could not help thinking, as I listened to the two speeches with which we have just been honoured, that they were very good speeches for a time of peace. But I should like to remind the hon. Baronet (Sir J. Walton) who has just sat down that there was an old saying current amongst business people who generations ago made the British Empire, and it was this, "Money lost, nothing lost; trade lost, much lost; soul lost, all lost." The things we are fighting for in the present War bear comparison only with the third of these dicta, but not with the first two. I could not help wondering why my right hon. Friend the late Chancellor of the Exchequer made his speech I am sure he did not wish to hamper the present Chancellor of the Exchequer in any future financial operations. But why did he say that the labour unrest was due to our expenditure? I venture to assert that the high prices are not due to our expenditure, and if we compare these prices with those current in other countries it will, I think, be admitted that that is the case. My right hon. Friend's argument might have been a very good and suitable one for the year 1913 or 1914—in fact, Lord Faringdon, the. then Member for St. George's, Hanover Square, on the Budget of 1913, brought forward figures to show that the. increase in direct taxation was affecting the price of commodities, and he. pointed out that the usual economic operation of direct and indirect taxation had broken down in consequence of the abnormal increase in direct taxation. Of course, that is true, but I do not think that the Government at that time paid very much attention to anything of. that sort. Certainly they did not reduce the direct taxation, and now, during the War, it seems to me you cannot conduct your finance according to those principles. We have certain things for which we are. lighting and which are absolutely necessary. I sympathise with my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the many technical difficulties he must experience in dealing with the finances of the country at the present time, and I intend to second him in every possible way in raising whatever money may be necessary to carry on the War. He will agree with me that there is nothing to be considered in comparison with the end for which we and our Allies are fighting, and the sole question for us now is how to raise the money in the most just way. Of course, we must be careful in our expenditure and pursue every possible method of economy. It is all very well for hon. and right hon. Gentlemen to take such a burning interest in the finances of the country just now, and to talk about economy, but if you want economy in time of war you must make preparation for war before you begin it. Germany, I believe, is conducting her war more economically than we are, but, then, she had worked out every single detail before she began it. We made no preparation whatever, roughly speaking, and I remember chat even in May, 1914, on the Budget of the right hon. Gentleman who is now Prime Minister we were actually talking about cutting down the expenditure on our military and naval services. If we adopted that policy of non-preparation for war—and we know on the highest authority it is the greatest form of imprudence, it is useless now to complain of our present uneconomic expenditure. We have been forced to organise every Department in the best way we can, and later on I hope to make a few suggestions in that regard. I appreciate absolutely all the difficulties experienced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in carrying on these vast preparations and at the same time saving money. I do not think one can easily do the two things together.

I wish, however, to draw the attention of the Committee to one or two other subjects which, sooner or later, and, in fact, even now, must directly affect our calculations of the economic strain we have to bear during the War. I wish to direct the attention of the Committee to a speech which was recently delivered by the German Chancellor, and to ask the Government, not for a detailed reply, but, at any rate, for some indication as to where we stand. There is this to be said about the speech of the German Chancellor, I do not think there has ever been a more swift confirmation of the correctness of economic analysis of the conditions in another country than is to be found in the speech of the German Chancellor. There is practically nothing like a substantial movement of what hon. and right hon. Gentlemen would call democracy in Germany. What you are face to face with is this: a military and economic combination to which the German Centre party has given its adhesion. We are right up against what we may call the objective realities of the situation. There is no sign in that speech, or in current events, of any movement of politics from economics towards those ideals which actuated our grandfathers, because, after all, much of the talk we are hearing now belongs to the early Victorian days. The movement of events is quite different from that. The German Chancellor, as I understand his speech, claims, and the military authorities of whom he is the mouthpiece have apparently made up their minds, that there is to be nothing in the nature, after the War, of an economic offensive against Germany, but that Great Britain and her Allies are to sit down quite comfortably while Germany resumes her policy of permeation, while she adopts measures intended to undermine the naval supremacy of Great Britain, and while she takes further steps to resume that control of raw material and of every other national resource which was the cause to us of so much embarrassment and perplexity in the earlier stages of the War. The Chancellor speaks with an air of injured innocence, as though he had been brought up in the most select of schools, and he adopts the methods of some of the older German speakers whom apparently he wishes to copy. I should like to ask my right hon. Friend—I really do not wish at all to press this question unduly nor to provoke anything like an inexpedient discussion—and I know he knows that—but I should like to ask him if he can throw some light on the nature of the British answer to the suggestions put forward by the German Chancellor. I am sure if he could do so he would give very great satisfaction to the country.

I should like, if I may do so, to ask whether I am not right in this view of the situation: in a sense Great Britain and her Allies have already given their answer. It is not true that the economic situation, as it is understood by the German Chancellor, has arisen from anything that we have done. We knew with what motives Germany entered the War. We know the object—that of economic domination—which she sought to attain. We see the object ruthlessly worked out and prepared for in Germany from the very beginning of the War. As a result of these observations—I speak very broadly and very roughly and do not care to go into careful detail—as a result of those observations my right hon. Friend the late Prime Minister and his Government went into the Conference of the Allies in March of last year, and later in June, in Paris, and agreed upon certain economic Resolutions. The result of the adoption of those Resolutions was to make it clear to the German mind that we were not going to have all our efforts thrown away in continuing a pre-war policy, but that we were formulating defensive measures to be adopted by the Allies. The German plans accordingly underwent considerable change. Then as soon as the present Government came into power I think we may say that Great Britain and the British Empire have done their part in answering the German Chancellor in the Resolutions of the Imperial War Conference, If you take the Paris Resolutions on the one hand and the Resolutions of the Imperial War Conference on the other, they are a full and complete answer to the statement of the German Chancellor.

What I want really to know is this— seeing that the issues have now been very clearly defined for us by Germany— what we are extremely anxious to know is: whether the preparations for dealing with these issues when they arise in the Peace negotiations are going forward with sufficient rapidity? I should like to assure- my right hon. Friend that we do not wish to give the impression that we are impatient, or anything of that kind, but we do want to understand where we are. The danger seems to us to be that if you do not get very well prepared beforehand upon these questions two things will happen. In the first place Germany, which certainly has made extensive preparations to meet you at a very great advantage, will be able to introduce serious discord between different parties to the Alliance, and, secondly, this country and the British Empire may be forced by their non-anticipation of those preparations to go into the Peace Conferences with a policy upon which they have made up their minds beforehand, but which is found to be entirely unsuitable. I am speaking particularly—if I may state it definitely to my right hon. Friend—of the policy of prohibiting or boycotting German goods for a period after the War. To a policy of that kind I have always been exceedingly opposed. My impression is that it would break down on the very first day's discussion at the Peace Conference. You would then be left without any policy and Germany would gain the day. I want very much to know whether we are taking proper steps in this matter.

We have a large number of Committees— I do not know exactly how many—dealing with a number of subjects. I want to make the suggestions to my right hon. Friend—and I believe many of my colleagues agree with this—that it is rather a mistake at this stage of the War to bind Committees in regard to their terms of reference. What we want is consecutive action. We want a Minister who will not dissolve these Committees. Far from it, because they are doubtless doing excellent work on definite technical questions, and they can be referred to for advice on these points. But we do not want these Committees to range over the whole field of international diplomacy and trade questions; we want them really to be used for the purpose for which they may rightly be used, and I should like to know very much whether these Committees are as far as possible anticipating the future. In particular it seems to us that a great deal of importance will attach to the Reconstruction Committee. We should like very much to know whether it is possible for us to be made aware of the subjects which the Reconstruction Committee is considering at the present time. What are the Sub-Committees? How far have they got in their preparations? In regard to many of the public Departments, I believe a great deal of work has been done. We are extremely anxious not to put undue pressure upon the Government—for there is no use in doing that at any time—and really we are anxious to help the Government in any way we can. But we are also most anxious that practical steps should be taken to carry out the conclusions which the Allies and the British Empire have come to, and to carry them out at the earliest possible moment.

There has been a suspicion in some quarters—I am quite sure it is not justified, but I think it desirable to mention it—that the entry of the United States into the War may, in the opinion of the Government, alter the situation to such an extent that they think that neither the Paris Conference Resolutions nor the Imperial War Conference Resolutions can be carried out. May I say to the Chancellor of the Exchequer that that certainly is not our view. After all, we know about what would take place, or, at any rate, what we hoped for, and what was even contemplated on the part of the United States at the time of the Paris Resolutions. Many of us had the hope that the passing of the Paris Resolutions might be a factor which the United States would consider it worth while to take into consideration. We hoped that the United States would come into the War. In any case, if the United States had not come into the War, the United States, being what she is and where she is, would have had to be considered almost as much as on her entry. We do not see why the entry of the United States should in any way affect any of the other very material problems. The truth is that we might take a leaf out of the book of the United States in one important particular. We should like to see our Government at least as active as that of the United States in making preparations for after-the-war problems. We note the great energy that the United States has displayed in Russia and other parts of the world at the present time. It is a very good example to us of what we might do if the Government were more active in taking hold, in a practical way, of these after-the-war problems.

The Paris Resolutions, however, and the Resolutions of the Imperial War Conference, are not all that the German Chancellor chooses to think them. We really have no idea here of what we may call an economic offensive against Germany. What we assert, and what we claim, is that the different Allied contries should be able to exercise what may be called the natural rights of nationalities— that is, to make treaty arrangements with their friends. I presume Germany does not propose to give up her right to make treaties with other of the Central European countries, nor to forego any of the other rights which she has exercised in the past. It is not for us to give any colour to the idea that we are not going to make our own adjustments of our own policy, in our own Empire, with our own Allies, whether or not it operates in the way of differentiation against any other country or countries. If you give this up you are giving up one of the primal rights of every nation and every State. I do not take the view that it is necessary to adopt the very heroic measures which some people are in favour of after the War in regard to the Central Powers to arrive at the objective we have in view. In these matters of economic policy you have to deal with margins. A very moderate alteration in our policy, a system of treaties with our Allies, and preference within the British Empire, will really secure what we want. We need not go into these extreme courses, which will not bear the test of detailed examination at the Peace Conference, and certainly will not have the effect which it is supposed by many they will have. My view is, and always has been, that moderate and statesmanlike courses will be far more effective than extreme measures in securing our ends. These are the measures that we want to see the Government adopt. If these measures are pursued with discretion they cannot be objected to by anyone on the ground of policy, or anything else, or as being unjust or impolitic. They are but the natural rights of great nationalities. I should rather put it that what we want is an assertion of that order and justice of international relations without which you cannot possibly have a durable peace. We are most anxious that the Government should be able to assure us—I do not for a moment press the right hon. Gentleman to make a formal declaration — and we shall be glad to be assured — that the Government have made proper plans for the future, and that, so far as possible, complete preparations both for the Peace negotiations and for the period that will follow the War have been made. Germany is a dangerous foe. Up to the present time we have not really substantially affected the efficiency of the German machine. All the ability that the German statesman can command—and that ability is very great and very extensive—will be at the service of that country, and of the Central Powers, with a view to depriving the Allies of any advantage they have gained during the War, which advantage may be used as a basis of a durable and a lasting peace. In accordance with the principles that I have laid down, and because of my anxiety that everything should be done to prevent such a very great misfortune as I have indicated, I would venture to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he can give some information to the House as to how the matter stands.

I do not. intend to trouble the House at any great length, but I feel that I have a duty as representing, in some small way, labour interests in this House. I listened with the greatest possible interest to the very clear, frank, and definite statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his explanation of the advance in the expenditure of the country, and in connection with the welfare of the country. The ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer seemed to make it out—I do not know what justification he had—that the unrest in the labour world was not to be ascribed to profiteering. Whether rightly or wrongly, the industrial classes generally do not, and will not, believe that. I was one of those who gave evidence before the recent Commission appointed— and very properly and necessarily appointed—to deal with the question of labour unrest in the country, and before Judge Parry I stated—I hope with some effect—that profiteering, and the feeling that the Government was not disposed to keep its pledge in regard to the treatment and the conditions of labour which they had sacrificed for the good of the country, and for the continuance in a successful way of the conduct of the War, were two causes. The belief is universally entertained that profiteering does take place. This is the sort of example given. How is it that since the Munitions Act came into existence firms have spent more in office repairs, in extension of their works, and in restoring their establishments? They point to that, and they have full knowledge of the facts, and can substantiate their case that that is taking place all over the country, which they regard as a sign that profiteering is taking place on a very large scale.

The ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer endeavoured to show that high prices of food were attributable to the inflation of the expenditure in respect of the conduct and carrying on of the War. It would require a great deal more than a mere statement to satisfy the general workers of the country. I hope some attempt to-day will be made by those in authority with a view to restoring the confidence of the country in the governmental authority. We want—I am sure I am as anxious as anyone—that there should be complete confidence and complete unity in regard to these great matters affecting so seriously the welfare and success of this country. The last speaker endeavoured to make out—and I think successfully—that Germany was a very serious and a very great foe. That is quite true. I think the evidence of their conduct in this War has clearly substantiated that statement, and the nature of their intrigues, the subterfuges that they have employed, the want of honesty in connection with everything they have done in this War, stamp the German race with ill-fame, which will follow them, I think, throughout the coming generations. I want merely to deal with the statement of the ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer, so that the reply coming from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or someone representing the Government, may be clear, emphatic, and unmistakable. I meet with working men who say, "Are you prepared for the coming revolution? What is going to happen in this country? Are the Government facing the inevitable? Are they prepared to meet our demand for some restitution, at any rate, of the trade rights and conditions that we laboured for fifty years to establish? Do you believe that the Government after the War will do their duty by us?" It wants to be made clear from the housetops of this country. There ought to be no mistake on that matter. The Government should reiterate from those benches that they are prepared, and willing, to meet these men on fair and equitable terms when the War ends with regard to these conditions of labour. Is there an hon. or right hon. Member in this House who will say that the workmen have failed to come to the rescue of their country? It is true that there have been at times individual, or, rather, some sectional, disputes in various parts of the country; but if these men felt that the country, the House of Commons, the Government were playing the game by them, they, too, would stand by the country, would help the country, would not hesitate for a moment, and would not countenance for a moment my kind of shirking or slacking on the part of their colleagues in the workshops of the country.

I want to see the feeling that the men can rely upon the Government and upon Parliament to do that justice which their sacrifices really demand and deserve. If it is not profiteering, if that is a misnomer in connection with war production, then let us have it from those benches, and I am now speaking with a full heart, anxious as a Labour representative that we should have this complete restoration of public confidence, especially among the industrial classes, to encourage the support that they are willing to give, and even to give ungrudgingly, to help the country in this great and terrible crisis. I have gone about the munition works speaking to these men to encourage them to put the whole energy of their nature into their work, and bear the sacrifices for the sake of destroying once for all that spirit of militarism and domination which has animated the German nation for the last forty years. If we can exterminate it, then freedom, liberty and security will be ours for this generation and future generations. I am anxious that the Government from time to time should lead our fellow-countrymen, and especially the working classes, to understand that the country is with them, encouraging them, appreciating their work at its proper value, and letting them understand that, so far as the Government is concerned, they are wishful to do everything they can to keep down any form of profiteering whether it is of the richer, the middle, or even the lower classes themselves, and that no-one is taking an undue advantage of the extra energy which they are imparting into their labour. If they feel that the Government is doing its part, I believe the working men of the country will respond right loyally in support of the Government. I am for bringing about a completely victorious termination of this War. No sacrifice ought to be too great for all of us to make to bring about such a victory that our children and children's children will rejoice at the sacrifices we have made to give them that assistance which they have a claim upon us to make on their behalf.

I have only one word more to say about the Government. It will be remembered that they were bringing forward some little time ago an Amendment to the Munitions Act, introducing the question of further dilution, as they called it, in private work. Instantly the men in the workshops had the belief that that was not for the benefit of the War, that it was not to help our soldiers in the trenches, but that it was rather that employers might still further exploit their labour with the object of further profiteering. That was the belief largely entertained among the workpeople of the country. We want to disabuse their minds; we want to give them the real facts; we want the Government to state its case, and I would be glad if it were possible in this Debate that some statement of that sort could be made to relieve the minds of the men that there is no danger about this proposal of further dilution, that the men may rely upon the Government minimising as far as possible an aggravating and a provoking part of the Amendment, making it as easy and lenient as possible, so that it will not in any way be oppressive, and showing that the Government by every means in its power is striving to bring as little additional pressure upon them as possible. I do plead most seriously with the Government to realise the present position. Revolution—and I am not speaking inadvisedly—is being fostered, I am sorry to say, by certain sections of leaders among the people who ought to know better, and I regret very much that this insidious kind of talk is going on and being so glibly preached about at the street corners and other places. It is regrettable that in the midst of a great war men will say, "We will have a Russian revolution in this country." It is deplorable to think that there is a British citizen prepared to entertain such a notion when we are at death grips with an enemy such as we have to fight at the present moment.

As a working man, having had long experience and having had forty-six years' direct association with trade unions, I say here from these benches that there is nothing that has been so regrettable to me as to think that men can so glibly talk about red revolution and sing "The Red Flag" when they ought to be singing the praises of our men in the trenches, who have done so much for us, and when they ought to be expressing their own undying gratitude for all the services and sacrifices they have made on our behalf. I do not think it is possible for anybody to take too serious a view of the position that now confronts us with regard to our Russian Allies, for it is a painful experience for all of us. We expected that the Russians would have kept united and realised the responsibilities of their freedom, which had been won after so many gallant struggles on their behalf, and we ought to take a very serious view of the position. On the other hand, we are glad that America has come to help us in our struggle, and I hope their help, financially, morally, and in the direction of strengthening the moral and confidence of our country, will have its desired effect.

I want to say a word or two upon the action which the Government have taken with regard to the regulation of food prices. I quite agree with the late Chancellor of the Exchequer that we are embarking on a very slippery path if we are going to fulfil the old Roman practice of supplying bread in circuses or bread in kinemes to the working classes. I quite agree with the late Chancellor of the Exchequer that once you begin upon this question it is impossible to know where you are going to stop. It cannot be denied that very large increases of wages have been made to the working classes on the sole ground that food is dear, and I do not think they can expect to have large increases in wages and at the same time have a reduction in the price of food. I have had two letters sent to me this morning, and after reading them I propose to hand them over to my hon. Friend (Mr. Baldwin). They are signed by the writers and, although there is no privacy about them, I do not propose to mention the names. The first letter says that the writers are brokers in the City of London who had made contracts for the importation of peas and lentils, and they say on the 16th of last May the Food Controller informed the shippers that they were not to pay these people the brokerages they had agreed to pay. I do not know why the Food Controller should have interfered in matters of that sort. This does not appear to be the only case, because according to a statement which I have here the Food Controller has told the shippers they are not to pay the brokerage to these particular people who have done the work, but to the Govern- ment. Why should they pay it to the Government? Are the Government becoming profiteers? I am told that since the Food Controller has taken possession of the supplies of peas and lentils the price has increased very largely. This is what they say:

"The increase in the price of peas ranges from 10s. to 30s. per quarter of 504 pounds, and in lentils it is greater, in many instances reaching 50s. per quarter. We have protested against this injustice in a letter to the Food Controller, and pointed out that our contracts are confined to the shippers as sellers and the manufacturers as buyers, and also that there is not the slightest suspicion of a speculative element."

That is the first letter which I propose to hand to my hon. Friend in order that he may see that my statements are correct. The second letter is from another firm of brokers in the City of London, and they practically say the same thing. They say that the increase in price since the Government has taken over these contracts is enormous. They say that their price per quarter for large lentils was 127s. 6d., whereas the Government price is 175s. In the same way with small lentils, their price was 106s. and 110s., and the Government price was 150s. In reference to white peas, their prices vary from 102s. to 120s., while the price of the Government is 130s. What happens to the difference between the prices? The writers of these letters are thoroughly respectable men of business, and I do not think that the Government have any right to do that sort of thing. If they do interfere in these matters, they should not make a profit out of the transaction. I have only risen to say this because these are matters of considerable importance, and if the Government are going to control all prices in all articles, they should do it in a clear and straightforward way, and not make profits themselves, and they should deal justly with the people whose living and business they have taken away. I think I am justified in saying at least that ought to be done.

I rise for the purpose of drawing attention to another aspect of the War and a very important one, namely, the War staff who controls the whole direction of the naval war. First of all let me extend a word of welcome to the appointment of Sir Eric Geddes who takes charge of the Navy at an extremely important moment, when I take it that the Navy must pass from the defensive to the offensive. I say this for a variety of reasons. In the first place it is very necessary that the doctrine of the single front should be extended from the Army to the Navy, especially at this moment when the Allies are so hard pressed by the disaster which has overtaken the Russian Army; and, secondly, I hold that it is necessary to pass to the offensive because of the submarine menace. The only way in which we can really tackle it is by an offensive, by a relentless hunt, and by carrying the War right up to the bases from which the submarines make their exits.

In this matter of dealing with the submarine menace by defensive means we shall be in very much the same position as we were in dealing with the air raids. First of all we had to deal with the Zeppelins and we had great difficulty in countering them. Then we perfected our defensive arrangements, which became so-perfect that the Zeppelins never came. Then the Germans substituted the aeroplane menace for the Zeppelins and the Zeppelins defence was useless. We are now trying to perfect our arrangements with a new defensive. In regard to the submarines we had great difficulty in dealing with the earlier attacks, but we perfected our defensive arrangements, but the Germans went ahead and built submarines for work in the oceans faraway at sea. I venture to say that the Germans are not going to stand still while we are perfecting our arrangements to deal with that menace. I think they will build submarine cruisers, and therefore the only way to deal with this question is to carry our war operations as close as possible to the enemy's coast and so deal with every form of menace in the shallow waters. There are some people who say that you cannot deal with the German bases because they are under the protection of gunfire. That is, indeed, true of the coast of Flanders, where our combined operations of Army and Navy must root the Germans out, but that is not in any sense true with regard to the channels leading to the estuaries of the Elbe, the Ems, and the Jade. The channels of the Elbe and the Jade Rivers extend for miles out to sea through sandbanks, beyond the range of the guns, and it is quite possible by suitable operations to carry the War right up these channels and mine and net them against the enemy.

6.0 P.M.

My third reason for desiring to take the offensive is that it is only by the offensive that we can keep the Allies together. If we resort to a defensive policy our Allies will keep their forces for the defence of their own coast. We saw an illustration of this in the case even of a badly-conceived plan such as the Dardanelles, where we got the most enthusiastic support of the French for offensive operations. My final reason is that we have now got the American Navy on our side, and it appears to me that there is not a shred of excuse for remaining on the defensive. It is not only the man in the street, but the man in the Fleet who complains of our defensive policy. They point to the overwhelming naval preponderance of the Allies, which is something like four to one, and to the fact that it is quite possible to put into the North Sea two Grand Fleets each of which will be 50 per cent. stronger than the whole of the German High Seas Fleet. It is no use resorting to the offensive if it is not going to be informed by an adequate War Staff. The history of this War has been largely one of failure in regard to the Navy, because of the want of an adequate War Staff before the War and during the War. If we had had one we should never have allowed the engineering population to be drawn away into the Army in France. We should have had the mines which the House well knows we had not got at the beginning of the War, and which we are only beginning to obtain this year, after two years of war. We should have been able to run close up to the enemy coast and mine it. We should have had submarine-proof harbours and then we should not have lost the "Audacious" on the North Coast of Ireland. We should have had the trade routes defended, and we should not have lost a great deal of shipping. We should have had a sufficiency of small craft, and therefore should not have had to abandon the North Sea and the Baltic. After the War broke out the want of a War Staff was shown on many occasions. No attempt was made to bring away the forty German ships at Antwerp. There was no attempt made to destroy Zeebrugge and Ostend. We lost the three "Cressys," when even the midshipmen saw that they were bound to be lost. They were called "The Live Bait Squadron" throughout the Fleet. We lost our ships at Coronel. We blundered in the Dardanelles because of the want of a real War Staff, and then at the end we formed an adequate War Staff on the spot in association with the Army, and we had the withdrawal from the Dardanelles magnificently conducted from first to last. It is an old story, but I have urged over and over again that to cover up our deficiencies we abolished the court-martial. During the whole time that my right hon. Friend the new Minister of Munitions (Mr. Churchill) was at the Admiralty we only had two courts-martial. Both were inquiries into navigation losses—one a mercantile cruiser and the other a destroyer. The reason is obvious. Any court-martial which had been formed would have blamed the Board of Admiralty, as, indeed, the Court of Inquiry in the case of the three "Cressys" did. The verdict in that Court of Inquiry was referred back by the Admiralty, with the request that the President would alter the verdict. He, like a man of honour and a gentleman, refused to do so, and risked his career. Why I insist very strongly on the court-martial is that it is the means by which the great body of doctrine of a Navy is enforced. It lends an almost religious sanction to that body of doctrine.

You cannot, indeed, exaggerate the importance of the matter. Practically in the history of all our wars at the beginning there has been a certain slackness in the Navy. Take the French Revolutionary War. At the beginning of it we had Admiral Hotham, of whom Nelson said that he was quite satisfied if a week passed without losses to our side. Then later, in 1805, Sir Robert Calder won a victory against a superior force, captured two French ships, and broke up Napoleon's combination, and yet Sir Robert Calder's career was broken by a court-martial because, according to the body of doctrine of that day, the victory was not big enough. The body of doctrine which the French Army possessed when this War broke out was of the best. At the time of Dreyfus scandal, not many years before, it was the worst, but after that scandal there took place a revival in the French Army. The officers produced some of the finest literary and informed work which has ever been produced, and when the War broke out we had in charge Joffre, a distinguished officer who had been a military professor, teaching strategy in the classroom. The body of doctrine was passed on to distant stations by the officers who were his pupils and permeated the whole French Army. The same is true of Pétain, the present Commander-in-Chief, who was a professor of military fortifications when the War broke out. He went to the War and rose to his great position to-day. It was the same with Cardorna in the Italian Army. I know that these officers, who are informed in strategy and who ought to be on the War Staff, are described as "paper men" by some of those who belong to the old "rorty" class of seaman who have been in the ascendant at the Admiralty in this War. I expect the Fleets where, as tacticians, we have the very best men; men who can think and put their ideas on paper, are paper men, then Caesar, Frederick the Great, Turenne, and Napoleon were all paper men. It is not a charge that will ever be brought against them.

There is this curious position. I find that these officers, who are not on the War Staff, and who I hops some day will be on the War Staff, are in favour of the offensive. It is curious that paper men should be in favour of it. They are in favour of decentralisation, which means getting rid of paper work, and they also do not pray to the great god of material to give us an invention to deal with the submarine menace. They believe they can deal with it without being dependent upon this or that invention, although no one would deny the importance of inventions. If we had not acted in that spirit our naval supremacy would have been over long ago, because we should have waited for an invention to smash up the fire ships, whereas it was our sailors who smashed up the fire ships by inventing a fresh tactical formation.

We have had warning after warning of the importance of this War Staff work. Apart from history, there was the report of evidence of the Hartington Commission in the eighties. It reported that nearly all our troubles in connection with the War Office and the Admiralty were due to the want of efficient thinking departments. Then later we had the South African Commission, which reported that the want of a War Staff was responsible for many of our disasters in the South African war. In 1909 we had a Cabinet Committee, presided over by the late Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith). That was the Beresford Committee. They investigated this very question of a naval War Staff, and they reported that they were struck by the differences of opinion between naval officers on important questions of strategy and tactics. I say that the differences of opinion persist. The Committee hoped that a War Staff would be formed on such lines as would lead practically to the formation of a body of doctrine which would permeate the whole Service. That difficulty, I maintain, still exists at the present moment. In 1911 we had the Agadir crisis, and my right hon. Friend the new Minister of Munitions was sent to the Admiralty for the purpose of creating a, War Staff. It was found at the time of the Agadir crisis that the Navy was not ready with its plans. I contend that the Minister of Munitions formed his War Staff on wrong lines. He mixed up a great many administrative functions with the War Staff. Not only that, but one of his premises was wholly wrong. He treated the matter as if naval warfare was purely an open-sea problem.

This is rather ancient history, and it is difficult to see how it bears upon the present Vote of Credit.

There is no reason why the hon. Member should not begin with the Battle of Trafalgar.

I am dealing with 1912 and with the system which existed up to last May.

I submit that the War Staff must take into consideration not only open-sea fighting, but the configuration of the land, the depths and the soundings which affect submarines and mines. It has to deal with coastal forts and guns, because these defend the naval bases from which submarines make their exit.

I really must request the hon. Member to leave that part of his survey and to come to something which relates to the Vote of Credit.

The War Staff controls the whole of the Navy, and I submit it has everything to do with this Vote of Credit. I will come to the period of last May. I presume that I may deal with that. Last May we made changes in the War Staff, which I have urged for many years, so as to relieve them of administrative functions. Sir Eric Geddes was appointed to take charge of all the supply of material. That was a great improvement, but before that we were applying to the War Staff methods which Lord Haldane declared would wreck the General Staff. If the General Staff, he said, were to interfere with the administration of Departments in matters such as the supply of material it would inevitably lead to failure. That was the arrangement which existed in the Navy up to last May. We have changed that, but we must do much more. I submit that strategy is a specialisation in itself. No one would be more concerned than myself to express his entire confidence in Admiral Sir John Jellicoe in certain directions, but I submit that the training which he received for his present position was not one which was likely to make him a great strategist. He was eight years as a flag officer in an office dealing first with the supply of material, and finally as the Second Sea Lord in charge of the appointments of lieutenants. Then he went to the Grand Fleet. The deputy-chief of the War Staff (Sir Henry Oliver) was an old navigator, which is a position leading a man to be precise about details, but does not give that great strategical insight required of anybody on the War Staff. Everybody admits that he is a great officer in his own line.

The same difficulty occurs everywhere else. Painting and sculpture are allied arts. Yet the world has only produced one man to combine both functions, and I submit that Moltke was right when he said that you rarely get an admiral and a general who will combine the tactical side with the strategical side. I doubt if we have ever had anyone in the Navy except Nelson who combined both those functions. In a great degree the War found us in the hands of what I will call the material school. Very many years ago I said that the Navy had always been divided into two schools—the material school and the historical school. We have won all our victories under the historical school of strategists. I submit that Sir Eric Geddes has himself won all his victories in his own particular line as an engineer on the material side. His bias is naturally to the material side, and I do hope he will get rid of that natural bias in forming his War Staff to conduct this War. I hope that he will see that we have accentuated the importance of the material side at the expense of the strategical side, and that the reason why the submarine menace has become so acute, so that we lose one cargo and one ship in every ten that come to this country, is because the War Staff is run by men who are materialists and tacticians rather than strategists of the type of Moltke.

I should like to call the Chancellor of the Exchequer's attention to one or two points in connection with his speech. First, there is the question of the advances which have been made to our Allies. We all realise that this country will have to carry the heaviest burden in connection with this War. So far as I have been able to ascertain, none of our Allies, and certainly not our enemies, have done anything to raise taxation to anything like the same proportion as we have done in order to meet the expenditure. If the Chancellor of the Exchequer could give us some insight as to what has been done by France and our other Allies by way of increasing taxation in order to meet war expenditure, it would ease our minds in assenting to the advances which are being made to our Allies. I have not been able to get much information about some of them, but certainly so far as France is concerned she has not been meeting expenditure in anything like the same proportion as we have done. The same remark applies to Germany. I believe she will find herself in a very difficult position after the War. We are not concerned with her, but we are concerned that those countries which are allied with us should raise some taxes to bear some proportion of the expenses incurred. Everybody must be impressed with the enormous growth in our national expenditure. If this is to be a long War, as I believe it will be, many of us will be greatly concerned as to how we shall stand in the succeeding years in view of that enormous expenditure. We ought not only to do everything we can to vote money, but we ought to do everything we can to see that the money is properly spent when it has been voted by the House. I am sorry to say that ever since the War began the Government have not taken full control over expenditure. They did not take advantage of the experience of many business men in the House to supervise the contracts which were made. I called attention to this matter when the War broke out. To me it was appalling that the whole of the contracts granted by the Army, on which we were spending millions of money, should be supervised by the then Financial Secretary to the War Office, whose experience in business was practically nil. The Government would have been well advised in those early days if they had taken the course I suggested.

As far as I can see, nothing has been done since to ensure that contracts should be supervised by men who know something about them. There was the case of the Meyer contract, which was brought up in the House some time ago. I remember that we were advised to see the head of the Office of Works in regard to that contract. He quite satisfied me that when he first entered into it he was perfectly justified in making that contract, but he did not realise, and no one could realise, that the contract would have amounted ultimately to the figure it did, because of the Office of Works being asked to buy timber on behalf of the War Office as well as on their own behalf. While the contract was a perfectly good one when it was entered into, it should have been watched and supervised by men who knew something about contracts. It was scarcely possible to expect that the officials in the Departments would exercise such supervision. I would suggest that it is necessary that a Committee should be appointed consisting of three or four men who know something about the particular trades in which this expenditure has been incurred. I have been informed—I do not know how far it is true—that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is not particularly favourable to the formation of such Committees. He is a business man, and I am quite sure he will realise that although he may have the finest man possible at the head of a Department, it is impossible for him to have the necessary information upon which he can supervise all the contracts which that Department may make. I strongly urge that he should associate with the different Departments men who have some knowledge of such matters. A large number of Members of this House, who could not possibly have any connection with any contract entered into, would be able to do something to supervise these contracts. We had an illustration in the contract which was entered into by the War Office with Sir John Jackson. There was a Commission of Inquiry in regard to it. I read a good deal of the evidence, and I was satisfied that those who took charge of that contract were wholly in- capable of dealing with a man like Sir John Jackson. It is essential that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should take advantage of the business capacity of Members of this House in order to supervise expenditure. We all know that when the Government place a contract there is always an increase in the price, and that a Government can never place a contract on precisely the same terms as an ordinary business house. For these reasons I trust that the Chancellor of the Exchequer will do something to see that adequate control is maintained over the expenditure by the different Departments.

The Leader of the House, in moving a Vote of Credit, generally gives us a résumé of the War situation.

My right hon. Friend has omitted that which would be a very interesting résumé at the present time. I confess that, although I listened with very great interest to the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. Hewins) as to what is going to happen after the War, my concern is for the present. I trust that the Allies may be in the position, after the War of being able to impose their own tariff policy on the world. We are in a very critical stage at the present time. The hon. Member for Bolton (Mr. Tootill) touched on a very tender spot when he referred to the great unrest among the working classes. They are not very happy in Germany. They do not change their Chancellor without some reason. The question I wish to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Government tonight is, are the great and magnificent resources of this country being used to the best advantage for the prosecution of the War to-day? The efforts of Britain, her soldiers, her Fleet and her people have been quite extraordinary. The House the other day appointed a Committee to inquire into expenditure. Does not expenditure depend upon policy? What is outside the control of the House is the policy of the Government in regard to war expenditure and great war enterprises. This morning we have had news from two countries far remote—not very satisfactory news—from East Africa and from Gaza. Might we have some informa- tion about those two theatres of war? They must be immensely costly; they must be fed by ships, of which there is a great scarcity. Can the Government give us some idea as to what we are doing at Gaza? Where are we going there; what is the objective? Even if you make an advance to Jerusalem it will not be a vital part of the Turkish Empire. The general has come home, after what we were told was a victory. Why did he come home? I am not sure that some honour has not been conferred upon him. I do not understand these things, and perhaps the Chancellor of the Exchequer will take some opportunity of enlightening us with regard to them. I should further like to ask, was this attempted advance to Jerusalem a plan carefully thought out by the General Staff of the War Office, or was it more of a politicians' plan?

Again, take the question of Bagdad. The original advance has been discussed in this House on the Mesopotamia Commission Report, but what are the Government going to do there now? Have they a clear policy as to what they are going to do at Bagdad? The German Chancellor stated that

"The Turkish army is newly equipped and full of confidence."

I understand that the Germans have sent one of their finest generals to Bagdad, that they propose, if possible, to attack our forces, and that they intend to turn us out. I should like some information upon that matter if the right hon. Gentleman can give it to us. There is another quarter of the earth—Salonika. Can we have any reassurance as to the position there? There has been a huge army at Salonika now for nearly two years. I am told, upon authority which is quite good, that the tragic blunders and the colossal incompetence which characterised the Dardanelles and the Mesopotamia campaigns will pale into insignificance when, if ever, an inquiry is held into the Salonika campaign. I am told that although there is a composite force of four nationalities there is no Allied staff, there is no co-ordination, and, what is more, there is considerable heartburning between the various troops; that there are huge masses of stores, but that our guns are six-inch guns while the enemy has eight-inch guns and is able to outrange us, that the enemy have a great advantage in aeroplanes, and that the enemy have gas shells, which we have not. One would like to know whether the Government are really taking this expedition in hand with some firmness. If they are going to stay there, let us give the expedition a chance. If they do not intend that then let us come away. At any rate, if forces can be sent to Salonika, the advance would cut vital communications between Turkey and Germany. I have often before in this House striven to inculcate, with little success, that Britain, after all, is the heart of the Empire, and that Britain must be protected. Our sea-power to-day, upon which we have always relied, is imperilled by the submarine menace. The Germans to-day are building great hopes upon their submarines. No one could have read the German Chancellor's speech without seeing that. He' said of the submarine:

"It impairs England's economic life and her conduct of the War from month to month, so that it will not be possible for her to hold out against the necessity of peace much longer."

Those are the hopes which the Germans are building upon their submarine campaign. I have contended in this House for the last fifteen months that we ought not to lie down so quietly under this menace. I do not believe that the submarine cannot be crushed. One gentleman, not unconnected with His Majesty's Government, said to me the other day, "You might as well try to get rid of the moon as to get rid of submarines." The moon is an act of God; the submarine is an act of man. What man has invented, man can destroy. I am perfectly certain that in this question of submarine destruction our Admiralty—I draw a very sharp distinction between the Admiralty and the Navy—have not been sufficiently vigorous. They have not had sufficient foresight and they have not achieved that success which we certainly think they ought to have achieved. Whatever happens we must master the submarine or the whole future of this country is menaced. It is no use the Prime Minister saying, I have no doubt justly, that we have a large amount of food in this country. We must get in a large amount of raw material, and that cannot come in if the submarine menace is not diminished. There is one thing which I think the Admiralty is doing which cannot be defended, and that is issuing every Thursday morning a misleading return as to the tonnage sunk.

I do not want to criticise too severely, but I feel that when there is issued by the Admiralty a Return purporting to show our submarine losses, it should be an accurate representation of the facts. I have here the submarine losses of Britain, the Allied countries and neutrals, and the totals from the beginning of the War. I am not going to give them. It would not be fair. It is the Government's responsibility.

Why is my right hon. Friend privileged to have the figures and not the House?

I did not get them from any Government Department or any Government Return. I have other means of information which may possibly not be open to my hon. Friend. The Government has decided to issue a Return. I simply ask that they should issue it in a fuller and more accurate form. I do not think I can go beyond that. Although there has been a slight diminution in the first fortnight or three weeks in July, the menace is grave, and it threatens very materially our prospect of being able to continue the War with the same vigour as we have done in the past. I have suggested over and over again that the Admiralty should be reinforced by men on their War Staff with vision and imagination. I was reading, curiously enough, the statement of one of the admirals who used to enlighten this House, who derided entirely the idea that the submarine would be a grave danger to us in time of war. It is reported in the "Times," of 11th July, 1914—about a month before the War began. When I was turning over the pages of that paper, another incident struck my notice, and that was the first meeting of the Provisional Government in Belfast. We have had a procession of First Lords of the Admiralty. We have had four First Lords in three years, and we have had four First Sea Lords. I have stated here, and I do not think it can be contradicted, that one of those First Sea Lords alone was right, and if his advice had been followed we should never have had the Dardanelles disaster, with all its attendant blunders. The right hon. Gentleman (Sir E. Carson) has now retired, not of his own will, but because it has been thought he could serve the country better as a member of the War Council.

I speak here with some experience of the Admiralty. A civilian goes into it, and goes into a different life altogether. It took me from twelve to eighteen months to conceal my ignorance from the officials, and I do not think I was very successful then. Really, when you keep on bringing in new men, they are not competent to judge of the men whom they shall call upon to serve them. Every Briton would wish Sir Eric Geddes Godspeed. He is an extremely competent engineer, he has done great work at the Ministry of Munitions and in France, but has he the knowledge to select the best naval advisers? Will he select advisers who have the conception to utilise the Fleet? We have, with the American. Fleet, at least three and a half of the Allies to one of the Germans in gunpowder, yet for nearly three years our Navy has been kept at bay. That is a triumph for the German. I believe the British Fleet is the finest fighting machine in the world, and, given the chance, it will do as well and earn as great credit for itself as the seamen in the days of Nelson. But if the Fleet is to be used it must be upon a strategic plan. I should deplore more than I can say that, because of some ill-regulated demands here, the Navy were tempted into some operation which was not carefully thought out. I believe that was done in Salonika. There was a great demand here for some offensive in Salonika. The generals undertook the offensive. The consequence was no advance and 7,000 casualties. Therefore, I would urge that naval advisers should be selected who can conceive a strategic plan which must be boldly and prudently conceived, carefully and thoroughly prepared, and resolutely executed. I now regard the formation of the Coalition Government in May, 1915, as a grave blunder. Many of us supported it at the time, but I do not think it has been that success which we should have wished. But in May, 1915, when I left the Admiralty there was an armada of ships being built. There were specially constructed vessels for a particular strategic purpose. People say to me now, "look what you did when you were at the Admiralty. You have built ships, some of which were described on the occasion of the King's visit to the fleet as mystery ships; you have built monitors, things which are not of the slightest good to-day." Of course, they are not, because the whole strategic plan of the Admiralty of that day was ruined by the Dardanelles. All the ships were sent there.

So far as the Navy has been employed it has done wonders in the protection of our transports and of our commerce, and in clearing the German commerce from the seas. But there is really no reason why it should hide now in abject seclusion waiting for the Germans to come out. I put that strongly to the Government. I have done it before. It has not had much effect, and I dare say it will have none in future. But may I ask another question. We had an incident at Nieuport the other day. There the officers of the King's Royal Rifles gave a magnificent exhibition of heroism. They stood back to back and died shooting down Germans—a very fine example of sacrifice to our own civilians here. Nieuport is close to the sea. Where was the Navy? Could it not have helped? Could it not have taken the Germans with an enfilading fire? I do not press for these questions to be answered here, but I wish to tell the Government that they are very much alive in the minds of those of us who take an interest in these matters. The Belgian coast to-day is, as Napoleon said of Antwerp, a pistol pointed at the heart of England. Why is it that our strategists cannot look at the question as a whole, and instead of attacking at Gaza, why do not they advance along the Northern Belgian coast in co-operation with the Navy. It is impossible that these places can be taken by a naval operation. It must be a joint naval and military operation. Of course, it would be quite impossible for the Navy to attack these land forts, but I presume these things have been considered. Why is it that we do not see some result, and that the northern coast of Belgium should not be the object of our attack rather than the outlying portions of the Turkish Empire?

There is one question I should like to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer in regard to food. He says he proposes to fix the price of wheat for the farmers. I hope he will make that announcement soon, but I am glad the Government is dealing with this question of food. It is vitally important, and, though they may have to outrage some rules and regulations of political economy, it has got to be done. I wish they had shown a little more courage with regard to racing. I do not understand at all why racing is allowed in these days, but still one must presume that they know better than we do. The hon. and gallant Gentleman (Commander Bellairs) made use of a very ominous word, of which we hear a great deal in these days, and that is the word "revolution." There is nothing for our country to have a revolution about. It is a constitutionally governed country, and I am sure there is no man in the whole Empire who strives to do his duty more than His Majesty the King. The King may be badly advised, and I am not at all sure that in some of those sham fights in France the other day someone was not badly advised. I will say it out here, because it is better to have it out in the House than to have it spreading underground in the country.

made an observation which was inaudible in the Reporters' Gallery.

It was not only aeroplanes. According to the correspondent there was a considerable amount of military display in France, which was inadvisable when the real thing was going on so near. I have made these remarks with no desire at all to embarrass the Government, but I ask them to consider carefully the suggestions I have put forward.

Perhaps I may be allowed at this point to reply to the hon. and gallant Member (Commander Bellairs) and my right hon. Friend (Mr. G. Lambert). The hon. and gallant Gentleman referred to the constitution, functions, and personnel of the War Staff, and incidentally he raised a topic which he has brought before our attention on many occasions, that of courts-martial. As regards the latter subject, he will remember that I stated the policy of the Board on the Motion for the Adjournment on the Whitsuntide Recess, and, as nothing further has been raised in his incidental remarks, I can only say that I cannot profitably add anything to the statement I made on that occasion. As regards the War Staff, he doubted the qualification of certain distinguished members. I must respectfully decline to follow him in that conclusion. He seemed afraid lest the War Staff should be obsessed with problems of material and problems of administration, and, therefore, not be able to give proper time and promptitude to questions of strategy. I can assure him that his fears on that score are quite groundless. Like my right hon. Friend (Mr. Lambert), I have had considerable experience in the office where he served for many years, and I can say that there never was a time in that memory when it was less likely, as a result of the distribution of Admiralty business, that the War Staff should find themselves unduly occupied with questions of material and administration, and unable to devote themselves properly to questions of strategy. If the hon. and gallant Gentleman would like to see the document when it is prepared, showing the distribution amongst the various branches in the Admiralty, I shall be glad to let him have a copy, and I think that will remove his doubts. As regards the members of the War Staff, I decline to follow him in his conclusions. Not only have they their hands free for the particular work which they have to do as a War Staff, but, in the words used by my right hon. Friend (Mr. Lambert), they have, as I know, both vision and imagination.

As regards the speech of my right hon. Friend, he took exception to the form of Return of shipping losses week by week. He knows that that was deliberately arrived at by the War Cabinet after consultation with and in agreement with our Allies. I cannot undertake to do more than to express his view once more that he is not satisfied with the form, and that he does not believe that it shows precisely the position. I have only one other comment to make on his speech. I listened with some regret to certain comments he made about the use of the Fleet. I do not feel competent as a civilian, though a civilian closely in touch with this great Service for many years, to dogmatise as he does as to the precise use to which the Fleet should be put. It is quite true that the right hon. Gentleman occupied a distinguished position as a Commissioner of the Admiralty for a great many years, and he may have qualifications to lead him to say what the Fleet ought to do, but I do not possess those qualifications.

I do not dogmatise. I am not a naval man, and I do not put forward my views on these matters. The hon. and gallant Gentleman (Commander Bellairs) was a naval officer, therefore we are bound to listen to his views on that point with respect. My views must be taken for what they are worth, as one who has been associated with the work day by day. I was certainly very sorry to hear the phrase used by the right hon. Gentleman that the British Fleet was kept at bay. The right hon. Gentleman went on to say that the British Fleet had done wonders, and he never said a truer word in any speech he ever made. I recognise, however, that he confined those wonders to the safeguarding of our transports and the clearing of the German flag off the seas. Those are very considerable achievements, but if he confines the wonders of the Fleet to those two transactions, namely, the safeguarding of our transports, in some cases thousands of miles away from these islands, and the driving of the German flag off the seas, then I say, with great respect, that I am a little surprised. He must be unmindful of the several naval actions which have taken place since the 4th August, 1914, and the distinguished part which the British Fleet has played on those occasions.

I beg to move, to reduce the Vote by £100.

We have had a very interesting Debate on naval matters in the last few speeches, and I do not offer any apology for bringing the Debate back to the question before the Committee. I agree with some of the remarks of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. G. Lambert), and I hope that his appeal to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to make some statement in regard to the campaign in Palestine and in regard to our policy in the East will be successful, because they are relevant to the enormous sum of money we are asked to vote to-day. We are asked for the colossal sum of £650,000,000. I move a reduction of this Vote as a protest against this abnormal and exceptional amount which is calculated to lead to waste and extravagance, and will be detrimental to our financial position and injurious to the cause we have at heart. I submit that it would be very undesirable, at this very serious stage of the War, to give the Government a credit for £650,000,000, which I understand is to enable the Government to finance the War to the end of October. That, I think, is really going beyond the powers which are centred in this House. The Chancellor of the Exchequer and other speakers have referred to the fact that recently, owing to the action of this House, a Select Committee has been appointed to look into matters of expenditure. I ask hon. Members if it is not a fact that one of the best checks on expenditure and one of the best methods of enforcing economy is to have a tight hold on the purse. To give a credit for this amount at this time and at this stage of the War seems to me to cut across the purpose for which the Committee in question was appointed. Supposing that in October the expenses prove to be £10,000,000 per day. That is equal to £300,000,000 for that month alone. A credit of £350,000,000 or £400,000,000 would have carried us to the end of September, and I think I should be within the mark in saying that you could easily have cut off £150,000,000 or £200,000,000 from this enormous Vote of Credit. We could then take up the question early in October with regard to any further Vote. We ought not to adjourn for so long a period. In the early stages of the War we frequently met for the purposes of finance and other matters. Everyone will admit that at this serious stage in the War, when the news from Russia is very critical, it seems wrong to dismiss the House of Commons for a couple of months, perhaps, and to ask for a credit of this character is an inducement to the Government to spend money with both hands and to enter upon more extravagant expenditure than they have been engaged in in the past.

Some references have been made by the late Chancellor of the Exchequer to our indebtedness and the question of inflation. I may, perhaps, take a melancholy satisfaction in. hearing the speech of the late Chancellor of the Exchequer, because I can well remember—and perhaps it may be within the memory of hon. Members—that two years ago, when the Government of that day entered upon inflation, the issue of Treasury notes was £40,000,000, compared with £160,000,000 or £165,000,000 to-day. However, one welcomes this death-bed repentance, and when one finds the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. McKenna) saying very ably in his lucid speech that there is a limit, and there must be a limit to our expenditure, it is very interesting. He was interrupted by one hon. Member, who said you cannot cut down your expenditure on munitions. No one suggests that you should cripple your munitions in any way; but if you find you are likely to cripple your expenditure on munitions by excessive expenditure generally, surely the deduction is that you must cut down other parts of your expenditure to enable you to continue the expenditure upon munitions. In other words, as the right hon. Gentleman very properly and very ably pointed out, there is a limit to the actual figures you can spend per day. I hope that his well-timed words will be weighed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Treasury, and that we may see some evidence of a desire to limit expenditure in some form or other. It may be asked, "How do you propose to meet the situation? What do you offer in the way of practical suggestions?" The hon. Member for Barnsley (Sir J. Walton) pointed out very properly the gravity of our financial position, and referred to the question of inflation, especially in view of the next Loan. I suggest to the Treasury that they might begin even now to call a halt to the activities of the Treasury. They are issuing increases of these Currency Notes every week to the extent of about £1,000,000. That must, as anyone conversant with the subject will admit, lead to an increase in prices, and an increase in prices was said in the Napoleonic Wars to be worse than a reverse in conflict with the enemy, because it creates unrest in the country. It has done so now, and that serious unrest is accentuated by the action of the Government. Why, then, pursue the policy which accentuates these increases in prices? Why not listen to the protest made by the late Chancellor of the Exchequer, by the hon. Member for Edinburgh, myself, and others? We have been endeavouring to warn the Government for nearly two years. We pointed this out two years ago, and told the Treasury of that day what was the inevitable result of their policy, and that it would lead to the increase in prices which has caused the present unrest, and which is bound to lead to serious trouble.

7.0 P.M.

Revolution has been referred to, and the hon. Member (Mr. Tootill), in his very manly utterance, denied that the working classes would countenance for a moment the idea of revolution. I agree with him, but at the same time the working classes are human, and if the struggle of life is so accentuated that men feel that struggle severely, and if we have peace and this enormous expenditure is withdrawn but this inflation still continues and the struggle of life is still accentuated, we may find that we shall have great trouble and that we are sowing the seeds of revolution if the British working classes are not able to keep the wolf from the door and to carry on. I submit to the Government, in the interests of sound finance, that they ought to pay some attention to these matters which are within their own control. It is not a question of freights or a shortage of labour. It is a question of administration. I have never been able to get such an admission as was made to-day by the late Chancellor of the Exchequer and even, I think, by the present Chancellor. The hon. Member for Hereford said that expenditure has no effect on the rise in prices. It does not require much argument to show the hollowness of that statement. It is evident that considerable expenditure leading to an enhanced demand tends to raise prices. I am surprised that the hon. Member should have made such an amazing statement. He went on to refer to the speech of the German Imperial Chancellor. He hoped, as he is a very enthusiastic supporter of Tariff Reform, that no support would be given to the plea of the German Imperial Chancellor that there should be no economic boycott of Germany after the War. This is not the time to go into the question of the Paris Conference, as far as the policy of this country is concerned, further than this, that I entirely disagree with the hon. Member. I hope that when the time comes this House and the country will weigh well any departure from our ancient policy of Free Trade and finance which has enabled us, to the amazement of the civilized world, to carry on this War and make the advances which we have made to the Allies and the Dominions, which are unexampled in the history of the world, and which by itself, without going into the merits of the questions, furnishes the most eloquent testimony to the soundness of the policy which enabled us to achieve these magnificent results.

The German Imperial Chancellor unquestionably in my humble view is anxious for peace. Some say that his enthusiasm for U-boat warfare shows that he represents the reactionary party. Probably he does, but even reactionaries sometimes come to see wisdom. If I read that speech, as I endeavoured to do, with an impartial mind, I see it confirmed by the Debate in the American Senate. Most people will agree that there are increasing evidences that Germany desires peace with this country. We may say that we are not going to make peace, as the Prime Minister said in his speech, with a military autocracy. Certainly I yield to no one in my detestation of a military autocracy, but you cannot dictate altogether—even the Prime Minister himself said so in a previous speech—what sort of a Government Germany should have or what sort of a Constitution she ought to obey. Certainly if we could in any way advance the liberal and constitutional idea of a democratic Government in Germany I, for one, would be glad to give any help we can, but as practical men we have to deal with the German people, and as long as they are content to have these men, such as they are, to represent them, we cannot impose our will as to the persons with whom we have to deal. There are only two alternatives to the present position. One is to crush Germany. Then you would be able to dictate to the German people. But when we have the right hon. Gentleman, the late First Lord of the Admiralty, who I understand is now to be a member of the War Cabinet, as his contribution to statesmanship, calmly suggesting in a speech that we cannot treat with Germany until she has withdrawn her armies behind the Rhine, then I say that you might as well ask her to withdraw her armies to the moon. It is ludicrous to expect the Central Powers to withdraw their armies to suit the sentiments of the First Lord of the Admiralty. There is only one way of getting these armies to go behind the Rhine, and that is to drive them there, and if you cannot do that, if it would be too costly, another way of attaining your object, and thus saving the lives of your sons and any further embarrassment of your finances, might be by negotiations. But speeches such as that of the right hon. Gentleman are enough to make one despair. These are the men to whom we are asked to vote £650,000,000. One would hardly vote them 650 pence. The Government should visualise the position as practical men. What a contribution to practical statesmanship to say that we cannot negotiate with Germany until she withdraws her armies behind the Rhine! To say that is to assume that we are bereft of common sense.

I submit that the Prime Minister himself in his reply did not advance matters by saying that he had read the speech of the German Chancellor three times, and thought that it indicated a sham independence for Belgium, a sham demo- cracy for Germany, and a sham peace. What an easy way of dismissing the speech by making statements of that kind! We have never found out yet, we have never gone so far as to ask, what are the German terms. We have never met the German advance, which has been made over and over again for a conference. They have stated that they are willing to submit propositions to us. Let us ask them to submit them. It does not indicate weakness to ask any Power to state its terms in a conference that you are going to attend. They had a conference in the Crimean War. It was not a success, and the war was resumed. It is in accordance with common sense. We have had very foolish discussions in which we have talked of the annexation of Constantinople and the disintegration of Austro-Hungary, and while I hold to the objects, upon which I have never weakened, the primary objects with which we entered the War, yet I say that to enlarge upon other subjects of detail which may never be agreed to is to depreciate the good name of your country by stating things which possibly you will not be able to carry out, and it would be a wise policy if we could attain by negotiation our primary objects for which we have willingly sacrificed our blood and our money.

It is very relevant to this Amendment to consider for a moment the grounds on which it is based. In deciding on the colossal sum which is named in the Vote of Credit, there must have been in the minds of the War Cabinet a very close calculation as to what may happen in the next few weeks, and it will have been based upon a revision of their aims which are likely to affect the course of the War. I make no excuse, therefore, for raising the subject of war aims. One particular item in the list of war aims has been debated lately in this House, and a very vigorous view has been put forward by two or three Members to the effect that we ought to extend our ambition and definitely pledge ourselves to break up the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and I do not think that the contrary opinion, which is, of course, I am sure held by the great majority of the House, has been expressed as yet in much detail by any Member. The recent speeches of the Prime Minister and also of the German Chancellor have brought us to quite a new stage in the history of the War. We have had a period during which the Russian formula, "no annexation," has been discussed. But to my mind the discussion was always vain so-long as we did not get to grips with particular items to which the formula was to be applied. Now we have had responsible utterances on certain great questions, which must be faced before negotiations. We have had a definite assurance from the Prime Minister on the questions of Belgium, Mesopotamia, Armenia, Serbia, the Colonies, and the matter of international economic policy after the War which has been raised by Germany. This question of Alsace-Lorraine has also been raised, but that is not yet a matter for discussion in detail. Obviously a great deal will have to be said about it, and very little has been said upon the principles which will have to be applied to it, the wishes of the people who live in Alsace and Lorraine, principles which will ultimately be the guide in a decision of that kind.

The Chancellor's speech may be read, as the Prime Minister said, in different ways, but on the question of democratisation it has to be admitted that the speech was most unsatisfactory. On the question of terms it was moderate but ambiguous. The German papers are saying that we are wilfully blind to the fact that it repudiates annexation, especially for Belgium. We at all events know what we mean about Belgium. It may be that the Chancellor intended to say something definite. To my mind he did not succeed. We mean restitution and independence in every respect whatever. Until the Chancellor makes that clear we shall get no further. The air has been considerably cleared, however, by the Prime Minister's speech at Glasgow, and the question of our claim against Turkey and the question of the German colonies. The matter in which public views are still rather fluid is our claim against Austria. We had some valuable leading on this point in the Secret Session of May, but we must not publicly allude to official utterances on that occasion. We had, however, some guidance on the subject from an utterance from the Leader of the House in replying to a speech by the Member for Inverness Burghs, in which he had ardently insisted on the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Following that speech the Leader of the House, in disagreeing with the speech, said: The public did not sufficiently notice the importance of this utterance, but it apparently sufficed to create immense alarm among the apostles of the doctrine that Austria is the chief enemy. It is that doctrine which we ought very carefully to consider, because the question is still unsettled, and opinion in official quarters is markedly divided, and the whole policy and conduct of the War may be vitiated by a wrong decision. We had an interesting argument upon it from the Member for Perth a few weeks ago, and I cannot do better than regard him as its most responsible exponent. Let me examine his point. The arguments for breaking up Austria, or, as he preferred to call it, disturbing Austria, are in the main two, sentimental and practical. First, that it is our duty to allot Europe to independent national States because we are fighting for nationalities, Second, that for our own protection we ought to put a solid barrier to the Drang nach Osten, in the shape of a great South Slav State. These are very attractive ideas, and they are supported by our natural resentment, roused by the abominable atrocities committed by the Austrian troops in Serbia, and by the menace which we feel to be offered by the plans for a closely organised Mittel Europa. It is not enough to quote the historic maxim, "If Austria did not exist it would be necessary to create her."

What we have to meet is an attempt to get the Allies to make new and larger promises to Serbia. They are to drop their promise of restoration, and make it a guarantee to establish a great Imperial union of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. But let us examine these points more closely. To dispose first of the matter of atrocities, I perhaps have been in closer touch with the matter than other Members of the House, because I was with the Serbian Army Headquarters at Kraguje-vatz at the very moment when the Serbian Army, with a magnificent effort, threw back the Austrians, and when Austrian prisoners by tens of thousands were being brought in to the Serbian camps. I heard, of course, all that was being said about the atrocities, and saw the photographs and immediate proofs of them. I saw the troops who had committed these atrocities coming in as prisoners, and the extraordinary thing about that spectacle was that the prisoners, not in some cases, but in the main were South Slavs. They spoke in a language that the Serbs understood and even sang the same songs. They were, strangely enough, drawn from the very population which form the population of the great Serb State. The Serbs freely admitted that this was so, and that it was not the Magyars or Germans alone who had been guilty. What is to be drawn from that? You must make every allowance for the difficulty for any troops to disobey orders, but two things, I think, are clear. One is that the Army authorities were not afraid of employing Serbo-Croat troops against Serbia. They did not fear their sympathetic feelings. And, secondly, we must be very careful not to believe that the sentiments of the South Slavs in Austria, even the Orthodox South Slavs, are of the same stuff at all as the patriotism of the Serbs of the free kingdom which we so much admire. As to the Croats, they are severed from the Serbs even on religion, the great dividing force in the Near East. I was in Agram when the Serbian shops had just been looted by the Catholics, all down the main street.

I shall be told, as I have been told in the public Press by the Member for Perth, that I myself, in a book on the War and the Balkans, advocated profound changes in Austria and the creation of Jugoslavia. The advocacy of that plan, in the early days of the War, was part of a proposal that we should aspire at a genuinely national redistribution of the whole Balkan and Danubian area. The possibility of it depended absolutely on the feasibility of restoring to their rightful owners the non-Serbian and non-Roumanian lands to the south. It depended also on the belief that the break-up of Austria would be rapidly secured through the disaffection of the component nations in Austria and Hungary, and by the ardent efforts of Russia—accepted as the true leader of the Slavs—leading to the early downfall of what the Prime Minister then called the "Ramshackle Empire." These premises, in which I admit to have shared, have proved to be false. There is, after all—as many Russians always held—a genuine idée autrichienne, or traditional attachment to Austria, largely prevalent in the people of the Dual Empire. Again, to come to something more final still, the New Russia declines to lift a finger to break Austria up; and there is a still more final obstacle to the plan in that we have no evidence that the greatest factor of all, America, will regard the Dual Empire as ramshackle at all, or destined now and finally to disappear. Adjustments as to the Trentino, and perhaps elsewhere, are not impracticable, but the plans of the Jugo-Slavians are purely doctrinnaire, taking no account of facts.

Let me briefly indicate some other considerations that ought to govern war policy towards Austria, if we are not to treat it in a spirit of pure crusading sentimentality. The solution by autonomy or Home Rule within the Empire was advocated before the War by the most conspicuous friends of the South Slavs. They said the worst fate for the South Slavs would be to come under Serbia. It was natural that the War should change their views, but in reality the possibility of a genuine Home Rule solution is not further but nearer. We are told that the Slav nations are now all converts to independence, but where is the proof? The speeches of their representatives, when the Reichsrath met, were not those of men who represented people desiring independence. Our fire-eating Austrophobes tell us with superior wisdom that, naturally, men in fear of their lives would not advocate independence; but when they go on to say that the attitude of the Slav leaders conceals the desire for independence, the facts do not bear them out. Their speeches advocated the fulfilment of the national destiny as parts of a genuine Eastern Federated State, combining nationalism with Habsburg continuity. They pictured this hope with glowing eloquence. This tone was quite unnecessary if they were only speaking to save their lives. If their followers wanted mere independence, it would have been highly dangerous for their personal safety. There are practical grounds that we must not forget with regard to creating an obstacle to Germany and breaking the corridor. A congeries of small States like the Balkan States is not an attractive proposition. The Undersecretary will agree with me that a number of small States with sovereignty and powers, and temptations to war, is not the most suitable system that you can idealise. It has grave economic disadvantages. It admits of intrigue from the powerful States, it might even increase the opportunities of Germany, and it would lead to friction and would greatly augment the local causes of war. Again, on grounds of justice, let us also remember that the creation of a number of independent States would mean also the creation of several Ulsters strongly supported from outside and each without a guarantee against persecution. You will also have a future tending to instability which will be unavoidable if you make a number of States out of a present single State. To give nations the right to-fight each other is not really one of the essential rights of a nation. We can grant them cultural freedom, freedom to develop the realities of national life without it. The probability of improved international-machinery is again a thing that we must have in view. We talk about establishing a barrier and breaking the corridor by bringing a powerful ten million estate across the German path. A State of that kind would not be a great State, and it would be a State not even with a homogeneous population. Surely, however big you made that State it would be no use as a barrier unless it were financed and militarily germanised by great Powers outside which desired to obstruct the German plans. If it depends on that you secure that almost as well, if not quite as well, by our existing policy of restoring Serbia and Roumania. You do in that way cut the corridor, and if you are going to hold them off by military force you have the ground on which to do it. I do not know that you are really much better off in a powerful concrete military way if those States are slightly larger. Heaven help us though, if our only security in the future is to be our reliance on strategical military force of that kind. If we rely for the making of a long period of peace on some improvement in international machinery, most of the arguments used by our fire-eating Austrophobes are knocked on the head.

The fear of Panslavist ambitions on the part of Russia was the uniting force between Germany and Austria and to a very great extent that fear as a uniting force has probably gone for ever. We have the result already visible in the ferment which is going on in Austria. The attitude of the new Emperor cannot be disregarded or described as irrelevant on any account. He certainly faced the indignation of the German elements when he summoned the Reichsrath and the permission granted for the use of non-German languages for official purposes was another thing very obnoxious indeed to the German element and is proof that things are moving in the right direction. We did not, if we throw our minds back to three years ago, enter the War in order to dismember Austria. We have added on that idea because it appeared to us that the whole of Europe being in the melting-pot it was a thing that could be attained without an extension or addition to the War for the purpose of bringing it about. We thought, too hurriedly, that it was not a thing which was very costly to add to our programme, but the facts have shown that the idea of adding it to our programme was a mistaken one. It is only a few years, after all, very few, since we regarded Austria as one of the foremost friends of this country. It is literally not ten years since it was the thing for all of us to talk like that and for the Press to talk in that sense. It was not until the Bosnian affair of the spring of 1908 that public feeling and to a great extent, I suppose, official feeling—changed between this country and Austria. That is no reason why those good relations might not return. Right up to the time when we backed up Russia in the Balkan affair we regarded Austria as almost our best friend among the great Power. We became anti-Austrian on that matter at the instance of Russia. That was the Russia of the past, not the Russia of the present, or probably of the future, the new Russia with which, on practical grounds, we must be in harmony.

To summarise my arguments I would submit that the idea of destroying Austria was a delusion. The immense prolongation of the War required to carry it out might possibly be worth while if it arrived at an ideal situation and would be worth immense sacrifices if the policy were good on its merits. But what are the merits? Russia will have nothing to do with the sentimental idea of a crusade for a Serbia which shall devour Southern Austria. It is solely on the ground of self-interest that anti-Austrian policy can be upheld. But who can prove that the disappearance of Austria, even if attainable, which it probably is not, would conduce to our safety. We want to be very certain on that point before we embark on so costly an enterprise. There is no certainty at all that the gain held out to us is anything but problematical in the highest degree. The chance that the Danubian world will be anti-German is just as great, or greater perhaps, if Austria is let alone. Let us give our attention very thoroughly to this problem and see it in its true light. I think when we do examine the proposal, with which we are being bombarded by some of our more fire-eating friends in these days, in that way, we will see that it is one which is oil the practical score mistaken, and which is mistaken even as to the potential unity of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in a single State. Let us see the proposal as a pure crusade, continued in defiance of its author, Russia; a sublime dedication of vast numbers of our young men for the purpose of creating a large and quite artificial new State which might or might not be a barrier to the German corridor, and which after all might prove neither to be a barrier to Germany nor even a national unity.

I do not rise to follow the hon. Member who has made, if I may say so, such a constructive and wise contribution to the discussion of one aspect of the problem of the War and its settlement. I rise to refer in a few sentences to the most remarkable speech delivered in the early hours of this sitting by the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. Hewins). That hon. Member put to the Leader of the House certain questions with regard to the economic policy of the Allies and particularly with regard to the Paris Conference. He wished the Leader of the House to give renewed assurances that that policy was still the policy held by the Allies. I will only say with regard to his request that the economic policy as represented by the decisions of the Paris Conference was a policy which when it was first adopted was opposed by many Members of this House, and is to-day, I think, opposed both in this House and in the country by a still greater number. That, however, is a matter of argument, and is not the question I am concerned with at the moment. What I want particularly to refer to is the amazing commentary which the hon. Member made upon the present position of that policy, because he led the Committee to believe, or suggested to the Committee, that the decisions of the Paris Conference had brought the President of the United States into the War, and that that policy had the warm approval of the President of the United States. I know from experience how any reference to the President and to the Government of America are telegraphed to America, and what wide publicity they are given in the American Press. That was why I listened to observations like those with such extreme regret, because they appear to me to be very remote indeed from the truth. I for one should not like those statements to be made in. this House without contradiction. I very much regret that the hon. Member who made them is not at the present moment in his place.

I would like to put this to the Leader of the House. He has been invited again to affirm the policy of the Paris Conference, and the principle then adopted, and the resolutions then adopted on the ground, among others, that that is a policy which commends itself to the President and Government of the United States. I do not think if the Leader of the Houses rises to confirm that policy that he can do so on any such ground. I think the great majority of our country people are grateful to the President of the United States because he has set forth a constructive scheme which will not only reach to the end of the War, but which will give us permanent peace after the War. He has declared, not in vague phrases, but in definite terms, that he seeks, and his country seek, no sort of commercial or any other advantages out of the War. He has declared in equally emphatic terms, and not in vague phrases, that he desires to set up a League of Nations, out of which permanent peace will be possible for the free democracy of all countries. In doing this it stands to reason that no one is entitled to rise in this House to say that the President of the United States stands for a war, an economic war after this War —stands for the policy of the Paris Conference. I rose simply to make these comments and this protest against that speech in the hope and in the belief that my remarks can do no possible harm.

I hope my hon. Friend who has just sat down will excuse me if I turn from the very admirable remarks he has just made, and with which I entirely agree, to the most remarkable speech I have listened to for some time—I mean that of the hon. Member for Norfolk (Mr. Buxton), who make a thoroughgoing and slashing attack upon the Jugo-Slav idea. There were sitting in this House at the time various members of the Jugo-Slav party, and I naturally thought that one of them would rise to his feet. I see some of them on the Treasury Bench, but so complete and crushing was the argument of my hon. Friend that not one of them has dared to rise, and several of them, I am sorry to see, have slunk away out of the House with shame and dismay. Let me say, in congratulating my hon. Friend, that I compare his speech—one of the most remarkable speeches for diligence and thoroughness of apprehension, for bringing personal knowledge and experience to bear, and for industrious understanding of the case—with the recent speeches we have heard from the Foreign Secretary in this House. I congratulate the Foreign Secretary that he has sent the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs on this occasion to be in his place, because as we all know, and as his relative recently reminded him, the Foreign Secretary is in the habit of making speeches on those subjects to which he has only given indolent attention. I am sure he has never given thorough attention to the Jugo-Slav question, and that, therefore, he is incapable of answering my hon. Friend. We have at this time, I believe, one of the most serious and difficult questions for: the Government to face—I mean in connection with their foreign policy—and it is the question of how they really stand to the Austrian Empire and to the Balkans. We know perfectly well that a Conference upon that question is to be opened to-morrow in Paris, and I am sure, especially as I understand that Lord Hardinge is not going, that everybody will expect some successful issue from that Conference. I am very glad, indeed, also that the Foreign Secretary has not gone. My only regret is that my hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk is not sent, and if at this late hour it is possible to send a man who is thoroughly master of the questions of the Balkans let me impress upon the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and also upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that if he wants to get knowledge, wisdom, enlightenment, and common sense on the Balkan question, he cannot do better than send my hon. Friend.

Yes, gladly. I would undergo any self-denial, risk, or danger if I might only go with my hon. Friend. The matter, I say, is a very difficult and a very important one, because, as hon. Members are probably mostly aware, a most important, and I may say amazing, statement has just been put forward by the Jugo-Slavs which we received yesterday— at least a great number of Members of this House received it yesterday. I hold a copy of this in my hand, and let me call the attention of the Chancellor of the Ex- chequer to the fact that it is sent out with the names of three members of the War Cabinet upon it. Three Members of the War Cabinet have given their names to it, although I do not believe they are personally acquainted with this. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Black-friars (Mr. Barnes), the right hon. Member for Trinity College (Sir E. Carson) and Lord Milner, together with other members of the Government, have given their names to this Jugo-Slav document. Moreover it is evidently approved, and it is actually signed, by two officials of the Government. I know a great deal of folly can be done by Ministers, especially when they are overworked, but I do not think the folly of putting their names to this document can really fairly and deliberately be laid to the charge of these right hon. Gentlemen.

I do not think their personal signature has been obtained. More serious than that, however, is the fact that the document has evidently been drawn up and signed by two officials in Government offices and Government pay. I refer to Colonel John Buchan and Private Doctor Seton-Watson, officers in the Army, but taken away from the Army to serve in the secretariat of the Prime Minister. They are in a position where they have immediate and direct access to the Prime Minister without the intervention of the Foreign Office; they are working, I believe, in Downing Street, and they take the opportunity of using information which they must have had through diplomatic and special sources to bring out a document of this kind. I do not quite know whether I ought to give this document the advertisement that it deserves, but I will make one or two animadversions on it, because it shows the utter lack of control these Ministers have over one another and over their direct officials. It is, I think, perfectly intolerable that Ministers should have their names put to this document. I do not believe it personally, and yet it it definitely said that the Serbian Society of Great Britain, of the council of which these members of the Government are members and their names are sent out along with them—I do not think they are in any way responsible for this document—

No; I say I do not think their signatures were given, but the unwary and those ignorant of the laxity and lack of control that goes on in Government circles may be impressed by their names if this precious and ridiculous-document reaches them. I will refer, first of all, to the facts of the document before I refer to the policy of it. What are the facts disclosed by this document? I am never afraid of mentioning facts, and I am one of those who state that there ought to be the fullest statement of these facts in this House, but there are facts mentioned here which I will not venture to repeat even in this House. But one of them is this the extraordinary despair, disappointment, and exhaustion not only in the Serbian Army and the Serbian Government, but in the whole of the Serbian nationality, and we are told here that a possible surrender to Austria of Serbia may be considered as a near possibility. I say that is only one of the minor and less alarming facts in this document. That men in a Government office, with the object of pushing some special fad—for it is nothing else—of the Jugo-Slavs should be allowed to send out documents like this, men like Colonel John Buchan and Dr. Seton-Watson, is a perfect scandal.

Yes; but it is sent out by the score. I picked up two copies in the waste-paper basket in the House of Commons. It is sent out by the score, and even if it is confidential it is not of a confidential character compared to the importance of the effect and the seriousness of the allegations here made. There are other painful facts revealed, or, if not revealed, at any rate stated, by this document, to which I will not allude to-day. I will, however, allude now to the definite proposals which are put forward in this document, and which, remember, are the authoritative declarations of policy of the very important Jugo-Slav party. Whatever we may think of their methods, they are a very important party. They have secured, for instance, that Mrs. Pankhurst should go to Petrograd—a very great achievement, I think a very happy one for this country that she is out of the land, and a very unhappy thing for the Russians that they have to put up with her. Moreover, remember this: Why is it that at the present time the United States are not at war with Austria, nor with Bulgaria, nor with Turkey? Why? Why did the Foreign Secretary go over to America? To bring into accord, we were told, the war aims and policies of the Allies here and in the United States. The Foreign Secretary went, I understand, to try to get the United States to adhere to the Paris Conference Resolutions. Did he succeed? No. He had to come back a failure. The Foreign Secretary went in order to get the United States completely up to the hilt with us in war not only against Germany, but against Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Did he succeed? No. He has failed on these two great points, and people who go about saying in an idle sort of way that the visit of the Foreign Secretary to America was a huge success are talking about what they know absolutely nothing about.

I was with the right hon. Gentleman, and, whilst I disagree, I say his visit was a success.

Exactly. As a personal thing I admit it was a great success, and I am very glad the hon. Gentleman has given me the opportunity of saying that for bringing about an understanding and clear sympathy between the two nations it was a great success. That I do not deny for a moment, and I wish to pay my tribute to this right hon. Gentleman. But he went with a political object as well. We were told he was to bring into accord the war aims and policies of this country and the United States, and I say that on those issues the visit of the Foreign Secretary to America was a failure. I have said, I hope, enough to show from another point of view from that advocated by the hon. Member for Norfolk that the whole of this uncertainty of policy in the Government as to what their real war objectives are in the Balkans, and when they are face to face against our Austro-Hungarian enemies, is a very serious matter indeed, and it cannot be allowed to continue. I hope such speeches as we have listened to to-night from the hon. Member for Norfolk, and such a poor protest as I have made myself, may at last have some influence with the Government. The Government has, I think, so often rejected common sense and so often gone in for wild or hysterical policies that I almost despair of them. Again, to-night I appeal to them, on the ground of common sense, to let their War aims in the East of Europe not only be clearly visualised but courageously stated. I hope that even to-night the Noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs may reply to us in such a way that we may see a ray of light through the darkness, and if the Government will adopt that policy they will begin also to earn some confidence in the country.

8.0 P.M.

The Prime Minister, winding up the Debate on the Mesopotamia Commission the other day, indulged in a most passionate peroration, in which he appeared to lose control over himself entirely, and appealed to the House to draw a veil of oblivion over all these subjects and to allow the Government to go on with the War. Go on with the War! What have successive Governments been doing for the last three years but going on with the War? But if they are determined to go on with the War in the spirit of absolutely refusing to learn any lesson from the blunders and disasters—the horrible blunders which have prolonged the War for three years—then I really do not see what chance there is of their ever bringing the War to a successful conclusion. If the lessons taught by the Mesopotamia Commission and the Dardanelles Report are to be ignored and cloaked over, really I think the position of this country is a very desperate one. What security have we got when the Prime Minister makes these passionate appeals that other blunders will not be committed in the future, quite as bad as Mesopotamia or the Dardanelles, and what security have we that similar blunders are not being committed at this present moment? I am convinced, from information which has reached me, that if there was a Commission appointed tomorrow to inquire into the campaign in Syria or the campaign—I will not call it a campaign, but the position—at Salonika the revelations would be very nearly if not quite as shocking as the revelations in regard to Mesopotamia or the Dardanelles. Therefore I say that for Ministers to get up and endeavour to burke or cloak over discussion by any of these passionate appeals to allow them to go on with the War is, in my opinion, a stupid policy, and a policy likely to end in disaster.

The question which has been raised just now, as I understand, is the question of the position of the Balkans, and surely the House is entitled to have some statement from the Government on the occasion of this enormous Vote of Credit as to what is the position and what is the policy of the Government in the Balkans. To-night we have listened to the Chancellor of the Exchequer introducing this enormous Vote of Credit—the largest ever asked for in the course of the War—and not one single word did he give indicating either the policy of the Government on any of the fronts of the War or the military position of the War. That is a departure which I think is to be condemned. In the earlier days of this War it was the custom of the late Prime Minister, who used to introduce the Votes of Credit, always to commence by giving a general survey of the military position on the various fronts. That has now been dropped. I think it is a most unfortunate change, and really to listen to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to-day, but for the horrible and appalling figures of expenditure, one would have supposed that we were at peace, or, at any rate, that the progress of the War had no interest for the public of this country. But it is certainly opportune and right that in this discussion to-night the question of the policy which we are committed to or intend to pursue in the future in the Balkans should be raised, and if for no other reason than that. I understand to-morrow, in Paris, there is to be an all-important Conference to decide this very question. I think it is really intolerable— at least but for recent experiences I should have imagined it was intolerable —for the House to be left in the Stygian darkness in which we live as to the policy and ideas of the Government in what I consider to be the supreme theatre of the War.

We know perfectly well that for three years a bitter contest has been going on behind the scenes between the military experts of this country on one side, and what are described in these modern days with contempt as politicians on the other. All Ministers, I suppose, are politicians; at least they used to be and were not ashamed of the name, but now the name is a bogey. That is a matter of notoriety. You have had for the last two years the controlling forces of this country divided into two camps. You have had what is called the Eastern school and the Western school, and the military experts of the General Staff have all along been attached to the Western school, which, as I understand it, holds the view that all the resources of this country ought to be piled on the Western Front in France, and that all other expeditions or fronts in the War are side-shows which ought to be either completely abandoned or, at all events, starved out, including the Salonika Expedition. This quarrel has been going on a very long time to my knowledge, and I should say, from all we are allowed to know—which is very little—that the Western School has now completely triumphed and that Salonika and the Balkans are practically thrown overboard. In my opinion that policy has been in the past fertile of disaster. I am convinced, although I do not pretend for a single moment to be a military expert, that the policy of what is known as the Western School is built up on a total misconception of the real aims of Germany in this War.

The main aim of Germany in this War has been to obtain control of the Balkans and Asia Minor, and if, as now appears to be likely, peace will come by some negotiated arrangement, even supposing that arrangement were to carry with it the complete restoration of Belgium, and even, I go further and say, supposing that arrangement were to carry with it the complete restoration of Belgium, combined with a certain indemnity for the horrible losses and cruelties that have been inflicted upon her—and even if furthermore there were to be made some concession to France in the shape of what is talked of and rumoured as being in the minds of Germany, namely, some portion of Lorraine restored to France—so long as Germany controls the Balkans and has the railway to Constantinople open and her access to Asia Minor she will have won this War and attained the real object she had in mind all the time; and we, by abandoning as we have for two years the Balkan campaign, have, to my mind, played the game of Germany and prolonged the War. I heard my Friend the Member for Somerset (Mr. King) just now pouring out contempt on a certain document which he said he has fished out of the waste-paper basket. I think it is perfectly ludicrous to treat that document as confidential, and I challenge the statement that the signatures to that document are not to be taken as, bonâ fide. I say they are bonâ fide. I say that every man who allowed that document to go out with his approval, and remained a member of the Committee which issued it, is responsible for that document, and I do not see how he can get away from this responsibility.

Then are we to be told that this is the condition of things now, that members of the Government belong to Committees and do not take the trouble to know what those Committees are doing? I say they are responsible so long as they belong to those Committees, and I say it is a cowardly thing to run away from that responsibility. This document undoubtedly is a very important State document, an all-important State document. For my own part, although I do not belong to the Committee at all, I agree with every word in it. I think it is a most powerful State document, and I say it is all the more important because it is endorsed by members of the Government and by officials who are in what is known as the Garden Party, which is in some respects, I believe, more important than many members of the Government. The Garden Party is over the Foreign Office, and the Foreign Office itself is not as important as the Garden Party, which is in close touch with the War Cabinet to which the Foreign Office now, under the extraordinary administration under which we live, is not admitted. For all I know, or any Member of the House knows, the Foreign Office can only approach the Cabinet through the Garden Party. Here you have this document giving the views of the Garden Party and some members of the Government itself, and it is circulated throughout this House. I find no fault with it. It is a vitally important document, and it is perfectly idle to imagine that members of the Government can shirk their responsibility if they allow documents to be circulated broadcast with their names appended and say they know nothing at all about it. Surely if they remain members of Committees they are bound to know what documents those Committees are issuing, and I say this is a matter of extreme importance.

What is it that document deals with? It deals with the position of the Balkans. In my opinion it is one of the most important documents issued during the whole course of the War. What does it amount to? It says that the Serbian Army is exhausted. There were 320,000 men surviving when the Serbians were mobilised to resist Austria and when we ought to have been at her side, and would have been at her side and captured the whole of the Balkans if it had not been for the Western School. They had 320,000 of the best mountain fighters the world has ever seen, and they hurled back the armies of Austria until we allowed them to be attacked in the rear by the Bulgarians, although our enlightened Foreign Office— with its indispensable Permanent Official at its head—five weeks before the Bulgarians attacked Serbia in the rear had said they would answer for Bulgaria, and that there would be no danger whatever from Bulgaria. And when the Serbians were willing to march to Sofia before the Bulgarian Army could be mobilised our Foreign Office forbade them, and said they would answer for Bulgaria. Serbia mobilised 320,000 of the finest troops in Europe, and they were attacked by Austria and Germany on the north and by the Bulgarians in the rear, and were surrounded by 750,000 men. Then began that awful retreat into Albania, one of the most tragic things that has occurred throughout the whole history of this War, and of which we have heard so little. This magnificent Army of Serbia emerged, a ragged, starved, tattered mob, on the shores of the Adriatic, after passing through these terrible mountains under circumstances of hardship such as perhaps no army ever faced in the history of the world. They were taken on board our ships and the Italian ships of war and brought to Corfu—these 40,000 survivors out of 320,000 troops. They were re-clothed, rearmed, and—unparalleled in military annals—they were ready to fight again in a comparatively short space of time. They were brought by sea to Salonika. Our honour was pledged that we would never desert them, that we would see them back into their own country, victors and independent once more. We brought those 40,000 survivors to Salonika, and then we brought them to Monastir. It was they who captured Monastir, they who did nearly all the fighting which has been done in the Balkans—that is to say, on that front—the only real fighting which has been done. They fought and captured Monastir. Of the 40,000, 20,000 survived. It is from these 20,000 that this appeal has come. Are we going to fail and to desert them?

I say that this is, in my opinion, the greatest crisis in the history of the War. They charge against us that they could have taken Uskub and have cut the Balkan railway to Constantinople if the French and English troops had only backed them up after they took Monastir. When they had done the fighting and sacrificed 50 per cent. of their effectives in these battles we retired and left them alone, our troops all the time being tied up in the swamps around Salonika. When at last a favourable turn took place in affairs of Greece, after years, and we took possession of the port of Volo—which, I believe, was the main base for German submarines to cut our communications to Salonika, and, no doubt, to try to sink our transports and our ships—after we had done all this we have retired from Thessaly and are back again in the swamps There is our Army of 150,000 strong, or more, condemned for two years to squat in those swamps around Salonika, face to face with the mountains, pretending —it is a public farce to pretend in this way—pretending from time to time to make attacks on those mountains which everybody who knows that country has told us are absolutely unassailable. The road is open. The Serbians know it. That is to say, the road by which any real advance can be made from Monastir to Uskub, the same road by which the Germans came down to attack. The Serbians know it, and were prepared to lead the way. But our gentlemen here in London, who belong to what is known as the "Western School," would not allow anyone to go out of Salonika. What has been the result? According to information which has reached me, our Army in Salonika is thoroughly demoralised. Why keep an army at Salonika at all? Why keep 150,000 men there if they are not going out to fight there? Everyone knows that if you keep an army encamped in an unhealthy place, and do not allow them to fight for a year or two, they become wholly demoralised. That is what has happened. Let me read to the House a message I got three or four days ago. I have no doubt that it is true; at all events, I should like to hear from anyone on the Government side who is prepared to deny it. This person writes to me to say: inevitable result of demoralisation. I am told by friends that every soldier, officer or man, implores his commanding officer not to be sent out to Salonika—anywhere but there. That is very characteristic, because so far as fighting goes it is the quietest front that can be selected. But it is a pest place. The average British soldier does not want to go anywhere where there is no fighting, and the place is intolerable.

What happened last year? We had about 150,000 men at Salonika. There was, practically speaking, no fighting, but 60,000 men were down with dysentery and malaria, and a great deal of our tonnage was taken up in transporting these men to Malta and elsewhere to recover. I want to know from the Government to-day, are they still going to keep the House of Commons in the dark on this matter? Over and over again since last November I have endeavoured to raise this question in the House. My contention has been that the House of Commons is entitled to know what is the policy to be pursued. I do not want to know military secrets. I want information on the question of general policy in the Balkans. We are entitled to know that. We are entitled to debate it. What has been the course of the whole Balkan campaign? I have given the history of our relations with Serbia. I say that this document, which has been found fault with just now, is, in my opinion, one of the most momentous documents which has ever been published in the course of the War. It is endorsed by members of the Government, members of this Government, and by officials who from their position have full access to private information that the Governments possess. It amounts to this—that we are on the eve of a tremendous catastrophe. That is not exaggerated language. I understand that the Serbians have already been approached by Austria to make a separate peace. If the Serbians make peace with Austria, where are we? I say that the War is lost. The purpose for which we went into the War has gone. If the Serbians make peace with Austria then our position before the world is ruined. We shall be held to have deserted the Serbians, and the Balkans are irretrievably lost! With the Serbians gone, and the Balkans gone, there is no use in wasting our troops out there. We shall have to accept the position in the Balkans, and that will be our loyalty to Serbia!

We are entitled to know about this. We are entitled to know from the Government whether we are going to desert the Serbians finally or not—and the Serbians are entitled to know. They have suffered as no other nation has suffered in this War. They have suffered far more than Belgium, of which we have heard so much. They have fought better, far better, than any other nation. They are the manhood of Serbia, and are nearly all the manhood left. Who can blame them if, seeing themselves deserted by this great country and by the French, they say: "Very well, we have given good evidence that we have fought well and for honour, and we now intend to give in." The Austrians have already approached them, according to this communication—I do not pretend to know anything about it—with offers to make peace, and it is not only a question of Serbia. My contention has always been that, even supposing the Government were determined to stick to the Western Front and to France—a policy which always appeared to me to be insane —although I should be the last person in the world to be too definite, as not possessing military knowledge—though I know that a great many of His Majesty's Ministers agree with me strongly—Supposing that view had prevailed, would it not have been common sense two years ago to have made up your mind on the question and to have shaped your policy accordingly. Of course, the common sense policy, as anybody who has no military knowledge at all can see, was that if you were determined to abandon the Balkan campaign, you ought to have abandoned Salonika long ago, and saved millions of tonnage and all the sacrifice of men's lives.

Let us look for a moment at other aspects of the Balkan campaign. Look at Roumania. How did we treat Rou-mania? I raised this question of Rou-mania in the month of November last, when the late Prime Minister was moving a Vote of Credit, and I appealed to him to let us know where we stood on the Roumanian question. Of course, I could get nothing out of the Government, but I was attacked immediately in the Press by the Gentlemen who really rule this country—the military correspondent of the "Times" and the Harmsworth Press, and they attacked me for raising this question at all. They said the Roumanian campaign was going on splendidly, and that I took a most ridiculous view of the danger of Roumania. I have no pretence to military knowledge and I never pretended to have, but from private information, from thoroughly well-informed sources, I drew a picture of the dangers of Roumania, and I said that, from all I could hear, we had treated Roumania badly, and had failed to come to her assistance when we had undertaken to do so. I did not speak without some ground. I had very good information as to the facts. Was there ever any statement in this House more completely justified? It was pooh poohed in the Debate, and, as I say, the great Colonel Repington, the military correspondent of the "Times," wrote a special letter to the "Times" to say that my statement was preposterous, and that the Roumanian campaign was going on splendidly. At that time the Roumanians were across the border in Transylvania

What has happened? It has now been proved, in spite of what the Under Secretary, the Noble Lord, said the other day, that we did treat the Roumanians very badly indeed—how badly I cannot undertake to say, but it is clear that we treated them very badly. What happened was this: Roumania, although always friendly to the Allies, was afraid—and naturally afraid—to come into the War, having the fate of Belgium and the fate of Serbia before her, and she hung back, claiming that certain undertakings should be given by Russia and this country before she ventured to commit herself to War. Suddenly the Russians delivered some form of ultimatum, which has been published in the German Reichstag, and never contradicted, saying that if she did not declare war before a certain date they would cross her frontiers, and, accordingly, Roumania appealed to us to give her certain undertakings as regards our assistance by an advance in Salonika, which would hold up the Bulgarians. I cannot think there is the slightest doubt that the whole Roumanian campaign was based on the mistaken idea that they were safe from the attack of Bulgaria, otherwise no one but a lunatic would have opened the campaign by crossing into Transylvania. They were under the impression that the Bulgarians would be held up, and that they were safe on that front. It was in connection with that that the famous letter, which I was accused by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of having stolen off a German submarine, but which was in reality published all over the world before I read it to the House, comes in, and the permanent head of the British Foreign Office was convicted of writing a letter to our Ambassador at Petrograd at this critical moment, a few days before Roumania declared war, speaking in the most offensive terms of M. Bratiano, saying that he was "an elusive fellow," and was holding out and demanding certain guarantees from this country. Whether those guarantees were ever given or not, we do not yet know, but I can say this, that M. Bratiano showed his wisdom and statesmanship in holding out, and he was forced in by the action of Stuermer, one of the blackest traitors who ever disgraced humanity, and who, I am glad, is now in gaol.

While speaking about Lord Hardinge and the Foreign Office the other day I did not say, as the Foreign Secretary endeavoured to misrepresent me as having said, that I charged Lord Hardinge and the British Foreign Office of being consciously in conspiracy with Stuermer in his infamous action. I said nothing of the kind. I said I believed they were Stuermer's unconscious tool. There was no truth about it at all. What a state of things the Foreign Office is in! Although to my own knowledge they were warned more than once by men thoroughly well acquainted with the international politics of Europe of the character of this man Stuermer and his confederates around the Tsar, they pooh-poohed the thing, and would not listen to the warnings offered. That I know to my own knowledge, without fear that it can be successfully contradicted. The Foreign Office in this country said that anything casting reflection on the Tsar or his ministers was out of the question, and in consequence they, in blind ignorance, were used as the tools of Stuermer and those corrupt treacherous men who were more or less in the pay—I believe actually in the pay—of the German Emperor. Unfortunate Roumania, with her magnificent army, which, if properly used at the right moment, could have turned the whole fortunes of the War, suffered a great disaster at a critical hour, and Germany was given a vast field for her food supply in the harvest of Roumania which she is now reaping, and a supply of oil which was one of the things she most desperately needed at that moment. That was done, as we are now told—this I cannot say as an absolute fact, but I have heard it stated—at the time Stuermer had a secret undertaking with the German Emperor that he would drive Roumania into the War, would cut off her resources, and, after she was conquered, he and the German Emperor would make peace and would divide Roumania between them. And is it not a fact that the guns which were sent to Roumania were held up by the Russians? I believe that to be an undeniable fact, and one of the unfortunate reasons Roumania was crushed so completely, so that when the Germans got their reinforcements down there were no guns competent to deal with the German guns, although we had sent a very full outfit of heavy artillery to the Roumanians.

Those are terrible things, and it is idle for the Prime Minister, in face of all those facts, to cry out, "Let us go on with the War," as if going on with the War is all that has to be considered, and this House of Commons is not to take into account at all how we go on with the War. Has the House of Commons ever realised the fact that we may go on with the War, and if we go on in the way we have gone, we may go on till we are badly beaten? Is that not a possible result? [An HON. MEMBER: "NO!"] I hope and pray it may not be, but I fear if we go blundering along in the way we have been blundering, it is a possibility, and, in any case, is it not intolerable that a Minister should stand up in this House and talk about the loss, as he himself said, of tens of thousands of human lives in indescribable agony? We must not think of them at all! We must go on with the War, no matter how many people died in indescribable agony, which might have been prevented. That is not the way I understand going on with the War, and I think we are entitled to ask what is the policy and what is our aim and object in the Balkans. Are we going to keep an army there to perish from disease and demoralisation without allowing it to fight? Do we mean to stand by the Serbian nation and continue the Balkan campaign as a reality? What about Greece? I have on innumerable occasions attacked the late King of Greece, because I believed he was traitorous to his people, and I remember that I was contradicted when I said that the majority of the Greek people were with M. Venizelos. I would not have attacked the King had I not been convinced that the Greek nation was with us, and I was convinced of this fact by the verdict of the election. It is perfectly clear that the majority of the Greek nation are with M. Venizelos now that the German subsidised conspiracy has been removed. With regard to the King of Greece, I only wish the job had been done completely instead of allowing his present successor to remain.

I was talking the other day to a man who has lived a long time in Greece and who knows the country well, and he defended the King of Greece warmly. All my life I have made a point of hearing both sides of a case, and what did this man tell me? He said that the King of Greece twice offered his whole army to this country, and that is true. If we had taken that offer, or if we had been free to take it, we should have long ago been in Constantinople, and the War would have been over. It was refused, I believe, owing to Italy and Russia. This gentleman told me that the reason why the King of Greece carried on as he has done is because he believes that the English will desert him, and that his country will be wiped out at the end of the War. I want to know, are we going to desert Greece? If we desert the Serbians our position is absolutely hopeless, and I have not the slightest doubt that the German Army will be sent to wipe out Greece. This is the turning point in the War. I believe the War could have been settled, and will ultimately have to be settled in the Balkans. We have come before the world as a champion of small nations, but where have we vindicated that title? Certainly not in Ireland, and if it goes forth that every small nation that has taken our side has been defeated and destroyed by our enemies our position will be hopeless.

On a point of Order. May I ask, Mr. Speaker, if other speeches are made upon foreign policy, will there be anybody present to answer them?

The House has listened to some very interesting and well-informed speeches, and I hope the Committee will not think I am guilty of any disrespect if I try and compress my observations as far as possible, because I think every hon. Member will realise that there are many considerations which have very properly been touched upon, in regard to which it would be impossible for me to express my full view without committing the Govern- ment more than I am entitled to do. The speech of the hon. Member for East Mayo (Mr. Dillon) I think was more remarkable for the attacks which he levelled at this country and at the successive Governments of this country than for any other particular characteristic. The House is accustomed to that peculiarity in the hon. Member's speeches, and I do not remember any single instance in which this country has engaged with any other country in controversy in which the hon. Member did not take advantage of that opportunity of rising in his place to say how much this country was in the wrong.

Does the right hon. Gentleman mean to insinuate that I got up to say that Germany was right?

Whatever relation this country has with any other country, the hon. Member is always to be found arguing that this country is wrong. The hon. Member described us as having deserted and deceived Serbia and as having basely treated Roumania. He did not confine his observations to the present Government or the late Government, but he embraced both in his denunciation. That contribution is the hon. Member's idea of assisting in this crisis to bring this country to a successful conclusion of the War. The hon. Member made a great deal of reference to a particular document, which I understand was sent to a number of hon. Members of the House this morning or yesterday. It was not sent to me, and I never saw it until I came into this House. I have not had an opportunity of reading it carefully, although I have glanced through it. I understand that it was sent with a leaflet on which was printed the names of the Council of the Serbian Society of Great Britain. I noticed the names of a number of persons as members of that Council including my right hon. Friend the Member for Trinity College (Sir E. Carson), my right hon. Friend the Minister of Pensions (Mr. Barnes), and Lord Milner. Obviously, I have not been able to communicate with all those Gentlemen as to their responsibility for this document, but I think it right to say that I have been able to communicate with Lord Milner and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Trinity College, and they both assure me that they never saw or heard of the document until it was issued. Characteristically the hon. Member for East Mayo said that since these Gentlemen remained members of the Committee, they are responsible for everything the Committee does. As a matter of fact, I do not know from whom this document emanated. I do not know whether it was drawn up by the Committee or the Council or by any members of it. I certainly altogether repudiate the doctrine that for every single thing that any Society does, all the members of it are responsible. I do not know whether the hon. Member for East Mayo, looking back upon the history of some of the societies of which he has been a member, would altogether like that conclusion to be drawn. I certainly should not, looking back upon the history of some of the societies of which I have been a member. The hon. Member made certain strong accusations as to the demoralisation of the troops at Salonika.

Will the right hon. Gentleman refer to the position which Colonel Buchan and Dr. Seton Watson occupy, because that is very important?

I have told the House all that I know about it. I am sorry, owing to the circumstances to which I have already alluded, that I am not able to give any more information upon the subject than I have given. The hon. Member made certain charges against the morale of the troops at Salonika. I very much regret that no information was conveyed to any member of the Government that such an attack was going to be made, because it is evident that a charge of that kind will be very hotly and properly resented by the troops in question, who will regard it as a very gross insult.

The hon. Member has peculiar ideas on this subject, but I do know enough to say that I believe it to be utterly untrue that the force has become completely demoralised. Of course, I cannot deal with that statement, harsh and unjust as I believe it to be, in the way that it ought to be dealt with by those who are fully conversant with all the facts of the case. The hon. Member made a variety of other statements about the Foreign Office. They were all attacks. That is unfortunate, but I must put up with that. He made one statement, however, and I should be very glad if at some time or other he would furnish me with the grounds upon which it was made. He said that the Foreign Office told the Serbians that they would answer for the Bulgarians. I am not aware of the authority on which that is based. The date of which he is speaking is now nearly two years ago, and I cannot charge my memory with everything that was said, but I do not recollect anything which would bear out any such statement, and I believe it to be altogether untrue. With all his eloquent praise of the Serbian courage, of the Serbian devotion to their own country, of the magnificent way in which they fought in the early parts of the War, and also in the later parts of the War—with all that, admirably said. I am, and I am sure every colleague of mine, is in the heartiest possible agreement.

I do, I confess, resent the suggestion that we are about to abandon Serbia. The Government, and each Government in turn, have given the most absolute pledges that they will stand by Serbia as they will stand by all their Allies, and, unless anyone who really honestly and genuinely wishes for the success of this country in the War has real solid ground for it, I do not think a charge of that kind ought to be made in public. Certainly it is absolutely and totally untrue. There is no intention whatever of receding from the pledges which the Government have always given, namely, full restoration and reparation for Serbia, and I trust, whatever is reported of this Debate, that declaration at any rate will receive full publicity.

The hon. Member accuses the Government of keeping the House in the dark. He had a long passage about what he called the "Western School" and the "Eastern School," and the necessity of bringing the War to an end by fighting in the Balkans, and not concentrating our efforts in the West. I am not going to follow him an inch on that ground. It has nothing to do with diplomacy. It is pure military policy, and I am certainly not going to say anything in this House which by any possibility can give any indication of what are the military plans of this Government or of the country. The hon. Member said that he did not ask for any military secrets. He must be perfectly well aware that if any hon. Member of the Government were to say, supposing he were foolish enough, that the Government did not believe in the Western School, or that the Government did not believe in the Eastern School, that itself would be a direct warning to the enemy that they could afford to neglect that part of the field of war, and remove their troops in order to face this country in the other part of the field. I am astonished that even the hon. Member, who avowed at once that he knew nothing whatever about military affairs, should have asked for information on such a point.

If I am asked, as I was by the hon. Member for Norfolk (Mr. Noel Buxton) and others, what are the broad aims of the Government and the objects for which we are fighting—the War aims of the Government—then I quite admit that it is easy for me, and I will with pleasure go into them with the fullest details that I can give. In the first place, let me say at once that I find myself in agreement with the hon. Member when he says that Austria is not our chief enemy. That is a mere platitude. Germany is and must be our chief enemy. She is the front and the source and the inspiration of those who are fighting against us in this War. As for our broad principles, I venture to think they are three. In spite of the hon. Member for Mayo, our first principle is to stand by our Allies. Something was said by two speakers about Alsace-Lorraine. As far as that goes, it will be for the French to say what they desire there, and for this country to back up the French in what they desire.

I will not go through all the others of our Allies—there are a good many of them—but the principle will be equally true in the case of all, and particularly in the case of Serbia. We are absolutely pledged, as I have already said, to full restoration and reparation. When the hon. Member goes on to discuss how far we accept the doctrine of the Jugo-Slay movement, I admit that is a point on which it is dangerous to go further, as I think, than the position we occupied when the Government made their reply to Mr. Wilson's Note. They then said that they were there to liberate Slav nationalities, among others, who were oppressed and dominated by other races from whom they desired to be free. We did not go any further than that. We did not pledge ourselves to the particular form of liberation which we should advocate at the Peace Conference when it came off. I am certainly not in a position to go further than the Government went in that considered utterance which they then made. But I do say this, that the second principle for which we are fighting is a stable settlement. As it has often been put, we are fighting for peace. We want a sound and satisfactory peace, resting not on conquest or mere domination, but resting on some natural principle, as far as may be, which will secure that settlement, when it is arrived at, as far as any settlement can be secure from change or alteration in the future. We want a satisfactory and stable peace, and we then want—at least I want tremendously, and in this matter I speak for myself—to see how far those proposals, to which President Wilson has given expression, for barriers to be erected against future wars are capable of being carried into actual effect in the Treaty of Peace.

I do not necessarily mean the League of Nations and all that group of ideas and proposals that have been made. The third great object for which we are fighting is one which is often described as the "destruction of German militarism." It is really only part of the second object. We desire the destruction of German militarism, because it is to us the great danger to the future peace of Europe. Some hon. Members have referred to the speech of the new German Chancellor. I am not going to refer to that in detail, but the Committee will reflect that two feaures of it stand out. In the first place, he demands a victorious peace for Germany, and, in the second place, he rejects all real democratic power in the German constitution. Those seem to me, I must say, extremely ominous features of that utterance. The Prime Minister said eloquently the other day—I forget the exact phrase, but it was something to this effect—that it would be easier to make peace with a democratic Germany. I respectfully entirely agree, not from any doctrinaire preference for democracy over other forms of government, not because—although I think it might be maintained as well—such a government is a better and a sounder form of government than other forms of government which could be devised, but because I do believe that, if there had been a democracy in Germany this War would not have taken place, and because I do believe that if you had a really democratic Government established in Germany—established really and genuinely and securely, not a mere pretence of a democratic Government but a real democratic Government—that would be in itself a strong guarantee that German policy had definitely changed, and that the dangers we should have to fear in the future from that country would be proportionately decreased.

9.0 P.M.

I would ask hon. Members who have listened to the speech of the Noble Lord whether there was anything in that speech which gave them confidence that the affairs of the nation could be safely reposed in the representatives of the Foreign Office? In place of striking out a great policy such as would appeal to the imagination of all the Allies and win their enthusiasm, the Noble Lord seems to have found his chief strength in the power of gibes and flouts and sneers which has descended to him, although, as often in accordance with hereditary descent, in a degenerated form. The virus has become attenuated. The whole of his reply consisted of the usual game of the great arsenal of the Government Parliamentary tricks, strategems, Machiavelian dodges, never once the faculty impressed upon our minds of looking a problem squarely and fairly in its own character, and, from that study, evolving a valid plan which, if carried out point by point, would carry the earnest of victory. In speaking in that manner the Noble Lord has simply been characteristic of the rest of the Government.

Some two years ago I had occasion to speak from this seat, and I uttered a remark which produced scorn, particularly from the front benches, namely, that again and again we should be forced to come down to this House and listen to demands for colossal sums of money, and that with each repetition the whole political and military situation would be pretty much what it was at that moment. Those remarks were treated with the most flouts, gibes, and sneers, but they have become verified up to the hilt in the intervening time. I should like to ask the members of the Government who are responsible how often will this demand for hundreds of millions be repeated? Is there one man who can say that on any plan now being worked out this War will end this year? Is there any man who will get up and say that this War will end next year? Is there any man who can fix any limit of time to any possible victory upon any plans which are now formulated and being pushed to a legitimate conclusion on the part of the Government? No! They have no plans. In place of a well-considered, coherent, coordinated plan, we have the policy of drift, drift, drift. Nations before have drifted to defeat. The shores of the world are strewn with the wreckage of nations led by men without faith and insight. I would ask where, in the history of the world, can you point to one single example of a nation which has drifted to victory? Let us look for a moment at the question of Salonika. If the Salonikan expedition is useless, why continue it? Why make of that expedition what it is currently reported the Germans call it—their greatest internment camp in Europe? Why fritter away the enormous resources which have been expended on it in sheer futility? Why literally waste the lives of hundreds of thousands of brave men simply to cover up a bad Parliamentary situation? If, on the other hand, that expedition be necessary, why not make it valid and real, why not make it show its necessity in results, why not strengthen it even at enormous cost of the vast reserves of all the Allies? Instead of leaving there in a precarious situation somewhat less than 300,000 men, why not work out a plan, even if it took two years to execute, which would throw 2,000,000 new troops on the Danube? That might be a valid plan, a plan worth carrying out even if it drew on the resources of this country and of the Allies to their very foundations. That might possibly be an avenue of victory. But the Government is in this position, that it has no plan. It dare not say the Salonika Expedition is useless. It dares not say the Salonika Expedition is valid and must be pushed to a conclusion. It refuses, in this as in other matters, to face the issue at all, and drifts and drifts and drifts. Again I ask, has a nation ever drifted to victory?

Consider, on the other hand, the Western Front. There, again, so long ago that it seems like ancient history, I said that the Western Front, according to present plans, according to plans within the scope of the commanders of the Armies there, is impregnable, and that again and again British soldiers in tens or hundreds of thousands would be dashed against the wall. They would sacrifice their lives in glorious heroism, but the result would be disaster or futility, and the generals, who have no better conception of victory than following in an imitative way the school of the less inspired German commanders, so far from being brought to book, would have all their failures covered up, even by a shower of titular honours. Months ago I asked for the recall of General Haig. That shocked the House, just as it shocked the House when I asked for the recall of General French. He was recalled a fortnight afterwards. Would any man replace him in his position of power? Yet was not every argument which was then used to defend General French the same as those now used in repetition to cover up the failures of General Haig? I never at any time said that General Haig was not a great general. He may be a compound, as I have heard him described by a young officer, of Marlborough, of Wellington, and of Napoleon. That may be so, but I judge by results, and even if he be that happy compound his results have all been negative. That kind of leader cannot win the War.

Take it even on his own showing. Take it on his own bulletins. He has had all this year to prepare for a great forward movement against the Germans. The year is waning. No resources have been spared to him. He has been lavishly supplied with all he has demanded in munitions and men. He has hurled them against the defences of the Germans. He has lost tens of thousands of lives. Has the military situation changed by one iota? The military situation has changed if the mere conquest of ten, twelve, or twenty miles, or any amount of territory be of any advantage. I mean, have the essential elements of that problem, as a great military problem, been changed to any degree whatever by the operations of the present year? No. Further, if you take one year to gain twelve miles of territory, remembering also that the great material defences of Germany increase in magnitude with the Eastern move, I would ask you as men of common sense, not neces- sarily strategists at all, how long will it take you even at the highest rate these commanders claim, to march through Belgium or to cross the Rhine? You cannot beat Germany unless you march through Belgium or cross the Rhine. In these victories which have been reported in the papers, and which at any rate have had this element, that they have all been signalised by the most heroic courage of British soldiers, in these great victories of which we read almost every day in our newspapers in the morning, we have seen names of towns in France almost unheard of before which have risen like great mountain peaks in this onward march, names like Bapaume and Peronne, and now Lens, stand out like the rock of Gibraltar. Not many people had heard much of Lens before the War, but after Lens we have Lille, and after Lille Antwerp, and "Alps upon Alps arise."

I ask you to take this matter to your thoughts in the sincerest and deepest way, and ask yourselves in all honesty, can you believe that at this rate of progress this War can end this year, or next year, or in five years? If we have Generals whose highest feat of generalship can have reached this acme, we are bound to ask ourselves, "Have we no other resources?" We hear again and again the question, "What men could be put in their place?" That is always a most ridiculous argument. That was an argument used to keep down Napoleon Bonaparte himself, and I have no doubt that in our Army to-day, or in the armies of the Allies, we may have a Bonaparte, or men of that breed. We may have many a Marlborough, but what chance have any of these men of rising? The only way in which a man of that kind can distinguish himself is by the certain elasticity of mind and boldness of conception, which evidences originality. But with stereotyped generals, trained in a bad school, that very originality would be noted as a bad mark, and minds of that type would be discouraged. I do not say these men have not done their best, but their best is not good enough. We cannot win with these generals, and we must find other resources. So much for the Western Front.

The Salonika Front has been practically abandoned; not frankly and in an honest way, but left derelict to cover up a bad Parliamentary situation. Remember that those men are left as a sacrifice to a great powerful move of the enemy, who hold that in readiness whenever they care to launch it; and if ever the Germans take Salonika and overrun Greece they have the Mediterranean at their mercy, and then they can give the fullest play to that great weapon on which they are beginning to base their hopes of final victory; then will be an enormous development of the submarine campaign. The Mediterranean would be closed. The access to Egypt would be closed. The access to the whole of the East would be open to the Germans. Have the War Cabinet ever considered these matters? Do they ever free their mind from that plague of intrigue of the petty little Machiavellian of politics? Is there one man who ever rises to the height of great conceptions as homely, homespun Abraham Lincoln would have done, and in sheer honesty declared to his colleagues, "We must face realities; we must look at this great and multiplex problem, seeing all things in true proportion and perspective. We must seize the essentials; we must lay down great guiding lines; we must arrive at the plan that contains victory; we must lay it down boldly and carry it resolutely through, step by step, by great engineers of victory until we secure a final triumph." No, there is no such man, and you know it. What again has hampered this policy in the Balkans? I will tell you. A fatal inspiration partly evolved from the finesse of party diplomacy, but arising partly in sheer cowardice, of which the outcome is this—we can detach Austria and her alliance, we can win over Bulgaria yet, and the price that we will pay for the co-operation of those countries on which we base our hopes of victory and will build our future policy will be the sacrifice of Serbia! If the country followed that policy, which I declare is the policy of at least one man in the War Cabinet, it will not stave off final ruin, but it will add to that ruin a disgrace that will ring throughout history. I believe, although I am not one to flatter the English nation, that that policy is un-English and does not respond to the best instincts of the English people; because, whatever be its faults, one great quality which has carried this nation through many difficult tasks has been staunchness, tenacity of purpose. The people are surely not going to yield to the lure of this wicked, un-English, Machiavelian diplomacy. The Government will never succeed in that line, but if they attempt it they will cover themselves with infamy

Look at Russia for a moment. Russia meant a hundred million, amongst them the finest soldiers in the world, and also perhaps the best military brains. That enormous assistance is slipping away, partly through circumstances over which this country has no control, and partly through circumstances within the control of the Government of this country. When the first mutterings of the Russian revolution were heard, instead of meeting the situation, and instead of having the insight to see the universal sweep of things coming in Russia, inspiring the young minds of Russia with a new hope, an extraordinary Ambassador was sent to Petrograd to try to stem back that movement, to try to buttress up the tottering throne of the Tsar, and to identify this country with that wicked policy which would have terminated in a betrayal of the Allies by the reactionary Government. When the Revolution had come, and all Russia and all Europe were ablaze with the new hope of the Republic, this Government by every act showed itself out of sympathy with that forward movement. And in every critical condition, as, for instance, in that over the settlement of Greece, they showed an inevitable leaning towards a reactionary policy. A reactionary policy might have found justification at the time of the late Tsar, when Russia was thought to be the great factor in the final triumph; but when Russia has become a Republic, and when a new ally, the great Republic of America has come in, and with France a Republic, what is the use of clinging to these old shams of mediævalism and throwing away perhaps the prospects of victory in order to bolster up this played-out tradition? That has been the policy which has hampered the diplomacy in Greece, and that diplomacy in Greece has hampered the military action in the Balkans. What other explanation is available?

Finally, after two years of negotiations, we have reached this brilliant feat of super-statesmanship, that after they have been fooled and baffled by Constantine during that period, to the very grievous detriment of vital national interests, they can arrive at nothing better than to put up his son, a nephew of the Kaiser, to be the instrument to carry out their policy. In the whole history of diplomacy was there ever any more flagrant case of the reductio ad absurdum? Was there anything more ridiculous ever evolved by men with pretentions to statesmanship? It is so ridiculous that one is forced to find some other explanation than that on the surface, and I declare to this House and to the country that the Government has not faced the situation with the intention of solving the problem in the best interests of Greece, but they have devoted their diplomacy to bolstering up the reactionary system of Royalty, even though the representative of Royalty be a close relative of the Kaiser himself.

Still, I believe in ultimate victory, not from the generalship so far displayed on the Western Front and not from the wisdom of this Government, but from the fact that the United States of America have entered the lists, and I cannot imagine, come what may, even if the War should be protracted to seven or ten years more, that the great American people, having entered the fight, will ever consent to a humiliating peace. It is in their character and in their genius of achievements that I rest my chief hopes of victory.

I should like to say a word or two as to the general conduct of affairs by the War Cabinet. I confess that I was one of those who built high hopes of the assumption of the chief office by the present Prime Minister. He had great qualities. He had the quality which is called imagination, which means clear conception, and a certain psychological sympathy with the sentiments of men and peoples which gives understanding; but I expressed this doubt, as being a suggestion of danger, that his mental make-up and his temperament seemed rather to indicate the Gambetta type of mind than that of Carnot, whom I took as the type of the "organiser of victory." I hoped that, as often happens when a man attains to the highest position, that, having his hands more free and unfettered, he would rise to that height and direct his mind accordingly, and that he would reveal new powers.

I have been disappointed. I have not seen the Carnot, the organiser of victory, but I have seen the Gambetta, the journalist, the man who makes speeches, the man who whips up an artificial optimism, not the man who shows great intellect, who studies these multiplex questions in a scientific way, and who can build the great and valid plans which by their greatness and validity he can impress upon the Allies, and who, step by step, like an engineer, having laid the foundation, can build the parts until the structure of victory is complete. No! He has the faculty of making speeches, the faculty of making the worse appear the better reason, the faculty of coming down to this House when the external situation is bad, with no plans with which to face the situation and to overcome the difficulty, but with words to persuade this House that all is for the best in, the best of all possible worlds. I say that that man is not going to lead you to victory. Not only he, but his subordinates are tarred with the same brush. Many of his appointments, and some of those recently made, have not been made in the fashion in which old Abe Lincoln would have made his appointments, by looking to the external problem, seeing what conditions of mind, temperament or experience were demanded, and finding the men who best corresponded to the situation. But again they have been made in view of the Parliamentary situation; they correspond to the petty intrigues of back parlours, and men have been put in positions, not because they had great brains, but because they were possible-dangerous opponents in opposition.

I believe that this country has one way open to a great victory, and I will indicate a proposal in the briefest form so chat it may be possible to seize upon the public mind and remain there as a general principle. The Western Front is impracticable. The sea situation is bad. The Germans have lost that hypnotism of the Zeppelin which betrayed them so long to our advantage, and they are concentrating now on aeroplanes. Two and a half years ago I formulated a plan which at that time I could have worked out in detail by which this country now might have had an aeroplane fleet of 100,000 aeroplanes, which would merely not have given promise of victory but would have given victory at this hour. But in answer to every fresh demand for information from that Front Bench we were assured that all was for the best. There have been mistakes, lapses, negligences in the past, but all was now for the best. Yet each six months it was said, "This was neglected beforehand, but now we must make a great effort." And so the question has drifted. Nothing effective has been done, though again we are told to live upon promises. That now is the one hope of victory on this side. I say that the plan which this country had better follow is to renounce the hope of piercing the German line on the Western Front, to close up the sea, to safeguard as far as possible the Eastern campaign, unless you intend to make it a great campaign. In other words, make a Hindenburg line on sea and land, as far as the Army and Navy are concerned, and go Nap on the air.

I want to bring the Committee back for a moment or two to the speech of the hon. Member for Hereford in the earlier part of the Debate. I want, if possible, to bring the Committee back to a very practical consideration which arises from the speech of the German Chancellor on Thursday last. The Noble Lord the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in his speech this afternoon, said that for his part, and he spoke for himself, what he was anxious to fight for most of all was for a firm and stable peace. The hon. Member for Hereford said that the ends for which the Allies were fighting are inestimable from the point of view of finance or money, and in that connection he quoted an old saying, which finished up by saying, "Soul lost, all lost." The hon. Member very properly called attention to what I, at any rate, view as a very direct challenge on the part of the German Chancellor. What is the absolute inherent right of every self-governing people, quite apart from a nation like the British Empire, with enormous ramifications and great Dominions in every part of the world? The right to renounce entangling treaties which prevent their freedom of action, to develop their own trade and develop their own territory and resources in whatever way seems to them to be best. The words of the Chancellor, to which I think the Government have made no reply at all—I will not say no adequate reply—and to which I hope my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer will reply, are these. I quote from the "Times" under the heading, "German Terms"— the subsequent Imperial War Conference at which this Government for the first time definitely adopted as part of its policy the scheme of imperial preference. I wish to reinforce what the hon. Member for Hereford said, because really the country is intensely interested in this. It is quite true that the objects for which the Allies are fighting, as the hon. Member said, measured in money, are inestimable; but we have had, I think, what is almost a surfeit of vague phrases, such as the "triumph of democracy," "fighting for civilisation," "triumph of liberty," of personal liberty, and the liberties of peoples and countries, small and great, as against an autocratic military system. But when we come to fight for liberty, the first liberty we have a right to claim is complete liberty to make any arrangement which seems to us best within the Empire, to develop the resources of the Empire, so that they will be available for every citizen of the Dominions in every part of the Empire, for their advantage, and not to be an orange for Germany to suck dry, as she did in all her peace policy before the War. Therefore, I wish to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, when he replies on this Debate, which I suppose will be to-morrow, to make some special reference to this question. and also to assure the House that this is a matter which will be carefully considered. To-day at Question time he told us that on Friday the House will be occupied mainly with the Bill to establish a new Ministry of Reconstruction. Of course it is an open secret—it is no secret at all really—that the right hon. Gentleman who was lately the Minister of Munitions (Dr. Addison) is destined to be Minister of Reconstruction when that Ministry is constituted. The hon. Member for Hereford referred to the fact that there were a vast number of Sub-committees connected with this question of reconstruction; that they were considering all sorts of questions, some, so far as I can gather, not yet touched upon, yet absolutely vital to this matter.

I want to know whether all these Subcommittees, and whether the Ministry of Reconstruction itself when constituted, will proceed upon a definite national and Imperial policy, a policy that means that Great Britain and the British Empire is, first and foremost, for the citizens of all parts of the British Empire, and that we shall not, by any terms of peace, be hampered in our complete freedom of action in regard to every economic question which tends to develop the interests of the Empire. If all these Sub-committees, and if the Ministry of Reconstruction itself, proceed upon a clearly understood policy of that kind, and believed in by the working classes of this country, then I say that it will be an enormous addition to our strength in fighting for the country, and I am perfectly certain that the vast mass of the people of this country will feel that they are fighting for a policy which is absolutely vital to us, a policy which will mean the permanent advantage of the citizens of the Empire, and that Germany and any other of her Allies will always come second in any arrangement that is made on economic lines. I frankly admit that I do not myself feel that there is certainty about that policy. The heart gets sick if it is constantly subject to delay. We know that more than a year ago, now getting on for eighteen months ago, the country was full of this new idea that the Allies had some definite and economic object to fight for, and which they intended to achieve. That was definitely laid down at the Paris Conference.

There has been a Committee sitting under Lord Balfour of Burleigh to consider the practical steps to be taken to give effect to that policy. The Committee has had innumerable sittings, and I understand that some of its findings have been accepted by the Cabinet; but we have never had any strong pronouncement up to the present moment. Now we have this direct challenge from the German Chancellor, which the Prime Minister, making a reply two days later, dismissed with what I can only term a very misleading reference to what was the vital part of the German Chancellor's speech. Therefore, I hope we shall be assured, whether it is the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Hoxton (Dr. Addison), or any one else who is Minister of Reconstruction, whether he is selected for his wide experience of Imperial trade and has a great ideal of Imperial development or not, that, at any rate, a clear policy will be clearly laid down by the Government, and that the country will be able to feel secure that they have got something perfectly definite which is well worth fighting for—namely, complete liberty to live our own life and develop our own Empire by whatever means we consider best. In that connection I want to say one final word. The policy of the prohibition of German imports into this country appears to be absolutely impossible. It is only justifiable in war-time on the ground that we have not got ships to bring her commodities here. It is an undoubted fact that we want commodities from every country in the world, but if you are going to talk about an offensive alliance against the German Empire and its Allies, it will be precisely such a policy as could be described in these terms, whereas the policy of regulating the flow of trade by the well-known system of preferential tariffs with your best friends is not a policy that is an offensive alliance against any Power in the world It is within the province, and within the rights of every country to make trade arrangements on those lines, and we have the right to say that our economic alliance, if there be an economic alliance, is purely for defence of our own right and liberty to develop our own trade, and does not aim at hurting the trade of any other Power.

Amendment negatived.

Original Question put, and agreed to.

Resolution to be reported To-morrow.

Civil Services and Revenue Departments Supplementary Estimates, 1917–18 [New Services]

Class II

£1,840, Conciliation and Arbitration Board.

Class IV

£17,000 (Supplementary), National Gallery.

£21,000, National War Museum.

Resolutions to be reported To-morrow; Committee to sit again To-morrow.

Ways and Means

Considered in Committee.

Resolved, "That towards making good the Supply granted to His Majesty for the service of the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1918, the sum of £664,265,560 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom." —[ Mr. Bonar Law. ]

Resolution to be reported To-morrow; Committee to sit again To-morrow.

Naval Discipline Bill

Considered in Committee, and reported without Amendment; read the third time and passed.

Public Works Loans [Remission of Debt],

Resolution reported,

"That it is expedient to authorise remission of arrears of principal and interest due to the Public Works Loans Commissioners in respect of Eyemouth Harbour, in pursuance of any Act of the present Session relating to local Loans."

Resolution agreed to.

Public Works Loans Bill

Considered in Committee, and reported without Amendment; to be read the third time To-morrow.

The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.

Whereupon Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER, pursuant to the Order of the House of the 12th February, proposed the Question, "That this House do now adjourn."

Question put, and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at Ten minutes before Ten o'clock.