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Commons Chamber

Volume 100: debated on Wednesday 19 December 1917

House of Commons

Wednesday, December 19, 1917

Conscientious Objectors (Rules)

Copy presented of Additional Rules made by the Committee on Employment of Conscientious Objectors [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

West African Currency Board

Copy presented of Report of the West African Currency Board for the year ended 30th June, 1917 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

Customs and Excise

Copy presented of Eighth Report of the Commissioners of His Majesty's Customs and Excise for the year ending 31st March, 1917, being the Sixty-first Report relating to the Customs and the Sixtieth Report relating to the Excise [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

Inland Revenue

Copy presented of Sixtieth Report of the Commissioners for the year ended 31st March, 1917 [by Command], to lie upon the Table.

Finance (New Duties) Act, 1916

Copy presented of Regulations, dated 10th December, 1917, made by the Commissioners of Customs and Excise for securing the payment of Entertainments Duty [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.

Oral Answers to Questions

War

Recruiting (India)

asked the Secretary of State for India what has been the result of the creation of a Man-Power Board in India; and whether recruiting in the Indian Empire is progressing satisfactorily?

As a result of the establishment of a Central Recruiting Board in India, the recruiting situation has been reviewed in all its bearings, the minimum requirements of the future ascertained, and a provincial and district organisation created by the civil and military authorities acting in concert for obtaining by voluntary enlistment the requisite number of combatant and non-combatant recruits. In these arrangements the principal native States have, at the wish of their rulers, been included. Speaking in the Imperial Legislative Council, the Viceroy has described these measures as highly successful. A steady flow of reinforcements to the various fronts has been maintained, and the raising of new units facilitated.

Irish Channel Traffic (Protection)

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty what protection, if any, is afforded to ships trading between Ireland and Great Britain; whether sufficient life-saving apparatus is guaranteed to be on board all passenger ships, and if they carry sufficient rafts for the number of passengers carried; if he will state the class of cargo carried by the Dublin steamer "Hare," which was sunk on the morning of the 14th instant going to Dublin, and the number of lives lost?

All that is possible in the direction of affording protection to ships trading between Ireland and Great Britain is done. I am advised by the Board of Trade that every passenger ship must be provided with sufficient life-saving appliances before she is allowed to ply, and that in the case of passenger ships engaged in trade between Great Britain and Ireland the boats and buoyant apparatus must be sufficient for all persons on board. The vessel referred to in the third part of the question had a general cargo; and as to the last part of the question, I understand from the Board of Trade that full information is not yet available regarding the number of lives lost, but further inquiries are proceeding.

Can the light hon. Gentleman say whether these vessels carry an efficient ship's carpenter, so that in the event of submarine attack or accidents, by having a fully qualified shipwright on board, they are in a better position to secure the safety of the passengers, crew, and ship?

Royal Navy (Linguists)

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether it is customary to have linguists among the ship's company of vessels whose duty it is to keep contact with neutral shipping?

Linguists are appointed to ships and ports where they are considered necessary.

Are we to understand that all ships that come in contact with neutral shipping have not linguists on board, and will the right hon. Gentleman consider the advisability of calling some linguists back from some of the regiments of the Army—there are plenty of them?

It would be the duty of the flag officer to see that one was there whenever there was an examination.

Royal Dockyards (Pensioners' Daughters)

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, in view of the prices of living and the smallness of the pensions awarded to men on leaving His Majesty's dockyards after many years of service, he can see his way, at any rate during the War, to place the daughters of dockyard pensioners on the same footing as widows and orphans with regard to entry into the yards?

The widows and orphans must, of course, have the first claim upon us in this matter, but as and when their needs are met we deal sympathetically with the cases of the daughters of pensioned dockyard workmen, so far as we can.

His Majesty's Ship "Indus" (Engine-Room Artificers)

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the pensioner engine-room artificers employed on His Majesty's ship "Indus" for boy artificers have not yet received the two bonuses recently given; and whether, in view of the fact that men in similar positions at Portsmouth and Dartmouth College are being paid the three bonuses, he will say on what ground the difference is made in the case of the pensioner employed on His Majesty's ship "Indus?"

I am not sure that the men referred to in this question are eligible for the bonuses to which my hon. Friend refers. But I have asked that the matter shall be gone into at once, and I will communicate with my hon. Friend.

National Shipyards

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, seeing that shipwrights and skilled men are urgently required for the new national yards, he will consider the advisability of employing some at least of those hundreds of men now walking about the streets of our dockyard towns, men possessing the required skill and twenty-five to forty years' experience in the Royal dockyards; whether he is aware that these men in many cases are only in receipt of a pension of about 14s. a week, and, provided that small sum is not taken away from them, they are quite ready to do the work that is necessary; and on what ground of economy he justifies the transfer of young men from the North to His Majesty's dockyards in the South and paying these men an extra £1 a week while there are so many pensioned shipwrights and skilled men ready to do local work?

My hon. Friend's question is designed to assist ex-dockyard employés retired on pension, but physically capable of further service: and his purpose, of course, has our full sympathy. I feel pretty confident, however, that he overstates the case when he says that hundreds of such men, being skilled craftsmen of from twenty five to forty years' experience, are walking about the streets with nothing to do and in receipt of nothing but their dockyard pension. I rather fancy if he went more closely into the matter he would find that the vast majority of those who are physically capable of further service, and ready to give the same, are at the present time engaged in some capacity or another; and, if not so employed, it would be in their interest to register their names at the local Employment Exchange. I am afraid the organisation of the national shipyards, which has already been fully described, does not lend itself to the adoption of my hon. Friend's suggestion.

Is it not a fact that if these men went to the Labour Exchanges and were employed they would be obliged to give up their pensions?

It is a fact; but it is a matter for the Superannuation Act and the Treasury and not for us.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he will state the date of meeting of the Advisory Committee at which the Committee was consulted as to the policy of establishing national shipyards, and the names of the members of the Committee present at the meeting?

The policy of establishing the national shipyards was decided upon by the War Cabinet. Directly the commission reached us to carry out that decision, the expert advisers, the names of the principal of whom I gave my right hon. Friend on the 14th November, were consulted at every stage. But it is the fact that the Advisory Committee to which my hon. Friend refers was not consulted by the War Cabinet, so far as I know, before it took the decision to which I have already referred.

Did the War Cabinet decide upon this policy of its own volition, or was it pressed upon it by the Admiralty?

I cannot answer that question. So far as the War Cabinet is concerned, perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will put a question to the Prime Minister.

War Service (Decorations)

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether it is pro- posed to grant to the officers and men of the Royal Navy employed on armoured train service in Flanders and at the first battle of Ypres (1914) the 1914 medal; and if application on their behalf has been made to the War Office for granting the medal to those of the naval service employed under the military officers in command at that time?

The 1914 Star, provided the claims are approved by the Admiralty, will be granted to all officers and men of the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, Royal Naval Reserve, and Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, who actually served in France or Belgium on the establishment of a unit landed for service on shore between the 5th August, 1914, and midnight, 22nd-23rd November, 1914. The armoured trains will naturally be included under the above. Regulations giving effect to this decision are now being issued, and will contain instructions as to the method of making application.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the Royal Naval Air Service is included?

The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve and the Royal Naval Air Service would be included if they fall within the definition that I have given.

Ship Repairers

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, in view of the need for ships and labour, he will make inquiries into the number of ship repairers of all trades who, during the last two months in London, have been suspended, worked part time, or have been compelled to stand idle, with a view to steps being taken to make the fullest use of available labour?

My hon. Friend raises a question of considerable importance in view of the urgency of ship repairing. The matter is at the present time in the hands of the Director of Shipyard Labour and the Director of Ship Repairs, who are in communication with the Port of London Authority.

Naval Courts-Martial

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he will give the exact wording of the verdict of the court-martial of the crew of His Majesty's Ship "Mary Rose," in connection with the first loss of a Norwegian convoy, as pronounced in open Court in accordance with, the Order in Council of July, 1916?

Article 674 of the King's Regulations, as amended by Order in Council, of July, 1916, provides that all or any portion of the public may be excluded during the whole or any part of the trial, and directs that the sentence (not the verdict) shall be read in open Court. In the case of the "Mary Rose," the Court, in their finding, acquitted all the survivors, and there could, therefore, be no question of reading the sentence in open Court. If the Court had had occasion to pass sentence, it would have been read in open Court in accordance with the law.

Are we to understand that every portion of the proceedings of these courts-martial have been concealed by the Admiralty from the House of Commons and from the public?

There is no question of concealment. We are following the law, which provides that the sentence is to be read in open Court. That must be done.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that before the War on every single occasion the whole of the proceedings were conducted in open Court, as following the common law?

My hon. and gallant Friend's view on the common law arises on the next question. He knows that the procedure to which I am now referring has been practically altered for the purpose of the War by Regulation 674.

What is the use of telling the House of Commons that the Admiralty will examine into these disasters by means of an inquiry and then, if the House wishes to know the result of the inquiry, which is held as a result of their criticisms, they are not told?

My hon. Friend has not got it quite right. It was put to me whether the sentence is read in open Court. I have explained that the survivors were acquitted, and, therefore, there was no sentence to be read in open Court. The findings of the Court are before the Board, and it will be for the First Lord, if he thinks it in the public interest, to make any statement he likes to the House. I have no doubt he will take into serious consideration the desirability of doing so. The point raised by my hon. and gallant Friend (Commander Bellairs) is a technical one.

Will the right hon. Gentleman convey to the First Lord the fact that the House does want to know the result of this inquiry, and what is the reason why this convoy was attacked in this way in the North Sea?

The First Lord stated the day before yesterday that he would certainly tell the House as much as possibly could be said without giving information to the enemy, and I am sure he will make such a statement. I will convey to him what has been said.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, in view of the fact that the custom of the Navy and the King's Regulations up to July, 1916, laid down that courts-martial should be held in public and in view of the fact that courts-martial are under the same conditions as common law in being, held in public, whether the Admiralty have yet taken the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown as to the legality of the alteration made by Order in Council enabling the Admiralty to hold courts-martial in secret with the exception of the verdict, which is to be delivered in public?

I should not be disposed to accept without considerable qualification the suggestion of my hon. and gallant Friend that the conditions are similar in time of war at naval courts-martial to those applying in the ordinary Courts. The alteration of the Regulations were made by Order in Council on the report of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in accordance with the requirements of Section 65 of the Naval Discipline Act. I am bound to say that the unanimous concurrence of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the Regulation 674 as a war measure seems to me to make it altogether unnecessary to consult the Law Officers, but I have asked that the matter shall be considered by the Board.

Russia

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has official information to the effect that the present Government of Russia has repudiated its financial obligations?

Will the Noble Lord be ready to receive a personal communication from me on this subject?

I am always ready to receive personal communications from any hon. Members.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has information that Japanese troops have landed at Vladivostock; and, if so, whether the British Government or the Allies had previous knowledge of this action?

So far as His Majesty's Government are aware, there is no foundation for the report that Japanese troops have landed at Vladivostock.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has given further consideration to the suggestion that he, in conjunction with our Allies and America, should issue a statement for the guidance and warning of Russia; and whether he is taking any steps to meet the German plans for the exploitation of Russian resources if Germany succeeds in getting Russia out of the War?

The hon. and gallant Member can rest assured that the situation in Russia and the designs of our enemies are receiving the most earnest consideration of His Majesty's Government and their Allies.

Will the Noble Lord consider the suggestion that there is still hope that Russia may play a great part on the side of the Allies?

The suggestion contained in the question will undoubtedly receive consideration.

Cyprus

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether, con- sidering that in the Report on Cyprus for the year 1916–17, No. 941, practically the only mention of the War is the statement that financially the island has been beneficially affected by the War, and that several thousand able-bodied Cypriots have been recruited on generous terms of pay to serve as muleteers with the Salonika Army, and have been able to remit substantial savings to their families in the island, he will have a Report published showing what help in men, both for combatant service and in labour battalions, etc., and in materials, the Colony has provided towards the prosecution of the War?

In present circumstances I do not think that there would be advantage in adopting the suggestion of my hon. and gallant Friend.

Will the hon. Gentleman request the authorities in Cyprus to try to put what information is available in next year's Report?

Soldiers' Votes (Canadian System)

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he can give particulars of the machinery used for the polling of Canadian soldiers in the United Kingdom and in France; whether any proxies were used or the postal vote utilised; and how far the Canadian system synchronised with the Clauses for the voting of soldiers in the Representation of the People Bill?

I am placing in the Library of the House some Papers which will, I trust, give the hon. Member the information he desires.

Will it be possible to publish it as a White Paper for the information of hon. Members?

I do not think that is desirable. The Papers I am placing in the Library will give the hon. Member the information he desires.

Military Service

Irish Munition Workers

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War if he will state the result of his inquiries into the complaints of attempted conscripting of Irish munition workers temporarily resident in Halifax; if he is aware that these men were sent from the Dublin Labour Exchange to perform work of national importance, and were so engaged when they were served with calling-up papers; if he is aware that when leaving Dublin these men received guarantees against conscription; and what these guarantees are now worth?

My hon. Friend has asked me to reply. I have made inquiries into the cases referred to by the hon. Member, and I am informed that the men in question were merely called upon to present themselves for medical examination and were not called up for military service. The munitions area recruiting officer at Halifax was not aware that these men were Irish labourers or that they held cards issued by the Labour Employment Exchange to that effect, certifying that they were not liable to military service. Had the men produced the cards issued by the Employment Exchange as evidence that they were not liable to military service, the notice calling upon them to present themselves for medical examination would no doubt have been cancelled. In the two cases where such forms were produced, the recruiting officer at Halifax was instructed to cancel the notice papers.

Re-Classification

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War if men who enlisted in the early days of the War and are now approaching fifty years of age may, if they feel unfit for general service, claim to be classified according to their physical condition by a medical board with a view to transference to more suitable units, having regard to the fact that they were not so classified at the time of enlistment?

Provision is made for all men who become unfit for the duties of the unit in which they are serving, owing to increased age or for other reasons, to be reclassified and, if necessary, transferred to a unit where their duties will be suitable to their physical condition. Those who become unfit for any form of military service are, of course, released to return to civil life.

Does that refer to men now serving in Salonika and the East?

Non-Combatant Corps

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether on the 6th instant certain members of the Non-Combatant Corps, stationed at Park Hall camp, Oswestry, were ordered to repair trenches used for the purpose of teaching bombing by means of live bombs, with the result that fourteen now stand charged with the crime of mutiny and also of disobeying a lawful order; and whether, in view of the provision that these men are not to be called upon to train with arms or to assist in such training, he will say what action he proposes to take in the matter?

The Non-Combatant Corps are not required to bear arms or to be trained in the use of arms, or to be placed in any position in which they might be likely to be required to take up arms in their self-defence. Under these circumstances I do not propose to take any action in the matter brought to notice by my hon. Friend.

Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (Outfit Allowance)

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty what grant per head has been made since the outbreak of war by the Admiralty to officers of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve for the purpose of providing themselves with kit and equipment up to Admiralty requirements?

Officers of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (other than those who had previously qualified for and been paid outfit allowances) have, since the outbreak of the War, been paid allowances of £10, £15, or £20, for the first provision of blue uniform, according to the nature of the duties for which they have been entered. In addition, grants varying from £5 to £20 are made for the first pro- vision of special outfits of khaki, tropical or warm clothing, or camp kit needed. No further grants are made. I might state, for my hon. Friend's information, that we have recently received a communication from the Treasury authorising relief from Income Tax in respect of the purchase and upkeep of naval officers' uniforms. The following is an extract from that communication:

"My Lords are pleased to fix, pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 of the Finance Act, 1913, the following sums as representing a fair equivalent of the average annual amount laid out and expended in the purchase and upkeep of uniforms, namely:—

Royal Naval and Royal Marine Officers—

Are we to understand that the smaller an officer or man's income the less relief he gets?

That is a matter for the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I have tried to assist my hon. Friend by referring to the fact that although there is no grant they get relief in respect of Income Tax for the money they expend on these things.

Defence of the Realm Regulations

Police Raids

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War what is the name of the official at the head of the Department of the War Office which orders raids to be undertaken under Regulation 51 of the Defence of the Realm Act; and whether he has any recognised legal qualifications.

The power to take executive action under No. 51 of the Defence of the Realm Regulations is given to any competent military authority irrespective of his legal qualifications.

Will the hon. Gentleman answer the last part of the question—who is the official at the head of that Department of the War Office which orders raids to be undertaken?

There is no Department of the War Office specially authorised to order raids to be taken.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the Home Secretary last week stated that these powers are exercised by the specific instructions of the officer in chief command at the War Office Department dealing with these matters? Can the hon. Gentleman tell me the name of that officer?

I have already said there is no Department of the War Office which exercises direct control over these raids.

Discharged Soldiers

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether, having regard to the increasing number of cases of poverty and distress among soldiers discharged from the Army as medically unfit, the Army Council will form a Special Reserve into which these men can be drafted for light duties pending definite opportunities for each individual to re-enter civil life at a wage which will enable him to keep himself and his wife and children from starvation?

Is there not an enormous amount of work which can be carried out by these men when they are discharged? The only chance they have is to be taken on in munition works. If they are fit enough to take munition work, why not find them employment and relieve more able-bodied men, and not cast them on the streets?

Is it not during the period which elapses between the time the Pensions Department gets hold of them and the Army has finished with them that this takes place?

Will the hon. Gentleman consider this point, that as these men have been discharged medically unfit and are liable to recall at intervals of six months, it is impossible for many of them to secure any kind of remunerative employment?

How can it be a matter for the Minister of Pensions, whose duty it is to give pensions? This question deals with employment, and the question is whether the hon. Gentleman knows that men in this position cannot secure employment on account of the fact that the employers also know that they are liable to be called up at intervals of six months?

The hon. Member must realise that the question is about discharged soldiers.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether his attention has been called to the case of a young soldier who, after losing the sight of an eye through a wound in action, was first released to work on his father's farm and to take up a chemistry scholarship at Queen's University,' Belfast, but was subsequently sent from Ireland to do agricultural work in England; whether he has now received representations on the subject from the vice-chancellor of the university; and what steps he proposes to take in the matter?

My hon. and gallant Friend has already brought this case to my notice. Steps are being taken to enable this young soldier to resume his studies.

Soldiers' Leave

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he has received any complaints as to the delay caused at Victoria Station to men arriving home on leave from the front; and is it possible for him to do anything to accelerate these men leaving this terminus on their arrival?

I have made personal inquiry on the spot into the arrangements made for the reception of the troops arriving at Victoria, and I can testify to the expedition with which the evacuation of trains is carried out, and to the successful efforts of all concerned to ensure the comfort of the troops and to facilitate their transfer to their various destinations. I would like to take this opportunity of expressing the thanks and gratitude of the Army Council to the numerous voluntary workers, male and female, who are rendering, and who have rendered, such patriotic service at the various termini in London. I can assure them that their splendid and self-sacrificing devotion at all hours of the day and night is greatly valued by us and appreciated by the troops.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that on 29th November a letter, B.M. 4747/1917 A.G. 4s, signed by the staff captain for the Director of Personal Services, was sent to a correspondent regarding leave for a soldier in which it was regretted that owing to the difficulties of transport leave could not be granted; whether he is aware that the letter also stated that the case had been referred to the Comrades of the Great War organisation, who would communicate with the correspondent; and why such a reference was made, on whose authority, and for what purpose?

The answer to the first two parts of the question is in the affirmative. The letter referred to was sent to a clergyman who sought the assistance of the War Office in a very sad case concerning the family of a soldier serving in Mesopotamia. It was impossible to accede to the request made for this soldier's leave, but the facts of the case were such that the officer thought it both humane and desirable to bring the facts before the society referred to.

What right has the War Office to refer an official letter concerning me to a charitable organisation known as the Comrades of the Great War, which was promoted, among others, by Lord Derby, the Secretary of State for War?

I did not understand that Lord Derby ever promoted this organisation, whatever his sympathies may be. But I do not think, in any case, this House would condemn any officer, if he found that the Army itself was unable to deal with such a case, if, in any country district, he suggested where assistance might come from.

Is the Comrades of the Great War the only organisation known to the War Office to deal with these matters; and is it not the fact that, as this was a country district, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association was the proper organisation, if they wished to make a charitable appeal?

I know nothing about the information at the disposal of the officer; but I think the House will agree that any information which was available—and this appears to have been the only information—should have been placed, in this case, at the clergyman's disposal.

May we take it that the War Office is disposed, as a regular practice, to refer cases of this kind to one organisation, or will the War Office attend to its own business?

Is it not the case that for many years it has been the habit of military authorities to refer cases of this kind to the Sailors' and Soldiers' Families Association, or other charitable organisation?

Home Service Employment Companies

asked whether the attention of the Army Council has been called to the passage in the Report of the Select Committee on National Expenditure recommending a large reduction in the strength of the Home Service Employment Companies, in which 62,000 men are engaged in fatigue duties; and, in view of the fact that these men are of no military value, will they be allowed to return to civilian employment, where their services are needed?

The Army Council is aware of the passage in the Report referred to and steps have already been taken to effect a large reduction in the home-service employment companies. A large proportion of the personnel thus released can be utilised in other directions within the Army, mainly for substitution of category A men in other units, and will not therefore be available for return to civil life. Any of these men who cannot be further utilised in the Army will be released for civil employment in the ordinary course.

Military Hospitals (Accommodation)

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether the accommodation at Stobhill Hospital is so crowded that two beds are put together and three men placed in them; whether at Bellahouston patients are placed on the floor; and, if so, whether some of the smaller hospitals, such as Aikenhead, will be reopened?

I have asked for a report on this matter, and will let my hon. Friend know the result as soon as possible.

War Department Employes (Ireland)

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War if he will recommend the payment of an increase in wages to the ordnance workers at Island Bridge and the Government workers of Dublin and district, in accordance with the list of local rates of wages sent to him by the hon. Member for the Harbour Division of Dublin on the 14th instant; if he is aware that the list contains many increases; and if he will see that Government workers are paid a living wage?

In view of further information as to local rates of wages at Dublin, the adequacy of the present rate paid by the War Department for unskilled labour will be inquired into.

Army Officers (Outfit Allowance)

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War what grant per head has been made since the outbreak of war by the military to officers of the New Army for the purpose of providing themselves with kit and equipment up to military requirements?

Combatant officers of the New Armies have received an inclusive grant of £50 each.

In view of the fact that this War has now continued for over three years, and some of these uniforms are getting worn out, has the hon. Gentleman considered the advisability of making a second grant for the next three years?

That is being considered, amongst other things, by the Government in connection with the proposed review of pay.

Naval and Military Pensions and Geants

asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether the allotment now being taken over by the War Office will be paid in the case of all soldiers, including those on family allowance; and, if any exceptions are made, will he give the classes to which, those exceptions apply?

The regulated allotment will be paid whenever separation allowance is paid, subject to the exceptions laid down in the Royal Warrant of 3rd inst. and the A.C.I. accompanying it, and is also included in the new scale of family allowance.

Militia Long-Service Medal

asked the Under-Secretary for War whether he will consider the practicability of granting the Militia long-service medal to officers and men of that force who, having served for fifteen years before the outbreak of war, have served three years since that event, thereby completing eighteen years' total service with the Colours?

This question has received consideration, but it has been found impracticable to give effect to the proposal.

Wool (Army Purchases)

asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office if he will give the name of the official who inspects wool purchased from farmers in the South-West of Scotland; what is the salary paid to this man; and what was his former position before being employed by his Department as a wool expert?

In Scotland, in addition to the district officer, there are three officers who value wool under his superintendence. The district officer was a partner in one of the principal firms of wool merchants in Scotland, while the other officers were formerly wool valuers in the employ of leading wool firms. The district officer decides which of them shall value any particular clip.

Naval and Military Pensions and Grants

asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether he is aware that recently many men have been transferred from one regiment to another, and in consequence of this action there is delay in the payment of allowances to wives and children, owing to the fact that new ring papers must be obtained from the paymaster of the new regiment; and can he do anything to prevent these delays in the future?

The hon. Member is misinformed. No new ring paper is required on account of a transfer from the payment of one paymaster to that of another; but it has not hitherto been found possible to prevent delay in some cases, when the transfer and the date for issue of a fresh ring paper on expiration of the old one coincide. Constant attention is being devoted to the point.

In any case, is the woman not entitled to draw her money from the local war pensions committee?

The local war pensions committee will always give any assistance in their power.

asked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been called to the official estimate of the Food Controller that the weekly cost of the voluntary ration of bread, meat, flour, and sugar for a woman and one child was 15s. 3½d.; whether he is aware that separation allowance paid to a woman and child is 19s. 6d., and to a woman and two children 24s. 6d.; that the pension paid to the same is 18s. 9d. and 22s. l1d.; and that, in the case of separation allowance, what is therefore left to the woman and child and to the woman and two children is 4s. 2½d. and 2s. 2½d., respectively, for all other purposes with the possible exception of rent, and in the case of pension, where nothing is provided for rent, 3s. 5½d. and 7½d., respectively; and whether the Government are prepared in these circumstances to raise both the separation allowance and pension above the poverty line?

The approximate weekly cost of the voluntary ration of bread, meat, flour, and sugar is, I understand, one-half of that stated in the question. The last part of the question does not, therefore, arise.

Apart from the correction of the figures, is the right hon. Gentleman aware that only four foods are mentioned in this question, and that there are a great many others required for physical efficiency; and in addition there is light and rent. The last paragraph of my question still remains true. Separation allowance and pension does not bring these people above the poverty line?

The seriousness of the matter is greatly diminished by the fact that the figures are halved.

Soldiers' Pay

asked whether the increased Army pay will be given to men serving in the Royal Army Medical Corps, the Army Service Corps, the Army Pay Corps, the Army Ordnance Corps, and the Expeditionary Force Canteen Corps?

If my hon. Friend will refer to the Royal Warrant of the 3rd instant and the Army Council Instruction issued in connection with it, he will see that with the exception of men engaged by the Expeditionary Force canteens who are paid as civilians, the various corps mentioned are included within the scope of the Royal Warrant.

Food Supplies

Rabbits

asked the President of the Board of Agriculture whether he is aware of the number of rabbits overruniing the country at the present time; whether he is also aware that market supplies are limited, with the result that the prices are greatly in excess of the normal, although there is no increase in the cost of production; whether his Department possess any powers or can take any steps to ensure market supplies in proportion to the resources of the country; and, if not, whether he will seek powers which will facilitate the trapping of rabbits with the object of bringing prices down to a reasonable level?

The Food Controller is aware that prices have now reached a level largely in excess of pre-war figures and above the price of last year, and he hopes to take prompt steps to limit these prices if this can be done without risking supplies. He is further endeavouring to stimulate the collection of rabbits in areas where they are believed to be specially prolific.

Would it not be as well if the Food Controller increased the number of rabbit catchers?

That is one of the phases of the problem with which the Committee is dealing?

Will the hon. Gentleman take care that he does not do too much damage to sylviculture and agriculture by the excessive production of rabbits which are nothing better than vermin?

Bread

asked to what extent potatoes are at present being used in the manufacture of bread; and what saving on wheaten and other flour is being thereby effected?

Arrangements have been made by the Ministry of Food to supply bakers throughout the country with potatoes for use in bread making. As soon as I have definitely ascertained the quantity of potatoes that they can utilise for this purpose I shall be in a position to answer the question, but the figures are not yet available.

Is it proposed to issue potato flour for this purpose or will the potatoes be used in the ordinary way to mix with bread?

That depends upon the machines. It may be used in two different forms, according to the facilities available.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that large numbers of private householders supply themselves the potatoes which are used in the flour? Has he any information?

Transport (Co-Ordination)

asked whether the Departmental Order, dated October, 1917, and headed "Co-ordination of Transport, M.G. Transport 1," is to be applied to the regular journeys with horse and cart of Mr. Thomas Jardine, baker and grocer, Hawick, to the districts lying below the Cheviot Stills, seeing that nearly the whole of his custom is on the further side of Bonchester Bridge, that he covers a large area where the population is very thin, that his rounds enable him to purchase from the people large quantities of produce for the use of Hawick, and that if he is compelled to give up this landward trade his son, the owner of the business, who is now serving in Egypt, will be the loser and the wife and young children will suffer?

The scheme referred to in the question contains no element of compulsion, but was put forward as an incentive to voluntary effort for the coordination of transport, and the Hawick Food Control Transport Sub-committee have merely discussed the proposals contained in the scheme. In any case it is not intended to interfere with any business of public utility which does not involve wasteful overlapping with other deliveries.

Sugar

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food whether he is aware that it is difficult to obtain the new sugar cards for registration at the local post offices; whether he will make arrangements for more facilities for obtaining these cards; and, if not, whether he will arrange for an extension of the date for registration beyond the 31st December?

I am aware that at the outset difficulty was experienced, in a few cases, in making application forms for ration papers immediately available at post offices. This difficulty has, however, now been overcome. I shall be glad to have inquiries made, if the hon. Member will inform me of any cases in which application forms are not in the hands of post offices at the present time.

Oatmeal

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food the price of oatmeal in Ireland; the price in pre-war years; and if he will take steps to see that there will be no profiteering in this necessary food-stuff?

The maximum permitted retail price of oatmeal in Ireland is 5d. per lb. I am informed that before the War the usual price was 2d. Steps are being taken in the direction indicated in the last part of the question.

Wastage

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food whether he can make any statement as to his recent visit to the various docks of London; and whether there is waste of food and other necessary commodities taking place on the dock premises, quay sides, barges, and other places in the docks?

The result of Lord Rhondda's visit to certain of the London docks was to confirm his impression that, whatever may have happened in the past, there is now no wastage beyond what inevitably occurs in the work of transportation. Steps have been taken to prevent the recurrence of any avoidable waste.

Food Rations (Cost)

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food if he will state the weekly approximate cost, at present rates, of food necessary for a man, woman, and child, respectively, including not only the suggested rations for certain foods, but the other necessary food?

The figures supplied in answer to a previous question on the rationed foods only were for a fortnight and hot for a week as stated. The correct figures for the approximate weekly cost of the rationed foods only are:

Does my hon. Friend remember that the Board of Trade referred the original question to his Department, and are we, therefore, to understand that neither Department can give us to-day the approximate cost of living, including the rationed food?

It was because of the conflict of views on those statistics that the suggestion was recently made by the Select Committee on National Expenditure that special inquiries should be made by a competent body to ascertain accurately the figures.

Can my hon. Friend tell the House how that mistake came to be made, and does my hon. Friend realise what a very serious effect the answer will have in the country?

As I understand, the mistake was made by the person making the calculation mistaking a week for a fortnight.

May I ask whether, in order to get the approximate cost, he has had a consultation With the Board of Trade?

Food Distribution

asked what steps the Government are taking to effect the equitable and prompt distribution of food among the people by increasing the number of places at which it can be distributed, and preventing the loss of time and the danger to health occasioned by the formation of queues before the few places at which distribution is now made?

The policy of the Food Controller has necessarily been to utilise the ordinary channels of distribution and to secure that every retailer in every district obtains his proportionate share of available supplies, having regard to trade returns and statistics of population. This policy has already been adopted in the case of sugar, butter, and tea; it will be promptly followed in the case of bacon and margarine. In so far as the formation of queues is attributable to the unequal distribution of margarine, I may state that the chief home manufacturers of this commodity have consented to ration their shops according to our estimated requirements; and to allocate the surplus to competing retailers in the same area.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware of the congestion caused by queues, and could they not be very considerably diminished by the Food Controller taking into account the quantity of food in each classification available, and providing for its primary distribution to a number of shops in towns and areas, and not leaving it to one or two, thus simply encouraging discontent?

It is because we have taken that into account that, as I have stated in the last part of my answer, the large manufacturers of margarine have now agreed to our stipulation to supply a share of that commodity to shops in their areas in addition to their own shops.

Margarine

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food whether, in view of the fact that the supply of margarine is very unequally distributed owing to the manufacturers in this country supplying their own multiple retail shops and leaving the districts where they have no shops of their own without a sufficient or any supply, he will consider the advisability of taking over the produce of the manufactories and of arranging for its more equal distribution over the country?

As I informed the House on Monday, a scheme is being prepared to ensure the equitable distribution of available supplies of margarine, and this will be completed without delay, regardless of any existing monopoly or right to supply particular shops.

Questions

New Buildings, St. James's Park

asked the First Commissioner of Works why the new buildings now being erected in St. James's Park are being built of brick; why such permanent material is being used; whether it is intended that these buildings shall be permanent and remain after the War; and, if not, whether he is aware that the form of construction being used is likely to do damage to the old grass land and amenities of the park?

The new buildings in St. James's Park are being constructed of brick because of the impossibility of obtaining the requisite amount of timber and other building materials. It is not intended that these buildings in the park shall be permanent, and they will be removed as soon after the declaration of peace as the interests of the State will allow.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in some of these buildings concrete is used, and they are as solid as a permanent building?

Do they not take as deep foundations as for permanent buildings?

Theosophical Society Buildings (Swansea)

asked the First Commissioner of Works whether he has received any protest against the action of his Department in taking over the buildings of the Theosophical Society in Swansea on the ground that other buildings just as suitable were available; will he state the purpose to which the buildings are to be put; and whether, in view of the local protests, he will reconsider the matter?

The War Office will answer this question. My Department has not taken over the building in question. I have received protests, but they do not relate to my Department.

Shipbuilding (Lifeboats)

asked whether plans for shipbuilding now in use provide for boats carried by passenger ships so fitted as to carry stores and other necessaries for a voyage of possibly several days duration; and whether the latest methods of lowering boats are in all cases provided?

The construction, stowage, and launching arrangements of boats on passenger ships are governed by Statutory Rules. In the case of a new ship, the plans and specifica- tions must be submitted to the Board of Trade for approval, and the launching arrangements are tested by actual trial in every case. The latest boat-lowering devices are not always the most satisfactory, but every encouragement is given to improvements. Every precaution is taken to provide lifeboats with sufficient food and water; and I may say that the new arrangements for the control of the supply of food-stuffs to British ships allow a seven days' supply to be placed in every boat.

"Charitable" Organisations

asked the Prime Minister whether he will take the necessary steps to make it illegal to employ the word "charity" or "charitable" in the title of any society or organisation having for its purpose the fulfilling of any part of the national obligations to discharged soldiers and sailors?

Will the right hon. Gentleman be prepared to reconsider his decision, having regard to the fact that the word "charity" is very distasteful to men who have given everything for their country?

I think the hon. Member would find it very difficult to draft a Bill to make it illegal to use the word "charity."

Can my right hon. Friend say whether it is necessary for an organisation to register under the War Charities Act if the members are mainly responsible for the financing of that organisation?

Capital and Labour (Whitley Report)

asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the reception given to the Whitley Report and the advisability of setting an example to employers and workmen, he will have the recommendations in the Report put into operation in all the Departments of the State employing men on weekly wages?

This question is receiving very careful consideration, but I fear that it is not possible at present to make any statement.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the acceptance of the request which has been made by the Government to employers and workmen to form these councils is distinctly prejudiced by the inability of the Government to set up these committees in Government Departments?

The Government fully realise the importance of setting an example in this respect.

Government Departments (Staffs)

asked the Prime Minister how many clerks under eighteen years of age are employed in Government offices at the present moment; whether the Food Production Department has instituted a scheme of education for the young persons employed by them; and, if so, whether instructions will be given to the Admiralty, War Office, and other Departments to follow the example of the Food Production Department?

The total number of juvenile employés in Government offices throughout the United Kingdom is estimated at 30,000, of whom more than half are employed under the Post Office. I fear I cannot state what number are employed as clerks. Juvenile employés are encouraged, and in some cases required, to attend classes arranged for them by the local education authorities, in co-operation with the Departments. I am not aware that the Food Production Department has instituted any special scheme.

asked whether the Government will cause systematic inquiry to be made into the number of clerks employed in the Government offices, with a View to eliminating those who have been found incapable of performing their duties in an efficient manner, before it sanctions increases in the temporary buildings and the taking over of hotels and other buildings?

While the responsibility for the efficiency of their staffs rests primarily with the heads of Departments, the general question is receiving consideration by His Majesty's Government in connection with the recent Report of of the Select Committee on National Expenditure.

Will the Government at the same time give their attention or cause attention to be given to excessive working of overtime amongst some of the women clerks in some of the Departments?

Army Officers (Pay)

asked the Prime Minister whether he is in a position to announce the decision of the Cabinet Committee on the subject of the pay and allowances of junior commissioned officers?

I cannot add anything to the answer which I gave to the hon. Member for East Edinburgh on Wednesday last.

Does not the right hon. Gentleman remember that he promised to announce the decision of the Government on this question before the Adjournment of the House? Will he be able to do that to-morrow?

I am sorry that I shall not be able to announce the decision. I think I promised to do so before the end of the Session, not before the Adjournment.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether this decision will be announced during the long Recess? Is he aware that these people have waited an extraordinarily long time?

I can assure the House that I am as disappointed as hon. Members, but the Committee has been sitting almost daily, and it is not a very easy problem to solve.

Will the right hon. Gentleman say to what charitable institution these hard-pressed men can go?

Naval and Military Operations (Co-Ordination)

asked the Prime Minister (1) whether he is aware that in the case of the military secretariat of the Supreme War Council their exclusive function is laid down to act as technical advisers to the Council, whereas in the case of the secretariat of the Allied Naval Council their function is to collect and collate all necessary information; and why the function of advice is emphasised in the one case and excluded in the other; and (2) whether he is aware that co-ordination between naval and military effort has been the foundation of most of our successes in war, as in Palestine to-day; whether he is aware that the Supreme War Council, with the Prime Minister on it, has been charged with co-ordinating Allied military effort, whereas a separate body, the Naval Allied Council, with no member of the War Cabinet on it, has been charged with co-ordinating Allied naval effort; by what machinery he proposes to co-ordinate naval and military operations; and if he is satisfied it is working satisfactorily against the supreme direction of the enemy's armies and navies by Hindenburg?

I cannot add anything to the answer which I gave to a supplementary question by my hon. and gallant Friend on Monday last. In the opinion of the Government the co-ordination of naval and military operations has been strengthened by the recent arrangements.

Can we be assured that the naval and military authorities are working in the closest co-operation on this Council?

Yes. The arrangement in connection with the Versailles Council is that a liaison officer of very high rank is in constant attendance.

Raw Materials (Germany)

asked whether the statement by the Member for Trinity College that, until our own needs and the necessities of our Allies and Dominions were satisfied, the Germans ought never to obtain one ounce of raw material out of our Empire, is the considered policy of the Government; and, if so, are there any terms of peace to which Germany might agree that would modify this condition?

The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. The second part is hypothetical, and I cannot therefore answer it.

Ministerial Statements of Policy

asked whether all public pronouncements by responsible Ministers bearing on war policy and aims are, first of all, debated, decided on, and authorised by the Cabinet; and, if so, whether it is the established policy of the Government to authorise no statement of war aims or intentions either during or after the War whose only effect can be to tend to strengthen the resistance and justify the determination of our enemies?

It would be clearly impossible to follow the course indicated in the first part of the question. As regards the second part of the question, I do not think that the policy of the Government as regards war aims can be usefully dealt with by question and answer in this House.

Would it not be possible to censor some of the speeches of Ministers even before they are uttered, as sometimes Ministers are very foolish?

I cannot conceive how that operation could be carried out, because Ministers themselves very often do not know what they are going to say.

Munitions (Wages Advance)

asked if, in view of the labour disturbance which has resulted from the Order of the Ministry of Munitions giving an advance of 12½ per cent, and the results as regards cost in claims by other workers, the Government will take steps to secure that before similar Orders are issued in future the concurrence of the Ministry of Labour shall be required to any such proposals?

I have nothing to add to the very full statement which was made by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Munitions on 28th November and to the answer which I gave to my hon. and gallant Friend yesterday.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I asked the Minister of Munitions the question asked in the last part of this question and have never yet received any reply?

Ex-King Constanttne

asked from what Vote the annual payment of £20,000 to King Constantine of Greece is provided; and if he will state the reasons for this payment?

The answer to the first part of the question is from no Vote, and to the second, therefore, that there is no payment.

Are we to understand that the British Government are not making any payment whatever to the King of Greece?

I beg to give you notice, Sir, that to-day or to-morrow I will ask your advice, as a Member of this House, as to how it is possible to impeach the Government for subsidising an alien enemy.

Bearer Shares (Taxation)

asked whether there is any system of tracing the ownership of bearer shares for the purposes of taxation; and whether, when a sale of these shares takes place, the same is registered in a transfer book?

So far as I am aware, there is no system such as is suggested by the hon. Member, but I would remind him that the principle of collection of Income Tax at the source applies to bearer shares.

War Bonds (Subscriptions)

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer why, in the comparative statistics on the War Bonds subscriptions issued to show what sums the various provincial cities have subscribed, no memtion is made of Scottish cities' subscriptions; and will he see this remedied in future advertised comparisons?

I am in communication with the Scottish War Savings Committee on this matter.

Currency Notes

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will state the total amount of £l and 10s. currency notes outstanding on the latest available date?

I would refer the hon. Member to the Return published in the "Gazette" of Friday last.

Does the right hon. Gentleman see any prospect of limiting the issue of currency notes, or can he, at any rate, assure the House that the issue will not be increased except in response to actual demands by the bankers?

I believe that it is a fixed amount. At all events it will not be increased to any extent if we can avoid it.

War Savings Certificates

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will state the total amount raised by means of War Savings Certificates to the latest available date?

The cash proceeds of War Savings Certificates paid into the Exchequer to the 15th December amounted to £102,700,000.

Russian Dividends

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that the French Government has announced that Russian dividends due next month and payable in France will be paid as heretofore; and whether he will announce that the same course will be adopted in this country?

Will the right hon. Gentleman consider the question most seriously with a view to acting in concert with the French Government, which is all that I suggest?

I need not say that we are considering it, but it does not necessarily follow that we will give the result of our considerations.

Tonnage Facilities (Mr. Gattie's Scheme)

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will make a statement regarding the proposals of Mr. A. W. Gattie, whose scheme and machinery for increasing tonnage facilities he has recently examined?

I do not think I can usefully add to the reply on this subject given on the 17th instant to the hon. and gallant Member for Christchurch.

Kellner-Partington Wood Pulp Company

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether the contract by the Kellner-Partington Company with the Norwegian purchasers is a contract for the sale of their assets and property or is a contract for the sale of the shares in the company itself; if the latter is the case, whether the effect will be to place the complete control of the Kellner-Partington Company in the hands of foreign shareholders; and whether, in order to ensure as far as possible that the products of the company, which are valuable for the manufacture of munitions of war and textiles, shall not pass into German hands, he will apply to the Court under the Trading With the Enemy Acts for the appointment of a controller?

The contract with Norwegian purchasers in the case of the Kellner-Partington Company is a contract for the sale of the shares of the company. The purchasers of the shares will obtain control of the company by their voting power, but the company will remain subject to English law with regard to trading with the enemy and in other respects. The President of the Board of Trade does not at present think it necessary to apply to the Court for the appointment of a controller.

Shipwrecked Seamen (Compensation)

asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will take steps to obtain full compensation to seamen who have lost their effects by reason of shipwreck caused by the operation of enemy submarines and have only been partially compensated for their loss by Messrs. F. W. Peddar and Company, the firm in question having excused themselves for not paying compensation in full on the ground that they were employed by the Russian Government and could only pay over to the seamen employed on their ships the small amounts said to have been allowed by the Russian Government for purposes of compensation?

If my hon. Friend will give me particulars of the case he has in mind, I will make inquiries into the matter.

National Tramways Committee

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he has received a resolution, passed on the 7th December by the Scottish tramway officials, that in the recently-appointed National Tramways Committee there is no member directly representing the Scottish tramways undertakings who is resident in Scotland; whether he is aware that large numbers of munition workers are carried by these tramways apart from the ordinary public convenience; and whether he will see that Scottish tramway interests are directly represented on the Committee?

The resolution referred to has been received, and it has been decided to add to the Committee a representative of Scottish tramway undertakings.

Matches

asked whether a controller of matches has been appointed; and, if so, what staff has been allotted to that Department and what are the expenses which it involves?

The control of matches was added to the functions of the Tobacco Control Board in September last. The two subjects are dealt with by a common staff and I tm unable to say what portion of the expenses is attributable to each part of the work.

Petrol (Inspectors)

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in addition to a general controller of petrol, ten local controllers have been appointed; and, if so, what are the duties and salaries of these local petrol controllers?

No local controllers of petrol have been appointed, but eight inspectors have recently been appointed. The usual salary is £3 a week. They are employed in the inspection of licensed dealers' stocks of petrol and visit the various garages, etc., throughout the country.

Coal Exports

asked the President of the Board of Trade (1) whether the arrangement made by the Board of Trade with the exporters of coal in May, 1916. for the export of coal to France and Italy has worked to the complete satisfaction of the French and Italian Governments; and, if so, why the arrangement then made has been departed from in respect of the coal supplied to the United States forces in France; and (2) whether he can state the name of the firm which has obtained the contract for coal for the United States forces in France; whether this firm has been engaged in the export of coal to France in the past; and, if not, why a firm not formerly engaged in this trade has been enabled to obtain a contract contrary to the basis of the arrangement made by the Board of Trade with the coal exporters in May, 1916?

The arrangement to which the hon. Member refers relates to coal for French and Italian requirements. The President of the Board of Trade is not prepared to interfere with the purchasing arrangements which the United States Government have adopted as best suited to their own requirements.

Will the hon. Member say what is the name of this firm, and whether it has been engaged in the export of coal to France in the past?

Is my hon. Friend aware that the name of the firm is Harris and Dixon, and is one of the partners in that firm a member of the Government?

Newspaper Advertisements

asked the Secretary to the Board of Trade whether he is aware that a full page advertisement in some of the better known newspapers approximates a dissipation of nineteen tons of paper in one day; and whether, having regard to the shortage of tonnage, he will take the necessary steps to prevent one individual, for the purpose of personal gain, from dissipating nineteen tons of tonnage in one day?

I have seen a statement in which the figure quoted by the hon. Member occurs; but this figure cannot be accepted as a basis on which any general estimate of consumption could be framed. As at present advised, I am not prepared to regulate the size of individual advertisements in newspapers.

Is the hon. Gentleman prepared to consider the advisability of controlling to some extent the advertisement of certain articles? Does he consider that it is in the best interests of this country that articles which are pure luxuries should be advertised so widely as things of this description, at a time when we are asked to study the question of economy in purchases?

I am afraid that the question of the censorship of advertisements does not fall within the province of the Board of Trade.

Having regard to the amount paid for these things, would the right hon. Gentleman bring it before the Prime Minister?

Ceylon

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he is aware that a Motion was recently moved in the Legislative Council of Ceylon by the Ceylonese Member expressing the opinion that in view of the recent disclosures it is dangerous to allow Mr. H. L. Dowbiggin to continue to hold the office of Inspector-General of Police; that during the Debate on this Motion the Attorney-General defended Mr. Dowbiggin as one of the brightest ornaments of the public service; that Mr. Dowbiggin is the officer who, in his evidence before the Government Commission, stated that he approved of the shootings of Sinhalese, which the Governor of Ceylon has characterised as lynch law and deserving of the loathing and disgust of every decent Englishman; that although all the Sinhalese and Tamil unofficial members of the Council voted in favour of the Motion it was defeated by means of the votes of the official members; and whether, in view of these facts, he will consider the desirability of withdrawing this officer from Ceylon either by transferring him or promoting him to some other more suitable appointment outside the Colony or by some other method?

I have read Press reports of this Debate, and I have noticed the appreciation of Mr. Dowbiggin's official record which was expressed by the Attorney-General as well as by certain elected and nominated members of the Council. I am aware that the Commissioners reported that Mr. Dowbiggin told them that while he had not authorised the action taken by the patrol in question or intended that that action should be taken, he approved, in fact, of what the patrol had done. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, I see no reason for withdrawing this officer from Ceylon. I would add that the motion was opposed by the Mahomedan member, the Burgher member, and the two elected European members, as well as by the official vote.

Is it not a fact that this officer approved of the illegal shootings, because he himself was responsible for the order to shoot without trial; and is it fair that while subordinates have been removed from their offices for carrying out this business, the Inspector-General of Police, who was largely responsible for these orders to shoot at sight, should be retained in his position?

The hon. Member is putting the same questions in another form. I have already answered both.

Does the hon. Gentleman think it desirable to retain in office men who have lost entirely the confidence of the public?

Message from the Lords

That they have agreed to—

Chequers Estate Bill, with an Amendment;

Education (Provision of Meals) (Ireland) Bill, with Amendments.

Orders of the Day

Business of the House

Resolved, "That this House do meet To-morrow at Twelve of the clock."—[ Mr. Bonar Law .]

Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) Bill

Order for Third Reading read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read the third time."

War Aims

Since I have had the honour of being in this House, after the lapse of six years, I have endeavoured to take some part in the work of the House and its Committees, but I have never previously ventured to take part in any Debate on the subject of the aims and objects of the War, or the methods of its conduct and prosecution, and that for two reasons. In the first place, very early in this year, the War Cabinet asked me to undertake a rather arduous duty in presiding over the Conciliation and Arbitration Board for Civil Servants, which proved to be rather a bigger task than, I think, was originally anticipated, and that work has largely absorbed my time and energies; and, in the second place, I was most anxious to avoid, even in the slightest degree, I will not say embarrassing, because that might seem presumptuous, but troubling His Majesty's Government in the execution of their Herculean task. When about a year ago I was invited by the electors of Derby to re-enter political life, I had no hesitation in assuring them that it was my earnest desire loyally to support His Majesty's Government in their endeavour to attain the objects which we had in entering upon the War. In the second place, I ventured to say that in my opinion no durable peace was possible so long as the Prussian military autocracy continued either undefeated or unrepudiated by the German people. The aims with which we originally entered upon the War are well known. This was to be a war to end war, a war to enthrone public right, a war to secure the sanctity of international law, not only for large but for small nations, and to vindicate the great principles of humanity, liberty and justice. These aims, I think, have been repeatedly stated, always in much the same form and with the same ideals by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife (Mr. Asquith). I think they were also the views contained in, if I may say so, that finely-phrased despatch which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs directed to the Minister at Washington, to cover the statement of the Allies' aims, in January last. But I am afraid, perhaps it is my fault, that I have not always detected the same devotion to high and disinterested ideals in all the Ministerial statements which we have heard either in this House or out of it. I may quote one passage in that most lucid dispatch of the right hon. Gentleman to the Minister at Washington. It contained this phrase, summing up the aims of the Allies: tinguished representative of Prussian autocracy. Both by vocal and facial expressions I gathered from this strong man from Berlin, at this International Conference at which I was a British delegate and he was a German delegate, that if this sort of thing was continued very long the whole fabric of the Prussian military autocracy was threatened, that the hegemony of Prussia in the Bundesrath and the irresponsible Imperial Chancellor and the whole fabric of Kaiserism, were being threatened by these victories at the polls of the Socialist parties in the Reichstag.

The impression I formed was that this Prussian militarism was not a growth proceeding from below, but an imposition from above; and I am afraid the universities of Germany have played a very large part in the growth of that cult. I had occasion in pre-war times to visit several of the German universities to study their constitution and observe their methods; and instead of, as in former days, the universities of Germany being suspect as centres of free thought or as seminaries of sedition, they had become, during the last twenty or thirty years, the obsequious promulgators of a State-made philosophy. That has been largely instrumental in promoting this State idolatry, of which we have seen the lamentable results. I hope and trust that, in the struggle with that doctrine, which must be internecine, and with which there is no question of a halfway house, we may never be contaminated or infected by that accursed thing.

In looking back over the last year, the year now approaching its close, perhaps one of the most remarkable facts in the history of the War, one might almost say one of the most remarkable in the history of the world, has been the evolution of opinion in the United States of America. In a sense greater or finer than Canning ever knew when he coined the phrase, "the New World has come in to redress the balance of the Old." It seemed almost as if the United States of America, as a great impartial jury, was watching the rival claims of the belligerents, and after prolonged observation and the most impartial—some thought too deliberate—inquiry, emphatically threw in its lot with the Alliance and with ourselves.

It seems almost strange to reflect that so recently as January 22nd President Wilson was saying: "It must be a peace without victory "; and he also spoke of: "a peace between equals." On February 26th he said he "devoutly hoped it would be unnecessary to put armed forces anywhere into action"; and also: "I am a friend of peace, and mean to preserve it for America so long as I am able." On February 17th I was discussing the position with Bishop Brent, Bishop of the Philippine Islands, who was then in this country, and he agreed that it seemed impossible where fundamental questions of right and wrong were concerned, that American neutrality could be long preserved. It was not surprising, therefore, that on April 2nd President Wilson declared war against Germany, and said at the same time that there was "no quarrel with the German people," but that they were "only in armed opposition to an irresponsible Government, which has thrown aside all consideration of humanity and of right in running amok." That sentiment runs through all his speeches, and even in the most recent message to Congress he has consistently held the view of discriminating between the Prussian military autocracy and the German people themselves. The American people at the present time appear to be in that state of high enthusiasm which prevailed in this country during the autumn of 1914, and only recently I received a cable from my friend, Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, New York, and a member of the Carnegie Trust, in which he said the Carnegie Trust for International Peace unanimously passed this resolution: "That the most effectual means of promoting durable international peace is to prosecute the War against the Imperial German Government to final victory for democracy in accordance with the President's declaration."

4.0 P.M.

What is the final victory for democracy of which the President speaks? We are assured by the Prime Minister that the President's last message represents the opinion and the views of the Government. What is the answer he gives to the question: "When shall we consider the War won?" He says: "We shall regard I the War as won when the German people say to us through properly accredited representatives that they are ready to agree to a settlement based on justice and a reparation of the wrongs their rulers have done." He again emphasised the distinction between the German people and their masters, who, he said, were grossly and wantonly deceiving them by calling it a war of self-defence against aggression. The President also clearly made plain in his last message that the economic weapon was only to be used if after the War German rule continues what it is and if it is "impossible to admit them to a partnership of nations which must henceforth guarantee the peace of the world." In the speech of President Wilson, with which we are now assured the Government is in full agreement, there is this remarkable passage: After again referring to the German people and their rulers, he goes on: One would gather from some of the expressions one hears in some quarters that war was an end in itself, and that war was waged for the sake of war. That is a hateful doctrine, and should be left to the von Bernhardi school of thought. I cannot help asking, though, if it be true, as the Prime Minister in his recent great speech at Gray's Inn indicated, that there are in some quarters some falling away, some faltering, some slackening of morale, whether it may not have been due to the varying formulation of the aims of the Allies. Has it been that they have lost something of their pristine purity, lofty idealism, and disinterestedness in the process of translation into territorial expressions and the language of the economic offensive? We have been reminded by the late Prime Minister that we are seeking a clean peace. If we seek a clean peace we must seek it, and ensure it, and ensure it by clean methods. I confess I am sometimes tempted to prefer the tone and ring of President Wilson's speeches to some of those nearer home, because we seem to catch in the former what we miss in the latter—the vibration of unselfish ideals and noble aspirations after world-wide liberty, humanity, and justice. But I have only risen to ask the right hon. Gentleman, who I understand has left a bed of sickness to come here—for which we are grateful to him—that if he replies he will perhaps favour the House, not so much with a restatement of our war aims, but some reassurance on some of the questions which I have ventured to put before him.

I had not intended so early to intervene in this Debate, and I would have given way at once to any hon. Member who had risen, but seeing no one did, I venture to speak now. I am sure the House has heard with great pleasure the speech just delivered by my hon. Friend. The admirable tone and temper in which he presented to the House the case for a restatement of our war aims is one which, I am sure, the Government can take no objection to. While I am in agreement with a very large part of what my hon. Friend has said, I feel that we have reached a moment now in the War when it is necessary to express, perhaps, a little more forcibly than he ventured to do some of the points which are troubling the minds of a great many people of this country. On former occasions we, on these benches, have initiated Debates, either on the Second or Third Reading of Consolidated Fund Bills; those Debates have taken place periodically. I venture to think they have been of very great service. It has been customary to refer to us as a negligible minority. Judging, however, by the attention which the Government has paid to us within recent months I do not think that the word "negligible" can be considered very accurate. They have turned on a considerable number of their Departments to counteract our activities. They have strengthened the Defence of the Realm Act in order to counteract opinion expressed in our sense. They have instituted a Committee which they have declared in this House has this main object; to counteract our propaganda. This War Aims Committee has circulated a great deal of literature, and has spent untold sums of money which we are not allowed to have mentioned in this House—sums of money which make the very Whips blush; all this in order to deal with a negligible minority! The word "minority" may be applicable to our numbers in this House. I am beginning very much to doubt whether it is equally applicable to those who agree with us in the country, because there is a growing feeling of unrest, there is growing dissatisfaction, of which all hon. Members have the opportunity of seeing signs from time to time. The Press in no way expresses the real views of the people of this country. We are dominated to a large extent by a Press which is subservient to the Government, and we have not got anything like a free expression of opinion.

Entering the fourth winter of the War, we are all of us so deeply impressed with what this War means that we hardly like to refer to what is going on in France and Flanders. When I hear it said that the casualties, which are so high, are nothing as compared with the casualties on the German side, it is no consolation whatsoever to me. I feel that this hideous struggle, which seems to increase in horror and savagery as time goes on, requires to be justified by more clear and explicit arguments than we are accustomed to hear in Ministerial utterances. It is customary to criticise and blame our soldiers when there is failure in the field. I have never joined for one moment in criticism or imputing blame of that sort. I do not believe that there is a soldier, from the last recruited private up to the commander-in-chief, who should receive any blame whatsoever. The task they have been given is an almost superhuman task, and the way they have discharged it appears to me to be beyond all praise. I do not think that any criticism ought to be levelled against the soldier even when he fails. The whole brunt of criticism and the whole brunt of blame ought to fall upon His Majesty's Government, and upon the War Cabinet. The military situation, such as it is, is only a consequence and not a cause. The domestic situation, which we see growing more grave week by week, is also a consequence and not a cause. The root cause of the present situation is the policy and the diplomacy that one hears much too little about in this House.

I intend to deal with the diplomatic situation, because it is the conduct of our diplomacy which seems to me to be driving us down an abyss. Our diplomacy, not to go very far back—I do not for a moment intend to deal with pre-war diplomacy—our diplomacy during the course of the War is nothing which would justify us in having very great confidence in the skill of those who conduct it. We failed to prevent Turkey joining the Central Powers. We failed to prevent Bulgaria doing the same. We urged, or at any rate we did not prevent, Roumania from joining in the War at a time when her neutrality would have been far more valuable to us. But these points pale before our policy in regard to Russia. First of all, let me deal with it as regards the Russian Revolution. The Russian Revolution took this country by surprise, but I do not think it ought to have taken His Majesty's Government by surprise if they had been watching matters carefully. The reception which was given in this country to the Russian Revolution was so chilling as to spread a feeling of amazement in Russia amongst those who had engineered this most marvellous change in the government of Russia. It was referred to in this House in chilling terms, and in the Press with nothing but disparagement. Then came Mr. Kerensky's suggestion, and his references to the proposed Conference at Stockholm. The truth about that will be very difficult to unravel, but all we know is that a great deal was expected from the Stockholm Conference, if it really was going to be the united voice of Labour in the various countries, and the support given to it by the Russian Government of that day was undoubted. I need not recall to the House the incidents which led to the resignation of the right hon. Member for Barnard Castle, and the opinions which were quoted as being Mr. Kerensky's, and which proved, after all, not to be his at all. But, anyhow, the mismanagement of the situation has only aggravated the feeling which those in Russia were beginning to have over the attitude this country was adopting towards the new Government.

Then Mr. Kerensky, in his extremely difficult task, tried to induce this country to join in a Conference for war aims. Again that was delayed month after month, and finally it was dropped. Everything depended for the stability of Mr. Kerensky's Government on that Conference materialising. We failed him again at a critical moment, with the result that he was overturned and the extremists got the upper hand. Such bungling is difficult to believe, and now that Russia has gone over the border, and is practically out of the War, I think the blame that is cast on Russia is out of place. The blame again, I say, should be cast upon His Majesty's Government, and upon His Majesty's Government alone. At any rate, I hope that no blame will be attached to our Ambassador in Petrograd. Sir George Buchanan has had the most difficult task, and I think he has discharged it in a way that deserves great praise. I think also that our sympathy is due to him, and I think we should pity him less for the chaotic, and in some ways dangerous, situation with which he is faced in Petrograd, than for the bungling, the inefficiency, and the unstatesmanlike way in which he has been backed in London. He has not received the support that he might have.

The Russian situation and the Russian Revolution have brought about, anyhow, one very remarkable event, and that is the tearing down of the curtain which has hung before the secret diplomatic negotiations that have been going on during the War. We have now publicly before us some of the arrangements, conversations, agreements, and dispatches which have been passing between the Allies during the course of the War. The secrecy that is kept up at ordinary times with regard to diplomatic conversations between Ministers is one of the chief sources of international discord, but in war-time it is even more serious. It is often made a cause of complaint that indiscreet questions on foreign affairs are asked in this House. If a man is standing before the locked door of a room where the lights are turned out, and people are whispering, it ought not to be complained that a great many questions, many of which may be indiscreet, are asked as to what is going on behind the door. The fault lies with this system of secrecy, and not with those Members in the House of Commons who desire information to understand what the policy is that is being pursued. During the course of the War we have had several declarations from His Majesty's Ministers as to the general trend of our policy. To begin with, the late Prime Minister, at Cardiff, said: the War has been fought during these years. First of all, there was, as we suspected, although we never could get any satisfactory explanation of it in this House, a firm understanding with the Government of the Czar that Constantinople should go to Russia. The exact words, which are given in a dispatch from M. Sazonoff, are:

Then we come to Persia. The agreement with regard to Persia in the same dispatch was:

Did he say that about the relation of Russia in those spheres?

This was Sir Cecil Spring-Rice's dispatch of 4th September, 1907, at the time the Anglo-Russian Convention was concluded.

Was the arrangement set out by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman as to Russian influence as regards spheres in Persia?

I did not mention Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman at all. I was mentioning Sir Cecil Spring-Rrice.

He was at that time our Minister in Teheran, and in conveying to the Persian Government—who, needless to say, had not been consulted—the Anglo-Russian Convention, used the words which I have quoted. I only say, when we have all these protestations about small nationalities, and about not desiring to partition or break up Empires, it rings a little bit false when we get down to the bed-rock of facts as disclosed by these recent agreements. We go further, and we find there was an agreement with regard to Italy. This has not been fully disclosed yet. There was a Treaty of London with regard to Italy, and only telegraphic summaries of it have appeared in the "Times" and other newspapers, but it seems that the Trentino, South Tyrol, Trieste, Istria, Dalmatia, islands in the Archipelago territory in Asia Minor, and possibly some extension of territory in Africa were to be awarded to Italy. And then it is said that this is not a war of aggression on the part of the Allies.

With regard to Poland, it is interesting to see exactly how that country is referred to. In a Russian dispatch, dated 24th February, 1916, it is set forth that it is particularly necessary to insist on the exclusion of the Polish question from the subjects of international discussion, and that the Russian Government did not want to have the Polish question raised. They did not approve of all this talk about Poland. President Wilson, on the 22nd of January, 1917, said: Now, that did not tally with these agreements and these interchanges of ideas that were being made with the Czar's Government when that Government was still in existence. The most important of all the disclosures that have been made are those which refer to the agreement with regard to Alsace-Lorraine and the Rhine countries, and these have been disclosed in two dispatches, one dated 13th January, 1917, a copy of which was sent to London confidentially. I emphasise that point because there appears to have been some ignorance with regard to this agreement, and I do not quite understand how it arose, because the words used in the dispatch are very interesting, for it says that at an audience with the Most High (that is, the ex-Czar), it was submitted that the desire of France was to secure for herself at the end of the present War the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine and other German territory, so that the river Rhine might form the permanent strategic French frontier. This was set out very much more fully in a dispatch later on in February, 1917, in which the whole plan, by which the Rhine should henceforth be the frontier of Germany, was laid down in very explicit terms. I do not think I need to trouble the House with the quotation, but I may say that in that dispatch it is shown that France was to have Alsace-Lorraine and that territory was to be taken from Germany up to the Rhine frontier. In all these cases, just as in the case of the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, which was foreshadowed in the answer to President Wilson at the end of last year and was explained rather more fully in the right hon. Gentleman's dispatch to our Ambassador in Washington—in all these cases it is not for us to discuss whether the policy foreshadowed was a good or a bad one, whether the Rhine should be the frontier of Germany or not, whether Austria-Hungary should be broken up, whether Poland was to be independent, whether Asia Minor and the Ottoman Empire should be partitioned, it is not for us to discuss that, but that all these projects were set forth as aims which one or other of the Allies desired to gain as prizes from this War is now clear beyond a shadow of a doubt, and this does not tally with the repeated declarations made to the country and the public.

Therefore, I say it is useless for us to go on pretending that there is no ground for misunderstanding and misinterpreta- tion of what our war aims are. The hon. Gentleman who opened this discussion very rightly referred to the fact that President Wilson, in his extremely clear declarations, has voiced what a great many people think in this country; but he also asked, "Why is it that we cannot declare our war aims for ourselves?" In reply to the Pope we hid behind President Wilson's reply. President Wilson makes a speech, and all we can get from the War Cabinet are variations of the knock-out blow theme, disparaging remarks about the League of Nations, and hints that the economic war after the War is still part of the policy of His Majesty's Government. The Central Powers have taken full advantage of this want of clearness, and have represented to their people that our aims are aggressive and that we are out for Imperial aggrandisement, and in so doing they have joined together the whole of their country and fortified their cause, whereas not only now, but twelve months ago, if we had made clear our war aims we might have split Germany in half—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, oh!"]—and we might have strengthened the party in Germany who would have said that the enemy is not out for aggression. Why do you not state your terms fairly? I grant that the German Government have not stated clearly their war aims, but why should we follow their example? In this matter why cannot we take the lead and try to stop this hideous slaughter? Even in France, where the Censorship is extremely severe, there are expressions of opinion which show that the French people themselves are getting rather tired of the vain repetition of the statement that this is a war which can only be determined by a decisive military victory, and that it must go on year after year until some tangible end is gained. "Le Pays," a French newspaper, published this paragraph on 4th December-and I would emphasise my view that for this to appear in France in the Press is a very extraordinary thing:

Hon. Members' suspicions in regard to this paper are quite natural, but may I point out that on 19th November M. Caillaux wrote to say that he had no connection at all with the paper. It is only asking for information to have the objects set forth clearly. Surely the sacrifice is out of all proportion. We do not know exactly what it is we are fighting for, and we do not get it in the speeches of the members of the War Cabinet or the Prime Minister. Recently we have had an appeal on this subject in a document which has had a very widespread effect—I mean the letter written to the "Daily Telegraph" by Lord Lansdowne. Although there is a great attempt to minimise the importance of that letter and to read into it all sorts of things that are not in it, and to pretend that it was an event that did not signify, it has had an enormous influence, and it has been talked about in every town and village in the country. When the people see a man of such eminence, with such a fine record, pressing urgently and in such a statesmanlike way for a restatement of our war aims, they feel that it is a matter which should not be allowed to pass without reply, as it has done. Lord Lansdowne, President Wilson, and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife, have all emphasised some very important points. They foresee the possibility of emerging from this world catastrophe something in the nature of a League of Nations. Whatever may be said about a League of Nations, I am confident that if it is going to give anything like security for the future peace of the world it must be a League of Nations and not a League of Governments, and in order to secure that you must allow the people to have the control of those matters which concern their lives and the destinies of their country. You must not treat them as children, and behind their backs conduct the affairs of State in such a way as to make them suffer for things of which they are entirely innocent.

I am afraid that I have detained the House longer than I intended to, but I consider that as time goes on it is necessary to speak out. This chaotic situation which has been disclosed with regard to our diplomacy is by far the gravest element in the whole situation at present, and I cannot emphasise too strongly that, while we here in the House of Commons have to pay so much attention to the conduct of the War, to the military situation, and to all the endless difficult problems at home with regard to employment, food, and other things; behind it all, governing, everything, is the question of policy and diplomacy. I feel that we have been let down, and I would say to the Government: You have prostituted the original disinterested motives for which this country entered the War, and you have substituted for them a mean craving for vengeance and punishment, a sordid desire for gain, and an arrogant demand for Imperial aggrandisement and domination, without the consent of the people, and behind the backs of the people, secretly and surreptitiously making declarations all the while which were deceitful and false. To treat the people like this at any time would be a gross deception on the part of any Government, but to conduct the affairs of State by these methods and in this spirit in the middle of a hideous conflict like this War is to jeopardise the national honour, to endanger the high position which this country has hitherto held in the Councils of the world, and to betray the trust which you have undertaken on behalf of the people. Whatever may be the result of this War from a military point of view, I devoutly hope that militarism and secret diplomacy will be destroyed once and for ever. Let the Government be on their guard; let them take heed lest the people determine that all those who have been in any way responsible for aiding, abetting, supporting, and encouraging these evil and pernicious systems shall themselves be destroyed and shall never again be allowed to have any voice in determining the destinies of this nation.

I listened not exactly with interest, but certainly with attention, to the very singular speech with which we have just been entertained. I wondered all through that speech what the object of the hon. Gentleman was in making it.[An HON. MEMBER: "To help the Germans!"] At first, listening to the wealth of epithets which he devoted to attacking the diplomacy of the Government—not this Government alone or chiefly, but of all Governments that have held power in this country, when I heard him explain—I am not sure I took down the exact words, but I know that among the milder epithets he used, "bungling" and "incompetence" figured largely—I supposed that at that stage of the speech his object was the very legitimate one of trying to attack and discredit his political opponents. I have no special quarrel with him on that account, but, as he went on, as he embraced in the ambit of his attack all his old political friends, his old political chief, not merely the present holders of office but the late holders, not merely this country but all the Allies who are engaged in the War, then I came to the conclusion that he was not concerned with the legitimate Parliamentary task of throwing stones at his opponents, but that he really did desire to injure the Government of his country because it was the Government, and because it was his country.

And he gladly used every phrase, and he correctly or incorrectly dragged up what he conceived to be every fact which could be turned to propaganda account by the enemy. The hon. Gentleman in that, following a speech conceived in a very different spirit and aiming at very different objects, drew a contrast between the statement of President Wilson and the statement of His Majesty's Government, as well as those of my right hon. Friends the Members of the late Government. I am not going to discuss the comparative merits of the statements of war policy made by the President of the United States of America and by various leaders of thought in this country. They seem to me to be absolutely identical in spirit, and I do not think there has been in the whole history of the world more powerful State documents than those which have been issued from time to time by the President of the United States of America, When the hon. Gentleman, with a sneer, said that we had sheltered ourselves behind President Wilson in regard to the Pope's Note, and sheltered ourselves behind President Wilson on some later occasion—I forget at the moment what the occasion was—when he says that, I presume it means no more than that when a statement of policy has been admirably made by the head of a great Republic with whom we are carrying on the War, when that statement has been made it is not necessary—it may not be necessary—very often it is not necessary that it should at once be repeated and copied by everyone who may agree with it on this side of the Atlantic. But if he means that any statements of our policy on the broadest lines and in the most explicit terms and in the clearest manner have not been made by right hon. Gentlemen opposite, by the late Prime Minister, by the present Prime Minister, and by others sitting on that bench, and on this, he is profoundly mistaken.

I do not want to refer to my own statements or my own dispatches, but my right hon. Friend (Sir William Collins) who initiated this Debate, referred to a statement of policy which I made on behalf of the Government nearly a year ago, before America was in the War, and before President Wilson had stated in public his views on the great issues in the decision of which he and his country are now taking so great a part. That statement remains. It is clear, it is explicit, it puts in broad outline what it is we are fighting for, why we are fighting; and I am utterly unable to understand why the hon. Gentleman ignores this formal statement, and, if he deals with general statements of policy at all, why he refers to us in a sneering manner and says, "You leave all these statements to be made not by statesmen of your own country, but by the President of the great English-speaking Republic on the other side of the Atlantic." At first one might have felt some surprise at this method of dealing with the statements of policy made by my right hon. Friend the late Prime Minister, by my right hon. Friend the present Prime Minister, and by other persons of great authority who have spoken not once nor twice, but constantly, always in the same language, always explaining with perfect lucidity the great aims for which we are fighting, not with any selfish motives, but for a peace which is to last, and under whose shelter nations small and great may develop according to their own national ideals. Why does the hon. Gentleman who has just spoken adopt a method so obviously and grossly unfair? It is that he may do everything he can to assist the policy of our enemies, whose chief method of propaganda in their own countries and in Russia is to explain that our aims are selfish——

I am coming to the treaties—whose method of propaganda is to explain that our aims are selfish, or as the cant phrase is, "Imperialistic," and that Great Britain, for purely selfish objects, is prolonging the War which these Central Powers only desire to bring to an end on fair terms. A grosser travesty of the facts does not exist. The hon. Gentleman must know that no greater travesty exists, and if that is so, and I believe it to be so, it is no want of charity to him to give the explanation of his conduct which I have ventured to formulate to the House. The hon. Gentleman really appears to think that it was the bungling and blundering of the Foreign Office, or the War Cabinet, which prevented Russia being at this: moment whole-heartedly on the side of the Allies. There is no possible foundation for that statement. It is not my business—it would be quite improper if I were to attempt to give a survey of the movement of Russian thought and Russian politics since the Revolution. May I say in that connection that when the hon. Member tells us that the Russian Revolution was received in this country, and by the Government of this country, in a manner so chilling that the whole future relations between this country and Russia are likely to be marred thereby—when he tells us that—his memory completely fails him, I can answer for it as far as the Government is concerned; I believe I can answer for it as far as every section of opinion in this House is concerned. The end of autocracy in Russia was welcomed with a warmth of enthusiasm and a vividness of hope for which, unfortunately, up to the present time, there appears to have been so far little justification. But, at all events, if good wishes, warm hopes, sanguine expectations in this country were going to make the revolution in Russia a success, it ought to have been the greatest success possible, for all these feelings were warmly expressed and, I believe, were expressed by every shade of opinion in this House. Certainly it was the opinion entertained by His Majesty's Government. Conference on war aims was never refused by His Majesty's Government. There are, of course, enormous difficulties in dealing with these Conferences, and my private and personal belief is that it is probable less in formal Conferences than in friendly conversations that any discussion of these difficult and delicate matters can best be carried out.

At all events, what is felt, I think, by all Powers concerned in the War, and very largely felt, and at certain times very strongly felt by the Russian Government itself, was that this or that moment was not opportune for this particular discussion, and that what was most desirable was not so much discussion upon war aims as upon war methods. Carrying on the War was the immediate interest, the vital interest, the all essential interest. The details to which the hon. Member refers could and would, perhaps, in any case, have to wait for full consideration and discussion, for they were details. The broad objects of the War were never in doubt, the broad objects of the War have always been stated; but, no doubt, when you are dealing with a war that spreads all over the world, when you are dealing with a war the like of which has never been before, all sorts of difficult side issues necessarily arise, are always arising, and cannot be avoided. The hon. Member thinks they would not arise if you discussed them every day in the House of Commons. He is profoundly mistaken; he shows his ignorance not only of diplomacy, but of human nature and of this House. The notion that you can make, as a substitute for a friendly conversation between two Prime Ministers or two Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, or whatever it may be, a Debate carried on in public in this House is really so grotesque that, often as it has been exposed in Debate by my predecessors and by myself, Gentlemen of the robust faith of the hon. Member who has just sat down will always revive it, and will, apparently quite seriously, without the least sense of the absurdity of what they are saying, explain to the public that if only everything were said at Charing Cross with the sound of a trumpet all diplomatic difficulty would vanish.

I am sure the right hon. Gentleman does not want to misinterpret what I said. I have never made any such grotesque suggestion as he now makes. I only ask that decisions, agreements, and treaties should be submitted to the House of Commons for their sanction. That is not asking very much.

Forgive me. The hon. Member went much further than that, and as for these treaties of which he speaks, he must remember that there are two and very often, if anything, more than two concerned in these arrangements, and that it is only with the consent of those with whom you make a treaty that that treaty can be made public. The hon. Member would like a system under which, you enter into a treaty, and whether your co-treaty maker agrees or does not agree, you should give it to the world. The hon. Member seems to think that we have indulged in illegitimate, even in criminal secrecy, in our proceedings, and he attempts to justify the questions put in this House upon foreign policy by himself and his friends. I frankly admit that that may be the explanation of some of the questions put in this House, but if the hon. Gentleman will look through these questions, as it has been my duty to look through them every Parliamentary day during the time that the House is sitting, he will come to the conclusion, I think, that there are some Gentlemen who put questions, and some questions they put, which have not for their object the enlightening of natural and legitimate curiosity, but the deliberate desire to put questions which they know it will greatly embarrass the Government to answer.

Let us turn now for a moment and compare the broad charge which the hon. Member has made against the Government in general, and the Foreign Office in particular, with the facts which he brought forward in support of it. The broad charge he made was that when the Government, and when our friends the members of the late Government, made declarations as to the disinterested objects with which this country went into the War, they were deceiving the people, they were deceiving the Central Powers, and they were, as a matter of fact, doing something which, I think he said towards the end of his speech, "tarnished the honour of the country." I think that was the phrase, or something very like it. The statements we have made about our disinterestedness in entering the War were statements made about the policy of this Government. It is not our business to discuss the intentions of those with whom we are acting. It would be grossly impertinent to criticise their motives. We can speak, and do speak, of our own, as the President of the United States speaks for the motives which animated the great country of which he is the head.

In that respect he knows quite well that his utterances about his own country are not less true about ours. What is the proof the hon. Member brought forward that the late Government and the present Government were acting a hypocritical part when they talked about this disinterestedness? His first case was Constantinople. Apparently he thought that out of these secret treaties which the present holders of power in Petrograd have most illegitimately made public he could find a proof to show that we were acting a hypocritical part, and had really gone into the War for Imperial gains. What is his first case? His first case was Constantinople. All that episode to which he referred happened, I need hardly say, in the time of the late Government, and, in my opinion, the late Government were absolutely justified in what they did with regard to Constantinople, and in what they did for Constantinople they were doing nothing for the Imperial aims of this country.

It was the hon. Member himself who reminded me that the traditional view of those who are supposed to hold Imperialistic views in this country was that it was contrary to the interests of the British Empire that Russia should hold Constantinople. We did not make an arrangement in regard to Constantinople to carry out any British Imperialistic idea. The notion is utterly absurd. Surely it is absurd at once to anyone who has the faintest knowledge, the most superficial knowledge, of the history of British policy in the Near East. It stands on the face of it that to hand over Constantinople to the Russians is a thing which British statesmen, from the Imperialistic point of view, might acquiesce in, but would not have suggested, and certainly would never have pressed upon reluctant Allies. Is it not perfectly clear from the very statement read out by the hon. Gentleman himself that the then Russian Government made a claim to Constantinople. We were carrying on together a great struggle for a great aim, and we acquiesced. What is there in that which is in the slightest degree inconsistent with any profession of faith made either by ourselves or on our behalf by President Wilson?

What was the next point? The next point, I think, was Persia. He read out some arrangements with regard to spheres of influence in Persia, and if this part of his speech had any meaning at all, it implied that the existing spheres of influence in Persia were antagonistic to the independence of Persia, were a great outrage committed by the strong upon the weak, and were inconsistent with all the best traditions of British statesmanship. That was not the view taken by the hon. Gentleman when the arrangement between Russia and Britain with regard to Persia was made in 1907. He was at that time Private Secretary to the late Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. Sir Henry Camp-bell-Bannerman was Prime Minister, Sir Edward Grey was Foreign Secretary, and that arrangement, looked at, let me say, with considerable suspicion by the then Opposition, was carried through as a great triumph in carrying out international amity by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and Sir Edward Grey.

The right hon. Gentleman would not expect that as Private Secretary to the Prime Minister I should be able to express any sort of opinion on a subject of this kind. As a matter of fact, from the time I came into the House in 1908 until the beginning of this War, I never ceased, I am afraid, to embarrass Lord Grey with regard to this particular point of the partition of Persia into spheres of influence between Russia and Great Britain. Time after time in this House I did that.

I was not aware of that, but, of course, I accept the hon. Member's explanation. I do not in the least wish to suggest that the hon. Gentleman should have denounced Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, or have resigned his place, or done anything of that sort, because he differed in policy. I was pointing out that it was surely not legitimate that, when the party of which his chief was the leader made themselves responsible for this, he should now denounce it as utterly inconsistent with our professed war aims, though I should have thought there was no man in the history of this country who would have been more scrupulous in such matters than the late Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman.

As my right hon. Friend observes, there was no secrecy about it, and never do I remember this particular line of attack being directed against him. If that is so, it does not prove that the hon. Gentleman is wrong, but it does prove that he is rather isolated, and that before all the difficulties which now divide him from the majority of the House, when he was still an ardent member of the Liberal party, he thought this kind of arrangement absolutely consistent with all the great objects for which we are now fighting.

I then come to Italy. The hon. Gentleman says that he does not know all the arrangements made about Italy. That may be so. He says he knows, that Italy desires, and most naturally and properly desires, that there should be some rearrangement of territory in her favour. Why are we to be accused of Imperial objects because Italy, with that legitimate object of her own, associates herself with those great and general objects to which President Wilson and the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Asquith) and others have given such free and such lucid expressions? What is there in that which is inconsistent, and which shows that the country is using one language in public and another language in private? What is there in that to show that, under the shelter of secret deplomacy, this country is pursuing certain selfish ends while publicly announcing those general and most far-reaching desires for mankind? Is not that true of Poland and Alsace-Lorraine, the other two points on which the hon. Gentleman spoke? He said, "What is clear from these secret treaties?" It is clear that the late Czar of Russia, while expressing explicitly the policy of forming an independent Poland, said that, as far as that part of Poland which was and is a part of the Russian Empire was concerned, it was a question of domestic policy. He may have been right, or he may have been wrong. Did the hon. Gentleman wish us thereupon to break off relations with Russia? Did he wish us to say to Russia, "We will have no more to do with you"? The Czar had declared himself in favour of Poland. We might have wished that declaration had taken a different form, but the declaration was made explicitly, and we believed in it. Then because the Czar, not we, said that the arrangement should be a domestic matter, the hon. Gentleman comes down and says, "Look at the iniquity of secret diplomacy! Look at the bungling and the blundering of the British Foreign Office and the criminality of British statesmen, to use one language in public, and another language in their cypher telegraphic communications to their Ministers abroad! "A more futile charge and one more obviously absurd it would be very difficult to find. Let me say this about Alsace-Lorraine. The hon. Gentleman thinks that we ought to have known about M. Doumergue's proceedings at Petrograd, and he thinks so on the mere statement that it was telegraphed to London. Is not that it?

If "London" means the British Foreign Office, it was not sent to the British Foreign Office. It may possibly have been sent confidentially to M. Cambon, but of that I know nothing. We had never heard of it at all at that time. We have never expressed our approval of it, nor do I believe it represents the policy of successive French Governments who have held office during this War. Never did we desire, and never did we encourage the idea, that a bit of Germany should be cut off from the parent State, and erected into some kind of independent Republic or independent Government of some sort on the left bank of the Rhine, so as to make a new buffer State between France and Germany. That was never part of the policy of His Majesty's Government. His Majesty's Government were never aware that was seriously entertained by any French statesman, and the notion that on such a flimsy foundation as that we are to be charged with want of faith, want of directness, want of honesty and fair dealing, and want of legitimate diplomacy shows the animus of the hon. Gentleman. Let him believe me, it shows nothing else.

I think that I have gone through all the points of the hon. Gentleman's speech. He ended by saying that the Central Powers—that is the way he puts it—"have taken advantage of our obscurity in stating our war aims." There is no obscurity in stating our war aims. The obscurity, if "obscurity" is the word, is the obscurity of the Central Empires. As the hon. Gentleman who spoke first, and I think even the hon. Gentleman himself admitted, we have stated our war aims. The charge against us through the greater part of the hon. Gentleman's speech was not that we have not stated our war aims, but that we have stated them falsely. We have stated them, and we have stated them truly. The Central Powers have not stated them at all. How then can the hon. Gentleman come down, and in an assembly of his own countrymen, draw a comparison between the way in which we are treating our public and the way in which the Central Empires are treating their public?

Let him look at the answer given by Germany to the Pope's Note, an answer which was heralded for days, and I think for weeks, in the German Press as an answer that would throw a blazing illumination upon the European situation. This anxiously expected reply came. As far as I remember, it literally consists of only two parts. The first part consists of a long explanation of the extreme anxiety of the German Emperor and the German Government to preserve and maintain peace, an explicit statement that he was not responsible for the War, and a general travesty of the diplomatic history of the last few years which makes it unique among public records. The second part consists of a profession of extreme anxiety that a League of Nations to secure peace should be established.

Up to this War, and until it suited them diplomatically, the Germans have been the people who have stood in the way of every reform in international relations. It was they who refused absolutely to imitate the United States and ourselves in encouraging treaties for arbitration. It was they who refused to discuss disarmament at The Hague. Their whole policy, and the writings of all their important men have been of one tenor in that respect, and as for the professions made in this singular document, which I fear are empty, it is quite obvious that they are made for diplomatic reasons. They are guarded by phrases which will prevent their ever being inconvenient to those who make them, and they form a fitting epilogue to that strange prologue I have already described to the House in which the Emperor declares that for all time he has been a lover of peace, and has no responsibility for the present War. That is the answer to the Pone. There is nothing about terms; there is nothing about peace. The Pope asked explicit questions about Alsace-Lorraine, Belgium, and Poland. All of them might surely have provoked a reply from the Powers which have taken Alsace-Lorraine, which have invaded Belgium, and which have divided Poland. They do not concern us immediately and directly. We are not concerned with that history. We are not the criminals. We are not the people who are preventing the Pope's objects from being carried out. The criminals are the Central Powers. They might have said something about those objects. Not a word; and, with that document in his hand, the hon. Gentleman turns to us, and says, "How comes it that you do not talk about your war aims? Your silence is being misunderstood by the Central Powers." The folly of these statements is exceeded only by the mischief that they do. I profoundly regret that the hon. Gentleman has taken advantage of his position in this House to make a speech possibly intended to damage His Majesty's Government—which is quite immaterial—undoubtedly contrived to add strength to every particle of that mendacious and untiring propaganda which the Central Powers are carrying on in every country in Europe.

We have listened to a very able duel between an hon. Member who since entering this House has never ceased to attack the Foreign Office and the ablest representative of the Foreign Office that we have had in this House during the War. It is unfortunate that on this critical occasion the discussion should degenerate into a duel between a critic of secret diplomacy and a defender of that secret diplomacy. We want from my hon. Friend opposite and we want from the right hon. Gentleman, not arguments which will help their old-standing squabble, but arguments which will help this country in its present need. Whether those treaties that have been made public in Russia are good or bad matters now comparatively little. We can discuss that after the War. We can then discuss secret or open diplomacy. I do not think that the Foreign Office itself, although their defence has been so ably brought forward to-day, are very well satisfied with their record in the past, and I do not think that some of the points made by my hon. Friend are very fair as directed against a Government attempting to carry on a war, although they may be thoroughly justified against any Government which makes such treaties in times of peace. What we have to face is the situation at the present moment. That situation does demand treatment quite unlike the speech made by the right hon. Gentleman this afternoon. Let us be perfectly frank. Our difficulty in stating our aims is because we do not want to give up the chance of getting something which victory may give us in the future. That is the honest way of putting it. That affects the Germans just as much as ourselves. We saw, before the attack upon Italy, the Centre Party's terms and the Majority Socialists' terms. We have seen them since, and they have revised their aims. They are allowing Tirpitz a freer hand. That is the difficulty all contending nations will have to face.

At the present moment we ourselves might drop that difficulty altogether. It is common knowledge to everybody in this House that, as a matter of fact, America is going to call the tune. America is not bound by any agreement to come out of this War only with its Allies. America has a free hand. America is the main support of the Allies at the present moment. If America goes out of the War, we shall have to stop too. That is absolutely patent to everybody. That shows the unreality of whatever terms we may put forward. We are more or less bound by the terms that President Wilson will accept. Therefore I say that the declarations that President Wilson makes in those magnificent messages of his are of incalculably more importance than any declarations made either here or in France or in Italy. We all want to get certain aims. We all have very legitimate aims. I do not say that the Italian ambition with regard to Dalmatia is illegitimate. We may point to our expenditure of blood and treasure, but it is a question of what appears right to the President of the United States that is really the critical feature in all questions of peace terms. Speaking as a Liberal, I am bound to say that I prefer the terms adumbrated by President Wilson to those that we have had from any speakers in this country, because I feel they are animated by the Liberal ideals in which I have been brought up.

I am glad of the attitude taken up by President Wilson for another reason. I have stated that America is, in my opinion, the controlling Power in peace terms. We know, and we never knew it better than at the present time, that during our lifetime and for the succeeding century of history of mankind, we are perforce bound up with the Americans—bound to them in the firmest of all alliances, because only by standing together, by having aims which are united, and by carrying on a united policy, shall we be able to face the German menace in the years to come. It is not only an alliance of ideals, but an alliance of necessity. Therefore, it is all the more urgent, that our speakers here should approach ever more nearly to the terms adumbrated by President Wilson. I think the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made a slight error in telling the House that all the speakers who had spoken for England had said the same thing throughout the War. There are certainly within my recollection two slightly unfortunate speeches made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Trinity College (Sir E. Carson), one of them connected in some way with the Rhine and the other unfortunately attacking President Wilson's principal plank, the League of Nations. It would have been more advisable that those speeches should not have been so explicit. I am bound to say that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has himself always supported that main plank in President Wilson's proposal.

It seems to me that on the League of Nations the whole hope of the future of the world depends. The sooner we get that League of Nations in operation the better. There is no need to wait until the end of the War. We ought to encourage at the earliest possible moment the establishment of machinery in the ranks of the Allies for working out the peace problem, and that could not be done better than by an embryonic League of Nations. What, for instance, will be the natural solution of a struggle which might not end in victory for either side? Surely the natural result of any such struggle will be what the Labour party calls the super-nationalisation of the various territories in dispute. If you cannot decide as between the two contending parties whether some particular territory is to belong to one or the other, there are two solutions: one is to divide it in half, and the other is to vest that territory in a super-national organisation. We cannot say for certain that the super-national organisation will make a success of its government of its international territory, but at any rate it gives us an opportunity of getting peace, and that is the principle thing. The question of the belt of land in tropical Africa, the question of Alsace-Lorraine, the question of Poland, all these questions can be solved, given good will, on the basis of internationalisation under a League of Nations. You would thereby not only obtain peace but you would, at the same time, build up your buffer State, belonging to everybody, guaranteed by everybody, and, above all, guaranteed by the American nation. Just think what it will mean to have the guarantee of the American nation! Hitherto we have supported the white man's burden in Europe and the cause of honesty and fair dealing in Europe on our own shoulders. The burden has now become too heavy to bear. Let us do everything in our power to rope in to our assistance the inestimable support of the American public.

We know perfectly well, however much we may criticise our leaders and however much we may criticise our history in the past and throw stones at the Foreign Office, that we are essentially an altruistic nation. We have shown it in South Africa and over and over again in our history. We are going to show it in India, and in our peace terms in this War. We are an altruistic people and we have the gift of criticising ourselves. The only other nation in the world we can put on the same level with ourselves is the American Republic. Therefore, there should be a much closer union of aims between ourselves and the American Republic, and a much apter appreciation of this League of Nations idea. President Wilson might find that his hands are strengthened by the firm co-operation of this country. Like a good many of my Liberal friends, I have felt during the last year that there were two extremes of ideas permeating particularly the public officials of this country. There were a certain number of people who were jealous of the Americans, always belittling their efforts and complaining that they were late, and who were always saying that British aims could be supported qua British aims, who were always Imperialistically inclined, and who had the old vain idea of painting the map red. Running alongside that current we have the other current which represents more accurately Liberal opinion in this country, that is the desire not so much for peace, but the desire for justice among nations, and the desire for a firm union between the Republic and ourselves. Nowadays, I am thankful to say, the second party is gaining ground. The sentiment in favour of that union is stronger than it has been up till now, perhaps, because we understand the Americans better, and perhaps because we are willing to learn how little they possess of that bumptiousness and conceit of which many people thought, ignorantly, they were capable. In any case, this sentiment in favour of supporting American ideals is growing in this country.

Think how valuable it would be if we could have a statement of terms from our own Ministers and our own Government identical with the terms laid down by President Wilson. It would not merely cement the Alliance, it would not merely, as an hon. Gentleman has said, split German opinion and the German nation from top to bottom; it would also add inestimably to the morale of the people of this country and to the morale of our troops. We know quite well that the morale here is not what it was at the beginning of the War. We want to restore that morale by showing the people of this country that we are fighting because we must fight in order to get this irreducible minimum of the terms of justice adumbrated by President Wilson, with the international areas and super-national control. If we can show that we must fight for those terms, that Germany will not accept those terms, then we shall restore the morale of the people of this country. It will show them that they cannot get an easy peace, and it will show every Englishman that in order to get what they consider to be essential and the minimum for which anyone can ask, they must buckle on their harness and fight as they never fought before. The effect on the morale at home will be nothing compared with the effect on the morale of the men at the front, the men who are really suffering in this War. They are the men to whom we owe everything, for whose good courage and whose comfort and contentment, particularly their mental comfort and contentment, we ought to do everything in our power. I am not one of those who agree with Lord Lansdowne and who are inspired by his fear of a revolution or fear for his pocket. Still less do I find myself in association with Dean Inge in his admiration for the German autocracy. But those are the declarations which go out to the troops at present and which permeate the opinion of the men in the trenches and if we want to put a stop to that thoroughly undesirable spread of ideas what we have to do is to have an authoritatively and thoroughly English pronouncement on the lines of President Wilson's statement. It seems to me that in the interests of morale here, in the interests of the morale of our troops, in the interests of splitting opinion in Germany, in the interests of peace itself, it is necessary to have stated our irreducible minimum terms and to make them, in the case of all disputed questions, involve the internationalisation of territory under the control of the super-national body, the League of Nations. Having stated those terms in complete agreement with President Wilson and with the agreement and consent of the rest of our Allies, who are after all even more dependent upon America than ourselves, we must keep our teeth set and our lips firm and fight on until we get those terms. Do not let us be either up or down according as fits of depression or exaltation come along. We do not want to have variable terms. We want to get justice, we will fight till we get justice, and we will not accept anything less than justice.

I seldom address this House, but I feel that we are getting to a crisis in the country, and particularly in the conduct of affairs both at home and abroad, but especially at home, when it behoves Members of the rank and file of Parliament, especially those who claim to be the more moderate ones, not associated with any special section on these various questions, to express their views on the floor of this House. I am very sorry therefore that the admirable speech of my hon. Friend (Sir W. Collins) was so entirely eclipsed by the speech that immediately followed, that any experienced Parliamentary debater, be he the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary, every one knew would devote his reply, as indeed he did, absolutely to that speech, ignoring practically all the points which were mentioned in the more moderate speech which opened the Debate. It is my desire that in the time available before we separate for the Recess, we should have a general expression, even in short speeches, the more the better, of the general feeling, whether of agitation or of confidence, both as to our War Cabinet's diplomatic alertness abroad and its conduct of affairs as regards people at home. Therefore, before the Debate ends I hope the speech to which I have alluded, backed up as it has been by the speech we have just heard, may have a fuller and more deliberate reply than the one which the Foreign Secretary made, which after all, if you analyse it, was simply scoring debating points. We are in far too deep a crisis to devote our attention to scoring debating points or to past history. I do not want to go back two, three, five, or fifteen years. The time under review now is the last twelve months, when the present War Cabinet has been directing the affairs of the country. I feel that we who have kept silent in the House and in the country and have given our support to the Government may claim on an occasion like this from time to time to take the general situation under review.

I feel that at present, with the most disastrous collapse of Russia, weighed down by the enormous difficulties with which she has had to contend, our critics may say it is unsuitable to raise the question at all. I do not seriously think it can do any harm, and if it can do no harm it is a great responsibility to risk the benefit it may possibly do at home and abroad. I think the developments in Russia and even the revelations with regard to secret treaties free the Government of this country from any hesitation to restate their original war aims in a perfectly definite and simple form—not to say, "I agree with President Wilson," or "I agree with the late Prime Minister," but to say on behalf of the War Cabinet—a small body of five or six ought to be able to state their views—"we unanimously agree on these particular points." And let them be such as are understanded of the people as well as the neutrals and the enemy abroad. Let not the enemy or the neutrals say that they include so-and-so, which they do not. Obligations which may have arisen owing to the entry of Russia, Roumania, and Italy into the strife are to a large extent merged in the present situation, and I contend that the present time admits of a very definite, concise, and unmistakable statement of our present war aims and of the point to which we are going to continue to struggle for them. We can do that without in any way remitting, I believe it would intensify, the support which this Government would get in the country, and even in the Army. It would intensify it in the trenches if it was known definitely and absolutely what this pronouncement is. They are bewildered at present. There is a vast deal more sympathy in the country, and even in the ranks of the soldiers, with a great deal of Lord Lansdowne's letter than even this House, the Government or the public is able to appreciate owing to the present conduct of affairs, the censorship of the Press and public meetings and so on. If you organise a public meeting on Lord Lansdowne's letter, or even on President Wilson's or the ex-Prime Minister's understanding of that letter, you would probably have it broken up by a small and noisy section if you did not have the hall withdrawn for fear of smashing the furniture. That is a terrible state for people accustomed to freedom of speech to be liable to drift into. That is another reason why a clear statement is justifiable and is called for.

I do not want to go beyond what my right hon. Friend, Sir W. Collins, said, yet I cannot but feel that in the absence of any statement like this the ordinary man amongst us, much more the ordinary reader of newspapers, is apt to be misguided and to take the newspaper interpretation upon this or that speech and form his opinions accordingly. Running over in our mind the speeches which have been made by the leaders of the Government during the last few months one would be very mystified to quote any clear pronouncement in any of them. Are we to take the statements of the right hon. Gentleman (Sir E. Carson) as typifying the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Barnes)? I want to know that. We are accustomed to differences in a Cabinet of twenty-two and to some minority, but in a Cabinet of six there ought to be no minority. How can you expect success for the great war aims campaign which many of us are working at unless you have a definite lead? Are we to take the definite lead of the right hon. Gentleman (Sir E. Carson) as typifying the lines on which these meetings are going to be held? Is the borderland of Germany and the Rhine to be included? It mystifies. The common man wants to know and we want to know, and the more plainly we are told the terms that we expect to ask, both the real war aims and the ultimate settlement, it cannot but tend towards that conclusion which we all so eagerly and anxiously await. I do not see how the British public are going to be encouraged to take a firm line by such platitudes as "springing like leopards at the Huns," and that kind of expression. That is not what the British public and the working man want to keep their shoulders at the wheel. When the ordinary people in Germany—I believe there are ordinary people in Germany the same as here, only their voice is stifled—are able to quote these sayings, and say, "I told you so'," "That is what the Entente is out for," you may wait for a weary long time before you get any of that uprising of the public spirit in Germany which we at one time thought was to be a large factor in bringing the War to a close. Therefore, I beg the Government, not only in respect of the position abroad, but almost equally in respect of keeping this country solid for the purposes for which it originally went into this War, that they should make definite and clear pronouncements in these various respects.

6.0 P.M.

I feel that perhaps I had better not go further, and yet I should like to say that unless they can make some definite statement of this sort I, as a supporter for twelve months of this Coalition Government and War Cabinet, cannot have continued confidence that they are the set of men to watch the present situation from a diplomatic point of view. They are not going to sit by with their hands in their pockets and wait till Germany makes an offer, to say we are going to fight till the knock-out blow, and fight till Germany is on her knees and sues for peace. When you realise the agony and the suffering of this War and what it means, not only to this country but to many of the countries in Europe which are embroiled in it, you cannot feel that you can sit quietly with your hands in your pockets and wait till one goes to the other and says, For Heaven's sake give me peace. Germany will never say that. In a great war of this sort there comes a point when the contestants must feel that nothing can be gained by going further. Essays will be made not directly, but indirectly, and opportunities may arise. Have we in this House confidence that those five or six gentlemen, crowded with work, crowded with the direction of the War in its various phases, no doubt able to do that as well as anybody else could do it—have we the confidence that they have the time, the correct view, judged by their predilections, their sayings, their thought; and that they are in the position to give thorough and full consideration to every opportunity that may arise? We never know when they may arise. They may have arisen during the last five or six months. There may have been opportunities for bringing this War to a conclusion. We know not. It is a grave responsibility, far greater than the responsibility of the conduct of the War, which rests upon their shoulders, if they neglect one single opportunity, and the earliest opportunity, that comes in their way, for bringing about that permanent peace and those conditions which President Wilson has foreshadowed will be absolutely necessary whether we fight to a finish or whether we fight until we admit that it is finished because no one can go on any longer. I hope I have made my position plain. I could not refrain without expressing, even somewhat imperfectly, these views, and it is in no sense of light-heartedness, but with a very grave and serious feeling of the position into which we are drifting at home and abroad that I have ventured to address the House.

It is with some hesitation that I rise to address the House, because these are critical times, and it is the duty of every private Member to say nothing to embarrass the Government. I only intervene in this Debate for the purpose of urging the Government to adopt the course which I think will sustain the spirit of the nation so that it may endure until the final triumph of our cause is secured. The Foreign Secretary has said that there can be no doubt about our war aims, and that we agree with President Wilson and also with the late Prime Minister. But at the same time I feel some degree of disappointment—a disappointment which I have often felt when I have read the utterances of our leading statesmen. For instance, the right hon. Gentleman left us just as much in the dark as we were before with regard to what is supposed to be a war aim, and which has created an immense amount of suspicion, distrust, and dislike in this country, and that is the Paris Economic Conference. He said nothing to clear up the situation in regard to our objects in this respect. I believe this country is as sound as a bell in regard to our major war aims. I believe the country is absolutely unanimous to fight to the bitter end in order to pay its debt of honour to France, Belgium, Serbia, and Roumania, and the only final test of victory is when the German nation is so disillusioned of its military ambitions that it is willing to put right before might and to come into a League of Nations. I believe this nation is firm on this point, that it is futile to talk of a League of Nations while the Germans are in possession of the soil of France, Belgium, Serbia, and Roumania. If they will evacuate those countries we can begin to think of peace, but not until then.

So far I think the nation is absolutely unanimous on that point, but when you begin to add to your war aims you arouse a suspicion in the minds of the people that they are being asked to fight, not in order to make the world safe for democracy, but for plutocracy, there is suspicion and a loss of morale result. I cannot help thinking that whatever loss of morale there is is due entirely to the suspicion that this country is being asked to go on fighting, not for any high ideals, but in order that our captains of industry and our great commercial men may get a monopoly when this War is over. Dissension in this country is being caused by these unfortunate Paris Resolutions. I believe there is nothing that is tending, on the other hand, to strengthen the will of the German people more than those Resolutions. I believe with Mr. Wells that going to ask the people of this country to undergo much greater sacrifices than they have done in the past, and it is, to my mind, most imperative that the Government should reassure the people of this country what is the object for which we are fighting, how far we wish to go, and what they intend by victory and what they do not intend. Those who are asking for a restatement of our war aims are only asking the Government to take a patriotic and statesmanlike course. They have no wish to embarrass the Government in the slightest degree. They only wish that the Government, and the people who speak, shall not, as they have in the past, play into the hands of the pacifists at home and the militarists in Germany. There is no doubt that the uncertainty of our war aims has been a most valuable weapon in the hands of the German militarists, and to express the hope that the Government will cease to play into the hands of our enemies is, I think, a reasonable demand.

I want to say only a few words in regard to the last speeches. The moderation displayed by the Noble Lord is recognised. It is very difficult to differentiate the effect of his speech from the speeches of those who were prompted by more vicious feelings, for the simple reason that it is speeches of that kind which do cause the doubt which exists in this country. I believe that the war aims which the people of this country desire from one end of the country to the other are summed up in one word, which is "victory." It is no use bringing forward suggestions in this House as to whether the Government should make a further statement one way or the other. There is only one thing which our people are determined upon and that is victory by force of arms, and if we neglect to effect that it means that we are living in a fool's paradise.

All I ask the Government to do is to define whether we are to have a victory for democracy or plutocracy.

The Noble Lord may find a difficulty in understanding that we are waging a war which is a national war, not for this country, but for civilisation, and to try to divide up the country into sections of this kind is not the kind of thing one expects from the Noble Lord, and I can hardly believe that he really advocates that the Government should state, one way or another, that they are for this section or the other.

I do not want to go into that. We must realise the sincerity of the view that the whole nation ought to be united at this moment, and that any divisions of this kind are criminal in face of our national peril. The right hon. Member for Worcester (Mr. J. W. Wilson) said that he wanted to see a permanent peace brought about, but almost in the same breath he said that he did not think that could be come to now in view of the military situation.

The right hon. Gentleman indicated very clearly that he was very doubtful as to whether it would come and that, therefore, we ought to have more definite war aims. I suggest that to try to deceive the people of this country into the belief that you can have any permanent peace on the present military situation, by merely stating a few more words one way or the other, is really hoodwinking the people. The people from one length of the country to the other are not thinking only of themselves and of the sufferings they are going through—and they are bearing those sufferings as no other race has ever borne such sufferings, with a cheeriness of spirit and a unity which is amazing—they are also thinking of their children, and they know that if you throw up the sponge in the manner which has been indicated in some of the speeches, for that is what it comes to, without a decisive military victory, Germany is going to maintain her military grip over the whole of Central Europe, and he is a wise man who will suggest that once having brought that about what is to prevent Germany's next step in her programme in a few years.

With regard to the economic weapon which was mentioned by the Noble Lord, I think that perhaps we have made an error in the way we have discussed the economic issue. I think that it ought to have been a progressive economic weapon. We ought to have told our enemies long ago that for every month they proceeded with this ghastly wicked war, which they brought on this country—a fact which is sometimes forgotten by hon. Members of this House—they will be excluded from the raw materials of industry and from entering any British port for a complete year after the War. I believe that this is business, and others far greater than I hold that view. A very large number of distinguished men in the United States of America believe that we ought to have a progressive economic statement to the Central Powers at the present time, and there I think you might state more definitely and clearly your war aims—that until Germany accepts our terms, then for every month she continues this War you will for a complete year after the War exclude her from the markets of the British Empire and from the United States. There is nothing, in my opinion, that can do more harm to our cause than all these speeches which are repeatedly made of this nagging description against the Government. Heaven knows that the Foreign Secretary has got a difficult enough task without having the kind of innuendoes which have been made in these speeches. The hon. Gentleman says that he withdraws his support from the Government. I venture to hope——

That he had supported the Coalition Government for months, and if this thing went on with due responsibility he could no longer support it.

For a little longer he was going to support it and then he might have to withdraw his support altogether. It would be a good thing if a few more of those who speak in this manner would openly withdraw their support from the Government and would persuade the Government to do what has been done in Canada—put this issue to the test of an election. I say this because there are numerous Gentlemen in this House who take the view that it is quite right to make speeches of the description which we have heard this afternoon. They may be right; they may represent the country; but if there is any doubt about it, and the Government are sniped at in this manner by hon. Gentlemen in various parts of the House, then you have the lesson of Canada. You have seen a most remarkable thing happen there. Whole provinces, which previously had gone to one particular party, standing by the appeal for unity—the whole of the States of Saskatchewan and Manitoba, and also Alberta and British Columbia—and only in one province of Canada is there any substantial following at all against the Union Government, and that is the province in which the people fear Conscription. The Government should take note of that lesson. It should realise that the people of this country are just as determined as the people of Canada, The people of Canada are determined to send reinforcements to the troops at the front. This wonderful example ought to hearten the Government; and if, with that example before us, it finds any difficulty of any description in this House, the only wise course is to appeal to the people of this country and get a mandate for victory, which it will get by a majority which will surprise it.

I do not want to be led away from the one or two topics on which I would like to speak by the remarks just made to the House. The hon. Member for Christchurch, as a Tariff Reformer, is always bound to drag that subject into his speech.

He has got it in in the speech which he has just made, and he wants to strengthen his arguments by appealing to the Colonies, to see if he can get any support from them. That is an undesirable and highly improper thing to do. The elections in Canada have not been held on the issue whether the Canadian Government should or should not support the War. They have been held on one point only—as the hon. Member knows perfectly well—compulsory military service. A large number of those who voted against the Government are just as patriotic and keen for carrying on the War as those who voted for it. The ex-Prime Minister of Canada ought to know his own mind as well as the hon. Member. The ex-Prime Minister of Canada is as loyal and patriotic as the hon. Member, if not a great deal more useful.

Any Member rising to take part in this Debate who ventures to offer a word of criticism of the Government must feel great diffidence in speaking, and must be extremely anxious—as I am—that nothing which he says should in the smallest way interfere with the harmony and the unity which we want to see in this country. But I do think it is quite possible to have honest differences of opinion as to what the war aims of this country should be, and if we express these differences, we ought not to incur the odium of being described as less patriotic than those who happen to be expressing war aims which are, perhaps, for the moment held by the majority of people in this country. I think that most of us who have had some hesitation in being able to record full approval of war aims as they have been expressed in various speeches by members of the Cabinet during the last year have been silent and have been rightly silent. But at the same time I think that there does come a time when it is our duty to speak quite plainly and quite moderately, and to try to show, not that we are faltering in the very least in our support of the Government, or that we have changed our view as to the necessity of carrying this War to a victorious conclusion. But we have a right to try to make plain what are the aims for which we think the country is making this great sacrifice, and if we think that the aims which the country ought to pursue are not the aims which the Government are pursuing, I think that we have a right to state that plainly. I think that the war aims which the Government and the country seek ought to be stated in greater detail, and that the possibilities of sacrifice on the part of this country in one way or another, and as to the sacrifice of countries which may enter a future peace conference, there should be something said under that head, so as to free this country from being supposed in neutral countries, and even among its own Allies, to be seeking advantages which are not equitable advantages.

I agree that in the difficult military situation in which we are placed the present is not, perhaps, the most desirable moment. But at the same time I feel that the political considerations which have come into view as the result of what has happened in Russia do make it necessary that these aims should be described, and should be described anew, for the reason that the Russian defection makes it necessary, and if it has made it necessary it seems to me that to postpone saying plainly what alterations the Russian defection has made in our view and in our war aims is to do something which is inadvisable and which may prolong the War. It seems to be desirable that we should as soon as possible make perfectly plain to our enemies, and to the world, the alteration of our own mind and of our own intention in regard to those questions which the Russian situation has altered. I am one of those who feel that the refusal to allow the Stockholm Conference to take place was a mistake, and I say that not in the smallest degree because I am in any agreement with the few pacifist Members of the House, but on the ground that I feel so convinced that if the deputations from the various countries had attended that Conference and had met the German minority or majority Socialists the democratic representatives of England, France and Russia would have made plain to the German representatives what they regard as the just objects of the War.

There is always room for disagreement in minor matters, but I think that there would have been no difficulty at all in the Labour representatives of the Allied Powers agreeing as to what in the main were their objects in this War. I believe that the result would have been to send the German delegates back with a much truer idea of what the democratic view was in these countries. I think it most unfortunate that that leaven which they might have put into Germany was not allowed to be put there. If it had been, I cannot help feeling that it would have gradually worked and tended in the long run to strengthen those sections in Germany which are more favourable to fair conditions, and to a peace which would be a peace in which this country and its Allies could take part. I think that the Government's action on that matter was unfortunate. I much regret what took place afterwards. I do not for a moment attribute Kerensky's downfall to what took place in that matter, but I do think that it was a contributing cause, and, in so far as it was a contributing cause, it did a great deal of damage to our prospects. In the first place, as to what we think might be done by the Government in regard to a plain statement of war aims, I think that in regard to all territories which Great Britain has been able to conquer or annex during the time the War has continued, a plain statement is certainly due from the Government. It ought to be stated whether in any peace conference, in which we may take part in the future, every inch of that land is going to be placed, so to speak, on the table and is going to be part of the matters discussed at that peace conference, the destiny of which that conference has got to settle. Unless there is a plain statement on this matter this country is under the suspicion, not only of the enemy but of neutrals and Allies, and it is absolutely essential, from the point of view of honesty, equity, and the obtaining of a peace which would be acceptable to the world and would be a lasting peace, that we should approach that conference in that way and that we should say now plainly while the War continues that we are all fully agreed that all such matters as these are to be dealt with at the peace conference. It may be said in reply, "Of course they are." But that is not what the hon. Member for Christchurch would say. It is not what a great many people think, and I do think myself that large numbers of persons in the enemy countries feel that this country is not going to take up that attitude.

Personally, I agree fully that now that America is an Ally in this War that attitude will be taken up. There is no shadow of doubt about it. All of us, of course, hold a high opinion of our own country of its honesty, and of its equity, and of the spirit in which it would enter upon a peace conference. Still, I do not see any objection to a plain statement on a matter of this kind being made. I think it might be made, and that it would do great good. In this, the fourth year of the War, there are still people in this country who decry the democracies of enemy countries, but I submit that we must realise the duty of trying to change their outlook, and it is on that ground that I believe a plain statement should be made in regard to our position to-day. I believe that such a statement would have a great effect, perhaps not quickly, but gradually, on the minds of large numbers of persons in enemy countries as well as in neutral countries. In my view it would be well if our Allies, also, plainly stated their aim about all the countries which have been occupied by them. I think we all realise that the rights of various countries in Europe were a matter which, in the early days of the War, we were apt to treat as if the Allies would decide what was to happen in regard to them. I think we are now inclined, and, indeed, that we are all agreed, that the large countries are not going to decide what happens in small countries, but that, under the peace we wish to obtain, the small countries will decide for themselves what is to happen to them. I think that is a point which also might be stated plainly.

There is one other matter to which I wish to refer, and it has reference to the speeches which have been made, not so much by the present Prime Minister or Members of the Cabinet, but by the ex-Prime Minister, in the earlier days of the War, in regard to Austria and the Balkan States. At that time a good many of us—the number was rather larger than it is now—had expectations about Russian help and sympathy—a large part of which we now know we shall never get—and we thought we should be able to do great things in the Balkans. We talked calmly about dividing Austria up, according to races living there, and we talked in the same way about the Balkan States. The ex-Prime Minister was one of those who made speeches of that kind. I think everyone will realise that the defection of Russia and the military and political position in that part of the world have made all those speeches to which I refer out of date. We have not any of us those hopes and not even those desires, knowing that the desires cannot be fulfilled, that we had in the earlier years of the War. We have no expectation of dealing with any of those questions in the way in which the ex-Prime Minister hoped to deal with them. That being so, when we know that there is a very strong feeling in Austria about these speeches, and when we know that we shall have to put these things out of our programme, I think it would be well to say so boldly and plainly. I cannot see any harm that would be done by it, and the friction, the unnecessary sense of grievance and doubt on the part of the Austrian people, might as well be got rid of. It cannot do us any harm to get rid of it; indeed, I think it would do very much good.

Another point has reference to the speech which the Prime Minister made last week, in which he referred to the Lansdowne letter, and said that what we wanted was victory. But I submit that we ought to have in view, what I believe to be the fact, that whatever was the feeling of the German people in the early days of the War, their feeling to-day is not precisely what it was in 1914. While one is anxious to help one's own country, and to perform all the duties and humbly do all the work we are able to do, yet, at the same time, we must take a logical and practical view of the change which it is fairly conceivable has been made in the minds of the German people, and of peoples in other parts of the world. If we look around England to-day, and compare the views on all sorts of questions held in 1914, it will be found that they are greatly different from those which are held to-day. In the same way, that may be true of Frenchmen, and I cannot see, therefore, why we should insist that the people of Germany and Austria in 1917 have precisely the same character and mentality as they had in 1914. The effect of events on the Germans and Austrians, and of the peoples in all enemy countries, but I think especially on the Germans, who have gone through as severe a test as any human beings on the face of the earth have ever been through, must have produced nothing short of a mental revolution. They have, as we know, been rationed from the early days of the War, and they have been under an iron discipline. No one can doubt the self-sacrifice which the ordinary German man and woman has had to make, or the hardships they have been subjected to during the last three or four years. It is argued that their opinion of their Government, of the Junker class, and of their military system is now what it was in 1914. It seems to me that must be in the very nature of things something which is utterly untrue. The Prime Minister spoke of a victory which will be so decisive, so overwhelming and so crushing to the economic life of Germany and the whole life of Germany, as to leave them unable, if they desired, to break their treaties. To ask for such a victory is to ask for that which is not a reasonable victory, or an attainable victory. It is not a victory we can expect to get, nor is it a victory for which we should continue the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of lives in order to attain.

The definition of victory is, of course, an extremely difficult thing, but I should regard victory as having been attained when I had evidence that the mind of the people in enemy countries had been sufficiently affected by all that had gone on to render them willing to now accept terms that they were not willing to accept years ago. I do not pretend to know, but I believe that when the Prime Minister advocates a kind of peace which can only be secured by an overwhelming victory of the kind he describes, when that is the sort of victory he puts before the country, I do not think that is a prospect which large numbers of English people consider to be the true goal in the circumstances of the time. We shall have eventually to regard the German people as having changed their views, though the actual German Government may not be changed. We shall eventually have to attend a peace conference, and at that peace conference we shall have to trust our enemies, or there will be no peace. The Government is asking the people for sacrifices for a victory, the definition of which is too vague and does not define the objects and aims for which the War is to be continued with sufficient clearness. In conclusion, I urge that we should be clear in regard to these three points: We ought to have a plain statement in regard to the territorial claims which we and our European Allies make; a clear statement as to Austria, and the Balkan States; and, in regard to our own people, it ought to be made plain by the Prime Minister what he means by victory, and, in discussing all these matters, I do not think it would be reasonable to leave out of account the change which the logic of bitter events has made in the views of the German people.

I desire to say a word or two on the situation which has arisen from the letter of Lord Lansdowne. It appears to me that letter is directed to the situation in a way that is desirable, for it has led to a wide discussion of war diplomacy, and we have seen to-day the result in the intervention in this Debate of many Members who have not hitherto taken part in Debates on war aims. I am one of those who think we cannot exaggerate the place of diplomacy in the conduct of the War. I attach myself to the dictum of Sir William Robertson, that the factors which contribute to success in war are not mainly military: they are, in a larger degree, factors of a moral kind, and any debate like this, conducted almost entirely without heat, is a contribution which seems to me desirable. The Lansdowne letter, it appears to me, has been largely misunderstood. It appeared in only a small number of papers, and it was, strangely enough, regarded as conveying the opinion—taken up by many in this country—that we should not adhere to the total restora- tion of all the land at present in the hands of the enemy. That appears an extraordinary reading to place upon the letter, but so it is. In those who have followed the letter closely it has raised the question in their minds whether Lord Lansdowne is right that a restoration policy, a policy which he seems to imply to be right, is a sound basis for future security or not. Lord Lansdowne has made a break in public opinion by suggesting that question to many minds, and though he did not define that his aim would be a restoration peace, he seemed to imply it by defining declarations of a negative character. Personally, I do not want to join in any demands for explicit, complete, and positive declarations of war aims. I think the declaration of last January was not fortunate, and that what is required, as has been urged by the last speaker, is negative declarations on the main points. As one who has always loyally done my best to support the War, I think that in this House there is no difference of opinion as to restoration. There is no one I know in the House who does not think that we ought to fight to the last for the total defeat of the enemy aggression. There is no one so pacifist as to think that a settlement ought to be made which left in the hands of the enemy any of the countries he has conquered."

Why restoration, to my mind, as suggested by Lord Lansdowne, is a sound basis of settlement is, because, as I see it, what we ought to have in view in the settlement is not the vindication of our honour so much as security and stability in the future. There is a general feeling, I think, still abroad that a restoration settlement would not be an adequate punishment to the enemy to secure a stable settlement. The Government, at all events, reject the idea. What is the reason why the Government attacks the Lansdowne letter and attempts to blacken it as a pacifist utterance, when in fact it expresses what the Prime Minister said, I think at Glasgow in August, when he used the words, "Let the enemy give us restoration, and then we will talk." It is evident that the extremist forces in the Cabinet have been too much for the Prime Minister, and that the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Trinity College has spiked the guns of the moderates by demanding the left bank of the Rhine. At all events, the Government does not accept the idea of demanding a restoration peace. The policy pur- sued, therefore, must be called an aggressive policy. Now, an aggressive policy is not content with restoration, and it is uniting German feeling in support of the military gang. The new German Chancellor, no doubt, represents in some degree the rise of the moderate forces in Germany, but his hands will be tied if such utterances as I have alluded to continue. In fact, we are blocking the way by such utterances to the American policy of relying upon the rise of the German democracy. The Government is resisting pressure towards a purely restoration peace not only by recent utterances, but because the menace of economic strangulation and the dismemberment of Austria remain in our programme. We are in that absolutely at variance with the American statement that "punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues" are inexpedient. If we have aims which are not satisfied by restoration it seems to me to be pertinent to ask what are the aims to which we ought to be attached. If we have aims which are not satisfied by restoration, and if they are supported by argument and shown to be necessary to security, I should be the last to refuse to support them, because I am by no means for any terms which are not deliberately calculated to give security.

The arguments against aggressive aims going beyond a restoration peace appear to me to be overwhelming. The first, I think, is that America is against it, and, as the hon. and gallant Member for Newcastle (Commander Wedgwood) has pointed out, we are not able to resist the strong views of America upon war aims. It is against them definitely on the question of Austria. I think it is highly probable that it is against them on the question of Alsace-Lorraine. I do not think the Foreign Secretary will tell us that in our views upon Alsace-Lorraine we are supported by the American Government. I am quite sure he would not venture to make that assertion. If we make claims which we afterwards withdraw, it must be to an extent humiliating to us. It is certainly humiliating that the threat of the boycott policy embodied in the Paris Resolutions was virtually withdrawn under American pressure. Aggressive aims are objectionable, because they assist the enemy. Nothing is more gratifying to the Junker party than such utterances as have been made by extreme men, and nothing more useful to them in maintaining their power. The revelations of the Bolo case make it impossible for anyone to be blind to that. German money was used to promote violent utterances in France, because they were useful in uniting the German people. Pacifist movements here are not of any profit to the Junkers of Germany. They encourage the moderate and anti-Junker forces. Our diplomacy, like that of America, ought to aim at injuring the Junkers by bringing the Moderates to the top. Our own yellow Press, like the French yellow Press, whether subsidised by German gold or not, has undoubtedly contributed to the Junkers some very useful material. It has played the game played by the "Journal" and the "Rappel," which were subsidised, by German gold. Our own yellow Press is more accommodating still to the Huns, in that it varies wild aims with detailed demonstrations of British weakness, constantly exaggerating things which it is quite unnecessary to proclaim to the world, such as the supposed revolutionary disaffection and demoralisation by air raids.

If we recall the wild aims in which we indulged in the early days of the War we see how opinion is verging now towards a restoration peace. It has moved quite a long way, and ultimately will move further. It has been driven largely by military facts, and, although that is rational enough, it is a thing I personally find no sympathy with, because it is on the ground of intrinsic merits that an anti-annexationist and restoration settlement, in my opinion, ought to be advocated. I have in this House argued in detail the objections against Colonial annexation and against the dismemberment of Austria. But will the Government tell us what aims it is really attached to? Public opinion, is not attached, and no one will say it is attached, to definite aims of annexation. The Jingo Press is already complaining that large sections of opinion are against such aims. For which of these aggressive aims is the Government holding out? If you are against a restoration peace you must ultimately be for some form of annexation, but we are not offered any argument for annexations anywhere. The real reason for resisting restoration aims is with some people a mere intuitive instinct, desiring to avenge our honour and dignity, while others hold the belief that without a dictated peace the future will not be secured. This is really the fundamental and important question—and I think the service Lord Lansdowne renders is in bringing that question much more under public discussion—the question of German psychology in the event of one kind of settlement or another. We are fighting for security. The Prime Minister said we must fight so that never again will war occur, and that we must stop the moment we have guarantees. How does Lord Lansdowne differ from that?

7.0 p.m.

It is a vital point to leave German feeling hostile to war. No one supposes that purely material guarantees, however successfully we pulverise the German military machine, will be of permanent value in preventing the resuscitation of German military force. Everyone admits that if the War stops a very long period will elapse before another war could take place. There is fatigue, disgust of war, exhaustion, and also the overwhelming forces which will belong to the Powers on whose side is America. The idea of security based on the balance of material power through the crushing defeat of Germany does not really appeal to rational people. In fifty years, or even in twenty-five years, the grouping of the Powers will unquestionably change, probably not once, but more than once. To-day, too little thought, it seems to me, is given to this central question. Upon the answer to it is based our decision to continue the War lather than to seek a restoration peace, which probably has been obtainable if we definitely sought it at two or three different periods in the last two years. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee (Mr. Churchill) came nearest to grips with this problem not long ago when he asked at the Aldwych Club what the Junkers would say if the German frontiers were preserved. That is the point—how far the Junker propaganda will go down with the German people under one set of conditions or the other. The Prime Minister brought us nearer to this question when he laid it down that Germany must not gain by the War. That is a good test. If the War ends with the German frontiers intact—I do not mean restoration in exact details everywhere, but in principle and on the whole—will the German public feel that Germany has gained? That is really the question that the Prime Minister asked. It seems to me that it is a matter of German psychology. The central question of all is one for very expert knowledge. There is in this country a great stock of expert knowledge, but I feel doubtful whether the Government has made full use of that expert knowledge that it has access to. To my mind, you want on this point such experts as Sir William H. Dawson, the best-known writer on German subjects. Here, it seems to me, you want a Commission of Inquiry on this detailed question of German psychology. The Government has various Departments which study the German Press, and some of them overlap each other. But does it base its view, which is really at the bottom of our decision to continue the War, on a deliberately calculated estimate of the effects upon German psychology of one set of terms or another in the future leading to stability? Two rival theories lead to two different conclusions. The first would be that the more Germany is humiliated the less will the Junkers succeed in the future. The other would be if we are to avoid leaving the Germans with immense losses, the losses accruing from the War, giving them material by which the Junkers will arouse a public sense of revenge—in that way the best conditions will be produced for their failure in the future to obtain support.

May I draw an analogy? These theories are familiar really in British history. They have been applied, and been the subject of great political controversies long ago in regard to Canada, and particularly in the recent past in regard to South Africa. They have been advanced, it is true, in the past by different parties; but it is recognised that the second principle, the principle which relies upon the avoidance of materials for the revival of revenge, has been the principle which by common consent has succeeded. We may fairly, I think, draw the analogy from the South African question upon this point. Those are rival principles which in the main have been discussed and been applied to British policy in the past. No one denies that if the purely humiliating plan, the naturally instinctive plan, had been applied to South Africa we should during the War have been in a position of terrible danger. However that may be, the Allies are moving by degrees to a peace based on restoration. They are doing so more or less under the necessity partly of conviction and the increase of thought of what would really minister to security. They ought to have arrived at that con-elusion on a basis of actual war aims. Men without real statesmanship say that war aims depend on the degree of success that we can obtain. Surely that proves that they have not a calculated idea of the conditions which would be most likely to produce security? Whatever idea we possess of the way to produce security we ought to be ready with it. If the Allies had had co-ordinated their diplomacy and from the first had aimed their policy at security, giving their best, cool judgment to the real welfare of the future, they would have attained their ends, because the restoration of peace has been probably accessible at several periods, and is probably accessible, if persistently pursued, in the not distant future. Their policy has been the cause of the disasters which have come with the prolongation of the War. If it be true that the restoration of peace would have been the best basis of settlement, and that it might have been attained two years ago, what, then, are we to think of the disasters which have occurred to Serbia, Roumania, Russia, and Italy, not to speak of the general exhaustion?

History will almost certainly record that the War ended with something like a restoration settlement, and that the same end could probably have been obtained months, or even years, sooner. To my mind, if we can obtain a humiliating settlement, it would not be worth the cost; it would not give us such good security. If, then, restoration is available, it is surely at least a part of sanity to consider the terms available, because simple restitution, upheld by the Prime Minister the other day, is our object. Undoubtedly it appears to Lord Lansdowne—and to others—that that is the thing at which we ought to aim, as supplying the best condition of a future peace.

It would not be unprofitable, perhaps, to ask ourselves what were our original war aims. They are not those of the Allies. Perhaps it is not very profitable to consider what were the war aims of Russia, or France, or Italy? Better to ask ourselves what we started out to obtain. Have we attained our object? If not, there is a call upon us to continued and increased effort! I venture to give the House a version of the reasons for our entrance into the quarrel, as they were understood by me at the very outset. In imagination I wish to take hon. Members once more to 3rd August, 1914. We all remember that day. I remember coming up by an early train to get my usual seat in the House. When I arrived here I saw an avalanche of cards upon the seats, and what I had never seen before, a number of chairs in the centre of the floor of the Chamber. I had to be content with a seat on the cross-benches behind, technically outside the House. From there I heard every word in that most momentous statement made by Sir Edward, now Lord, Grey. That utterance was most ominously deliberate, with no rhetorical phrase; the whole of it marvellously precise. Allow me to quote one powerful passage from that speech. The speaker said:

Why are we at war? Why do we continue to put our best into it? We are at war for the sake of Belgium. We continue to put our very best into it because of the generous and noble impulses which have been stirred in all our hearts by her heroic and self-sacrificing stand for liberty. Therefore, I submit that we entered into this quarrel with two war aims, and two only, both of them unselfish. The first one was to defend the undefended Northern and Western coasts of France, and the second was that, at all hazards, we were determined to stand by Belgium and by our pledged word. We have largely fulfilled number one. We have defended the Northern and Western coasts of France, and I submit that our Navy has to complete their good work by sinking or capturing every enemy vessel. It should be a point of honour with the Navy that not a solitary U boat or warship that comes out of Zeebrugge or any other port ever returns to the base whence it sailed. The whole brood of vipers that are at large must be exterminated, or otherwise accounted for, without mercy and without mistake. The war aim that I recommend to the Admiralty is, Sink U boats; sink more U boats; sink still more U boats; sink every U boat. With regard to the second war aim, we are bound to confess that we have made little progress in freeing Belgium. Belgium is still under the heel of the invader; the rod of the oppressor is still unbroken; her Refugees are still in our midst.

It is a stubborn fact, and it is no use blinking our eyes to it, that Germany—at least her present rulers and war lords—will not renounce one square yard that she can hold either in the Balkans, or Poland, or Russia, or France, or Belgium, and, to do her justice, she does not expect us to renounce any of our conquests. But Germany knows no argument except that of the mailed fist. We have been reminded this afternoon by my hon. Friend who introduced this discussion that President Woodrow Wilson in the United States Senate on 22nd January said "that it must be a peace without victory." Now that is a hard saying—who can bear it?—especially when Dr. Wilson has reserved to himself all the rights of interpretation. But one feels constrained to say that there will be no peace in this War without defeat, and I venture to think that the Kaiser, the President and Parliament will agree. The War must go on until one set of belligerents is defeated, or at least convinced that it can no longer stave off defeat in the long run, and, therefore, asks for peace. Therefore, I recommend to the War Office that their war aim should be to drive the German armies out of Belgium. I agree with Sir Douglas Haig that the decision in this War will come to pass on the Western Front, and we want to concentrate upon that. We are in a better position to-day to concentrate upon it than ever we have been up to now. We have got Egypt, we have got Baghdad, we have got Jerusalem, we have got every German colony, including East Africa. The sooner Germany is driven out of Belgium the sooner the War will be ended, the sooner we shall have peace, and we are not likely to have it before—that is, of course, humanly speaking. But we all acknowledge that it is God that "maketh wars to cease unto the end of the earth; He breaketh the bow, and cutteth the spear in sunder; He burneth the chariot in the fire." Again, I say, Remember Belgium! If, at the end of the War, we have gained the whole world of German colonies, and have not set Belgium free, we shall have lost our soul, and our names will descend to posterity unwept, unhonoured—dishonoured!—and unsung.

I do not intend to follow my hon. Friend opposite in the line of argument he has taken, but I rise mainly to ask whether there is to be any reply from the Government to the Debate as a whole. We had the pleasure of listening to a speech from the Foreign Secretary after two hon. Members had addressed the House, and he devoted his speech exclusively to a reply to my hon. Friend the Member for the Stirling Burghs (Mr. Ponsonby). Now, I think every Member of the House was impressed by the very able and very eloquent speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Derby (Sir W. Collins). He has been followed, of course, by a number of hon. Members who have represented the same point of view to the Government and to the House. In every case the view has been put with studious moderation and with the keenest desire to say nothing which would embarrass the Government in the conduct of the War or which could, by any stretch of the imagination render comfort to the enemy. I hope that it may be possible for the Leader of the House, who has listened to the greater part of this Debate, to say something authoritatively upon this subject matter. I have only once before ventured to address the House in the course of a Debate upon war aims, and on that occasion, though a fairly regular and persistent critic of the Government, I was able to agree entirely with what the Foreign Secretary said. He then demurred to any definite statement of war aims, and I think at that time his argument was conclusive. He said that the definite war aims would be ultimately determined by the balance of forces at the conclusion of the War, and that we should be content with the general statement of war aims which had been put forward by the late Prime Minister.

Now the situation seems to me to have been changed. There are two new factors in the situation, which, it seems to me, it is impossible for the Government to ignore. The first of these is the publication of the secret treaties by the present de facto Government of Russia. I am not going to express any opinion on the wisdom or folly of these treaties. I am quite willing to admit that at the time these treaties were made it was probably advisable for the contracting parties to make these treaties in the interests of the Alliance as a whole; but, undoubtedly, the circumstances under which these treaties were made no longer exist. In one important respect there has been a complete revolution in the situation. One of the principal parties to these treaties has ceased to exist as a Government, and, in the second place, the country which that Government represented is no longer an active belligerent. I think this fundamental alteration of the situation makes it necessary for us to have a fresh statement in relation to these secret treaties. But there is more than that. These secret treaties have undoubtedly been used by German propaganda in order to prejudice the cause of the Allies in the eyes of neutral countries, and, I think, in the eyes of our friends in America. The prejudice, I think, can readily be understood without any elaboration in this House. Surely in these circumstances, in the interests of the Allies, now that the circumstances have entirely altered, the Government are able to find themselves in a position to make clear their attitude on many of the questions with which those treaties dealt.

That is the first reason. There is a further reason. While from time to time in this House we have been advised by the Foreign Secretary not to demand specific and definite statements of war aims, that self-denying ordinance has not been observed by his colleagues. It has been observed—if I may put it this way—by the more moderate members of the Government, but not by those whom I think I am entitled to describe as the more extreme. Reference has been made in several speeches to a statement made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Trinity College (Sir E. Carson). He it a member of the War Cabinet. He was a member of the War Cabinet at the time he made this statement, and that statement implied—I think it definitely meant—that it was the aim of the Allies to drive Germany back to the Rhine. In other words, his view of the war aims of the Allies coincided with the view set forth in the secret agreement made at St. Petersburg between the French representative and the late Russian Government. That seems to be the real significance of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Trinity College.

I think we are entitled to a specific and definite disavowal and repudiation of that statement on behalf of the Government. The Leader of the House is a member of the War Cabinet, and he is its spokesman here. I hope if the right hon. Gentleman intervenes in this Debate, which I think is necessary, that he will be in a position, without any doubt whatever, to repudiate those views which were set forth by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Trinity College. I think it is a matter of fundamental importance that in a case where suspicion may be thrown, where doubt may be thrown upon the intentions of this country or its association with an agreement in regard to which the Foreign Secretary has said we were never a party and which we never heard of, that this repudiation should be made promptly, and it should be absolutely specific. There are not only what may be called immediate war aims relating to territorial adjustments, which are bound to arise at the end of the War—everybody contemplates, however, they may talk of victory diplomatists sitting round a table, and half a dozen or a dozen must sit round a table sometimes—and when they do it will be their duty to make certain territorial arrangements, and all that can be said is that those territorial arrangements should correspond with the avowed principle upon which this country entered the War, and to which President Wilson has given his support since America came into the War. If that principle is affirmed there will be little need to quarrel with the territorial adjustments at the end of the War.

But there are some more remote war aims as to the conditions which are to follow peace. President Wilson and Lord Grey have made certain statements in expounding the policy of the League of Nations, and we want to know where the Government is on those points. The Government, through the Foreign Secretary, to-day tells us that they accept President Wilson's statement; in fact, the right hon. Gentleman said "ditto" to everything contained in President Wilson's last message, ignoring the fact that that message contained a very strongly-worded censure on Allied diplomacy in regard to Russia, although he accepted it as a whole. I think, however, we are entitled to something more specific. Is the League of Nations the policy of this Government or is it not? We have had some reference during this Debate to economic questions, and to the use of what is called the economic weapon after the War. Those who have spoken regarding this point, as I understand it, intend that the economic weapon should be used for one or other of two purposes—first of all, as a threat of punishment to Germany for unduly prolonging the War, and secondly, as a sanction for the League of Nations arrangement after the War. But there is an entirely different school who look at the economic situation after the War from an entirely different point of view, and these people base themselves upon a particular reading of the Paris Conference Resolutions. After all, I do not attach much importance to those Resolutions, because I think they are undoubtedly ambiguous, and intentionally ambiguous, and as this view seems to be corroborated by high authority, I think the House may take it that that is a true account of the Paris Resolutions.

That view of economic policy is one which is held by those who give a particular interpretation to these ambiguous resolutions. It is a school which believes in a self-sufficing state. There are those who believe, with a great deal of reason, that it is necessary, in the interests of the British Empire, to make it a self-sufficing economic unit, and that our economic policy after the War should be devoted to that end. These people look forward to a situation after the War in which the various States concerned will follow this policy of economic self-sufficiency, and there is evidence that the present Government believe in that policy because they are introducing Bills based upon that policy. Only yesterday we were discussing the Bill, the only justification for which could be the acceptance of the theory of a self-sufficing economic State. That Bill did not relate simply to certain key industries of which we have often heard, but it related to a large number of other articles which cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be described as key industries. The Bill I referred to provided for the total exclusion of the trade of our enemies in these commodities in this country after the War, and that view is totally inconsistent with the League of Nations idea. You must either take the one view or the other. If this Government is in favour of the League of Nations idea, then, it seems to me, that the Government must abandon the theory of the economic self-sufficing State. I go back once more to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University who, only last Friday in this House, in the course of a Debate on war aims, said that one result of this War to which he committed himself was that after the War the Germans would not get one ounce of raw material from the British Empire. [An HON. MEMBER: "He did not say that!"] I was present, and I heard it. [An HON. MEMBER: "He said 'during the period of reconstruction!'"]

What my right hon. Friend said was that they would not get any of these necessities until the needs of ourselves and our Allies had been supplied.

That is still a policy of economic exclusion. I admit that there is a difference, but in that case who is to determine when the needs of ourselves and our Allies are satisfied? Furthermore, if you are going to have a peace arranged by men sitting round the council table I will put this to the right hon. Gentleman: Does he see at the present time any prospect of a military situaton whch will enable him or any other representative of the Allies exacting such terms as those from Germany? I want to know are our men now in Franders to go on shedding their blood until that end is attained? That is a question for the right hon. Gentleman to answer, and it is a very serious matter. It means that lives are being risked to-day and the treasure of, this country is being squandered in order to prevent Germans having an ounce of the raw material of the British Empire until in the judgment of somebody unnamed the needs of ourselves and our Allies are satisfied. But that is not all. We had a speech from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University the other day, and what was his great war aim? It was to "bomb Hun businesses." Is this the great ideal and the altruistic aim of the Allies in this War?

Every succeeding Government in this country has repudiated the idea that trade had anything to do with this War, or that trade interests were in any degree connected with it or that we intended definitely to obtain trade benefits out of it. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Trinity College thinks otherwise. It means that our men are fighting in France, and the other theatres of war, not for civilisation, not for justice, not for the rights of small nations, but in order to bomb Hun businesses. I ask the right hon. Gentleman if this is specifically to go out to the world as the view of the British War Cabinet? It is not the view of President Wilson. I want to know from the Leader of the House now whether the British War Cabinet on this particular matter of trade after the War holds the view of President Wilson or of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Trinity College? My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Commander Wedgwood) in his speech this afternoon pointed out that after all it did not matter a great deal what the British War Cabinet said, and that in his view it seemed to be a good thing that the determining factor in the War now, both as to its duration and its results, was President Wilson. As he believed President Wilson was a Liberal and the present Government wag not indifferent to Liberalism, he was satisfied that the results of the War should be settled in accordance with the Liberal views and principles of President Wilson. I share his views. But there is another fact to be considered. There is no doubt that the longer this War goes on the greater will American influence be in the settlement, and the longer it goes on the less will be the influence of Great Britain on the policy underlying that settlement. While from the Liberal point of view I might welcome that, yet from a national point of view I distinctly deplore it.

If I may be permitted for a moment, I will endeavour to recall the attention of Members of this House to one matter which has been omitted and neglected by everyone who has discussed this question of our war aims. I should like the House and hon. Members to look at the peace question from the point of view of British interests. It has been a misfortune to this country that the most powerful man in it during the War—the greater part of the War—has not from the beginning been a British Minister, but has looked after the interests of our Allies. He has consistently and persistently looked away from British interests. It is the duty of any Government which professes to guide the destinies of this country and Empire to look at every situation from the point of view of British interests. How are those interests going to be affected by an indefinite prolongation of the War? You may wear out, crush, and exhaust Germany, but are you not also going to wear out and exhaust yourselves? At the end of the War is the centre of gravity of the world to be shifted from Western Europe, where it has been for centuries to the benefit of mankind, to the western side of the Atlantic? I do not know that, that would be a misfortune if we had security that America was a country which would always be guided by enlightened statesmen like President Wilson. But we cannot forecast that, and it would be foolish to believe that it will be so. Strange tendencies and currents sweep over communities and particularly over democratic communities, and there is a possibility—nay, even a fair probability—that in the future in that great community of the United States some men may under the impetus of a so-called Imperialistic purpose be guilty of aggression not unlike that on the part of Germany against which we are now fighting. Is it going to be for the advantage of the world that in the future the great Power which has held the balance and which has exercised the historic function exercised by our country in the past—that the great Power which has held the balance of the civilised nations should not be able to exercise the influence which it has hitherto so justly and so fairly exercised? That is a risk which an indefinite prolongation of the War means to this country. I believe it is a serious risk not only to this country but to the world as a whole. We are going to see that risk probably incurred, and I say that with a prospect like that before us, grave, dark, and ominous, it is the duty of the Government to face the issues raised this afternoon, not by debating dialectics such as those in which the Foreign Minister delights, but by statements as sound, and as authoritative as the situation demands.

I have watched with considerable interest and surprise the action of the Government during the course of this Debate. We had a most eloquent and powerful speech from the Member for Derby (Sir W. Collins), and although many other hon. Members have taken part in this Debate, I believe that only one single speech has been made by an hon. Member who can be described as a Pacifist, and the result of that speech was that the representative of the Government immediately got up and made a purely debating speech in answer to my hon. Friend. That is all they have done. They have made no attempt to answer anybody else. The hon. Member for Stirling Burghs (Mr. Ponsonby) holds opinions which are not by any means largely shared in this House. He states them with great force and with great sincerity, and he has been answered on a great many occasions. If the Treasury Bench are going to confine themselves to answering him, such conduct amounts almost to a waste of time. It carries us no further forward. We wish to get from the Government a plain declaration of the war aims of this country and its Allies, a declaration which we can understand, which the people can understand, and which we Members of Parliament can recommend our constituents to act upon. I believe the Prime Minister has spoken of our wair aim as victory. What is victory? If I were to back a horse and if I said I wanted victory, everybody would understand what I required. They would know that my desire was to see that the horse I was backing passed the goal first—I should say, passed the winning-post first. If I were interested in a cricket match, and said I wanted victory, everybody would know that what I wanted was that when the other side had exhausted their right of batting my own side should go in and make more runs. But what is victory in a war? When do you get it? How do you know when you have got it? I suggest to the House that victory in a war means that your enemy is willing to concede to you demands that will satisfy you; that he is willing to con- cede to you the objects for which you began the War. That is victory. Why not tell us what will satisfy you, if you obtain it?

The present Prime Minister, it will be remembered, in October last gave his famous "knock-out blow" interview. I think many of our troubles are to be traced to that famous episode in the right hon. Gentleman's career. This present Government was formed in consequence of that interview. It was set up in order to carry out the policy indicated in that interview. Let me give a short review of some of the events which have happened since that memorable utterance, in which we were told that the enemy was squealing for peace; that he was only too anxious for peace, on almost any terms. What has happened since then? There has been a most terrific loss of life all over Western Europe. There has been terrible destruction of property. All that is clearly so much to the bad. We have had many very glorious episodes in our military history. Our troops have shown the greatest heroism. We have captured Baghdad and Jerusalem. That is so much to the good. On the other hand, Russia has gone out of the War. That is a serious military disaster which probably cannot be repaired. We are bound to ask ourselves whether, after twelve months' experience of the knock-out blow diplomacy, we are any nearer victory—any nearer obtaining our desires?

Let me state what I believe to be the preponderating national idea as to the sort of peace we want. It has been defined in the well-known words of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife (Mr. Asquith) uttered in the November following the outbreak of the War. Our, aim was, he said, the evacuation and restoration of Belgium, France, Serbia, and Montenegro, coupled with the crushing of Prussian militarism, and, I think the words were, the maintenance of public law in Europe. That is what we are aiming at. That, and nothing more; and it appears to me that that also is the object that has been set before us by Lord Lansdowne in his public-spirited letter. When we come to consider the objects put before us in that letter, we are bound to remember that nearly all the most important members of the Government, including the Leader of the House, immediately denounced the document in the strongest possible language as a national misfortune. That has been making people wonder whether the letter does express the views of His Majesty's Government, and whether the objects aimed at by Lord Lansdowne can really be taken to be our war aims. It appears to me they are most reasonable.

8.0 p.m.

The first is that we do not desire the annihilation of Germany as a great Power. Is that not a correct statement of our policy in this War. Yet we hear talk, most sinister talk, by the right hon. Member for Dublin University (Sir E. Carson), a member of the War Cabinet, as to the treatment of Germany and driving her back to the banks of the Rhine. I said most sinister talk, because it happens to agree with the terms of a secret treaty recently divulged. I am sure nobody will doubt the words of the Foreign Minister, who, in a most explicit manner, has pledged himself to total ignorance of these secret treaties. He told us that our Government had nothing to do with them. But everybody must see it is a most unfortunate coincidence that a very prominent member of the Government should have adopted as his policy the policy embodied in this particular secret treaty. It must, after what the right hon. Gentleman has said, be nothing but a coincidence, but it is a most unfortunate one, and it requires some explanation by a member of the Government who is responsible for our statement of policy. Then Lord Lansdowne goes on to say that we do not seek to impose upon the German people any form of government other than that of their own choice. That, again, is a proposition which cannot be disputed. Further, we are told that, with the exception of legitimate war measures, we have no desire to prevent Germany taking her place among the great commercial communities of the world. That, apparently, is a proposition which is very much disputed, and in the same quarter—by the right hon. and learned Member for Dublin University. Yet I do not believe that when we entered this War there was a single person in this country who had any idea in their minds that they were going to destroy German trade. I believe we entered into this War for purely altruistic objects, and it seems to me a very great pity that the Government should cause, through one of its most important members, grave doubt as to whether we adhere to those objects. Lord Lansdowne goes on with a reference to the freedom of the seas, which I fail to understand. I have never yet understood what freedom of the seas means, because they are always free in time of peace, and no one would wish that they should be free in times of peace more than the average Englishman; while in times of war I should have thought it most obvious that no one would be more opposed to their freedom than the ordinary, or rather I should say the extraordinary, German. Then Lord Lansdowne goes on to say that we are prepared to enter into an international pact in which ample opportunities would be afforded for settling international disputes by amicable means. That is our friend, the League of Nations; that is the object to which I understand President Wilson is deeply attached, and which I certainly understood was part of the original idea of Lord Grey, and of His Majesty's. Government. Again on that, the right hon. and learned Member for Dublin University has cast grave doubts, for quite recently he treated the whole attitude with scorn, and even in this House announced his adherence to what he called a league of the British nations; something which is very different, an idea which postulates a British Empire—plus, I suppose, the United States of America—forming a mutual trading society, keeping in their hands the resources of the world, and excluding everybody else, including, amongst others, I suppose, our Allies.

These are the things, after all, that have been said, and what we want to know, and what others want to know, is with which of those very divergent voices His Majesty's Government and the Allies speak. Let us know in this country, and let the Germans know, too. We are told we want security after the War. We all do. There is probably nothing any of us wants more than security. May I look at two different actual peaces that have been made in order to see where you get security? Is Germany getting security by the peace of 1871? Has Germany ever at any time obtained security by that peace? I think everybody must really now see that far from Obtaining security Germany built the foundation of the dreadful disaster in which she has overwhelmed herself as well as everybody else by that peace of 1871. Look, on the other hand, to the peace and settlement we made after the last great war in which we were engaged, the war in South Africa. Surely there has never been a peace which has given greater security. If security is what we wanted, that settlement, has given us a security in South Africa which could never have been obtained by any other method, and I should like in that, connection, particularly as these things are in the hands of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Balfour), to read what he said in July,1906, with regard to the settlement in South Africa and the grant of self-government to the Transvaal, because I think what he said then illustrates a frame of mind very largely held by many people, but which unfortunately appears not to be a correct judgment. I am reading from a speech by the right hon Gentleman made on the 31st July, 1906: Member for Barnard Castle (Mr. Henderson), recently a member of the Government, which had the heading—"No sliding-scale peace." I think that is a very good motto. I am sure we should like to know from the Government that they accept that doctrine, "No sliding-scale peace." In conclusion, I should like to endorse the eloquent speech made by my right hon. Friend the Member for North Worcestershire (Mr. J. W. Wilson). If we are going on with this War the people of this country will have to endure very terrible sacrifices. The soldiers, the civilian population, everybody, in every respect, is going to be called upon to make the most terrible sacrifices. I believe the people of this country will endure those sacrifices if they are satisfied that they are for a worthy and a right object. But if the Government leave the people in doubt, as they are doing, as to whether the objects for which we are fighting the War are those with which we began the War, or are really the horrible plans put forward by the right hon. and learned Member for Dublin University, then I venture to say that the Government will find that there is not that willingness to go on with the War that is necessary to obtain the triumph which we desire.

I think everyone will have listened to this Debate—certainly I have done so—with a feeling that it is entirely justified in the intentions of those who have put forward the demand for a declaration of aims. From every side and quarter of the House we have had hon. Gentlemen, differing very much from each other in other opinions and in their views as to the War, getting up one and all to say that they were not satisfied that we have at present a clear declaration of aims, and asking that the Government should revise and define what it is for which the Allies are really fighting. We have had one speech from the Government Bench, that of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and one speech from a supporter of the Government, the hon. Member who represents Christshurch (General Croft). With regard to the speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a great part of it was taken up with a bitter, and, as I think, most unjust and unfounded, attack on my hon. Friend the Member for Stirling Burghs (Mr. Ponsonby). I have not always agreed with all the views of my hon. Friend even on the subject of this War, but after having been in the House with my hon. Friend for a great many years, and after having had relations with him in private and in public, I venture to say that there is not a man whose sincerity, earnestness, and high patriotism are more beyond the reach of doubt than are those of my hon. Friend the Member for Stirling Burghs. I do not think a more unjust, unfounded, and altogether undeserved attack was ever made on an hon. Member of this House, and I confess that I very much resent the aptitude of those who support this War for saying that everyone who does not agree precisely with their views is actuated by a desire to assist the enemy, and is in some way failing in the patriotism due to this country.

I will leave that very unfortunate portion of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, and will ask what else it was that the right hon. Gentleman had to tell us who introduced this Debate, which had already been made by my hon. Friend the Member for Derby (Sir W. Collins), who introduced this debate, which had not been so widely made, but which, at all events, was well known to exist, not only in this House but in the country—the demand for a clearer and better statement of war aims than we have yet had? The right hon. Gentleman said, in the first place, that there was no obscurity, and, in the second place, he referred all his critics, as I understood him, to the Note which he sent over a year ago to our Ambassador at Washington as giving the last and fullest statement of what our war aims were. That Note was written before the revolution in Russia, while we were still in alliance with the old autocracy of Russia, and a part of it at any rate, so far as I remember, was devoted to saying that it was right on our part to fight for the transference of Constantinople to Russia, and at any rate it indicated something very much like the breaking up of the Austrian Empire as one of the aims of the Allies. No one can deny that the whole of the conditions of the War have altered since that Note was sent, and yet the right hon. Gentleman has no better response to make to those who ask for a restatement of war aims than to refer us to the Note which he wrote over a year ago. Not only is that out of date, but we know that again and again the Members of the War Cabinet are continually making speeches which are inconsistent even with that Note, and entirely inconsistent with one another. In one week not long ago we had speeches, first of all from one Member of the Government, saying they were entirely in accord with M. Clemenceau's speech—in which he said that Germany was to be excluded for ever from the League of Nations—and secondly, that they were entirely in accord with President Wilson, who put the establishment of a League of Nations, and if possible its inclusion in Germany, as one of the most important of the war aims of the Allies. That is the sort of divergence that we are seeing all the time. We have the Prime Minister, with his policy of a knock-out blow and of the crushing of Germany, practically repudiating the idea of any clear statement of the Allies' terms. Take the question of a League of Nations, the question of Alsace-Lorraine, and the question whether we are to have an economic war after the military war is over. On any such questions as those, can anyone, say that there is a clear opinion in the country as to what really are the aims of this Government? Of course not. Neither in this House nor in the country is there any clear knowledge of the war aims of the Government.

It is an outrageous thing, after a debate like this, in which the Government have been pressed from all sides to declare what are their war aims, that we should have no better response than that which has been made to-night by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Again and again the demand has been made, and there have been opportunities which the Government might have seized for making their position clear. There was the demand made by Mr. Kerensky's Government, and if the treatment of Mr. Kerensky's Government in that matter had been different, there is at any rate a probability that the Russian democracy might still be standing at our side endeavouring to secure a really democratic settlement of this War. Not only did they fail to respond to Mr. Kerensky's demands as regards no annexations and no indemnities, but they treated the whole business of the Stockholm Conference in such a way as to cast very serious discredit upon the good faith of this Government and upon the position of this country with regard to democratic aims. Then there was the Papal Note. The Pope, I suppose everyone will admit, represents the greatest international society in the world, and when the Pope sent round to the belligerent nations asking for a restatement of their aims, you would have expected that from France and this country there would have been some answer given. We have been told that the answer of Germany was unsatisfactory. Yes, but at any rate they made some answer. We in this country made none whatever. No sort of response has ever been made, so far as I know, to the Pope's Note, and not even a reference, I think I am right in saying, has ever been made by any leading statesman to it in any speech. The Pope's letter, even if one could not agree with it altogether, did offer some hope of getting a conference between the nations, and it did lay down some elements of a lasting and an honourable peace. It was perfectly clear as regards the restoration of Belgium. It was an outrageous thing that this, the second great opportunity that this Government has had since they came into office, should have been entirely passed by, neglected, and refused. Then, on 2nd October last, we had the very remarkable speech that was made by Count Czernin, the Foreign Secretary of Austria, a speech in which he set out as the principal terms of peace four points: First of all, obligatory international arbitration—that is to say, the idea of a League of Nations. Secondly, a gradual and general disarmament after the War, not merely, as he said, to the standard of 1914—though that in itself would involve a great reduction of armaments—but, as he hoped, a complete disarmament to a much lower standard so as to relieve the civilisation of Europe of the ghastly burden of armaments with which it was threatened before the War and by which it will be threatened again unless something of this sort is done. Thirdly, he supported expressly the principle of no annexation, and of Austria he said: must be absolutely eliminated from every future arrangement. Then he went on to say: set of men as those whom we now see in power, who are incapable of taking statesmanlike views, or expressing themselves in a statesmanlike manner.

There we have had four opportunities, which hitherto have been missed, of making a full statement. For my part, I have never doubted the unselfishness or the nobility of the general aims of the people of this country with regard to the War. Nothing finer has ever been known than the impulse which led those thousands of young men to volunteer for the Army at the beginning of this War in order to go out, as they believed, for the protection of small nationalities, especially of Belgium, for a democratic war, and for a war which was to end war. Gradually a great change has come over public opinion since the early days of the War. People have watched the suppression of free speech, and the shameless profiteering which is now going on up and down the country; they have seen all the great interests with their pull upon the Government, they have watched the way in which only lately the shares of the great breweries have gone up by a 100, 150, 200, 300 and even 500 per cent; they have seen everywhere the growth of a feeling in the governing classes to make a profit and a good thing out of this War; they have had the declarations of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Trinity College that this is a war to bomb Hun businesses, and that this is a trade war; and they have felt a scepticism, amounting to despair, as to the objects of the War. We ask that an end should be put to this.

On the one hand, we ask that all those new aims that have accumulated round the War since it started should be, as far as possible, pruned and cut off, and that we should know what are not the war aims of this country, which is almost as important as knowing what they are. That might have been one of the great services of Lord Lansdowne's letter if it had been properly used. He at any rate gave the Government the chance of indicating what are not the war aims of this country, and of removing some of the false impressions that have arisen with regard to our war aims. The second thing we ask is not that we should have a statement on every small point of territorial adjustment that will have to be made when the peace settlement comes, but that we should know the essential conditions on which the Government will be prepared to enter into negotiations with the enemy States. It is now three and a quarter years since we first entered into this War. For 1,200 days we have watched this slaughter going on. There are Members in this House who have lost their dearest and best, and I suppose there is not one here who has not suffered terribly through the loss of relatives. We have seen the bravest, the best, and the most cherished young men of the country falling in the War. We have seen the best life of civilisation threatened, as it is at present, by the continuance of this great disaster. Is it too much to ask that the Government should give us this assurance, by making clear the objects of the War, that they will not lose the chance of shortening the War, that at any rate they will see that its continuance is not unduly prolonged, that they will also see that the sacrifices which have been made have not been made altogether in vain, and that peace when it comes at last will be an enduring one, because it will be a peace based upon just and sure foundations?

So far the characteristic of the Debate has been the expression of a very temperate desire on the part of the moderate party in the House, if I may so distinguish them from those who act with me who are called the extremist party, for a definite expression of the Government view of what the war aims of the country are. Nearly everyone who heard the speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs regretted very much that he should have taken the opportunity afforded by my hon. Friend the Member for Stirling Burghs (Mr. Ponsonby) to divert his attention from the more moderate statements made by the moderate party in the House, and should have made almost a personal attack upon my hon. Friend. The motive was so obvious that I do not propose to defend my hon. Friend at all. As a matter of fact, his speech was a very temperate one also, and certainly deserved a real answer from the Government. I am afraid that the Government wanted to avoid the real issue. The real issue, to put it in a sentence, is the Lansdowne letter and the Government reply to the Lansdowne letter. The essential point at which Lord Lansdowne was aiming was a statement of war aims, especially a repudiation of the suspicions of Imperialism, which attach to the later development of the war aims of the country. The Government are making a great mistake if they imagine that the way in which that letter has been treated by the newspapers at large, except in the case of a few Liberal newspapers, represents in the slightest degree the feelings of the country in regard to that letter. I happened to be in Glasgow during the weekend that letter was published. Of course, it was not published in a good many newspapers. The effect was that from one end of Glasgow to the other, it did not matter whether they were people connected with the municipality, leading business men, policemen, working men, whoever I met during those three days in Glasgow, was talking about Lord Lansdowne's letter, and very nearly all of them agreed with it. A friend of mine in one of the Departments of State the other day gave me news which would very much surprise a good many members of the Government. He said there was hardly a single Civil servant in his Department who did not approve of Lord Lansdowne's letter. It is a very unwise thing of the Government to assume that Lord Lansdowne's letter has not a very deep response in the minds of the people of the country. It will be very unfortunate if the Government before the conclusion of this Debate does not reply to the expressions of the recognised moderate party of the House of a desire for a statement of war aims, and I hope nothing I say will cause the Noble Lord (Lord R. Cecil), if and when he replies, to spend his whole time in replying to me because I happen to be sitting on the bench from which Debates have been raised in the past about war aims.

The Foreign Secretary said everyone knew what the broad aims of this country were in the War. Of course everyone knows the vague phrases of denunciation which have served for war aims in many speeches which have been made, but it is not the real point whether the large and generous ideals which have been put forward in, the speeches of the leaders of this country are in fact honourable, large, and generous ideals. Let me take the converse. Any German would probably tell you that his Government expressed large and generous ideals with regard to the War, and that it was a war of self-defence. But that does not satisfy us, for the simple reason that when you come down into discussing the details of German policy you find that a war of self-defence means rushing through Belgium, occupying Belgium, and torturing Belgium in the way we have seen. There, fore, it is essential to go very much beyond the broad objects which this country is out for, and to answer accusations which are made, not from this Bench but by the world at large, with regard to what the aims of this country are. I have been talking to a good many friends as to whether it was wise to talk about war aims at this particular moment, and what I may call the most substantial argument against a statement of war aims by the Government at present appears to me to be the argument that the Germans are having considerable, if local, successes, and that if we begin stating what our war aims are now we shall be encouraging them by making them think we are beginning to yield. In the first place, it is very easy to exaggerate the German success. It may have been big, but it is local, and the Germans know that just as much as we do. I very much doubt if the German people are being deluded into supposing that there is anything like a complete victory because they happen to have succeeded partially in Italy. But there is every evidence that the weariness of the War in Germany is not going to alter even in the face of some apparent military success. One thing is quite definite in Germany: There is a persistent, and, what is more, an increasing, demand on the part of the German democracy, voiced not only by the Social Democrats, but by other parties of the State, for a definite repudiation of the annexationist aims which are put forward by the Junker party in Germany. A very remarkable episode took place in Germany within the last week or two. I do not know whether local elections take place generally in Germany or whether they are suspended during the War as they are here, but, at any rate, in Leipzic local elections took place. All the different parties put forward their candidates in the normal way—the Conservative parties, the Centre parties, the Majority Socialists, and the Minority Socialists, who have been against the War the whole time. In the whole of Leipzic not one single man was elected who did not belong to the Minority Socialist party. An event like that illustrates the intense weariness of the German people with this War and shows how right Lord Lansdowne is in urging as the centre of his argument that we ought to consider strengthening German peace pressure and inducing it to work upon its Government.

But more than that we are hearing more and more of the German Government's responsiveness to this pressure. Of course, we are told very little. We are told there has been no official statement of German terms. On the other hand we have extremely authentic reports of what the French people think was happening recently in France, how an approach was made through M. Briand to the French Government, how M. Ribot turned back that approach and refused to have anything to do with it, and how subsequently M. Briand called together a large number of French Deputies and told them what that German offer was. So impressed were those Deputies that they demanded a Secret Session of the French Parliament. From all that is definitely known the result of that Secret Session was that M. Ribot, who had refused the terms offered, had to resign. We know that two or three of the Jingo papers in Paris said that if there was any approach to truth in the report widely circulated in France as to what the offer was, that offer ought to have been the basis of negotiation. Repeatedly in the news that was sent over here from France such reports as we were able to get stated—I am not going further into the details of what was said—that the Germans had expressed themselves ready to evacuate Belgium. I am bound to say that there was something justifiable in the complaint which I have made and the questions which I have asked in this House that large numbers of French Members of Parliament should be told what offer was made by Germany, not under the pledge of secrecy, and that we should have no opportunity of getting the knowledge which they have. It is no use saying that the German Government are not ready to evacuate Belgium until our Government have explicitly asked them and really know what the situation is.

I want to say a few words in defence of what my hon. Friend the Member for Stirling (Mr. Ponsonby) was saying in regard to Russia. Of course, the Government have avoided making any defence of their diplomatic policy towards Russia by blaming the Bolsheviks. They say, "There is anarchy in Russia. You cannot deal with anarchists. They are bought with German gold, and we cannot deal with such men. We regret very much that the Russians are falling out of the War, but how are we to blame?" My answer is that they have had their chance but they did not take it. For six months there was in power in Russia, having behind him really and essentially the same forces which are behind the Bolsheviks now—that is to say, the force of the Soviets—M. Kerensky, who was trying the whole time to make our Government state its war aims. He tried in one way and in another. He tried in one tragic way by sending forward the Russian Armies in that gallant attempt to drive back the enemy which momentarily succeeded, but eventually did not. He tried to persuade us of his own bona fides , of his desire to continue the War until there could be a satisfactory peace, and he tried to induce us to show our bona fides by stating our war aims and repudiating our own Imperialistic designs to which we had given our hands. For six months M. Kerensky failed to get a statement of bur war aims, and then he fell, and we immediately began to hear of things like this from our correspondents in Russia: Imperialistic designs on the part of Great Britain." The fact is they were made with Great Britain's consent, and the serious part of them was this—Russia, in so far as she was concerned, the moment the Revolution took place, repudiated her whole share in those treaties. Russia did not think it unnecessary to say what we appear to think it to be unnecessary to say, "These treaties were wrongly made. We will not say we will tear up these treaties, but we will repudiate them." That is what Russia very wisely did. The moment she got rid of the Czar she said, "We repudiate the past policy of the Czar. We do not want Constantinople." Why cannot England say so? Why do we not make it clear to the world that we are rid of that? The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that Constantinople has nothing to do with us. As if it had nothing to do with us, when we had secretly for a year and a half committed this country, if the Czar had not been dethroned, to conduct the War for a thing of which the British people knew nothing, and about which they had never been consulted! As if that was a thing which we could not repudiate! The Foreign Secretary said that it was no gain to ourselves and therefore our hands were clean. Was it no gain to ourselves? This is the view of the Russian Government of this precious document: quid pro quo with regard to Constantinople. We consented to pursue the Czar's ambitions for him, to throw away British lives for the Czar's ambitions which, when the tyrant falls, are found to have nothing to do with the desires of his people.

We are getting a quid pro quo somewhere. I wonder whether it is to be found in Persia? It is all very well saying that these treaties do not show any desire for aggrandisement on our part, but we were going to take another large slice of Persia under our control. It does not matter whether that policy is right or wrong. It is aggrandisement. It is getting something out of the War. Then the left bank of the Rhine. That was not a British piece of aggrandisement. It was a French piece of aggrandisement. My hon. Friend the Member for Northampton was told in the last Debate by the Foreign Secretary that it was a mare's nest. The mare's nest has now proved to be true, if a mare's nest can be proved to be true, in black and white, in the letters which have now been published from Petrograd. France and Russia agreed that the left bank of the Rhine should cease to be German. That needs repudiating. It is no use going on saying that you are going to get nothing out of the War if treaties exist which show that you and your Allies do intend to get something out of the War; and the way to make our case clear is not to make a proud proclamation that you are not out for annexation, but is to rebut the definite charges which are made by the very documents to which our Government have put their hand. If our Government put their hand to those treaties, or consented to them, or allowed the Allies to put their hand to them, surely it is not much to ask that when those treaties are shown now, and everybody repudiates them, there should be a definite statement that those treaties are definitely and finally repudiated! That is not an unreasonable or an unpatriotic demand to make on the Government.

9.0 P.M.

I make another appeal on a different line—that the Government should not consent at this stage of the War to the obscuring of the real issue by any fine phrases, even by very eloquent speeches such as that delivered by the Prime Minister the other day. Little as I agree with him, it was a very fine speech. I do not agree with it, because it simply concealed in its fine phraseology, or attempted to conceal the fact that he was looking forward to another two or three years of war. Perhaps he has abandoned the idea of the knock-out blow; certainly he has not abandoned the idea of a war of attrition, and certainly in that speech he intended deliberately to take up a position adverse to Lord Lansdowne, and to the Leader of the Opposition, who are asking for a clear statement of war aims, and he was clearly taking up a position adverse also to the attitude which, it is pretty obvious, the Labour party is going to adopt in the course of the next few weeks. Another two years war is a very serious thing. What does it mean? One of my hon. Friends, speaking to-day, based the greater part of his speech on our responsibility to Belgium. Take our responsibility to Belgium. Suppose that to-day it turns out—as the Government have not yet found out, but as they might be able to find out—that Germany was ready now to evacuate Belgium and to come into a League of Nations. If we are going to prolong the War just because we cannot get everything else, have our people, even from the point of view of Belgium, contemplated what that means? Our sympathies have been spent on Belgium for the last three years, our money has been devoted to trying to save Belgian people, and we do feel that for us the principal responsibility in this War is Belgium. What does another two years war mean for Belgium? It means not only that our towns shall be bombed, and far more German towns shall be bombed, but we must remember that, even now, the bombing is far more extensive in Belgium than in any other country, in consequence of the quantities of explosives that are dropped into occupied Belgian towns. They are no less Belgian, because they are occupied by Germans. Two years more of war means two years more of that kind of horror for Belgium.

Then another theory is that we are going to bring this War to an end by starving Germany. If we starve Germany we starve the Belgians first and worst. My hon. Friend, whose speech attracted my attention, said that we should drive the Germans back from Belgium. What does that mean? That means that every single village and town of Belgium will be destroyed as this process goes on. If your military power does succeed it means that in the end we will have emancipated Belgium, but it will be a dead country. That makes me say that our heavy responsibility to Belgium ought to make us, before we proceed to continue this War, as the Prime Minister suggests, for another two or three years, absolutely certain, instead of being quite uncertain, that the Germans are not now ready to turn out of Belgium.

One other matter. I say this with greater readiness than some other Members of this House, because I have said it openly before, but I believe that there will be a great deal more agreement with me now than there was on the previous occasion on which I raised this matter. It is that the idea of a decisive victory in this War is gradually disappearing from men's minds, that the great warring nations are slowly coming to realise that the chance of victory on either side, in the sense of being able to dictate terms to the other side, which is the only sense in which we can regard victory as decisive, is gradually now going outside the pale of human probabilities. It is quite true that there has been, and perhaps will be, great local victories in this War, but the general result has been, is, and will remain, in its essence, a deadlock. The military situation will be such that neither side can have any serious chance whatever of being able to dictate terms.

I wonder what the real moral of the Italian disaster is. It was a terrible disaster. It was a disaster that would have brought to an end any war of Napoleonic times. Germany is no nearer dictating peace to the world, as the result of the Italian victory, than she was before. What is the moral for us? Are we likely to be any nearer dictating peace to Germany because of lesser local victories, which never amount to what she wins. And our losses go on and on. Our loss up to October, during this year, according to the official figures, is 646,000 for this year only, as much as for the whole of the previous year, and a great deal more than the year before that. The total casualties of Great Britain during tne War, up to October, according to the official figures, is 1,855,000. You call this a war of attrition. When people speak of a war of attrition they think only of Germans, but it is ourselves as well. The pace of our advance accelerates very slowly, but the pace of the death of young men accelerates a good deal faster. I know there are many men who are thinking as I do, and I believe it is the truest patriotism to say so. The tide of misery is rising. Kerensky told us before he fell that Russia is worn out. It is not only in Russia, but it is Italy and France. We are a prosperous and happy people compared with the peoples of all those other countries, but do not be sure that that is always to be our fate if this War continues. Are we going to be exempt twelve or twenty-four months hence from hunger and revolution ourselves? I venture to say that, in this year, among responsible Members of this. House, we ought to ask ourselves, Is it, indeed, the only issue to go on until, some two, or three years hence, Belgium may have been freed by war, leaving behind us a desolate and depopulated land, after having vindicated the rights of a nationality that is dead? Then, when starve- tion is sweeping over us and Germany, and when the French peasantry are only a pathetic memory, there will be peace at any price because of hunger and despair. I have spoken to-day from my own point of view—I hope more or less temperately. The aim of my hon. Friends in various parts of the House is not to have a dishonourable peace, not to throw aside all the higher things for which the nation feels itself fighting, but to make it quite clear that there is not attached to those higher ideals selfish or mistaken ones, which might be repudiated, and which, owing to some misunderstanding on the part of our Government, they will not be wise enough now to repudiate.

I am glad that the Minister of Blockade is in his place, because my object in rising is not in any way to criticise, and I certainly hope not to embarrass the Government, but to put one or two matters before the Foreign Office which I hope they will consider, .and on which I hope they may be able to give us some enlightenment. As regards the demand for a restatement of war aims on the part of the Government, I was very much struck at a war aims conference in my own Constituency the other day, when a workman rose and gave a short and effective contribution to the debate. He said: herring across the track—a confusing of the issue. We are fighting for one thing only, and that is security. Security can obviously be obtained in different ways. First, we have to defeat the enemy. Let there be no mistake about that. But what next? In former wars it has been almost a commonplace that the victor should insist on some territorial adjustment—on some rectification of frontiers to obtain better security for the future. That has been an implied war aim in most cases. At the conclusion of many wars the conqueror has insisted upon the frontiers being altered for the purpose of giving his country strategic security. It was not a wrong or improper aim. If that is the only way of obtaining security it is certainly not a wrong or improper way, and to my mind there is something very painful about the spectacle of hon. Members of this House, who seem to have no regard for the depths of misery into which France has been plunged by the cruel and wilful aggression of her neighbour, imputing to that unfortunate country, bleeding from a hundred wounds, annexationist and Imperialistic designs, because, forsooth, of her desire to find security of some kind, of any kind, against the ruthless and wilful aggression which they have feared day and night for forty years from their neighbour, because the French have dared to consider whether they could establish some neutral zone, by placing the valley of the Saar in neutral hands, in order to get some security against their neighbour. To my mind it is a cruel thing, when our friend and Ally, who is suffering to-day and who has suffered for forty years from the brutal and unprovoked aggression of her neighbour, seeks by some disposition of territories on the west bank of the Rhine to obtain some security against that aggression for the future, to accuse her of Imperialistic aims.

I pass from that. I think it will be generally admitted at this stage of the War that statesmen of all countries have come to realise that it is not by territorial readjustments, however skilful, not by the imposition of strategical frontiers, however cleverly drawn, that the peace of the world is going to be secured. By what other means is it to be secured? I venture to suggest to the serious consideration of our Foreign Office that there are only two other ways by which it can be secured. One is by so arranging treaties and alliances as to maintain a balance of power sufficient to check future aggression. I know that is now regarded as a discredited and effete system of statesmanship, and I quite sympathise with hon. Members who take that view. But we cannot afford, in the dilemma in which civilisation finds itself, to reject any means of preventing war without at least paying them the compliment of consideration. Then there is the third way, and, as I believe, the best way, and that is the suggestion, made first, I believe, by the ex-Prime Minister in September, 1914, and subsequently by President Wilson, that we shall be bound at the conclusion of this struggle to find in some League of Nations, in some partnership of the free nations of the world, that guarantee for the peace of the world which has hitherto been lacking. Just one word about that proposal for a League of Nations. A good many people refer to it as though it were some pro-German suggestion, some pacifist idea. They seem wholly ignorant of the precise terms in which President Wilson first placed the idea before the Allied Governments. President Wilson's proposal for a League of Nations was not a proposal that, we should commence to negotiate with an undefeated and unrepentant Germany. Let me quote his own words. He said "It must be a league of free nations. No autocratic Government can be trusted to keep faith or observe its covenants"; and although undoubtedly it would be safer and better for the peace of the world that an unrepentant Germany, after proper reparation and restitution, should be admitted to the League of Nations, I for one will never admit that it is not in the power or competence of the free nations of the world to establish a League of Peace, a bulwark against aggression, without fisrt obtaining leave and licence of the Hohenzollerns.

I want to ask two questions of the Foreign Secretary. We are nearly all of us agreed that, however much we may desire peace at the earliest moment, there is no practical possibility of obtaining any peace of a satisfactory character until the military forces of Germany have been defeated, and decisively defeated, in the field. One cannot read a German newspaper to-day, one cannot read a speech by a German statesman or an article by a German journalist, with- out seeing that, underlying every argument they use, the idea is firmly implanted in their minds that after this War there will be another war. They are to hold Belgium. Why? Because it would be a spearhead for England in the next war. Only to-day we hear that England must never be allowed to construct the Channel tunnel. Why? Because it would be a bridgehead for England in the next war. It is not so important to observe the actual statement of intentions on the part of the German publicists—they may be, and often are, intended to deceive—but I invite hon. Members to consider what the underlying assumption is in everything they write. You will find that the underlying assumption of every German speech and article is that if this War does not leave Germany triumphant there will be another war. Therefore I say we are all agreed that victory is necessary. But what next? We are fighting for security. Military victory alone will not give us security, and I tell the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, as representing the Government, quite plainly that it is a mistake to suppose that the people of this country are lagging behind the Government in their patriotic aims and in their resolution. That is a mistake. The people of this country are suspicious of the Government—not suspicious that they are going too far, but suspicious as to whether they intend to go far enough. Some of them, very unjustly, think there are members of the Cabinet whose democratic ideals are not so robust or so racy of the soil as those of the Prime Minister; and they have an uneasy feeling that, after this victory over Germany has been obtained, then possibly the Government may say: "Now we are satisfied; now we are prepared to make a peace; and we will just go on with armies and navies on both sides as before—in the same old-fashioned way." That will not satisfy the people of this country. They want to know by what practical means you propose to give them the security for which they are making sacrifices with both hands and with eager hearts.

Now, what do you propose to do? Of course, one way would be to crush and destroy Germany. We do not propose that. No sensible person does. It is not possible; and if it were possible we should not wish to do it. The second way would be so to restore the balance of power in Europe that although Germany might be unrepentant—although a universal League of Nations might be a dream impossible of attainment—still, we shall have so arranged and so united the forces of democracy and the forces which make for peace that we shall have achieved the safety of the world. Is the Government doing anything on those lines? I do not like to see this German League of Nations indisolubly knit together in close alliance and on the other side no league or alliance at all. We have heard a good deal about the supposed incapacity of democratic States to make war effectively, and I think and hope that when the military history of this War comes to be written it will be said that we have given a fairly satisfactory answer to the people who doubted the capacity of democratic States to make war. But I want to ask the Foreign Secretary this: Are the democratic States making alliances with one another? Is there any record in modern political history of any democratic State making an alliance with another democratic State for keeping the peace, or for any other similar honest purpose? It is a very curious position. The autocracies can make alliances. Emperors can make leagues. If you turn to the history of the great democracies—France, America, England—where in our history can you find an example of a great democracy taking the hand of another democracy in partnership? I do not know an example, and I am rather appalled at the spectacle that we see today: the autocracies clinging ever closer in alliance as the storm grows fiercer, and the democracies of Europe, curiously unsociable and with that aloofness which marks the proletariat, unable to enter into any alliance or agreement even for the prosecution of this War.

That is not an agreement or an alliance. Take ourselves and America. There is not a scrap of paper; there is not an agreement of any kind or description with regard to the prosecution of the War.

I do not want to overstate or misstate the case; but surely the present position is what I have said. Between ourselves and America (we ought to face the fact) there is neither alliance nor agreement. Between ourselves and our Colonies there is neither alliance nor agreement. Between ourselves and Russia there lies a broken and dishonest pact. Between ourselves and France and Italy there is nothing except the one scrap of paper which says that we will not make peace separately in the present War. Surely hon. Members will not object when I say that that state of things is not at all comparable to, or any way as satisfactory as, the stable system of alliances such as is pitted against us by the autocracies of Central Europe? I say this—I want to make this point clear: It is possible—I do not think it probable—it is possible that the end of this War will not bring to Europe all that we desire. It is possible that all our ideals may not be attained. It is possible that the end of the War will leave Europe still in arms, and some of us foresee the possibility of a future war. I ask the Foreign Office this: Are they taking any steps to see that if the War should come to an end of that kind we shall, at any rate, have some sort of League of Peace, some sort of counter alliance, to oppose to that German League of Nations, to that League of War which has proved its efficiency in so remarkable a way in the last three and a-half years of this War?

I come to my final point—the third question—the suggestion that security may be obtained by forming a League of Nations. If our war object is security, if our soldiers are bleeding, dying every day in order to obtain security, and if that, security can only be attained by an agreement in writing, by a League of Nations, by some alliance for the purpose of peace, is it fair to our soldiers to ask them to go on bleeding and dying in order to obtain a security which, after all, will have to be attained, in large measure by our diplomatists without some help from diplomacy? Is it not legitimate to suggest that if the security we demand is to be obtained by a League of Nations the diplomatists ought to be marching at the same time as the soldiers? They ought to be taking steps in the matter. What evidence do they give that there is any sincerity in the avowed adhesion of the Allied Powers to President Wilson's proposal for a League of Nations? When President Wilson made his speech to the American Senate and put forward that scheme as his proposal, his contribution, as a method by which peace was to be attained, the Allied Geovern-ments sent in a joint reply in which they said in a general way they were in complete accord with President Wilson's suggestion of a League of Nations for securing the peace of Europe. In a general way! And in a general way they have apparently done nothing since! For my part I do not, I cannot, understand why, if America, speaking by her President, meant what she said—that security was only to be obtained by a League of Free Nations pledged not to make war upon one another, pledged to use all their influence to maintain the peace of the world, and if the statesmen of this country are of like mind, what is there to prevent our joining hands with America and agreeing not to make war with one another? It seems an extraordinary thing that the Allied Governments should say that their principal war aim is to secure perpetual peace for Europe, yet they do not even enter into an agreement not to make war the one with the other! Surely that ought to be possible?

I do venture most seriously to suggest to the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs that if the Allied Powers would take one step, only one little step, forward in the direction of forming that League of Nations which they admit is essential for security they would do more to re-establish public confidence, they would better restate the war aims of the Government, and restate them in a manner more comprehensible and less capable of misrepresentation, than they can in any other way. They would, if I may humbly make the suggestion, create a new unity and a new inspiration amongst the people of the Allies. Therefore, I venture to ask the Foreign Office to consider most seriously what is the diplomatic method by which we intend to secure that our military victory shall be followed by the obtaining of some security against future wars. If they are only relying upon the traditional methods of European diplomacy, upon the balance of power, are they taking any steps to weld and cement the alliances between ourselves and the nations which are now fighting for it while we are actually fighting side by side? If not, why not? Or do they rely upon the proposal put forward by President Wilson for our future security, upon a League of Nations that shall be pledged not to make war upon one another, to submit their own disputes to arbitration, and to the best of their ability to maintain the peace of the world? If so, is there any reason why they should not take some concrete step to give the peoples of the Allied countries an earnest of their good intentions?

The discussion to-day on the war aims and policy of our Government has been of a more concentrated character than any that we have enjoyed on the subject since the War broke out. With one or two exceptions the Foreign Office can scarcely complain of the attitude which has been adopted and the language which has been used. That was due in some part to the excellent opening which this discussion received from my hon. Friend the Member for Derby. It has also been due, I think, to the grave sense of responsibility which Members in all parts of the House feel now as much as, if not more than, at any time during the War. It is not easy to discuss our war aims at the present moment without keeping in mind the fact that we are addressing not only this audience, but some four or five other audiences of different characters. There is the public outside which is now worn and tired, but, I believe, as determined as ever, subjected, however, to hardships, invited to sacrifices far in excess of anything that they anticipated three and a half years ago, although I remember that on the very day when War was announced my Noble Friend Lord Grey from that box warned the people of this country that they were in for a period of unexampled hardship and sacrifice. That audience cannot be ignored, and the Government would, I think, be well advised in anything they say on our war aims in realising that the spirit of the English people is not necessarily kept by bold and extravagant speeches. I am not at all sure that at this period of the War extravagant speech does not do far more harm than tepid speech.

We all know perfectly well what brought us into the War and what were the objects that actuated each one of us individually, and there never has been a war in which this country was involved where the merits of all kinds were better ascertained and understood in this country. That is to a large extent due to the recruiting meetings, which were one of the characteristics of English public life for the first twelve months of the War. One of the reasons why many of us regretted the necessity for introducing the Military Service Act was that it did away altogether with that kind of campaign. Those recruiting meetings, held in every town and every village of Great Britain, educated our people on the true merits of our cause, but, as I look back to what was advocated then, I find a very different claim put forward by those who were urging our young men to volunteer into the Army from the claim which is put forward in some sections of our Press to-day, and, I regret to say, by some members of the Government. If this discussion does no other thing than bring back, not only Members of this House, but the audience outside, to a consideration of the aims which induced us to enter the War in 1914, it will have been a step in advance.

Then there is another audience, the purely enemy audience anxious for any syllable that can be heard here to be used in Germany. Speeches may be made here which may encourage the Germans to prosecute their war with renewed vigour and spirit, and put up with still greater sacrifices than before. But those speeches may be of two kinds. They may be either the speeches which are distinctly pro-German in character—and there are not many of those delivered in England—or they may be those which are of such an extravagant kind as to make the German people feel that they must fight as long as they have legs to walk on, and as long as they have ammunition to fight with. Both those kinds of extreme speeches are used in Germany with telling effect. There are many things in which we can excel the Germans, and there are very few things which we cannot take up for the first time and do with great vigour, but one thing in which the Germans have beaten us from the very first is propaganda. Propaganda amongst their own people has been far more successful than has the similar kind of propaganda amongst ours. They turn every-thing to account, and speeches which are delivered here provide them with endless pamphlets. I think that is a third reason why Members have spoken here with a great sense of responsibility to-day.

Then there is the audience of the Allies. I can quite understand not only Members, but representatives of the Foreign Office being cautious in what they say with regard, for instance, to Alsace-Lorraine, or Serbia, or Roumania or Dalmatia, for there is an Allied audience anxious to see what is said by those in authority, and to watch, carefully the drift of public opinion here. On the whole, I do not think the discussion to-day can have offended Allied ears, but it is equally necessary with the Allies to be frank as with our own people. I can imagine nothing that is likely to do more harm than that we should, for instance, tell our French Allies that we are determined to prosecute the War with just as much vigour for the sake of Alsace-Lorraine as we would prosecute it with the object of driving the Germans out of Belgium and out of the occupied districts of France. The two things are not on the same plane, and I think we should be misleading French opinion if we told the French that we consider them to be on the same plane. I think it would be a great pity if we have an impression in Italy that, we were prepared to aid in the attainment of Italian ambition by pressing for the break up of the Austrian Empire. Let us press for Italian aims as much as possible, but do not let us give the Italians the impression that public opinion in this country is likely to support a Government which would go on prosecuting the War after, say, we had driven the Germans out of Belgium and the occupied districts of France, purely with the object of attaining some of the extremer ambitions of Italian politicians. We can aid Italy, and will aid Italy, to the utmost of our power, but let us be moderate in the amount of her programme which we are prepared to regard as of first-class importance.

Those various audiences make it difficult for anyone, perhaps, to speak in public at the present moment, and I hope the House will forgive me if I leave a good deal more unsaid than I should be prepared to say. I think reticence on the part of those who hold public positions is probably their most valuable quality at the present moment. One of the greatest blunders made during the War of the many which are recorded from time to time by those in high authority is that too many speeches, rather than too few, have been made, and I regret that I should have felt it necessary to say anything to-night. In all these objects and aims which have been under discussion we are bound to be dominated by the American view. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Commander Wedgwood) drew our attention to the fact that we are now to a large extent dependent on America. We all recollect the speech made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in regard to our financial resources, in which my right hon. Friend expressed, in language more extravagant than he is in the habit of using, our dependence on America, not only for support, but actually for our own strength. Without American support our financial strength would have disappeared. I believe my right hon. Friend went so far as to say that the intervention of America saved us from financial disaster. If that is a true description of our dependence upon America it must be obvious that American opinion should carry great weight with us. Indeed I do not know but what the announcements made by President Wilson do not express more truly the ultimate aims and objects of the Allies than anything that has been said elsewhere in recent times.

I turn to the last address delivered by the President in America, and what do we find there? First of all there is a notable omission. The President said nothing whatever about Alsace-Lorraine. I think it would be as well to say nothing further on that subject except to mention the fact. The second remarkable fact is that he deliberately declared that he was not in favour of the break-up of the Austrian Empire. His third important pronouncement was that he was against economic war after the conclusion of the present war. Now those three statements are in themselves so clear that we need be under no misapprehension as to what they mean. President Wilson is not prepared to have the American forces used for any one of those three purposes, and without the American forces it is perfectly obvious that none of the aims and objects described so well by the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite can possibly be attained.

Let me say a word or two with regard to the economic war after the War. That aspect, I feel, is likely to give rise to controversy in this country as it may do elsewhere. There are many sides to it, which appear to me to be far more complicated, and if I may say so, more beneficial than some people appear to understand. In the first place during the war every country is quite entitled to use its economic weapons. The Minister of Blockade is responsible for using an economic weapon. He must have the assistance of the Navy, but he is using an economic weapon, and without the blockade it is obvious that Germany would not be in her present comparatively weak state. That economic weapon may be carried still further when you come near to the time when you are about to negotiate when it is quite possible that the further use of that economic weapon may be one of the most valuable means you have of bringing things to a conclusion. But observe that that economic weapon can be of no use if you are going to say to Germany that no matter what happens you are going to go on using your blockade against Germany for all time. There must be a perfectly clear understanding that the weapon is to be used with the utmost rigour if Germany refuses to make peace, and if she makes peace the weapon will not be used. Either one or the other, and it is impossible to have it both ways. If it is to be used in any case it loses its force the very moment when it might be of value. That is the first comment I make on these economic questions which are sometimes disposed of merely by a reference to the Paris Resolutions.

There is another aspect of the use of our economic weapons, which is also of the greatest importance. My hon. and learned Friend before he sat down referred to the League of Nations. I think he was a little hard on the American and British democracies in stating that we at the present time were not able to enter into any bargain or agreement which safeguarded us against outbreaks of war. I think my hon. and learned Friend must have forgotton the arbitration treaty which was negotiated by Lord Bryce some four years ago, and which we hope will be the governing document in all questions of dispute between ourselves and the United States. If a League of Nations has ever to come into being, and I fervently hope it will, then it must have behind it some element of force. The only argument I have ever heard against the League of Nations by men in authority was that used by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Trinity College (Sir E. Carson) who said that as Germany had broken the treaty which safeguarded the neutrality of Belgium she could not be trusted to keep any obligations she might enter into in regard to a League of Nations. That may be quite true, but the only way you can safeguard your League of Nations is by the combined forces of all the contracting parties. It must be done by conjoint force, and when you consider what is the force to be exercised I think it is absurd to imagine that you can succeed merely by the pressure of an international police. Germany is at present held by the combined organised international police of the world, but you must have something beyond that. You will have to combine both your military and economic pressure, and without that it will be impossible for us to exercise the requisite amount of force in a League of Nations.

It may be said that at the present moment we are using that economic force as effectively as we can. That is quite true, but you can use it effectively afterwards in advance of a war with all the commercial, industrial, and banking classes taught, as they are being taught, that Germany can gain no indemnity by force of arms, because you can put on the blockade in war-time, and you would have the whole force of commercial opinion against an outbreak of war. You would have all that on your side, and in Germany there would be the fear of being cut off from the raw materials of the world. She would not get wool from Australia, South America, or the Argentine. She would not get cotton from the United States of America or Egypt, nor rubber from the East and from West Africa, and she would know that she would be cut off on the first breach of that pact by a form of pressure which would in itself be more effective than force of arms. To that extent economic pressure is justified, but once more, I repeat, it can only be effective if you have a direct contrast between free access to raw materials and absolute severance from raw materials, and it must be either one thing or the other. To talk of cutting Germany altogether off from her raw materials, excepting in circumstances such as I have described, is bound to weld together public opinion in Germany which may be reopening towards peace.

10.0 P.M.

It is not easy to describe what is passing in the German mind. I venture to say there are very few of us who have a complete conception of German mentality in this War. It is very difficult at any time to say what is passing through the minds of the English people. We have all sorts of elaborate machinery for ascertaining it, and of this we can be certain, that in Germany at the present time, with its widespread degree of suffering and the prospects of ruin which face many of their commercial and industrial classes in the future, and the dreadful war weariness which must come to all the people, there must be a great section of German opinion which will thank God for the first prospects of an early peace. If we can do anything to really persuade that section of German public opinion that peace is attainable on terms which will leave to them a chance of existence after the War, with the world open to them for trade so long as they are prepared to abide by the Pact of Peace, so long as they are not guilty of bad behaviour, I believe a great deal will have been done to prepare the atmosphere without which no peace will be possible in the future. I hope I have not overstated the case. I do not wish in the least to do that, but I suggest that, unless we take these facts into account, we shall not take a complete survey of the atmosphere in which our diplomatists are bound to work sooner or later. May I say a word or two on the necessity for maintaining at home here the kind of opinion which will alone buoy up the Government which is to carry us through these terrible times? We have watched during the last few years changes of public opinion; we have swayed to and fro from time to time, and nothing has been clearer to those of us not in office—and I think here the Leader of the House will entirely concur with me—nothing has been clearer to us than that there is not sufficient information given to the public. While we were in office we were not conscious of the small amount which was doled out for the consumption of the public. That is an inevitable result of being burdened with an enormous amount of administrative work, and not having either the time or the skill to run a Publicity Department as well as the affairs of our own offices. Unfortunately, the Publicity Departments we have had experience of in recent months have been concerned much more with personal than with national matters. It is indeed a real misfortune. It is very difficult indeed for us to ask for information at any time. We all know how delicate is the operation even of putting questions on the Paper. A hint given abroad may entirely affect the very atmosphere I wa3 describing a few moments ago. A question asked in the course of Debate may be entirely inopportune. When things are going badly or well I believe the Government would be well advised in letting us know a little more of what is passing, and giving us information without any attempt to colour it. The same point was raised when we had a discussion on the Vote of Credit. After the statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty there was an attempt to colour the statistics. That gives a bad or wrong impression, and sooner or later it brings its own retribution. What was the good of telling us on the 16th of August that the output of tonnage this year would be in the vicinity of 2,000,000 tons, and then discovering at the end of December it was barely over a million? How much better would it have been to tell us in August that the anticipation was 1,000,000 tons? That sort of thing I am afraid disturbs public opinion. It does not give public opinion a chance of realising our position, or realising whether we are becoming stronger or weaker; whether we are, in fact, on such information as we have before us, showing those powers of endurance without which it will be impossible to conduct the War to an end. It may be that some of the information cannot be given in public. I would suggest it would be well to give it privately to those who have great influence over public opinion. I only offer that hint for what; it is worth. If the Government feel that they cannot give more information than we are now receiving, I do not press them for it. They are the best judges, but in so far as they feel they must withhold information from the country, just so far must they count on the public opinion of the country deserting them, probably at the moment they most need support.

The last point I will make is this: Whatever may be our war aims, I do not ask for a fuller statement than that given by the late Prime Minister at Birmingham last week and by President Wilson in his address to Congress. If it is at all opportune that a further statement should be made, I will say no more than that I think it would be in the public interest, if there are no other reasons against it, that the Minister for Blockade should tell us in language quite easily understood by people outside—I know he is a master of patriotic phraseology—but if he can he should tell us to-night in perfectly clear language exactly what we may regard as being the limits for which we will fight at whatever cost. I do not ask him to get up and say our aims are unselfish and disinterested. Without disrespect to any of the distinguished orators who have debated on our aims, I may say I am getting a little tired of the words "unselfish" and "disinterested." I may say quite frankly that when we went into this War in 1914 I was not thinking merely of Belgium. I was thinking of British interests as well. I should have regarded it as a most dreadful peril to this country if the north coast of France had been held by Germany, or if Germany had been left in continuous possession of Antwerp, Ostend, and Zee-brugge. It is as well one should be candid with the world as well as with our-selves. It is more easy to deceive ourselves than to deceive the world. We should be perfectly candid with ourselves and say we are fighting this War not only in order that Belgium may be free and that France may be swept clear of her enemies, but also in order that Great Britain may be safe.

I, myself, am in entire agreement with much of what the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Runciman) has said, and particularly with his warm and well-deserved praise of the admirable tone—if I may be allowed to say so—which has prevailed, I think I may say throughout the Debate—at any rate, throughout the portion of it to which I have been able to listen this evening. The right hon. Gentleman has made my task in replying easier by one very admirable observation, namely, that reticence was better than speech. That is an observation with which I find myself in entire agreement; and never more than when I sit down, after having made a speech in this House, and reflect with anxiety on all the phrases that may have dropped from me that may possibly do harm, and how almost impossible it is that anything I can say has done good. There is another reason which enables me to confine my observations within narrow limits this evening, and that is that I understand the Prime Minister is going to make a speech tomorrow, in which, I have no doubt, he will survey the whole field. The right hon. Gentleman says that he regretted the little amount of information which the Government give, and he very fairly said that that was not an anxiety which he felt when he was, himself, in office. I quite agree with him, because I remember very well—before I was in office—that my feeling was exactly the same. It seems so hard that one does not know more. I often feel, in dealing with my own De- partment, that I should be very glad indeed to convey further information; but, in going over, in my mind, all the topics on which I can speak, I am bound to say I nearly always arrive at the conclusion that unless I am pressed very hard I had much better not say it; that if I do say it it may do harm, and that if I do not say it it will possibly do good I hope the House will not think me egotistical in referring to myself; but I have made a practice, for the last year or so, of seeing a number of American correspondents every week, and I have frequently expressed my readiness to see other correspondents, if they desire to see me. I say to them all that I can say; but I am quite conscious it is very little. I feel every time how very dangerous it is to speak, particularly on foreign affairs, and though I thoroughly recognise the enormous importance of taking the country into the confidence of the Government to the utmost possible extent, yet I do feel that though that is an important matter I am not quite sure if I were to survey quite impartially the history of the three Governments that have held office here during this War I should not say that on the whole it would have been better if they had not spoken so much. That, at any rate, is an opinion which it is possible to hold. I pass to the Debate, and will a make very few observations on it. The hon. Member For Elland (Mr. Trevelyan) was good enough to beseech me not to answer anything that he said, and I will do my best.

There is one observation of his to which, for the information of the House, I must reply. He suggested more than once that the Germans were ready to make a statement of their terms of peace, and he hinted that they had been ready to make such a statement to M. Briand, in France. I must observe that it is a regular trick of our enemies to put about rumours and suggestions—nothing very definite; "I could if I would"—that they are prepared to make most favourable offers, that they are prepared to suggest that they will go out of this part of Belgium, or out of Belgium altogether, that they will even entertain the question of Alsace-Lorraine, and all the rest of it. But when you try to bind them to any of it, and any effort is made to find out what they really mean, it turns out that there is no meaning in it at all. The hon. Gentleman speaks as if we made no effort to find out what the German terms are. I believe there is scarcely anyone who has spoken in this House, whether from that bench or from this, who has not at some time or another asked the Germans to state their terms. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife (Mr. Asquith) only a few months ago challenged them, and has rechallenged them over and over again to make a statement about that very question—"Are you prepared to withdraw from Belgium and to grant reparation for the damage that you have done?" No reply; not a word. The House was made aware, owing to circumstances which occurred in Russia, only the other day that when the German Government held out some hope, through a neutral Government, that they were prepared to make some statement about peace, this Government instantly said they were ready to listen to anything the Germans had to say and to lay those terms, whatever they might be, before their Allies. From that day to this no statement has been made by the German Government, and it is, therefore, rather ridiculous that the hon. Member should allow that bias against his own country which so often characterises his speeches——

I am very sorry to intervene, but I do not think that is quite fair. I should only like to say—[HON. MEMBERS: "Go on!"]—hon. Members are making insulting remarks, and I only looked. I should only like to say that the things which I referred to with regard to M. Briand appeared in several of the leading papers here and were never contradicted in any way. I think I was justified in referring to them, but all I said was contained in a Conservative paper, the "Daily Telegraph," as well as in other papers, such as the "Manchester Guardian"—papers of responsibility.

I did not quarrel with the hon. Gentleman in the least for referring to that. What I was venturing to criticise was the suggestion that we were behindhand in asking for German terms, and that we were not ready to listen to German terms if they had been made. That was the subject in the hon. Member's speech which deserved criticism. A good deal has been said by earlier speakers about certain observations—I do not know in the least why he has been singled out for attack—made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Trinity College (Sir E. Carson). [HON. MEMBEBS: "Oh!"] If hon. Members will allow me to go on I do not propose to leave his defence exactly at that. Two or three observations of his have been singled out. There is the old story about the West Bank of the Rhine. I thought that that had been cleared up completely. I did think, until I heard it again referred to by hon. Member after hon. Member, that it bad been made abundantly clear that my right hon. Friend did not intend to suggest—he may have used a careless expression—anything in advance of the general policy of the Government with regard to Alsace-Lorraine. I really think that no good is gained by suggesting over and over again that some British Minister has made himself responsible for a policy which the Government have never suggested they would accept, and which I am quite sure no British Government ever would accept.

If the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Trinity College is to be defended in this House, why should he not come here and speak in his own defence?

The hon. Member is not entitled to interrupt in that way. It is a gratuitous interruption on the part of the hon. Member.

I may remind the House that my right hon. Friend has distinctly denied that he ever intended to announce any policy of annexation such as has been attempted to be attributed to him. He has been much criticised for some observations which he made about an economic offensive and about "bombing German businesses." I was very glad to hear what my right hon. Friend the Member for Dewsbury (Mr. Runciman) was good enough to say about an economic offensive. It is quite as important as, if not more important than, any other arm that we have, and to suggest that my right hon. Friend was saying anything improper or anything undesirable when he used the expressive simile "bombing German businesses," or whatever it was that he said, seems to me a mere extravagance of the prejudice which my right hon. Friend appears to excite in certain quarters of this House. It is perfectly right to bomb German businesses, and when I had the honour to be a colleague of my right hon. Friend's opposite I introduced on behalf of the Government a Bill the whole object of which was to bomb German businesses. [HON. MEMBEBS: "No!"] Yes, it enabled us to establish what is called the Statutory List and to do our best to put out of business German firms in neutral countries, primarily in the Far East, and afterwards in South America. I am satisfied myself that policy, which has been carried through to a very considerable degree of success, has been one of the main instruments of weakening the economic power of Germany in this struggle, and making her anxiously look to a period when peace will be restored. Therefore, I altogether repudiate that attack on my right hon. Friend, and I venture to say that in the rest of his observations he has been equally unfairly attacked. He is much reproached because he suggested that if the War went on Germany would have a difficulty in obtaining raw material. I want to make it perfectly clear that so far as I am concerned I am no advocate, nor do I believe that any member of the Government is an advocate, of what is called an economic war after the War, and if I remember rightly my right hon. Friend in the very speech for which he is being attacked said expressly that he was no advocate of "a vindictive trade policy," or some phrase to the same effect. I also think, and think very strongly, that it is right to put before the world the position in this matter, and undoubtedly there is in many respects, as we all know, a world shortage of raw materials. It is caused by the War and is being increased by the War. The longer the War lasts the greater will be the shortage of raw materials. Is it to be said, if it so happens that the great mass of raw materials are under the control or supplied by the territory of ourselves and our Allies, that after the War we are to go short of those raw materials in order to supply Germany? Of course it is not, and if it were suggested, it never would be carried out. This country would have a right to impeach any Ministry which allowed this country to be in want of essential raw materials because they were being sent to those who had been our enemies in this War. There is nothing vindictive about that. It is a statement of economic fact which it is right to present to the world and to press upon their attention.

That is all, as I understood him, that my right hon. Friend said. Personally, for what my opinion is worth, I entirely agree with him. I believe it to be the most important economic truth, and it is most important that it should be pressed on the attention of Germany as well as on the attention of other people. May I say a word or two about what may be described as not being our War aims? The right hon. Gentleman invited me to lay down those articles which we would fight for at all events. I think that is a very dangerous invitation, and, for my part, I am afraid I cannot comply with it. I do not think that in the course of a Debate in this House I, or even a much more experienced Minister than myself, would do well to try to trace out the territorial changes which we regard as absolutely essential, or to attempt to define in a speech like this the terms which we should ultimately seek to secure. My right hon. Friend will forgive me for saying that there is only one part of his speech which I regret. That was the part which appeared—I think it was only an appearance—to throw some question upon our zeal for the War aims of our Allies. I say to the House I am quite sure that British public opinion would never permit us to abandon any of the undertakings which we have given to any of our Allies, and I am perfectly satisfied that whatever else we should be disposed to compromise about, those essential requirements which our close and devoted Allies regard as vital to their future we should regard as vital as any aims that we might have for ourselves.

I can only say to hon. Members that those interruptions are only made for a mischievous object. I have said that I do not propose to define exactly this evening those changes we propose to insist upon. The hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. McCURDY) in his interesting speech said that victory was not enough. I entirely agree. He said it with such freshness and vigour that it seems almost a platitude to say that what we are fighting for in this War is security. I entirely agree that the country is entitled to know what means we intend to take, in broad outline, to achieve that security. There are two main things to which I attach the greatest importance. I think the territorial settlement that we must aim at must be based on some real essential principle. We must not imitate the defects and follies of the Treaty of Vienna. We must try to base the new settlement, whatever it is, as far as we can—because after all may be we shall not be able to do everything we wish to do—on some general principle which will make for a lasting settlement. We must avoid and take away, that is, national injustices. I am not going to be betrayed into trying to make that more specific because it would be most dangerous, but the general principle is sound, and I believe it is one that we must keep before us in the terms of peace.

My hon. Friend went on to suggest that there were two particular precautions that we must take. We must aim at what he called a new balance of power, and we must aim at a League of Nations. I am not quite sure that his phrase "balance of power" was very well chosen to describe what he had in view. What I understood him to mean was that we should aim at some permanent alliance of sufficient strength to secure the peace of the world. That is a dangerous topic to embark upon, but this I think, I may say with safety. There is not a member of the Government who does not hope for close and lasting relations between those who are our Allies in the present struggle. I certainly hope for the greatest possible advantage to the history of the world for an ever closer alliance between us and the United States. I believe that policy, which must be the policy of every rational being, is not in any way in conflict with, but is the necessary foundation for the policy of the League of Nations. I would not remain a member of any Government for an hour that did not make the establishment of a League of Nations after the War one of its main objects. I have said that before in this House.

Nor is there the least ground for imagining that my right hon. Friend (Sir E. Carson) differs from the idea of the League of Nations. I believe in it most profoundly, but I believe also that if it is to come it must come first, as was so well put by President Wilson in his last message, as a partnership of those nations whom he regards as worthy of entering into it. That must be the beginning in all probability. If it is a success, as I earnestly hope and believe it may be, it will gradually extend till it includes, I hope, ail the nations of the world. For my part, I regard it as the only thing really worth struggling for in connection with international affairs. I am profoundly convinced of the soundness of the idea, and I am not convinced that it is impracticable, but I feel, that before you can establish your new settlement of the world, before you can hope to establish your League of Nations, victory must be won. That is essential. The idea that a League of Nations would ever be established by a victorious Germany is utterly fantastic. The whole of their training and the whole of their belief is against any such idea. We, and we only, could establish that great ideal, and it is because I believe that and because I, in my heart, believe that victory will be ours, that I have no hesitation whatever in speaking to the House in a confident tone to-night.

At this late hour of the night I do not propose to move the Resolution [ in reference to the nan-power problem ] which stands in my name, but I will take the opportunity of dealing with the question at to-morrow's sitting.

I endeavoured to address the House before the Minister of Blockade replied. I should like to say that the Debate this afternoon has proved the danger of the Government attitude not only towards this House but towards the whole country. I listened with considerable interest to the right hon. Gentleman's remarks, and I knew quite well that we should hear from him what I could say to this House with safety we were going to hear, and that is nothing at all. That is exactly what this House heard throughout the whole of the speech. I find myself speaking on the same platform with all shades of opinion. The speeches which we heard to-day up to recently were only from what are known as the Pacifist Benches. When we find men who, two or three months ago, would never have got up to say to this House the things they say now, is not that an indication of the danger of the Government's method? Is not that an indication that their indifference to this House, their almost jocular indifference to criticism and demands for information, is an illustration of the end that may well come to this House, when the Government will fall, not primarily because of its inefficiency—which I do not propose to criticise now—but because of its inability to take not only the temper of this House, but the temper of the people of the country? They have a War Aims Committee. Presumably, a committee of war aims is a Committee to state what war aims are, The Prime Minister is, I believe, president of that Committee, and he oscillates from fatuous optimism to extreme pessimism. He does not state any aim. He simply and solely says that he can see the sun shining on our banners, or that he cannot see the horizon, or phrases of that description, which convey nothing to the people. What the people of this country want to know quite clearly is what we are out to do, and to some extent how we propose to do it. Up to now many promises have been made. We have always been going to be told of the way that victory was going to be brought nearer to us, but on the other hand we find nothing but reckless speeches from the Ministry. The Leader of the House said this afternoon that the Government were not responsible for what Ministers said, and very frequently Ministers themselves do not know what they have said when they sit down. I think that is a very regrettable state of things, and I am quite satisfied that the defence which the Minister of Blockade offered to-night for the right hon. Member for Dublin University had not any substance in fact. You can read anything into a phrase, and it pleases the right hon. Gentleman to read into that speech exactly the opposite to what it pleases hon. Members behind me to read into it.

Repeatedly I have put down questions appealing to the Prime Minister to use any influence he has with his Cabinet or Government to restrain them from making speeches of this reckless nature, and I am told at that table that the Prime Minister has no influence over and no right to control those speeches, and therefore it is useless to address questions to him. It is very tempting when addressing an audience to say what is popular. It is very pleasant to utter perorations that bring an audience to its feet, but that does not bring victory any nearer. The people of this country are satisfied, or should be satisled, that there are many greater sacrifices to be made before any hope of victory is possible. We have heard this afternoon that this is going to be the last war. I doubt if there ever has been any war in the course of which there were no politicians who said that we shall never see war again. But the one thing to which Members do not refer, and the significance of which they seem to fail utterly to grasp, is the fact that even if we had a League of Nations we have no security that two of the nations in that league may not have a difference of opinion. We have seen in this House that there are two parties who have differences of opinion, and when the leaders differ we see various members flocking to their standards, and therefore in any League of Nations which we may get two nations will differ one from the other, and you may find various other nations flocking to their respective standards, and all over again you will have the same position as at present. What is the position at present? We have a whole league of nations allied against Germany, and they cannot reduce her, or they have not done so so far. I think that the League of Nations in a wonderful dream, but that it is not going to bring peace to the world, and I do not think that there is any possible hope of bringing peace to the world until, to use a platitude, we have utterly and completely reduced the German military machine—that is, until we have put ourselves in a position, if we can do so, to prevent Germany, not from building big guns, but from building in the next ten years a vast fleet of aeroplanes, of which we have had the veriest sample so far.

I regret that in the whole of this discussion, as to how we are going to bring back peace to the world, there was no Member of the House who made even a passing reference to the punitive possibility of aeroplanes. Only last evening we had to adjourn the seat of Government because of half-a-dozen of them. What are we going to do when there are half-a-dozen thousand of them? It is a perfectly simple proposition. The lack of intelligence on the part of the present Government is a far greater menace to the peace of Europe than anything else. Do they grasp the reality, the possibilities of aeroplanes? Have we had that demonstrated in this House yet? A German airman boasted to a friend of mine that the seat of the German Government would be brought to Bristol before long, and I am not sure that it will not, if we go on behaving in the manner in which we behaved last night. It would not be serious if half a dozen Members of this House were killed, or half the Government were killed, but what is wanted is that this House should set an example to the people. Noble Lords in another place asked why people ran to the Tubes. Why did they not stay in their dwellings, such as they are, ramshackle structures, that are their only protection? Last night Members who believed in their duty decided to remain in the House, and I believe that had the matter been taken to a Division, they would have voted against an adjournment. I hope we will never be guilty of such a grave indiscretion again. Never let it be forgotten what poor people may think of you, and remember that Members of this House are responsible for all the suffering which aeroplanes have brought, and are likely to bring, to this country. Two years ago I asked what would be the position if German aeroplanes ever caused the adjournment of this House. That was received with laughter, and it was said, "We will wait till that event takes place." Will hon. Members take last night as an example, and will they please do all they can to impress upon the Government the need of punishing Germany? It has been said that the only possible way is to reduce Germany on the Western Front. I believe that what we want to do is to punish the civilian population which is behind the Army machine. Up to now they have never realised in any degree the grim cruelty of war. They have tightened their belts, to what extent we can only guess. They have suffered, but they have not suffered the bloody horrors of war, while the horrors which many men and women in this country have experienced, will not be readily forgotten. It is useless to think of peace, unless we are going to throw up the sponge, until Germany is adequately punished. Nothing grieved me more this afternoon than to hear hon. Members applauded for saying, "What was the good of trying to punish Germany?" Unless we punish Germany, unless we are prepared to impose terms on her, the terms which have been stated by some of the leading statesmen of this country, I am afraid we will have to admit that we are beaten. I think the Chancellor of the Exchequer was guilty of the most grave indiscretion of all his indiscretions of speech in this House and outside of it when he said that were it not for America financial disaster was our fate. Couple that with what the present Prime Minister said, that, "the last hundred thousand would do it." That implies absolutely and completely that the conduct and control of this War have passed out of our hands into the hands of the American financier, because, if it is a question of the last hundred thousand, until America conscripts her wealth it is the American financier whom we have to deal with. Perhaps that may account to some extent for the great discretion and diplomacy with which affairs are dealt by the Front Bench.

There are too many people making their bit instead of doing their bit in this country to-day, and if we could only have from the Government at least a firm hand, and if only they had the confidence of the people of this country, which they have not, it might help us so very much. We have nothing but boasts from members of the Government. Even the present Air Minister gets up and says he is going to give the Germans hell. Six months ago the Prime Minister said he was going to give the Germans hell, and ever since they have been giving us hell. So far as I can see our present building programme does not permit of our carrying out our threats. These idle threats lead us nowhere. If only the Government would get on without rhetoric, cut out the perorations, cut out the "sunshine on the banners," and all that business, and simply make cold statements, it is perfectly possible for them to say now what is our position in this War. Hon. Members on the opposite side said we must consider our vested interests. I always like to believe, most of the people of this country wish to believe, that the vested interests which are so powerful in this House are not all-sufficing in the question of the issues of this War. There is something greater than vested interests. There is our national honour and reputation.

The Minister for Blockade stated just now that we were prepared to keep all our treaties. I do not know to what he referred. Does he refer to those secret treaties we have heard so much about, and in which, I suppose, we are equally involved; and does he refer to all the proposals stated by various Ministers? What is the position? A right hon. Member, speaking from the Front Bench, said we were speaking to five audiences. All the better; but, if we are, let us speak straight. Diplomacy is a very fine thing, but when war breaks out, what does it prove? It proves that our diplomatiste have failed. Otherwise there would have been no war, and, therefore, it is time they ceased speaking. I utterly fail to see why we should not have a perfectly straightforward statement. We never get one. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman might just now have made no reply—a few compliments here, and a few statements there. But what have we learnt? Who is any wiser for the statement of the Noble Lord? Though I do not hold him wholly responsible! We are going to have the Prime Minister here to-morrow. That, at least, will be a novelty. I trust he will use that opportunity, not to tell us that six U-boats have just been sunk, that shipbuilding is going up by leaps and bounds, that by next December we shall be all right, and that by next October twelvemonths we shall be growing five thousand million bushels of corn—that is not what we want to hear. What hon. Members and the people of this country, want to hear is a clear-cut policy which can be put into 500 words—what is written, if he prefers it—a considered speech, simply saying that there exist no secret treaties to which we are committed, and that the people of Great Britain and her Dominions and Dependencies are at one with the President of the United States on some given point; to say what is that point, and that we will press on, if it is a question of two years or five years, and that we have the resources for carrying on the War—we might just as well be perfectly straight in the matter—and that it is our intention to carry it on under such-and-such a condition of affairs. I do not want to suggest any terms of peace to the right hon. Gentleman. I do not profess to be able to do so. Surely he knows what we are prepared to accept; but we must not be dubious about our position or impose any terms that we tremble even to give lip to. Surely we can say that nothing shall be done to destroy the unity of the British Empire—not from its Imperial standpoint—not as an Empire. I need not say that if we want to have a League of Nations, how better could we start than by having a league of our own fresh-blooded Dominions, and to lay down to what extent that is possible? Hon. Members seem to forget; they talk quite carelessly about a League of Nations. What you have to deal with is units, individuals—the national character of all these nations.

Character is governed by climate, by geography. You might just as well say that you are going to sweep all the world together and get the hot-blooded Italians to agree with the Icelanders on any given subject. It does not seem to me that hon. Members have really been reasoning. It simply means that the British national character—such as it is—has managed to stand the test both of the tropics and of the snows. We have a common view. Wherever you find the Britisher, whether in South Australia, North America or anywhere else, he has a certain outlook upon life which is common to the British natural character. He has a certain outlook on life. His ideals are totally different from those of the Italians or the Southern French. To suggest that just because we have all suffered for the last three years that we are going to sink all our peculiarities all our eccentricities, and suddenly to embrace one another in a world of peace, and that there will never be any friction, that the respective nations will have a sort of international council which will never disagree, is, well, somewhat absurd. I am satisfied that that is impossible, and I agree with the Noble Lord that the only possible League of Nations to commence with is an alliance, and a thorough and deep understanding, with those of our Allies with which, diplomacy suggests, it is possible to form an alliance, and to reduce the German military machine, and if we cannot reduce it now it is no good our going into a partnership with it in the future. Now As the time, and now is the test, and it is not by endeavouring to belittle the task, which confronts not only the British but the American people, that that task will be accomplished. I do appeal to hon. Members and to the Government, and more especially to those Departments of the Government which are coming into contact with American Departments, now not to irritate the American people. I have every reason to believe that the American people have about weighed up the reason why we have been three and a half years without winning the war. If you meet Americans in France to-day, or Americans in this country who come back from France, they tell you, when they speak straightly—and they do speak straightly—that they are fed up with the corruption and the inefficiency which exist in our various Departments.

There is a very, very big proposition before this country to-day on the question of the air raids, which I hope to see carried out in the coming summer by the American air fleet. Now, hon. Members might not appreciate this, but there is a decision being taken by the Air Board at the present time as to what shall be done with reference to that programme, and I would like to tell the Air Board this: that if they are not very careful they will not only confuse, but they will utterly ruin what may possibly be a turning-point in this War, if they persist in endeavouring to impinge their views and their opinions on the Americans in this matter. I appeal to hon. Members to force the Government to give the Americans an absolutely free hand in this question of the air war. We have muddled it. We have intrigued. We have failed again and again. We have put our trust in false leaders, whom we have supported through thick and thin, to save the faces of various Departments. For God's sake, I appeal to Members of this House not to allow these muddlers, these intriguers to get mixed up with, or in any way control, the fresh, clean opinion of American aviators in this War. Let them have a free hand. Let them, in the coming spring, with the fleet they are training, carry out their own offensive unvexed by the vested interests of Great Britain in Germany, which I have heard argued here on the Non-Ferrous Metals Bill, which was the cause of all the trouble, because our interests in Germany were greater than German interests here. I appeal to hon. Members to let us have one last chance, one last go at the German Empire by endeavouring to reduce their civilian population with the aid of our American Allies, and not to tamper and meddle with them. Let America come in where we have failed, and bring a true peace to this earth, which means the absolute collapse of a military machine which has not only dominated this world for three and a half years but is dominating it to-day.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill read the third time, and passed.

Chequers Estate Bill

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Lords Amendment be considered forthwith."

Is there any question of principle or alteration of any vital importance, or is it merely a verbal Amendment?

The Amendment is purely formal. It is intended, in the ordinary fashion, to protect any rights of third parties.

Question put, and agreed to.

Lords Amendment considered accordingly, and agreed to.

Education (Provision of Meals-Ireland) Bill

Lords Amendments to be considered forthwith.—[ Mr. Duke .]

Considered accordingly, and agreed to.

The remaining Orders were read, and postponed

Whereupon Mr. SPEAKER, pursuant to the Order of the House of the 12th February, proposed the Question, "That this House do now adjourn."

Question put, and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at Two minutes after Eleven o'clock.