Can the Leader of the House now tell us what business it is proposed to take on the first day and the succeeding days of the week when we reassemble after the Recess?

On the first day we shall take Supply (the salary of the Minister of Labour), which will give an opportunity of discussing unemployment benefit.

On Wednesday and Thursday my right hon. Friend (Mr. Chamberlain) hopes to introduce the Budget.

To call attention, on Wednesday, 7th May, to the condition of Ireland, and to move a Resolution.

To call attention, on Wednesday, 7th May, to the question of Federal Home Rule for Wales, and to move a Resolution.

To call attention, on Wednesday, 7th May, to the limited powers of magistrates in dealing with old offenders, and to move a Resolution.

I beg to move, "That this House do now adjourn."

In rising to move the Adjournment of the House, I shall ask the indulgence of Members to make some observations about the present situation. My first impulse, when I returned from the Peace Conference, was to await the much advertised criticism that I had been told to expect, but inquiries—diligent inquiries—proved to me that it was not forthcoming. The reason assigned, in particular quarters is rather a remarkable one—that I must not expect criticism until, at any rate, the House has been informed as to what the Delegates have been doing. Coming from such quarters, I should not have thought that fact would be regarded as the slightest basis for any criticism. But I am fully aware that there is a good deal of impatience in the world for peace—some of it very natural impatience, and some of it, perhaps, calculated impatience. I propose to address myself to the really sincere, honest impatience which is felt throughout all lands.

The task with which the Peace Delegates have been confronted has indeed been a gigantic one. No Conference that has ever assembled in the history of the world has been confronted with problems of such variety, of such complexity, of such magnitude, and of such gravity. The Congress of Vienna was the nearest approach to it. You had then to settle the affairs of Europe. It took eleven months. But the problems at the Congress of Vienna, great as they were, sink into insignificance compared with those which we have had to attempt to settle at the Paris Conference. It is not one continent that is engaged—every continent is affected. With very few exceptions, every country in Europe has been in this War. Every country in Asia is affected by the War, except Tibet and Afghanistan. There is not a square mile of Africa that has not been engaged in the War in one way or another. Almost the whole of the nations of America are in the War, and in the far islands of the Southern Seas there are islands that have been captured, and there are hundreds of thousands of men who have come to fight in this great world struggle. There has never been in the whole history of this globe anything to? compare to it. Ten new States have sprung into existence, some of them independent, some of them semi-independent, some of them may be Protectorates, and, at any rate, although you may not define their boundaries, you must give indications of them. The boundaries of fourteen countries have to be re-cast.

That will give some idea of the difficulties, purely of a territorial character, that have engaged our attention. But there are problems, equally great and equally important, not of a territorial character, but all affecting the peace of the world, all affecting the well-being of men, all affecting the destiny of the human race, and every one of them of a character where, if you make blunders, humanity may have to pay. Armaments, economic questions, which are the life of commerce and trade, questions of international waterways and railways, the question of indemnities—not an easy one, and not going to foe settled by telegram—and international arrangements for labour practically never attempted before! Thanks very largely to the skill and real statesmanship displayed by my right hon. Friend the Member for the Gorbals Division of Glasgow (Mr. Barnes), and thanks also to the assistance which he has had from some hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite, and from others who are in the Trade Union movement, a great world scheme has been adopted. And there is that great organisation—a great experiment, but an experiment upon which the whole future of the globe for peace hangs—the Society of Nations.

All, and each of them separately, would? occupy months. A blunder might precipitate universal war—it may be near, it may be distant. And all nations, almost every nation on earth, engaged in the consideration of all these problems! We were justified in taking some time. In fact, I do not mind saying that it would have been imperative in some respects that we should have taken more time but for one fact, and that is that we are setting up a machinery which is capable of readjusting and correcting possible mistakes. That is why the League of Nations, instead of wasting time, has saved the time of the Conference. We had to shorten our labours and work crowded hours, long and late, because, whilst we were trying to build, we saw in many lands the foundations of society crumbling into dust, and we had to make haste. I venture to say that no body of men ever worked harder, and that no body of men have ever worked in better harmony. I am doubtful whether any body of men with a difficult task have worked under greater difficulties—stones clattering on the roof, and crashing through the windows, and sometimes wild men screaming through the keyholes. I have come back to say a few things, and I mean to say them. [An HON. MEMBER: "Save you from your friends!"] I quite, agree, and when enormous issues are depending upon it, you require calm deliberation. I ask it for the rest of the journey. The journey is not at an end. It is full of perils, perils for this country, perils for all lands, perils for the people throughout the world. I beg, at any rate, that the men who are doing their best should be left in peace to do it, or that other men should be sent there.

Those are merely artificial difficulties. They are difficulties that are more trying to the temper than to the judgment. But there are intrinsic difficulties of an extraordinary character. You are dealing with a multitude of nations, most of them with a problem of its own, each and every one of them with a different point of view, even where the problems are common, looking from a different angle at questions—sometimes, perhaps, with different interests; and it requires all the tact, all the patience, and all the skill that we can command to prevent different interests from developing into conflicting interests. I want the House and the country to bear that in mind. I believe that we have surmounted those difficulties, but it has not been easy. There were questions one never heard of which have almost imperilled the peace of Europe while we were sitting there.

1.0 P.M.

I should like to put each Member of this House under an examination. I am certain that I could not have passed it before I went to the Peace Conference. How many Members have heard of Teschen? I do not mind saying that I had never heard of it, but Teschen very nearly produced an angry conflict between two Allied States, and we had to interrupt the proceedings to try and settle the affairs at Teschen. There are many questions of that kind where commissions have had to be sent, and where we have had to smooth difficulties, in order to enable us to get on with the bigger problems of the War. And those questions are important. They are questions of small States. It was the quarrel for small States that made the great War. The difficulties of the Balkans—I believe they disturbed Europe, they created the atmosphere of unrest which began the trouble, they aroused the military temper, and I am not at all sure they did not excite the blood lust in Europe. One of the features of the present situation is that, owing to the break-up of great Empires, Central Europe is being broken into small States, and the greatest care must be taken that no cause of future unrest shall be created by the settlements which we make. I have given the House some of the difficulties with which we are confronted.

Are you supplying them with food?

I do not think so. They are not asking for it; they are asking for equipment, and we are supplying them. As far as food is concerned, they are very well off. The Don is a very rich country, and we have not heard that there is any suffering in those parts. What more are we doing? This is so important a part of the policy of the Allies that I am bound to take up some time in order to explain it. The next item in our policy is what I call to arrest the flow of the lava—that is, to prevent the forcible eruption of Bolshevism into Allied lands. For that reason, we are organising all the forces of the Allied countries bordering on Bolshevist territory from the Baltic to the Black Sea—Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Roumania. There is no doubt that the populations are anti-Bolshevist. I had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Paderewski the other day. He had just come from Poland, and he told me that the Polish population were bitterly anti-Bolshevist. The Czecho-Slovakian statesmen—a very able body of men—told me exactly the same thing about Bohemia, and the same observation applies to Roumania. If Bolshevism attacks any of our Allies, it is our business to defend them.

Did not the Soviet Republic accede?

No; they would not accede to the request that they should cease fighting. On the contrary, they suggested that we were doing it purely because our friends were getting the worst of it. That fact itself shows that the time has not yet arrived for securing the pacification of Russia by means of any outside pressure. I do not despair of a solution being found. There are factors in the situation even now which are promising. Reliable information which we have received indicates that while the Bolshevist forces are apparently growing in strength, Bolshevism itself is rapidly on the wane. It is breaking down before the relentless pressure of economic facts. This process must inevitably continue. You cannot carry on a great country upon rude and wild principles such as those which are inculcated by the Bolsheviks. When Bolshevism, as we know it and as Russia to her sorrow has known it, disappears, then the time will come for another effort at re-establishing peace in Russia. But that time is not yet. We must have patience, and we must have faith. You are dealing with a nation which has been misgoverned for centuries, and been defeated and trampled to the ground, largely, let us admit, owing to the corruption, the inefficiency, and the treachery of its own governors. Its losses have been colossal. All that largely accounts for the real frenzy that seized upon a great people. That is why a nation which has gone through untold horrors has abandoned itself for the moment to fantastic and hysterical experiments. But there are unmistakable signs that Russia is emerging from the trouble. When that time comes, when she is once more sane, calm, and normal, we shall make peace in Russia. Until we can make peace in Russia, it is idle to say that the world is at peace.

Before the right hon. Gentleman passes to his next point, may I ask him whether he can make any statement on the approaches or the representations alleged to have been made to his Government by persons acting on behalf of such Government as there is in Central Russia?

There were no approaches at all, except what has appeared in the papers.

I put the question because it has been alleged that you have had them.

No, we have had no approaches at all. Of course, there are constantly men of all nationalities, coming from and going to Russia, always coming bask with their own tales from Russia. But we have had nothing authentic. We have had no approaches of any sort or kind. I have heard only of reports that others have got proposals which they assume have come from authentic quarters, but these have never been put before the Peace Conference by any member of that Conference. Therefore, we have not considered them. I think I know to what the right hon. Gentleman refers. There was a suggestion that there was some young American who had come back. All I can say about that is that it is not for me to judge the value of these communications. But if the President of the United States had attached any value to them, he would have brought them before the Conference, and he certainly did not do so.

I apologise for taking such a long time, but it is really a question of the first magnitude, and, if the House will believe me, it is a question of very great complexity. It is not so easy to decide one way or the other. It is one of those questions that, whichever way you decide it, you feel, probably, that you might be wrong, because it is so full of difficulty. On one thing I am clear. I entreat the House of Commons and the country not to contemplate the possibility of another great war. We have had quite enough bloodshed.

It was sent from the information put forward in an interview in the "Westminster Gazette," which was said to have been supplied by a high and distinguished authority.

Well, really, I wish my hon. Friend had explained that to the 370 Members.

I did explain it.

It was an article, anonymous I think, in the "Westminster Gazette." I am much obliged to my hon. Friend, but before he gave that answer he ought to have compared notes with my hon. Friend opposite (Lieutenant-Colonel Claude Lowther).

May I say that the telegram was sent with only one object, and that was to strengthen the hands of the representatives Great Britain at the Peace Conference.

I never doubted the bona fides of those who sent the telegram—not for a moment. I am only complaining of the "reliable source." My hon. Friend has given the "reliable source." He said it was a telegram from Paris, received by my hon. Friend, not the "Westminster Gazette." Really they ought to have compared notes? I blame their solicitor.

Did it do any harm?

Not at all!

Did it do any good?

It may do some good, before I have done with it. Will my hon. Friend do me the credit of believing that even Ministers have sources of information? I know the "reliable source," and I will tell the House something about it. There were peace terms published in November as a model for us to proceed upon. In those peace terms there was not a word about indemnities, not a word about the cost of the War. Reparation—yes, in the strictest and narrowest sense of the term, but no reparation for lost lives, no reparation for damaged houses, not even at Broad-stairs. That was in November. We were not at that time to try anybody responsible for the War. We were to try those who had been guilty of offences against the law, but the tribunals must be German. That is the "reliable source "! Now we must have everything—the cost of the War, damage to all sorts of property—hanging everybody all round, especially members of the Government! In December there were hundreds of thousands of newspapers circulated freely, at somebody's expense, among the soldiers in France, asking them to return candidates. If those candidates had been returned, the two peace delegates in Paris now would certainly not have been the Foreign Secretary (Mr. Balfour) and myself, but perhaps Mr. Ramsay Macdonald and Mr. Philip Snowden. Who issued that appeal? The "reliable source."

No, Sir.

2.0 P.M.

I happen to know, and the hon. Gentleman is the last man who would have treated that as a "reliable source," because he knows something about it. At the beginning of the Conference there were appeals to everybody all round to support President Wilson and his great ideals. Where did these come from? From the same "reliable source" that is now hysterically attacking all those great ideals. Just a few weeks ago there was a cartoon in one of these papers representing Bolshevism as a mere bogey, and I as a person trying to frighten the working classes with that mere bogey. Now it is no longer a bogey; it is a monster, and I am doing my best to dress it up as an angel. That is the same "reliable source." Reliable! That is the last adjective I would use. It is here to-day, jumping there to-morrow, and there the next day. I would as soon rely on a grasshopper.

Still, I am prepared to make some allowance—even great newspapers will forgive me for saying so—and when a man is labouring under a keen sense of disappointment, however unjustified and however ridiculous the expectations may have been, he is always apt to think the world is badly run. When a man has deluded himself, and all the people whom he ever permits to go near to him help him into the belief that he is the only man who can win the War, and he is waiting for the clamour of the multitude that is going to demand his presence there to direct the destinies of the world, and there is not a whisper, not a sound, it is rather disappointing; it is unnerving; it is upsetting.

Then the War is won without him. There must be something wrong. Of course it must be the Government! Then, at any rate, he is the only man to make peace. The only people who get near him tell him so, constantly tell him so. So he publishes the Peace Terms, and he waits for the "call." It does not come. He retreats to sunny climes, waiting, but not a sound reaches that far-distant shore to call him back to his great task of saving the world. What can you expect? He comes back, and he says, "Well, I cannot see the disaster, but I am sure it is there. It is bound to come." Under these conditions I am prepared to make allowances; but let me say this, that when that kind of diseased vanity is carried to the point of sowing dissension between great Allies, whose unity is essential to the peace and happiness of the world, and when an attempt is made to make France distrust Britain, to make France hate America, and America to dislike France, and Italy to quarrel with everybody, then I say that not even that kind of disease is a justification for so black a crime against humanity.

I apologise for taking up the time of the House, but I am bound to do it; and I must tell the House why. I have been in France for weeks. Here nobody takes notice of this thing—everybody knows it. But it is not the case in France. They still believe in France that the "Times" is a serious organ. They do not know that it is merely a threepenny edition of the "Daily Mail." On the Continent of Europe they really have an idea that it is a semi-official organ of the Government. That shows how long these traditions take to die out. I want them to know what all this means. I am doing this in the interests of good will. That is my only apology for taking notice of that kind of trash, with which some of these papers have been filled during the last few weeks.

The blockade?

That which I have described is the real danger. The gaunt spectre of hunger is stalking throughout the land. The Central Powers and Russia have overtaxed their strength in the conflict. They are lying prostrate, broken, and all these movements of Spartacists, and Bolsheviks, and revolutionaries in each of these countries are more like the convulsions of a broken-backed creature, crushed in a savage conflict. It is in these conditions, and with this material, that we are making peace. Nations with military ambitions have received a cruel lesson, nay, Europe itself has suffered more in the last five years than ever in the whole of its past history. The lesson has been a sharper one than ever. It has been administered to vaster multitudes of human beings than ever. The people have a more intelligent appreciation of what it means than ever. For that reason the opportunity of organising the world on the basis of peace is such a one as has never been presented to the world before, and in this fateful hour it is the supreme duty of statesmen in every land—of the Parliaments upon whose will statesmen depend, of those who guide and direct the public opinion which is the making of all—not to soil this triumph of right by indulging in the angry passions of the moment, but to consecrate the sacrifices of millions to the permanent redemption of the human race from the scourge and agony of war.

My first sentence in what I desire to contribute to this Debate is one of congratulation to the Prime Minister on the good form in which he is to-day. The House, and the country, have been looking forward with intense interest to the statement from the Prime Minister, to which we have just listened, and I am certain that I will carry general assent when I say that we have not been disappointed. The keen desire for information, as to the happening behind the closed doors at the Peace Conference in Paris, was a very natural one. The vast and complex issues which were being weighed there, so full of possibilities for the future peace and happiness of a war-weary world, were bound in the very nature of things, in the absence of detailed information, to strain the patience of all sections of our people, and were bound to raise all sorts of rumours and misgiving as to whether the proper steps were being taken to safeguard the interests of this country and lift the world out of the wreck and ruin inseparable from the great struggle in which we were engaged for nearly four and a half years. These doubts and misgivings were increased as time went on and no inside information was being given to the public of this country, and they found expression inside and outside the House, and prominence was given to the particular aspect of the great problem of most interest to this country by the source from which these doubts and misgivings emanated.

As the Prime Minister has already stated, in certain newspapers his pledges were being printed on front pages, evidently with the view of bringing pressure to bear on him to stand up to his pre-election pledges so far as peace terms were concerned. Questions were being raised and even telegrams drafted and sent from Members of this House with the same object in view. Paragraphs were appearing in certain newspapers warning the public that the eagerly-awaited speech must not take the form of another dose of soothing syrup. These doubts and misgivings were coming principally from the friends of the Prime Minister himself, and as the day drew near for his speech to be delivered we were getting accustomed to headlines, somewhat in the following terms: "The Political Bloc." "We are going to have a General Election this year," "A Bid for Labour," "The Prime Minister likely to form a new Centre Party." We have heard at last the long-expected speech, and while it has been of a very eloquent, interesting, and instructive character I am not at all sure if it will satisfy entirely all the Prime Minister's friends. As must be expected at this stage in the important negotiations which the Peace Conference has in hand, the information which he has given us has been of a general character, and there has been a complete absence of the details that I fear were expected by many of those who were giving expression to these doubts and misgivings. I am personally aware that it would have been a great mistake on the part of the Prime Minister if he had dealt with these negotiations in detail in a manner which would satisfy all those who were questioning the line that he was taking in Paris. At the same time there are certain aspects of the proceedings at the Peace Conference as to which I would have liked the Prime Minister to be in a position to give us more details.

I have already referred to the publication of the Prime Minister's pledges in the front pages of certain newspapers. The Prime Minister, in the course of his speech, has been dealing very effectively with that matter, but in dealing with it and in explaining as far as he possibly could the position that he has taken up at the Peace Conference, he carefully avoided telling us whether it is his pre-election speeches to the British people or his pledges on behalf of the British people, that were given fully a year ago, and again in November, to which effect is being given in the peace terms, these pledges being in complete agreement with the terms laid down by President Wilson. Again, dealing with the terms that have been agreed to by the Allies so far as Germany is concerned, the Prime Minis- ter has not told us whether the indemnities that are to be exacted from Germany were based on the pledges given to the British people or the pledges given on behalf of the British people. As he well knows, there is a considerable difference in the amount that would have to be paid by Germany under the one set of conditions as compared with the other. He has also very carefully refrained from telling us whether the peace conditions agreed upon, that are to be presented to Germany now very soon, will be irreducible terms, or again if they would be presented to this House for consideration before they are ratified.

The Prime Minister has dealt at considerable length also with the question of the League of Nations, and I am certain that those who are associated with me on those benches were delighted to hear the sympathetic way in which he dealt with this phase of the question. From newspaper paragraphs that have been appearing from time to time we were led to believe that some sort of struggle was going on in Paris between the policy of a League of Nations and the old ideas of foreign policy. I am quite pleased to have the assurance of the Prime Minister that such has not been the case, and that steps have been taken that will result in a League of Nations being established at an early date. Another point I want to question the Prime Minister upon with regard to the League of Nations is whether this is to be a real League of Nations that will embrace all the countries of the world, or whether it is to be a League of Allied Nations? I am perfectly aware that, before the enemy countries can be taken in they will require to give some guarantees as to carrying out the terms which the Allies are seeking to impose upon them, and that they will have to establish some stable form of government before they can be fully recognised; but, as soon as ever they have given proper guarantees as to fulfilling their obligations, and establish a stable form of government, then, I think, it would be a grievous mistake if the enemy countries were to be kept outside the League of Nations. As a matter of fact, we would be failing in our attempt to establish a real League of Nations.

We were also very much indebted to the Prime Minister for the very exhaustive explanations he gave us regarding the position in Russia. The only point to which I want to draw his attention in that connection is the fact that there is in the minds of nine-tenths of the people of this country an intense dislike to any of our soldiers remaining in Russia, and to suggest to him that he and his colleagues in the Government would be well-advised to take steps for bringing back our men from Russia at the earliest possible moment. In putting that aspect of the case before the right hon. Gentleman, I do not suggest that our men who are there, and may be in danger, are to be deserted. They may have to be relieved by the help of other men being provided, but, once that object has been accomplished, then the Prime Minister will remove one of the dangers of serious trouble in this country if he immediately withdraws both the rescuers and the rescued. If our men are to remain in Russia, as he pointed out, until order is established in that country, then there is room for serious trouble arising in this country regarding that matter. I think he will be well-advised to follow out the maxim, which he himself laid down in the course of the eloquent address to which the House has just listened, namely, that the settlement of permanent conditions that are to obtain in Russia ought to be left to the sons of Russia alone.

I want frankly to state that the Prime Minister, in the course of his address, has dealt very fully with most of the points that I had marked out. Consequently, my speech has been considerably shortened, for which I am not one little bit sorry. Another of the points, however, to which I wish to draw his attention, is one to which he also referred, namely, that the Labour Charter, which has been under consideration and has received, I understand the personal supervision of my right hon. Friend the Member for the Gorbals Division of Glasgow (Mr. G. Barnes), is to be incorporated as part and parcel of the machinery of the League of Nations. If that is done, I think we shall be removing many of the difficulties that we are from time to time discussing on the floor of this House. Even during the Prime Minister's absence we have been discussing various aspects of tariffs, Free Trade and things of that character, which, to my mind, would be very much affected if part and parcel of the machinery of a League of Nations contained the Labour Charter, on which my right hon. Friend the Member for Gorbals Division has been working so zealously during the last few months.

The last point I want to bring under notice is the statement of the right hon. Gentleman that they were justified in taking some time. I entirely agree with him. We expect, and we hope, that a good job will be made by the Peace Conference of the vast, complex and intricate problems that have been under their consideration. At the same time, I want him to recognise that in the present condition of the world, time is the very essence of success. Unless you can get the world back to work quickly, then I fear in more parts than in Central Europe you will endanger the stability of government. Unless you can get the world back quickly to work there is a great danger of universal disaster, and, while I do not want to see slipshod work done by the members of the Peace Conference, I would strongly urge upon the Prime Minister the great necessity for making haste, with a view of saving the world from a worse fate than has yet befallen it. I hope that when the proceedings of the Peace Conference have been concluded, there will be a brighter future in prospect for the whole world; that those ideas, for which at least nine-tenths of our manhood took up arms and entered into this great struggle, will be given effect to; that small nationalities will be much securer in the future than they have been in the past; that the principle of self-determination will be extended to them to a far greater degree than ever has been the case up till now; and that inside the various countries of the world, democracy will have better conditions, and a greater share of the wealth they are producing, and so ensure happiness and harmony to a greater extent in the future than ever we have experienced in the past.

The Prime Minister, in his speech, dealt very fully with the points that were raised on the Adjournment which I moved last Wednesday, and I should like to say just two things with regard to his statement. First of all, I am perfectly certain that his repudiation of the idea of any recognition of Bolshevism will give gratification among the law-respecting people in the whole of the civilised countries; and, secondly, his definite statement that there was going to be no attempt to abandon the loyal elements in Russia who have helped to fight, will also be welcomed, and will give considerable gladness to our Allies in that great country. I am not quite certain on one point, and probably a member of the Government who will speak at the end of the discussion may touch upon it. He said that it was the policy of the Government to supply munitions to the loyal Russians in different parts. I did interject a question as to food, and he said that he was under the impression that they were sufficiently supplied with food. As I understand, the position has been represented by distinguished and leading Russians who are likely to know the facts. I understand that the whole question of the recovery of Petrograd by a loyal Russian force is entirely dependent at the moment upon an undertaking by the Allies that food will be available as soon as the military operation of retaking Petrograd had been completed. There have been very careful inquiries. I think there is no doubt in military quarters that the force of volunteers there is sufficient for the purpose if the population can be fed immediately afterwards. It does seem to me that, in combination with the policy which the Prime Minister said had been determined upon with regard to Russia, does promise to do more to deal effectively with the Bolshevik sore, by recapturing the capital of Petrograd, than anything else, and I am perfectly certain, on the whole, there will be considerable gladness amongst the loyal elements in Russia by the general declaration of the Prime Minister with regard to Russia to-day.

I should like to be allowed to make a few observations on the general subject which has been raised on this Debate, and, before doing so, I should be glad if the House would allow me to explain exactly what is my own personal position in the matter. I have been in Paris during the last three months practically continuously. I went there at the request of the Government, after I had left the Government, to be their mandatory—to use a word which has become fashionable in another connection—in connection with the question of the League of Nations; and while I was there, after I had been dealing with it for some time, the Prime Minister was good enough to ask me also to deal with the economic questions which were arising upon a body which was called into existence, and named the Supreme Economic Council. I wanted just to make that short explana- tion, because I wish it to be quite clear that in the observations I am about to make I am not speaking in any sense as a member of the Government. The Government are in no way responsible for anything that I shall say, and though I have no reason particularly to think they will disagree with it, it is only right that that should be made clear. I speak as a Member of Parliament, having had some opportunities for studying certain aspects of international affairs, and only in that capacity. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Labour party made some observations just now about the League of Nations. He asked one or two questions, and I shall be glad to reply, as far as I can, and to give such information as lies in my power with respect to those questions. The House will recollect that as soon as the League of Nations Commission had concluded its first labours, it published to the world the draft of the Covenant upon which it was proposed to agree for the constitution of the League. The object of that publication was to secure that the world at large, and those who were interested in the subject might have an opportunity of considering the proposals in detail, and of making such criticisms as they thought right upon them. The result has been on the whole, I think, fully to justify the course which we then thought it right to take. The criticisms have been quite numerous, but they have been on the whole very encouraging.

In the first place, there has been no criticism of the general structure or principles of the League. The general idea that you should have a permanent organisation, that you should have, in addition to that, the assemblage from time to time of a larger assembly representing ail the members of the League and a smaller assembly which should deal with the current business of the League, and the general principles on which we proposed to try and safeguard the peace of the world—all these have been generally accepted, and no criticism, so far as I know, has been made on the general principles underlying them. More than that, I think we may claim that the friendly criticisms have, on the whole, as the proposals of the Commission have been studied, become more friendly, and that the unfriendly ones have become less unfriendly. I should like in that connection to answer the question put by the right hon. Gentleman as to the Labour Conven- tion. He asked whether under the proposals for the League it was quite clear that the Labour Convention was to be part and parcel—I am not quite sure whether those were the exact terms—of the organisation of the League. The Labour Convention, as the right hon. Gentleman is doubtless aware, provides that those who sign the Convention shall be members of the League of Nations, and that the members of the League of Nations shall be the signatories of the Labour Convention. And the Covenant of the League provides in express terms that the members of the League accept the Convention for the improvement of the conditions of labour and the necessary organisation for the purpose.

The right hon. Gentleman also asked whether it was quite clear that the League of Nations was really to be a League of Nations, not merely a league of Allies, and on that point also I think I am in a position to reassure him. I had the honour of presiding at two conferences representing the neutral Powers. There were thirteen Powers represented, and the conferences were of a most friendly description. Certain criticisms were put forward, and certain suggestions for amendments were made. Those were very carefully considered by the League of Nations Commission, and a good many changes have been suggested for adoption by the Conference in consequence of those suggestions. Throughout the two meetings nothing could have been more friendly or more well disposed than the representatives of all the neutral Powers, and since they have taken place we have received from one Power—Spain—a definite statement that she is prepared to join the League as soon as she is permitted to do so. The Covenant will, I hope, contain a provision by which all those friendly neutrals, if I may put it in that way—all those neutrals who from their presence at those meetings have shown a friendly spirit towards the League—will be invited to join the League immediately after the signature of the Covenant, and I have no doubt myself whatever that the great majority, if not the whole—I hope the whole—of those neutral nations will become members of the League in the course of a very short time. I confess I attach great importance to that, and very much for the reasons put forward by the right hon. Gentleman. For us belligerent nations who have been en- gaged in the storm and stress of war, it is natural and inevitable, and it is perfectly legitimate, that we should look at all the various questions which arise from a belligerent point of view, and that we should tend to judge the League as it would have operated had it been in existence during the late War. That is perfectly legitimate and perfectly right, but it is not the complete view, and cannot be a complete view of the operations of this great organisation if it is really to be a successful instrument of the world peace. We do not want to secure justice or even to secure safety for those who have been engaged in this War. We wish to provide means of a general pacification of the world, and to secure co-operation between all the nations of the world.

It is quite clear that if the League is to be a success, if we are really to hope for a new era in international affairs, we must have a just and durable settlement of the present War, and that involves—and this is really the main topic on which I wish to make these observations—not merely an adequate dealing with the territorial questions which have arisen. They have necessarily occupied a great deal of public attention, and quite rightly. They are of enormous importance, undoubtedly, for the future of the world, but, important as they are, I do not know that they are more important, or certainly not more urgently important, than the economic questions which at present face us throughout the whole of Europe. I do not think it is possible to exaggerate the urgency of the economic position of Europe at the present time. I must really confess, having had some opportunity of hearing the facts on the point, that I could not say otherwise than that I regard the position as one calculated to create great anxiety, if not alarm. The causes are obvious. We have had, on a scale which has never before been equalled in the history of the world, slaughter and destruction throughout all countries in Europe. It is not only, though that has been terrible enough, the actual loss of life and health which has resulted to some of the most vigorous populations in Europe, but there has also to be considered the tremendous psychological effect of the War. We see it in every country. It is not only in those countries that have been most ravaged, but in every country we see an attitude of mind which makes it very difficult to settle down to sober and unexciting exertion. We have seen some of it, perhaps, even in this country. I have certainly seen something of it in other countries, and everyone who comes back from the Central European countries gives you the same account. They say that there you have this situation—vast masses of the population in the greatest want, a considerable amount of work to be done, and yet no power apparently being able to induce the people who can work and whose work is wanted to set to work. No doubt there are physical reasons as well, but I am satisfied that one of the main reasons is what we have called in the War "war strain," and the condition of uncertainty and suspense which must exist until peace has been finally made. Then, of course, in addition to that, there has been the vast destruction of actual material, not only by the direct operations of war, but by the indirect operations in the wholesale dislocation of industry. There has been the failure properly to till the land, and there has been the destruction of rolling stock. All these things and many, many others are producing the same result, namely, the complete arrest, or the very nearly complete arrest, of all industrial and social life in those countries.

The Prime Minister referred in one of his most eloquent passages this afternoon to the want of food, and that is no doubt one of the chief effects of the state of things which I have been trying to describe. I saw a lady who has recently come back from Czecho-Slovakia. She told me that, according to the information given to her, out of a population of about 12,000,000, 5,000,000 were seriously underfed, and many of the districts in the more mountainous and poorer parts of the country were in the greatest want and the greatest distress. I have heard before the story which the Prime Minister told of the biscuit in the Vienna streets, and I have heard also that another distinguished statesman going through Vienna in his train naturally stopped there for some time and heard round his carriage all the children crying for food. I saw another man who had recently been through Bavaria. He told me that there was the greatest possible distress in the northern parts of Bavaria. He said that the women and children in that part of the world were undoubtedly approaching starvation, and in his judgment almost all the children were tuberculous as a consequence.

3.0 P.M.

I do not desire to "pile up the agony" in any way, but I have heard the most terrible descriptions of refugees from the eastern parts of Poland going back to Warsaw practically starving, and almost destitute of sufficient clothing to stand the very rigorous climate. These are terrible things, and they are not over yet. As a consequence you have unemployment, idleness—call it what you will—on an enormous scale. I saw a calculation that in. Budapest something like half the able-bodied men are doing nothing, and the proportion is not much different in many of the cities in Central and Eastern Europe. The reason is simply not only the want of food and the psychological effects of the War—though these contribute very largely to the same result—but in addition to that there is the complete dislocation of industry. I would like to give some instances descriptive of what is happening in the textile industry of Poland. There you have round the town of Lodz a large textile industry. The old course of trade was that the raw materials were manufactured in those mills and sold either in Poland itself or in Russia, and if sold in Russia, Russia exported corn in exchange for the cotton which was imported into Russia. Of course, all that has absolutely come to an end, and the only way in which you could set that industry going would be in some way to supply cotton to Poland. But Poland has no means at present whatever of paying for the cotton; she has no exports of any kind, and the only way it could be done is by supplying the cotton on credit, either by lending the money to Poland for the purchase of the cotton—and that is, in effect, what would have to be done—or by providing it in some other way. I take that as one instance, and the same thing is true of every district in every country in Europe, and to some extent even in this country.

Everywhere you have this kind of paralysis of exchange. You have it in the Allied countries, more or less, and you have it, of course, completely in Russia, and right through the Eastern and Central countries until you come to the Allied countries and to this country. It is impossible to exaggerate the seriousness of the crisis, and it is impossible to exaggerate the urgent need for dealing with it, and the only way in which it can be dealt with is to provide in some way or another the credit which can set the whole thing going again. The machine has stopped, and you have got to set it going somehow. It is to my mind a most urgent and serious condition of affairs. The difficulties are, of course, increased by the political question. For instance, in the new countries, in what used to be Austria-Hungary, there are political divisions now which prevent those countries exchanging goods with one another. You find, taking whatever it may be, goods from Poland not being sent into Austria, where they are urgently needed, or into Bohemia, where they are urgently needed in exchange for coal, because there is a dispute between the countries as to the possession of the coaling district. So it goes on, and those difficulties are, I am afraid, inevitable, and add very considerably to the urgency of the situation. You have also—and this is a very important matter—the almost complete breakdown of transportation in the whole of those countries. You will find some countries—I could name them—in which coal urgently needed in the interior is brought to the ports, but cannot be properly distributed because the transportation system of the country has so entirely broken down. That is due to two causes. It is partly due to the wearing out of the railway rolling stock which has not been replaced. In one country, out of 900 locomotives, only 200 are in working order, and the proportion is not very different in many other countries in that part of the world.

In addition to that, there is a great want of coal. Many of the coalfields of Europe itself, for one reason or another, are out of action. There is the district, to which the Prime Minister referred, of Teschen, which contains some of the best coal in that part of the world, and which, unfortunately, has become the subject of a political dispute between the two neighbouring nations, and I understand that coal production there has almost entirely ceased. So, to a large extent, the coal production of the great German coalfields, without having entirely ceased, has enormously gone down, partly owing to lack of food, partly owing to the psychological effects of the War, and partly owing to political disturbances. If I were to say what is most needed, and what would be most desirable if one had a magic gift to supply what was wanted in those countries I would ask first, I think, to be allowed to supply coal. I have been very much struck by the very serious crisis—and this shows, how delicate these things are—that was created very largely by the unrest in the coal trade here, and which dislocated for the time being the coal commerce of the world. These things spread to unexpected results from causes which no one would think would have those consequences. I want, if I may, to try and impress on the House that it is owing to the great energy and generosity of America, assisted as far as possible by ourselves, that very considerable quantities of food have been sent in to those countries. It is a commentary on the state of things that Vienna, about which the Prime Minister told the story, perfectly true as I know, is a town to which we are sending food at this present moment and have been for some weeks past. Yet even so, it is so insufficient as to produce the result which he described.

When was it sent?

I could not tell when the first consignment was sent, as to go into those matters would make my statement rather too detailed, but it has been going on, I think, for several months. Food by itself, however, is only a palliative. It deals with symptoms; it does not deal with the disease. If we had unlimited supplies and ships—and it is the ships that are really the controlling factor as to the amount of food which can be sent to these countries—we should still be dealing only with the effects of the disease, and not with the disease itself. It is no use feeding these people unless you can set them to work. That is essential. You have to set the machine of industry and commerce going. That is the great task which lies before us if we are to save Europe from the greatest disaster which has ever overtaken it.

I am not going to attempt to describe to the House in any completeness what is the remedy. But I say personally, and most important of all, we want peace! I was delighted to hear what the Prime Minister said this afternoon as to the prospect of a very early peace. It is impossible to exaggerate its importance. People will not set to work again till they see something like a normal and stable condition of affairs restored to their country. I am not going to discuss it, because I have not the knowledge, but we want the question of indemnities settled. At the present time it is producing a most unhappy effect, economically, over the whole of Europe. It is not only that the Germans do not know what they will have to pay. It is not only that neutrals hesitate to trade with the Germans. That is the economic aspect. But that is not the only thing. Countries which are to receive the indemnities are themselves waiting to see how much they are going to get, and until they know how much they are going to get they are not prepared fully to take the necessary economic measures to meet the crisis in which they are engaged. I am quite sure it is of the greatest possible importance to get that question settled and out of the way as soon as possible. In the course of the speech of my right hon. Friend he was interrupted by an hon. Member who mentioned the blockade. I quite agree with the hon. Member. It is essential to get rid of the blockade completely, and at the earliest possible moment. I hope the House will not take it that the blockade exists to any great extent at this moment. Except in respect to Germany and Hungary, there is no blockade at all. In respect to Hungary, but for sudden disturbances it would have been, I think, removed from the blockade. Those who control these things thought rightly that till you were assured that there was going to be a stable govern-men in Hungary it was no use removing the blockade from that country.

What is the difference between the embargo on exports to neutral countries and to blockaded countries?

I can only say there is no question of blockade. It is not a question of embargoes. But until you have decided to remove the blockade from Germany completely you must maintain, if you wish to keep the blockade complete, a certain control over the trade of the neutrals. If the hon. and gallant Gentleman had had the unfortunate experience I have had in dealing with these blockade questions he would have known that the most difficult and the most harassing part the only real difficult and harassing part of the blockade—was the question of food and other commodities going through neutral countries into Germany. It is precisely in order—it is necessary on military grounds, to maintain the blockade of Germany. It is almost impossible to relax control of the trade in the neutral countries adjoining. That is the difficulty. No one feels more strongly than I do—

May I ask the Noble Lord—[HON. MEMBERS: "Order, order!"]

The hon. Member must not interrupt. He will have an opportunity later should he wish.

No one feels more strongly than I do the necessity for abolishing all these restrictions, from an economic point of view, as soon as we are assured that can be done safely. I trust it will be done. I should like to point this out: Supposing you make all the Channel as free as possible, you will not do everything; you will not do very much. You may make it possible to trade. But you would not only have to put your machinery into something like good order, you would have to supply the motive power to set it going. In my judgment there will have to be made a very great effort on the part of all the nations of the world—certainly of the nations of Europe—to estabish industrial conditions in these countries.

I have often wished I were an eloquent man, but never more than on the present occasion. I cannot conceive anything which would be more worth while to apply eloquence to than to convince the people of this country and, as far as one's voice can extend, to the people of the world, of the urgency and vital importance of this question. We all believe we are on the threshhold of a new era. It is so. There is no doubt some great changes are going to happen. What is that era to be? Is it to be gradual and gradually increasing chaos in these countries, until they have engulfed the whole fabric of Christian civilisation? Or by a supreme effort are we going to, start on the road of international confidence and co-operation? That is really the issue before us. If I may venture to do so, I would appeal to all in this country alike—to the workman as much as to the employer, to the rich as much as to the poor—to make a great effort—as great an effort it may well turn out as any we made during the War. But I am bound to say that great as the effort may be, by ourselves we cannot succeed. All the countries in Europe are exhausted by this long War. Our own energies are diminished. Our own resources are very much restricted. If Europe is to be saved it will be saved by the united efforts of all those countries which were associated in the War. It is useless to suppose that in this world you can accomplish anything worth having except by sacrifice. In no other way does one really do anything worth doing. I venture to appeal, not only to my own countrymen, but to all the Anglo-Saxon race throughout the world. I do not base my appeal merely on the ground of self-interest—though that is strong enough. If Europe should collapse the repercussion on this country and on America must be of a very serious kind. I venture to appeal to a still stronger motive. It is not the first time the world has had to appeal for assistance to the Anglo-Saxon race. Never has the appeal been so urgent as it is now. The whole fabric of our civilisation is in danger. Unless we can really get the conditions of Europe back to normal, unless we can succeed in getting Europe at work again, and commerce and social intercourse once more established, it is impossible to exaggerate the danger that may be before us. I can only say that in my judgment humanity is waiting for our decision, and I express the earnest hope that it will not wait in vain.

The moral effect of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down seems to be that to raise the blockade is not enough, and that, in addition, we must also have international co-operation in finance. I only regret the right hon. Gentleman did not go further and urge not only international co-operation in finance, but also the higher international co-operation in idealism and in brotherly love, which is as essential to the establishment of real civilisation as the more material side of international finance. We on these benches welcome the right hon. Gentleman's return to Parliament, and we are extremely proud of the example he has set for English tradition and English character in Paris. It will be seen later that his efforts in regard to the League of Nations, and also in connection with the international economic situation, have secured recognition in quarters where his merits were not before so fully recognised.

We are here not only to welcome back the Noble Lord opposite, but also the Prime Minister. He, too, has in a way surprised some of those who did not receive his support at the last election by the admirable way in which he has carried on his work in Paris. The Prime Minister, in spite of all the yapping of the Press and the telegraphing of his followers, has maintained an even course absolutely in accordance with his Liberal past in backing up the Liberal ideas of President Wilson, and doing his best to re-establish the world on the basis of justice and self-determination. Although we have missed him from this House, we have seen that he was doing more useful work for the future of this country in Paris. I am glad he has come back, because I think we need him here more than in Paris. The fact is that it is not only the rest of the countries of Europe that are going to rack and ruin but this country as well, owing to the want of co-ordination in the different departments of government, and the general business of Cabinet rule here requires a head who will make some effort to co-ordinate the Departments and secure that there shall be a reasonable economic administration of this country.

Everyone knows that the Board of Trade is the public Department which is most open to criticism, and its system of maintaining restrictions on imports and exports has been quite inadequately defended in this House, and I am certain it would not have been tolerated if the Prime Minister had been more in this country recently. There is another Department which to me seems to require the firm hand of the Prime Minister. We all realise that when we had the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London (Mr. Balfour) and the Noble Lord opposite (Lord R. Cecil) at the Foreign Office, we had then people in charge of foreign affairs who at any rate could be trusted to maintain some of the old traditional Liberalism of view that we associate with Palmerston, and even with Mr. Gladstone in the past. Now we have at the head of the Foreign Office and in this House representatives who are not either sufficiently Liberal or strong to carry on those traditions, and consequently the Foreign Office, which has always wanted a firm hand to control its reactionary tendencies, is going from bad to worse. During the War there was a constant struggle between the Foreign Office and what was known as the Garden City, consisting of the Members of this House who were working more directly under the Prime Minister. This struggle went on, and now not only has the head of the Foreign Office changed, but we have now got Lord Curzon there, who is probably the most exact type of the eighteenth century Tory you could find.

Then followed the dissolution of the Garden City suburb which used to keep a check on the Foreign Office, and conse- quently you have foreign affairs conducted by the most reactionary element in the whole country. You have now a serious Egyptian situation, into which we have been dragged deliberately by the Foreign Office without rhyme or reason. They recalled Sir Reginald Wingate because his views did not agree with theirs, and because he thought that Egyptian views should be listened to and considered. As soon as they recalled him they sent out General Allenby, and the result was that he insisted on the carrying out of those reforms that Sir R. Wingate had asked for and had not obtained. This mere stupidity of the Foreign Office has involved us in a very critical situation, and what is far more serious we see in the Prime Minister's absence there has been a direct conflict of policy between the Foreign Office and the War Office and the policy advocated by the Prime Minister. That is where the danger is likely to come from. Before we know where we are we may find ourselves committed to expeditions either in Russia or Roumania or any part of the Far East, which is wholly opposed to the genuinely Liberal policy of the Prime Minister and President Wilson.

The papers one day are suddenly filled with news of the critical situation of our force at Archangel, where we are told we may expect another Kut unless something is done at once. We remember the cry that was raised of the women and children being in danger at Johannesburg in 1896, and this produced the well-known Jameson raid. We have this danger constantly flaunted in our faces. The newspapers are inspired with it, and the public get into a panic. The result is that the War Office gets carte blanche to send troops to Archangel, and we are committed without the consultation of the Prime Minister by the Foreign Office and War Office combined to an enlarged expedition to Archangel. The result is that men who wish to be demobilised and get back to their businesses, and who have been three or four years in the service, are either being detained at Archangel, or are being sent out there with a rush.

It may be that there is a real danger in Archangel; but from what I can hear the chief danger comes from the fact that the Russian troops that are co-operating with us have a fatal habit of deserting to the other side whenever they get a chance. What we do want, both from the Foreign Office and the War Office, is an assurance that in any case this demand for relief for Archangel or for the troops on the Murman Coast is not merely a mask for getting there a force which will make a further advance, and, indeed, make a dash, upon Petrograd and so by a sudden dramatic coup end the present Russian Government. What we want to have, particularly in view of the Prime Minister's speech to-day, when he said that peace was the one thing necessary—though I should say, rather, that peace was the first thing necessary—is an assurance that when we have a division, or two divisions, in Archangel those troops will not be used for a sudden aggressive campaign, and that no amount of urging from the Archangel end as to the extraordinary facility with which this advance could be made shall, as in the case of the advance on Bagdad four years ago, be allowed to induce the Government to sanction a further advance which may commit us to indefinite liabilities in that country. We know quite well how these things begin. The military on the spot take matters into their own hands. They assume responsibility, and the country is dragged in behind the military element in order to rescue people who appear to be in peril. I do ask that we shall have to-day an assurance that there will not be any question of using the troops which have been sent to Archangel for a further advance in the direction of Petrograd, but that during the time that they are there they will be used strictly as a defensive force to enable us to protect, if it must be by arms, the people whom we have promised to protect in Archangel and to help to withdraw the troops that are there as soon as possible. I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that the country is extremely alive to this question of the use of our troops in Russia. I have had letters from all over the country and resolutions passed by trade unions from the North to the South of England. They are all unanimously against this idea of an expedition to Russia, partly, of course, owing to the fact that they realise that we are attacking not so much a system of terrorism as a system of communism which is unpopular among the ruling classes, and also because the parents of the men who have served so long resent their sons being used in this way after they have been enlisted to fight for other purposes. I have a letter which says: I resignedly submitted to losing a boy in France, but I will not resign myself to losing one in a place where we have no business to be interfering. That sort of thing is being said by parents of all these men who are being sent out to Russia. They fear that this force, as soon as it is there, will be used to make an attack upon Russia. Our fears in this matter are based on the attitude of the Foreign Office towards Russia. It seems to me that they are ready to support any methods which may serve to overthrow the dreaded idea of revolution. Looking back on the history of the relations of our Foreign Office with the Russian Revolution, hon. Members will see that we have every ground for supposing, if there is a choice between right and wrong, that they will go wrong. We know Kerensky received no support from this country. He was perpetually regarded as a revolutionary and not a fit associate for the diplomatic body. He was turned down when he pressed for peace. I do not know whether hon. Members are aware of the evidence given by Colonel Raymond Robins as to how he was approached by Kerensky to get help from the Allies to see that none of the ammunition got into German hands. That, too, was turned down, because these revolutionary people must not be dealt with on any account whatever, not that they were not ready to attack the Germans, but that they were Bolshevists and revolutionaries, and that was enough to secure the hostility of the Foreign Office. Take the mad conduct of the Foreign Office in connection with Tchitcherine, now the Foreign Minister in Russia. He was in this country when the Bolshevist Revolution came about in November, 1917. Directly the revolution took place, Tchitcherine, who was proclaimed by the Bolshevists as their agent in this country, was put in prison. He was kept there, with every sort of indignity, and finally he was expelled from this country with equal indignity. If you were going to treat a man like that you should not have sent him back to a country where he could be a nuisance to you. I should have kept him here permanently rather than have sent him back to Russia to become one of the Ministers.

Their attitude towards Tchitcherine was part of their attitude towards the old regime. While they kept Tchitcherine in prison, they continued and paid the salary of Nabokoff, the old representative of Russia in this country, and to-day the British taxpayer is finding the pay of the old Czar's agents in this country.

That was not enough. Our representative in Russia, according to the Russian account, and it has never been denied, was engaged in a plot to overthrow the Revolutionary Government in Russia. I do not say that I would not have done exactly the same. When the Government of the country arrested him there was an outcry as to the wickedness of the Russian Government in arresting a member of the diplomatic body. A member of the diplomatic body in any country who tries to upset the existing government and who meddles in the internal affairs of that country is playing an extremely dangerous game and must take the responsibility for the risk. I submit that it is contrary to all the practice of the diplomatic body, contrary to the practice of this country, and to the practice of diplomacy in all countries, that diplomats should take sides in the political conflicts of the country to which they are accredited. We were promised by the Noble Lord opposite that we should have a full report of what Mr. Lockhart has done. We have never had that report. It was the Lockhart plot, and the attempt on Lenin and the murder of Uritsky which really started the terror in Russia. It was the realisation of the Bolshevists that they were threatened on the one side by external attack and on the other side by assassination from within that really started in Russia the terror in exactly the same way that terror was started in France in 1793. The evidence of that is to be found in the White Paper produced by the Foreign Office. This White Paper states, I think in two places, that the terror was the direct result of the Lockhart plot and the attempt on Lenin. That was in September. The terror was at its worst in October, and much as we must all of us deplore the excesses to which it has gone I think we ought, in fairness, to realise that during the first six months of Bolshevik rule there was no murders and no terror. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, oh!"] Well, I should be very glad to be told of any. I have stated what is my information.

Two Ministers were killed at that time.

Not by order of the Government. That was before the Revolution. I assert that there were no executions whatever by order of the Government for the first six or eight months, and it was not till then that massacres swept over the country, stirred up by the worst classes in the country. As soon as a Government starts general executions, then every ruffian in the country takes it into his own head to become a private executioner, and you get a welter of blood such as we see in Russia at the present time. The attitude of the Foreign Office is, we must admit, to support any methods or any Government which will upset the Resolution, and they go on carrying that out in spite of the fact that every time they make the effort it fails. They try to use the Russian people against the Revolution and the weapon breaks in their hands. Russia has become a Socialist State, and its success or example has to be destroyed according to the ideas of the Foreign Office. As long as we carry on our politics on these lines we are not only doomed to failure in Russia, but also to a perpetual indefinite war which will finally complete the bankruptcy of civilisation. You will have to continue fighting in Russia until you have driven the last Bolshevik out of the country, or else you will have to acknowledge it as a communistic State, disagreeable as it is to its neighbours throughout the world, and terrible as it is to contemplate in any industrialised country such as England that they have got a more or less anarchic country as a neighbour.

Russia is a Communistic Socialist State and there we must leave it. Unless we are prepared to continue war indefinitely for its suppression, it will be impossible to set up any Government in Russia—and I believe the Foreign Office will realise it as much as anyone who has come back from that country—it will be impossible to set up any Government there opposed to the present communistic Government unless you leave British bayonets there to support it, because the moment the British bayonets are withdrawn that Government will be upset. The fact is, there have been established vested interests in the Revolution. Every little peasant in Russia has since the Revolution acquired land which he had not got before. He knows perfectly well that his retention of that land depends on the permanency of the Revolution, and human nature being what it is, hon. Members can see that in any country where the vast bulk of the population are peasants who are of opinion that their vested interest is in the permanence of the Revolution, the permanence of the destruction of the landlords, it is impossible to get back to the old position where the peasant will lose his land and become again the tenant of the tyrannical landlord. It was exactly the same in the French Revolution, which was made permanent by the confiscation of the Church lands and their sale to peasants in France. These lands were bought by the peasants at a low price, and every man was determined that the bourgeoise should not come back until his title to the land was recognised. Consequently, the French Revolution, which was as anarchistic as Russia, became established, and no one has been able to return to the old system, which was completely wiped out, the peasants being left in possession of their assignats. We want to impress the Foreign Office at the present time that it is no good hating a form of government, and stirring up hatred against it in this country. If you are not prepared to continue war with that country indefinitely, you had better make up your mind that, bad as the Government is, it had better be tolerated rather than have an indefinite war for the suppression of an idea which is naturally unpopular among the governing classes.