May I ask my right hon. Friend what Vote will be put down on Tuesday week, when the House reassembles after Whitsuntide?

It has been arranged, I understand, that the Navy Vote shall be put down.

Ordered, That the consideration of the Lords Amendments to the Profiteering (Amendment) Bill have precedence this day of the business of Supply.—[ Mr. Bonar Law ].

I beg to move, "That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment."

Most of the Amendments which have been made in another place upon the Profiteering (Amendment) Bill are purely drafting Amendments, but there is one which raises a question upon which some hon. Members may wish to have en- lightenment, and I will deal with that when we come to it.

Question put, and agreed to.

Lords Amendments:

In Sub-section (3) (a), leave out the words, "under pre-War conditions" ["the sale of similar articles under pre-War conditions"], and insert instead thereof the words, "before the War"; leave out the word "expenses" ["the relative expenses of carrying on the business"], and insert instead thereof the words, "costs and charges."

In Sub-section (3) ( b, ) leave out the words, "in the same locality" ["sellers in that way of business in the same locality"], and insert instead thereof the words, "under similar conditions"; leave out the words "under pre-War conditions" ["the sale of similar articles under pre-War conditions"], and insert instead thereof the words, "before the War"; leave out the word "expenses" ["the relative expenses of carrying on the business"], and insert instead thereof the words pre-war conditions"]"the sale of "costs and charges."

Agreed to.

CLAUSE 3.—(Interpretation of s 2 b) of the principal Act.)

For removing doubts, it is hereby declared that a person shall not be deemed to be a trade competitor within the meaning of proviso ( b ) to Sub-section (2) of Section two of the principal Act of a person against whom a complaint is lodged by reason only that he is a member of a co-operative society which carries on ii business of the same class or description as is carried on by that person, if he does not take part in the management of and is not a paid official of the co-operative society.

Lords Amendments:

After the word "society" ["a member of a co-operative society"], insert the words, "or a shareholder in a Company"; leave out the words, "a paid" ["and is not a paid official"], and insert instead thereof the words "an"; at the end, after the word "society," insert the words "or company."

Agreed to.

CLAUSE 4.—(Minor Amendments of principal Act.)

The provisions of the principal Act specified in the first column of the Schedule to this Act shall have effect subject to the Amendments (being Amendments of a minor character) specified in the second column of that Schedule.

Lords Amendment:

Leave out the words "(being Amendments of a minor character)."

Agreed to.

CLAUSE 7—(Investigation as to proprietary articles.)

Nothing in this Act or in the principal Act shall (in its application to a proprietary article hereinafter defined) require particulars of any secret process of preparation, or of the ingredients used in the composition of such article to be furnished; but the Board of Trade shall be entitled to require that the cost of any such article (exclusive of overhead charges) shall be furnished by the proprietor under the certificate of a duly qualified chartered accountant verified by statutory declaration. The accountant by whom the certificate is to be given shall be approved by the Board of Trade.

A "proprietary article" shall be deemed to be any article, the exclusive property of any individual, or company, or firm, the composition of which is secret or in the preparation of which secret processes of manufacture are employed.

Lords Amendment:

Leave out Clause 7, and insert instead thereof the following new Clause:

Protection of secret processes, etc., against disclosure.

"Nothing in this Act or in the principal Act shall require particulars of any secret process or preparation, or of the ingredients used in such process or preparation to be disclosed, but the Board of Trade shall be entitled to require that the cost of production (exclusive of overhead charges) shall be furnished by the producer under the certificate verified by statutory declaration of a qualified accountant approved by the Board of Trade."

I beg to move, "That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment."

The House of Commons agreed to the insertion in the Bill of an Amendment which would protect secret processes from disclosure, but which would, at the same time, secure the safety of the public against unreasonable charges, by providing that, where such secret processes were put forward as a defence, a certificate should be given by a qualified accountant, approved of by the Board of Trade, as to the actual cost of manufacturing the article. It was pointed out, in the course of the discussion in the House of Commons, that all the classes of secret processes were not covered which deserve to be so protected, but only what are known as primary articles. It was maintained that there were many other processes of manufacture which were secret, and not protected by patents. At the moment I gave an undertaking to consider the proposal made in the House of Commons that other similar secret processes should be protected from disclosure. That view was accepted by the Government, and I now ask the House to agree with the Lords Amendment which has been made.

Question put, and agreed to.

CLAUSE 10—(Short title construction and duration.)

(1) This Act may be cited as the Profiteering (Amendment) Act, 1920; and the Profiteering Acts, 1919, shall be deemed to have continued in force until the date of the passing of this Act, and the principal Act as amended by this Act may be cited together as the Profiteering Acts, 1919 and 1920.

(2) This Act shall be construed as one with the principal Act:

Provided that the limit on the expenses of the Board of Trade payable out of moneys provided by Parliament under that Act shall not apply to expenses incurred after the date of the passing of this Act, so, however, that the expenses so payable after that date shall not exceed one hundred and twenty thousand pounds.

(3) The principal Act and this Act shall continue in force until the nineteenth day of May nineteen hundred and twenty-one.

Lords Amendment: In Sub-section (1) leave out the words "shall be deemed to have continued in force until the date of the passing of this Act, and the principal Act as amended by" and insert instead thereof the word "and."

Agreed to.

Lords Amendment: In Sub-section (3) leave out the word "and" ["the principal Act and"] and insert instead thereof the words "shall be deemed to have continued in force until the date of the passing of this Act and the principal Act as amended by."

Agreed to.

Schedule

Minor Amendments

Lords Amendment: Leave out the word "minor."

Agreed to.

The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.

The whole country has been deeply interested in the conferences that have taken place within the last week or two at Lympne, and certain official statements have been made; but I am certain the House will welcome from the Leader of the House, who I presume will deal with the matter, a very much more full and complete statement of the happenings there than has hitherto appeared in the daily press. We are accustomed to get a large amount of our news from Paris, where they seem to be more fully informed of what takes place at the conferences held in different parts of Europe, and the position in this respect is not one in which the dignity and responsibility of this House is at all considered or consulted. We are as much entitled in this country to hear what goes on at these conferences at the earliest possible moment as any of our allies. There is one very interesting event which has arisen out of the conclusions of the conference, and that was the resignation of M. Poincare. Right throughout the war he discharged a very patriotic, honourable, and useful part, and his resignation from that position is a matter of regret in many respects, since his splendid abilities can no longer be directed to discharging the duties associated with that position.

On that event perhaps an opportunity may arise for bringing the Reparation Commission within the scope of the League of Nations, and I believe that would be a really useful fresh departure. The League of Nations will not succeed unless it is given work to do, and I suggest to my right hon. Friend that some such step of that kind could be taken with much benefit to the whole of the undertakings of that part of the duties of our allies. There is one thing which one Government has at last definitely and distinctly stated, and it is that the sum due from Germany is to be reduced to a definite ascertained amount.

But the conditions under which the payment is to be made relate also to repayment from France and Bel- gium to us, and on this matter the House will welcome any information which the right hon. Gentleman can give us. No one in this country demurs for one moment to the proposal that priority should be given to Belgium and to France. The duty which not only we, but I think the whole world, owes to Belgium is one which I hope in some way we shall be able to recognise by the priority which is to be given to her, and what I say in that respect also applies in a full sense to France.

I think one may ask where do we come in in this matter? I think it is a very distant vista which is opened up to us of receiving anything. I say nothing further about that, because it is quite obvious that until the economic position of Germany is restored she cannot pay. You cannot get blood out of a stone, and you cannot get large payments out of a bankrupt State. I think therefore the best thing for the people of this country, in considering their economic future, is to recognise the fact that we have no sort of idea in our minds that in the money we have to raise for our vast undertakings at home or abroad there is any likelihood at all of getting one single penny from Germany for many years to come. That is the business way of looking at this matter. For the time being we should wipe it off, and then if it does come it will be in the nature of a windfall. Let all our taxpayers recognise for the moment that nothing can be got from Germany. Let us shoulder our burdens as best we can, with a determination to rely on ourselves, and ourselves alone, for our financial future for many years to come.

I think we may also write off all questions about the punishment of the Kaiser and matters of that kind, and make a fresh start. Let us look steadily to the future and not to the past. I know on this subject I hold a different view from many of my hon. Friends as to the punishment of the Kaiser. I think it would be a splendid example and precedent. But I would wipe it off. We are very deeply concerned with the prospects of the League of Nations. I know this is not an altogether popular subject in this House, but with all respects to the House, that does not alter the merits of the League itself. At present the position with regard to the League is a very difficult one, as it is not regularised in accordance with the proposals of the Treaty of Peace. There is a Council summoned, but I understand that for the Council to be put into an effective legal position the assembly should first of all be held. But whatever the decision may be, I am glad that a start has been made. It is very interesting to notice that in answer to the constant appeals which have been made, particularly by the noble lord the Member for Hitchin (Lord R. Cecil) on this point as to whether the League should not be made effective, an answer has been made. I quite agree it is an answer which has got a good deal of practical backing. I think I am quoting, not incorrectly, the words of the Prime Minister when he said some time ago, in this House, that the Supreme Council "alone has the will, the power and the organisation" by which the functions which have been allocated to the League by the Treaty of Versailles can be effectively utilised. Many of us think the time has come when "the will, the power and organisation" should be given to the League of Nations. In connection with a subject upon which I propose to detain the House for a few minutes, the question of Poland—I propose to read Article 11 of the League of Nations which we suggest has a very definite relation to the position in the Near East. It runs:— That is a very feeble answer to a very great responsibility. Of course the Allied, had the power, and still have it, of dealing with what, after all, is a creation of their own. They ought now to take in hand the position of Poland, and to say that the action which has been taken by her is in contravention of the spirit of Article 11 of the League of Nations, is inimical to the peace of the whole world, and disastrously detrimental to herself. As far as the Allies are concerned, we can easily test that by paying regard to the position of Poland at the moment. It is bankrupt, it is typhus stricken, it is smitten with hunger, and yet it has an army of 500,000 fighting men, thoroughly well equipped, hundreds of miles away from its own borders, fighting in a foreign country. It may be said that they are there to recover the historic boundaries of 1772, but I believe they have gone far beyond that. So far as we can judge their's is an attempt to reconquer a country which contains about 5 per cent. of Poles and 95 per cent. of Russians—more Russians in fact than there are Poles in the new Poland. How did she get there? How did that army of Poles get there? We know, and even the most amateur of amateurs has been taught by the experience of the last four or five years, that first class military operations of this kind cannot be undertaken without long and careful preparation. It cannot be done. We know what such preparations mean. We have been told we have two efficient, fully staffed Missions at Warsaw, one for the Army and one for the Navy. The duty of the Military Mission, as well as of our Civil Representatives there, is to keep the relevant departments in close touch with matters, military and otherwise, in the countries in which they are placed, and I do not think we can accept without a charge of ignorance, which would be very far from well-founded, the statement that we did not know months ago what the Poles meant. At any rate, if we did not know we ought to have known, and we ought to press also for the reason why we were not informed. It is rather a strain on one's common sense to think other than that the Military Mission there did know what was going on, and did let the people at home know also.

1.0 P.M.

I want to say in the comments I am about to make on the questions and answers which we have had in this House, that the last thing in the world any of us would do would be, either by word or by implication, to impute anything like a lack of bona fides to my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House. I say that in the fullest sense, and without any reservation of any kind whatsoever. What happened on May 6th? The Leader of the House told us that neither moral nor material support had been given to the Poles, and the impression conveyed to our minds was exactly what the words said, namely, that we had really nothing to do with this movement at all. The day before yesterday my right hon. Friend opposite, the Member for the Gorbals Division (Mr. Barnes), elicited what was a very frank and full statement from the Leader of the House, a word of two of which I should like to remind the House of. As far back as October last when it was feared that the Russian Border States would be attacked by the Soviet Government, and Poland being one of such States, a request was addressed by the Polish Government for assistance in their military equipment. In consequence of our commitments elsewhere, the British Government was unable to grant that request, but they promised Poland a certain quantity of surplus stores. The offer was accepted. In consequence of this gift, the material in question became the property of the Polish Government, and part is now being shipped on account of the Polish Government to Poland. A further question addressed to my right hon. Friend brought the reply that to cease allowing these shipments to proceed would be to break the bargain. What was that bargain? The bargain, as I understand this question, was this: that if Poland was attacked by the Soviet Government, we would give Poland such military assistance as we could spare. I am quite in favour of that. I think it was the proper thing to do, if the Soviet Government was going to break through the boundaries and attack one of the new the boundaries and attack one of the new states, as then formed. I do not know quite what my hon. Friends behind me think, but I say what I do on this matter quite frankly. But what is the position now? What are these stores being used for? Is it for defence? An attack launched hundred of miles into Russia is not defence.

It is the best form of defence!

That is quite an obvious answer from the point of view of the hon. and gallant Gentleman, but why not then go on and conquer Russia? According to some hon. Gentlemen—including, I think, the Secretary for War—there would be no trouble at all about conquering Russia. To my mind, my very ordinary mind, these munitions are being used for an offensive which is thoroughly outside the range of the duty or the obligations of Poland. I repeat again it is a deadly danger to the peace of Europe.

We have no control over the Polish Government. The right hon. Gentleman should make his speech to the Polish Diet, where he would be free to indict the Polish Government. Surely the Polish Government are masters in their own house, and it is for them to take such steps as they please? What the right hon. Gentleman is entitled to do is to invite His Majesty's Government to make clear to the House and the country any action they may have taken or may not have taken, but I think he ought to leave to the Polish Government and people the considerations which govern their determination to advance, or retire, or to remain as they are.

On a point of Order. Your decision, Mr. Speaker, may affect the whole course of the Debate, and may I therefore submit to you that the Polish Government are signatories to the Covenant of the League of Nations. They are bound by the whole of the terms of that document. I would very respectfully submit that it is the right, and within the power, of any Member of this House to argue that the Polish action is not really consistent with that Covenant. I do not know whether that is what my right hon. Friend opposite (Sir D. Maclean) was arguing—I do not know—but I only want to submit this point, which it seems to me is important—and to suggest to you that since Poland are also signatories it would have been right for His Majesty's Government to have taken such diplomatic action as they thought possible, and particularly as the Covenant itself provides for that, in order to secure that its provisions should be carried out. For that purpose it is necessary, I submit very respectfully, to èxamine from that point of view the general conduct of the Poles to see whether or not their conduct really is or is not in accordance with the obligations imposed upon them.

The logical result of the Noble Lord's argument is this: that in this House we have to discuss and decide the policy of every signatory of the League of Nations. What applies to the Poles would apply equally to any other signatory. Is it solemnly suggested in this House that we ought to consider and review the policy of every nation that is a signatory to the League of Nations?

If they break the Covenant we are so entitled?

This is just one of the matters of great delicacy. Are we going to discuss them all here? It seems to me that the House will go a long way beyond its duty if it does that. It is entitled to impeach His Majesty's Government for any action or non-action which they may or may not have taken; but we have no right or title of any sort to interfere or criticise, or have anything whatever to say as to the motives which govern the actions of other countries.

On that point of Order, Sir, the importance of which cannot be over-estimated, may I submit this—and I would like at once to say that I appreciate the difficulties of the situation and the points which must leap to your mind on this kind of question. But you might have noticed that in my opening remarks I commenced by reading Article 11, and I stated that Poland was a member of the League of Nations. We also are a member of the League of Nations—in fact, the dominant member of the League of Nations, and also, of course, of the Supreme Council. My argument on that point— which I lay with great submission before you—is this: that if the ruling which you have suggested—I do not know, just at the moment, whether you have actually laid it down—were followed, it would exclude this House from debating the action of a member of the League of Nations. This would react, one might assume, unfavourably upon us in connection with our duties as a member of that League, and lead, I am suggesting, to the great detriment of this country, to additional charges on this country in any wars which might be produced. If we are shut out from discussing a matter of this kind—where we have been shipping to Poland, and are at this moment shipping, munitions of war—I think the functions of this House in connection with the League of Nations and the watching of international policies will be so circumscribed that I do not think the nation could fully discharge its duties in connection with this League.

The proposal which is made is that we are to discuss in this House the motives which govern the action of the Governments of all the States which happen to be signatories of the League. I must say that appals me. I think we would be going entirely outside the functions of this House, and so far from leading to any friendly feeling between ourselves and the other signatories of the League there would be, it appears to me, very grave danger of raising a good deal of animosity. Leave Poland aside for one moment. Supposing hon. Members follow the example of the right hon. Gentleman and begin to criticise the United States of America which does not, for the moment, happen to be a member of the League of Nations, but which may well be some day. Is that likely to lead to any beneficial result? I cannot myself help solemnly impressing upon the House the view that the less we criticise or seek to interfere with the motives which govern the conduct of other States the more likely are we to arrive at, and remain in, friendly relations with them. For that reason, therefore, I would ask the House most solemnly—I quite see the very important point made by the right hon. Gentleman—to be very cautious indeed of how they take their stand upon this new development of our foreign relations. Hon. Members, of course, are fully entitled to say anything they please in regard to His Majesty's Government. I cannot, however, help thinking that a good deal of reticence should be exercised in regard to other countries if they happen to be signatories to the League of Nations.

I bow to your ruling, Mr. Speaker. If I may say so with respect, I think what you have just said in regard to our action or any criticism of the Governments of other countries is in accord with the traditions of this House and its duties and responsibilities. In so far as my remarks went on the lines which you have indicated in the latter portion of your ruling, I certainly will not pursue them any further. I am sorry for having transgressed. I think yours a perfectly proper ruling, if I may say so, to that extent. What I now wish to proceed with is the question of the action of the Executive of our Government in the sending of munitions of war to Poland. The point I was making was that the justification for the sending of munitions of war to Poland was for defensive action on the part of Poland. The reason for that has now gone, because the action of Poland was not defensive, but, in my opinion, offensive. There I leave it, having demonstrated—as I thought—that the action was of that kind which did not carry with it our agreement, at any rate, in respect to the action of His Majesty's Government. The replies which were given a day or two ago in this House on this point as to what was the military mission to which the munitions were consigned, was very misty, may I say, in expression on the part of the President of the Board of Trade. He frankly did not know. I ask my right hon. Friend to inform the House what was meant by saying that these munitions were sent to our military mission in Poland, if our mission had nothing to do with the handling of these munitions? Were they sent simply to the order of the Polish Government and dealt with by them there?

The only other point I wish to make is this. It is on the whole general question of the urgent need of the League of Nations being brought into active operation. I think, on the whole, a declaration of the kind made by the Chief of the General Staff, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, is one which I welcome, because it is just as well to know where we are. He said this at the annual general meeting of the Union Jack Club a day or two ago: proper appeal to make from his point of view—so as to be ready for the time that was coming. What did he mean by that? Whom are we going to fight at no distant date? Is it America, or France, or Italy or Russia? The Field-Marshal is a very distinguished man in very close contact with His Majesty's Government. He attends meetings of the Supreme Council, and he speaks with a sense of responsibility. I think the mind of the country will be very much disturbed by such a statement as that. What does it all mean? I am afraid it means that the military spirit is getting the upper hand again. I do not blame the Field-Marshal for saying that from his point of view. He sees conditions which to his mind and experience show him that war is imminent once again. It is a sad state to be in within eighteen months of the close of the greatest tragedy in the world's history. instead of the rustle of the wings of the spirit of peace, our ears hear nothing but the harsh rattle of the chariots of war. That is not what we fought for. I do not think Governments are going to be of much use. They get tangled up in all the difficulties of situations which arise from time to time. Unless the people of this country and the world realise that the future of the world lies in their hands —if they are not once again to be plunged into the ghastly shambles of 1914 to 1918—there will be no hope for them, unless they seize hold of the League of Nations, and no matter what the difficulties are, make it supreme. Unless the people are awake, that is what is going to happen. There is no doubt about it. Getting ready for war again [ a laugh ] It will not do to laugh about it. I urge this in no spirit of hostility against the Government. I urge them to break through the difficulties and tangles and technicalities and the manœuvres of small minds, and to grasp the fact that only through the instrumentality of such a League as that—spoken of with such sneers by men who ought to know so much better—can the difficulties be overcome. The greatest possible responsibility rests on this House in this matter, and I for my own part will join with any body which will take any reasoned step, whatever it may be, to secure that this spirit of war shall be damped down—exorcised if possible—and peace given a chance again.

I am sure everyone in the House would agree with the last passages of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. None of us have been through this War without wishing to see war dead and buried for ever. We all want to see the League of Nations made a going concern, if it is possible, but I would beg supporters of the League of Nations not to set it an impossible task before it is in working order. Do not ask the un-weaned babe to do work which would tax the strength of a grown man. It seems to me that on this Polish matter the Government have pursued a very right and proper course. They have said they could not take sides one way or another, and that the responsibility must rest with Poland. I agree that Poland and the whole of Europe needs peace. I agree that very probably the continuance of this armed war with Russia, as opposed to the economic war, is helping the Bolshevist movement and inducing a lot of people in Russia to rally to the Bolshevist Government, thinking that the Bolshevist Government is standing up for the national rights of Russia. But where I entirely disagree with the suggestion in this Debate is when it is put forward that the present state of war is due to the Poles and not to the Russians. Indeed, far from being averse from peace, the Poles have done everything they could, as is only natural, in the present position, to ensure that peace. They made protracted efforts to bring about a meeting with the Bolshevists.

indicated dissent.

The Noble Lord knows as well as I do, that a long series of messages took place by wireless between the Soviet Government and the Poles, and the Russians showed how little keen they were for peace by interspersing these messages on the subject of a meeting with violent propaganda to try to stir up revolution behind the Polish Army. Only a few weeks ago the Russian Government finally showed how little they wanted peace by making a very heavy attack on the Podolian front, but when Poland was in this desperate strait we heard nothing of this cry that the League of Nations ought then to intervene.

Yes you did. Last year you heard it.

I daresay we did last year, when Russia was in difficulties. We did not hear it six weeks ago.

rose —

I would ask the hon. and gallant Gentleman to wait. He takes part in every Debate, and no doubt in due course he will take part in this. If he will defer what he has to say till that moment arrives, the House will be better pleased.

The House was very well advised not to ask the League of Nations to interfere with Russia, because the House knows as well as I do that the League of Nations has no troops which could have made that interference effective. The Allies have not even enough troops effectually to supervise this plébiscite which it is their duty to carry out under the instrument of Peace and coercive action in Russia is completely out of the question. Neither we nor France nor Italy would under present conditions dream of raising forces to start a big campaign in Central Europe, and if the Polish Army had broken on the Podolian Front a few weeks ago nothing could have prevented disaster to the Poles. In spite of that difficulty the Poles went on trying to get negotiations. They offered to meet the Russians at Borisoff, in the devastated area. The Bolshevists answered that they would only negotiate at Warsaw or Copenhagen, or some other great centre, where, no doubt, they desired an opportunity for those intrigues and revolutionary manœuvres which are so dear to them in all the countries of the world. Seeing the way that General Denikin and Admiral Koltchak had been crippled by Bolshevist risings in the rear of their Armies, the Poles very wisely felt that until peace was actually signed it was very dangerous to have the Bolshevists behind their line of resistance. The Poles, however, were so anxious for an early peace that they did not wish even to work out a formal armistice, which is a very complicated matter and takes weeks. They pledged themselves, if they could get an immediate meeting, that they would not attack the Russians and that things would stand as they were.

indicated dissent.

I do not think my Noble Fried will dissent from the fact that they pledged themselves not to attack, and I do not think he really can argue against my construction that their reason for not having an armistice is that they did not want the delay which everyone knows is inevitable. I think, looking at the facts, there is no doubt whatever that the Poles did all they could to meet the Russians. As a matter of fact, you cannot make peace if only one party wants it. You cannot make peace in the present mood of the Russian Government. Look at the news in the papers this morning. If the Russians want peace with Poland, why do they suddenly start aggression against Persia? Persia is not their enemy. No one has taken any steps against them in Asia. Why are they to keep pouring thousands of troops into Northern Persia? That is only typical of their attitude, and on one pretext or another the Russians avoided negotiations with the Poles and massed troops. The Poles, therefore, really had no choice. The right hon. Gentleman (Sir D. Maclean) rather suggested that you can wage war on a system of limited liability. Of course, that is completely out of the question. In war it does not do to sit still and wait till you are attacked, and especially is it the case in Russia, where mobile operations cease during the winter and become possible and inevitable at the end of April when the country dries up. Initiative is everything, especially under these conditions, and the Poles very wisely forestalled their enemy and carried out a brilliant advance which shortened their front by, I believe, many hundreds of miles. I should have thought from the British point of view that that was most satisfactory, not only because the Poles are our allies, and have had this success, but also I should have thought it was to the advantage of the world that this great stretch of the Ukraine should have been freed from this Bolshevist dominion and this terrible epidemic of typhus which might possibly be controlled by the civilised government of Poland. The right. hon. Gentleman for Peebles (Sir D. Maclean) censures the Government for allowing munitions to go out to Poland. In view of the advantage we got during the most critical days of the War by getting munitions in America, I should have thought that it was a most short-sighted policy to attempt to overthrow the well-established principle which allows belligerents to obtain munitions in neutral countries. It is true that these munitions were not bought. They were given many months ago. At that time it was impossible to control the exact phase of the operations for which these munitions would be used.

How can the League of Nations interfere? I can quite understand that those who have always in this country repudiated any obligations which we might have towards our Allies in Central Europe would be very anxious to see pressure brought to bear on Poland by the League of Nations. But the League of Nations cannot act fairly unless it can bring pressure to bear equally on both sides. For this reason I am surprised at the school represented by the Noble Lord advocating intervention by the League of Nations, because under present conditions such intervention would not be creditable to this country or to the League of Nations itself. It is most unfortunate that those who take this view did not suggest intervention while the Russians were getting the best of the fighting, but, unfortunately, waited their time until the Poles were getting the upper hand.

indicated dissent.

On both sides we have constantly pressed for the admission of Russia into the League of Nations.

Intervention was never debated at that time. Now I think the realities control the matter. It was impossible for the League of Nations to act because Russia was not a member of the League, and would not have listened if the League of Nations had acted. Now that Poland is attacked, Poland is a member of the League of Nations, and you can, of course, bring pressure to bear, because Poland, being a member of the League of Nations, would be likely to listen. I think it is a most dangerous attitude that is being advocated. It would be a most terrible set-back to the popularity of the League of Nations if it should be realised by the small States that in a quarrel between a member of the League of Nations and a non-member, the League interferes not according to justice but merely according to opportunity. It means that inevitably it would have to interfere always against the side of a member. It is true that the League of Nations can now hit at Poland by the blockade. It is true they cannot use that same weapon against Russia, because there is no trade in Russia to be blockaded. The League may exhort the belligerents to make peace, but there is no hope of the possibility of Russia listening. It would be unfair to discredit the League of Nations by urging that, having shown its indifference or its inability to prevent the war, it should suddenly take more active steps and seize the opportunity of interfering when the fortunes of friends of this country are in the ascendant.

I should like to ask a few questions in regard to the recent conference at Lympne. I speak as an Englishman who cares little what party governs the country so long as it is well governed. We have heard a great deal about the Conference at Lympne, but I should like to know what actually transpired. Perhaps the Leader of the House can tell us. I cannot congratulate the Government on its strength in dealing with the trial of the Kaiser. This Imperial Crippen ought not to be allowed to go free without being brought to trial. I pass that by now. As I understand it, there has been some change in the Peace Treaty in regard to the indemnity to be paid by Germany. There is to be a fixed sum. In Paris the sum was indefinite, but at Lympne it has been fixed at something like£6,000,000,000. These are domestic compacts which have been made between the Allies. What will Germany say about it? I do not see any prospect that the Germans are prepared to pay anything. There will be extreme disappointment in this country if Germany does not repair to the best of her ability the damage that has been done by her warlike operations. Perhaps the Leader of the House will be able to give us some answer.

I should now like to ask the Secretary of State for War a question on a subject which has been alluded to earlier in the day. His Chief of Staff the day before yesterday made a very alarmist speech. The right hon. Member for Peebles quoted part of it. Here is another portion which he did not quote. It seems to me to be extremely ominous— are so near war as we were in August, 1914, or if the condition of the world is so inflammable as it was in August, 1914, it is a very serious state of affairs.

It is capable of a very much less alarming explanation. As I have frequently pointed out to the House, we have an enormous number of obligations at the present time. Cologne, Constantinople, Ireland, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Egypt and India. We are maintaining the whole of this tremendous strain of business and British interests with simply the small army which we had before the War, or practically with very little addition, and all recruited during the last twelve or eighteen months. It does not seem to me at all surprising that in addressing the representatives of that small body of soldiers on whose bayonets the whole of the peace and order of our immense Dominions rest, that the Gallant Field Marshal, the Chief of Staff, should point out to them how very seriously they are needed. That does not imply that we are on the verge of some great explosion or of cataclysm. That is over. We are in a period of great disturbance and of increasing degeneration in many parts of the world, but anything similar to the onrush of the organised legions of Germany upon the world need not be expected again.

I am glad to have elicited that explanation from my right hon. Friend, because the speech of the Chief of Staff did alarm me. I thought there was something behind that we did not know about. So far as I am concerned, I have taken no special part in regard to Poland, and I think your ruling, Mr. Speaker, is perfectly proper, that we cannot discuss the internal affairs of another country. I have regarded the emancipation of Poland as being a very happy result, and I cannot without some misgiving see war taking place between Poland and Russia, and I suggest to His Majesty's Government that the great need of both Poland and Russia is peace. Could not His Majesty's Government offer arbitration between the two? That would be a very striking commentary upon the desire for peace. We have to get into contact with Russia. There have been great changes taking place in Russia in the last few months. The old Czar Generals are now leaving the Bolshevik forces The Com- rades have practically ruined Russia. There is no transport. The peasants have the land, but they are not going to cultivate it for the benefit of the Comrades. They are only going to cultivate it for themselves. Therefore, anything we can do to help Russian reconstruction ought to be done.

I should like to make a special appeal to the Government, that they should make peace and come to the help of certain portions of the late Russian Empire. I refer to the three small States of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. These small States want to get to work at once. They have been recognised de facto, but they want to be recognised de jure, and I ask the Government to recognise them at the earliest possible moment. I asked the Leader of the House a question on this point, and he told me that he had decided to ask the Prime Minister to take this matter up with the French Prime Minister at their next meeting, which I think he said would be next week. I now ask the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the Government have come to any decision in regard to the recognition de jure of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. I make a special appeal on behalf of Lithuania, for they are looking with longing and anxious eyes to this country. I have the honour, through the courtesy of your secretary, Mr. Speaker, of introducing to this House a gentleman who is a Lithuanian. His great ambition was to see and hear the Prime Minister. He is a very distinguished man. He established the Moscow tramway system. He is in Russia on a Lithuanian mission, and negotiating with the Bolsheviks in regard to the countries between Russia and Lithuania. The eyes of these people are turned towards this country at the present time. They want to be recognised. Britain was the first country to recognise them. We recognised the de facto Government in October, 1919. They want to get on and to complete that work, and they asked to be recognised de jure. They are learning English, and they- want trade and they want peace. They have timber, flax and other products which this country is urgently needing. They have an elected Assembly of 112 members, elected upon the widest possible franchise, something like 80 per cent. of the electorate taking part in it. Therefore I ask that His Majesty's Government should, as soon as possible recognise this Government as a de jure Government. The Poles are in occupation of part of the Lithuanian territory, and they can make no move until they are recognised by this country. During the German retreat from Lithuania the Germans surrendered Lithuania territory to the Bolsheviks. The Poles marched in, and are now there. I ask the Government at the earliest moment to recognise the de jure independence of these three States, and I make a special appeal for the country of Lithuania, which has such very friendly feelings towards this country, because I feel that if the Government take action now it will be of great benefit not only to Great Britain, but will cause very friendly feelings to exist through the whole nationality of Lithuania.

I am one of those who, in season and out of season in this House, has pleaded for a sensible policy towards Russia and the border States of Russia, and I therefore very much resent the accusation by the hon. and gallant Member (Lieut.-Colonel Guinness) that it was only when the Poles were winning that we suggested intervention. On this side I and other members of my party and the Labour party have insistently pleaded for this very policy. Our complaint is that there are two policies of the Government. There is the policy of peace as enunciated by the Prime Minister in November last and again in February and there is the policy of war as followed out by the War Office, the Admiralty, and, I am afraid in some cases, even by the Foreign Office. The voice is the voice of peace, but the hand is the hand of war. That is our whole complaint at the present time. The Prime Minister, speaking in this House on 10th February last, to my surprise mentioned a suggestion for making war on the Bolsheviki which I had not heard put forward before: extract from the famous book by Field Marshal Ludendorff recently published and quoted before in this House when it has suited Members of the Government. Ludendorff says:

This Ukrainian district, the black earth belt of Russia, is being devastated for the third or fourth time. A year ago we could have had peace, and cultivation in that event would have been going on. It is a great sugar and wheat producing district, and supplies are essential for the world. I tremble when I consider the economic future of Europe. My hon. Friend cannot deny that the food situation in Central and Eastern Europe is appalling, and I cannot understand how the hon. and gallant Member opposite can light-heartedly support these aggressive attacks. I have great sympathy with the Ukrainian nationals. I spoke up for them last year, and got little sympathy from the Government, because we were then backing General Denikin. I believe I am right in saying that the Soviet are prepared to recognise the autonomy of the Ukraine, on the one condition that there is freedom of transit to Odessa, free trade between the rich food and mineral producing areas of the Ukraine and the rest of Russia. Every lover of Russia, whether right or left, I am sure is justified in asking for that. I believe that the Ukraine could be free, not by fighting but by negotiation, and it is for negotiation that I do beg at the present time. The position with regard to Persia, Turkey, and the Soviet Government, of course, is most serious. The hon. Baronet, the Member for one of the Divisions of Nottingham (Sir J. D. Rees), will bear me Out that if we are going to have another invasion of Persia by Russia the threat to India will be indeed great. Have we enough troops to keep it back? Contact between the Soviet forces and the National Army in Turkey is nearly complete, and Armenia is turning very naturally to Moscow for assistance.

That is not so.

My hon. Friend, with his great knowledge of Armenia, says that is not true, but to-day the Leader of the House admitted that three emissaries had proceeded from the Republic to Vladikavkaz. I do not blame them. We cannot help Armenia. There is no cotton or oil in Armenia to attract us, and very naturally they are turning to the only people who can help them. Our position in the East will be most precarious. How are we to meet it? I think we can do it by negotiation. We have great weapons in our hands. We and our Allies control the seas and therefore the trade of the world, and we can use that as a great lever for negotiation. Ever since the Armistice with Germany we have had repeated requests for negotiations from the Soviet Government. Hon Members may say that is only an excuse, a smoke cloud under which to stir up sedition and trouble in our own country. That remains to be seen. I have sufficient trust in my own people to believe that they can resist the propaganda in any case. At any rate, we might try this policy, because it is the only final policy. Might I also protest most strenuously against the action of our ships and our men-of-war in the Black Sea. While the Prime Minister in this House is declaring that we wish to re-open trade with Russia, our battle-ships and gun-boats are carrying on active operations against the town and villages on the shores of the Black Sea. It pains me to speak of it, because I am sorry to say that my brother officers are being used in what I consider the furtherance of a criminal policy. I would like to ask whether, before we bombard these ports and villages and towns, we give any warning, or any opportunity to non-combatants, women and children, to evacuate. It will not redound to our credit if we do not. It is painful for me to refer to these things, but someone has to do it, and I make no bones about it. For what purpose is this being done? Apparently in order to protect the Crimea from being taken by the Bolsheviki.

2.0 P.M.

When General Wrangel was in difficulties a message was sent from the Foreign Office to Moscow asking the Bolsheviki to stay their hands and to negotiate for the evacuation of these troops, in the words of the Leader of the House and the First Lord of the Admiralty, on ground of humanity. The next thing that we heard was that General Wrangel was advancing, and the War Office threw its cloak over him and issued the familiar communique that General Wrangel had made a very successful advance. I suppose it is hopeless to talk about keeping bargains in these days, but that was playing low down even towards the hated Bolsheviki. We saved General Wrangel by telling the Bolsheviki that trade negotiations would be depend upon their listening to reason, and the next thing we heard was the advance of General Wrangel supported by the guns of British ships. This is a policy which furnishes great excuse for any advance by the Bol- sheviki in Turkey or Persia with a view of making things uncomfortable. If we carry out that sort of policy, talk in this House in the words of the Prime Minister of peace and trade, and then sent out our fleets to the Black Sea to blockade Russian ports, bombard Russian towns, and assist the counter revolutionary leader, General Wrangel, in the Crimea, what can we expect but retaliation? It seems to me before we talk of breaches of faith on the part of the Bolsheviki we might put our own house in order. I repeat what I have repeated so often that it must weary the House as it certainly wearies myself, that the only hope for Europe is peace, production, agriculture, trade, commerce, while what we have in Europe is further invasions alarums and excursions and strife. It is because His Majesty's Government in this House speak of peace, but in practice stir up war and trouble that I make this protest again to-day.

I do not attempt to follow the hon. and gallant Gentleman over the very wide area of which he has spoken so eloquently. I will endeavour to respect your ruling in anything which I may have to say with regard to foreign governments. At the same time I do submit this point with very great diffidence. It does seem to me essential that foreign politics should be more discussed than they are discussed in this House. I believe that the time for propaganda has gone past, and that the time for truth has arrived. I am in favour of a continuation of our alliance with France, but I believe it can only be founded upon truth and not upon propaganda. It is, for instance, vital for us and for France to know what are our mutual obligations to each other. We know what France has done for the world. I think that in France they know to a certain extent how we have helped them. They know that we helped them in the trenches, but when there is acrimonious controversy in the French Press with regard to our intentions and actions, I think that very few people in France know that in this country we are taxed to the bone, and that the taxation in France is only to one third the extent of our taxation. It is essential that those things should be known.

I confess that the task of criticising the action of the Supreme Council is growing extremely monotonous, but facts are stubborn things, and even if one's knowledge is only very slight, one does feel it to be one's duty, for what it is worth, to set out what one knows about these various things. If one goes back and looks at the manner in which this peace has been achieved, one cannot be surprised by the result, because as someone has said, this peace is the child of Hang the Kaiser and the 14 Points. If you had had your soldiers making peace at Paris you might have a decent peace, because certainly you would not have had the frontiers which you have got now, vast frontiers which we cannot hope to defend, certainly not adequately, without conscription. Your soldiers would have known that. If you had had diplomatists making your peace at Paris you might have had a decent peace because diplomatists do know something of the feelings of the East, and they would not have done things to arouse the East against us from end to end, turning close friends now into most bitter critics. Lastly, if you had had men attempting to make a peace in that spirit, which we invoked when we went into the War, a certain spirit on behalf of Christianity, you would have had a chance of having a respectable peace, and you would have brought peace, contentment and prosperity, where at the present moment there are nothing but desolation, war and famine. The peace which we have actually got now is a kind of Frankenstein. It is to the benefit of all of us to get rid of it as soon as we can.

A great deal has been said about the East this afternoon.. I do not propose to weary the House with that, because I imagine that before long we shall have a full-dress Debate upon it. I only make one observation. There is no good in not looking facts in the face. America and Russia have gone out of the War. Italy has seen that trouble is coming in the East. Signor Nitti made the other day a speech on the whole Eastern situation. That speech, I think, was not reported in this country. The effect was that after this peace war was inevitable in the East, and Italy, not agreeing with this peace, would not feel herself compelled to come into the War. That was a perfectly fair and honourable statement. It leaves us in this position. America and Russia are out of the War, and the Allies, France, England and Greece are left to coerce Germany, partition Hungary, divide Bulgaria and extinguish Turkey politically. I ask how is it possible that that operation is going to be carried out.

There is another point. The right hon. Member for South Molton (Mr. Lambert) made an appeal on behalf of Lithuania. I will make one other short appeal. In 1913, after the Bulgarian War, a conference of ambassadors was held in England under the presidency of Lord Grey of Falloden. It recognised that the Albanians had the same claim to nationality as any other race that had fought for freedom. Under his auspices it was consituted a State. Then came the War, and we heard a great deal about the neutrality of Belgium. At the same time Albania was invaded. Albania had no royal family, no press, no diplomatic service. A compact was made in April, 1915, to divide that country between three neighbouring powers. After that we had the Fourteen Points of President Wilson, and the speech of our own Prime Minister, and, therefore, in September, 1919, a new arrangement was come to by which the sovereign rights of Albania were recognised, but a limited mandate was given to Italy under the aegis of the League of Nations. Following that this egregious occurrence took place. The prime Ministers of England and France in January of this year determined once again to divide that unhappy country between three neighbours, and when remonstrance came from America they said that on the whole that was the arrangement that satisfied everybody most. So it did, except the Albanians. Though there are many things in the Treaty which we all dislike, it would be a perfectly monstrous business at this stage to go back and divide up a neutral country. It is almost incredible that one should have to confess in this House that such a thing is possible. This suggestion I make to the Prime Minister or my hon. Friend (Mr. Harmsworth). All those countries around Albania have grown enormously in territory. Greece has grown beyond her wildest dreams. Serbia is a rich and great country. They can afford to be just and generous to a very much smaller neighbour, and in doing so they can achieve what we all so much need, that is peace in that part of the world.

The speech of the hon. and gallant Gentleman who has just sat down has widened very much the range of the Debate. I do not intend to travel to the further points of the operations discussed. The Debate was begun by a speech which rather limited the subject to the very definite issues which have been raised recently as to the action, of our Government in relation to the position created by the aggressive movement of Poland, and I want in the main to confine myself to that theme. We have been by your ruling given from the Chair somewhat limited in our observations, but I think that that it is possible within the limits to submit to the Government such questions as will enable an answer to be given which, I hope, will tend very much to clear the situation. The hon. and gallant Member for Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy) described what is the universal desire of mankind, and what certainly are the general effects of the present situation in a large part of Europe, and in corroboration of what he said, and of what many of us know, we might refer even to the King's speech, which was read in this House at the end of last Session. In that speech I find the following declaration on behalf of His Majesty's Government:

It is because of the bearing of the War new proceeding between Poland and Russia upon this industrial and economic situation, that I think we are entitled to criticise and condemn the policy of the Government. The Treaty of Peace gave us in its forefront the provisions and the machinery of the League of Nations. The League of Nations was designed to translate into actuality the general aspiration entertained by the people of this Kingdom, at any rate, and not least of all, by the soldiers who fought on behalf of this Kingdom—namely, the aspiration it was a war to end war. To put an end to war you must be as prepared for the making of peace as for the making of war. There are men whose mentality and whose natures, I confess, I fail to comprehend, men who appear not to have the slightest faith in mankind's capacity for perpetuating peace as effectively as mankind in the past has prosecuted war. It may be that this praiseworthy and beneficent effort, when made, will fail. We do not know. But at least it should be tried. Every possible effort which man, if interested in the advancement of humanity, can make to rid mankind the world over of mankind's greatest enemy, that is war, ought to have been made by us all, regardless of class and party. To that end I know of no machinery other than such machinery as the League of Nations provides. It may not succeed in its object, but at least a genuine and thorough and earnest effort should be made to make it successful. Some of my Labour friends have submitted an alternative to the machinery of the League of Nations. It is the broad, general, ambitious alternative of cementing friendships amongst the workers of the world on the basis of a great world-wide and international spirit, so as to make wars impossible. My view upon that is this—that no matter what kind of social system we have, no matter what kind of economic arrangements we have, no matter what might be the structure and plan of our society; in short, even if we had the world over Socialist states and Socialist kingdoms, my belief is that we would still require some machinery comparable to the machinery of the League of Nations, in order that differences might be adjusted even between those states and countries. I am not so vain as to believe that Socialists can so fortify themselves against the risks of differences as to be always certain to agree in future as between country and country. We have differences here now between Socialist society and Socialist society, and quarrels between Socialists and Socialists. That fact should rather warn us against a too great confidence in the amity of nations merely because they might exist on a certain economic principle. Whether the states be capitalist or Socialist my belief is that we must have some such organisation as the League of Nations in order to adjust differences between communities by the same means as we now try to settle differences between individuals.

This provision of the League of Nations was put in the forefront of the Treaty of Peace. It has received a blessing on many platforms by leading ministers, from the Prime Minister downwards. The King himself, if I may mention it, has on more than occasion called upon this country and upon other countries to support the League of Nations as an instrument for maintaining the peace of the world. Monarchs and ministers pour blessings on the machinery of the League. Their earnestness is tested by the events of the past few weeks. It would be as reassuring to us, as I think it would be helpful to the world at large, to have some satisfactory statement from the Government during the course of the Debate. The events in Poland are not the happenings of the past few weeks, for in October last, I think, as revealed in this House this week by an answer given to a question, the Government made a free gift of munitions and war material to Poland for the purpose of defending herself against some feared aggression on the part of Bolshevist Russia. I would like to know whether we can have the terms of the gift. Can we have a fuller statement as to whether these munitions were given with any understanding that they were not to be used for the purpose of aggression or for the invasion of another's territory, or that they were not to be used unless we ourselves should be embroiled in quarrels? Because in these days, once a war is begun, there can be no guarantee that it will limit itself to a particular sphere. The nations have reached a stage where all of them must feel more and more a growing common interest in the question of peace and war. The boundary of a wars region cannot be determined by those actually in conflict. I think, too. that in a matter of this kind, long before Ministers had information exacted from them by questions in this House, the country might have been informed of its position. We heard a great deal during the War about putting an end to secret diplomacy, about open arrangements between country and country. I doubt whether this country has ever lived through a period of greater secrecy in matters of the highest import than during the past twelve or fifteen months. The greatest questions are being settled without any reference to this House, without any statement being made, until occasionally they are divulged when everything is finally settled. We are then told, almost in so many words, that it is unseemly or improper, or perhaps dangerous, to make any observations on the settlements reached. We cannot call that democratic government. It is not even representative government. It is the worst and most dangerous form of diplomacy that was ever tolerated in any country having such millions of voters as we have. Apart from the lack of information, this concealment of actions having such an enormous bearing on the future peace of our kingdom, there has been on the part of the leaders of the Government a complete absence of that spirit of peace with out which the masses of these kingdoms cannot have any reassurance against a future war.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Peebles (Sir D. Maclean) quoted a statement made a night or two ago by Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. I would like to ask, if it is not putting the question too pointedly, whether such a public statement as that reflects the attitude of mind of the Government. Is it a statement which in any sense expresses the policy and the outlook of the Government. If it is such a statement there is all the greater need of activity on the part of this House to make the League of Nations the workable machine that it is intended to be. Of course a League such as the League of Nations cannot remain effective and cannot fulfil its object unless the Government of the day is in real harmony with the spirit of the League, and unless it uses it on every occasion when with good purpose it can be used. Individual members of the League or organisations which may back the League or great bodies of opinion which may approve of the League, can all be rendered futile unless the Government of the day is really in full sympathy with the purposes of the League. I do not think that the Government should have concealed from us the information of every movement with which they were acquainted in relation to Poland. If we cannot offer any comments as to the conduct of the Polish Government we ought to be informed of the position as accurately as possible, and we should not be thrown back on the pages of the newspapers with their conflicting information gathered from non-official sources.

In the later stages of our serious trouble with Russia, Labour rather congratulated itself upon having been effective in moulding opinion in this country, and I think in this House, in the direction of securing peace with Russia. There was some prospect of what might be termed the definite Labour policy being effective in relation to that country. It appears that Labour is likely to be disappointed, unless the answer which I hope we shall hear this afternoon is given. Poland has received, or rather has had restored to her, her freedom largely because of the action of this country. It may be said that our men fought and died for Polish liberty as well as for the liberties of other lands. In view of the terms of the Covenant we are entitled to call upon Poland now, as well as upon Russia, to submit their serious differences to the arbitrament of the League of Nations, instead of fighting them out on the field of battle. The Press, including the "Times" and other journals, have gone to the length of describing as fantastic some of the ambitions which Poland has recently conceived.

I do not know what the Government may have to say or whether the Government would prefer altogether to remain silent in this matter, but at least let us have a definite clear statement on one point, and that point is, what has the Government done to try to prevent this serious state of war between Russia and Poland. Surely the etiquette of parliamentary procedure or the custom which has been observed always I think in our parliamentary history of not interfering between country and country in their own domestic affairs should not prevent us now, having as I say contributed so largely to Polish freedom, exercising what I think is the elementary right of a country in our position of asking Poland whether such serious differences as she may have with Russia ought not to be submitted to the adjustment and arbitrament of the League of Nations. I mean by this Government for the terms of the Peace Treaty as I understand provide that if a difference arises between one country within the League and another, or even between one country in the League and another outside of it, that any member of the League may take steps to cause the machinery of the League of Nations to be put in movement. I think most Members will agree that we ought not to try and shelter ourselves between these very nice points, even if there were such, on a matter of such supreme importance to our own Kingdom and to the general peace of Europe. I was about to say that unaided Poland would have been incapable of this attack. That is no criticism of Poland. It is a mere statement of her impoverished and denuded position. She is sick, she has disease and she is impoverished. She has suffered enormously because of the War and its indirect consequences, and yet she has been able to build up as we are told an army of nearly a half a million men, equipped and fit for the purpose of war. My conclusion is that she would have been powerless for any purposes of attack had it not been for the assistance which she has received clearly from our own Government as well as from certain other quarters in Europe. Therefore, in view of the very serious bearing of the Polish position on our own internal state, and in view of the solemn pronouncement in the King's Speech read in this House in 1919, and in view of the repeated professions of our Ministers to try and maintain the peace of the world so as to get it restored to normal conditions and reconstruction —on all those grounds I trust the House may have some reassuring statement during the course of the Debate.

The right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken has made a very earnest appeal to the Government to make the League of Nations a reality. Certainly there is no Member of this House who is better entitled to make such an appeal. I should be greatly wanting in candour and in gratitude if I did not recognise and acknowledge the immense work which the right hon. Gentleman has done for the past month in advocating the League of Nations in all parts of the country. If the cause of the League of Nations had received as great assistance from the party to which I belong as it has received from the Labour party, it would be in a better position to-day in this country. I rise with a sense of deep seriousness of the present position. I think a moment has been reached in foreign affairs which is exceedingly critical. It is always foolish to say we are at the parting of the ways, because I suppose we are always at the parting of the ways, but it is just one of those critical cases where if we are to decide one way it will be very difficult, though I will not say that it will add greatly to our difficulties to restore peace; and if we decided the other way we should have taken definite steps on the path of that new era which has been so often talked of in foreign affairs. The present position in Central Europe is intensely serious. Never in the history of European civilisation has it been more serious. Vast populations are the prey of starvation and disease. The whole economic machine is absolutely dislocated, with the currency a mere farce and industry very largely at a standstill. This is the direct and immediate result of the fearful War through which we have been. I do not say that anyone could have prevented a great part of that result having occurred, but I do think that the measures taken at Paris and elsewhere have not been the best which could be devised in order to restore peace. But I am not going to deal with that.

The position is intensely serious and it is the result of war, the result of fighting. No one who has any kind of conception of what exists can contemplate the outbreak, I will not say of a fresh war, because I know that is disputed, but of afresh fighting in this area, without profound misgiving. It means a great addition to the already intolerable condition of affairs in those districts. It means the further devastation of those territories. It means increased disease and increased starvation. If the Poles are completely successful it may mean the destruction of the Soviet Government in Russia. I asked a distinguished Pole the other day what he thought would be the result of that and he said, "Oh, well, anarchy. Of course nothing would take its place but anarchy." As to the Soviet Government, I know that some hon. Members really think if you ever say anything in which you differ from them on Russian affairs you must be a Bolshevist. I think it would surprise a good many people in this country if it were said that I am a Bolshevist, but one never knows. But I am not at all clear from the point of view of the interest of the world that complete anarchy would be an improvement on the Bolshevist rule. That is the situation as far as Russia is concerned. If the Poles are not successful and if they are beaten I suppose it means that that unhappy district east of Warsaw will be again overrun and the last remnants of cultivation and human life will be again destroyed, and more completely destroyed than they are even now, and possibly Warsaw may be occupied by Bolshevist forces. That is a result which none can contemplate without profound misgiving. These are possibilities if the war is allowed to go on. In the meantime a vast additional expenditure of money is involved and further difficulties are put in the way of economic recovery. This is a very serious state of things and do not let us underrate it.

I am forced to ask, like my right hon. Friend opposite, is the League of Nations a reality or not? It was brought into existence in order to secure and maintain peace. That is its whole object and nothing else. From the first line of it to the last line of it, the whole purpose of its machinery and its provisions for international cooperation and its provisions for disarmament and its provisions for the settlement of disputes have nothing else in them except the preservation of peace. Is it going to be used, or why has it not been used, to put it in that way, in this particular case? Let me briefly review the history of what has taken place. I venture very respectfully to say that I have no desire whatever to pass judgment on either one side or the other in these disputes. I do not want to attack the Poles, why should I, and it is perfectly unnecessary for me to attack the Bolshevists, that has been done so frequently before. How did it begin? I do not propose to go right back to the beginning of everything, but as I understand, about September there was a very truculent, though I must avoid this kind of language, there was a very warlike message issued by Trotsky in reference to Poland. I do not know why exactly Russian revolutionary phraseology is so copious that it is not always quite easy to find out exactly what it means. But it certainly was intended to be disagreeable to Poland, there is no doubt about that, and it was intended to be a suggestion, at any rate, that the Poles had better look after themselves. It was, I suppose, about that time, and I suppose in consequence of those threats, that the promise of munitions was made by the British Government. The next event of any importance that I am aware of was the military movement of the Polish forces in January of this year. It was a very important move which resulted in the capture of a place called Dvinsk, being a considerable advance upon what might be regarded as Russian territory. At the same time there was published in Warsaw and reported in the newspapers here, a statement to the effect that this attack on Dvinsk was the prelude to further military action to be taken in Russia in the spring. That was said quite openly, and was supported by all the Warsaw newspapers.

The next event was a counter-attack by the Russians which completely failed, and which took place in March. They were beaten back by the Poles, and then came negotiations between the Soviet Government and the Poles. I have a French translation of the notes which were interchanged, and it appears to me to be a complete series of all the documents which passed. As I understand—and my right hon. Friend will correct me if I am wrong—this is what happened: The Soviet Government in the first place made an offer of peace upon the basis of a recognition of Polish independence. There was a considerable discussion, again made a little difficult to follow by the style of revolutionary dispatch writing, which is not to be commended as a model of clearness or brevity, but I understand the Poles replied ultimately by suggesting certain preliminaries of peace, and those are perhaps worth mentioning, because they are rather important. They are contained in a Polish Despatch of 19th March, and they demand the annulment of all previous partitions of Poland and the disannexation of all territories incorporated in Russia. That means going back to the 1772 boundaries, only they do not claim annexation; it means the recognition of all the States constituted on the ruins of Russia which exist de jure. I do not know exactly what that means—it means the restitution of all State property within the limits of the Poland of 1772, which is to be sent to the Polish State; and I believe also a sum of money to be paid by Russia. Finally, there is a Clause to say that Poland will decide on the lot of the territories situated on the west or Polish side of the frontier of 1772 in accord with the wishes of the population.

Those were the terms suggested by Poland. They were not, as I understand, rejected by the Soviet, but regarded as matters of negotiation, and then came the two questions on which the negotiations broke down. They were the question of the place where negotiations were to take place and the question of whether there should be a general cessation of fighting. The Polish Government asked to negotiate at a place called Borisoff, in the Army zone. The Soviet Government said that was a very unsuitable place, and they could not agree to it, but they would agree to any other place, either in any neutral country, or Rome, London, or Paris. At least, so I read the despatch. As to the question of the Armistice, they said, "We cannot negotiate unless there is to be a cessation of fighting," and the Poles declined to agree to a cessation of fighting, but said they would agree that there should not be any fighting in the immediate neighbourhood of Borisoff while the negotiations were taking place. Those were, as I understand—I may have misread these despatches—the points upon which the negotiations broke down, and there is a despatch sent to all the Entente Powers by the Soviet Government alleging that those are the points on which negotiations broke down, and asking for the intervention of the Entente Powers in order to prevent war recommencing on what they regarded as such an insufficient ground for the breakdown of negotiations. I should be very glad to hear whether any such demand was made and whether there was any reply sent to it, directly or indirectly, by the Entente Governments. At any rate, for my purpose, I do not wish to pass any judgment on those negotiations. Those are the facts, as I understand them, and unless I have been misinformed by the documents that I have tried to read. Here, at any rate, was a case perfectly clearly of two great States on the verge of war, negotiations breaking down, and a chance of the renewal of war, and I venture to submit that no clearer case can be imagined for the application of the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations. There are two Articles which directly, as it seems to me, cover this particular case. There is Article 11, which says, in effect: suggested intervention until the Bolsheviks were being beaten. If that has any application to me, it can only mean that I am favourable to the Bolsheviks and unfavourable to the Poles. I utterly deny, if it is necessary to deny, so absurd an accusation. As a matter of fact, it is entirely untrue that no suggestion of intervention was made till then. I did my best as a mere private individual; at the moment these statements appeared in the newspapers here, in January, I happened to be making a speech on the League of Nations in the country. I spoke fully on the subject, and I urged then and there that intervention should take place. Later, on the 4th February, the Society with which I am connected issued a document in which they said in so many words that there was a danger of fighting taking place between the Border States and Russia, and that it was the duty of the League immediately to issue a warning under the articles of the Covenant which were applicable to the case. There is no colour of truth in the suggestion that so far as I am concerned, or as far as those who are working with me are concerned, we have raised this point for the first time when the Bolsheviks are being beaten, and I should have thought it was too absurd a charge to have been worth a moment's consideration if it had not been put forward by my hon. and gallant Friend, for whom I have so high a regard.

The hon. and gallant Gentleman was alluding to the action of many hon. Members opposite, and not only to the Noble Lord. They never raised their voices at all.

All last year!

I have nothing to do with hon. Members opposite. I am speaking for myself. If these charges are made they are made against everybody. I have been in correspondence with one of the Members of the Government urging this intervention in the strongest possible way, and I assume that these charges, which have been made not only by my hon. and gallant Friend, but by other people, apply to me as well as to others.

Has the Noble Lord raised the point with regard to Persia?

That has nothing to do with this discussion. I have not raised any question about Persia at all, one way or the other, though I think it would be a very desirable thing to intervene with regard to Persia, but that has nothing to do with this point. I think there were two great opportunities when intervention could have taken place very suitably. There was the time in February after the Polish attack, and there was another time during the negotiations when it became clear that they were going to break down. I should think that those were both times at which intervention could have taken place. It is said, What could the League do? In these very documents the Soviet people say plainly and openly, "We are exceedingly anxious to open up commercial relations with the Western Powers and the rest of the world"—and it is notorious that they are very anxious to do it. It seems to me that that gave a great opportunity for negotiating with them. If they had refused to allow the League to intervene in the dispute with Poland we should have had a tremendous reply. We could say, "Your country is in a terrible condition"—and they admit it fully" do you desire to open up commercial relations? We are prepared "—as we were prepared at that time—"to begin commercial relations in a tentative way, but we cannot do it if you insist on going to war. That would be merely to enable you to break the peace of the world." I am convinced myself that we had an unrivalled opportunity of putting persuasive pressure of the greatest strength upon the Russians if we had used it.

They refuse the intervention of the League now.

3.0 P.M.

The hon. and gallant Gentleman says that, but, as a matter of fact, they have not refused it. They have said that—I do not want to drag in other Governments more than necessary—" So long as certain Governments are actively assisting, it is impossible for us to allow our representatives to negotiate." It may have been a most improper reply for the Soviet Government to make. I have nothing to do with that. Commercial negotiations are going on quite separately, and are proceeding at this very moment. There are commercial representatives of the Russian Government at this moment in this City, entering, I understand, into the question of commercial relations with Russia. As to Poland, there is no doubt whatever that Poland could not possibly have afforded to defy the Council of the League for economic reasons. The thing does not require argument. I have not the slightest doubt that there was an opportunity there to use the machinery of the League, and to use it effectively, in order to prevent the outbreak of further fighting.

I am asked now what should be done. I quite admit that the position is far more difficult than it was two or three months ago. To intervene when fighting is actually in progress is quite a different thing from intervening before the fighting takes place. Once the fighting has begun, however you intervene, you will be said to be intervening on the one side or the other. Still, I think there is a good deal that might be done even now. One thing is to take precautions against the possibility of the extension of the fighting. There are rumours—they may be untrue—that other countries are meditating renewing the war against Bolshevik Russia—Roumania and Finland. That is a matter which certainly should be inquired into. We cannot afford to have fresh wars. Even more than that I think might have been done. It may be that at this moment it would be difficult to intervene. It may be very difficult or hopeless to do anything at this moment, I do not know; I should not like to say. But there is almost certain to arise an opportunity. It may arise in several different ways. You may receive some kind of intimation from one of the parties that they will be glad of intervention. It may be that the fortunes of war will change to the extent of something like a balance between the two parties, so that you can intervene fairly, without being accused of intervening on one side or the other. There are hundreds of contingencies which might give you a chance of intervening. I very much hope that my right hon. Friend will be able to tell me that instructions were sent to our representatives on the Council of the League now sitting, or which was recently sitting—I do not know whether the Council has adjourned; I am afraid it has—which is now sitting, or has recently been sitting, at Rome, to have the matter discussed and considered. I would have liked to have had it discussed and considered in public, but if that is too much, then let it be done in private. Let there be a full arrangement and plan of intervention, if intervention should be possible at any time.

This is a case which does not in any way conflict with the historic doctrines of foreign policy in this country, to which my right hon. Friend alluded. Quite true, there is a difficulty in the intervention of a single power in international affairs, but one of the great points of the creation of the League was to get rid of all that difficulty. Intervention by the League as a whole is entirely different from intervention by a single power. There are great difficulties. There is the difficulty —I would not allow it to stand in a case of this kind—that we have not recognised the Russian Government. The League could intervene whether the States composing the League have agreed to recognise the Russian Government or not. They have a right and duty to intervene to stop fighting. Yes, but does every Member of the Government desire to stop fighting? I do not know. I am sure my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House does. I have the most complete confidence in him in that respect, and I am perfectly sure that he, quite genuinely, and from the bottom of his heart, desires the success of the League. But it is unfortunate that we get plenty of fine words, but not much doing. A very unkind critic of the Prime Minister said the other day that the League of Nations had taken the place of the Welsh' mountains in his perorations. I would not like to put it as high as that, but I would myself sacrifice, much as I admire them, the whole of his perorations for one definite proof that he really does mean to make the League the essential organ of international relations. The danger of the League is not that too much will be put upon it. The danger of the League is that it will be allowed to rust away inutility. There are in this country, more in other countries, hundreds of people who are only too anxious to see the League cast away into the limbo of forgotten dreams. Is the Government going to allow that? Are they really in earnest? Do they really intend to make a new departure? I confess I read the speech of Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson the other day with profound regret. No one could read that speech, no one could read other speeches made by other generals, without seeing that at the back of them there is a complete disbelief in the whole of this League of Nations.

Hear, hear!

Yes, but why do you not get up and say it? I would respect that.

I am a believer, in a sense, in the League of Nations in the future, but I want security first.

We are all believers in something good in the future, but if you want anything good you must be ready to make sacrifices. To what has this doctrine of safety brought us? Have not these doctrines, carried to excess in other countries, produced the devastating war Now we have got to try and do something fresh. We cannot go on with the old system; it is absolute destruction. The next war, whatever be the result, will mean the destruction not only of this country but of all the countries of Europe. [HON. MEMBERS: "Question."] It would No one who has studied the question can doubt it. I do not want to put my own personality in this matter, I do not want to say anything about my own personal position, but I say quite frankly that this is the question for me of all questions in politics. There is nothing which I can put in comparison with it. If I were really brought to the belief, which I earnestly hope and pray I may not be, that the government were not in earnest in this matter, I would have to take whatever steps I could to sever all possible confection with them. For my part, I do believe everything I have said about it. I do believe it is the solitary hope that we have. I have given the closest attention to this subject for months, indeed for years past. I think I know what is in my own mind, at any rate, and I know quite well that I should despise myself utterly from the bottom of my heart, if I allowed any other consideration in the world to stand between me and doing my utmost-what little it can be-to bring this great experiment to a successful issue. Let those Members of the House who do not think so, let those who really distrust us say so, and, in Heaven's name, let us know where we stand in this vital matter.

reported the Royal Assent to,

My right hon. Friend the Member for Peebles (Sir D. MacLean) began by making a request that some state- ment should be made in regard to the recent meeting at Lympne. I think I had better deal with that before touching upon the subject which has mostly engaged the attention of the House. He complained, and the complaint I think is utterly unjustified, that more information had been given to France than has been given to this country. I do not know on what that is based. There may have been more about the matter in the French newspapers, but certainly nothing official was given in France which was not contained in the communiqués, from Lympne. As a matter of fact there is not much that it is possible to tell the House in regard to this matter. It was not in any sense a meeting of the Supreme Council. The whole object was that the heads of the British and French Governments should meet, in order to have a preliminary talk in connection with the conference with the Germans to be subsequently held at Spa.

As was stated, and arranged at San Remo, the object of the conference at Spa is that there shall be a discussion face to face with the heads of the German Government as to the method of carrying out the Treaty. The first thing discussed at Lympne was the date at which that conference should be held. It had been arranged that it should take place this month, but as the German elections take place, I believe, on 6th June, it was felt by the representatives of the French as well as of the British Government—and from information I have received I am sure it will be agreeable to Germany—that as we desire to talk with the people who have the power, it would be obviously advantageous that the elections should take place, and that all the information which the elections' would give as to the nature of the Government should be available before these conversations take place. What was discussed at Lympne was the Agenda—the subjects to be taken in their order at the Spa Conference. The first subject was one to which our Government, as well as the Government of France, attach more importance than anything else, even more than to the question of reparation, and that was disarmament. We believe that to be the essential preliminary to any hope of general peace throughout the world. That must be done first, and we all felt that the delay in meeting at Spa should not prevent action being taken in the meantime; and the arrangements for pressing it forward are already taking place.

The next subject under discussion was reparation. On this point I think there has been some misunderstanding. I have seen extracts in the Press which suggested that in the Treaty at Versailles it was left to the German Government, if they chose, to make a proposal for a lump sum instead of the arrangements specified in the Treaty. It is hoped that such a proposal will be made at the Conference at Spa. What happened as between our representative and that of the French Government was that there was a general feeling that if it could be arranged, a fixed amount should be payable. The object of our meeting was not to be in a position, in the first instance, to make proposals to the German Government, but by a discussion among ourselves to be in a position to examine, criticise and give an answer to any proposals the German Government might make. There has been some question as to the amount, but that is not a subject which could possibly be discussed until the proceedings have gone further; and, naturally, I am not in a position to make any statement as to figures that were provisionally suggested at the meeting between the heads of the two Governments.

Another point raised by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Peebles (Sir D. Maclean) was his suggestion that it was recognised that there should be priority given to France. I do not know quite what the right hon. Gentleman means. The British Government have always recognised the special hardships which France endured in this war, and we have always been willing to recognise that; but we have never been willing to say that payments up to a certain date should go to the French Government and that ours should come next. That seems to me utterly unfair, not only to our own people, but to our Dominions. who have borne such a heavy charge. We have recognised their special claim, but we have done it in this way. It was an arrangement made with the precious French Government, and confirmed by this, that whatever sum is received, and whatever time it is received, as far as the French and British Governments are concerned, it will be in a definite proportion. The proportion will be that for every £5 we receive the French will receive £11. We think that is giving France a larger proportion than the expenses and the losses of the two countries require, but it is in that form, and we feel it is right and proper to show our appreciation of the special efforts of France.

Then it was stated that the subject of the Inter-Allied debts was considered at Lympne. So it was, but it was only considered to the extent contained in the official communiqué, which says:

That is all I desire to say except one thing. My right hon. Friend, the Member for Peebles, said that we should put out of our mind any idea that we shall get any money from Germany. In one sense that is true, and we are doing it. We are facing our financial obligations in a way which no other country is doing, and we are facing them on the assumption that we have to bear our own burden; but for all that, just as in my opinion at the time of the Armistice we had nothing approaching a peace spirit because in our hearts we were still at war, very likely we exaggerated the possibilities, as I am sure we did. On the other hand there is now a tendency to let sentimentalism rim wild in the other direction, and I can assure the House that it is no part of the policy of His Majesty's Government to take up the attitude that all the suffering, hardships and economic ruin which has been caused by this War should be borne by the nations who did not start it, and who had been victors in it. We do not intend to ask from Germany amounts which she cannot pay, but it would be a very curious ending of this War if as a result the countries which had been victorious were left in a worse financial position than the countries which caused the War.

I now come to the subject which has occupied most of our attention, and that is the crimes of the Government with regard to Russia and Poland. I am inclined to think that there is a good deal of misunderstanding on this subject, and I am going very briefly to state frankly what the view of the Government is and my own view in regard to these questions. There is an idea on these Benches, and it is expressed much more strongly outside, that this Government have no desire except to make war in any shape or form on the Bolshevik Government. That is not true. I am not going to talk of ancient history. in this matter. The House knows that we were committed by obligations created in the War to help Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin. That has gone, and we have told the House so, and I think I can speak for the whole of the Government when I say that I feel most strongly what was said by the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Lieut.-Colonel W. Guinness) that you are much more likely to strengthen the Soviet Government by always continuing a state of war than in any other way. That really is my view. I need not say that I neither demur nor sympathise with that Government. On the contrary, the kind of Government which they produce, and is already being modified, is a Government which in my opinion is impossible and contrary to human nature, and cannot last. I agree with what has been said by the Prime Minister over and over again, that the way to create a reasonable situation in Russia is to allow, however badly it may work out, the Russian people to work out their own salvation, and it is by trade and openings of that kind, much more than by arms, that the Bolshevik Government will be put down

We come next to the question of Poland. My right hon. Friend the Member for Peebles referred to an answer which I gave to a question in this House. I will read the question and the answer. He was good enough to say, and I am grateful to him for it, that he did not suggest that there was any prevarication in my answer, and there was not. This was the question: gave them to an Ally which had been created as the result of the War, whose position had been secured by the Supreme Council. We did it to put them in a good position to defend themselves, and to make it less probable that a time might come when we might be forced against our will to intervene with armed forces in that part of the world. It is said we should have made conditions, but we have made no conditions in other cases in which we helped our Allies. We could not make them. It is said that we knew nothing about this matter, and it is not surprising, because. it was not known to the Head of the War Office himself. Once a Cabinet has given a decision, and the carrying out of it is left to officials, it is obvious that the Head of the Government cannot follow the details. We considered this done, and I myself thought that the material had gone long ago. Is it seriously suggested that when this material was the property of the Polish Government the fact that we had given it made no difference? Is it seriously suggested that they would not be allowed to make their own arrangements, or that it would not be allowed to go? I shall show in a moment that, so far from giving the Polish Government any encouragement in this event, to have taken that step would have been not merely not to encourage the Polish Government, but to deliberately throw our weight on the side of the enemies of Poland after the fighting had begun. That, in my opinion, was not practicable.

Let me make it clear to the House what our attitude has been in regard to Poland. We told all these Governments, including Poland, that we should not take the responsibility of advising them. We said you must decide for yourselves whether it is to be peace or war. But that did not prevent us from having our own opinion, an opinion which might be quite wrong, as to what was the wisest course to take. But in January of this year M. Patek, the Foreign Minister for Poland, was in this country, and he had an interview with the Prime Minister. My Noble Friend almost suggested that we had treated this matter with indifference. That is very far from the fact. We thought the whole situation was so important that it was brought before the Cabinet, and the views expressed by the Prime Minister were formally communi- cated to us and approved. Let me read some extracts from the actual conversation that took place. The Prime Minister stated formally to M. Patek that, while it was not for Great Britain to advise Poland—which must take the full responsibility for deciding as between peace and war—the British Government certainly did not advise war. He said also he wished to make it perfectly clear to the Polish Government that the British Government did not wish to give Poland the slightest encouragement to pursue the policy of war, because if it were to give that advice, it would incur responsibilities which it could not discharge.

He went further, and he made it clear that, in his opinion, the principal difficulty would be the fact that the Polish armies had advanced far beyond the racial boundaries, into considerable territories which contained large Russian majorities. The Prime Minister said that if the Poles made a sincere attempt to make an equitable peace, and if the Bolshevists either refused, or having made peace, proceeded to repudiate it, Great Britain would feel bound to assist Poland to the best of its power. He was sure it would be possible for both the French and the British Governments to arouse their people, exhausted as they were by five years' war, to put forth fresh efforts if Poland had made a sincere attempt to make peace on fair terms, and the Bolshevists rejected it and attacked Poland instead. Finally, he said Great Britain entertained feelings of the most sincere friendship for Poland, and it was in the spirit of this friendship that he felt bound to make it perfectly clear to the Polish Government at once what was the Britain attitude towards the whole question.

The responsibility of deciding between peace and war must be with the Polish Government. But that is not all. It was not only the views expressed by the British Government. The Allies' Supreme Council made public their views about the same time. They said that if the communities which border on the frontier of Soviet Russia—whose independence or de facto autonomy they had recognised—were to approach them, and to ask for advice as to what attitude they should take with regard to Soviet Russia, the Allied Governments would reply that they could not accept the responsibility of advising them to continue a war which might be injurious to their own interests. Still less could they advise them to adopt a policy of aggression towards Russia. What more could this Government or the Allied Governments have done? We declined to give advice, and these extracts which I have read show that we made it plain that this country is sick of war, and that the one thing it desires is peace. What more could we do?

I think it is a little unfair to overlook the position of Poland in this matter. Feeling as we do—we are far away—we may have come to the conclusion that it would be wiser not to make this kind of attack. But that is not enough. All this kind of criticism leaves out of account one vital fact in dealing with Eastern Europe or any one of these countries. It is no use giving advice, and expressing an opinion unless you are prepared to back it. If you were to adopt the sort of attitude which has been urged upon us, we must take the responsibility of sending men to carry out our views. Is there a man in this House who will say that the British Government or the British people can be induced to throw their armed weight into the scale? I have heard the account given by the Noble Lord (Lord R. Cecil) of these peace negotiations. It is no part of my duty to defend the Polish Government or to attack the Soviet Government. I am only justifying as well as I can the action of the British Government in this matter. But there is another side of that story. It is a fact that after the defeat of General Denikin, the Bolshevist army on the Polish frontier was increased by more than 60 per cent.

When was that?

I think it was in April. Their numbers were increased to that extent, as compared with the end of the year. The Bolshevists said they only sent the troops because they were afraid of an attack by Poland. It was possible to say that. On the other hand, the Poles said that every indication they got was that, unless they were strong, and unless they showed their strength, the Bolshevists would overrun them. That is their case. I am not going to say whether they were right or wrong, but I can imagine nothing that would be more discreditable to this Government or to the Supreme Council than to say to Poland, "Even if you think it necessary for your safety, you are not to attack the Bolshevists." Then suppose it had been found that the Poles were right, and the Bolshevists overran Poland, what would our position have been? It is obvious you cannot have it both ways. We cannot say to this country or that, "Do this or that, because we think it is wise." We have to do one of two things. We have to leave them to work as they think best, or we have got to take the responsibility of supporting them by arms.

I come to the question of why we did not give this question to the League of Nations. I listened to the speech of the right hon. Member for Platting (Mr. Clynes) with great pleasure. I do not think I disagreed with any word he said as to general principle. But he said that this Government has not the spirit of peace. I assure him, and I assure the House, that when they talk of our "military spirit" they really are in absolute ignorance of the facts. On the contrary, we have felt not only a horror and dislike of war, but we have felt that the financial strain on this country is so great that we have undoubtedly cut down the military resources of this country to a point which is hardly justifiable, in view of possible difficulties in which we may be compelled to take part. There is no military spirit at all. If ever justice is to be done to us, I am afraid that the condemnation will be rather on the ground that, in cutting down expenditure, we have reduced the armed forces to a point which is not justifiable. My right hon. Friend said, "Why did you not refer this question to the League of Nations?" and he quoted Article XI. In that Article it says that the League this or that," we should have had a responsibility which we could not have discharged.

4.0 P.M.

I thoroughly appreciate the sincerity of my Noble Friend in this matter. His enthusiasm for the League is very great, but great and vital questions of this kind are not to be brought to fruition only by enthusiasm. There must be wisdom as well. He said of the Prime Minister, that he would rather lose his peroration, if he would only take effective action. I have served under more than one Prime Minister under whom I never expected to serve, and I feel bound to say that the Prime Minister is as strongly of the belief, notwithstanding how difficult it is—and I confess that America being out of it makes it very much more difficult—that the only real hope of getting rid of this system of terrible war is that the League of Nations should become effective. That is my view. In my opinion, if the time comes, advantage will be taken of it and in a far more effectual way than by speeches or letters. Let me put another point. My Noble Friend said we had had splendid opportunities of bringing in the League of Nations. But, curiously enough, in his speech he added, "I do not know if you can do it now, because they are at war." But they have never ceased to be at war My Noble Friend has a great belief in his own infallibility, but they have never ceased to be at war. He was very annoyed at the point about intervening now, instead of intervening when the Bolsheviks seemed to be getting the best of it. I do not question his sincerity in the least, but it is the fact that in March the Bolsheviks were carrying on an offensive which might have been very successful, and very disastrous to Poland. He made a speech, but he did not then take the responsibility, in his semi-official capacity as Chairman of the League of Nations Union, of sending a formal letter asking that we should intervene.

Yes, I did, indeed. It was the document which I quoted in my letter to Lord Curzon.

What document?

I am sorry my right hon. Friend has not read my letter. I thought he had, or I would have had it here. The document was issued on the 4th February, and signed by me as Chairman of the Executive.

I am sorry if I misunderstood. At all events, it did not attract the attention of the last communication. My Noble Friend is right, it does not apply to him.

I wish to be perfectly clear. That was on the 4th February.

And the Bolshevik offensive was in March. Then what I am going to say is right. I am sure my Noble Friend is perfectly sincere, and would like it to apply both ways, but I would say to him, and to anyone who has the League of Nations at heart, that I cannot imagine anything which would make its future more precarious and more doubtful than if the idea were to go forth that its influence is to be thrown in at a particular time to help the Bolsheviks, and not when it was going to damage them. Let me end this by one further observation.

It is said that the Government, by keeping the Supreme Council in being, seem to be minimising the League of Nations. If I may venture so to put it, that is absolute nonsense. Here we are, faced with the carrying out of the Treaty. In that Treaty, as one of the methods of securing it, is the occupation of enemy countries. I say to this House that we have not even completed the Turkish Treaty. The time may come—and no one would be more grateful and pleased than His Majesty's Government—when this disagreeable work can be left to the Leave of Nations, but at present it is utterly impossible. I do not suppose anyone would say that to-day the meetings of these Allied Councils should stop, and the whole thing should be handed over to the League of Nations. I go further, and say this; I know that there are others who take as keen an interest as my Noble Friend does, but take a different view, and think that, if you were to try to get the League of Nations mixed up with the settlement of this War, neutrals would not come into it, and you would damn it as an effective instrument. Look at this question of intervening in Poland! Is any answer required beyond the announcement which came from the Council of the League yesterday? What is the good of saying to Poland, "We want to submit all this to the League of Nations," if you cannot rely upon what you try to do being effective with the Soviet Government in Russia? Can you rely on that? We are trying, as the House knows, in the interests of the whole world, to get Russia opened up to the world again. We all want that. Three months ago, however, the League of Nations sent a message to the Soviet Government, asking if they would allow a deputation to go into Russia to consider the conditions. What happened? They delayed nearly three months, and then they sent a reply which the Council of the League of Nations describes as follows:

An effort has been made to prove the Soviet Government of Russia in the wrong, because it discriminates or seeks to discriminate, between the delegates that are likely to be sent by the League of Nations to investigate the conditions in Russia. We suggest to the Leader of the House that if that, in his opinion or in the opinion of the Government, places the Soviet Government in the wrong, then it undoubtedly places the Government of this country equally in the wrong, when it seeks to discriminate between the Soviet Delegation that is sent over here to re- establish trade relations between Russia and this country. The Leader of the House cannot expect discrimination only to be exercised from one side and not from the other. Personally, while I am against discrimination on the part of the Soviet Government against any Members of the League of Nations who may be sent to investigate, I am equally against any discrimination exercised by this Government against Russian Delegates or envoys who come here for the purpose of reestablishing trade relations. I am surprised, taking into consideration the purpose of the League of Nations, when one hears the statement to-day that the League of Nations should have those matters referred to it only when they are likely to be effective. Is this League of Nations on a false foundation? How do we know that the finding of the League of Nations with be effective until we submit the cases to the League of Nations to investigate? If we are going to hold back all the cases, and weigh up in our minds the doubts and the chances for the League making an effective decision, and for that decision being binding or effective upon the world, it means that the Government of this country, and all other Governments who take the same view, are ruling the League of Nations out of all possibility of taking effect in influencing the conditions of Europe. The Leader of the House makes a point regarding referring matters connected with Poland at this moment to the League of Nations. Let me read to him a despatch which was sent to Admiral Koltchak, on practically the same subject, as far back as the 26th May, 1919,

"Fourth, that the independence of Finland and Poland be recognised and that in the event of the frontiers and other relations between Russia and these countries not being settled by agreement they will be referred to the arbitration of the League of Nations."

Five Premiers signed this despatch, which is sent. to Koltchak, stating that Britain agrees to his particular request on certain conditions, the fourth of which is that which I have read, that the question of agreement as to the boundaries of Poland, Finland, and Russia should be submitted, where a difference arises. to the League of Nations. What you are doing in this case is not submitting it to the League of Nations. You are loading boats with guns and war material. That is the League of Nations according to the Government's point of view. That is one of the most absurd methods of carrying out the policy that the Government said it would establish when they came back after the Armistice was signed in November, 1918. The Leader of the House said they had promised to give these munitions to Poland, and that to refuse to give this material to Poland would have been breaking a bargain, and they would not break a bargain. Have they kept all the bargains they made with the men of this country who fought during the War? Have they maintained the pledges they made to the ex-service men in the Island of Lewis? They have broken the pledges they made to these men, and now they come before the House and say they cannot break a bargain they have made with foreign Powers, a bargain which will mean, if carried out, more slaughter, more death, and a wider extension of the disease and plague which affect that part of Europe, and will mean the retention, with implements of war, of 2,000,000 men, who ought to be going back into industry and doing that which the Leader of the House, the Prime Minister, and this Government are always impressing upon the Labour Members here and Labour leaders outside, to go back to our workers outside and tell them that what is wanted in order to restore this country and the world is more production. How can you have more production when you keep 2,000,000 men out of production?

What are they to work at?

They might clear up the mess that the politicians have made in Europe. More production is what we are asked for. The conditions of Europe are having their effect upon this country. You have the cost of living to-day at the highest point it has been known to reach in this country and still the Government refuses to conclude these things with Soviet Russia or with Poland. The point was made that they declined to give advice to the Government of Poland, the Government of Esthonia and the Government of Lithuania. Let me suggest that that matter be re-read. The statement of policy by the Allied Governments was as follows:

"If the communities which border on the frontiers of Soviet Russia were to approach them and to ask for advice as to what attitude they should take with regard to Soviet Russia, the Allied Governments would reply that they had stated the advice they would give."

In reply to a question put by the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Capt. W. Benn) the Leader of the House made this reply:

"I have already answered that question. We have informed the Poles and all the other Baltic States that we could give them no advice and take no responsibility for their actions."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 6th May, 1920, Vol. 128, Col. 2221.]

On the one hand, you invite them to come to you and ask for your advice.

:No.

I will read it again—

"If the communities which border on the frontiers of Soviet Russia were to approach them and to ask for advice—"

The hon. Member is entirely misunderstanding that. A request for advice had been made. This therefore was an official communication to the effect that we could not give advice, and the responsibility must be theirs.

I am only taking your own statement that they asked for advice, and then you adumbrated the advice you were prepared to give them.

It was no advice.

It may appear as no advice, but it appears there.

No.

Let me read it again. The Government replied that they could not accept the responsibility of advising. In other words, you would have them cease the war. If you will not advise them to continue the war, surely you mean that they shall stop the war?

That is your interpretation.

I submit that it is the only logical interpretation of the phrasing of this communiqué.

It does not appeal to me.

I judge things as I read them and place my interpretation upon them, and it is, of course, for those who have drawn up that particular document themselves to state whether my interpretation is correct or wrong. The first speech I made with regard to Russia was an appeal to the Government to get back to normal trading conditions with Russia. I repeat that appeal now. It is one which must, I am certain, appeal to business men. When we realise the large amount of articles and the wealth of commodities that came into this country from Russia prior to the War, and when we realise the condition of our own markets to-day, surely this is a matter which should appeal to the commercial instincts of business men, to say nothing of the practical needs of the very people themselves in this country. One of the great things which is affecting the housewife is the increase in the cost of living. Sugar has gone up recently. It is now 700 per cent. more than it was in 1914. Russia exported in 1912£22,984,534 of goods, of which the largest quantity,£8,900,000, were sent to Great Britain With regard to food, it is the same, and with regard to flax and hides, even from the Ukraine. You had millions of tons of grain being exported from all parts of Russia, which has actually the finest agricultural soil you can find, yet by this system of blowing hot and cold on military adventures in Europe you are continuing a state of affairs not only in that country, but you are allowing to continue a state of affairs in this country which means starvation and distress for large numbers of our own community. It may undoubtedly be said that you are not actually intervening. You have large areas on the Continent which are affected with disease. Only a few weeks ago there was an epidemic of smallpox in the city which the Leader of the House and I represent, which was said to come from abroad. There are close upon 200 cases there already. You cannot limit the frontiers of an epidemic. It will spread. If there is typhus, if there is small-pox, or if there are other diseases in Poland, and those diseases spread, no one can keep them from getting into this country, and you are going to pay the price by an epidemic of some disease that has had its origin in the devastated war areas which you are assisting to keep in a position off devastation and plague, by carrying on these adventures, and giving to Poland the munitions you have promised. Working men in this country are declining to load vessels with munitions for Poland. They will do so if you bring into any harbour in Britain any vessels which you are loading with munitions of war. The working people of this country are sick of war. It would be far better if you would load these vessels with these munitions which you do not require, and take them into the Channel and dump them overboard rather than send them to Poland to be used in the wasting of more human life, which this country and all countries in the world require to be used in an effort to build up civilisation again.

Working men are against these war adventures. They have had enough of war. You appealed to them to go out to fight in a War to end war, and they believed you. You made pledges and bargains with them, and you have broken them. There is scarcely a platform in any hall that is not littered knee-deep with the broken pledges and bargains that political parties made with the workers. They are having no more of these wars. They tell you emphatically that if, as many people believe, the working classes of this country, the labour movement of this country, come into this House in sufficient numbers to take over the control of the Government, they will tear up and repudiate every secret treaty. They will repudiate every bargain that has been made. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"] Hon. Members cheer. Yes, I repeat it. They will break every bargain that has been made by Members of this Government that conflict with the interests of civilisation. That is our view. We are not bound by things that you do. We are not bound by the military missions which you send to Poland, and which cannot keep you acquainted with the things that are happening in Poland, although newspapers in this country can print documents in January of this year as to what is happening in Poland, the Leader of the House admits that our military missions cannot keep the Foreign Office acquainted with what is going on. Such is the want of information, and the ability possessed by our great foreign intelligence Department. We shall have no need for that. That, at any rate, is a form of office that this or any other country has no occasion to have. There will be no military missions. The workers will repudiate these bargains, and will have nothing to do with them. They will enter into treaties with other nations in the interests of the peoples, for the building up of civilisation but not for its destruction; not for the aggrandizement of any one nation, not for assisting in wars of aggression on the part of any one nation, but for doing away with war, doing away with armament makers, and rebuilding the whole world according to their own desires and their own hearts.

The Labour movement of this country will be opposed by others. That I do not regret. If their views are opposed to ours, then it is better that we should state our views openly and frankly across the Floor of the House so that we know where we are. The working classes of this country will not continue to be the cannon fodder for a class of people in this country who make thousands of millions out of their sacrifice, and who squeal and scream when it is attempted to put a tax upon them to help to bear the burden of the War. These men are the individuals who are behind your gambles and your adventures abroad. These men have no country and no flag, in spite of their so-called patriotism. At least, if they have a flag it is adorned with the skull and crossbones of the ancient pirates. Their bible is their bankbook, and they know every text in it. That is the class of people who are behind the Government, and the Labour party protest against it. They demand that the same treaty and the same conditions which you as a Government agreed to, and which you as an Allied Government participated in when the Prime Minister affixed his signature to the despatch to Koltchak, shall come into operation to-day. They demand that Poland shall be told that Britain refuses to assist, either materially or morally, in the language of the Leader of the House, and that we will adhere to that, not merely in the spirit, but in the letter, and that no munitions will be sent from this country by the Government of this country, and that we will make it perfectly clear. They demand that we shall tell Poland to submit their claims to the League of Nations. At the same time they ask that the Soviet Government should be told to submit their claim to the League of Nations, so that there will be some chance of the European continent being restored to pre-War conditions. It has been said by the Leader of the House that the Poles say that it is the Bolsheviks who are the aggressors, and that the Bolsheviks say that it is the Poles who are the aggressors. Surely, when each is blaming the other, that forms a very suitable case for inquiry by the League of Nations. We demand that these things be submitted to the League of Nations, and that so far as this Government is concerned, as a Government that belongs to the people, and which is responsible to the people of this country, they shall give an assurance that they are ending any participation in these European adventures, and making a very strong and very honest endeavour to appeal to the nations to assist in helping to re-establish the civilisation of Europe once again.

I hope the hon. Member who has just spoken will forgive me if I do not follow him into all the details of his eloquent speech. I agree with him that our great ambition must be to restore international commerce, and to prevent war. The problem is how best to do it, and, as the Leader of the House said, it requires the exercise of wisdom as well as of passion. I am not going to follow the hon. Member, for the special reason that it seems to me very desirable that we should, as far as possible, eliminate passion from our consideration of this subject, and that we should consider it in a detached way. In the middle of last winter, I was sent on a confidential mission to Poland and South Russia. I am not going to make any interesting revelation as to what was committed to me. The policy which might have been possible a year ago, and perhaps was just possible at that time, is know certainly impossible. It seems to me that there are a few impressions which I formed from direct contact with some of the leaders in the intricate politics of Eastern Europe which might be wisely contributed to this Debate, the more so because the events which are now happening confirm me in the conclusions which I drew on the spot. I owe some apology to the House in speaking now because I forgot that the House met to-day at 12 o'clock, and therefore I did not hear the whole of the Debate; but I wish merely to give my impressions upon the subject, and it is not my wish to be drawn into the polemics which surround it. I would rather contribute to the discussion which is before the country some of the impressions which I formed in a detached way and about which I have tried to keep myself up-to-date since. It is above all things essential if we are to exercise a moderating influence in the confused politics of the East that we should remember one fact: that our excuse for interfering, apart from our power, is our detachment. We are not closely involved in the politics of that region. We can regard them from a world point of view. We are not involved in the historical disputes or in the successive questions that have arisen. It is above all things essential that we should give an impression to these nations, thus unhappily involved, that we preserve a detached point of view.

In what I say now, if I venture to put rather the Polish point of view, I do so because I feel that the anti-Polish point of view has perhaps been rather persistently and vociferously put before this House and in the public press outside. I think it is desirable that we should look at things occasionally rather from the point of view of Warsaw than from the point of view of London or Moscow. The Poles admit that they have not our detachment; but they claim that they are placed in a position to know much more of what is going on in Russia than we can possible know. Unless we giant that, we lose the advantage of the detachment which our position gives us. It is not only because the Polish language is closely allied to the Russian language that we may presume that the Poles may be able to understand more of the Russian psychology. The Poles have been neighbours for a long time of the Russians and they have known the Russians at one time as masters and at another time as subjects. There is something more than that. We must remember that the front of war there is in no sense comparable with what the Western front was in France. If it be the fact that the Poles to-day have a half of million men mobilized, that half-million men is distributed over something like 500 miles of front. Both sides, Bolshevist and Polish, who are engaged in this area are dealing with: front which is much wider than the front in the French or Western sense. There are a few masses of men, call them armies if you like, and for the rest merely posts widely separated, and the result is that there is for many purposes practically a free communication be- tween large parts of that country where there is fighting, or skirmishing, from one side to the other. Not only that, but there is a further point as regards the region between Warsaw and Moscow that you have what is known on the maps as "White Russia." It was so named while the Russians were in possession, but they found it necessary to have that term to distinguish "White Russia" from the other parts of Russia.

The population in that intermediate district is not wholly Russian. Undoubtedly they will tell you that they have been subjects of Russia and their ancestors had formerly been subjects of Poland. But if you asked a man there to-day whether he was a Pole or a Russian he would look puzzled and ask whether you meant or not that he was a Roman Catholic, because by Polish he would mean Roman Catholic. He would tell you he was of Vilna, or Grodno, or Minsk, or of some other place. There is a transitional Slav population between Moscow and Warsaw, and that district has been christened "White Russia" in order to emphasise that transitional characteristic of the population. If Poles they are Roman Catholic, but so far as the peasantry are concerned, they have no strong nationalistic feeling. That is the character of that region which merges between the Poles and the Russians. The result of that is that there is free communication of ideas, and they have a very good idea of what is going on as between Moscow and Warsaw. What happens in Moscow is very soon known in Warsaw, and what happens in Warsaw is, I am sure, in a short time known in Moscow. The Poles, therefore, being in this situation, have quite exceptional means of judgment. They know what is happening, and are in a position to judge of the essence of the things that happen in Bolshevist Russia. The Poles have formed the opinion that it is exceedingly difficult, not so much to make peace with the Bolsheviks, but to make a peace that the Bolsheviks will keep, and as a consequence they prefer that, if there is to be war, they should have their troops far outside of the Polish area. They prefer to have peace made, if peace is to be made, with their Army in that position rather than that the Army should be upon Polish territory. We have no right to criticise that. We have our Army on the Rhine in order that, in the event of renewed warfare, the fighting should not take place upon our own ground. The Poles had advanced into that position at the time when Yudenitch, Kolchak and Denikin were acting, and the Poles took up that position in harmony with the then policy of the great Allied Powers. They came innocently into that position which has materialised into what it is now. You may ask if that be so, is it not curious that at the present time—I think it was referred to by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith) in a recent speech, that we find the Poles along the Beresina, and does not that suggest that there. is a desire to go back to the position in 1772 Is there not a desire, you may say, to restore the old Poland and to go back on the course of history?

It is very important that we should not too readily and without criticism accept that insinuation of imperialistic designs on the part of Poland, because if we do we render it very difficult to the people of Poland to accept our advice, especially when theft advice is in a restraining direction. Their leaders have been conscious of the fact that they are not moved by such imperialistic designs. A line was drawn by the Paris Peace Conference, it is quite true—I think the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Paisley referred to it in his speech to which I have just referred—through Brest-Litovsk approximately from north to south. The minute of the Paris Conference—I inquired into the matter when in Paris, and also as to the understanding of it in Warsaw—made it clear that west of that line from that date forward the Polish administration should be recognised, but that same minute made it perfectly clear that nothing definite was decided as regards territory east of that line. Therefore, though a minimum limit to Poland has been fixed, the powers have fixed no maximum limit. Therefore, in the strict sense of the word, the Poles are perfectly justified in claiming that the eastern front has not in fact been fixed on the map by the Peace Conference, the Supreme Council, or anyone else.

One personal influence in Poland counts for a great deal more than any other. In this country we speak of Marshal Pilsudski as President of the Polish Republic. In Warsaw they speak of him as the head of the State. He is much more in Poland than merely President, as we understand the term. His career in one respect is not dissimilar from that of our own Prime Minister. He is a moderating influence in Poland just because he has come up from the Left in politics, and is trusted by the people of the Left because of what he said and suffered for them in past times. He is not a reactionary. He is supported by the rank and file of the Polish army and the peasantry upon the land. He is accepted by the Polish aristocracy because of the power which is displayed in a moderating direction, whether in internal or external affairs. In my judgment, as long as Marshal Pilsudski occupies the powerful position which he does in Poland, so long have you a force which will act against imperialistic ends on the part of Poland. Marshal Pilsudski is a soldier by profession.

We seem to be getting into a discussion of Polish affairs. I would remind the hon. Member that we are here this afternoon discussing matters connected with His Majesty's Government, and British policy, and we had better confine the Debate to that.

I wish very much to support the policy which was explained just now by the Leader of the House, and I was giving my reasons against the attack which has been made on that policy here, because I believe that the Government are perfectly right to taking up a detached point of view, and that that detached point of view should be maintained, and that it is necessary to maintain that by understanding and placing before the country a little bit, not only of the Bolshevik point of view as against Poland, but also the Polish point of view, which I think the Government ought to emphasise slightly, and for this reason, that they ostentatiously have expressed their disinterestedness on this question as between Poland and the Bolsheviks, and the impression they have produced in Warsaw, certainly which was produced at the time I was there, is on the whole that they are none too friendly to the Polish resistance to the attack which is being made upon them at the present time. If I have any criticism of the Government it is that it does seem to me that, in face of the attack which is made upon them, they ought to express, if anything, some friendliness towards the Poles in the very difficult position in which they find themselves. There is ground for trusting the Poles at present. My reason for thinking that the Government are right in the policy which they take, and would be still more right if they would support the Poles to some extent, is in order to set straight what, it seems to me, they have unduly bent in the opposite direction.

They should make it fairly clear why it is on the whole that the Poles may be helped in this matter. Marshal Pilsudski is not going to recommit the Napoleonic error of 1812. I am convinced that the Poles have no idea of marching to Moscow. That they have gone as far as the 1772 frontier is because they know the country in between their own Warsaw and that frontier. They have no wish to go beyond that frontier, where the people are thoroughly Russian. As to the region between the frontier of 1772 and Warsaw, where it is not undoubtedly Polish, where it is white Russian, the statement has been made responsibly on behalf of Marshal Pilsudski in the Diet of Warsaw that the Poles are willing either to plebiscite the whole area right back to the Brest-Litovsk line or submit the future of the country to the League of Nations once it comes to be a matter of peace, and I believe that. I believe, therefore, that the Government, in taking the policy of keeping faith in the matter of the delivery of these munitions with Poland, and keeping a detached and disinterested position, are taking a sound course. I believe thoroughly in the League of Nations. I believe that it may become a very valuable force, but I believe that it would not strengthen its position to seek to impose upon it at the present moment a task utterly beyond its capacity to fulfil. If you are not prepared to aid the Poles in the event of their failure, then you must leave to them the responsibility on the spot, with all the knowledge which they possess, of deciding whether they will treat with the Bolsheviks in one way or the other, the intention being ultimately to obtain peace.

But there is this last general consideration. The Government is assailed because it does not accept the Bolsheviks at their own valuation. What is it that you expect is going to happen in Russia? Our policy must be adjusted to that. Do you expect that a democracy is going to evolve? When about 85 per cent. of the people cannot read, and when, as far as those 85 per cent. are concerned, the whole of their ideas are concentrated in their own district, I do not think a democracy is likely to evolve. What the Poles believe is that you are going to see a new despotism evolve there, that by whichever road you go there is danger that you will arrive at a centralised and military power once more—call it a Czardom, a Jacobin Czardom, if you like. That end may be reached either because Lenin and Trotsky succeed in imposing their tyranny permanently on Russia, or because the Generals of the old regime, now serving in the Bolshevik Army, believe that Lenin and Trotsky will fall, and that they, the Generals, will inherit the power, and thus be able once more to give you a united and centralised and military Russia. Our Government, and not merely the Government in authority, but the nation, has supported the policy of raising autonomous border States in the case of Russia. It has been our policy to secure an autonomous Esthonia, Lithuania, Lettland, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and so forth. Whichever despotism you get in Russia, whether it be a Bolshevist despotism free from war, free to prepare for future war, or whether it be a despotism of Generals who take the place of fallen Bolshevism, they will be out to reconquer the old Russia, though they may be willing to make terms with Poland.

One of the difficulties of Denikin was that, if he agreed with our Government and with the Western view that there should be a decentralised Russia, with Border States autonomous, then Bolshevist Russia would outdo him in patriotism and would appeal to the educated and military classes in Russia by telling them that they at least would not give away the patrimony of Russia, and they would declare that they were out for the policy of reconquering the Baltic States. If the Government's policy be that they want to maintain a decentralised Russia, then their policy is identical with that of Poland. If you, not being yourself prepared to throw armies in, not having the support of a great and powerful America ready at your elbow, are going to leave to the peoples on the spot the responsibility of achieving some sort of stable and orderly government in those vast. regions, then at least you must recognise that there are only two courses open to you. You must not do anything to prevent Poland from supporting the remaining border States, or you must face the fact that you will see restored in Russia, bent on the reconquest of the border States, a new Czardom, whether coming from the proletariat or not, and that that Czardom will be a very uncomfortable neighbour for the democracies of the world. Therefore I support the policy of the Government. It is essential that in Poland they should feel, not only that they have the platonic and detached support of whoever may prove to be the victor, but that in this country there is as much goodwill towards Poland as there is amongst some classes towards the Bolsheviks.