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Commons Chamber

Volume 130: debated on Wednesday 23 June 1920

House of Commons

Wednesday, June 23, 1920

The House met at a Quarter before Three of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

PRIVATE BUSINESS.

Ministry of Health Provisional Orders (No. 5) Bill,

As amended, considered; to be read the Third time To-morrow.

Pilotage Provisional Orders (No. 3) Bill,

Read a Second time, and committed.

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

INDIA.

COAL MINES (ACCIDENTS).

asked the Secretary of State for India whether he can state how many coal mines inspectors are engaged in the Indian coal mines; what is the proportion of coal mines allocated to each inspector; if a record of the accidents in the mines, fatal and non-fatal, is kept; what is the yearly average of such accidents; if compensation is paid to those who meet with accidents in and about the mines and what is the amount; what is the age when young persons are permitted to enter mines; if women are permitted to be employed in and about the mines; if any Coal Mines Regulation Acts are in existence fixing the hours of labour for miners, and how many days per week and what are the annual holidays; and what is the day's wage paid to miners?

The Department of Mines in India has a staff of one chief inspector and four inspectors, who deal with mines of all descriptions under the Indian Mines Act of 1901. It has been decided to increase this staff by two officers, who are now being recruited. I do not know the proportion of coal mines allocated to each inspector. The annual published report of the chief inspector contains statistics of fatal and of serious accidents, with details of the former. The average number of separate fatal accidents for the three years 1916 to 1918 (the date of the latest report) was 175, involving 217 deaths, and of serious non-fatal accidents, 295. Compensation is not compulsorily payable except when the employer has been negligent or otherwise culpable. There is no age limit for the employment of young persons in mines, but the question of fixing a limit is under the consideration of the Government of India. Women may be employed, employment being largely based on the family system. As to hours and wages, I have nothing to add to the reply given to the hon. Member on 22nd December last, except that miners are believed usually to work on five or six days a week.

Are we to understand that in the case of ordinary accidents in the mines in India, the person injured gets no compensation?

There is no Workmen's Compensation Act or anything analogous to it in India at present, but if there has been negligence, of course he gets compensation.

Is it not the case generally that accidents are rare and the conditions comfortable?

I have very little knowledge of mining, but I gave the statistics as to accidents in three years. They did not seem to me to be very heavy.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the women at the Indian mines are taken out by their husbands, who do the work, and that the wives are kept there in case some other man steals them?

Yes. I have stated, in answer to the question, that it was done on the family principle.

PUBLIC WORKS OFFICERS (PAY).

asked the Secretary of State for India whether he has received a memorial, with comparative statement appended, from officers of the Public Works Department, asking for improvement in the scales of salaries recently issued; and whether he has already taken, or proposes to take, any action in connection therewith?

I have seen copies of the memorial to which the hon. Member refers and the original memorial has doubtless been submitted in the ordinary

PUNJAB DISTURBANCES.

asked the Secretary of State for India whether the Government of India propose to recognise the services of those officers, both civil and military, who, in its opinion, contributed to the quelling of the distur-

way through the Government of India, and will come to me with the recommendations of the Government of India. Since the memorial was written an improved scale of pay has been introduced with effect from 1st January, 1920. I am circulating this improved scale in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

The following is the statement referred to:

bances in the Punjab and elsewhere in India, by any other method than the general expression of satisfaction mentioned in paragraph 43 of the Government of India's letter on the Hunter Committee's Report?

I have not received from the Government of India any proposal for further recognition. I will draw the attention of the Government of India to the hon. and gallant Member's suggestion.

asked the Secretary of State for India whether Sir Michael O'Dwyer communicated day by day with the Government of India concerning the various outbreaks in the Punjab and the measures taken by General Dyer to deal with them; whether this information was submitted forthwith to the India Office; and if not, for what reason?

I received daily telegrams from the Government of India from the beginning of the disturbances up to the middle of May. These telegrams embodied the reports of the Punjab Government and, as I have already stated, were all, except two unimportant messages, communicated to the Press here. General Dyer was in charge in only one area, and there was no mention of him by name in those telegrams, and only one mention of him as General Officer Commanding Amritsar. Some movements of troops that were under his command are also reported in those telegrams.

If the right hon. Gentleman was receiving these communications daily from the Government of India, will he say why he stated in December that he knew no details except what he read in the newspapers?

There has been a great deal of misunderstanding on the point. I can assure my hon. Friend that what I said then was true. I was referring to a question put by my right hon. Friend the Member for Peebles (Sir D. Maclean) on the publication of General Dyer's evidence in the newspapers. I then stated that I had published reports on the occurrences as I received them. If my hon. Friend will look at it, he will see that the matters dealt with in the published newspaper evidence of General Dyer were not covered in this report.

Does the right hon. Gentleman think that the manner in which this gallant officer has been treated is likely to assist officers in general in dealing with outbreaks?

Is it not a fact that the right hon. Gentleman actually told the House that he knew nothing of these occurrences, that he would wire for information in regard to them, and left the impression on us that he was entirely ignorant of the whole business?

Perhaps the hon. Member will be good enough to look at the OFFICIAL REPORT on the question and supplementary question I answered. Perhaps he will look also at the speech I made immediately after the occurrence, and the telegrams which resulted. I think then he will be in a position to take part in the Debate.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that he stated on 16th December: "I thought I said I knew no details until I saw the account in the newspapers."

Every report I had received from the Government of India, with the exception of these two telegrams, was published. That is true. The occurrence to which my right hon. Friend drew attention was the details of the shooting by General Dyer at Amritsar. I had no information on that subject.

Did the Government of India keep the right hon. Gentleman fully informed of events, or did the telegrams hush up the most important part of the account?

A great deal of this unfortunate controversy has arisen because there is an impression that I was accusing the Government of the Punjab or the Government of India of concealing facts. I never made such an accusation, and I am prepared to defend their conduct in awaiting the Committee's report.

On a point of Order. Is not the supplementary question I put in accordance with Question 13, which says "concerning various outbreaks in the Punjab and the measures taken by General Dyer to deal with them?" I venture to suggest that the supplementary question I put actually arises out of the question.

asked the Secretary of State for India on what date he first interviewed Sir Michael O'Dwyer in regard to the outbreaks at Amritsar and discussed General Dyer's action; and whether at any time he interviewed Miss Sherwood, who was assaulted during the riots, and, if so, when?

The answer to the first part is, I think, on the 30th June, 1919; to the second, yes, on the 7th October, 1919.

Will the right hon. Gentleman explain how it was that he was able positively to state in December, if he knew from detailed information, both from Sir Michael O'Dwyer and Miss Sherwood in June, "I said I knew no details until I saw the report in the papers." If he sent the report to the papers he must have known it before he saw it in the papers. Is that a correct way of giving information to the House?

I suggest that the hon. Member's question shows the wrong- headedness of the whole thing. Miss Sherwood could not possibly have given me any information of what General Dyer did because this gallant lady had been attacked long before all these incidents occurred. If the hon. Member wishes to accuse me of giving false information or making a statement which is not true perhaps he will raise it in Debate, when I shall have an opportunity of answering him.

I shall have great pleasure in asking the right hon. Gentleman to explain how it is he is able to say he knew nothing at all of any details when he had seen Sir Michael O'Dwyer and had all the details from him six months before.

Does the right hon. Gentleman suggest that he knew nothing of the Amritsar shooting until he read it in the "Daily Express"?

No, I never said so. The fact that there had been shooting at Amritsar was known to me and was published to the world when it occurred in the telegrams I received from the Government of India. What I said in December, and what I say now, is that I had no information as to the details, shooting without warning, and shooting to the exhaustion of ammunition, and the principles upon which General Dyer acted, and so forth. Those things came to me as a shock when I read them in the newspapers.

When the right hon. Gentleman saw the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, why did he not, in June and at that interview and other interviews, ask him for full details?

I can answer that much better in Debate, and I should prefer to do so. I have many most important private interviews at the India Office, and it is very difficult to keep in one's head a year after exactly what occurred, but I think I can satisfy the House, if not the hon. Member, that everything I have said is absolutely true.

Will the right hon. Gentleman publish, before the Debate takes place, the account which Miss Sherwood gave him?

How can I do that six months after I had the private interview with Miss Sherwood, of which no record was kept? The step I took about Miss Sherwood, if the hon. Member wishes to know, was to tell, I think, two important London newspapers that Miss Sherwood was in London, and that it would be a good thing, in the public interest, if she were interviewed. I do not know what other steps I could have taken.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that Miss Sherwood's story has never really appeared in the Press?

ROYAL INDIAN MARINE (OFFICERS, LEAVE PAY).

asked the Secretary of State for India what are the new rates of leave pay for officers of the Royal Indian Marine?

An announcement regarding revised rates of leave pay for the Royal Indian Marine, which will take effect from 1st July, 1919, will, I hope, be ma de in a few days' time.

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE.

asked the Secretary of State for India whether the Governor-General in Council has approved the draft conventions and recommendations prepared at the International Labour Conference at Washington; whether India will be represented at the forthcoming conference at Geneva; and, if so, whether the Indian taxpayer will be called upon to provide funds for participation in the activities and actions of the League of Nations, whether or not such have any reasonable relation to Indian conditions and whether or not such are likely to produce practical results?

The Government of India have expressed the intention of ratifying the draft convention regarding the night employment of women and of young persons. They had already taken action on the lines of the Conference's recommendation regarding white phosphorus matches. They have addressed local governments generally favouring action in accordance with the other recommendations of the Conference, but have not yet come to a final decision on all points. It is intended that India shall be represented at the next International Labour Conference. Membership of the League of Nations necessarily entails some expenditure for all participating countries, including India. I believe membership of the League of Nations to be of great value to India.

CHAPLAINS (BONUS AND LEAVE).

asked the Secretary of State for India whether his attention has been called to the fact that chaplains of the Indian ecclesiastical establishment, serving overseas out of India after the Armistice, have since their return to India been called upon to refund the Army of Occupation bonus drawn by them under Army Order 54 of 1919, and also have been refused the special war leave granted to all officers of the Indian Army on service with them; and whether he will take the necessary steps to have these grievances remedied?

I have no information whether refunds have been called for, but, as regards the claims of these chaplains to the bonus, I would refer my hon. and gallant Friend to the answer given on 14th May to the hon. and gallant Member for St. Albans, of which I will send him a copy. The grant of After-War Leave is confined to officers serving under military leave rules. Like other civil officers employed on military duty during the War, these chaplains are entitled to the corresponding civil concession of accumulating privilege leave up to six months, subject to certain conditions.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I have had various letters from chaplains in India telling me that they have been obliged to refund their war bonus in one lump sum, that their pay does not allow of that, and that they have been very hardly hit?

I shall certainly inquire into that. If my hon. and gallant Friend will send me a specimen letter, I shall be able to investigate the actual facts.

May I also send the right hon. Gentleman instances of the same?

ARMY MECHANICAL TRANSPORT.

asked the Secretary of State for India whether officers sent to the motor transport in India from infantry regiments, Indian Army Reserves, etc., with no experience of transport, are paid considerably higher than officers sent out from England who are experts in mechanical transport; and, if so, whether he will see that this matter is rectified?

I would refer the hon. Member to the answer given by the Secretary of State for War to a similar question by the hon. Member for Wimbledon on the 17th instant.

asked the Secretary of State for India whether the North-West Frontier force was authorised to hire, and did hire, a considerable amount of mechanical transport at a price of 115 rupees per vehicle per day, the Government providing rations, accommodation, military clothing, petrol, and lubricants; and whether he will take steps to see that the mechanical transport service in India is put on such a basis that similar extravagance will not occur?

I have no information bearing out the statements made by the hon. Member, but I will ask the Government of India for the facts.

Without my going into details, will the right hon. Gentleman give very careful consideration to the conditions of mechanical transport in the Army in India? I will not say more than that.

I am giving very careful attention to it, and when the hon. Member put down this question I wrote him this morning telling him, in much more detail than is possible in answer to a question, the steps that have been taken.

AFGHANISTAN OPERATIONS (DESPATCHES).

asked the Secretary of State for India when despatches concerning the fighting in Afghanistan last summer are going to be published?

The despatch on the operations against Afghanistan, 1919, was published in the "London Gazette" on 15th March, 1920.

MESOPOTAMIA.

BRITISH POLICY.

asked the Prime Minister when the announcement of Mesopotamian policy is to be made; and whether he will arrange that it is communicated to Parliament not later than its publication in Mesopotamia?

asked the Secretary of State for India whether a draft civil constitution has been drawn up in Mesopotamia for the future system of government in that country, the outlines of which have been communicated to leading personages among the inhabitants; whether representations from the latter regarding the proposed draft are being received; whether this proposed constitution will be embodied in the mandate to be placed before the Council of the League of Nations; and whether it will be embodied in an Act of Parliament or otherwise submitted to Parliament before becoming operative?

Hon. Members will have seen the announcement of policy that has appeared in this morning's newspapers. They will no doubt have an opportunity of seeking further information during this afternoon's Debate.

Are we to understand that a report in the news- papers is to be taken as a substitute for an answer to a question in this House?

The policy was announced, not here, but in Baghdad, and the telegram has appeared in some newspapers reporting what announcement was made in Baghdad. Speaking from memory, I think the purport of the announcement was that, in response to the wishes of the inhabitants of Mesopotamia, Sir Percy Cox was to be the British representative under the mandate, and a temporary predominant Arab Government was to be instituted by him.

Does not my right hon. Friend think that it would have been only courteous to the House that an announcement of this very grave importance should have been presented to the House at the same time as it was made at Baghdad? Does he think it is considerate and courteous to refer Members of the House to a telegram which appeared in some papers? It did not appear in the paper I happened to look at, but it was no doubt in some paper connected with the Government, which is given the information for which the House has a right to ask. I venture to ask my right hon. Friend whether he will not, even now, send for a copy of this telegram and read it to the House.

I assure the House that I had no intention of being discourteous. The reason that I did not read the announcement in answer to the question is that I understand that, in the Debate this afternoon, the Prime Minister proposes to read the announcement himself. I would have referred my Noble Friend to the Debate, had it not been that I was bound to take notice of what had already been published in the Press.

AGA KHAN.

asked the Secretary of State for India whether the assistance of His Highness the Aga Khan has been invoked in connection with the administration of Mesopotamia?

ROYAL NAVY.

BATTLE OF JUTLAND (DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT).

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty when the descriptive account of the battle of Jutland brought out by the Harper Committee will be published; and what has been the total expenses of the committee, including the printing of the publication?

I regret that I am not in a position to state when the account will be published. Difficulties arising, among other things, from the provision of paper for the charts, are stated to be likely to delay the publication beyond the time given in previous estimates. The expense of the work cannot yet be given in full till the publication is completed; but it is anticipated that it will be balanced to a substantial extent by the sales.

Does that mean that we are to wait for the chart paper?

No, that is not what I said. I said difficulties arising, among other things, from the provision of paper for the charts had caused delay. There is no avoidable delay.

Can the right hon. Gentleman give any idea when this Report will be forthcoming? Will it be before the summer Recess or not?

I cannot say that. I have said, what I think ought to satisfy any reasonable person, that there is no avoidable delay. The Admiralty are just as anxious as anyone in the House or out of it. We will produce it the first moment we can.

As the Report intimately concerns Lord Jellicoe, will it appear before he departs for New Zealand?

NAVAL OPERATIONS OF THE WAR.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, in Volume I. of Naval Operations of the War, Sir Julian Corbett had access to all the documents in the possession of the Admiralty relating to the events described; whether the proofs of this volume were submitted to, and approved of, by the Admiralty; and whether the Admiralty accepts responsibility for the statements contained in this history based on official documents?

It will be sufficient for me to quote the statement which faces the title page of the volume, namely— The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have given the author access to official documents in the preparation of this work, but they are in no way responsible for his reading or presentation of the facts as stated.

The Admiralty saw the proofs and agreed to publication; but, as stated, do not accept responsibility.

ADMIRALTY EMPLOYES.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty what is the present number of persons employed by the Admiralty at home as compared with the 56,000 before the War?

I presume that my right hon. Friend's question refers to the Outport Home Establishments only, and is not intended to include Head Office staff. On this assumption, the number of the staff (including workpeople) now employed is 81,322.

Is it intended that 81,000 should be kept on the outdoor staff during the year, and has provision to be made in the Estimates for that number?

Discharges are taking place as is found possible. If it be necessary to come to the House in connection with Supplementary Estimates for more men, of course an explanation will have to be given.

Can the hon. Baronet give the House an assurance that all these men are being productively employed by the Admiralty?

WARSHIPS (SALE).

The following stood in the name of Viscount Curzon:

19. To ask the First Lord of the Admiralty whether it is intended to sell any capital ships, light cruisers, or destroyers to any foreign Power other than the ships already announced to be sold to Chile; and, if so, can he make a statement upon it?

Before asking this question, may I inquire whether you, Sir, have noticed a most extraordinary buzzing here to-day? I do not know if it can be stopped?

The reply to my hon. and gallant Friend's question is in the affirmative, but I cannot make a statement about negotiations still in progress.

Surely the right hon. Gentleman can inform the House whether it is intended to sell any modern ships abroad, and, if so, whether it is with the proviso that they are to be broken up?

That question has been answered I should think at least half-a-dozen times in complete detail. I have told the House repeatedly that ships which are surplus to post-War requirements will be sold under conditions which are approved not only by the Board of Admiralty but by the special staff of the Board of Admiralty whose special duty this is. If we do not sell our ships to countries which want them, someone else will. Meanwhile, it is wholly inconsistent with the action taken by the hon. and gallant Gentleman himself, and others, to press on the Admiralty a policy of economy if we are to be deterred from selling ships we do not want.

Where does the economy come in if we sell efficient ships abroad and then have to provide defence against them in future?

I am rather surprised that the hon. and gallant Gentleman, who has served in the Navy, takes that view. The ships that we are selling are surplus to our requirements. In other words, in the opinion of the Board of Admiralty they would not be helpful to the Navy in future. Any ships that are built will be of such a type as to be of value to the Navy.

In calculating the necessary naval forces of the country, will any account be taken of ships to be disposed of to potential foes?

In deciding upon the post-War Navy the Admiralty have had under consideration, as far as is humanly possible to-day, the risks to which this country can at sea be exposed, and all our post-War fleet in men and in ships is fixed accordingly. In any future policy that we may adopt we must, quite obviously, in regard to building consider the facts as they are.

Am I right in supposing that we have calculated our post-War fleet purely on the basis of the ships of which we have disposed of to other countries?

The hon. and gallant Member is looking at the matter from the wrong end. The Admiralty, by a most careful examination of the facts, have arrived at what they believe to be, and are prepared to defend as, an adequate Navy for the safety of this country, and, having decided how that Navy is to be constituted both as to men and ships, the rest of the ships are for disposal.

GRAND FLEET AND UNITED SERVICE FUNDS.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty what is the present position of the Grand Fleet Fund and the United Service Fund as far as the Royal Navy is concerned; and what has been decided as to the future of both of these funds?

It has been decided, as the result of a ballot taken in the Fleet, that the serving Navy shall not be associated with the United Services Fund. The question as to whether the ex-service men who served in the Navy during the War, and have since been demobilised, shall be associated with that fund is not yet settled, as the various associations representing ex-naval men which the Admiralty are consulting have not all replied. The question of absorbing the Grand Fleet Fund in a wider organisation suitable for dealing with naval benevolent funds generally is at present under consideration.

CADETS.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, in considering the withdrawal of cadets under training at Osborne and Dartmouth, he will give special consideration to the sons of officers who have rendered long and distinguished service in the Royal Navy?

This matter is under consideration, but I am afraid that no statement can be made at present.

STAFF COLLEGE, GREENWICH.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether any regulations have been drawn up as to the methods of selection of officers for admission to the courses of the Staff College at Greenwich; and, if so, whether such regulations will be published?

The regulations governing the selection of officers for the course commencing in September next were published in Admiralty Weekly Order of the 3rd of March last. The Press have full access to these orders.

PROVISION ALLOWANCE.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he is in a position to make a statement with regard to the food allowance at home ports and naval establishments; and can he now say what is the policy of the Admiralty with regard to raising the allowance of the ratings employed?

The question of an increase in the rate of provision allowance to naval ratings is still under consideration.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that on two occasions I have put a similar question and the same answer has been given? Can the hon. Gentleman say when the statement will be made?

I regret very much the delay in the matter, but it is one of considerable difficulty. If my hon. Friend will put down a question next week, I hope to be able to give an answer.

ADMIRALTY YACHT "ENCHANTRESS."

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty what are the intentions of the Government with regard to the Admiralty yacht "Enchantress"; and whether it is proposed to dispose of if?

H.M.S. "Enchantress" will be employed as before. The reply to the last part of the hon. Member's question is in the negative.

Would it not be possible for the Lords of the Admiralty to do without the "Enchantress" in order to show some economy in the public service?

It is a little difficult to answer that inquiry by means of question and answer. If my hon. Friend, believing that he is well advised, wants to raise the question seriously, I would suggest to him that he should do so by moving a reduction of my salary on Vote 12, which has yet to be considered by the House. His question seems to presume what is not a fact, namely, that economy would be the result of getting rid of the "Enchantress." I can only say that the matter has been most carefully considered, but if anybody thinks that undue extravagance is caused by the use of the "Enchantress," I suggest that they should raise the matter by moving a reduction of my salary.

NAVAL AND MILITARY PENSIONS AND GRANTS.

H.M.S. "RAMILLIES" (EDGAR COOPER).

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he is aware that Edgar Cooper, No. J25,089, who enlisted in the Royal Navy on 5th June, 1913, and served until his discharge as an A.B. from His Majesty's ship "Ramillies" in November last, having taken part in the battle off the Falkland Islands, is unable to get his gratuity and balance of account due to him from the Admiralty Records Office, his address being, care of R. E. Cooper, The Piece, Butterrow, Stroud; and will he inquire into this case?

I am having inquiry made regarding this case, and any adjustment necessary will be made as early as possible.

EX-SERVICE MEN.

RESETTLEMENT (HEBRIDES AND WESTERN ISLES).

asked the Minister of Labour whether an investigator has been appointed for the Civil Liabilities Department in the Hebrides and the Western Isles; what is his salary and the expenses of this office: what is the work justifying this appointment; and whether he will make a complete inquiry into this appointment and will place upon the Table of the House the Report of the Commissioner on this subject?

asked the Secretary to the Treasury if he sanctioned the appointment recently of an investigator to the Civil Liabilities Department for the Hebrides and Western Isles of Scotland; if before doing so the official concerned took steps to ascertain if such an appointment was necessary by consulting the recent Report of the new Commissioner for the North of Scotland on this point; and can he state whether the investigator is an ex-officer needing assistance or is possessed of ample private means of his own?

I have been asked by my right hon. Friend the Secretary to the Treasury to answer also the question addressed to him. The appointment of investigation officers in connection with the new scheme for local decision under the Civil Liabilities Fund was sanctioned by the Treasury. The Inverness district, within which this particular appointment falls, comprises the counties of Caithness, Sutherland, Ross and Cromarty, Elgin, Nairn, Inverness and Argyle, and the Islands of Lewis, Harris, North and South Uist, together with the Orkney and Shetland Islands. The total number of cases at the Inverness office for the week ending 11th June was 146. The principle on which the Department acts is to have a personal interview in every case in order to give the applicant a full opportunity of stating his case. This is particularly necessary in such a district where the men, crofters and fishermen, naturally find difficulty in filling up the forms. I am quite sure that my hon. Friend and all Members of the House would wish the cases of these men to be dealt with as promptly and as adequately as possible. After very careful consideration of the whole facts, however, I am proposing to make re-arrangements by which it may be possible shortly to withdraw this investigator from the area, if this can be done without prejudicing the right of the men to prompt determination of their claims. I should add that I have no information as to the private means of the officer in question who was appointed on the recom- mendation of the Selection Board for Scotland.

Is it not a fact that in this particular district there were many men who had insufficient or no knowledge of the facilities offered by the Civil Liabilities Department?

Yes, undoubtedly. While on the whole the scheme is not so expensive, it has enormously increased the efficiency. The present head of this Department, Captain McLaren, had to face 70,000 arrears, and I am very much obliged to him for having cleared them and having got to current cases.

Was not this temporary appointment necessitated by the fact that a large proportion of the population were called away on the first day of the War and had to leave their farms, their stock, their boats and nets, and that they were in the position of one-man businesses and suffered great damage.

Yes, this is a difficult district, and we must do our best to meet these men. I am going into the matter very carefully and I think I can arrange without prejudicing the men's claims to prompt attention, to withdraw this investigator in a short time.

APPOINTMENTS DEPARTMENT.

asked the Minister of Labour whether any decision has as yet been arrived at with regard to the possibility and desirability of handing over all the work of the Appointments Department to Lord Haig's Ex-Officers' Association; and whether such an arrangement would lead to economy?

I have given, and shall continue to give, my personal and unremitting attention to this matter, and I am in close touch with Lord Haig and the Officers' Association with representatives of which I held a conference last Saturday morning. Our joint endeavour is to avoid any waste of effort that may arise from any overlapping of functions between the Appointments Department and the Officers' Association, and to secure the most effective co-operation, in the interests of the ex-officer, between the two bodies. As at present advised, I do not think that it would be possible for me, while over 13,000 officers and other ex-service men of similar qualifications are on the lists of the Appointments Department still seeking posts, to close down the valuable machinery that the Department has created. But I can assure my Noble Friend that my only concern is to see that the work is done, and done well, with due regard to economy, but without regard to the particular form of agency employed; and with this end in view I am laying before the Officers' Association a series of proposals.

Can the right hon. Gentleman assure us that there is no proposal before the Officers' Association to hand over all this work to the Employment Exchanges?

KING'S NATIONAL ROLL OF EMPLOYERS.

asked what steps have been taken to carry out the promise given by the Prime Minister on 22nd March last, and by himself, that use should be made of the post offices throughout the country to advertise for public information the names of firms in each area who are employing ex-soldiers in the proportions entitling those firms to inclusion in the King's Roll; and, if these promises are still unfulfilled, what is the cause of the delay?

Arrangements for this purpose are in hand, and I hope it will be possible to exhibit the lists at an early date. The delay has been due to the time necessarily occupied in preparing the large number of separate lists that are required. Everything possible will be done to hasten the publication of the lists.

Will such lists have specific reference to the districts to which the lists apply?

asked how many firms are now on the King's Roll under the National Scheme for the Employment of Disabled ex-Service Men; how many disabled men are employed by these firms; how many are still awaiting employment; and what steps are being taken to extend the national scheme?

The number of firms on the King's National Roll on 21st June, 1920, was 17,811; the total number of disabled men employed by these firms was 154,569. The corresponding figures for 31st December, 1919, were 9,524 firms employing 89,619 disabled men. The number of disabled ex-service men shown as unemployed on the registers of the Employment Exchanges in Great Britain on 11th June, 1920, was 19,235, the corresponding number on 31st December last being 35,079. The Local Employment Committees and officials of my Department are at present engaged on a canvass of all employers who have not yet enrolled under the National Scheme. I am also in communication with my right hon. Friends the Minister of Health and the Secretary for Scotland with a view to ascertaining the possibility of enrolling more local authorities under the National Scheme, as I feel that this is an avenue of employment which ought to offer further vacancies for disabled men. I am glad to say that my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer has agreed that the name of His Majesty's Treasury, on behalf of Government Departments, shall at once be placed on the King's National Roll. It has also been decided that in placing Government contracts preference shall be given by Contracting Departments to firms on the King's National Roll.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that disabled ex-service men are being rather freely discharged at present from His Majesty's Civil Service, and will he look into the matter?

Indeed I will. I should say that they come last in the detailed scheme. They have a preference for retention in the detailed scheme in regard to discharges from Government service.

COST OF LIVING (HOUSE RENTS).

asked the Minister of Labour whether he can state the effect of an increase of 30 per cent. on house rents upon the index figure of the cost of living issued by the Ministry?

An increase of 30 per cent. on house rents (exclusive of rates) would raise the index figure relating to the cost of living, which is issued by the Ministry of Labour, by about 3½ points.

HOURS OF EMPLOYMENT BILL.

asked the Minister of Labour whether his attention has been called to the expression of opinion by the House last Friday in favour of a 48-hour week for shop assistants, more especially as this would tend to settle the question of early closing; and whether, under these circumstances, he will expedite his Bill dealing with the hours of labour generally in the country?

We shall proceed with the Hours of Employment Bill as soon as possible.

asked the Prime Minister whether, instead of giving any facilities for the Shops (Early Closing) Bill, he will introduce a one-clause Bill ensuring to shop assistants a 48-hour standard week?

asked the Prime Minister if, considering the importance to a million and three-quarters of shopkeepers and their assistants of a limitation of shop hours after the expiry of the Defence of the Realm Act in August, and the failure of the Shop Hours (Early Closing) Bill to pass the House on Friday last, if the Government will introduce a Bill this Session dealing with the whole question, or introduce a Bill continuing the present hours for a short period so that the whole question can be dealt with in the Autumn Session?

The whole question will be dealt with under the General Bill to regulate the hours of employment, but His Majesty's Government are considering the introduction of a Bill to extend the existing Regulations for a short period.

My answer says that we have not decided. I have only said that the Government are considering the matter.

I think that is necessary, because the Regulations come to an end before we meet again.

HOUSING.

RE-HOUSING SCHEMES.

asked the Minister of Health if he will say how many schemes for rehousing have been submitted by local authorities during the last six months and how many of these have been sanctioned, with the number of houses involved; how many new houses have been actually started or completed in the Metropolitan area, in urban districts, and in rural districts, respectively; and whether the difficulty, if any, is due to lack of initiative or money, or shortage of labour?

I am not clear what figures my hon. Friend wishes me to give under the term "rehousing," and if he will be good enough to see me on the point I will supply him with the figures he requires. Many of the details were given on Monday in reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston-upon-Hull, of which I am sending him a copy. Of the 61,708 houses included in contracts already signed, in addition to the 9,768 sanctioned under the subsidy scheme, the returns on 1st June showed that 29,076 were in various stages of construction, apart from 1,500 already completed. In the greater Metropolitan area, the figures under these heads are 6,147, and outside the Metropolitan area the number is 24,429. Of the latter, 4,158 are in rural areas in connection with local authorities schemes. The number of houses completed to date is 2,605, which includes 108 completed under the subsidy scheme.

UNOCCUPIED HOUSES.

asked the Minister of Health whether, in view of the increasing need of utilising every dwelling-house in the country for residential purposes, he will expedite the introduction of his promised Bill for preventing the withholding of dwelling-houses from occupation?

In view of the urgency of the problem, will the Government pass this measure into law before we adjourn for the Recess?

asked the Minister of Health what is the number of empty houses in London fit for habitation; and how many of these are only for sale?

Would not a question sent to every London Borough Council soon elicit this information, which it is most important to have?

A complete survey is being made of all empty houses to ascertain which of them can be put into proper condition for habitation. I cannot answer the last part of the question, as to how many of them are for sale only. The number of such houses varies very much from day to day.

Can the right hon. Gentleman answer the first part of my question, as to the number of houses in London fit for habitation? I understand the right hon. Gentleman says that he has that information, and, if so, why can I not get it?

I have not that information, but the houses are being carefully examined, and if the hon. Member will put down a question, I will give him particulars as to a specific date. The last part of the question I cannot answer.

SWANSEA SCHEME.

asked the Minister of Health whether his attention has been drawn to the fact that the Swansea direct administration building scheme is practically at a standstill for the want of certain classes of building materials; whether he is aware that a large quantity of wall-ties were ordered from the Director of Building Materials on 11th May, and so far have not been delivered; and whether he will have inquiries made into the matter and supplies expedited to enable the bricklayers to carry on their work?

I cannot accept the statement in the first part of the question. I am informed by the responsible local officer attached to my Department that since 3rd May (the date from which the work has been carried out by direct administration) the supply of all materials, except wall ties, has been satisfactory, and that the progress made during May was better than in any previous month. On the 14th of this month a visit was made to the site by the local officer, who found all bricklayers at work. As regards wall ties, I am informed that an order for 15 cwt. was placed by the Director of Building Materials Supply by wire on the 11th May. A further order for 35 cwt. (the balance of the local authority's requisition) was placed by letter on the 15th May. Fifteen cwt. wall ties were delivered on the site on the 13th June, and in the meantime authority was given for the purchase locally of small consignments which were sufficient to prevent a stoppage of work.

ARMY HUTS.

asked the Minister of Health if he will consider the handing over of Army huts for temporary use by families who are practically homeless, to tide over the time that must elapse before the new houses are ready for occupation?

Arrangements were made so long ago as last September to enable local authorities to acquire Army huts for temporary housing purposes, and steps have been taken to bring this method of making temporary provision prominently before local authorities. Huts and hostels have been thus acquired for conversion which provide accommodation for over 3,000 families.

PENSIONS FOR MOTHERS.

asked the Minister of Health whether, in view of the opinion of the House that a scheme of pensions for mothers is desirable, he will appoint a Committee to inquire into the details of such a measure, with a view to an agreed Bill being introduced at the earliest possible date?

I do not think that any useful purpose would be served by the appointment of a Committee such as the hon. Member suggests.

ERPINGHAM GUARDIANS (CLERK).

asked the Minister of Health whether he has sanctioned the proposed appointment of clerk to the Erpingham Board of Guardians; whether he is aware that the chief reason given by the board for the proposed appointment is that the selected individual has a head clerk who has been accustomed to doing work for a board of guardians; and whether he will insist upon the board obtaining a person who has personal knowledge of Poor Law work, and not one who would have to rely upon the services of others whilst at the same time enjoying the emoluments and privileges of the office?

I have not sanctioned this appointment. I am impressing on the guardians the importance of selecting a candidate who is qualified by the possession of Poor Law experience as well as by War service.

TURKEY.

asked the Prime Minister whether there is any stipulation in the Turkish Treaty as to whether the fortifications of Adrianople are to be dismantled?

asked why Sir Basil Saharoff, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., was not consulted with regard to the Turkish Treaty?

Is it not a fact that this distinguished Greek gentleman paid for the Smyrna expedition out of his own pocket, and controls the greater amount of the shares of Vickers Maxim?

I was not aware of either of these facts; but I wish that he would defray the expenses of our troops.

RUSSIA.

GENERAL WRANGEL'S OFFENSIVE.

asked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been called to the continued offensive of General Wrangel in the Ukraine; whether he is aware that this general is devastating and disorganising one of the richest wheat- and sugar-growing districts in the world; and whether His Majesty's Government are attempting to take any steps to bring this fighting to an end?

The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. As regards the second part, I should be glad to learn the source of the hon. Member's information. As regards the last part of the question, His Majesty's Government have ordered His Majesty's forces not to assist General Wrangel in any way in either defensive or offensive action.

With regard to the last part of the question, will the Government take some more active steps than starting to withdraw our missions? Why not cut off supplies from this man?

We are not giving him any supplies. I do not know whether the hon. and gallant Gentleman suggests that we should send troops to fight General Wrangel.

Will not the Government consider the stopping of supplies, whether we are officially supplying him or not? Ships must be going to this man. Otherwise he could not carry on.

The hon. and gallant Gentleman is constantly advocating the stopping of interference with ships going to Russia.

CENTRAL CONTROL BOARD (LIQUOR TRAFFIC).

asked the Prime Minister whether he is aware of the increasing dissatisfaction amongst club members owing to the prohibition of the supply of alcoholic refreshment after 9 p.m. on Sundays; whether he is aware that the bulk of members do not assemble in working men's clubs before 8 p.m.; whether the Government will therefore extend the closing hour to 10 p.m., in case of need altering the opening hour from six to seven; and whether, following the promises that have repeatedly been given, he will undertake to abolish the Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) without further delay?

I would refer my hon. and gallant Friend to the reply which I gave yesterday on this subject.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in the answer which he gave to the hon. and gallant Member for Market Harborough (Major Sir K. Frazer) he referred to the answer which he gave on the previous day, and that in that answer he said that he had nothing to add to what had already been said, and in consequence of the feeling in the various clubs, can we get a definite reply as to whether we are going to have the hours increased or not?

The supplementary question of my hon. Friend leaves me a little in a maze, but I think that he is wrong as to the facts. The answer I gave yesterday was that the matter was put before the Liquor Control Board, who had promised to consider it.

Did not the right hon. Gentleman refer my hon. and gallant Friend to the answer which he gave yesterday on the subject, and in the reply given on the previous day, did he not say, "I can add nothing to what has already been said on the subject?"

My hon. and gallant Friend has quoted one reply, but I am not sure that he has quoted the whole of it. If he has, there was another reply.

Is it to be understood that Members of this House must inform members of clubs in their constituencies that, as far as this present season is concerned, Members of the House of Commons are powerless to do anything in the matter?

Could not the right hon. Gentleman hurry up the Control Board, so that we may have some definite information at an early date?

I have no doubt whatever that the Liquor Control Board will consider it without any delay.

Will the right hon. Gentleman undertake, as suggested in the last part of the question, to do away with the Liquor Control Board altogether?

LEAGUE OF NATIONS (FUNDS).

asked the Prime Minister whether France, England, Italy, and other Powers have made their appointed financial contributions to the League of Nations?

As regards His Majesty's Government's contribution, I would refer the hon. Member to the Prime Minister's reply to the question asked by the hon. Member for Acton (Sir H. Brittain) on 14th June last. I have no information as to what contributions have been made by other Powers, but inquiries on the point are being made of the Secretary-General to the League.

IRELAND.

HUNGER STRIKERS.

asked the Prime Minister whether persons convicted of offences in Ireland who go on hunger strike will be released when their lives are in danger, or whether it is now the considered policy of the Government to inform such persons that they must face the consequences of their action?

The policy of the Government is as stated in the last part of the question.

LOCAL ALTTLIORITIES (DAIL EIREANN).

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland if he will state how many county councils and also how many other local authorities in Ireland have formally resolved to ignore the authority of the Local Government Board and to recognise Dail Eireann alone; and what measures the Government proposes to adopt in the matter?

I would refer my hon. and gallant Friend to the reply which I gave to a similar question asked by the hon. and gallant Member for the Burton Division of Stafford (Colonel Gretton) on Monday last.

Will the right hon. Gentleman say what measures they are going to take in view of the situation, as he omitted to do so?

I said in my reply to the hon. and gallant Member for Stafford that we had received no information of such cases.

If I send the right hon. Gentleman a good many cases, will he take some action?

ATTACKS ON EX-SERVICE CLUBS.

asked the Chief Secretary whether he is aware that a partially successful attempt was made on the night of 12th June to burn down the premises belonging to the local branch of the Comrades of the Great War, at Borrisokane, County Tipperary; and, in view of the fact that the clubs of the Comrades of the Great War, both at Midleton and Youghal, have already been maliciously destroyed by fire, will he state what special steps are being taken to give protection to the property of this and other ex-service men's organisations in Ireland?

An attempt was made to burn these premises on the night of the 12th instant. The fire was believed to be the work of some persons who were refused admission to the club. Somewhat similar fires took place at the club houses at Midleton and Youghal. The Inspector-General of the Royal Irish Constabulary has given instructions to afford all possible protection to premises of the Association.

DISORDER, LONDONDERRY.

May I ask the Attorney-General for Ireland whether he can give the House any information as to the position of affairs in Londonderry to-day?

At nine o'clock this morning a telephone message was received as follows: Londonderry during the night has been comparatively quiet. Occasional shots have been fired by civilians. It has been unnecessary for the troops to fire. At three minutes past ten o'clock, a telephone message stated that all was quiet.

Can the right hon. Gentleman state now if the citizens of Londonderry are going to be disarmed?

Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that rifles are being freely used in Londonderry, and can no steps be taken to secure them?

Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether a riot is also going on in Hull or not?

GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (CORRESPONDENCE).

asked the Prime Minister whether he is aware of the great delay which members of the general public frequently experience in receiving replies from Government Departments, in some cases two, or even three, letters containing questions of vital importance to the inquirer being despatched without even a formal acknowledgment in return; and whether he can see his way to issuing instructions which will effect an improvement in this direction?

I shall call the attention of Departments to my hon. Friend's question, but I must remind him that the rapid reduction of staffs considered necessary by the Government must inevitably cause some inconvenience.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that greater severity in this particular matter would have saved Ministers much questioning in this House?

I am sure that it is in the interest of everyone to make as certain as we can that there is no delay.

ANTI-DUMPING LEGISLATION.

asked the Prime Minister whether he will give an assurance to the House and to the country that the promised legislation to prevent dumping shall form part of the programme of the Government in the Autumn Session?

Has the Government at the present moment any examples of dumping from abroad?

EXCESS PROFITS DUTY.

asked the Prime Minister whether, at the time the Excess Profits Duty was introduced, definite pledges were given by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. M'Kenna, with the concurrence of the Government, that the tax was not to be continued in time of peace; and whether the present Government consider themselves in any way bound by such pledges?

The statements made by Mr. McKenna, when Chancellor of the Exchequer, show that he regarded the Excess Profits Duty as a temporary tax imposed primarily for the War period, but that he contemplated that it would continue for some undefined period after the end of the War. I have no doubt that we are continuing it for a longer period than was contemplated when the tax was first imposed. Our action must be considered and, in our belief, is justified by the immense burden of debt which the prolongation of the War has left us, and by the continuance after the War of abnormal conditions which prevailed during the War.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that Mr. McKenna gave definite pledges, with the concurrence of the Cabinet? That is the question which I should like the right hon. Gentleman to answer.

I am not aware that Mr. McKenna gave definite pledges as to the date of the withdrawal of the tax. I have consulted a good many of his statements before answering this question, and I have one before me now, which he made on the 27th October, 1915, in the course of which he said: We have to impose this tax for the War, but we do not impose it unless the firm is assured, during the whole course of the War, and for the period after the War, while the tax is still working, of the average profit made in the two best of the three years before the War.

Is it not a fact that when Mr. McKenna was Chancellor of the Exchequer he expressed the opinion that we should be financially unable to fight the War to a finish?

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BILL.

asked the Prime Minister if he is now able to make a statement with respect to the intentions of the Government regarding the Unemployment Insurance Bill?

I think that it is probable that this will be taken some time next week.

POLAND (BOLSHEVISTS' PRISONERS).

asked the Prime Minister if he will arrange for the British representative in Poland to inquire whether prisoners captured by the Bolshevists have been returned to the Polish lines with their eyes put out, and inform the House of the result?

I have no such information, but His Majesty's Minister at Warsaw is being instructed to make inquiries.

Will the right hon. Gentleman then inform the House if there is any truth in it?

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS.

asked the Lord Privy Seal if the United States of America will be represented at the conference of the International Commission of Jurists to be held at The Hague; and, if so, if he will state whether that country has agreed to accept and abide by any decisions which may be come to by the Commission?

I understand that a delegate from the United States of America is attending the deliberations of the conference. I have no information in regard to the second part of my hon. Friend's question.

VOLUNTARY HOSPITALS (PUBLIC GRANTS).

asked the Minister of Health if, in the event of grants from public money being made to voluntary hospitals, they will be conditional on the appointment of representatives of the public to the governing bodies?

In the event of any grants being made from public funds for the assistance of the voluntary hospitals such conditions will be attached to the grants as are necessary to secure that they are properly expended, but I do not think that the hon. Member's suggestion would be effective for this purpose.

INCREASE OF RENT BILL.

asked the Minister of Health what tenants under the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Bill he includes as bonâ fide tenants?

The expression "tenant" in the Rent Restriction Bill means any person to whom a house or part of a house is let furnished or unfurnished, but it does not include a lodger who has only a right to the use of the premises, but no right of exclusive occupation.

BRITISH WEST INDIES (MILITARY CEMETERIES).

asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies (1) whether the military cemetery behind the iron barracks at Needham's Point, Barbados is under the control of the Colonial Government or the War Office; whether he is aware that, although the latest interment in it was only made in the sixties, his graveyard is in a shocking state of ruin, the railings being broken down, the tombstones broken and overgrown, and the brick graves rifled;

(2) whether the military cemetery on the Morne, at St. Lucia, is under the control of the Colonial Government or the War Office; whether he is aware that the sum expended on this cemetery yearly is apparently insufficient to keep it in a good state of repair; and whether he will have the whole matter inquired into with a view to ensuring a proper and efficient control of this cemetery?

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the MINISTRY of SHIPPING
(Colonel Leslie Wilson, for Lieut.-Colonel Amery)

I regret that I am not at present in a position to answer these questions, but the Secretary of State is making inquiries as to the present state of cemeteries in the West Indian Colonies containing naval and military graves, and on receipt of the replies he proposes to take action in the matter.

NAURU ISLAND AGREEMENT.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies whether the Nauru Island agreement was submitted to the recent meeting of the Council of the League of Nations; and, if not, for what reason?

No, Sir. The agreement is, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, not one which requires to be submitted to the Council of the League.

Is Nauru Island held under mandate, and has the mandate been submitted to the Council of the League of Nations?

May I ask the Leader of the House whether it is the considered policy of the Government that this agreement as to Nauru Island is not to be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations?

It is hardly possible to expect a reply by way of question and answer on a subject which has been fully debated.

May I call the right hon. Gentleman's attention to the fact that his colleague has just announced that the agreement will not be submitted to the League of Nations, and, if that be so, the situation is an extremely serious one.

I myself stated in Debate that, in my opinion, it was a commercial agreement, and that a commercial undertaking is not a subject for the League of Nations.

Will the mandate under which the Government hold Nauru Island be submitted, or has it been submitted, to the Council of the League, and, if not, why not?

The mandate under which we hold this industrial concern—for that is what it is—will be treated in exactly the same way as the others.

When the Council of the League of Nations has met, and the agreement is in working order, why has it not been submitted to the League, if we are in earnest on the matter?

IMPERIAL INSTITUTE.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies what was the cost of the Imperial Institute building; in what proportions was the same provided from the United Kingdom, India, and the various Colonies respectively; will he inform the House who are the present trustees or Council; what functions they perform; and how often they meet?

As the reply is a rather lengthy one, I propose with the hon. Member's permission to circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

The following is the reply indicated: (1) Approximately £337,000. (2) Nearly three-fifths from the United Kingdom, from India a little over one-fourth, and the remainder from the Dominions and Colonies. (3) The Council are:—Lord Islington (Chairman), Viscount Burnham, Lord Emmott, Sir William Taylor, Sir Owen Philipps, Sir R. Kindersley, Sir Algernon Firth, Sir R. Threlfall, Mr. D. O. Malcolm, 2184 Mr. G. Grindle, Mr. A. Fiddian, and the Director; the High Commissioners for the Dominions, representing the Dominion Governments; Sir J. P. Hewitt and Mr. L. J. Kershaw, representing the India Office; Sir R. W. Carlyle, representing the Government of India; Sir Daniel Hall, Hall, representing the Ministry of Agriculture; Mr. R. W. Matthew and Mr. P. W. L. Ashley, representing the Board of Trade. (4) The Council is charged with the administration of the Imperial Institute, subject to the general direction and control of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. (5) The Council itself meets once a quarter, but the Finance and General Purposes Committee of the Council meets every month.

BRITISH ARMY.

SOLDIERS' GRAVES.

asked the Secretary of State for War if he will arrange that the Imperial War Graves Commission should send to the relatives of fallen soldiers a photograph, and the number, location, and nearest railway station to the graves of their sons or relatives as soon as such a procedure is possible.

The Imperial War Graves Commission have no authority under their charter of incorporation to expend public money in taking photographs of graves. Until last September the Directorate of Graves Registration and Enquiries supplied such photographs at the request of relatives, the cost being met from funds supplied by the Red Cross. The funds are now practically exhausted, the money in hand being only sufficient to meet outstanding applications. The number and location of a grave, as well as the nearest railway station, can always be ascertained on application at Winchester House.

Will not the right hon. Gentleman volunteer to send this information to the relatives, as they do not happen to know how to send, or where to send a letter. Surely that is not too much to expect from your Department?

Would it not be a good thing if some public funds could be allocated for this purpose in view of the tremendous sentimental interest attached to it?

It does not fall within my Department, but I do not think it would be practical to send communications to all the relatives, but the public are informed by the answer what to do, and if any further information can be given we shall be only too pleased to give it.

Surely the right hon. Gentleman is aware of the fact that the men who died out there were necessary for you to win for this country, and are you going to forget them now? Why do you not answer. I will put another question on the subject.

NATIONAL EXPENDITURE.

May I ask the Leader of the House when the promised Debate on public expenditure will take place?

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.

Can the Leader of the House kindly inform us what business it is proposed to take on Friday?

The Committee Stage of the Financial Resolutions on the Paper; the Overseas Trade (Credits and Insurance) Bill, Second Reading; and, possibly, other Orders.

Does the right hon. Gentleman not think that the Overseas Trade Bill, which raises a most important principle, should be put as the first Order?

I hope that the House realises that everything we discuss is important.

Apart from the right hon. Gentleman's excellent persiflage, does he not recognise that the granting of enormous credits is very important and should be placed as first Order.

There is no question of persiflage. We put them down in the order of the necessity of getting them, that is the sole reason.

Can the right hon. Gentleman now say when the Finance Bill will be taken?

PARLIAMENTARY FRANCHISE (EXERCISE).

I beg to move, "That leave be given to bring in a Bill to make better provision for the exercise of the Parliamentary Franchise and for purposes connected therewith."

I wish to detain the House for a few moments in order to explain one or two points with reference to this Bill. The Bill itself is a corollary to the Act of 1918, which has increased our electorate from some 8,500,000 of voters to over 21,000,000. The object of the Bill is to stimulate interest in elections, both in General Elections and in bye-elections. At the present time it is a fact that only something like 50 per cent. of the electors go to the poll and record their votes at elections, and at a time when we have enfranchised so many more people in this country—something like 13,000,000 more during the last two years—it is essential that something should be done to try and obtain from the people what their real opinion is as to the government which they wish to represent them. There exists already in another democracy, that of Australia, a law by which people who do not register are fined for a first offence 10s., for a second offence £2, and for a subsequent offence £2. This Bill does not seek to place any penalty for not registering, because as we have a register twice a year in this country that would impose a great hardship on the large mass of the electorate, and I think it would be unworkable, but is it too much to ask those who have the proudest privilege of any human being, that of being a British subject, that once in four years they should exercise the first duty of a citizen and go to the poll and record their vote?

At the present time, with only 50 or 60 per cent. of the electors voting, there is an enormous amount of opinion which is inarticulate. It consists to a very large degree of people of moderate views, because as a rule the extremists lodge their votes on both sides, but it is the people of moderate views who after all form that silent and tremendous force which we know as public opinion, and which acts as a gyroscope to the political ship of State. If we could get their opinion lodged at the polls in a far greater measure than we do now it would be a great advantage and would be a really democratic thing to do, and therefore I hope for the support of the most democratic Members of this House for the introduction of this Bill. The Bill in itself is a very simple one. It imposes a fine of £1 for not exercising the vote and for a second or subsequent offence a fine of £2, or a month's imprisonment. The Bill is drawn with very wide exceptions, such as illness, absence on naval, military, or civil duty, or residence over ten miles from the polling booth, and also any other reasonable cause which in the opinion of the returning officer is sufficient cause for not voting. It would simply act as a stimulant, and in most cases it would be quite unnecessary to use it. It is only in the cases of those contumacious people who absolutely refuse to go to the poll and record their vote that this Act might be used, and it would be really useful in forcing them to express their opinion. I think when hon. Members see the Bill they will see that it is properly drawn with wide exceptions

and that it is a natural corollary of the great increase in the franchise which has been brought about in recent years.

4.0 P.M.

I rise to oppose the introduction of this Bill. I think this is another instance of absurd legislation. I thought we appealed to the free and independent voter. I can imagine an occasion on which the only alternative a voter might have would be between a "Wee Free" and a Labour man, and are we going to penalise a man because, in the dignity of his own mind, he refuses to vote for either of them? Any man who has the vote ought in conscience to exercise it, I agree, but if he has an alternative before him which he regards as ridiculous or dangerous to the country, I say it would be an absolute stupidity—it would be the negation of all liberty—to put upon that man a fine or imprisonment for not voting. It looks to me as if the hon. and gallant Gentleman who wishes to introduce the Bill knew we were going to have a serious day, and thought we might have as a hors d'œuvre a little humour, but I think we ought to express our opinion on the subject by not giving him leave to introduce the Bill.

Question put, "That leave be given to introduce a Bill to make better provision for the exercise of the Parliamentary Franchise, and for purposes connected therewith."

The House divided: Ayes, 74; Noes, 158.

MESSAGE FROM THE LORDS.

That they have agreed to,

Amendments to—

City of London (Various Powers) Bill [Lords],

Corporation of London (Rating of Reclaimed Lands) Bill [Lords],

Wandsworth, Wimbledon, and Epsom District Gas Bill [Lords],

South Hants Water Bill [Lords],

Tees Valley Water Bill [Lords], without Amendment.

That they have passed a Bill, intituled, "An Act to amend the Law relating to Matrimonial Causes in England and Wales." [Matrimonial Causes Bill [ Lords. ]

Also, a Bill, intituled, "An Act to provide for the transfer of the undertaking of the High Wycombe Gas Light and Coke Company, Limited, to the Uxbridge Gas Company; to extend the limits of supply of the latter company and to change their name; and for other purposes." [Uxbridge and Wycombe District Gas Bill [ Lords. ]

And also, a Bill, intituled, "An Act to confer further powers upon the Manchester Ship Canal Company; and for other purposes." [Manchester Ship Canal Bill [ Lords. ]

Uxbridge and Wycombe District Gas Bill [Lords],

Manchester Ship Canal Bill [Lords],

Read the First time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.

BILLS REPORTED.

Gelligaer Urban District Council Bill [Lords],

Newtownards Urban District Council Bill [Lords],

Reported, with Amendments, from the Local Legislation Committee; Reports to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.

Londonderry Port and Harbour Bill [Lords],

Reported, with Amendments; Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.

STANDING COMMITTEE B.

Sir SAMUEL ROBERTS reported from the Committee of Selection; That they had discharged the following Members from Standing Committee B: Mr. Haslam, Major Henderson, and Mr. Ormsby-Gore; and had appointed in substitution: Mr. Neville Chamberlain, Mr. Herbert Lewis, and Mr. Young.

Report to lie upon the Table.

PRIVATE BILLS (GROUP F).

Sir EDWARD NICHOLL reported from the Committee on Group F of Private Bills; That, for the convenience of parties, the Committee had adjourned till Friday, at half-past Ten of the clock.

Report to lie upon the Table.

SUPPLY [13TH ALLOTTED DAY].

Considered in Committee.

[Mr. WHITLEY in the Chair.]

ARMY ESTIMATES, 1920–21, FURTHER VOTE ON ACCOUNT.

Motion made, and question proposed, That a further sum, not exceeding £10,000,000, be granted to His Majesty on Account for defraying the Charges for Army Services, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1921, namely:—

MESOPOTAMIA.

On a point of Order. It might be for the convenience of the Committee, in view of the fact that this, I think, is the first occasion on which these Estimates have been presented in their new form, if you could give us some guidance as to how you think that the Debate should proceed. As a rule, of course, we can select our Votes and get our issues on the separate Votes, but there is no intimation on the Order Paper how the Votes are to be taken. Hon. Members have to go to the White Paper for information as to what heads are to be taken. It is desired to-day, certainly on two occasions, to have the decision of the Committee. Perhaps you would inform the Committee what is your view as to the new procedure.

The right hon. Gentleman will recollect that in December last year, when the Votes were first presented in this new form, I drew the attention of the Committee to them, and particularly said that I was most anxious that the new form of Estimates should not take away from the Committee any of its rights to move and take a decision upon the reduction of any item. It is for that reason that I myself requested the War Office, in the presentation of this Vote, to put down the details which appear and which, if desired, I will read to the Committee. The sum of £10,000,000, which is the Vote before the Committee, is divided under the following heads:

That has been done in order to enable Members of the Committee to move reductions under the various heads, and the order of them has been arranged in accordance with the request of the Opposition, so that they may bring forward first the points which they desire to raise. With regard to to-day's proceedings in particular, I propose, first of all, to take an Amendment dealing with the expenditure in Mesopotamia, having been informed that is the first thing that the Committee desires to discuss. I understand that may be disposed of about 8 o'clock. If that be the case, I propose, following that, to take an Amendment for the reduction of the head dealing with the question of the scarlet uniform. If those two be disposed of, then any other matter will be open up till 11 o'clock.

Do you not think that it would be for the convenience of hon. Members if there appeared on the Order Paper to-day, instead of simply Vote on Account, the heads 1, 5, 4, 2, 3, 6 and 7, then we should have the whole of the information under one heading.

I think that would be misleading. Every Member of the House has had circulated to him this Vote with the details, and, in accordance with custom, the Order Paper to-day refers to that statement.

Could you inform us in what way you are going to put the question? Will it be the whole £10,000,000, or will you run through these headings? If you put the question of the whole £10,000,000, will you take the various reductions under the various heads which you have just mentioned?

Yes, that is what I intended to say. Although I put the question of the whole £10,000,000 to the Committee, I shall take, first, an Amendment for a reduction in respect of the expenditure in Mesopotamia.

Do you intend to confine the Debate strictly to the question of Mesopotamia, or will you permit us, for example, to refer to Persia, which I think is brought in, and, if so, what other areas in Asia will it be admissible to discuss?

It would be to the advantage of the Committee, I think, to take a definite issue as far as possible and not to be too discursive. I do not say that there may not be analogies and references to other parts of the Near East—I must be guided in that matter by the way in which the Debate proceeds—but I understand that it is the desire to concentrate in the first place on the question of Mesopotamia.

If Mesopotamia is to be taken first, would it not be convenient if we could have read to us the telegram alleged to have been receivd this morning from Baghdad? Several hon. Members have searched the "Times" and the Daily Chronicle" for this telegram and can find no trace of it. I do not know what was the newspaper in which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for India said that it appeared this morning, but it would probably shorten the Debate and save a good deal of unnecessary discussion if we could have it read to us now.

That is not a point of Order. It is open to any Minister to rise if he desires in the first place to put certain information before the Committee.

I do not know whether I might venture to appeal to my right hon. Friend, but in view of what took place at question time, would it not be courteous to the Committee to read the statement to us?

The Prime Minister intended to read the telegram, and, if hon. Members wish me to read it, I shall be very glad to do so. It is as follows: Acting Civil Commissioner made on 20th June following further announcement in regard to policy of His Majesty's Government in Mesopotamia:— His Majesty's Government having been entrusted with the mandate of Mesopotamia anticipate that the mandate will constitute Mesopotamia as independent State under guarantee of the League of Nations and subject to the mandate of Great Britain, that it will lay on them the responsibility for the maintenance of internal peace and external security, and will require them to formulate an organic law framed in consultation with the people of Mesopotamia and with due regard to the rights, wishes, and interests of all the communities of the country. The mandate will contain provisions to facilitate development of Mesopotamia as a self-governing State until such time as it can stand by itself, when the mandate will come to an end. The inception of this task His Majesty's Government have decided to entrust to Sir P. Cox, who will accordingly return to Baghdad in the autumn, and will resume his position on the termination of the existing military administration as Chief British Representative in Mesopotamia. Sir P. Cox will be authorised to call into being as provisional bodies a Council of State tinder an Arab President and a General Elective Assembly representative of, and freely elected by, the population of Mesopotamia. And it will be his duty to prepare, in consultation with the General Elective Assembly, the permanent organic law.'

May I ask whether, merely as a matter of form, there has been any communication to the Council of the League of Nations, or whether this has been arranged without that having been done?

As that is a matter of information, had it not better be pursued in the Debate which is to follow?

I beg to move, "That Item Head I., Sub-head C [Forces in other Territories, £33,358,630] be reduced by £1,000,000."

The telegram which has just been read by the Secretary of State for India comes as a complete surprise to me, and probably to the majority of the Members of the Committee. I confess that, without further consideration, I should not like even to attempt to interpret what is its precise intention and effect, and I think we should be wise to initiate and carry on this Debate with the materials already before us, having regard to the Estimates which we are now asked to pass. One of the most striking features in the Army Estimates is that the total number of men it is proposed to take, exclusive, of course, of India, to constitute what I see is described in the White Paper as our Standing Army, is 338,000 men. Of these, no fewer than 167,000—that is, about a half—are to be stationed and employed to carry on their operations in territories outside the British Empire—over 16,000 on the Rhine, 32,000 in Egypt, 23,000 in Palestine, 22,700 in what is called "Constantinople"—as I understand, the Constantinople Command—and 70,500 in Mesopotamia. Although I am not going to travel beyond your ruling—that our immediate discussion must be concentrated on Mesopotamia—it is not irrelevant to point out that the total cost of these forces to be employed outside the Empire is put down under Head I. as £33,358,630. If you add the expenditure upon these forces which comes under other heads, then I think you must add at least another £11,000,000, as far as I can make out, which brings the aggregate total to £44,000,000. Further, in regard to that £44,000,000, the Estimates are based on the assumption that in three cases—the cases of Egypt, Palestine and Mesopotamia—the forces will be reduced by one-half in the course of the year. That appears on the face of the Estimates, and, in the case of Constantinople, provision is definitely made for six months only.

The first six months of the financial year. If that assumption turns out to be incorrect, we must have in view, in respect of these various commitments, a far larger sum than £44,000,000, and £44,000,000, be it remembered—because I am afraid everyone does not remember it—which we are asked to vote for this extra-Imperial, or outside-the-Empire army, is something like £16,000,000 in excess of the total sum which was voted for the Army in all parts of the world in the year 1913–14. I must, I suppose, not ask—as if the issue had been rather wider I should certainly have been disposed to ask—one or two questions about the force in Constantinople. If the discussion is to be concentrated, and concentrated entirely on Mesopotamia, we must leave that—although I think it is very desirable to have information upon it—to a later stage. I am sure the Government will be willing to give us the information, which, I think, everybody desires on that point, and if they are, and the Committee agree, I should like to put two or three questions. Let me, therefore, with the permission of the Committee, put those questions. The whole force of what is called "Constantinople"—which I understand to mean the Constantinople Command—will include forces in Anatolia and Batum, and is 22,800, and the total sum asked for in the Estimates is £3,894,000. We are told…I am not sure we had it in answer to questions in the House, but since the Estimates were presented—that a substantial addition has been made.

In the last fortnight it has been necessary to send troops, and troops are now on the way there. But those troops are not additional troops from the point of view of the Estimates. They are moved from other garrisons—some from Palestine and some from Egypt. For the purpose of accountancy, they do not increase the total.

I only want to know. I am told they amount to something like four battalions. They are moved from other places. They are an additional force, as far as that area is concerned. What I think the Committee would like to know, and what the country would like to know, with regard to this force, what- ever be its precise composition, is what is it doing, what are its functions, and, above all, what will be its relation to the Greek force, which, we gather from the reports in the public press to-day, M. Venizelos has been authorised to put into active operation from Smyrna against the so-called Turkish Nationalists? We should very much like to know what the relation between our force and that force is going to be.

I should wish further to know whether there is any prospect, assuming this so-called Constantinople force becomes unnecessary, of it disappearing for accounting purposes from the public charge at the end of the first six months of the present financial year, which will be the 1st October next? No provision has been made for its maintenance in the Estimates, at any later date than that, and, of course, one would like to know, also, whether any further additions to it are at present in contemplation? Those questions I think it would be very desirable to have answered, in the general interest, at the earliest possible moment.

I pass to the subject which, as you have said, has been selected as the main, special issue of this preliminary part of our discussion, namely, Mesopotamia. I indicated my own view as to our proper policy in Mesopotamia in a speech which I made in the House on 25th March on the Third Reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill. I am not going to repeat what I said then. I strongly urged a policy of withdrawal and concentration—concentration, if possible, within—I will not say the Vilayet of Basra, but the zone of the Vilayet of Basra. During the three months which have since elapsed, as always happens in these cases, new troubles have arisen, encounters have taken place—a deplorable affair recently at Tel Afar, which led to the loss of gallant British officers and soldiers—and new obligations may have been incurred which make the execution of a clean-cut policy of withdrawal and concentration more difficult to-day. I still believe it to be a sound policy, both on financial and on political grounds, because what is the situation? Mesopotamia is a vague geographical expression. We have a land frontier there, as far as I can make out, of something like 2,000 miles. There are no definite boundaries. On the south you have a desert, which is peopled by a loose congeries of Arab nomads. On the north side you have the mountains, which are occupied by an equally loose, incoherent, indefinite body of Kurds, who descend from time to time from the mountain passes, and make a sweep of the surrounding country. There are no definite boundaries; in fact, you will never get them, if you are to treat Mesopotamia as an entity for administrative and strategic purposes you will never get definite boundaries. I pointed out three months ago, unless you take the Black Sea and the Caspian at one extremity, and the Persian Gulf at the other. There is nothing in between them which offers a real strategic frontier either from the North or the South. That is the country with which you have to deal. It is of enormous extent, and very sparsely inhabited, containing a population of certainly not more, and I should be inclined to think rather less, than 2,000,000 people. What are we doing? Our main force, I understand—I speak subject to the correction of the Secretary of State—to be at Mosul—the larger part of it.

Not the larger part? At any rate, the chief part. There is also a considerable portion at Baghdad.

There is a larger force at Baghdad, I understand, a smaller force, but still a considerable one, at or about Mosul, and there are scattered detachments dotted over the whole area. Further, there is a force under the command of General Malleson—because, as has already been pointed out, in Mesopotamia we are including North-West Persia for the purpose of this discussion—of something like, I suppose, 9,000 or 10,000 men.

Then that has been substantially reduced. There is a force, at any rate, and a substantial force under General Malleson at Meshed. These forces, particularly those parts of the whole force stationed at Mosul, which is many hundreds of miles from the sea, are at Meshed, through which supplies have to be taken, as I understand, along a very extended and devious route constructed in the course of the War. Those forces, for the purposes of transport and supply, are in a dangerous position. That is the general distribution of the forces, as I understand. Now I come to the question—an all-important question for the purpose of these Estimates—what are the actual dimensions of the forces in Mesopotamia and North-West Persia? In the Estimates, page 5, I notice the figure of 70,600. It appears, from answers given by the Secretary of State in the course of the last few weeks, that since the Estimates were prepared and presented those forces have been increased by 9,000.

I do not know whether my right hon. Friend would like me to explain the matter now, but it is obviously a case of misconception. The Estimates were introduced by me in February. The figures had been prepared in the month previous, and the estimate which was then taken was an estimate of the number of troops that would be in the country on the 1st April of this year. As a matter of fact, owing to the disturbed state of affairs, the reduction did not proceed at the rate we had hoped. We started the year with a larger number of native troops in Mesopotamia than we had budgeted for. In consequence, although there has been a continued diminution in the troops in Mesopotamia, there are actually at this moment more than we expected to have there at the present date. It is not a case of reinforcement, but of reduction proceeding much more slowly than we expected.

At any rate there is a larger number there than appears in the Estimates—that is the point! The number, I gather from the right hon. Gentleman, is something like 9,000. I am not at all sure that I am not right, but, at any rate, there has been a substantial increase in the force actually there, compared with the figures presented in the estimate to this House. I want to put a question which I think has been put—I do not know whether it has been put in the House, but so far as I know it has not been answered. That is as to the force now stationed in that part of the world—the force presented in these Estimates, the force which Parliament has to vote and maintain; does it include any, and if so what, contingents of the Air Force?

Do the figures appear in the Air Estimates? Apparently not! Diligent search has been made by various expert persons, and they have not discovered any trace, so far as I know, in the Air Estimates of the Air Force in Mesopotamia. There is certainly no trace of it here. Are units of the Air Force being employed in Mesopotamia? If so, how many? What is their cost? How can this Committee understand what are our commitments unless we know? In addition to the various units and items set out here, how much of the Air Force is being employed, at what cost, for the same purpose and in the same area? This is a question, I think, to which we are clearly entitled to have an answer. So much for numbers.

Now I come to what is said here about costs. The total figure given in the Estimates, page 17, under (e), is £21,605,000, which of course is preceded—as I have already pointed out—by the precautionary and encouraging heading that It is in contemplation to reduce the force … by approximately one-half in the course of the year, and the net sum provided has been arrived at on this assumption. Therefore, we have to take it that the Estimates here are based on the assumption that there will be a reduction of half the total number of troops employed in the course of the twelve months of the present financial year. My right hon. Friend has recently, in answer to a question, stated that his latest estimate is a figure per weeks which works out, I think, for the year at about nearly £25,000,000. By the latest figures given us by the War Office, the figure ought to be, not £21,605,000, but nearer £25,000,000, an addition of very nearly £3,500,000 on the figures which appear in the Estimates.

While I am still on this subject of cost, I should like to say a word as to the allocation of this cost as between the different items. The maintenance of troops—that is a simple matter. Under Head V—we are still on page 17—we see: works, £1,667,000; land, £1,000,000. Some of my hon. Friends and myself were puzzled by these figures. £1,667,000 is a very precise and minute figure. This appears to be arrived at by adding some- thing accurate and concrete and in the region of arithmetic. But £1,000,000 for land is a very round figure. This looks as it it might be speculative or conjectural. Accordingly my friends and I, having gone through these Estimates with great care, at last have got at facts, or something which seems to throw light upon the matter. What do we find? We find on page 90—a long way on—at the bottom of that page—and I ask the attention of the Committee to this—coming after numerous heads of capital expenditure for buildings at home, the Colonies, Egypt, and so on, there comes last of all: Mesopotamia and Persia, cantonments, etc., £1,064,000; military railways, £603,000. Add these two sums together, and they make £1,667,000, just the sum which appears on page 17. So far so good. But I then turn to the explanatory note on page 91—and the item "military railways" seems to suggest that we are making provision for a some what extended stay in this part of the world. Let me read the explanatory note to the Committee— The extent to which building and other works are to be undertaken for the armies of occupation in Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Persia has not yet been decided. What then does this very precise figure represent? I want that information.

Even then, if we get the information, we have still got the item of £1,000,000 for land. What is that? Is it land which has been bought, or intended to be bought, or land that even peradventure may sometime hereafter be bought? What is it? It is a very large figure. Nobody, so far as I know, can make out what it is, where it is, or what is its purpose. I should like a little further light.

I now come to the next item—still on page 17. I am very sorry to weary the Committee with these details, but they are all-important for an understanding of the case. Miscellaneous sea transport and land transport—two very large figures—are: Sea transport, £829,000; land transport, £1,415,000. There, again, one has to go a long way to try to prove what we are endeavouring to prove. Look again at page 97, Sub-head K, and the point I want particularly to ask about is—I am not going to deal with K—Indian miscellaneous charges, £7,350,000. That is explained in the note— Expenditure by the Indian Government, in respect of troops on Imperial Service, which cannot be allocated to the particular forces. ( See Head I.C.) In other words, "see Mesopotamia." Out of that large sum of £7,350,000 Indian charges, what part of that, how much, ought to be added for Mesopotamia charges, before we arrive at the final estimate of what the army of occupation in Mesopotamia will cost?

Finally, there is a small point to which I would ask the attention of the Committee. It is a very modest item, and lurks almost in obscurity. It is at the head of page 96, Sub-head E—Administration of Occupied Enemy Territories, £100 The explanatory note says that the £100 is a token sum taken by direction of the Treasury to provide for a possible charge on army funds in respect of any deficit that may arise on the civil administration of Palestine or Mesopotamia. So that we have got a token vote, by direction of the Treasury, of £100 for an absolutely undefined responsibility in regard to the civil administration of Mesopotamia. That leads me to ask: What is now the civil administration of Mesopotamia? Where does it come from? Whence is it recruited? Of what numbers does it consist? Under whose direction or control does it act? What Department here is responsible?

There is no trace, throughout the whole of these Estimates, so far as I can find, of a penny to be expended in the civil administration of the whole of Mesopotamia. Yet we know, and everybody knows, that a strenuous attempt is being made there by a pioneer or advance guard of the Indian civil administration—whether the telegram which my right hon. Friend read a few minutes ago represents abandonment or substitution, I do not know, but up to the present time, as far as we know, the tendency has been to employ Anglo-Indian methods—I do not want to say Anglo-Indian officials—for the administration of the whole of this vast territory. I should like to know about that—how much has it cost? Why have we not got something more than this token vote for £100 to guide the House of Commons in the matter? I will not hazard an estimate until we have a little more information from the Government as to what is the real cost of these operations. But, from the military point of view, you have to take it at over £20,000,000. There is no chance of a substantial reduction in the course of the next six, nine, or, possibly, twelve months. I should think, on a very conservative estimate, we are likely to expend on Mesopotamia in the course of the coming twelve months something like £35,000,000. Many people put it a great deal higher than that. For what are we spending it? When I raised this question in the Debate of 25th March the Prime Minister replied, and he said, among other things: Mosul is a country with great possibilities. It has rich oil deposits, and if you are going to undertake the expense of administering Mesopotamia it is right at any rate that the country should bear that expense. … It contains some of the richest natural resources of any country in the world. It maintains a population now of a little over 2,000,000. It was at one time one of the great empires of the world. Is it not for the benefit of the people of that country that it should be governed so as to enable them to develop this land, which has been withered and shrivelled up by oppression? What would happen if we withdrew? Does anyone imagine that if we withdrew there would be any improvement at all? If we did not undertake the task probably some other country would. There you get at the root of the whole thing, "some other country would." There are potential, contingent, speculative, uncertain, and wholly indefinite possibilities. There are oil-bearing strata, and possibly other mineral resources, in Mesopotamia. It seems to me that this is not only totally inconsistent, but is a fundamental violation of the principles upon which we entered into a covenant with other nations of the world in the League of Nations that those should be considerations which are determining British or any other policy. We have no legal footing in Mesopotamia whatsoever, and the only power that can give us a legal footing, according to the solemn covenant we have entered into with all the other powers in the world, is the League of Nations. It is their mandatory, and by this only, that we have any right to deal with Mesopotamia, either from a military, political, or economic point of view. It is for them to decide the terms and the limits of the mandate to be given. Has any such mandate been given? So far as I know it has not. It seems to me that we are maintaining a large military force, building military railways, appropriating land, and developing civil administration on the Anglo-Indian model, and that is, as it were, forestalling the ground and acting in advance of any legal or moral authority that this country or any other country can possess. This is being done at an enormous cost. I put it at £35,000,000, and I should be very much surprised if it was not more. This sum is largely in excess of the total cost of our army before the War broke out.

I make allowance for all that. We are spending this money in order to maintain territory to which you have no moral or legal title, with possibilities and potentialities, whether economic or otherwise, which are of the most uncertain and indefinite character; and surely, in the judgment of the great mass of the people of this country, in the present state of our territorial commitments and financial necessity, it is wholly beyond our power as a nation to add to the burdens under which we are already suffering. It is true that in days gone by Mesopotamia was a rich country, but it has suffered for centuries from devastation and misgovernment, as also probably from climatic and possibly geological changes, which make it a very different place from the Mesopotamia of which we read in the history of the past. Whatever may be its possibilities of resurrection, reconstruction, or revitalisation, it is certainly not a duty which it is incumbent upon us to take upon our already overburdened shoulders. If the League of Nations so desire and prescribe, let us be willing to consider—and it may be to accept—any mandate they impose upon us. You may be inclined to say that this is purely destructive criticism, but let me make a constructive point. I quite realise that we are the natural persons to whom that mandate should be assigned.

The mandate, in my opinion, ought to be confined, as far as our direct administration and responsibility is concerned, to those parts of Mesopotamia which are within reach of the Persian Gulf, and which roughly correspond to what I describe as the "zone of Basra."

No, I do not think it would. I will not say what the precise boundary would be because it is difficult to assign. The remainder of Mesopotamia, and certainly Mosul, ought to be placed under native, indigenous administration, with assistance and advice. We have a good precedent in the case of some of the countries on the Anglo-Indian frontier. Take, for example, Beluchistan, where we maintain no military force, but with the assistance and advice of British agents and British officers there is a force raised, levied, and maintained by themselves, with the operations of which we have no direct concern. That, I believe, would be a statesmanlike settlement of the mandate of Mesopotamia. It would certainly cut down both the responsibility and cost, as far as this country is concerned, within reasonable and even moderate dimensions, and we should no longer have to contemplate such possibilities as are before us now of contributing £30,000,000, or perhaps £40,000,000, out of our own taxation in a country of 2,000,000 inhabitants, with speculative and doubtful resources. At any rate, we should have a clear conscience in regard to the mandatory of the League of Nations in the discharge of such duties as that mandate may impose upon us.

I believe that to be a right and a wise solution of this difficult and thorny problem, and I could not possibly assent to a Vote such as this which, on the admission of the Secretary of State for War, would amount to £24,000,000, with other items that are necessary and consequential to it, which will certainly come to £30,000,000, and may rise to £40,000,000. This sum is to be spent upon a venture of this kind, as to which we have not, at the moment, received any moral or legal authority, and which is in no way imposed upon us either by our obligations or by the promises we have made in the past. In these circumstances, I feel it my duty to move a reduction of this Vote by £1,000,000.

I have listened with great attention to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman opposite, and I am somewhat surprised that he advocates the heroic policy of withdrawal from Mesopotamia and concentration. I believe if that policy were carried out you would be no more forward in dealing with the settlement of what ought to replace Turkish rule in Mesopotamia than you have been in the past. I am perfectly certain if his policy were carried out, and we withdrew to Basra, it would only be a few months before we should have to re-embark on military operations up to Mosul in order to bring the country to something like law and order. I do not think our expenditure in Mesopotamia can be reduced by the simple policy of withdrawal, and our expenditure there can only be reduced by establishing such political conditions in the country from the outset as will enable that country to become self-supporting in the very near future. I believe that can be done. That anything in this direction has been done during the last six months, I very much doubt. My regret is that the telegram that has been read out by the Secretary of State for India was not read out six months ago. I regret that we have not from the very beginning, from the time of the Armistice, adopted the policy which the Government have now been driven by public opinion in this country to adopt, and not only by public opinion, but by the visible effects of recent Anglo-Indian administration in Mesopotamia. I believe that the announcement that was read out in the House this afternoon will go far to enable a reduction in our expenditure in Mesopotamia. But the framing of an organic law and to set up an Arab Administration in the able hands and under the guidance of Sir Percy Cox is not enough. If we are to reduce expenditure in Mesopotamia we have to get rid of this enormous Indian garrison.

5.0 P.M.

The point, above all others, which I desire to make in this Debate this afternoon is that the continued maintenance of a large force of Inlian troops in Mesopotamia is the main cause of the political difficulties in that country to-day. It is notorious—indeed, it is historic—that the Arab and the Indian do not get on well together because neither of them have got that mutual regard the one for the other which people who do not know the Arab think might be the case. I am perfectly certain that the system of the Indian Army, with its large number of followers and with the entire equipment of an Indian Army dumped down upon the fellaheen and the towns of Mesopotamia, is a fundamental cause of racial and religious friction, and the cause of difficulty to those Englishmen who are struggling to create law, order, and progress in that country. I ask the right hon. Gentleman to get ask the right hon. Gentleman to get rid of this enormous and expensive Indian force at the earliest possible moment. Naturally, he will ask "What are you to do if you get rid of it? You must have the country protected." I quite agree, and the best way of protecting Mesopotamia from the invasion of Kurdish robbers, and of raiders from the Southern Desert, is to enlist the Mesopotamians themselves, and to train them for their own defence. If the information we have had given us this afternoon—that the mandate is to come to an end as soon as Mesopotamia can stand alone on its own national footing—is to be realised, it can only be realised when Mesopotamia is responsible for its own defence. You have in Mesopotamia some extremely good military material—many of the very best fighters in the Arab Army brought together by Colonel Joyce and Colonel Lawrence—Baghdadis and other Mesopotamians. Many of the best men in the Arab forces of the Emir Feisal to-day are Mesopotamians, and a great deal of trouble in Mesopotamia will come if you do not provide an outlet for the martial energies of men of this sort. If you are going to have the organic law, you must have at the earliest possible moment a local Arab Army, and you must call in the aid of a man like Colonel Joyce who knows how to raise and train an Arab Army, and give him a free hand. Then I believe when you have trained a certain number of Mesopotamians to defend their own country from frontier raids, a sort of local gendarmerie for the maintenance of order, you will be able to withdraw these awfully expensive Indian garrisons, for which you now talk of building cantonments and barracks at such gigantic expense to the British taxpayer.

To my mind the most interesting item in this Vote is the Token Vote for £100, which is, of course, simply inserted in order that there shall be some check by this Parliament, and very rightly so, on the expenditure upon civil administration in Mesopotamia. On that Vote for £100 we have to bear in mind that behind it, and on top of it, there is the expenditure of moneys which we collect in Mesopotamia as taxes and revenue for the extension of our administration. I have not seen the local Mesopotamian Budget for the next year, but I have seen those for civil administration for 1919–20 and for 1918–19. They were published in Baghdad, and the striking fact is that in 1918–19, when we were not in full possession of the whole country, we raised appoximately, by local revenue, towards the defrayment of the expenses of civil administration in Mesopotamia, 10,000,000 rupees, which, taking rupees at 10 to the £, represent roughly £1,000,000. In the following year we collected five times as much. We raised, in fact, over £5,000,000, and now we already run a country inhabited by an extremely poor people—the population numbers not more than 2,000,000—on a basis of annual taxation of £5,000,000 When you compare that with Lord Cromer's Budgets in Egypt, you will realise the enormously heavy taxation we are putting on the Mesopotamians.

And why? To me it seems we are in too much of a hurry. We have been trying to bring into existence in Mesopotamia a fully-fledged Anglo-Indian Civil Service, occupying every inch of the country, a service of political officers, irrigation works, and with all the concomitants of a fully organised State. I maintain that, in addition to your Indian troops, a cause of your political difficulties in Mesopotamia is to be found in these activities, and that is one reason why the British taxpayer is asked this afternoon to vote £25,000,000, or whatever the total may be, to maintain these enormous garrisons to keep the country quiet meanwhile. It seems to me that in Mesopotamia, above all places, you have to take into account the psychology and the history of the inhabitants. If you attempt to put too heavy taxation upon them in order to carry out projects, however desirable, you may merely produce reaction. When we entered Baghdad we were welcomed by the population, but if you attempt to force their development too rapidly, they will say of us, "These people are too fast for us. They wish to develop our country in a minute, and we do not want to be ruled in that way. We would far rather go back into the old, slipshod Eastern methods."

If we want to make a success in Mesopotamia, and I hold it is our moral duty to create an Arab civilisation and an Arab State there, a moral duty, made incumbent upon us after the Turk had gone, it is absolutely essential we should go slow and not promote too rapid schemes of development. Above all, we must be prepared to sacrifice a certain degree of efficiency for the sake of ensuring that civilisation shall be so developed in Mesopotamia as to induce the Mesopotamians to participate fully and freely in it. The whole keynote to the aims which we said we were fighting for in the middle East, the whole keynote of our propaganda, and I conducted some of it myself, among the Arabs during the War, was that we should give them a chance to develop their own institutions, their own ideas, their own army and their own policy. Let us do that, and then, I believe, we shall be able to cut down the Imperial expenditure in Mesopotamia in the very near future, we shall see once more springing up from the soil of Mesopotamia a civilisation which will attract all the best elements of Arabia, and we shall once more bring forward that civilisation which Baghdad possessed before the Turks came there and which made it a centre of culture, wealth and political development to a degree which was remarkable in the history even of Eastern countries. These are my views. I press them on the Government at this time. I sincerely hope that the whole spirit of their policy well be actuated by the professions which we gave out during the War and at the time of the Armistice, namely, that in Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria—in the Turkish Empire, in fact—our policy was not to secure oil for ourselves, but to liberate the people in order to develop their own autonomous institutions. The twelfth point of the famous fourteen points dealt with this matter and laid down an extremely wise policy. It will be recognised by anybody who knows the East and cares for the East, as an extremely wise policy, and I am perfectly certain that to-day religious sentiment in the Near East—religious fanaticism, can only be limited, and is being limited, by the new national sentiment which is developing throughout Asia.

If the British Empire will encourage that national sentiment, if it will help to build it up, to guide it, and to indoctrinate it with all the best of British civilisation, we shall build up another chapter in our relations with Asia even more brilliant than the chapter of the 19th Century. You cannot encourage and develop national sentiment in Mesopotamia so long as you maintain alien military garrisons there, and so long as Indian troops are present. I am not speaking so much of British officers and troops—they are perhaps less alien to the Arab than the Indian. The British officer, in the old-fashioned phrase, treats the Arab as a gentleman, and the Arab Sheikh treats him in the same way. That was how Colonel Lawrence treated the Arabs during the War. He had no authoritative position over the Arab; he was there as an Englishman who understood the Arab, and had sympathy with him, and as such he obtained great authority in the Arab army. It was a moral, personal authority. That is all we want in Mesopotamia. It is no use talking of building up an Anglo-Indian Civil Service in miniature in Mesopotamia, and going in for all kinds of works if they are merely to turn to Dead Sea fruit because thereby we have forfeited the goodwill of the country. If we are going to reduce our expenditure in Mesopotamia, and to retain the goodwill of the Arabs and the people of that country, I earnestly hope that there will be no more talk of withdrawal, but that the Government will carry out, in the letter and in the spirit, every word of that important declaration which we heard read by the Secretary for India this afternoon, and if over and above all that they are going to carry that out, they must, apart from all political machinery, at once start raising an Arab local army and get the Indian troops out of the country.

I propose to trouble the Committee for a few minutes only, especially as my hon. and gallant Friend (Mr. Ormsby-Gore), in his very eloquent speech, has expressed the views of a school of thought, to which he and I belong, on the subject of the Middle East. He, like myself, served with the Arabs and took part in the organisation of the Arab people against the Turks, and as be had longer experience of it than I had I cannot add much to the authoritative statement he has made. I would, however, like to make one observation as a somewhat independent supporter of the Coalition. I think the Secretary of State and his Department have been subjected in many respects to extremely unfair criticism for the size of the Armies, which in my opinion are necessitated by the con- ditions with which the world was faced after the War; and although it would not be in order to do more than refer to the cost of other Departments, I hope the Committee will draw a considerable distinction between the Estimates presented by a great number of Departments in this House, Estimates which it appears to me are grandiose and in regard to which entirely unnecessary schemes are put forward, and the inevitable effect of the aftermath of the War—an inevitable effect which, I am bound to say, the right hon. Gentleman who initiated this Debate (Mr. Asquith) seemed singularly to fail to grasp—that when we so singularly defeated our enemies we were necessarily driven far beyond the original objective we had in view. If I wished to be discourteous and brutal I might say to the right hon. Gentleman, who referred in rather scathing terms to those small bodies of troops scattered about the world, that had the operations been conducted by the Government of which he was the head we should never have got to these places at all, because we should never have defeated the enemy. It was inevitable that such a crushing defeat of the Turks and the way our enemies were scattered to the four winds of heaven should necessitate our troops being sent far beyond their original objective. It is all very well for hon. Members opposite to laugh, but I can say more of what happened on the Eastern Front than any of them.

Unless you were going to say, "Now we have defeated the enemy we will go home and forget all about it, and leave the country in chaos and anarchy," we were bound to keep these troops there for a time. Although I hold no particular brief for the War Office, I am bound to say that I think my right hon. Friend the Secretary for War has been subjected in many cases to most unfair criticism on the ground of the extravagance of the Department—criticisms which in many cases proceed, though not in the case of the right hon. Gentleman or of Members of this House, from utter ignorance of the conditions. There is another point. It is all very well to, blame His Majesty's Government. His Majesty's Government are not the only Government represented at the Peace Conference. There are other Governments, whose names may not be men- tioned, from whom we expected a measure of assistance in overcoming the anarchy and chaos in those countries, and from whom we have received not a single soldier and not a single bit of assistance of any kind. It is not for any of us to interfere in the domestic politics of any of our Allies, but if we do not say much, we can think a good deal about the way we have had to bear the burden. At the same time, no one can feel more strongly than I feel that it is desirable at the earliest possible moment to reduce these forces. Equally with my hon. and gallant Friend who spoke last I view with alarm the arrangements that apparently are in contemplation, or are in fact being made, to house and train enormous numbers of Indian troops in Mesopotamia. Unpleasant as this point of view or this fact may be to the average Indian statesman or soldier, it is the case, and has been the case for generations, that the Arab has a colour prejudice against the Indian. Very few Arabs are able to distinguish one Indian race from another, and in the majority of cases they are wholly ignorant of the conditions in India, but they have this colour prejudice, and so long as there are Indian troops in Mesopotamia, there is bound to be feeling or friction against the Indian garrison. The fact remains true, however, that the one soldier who is popular with these people is the British soldier and the British officer. Unfortunately, we cannot spare either the money or the soldiers necessary to garrison that country. We have to use Indian troops, unless at the earliest possible moment we create a local force.

There is one aspect of the formation of that force which has not been brought out as strongly as it might have been. In considering our military policy and what is to be the future defence scheme of the country, we are faced in Mesopotamia with the difficulty of reconciling three distinct objects. First of all, we have, if we assume a mandate, to protect that country in a military sense while it is adolescent. Secondly, we have to carry out the policy in a military sense of self-determination in accordance with the League of Nations, that is to say, that the force which is to be kept in the country must be a force to which the inhabitants of the country are friendly. Thirdly, and this is also very important, we have both on behalf of ourselves and on behalf of our Allies to prevent that country becoming a jumping-off place for any Power, whether they be Bolshevists, Kurds, or any Power hostile to the Allies and ourselves. We have in some way to reconcile all those three objects. I say it is possible to do so, and in the way sketched by my hon. and gallant Friend, by the formation of a local defence corps composed of Arabs. My hon. and gallant Friend emphasised the fact that the majority of the Arab Army with which we were associated in the last stages of the War were recruited from Mesopotamia. One or two of the British officers my hon. and gallant Friend has mentioned. I would like to mention an Arab officer who is perhaps not very well known in this country—General Neuri. He is a Baghdadi officer, and formerly served in the Turkish Army. During the campaign against the Turks he proved himself to be a soldier of no mean capacity and of great intelligence. He has recently been representing Prince Feisul at San Remo, and is in every sense a man of the world. He is a Baghdadi Arab born of a well-known Baghdad family, but is only typical of many of those who may be called the intelligentia of the Arabs, who are well educated, and, in the case of the soldiers, have a thorough knowledge of their trade. There are many such men who, in conjunction with military officers such as Colonel Joyce, could form within a comparatively short time an efficient defence force for the country.

We had an example of what can be done in that way in what was done by this country when the Sudan had been taken in 1908. We then proceeded immediately to organise a local Sudan Army, with a minimum of British officers and no British N.C.O.'s. The British officers, I believe, numbered only three to a battalion, but the achievements of the Army were wonderful. From 1908 right down to the outbreak of War there was in the Sudan not more than one British battalion, and, I think, only two British guns, and that was in a country which had been torn by internal disturbances, a country in which plunder, rapine, murder, and anarchy of every kind were far more rife than they were in Mesopotamia before we conquered it. This native army, with British influence and ideals, succeeded, with this tiny moiety of white regular troops, in keeping the country in a state of peace and prosperity which had never been equalled in the history of the administration of a native country. During the War, instead of having to increase the garrison in the Sudan as in other parts of the Empire, the garrison remained the same, and for two years at least the whole of the white troops consisted of 500 men of a British battalion, of whom the majority were over forty years of age and the youngest subaltern was aged 62. It is on those lines that a native Mesopotamian Army could be raised. It would be used only for defence. I think the Committee, instead of directing its criticism along the lines of what has happened in Mesopotamia in the past, should urge the organisation of a native defence force based on the ideals that we are supposed to support under the covenant of the League of Nations. I agree fully that it is not possible to evacuate the whole of Mesopotamia with the exception of the Basra vilayet. I entirely dissent from one thing he said. He sugested that we were under no sort of obligation to the people of Mesopotamia. As there seems to be tremendous ignorance on that subject in this country, I should like to say a word about it, because I have read the criticisms in the Press and elsewhere as to our situation in Mesopotamia, and one of the arguments which is most frequently used is, "What interest have we in the people of Mesopotamia, and what interest have they in us? We are under no obligation to them. We promised them nothing." We are under this obligation, that we took the country from the Turks. A great number of the inhabitants of the country, possibly the majority, have faithfully and loyally supported our provisional rule in that country. We have obtained administrators in the small posts. We have been training them to get big positions. We have recruited police. We have been in close touch with all the native organisations of the country. It would be a most retrograde step, it would be going back to the very worst days of little Englandism, it would be a return to the Majuba days, the days when we put a stigma upon our name which it took many years to eradicate, if we deserted those who supported us, if we were to say, "We cannot afford any longer to look after you. The Press will not allow us to do so. The oil barons have made trouble about the country. We are going to leave you to the mercy of the Kurds, the Bolsheviks or anyone else who likes to cut your throats because you supported us."

It is not for me to give any answer to the present attack on the Government, but one answer is that the policy which is advocated by many organs of the Press is one of complete dishonour for this country and a negation of what we fought for in the War. To desert these people and leave them at the mercy of every cut-throat who comes into the country without putting anything in the place of the existing administration would be a criminal act, and while I quite think the Government has got to consider very carefully its ways and means in Mesopotamia, I trust that irresponsible criticism on the lines of immediately leaving the country, to which I was sorry to hear the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Asquith) apparently give his adherence, with no thought as to what the position of these unfortunate inhabitants would be if we went away to-morrow, at the mercy of these cut-throats, will be forthwith abandoned. It is easy to overestimate the importance of Mesopotamia to the Empire, but it is equally easy to under-estimate its importance. It represents more than a bit of territory. It represents really very largely our whole relationship to our native people throughout the world. We have to do two things. We have to show these native people that we are determined to carry out to the best of our ability this policy of self-determination, which is now accepted by the Government, and we have equally to show to our native Allies and fellow-subjects all over the world, that when this country has undertaken to defend a country until it is in a position to defend itself we shall never, however great the screams from any portion of the Press, or criticism in this House or another place, give it up because it would be contrary to all our traditions, to the whole history of our native Empire, and above all contrary to everything we fought for in the War.

Like all who have travelled in the East, I most heartily welcome that telegram which was read out before this Debate began, because it shows that after a long time and much vacillation we are returning to the straight course and being true to our word. Half our trouble in Mesopotamia and half of our trouble throughout the whole of the Near East is that people no longer trust us. Why we were able to rule before was not only because we materially contributed to the prosperity of the country we governed, but because our word was our bond. I agree with nine-tenths of what my hon. Friend (Mr. Ormsby-Gore) has said and with a great deal of what my Noble Friend (Earl Winterton) has said, and I also agree to a certain extent with what the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Asquith) has said. When he talked of there being no defensive frontier beyond Baghdad, I think the frontier he must have meant to indicate was the Nasaiyeh-Kurnah-Ahwaz frontier. When I was in that country the general military opinion was that that was the only true military frontier in Mesopotamia. My belief is that with very little trouble you can redeem your word by setting up an Arab Parliament in Baghdad, that our position in Baghdad ought to be what it was before, but that there ought to be no fetters on the autonomy of the Arabs. We have a right to say, "We have policed that country, we have dredged those rivers, we have put up lighthouses, we have spent blood and we have spent money for the last 100 years, and we have a right to claim a special position." That, outside those military frontiers we have indicated, is as far as I would be prepared to see us go. I am only sorry about one thing. I am sorry this question of now giving autonomy and setting up a Parliament was done very long ago. If it had been done long ago, if the Government had done it spontaneously and not after a Press campaign, you would have had a very different situation in Syria from the situation you have to-day, because, as a matter of fact, once you begin in the East you really cannot separate units. The whole question is bound up, and there is no real frontier between Syria and Mesopotamia. With regard to the question of withdrawing our troops, I should really be the last to advocate anything that was dishonourable to this country or that repudiated pledges we have given to the people, but I think to a large extent we can withdraw safely. There is, as far as I know, no one at present who is going to attack those people. It will doubtless be said that to do so would be to inflict a blow upon our prestige. I have been a good deal in the East, and after years there I have come to the conclusion that there is nothing like the amount in prestige that people very often believe in this country. Prestige is a word invented by the French, borrowed absentmindedly by the Foreign Office, and annexed by the profiteers in order that we may hold half the world. A thing that is more important than prestige is our good faith.

I have traced all our evils in the East to the fact that we are not trusted, and that fact comes from one statement made by the Prime Minister on 5th January, 1918, which he subsequently confirmed, I think, on 26th February of this year. In that statement he said we were not fighting for Constantinople, for Thrace, or for the homelands of the Turks. He confirmed that on 26th February. What has happened since then? Those lands are in the occupation of the Greeks. That means first of all that the pledge has been definitely violated. Hence your trouble in India, Egypt, and elsewhere. Secondly, it means that we have sent in the Greeks as our standard bearers. What are we going to do if our standard is captured? Are we going to support the Greeks or are we not? I hope the Prime Minister will treat this question as one unit, and tell us what he proposes on that. From my point of view, and I think from that of nearly every man who has travelled in the East, this last thing is one of the most fantastic and cruel pieces of policy that has ever been pursued. What you have actually done is this. You have raised a host of enemies round Greece. You have ringed Greece with hostility. It will need even more than genius, it will need immortality on the part of Venizelos if he is to save his country. I should like the Prime Minister to answer quite definitely what is to happen if the Greeks are beaten. Are we to go in or are we not to go in? I should also like to ask him quite definitely how he is going to explain out attitude to the Moslems of India.

I am not sure that I should be in order in entering into a discussion of the Turkish Peace Treaty upon this occasion. It would open up a Debate of a formidable character, where there is a good deal to be said on both sides, by hon. Members who feel very strongly on both sides, and it might, I think, divert and distract the House from the subject matter of the discussion which has been arranged, I believe, between the Government and its critics. I could give a very complete answer to my hon. Friend with regard to Thrace, but it would involve the quotation of statistics, and many other considerations which I think would not be quite germane to the subject matter of the discussion this afternoon. I come to another part of his speech which is strictly relevant to the discussion to-day. He suggests that the Government has at last returned to its original intentions with regard to Mesopotamia. We never departed from them. A declaration was made in November, 1918 from which we have not departed. But at that time we were simply in military occupation. We had no power to define or decide or organise the final form of government in Mesopotamia until we were entrusted with a mandate. We have been entrusted with a mandate by the action of the Allied Powers. The moment we were entrusted and equipped with that authority we took action. It was only at San Remo that it was finally decided. That is a very few weeks ago. We at once made a declaration as designate mandatory of the Powers. It is open to my hon. Friend to say, "You ought to have settled the Turkish Treaty long ago." That is another point which I am quite willing to explain. The Government are not entirely responsible for the delay. I do not want to shift the responsibility on to anybody else, but it is thoroughly well known that when the discussions on the Turkish Treaty took place we hoped that America would come in. We are very sorry to have been disappointed. If America had come in it would have been worth all the delay. Everybody thinks so. If we had not consented to the request made to us that we should put off the discussion of the Turkish Treaty until America could decide, it would have been suggested in America that Great Britain was anxious to manœuvre the United States of America out of having any lot or part in the Turkish settlement. There are plenty of ill-natured people even in America—they are not all confined to this country—who would have been prepared to make suggestions of that character. Although the course which we took has been costly to us, and although undoubtedly it has been costly to Mesopotamia, still, looking back upon it, I feel convinced that it was the only course open to France, Italy, and ourselves when a request of that kind was made. The delay has been entirely attributable to that cause. The moment the terms of the Turkish Treaty were settled and the moment those terms were sent to Turkey, and it was decided definitely who the mandatory power should be, we immediately acted upon the declaration of November, 1918. There has been no change in our policy in the course of these several months.

I come now to the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith). I am rather disappointed with it. I have heard a great deal about that speech. Even in France it had been advertised that the great attack was coming at last. I am rather disappointed. I am not quite sure, after listening most carefully to the speech, what our offence is. At first I thought that our offence was that we had 97 pages of Army Estimates, and that we had entered into rather too elaborate explanations; but in the end my right hon. Friend explained what the offence was. It is not that we are taking the mandate for Baghdad and Mesopotamia. It is that we did not clear out long ago, on the ground that we could not afford it, and go to Basra, which is not a very sanitary neighbourhood. The right hon. Gentleman suggests that we should leave Baghdad and come right down to the marshes of Basra, on the ground that we could not afford to remain in Baghdad: but that if the League of Nations asked us, then we were to go back at once, whether we could afford it or not, because the League of Nations asked us. Let me follow that process. It is very interesting. We should have cleared out. Who or what would have taken our place? Chaos, in some form or other. There was no government. We had destroyed the Turkish government. You might have had some Arab chief, but then another Arab chief would have contested his claim. You would have had civil war, and probably Mustapha Kemal would have come down and occupied the country. The League of Nations under these conditions would have said, "We make you mandatory." And we should have gone back to re-conquer the country. We should have had to organise another great expeditionary force, because we should have had to do it thoroughly. We could not have taken chances of another Kut, and the capture of British forces. It would have had to be done carefully and thoroughly and with overwhelming forces. Twenty-five millions! The cost of re-conquering the whole country from Basra up to Mosul would have been much nearer £150,000,000 or £200,000,000. What a policy! I could understand anyone getting up and saying, "Do not touch the country. It is none of your business. Leave it alone. The moment you had defeated the Turks you ought to have cleared out." That is a clear policy. But to say that you should only clear out to Basra and stick there, and then, when the League of Nations asks you to advance, you should organise another military expedition to re-conquer the country, is about as preposterous a suggestion as could be made.

My right hon. Friend would take responsibility for the vilayet of Basra. He might even go a little further. He was not quite clear as to the boundary. But at the beginning of his speech he said, "You really cannot stop between the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf." But is not Basra between the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf? Is not Nasariah between the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf?

Whether you go to Basra, or Nasariah, or Mosul, you are up against the same problem: you must have a boundary or a frontier somewhere. The point is, where are you going to fix that frontier? My right hon. Friend seems to forget that he is responsible for the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Under the Sykes-Picot Agreement the British were to become responsible for the whole vilayet of Baghdad as well as Basra. That was the policy at that time. In view of the criticisms about the selfishness of our views about oil and grain, may I point out that under that agreement we claimed that Great Britain should have priority of right to enterprise and local loans, not merely in that area, but in the whole of that sphere of influence? That was the purpose of the authors of that agreement.

I am answering my right hon. Friend. That was his view at that time. His view at that time was that we should accept responsibility for the whole of Mesopotamia, but now he retires to Basra. What possible defence can there be for that? Clear out altogether is an intelligible policy, but not to take this marshy end of Mesopotamia, garrison it, administer it, with no definite boundary, and so divide the population. Would you do it with the consent or without the consent of the Arabs? If the Arabs said, "We want a unit of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra," are we to say, "No, this part is to be ours"? Mosul is in a peculiar position. The total forces in Mosul at the present time come to one-eighth of the total in Mesopotamia. My right hon. Friend's policy, as dictated by the Sykes-Picot Agreement, would have involved, unless it had been abandoned, a garrison of seven-eighths, at any rate, of the present garrison. We think that it is essential to the proper administration of Mesopotamia that the vilayet of Mosul should be part of it. My right hon. Friend attacks us because we have added Mosul. He does not regard it as worth our while. It is very odd. There is a debate probably at this very hour in the French Parliament where an attack is being made upon the French Government because they have handed over Mosul to the British sphere of influence.

I have not such a poor opinion of my neighbours as my hon. and gallant Friend. He has not the monopoly of honourable dealings. I do not take that view of M. Briand and other men who are pleading that it should have been added to their territory. It is because they take a different view upon the organisation of that sphere from the one that we have taken. That is all. Take the position in regard to Mosul. The population of Mosul, the leading people of Mosul, have petitioned the British Government in favour of the unit of Mosul with the vilayet of Baghdad and Basra, and I have no doubt that if you leave it to the Arabs they would prefer that it should be treated as a unit. It is essential. To begin with, it is a trading unit. Most of the trade of Mosul comes down from Baghdad to Basra. It is on the same river. The position is more or less that in Egypt, where you find that in order to command the head waters of the Nile it is essential that you should get the Soudan. It is the same political unit. It has the same population, the same race, the same religion. The intercourse between them is complete. There is no desert between them. There is nothing between their territory and Baghdad. There is not even a range of hills. Strategically it is a unit. Lord Kitchener did not take the view which my right hon. Friend takes, that there is nothing between the Persian Gulf and the Black Sea. He believed that the mountains north of Mosul were the natural boundary from a strategical point of view for the defence of Mesopotamia, and he expressed that view. It seems to be considered an argument against Mosul that there is oil there. Why? The administration of Mesopotamia will be an expensive one for some years. Is it not desirable that any natural product of that kind should be developed for the benefit of the whole of Mesopotamia? It is the most obvious course. By the Treaty and the arrangements we made, the whole of those resources will belong to the Arab State we set up. There are all sorts of suggestions that arrangements have been made with private companies There is no arrangement of any sort made with any company.

Are we to assume that the statement in the "Times" on 16th February is wrong?

You are to assume that most of the statements in the "Times" are wrong unless you have got very good reason for the contrary.

There is no question of any individual. There is a document which is signed. No company has any lot or part. The whole of the property will belong to the Arab State, subject to any arrangements which were made before the War with Turkey. There you have got to safeguard the interests of America. If the Americans claim that they got some interest, they have got the same legal rights as anybody else. If there was any document signed before the War by the Turkish Government, we must safeguard any interest of that kind. But, in so far as any arrangement made between the Governments at San Remo or any other time are concerned, the whole of the property will be vested in the Arab State and will not belong to any company.

There is no objection so far as I am concerned. I was hoping to be able to get it here to-day, but I only came back this morning, and therefore I had not time to get it before this Debate took place. If the Debate had taken place to-morrow, I should have had more time to get the documents here. I think that would be a good thing. I must, of course, get the consent of the French and Italian Governments to laying the document on the Table. We have no objection. I thought it very undesirable that in any arrangement made, the freedom of the Arab State, should be fettered in this respect, except in so far as there were any contracts in existence before the War. We are bound to respect those, whatever they are. Here, at any rate, you have got, according to all the evidence which is available, certain deposits. I agree that it has not been examined as to whether these deposits are of great or small value. That is something that no man can dogmatise upon, but the general opinion is that they are valuable. If that is so, I think it essential for the development of its territory, that the Arab State should have these oil wells and deposits at Mosul, not merely for the development of Mosul, but for the development of Mesopotamia. As to the quotation which my right hon. Friend made from my speech, I do not know what he is complaining of. I still say that those oil wells will be of great value to any State which is set up there for the purpose of paying its current expenses. What is there in that to complain of or to attack?

My right hon. Friend made great play about the cost of civil administration, and said that there is a Token Vote of £100. "Why £100? Why is it not more?" Because it is not more—not to the British Treasury. There is no deficit at the present moment in the cost of civil administration. Civil administration is paying its way both in Palestine and Mesopotamia. £100 is put down as a Token Vote to enable the House of Commons to discuss the civil administra- tion if it wishes to do so. We might have put £10 down and it would have had exactly the same object. That was the point of it. The civil administration is not costing anything at the present moment.

Then I would like at once to challenge the claim made by my right hon. Friend that the League of Nations has got to dispose of these mandates. I do not accept that. It is not the view that was taken by any of the signatories to the Treaty of Versailles. It is not the view which was taken by President Wilson, who was the champion of the League, who had no interest—I do not, of course, mean personal interest—but who had no particular interest even as representative of the United States in the distribution of the German mandates. At Versailles we laid down the terms of the German Treaty. We then met for the purpose of distributing the mandates for the German territory with President Wilson there. Under the German Treaty the German colonies are handed over, not to the League of Nations, but to the Allied and Associated Powers. By the cry terms of the Treaty it is for them to decide who are the mandatories. After all, the expense of emancipating these colonies fell upon the Allies. We took exactly the same line with regard to the Turkish Treaty. Article 94 says: The determination of the other frontiers of the said States, and the selection of the Mandatories, will be made by the principal Allied Powers. The principal Allied Powers met after that document had been prepared and decided what the mandates were. I repudiate entirely the suggestion that it is for the League of Nations to determine who shall be the mandatories of those countries.

Does my right hon. Friend mean to say that the League of Nations could meet and hand over the mandate for countries that cost us hundreds of millions to emancipate, like Mesopotamia and Palestine, to Germany? It would be an intolerable position, and we certainly could not accept it. No one ever contemplated it. I never heard that contention put forward by anyone until I heard it in this House, to my amazement, the other night. President Wilson certainly never put it forward. He was present at the meeting where the Allied and Associated Powers distributed the mandates under the German Treaty. I take the same view about the Turkish mandates, that the Allied and Associated Powers should determine who should be the mandatories. The terms of the mandate will be submitted to the League of Nations. That is another matter. The way in which the mandates are carried out will be discussed by the League of Nations. That is another matter. If there is any abuse of those terms it will be for the League of Nations to consider it. If the natives are oppressed by a mandatory, if an unfair use is made of the powers of a particular mandatory, then the League of Nations may operate, but it is for the Allied and Associated Powers, who have emancipated these territories, to determine who the mandatory should be, and that has been done.

My right hon. Friend said that he did not know of any moral or legal doctrine by which we could claim the mandate for this district. Moral, certainly. The whole cost of emancipation in money and in blood fell upon this country and no country has got a greater or higher or better moral claim, if we wish to be the mandatory for these territories, than the country which endured and suffered so much to rid them of their oppressor. As far as the legal doctrine is concerned, the legal document will be the Turkish Treaty. Under the Turkish Treaty we shall be receiving the mandate from the Allied and Associated Powers. We shall have both a moral and a legal right to this position.

I again repeat that I do not quite know what the case against us is. I can understand the case of those who say, "clear out altogether." I cannot understand the case of those who say, "take the mandate if the League of Nations wants you." What is the grievance against the Government? Does the right hon. Gentleman imagine that we could have cleared out if we intended to take the mandate and leave this country in chaos and confusion? How could we have done that? You may say there are too many troops there for that purpose. Who says so?

My right hon. and gallant Friend would be the first man in the Debate to say so.

The right hon. Gentleman says he would have more. He had better settle that point with his neighbour (Mr. Asquith) who says that there are too many there already. Having occupied the country, having decided to take the mandate, you have to hold it until you set up a Government. What have we done? The moment the mandate was given to us, we instantly took action. We sent for Sir Percy Cox, who is far and away the greatest authority in that part of the world, who exercises great sway and influence and has great knowledge and is one of the ablest servants of this Empire, and we hope that he will be here in the course of the next fortnight or three weeks. Before we take definite steps we propose to consult him as to the best method of procedure. We propose to take the views of the leaders of the Arab population as to the best method of setting up a Government. What the procedure will be, I would not embarrass Sir Percy Cox by attempting to lay down, even in outline, at this stage. I believe he is there now. He is conferring, and he will come here and give us the best advice available. He will then return, in order to carry out the definite pledge given in November, 1918, and repeated with his authority in that proclamation. He will then take the necessary steps to redeem that pledge to the Arab population. Whatever Government is set up there, it will be under the mandate of Great Britain—it will act with the advice and assistance of Great Britain. We shall have the responsibility to the League of Nations for that State. Until some steps are taken for the purpose of setting it up, we must accept the responsibility for keeping order in that quarter of the world. It would be idle for us to consult Sir Percy Cox about the best methods of setting up Arab States, if we left that country to chaos, confusion, anarchy and civil war. Such a consultation would be a sham. But, as soon as the State is set up, I have no doubt at all, in spite of the rather gloomy predictions of my right hon. Friend, that the expenditure will decrease, that the forces that will be necessary will diminish, and that, in course of time—I am not going to say how soon—this State will be a self-supporting and prosperous community. No one imagines that we are going to keep a great force like this in Mesopotamia indefinitely. The total population is only 2,000,000, and, when the responsible Arab leaders are brought into association with whatever Government is set up, I have no doubt at all that they will be able to run the State at much less expense than any foreign Government possibly could. That is the position at the present moment.

My right hon. Friend (Mr. Asquith) asked me a question about Constantinople and the Straits. We had a considerable Debate here on that subject earlier in the year, and I then made it quite clear that the policy of the Government and of the Allies was that the freedom of the Straits must be guaranteed by the Allied Powers. I do not know whether that is challenged, but that is what we are doing. It is perfectly true that we are undertaking more—I will not say than our fair share, but than our anticipated or arranged share—of the, guarding of the Straits at the present moment. France has her difficulties elsewhere, and Italy has had two or three ministerial crises which are not conducive to immediate action in that neighbourhood. But I have no reason to believe that France and Italy will not contribute their equal share to the burden in course of time. My right hon. Friend asks what are the relations between the British force and the Greeks. It is a little difficult to say that without saying exactly what the operations are, and I am sure my right hon. Friend would be the last man to press me with regard to that. Certain operations are being undertaken independently by the Greeks; certain other operations may be undertaken conjointly by the Greek and the British forces, under British command, if they are necessary; but the news from that quarter is very much better than the alarmist telegrams which appeared at the latter end of last week. May I just say at once, in answer to certain statements which I saw in the Press to the effect that the plan of campaign was something which I had forced upon the military, and that Marshal Foch and Sir Henry Wilson are against it, that, as a matter of fact, it was all planned by Marshal Foch and Sir Henry Wilson, and was only submitted to M. Millerand and myself for our approval, and we approved.

No. The Greeks generally pay their way. We have no financial responsibility for the action of the Greek forces, and we are not increasing our own forces. We are moving certain troops from other quarters, but that is not increasing our forces, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War pointed out.

I understand that whatever expenditure our forces are put to is included in this Estimate.

Certainly. There may be cost of transport—moving the troops from other quarters—and that will involve a certain addition to the expenditure, but there is no increase in the number of troops even in that quarter of the world. I am including the Mediterranean. That is the position there. I hope to be able to give more information to the House later on with regard to this without doing any particular harm. I think that the action taken is quite necessary. I do not think it is possible to have any peace in that quarter of the world unless we make it quite clear that the policy which we have laid down there must be carried through. The policy has been stated over and over again, not merely outside but in this House. Clearly, it is a policy of releasing all non-Turkish populations from Turkish sway. That has been accepted by everybody, in the House and outside. There has been a dispute about Constantinople. There the Turk is in possession. Outside, the claim is that he is in a minority; in Thrace and in Smyrna he is in a minority; the Arab States have been taken from under his dominion. The one difficulty that remains is Armenia, and I wish that that could be as easily solved. That is the policy. If we allowed Mustapha Kemal, or any man of his type, to organise forces in order to break down that policy, Europe would have failed dismally in its duty. I believe—I say so after full consultation with the ablest soldier in Europe—that we shall be able to establish authority over these areas. When it is quite clear that Europe is not going to be bullied, is not going to be hustled, is not going to be frightened, even by newspaper articles, out of the deliberate policy which it has solemnly proclaimed and which it has incurred enormous obligations in order to establish and vindicate, it will then be much easier to make arrangements. If it is made quite clear to those forces that Europe is determined, it will be easier to settle matters than it will be if, the moment there is the beginning of a little trouble there, it allows itself to scuttle and run away before any bandit who appears on the scene.

I should like to say one word of a general character in conclusion. It is very easy to point to expenditure here and expenditure there and blame my right hon. Friend the Secretary for War, who is not in the least responsible for the expenditure in Mesopotamia. He is carrying out the policy, upon which the Government and the Allies are agreed, with such forces as he has at his disposal. He may be responsible for a good deal, but for this he has not the slightest responsibility. There is no man who would be better pleased to get his forces away from Mesopotamia and from Persia, if he could do so without dishonour, than my right hon. Friend. He is carrying out a definite policy which has been decided by others. It is no use complaining, whether against my right hon. Friend or against the Government, "Look at your expenditure there and your expenditure here—£20,000,000 or £25,000,000 in Mesopotamia, and so many millions in Constantinople." The whole point is this: Are we, after all that we have done, all that we have achieved, really going to give it up through weariness of the burden? There was a moment when many of us thought the War would last another year—many well advised men. The collapse came suddenly; it came with a crack, when it might have gone on. We can see now, reading those very remarkable books written by German generals, how it might have gone on. If it had gone on, we would have gone on. This country would never have given up except with victory. But if it had gone on for another year—and we would not have shirked it—it would have added another two or three thousand millions to the burdens of this country. Victory came. Is the country, that would have been prepared to face even that gigantic addition to its burdens, going to throw away all the fruits of that great labour, that great sacrifice and burden, because it cannot keep its heart until the situation is cleared up? You cannot, the moment war is over, suddenly say, "That is over, let us clear up, let us go home, let us drop our rifles, let us shut down the War Office and the Admiralty," and here I may say I think my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer is very unfairly blamed for something for which he is not responsible. You cannot do that after this terrific disturbance. I know it is said that things are getting worse. They are not; they are getting better. Just let anyone rub his eyes and look straight on. The moment a great war is over there is of course a false tranquillity, a kind of paralysis. Nations are stunned, and there is an appearance of complete submission and quiet. It is like water at the bottom of a great fall which looks quiet, but the surging waters only come up afterwards. That is what has happened. Humanity has been dashing over precipices. Let us do our best to steer through the rapids and not crash on the rocks, even though excitable people on the banks shout all sorts of contradictory advice. If you had followed the advice of one of them you would have had a smash, and that would have suited them because that would have made good copy anyway. Then they would have started shouting at the next boat. I believe we are working our way out of the whirlpool, but let us keep steady. The nation that kept its head and kept its heart in the most trying period that has ever strained the endurance and fibre of our people can still be patient, can still be enduring, can still be courageous. We will not spend a farthing on these countries except to carry out our mission, but let us go through with it. If we do, these countries will bless us and we shall have done something which will add to the lustre and glory of this great Empire.

I am sure that the whole House and the whole country will agree with the Prime Minister that it is our bounden duty to protect all those races who have been subject to Turkish misrule. There are no two opinions about that in any quarter of the House. That was one of the things we fought for, and that is one of the greatest reasons for rejoicing at our victory, and at whatever cost we must free those unfortunate peoples from Turkish misrule. But I join issue with the Prime Minister, not on what he has done in accepting the mandate of Mesopotamia, but as to the way it is being done. I say that public money has been wasted in Mesopotamia, because you have employed the wrong sort of forces in the wrong way both from the political and military point of view, and you have adopted a wrong policy. I agree with my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Stratford (Mr. Ormsby-Gore) that when we went to Baghdad we were received with open arms by the Arabs, and had we then adopted a different policy from that adopted, we might have saved ourselves millions of pounds. It is all very well for the Prime Minister to make a very eloquent peroration with which we all sympathise, but the point is that we have got to spend out of the taxpayers' money anything from twenty-five to forty million pounds in administering a country which many of us claim could have been administered fox millions of pounds less, and what is being done we claim to be unfair to the British taxpayer and unfair to the soldiers who are employed there. I have seen a good many people who have come back from Mesopotamia recently, and I find that they all agree with this view. If you say to the expert now, "We want to occupy this country in the old-fashioned way, tell us what garrisons you want," and they will prepare for you the astonishing document which we see here. In order that I may make good the statement that it is an "astonishing document," I would ask the Secretary of State for War whether it is the fact that we still have 52,000 Indian troops in Mesopotamia. Is that so? I assume it is.

See where we are led to by this extraordinary policy. We know that the population of Mesopotamia is about two millions, so that the able-bodied and adult males in that country must be not more than about 400,000. We have, therefore, actually one Indian infantry soldier to control every eight Mesopotamians, and we have it on the best authority that the Mesopotamians are our friends. If we were to garrison India on the same figures we would require millions of troops, and this country would be bankrupt. Our policy in Mesopotamia, in the view of many of our ablest administrators, is madness. We have just said in a vague way, "You see all these places, the main centres, like Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra, and a number of minor places, and the League of Nations will no doubt endorse the mandate we receive, and we must keep it safe." Therefore, the expert produces this amazing picture. Has the right hon. Gentleman ever taken the care to consider what it would cost to administer other parts of the world on the Mesopotamian basis? I invite him to do it, and I know that when he has done it he will be the first to come down to this House, and I venture to make the confident prophecy when he sees the cost that he will own up that the administration was grossly extravagant, and if he does not do that, I shall beg his pardon, though I do not think I am likely to have to do so. On my information, which is, I believe, accurate, the whole position is unjustifiable. It may be said, what ought we to do. We ought to do what Sir Percy Cox is to be ultimately asked to do, and get into touch with the Arab Chiefs who are more friendly to us than to other people, and many of whom are frankly devoted to us through Colonel Lawrence, and ask them to form their own infantry forces, and confine our own forces to those wonderful things which science has given us instead of having 52,000 infantry soldiers stuck down in cantonments. You have spent a great deal of money putting up hutments there, and that is not fair to the troops themselves.

From the information before me I believe that what has already happened is very liable to happen again all over this widely scattered region. The last thing in the world we ought to have done was to dump down Indian infantry soldiers all over Mesopotamia in hutments, and I say that quite apart from the expense. Anybody looking at this document would not imagine that it referred to 1920. You do not want to conduct war on the principles of many years ago when modern science has provided you with the means of conducting it on the principles of 1920. I said on a previous occasion that by the policy the Government were pursuing they were shutting their eyes to the necessity of combining science with war, and that that was going to cost this country millions of money and thousands of lives. It has cost the millions already, and if we do not take care it is going to cost thousands of lives as well. The kind of force which, I am informed, would cost half of this, or less, and which would be far more formidable and which would work in conjunction with the political officer, would be a powerful and well-equipped air force and a series of powerful mobile columns, and of infantry practically none at all. Instead of that, you put down these little infantry garrisons in remote parts of Mesopotamia.

I ask the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister to give his personal attention to this, because in vain we appeal to the Secretary of State for War, whose fault it is. It is no good for the Prime Minister to stand up and say that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War has lots of faults to his credit, implying that though it may be his fault about other matters, it is not his fault here. It is his fault here. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State will not bend his mind to the real problem to which he ought to bend his mind, and he does not put the problem to the expert fairly, and if he wishes to ask the experts anything they will tell him something. That is the gravamen of the charge I make against the Government. I have said it has been very costly in money, and to a certain extent in life. I should be glad if Sir Percy Cox and the experts of the Army were called together and asked whether the view that has been put forward be not the just and right view, and whether it would not be wise to abandon the cantonments. It would save, undoubtedly, millions of money, and, what is more important, save the lives of thousands of the unfortunate Indian troops who by this futile policy are spread over the country, and who, unless steps are taken quickly, will be doomed to the disaster which has already befallen some of them.

My right hon. Friend (Major-General Seely) in his speech has overlooked the fact that there is really no such person as a Mesopotamian. He spoke of Mesopotamians as if they were a nationality and were united. I venture to submit that they are, in point of fact, composed of the inhabitants of three cities which have very little affinity, and certain loosely connected tribes. Those tribes are said to be very friendly to us, partly owing to the services, which I am sure I do not under-estimate, of Colonel Lawrence, but I can remember that they were extremely friendly towards another colonel on a former occasion until they took his life. It is true that my right hon. Friend and others have counted to a considerable extent on the friendship of the Arabs because of their hostility to the Turks. Their hostility to the Turks simply comes from the fact that the Turks were their governors. The Turks governed them easily, loosely, spasmodically. It was the easiest yoke in the world, but the Arabs hated them, because they hate any yoke. They are the same people now as they were when I knew them, and as they were in the days of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and they are only dwellers in Mesopotamia now as they were then. They are in no sense Mesopotamians, and we cannot count at all upon their friendship in the manner which has been suggested in this Debate. My hon. Friend the Member for Stafford (Mr. Ormsby-Gore) made a most excellent speech, and there was one thing in it which really brought me up, and that was the statement that, just in proportion as government is good government, so far will it be hateful to the Arabs. What we consider good government is exactly what they abhor, and they will hate us if we impose upon them anything like civilised Western administration far more than they hated the Turk. In point of fact, their hatred of the Turk was purely of a professional character, in the same way as an Irishman will write himself down against the Government, wherever he is, and whatever the government. The same is the case with the Arab nomads, and they are, I think, the majority of the population of this region which we roughly call Mesopotamia. They will the more dislike us the more of our money we spend in imposing upon them a civilised administration.

The Noble Lord the Member for Horsham (Earl Winterton) spoke of the hardship of imposing upon them the Indian Civil Service as well as Indian troops, and as an Indian Civil Servant I might perhaps be expected to object to that, but, on the contrary, I heartily agree. They do not want that class of administration which we have created in India. In India it is a matter of education. We threw every kind of modern learning at the Hindus, and created in them a love of advanced democratic administration; but there is nothing of the sort amongst the Arabs, and I hope we shall not add to our embarrassments by wasting our money in the vague, foolish, and, as I think, odious effort to impose our own views of what is good administration on nomad tribes and on the inhabitants of these three cities in Meso- potamia. Let us give them material advantages, but let us not endeavour to interfere with the psychology of the Arab people, which is still what it was in the days of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and of Sinbad the Sailor, and let me say that in Sinbad the Sailor those who read Arabic will know there is a very strong confirmation of the theory of the Prime Minister's that these three cities on the river have a common tie and should not be separated.

Leaving my right hon. Friend for the moment—and I always hear him with great pleasure—may I say with what intense satisfaction I heard the Prime Minister repudiate the doctrine that the League of Nations has anything whatever to do with giving mandates to anybody for anything, and also with what satisfaction I heard his statement that there was no cost for the civil administration. I confess I do not quite understand that, but at any rate the Prime Minister said, and I accept the statement, that there is no cost at present for civil administration and that the receipts are equal to the expendiutre. Is it quite clear that under the administration sketched in the telegram, which I was so unfortunate as not to hear, Mesopotamia in future is to be under the India and not under the Foreign Office? I sincerely hope that it will be under the India Office, with which it is far more closely connected and by which it is far more likely to be satisfactorily managed than by the Foreign Office. My hon. Friend the Member for Stafford said we should train the Mesopotamians in order to be able to withdraw the Indian troops, but again I do not understand what he meant by Mesopotamians. Who are the Mesopotamians that he suggests should be regulated and made into disciplined soldiers? Is it the desert tribes, who hate one another and unite in nothing else but in disliking one another until somebody else tries to govern them all, when they hate him more than they hate one another? Is there any good military material in these cities? If there is, it was not palpable at the time when I knew something about them. My hon. Friend took a lofty view of indifference to oil, but I was glad to hear what the Prime Minister said on that subject, and that he does not endorse the view that whatever is to happen as the result of the expenditure of British blood and treasure, no advantage must on any account ensue to any British subjects or trade. The repudiation by the Prime Minister of that doctrine gave me the profoundest satisfaction.

My hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr. A. Herbert), whom I always hear with such pleasure, laid down the doctrine that prestige as a factor in Eastern administration was over represented in this House and that it mattered far less than was generally supposed. I cannot sit here and let that pass without lifting up my voice to a totally contrary effect and to say that it is impossible for the British to continue to govern India or to rule any nations in the East if they do not maintain their prestige at that high level at which it has been maintained hitherto. The Prime Minister avoided, and therefore I suppose I should avoid, the question of the Turkish mandate, and he only referred incidentally to Armenia as being one of those countries of which we are to dispose in accordance with the mandate under the Turkish Treaty. I hope that does not mean—I do not suppose it does—that we are to have any voice in disposing of what was Russian Armenia, or the Armenian Republic in Georgia, because if so we shall never be quit of these responsibilities, and we shall never cease having troops in various places engaged in carrying out this scattered policy all over the world. The one characteristic of the Armenian is that he never can get on with any of his neighbours. He is always at variance with all his neighbours, and I will only say this about the Armenian question, that it is the only question since I have been in Parliament which is not admitted by anybody to have two sides, and in regard to which it is taken for granted that the Turk is a bad man and a Mohammedan and the Armenian is a good man and a Christian, and anybody who is satisfied with that rough definition and believes there is anything in it must know very little indeed of either Turks, Mohammedans, or Eastern Christians. However, the Prime Minister kept off that, and Heaven knows when the Prime Minister keeps off a subject it would become a private Member to do the same, anxious as I should be to deal with it, because this question is practically boycotted, and it is very difficult for a Member to speak the truth about the Turkish and Armenian question and to lift up his voice for one moment in this House unless he adopts the attitude which has been gained by gold and intrigue far more than by the merits of the question.

Before I sit down I want to say one more word on the extreme danger of imposing anything like Western administration upon the Arabs. The Turkish collection of taxes was extraordinarily agreeable in its character to the dwellers in Mesopotamia. They did not come out except now and again, in a kind of sporting state, in which they had a drive and drove the people whom they wanted to tax; when they had got them under their hands they taxed them, and when they did not come they were not taxed. That is infinitely agreeable to nomads, and if it seems that that is very extraordinary, I would point out that there is a great deal of that sporting spirit, both in the Turks and in the Arabs, and that I think both thoroughly enjoy that method of tax gathering. I repeat it because it is necessary that the House should take to heart what the hon. Member for Stafford said, that you must above all avoid imposing a sort of Indian high-class administration on these people. I do not know if I should weary the House if I ventured to give an illustration of what I mean from what actually happened once in India. There was once an Indian prince, a gang of whose subjects took to robbery, and he said, "I will stop these fellows," and he went out with a gang of his friends with guns. When he came up to the robbers they opened fire on him from behind rocks, and he returned the fire, and none of his people were hit. After this had gone on for about half-an-hour he could contain himself no longer, but jumped on the highest rock, shook his hands at the robbers, and said, "I will have all you rascals hanged; such bad shots are a disgrace to my dominions,"—because they had not killed himself or any of his followers. That shows the spirit which obtains in regard to tax gathering amongst Orientals, which is totally alien from anything we understand in the West. I ventured to repeat that little anecdote because I think it will bring home to the Committee far more than a laboured and serious statement of mine what really is the kind of attitude of the wild, nomad, free dwellers in the desert towards government, and I want to protest that no sooner shall we be installed as governors of the Arabs than, unless we draw government very mild, we shall be far more unpopular with them than ever the Turks were, whose yoke was light, although occasionally they came out with guns and swords to collect their taxes. I hope what I have said about the extreme advisability and absolute necessity of avoiding anything like what we call good government, and letting these people go on managing their own affairs, will be acted upon by the Government. The more we take that to heart, the cheaper we make our administration, the more we leave it to Sir Percy Cox, who is known and honoured all over the East, the more popular we shall be, and the better we shall carry out in fact the objects of the mandate.

7.0 P.M.

I wish to ask one or two questions of the right hon. Gentleman representing the War Office. First of all, is the Government satisfied, and are the military authorities satisfied, that our military resources are equal to our commitments in that great stretch of country which lies between India and the Mediterranean, including, Persia, Mesopotamia, and Turkey? One hears rumours of all sorts as to demands for British troops all over the world. One hears of demands for troops for Ireland, Constantinople, Teheran, and India. I should like to receive some answer from the Government whether they are fully satisfied that we have resources equal to our commitments. There is another point. I do not know what this British force at Meshed is doing under General Malleson. I heard a rumour that it was being withdrawn. Will my right hon. Friend tell us whether it is being withdrawn?

It is in process of withdrawal. The process, of course, will be a lengthy one.

I am not criticising the War Office in the least, but I think the more these commitments in Persia can be reduced the better. There is another point I should like to have cleared up. Were the War Office consulted by the Foreign Office when the Persian Treaty was brought into force? I do not believe they were. I believe constant demands have been made on the War Office without reference to whether they can carry out the policy of the Foreign Office. There is no proper co-ordination between the India Office, the War Office, and the Foreign Office. I sincerely hope there will be in the future. I trust we are not going to cut down expenditure to such an extent as to jeopardise our forces in Mesopotamia. I do not think we ought to put our forces into disposition so far from our bases.

I listened with very great interest to the speeches which were made this afternoon, and especially to the speech of the Prime Minister, and I am glad to say that, on this occasion, I was able to agree with almost every word he said. I am not always in entire agreement with him, but I think his speech this afternoon was very much to the point. I also listened with very great interest to the speech of the hon. Member for Stafford (Mr. Ormsby-Gore) with regard to the Mesopotamian forces. I have a great respect for the achievements of our native troops, and I hope the force of which the hon. Member spoke may be raised, and may do very great service to the Empire. The reason I have risen is to appeal to the Prime Minister not to be misled by adverse criticism, such as emanated from the Leader of the Opposition, or by the vision of reducing the expenditure at once, or even by the prospect of forming a large force of native troops in Mesopotamia, into risking the security of our white troops there, by false economy, or by a withdrawal of so much of our force there as to endanger the position of those of our white troops who remain. I quite agree we ought to hold Mesopotamia now we are at Basra and Mosul. I do appeal most strongly to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for War to maintain our troops in that part of the world at a strength, which will insure the security of our white troops there. I am perfectly certain the majority of Members of this House, and certainly a large majority of people in the country, will support him in maintaining the security of our white troops in Mesopotamia. I do trust the Prime Minister will act up to the words he spoke this afternoon, and that the Secretary of State for War, in whose patriotism and anxiety to support our troops in every part of the world I have great confidence, will be firm, and not be led by any criticism into risking our gallant troops in Mesopotamia.

We on these Benches cannot at all appreciate the policy which is being pursued, and we think that these Estimates are launching the nation into a greater debt than ever, and that we are not in a position to pay for them. The Government is undertaking liabilities and responsibilities in Mesopotamia which, we believe, are not at all in harmony with their promises and pledges. We think, too, the policy which the Government is pursuing is a repudiation of the policy which inspired many of our men to join the colours, and is directed and guided, not from the purest motives, but it is due to the financial influences outside the House of Commons, and perhaps inside as well. It seems to us as if they have not gathered any experience as a result of the War. Instead of the War and all it has cost having a sobering influence upon the mind of the War Office, they are launching into new schemes and new responsibilities which will add to the debt of the nation. I interrupted the Prime Minister when he suggested that the motives were entirely pure. According to a leading article in the "Times" of 20th May: The whole atmosphere of our proceedings in Mesopotamia and Persia appears to savour more of syndicates than sense. On February 16th last the "Times" said, The Persian Government has granted an option to a powerful British syndicate for the survey of a railway, from Mesopotamia railhead at Kuretu via Kerman-shop, Hemadan and Kasvin to Teheran, with a branch from Kasvin to Enzeli. We believe that these are the influences which have led us into huge financial liabilities and responsibilities, which we think the Government have no right to undertake in the light of the promises that were made to those who served and made sacrifices in the War. Instead of the development of Mesopotamia, we say the Government are under an obligation to develop our own country. We see that one of the items of expenditure for Mesopotamia is £1,667,000 for Works? What are these Works for?

When they are undertaken they will be for the purpose of affording shelter to the troops billeted in Mesopotamia.

As a matter of fact, these works have not been begun, because of the uncertainties.

If there were no troops there, these works would not be required. Again, there are £1,000,000 for land and £354,000 for railways, mechanical transport, and inland water transport stores. Surely, if there is any country which wants development, it is our own country. We have men in search of employment, and we want railways, and if there is a surplus capital, why should we send it to Mesopotamia? We have land in our country laden with all kinds of mineral wealth, and everything essential for industry, but we cannot develop our own resources, because we are told we have not the means to do it, and the want of transport. But we can relieve the difficulties of all other countries, instead of utilising our own resources to carry out our pledges and promises to our own people. We on these Benches desire to repudiate the Government policy and shall certainly vote against these Estimates. The Prime Minister said that he could understand the attitude of those who say, "Clear out of Mesopotamia. Well, that is the policy of the Labour party. It seems as if we are still drunk with the spirit of war. We cannot afford to squander our resources, which come out of the British taxpayer, when we have got a debt of £8,000,000,000 and a revenue of £1,000,000,000, and to meet the requirements of the nation we have to sell our stores which were bought out of borrowed money. This policy is leading us into a bigger maze than ever, and is making the possibility of the Government carrying out its pledges and promises more remote than ever. We have embarked upon responsibilities and liabilities which will mean an additional cost to the taxpayers. We say that it is not due to consideration of the national need that that policy is being pursued. The Prime Minister said that we had no interest in Mesopotamia. We on these Benches suggest that that interest is oil—not very palatable, perhaps, for the British taxpayer. A question was put in the House to the First Lord of the Admiralty on the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, to which the right hon. Gentleman replied that the amount held by the British Government in the company was: Ordinary shares, £22,000,000; Preference shares, £1,000; Debenture shares, £199,000; total, £2,200,000. The value of these shares, he said, had considerably appreciated. But the "Stock Exchange Gazette," some time last year, showed that the ordinary shares were selling at £20 each. There are over £2,000,000 worth of shares held by the Government? We have no right to say that it is high moral motives that have inspired the policy of the British Government. The policy we have advocated from these Benches ought to be pursued still further in this country and other parts where we have interests, not only part-shares. We ridicule the policy of the Government. Is it right to violate pledges and promises made to the electors? If we have got to carry out a policy of reconstruction necessitated by the aftermath of the War, then we suggest we should commence at home. If we have capital to squander—which we have not—we ought to utilise it to build homes for the people and to provide those amenities so much required in this country.

I feel so strongly on the subject that I feel bound to say that I was not satisfied in one direction at the Prime Minister's speech this afternoon. I do not think that he put quite sufficient strength into that part of his speech in which he referred to the intention of the Government to set up an Arab Government in Mesopotamia. But the point I am anxious about, and that I think is a real danger to the country is this: To-day we have heard that in Mesopotamia the maximum force of Indian troops is quite inadequate to deal with a rising on the part of the Arabs, a rising which might quite easily occur at any moment. You admittedly have small parties of men in this immense country and there might be irritation on the part of the Arabs against the presence of the Indians, to which allusion has already been made, and there might be an outburst which would be disastrous to the British name throughout the whole of the East and, indeed throughout the whole of the world. The danger is not, I think, sufficiently realised in this country. There is danger even with small parties of Arabs over which there does not seem to be any great control. They might cut our communications, and that would entail a hugh enterprise and a hugh expedition such as the Prime Minister mentioned. This might cost us into millions of pounds. I do not pretend to have great knowledge of that part of the world. I have not. But it has not been mentioned this afternoon, I think, sufficiently strongly—quite apart from all questions of oil and so on—which I may say with all respect are the matters which are not really important, though they may be so in some instances—the great danger that exists to the prestige of our country in leaving small parties of troops scattered over this great area when we know there are at this moment 200,000 Arabs armed with British rifles who might easily create a disaster. I should like the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War to say definitely whether or not he is satisfied with the situation as he finds it in Mesopotamia to-day, and whether he has received assurances from those who are in command on the spot that they will be able to withstand any rising, whether it is from jealousy, ill-feeling against the Indian troops, or from whatever cause; and that the British troops are in a position to maintain the great name of this country in that wide area. I feel it necessary that the right hon. Gentleman should give some assurance to many who are extremely anxious as to a position which at any moment we may find ourselves in. For these reasons I feel bound to utter a warning as to what may occur in the near future.

I regret the Prime Minister is not here, because I should like to convey my approval and appreciation of his entirely new peroration, and one which was very suitable indeed to a sultry day. I know him sufficiently well to make this deduction from the very eloquent conclusion of his speech: that he is mainly desirous of drawing the attention of the House away from the charges which have been levelled against his Administration by the leader of the Opposition. The Prime Minister referred to a declaration which was made in November, 1918. I happen to have the exact words of that declaration. It referred to Mesopotamia. This was a declaration jointly made by this country and France. The words are these: Far from wishing to impose any particular institution on these lands— said France and Great Britain— they have no other care but to assure by their support and their effective aid the normal workings of methods of administration which they shall have adopted by their own free will. The claim of the Prime Minister was that from that declaration they had neither in spirit nor in action departed. But a more extraordinary record of administration on these lines than that of the Government during the past 18 months I have never heard. What is being done? First of all, as to cost. The Estimates for this year runs, on the admitted figures, well up to £25,000,000. From what has been shown already it is very safe to assume that the cost will at least approach £35,000,000. That is by no means the whole of the story. We are entitled to ask what did it cost last year? The figures are here in the Estimate before the Committee. It cost there nearly £33,000,000 for a precisely similar service. The exact figure is £32,890,000 for Mesopotamia, including North-West Persia, exactly the same service as the Government are estimating for to-day.

I am talking about the total cost. In two years our administration in Mesopotamia and North-west Persia will have cost this country very little short of £60,000,000. I should like to press my right hon. Friend for an answer to one or two points which have been put before him by my right hon. Friend. Will he tell us what is the estimated cost of the operations of the Air Force in addition to the sum given here for the operations of the Army? Will he also relieve our anxiety on a point on pages 96 and 97, under sub-head L, in the Miscellaneous Charges? Is it or is it not the fact that there is expenditure for troops by Indian Government in respect of these Imperial Services which the Indian Government is going to pay in the first instance, but which we shall have to repay?

I ask this further question: Are the forces under General Malleson at Meshed included in the British Estimate or do they fall under the Indian Miscellaneous Charges? In short, what I want to know is this: Does the Estimate of £15,825,000 represent the actual cost of the troops that are there, with probably tens of thousands to follow? Where does that charge come? We are entitled to know what is the actual cost of this great undertaking. The Estimate which has been given is one which, so far as I can see, does not disclose all the facts, although I want to say this at once, that the way in which this Estimate is drawn up has certainly given us more information than any other form in which the Army Estimates have so far been presented. The new system has given us a further amount of information for Debate purposes that otherwise, and on other occasions, we have certainly not been able to obtain. The £100 Token Vote was also dealt with by the Prime Minister. He said that at present it is costing the British taxpayer nothing. That may be so at present. But I think we are certainly responsible for it, and if the estimate given by the right hon. Gentleman is at all correct, this is what has happened: That these 2,000,000 people under the most recent Budget are raising £5,000,000, presumably for civil administration. That is, they are being taxed at the rate of over £2 per head. We have had a speech from my hon. and gallant Friend opposite who has some knowledge of Indian affairs, and he described with all his knowledge the intense irritation caused by the taxation of a nomad people. How long are you likely to raise this £5,000,000? The civil administration of Mesopotamia next year will not be a token vote but a substantial lump sum. The irritation which is spreading rapidly in that country, and the riots which are bound to take place, will leave you with no money at all for the civil administration we are imposing on that country. This is one of the charges we make against the Government. They set out with high ideals as shown in the Declaration of November, 1919. You start with an expenditure of over £32,000,000, and you are going to limit us this year to £25,000,000. You have to-day between 70,000 and 80,000 troops there, and it has been admitted upon expert knowledge to-day that our military forces, large as they are in that country, are in a dangerous position, and they fear not that we have too many, but that we have not enough troops there. I think that is a very remarkable state of affairs for the Prime Minister to be proud of.

What did the right hon. Gentleman get the wild cheers of this Assembly for? For a record which has landed this country into an expenditure in two years of over £60,000,000. The right hon. Gentleman was wise enough to say that it is a very open question as to when we shall arrive at the passive condition under which the new Arab Government will begin to function with any degree of efficiency. It is only a hope. I think the hon. and gallant Member for Stafford (Mr. Ormsby-Gore) was right when he said that it was the pressure of public opinion which alone had been the means of bringing about the declaration that we are going to revert to the policy of November, 1918, and administer that country in accordance with the ancient traditions of this country in dealing with alien subject races, and that they should be managed not for our benefit, but for the benefit of those who live in them. If this system had been tried in India we know what would have happened. There would have been atrocities, and we should not have been able to hold the Indian Empire. The whole policy has been wrong, and now the country is awake to the fact that their hard-earned millions have been poured out in a ceaseless stream of reckless and irresponsible extravagance, and that is what is happening. The Chancellor of the Exchequer does not know which way to turn to raise the necessary money for our abnormal expenditure under peace conditions in this country, while thousands of miles away millions have been poured out by the score.

It is here and here alone that we can exercise any influence over these matters. It is hard work to check the Estimates, taking a few millions here and there, and £500,000 on another occasion, and find that we are voted down every time. Here you have a case where the Government carry out their policy solemly set down between this country and France in November, 1918, and but for this policy this country would have been the better off by scores of millions to-day, and we should have saved many precious lives, and there would not have been that wastage of life which always goes on even when no actual combats take, place and which is due to sickness, and devitalisation of the best of our British manhood. Instead of being carried away by the answer of the Prime Minister, I have never felt more confirmed in my view that the House of Commons will not be doing its duty if it does not register its strong, earnest, and sincere condemnation of the policy of His Majesty's Government in Mesopotamia and North-West Persia.

I fail to understand what the object of the last speaker was except to criticise. He did not say whether the policy enunciated in the telegram met with his approval or disapproval.

The hon. Member could not have been listening to what I said, because I stated more than once that I welcomed the new policy announced today.

The right hon. Gentleman does not suggest that we should evacuate immediately, and he does not deny that the new policy demands the presence of British troops. I wish to call attention to an observation made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ilkeston (Major-General Seely), who said that our present method was more in accordance with 1815 than 1920, and he seemed to base his charge upon the statement that the means we had at our disposal were not the right means, and led to greater dangers than the job we have undertaken would normally lead us into. He also said we were not using all the scientific aids which would help us to complete what we had undertaken. If that is so, it is a very serious charge. The right hon. Gentleman is not the only Member who has emphasised that point, and I ask for a clear statement as to whether that charge is correct or otherwise. If we are not utilising all that science can give to us in the undertaking we are committed to, will there be any assurance given that in the further prosecution of that engagement in this part of the world all that science can do in assisting us will be done, so that we may successfully complete the work to which we have put our hand?

I only rise to answer the specific questions which have been put, and not with the object of continuing the general Debate. I do not feel that I could in any way add to or improve upon the impression created by the Prime Minister in his broad general treatment of the subject. My right hon. Friend asked me to state for the benefit of the Committee before proceeding to a Division, what was the expenditure at the present time upon the Air Force there. It is about £450,000 a year, and the total number of men are about 1,000 or 1,100, including natives. Three squadrons are actually there. Then I have been asked a question about the item on page 96 which has come in for an ample share of attention from two right hon. Gentlemen who have spoken. The question was whether that item included anything for the maintenance of General Malleson's force at Meshed. The answer is "yes," and £2,000,000 are included in that figure for the maintenance of that force this year. The force is controlled and administered from India, but the charge for it has been placed upon the Army Estimates. Orders were given some time ago for the withdrawal of this force. That withdrawal is in progress, and I am informed that it will be a matter of four or five months before it is completed, although every effort is being made to accelerate its withdrawal. Therefore it is probable that the expense will not be limited to the £2,000,00 taken in the Estimates.

The hon. Member for Tonbridge (Lieut.-Colonel Spender-Clay), approaching the subject from a directly opposite point of view, asked whether we were certain we had enough troops in Mesopotamia. I do not deny that in this respect the resources at our disposal there are heavily strained at the present moment. When you consider what our commitments are in Cologne, in Ireland, in this country, in Constantinople, Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Persia, when you consider that we are discharging all these commitments in countries where there is every variety of disturbance and unrest in different forms and in widely different sphere; when you consider that we are discharging all these responsibilities with a voluntary Army only that we have been able to enlist by voluntary methods since the Armistice, I think that should excite feelings of concern in the breasts of all who have studied these questions, and it should excite feelings, I will not say of gratitude, but at any rate of appreciation, of the efforts and exertions of the military authorities who have been able to bring these forces into being in such a short time, and who are actually discharging these grave and serious responsibilities in so many different parts of the world.

I have only one more word to say, and it is suggested to me by the curious criticism which my right hon. and gallant Friend, the Member for Ilkeston, has made, and to which my hon. Friend below the Gangway (Mr. Seddon) has drawn particular attention. My right hon. Friend says that we have adopted the method of 1815 in the year 1920, and he makes it a specific charge that I am advocating that course. Nothing can be more unjust, and I should have thought that no one knew better than my right hon. and gallant Friend that nothing could be more unjust. Apparently, this is outside his usually wide sphere of knowledge. As a matter of fact, I think I was the originator of the suggestion that the Air Force should be given a free hand to develop control in Mesopotamia, and no time has been lost since then. The Air Staff have drawn up detailed plans, and Sir Hugh Trenchard has prepared a scheme, and a high officer of the Air Force has been touring about Mesopotamia and has arranged a scheme with the military General on the spot. Therefore, these plans are in readiness and we are in a state when they can be submitted for Cabinet approval. When they have been submitted, however, and approved it will take more than a year to raise and train and develop the Air Force necessary to give effect to them. So far from making such a charge as he did against me, or against the Government, my right hon. Friend ought to have been sufficiently well-informed to know that exactly the contrary to what he suggests is the case.

We all know that my right hon. Friend was the apostle of scientific warfare before the Armistice. He has now, however, admitted there are 70,000 men in this small country and an air force only 1,000 strong. How can he justify that?

That is a very good specimen of the kind of criticism to which we are subjected. Everybody knows that when the War was over a great mass of the men and mechanics in the Air Force disappeared. We have since been struggling to recreate from the original element a force sufficiently strong to discharge its proper share in the business of defending the British Empire. We are succeeding, and perhaps we should have more rapidly achieved our ambitious and far-sighted policy had we only enjoyed the great advantage of the continued assistance of my right hon. Friend hope I may appeal to the Committee to take the Vote on this subject without any further delay, because there is another subject to come on this evening which raises matters of keen feeling that excite general interest among Members, and when that subject is disposed of there are other items on the Estimates to which I know a good many hon. Members wish to refer to. I therefore venture to appeal to the Committee to come to a decision.

It is not my intention to say very much, but I want to express my regret at the last statement of the Minister for War. Towards the end of the War we were gradually producing an efficient Aeronautical Department. We had produced the finest and most efficient Air Service in the world, a service which, I respectfully submit, would have done the entire punitive work in which the British Army is now engaged in Mesopotamia at a fraction of the cost which is being incurred. Today, had the War Minister spoken truly, we have practically no Air Service at all, and that is largely due to the hysterical criticisms of the Opposition, such as it is, on the whole war policy of the Government. The unfortunate part is that hon Members of this House seem to think that we are embarking on a new war. That is not the case at all. The state of war has in fact never ceased, and the fact that one of the principal combatants ceased fighting was no justification for this Government to assume that peace had come on this earth. The action which we are taking in the East to-day—and on this I find myself for the third time in four years on the side of the Government—is, I would like to think, only part of the considered policy of the Government for maintaining the prestige of these islands in the East. It is all very well both on platforms and on the floor of this House to echo the popular Press campaign for economy. I have no doubt that a little later on this evening we shall have many references to it in connection with another subject.

The Prime Minister this afternoon made one of the most eloquent speeches he has ever made in this House. It gave us the impression he was absolutely sincere, but it also made it clear there was an atmosphere of apology in the statement, for the right hon. Gentleman seemed to be excusing the Government for realising that until we do, by the employment of the sword, which is so much jeered at now after eighteen months of supposed peace, establish order it will be impossible for the nations of the world to settle down to peace. I only wish the Government would make it more clear that that is so. I wish, too, that the Prime Minister or the Minister for War had gloried in the work they are doing and not apologised for it. They are doing it in the face of the opposition of this House, such as it is. They are doing it in the face of the Press of this country, which is shrieking for economy. The Prime Minister pointed out that the cost of continuing this war on the old scale of fighting Germany for one year would allow us to continue the administration of constitutional government. That is our task, and those who believe that the nebulous League of Nations is going to produce peace may continue in their belief. I believe the Lord President of the Council is the head of that move-

ment. I appeal to hon. Members of this House to realise that I am not speaking in a Jingo spirit when I urge that this country has a mission in this matter to put all its strength into establishing law and order, and, above all, in maintaining our prestige in the East, which so many hon. Members treat as of such little account. No matter how much they may wish to harass the Government for ulterior or party motives, I appeal to them not to do so in this matter of the fulfilment of the work they have started out to do—the work of bringing peace. It has been suggested we have won the War, but it is quite possible, if the Government do not persist in a strong policy, that we may lose the Peace. I gather from their cheers that very many hon. Members agree with me. I hope they will have the courage to support the Government in the Lobby in the face of popular opinion, which is for economy at all costs, and I beg them not to sell for the sake of a few millions what has cost us already many thousands of millions in money and, what is more precious, the best blood of our country.

Question put, "That Item Head I, Sub-head C, be reduced by £1,000,000."

The Committee divided: Ayes, 50; Noes, 285.

Original Question again proposed.

BRITISH ARMY.

RE-CLOTHING.

8.0 P.M.

I beg to move—"That Item Head V., Sub-head A [Stock Accounts], be reduced by £500."

I bring this forward for the purpose of raising the question of what popularly is called khaki versus scarlet. We have just had what the right hon. Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith) might describe as a vogue, indeterminate, distant and remote subject under discussion, but now we come to something very near home, something which has really seized popular imagination. We are dealing with a subject in which sentiment and commonsense, economy and efficiency can go hand in hand. When the subject was first raised the Financial Secretary to the War Office was pleased to say that we were going to spend £3,000,000 on turning the Army from khaki into scarlet, for the sake of esprit de corps. I ventured then, I hope not rudely, to interrupt him and to suggest that there was some esprit de corps in the Army during the four years of the Great War, and that it was won and maintained in khaki. Khaki was the colour of the Expeditionary Force. It was in hkaki that Lord Kitchener called upon the manhood of the country and met with a response more wonderful than has ever been known in the history of the nation. On the sentimental side I say that khaki was good enough for war, and is good enough for peace. Let us leave sentiment for a moment, and look at the question from a business point of view. The Army of to-day is a business Army. I hope we have ceased dragging men to the Colours by mere gew-gaws and millinery. We have sought—and the Government are to take great credit for it—to put the Army on a business footing, to give the men a decent wage. Instead of providing them with a dead-end when they leave the Army, we offer them good emoluments and good opportunities, so that when they return to civil life they may become useful and productive citizens. So I say that the lure of scarlet has gone for ever. I take the War Office attitude itself. I have a leaflet in my hand. "Opportunities in His Majesty's Army. Experience counts. A few years with the Army fits a man to go anywhere or do anything." There there is no lure of scarlet. That is a fair business proposition which is put before the manhood of the country, and we have it from the Treasury Bench that it is a proposition which is attractive to the manhood of the country and recruiting is doing very well. I could go through this list to show hon. Members, if they have not paid particular attention to the subject, that the Army is offering to-day good wages and good opportunities to the manhood of England. I hold in my hand a rather remarkable, well-devised and attractive placard. It is almost equal to those we had in the War. The pictures here are in khaki and not in scarlet, an obvious suggestion that the War Office quite well believes that the lure of good pay and a trade when they leave the Army is good enough for any honest, straightforward Englishman. "His Majesty's Regular Army. Old and the new rates of pay. Comparisons No. 2." Here you see the wonderful comparisons set out with all the money and the Treasury notes which can allure a man to the Colours. A regimental sergeant-major in August, 1914, took 5s. per day. To-day his pay is 14s. An ordinary private has 1s. a day to be shot at, as we used to say. To-day he takes 2s. 9d. and after two years 3s. 6d. a day. A company sergeant-major who used to get 4s. now gets 10s. A quartermaster - sergeant who previously had 3s. 6d. a day now gets 9s. 6d. A sergeant has been raised from 2s. 4d. to 7s., and a corporal from 1s. 8d. to 5s.

I quote those figures because I feel it is necessary to make the point plain that the Army to-day is a business proposition for any man in the country, that we want to get away from the old stupid idea that it was necessary to trick out a man sometimes in a showy uniform in order to attract him to the Colours, in order that he might walk out, as they say, with a nursemaid or a cook. In my opinion, the national sentiment in this matter has been strongly aroused, and national sentiment is of much more importance than the extravagant whims of Whitehall. I have received hundreds of letters on this subject, not only because I have taken a somewhat prominent part in the matter in the House, but because from my peculiar position I get a great number of letters on any subject which touches the public mind or seizes the popular imagination. [ Interruption. ] I am putting the case which the country wants put. If the hon. Member has anything to say, let him be courteous and say it when I have finished. I hope I shall hear no more of his interruptions. I have received hundreds of letters. I must admit that I have received one in favour of turning the Army back into scarlet, and that is from an admirable man in His Majesty's dockyard at Gibraltar. Let me make a point against myself, because he said, "Let the Army settle the question. What glorious pages of history do those scarlet uniforms unfold! Salamanca, Heights of Quebec, Alma, Thin Red Line, and so on. We fought and won, in scarlet, £3,000,000 to keep green the memory of those gallant fellows who fell in scarlet for King and Empire in days gone by." A very admirable sentiment, but the millions of men who fell in scarlet in days gone by are nothing to the millions of men and the glorious rivers of misery which have flowed in khaki in the Great War from which we have just emerged. I have a letter from a man in the Wellington Barracks, Dublin— I do not know one soldier here who wants it. That is, scarlet. Here is another— I think that the £3,000,000 the War Office is desirous of spending on the garish colours of pre-War days to clothe our soldiers would be better spent in starting factories to find work for the unemployed ex-service men. Here is another— If Mr. Churchill wishes to leave his name on the roll of fame, let him turn over the £3,000,000 to the Ministry of Pensions to be given as a clothing bonus to all disabled men under treatment. I could quote other letters to show that there is a very strong public feeling which must be recognised in this matter, and I think the Government have shown a lack of what we call imagination in plunging us, as they did, into this £3,000,000 suggestion without any consideration. Let me quote one more letter from a woman. She says: I wish you would read this letter in Parliament. I think it is worth reading, and I will do so— Next time you are conversing with Mr. Churchill regarding the Army going in red, will you be kind enough to ask him to increase the separation allowance of soldiers' wives and their children, as it would be much more appropriate than putting the Army in red. My husband is a private soldier in Belgium, and all my allowance is 23s. per week to keep me and a son of eight years. I am 39 years of age and in a delicate state of health, and not able to work. I have already written to Mr. Churchill on the matter, and had a reply back to say I could not be allowed any more. I think a little more money for the wives and children of soldiers to feed them properly would be much more beneficial than red tunics for the men and gold lace for the officers. The right hon. Gentleman may think these letters show a wrong spirit, but I beg him to realise that that is the feeling right throughout the country, and in this time of great financial pressure, when everyone is feeling the weight of taxation, the idea of spending £3,000,000 on what we regard as an unnecessary change from khaki to scarlet is a proposal which is received throughout the country with dismay and almost with disgust.

The attitude of the Government on this matter has not been quite straightforward. I think their idea was that they were going to bluff the House of Commons into this £3,000,000 Vote. I remember perfectly well the whole proceedings, and I remember the Financial Secretary said that it was to be a £3,000,000 outlay. He said on 19th May that the total initial cost would be somewhere about £3,000,000. I think we know something of these somewhere-abouts. We know that when expenditure is started on in this way we cannot track it and trace it to its ultimate end. I object to the attitude the Government have taken up on the matter. First of all, we were told it was £3,000,000. Then we were told by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Churchill) that the Government were so committed to this matter that it really was no good the House of Commons objecting to it. It was finished. We had the phrase that the looms were already turning, and when we tackled him on that point the other day he had to admit that he had not been quite candid to the House, that orders had not been given, and that absolutely nothing had been done, except so far as the Foot Guards were concerned. The looms were not turning, and it is to be still left to the House to review the whole policy and express its opinion upon it and make it effective. We had the Chancellor of the Exchequer on this matter. He, of course, always comes out with a full chest and a stand-or-fall attitude, and he was pleased to tell us that if we objected to this matter it was a case in which the Cabinet's decision had been taken, and he said in effect: "If you turn it down you will have to find successors to the present Government." I am not out finding successors to the present Government. I believe this is the only Government possible at the moment, and I shall support it whenever I think it is right But I am perfectly certain in my own mind that it is entirely wrong in this matter, and it must listen with patience, and I hope, if the vote of the House is against it, it will act on the vote of the House. Having had some experience of politics I am a little tired of the idea that because a vote of the House goes against the Government the Government must immediately throw up the sponge. I wish we could get a new idea, that when the House of Commons frankly and honestly passes its opinion against the Government on a matter which is not a great or vital important matter of policy, the Government ought to bow to the opinion of the House and not come out in the bombastic furioso attitude: "If you disagree with us we shall disappear." I do not want to see the Government disappear; but I want them to take a straightforward, sensible and common-place attitude on this matter of khaki versus scarlet. In passing, I do not think the attitude of the Government was quite candid in the matter of the sword, which is in a sense part of this question We were told by the right lion Gentleman who now sits on this side that the sword was optional in the case of air officers, but within five minutes we were told that no man could go on ceremonial parade without a sword. Optional to buy but compulsory to wear! It is that sort of thing which makes one feel that the Government has no real policy or opinion on this subject, and when we are told by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that the Cabinet had come to a decision, I should like to know more on that matter. I do not know whether we are going to be honoured by the presence of the Secretary of State for War. In a matter of this importance he might have shown us the courtesy of being present. We all want to dine, but there is something more important than dining, and that is the interests of the country and the interests of public economy. If other people can stay here and go without their dinner it would be only courtesy if the right. hon.

Gentleman, who is the chief spokesman of the War Office, had been hear to listen to something we had to say. But as dinner is so important, I pass that by.

I am all for brightness and colour in our drab life, and I believe in pageantry, but I do not believe in tricking out our soldiers in these pre-War comic opera uniforms, as many of them are. I wanted the right hon. Gentleman to let us see these uniforms, and to let us judge of the scarlet and gold and the plumed hats and the busbies as compared with honest, straightforward working uniform in which our men fought and won their glorious victory; but he refused the suggestion. All the esprit de corps and all the love of a regiment can be attained by having distinctive badges. I wish the right hon. Gentleman were here. I do not say that it would make my speech more effective, but it would he more pleasure for me to address my remarks to the right hon. Gentleman, because I have had sufficient experience of political life to remember the time when he stood almost where I am standing—a violent apostle of economy in the Army. I can remember the time when he inherited that great tradition of economy from his father, and I remember, in passing, that I learned the first principles of Tory democracy from the late Lord Randolph Churchill. Lord Randolph Churchill resigned his position in the Government as Chancellor of the Exchequer, as a protest against the sort of extravagance against which I am protesting. I admit that historically he forgot someone in doing that, but he remembered his duty and left the Government. The right hon. Gentleman, who is taking his dinner while I am speaking, left his party on the question of economy. I remember him standing up from his seat below the Gangway night after night and denouncing the Government for their extravagance, and he passed to this side of the House. I admit that it was a less expensive action than that of his father, although equally spectacular, and he did it as a protest against wasteful Army expenditure.

We have just listened to a Debate in connection with which we must give the Government credit for knowing better than any of us what is necessary in the near Middle East, and we are now as practical men, speaking for a large body of opinion, and protesting against this proposed change in regard to reclothing the Army. I say "proposed" because we have an assurance now that it has not taken place over the general body of His Majesty's forces. I ask the Government to take this opportunity to signalise and perpetuate the great change that has been brought about by the War. In the minds of the people of this country, the Army has passed from the days of the be-ribboned recruiting sergeant with the King's shilling and the village public house. I have shown that we are offering the manhood of this country to-day a business proposition in a business Army, and it is against the spirit of the people at this moment to deck out our soldiers in expensive and unnecessary colours. Let the Army be taken as a serious profession and a serious calling. Let us make our Army a great human and humanising institution. And here I pay my tribute to what the Secretary of State for War has done already through the courts-martial to enable the citizen who joins the colours to call his soul his own, and I pay my tribute to the action they have taken in doing their best to attract to the colours straightforward, honest, patriotic men, who will go into the Army and learn a trade and pass out of the Army better and more useful men than when they entered it. I understand that it is not intended to clothe the Territorials in colours. They are to maintain the glorious traditions of khaki in which they won undying honour in the War. If khaki is good enough for the voluntary Army it is good enough for the paid Army.

I ask the Government for their own sake, and for the sake of the confidence of the country, to pause before they go further in this wasteful and unnecessary expenditure. I can assure the right hon. Gentleman (Sir A. Williamson), and I hope he will convey as much of my sentiments as he can to the Secretary of State for War, that this proposed expenditure of £3,000,000 for scarlet coats has done more to shake the confidence of the ordinary person in the genuine desire of the Government for economy than anything that the Government has done since the Armistice. There is in the country to-day a passionate desire and demand for economy. People do not mind being taxed, however heavy the burden, if they feel that they are being taxed for a real national necessity, but in this matter of the Army they do not realise the necessity, and we have had nothing said yet which has proved the necessity. I have no desire to embarrass the Government. I have no ulterior or party motive. Some of us were returned to this House pledged to economy in every Department of State, and we are opposed to this attempt of the Government to force this expenditure upon the House of Commons. First of all, it was attempted in a disingenuous manner. The protest was made that the matter had gone too far, that the looms were running, and that they could not recall what they had done or go back upon this preposterous proposal. That has gone, and we can now review this thing, with the exception of the Footguards, de novo. I ask the House to consider the matter from the point of view of great public sentiment and from the point of view of the needs of the Army, and if it can be proved that public sentiment in this matter is stronger than the needs of the Army, and that we can get the force that we desire without tricking out the soldiers in these colours and all this military millinery, I ask the House of Commons to show its independence and to vote against any further expenditure on scarlet coats for His Majesty's Forces.

I listened to the hon. Member (Mr. Palmer) with some interest and surprise. I am sure we are all very sorry that he has not had his dinner, but he must realise that my right hon. Friend (Mr. Churchill) had no other opportunity of getting his dinner while the hon. Member might have had his dinner before the end of the last Debate. The hon. Member spoke of the esprit de corps which had been shown by men in khaki, and said that khaki was good enough for the War and was good enough for peace. With those words he makes one almost believe that esprit de corps did not exist in the army prior to the late War. It would be better if my hon. Friend would take the trouble to read a little military history. If he would read the history of days gone by, when the British army, before khaki was invented, fought in scarlet, he would realise that esprit de corps in the regular army and the territorials was not confined to the days when khaki was introduced, but has been a tradition and a very valuable tradition in the British army for centuries. I do not know what would have happened unless that tradition and esprit de corps had existed when our regular army, commonly known as the "old contemptibles," went out to France, and withstood the onslaught of the Germans. The hon. Member seems to forget, though I hope other hon. Members will not forget, that esprit de corps is not only built up of love of a regiment and appreciation of a regiment, but that it is very much fostered and encouraged by the past traditions and history of the regiment. Every regular regiment in the British army—and I speak now regarding the regular service, and not about what my hon. Friend describes as the "voluntary soldier": I suppose he means the Territorial force—

I said so; I meant that the territorial, I understood, is to remain in khaki, and that the regular soldier is to go back to the pre-war uniform.

I understood him to describe the two forces. I do not know how the territorial would like to be called a "voluntary soldier," because I would remind the hon. Member that he is paid for training and also paid now for drill, and I do not think that there is much distinction between him and the other soldier. Both are paid However, to revert to the uniform, the traditions of the uniform are valued in many of our regular regiments, and there is no reason for any hon. Member of this House to come down and insult, as the hon. Member opposite has done, those old and valued uniforms of the British army. How does he describe them? As comic opera.

Or as gewgaws. What are these things that are called gewgaws? Does the hon. Member realise—I do not suppose he does and therefore I recommend him to read military history—that in the scarlet uniforms of our regular army and so many of the territorial forces every badge and every facing on these uniforms has some meaning, and has been won by that regiment in past wars for some great deed of gallantry.

Those are the uniforms with which they fought in the old days, and which are absolutely wrapped up in the history of the regiment. Does he consider that these men would be very flattered at having those uniforms described as comic-opera uniforms? I sincerely hope that my right hon. Friend will retain the red uniforms for the British Army. There must be full-dress of some sort or other. I hope that my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary may be able to tell us later on whether, if the suggestion of the hon. Member opposite is adopted, there would be a great deal of difference in the cost of having a full-dress uniform in khaki with facings and badges and that of having the same uniform in the old scarlet with which the British Army first won the great renown which it has never lost since. There is one question which I would like to put to my hon. Friend as to the allowance to officers. I think that I am correct in saying, if this House decides that red should be restored, an officer on joining will obtain an allowance of £150. Does that £150 go also to officers who have fought during the War, but who joined during the War, and who have not got the full uniform? I sincerely hope that these men will be included. Otherwise there would be gross unfairness. Then there is the question of upkeep which I understand the War Office do not intend to touch. I understand that they do not intend to give officers anything for the upkeep of the uniform. I hope sincerely that they will reconsider that, and see whether or not—as the amount is likely to be a very small one—they cannot give some allowance once every two or three years to officers to help towards the upkeep of their uniform. Once again I urge the Government to retain the old-time régime. Although my hon. Friend says he speaks on behalf of the national sentiment, let me say that there is another sentiment, and a very strong one, in the British Army with regard to doing away with the uniform which they prize and value so greatly.

The hon. Member for the Wrekin (Mr. Palmer) referred to the suggestion that this expenditure of £3,000,000 for scarlet uniforms was finally settled and beyond the jurisdiction of this House. I think that, in face of the storm of feeling in this country as well as in this House, it was finally decided at least to let the House discuss the matter, and that was extremely generous on the part of the War Office. I hope I am wrong in my conviction, but it seems to me that the War Office has rather "queered the pitch" for the followers of the Government. Even if the result of this Vote is in favour of the Government, it will not be, I daresay, because of the real convictions of hon. Members, but because the War Office has largely settled its policy before this House had an opportunity of dealing with the matter at all. As one who is proud of this great representative institution, I wish the Government would have more regard to the sentiment of this House, and would allow its Members to decide the policy of this country without its being settled beforehand. I think most hon. Members know that, proud as we are of this great institution, the War, as in the case of other institutions, has very much tested it. There are certain sections outside who are looking to other ways. I am one of those in the Labour movement who want to see this great representative institution respected and reverenced by the mass of the people of this country. I warn the Government, however, that they are taking a step, and are repeatedly taking steps which are revealing to a great many thoughtful people the fact that even the Members of this House are not taken into consideration in matters of fundamental importance to the nation. That has a very bad effect upon the country at large.

I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but I should like to be clear as to the proposition he is laying down. Does he suggest that it is a constitutional duty of the Government and of the War Office to come to the House of Commons before they make any alteration in the uniforms of our soldiers?

I suggest that the secret of the power of the people of this country, and of the power of this Parliament, is that it has a clear grip of the finances of the Government generally, and I say that my proposition was a perfectly reasonable one. We want to oppose the grant of this £3,000,000 because we want sufficient money to set our own house in order before we begin to talk about extras such as fancy dress. This country ought to honour its obligation to the men who fought in the last War before it begins to spend money in this way. Not very long ago a deputation representing thousands—I believe, indeed, tens of thousands—of ex-soldiers met the Prime Minister, to ask for increased pensions and more consideration. The Prime Minister admitted that their case was a good one, but he said there was not money to meet the claims of the men who were before him. Is this House going to pass an expenditure of £3,000,000 on giving a certain satisfaction to the Secretary of State for War, or to the older representatives of the Army in this House, whilst it is conscious of the fact that it has not yet honoured its obligation, and the Prime Minister admits that it has not met the case of these men who saved the country during the past five years? The financial stress that is upon the country to-day is well known. Hon. Members from these Benches are continually putting admittedly hard cases among various sections of the workers, and hon. Members on both sides of the House are continually putting what appears to be a very reasonable case for the business interests. On every side we are met by facts which demonstrate that the whole organisation of the working classes and of the commercial, business, and financial interests is being strained, and yet we are talking in a flippant way of spending £3,000,000 on a matter like this. I admit that these are days when a few millions are neither here nor there. A few moments ago we settled the matter of about £33,000,000. I know this is just a little extra, but I wish the Government would get the point of view of the people of this country who really feel what the situation is. If they would do that, they would place a greater value upon even a few pounds than they do upon millions at the present time.

Another case which calls for consideration, and which I know has been raised in this House, is that of the ranker officers. Does anyone seriously suggest that a man who gave good service during the War, who won his commission, and who may have belonged to the working class ranks£does anyone suggest that, out of his ordinary pay, he can maintain himself and his uniform under the conditions laid down here? Men who have left the Army will tell you in many cases that they would not have left it if it had not been for the difficulty of meeting their financial obligations and fulfilling the duties they were called upon to fulfil. In this country there are ever-growing opportunities for men in the lower ranks of society, as they are called, to improve their position and reach out into the professions and so forth, but we know, to our regret, how strong is the caste that prevails in civilian society. I speak without actual inside knowledge, but from very close observation, when I say that the castes in civilian society are not to be compared with the castes that prevailed in the old Army when the old tunic was in vogue, and it is going to be very difficult indeed—I venture to say an impossibility—for a man how may have proved himself to be a useful, able, intelligent and brave man during the War, to meet his obligations and remain inside if this begins to operate. I have sometimes thought that one of the reasons for the re-adoption of this scarlet uniform system is that there is too great a sense of freedom, too much association with the old civilian Army, connected with khaki, and that the War Office want to get rid of that feeling. I am not going to presume upon the goodwill of the House except to refer to one extract. The Chancellor of the Exchequer on the 16th March, in a very definite challenge, asked this House to put its finger on any practical means of saving half a million pounds. Here are six half millions and we ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer how he comes to have practically supported this proposition in view of the statement that he himself made. I am well aware of the great traditions and historical associations connected with the old scarlet uniform, but I venture to say that the associations connected with the khaki uniform are not less than those of the scarlet uniform. On the grounds of reason there does not appear to me to be any case for this expenditure. There is more work for the men on this proposed uniform. From my experience there was plenty of work on the khaki uniform and I do not know how the men will do it with scarlet uniform. The business of the War Office is to ask itself whether it wants soldiers or showmen. If the country has to maintain a standing Army it wants soldiers neatly dressed, but that does not necessarily mean that they should be dressed in vivid scarlet uniform which is going to cost this amount. I hope that the House will turn down unanimously, or at any rate by a big majority, this proposition to spend money which is necessary for other purposes in this country.

I confess I was anxious to catch your eye, because there is now presented to the House in this Estimate expenditure of a kind which must appear serious to all who are impressed with the economic state of the nation at the present time, and, as was said by the hon. Member who moved, an expenditure as to which it is well within the competence of Members of the House to express the grounds upon which they may well have opinions. In coming to the discussion of this matter, I think hon. Members can well put aside extraneous considerations. It is perfectly true that this Estimate has come before the Committee in a way not the most fortunate or most persuasive. There were suggestions that it was already an accomplished fact, and there was an answer from my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer which, in the case of anyone less amiable, would suggest a passing tinge of fretfulness. There is a disposition in some quarters to look at the restoration of scarlet in the British Army, admittedly a greater expense than the continuation of khaki, as being so natural and inevitable an occurrence that it was hardly fitting to criticise it or to ask the reasons why it was being done. Are we who live in this country to-day not in a position when it is not only excusable, but when it is rather our peremptory duty to inquire into all kinds of expenditure the necessity of which is not carried absolutely upon the surface of the demand. Here we have the Secretary of State for War and the War Office asking for a sum of money, which in certain aspects amounts to £3,000,000, for the purpose of re-clothing the Army in a kind of uniform which it is estimated is more expensive than that they are using, and a kind of uniform which from its very conspicuousness is bound to call attention to expenditure. Are we not at that point in the history of the country when any expenditure, particularly expenditure which calls attention to itself, requires the clearest and fullest justification.

9.0 P.M.

I admit, and I am sure everyone who approaches this subject in a spirit which desires to be fair to the Government and the Army, and also the financial position of the country would wish to take, that, of course, there are reasons of high position and sincere and genuine sentiments which are attracted by a proposal of this kind. The speech of the hon. Baronet (Sir S. Scott) on this side was transparently sincere. There is no doubt if this country was in the same financial position to-day as it was in before the War, there would be very much less criticism, or much less varied criticism, than there certainly is to-day in the country, or than there will be in this House during the next few hours, of this proposal. Were were not obliged during the War to put aside traditions and habits and all kinds of things that were pleasant because of the interests of our country, and are we not to-day in that stage of war when military operations have ceased and economic operations are having their most terrible play in precisely the same position. We have to sacrifice many things we care for, many things right in themselves, many things which appeal to perfectly proper and powerful feelings and traditions, in order to see that the supreme duty put upon all of us to help our country into a proper economic position, may not be hindered for an hour by anything which can properly be avoided at this time. The criticism which many of us make on this proposal is that its necessity at this time has never yet been demonstrated, and that reasons for it adequate to override the reasons that occur to all of us, and which are common comment wherever men meet, have never yet been put either before this House or by any other method before the public of which we are members. We are not told if it is true, and we would like to know, that recruiting at the present moment either for the household troops or for the regular Army generally is at once so bad and so curiously due to the present clothing of the Army that the only remedy is to spend millions upon re-clothing the Army in scarlet. If that were the case, and if this is the only way to bring about recruiting in the voluntary Army, let us have that argument based upon undeniable facts and figures as soon as possible. But in the absence of any contention of that kind, we are asked to sanction expenditure which on the face of it does not appear to be necessary, and obviously shows in all parts of the country to anyone who takes notice of it an apparent extravagance which has almost as bad an effect upon national character and habits as if you had proved up to the hilt that every penny of it was actually extravagant. If ever there was a time when it was the duty of all of us, from the Government to the least influential individual in the country, to avoid the appearance of evil, as well as the actuality of evil, that time is this. At a time when national expenditure is very great, and when there are avenues of expenditure which, with the best will in the world, cannot be kept closed, surely it is more than ever important for the Government to avoid any expenditure of a doubtful character, and for expenditure of this kind, apparently upon show, upon something not necessary but, presumably, attractive, it is surely more important than ever that that kind of expenditure should be avoided, both because of the money involved in carrying it out and because of the example which, at any rate, apparently is set by the Government to those in the country who require, alas, no evil example to tempt them to expenditure which, however much they may enjoy it, is bad for the country. Therefore, from the point of view of a supporter of the Government and of one who supports the existence and the strength and efficiency of our Army, I ask my right hon. Friend, who represents the War Office, whether this expenditure or any part of it is really necessary? There is, indeed, a special reason why expenditure upon our Army at this time should be watched with special care and should be kept sedulously within the narrowest limits. The great tide of military and warlike enthusiasm to which the nation owed much and which went a long way towards the successful conclusion of the Great War, is now of necessity at its ebb, and I can well imagine that it may be necessary for our country for money to be spent upon the Army, which it is unpopular to spend; it may well happen that in this year and for some years to come the safety of our country and our Empire may demand expenditure which will not be popular with the man in the street, which will be open to criticism, which will require very careful presentment to this House to get the proper support behind it, and in circumstances of that kind, when the tide of warlike enthusiasm has ebbed, when the inevitable commitments of a great Empire like ours have become greater and not less with the devaluation of money, with all the complexities following upon an intricate peace, when these circumstances are the prominent circumstances of the situation, when, in other words, none of us can tell what expenditure upon the Army may not be absolutely necessary, is it not, therefore, more than ever important and more than ever the duty of the Government to avoid, with the most scrupulous care, any expenditure which is not absolutely necessary and directly and inevitably connected with the necessary efficiency of those forces which defend our country and Empire against all the hazards of international life?

I say the moment is most inauspicious for any doubtful expenditure; I say that no evidence has been brought in this House or in the country that the state of recruiting is such as to require this apparent stimulus; I say that the traditions of the Great War connected and intertwined with the use of khaki are traditions at once as sacred arid as stimulating as those older traditions which had so much to do with maintaining the spirit and the efficiency of the pre-War Army; I say that these traditions of the Great War may surely be relied upon to preserve for many a year to come that spirit which it is desirable to preserve if young men are to be ready to come forward to defend their country. If and when those influences have faded, if and when the necessary recruiting lags, and some stimulus of this kind is sought for, this House will then consider the matter under such changed conditions, but to-day economy is the overwhelming necessity and duty for the Government in every Department, for the country everywhere, and for all individuals. The burden of proof is upon any Department which even in appearance seems to violate the demand and necessity for economy, and when that is apparently violated by a provision of this kind, for which no case has been made out, and which certainly arouses the greatest anxiety among all kinds of persons, which brings sincere and loyal criticism from those who are anxious to help and not to hinder the Government, from those who would much rather strengthen than weaken it, then I would ask my right hon. Friend to consider very carefully and fully whether there is really any ground on which the Government ought to ask the House of Commons to approve of this expenditure. It is because I see in this proposal that which is inconsistent with what the Government's example ought to be that I make my protest against it, and I assure the Government that they do not realise the width and general character of the feelings which have been stirred by this proposal, unless they realise from their friends as well as from their critics that there comes a sincere desire, based on no wish to injure the Army, but, on the other hand, on a wish to keep the Army as popular and as reliant on public sentiment as possible, that this up to now undefended and unexplained expenditure should be abandoned in the interests of the country in all aspects of the country's life.

The hon. Baronet (Sir S. Scott) spoke with a good deal of heat of the esprit de corps of the Regular Army, and I should like to say at the commencement of my remarks that there is no one who has greater respect for the traditions and esprit de corps of the Regular Army than I have. I have had the honour of commanding an irregular battalion, and it was always my endeavour to try and inculcate into my men the spirit of the Regular battalion whose name we bore. Like the hon. and learned Member who has just spoken, I look upon this proposal as unnecessary and unfortunate. I consider it unnecessary because for five years we have got on very well without the full-dress uniform, and I consider it unfortunate because it is one of those items in the business of the Government on which the public mind can become focussed. It is something which the public can easily grasp. They have been educated and taught a great deal lately about the so-called wasteful extravagance of the Government, and here is a proposal which seems to confirm them in that opinion. I am informed that the decision to put the Army back into full-dress uniform was come to after a Special Committee had taken full evidence from all branches of the Army. I should like to know who composed that Committee and what sort of evidence it took, because I am inclined to imagine that the mentality which composed that Committee would not be the mentality which is usually inclined towards economy. To my mind this question resolves itself into this—does the Army really want it? It does not want it for recruiting purposes. I do not think it is necessary to have a showy uniform to attract recruits. If the Army is not good enough on its own basis as a profession we should not try to encourage young men to enter into that profession merely on account of a showy uniform. But the question is, does the Army really want it? If the Army does want it, I should say it should have it. I do not attach so very much importance to the money. The money is going to be spent over a number of years, and although £3,000,000 is a large sum it is not a large sum in the whole total of the items of other expenditure. But it is an amount which appeals to the public mind, especially on a matter of this kind, and that public mind is not always highly educated in such matters; it is in perhaps something like the state of the mind of the hon. Member for the Wrekin Division (Mr. Palmer), who has spoken this evening. I have made some inquiries. I know a good many soldiers and I have asked them their opinion, and I have come to the conclusion that they do not care very much about it one way or the other. What they do want, however, is an alternative uniform. By that they do not mean a very expensive uniform or head-dress or equipment of an elaborate kind. They want something into which they can change when the day's work is done. I have worn putties, and I do not think that any soldier wants to wear putties when he goes out after his work is done. What he wants is a nice, smart, clean, simple dress which he can wear with pride and distinction. It need not be so very expensive a uniform as that which is commonly known as full dress.

I am glad to see that the Secretary of State for War is in his place. I have heard him explain a good deal about the soldiers' buttons and collars, and things of that kind. I think it is quite right that he should be able to descend to small interests of that kind. If I may say so without offence, the right hon. Gentleman does not always wear a very convenient collar, and I think the members of the Committee to whom reference has been made would not care to wear the soldier's collar themselves unless it was absolutely their duty. There would be a great deal about the full uniform that would want cleaning, and the officers might be depended upon to see, if it is adopted, that everything was polished up to the last degree. Therefore, the soldier does not care so very much about it because it would mean a great deal of trouble to him. I want to emphasise the importance of the matter to the Army itself. The traditions of the old uniform belong to an age that has passed away. It is many years since the Army fought in anything like full dress, and it is a long time since the Army began to wear khaki. It was brought into use for the Army in India, and was afterwards used in other parts of the world. There is no one who remembers the recent fighting who will not agree that there were deeds of as great heroism performed in khaki as any that had ever been performed in the old Life Brigade days. I hope the Government will reconsider this decision because I feel that it is a very unfavourable, if not unnecessary, proposal.

This matter may be considered upon various grounds, historical, sentimental, and practical, and perhaps the most vital and practical is the question of recruiting. We have had an official statement from the Front Bench that recruiting is going on satisfactorily, but, so far as an ordinary individual can hear, recruiting is not at all satisfactory, and our Army is very much under its proper strength. I believe the red coat has a good deal to do with recruiting; certainly, a smart uniform has a good deal to do with it. The soldier is not attracted altogether by the higher pay. We have had proof of that in the list that was read out by the hon. Member for the Wrekin Division (Mr. Palmer), showing the enormous increases of the pay recently made, and yet, if I am right in my opinion that recruiting is not all it should be, that shows that the pay is not altogether the necessary attraction. The pay at present is quite ample, and it would seem, therefore, that if there is any need of men, who are not coming forward, there must be some other reason than that. A good deal of claptrap is talked about the soldier's point of view with regard to the scarlet uniform. The hon. Member for Wrekin said that the young soldier wanted to walk out with the cook or the nurse. That is not quite fair to the soldier, because, although the young soldier may wish to attract a girl, there are many older soldiers, married men, who do not wish to attract any girl, and yet they would be proud to wear a smart uniform. So far as I have been able to learn, the men would like to revert to something like the pre-War uniform. I would however join in urging upon the Government that they should give an undertaking that they will not proceed any further with this proposal except in the case of the Household Troops, which, I understand, is un fait accompli, until next year, and that then they will come down to the House, and it can be considered by the House again. I hope they will not go any further than that at the present time in view of the strong feeling that there seems to be against it in the country. No one wants to have a taunt of "no economy" thrown against the Government. It may be necessary to have full dress for ceremonial duties, and that would involve the scarlet uniform. The Household Troops are in a different position and I do not think that Members as a whole have any objection to reclothing them.

Would the hon. Member explain what he means by the Household Troops? Does he simply mean the Horse Guards Blue and Life Guards?

The Household Troops include the Household Cavalry and the Foot Guards. I am in favour of the Household Troops having their full uniform. I should be glad to know from the Government what the exact position is with regard to the vote in the House to-day. There are some Members who like myself would be willing to support the Government and make the change for the Household Troops but who would not like to feel that by doing that they were sanctioning the re-clothing of the whole Army in the next two or three years.

I do not propose to treat this as a "business proposition." No issue that affects so vitally the British Army should be treated merely as a business proposition. Nor should we look upon recruiting altogether from an economical or a financial point of view. No expenditure is too much if that expenditure is really necessitated by the present need of the British Army. We should look upon recruiting as an all-important question. If, for the purpose of recruiting, it is necessary to have scarlet tunics the Army must have them. There never was a time when we were in greater need of a sufficient Army. Whatever expenditure is necessary, we must have an Army which will be adequate for the great needs of the country. But if it is not necessary in the interests of recruiting to have scarlet tunics, I should like to associate myself with those hon. Members who are in favour of khaki, and not scarlet, because if it is not necessary in order to get the recruits to have scarlet, the issue simply becomes a question whether it is to the advantage of the nation that men should be dressed in scarlet or khaki uniforms. A good deal has been said about what is the opinion of the soldiers themselves. I am not going to arrogate to myself for a moment the task of trying to say what the soldier thinks, because nine times out of ten he does not think at all. I imagine in the old Regular Army the balance of opinion would be in favour of scarlet, but long ago there were opinions in a contrary direction. Hon. Members may remember a book entitled "My Life in the Army," by Robert Blatchford, in which there is a protest against everything which savours of pipeclay and brass, and I know that in my own constituency an association, composed very largely of old soldiers of the Regular Army, has asked me to protest against the re-introduction of scarlet at the expense of khaki. So that I think it is very difficult to dogmatise with regard to the views of the old Regular Army. I think it is much easier to dogmatise with regard to the new Army. I think the great majority of men who served during the War are in favour of khaki, because it is much more easy and comfortable, and avoids the great waste of time and labour, which undoubtedly accompanied the scarlet uniform. It required constant care and attention.

So much for the point of view of the Army, but I am not certain if, at the present time, the outlook of the country as a whole is not more important than that of the Army, because there is a very great suspicion in the country that the Minister for War has delivered himself over to what are called the forces of reaction in the Army, the adherents of that very old school, who are opposed to all progress, and who, in spite of the War, like the Bourbons, have learnt nothing and forgotten nothing. There are people like that in the War Office, and in the Army, I suppose. With all their very high and great qualities, those men are very often lacking in a sense of the true perspective of things, and regard the choice and care of uniforms as something in the nature of a cult, instead of something in the nature of an expedient. There is no doubt that the selection, care, and maintenance of full-dress uniform occupy considerably too much space in their thoughts. A great deal has been very rightly made of the regimental traditions of the Army. So far as those traditions are not embodied in customs which have no associations with uniforms at all, they are very largely associated with things like buttons, badges, flashes and kilts, and other articles of uniform which are easily maintained in the khaki, and have, in fact, been so maintained during the War. The soldier fighting in khaki has worn identically the same buttons and badges as his predecessors who wore scarlet. The change has not been in those emblems associated with past glories, but in the mere alteration from scarlet to khaki. The really essential emblems of tradition have been quite unaffected by that change. Even in the old Army there have been great modifications in dress from time to time.

Hon. Members who support the idea of scarlet have laid a great deal of emphasis on the fact that they are fighting the battle of the old uniforms in which our soldiers won some of the greatest victories in British history, but of course the uniforms which were worn at Blenheim and Quebec, Plassey and Waterloo are as different from the scarlet uniforms to which we are now asked to revert as those scarlet uniforms are from the khaki uniforms which were worn in the War. We are familiar with that happy phrase, "The thin Red line," and I asked the hon. Member for Oxford University, who is a great expert in matters of military history, how that came into being, and he said it was culled from a popular song written in honour of the 93rd Regiment, who repelled a charge of Russian cavalry at Balaclava. And even in the reign of Queen Victoria, in the imagination of the country, "The thin Red line" changed into "The gentleman in khaki ordered South" of the South African War. So that you cannot say that the red uniform is really an essential element in British military tradition. Although there may be certain families to whom these old historic memories fill a very important place in imagination, there are infinitely more English homes where khaki holds that place, and in a country like ours, where hardly anybody has any history at all, the military associations most cherished are those very poignant, undying memories of men who have gone from their homes quite recently to take part in the Great War, and that I think is the real essential feeling of the ordinary Englishman to-day. When you are asked to conjure up in your mind the vision of the ideal, typical British soldier, the men who come to your mind are not, with all their gallantry and all their greatness, the soldiers of Quebec or Waterloo, but they are those gallant men, our comrades, whom we saw serving in the field, and laying down their lives for their country among the rocky gullies of Gallipoli and on the bloody battlefields of France.

Although the amount of the Vote at issue to-day is trifling compared with many of the figures the Committee has to consider, I think we shall all agree that there is behind it the principle whether we are only prepared to pay lip-service to economy, or whether we are prepared to put it into practice and reality. We have been told earlier in the Debate by the Noble Lord opposite that on whatever we economise we must keep our hand off Army expenditure. I suppose we are to economise on social reform and expenditure for the well-being of our country as a whole, but we must not reduce our Army Estimates. Yet we have the authority of the Prime Minister, speaking in this House last year, when he said that, if our faith in the League of Nations was to be a real one, we must show our trust in it by reducing our armaments. He said that there is one thing that matters in economy, and it is this: the great nations which promoted the League of Nations should show their confidence in it and trust it. If those who promoted it increased their armaments, it would be a sham, and remain a sham. I suppose, although the particular amount here is small, it goes to make up that huge total of our expenditure on armaments which to-day is greater than in pre-War time. We are told that this was a War to end war. Yet we find to-day our Army Estimates, even making due allowance for the decreased value of the £, are greater than they were before we entered upon the War. I say this Amendment is a test as to whether or not we are really to have faith in the League of Nations. Whether we really intend to show that faith by setting the example and reducing the huge expenditure on armaments will be decided by our Vote to-day. The amount is small, but surely it is typical of the principle. If we cannot economise on this particular occasion, what occasion is there on which we can economise? We have had quotations and references made to the spirit of the Army. I should like to associate myself with the last speaker, who deprecated anyone putting forward the claim to speak for the mind of the Army; yet I think he expressed that mind very fairly and fully. He, no doubt, spoke from the standpoint of the commissioned ranks. I should like to speak as one who has served only in the ranks, but if I know anything of the mind of the ordinary soldier, it is very much against these irritating regulations which are associated with pipeclay, brass, and cleaning required by the official mind in the past.

I submit the position has changed entirely. With all respect to the old Army, we are to-day recruiting a different type of men, and men from a different strata of society to-day. We want men who will continue to be thinking units, and not merely numbers in a huge military machine, without thought and without individuality. If the modern Army is made up of men recruited from the higher ranks of civilian life, such men do not want to be tied down by this narrow, pettifogging military tyranny which existed so much in the past, and particularly dealt with points of equipment, cleaning, pipe-clay, and buttons. We want the man who has a larger outlook, and who makes a better soldier in consequence. Therefore I submit, if we want to show our faith in economy, we must support the Amendment. We have been told on several occasions that we must economise in our social reform expenditure. I had the honour to serve on the Committee which dealt with unemployment. What was it that was thrown at us whenever we suggested that the unemployment benefit should be increased and the length of period of waiting reduced? We were told by the representatives of the Government that the Government could not afford it. They sympathised—their sympathy was most prolific—with the purpose of the Amendments to increase the amount for women from 12s. to 15s. per week, but they gave the cost, which was a huge amount, and said they could not afford it. They could not afford to increase the rate of the men from 15s. to £l, because that would mean £3,000,000. The Solicitor-General, in replying on an Amendment which I had the honour to move to increase the rate of allowance to the women, said—I want to quote his words, because they seem to be so typical of the attitude of the Government on this matter—the right hon. and learned Gentleman said: We have considered the matter very sympathetically—to raise from 12s. to 15s. per week the Unemployment Benefit for the women—and I am sorry to say that it is quite impossible at this time. It would mean another £169,000 per annum. The Cabinet have definitely decided they cannot authorise the expenditure of that further sum. £169,000 to do a simple act of justice to the women workers of the land! The Cabinet itself had considered the matter, and could not afford the money to do what they admitted was an act of justice! Yet to-day we are asked to sanction the expenditure, not of £169,000, but a proposal which will ultimately involve the expenditure of £3,000,000. I submit, therefore, that everyone of us who wants to show that he really believes in economy, if we are prepared to put the question to the test, must support the Amendment which is being moved, in order that when real social reforms are required we can turn to the Government and say, "You saved so much on the Army—on the small trappings of the soldier—and we can have it for this real reform, which makes for the well-being of the people and for social improvement."

The hon. Member who has just sat down made a great display in favour of economy. His idea and method of carrying that out is to save money on the clothing of the Army in order to spend it on something else. That is economy!

I call it the very worst possible form of economy. In fact it is not economy at all. If the hon. Member has said: I desire to save this money in order that I may reduce the taxation—I do not agree with him, but there might be something to be said for it—but to say I desire to save money in order to—

But that is not economy! Suppose the hon. Gentleman who has just interrupted had an income of £1,100 or £1,200. Does he mean to say that it would mean economy to say: "I propose to save £100 which I will spend on clothes instead of spending in a restaurant." That would not be economy.

No, but if I decided to save it on my clothes, in order to spend it in the restaurant on good food, that might be a right way of expending the money.

That is not economy. It would be if the hon. Gentleman saved the money on the restaurant and, say, paid his debts, or saved it in other ways, that would be economy. But to divert money from one expenditure to another is not economy. Of the hon. Members of this Rouse who have for the last five or six years preached economy, I think I may say I have been foremost. If I thought that the proposal of the Amendment would result in real economy, I should support the Amendment—though perhaps on different grounds to most—and on different grounds to the hon. Gentleman who made the last speech. But I do not think this will lead to economy. I am going to vote against the Amendment, and with the Secretary for War, because I believe the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman will result in economy. I shall endeavour to show It is necessary to keep the Army up to strength. We must get recruits. We do not want to find ourselves in the position we were in if there should be another war. We have to have an Army. One of the results of our policy before the late War was that we endeavoured to spend little, and we later found that we had to spend many millions which need not have been the case if we had had foresight. Recruiting is not good at the present time. [HON. MEMBERS: "Yes, it is!"] Well, I understood from authentic sources it was not.

May I tell the right hon. Baronet that yesterday the Financial Secretary to the War Office informed me, in reply to a question, that recruiting for our regular army was extremely satisfactory.

Not if this Amendment is carried. Certainly not. Therefore, in my opinion, the most effective way to encourage recruiting is to have an attractive uniform. Hon. Members opposite may say that the soldier who is desirous of serving his country will serve it under any circumstances. As a matter of fact, an attractive uniform does influence, to a very large extent, recruiting in the army, and has always done so. It is not to be wondered at. I think it is a good thing that a man should have a smart uniform. Whether we could do without it or not is quite another thing, but it has a great effect on recruiting. My impression of the new army recruits is that they are very much the same as the recruits of the old army. I do not believe you are going to get a superior class of recruits in ordinary times. I do not say the recruits of the old army were in any way inferior, in fact, I should be inclined to say they were superior. Nobody can deny that the army that went to France in 1914 was the finest army that ever left the shores of this or any other country. What is one of the reasons for that efficiency? Surely it is the old esprit de corps and the traditions of the regiments. The thin red line has always had a great effect upon the soldiers of the army. If that is so, is it not likely that we shall promote economy by encouraging recruiting.

As I understand the proposal, it is that the Household Cavalry and the members of the Guards shall be clothed in scarlet more or less at once, and then, as the khaki uniforms gradually wear out, this principle will be extended to the rest of the army. Where is the extravagant expense in that? It is nothing like the £3,000,000 which has been referred to. Supposing this change does attract a number of recruits, is it not advisable to spend a little money in doing that instead, perhaps, of having to increase the pay or incurring some other form of expense in order to attract recruits. I do not know whether I shall be labelled an out-and-out supporter of the Government on all occasions, but I think, at any rate, that I am capable of exercising an independent judgment in this House in addition to being a supporter of everything that is economical. From all the information that I have been able to gather on this question, I earnestly believe the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman is in the right direction, and that it would result in economy and a more efficient army.

I must say that I have heard the speech of the last speaker with the most profound regret. He claims that he has taken the lead during the past five or six years in the advocacy of economy.

I do not think I said I had taken the lead. I said there was no hon. Member who had advocated economy with greater zeal than I have.

I accept the version put by the modesty of my right hon. Friend, but up to now I am quite willing to give him the lead in economy, but now I am inclined to put him at the bottom of the class. We have had speeches from hon. Members who are themselves soldiers, and without exception they do not support the proposal of the Government. A minor exception might be the hon. Member for Brighton, but even he said that however desirable it may be it should be deferred this year, and that this is not the right time to do it. I can only repeat my profound regret at the speech of my right hon. Friend opposite. One of my hon. Friends put before us two cases which had been before the Committee upstairs in which the Government spokesman on both occasions said that, however desirable the expenditure might be—one was for unemployment benefit and the other for the injured—the Government had decided that they cannot afford it. An expenditure of that kind would be reproductive in the best sense of the term, and you would have been giving a chance to citizens who were poor and invalided instead of allowing them to become a charge upon the State as they might do, and you might be preventing their homes being broken up by the subvention you were asked to give. You could not have had a more productive kind of expenditure. This proposal which the executive are seeking to impose upon a reluctant House is a charge which is thoroughly unproductive.

According to the right hon. Gentleman opposite the only way out of it might be that you would have to make the Army a little bit more attractive, and then you need not pay them such high wages. Is that what my right hon. Friend means? If so, that is where I part company with him. Let us see what the proposal is. It is a very serious one. It is backed by the authority first of all of the Army Council. The Secretary of State for War announced that to the House. In addition to that it has the backing of that champion of economy, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who told us in the House that the Secretary for War had acted upon a decision of the Cabinet for which the Government as a whole is responsible, and in reply to the hon. Member for the Wrekin division (Mr. Palmer) it was stated that the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the First Lord of the Treasury are still Members of the Cabinet. And so we have the Chancellor of the Exchequer in favour of it, and the whole of the Cabinet supporting it. But what we are faced with to-night is a vote of censure. That is the issue. The gage of battle has been thrown down, and on what? These are fervid days of appeals by the Prime Minister and new written rhetoric to the State Departments for economy all round. Here you have a Cabinet issue of supreme and vital importance, and it is a vote of censure on scarlet for the Army. What a Government it is! They solemnly throw down the gage of battle on this issue. It is just like them, and the whole of their policy! No doubt I may lose some votes for saying that. The issue has been clearly defined by the Secretary for War. In his answer on the 8th June he minimised it in this way. He said the total avoidable expense in not £160,000 but £130,000. Reference has already been made to two demands which were rejected on the ground that they could not be afforded. I suppose we are to take it that this little sum of £130,000 means nothing. What it really means is this, and I warn the Committee seriously to bear it in mind, that if they give the Government this first step it will mean that the whole of the £3,000,000 will be spent. The Army Council will make no mistake about that, and the Cabinet will be solemnly pledged to it. They propose to stand or fall by their proposal. In the answer given by the Secretary for War, in the closing paragraph, there is something of which I want more particulars from the right hon. Gentleman. I admit at once that the question of the Household Cavalry does not arise. They have had their uniforms right through the War, and there is no economy to be effected there.

I presume so. I am not raising that point, I am raising a new point, and it shows how reasonable I am. I am just dealing with the new proposal of the Government. The Household Cavalry are to be kept as they have been during the War. What we are objecting to is new expenditure, and I want to bring the Secretary for War straight to that point. What he said was this, that the Household troops meant the Guards, and there would be a waste of fully £80,000, because they had some 7,000 bearskins and I do not know how many thousands of yards of scarlet cloth. Cannot those bearskins and that scarlet cloth keep! Of course they can. They can be kept for years, and if the Army Council or the War Office do not know how to do it let them call in the assistance of some women. What I want to know from the right hon. Gentleman is this. Let him tell us what the last part of his answer really means. I am sure he has no desire to mislead the Committee. I think he has mixed up two things, but will he tell us what is going to be the real amount of alleged waste? I want to impress upon him that you can keep scarlet cloth and bearskins for years. He has millions of yards of khaki. I do not know how many millions of yards of khaki he has placed in the hands of the Disposal Board. At any rate, he told us yesterday he had many million yards of khaki. Why does he not use it? There is no evidence at all that the soldiers want scarlet. There is not a Member of this House who, in his heart, does not support our view that it is of the utmost importance that in an issue of this kind, which the public mind has thoroughly grasped, the question of governmental economy is involved. It may not amount to very much, but it is these little things which show what the Government mean. Every speech I have listened to to-night, with one solitary exception—that of the hon. and gallant Member for Brighton, the effect of which was much minimised by the suggestion that the change should not be tried this year—every speech, I say, with that exception, has been against the proposal of the Government. There is not a single argument in favour of it except it may be that money might be saved on wages.

And if you say you are going to get an efficient army only by putting it into scarlet, I would suggest that you are throwing an insult on khaki. Was there ever a more efficient British army than there is to-day? On the ground of economy, on the ground of sentiment, and on every practical ground this proposal of the Government is condemned. The only arguments put before the Committee in its favour are that the Army Council want it, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer says it is a good thing, and that the Government are pledged to it. There is the issue: I wonder which way hon. Members are going to vote.

On this subject, I have not heard any reason given why the Government wishes to place the Army in scarlet. It cannot be with any object of economy that they wish to turn the Army into a Red Army—of course, I do not mean that in a Bolshevik sense. But what is it that causes the Government to desire to spend money in this way? is it due to a lack of recruits? We have had various suggestions made on this point. Some Members say, and the Government have stated, that recruiting is very good. Others, speaking from personal experience, say it is very bad. I certainly have heard many men in the Army describe it as bad. Which are we to believe? Will the Secretary for War tell us whether recruiting is good or bad, so that we may know exactly what the issue is? If the reason for this expenditure is that recruiting is bad, I presume the Government imagine that it will be better if the Army don a scarlet uniform. I know before the War that certain women admired the soldier in scarlet rather than the man in khaki. It is very well known that nursery maids have been willing to pay soldiers half-a crown to take them round the park. But those times have gone by, and, after this War, women have a very different idea as to whether they will walk out with a soldier in scarlet or one in khaki. An hon. Member opposite said just now that soldiers do not think. I venture to assert that women do think and that their decision on this point is likely to make a great deal of difference. I do not think that anyone can suggest that recruiting would be better if a soldier donned scarlet.

10.0 P.M.

Another point arises as to whether we want more recruiting, as to whether this country is not getting a little tired of militarism and keeping up a very large army. The fact that the sum is only £3,000,000 and refers only to scarlet uniforms is not a very important point, but I regard this Debate as a symbol and a guide as to whether or not the House and the country wish to keep up a large army and to spend money extravagantly for that purpose. I understood at the beginning of the year that we were keeping 600,000 men, but that the number would be greatly reduced this year, and would reach the level of a standing army of much smaller size. So far I do not think there is the slightest sign of the Army being reduced to the normal size. Does that mean that we are to continue to keep up a large army? Does it mean that our commitments abroad are so great that it is absolutely impossible for us to reduce the total by a single man? Does it mean that we have such large commitments in the East and other places, and our contingents of men are too far apart? Does it mean that the Army Council are frightened that if an attack came or if some disturbance arose in our possessions in the East, we should be unable, owing to lack of resources, to send men to keep the country in order? I think that is a very important point. It was raised to a certain extent in the Debate this afternoon, and the right hon. Gentleman in reply said that he considered our forces in Mesopotamia rather dangerously far apart. The point as to whether we have large enough forces for our Empire is raised again on this subject of uniforms, in connection with better recruiting. If the Army Council think we have not enough forces to garrison our Empire, why do they not come to the House and say perfectly frankly that that is the case, that they want more men, and that they intend to introduce scarlet uniforms in order to get more men? Then we can argue whether or not we want such an increase in our Empire, as regards Mesopotamia. On the point as to whether or not we should have scarlet uniforms, because they are scarlet, and because khaki happens to be khaki, I do not think one could bring reasons either way, unless it is the fact that recruiting is bad. The right hon. Member for the City of London (Sir F. Banbury) stated, I understand, that he thought we were going to have another war, or something of that sort, very shortly. I think his words were slightly in that direction; and he said we must start preparing with a large Army for a war in the future. I cannot see any reason for preparing for another war in the future. If a war comes within the next ten years the country could not afford to pay for it, so I do not see any reason for raising a large Army to prepare for it.

The hon. Member remembers the old saying, "Autres temps, autres moeurs."

I quite agree that before the War we should have had a larger Army to prepare us for it, but surely it is quite inconceivable that there should be another war of this kind within the next fifty years. We may have small wars in different parts of the world, but it is inconceivable that we should have enough resources left to fight within the next fifty years. I do not see any reason in that for keeping up a large Army. The right hon. Gentleman also made the. statement, in arguing in favour of scarlet uniforms, that it encouraged recruiting, and he stated that in his knowledge one part of the Army, namely, the Foot Guards, had suffered in recruiting, and at the same time it came out that the Foot Guards were the only regiment that had scarlet uniforms.

Because they make such an ornament on parade. You cannot compare a band with foot soldiers. I protest very strongly against the proposal of the Government to put the Army in scarlet uniforms unless there is some very good argument in favour of it.

This Vote appears to me to involve two quite dis- tinct points. The first is the merits of the question whether it is right or not to restore the pre-War uniform, and the second appears to be the manner in which the Government has handled the question. On the merits of the question as between these two uniforms I have no very strong opinion. I do not know for what reasons the Government desires to restore the scarlet uniform. They may be tolerably good reasons, but in the absence of any convincing proof of its necessity I think the natural inclination in all parts of the House would be to question the wisdom of such a policy. But I want much more to lay stress on the way this question has been handled. The Government, whatever the merits of the case may be, knows perfectly well that on all questions of expenditure at present there is a great feeling of anxiety, if not uneasiness, both in this House and in the country, and a very genuine desire to effect economy wherever it can be done without seriously interfering with the efficiency of the public service or the policy of the Government. The Government, knowing that, has made this proposal, and in the Press and other means of public expression it has been quite clear, from the moment it was made known, that there was at all events a very great deal of doubt in the public mind as to the policy which was to be pursued. Under the circumstances I should have thought that the wise course for the Government to pursue would have been to say, "We will not take any decisive step. We will not commit ourselves to it until we have had an opportunity of laying our views before the House of Commons and trusting to our powers to persuade them that it is a wise and politic course to make this change." Instead of that, and in spite of the manifestations of disagreement, the Government immediately took steps to carry that policy into effect, and my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in answer to a question, practically intimated—in fact he said so in terms—that if this Vote were not carried it would mean the resignation of the Government, because he said it would be a question for their successors. That is a course against which this House ought to protest.

I do not think it is right that on a matter of this sort the Government should present an ultimatum to the House. No doubt many hon. Members during the last week have been, as I have been, interested in the concluding volumes of the life of Disraeli. If so, they will probably remember a very important and interesting document composed by that statesman in 1873, in which he strongly protested on constitutional grounds against the doctrine that the Government had a right, of their own sweet will and pleasure, to make any issue they chose a vital one, and to say that Parliament must accept their proposals or must turn them out and form another Government. Mr. Disraeli successfully resisted that doctrine and by refusing to displace the Ministry that he had defeated in this House, he established a doctrine which I think is as sound a constitutional doctrine to-day as it was in the year 1873. That being so, I would earnestly appeal to my right hon. Friend to allow the House some liberty to-night on this Vote. The Government earlier in the Debate received proof overwhelming of the support which they have in this House on any substantial matter of policy, and it would be most unfortunate if the right hon. Gentleman should force many of those who would most reluctantly go into the Lobby against them, to take that course on a matter of such comparative unimportance as the difference between one uniform and another. I am quite certain that whatever arguments there may be in favour of restoring the scarlet uniform—and I daresay there are cogent reasons—I do not think any Member of the Government can really say that it is a matter of such vital importance to the very existence of the Government, overwhelmingly supported in this House, that it ought to stand and fall by it. Therefore, I hope that my right hon. Friend will take a course, which would be a very popular course, after the demonstration of support they have received to-night, and take off the Government Whips and allow the House to give a perfectly free and untrammelled vote on this subject. I do not suppose there is anyone who is less desirous than I am of turning out my right hon. Friend or any of his colleagues from office. On a question of vote of censure I would vote at any time for a vote of confidence in the Government, but upon this question, if my right hon. Friend forces us to go into the Lobby, even though he choses to say that it is vital to the existence of the Government, I shall find myself quite unable to support him.

I think the trend of this Debate has elicited at least one fact, that in our present financial straits a monster on a heap of skulls would be less objectionable than a bureaucrat on a mound of pipeclay. The right hon. Baronet the Member for the City of London spoke in favour of this proposal. His main argument, as I understood, was that to clothe the Army in red uniform was conducive to esprit de corps in the Regular Army. I refuse to believe that the esprit de corps of the Regular Army goes no deeper than the tunic. I would remind the right hon. Baronet that, while he and his contemporaries spent practically the whole of their soldiering in the red tunics, the young men of whom the present Army is composed spent all their time in khaki, and all the glory of their regiments is bound up inseparably with the khaki tradition. His second argument was that this red clothing was conducive to recruiting. It is inconceivable that any young man should join the Army without first consulting some old soldier as to what was to happen in the Army. If he consults one of those old soldiers, he will learn from an expert source that one of the most unpleasant duties of soldiers' life is the cleaning of this red uniform. Hours of his time are wasted in this unproductive duty. The red uniform is extremely unpopular among old soldiers. At any rate, it is open to doubt whether the red uniform will assist recruiting. I do not believe that many men are attracted to the Army by the glamour of a poster or the prospect of amatory success. But, in any case, the right hon. Gentleman has assured us that recruiting for the Regular Army is proceeding satisfactorily, and the maintenance of His Majesty's Forces will not depend entirely upon the influence of the romantic nursemaid.

The real argument in favour of the red uniform is that on ceremonial occasions it looks nice. That is the beginning and end of the matter. To pursue that argument to its logical conclusion, hon. Members might just as well say that on ceremonial occasions it would look nice to have Whitehall painted pink. The answer in both cases is that in the æsthetic sense the contention may be true, but that from the financial sense we simply cannot afford these luxuries. I know or I believe that the right hon. Gentleman will avoid this issue on the ground that it is quite unnecessary to extend this proposal to the main body of the Army and will confine it to the Guards. It was said, I think this afternoon, that the red uniform would be unpopular, and therefore the rest of the Army would be pleased to escape this unpleasing obligation. I quite agree that it is unpopular, but I am quite certain that if any differential treatment is meted out to the Guards immediately an outcry will arise throughout the Army, and the right hon. Gentleman will in a very short time come down to the House with a great pressure of Army opinion behind him and say that he must have the moneys to clothe the whole Army in scarlet. We all know that this objective lies at the back of his mind. It has been urged eloquently by my hon. Friends beside me that this money might be devoted to uses very beneficial to mankind. Many instances have been cited, of which I need quote only one, which I hope will be very dear to the heart of the right hon. Gentleman himself. This £3,000,000 might be devoted to making this country entirely safe against aerial attack. It might be devoted to the development of our Air Service, to putting it in such a position that it would be unchallenged by any other Air Service in the world. To give an entirely different kind of instance, the League of Nations at the present moment is appealing for a sum of £2,000,000 with which to check the threatened attack of typhus during next winter, which will probably involve the loss of at least a million lives. Two-thirds of this money which is to go to gladdening the eyes of bureaucrats might save a million lives next year.

The only mission of this £3,000,000 is to deprive the people of this country of the khaki spectacle which, as I, at any rate, believe, will ever remain one of their most sacred memories. Many of us were inspired with high hopes, when the right hon. Gentleman went to the War Office, that his realistic outlook and forceful character would be thrown into the scale against the retention of these expensive anachronisms. Those hopes, however, have been dashed to the ground. I fear he is bound too securely to military ambition to realise the necessities of peace. The right hon. Gentleman has developed a reputation for modelling himself upon ambitious precedent. It is scarcely necessary to remind him that the first Napoleon excelled, not merely in the realms of martial display and military achievement, but also in the gentler sphere of peaceful administration. The right hon. Gentleman has already had full opportunity for the display of his genius for war. May I now beg him to turn his attention, flushed as he is with victories won and reverses manfully sustained on far-flung fields—may I beg him to return to the less exciting, but none the less exacting pursuits of peace? I am even ready to believe that, unless he speedily devotes his great intellect to the furtherance of some great constructive work of peaceful organisation—such, for instance, as the League of Nations—he will be in danger of occupying a lesser place in the verdict of posterity than his great predecessor and prototype, the first Napoleon.

This is admittedly a very difficult question. It is a question about which anybody can talk. Everyone feels on an equality with regard to opportunities of forming an opinion, and no one feels that he need be hampered by a small acquaintance with the character and traditions of our voluntary professional British Army. On the other hand, it is a question which gives rise, undoubtedly, to a good deal of prejudice. Anyone can see how easy it is for skilful ingenious, imaginative and youthful brains to turn the admitted difficulties of this question of clothing in the Army to good effect in an exciting and rousing Debate such as we have had this evening. I hope my hon. Friends who have criticised the War Office and myself in this matter may still, perhaps, remember that from time to time very difficult questions do come up, on which the Minister, who for the time being is responsible, has to form an opinion and advise action. I have had, even in the course of the present Parliament, which has not lasted more than eighteen months, two or three of these very difficult questions, and just the kind of questions about which anybody can form, and about which most people do form, an opinion. We had questions like that of the Slough depôt, in which there was a tremendous newspaper attack of great violence, and in which we were counselled to take most precipitate action, and to scrap or sell at any price the whole concern. I took very careful advice, and I went to people who knew about these things, and after looking into it I came to the conclusion we would do better to wait and to hold on to this valuable possession. As a result of that decision, which was endorsed by the House, and which the House sustained, we were able to make an exceedingly good business transaction out of the winding-up of Slough depôt. Then there was the case of Miss Violet Douglas Pennant.

I am not sure that my hon. Friend was not in both of them. It was just the kind of case which suits particularly his peculiar genius. At any rate, I had not seen the House in a more difficult or more critical mood in regard to any matter with which I have been concerned in my official capacity till to-night since the Debate as to Miss Violet Douglas Pennant. On that occasion I had difficulty sometimes in obtaining a hearing from many hon. Gentlemen. We had these sort of questions which are very, very difficult questions, and I do hope that the fact that I should have to deal with them will be attributed to my office and not to my possessing a double dose of original sin or any other particular personal failing of that kind. That is only by the way. I hope we shall try to come to a general agreement. I quite agree with what was said just now by my hon. Friend, that it is not for us to go on debating as if it were about continents and governments falling on a question of taste and of opinion, and almost one might say of caprice on a question of this kind. Certainly my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer in no way intended to convey that serious impression to the House. It was a light reply to a still lighter supplementary.

I would like to point out to the Committee that there is a good deal of authority and of careful thought behind this proposal. In the first instance it was most elaborately considered by what is called the Murray Committee. They sat for months, and they examined hundreds of witnesses from every branch of the Army and from all ranks of the service. They went most laboriously into the whole question and into the details of the uniform of each regiment. They considered all sorts of alternatives. My hon. Friend who moved this Amendment suggested that we should make alterna- tives to khaki with the colour facings of the different units. They actually made them, and so revolted were they by the appearance of these garments that they unanimously rejected them.

I certainly do not exclude that, and if my hon. Friend's nerves are strong enough it may be possible to arrange for him to have an opportunity. First of all, there was this Murray Committee, which sat for months, and they gave their opinion. Then there was the Army Council. Hon. Gentlemen who spoke from those benches a little while ago spoke of those reactionary, ancient, anachronistic soldiers of a vanished period, but the Army Council, on the whole, may claim to be equal in military personnel to the best brains of the Army at the present time; certainly they are among the most able officers, and all have made their mark in one way or another in the most responsible and serious duties of the War. They came unanimously to the conclusion that this was a very desirable step for us to take in the long, general, permanent interests of our voluntary British Army. Of course, I know there is a certain class of opinion which regards the view of a professional military man, not an amateur military man, but a professional military man, as necessarily beneath contempt—" Ah, well, he is only a soldier; we can put his view aside"—and especially if, in addition to being a military man, he is a military man holding high rank, then, of course, his opinion must on no account be taken into consideration.

In coming to a difficult decision of this kind, I have to try to sum up the advice which I have received from those who have lived their whole lives in the Army, and who have made a special study of the military profession; I have to bring this advice together into a definite recommendation and I have to submit it to my colleagues in the Cabinet. I do not think I am in a position, at any rate, to brush aside as absolutely irrelevant the concentrated and unanimous opinion of all the responsible military authorities. I did not stop there. Before I placed the matter before the Cabinet I had the advantage of discussing this matter with the Service Members Committee of this House. Quite a large meeting—30 or 40 Members—were present, and I exposed most plainly the difficulties which I felt in the matter. I am quite conscious of the fact that a prejudicial case can be put on a subject like this. There is no doubt whatever that it would be easy to make the kind of argument we have had from the right hon. Gentleman this evening. People would be able to say, "What a Government!" All this sort of argument would be put, and everyone would have contrasted every penny that was spent on the uniforms of the Army with a hundred other exceedingly desirable avenues of expenditure. I therefore exposed my difficulties frankly, as I think some hon. Gentlemen who are here present will remember, and the opinion which I generally derived from those hon. Members was that the difficulty would be the expense in regard to the officers, that officers who had no private means of their own would find a great difficulty in meeting these charges at a time when prices are so abnormally high, and I had particularly in mind the case of officers promoted from the ranks, of whom there are many in the Army at the present time. Therefore I regarded it as essential, in making a proposal of this kind to the Cabinet, that an effective contribution should be made to take the burden of such a change off the serving officers. Having got the matter as far as this—and I am only telling the House these stages, not in order to try and beg the question of who is right or wrong in the matter, but only to show them that it has been seriously, and carefully, and patiently considered at every stage—having got so far, I submitted the matter to the Cabinet. The Cabinet, with all their faults, are not entirely inexperienced. They know perfectly well the sort of difficulties that arise on these questions. They know perfectly well the kind of Press campaign that is being run against us on these questions. It would have been quite easy to write beforehand the headlines and the leading articles which have appeared. We have, however, to take many matters into consideration, and, after full, careful, thorough discussion and consideration, the Government decided upon a definite. policy.

Let us see what is that policy, because it would be a great pity if we were here this evening to make up our minds on an entirely false issue—I will not say on a red herring, but on an entirely erroneous view of what is the policy of the Government and what is the issue to be decided. My hon. Friend who spoke from these benches (Mr. E. Harmsworth), the anti-waste candidate, brought out the £3,000,000. He could not get away from that figure, which has played such a promient part in our national discussions out of doors. That is not the issue. The Government felt that in principle it was necessary that there should be a full or ceremonial dress for the Army. They felt, in regard to the Household Cavalry and the Guards—who are the guards of the capital of this ancient Kingdom and of this world-wide Empire—that there was a necessity that these troops at the very centre of this the greatest city in the world should have a definite ceremonial dress. We were not able to say that such a ceremonial dress should be extended to the rest of the Army, but we did consider that the Guards and the Household Cavalry stood in a different position in point of urgency as well as to a certain extent in point of principle from the rest of the Army. The Government decided to proceed this year with the clothing of the Guards and, as far as is necessary, of the Household Cavalry, and to leave the question of the clothing of the rest of the Army to some future period.

I really do not think that ought to be brought in, because, as a matter of fact, we ought to take a right decision in the interests of the Army. The hon. and gallant Gentleman is looking at it from the point of view of the election. He ought to look at it from the point of view of the Army.

When the election comes I do not suppose we shall find ourselves at a great disadvantage as compared with him. The case of the Guards and the Household Cavalry stands in an entirely different position from that of the rest of the Army. In the first place, as I pointed out the other day at Question time, there would be a loss either way. The Household Cavalry have already their uniforms, and to deprive them of their uniforms would entail a great waste. The Guards have already a quantity of uniforms, and of material for making uniforms, and all these costly bear-skins. There are 7,000 of them—enough to deal with the whole question of the Guards for many years to come. The total cost of re-equipping these troops, who have ceremonial duties to discharge about the Capital, with their pre-War uniforms, simplified as they have been, will be £160,000. That is a very serious figure, and I hope it is not supposed that it is a figure which I regard lightly, but, if a figure is to be quoted, I would rather the figure of £160,000 were quoted than the figure of £3,000,000, which is the only one which has been raised in these discussions. I am very much inclined to think that the conclusion to which the Government came will be taken in a great many quarters to have been a reasonable and sensible one. These troops stand in a special position. They are already partly clothed in this form of dress. Let us complete them, but let us leave the question of the rest of the Army to some future occasion.

We are prepared in this matter to follow a policy which will appeal to the right hon. Gentleman opposite. We are prepared to "Wait and see"—to wait and see what the progress of recruiting is in the unit which has the full dress, and in the units which do not have it. That will give us a very accurate test. We may wait and see the movement of prices, because I cannot think of anything less prudent than to put out on the market an order for a very large number of new uniforms at the present time, and enable tailors to put up their prices. Obviously, if this is done at all, it can only be done by feeling your way from point to point. I think we are entitled also to wait and see what is the movement of opinion in the Army, and of opinion out of the Army. Of course, if my hon. and gallant Friend who spoke last is right, that the soldiers dislike the uniforms, and that they will resent having to wear them because of the trouble of keeping them in order, that will easily become manifest, and we shall see a falling-off in the recruiting for the Guards, and a rush to wear the khaki of the ordinary line. We shall also see what opinion the officers of the Army form about it, and their opinion, I readily admit, is by no means united. It is a very difficult question. It is a question where you get as many different opinions as you get men in the interval we shall be using fully the stocks of khaki. It is unthinkable that we should waste a scrap of khaki or a scrap of khaki uniform. There is no question of doing away with the khaki uniform. It will be the permanent working dress of the whole Army, including the Guards.

After all its honours in the last War, it is to be used as a working dress!

In the interval we can resume the inquiries into a subject, which I do not think is by any means exhausted, namely, the possibility of finding an alternative full dress for the Line. I would like to put this to the Committee as a very practical point. Whatever decision the House may take, the soldier has got to have more than one suit of clothes. You have the workman in the overalls in which he works. He has his Sunday suit as well. The soldier also requires his workaday clothes, his service kit, his fighting kit, and, in addition, a dress of some sort and of a different character more suitable for the ceremonial proceedings of life. Some people think that the soldier in time would resent only having a dress which was associated with the more sober and terrible duties and aspects of his profession. I have had that point put forcibly before me. At any rate, however you look at it, it is perfectly clear there must be at least two complete sets of uniform with which the ordinary private soldier has to be supplied. I am quite ready to go into this question of the alternative uniform in the interval, but I would say it was thoroughly examined by a Committee, which, however, did not find a satisfactory solution.

It is very easy to sneer and chaff at the importance attached by soldiers to their uniform and to refer to their regimental position; but no comparison can be made between the great nationally-raised conscript Armies which have been, and possibly are going to be, raised by all the countries in Europe—except those who are precluded by the Peace Treaties—it is not possible, I say, to draw a comparison between our own small voluntary professional Army and those great Armies on the continent that are taken by compulsion. You do not need to offer them an attractive uniform. The authorities there know for certain the men they will get each year as they reach a certain age. These men live in their own country, and see their potential enemy just across the frontier. They see the nation from which they have suffered the most terrible injuries: possibly, if all went wrong in the world again, they might again be the victims. The men only serve for a short time, say for one or two years. What, then, is the relevence of the comparison with these Armies, and the Army that this House has deliberately chosen? In the old pre-War professional Army the men served for seven years with the Colours and five years with the reserve. They served in the main on terms of duty through the great foreign stations of the British Empire, and the recruiting was regulated entirely by the free working of the labour market. There is no comparison therefore between, our old Army and the Armies to which I have referred. A smart uniform carries on the traditions of many generations and of many famous campaigns in which are bound up the greatness of this island, and the splendour of its records. Such a uniform is an important element in the regimental life of the Army when the soldier has to go away for years at a time from his country and his family, and his regiment has to supply so many of the social and moral needs which he naturally feels.

It is a very odd thing that I should have to defend this particular proposal. Because I remember well that I was as young as my hon. Friend who spoke a while ago, and about as young as my other hon. Friend; I remember well standing in my place after the Boer War and denouncing, in unmeasured terms, the folly of gaudy and tinsled uniforms. I make this confession quite frankly to the House, I admit that I have changed my point of view to a very considerable extent. The passage of years and the slow acquisition of maturer wisdom have had their influence, as also has the terrible ordeal through which the world has passed and is passing. I confess that I see a far greater value in continuity, tradition, custom and in the structure of our social and national life than I did in the days when I came here as a young Member of 25 years of age. Remember this: We hope we are embarking upon a long period of peace. We hope we are embarking on a period which will extend over one, two, or three gene- rations, in which no great, vast or terrible struggle will shake and convulse the world. Still, Britain, with her Empire and her vast possessions and great position in the van of the nations, will require to keep some sort of military establishment in being.

These traditions and the uniform under discussion were all we had when the Great War broke out. There has not been any war like the last since the Napoleonic Wars, and yet we have kept alive the full traditions of the British Army. They were so strong that we were able to imprint them at once on the whole of the national force which in a couple of years we rallied and organised for the national defence. Each one of those regiments produced at least 20 or 30 other battalions, and every man who served in them had the feeling that he was one of that regiment, and associated with the long traditions attached to it. I hope that aspect of the question will not be left out in our future consideration of what should be done for the Army as a whole.

The only issue before the Committee is that the Guards and the Household Cavalry should be reclothed this year.

I am quite willing to give the Committee an undertaking that before any further expenditure is incurred on the reclothing of the Regular Army of the Line, which certainly would not arise until another year, the House shall have a further opportunity of discussing this matter in the light of the experience which we shall gain from this small experiment upon which we have decided.

Will the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that nothing shall be done to do away with kilts or tartans or to put any of the Highland regiments into khaki kilts?

As the right hon. Gentleman is going to protect the best interests of national life in the matter of Scotland, Ireland, and Wales, will he not give the same consideration to the best interests of the British regiments, and keep them in their national uniforms?

Question put, "That Item Head V., Sub-head A, be reduced by £500."

The Committee divided: Ayes, 85; Noes, 222.

It being after Eleven of the Clock, the Chairman proceeded, pursuant to Standing Order No. 15, to put forthwith the Questions necessary to dispose of the Vote.

Resolution to be reported to-morrow.

Committee to sit again to-morrow.

The remaining Orders were read and postponed.

IRELAND (DISTURBANCES).

May I ask the Attorney-General for Ireland whether he can give the House any further information with regard to the state of affairs in the City of Derry? Members representing Irish constituencies have, in the course of to-day, received telegrams which have given a very alarming account of the state of affairs there. I should like to ask more particularly whether, up till now, there have been any further troops sent to the city, and whether there is any truth in the statement, which has been widely published in the Press, to the effect that the local Justices in the City of Derry sent to the Chief Secretary yesterday, and, I think, the day before, asking for further military reinforcements and for the application of martial law, but that, up till this afternoon, no further reinforcements have arrived, and, not only that, but that they have not received any reply from the Chief Secretary?

Can the Attorney-General answer the question which I put to him yesterday as to whether, when order is finally restored, as we all hope it will be soon, in the city of Londonderry, the whole of the arms in the city will be taken possession of and removed? It is desirable that the whole of the population should be disarmed. We have heard of and seen pictures of fighting with rifles and revolvers, and the last four or five days behind barricades, and therefore I would like to know whether any steps will be taken to search for and confiscate the whole of these arms, including German rifles?

Half a battalion of the Norfolks, about 500 strong, have to-day arrived in Derry from Belfast. A further half battalion is ready to be despatched at any moment to the Commander-in-Chief. There are at present in Derry 1,500 soldiers and 150 members of the Constabulary.

Can the Attorney-General state what is the actual state of affairs in Londonderry since 10 o'clock this morning? He made a statement in the House at question time and quoted a telegram despatched at 3 minutes past 10 o'clock which was of a soothing and satisfactory character. That, however, does not conform or coincide with the statement that has appeared in the Press. Contrary to the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Press state that the night in Londonderry was a disturbed one; that there was constant firing of a serious character. It appears in the Press to-day—and it is a very serious matter to all Members whether they come from Ireland or not—that barricades have been erected, that there is constant firing and constant fighting, and that there is no sign that the Government has intervened in any effective manner. What effective steps have the Government taken to bring this state of civil war prevailing in Londonderry to an end? The Government, through the Attorney-General, stated last night that they were relying upon the support of loyal citizens; but loyal citizens in Ireland are very liable, especially in that part of Ireland, to be on one side of politics. The other side of politics—unfortunately for Ireland the country is ridden with politics from top to bottom—are liable to be against the Government; therefore an appeal to loyal citizens means an appeal to civil war. We desire to know whether the Government has intervened in any effective manner since 10 o'clock this morning between the rival partisans in Londonderry.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether there is any truth in the statement that the Government troops are not remaining neutral in Derry city? Statements are made in the Press to the effect that when the Sinn Fein armed party advanced they were covered by the troops, but that the troops took no part whatever in the faction fight between these two sections in Ireland. Is that true? Do the Government propose to reply to the very proper question addressed to them by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Ken-worthy) as to what is the policy of the Government with regard to disarmament in Ireland?

May I also appeal to the Government to answer the request that has been made to them repeatedly, and is further expressed in the request of the hon. Member for Hull—when are they going to take stronger action against both parties? When that question was put to the Attorney-General he gave no answer at all. We do urge from this side of the House, as well as from the opposite side, that the Government should take the management of the Government of Ireland into their hands in a more effective manner, and should put a stop to the state of affairs now prevailing in Derry.

I should like the Attorney-General to tell us what is the exact position at the moment so far as the military strength in Londonderry is concerned, and what steps are going to be taken to restore and maintain peace. In order to restore and maintain peace, if my information be correct, there were 250 policemen who remained on duty yesterday unbrokenly for more than 24 hours, and they were so completely exhausted that they were physically incapable of continuing. I would like the right hon. Gentleman to tell the House, in view of some suggestions that came from the other side, whether it is not the fact that upon the arrival of a substantial military detachment the first thing that happened in Londonderry was that they were fired on by the Sinn Feiners, injured, and returned the fire. The position in Londonderry is really dreadful at the moment. I can tell the right hon. Gentleman, though perhaps he has his own sources of information, on the clearest proof, that it has been perfectly impossible to distribute bread to the population, or milk or any kind of food supplies; the shops are being looted, right, left and centre, by the Sinn Feiners; property is being dispersed. The hon. Gentleman who interrupts had better keep himself quiet. If he does not I will deal with him. If he would address this House only on matters on which he is informed he would seldom be heard here.

This is a serious question. The loyal population, who desire to maintain order, offer themselves as a body to assist the authorities in preserving peace. As the right hon. Gentleman must perfectly well know, they have been assailed in their own fortress, and neither military nor police have been able to defend them; they have had to stand on their own defence. The right hon. Gentleman told the House yesterday that he knows the city of Derry well. He will forgive me if I say that I know it nearly as well. What we want to know definitely from the Government now is this: Four days have elapsed, and they have been repeatedly appealed to from these Benches to step in and restore order. We are entitled to press them now in view of the fact that four days have passed and practically nothing has been done, to immediately proceed to deal with this situation that has arisen there with whatever force may be necessary. Speaking for myself, I do not care what party it is directed against so long as it is necessary, and it is the duty of the Government to see that law and order are maintained there and peace restored in that unhappy city.

I rise to support the proposal of the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy) to have these parties disarmed. One of the parties in Ireland was disarmed in 1914 and only one party remained possessed of arms. If that party were dispossessed of their arms now there would be peace in the City of Derry.

When I find my hon. Friend the Member for North Down (Mr. T. W. Brown) supporting the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy), I am in considerable difficulty in understanding what the point of view is. I may remind the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull that he is a supporter of the opposition to the Firearms Bill. I do not quite understand his idea about disarmament in connection with his opposition to that Bill.

May I point out that the Firearms Bill is simply directed against pistols, and that the Pistols Act, if employed, would have been quite sufficient to prevent pistols being carried anywhere.

I would point out to my hon. and gallant Friend that pistols are extremely dangerous weapons. I can assure other hon. Members who have referred to this matter that 500 men were moved into Derry City yesterday. It is not for me to make suggestions to competent generals and competent police officials, but I can assure hon. Members that, if they make any requisition for further troops, that request will be attended to with the respect it deserves. At the present time, in this city of 40,000 inhabitants, there are 1,500 soldiers and 150 police, and I think that ought to be reasonably sufficient, especially when the Government are prepared at all costs to supplement any efforts they are making. I agree that the position is difficult, but all that any reasonable person can expect the Government to do is to attend to the requisitions of those who are responsible for the peace, and who are prepared to pay the cost of carrying out their duties with their own lives.

I can assure my hon. Friend that for practical purposes under the Defence of the Realm Regulations martial law is only a word. We have all that, in reason, can be afforded by martial law. If the military authorities represent to us that it is impossible to carry on under the Defence of the Realm Regulations that will be very seriously considered, but the military authorities have immense powers under those Regulations. Those powers are so great that this country has been able to carry on under these Regulations during the most terrific war that was ever waged.

Adjourned at Twenty-three Minutes after Eleven o'Clock.