House of Commons
Tuesday, July 20, 1920
Private Business
Private Bills [ Lords ] (Standing Orders not previously inquired into complied with),—Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in the case of the following Bills, originating in the Lords, and referred on the First Reading thereof, the Standing Orders not previously inquired into, which are applicable thereto, have been complied with, namely:
Llanelly Corporation Water Bill [ Lords ].
Royal Bank of Scotland Bill [ Lords ].
Ordered, That the Bills be read a Second time.
Halifax Corporation Bill,
Leigh Corporation Bill,
Sutton Coldfield Corporation Bill,
Tredegar Urban District Council Bill,
Lords Amendments considered, and agreed to.
Dearne Valley Water Board Bill [ Lords ],
Londonderry Port and Harbour Bill [ Lords ],
Read the Third time, and passed, with Amendments.
South Metropolitan Gas Bill [ Lords ] (by Order),
Read the Third time, and passed, with Amendments.
Manchester Ship Canal Bill [ Lords ] (by Order),
Port of London Authority (Consolidation) Bill [ Lords ] (by Order),
Second Reading deferred till Thursday.
Pilotage Provisional Orders (No. 3) Bill (by Order),
Read the Third time, and passed.
Oral Answers to Questions
Questions
Persia (Political Situation)
asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can make any further statement with regard to the political situation in Persia; whether the Red Army reported to be operating in Northern Persia is composed of Russians or of local Maximalists and insurgents; and whether His Majesty's Government is assisting the royalist government in Persia in any way?
I regret that, in the present circumstances, I am unable to give any comprehensive review of the political situation in Northern Persia, which, pending the consolidation of the new Ministry, is somewhat inchoate. With regard to the second part, information has reached me that the Bolshevik forces which are operating in Northern Persia have been joined by a certain number of local insurgents. In answer to the third part, I would refer the hon. and gallant Member to the answer given by the Lord Privy Seal on the 14th instant regarding the terms on which His Majesty's Government are prepared to resume negotiations with the Soviet. These include a cessation of Bolshevik operations of this nature, and it is hoped that this may prove a means of assisting the Persian Government to deal with the situation created by the Bolshevik invasion of their country.
Is that the only assistance being given to the Royal Government of Persia?
My hon. and gallant Friend knows what are the relations between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Persia.
The hon. Gentleman has told us that we are intervening on their behalf with the Russian Government, but are we giving them any material assistance in Persia?
I must ask my hon. and gallant Friend to give me notice of that question.
May I ask whether the Persian Government have given any indication to His Majesty's Government that the Medjliss is going to be, summoned, and are British troops still occupying Reshid?
The hon. and gallant Gentleman should give notice of that question.
Shell Transport and Trading Company, Limited
asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any of the managing directors of the Shell Transport and Trading Company, Limited, have any association, either direct or indirect, with the Foreign Office?
No, Sir.
Russia
Armistice Negotiations
asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the Governments of Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania have accepted the invitation of His Majesty's Government to a peace conference in London; whether the Russian Government has sent any reply to the same invitation; if so, what is it? Whether General Baron Wrangel has accepted His Majesty's Government's suggestion for an armistice; and, if not, what action does His Majesty's Government suggest with regard to Baron Wrangel?
asked the Prime Minister whether any reply has been received by the Government to the Note addressed by them to the Russian Government; and, if so, what are its terms?
The answer to the first part of the question of the hon. and gallant Member for Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy) is in the negative, and to the second in the affirmative. General Wrangel has not, so far, been approached in the matter by His Majesty's Government. As negotiations are proceeding, the Government do not think it desirable to publish the telegram from the Soviet Government by itself, but as soon as it is possible to do so in the public interest, all the correspondence will be given to the House.
Is the hon. Gentleman aware that summaries of this reply are appearing in the French Press and our own "Times," and does he not think it would be more respectful to this House if we could have it as soon as possible?
I have seen what purport to be summaries of the report in the newspapers. I know nothing of what has appeared in the French Press, except what the hon. and gallant Gentleman has told me.
asked the Prime Minister whether, in the event of the territory occupied by General Wrangel being handed back to the Communist Government of a part of Russia at the instance of this country, any steps will be taken to protect the non-communist section of the population from outrage and punishment?
If the proposed conference on Russia and the border States takes place, the question of General Wrangel's position will be discussed at that conference and a satisfactory solution will be sought for the many difficult problems connected with it. It is, however, impossible for me to state at present what would be the details of such a solution.
Is it the fact that the Government is putting pressure on General Wrangel?
As a matter of fact we have sent no communication to General Wrangel, but I think the House understands that a long while ago we made it clear that if offensive operations were undertaken by him, we should accept no responsibility.
Is it not a fact that when Odessa and Archangel were taken by the Bolshevists an amnesty was given and observed?
British Institute, Florence
asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the British Institute at Florence was founded by His Majesty's Government in 1918; whether at the opening ceremony it was announced by the British Ambassador that it would be permanent; and how, if it is now closed, His Majesty's Government will fulfil its obligations to Italian students who have commenced long courses at the institute?
asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the French and German Governments maintain institutes at Florence; whether a British institute was established there during the War by the British Government for the permanent cultivation of a good understanding between Italy and Great Britain; and whether he will consider the unfortunate effect on Italian opinion in present conditions if that institute is closed?
asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will state what assistance the Government is prepared to give to the British institute at Florence; and whether such assistance will enable the institute to continue the work on which so favourable an opinion has been expressed by the Committee on British Communities Abroad?
asked the Prime Minister if he is aware that active propaganda in favour of German kultur is being carried on at the principal educational centres in Italy; and, if so, will he at once take steps to advance the better understanding of British ideas at those centres?
I am informed that there is an institute which is assisted by the French Government at Florence. There was also a German institute before the War, but I have no information as to whether it has again begun its work.
The British institute was founded, as suggested, in 1918. The question as to the assistance which can be given to the institute other than by a money grant is at present under consideration. I fear, however, that as far as its financial needs the concerned the continuance of the institute must depend on the fees obtained from the scholars and the generosity of private subscribers.
Does the Government realise how necessary it is to do all we can to dispel any coldness in Italian circles towards this country, and does the hon. Gentleman recognise that an institution of this kind will strengthen the relations between the two countries?
I entirely share the view expressed by my hon. Friend.
British Army
Army Council
asked the Secretary of State for War whether he can state the reasons that have led to the recently announced decision to add two permanent Civil Service officials to the Army Council, thereby impairing its military character by transforming the Board, which executes the functions of Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the Crown, into one in which the military members are no longer in a majority; what steps he proposes to take to prevent these two secretaries, who will be the only permanent members of the Council, from obtaining undue influence, owing to the fact that the other members, both military and political, will be constantly changing; and whether, if these two secretaries must be on the Council, the Government will arrange for them to be gazetted as associate members without votes, thus preserving the military majority of votes on the Army Council, as laid down by the Committee which recommended, and by the Government which adopted, the present Army Council system?
The decision of the Government to make the Permanent Secretary directly responsible to the Ministerial Head of the Department for the control of expenditure, and to give him the status of a full member of the Council or Board, was announced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Debate on the Consolidated Fund Bill on 24th March last.
The Permanent Secretary of the Admiralty has for many years been one of the Lords Commissioners.
As regards the War Office, it was decided that the best means of giving immediate practical effect to the decision was to make the Assistant Financial Secretary a joint Secretary for Financial Duties, and to put both the Permanent Secretary and the Secretary for Financial Duties on to the Army Council. This avoided the imposition of further heavy duties on the newly appointed Permanent Secretary, Sir Herbert Creedy, and utilised to the best advantage during this critical period, when financial control is of the utmost importance, the long experience of the Assistant Financial Secretary, Sir Charles Harris.
This is an interim and transitory arrangement, as, in due course, the two sets of functions will be exercised by one Permanent Secretary, and the Civil Service element on the Army Council will be correspondingly reduced.
Thus, normally, the constitution of the Army Council would be as follows: —
Will this not lead to the military members being in a minority?
The procedure is not conducted by the counting of votes, but by weighing them.
If there be a difference of opinion and a vote be taken on it, does not the right hon. Gentleman agree that the decision will be given according to the number of the votes recorded?
Yes, Sir, but I think there is a complete misapprehension as to what kind of body this is, if it be supposed that matters are settled only by votes, in the same way as divisions are taken in the House of Commons. Opinions are expressed, and the opinion of the Council is finally pronounced; but neither in the Board of Admiralty nor in the Army Council is the usual procedure that of counting votes.
Will the right hon. Gentleman say what is the relative weight of the vote of a civilian and of a military member?
The value of the opinion expressed makes for the general decision of the Council.
If an acute difference of opinion occur, what do they do?
Does the right hon. Gentleman wish us to understand that votes in this House are not weighed?
Will not the weight of the five civilians overbalance that of the four military men?
I do not consider that that point arises in any direct way. I should be glad to discuss these matters, in regard to which I have had considerable experience at the Admiralty and at the War Office, if an occasion occurred in Debate, but I can only say at Question Time that I do not think the issue arises in that form at all.
Machine Gun Corps (Private Wilson)
asked the Secretary of State for War whether his attention has been called recently to the case of Private William Wilson, No. 189752, Machine Gun Corps, of 11, Pine Street, Southmoor, Stanley, county Durham; whether this lad, being then less than 17 years of age, enlisted on the 6th October, 1918; whether his parents applied for his discharge personally within the next day or two and in writing on or about the 29th of the same month; whether the discharge was first promised and afterwards refused by the Army authorities; whether they now demand £35 payment for the discharge; and, if so, whether he will say why?
Private Wilson was a few days under 17 years of age when he enlisted in October, 1919, not 1918, as stated in the question. There is no record of any application for his discharge until 29th October, 1919, when he was over 17 years of age, and his release was refused by the proper authority in accordance with the discretionary powers vested in him. The case is, however, being further considered and I will let the hon. Member know the result in due course.
Re-Employed Officers, Allowances
asked the Secretary of State for War whether officers reemployed during the War who had previously retired on gratuity were given the same gratuity, bonus, outfit, uniform, and other allowances as officers who had never served before; and, if so, in what way were they treated better than officers who had never served before?
Officers who had previously retired with a gratuity were only eligible, like officers in receipt of retired pay, to a gratuity at a lower rate (Article 497A, Royal Warrant for Pay etc.) than that applicable in the case of a temporary officer (Article 497B, Royal Warrant). They receive the same bonus, allowances and outfit allowances as officers without previous service except that those rejoined as officers between August and December, 1914, were eligible in certain circumstances to a higher rate of outfit allowance (£100 instead of £50).
Physique Records
asked the Secretary of State for War if copies of the physique records of each county, city, and county borough in Great Britain of recruits received therefrom between August, 1914, and August, 1918, could be supplied on request from such counties, cities, and towns, on condition such request was preferred by the medical officer of health of such places for the purpose of considering schemes to improve the physique of the inhabitants?
I am afraid it is not possible for the War Office to furnish such information as this, but I am consulting with my right hon. Friend the Minister of Health.
Wimbledon Common Camp
asked the Secretary of State for War why the portion of the 97 acres of Wimbledon Common in the occupation of the War Office, which was to have been handed back to the conservators of the common in June, has not in fact yet been handed back; and what is the reason for the failure to carry out the arrangements?
The temporary retention of this camp is necessary for the accommodation of battalions of Foot Guards. The question of releasing part of the camp has been carefully considered, but it has been found impracticable to surrender any portion at present. It is proposed to remove two of the battalions, in October, and it is confidently hoped that it will then be possible to give up one complete lines.
Strength and Establishments
asked the Secretary of State for War if he will state what were the ration strengths and establishments, separately, of British troops, all ranks, in the undermentioned areas on the 30th June last: Ireland, Scotland, England and Wales, France and Belgium, Rhine area, Constantinople area, Black Sea area, Palestine, Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, and the Crown Colonies?
No, Sir, I do not think it is desirable at the present stage to make public this information.
Navy and Army Canteen Board
28 & 29.
asked the Secretary of State for War (1) whether there were sold to G. Stanley, on 18th September, 1919, 50 tons of sago at £23 per ton, and also 50 tons of tapioca, at £23. per ton, the market prices being £55 per ton and £49 per ton, respectively, these sales resulting in a needless loss to the Navy and Army Canteen Board of £2,900; whether there were sold to Adam Montgomery, on 22nd September, 1919, 10 tons of sago at £25 per ton, the market price being £55 per ton, and also 20 tons of seed pearl tapioca at £27 10s. per ton, the market price being £52 10s. per ton, a loss to the Board of £800;
(2) whether certain stocks belonging to the Navy and Army Canteen Board have been sold at prices considerably below current market prices, namely, 30 tons of macaroni to G. Blake and Company, on 20th August, 1919, at £45 per ton, the market price being £68 per ton; whether again, on 28th August, a similar quantity was sold at £44 per ton, the market price remaining at £68 per ton, showing a loss to the Board of £1,410 on these sales; whether, at about the same time, several hundred cases of candles, six dozen pounds in each, were sold at 6s. per dozen to the same company, the market price at that time being 8s. 4d. per dozen; and whether, in this connection, his attention has been drawn to the criticism directed against the Board by the complaints tribunal of the central committee on 14th May, 1920, regarding the disposal of candles by the Navy and Army Canteen Board by private treaty at 6d. per lb. while at public auctions nearly twice that amount was obtained for them.
The Army Council has no reason to suppose that the trading of the Navy and Army Canteen Board, viewed as a whole, is not properly and efficiently conducted. The individual transactions of the Board are not carried out with public money, nor charged upon the Votes of Parliament, and my right hon. Friend is not prepared to regard them as proper subjects for question and answer in this House.
Is it not a fact that the War Office is represented upon the Board of the Navy and Army Canteen Board, and therefore shares the responsibility for their policy?
My answer refers to the transactions of the Board, and not to their policy. The War Office are represented on the Council of the Board, but not on the board of management.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the facts stated in this question are correct?
Seeing that the transactions in this case are, on the face of them, so unsatisfactory, is there no means of investigating them? Can no one find out why these goods were thrown away like that?
Is it not a fact that the very existence of this Board depends upon the approval of the War Office?
Yes, Sir; the existence of the Board does depend upon the approval of the War Office; but, having selected men and given them your confidence, it is your duty to accept their acts, if they be bonâ fide, with regard to the details of commercial transactions I understand, in connection with these goods, that it was difficult to dispose of some of them, and that some were not of first-rate quality.
Will the right hon. Gentleman request the military representative on the Board to ask for an inquiry into this matter?
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware, also, that one of the men mentioned was until recently a member of the firm to whom the goods were sold, and also had some control or say in the Army Canteen Board?
No, Sir; I am not aware of that.
Will he make an investigation into these abuses—for they are abuses?
Affiliation Orders
asked the Secretary of State for War whether the maximum amount of the affiliation order which can be made against the soldier for his illegitimate child, or children, is still the same as when his rate of pay was 7s. a week; and, if so, why?
The amount which can be stopped from the pay of a private soldier for the maintenance of an illegitimate child, which was 4d. per diem when his pay was 1s. per diem, has been raised to 1s. per diem by the Army and Air Force (Annual) Act, 1920.
Wesleyan Church, Southport
asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether he is aware that the claim for damages done by the military occupation of the Mornington Road Wesleyan Church, Southport, premises have not yet been settled, despite the fact that this matter has been in hand since September, 1919; whether he can state adequate reasons for the excessive delay; and whether he will take steps to have this claim met forthwith?
I have no information as to the present stage of the negotiations in this case, but the local military authorities are being urged to expedite the matter. I would point out that the applicants are largely responsible for the delay, as they did not make any claim until nearly 12 months after the Armistice. Such a delay adds enormously to the difficulties of negotiations, owing to changes of staff, demobilisation of personnel, etc.
Questions
Fallen Soldiers (Removal of Bodies)
asked the Prime Minister whether he is aware that the French Government have given permission to relations of fallen soldiers to remove the bodies to cemeteries near their own homes, and that the American Government is removing at public expense the bodies of those whose relatives desire it to America; and whether he will give permission to relatives of English soldiers who are buried abroad to remove the bodies to England?
I am aware that the American Government are taking action as stated, and that the French Government contemplate similar action. I regret, however, that, for the reasons which have already been carefully explained to the House in reply to previous questions on this subject, I can hold out no hope of similar facilities being afforded for the removal of British dead. In particular, I would refer the Noble Lord to the answers to his question on 14th July, 1919, to the hon. and gallant Member for Fairfield on 25th March, 1919, and to the hon. and gallant Member for Finchley on 18th February, 1919.
As the French Government has now given this permission, which they had not done at the date referred to, what reason is there why the British Government should not give a similar permission?
Is it not a fact that the only permission given by the French Government is the removal from one communal cemetery to another, and that a large number of Americans very much dislike having the bodies removed against their wishes, and wish them to remain where they are?
I cannot answer the last question. With regard to the Noble Lord's question, the matter has been fully explained, and I have nothing to add.
Will a further opportunity be given of discussing this matter? There is very strong feeling on the matter, and it is unsatisfactory that it should remain where it stands.
It has been discussed before, and it was decided not to take a Division. I thought the House came to a final decision.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this is a new point, which was not discussed, and that there is feeling among a certain number of individuals as to the removal of bodies? Should not their grievance be considered?
I realise that. Unless my memory fails me, that point was discussed. I do not think there would be any desire on the part of the House to have another discussion.
Does the decision which the right hon. Gentleman has announced alter the decision announced by Order in Council in regard to the soldiers buried in occupied areas?
I am not able to answer that without notice.
Mesopotamia (British Re-Inforcements from India)
asked the Secretary of State for War whether the Army Council is satisfied that the safety of British and Indian troops can be maintained; and how comes it that the Arabs are so hostile as to cut the railway and attack British detachments?
Large reinforcements have been ordered from India, and the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Mesopotamia has been given full authority to take any measures of concentration or contraction which the military situation requires. In these circumstances there is no reason for anxiety about the general safety of the garrison in Mesopotamia. The small force in Rumeitha is holding out, and is being supplied from the air.
The second part of the question should be addressed to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for India.
Is not the policy of His Majesty's Government to establish an Arab State in Mesopotamia, and has that been known to the Arabs who are now attacking British forces?
The War Office is not responsible for the policy which is adopted with regard to the political treatment of the inhabitants of Mesopotamia, but only for military security of the country so far as it is possible for us to maintain it.
Is not the right hon. Gentleman a Member of the Cabinet, and therefore jointly responsible for its policy in Mesopotamia?
Yes, but it was from the point of view of the Department to which particular questions should be addressed that I was speaking, and from that point of view the hon. Gentleman should address himself to the Secretary of State for India.
Are we, therefore, to understand from this very important answer that the Government are going to increase our commitments in Mesopotamia instead of diminishing them?
"Commitments" is a term I do not quite understand in this connection. The Government at the present moment, instead of diminishing the forces in Mesopotamia to the extent of one-half during the current financial year, have found it necessary to order large reinforcements.
Instead of doing that, would it not be much better to evacuate a great deal of territory?
That is a question that should be dealt with in Debate, and not by question and answer.
Ireland
Disturbances, Fermoy and Lismore
asked the Secretary of State for War whether the inquiries into the recent disturbances at Fermoy and Lismore, in which soldiers and police are stated to have damaged shops and houses, have been completed; and when he will be able to make a statement on the alleged occurrences?
A report has been received regarding the disturbances at Fermoy, but I have not yet had time to consider it.
May I ask when the Report on the disturbances at Lismore will be ready?
I should have said "Fermoy and Lismore."
May I ask the reason for the continued delay in the receipt of this Report? It has been asked for three times in this House, and three times the answer has been the same.
The inquiry has been proceeding. I am sure that no one would wish to hurry it, or that it should be otherwise than leisurely, thorough and searching. It is now completed, and the Report actually arrived last night. I hope to have it examined in the Department and to read it myself during the course of next week, and if my hon. and gallant Friend will put down his question next week I shall be able to give him an answer.
Petrol (Looting at Mullingar)
asked the Secretary of State for Air whether any escort of soldiers or police was in charge of the consignment of 3,000 gallons of petrol sent by rail from Dublin to Oranmore which was looted at Mullingar on 30th June; and what was the Report of the court of inquiry held to investigate this loss of public property?
The petrol referred to was being delivered by the Shell Company under a standing contract with the Army, but was, in this case, delivered by the company to a Royal Air Force unit. No escort was provided. No Court of Inquiry of the ordinary Military or Air Force pattern has been set up to inquire into the loss, but investigations of a less formal kind are proceeding. In future an escort will be provided where-ever possible in cases where it is considered that there is a risk of loss or damage to valuable stores.
Has any censure been passed upon the official who neglected his duty in regard to this petrol, and provided no escort for this very important convoy?
I have said that less formal investigations are proceeding —of course, without prejudice to any more formal investigation that may afterwards be required. It is absurd to suppose that there are enough troops or airmen or police in Ireland to secure simultaneously the protection of all kinds of stores in transit at every vulnerable point at which they may become the subject of a treacherous attack.
Is it not equally absurd to suppose that the Sinn Feiners would let 3,000 gallons of petrol pass without capturing it?
Office of Lord Lieutenant
asked the Prime Minister whether it has been decided to abolish the office of Lord Lieutenant of Ireland; and, if not, what useful purpose is served by the continuance of this appointment under the Crown?
Is it in order to address a question of this sort, reflecting on His Majesty's representative in Ireland?
I do not see any reflection upon the Viceroy. It is a question of the abolition of the office, and there is no reflection upon its occupant.
The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative. The second part of the question raises too large a subject to be dealt with by question and answer.
Does the right hon. Gentleman know that as long ago as 1862 it was decided to abolish this office, and is not this a reform rather long overdue?
It is a considerable interval, but the fact that it was considered then and has not been carried out suggested my answer.
Kidnapping
asked the Prime Minister whether he will introduce legislation to increase the penalties for kidnapping in Ireland, in view of the plan of intimidation against the sympathisers with law and order in that country lately instituted by Sinn Fein, whereby those who actively assist the executive are deprived of liberty for indefinite periods, the victims including railway men and labourers, as well as officials; and have any of those who have been kidnapped been rescued by the authorities?
The question of increasing the penalties for false imprisonment and other offences is now under consideration.
Is the right hon. Gentleman considering the case of the kidnapping of children by the police?
Questions
Motor-Car Act (Police Controls)
asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many police controls were in operation in the Metropolitan police area for detecting infringements of the Motor Car Act between a.m. 17th July and p.m. 19th July; how many police officers were employed, and with what success; and were any cases of dangerous driving reported?
There were 97 controls during the three days; 68 officers were employed; 159 cases were reported by the officers on control duty for prosecution, of which three related to dangerous driving; and two cases of dangerous driving were also reported by police on ordinary duty during the period.
Were the fines obtained sufficient to pay for the employment of the police?
Is it a right and proper thing in these unsettled times to give information to the enemy?
Ex-Service Men
Metropolitan Police (Ex-Constable Lowes)
asked the Home Secretary whether ex-Police Constable Lowes, who was demobilised from the Army in January, 1919, has yet been re-examined by the Metropolitan police surgeon; and, if so, whether he can say if it is proposed to reinstate ex-Police Constable Lowes in the Metropolitan police, so that he may be able to serve the three and a half years necessary in order to qualify for a full police pension?
The Report of the Medical Board on which the Pensions Ministry based their award of pension to ex-Police Constable Lowes on his discharge from the Army, and his medical history in the Army, were received by the Commissioner of Police on the 15th instant, and they are now under the consideration of the chief surgeon.
Pensions (Enemy Air Raids)
asked the Minister of Pensions if any decision has yet been reached regarding the treatment of ex-soldiers who were wounded while home on furlough by enemy air raids?
I regret to find that these cases do not properly come within the terms of the Warrant, unless the soldier was actually performing military duty at the time of the accident.
Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that some of these men have had to apply to boards of guardians for relief on the ground of destitution?
They would be entitled to the same pension and remuneration as are civilians under the same circumstances, and they apply for them through the Ministry of Health.
Edmonton District Council
asked the Minister of Health if his attention has been called to the dismissal by the Edmonton District Council of a gardener, ex-Rifleman R. Digby, on the ground that he was not a trade unionist; if Digby served five years during the War, joining up originally when over age; and if he has any powers which enable him to prevent this kind of persecution by public authorities of ex-soldiers?
My right hon. Friend has not received any official information of this case, but he observes from the Press that the council have agreed to reinstate Mr. Digby.
Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the reason the Edmonton District Council have reinstated this man is the agitation amongst the non-unionists? Does he think it advisable that any borough or district council should adopt methods which are detrimental to the interests of those who are not prepared to join trade unions?
My hon. Friend began by asking me whether I was aware of certain facts he mentioned. I was not aware of them. Therefore the second part of his question does not arise.
Questions
Taxi-Cabs (Lights)
asked the Home Secretary whether under the police regulations taxi-cabs are required to carry sufficient light to enable passengers to read the meter and the fare bill at night without difficulty; and, if so, whether it would be possible for police officials at various points to see that these regulations are carried out?
There is a police regulation that taxi-meters are to be properly illuminated to show to the hirer the amount of fare payable. The police are instructed to see these regulations are observed, and renewed instructions will be given.
Is the hon. Gentleman aware that at present it is impossible to read the meter inside the cab and the meter outside the cab is never properly lighted?
I think it varies. Sometimes you can read it and sometimes you cannot.
Temperance (Scotland) Act
asked the Secretary for Scotland if he can now see his way to include in the return being prepared in connection with the Temperance (Scotland) Act the number and classification of existing licences in each voting area?
As the information referred to appears to be of considerable importance, my right hon. Friend is endeavouring to obtain it, and hopes to include it in the statement promised in his reply to my hon. friend on the 20th June.
Rhineland Commission (Coloured Troops)
asked the Prime Minister whether the Rhine-land Commission has suppressed various journals for publishing articles against the employment of coloured troops in the occupied regions; whether the Rhineland Commission have satisfied themselves that charges brought against coloured troops are false; and whether the British representative on the Commission has sent any information on this subject to His Majesty's Government?
The Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission recently pronounced a sentence of suspension for fifteen days from 16th June as regards seven German publications, of which the two most important were the "Kolnische Volkszeitung" and the "Rheinische Zeitung," for articles attacking the French coloured troops. The High Commission are satisfied that the accusations made against these troops are devoid of any substantial foundation. Several of the newspapers which published these charges having apologised, the period of suspension was reduced to five days. The British representative on the High Commission has reported in this sense.
"Land of Mystery" Film
asked the Prime Minister whether the cost of producing the film "The Land of Mystery" has been or will be defrayed wholly or partly out of public funds; who is the author of this film; and how did the 33 film artists who took part in the production of the film obtain their passports to Russia and other countries?
The film in question has not received and will not receive any grant from public funds. It is entirely a private venture. I understand that the author is a Mr. Merwin and that the film artists received passports in the ordinary way for Poland and other countries.
Does "The Land of Mystery" refer to Russia or to Great Britain?
Richborough Port
asked the Prime Minister how is it proposed to deal with the port of Richborough; whether such a large reduction of staff has recently taken place as to impair the use of the port; whether there is any prospect of disposing of the port to any private concern; whether there are a large number of railway wagons at present at the port lying almost derelict, and a number of steam rollers; and whether these could be presented to various firms and public bodies as War memorials?
I am informed that Richborough is being advertised for sale, and it is hoped that a purchaser may be found for the port as a whole. The answer to the second part of the question is in the negative. There are some 500 railway-owned wagons under repair, which will be handed back to the railway companies, and 23 steam rollers which were returned from overseas a fortnight ago. Six are being handed over to the War Office and 17 are being sold.
Have any steps been taken to dispose of such things as lighters? There is an enormous number of iron and steel lighters getting derelict. Have steps been taken to see whether they can be used on inland waters?
A great many have been sold.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that some steam rollers have been there for several months and are rapidly deteriorating through being left there?
No, I am not aware of that, but I think it would take more than a month to deteriorate steam rollers.
Public Services (Withdrawal of Labour)
asked the Prime Minister whether he is aware of the determination of the general public not to submit to the loss and inconvenience caused by the sudden withdrawal of labour and refusal to go to arbitration in essential public services, and to themselves maintain such services if necessary by volunteers drawn from their own ranks; whether an improvised service of coal getting is alone impossible; and will he, in consequence, facilitate the manufacture and importation of oil-burning devices for household and other purposes in every possible way, and also maintain at suitable centres the most ample supply of oil fuel?
This question seems to be more suitable for Debate than to be dealt with by question and answer.
Royal Air Force
Aero Engines
asked the Secretary of State for Air whether aero engines are still being manufactured for the Air Ministry; if so, how many and of what types; whether engines of a similar type are now and have been declared surplus to the Disposal Board; and if so, why are engines still being manufactured?
The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. The following engines are now on order for the Air Ministry:—
Transport
Great North of Scotland Railway
asked the Secretary for Scotland whether he can state the present position with regard to the extensions of the Great North of Scotland Railway to Braemar and Strathdon, as recommended by the Rural Transport (Scotland) Committee, 1919?
I have been asked to reply to this question. The proposed extensions of the Great North of Scotland Railway from Ballater to Braemar and from Alford to Strathdon as recommended by the Rural Transport (Scotland) Committee are at the present time under investigation by the Ministry of Transport in conjunction with the other Government Departments concerned.
Is the hon. Gentleman aware that they have been under investigation for six months? Has any improvement been made in the right direction?
These cases have been under careful consideration during that period. The rapidity with which they can be proceeded with depends entirely upon the Votes which the House may give for this purpose.
Railway Officials (Government Service)
The following question stood on the Paper in the name of :
66. To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer in how many cases railway servants lent to the Government by their companies during the War refused to take State salaries; whether in all such cases they continued to receive their salaries from the railway companies; whether the Treasury has made any calculation of the extra cost to the State of this arrangement under the guarantee of the railway companies; and whether he will consent to a Return showing all salaries above £1,000 paid by the companies to railway officials lent during the War, contrasting the sums they would have received as Ministers of the Crown or officials of the Government, and so revealing the extra cost, if any, to the taxpayer as a result of their honorary services to the State?
Before asking this question may I ask what are the principles governing the sub-editing of questions? In the third line, after the word "war," and before the word "refused," there came the word "patriotically." Possibly you will be good enough, Mr. Speaker, to tell me why that has been deleted?
We discourage all these adjectives.
Am I then to understand that no adjectives are allowed in questions?
No unnecessary adjectives.
I beg to put my question.
I have no complete information showing the number of railway servants employed in Government work during the War who continued to receive salaries from their companies instead of from the State. The compilation of a return such as that suggested is not practicable, since no estimate can be made as to the salaries particular individuals would have received in respect of war work.
Hop-Pickers
asked the Minister of Transport what are the exceptional conditions that differentiate hop-pickers going from London to Ashford from those going from Portsmouth to Farnham?
The hop-pickers going from London to Kent travel in considerable number, and, as I pointed out to my Noble Friend on the 12th of July, they are carried by special trains which run after midnight.
Would my hon. Friend be prepared to provide special trains for the hop-pickers of Hampshire?
If we can do it I shall be glad to take the matter up with the railway companies.
Will they pay the higher fares now proposed?
Railway Fares (Increase)
( by Private Notice ) asked the Leader of the House whether his attention has been drawn to the evidence given by Sir Alexander Butterworth before the Rates Advisory Committee yesterday to the effect that the railway companies, in submitting their figures, in justification of the proposed increases in fares and rates, had no thought of applying these increases to the month of August, and whether the Government will at once confer with the Advisory Committee with a view to arranging that the increases should commence on 1st September?
As I understand it, Sir Alexander Butterworth's evidence was that the 1st September was the earliest date they thought practicable, but in any event the responsibility is not that of the railway companies. As I stated yesterday, the Rates Advisory Committee have been asked to fix a scale of charges which will make good, by July of next year, the deficit due to the recent increased costs of working the railways, and the Cabinet definitely decided to give effect to this decision. It is impossible for us, therefore, to postpone the imposition of the new rates beyond the date to be fixed if the deficit is to be wiped out. I am not yet in a position to state when the Report will be received, the amount of increases, or the date for their introduction which the Committee will recommend. It is for the purpose of arriving at a sound and an equitable decision on these points that the Committee is taking evidence.
When does my right hon. Friend think that he can make an announcement as to the date from which the increase is to be operative.
I quite realise that, in addition to the general hardship, with which I sympathise, it is a great pity not to let the public know the exact date of the increase. For that reason I asked the Minister of Transport to-day when he thought the Advisory Committee would report. He said he could not tell definitely, but he thought it would be within about a week. I wish the House to understand that the actual problem is to meet a deficit. The Advisory Committee are asked to give us their method of meeting the deficit, and what the Cabinet and the House have to decide is whether or not we shall meet it in that way, or whether the taxpayer will pay for it.
Is it the assumption of the Government that this considerable increase will substantially diminish receipts?
That is obviously one of the great difficulties, and it is evident that the time must come when continual increases of rates will destroy the revenue. It is for the purpose of judging as to the amount which can be put on without destroying the revenue that the Advisory Committee is working.
Will the Cabinet consider as germane to this position the fact that in parts of England, particularly in the north, holidays are taken late in August, and that, therefore, the divi- sion of that month will be unduly in favour of one part of the country, and unduly harsh to another part?
That is perfectly true, and I myself am convinced that the only fair and reasonable thing to do is to act upon the advice of the Advisory Committee, whatever it may be.
Are we to understand that the date of 5th August, which was definitely fixed, is definitely gone for the present?
It was never given as a definite date.
Oh, yes!
At all events, the decision of the Cabinet was not given as a definite date. What we decided was that, even if the Committee reported before that date, the increased rates would not be imposed before 5th August.
Having regard to the hardship experienced by people who have made arrangements for holidays, unaware of this rise in fares, would it not be possible for the Government to charge a slightly higher rate as from 1st September, rather than have a lower rate as from 5th August?
My hon. Friend may be sure the Government do not wish to impose this hardship upon holiday traffic. [HON. MEMBERS: "Then, why do it?"] My hon. Friend's alternative is quite right—postpone it, and have a higher rate for the remainder of the year. I am quite sure no Advisory Committee would advise that.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that all the factory hands in Lancashire have holidays in September, and would he favourably consider the postponement of any increase?
That surely is justification for the action of the Government. If we postpone it until that date, why not until after Christmas?
It is not a fact that the Minister of Transport definitely stated that they postponed the imposition of these new fares until after the Bank Holiday, and that they would not come into operation before 5th August; and was it not the understanding of the general public that the new rates were to come after 5th August?
My right hon. Friend definitely stated they would not come into operation before 5th August, but it was always stated that the date would depend on the decision of the Advisory Committee.
Peace Treaties
Reparation (Germany)
asked the Prime Minister whether, in calculating the ability of Germany to fulfil her financial obligations under the Peace Treaty, any allowance is made in respect of interest upon her own war loan, or whether the payment of such interest is to be deferred until after her obligations to the Allies have been discharged?
The Treaty provides that the sums for reparation which Germany is required to pay shall become a charge upon all her revenues prior to that for the service or discharge of any domestic loan.
Questions
Board of Education (Estimates)
asked the Prime Minister on how many occasions the Education Vote has been discussed in the House of Commons since 1914; and whether, in view of the fact that the Education Vote for England is now upwards of £45,000,000, an opportunity can be given this Session for discussing this expenditure, and investigating how much of it is justifiable and how much is extravagant and wasteful?
The answer to the first part of the question is four, exclusive of the discussions of the Education Act, 1918, and of educational matters on 12th August, 1919, on the Third Reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill. As regards the last part of the question, I regret that I see no prospect of time being found for further discussion.
In view of the fact that the Education Vote, which has so largely increased, has not been discussed this year or last year, is there no means of bringing this wasteful expenditure before the consideration of the House before next year, and before the wasteful expenditure has been increased?
It is not the fault of the Government that any particular Vote is not taken. To describe the expenditure as wasteful is to anticipate the discussion beforehand. I see no prospect of the discussion now.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say when the Report of the Committee on National Expenditure is likely to be out, and whether it will include any statement as regards the expenditure of the Board of Education?
I cannot say without notice.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that during the past 18 months we have had under three hours' discussion on the Education Vote, despite many requests for opportunity by hon. Members?
I realise that, but we do not select the Votes that are taken.
Will the right hon. Gentleman ask the Minister of Education to avoid any expenditure which may be considered wasteful, pending discussion by this House?
I am sure it is not necessary to give my right hon. Friend that advice. Any expenditure which he incurs he thinks is not wasted.
Pylon War Memorial (Proposal Abandoned)
asked the Prime Minister whether it is proposed that the cost of the proposed national war memorial in London should be borne by the taxpayer in part or whole; and, if so, will its erection be delayed until such time as this country receives from Germany an instalment of the war indemnity and a portion of the indemnity can be ear-marked for the purpose.
asked the First Commissioner of Works if anything has been decided as to the pylon proposed to be erected at Hyde Park Corner; who was responsible for asking Sir F. Baines to prepare the design; whether any expert opinion has been obtained as to its suitability; whether an estimate has been obtained as to the total cost, including the alterations to the site and the removal of Decimus Burton's arch, the Quadriga, and the Wellington Monument; whether the consent of His Majesty has been obtained for the curtailment of the garden of Buckingham Palace; whether an Act of Parliament will be required to curtail the Green Park; whether, in these days of heavy expenditure, the Cenotaph is not an adequate and a sufficient memorial of the War for the present; and whether the House will have an opportunity of discussing the proposition before further expense is incurred.
asked the First Commissioner of Works if the monument for Hyde Park Corner projected by his Department is intended as a national memorial to our soldiers; is it, in the opinion of his Department, quite fitting that such a monument should be crowned with a ball-room and bar; and can any English or European style of architecture be adopted in preference to barbaric and pagan Egyptian?
asked the First Commissioner of Works whether any official communication was made by his Department to the effect that the design for a war memorial at Hyde Park Corner is making a profound impression on the collective feeling of the House of Commons; whether he has received any intimation that a single Member of the House is favourably impressed by the design; whether it was by his instructions that a design in Oreintal style, abhorrent to English taste and incapable of expressing Christian sentiment, was prepared for the purpose; and whether, in order to allay at once all apprehension lest London be disfigured by the erection of an Egyptian building devoid of beauty or meaning at Hyde Park Corner, he will give an assurance that there is no intention of using the design referred to for the purpose of a war memorial?
asked the First Commissioner of Works whether the design by Sir F. Baines for a proposed war memorial at Hyde Park Corner has been put forward with the approval of the Cabinet; whether it has the approval of the Royal Institute of British Architect's; and whether it is desirable that any design put forward for consideration should be more in accordance with the traditions of the best periods of British architecture?
asked the First Commissioner of Works by whose direction the plans for a war memorial at Hyde Park Corner were prepared; what is the estimated cost of the same; and will he state whether Parliament will be given an opportunity of discussing the matter before the country is committed to the present or any other proposal for a war memorial for the Empire?
asked the First Commissioner of Works whether he can give an approximate estimate of the probable cost of carrying out Sir Frank Baines's design for a national war memorial?
asked the First Commissioner of Works whether the proposal to erect another war memorial will be brought before Parliament prior to any commitment being made in this behalf?
I propose, for convenience, with the hon. Members' permission, to incorporate in one statement my replies to all questions in regard to the proposed design for a war memorial. The design was prepared by Sir Frank Baines some time ago, entirely on his own initiative and in his own time. It has never been put forward for official consideration, and I have never contemplated submitting it to the Cabinet. The questions in regard to detail do not therefore arise. I allowed the designs to be exhibited in the tea room at the request of the hon. and gallant Member for the Tradeston Division of Glasgow, who informed me that a number of Members would be interested to see them. No memorial could be erected out of public funds without the approval of Members of this House who would have to sanction the necessary expenditure.
Is it a fact that this design is in the Egyptian style, of the period of Pharaoh, and does the right hon. Gentleman realise that what is wanted in London is a memorial of the War, and not of the Exodus?
May we regard this particular scheme as quite dead?
I should certainly think so myself.
What reason does the right hon. Gentleman adduce for having put this design in the Tea Room? Can any design, however monstrous, be put in the Tea Room of the House?
I was endeavouring to meet the wishes of an hon. and gallant Member who pressed me, and who said that a number of Members were interested. Apparently a large number of people are very interested.
Will the right hon. Gentleman have it removed from the Tea Room?
May we take it that nothing will be done to commit the Government to the scheme until the House has had an opportunity of expressing an opinion?
I have said so in my answer.
Not only this scheme, but any scheme?
No scheme can be proceeded with unless the House has sanctioned it by a Vote in the Estimates.
British South Africa (Lord Cave's Commission)
asked the Lord Privy Seal whether his attention has been drawn to the proceedings before Lord Cave's Commission of the 30th June, when the Attorney-General stated that an intimation had been given to him that there should be no prolonged delay in the inquiry into the claim of the British South Africa Company; whether the Attorney-General stated that, with the present fragmentary part of the inquiry before him, he could not expect to be in a position to deal satisfactorily with the claim from the standpoint of the Treasury; and whether His Majesty's Government will give an assurance that no steps will be taken to bring the inquiry to a close until the Attorney-General has been placed in a position to deal satisfactorily with the claim on behalf of the Treasury?
I am aware of the proceedings to which reference is made, but the remarks attributed in the question to the Attorney-General are by no means a correct version of what he said. There is not, however, the smallest reason to suppose that the gentlemen constituting the Commission, upon whose experience and distinction I need not dwell, will fail to arrive at a just and well-founded conclusion upon the matter submitted to them.
Is the right hon. Gentleman in a position to say that no commitment will be made on behalf of the British Treasury without first obtaining the consent of the House of Commons?
We shall incur no binding obligations of any kind without the approval of the House.
Have the Government made up their mind whether they wish the Cave Commission to submit an interim Report forthwith, or to wait until further material has arrived from South Africa for handling by the Attorney-General?
No. As I understand it, the Government are quite ready to leave the matter to be decided by the Cave Commission, when they think they have all the information required.
Rhodesia (Chartered Company's Debts)
asked the Lord Privy Seal whether Sir Charles Coghlan, on behalf of the people of Rhodesia, has formally repudiated any liability for the Chartered Company's debts; whether His Majesty's Government is averse to placing this burden upon the British taxpayer; and whether he will now give the assurance that the award, whatever the amount may be, will not be attached as a debt charge to lands occupied solely by the native tribes of Southern Rhodesia?
The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. As I have already stated, His Majesty's Government will not commit the British taxpayer to any payment without consulting the House. As regards the last part of the question, having regard to the nature of the native reserves, I am unable to understand how any question of attaching any debt charge to them can arise.
If it does arise will the right hon. Gentleman undertake that it shall not be a tax?
The answer means, that it cannot arise.
Poland
asked the Lord Privy Seal if the Government are taking any steps to put a stop to the anti-Polish campaign in this country which takes the form of unfounded reports as to the use of coloured troops, the commission of atrocities, and other misstatements; and whether the Government has any evidence to confirm the suspicion that the circulation of such reports is the work of persons in political circles in this country who are compensated for their anti-English services from German and Russian sources?
It is quite true that there is an organised anti-Polish campaign which circulates many unfounded reports; but it is not possible to prosecute for false statements as to things which are alleged to have happened in foreign countries beyond the personal knowledge of any witness in this country.
Will the right hon. Gentleman answer the last part of the question?
As to whether we have any evidence that political persons are concerned? We have no proof of that.
Civil Service Commission (Staff)
asked the Lord Privy Seal whether, in view of the specific recommendation of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service re- specting the employment of one or more women on the administrative staff of the Civil Service Commission, and having regard to the circumstances that the Commissioners annually deal with several thousand cases concerning women candidates, what steps can be taken without further delay to appoint a woman of administrative or equivalent rank in that department?
The question of making such an appointment is now engaging consideration.
Food Supplies
Bacon
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that the Ministry of Food have £11,000,000 sterling of bacon stored in the United States of America; whether they have stated that they have operations still in progress; whether this policy is one which should be investigated by the committee now being set up; and whether it is desirable to amend the terms of reference to allow these committees to make comments an the extravagance of the Government due to ill-advised policy?
As regards the first two parts of the question I beg to refer the hon. Member to the answers given to him by my right hon. Friend the Food Controller on the 23rd and 29th June. The answer to the last part of the question is in the negative.
asked the Minister of Food how much American and Canadian bacon they have bought since the Food Control Department came into power what they paid for it in all and what they sold it for up to 1st May of this year; how much of this bacon remains unsold and what price they propose to charge the public for it; and are they endeavouring to make a profit or are they willing to stand a loss, balancing their profit on their previous sales, particularly in view of the fact that the consumer and the taxpayer have a perfect right to know the reason for the present high cost of bacon to them?
The total amount of American and Canadian bacon purchased by the Ministry of Food and landed in this country from the autumn of 1917 to the 1st July, 1920, is 1,065,000 tons. As regards the second part of the question, the amount to be paid for the bacon requisitioned by the Ministry of Food in the autumn of last year is still the subject of negotiations with the packers concerned, so that no figure for the total amount paid can be given at present, and as regards the third part of the question, so long as the Ministry is a buyer in the world market, I am not prepared to publish the stocks in hand. In reply to the last part of the question, the policy of the Ministry of Food is so to adjust its sale prices as to involve no loss to the taxpayer when liquidation is completed. I may add that the increase in the retail price of bacon in this country since the beginning of the War is less than that in any of the principal European countries.
asked the Minister of Food whether he can differentiate in the recent official estimate as to the consumption of American bacon between the bacon originating in Canada and the United States?
For the reasons indicated in the Food Controller's answer to the hon. Member on the 29th June, it is not possible to state accurately the consumption of Canadian bacon in any one month. It may, however, be estimated that the consumption of Canadian bacon during May of this year was between 4,000 and 5,000 tons.
Mutton
asked the Minister of Food how much New Zealand mutton they have bought since the Food Control Department came into power; what they paid for it in all, and what they sold it for up to 1st May of this year; how much of this mutton remains unsold, and what price they propose to charge the public for it; and whether they are endeavouring to make a profit or are they willing to stand a loss, balancing their profit on their previous sales, particularly in view of the fact that the consumer and the taxpayer have a perfect right to know the reason for the present high cost of mutton to them?
No New Zealand mutton has at any time been purchased by the Ministry of Food, but this Department is at present disposing of stocks acquired under contracts made by the Board of Trade. The prices at which New Zealand mutton has been sold for civilian consumption have varied from time to time since the institution of control at the beginning of 1918. On the 1st May this year the wholesale price was 9d. per lb. At the present time the price ranges from 6d. to 9d. per lb. according to the description of mutton. Since some of the contracts under which the mutton is acquired have not yet terminated, it is impossible to state exactly how much remains to be sold. As regards future prices, all that can be said is that these will be governed by the desire to reduce losses to the Treasury to the minimum compatible with the speedy distribution of existing stocks in good condition to consumers. I may add that present prices are below cost. In reply to the last part of the question, I would point out that, in comparison with the pre-War level of prices, meat generally, and imported mutton in particular, represents one of the cheapest staple articles of food.
Is it a fact that a large supply of mutton now in the hands of the Food Ministry, for sale to the British public here, has been killed about 18 months?
I could not answer that without notice.
If the mutton is being sold at less than cost price, is the difference made up out of amounts which pass through the hands of the Minister on other goods, or is it a direct charge on the taxpayer?
There will be a certain balance of credit in the shape of insurance reserve, which it will be possible, no doubt, to set against losses made by the Ministry. There is also a certain balance of credit from earlier sales.
Am I to understand that the mutton is not being subsidised by the State?
I hope in the actual event it will be found that no loss has occurred.
Flour
asked the Minister of Food the total amount of money which has been collected by inspectors of the Ministry in licence fees, that is, 24s. per sack of flour of 280 lb., since the Armistice?
asked the Minister of Food the number of cases in which the food Orders relating to the restricted use of flour have been violated, and the number of persons who have been proceeded against before the courts since the Armistice for any breach of such Orders?
I am unable to give the precise amount of arrears of licence duty collected by the Ministry's inspectors since the Armistice, but the total sum so collected since the institution of the Orders relating to the restricted use of flour is approximately £22,000. During the same period the number of cases in which proceedings have been taken for violation of the Orders is ten, and in one of these cases a fine of £600 was imposed. Since October, 1919, when a special staff of inspectors was appointed for the collection of this Duty, 560 cases have been dealt with and in 550 cases arrears amounting to over £17,000 have been recovered. I may add that at the current rate the total annual amount of licence duty paid is approximately £1,500,000.
asked the Minister of Food whether he will consider the advisability of having a thorough investigation into the practices obtaining in the administration of the Cereal Restriction Order and the Flour and Bread Prices Order, and to ascertain the loss since the Armistice the Government has sustained through the condemnation of wheat and flour which has subsequently been sold by the purchaser at a much higher price than the price prevailing for subsidised flour?
I would refer the hon. Member to the answer I have just given him. The Food Controller does not consider that any other special action is at present necessary.
asked the Minister of Food whether there has been a considerable increase in recent years in the number of firms mixing with cattle food flour purported to be damaged and unfit for human food; whether a large proportion of flour which is condemned as unfit for human food is of such a high grade that it could easily be mixed by millers in small quantities with Government regulation flour, and would be quite suitable for bread and other like purposes; whether the Ministry have had occasion to make inquiries in connection with the use of flour by any firms trading in pig, and cattle food or flour used for industrial purposes; and what has been the result?
I am not aware that there has been any increase in recent years in the number of firms mixing with cattle food flour purporting to be damaged and unfit for human food, nor is there reason to believe that any proportion of flour which is condemned as unfit for human food would be suitable for bread or for like purposes. The Enforcement Inspectors of the Ministry are constantly engaged in making investigations with a view to detection of offences against the Orders relating to the use of flour for purposes other than human food, and in this connection I would refer the hon. Member to the reply already given to the hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. J. Davison) on this subject.
asked the Minister of Food whether subsidised flour fit for human food is and has been extensively used in England and Ireland for pig and cattle feeding and industrial purposes; and whether flour which can be legitimately used for cattle feeding and industrial purposes (exclusive of the licence fee of 24s. per 280 lbs.) costs more than flour used for human food.
I have no evidence that subsidised flour fit for human food either is, or has been, extensively used in England or Ireland for pig and cattle feeding and industrial purposes. The answer to the second part of the question is in the negative.
asked the Minister of Food the number of inspectors engaged by the Ministry in administering the Orders relating to the restricted use of flour; whether the number of inspectors has recently been increased; and, if so, will he state the reasons for such increase in staff?
The number of flour inspectors now employed by the Ministry is eleven, of whom nine are ex-service men. This special staff was organised in October, 1919, and started with four inspectors. Recently an increase of staff was found to be necessary in order to recover arrears of licence duty. The sums collected as arrears during the nine months amount to over £17,000. This, however, does not represent the full value of the work done by these inspectors, as their activities stimulate the payment of licence duties in the ordinary course of business.
Questions
Super-Tax (French Subjects)
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that the Commissioners of Inland Revenue are endeavouring to compel French subjects domiciled and resident solely in France to make returns of, and to pay Super-tax in respect of, their income derived from English securities from which Income Tax has already been deducted at the source; whether the French authorities are contemplating retaliatory measures in respect of income derived by domiciled British subjects from their French investments and other property which at present are immune from taxation in France; and whether, having regard to the fact that for every French subject who derives an income of over £2,000 a year from British investments there are 20 Englishmen who derive a like income from investments in France, he will give the necessary direction to the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or introduce legislation dealing with the matter?
Super-tax in the United Kingdom is chargeable for any year on any individual whose income liable to United Kingdom Income Tax for the previous year exceeds a limit determined for this purpose by Statute, irrespective of domicile or place of residence. The question of the assessment to Super tax of non-residents was considered by the Royal Commission on the Income Tax, who made suggestions on the subject. These will be considered when we are able to deal with the recommendations of the Royal Commission which are still outstanding.
Ex-Cabinet Ministers (Pensions)
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will state how many ex-Cabinet Ministers are now drawing ex-Cabinet Minister's pensions up to £2,000 per annum; who they are; and whether each recipient makes a periodical declaration that he requires the allowance for financial reasons?
Pensions under the Act 32 and 33 Viet. c. 60 are drawn by Lord George Hamilton, £2,000; by Lord Chaplin, £1,200; and by Lord Balfour of Burleigh, £1,200. The Act does not require any periodical declaration of means.
For how many years have these pensions been enjoyed, and for how many years of service?
I could not say without notice, but I could no doubt obtain the information. As the hon. Member has put the question, I think I ought to say that all these gentlemen have rendered services to the State since the award of their pension, and often of a very arduous character.
Housing
Building Schemes, Scotland
asked the Secretary for Scotland if he will state what period is expected to elapse before the 253 local authorities, who have submitted schemes for 114,590 houses, are informed that the outstanding 104,000 houses are approved; whether the estimated cost of building the 9,373 houses for which tenders have been approved up to the 30th of June is now likely to exceed £9,373,000 on account of the recent strike; what prospect is there that the present total of under £300,000 raised for housing purposes in Scotland will be greatly increased; whether a sum of over £1,000 for each house built is a high average; and what steps are being now taken to improve the position?
Schemes have been approved to the extent of nearly 103,000 houses. It seems likely that the estimated cost will be exceeded. The Scottish Board of Health are urging local authorities to make every effort to obtain money by means of housing bonds, and I am hopeful that considerable further sums may be obtained by this means. According to prices, as given in tenders now being submitted, £1,000 is not a high average for houses under consideration. The matter of expediting housing construction is receiving continual attention.
Are we to understand that only £300,000 has been raised in Scotland up to the present, and that £114,000,000 is required to carry out the schemes?
I am afraid I must ask for notice of that.
It is in the question.
Grants
asked the Minister of Health when he proposes to bring in a Bill to extend the period for building houses in respect of which grants are payable under the Housing (Additional Powers) Act, 1919; and whether the period will be extended in respect of houses which which have already been guaranteed a subsidy on condition of their being built within the period mentioned in the Act?
My right hon. Friend is not yet in a position to fix a date for the introduction of the Bill. The answer to the second part of the question is in the affirmative.
Building Materials (Cost)
asked the Minister of Health whether he is aware that the continual increase in the cost of building materials is retarding the progress of the erection of houses in the Scunthorpe and Frodingham area; and whether he proposes to do anything in the matter?
As my right hon. Friend has previously stated, the increase in the cost of building materials is being investigated by a Committee appointed under the Profiteering Act, and he hopes that they will report at an early date. As regards the particular area referred to, he is informed that a contract for 113 houses has been let within the last few days.
Wooden Houses (Women's Labour)
asked the Minister of Labour whether he can now state whether the 200 skilled women who were offered employment by Messrs. William Thomas and Sons in connection with the erection of urgently needed wooden houses, but were prevented from accepting the same by the General Union of Operative Carpenters and Joiners, are still prevented from earning a living by reason of the action of this trades union; and will he state what steps the Government are taking in the matter, in view of their pledges that men and women should be given equal opportunities?
I understand that this firm manufacture wooden huts, which cannot be supplied in sufficient numbers owing to the shortage of joiners. To meet this difficulty a proposal was made to the Union that 50 to 60 ex-service men should be intensively trained for part of the work, and thereafter 200 unskilled men or women could be employed in the erection of the huts. The Union state that as they are supporting the Government scheme, which provides a period of general training extending over three years, they cannot accept the proposal for a partial intensive course. Negotiations are, however, proceeding between the parties, and my Department is taking an active interest in the matter.
Is it not a fact that some 200 women for over three years have been engaged in this work and are highly skilled upon it, and what is the justification for their being prevented from continuing work in which they have acquired skill, especially as houses are urgently needed?
I am not aware whether the suggestion made is correct or not. If the hon. Member wishes to put down a question on the subject, I will do my best to give an answer.
Does the hon. Gentleman not think it about time that the Government trained these ex-service men for work in the building trade without allowing themselves to be obstructed by the trade unions?
Questions
Ceylon (Constitutional Reform)
asked the Undersecretary of State for the Colonies whether the proposals with regard to reform in the government of Ceylon are to be published at an early date?
The question of constitutional reform in Ceylon has been under the active consideration of the Secretary of State, and certain definite proposals have now been drafted for his approval. The settlement of details must necessarily take some time, but I hope that it may be possible shortly to make some announcement in general terms.
Does that mean before the House rises?
I hope so.
Are they submitted in any form to the House?
I hope to be able to make a general statement of the character of the reforms, and I hope the House, of course, will have some opportunity of expressing their views upon them.
Westminster Hall (Restoration)
asked the First Commissioner of Works at what date the work of restoration and preservation of St. Stephen's Hall began; how much has already been spent upon it; and whether any estimate has been made as to the sum necessary to complete the work and of the probable date of completion?
The work was commenced in July, 1914, and it is hoped that it will be completed in the Spring of 1922. The expenditure to date is £55,000, and it is estimated that a further £65,000 will be required to complete the repairs. The work was much retarded by the War.
Can the right hon Gentleman give an assurance that Westminster Hall will be ready in time for the trial of the ex-Kaiser?
Manchester (Noxious Vapoues)
asked the Minister of Health whether he has recently received any complaints from Manchester regarding the atmospheric conditions prevailing in that city; whether his attention has been drawn to a complaint of the rector of St. Luke's, Miles Platting, regarding the bad smells in the district; and whether he contemplates taking any action in the matter?
A complaint has been received, and it has been referred to the Departmental Committee on Smoke and Noxious Vapours Abatement which is visiting Manchester this week.
Student-Apprenticeships
asked the Minister of Labour whether he is now prepared to recommend schemes, in co-operation with the Minister of Education, of combined student and apprenticeship formation, to operate in the engineering, agricultural, and textile trades of the country; and what powers he further requires to put such schemes into immediate operation?
The matter raised in my hon. Friend's question appears to be one which more directly concerns my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Education, and I propose to bring it to his notice.
Business of the House
Is it intended to take any business after the discussion on Foreign Affairs to-morrow; and, if so, what, and what will be the business for Friday?
As regards Friday, it depends upon progress. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will put a question to-morrow. We hope to take other business to-morrow, and, as it is unlikely that the Ministry of Food Bill can be taken at an early hour to-day, we do not propose to take it to-day, but to-morrow, and also, I hope, the Resolution on the Government of India Act.
Will it be possible to publish the reply of the Russian Government before the discussion to-morrow?
We carefully considered that this morning. I think the House will agree that, if there is any hope of coming to a result in the negotiations, it is undesirable that they should be published piecemeal, and the Government came to the conclusion that we ought not to publish the one document without the subsequent documents.
May we take it that this discussion is going to take place without our having seen any reply from Russia?
I cannot add anything to what I have said. Of course, the Prime Minister may use his own discretion as to how much, without detriment to the negotiations, can be made public.
Motion made, and Question put, "That the Proceedings on the Public Libraries (Ireland) Bill, and the Sheriffs (Ireland) Bill be exempted at this day's Sitting from the provisions of the Standing Order (Sittings of the House)." —[ Mr. Bonar Law. ]
The House divided: Ayes, 240 Noes, 57.
Division No. 229.] AYES. [3.55 p.m. Adkins, Sir W. Ryland D. Bellairs, Commander Carlyon W. Burn, T. H. (Belfast, St. Anne's) Agg-Gardner, Sir James Tynte Benn, Sir A. S. (Plymouth, Drake) Butcher, Sir John George Amery, Lieut.-Col. Leopold C. M. S. Benn, Capt. Sir I. H., Bart. (Gr'nw'h) Campbell, J. D. G. Armitage, Robert Bennett, Thomas Jewell Carr, W. Theodore Ashley, Colonel Wilfrid W. Betterton, Henry B. Casey, T. W. Astbury, Lieut.-Commander F. W. Bigland, Alfred Cecil, Rt. Hon. Evelyn (Birm., Aston) Astor, Viscountess Birchall, Major J. Dearman Cecil, Rt. Hon. Lord H. (Ox. Univ.) Atkey, A. R. Bird, Sir A. (Wolverhampton, West) Cecil, Rt. Hon. Lord R. (Hitchin) Baird, Sir John Lawrence Blair, Reginald Chamberlain, Rt. Hn. J. A. (Birm., W.) Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley Boscawen, Rt. Hon. Sir A. Griffith- Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S. Balfour, George (Hampstead) Bowyer, Captain G. E. W. Clay, Lieut.-Colonel H. H. Spender Banner, Sir John S. Harmood- Boyd-Carpenter, Major A. Clough, Robert Barlow, Sir Montague Breese, Major Charles E. Coates, Major Sir Edward F. Barnett, Major R. W. Bridgeman, William Clive Colfox, Major Wm. Phillips Barnston, Major Harry Buchanan, Lieut.-Colonel A. L. H. Colvin, Brig.-General Richard Beale Barrand, A. R. Buckley, Lieut.-Colonel A. Cope, Major Wm. Barrie, Charles Coupar Bull, Rt. Hon. Sir William James Cory, Sir C. J. (Cornwall, St. Ives) Beckett, Hon. Gervase Burgoyne, Lieut.-Colonel A. H. Cowan, D. M. (Scottish Universities) Bell, Lieut.-Col. W. C. H. (Devizes) Burn, Col. C. R. (Devon, Torquay) Cowan, Sir H. (Aberdeen and Kinc.) Craig, Captain C. C. (Antrim, South) Kinloch-Cooke, Sir Clement Remer, J. R. Craig, Colonel Sir J. (Down, Mid) Lambert, Rt. Hon. George Remnant, Sir James Craik, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry Lane-Fox, G. R. Rendall, Athelstan Curzon, Commander Viscount Law, Alfred J. (Rochdale) Renwick, George Dalziel, Rt. Hon. Sir J. H. (Kirk'dy) Law, Rt. Hon. A. B. (Glasgow, C.) Richardson, Alexander (Gravesend) Davies, Thomas (Cirencester) Lewis, Rt. Hon. J. H. (Univ., Wales) Robinson, S. (Brecon and Radnor) Davison, Sir W. H. (Kensington, S.) Lewis, T. A. (Glam., Pontypridd) Rodger, A. K. Dawes, James Arthur Lloyd, George Butler Roundell, Colonel R. F. Dean, Lieut.-Commander P. T. Locker-Lampson, G. (Wood Green) Royds, Lieut.-Colonel Edmund Denniss, Edmund R. B. (Oldham) Locker-Lampson, Com. O. (H'tingd'n) Rutherford, Sir W. W. (Edge Hill) Dockrell, Sir Maurice Lorden, John William Samuel, A. M. (Surrey, Farnham) Donald, Thompson Loseby, Captain C. E. Samuel, Rt. Hon. Sir H. (Norwood) Doyle, N. Grattan Lowe, Sir Francis William Sanders, Colonel Sir Robert A. Edge, Captain William Lyle-Samuel, Alexander Sassoon, Sir Philip Albert Gustave D. Edwards, Major J. (Aberavon) M'Donald, Dr. Bouverie F. P. Scott, A. M. (Glasgow, Bridgeton) Eyres-Monsell, Commander B. M. Macdonald, Rt. Hon. John Murray Seddon, J. A. Falle, Major Sir Bertram G. Mackinder, Sir H. J. (Camlachie) Sprot, Colonel Sir Alexander Fitz Roy, Captain Hon. E. A. McLaren, Robert (Lanark, Northern) Stanley, Major Hon. G. (Preston) Foreman, Henry M'Lean, Lieut.-Col. Charles W. W. Stanton, Charles B. Forestier-Walker, L. Macmaster, Donald Steel, Major S. Strang Foxcroft, Captain Charles Talbot Macnamara, Rt. Hon. Dr. T. J. Stephenson, Colonel H. K. Gange, E. Stanley McNeill, Ronald (Kent, Canterbury) Stevens, Marshall Ganzoni, Captain Francis John C. Macquisten, F. A. Stewart, Gershom Gardner, Ernest Magnus, Sir Philip Strauss, Edward Anthony Gibbs, Colonel George Abraham Mallalieu, F. W. Sturrock, J. Leng Goff, Sir R. Park Malone, Major P. B. (Tottenham, S.) Sugden, W. H. Grant, James A. Manville, Edward Sutherland, Sir William Greene, Lieut.-Col. Sir W. (Hackney) Marriott, John Arthur Ransome Sykes, Colonel Sir A. J. (Knutsford) Greenwood, William (Stockport) Middlebrook, Sir William Talbot, G. A. (Hemel Hempstead) Greig, Colonel James William Mildmay, Colonel Rt. Hon. F. B. Taylor, J. Gretton, Colonel John Mitchell, William Lane Thomas, Sir Robert J. (Wrexham) Guinness, Lieut.-Col. Hon. W. E. Molson, Major John Elsdale Thomas-Stanford, Charles Gwynne, Rupert S. Mond, Rt. Hon. Sir Alfred M. Thomson, F. C. (Aberdeen, South) Hall, Lieut.-Col. Sir F. (Dulwich) Montagu, Rt. Hon. E. S. Tickler, Thomas George Hanson, Sir Charles Augustin Moore-Brabazon, Lieut.-Col. J. T. C. Townley, Maximilian G. Harmsworth, C. B. (Bedford, Luton) Moreing, Captain Algernon H. Tryon, Major George Clement Harris, Sir Henry Percy Morison, Rt. Hon. Thomas Brash Turton, E. R. Haslam, Lewis Morrison-Bell, Major A. C. Wallace, J. Henderson, Major V. L. (Tradeston) Mount, William Arthur Ward, Col. L. (Kingston-upon-Hull) Henry, Denis S. (Londonderry, S.) Murray, Lt.-Col. Hon. A. (Aberdeen) Waring, Major Walter Hewart, Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon Murray, John (Leeds, West) Warner, Sir T. Courtenay T. Hills, Major John Waller Neal, Arthur Warren, Lieut.-Col. Sir Alfred H. Hoare, Lieut.-Colonel Sir S. J. G. Newman, Colonel J. R. P. (Finchley) Wason, John Cathcart Hope, James F. (Sheffield, Central) Newman, Sir R. H. S. D. L. (Exeter) Wheler, Lieut.-Colonel C. H. Hope, Lt.-Col. Sir J. A. (Midlothian) Nicholl, Commander Sir Edward White, Lieut.-Col. G. D. (Southport) Hope, J. D. (Berwick & Haddington) O'Neill, Major Hon. Robert W. H. Wigan, Brig.-Gen. John Tyson Hopkins, John W. W. Ormsby-Gore, Captain Hon. W. Williams, Lt.-Com. C. (Tavistock) Hopkinson, A. (Lancaster, Mossley) Palmer, Major Godfrey Mark Williamson, Rt. Hon. Sir Archibald Horne, Sir R. S. (Glasgow, Hillhead) Parry, Lieut.-Colonel Thomas Henry Wilson, Capt. A. S. (Holderness) Hunter-Weston, Lt.-General Sir A. G. Pearce, Sir William Wilson, Daniel M. (Down, West) Hurst, Lieut.-Colonel Gerald B. Pease, Rt. Hon. Herbert Pike Wilson, Colonel Leslie O. (Reading) Illingworth, Rt. Hon. A. H. Pennefather, De Fonblanque Wilson, Lieut.-Col. M. J. (Richmond) Inskip, Thomas Walker H. Phillipps, Gen. Sir I. (Southampton) Wolmer, Viscount Jackson, Lieut.-Colonel Hon. F. S. Philipps, Sir Owen C. (Chester, City) Wood, Hon. Edward F. L. (Ripon) James, Lieut.-Colonel Hon. Cuthbert Pilditch, Sir Philip Wood, Sir H. K. (Woolwich, West) Jephcott, A. R. Pollock, Sir Ernest M. Wood, Sir J. (Stalybridge & Hyde) Johnstone, Joseph Prescott, Major W. H. Yate, Colonel Charles Edward Jones, Sir Evan (Pembroke) Pretyman, Rt. Hon. Ernest G. Yeo, Sir Alfred William Jones, Henry Haydn (Merioneth) Purchase, H. G. Young, Lieut.-Com. E. H. (Norwich) Jones, J. T. (Carmarthen, Llanelly) Rae, H. Norman Kellaway, Rt. Hon. Fredk. George Rees, Sir J. D. (Nottingham, East) TELLERS FOR THE AYES. —— King, Commander Henry Douglas Rees, Capt. J. Tudor (Barnstaple) Lord E. Talbot and Mr. Dudley Ward.
NOES. Asquith, Rt. Hon. Herbert Henry Hall, F. (York, W.R., Normanton) Myers, Thomas Banbury, Rt. Hon. Sir Frederick G. Hallas, Eldred Newbould, Alfred Ernest Bell, James (Lancaster, Ormskirk) Hancock, John George Palmer, Charles Frederick (Wrekin) Benn, Captain Wedgwood (Leith) Hartshorn, Vernon Robertson, John Bottomley, Horatio W. Hayday, Arthur Rose, Frank H. Bowerman, Rt. Hon. Charles W. Hirst, G. H. Royce, William Stapleton Bramsdon, Sir Thomas Hodge, Rt. Hon. John Sexton, James Briant, Frank Hogge, James Myles Shaw, Thomas (Preston) Bromfield, William Holmes, J. Stanley Short, Alfred (Wednesbury) Brown, James (Ayr and Bute) Irving, Dan Sitch, Charles H. Cairns, John Kenworthy, Lieut.-Commander J. M. Spencer, George A. Carter, W. (Nottingham, Mansfield) Kenyon, Barnet Wedgwood, Colonel J. C. Clynes, Rt. Hon. J. R. Kiley, James D. White, Charles F. (Derby, Western) Crooks, Rt. Hon. William Lunn, William Wignall, James Davies, A. (Lancaster, Clitheroe) Maclean, Nell (Glasgow, Govan) Williams, Aneurin (Durham, Consett) Davison, J. E. (Smethwick) Maclean, Rt. Hon. Sir D. (Midlothian) Wilson, W. Tyson (Westhoughton) Edwards, C. (Monmouth, Bedwellty) Malone, C. L. (Leyton, E.) Wood, Major M. M. (Aberdeen, C.) Finney, Samuel Mills, John Edmund Graham, W. (Edinburgh, Central) Morgan, Major D. Watts TELLERS FOR THE NOES. —— Grundy, T. W. Murray, Dr. D. (Inverness and Ross) Mr. G. Thorne and Mr. T Griffiths.
OSBORNE'S DIVORCE BILL [Lords]
Ordered, That a Message be sent to the Lords to request that their Lordships will be pleased to communicate to this House Copies of the Minutes of Evidence and Proceedings, together with the Documents deposited, in the case of Osborne's Divorce Bill [ Lords ].—[ Mr. Morison. ]
Message from the Lords
That they have agreed to,—
Ministry of Health Provisional Order (Southampton Extension) Bill,
Central London and Metropolitan District Railway Companies (Works) Bill, with Amendments.
Ministry of Health Provisional Order (Southampton Extension) Bill,—
Lords Amendments to be considered To-morrow.
Selection (Standing Committees)
Standing Committee A
Sir SAMUEL ROBERTS reported from the Committee of Selection; That they had discharged the following Member from Standing Committee A: Mr. Hirst; and had appointed in substitution: Mr. William Graham.
Sir SAMUEL ROBERTS further reported from the Committee; That they had discharged the following Member from Standing Committee A (added in respect of the Blind Persons Bill): Mr. Clynes; land had appointed in substitution: Mr. Sexton.
Reports to lie upon the Table.
Erith Improvement Bill,
Reported, with Amendments, from the Local Legislation Committee (Section B) [Title amended]; Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.
Ministry of Mines Bill,
Reported, with Amendments, from Standing Committee B.
Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 151.]
Minutes of the Proceedings of the Standing Committee to be printed. [No. 151.]
Bill, as amended (in the Standing Committee), to be taken into consideration upon Friday, and to be printed. [Bill 177.]
Orders of the Day
Indemnity (Recommitted) Bill
Considered in Committee.
[Mr. WHITLEY in the Chair.]
CLAUSE 1.—(Restrictions on the Taking of Legal Proceedings against Persons Acting in Good Faith.)
4.0 P.M.
(1) No action or other legal proceeding whatsoever, whether civil or criminal, shall be instituted in any court of law for or on account of or in respect of any act, matter or thing done, whether within or without His Majesty's Dominions, during the War before the passing of this Act, if done in good faith, and done or purported to be done in the execution of his duty or for the defence of the Realm or the public safety, or for the enforcement of discipline, or otherwise in the public interest, by a person holding office under or employed in the service of the Crown in any capacity, whether naval, military, air-force, or civil, or by any other person acting under the authority of a person so holding office or so employed; and if any such proceeding has been instituted, whether before or after the passing of this Act, it shall be discharged and made void:
Provided that, except in cases where a claim for payment or compensation can be brought under Section 2 of this Act, this Section shall not prevent—
(2) For the purposes of this Section a petition of right shall be deemed to be a legal proceeding, and the proceeding shall be deemed to be instituted at the date on which the petition is presented.
(3) For the purposes of this Section, a certificate by a Government Department, that any act, matter, or thing was done under the authority of a person so holding office or so employed as aforesaid shall be sufficient evidence of the facts stated in the certificate, and any such act, matter, or thing done by or under the authority of a person so holding office or so employed as aforesaid, shall be deemed to have been done in good faith unless the contrary is proved.
(4) Nothing in this Section shall prejudice or prevent the institution or prosecution of proceedings for giving effect to a final judgment given before the passing of this Act by any court of final resort or by any other court where the judgment at the passing of this Act is not then the subject of a pending appeal and the time for appealing against it has expired.
I beg to move, in Sub-section (1), to leave out the words, "and if any such proceeding has been instituted whether before or after the passing of this Act it shall be discharged and made void."
The effect of the Clause with these words in is simply that if someone has got a claim against the Crown in respect of property or damage, or anything else arising out of the War, and if he happens to have commenced proceedings in a court, which the courts have held he is entitled to commence, and if those proceedings are actually pending, under this Sub-section as it stands as now submitted to the Committee, not only is it to become impossible for any such proceedings to be commenced, but those subjects who have actually commenced their proceedings and are in the ordinary course entitled to continue them to a final conclusion are to be deprived of the right to go on. We have seen in a good many cases legislation proposed in this House where people who have a legal remedy are to be deprived of that legal remedy. I confess that this is the first time that I have ever seen the suggestion made that those who have a legal remedy to which the highest court in the Realm, the House of Lords, has found they are entitled, and who have elected to commence their proceedings, should be deprived of the right to go on and bring those proceedings to fruition. It seems to me to be carrying the suggestion of depriving the subject of the Realm of his legal right to a very improper length, when people are to be deprived of the right to go on with proceedings which they have properly and legally commenced at the time of the issue of writs. I have never heard of such a suggestion before. The right existed at the time when the writ was issued, or at the time when the petition was presented, and it seems to me to be obvious that as a matter of equity the man who so commenced his proceedings ought to be entitled to continue them and get such judgment as the courts of the Realm entitle him to receive. I therefore propose that these words which would deprive a subject of those rights should be omitted from the Sub-section.
I think that the two Amendments following on the Paper deal with the same subject.
Not quite. The two Amendments which follow seem to be an attempt on the part of the hon. Member who put them down to make further alterations in the words now proposed to be left out, assuming he is not successful in leaving these words out Then he proposes to make some further alterations in order to mitigate the consequences.
I think I can explain to the Committee in a very few sentences why it is impossible to accept this Amendment. The matter dealt with in the Amendment is one which exercised a great deal of consideration by those who were responsible originally for the drafting of the Bill and also a great deal of attention by the Select Committee who considered the Bill. The Committee decided, as their Report says, after evidence taken, that it would be impossible to re-open the claims which had been made and dealt with. It was also determined by them that in future the same principles which had been used in assessing compensation should be administered in future, and there are a number of cases in which claims to compensation will still be assessed, and the Bill provides for those claims being assessed on the same scale, subject to the fact that now they have got a legal right, but on the same scale as has been meted out during the five years during which assessments have had to be made. The Committee considered, and I have considered, too, very carefully, whether it is possible to allow existing proceedings to go on in order that one might not interfere with the ordinary course of practice in Bills which very often safeguard intermediate rights of persons who have already taken steps, but if one was to accept this Amendment, one would be doing this. You will be giving a preference in the sense of going to the Courts and trying to establish a different measure of compensation to the one which commended itself to the Committee and the one which is adopted in the Bill. Now, on what grounds is it suggested that this different measure should be given? It is to the mere fact that proceedings have been commenced. There is a number of claims which will be dealt with under the Bill, but in respect of which no proceedings have yet been commenced. I do not think the Committee will feel that a real just alternative or distinction can be drawn between those persons who have by a writ or by a petition of right initiated proceedings, and those persons; who have waited until the matters were cleared up to see what course they could pursue. In many cases you might be giving a preference to those who, by means of their circumstances, were able to employ and secure advice, and those who stood by because they did not want to expend their money in obtaining that advice. The number of claims which are outstanding ought to be dealt with according to the same measure, and if we were to adopt this principle you would be giving a different measure to those persons who have been fortunate enough to initiate proceedings, and they would be standing in contradistinction to others who, for perfectly good reasons, may have hesitated and waited to initiate their claims. The matter was considered very carefully by the Select Committee, The Clause as it stands now was carefully drawn, and I suggest to the Committee that there is no good reason for making a differentiation in the amount of compensation or the method by which compensation is to be ascertained in favour of those who, it may be by an accident or for other circumstances, have commenced their proceedings, and those who have stood by and waited to initiate their claims in a Court of law.
My right lion, and learned Friend has repeated, almost word for word, the reasons which are given in the Report of the Select Committee. One might almost imagine that the suggestion had been made to the Select Committee that something of that sort ought to be done. The words are practically identical. What does it all amount to He says it is hard that A, who has commenced proceedings before the passing of this Bill; because A has had a little courage and possibly been well advised by the solicitor he employs, is to be put in the same bad position as B, who has either had no courage or teen badly advised or even said," Well, on the whole I do not want to fight a Government which has the whole resources of the taxpayer behind it, and therefore it is an injustice, but I am going to put up with it." On the contrary, I should have said that those people who have had the courage of their opinions and come forward and endeavoured to go to a Court of law, which is, after all, the only course to which those matters should be sent, I think those people ought to have their rights preserved. If not, why not say that the decision in the House of Lords in the De Keyser's Hotel case is to be void. It comes to exactly the same thing. The only difference between this establishment and the establishments that this Bill will effect is that they have got their case settled, while in the other cases it may have gone to the Court of Appeal, but has not yet gone before the House of Lords. All this costs money. Supposing I have an appeal and that I have employed solicitor and counsel, and that I have won my case before the House of Lords, even gone to the Court of Appeal and won my case. Now, on the ground that somebody else has not had the courage to do that, all the money I have spent is lost. Is that so? There is nothing in the Bill about it. Not only am I to lose what I should perhaps have gained if I had pursued the suit, but I am to be deprived of all the money I have spent. I think there can be no doubt that the equity of the case would be that those who have commenced an action should be allowed to continue it. With all due respect to my right hon. and learned Friend (Sir E. Pollock), I think it is special pleading to try and say that because somebody else has not done what he might have done, therefore the other person who has done what he might have done is to be deprived of his rights and mulcted in costs. I shall support the Amendment of my hon. Friend and hope he will allow me to tell with him if, as I hope he will, he goes to a Division.
This Clause, I think, goes further than some hon. Members think. It is possible under this Clause to have brought an action, and succeeded in a Court of first instance, and there are cases in which a claimant has been successful against the Crown, and got a verdict carrying costs. But unless something is done to prevent this Clause being carried, it is not possible for these people to proceed. Not only that, but in one or two cases which carried costs, the costs were not paid at the time, because it is the custom when the Crown is defendant not to exact payment immediately, but to allow costs to follow the judgment in the Appeal Court. So in one or two cases costs, although they were given by the Court of first instance, were not paid over. Unless something is done with this Clause, or unless the Government make a promise, a man who has won his costs will be precluded from receiving them. I think that is very hard. It might have been reasonable in cases where people had only given notice of proceedings but had not proceeded along the journey, but when a claimant who has succeeded in one of the High Courts, and got his verdict and his costs, to bring in an Act of Parliament which wipes out the whole proceedings and denies him any remedy does seem to be an injustice.
The Solicitor-General, in attempting to maintain a very bad Clause in a very bad Bill, has brought forward in argument the view of the Select Committee, but he has not even quoted accurately what the Select Committee said. The learned Solicitor-General told us the Select Committee said it would be impossible to re-open cases. What the Select Committee said was that it would be impracticable and undesirable. I speak with every deference of the Select Committee, but it is not" impossible" for this great country to do justice, and to cut out the law as it has existed from the time of Magna Charta. That is not" impossible;" it may be undesirable, it may be impracticable, but really my learned Friend must not put in the mouth of the Select Committee something which it did not say. I hope, with the right hon. Baronet, that my hon. Friend will carry this to a Division. I think that no such proposal has ever before been brought before the House of Commons as that litigation, properly begun and founded on right and justice, shall be stopped because you are introducing some other sort of procedure which, admittedly, is based, not upon any right or justice, but upon something which was improvised during the War in order to assess War claims in a rough and ready way. The House will remember the old case in which Frederick the Great desired to seize the property of one of his subjects—a miller. He said to the miller," I am going to have that property.' The miller said,' Oh, no, you are not." The King said," If I take it, what will you do'" The miller said," There are law courts and judges at Berlin." Perhaps that is not a good illustration at the present moment, but I submit that by the legislation now proposed we should not only establish a new remedy in cases of damage to property, but we should even take away rights which people already possess and have partially exercised. If I were the only Member to go into the Division Lobby I would vote for the Amendment. I hope the Government will seriously consider, even now, the acceptance of the Amendment.
The Clause may be a bad one, but it is not nearly so bad a one as the first speaker suggested. If I understand the last Sub-section, it expressly exempts from the operation of the Section any cases where a judgment has been obtained. [HON. MEMBERS:" No, no !"] It says that—
"Nothing in this Section shall prejudice or prevent the institution or prosecution of proceedings for giving effect to a final judgment given before the passing of this Act by any court of final resort, or by any other court where the judgment at the. passing of this Act is not then the subject of a pending appeal and the time for appealing against it has expired."
I understood the hon. Member to say that where a final judgment has been obtained it was not to be enforced. [HON. MEMBERS:"No!"] Is the Section bad? The framework of the Bill is to put everyone on the same footing. That is not a bad principle, and we could not— I was a member of the Select Committee, and we investigated it to the best of our ability—we could not see that there was any injustice in the view put by the Solicitor-General of putting everybody as regards these claims on the same footing. The Select Committee's duties turn really on three matters, apart from the question of personal liberty, one related to the lands, the other to goods, the third to ships. So far as lands were concerned, the Bill does secure to a claimant the benefit of the De Keyser judgment, and the Bill does very considerably enlarge the rights given to claimants in respect of land that has been commandeered. As regards ships it does establish the principle of compensation that was settled by the Arbitration Board, with the unanimous assent of all shipowners. So far as goods are concerned, it establishes the principle on which the Defence of the Realm Losses Commission was acting; that is to say, the principle of giving to the owner of the goods requisitioned the cost price of the goods plus a reasonable profit. It is quite true that, as to the last named, contradictory decisions have been given by learned judges. The matter was not finally settled, and the Select Committee took the view that the principle I have enunciated was not a bad one, and was really fair, because it was quite impossible to give the market prices in the hundreds of millions of goods that have been seized, as market prices did not exist. That being the position, the Select Commission had before it the task of drawing a line, and the principle was to secure to everybody—whether their claims had been settled or whether they were pending—the same principle and the same measure of compensation. So far as the actual institution or proceedings are concerned, I submit that there is no difference in principle between the claimant who happens to have started his proceedings and the claimant who is just about to start. There can be no difference in assessing the compensation to which he is entitled. Where the final judgment has been given, the course of law takes its full effect.
The effect of this Clause has not, I think, been fully considered. It really is, as it stands, absolutely indefensible. I am leaving out altogether the general principle of the Bill and of the other Clauses to which my hon. Friend referred. I do not think they have any bearing on this particular point.
My right hon. and learned Friend suggests that the Clause referred to by the hon. Member for East Grinstead (Mr. Cautley) does not touch it, but it safeguards the principle in one case, and the only one case, and the Clause and Sub-section (4) has been drawn in order to safeguard the rights of the De Keyser's judgment. I am told there is no other case in which judgment has been given.
I did not refer to a case where the House of Lords has given judgment, but there must be cases which have been heard in the Court of Appeal. If my right hon. Friend assures me there is no case at all, then I do not understand quite why he wants this Clause. It is quite useless. Take the case of a man who brings his action. It may have been started years or months ago. He brings his action, he is successful in the first court, and in the Court of Appeal, and the case is pending in the House of Lords. Then comes this Act and declares the whole of that void, and deprives him of his costs; he is not entitled to recover a single penny, and the result is he will be mulcted in a very large sum for having enforced his legal rights. Really, I do not think my right hon. Friend can have considered that. It cannot be defended. He says he wishes to put everybody on equal terms. That is a fine sentiment. But you are putting a person who is enforcing his legal rights in a worse position. When I was practising at the Bar there was an excellent maxim which I think ran vigilantibus non dormientibus leges subveniunt, which in effect meant that the law assists those who are vigilant in asserting their rights, but not those who sleep upon them. This present procedure is a reversal of that. It is fining those who are vigilant for their rights and encouraging those who do not assert their rights. It is a reversal, I say, of the whole of the legal doctrine on which we were brought up, that a man, knowing he has got certain rights, and enforces them against the Crown, is to be fined. That is the spirit of this Government. It was bred in the War. Until we get rid of that spirit we shall not reform this Government, either in matters of legislation or administration. We have to get back to the old principles of English liberty. That is the really vital point. I do hope the House, even in its rather anaemic condition—which it is in these days—will assert its full rights and assert the fact that the Government has not to trample upon the rights of the people. A great many things were done in the War at which we looked askance, but we knew we had to put up with them. We must have an Indemnity Act. But this pays no regard to the rights of anybody. This seems to be perfectly indefensible. If the Government do not strike out this Clause, at any rate let them so modify it as to make it somewhat equitable. Personally, I should prefer to see these words struck out altogether, so that a man should have the advantage of his vigilance and public spirit in asserting the rights of the subject against the Crown, which, in my judgment, is always a good thing to do in all circumstances.
I am sorry the Government have not seen their way to meet us in any respect. Some of us who have been a good many years in the House and have consistently supported the Government in every reasonable matter feel ourselves now impelled to take a stand even if there is only half-a-dozen of us, to go into the Division Lobby. I think the Committee ought to know the class of case and claim to which this would apply, and which the Government, in the various Departments, have been dealing with; and what the effect of this Clause is going to be if the Committee do not see their way to adopt the Amendment. I desire to point out that a vast number of subjects of the realm have suffered damage and loss. Take the case of a poor man, a sailor on a steamer, not a Government boat, which went to Gallipoli with munitions or something of that sort. This steamer got sunk by the Turkish batteries. The man I refer to lost his effect, a sailor's kit, to the value of £35. I am giving a concrete case. He was under the impression that there was somebody who would repay that £35, and after applying in various directions and getting Various advice, he eventually found that he must lodge a claim in the Foreign Claims Department at the Foreign Office He did so. He had some correspondence with the Committee, of which Mr. Justice Peterson was chairman. Eventually the claim was agreed to with a reduction of a few pounds, and he was awarded £31 odd. Naturally, he assumed he was going to get the money. But he did not get it, and has not yet got it. I have no hesitation in saying to the Committee that the great body of Members of Parliament do not know the facts of these, cases.
I know there are hundreds of these cases in Liverpool, of which I am one of the Members. I know that there are hundreds of other cases involving thousands of pounds in which the principle is the same. Although I cannot say they are all poor men, yet many of these people have lost practically all they had in companies and other concerns. The claims have been filed. Yet they have never received a penny and are not going to receive a penny. Some of them have had the care to commence proceedings, and some have had the thought to present a petition of right. In some cases that petition has got as far as a judge. There is a case in which I am personally interested, and of which I know the facts, and therefore I am entitled to explain what the position is. That case is this: The properties of the company were destroyed by the British Military Mission in Rumania in November, 1916. We then received an assurance in writing that the British Government would pay for what had been destroyed. The German agent would have given an army corps for our stock of petroleum which was then destroyed. I explained this later to the shareholders. They cheered when they heard their property was destroyed, because they were patriotic and were not troubled to see the concern practically swept out of existence and a million and a quarter worth of property destroyed. We were, I say, quite willing, that that property should be destroyed and that we should incur all these losses for an indefinite period.
But we relied upon the writing we had got in the name of the British Government. We put in our claim in February, 1917. Every obstacle was put in our way of getting the case tried. We spent £5,000 or £6,000 on counsel, every penny of which was earned. I am not complaining of the fees, for the cost probably would now have been £10,000. We got judgment in the court on the first instance that we were entitled to have our losses recouped. We got that judgment last April. Notice of appeal on a perfectly trivial point has been given. If we pass this Clause this afternoon we shall be deprived of our judgment, because there happens to be notice of appeal given upon some trivial point. I cannot conceive that the House of Commons or any other body could possibly allow this kind of thing to go on. The small man, the big man, thousands of people are concerned. Wherever they have got judgment notice of appeal has been given. The whole of this business has to be wiped out. People are all to be reduced and to come under the same rule of thumb, and be subject to an haphazard act of grace. They are to get something or other at some time or other. It is not natural justice. It is not British justice. That was one of the things for which our ancestors fought. It is part of the petition of right that we should be able, if we have a claim, that we should have that to which we are justly entitled, and this Committee and the House should look very, very carefully at the rights of the subject and see that nothing is done either by the Government or the Crown—whom the Government are supposed to represent— which deprives any citizen either of his liberty or property, and what is even more sacred, of the right of justice.
The courts are not going to give people more than that to which they are justly entitled. Why should people be put to all this delay? Why should poor people be kept out of their money and, like the sailor, deprived of their belongings? Why should we be deprived of the right of being recouped for the stuff that was destroyed three years ago? Some of us feel very strongly about these matters. I have listened with amazement to the speech from the back Bench just now, from an hon. Member who explained that he had been on the Committee. The hon. Member seems entirely to have misread Sub-section (4) on page 2 of the Bill. He sand that if you have a final judgment it is not to be affected. Has he forgotten the words that come immediately after," where judgment at the passing of this Act is not then the sub- ject of a pending appeal"? Notice of appeal has been given, as I understand it, in practically every case. Other judgments are to be swept aside. We feel so strongly about this that we shall feel bound to go to a Division upon it.
I think perhaps it would be convenient to the Committee if I were to say a word lest it should be misunderstood what is the purpose both of the Amendment and the Bill, and what the latter does. The last speech has led me to get up, because it is so plain that the hon. Gentleman (Sir Wm. Rutherford) has not appreciated really the position. He is chairman of a company which, as he has told the Committee, is engaged in litigation with the Crown, based upon a contract on which judgment has been obtained. If he will kindly look at the Bill he will observe that following the Clause there is a proviso which says:
"Provided that, except in cases where a claim for payment or compensation can be brought under Section two of the Act"— That is, establishing the fact that your goods were requisitioned—that shipping or goods were requisitioned—
"This Section shall not prevent—
Therefore the claim to which my hon. Friends have referred is a claim which is a claim in respect of a breach of contract, and ought not to be excluded by this Section. I cannot help thinking that a great deal of the warmth displayed in this matter would not have been exhibited if my hon. Friend had really taken the trouble to understand this Bill.
Perhaps my hon. and learned Friend will allow me. I ask him to believe, and I ask the Committee to believe, that although I have been chairman of this particular company to which I referred for some years, during the whole of the time the destruction was going forward in Rumania I never associated my position as a Member of this House with that company, nor have I sought to harass the Government or to raise this question in any way, or to associate my membership of this House with these other proceedings. I would be the last person in the world to come here and complain of any personal damage.
Hear, hear!
I simply gave the case as an illustration. I asked the right hon. Gentleman kindly to accept it as an illustration, which I gave because I know more about it than about others. There was no attempt made to assert the claims of my company, or to make it in any way the subject of complaint.
I am delighted to accept the explanation which has just been given if any was necessary. I should be very sorry to think I had said anything that indicated the contrary. I am glad to say that my hon. Friend has not in this matter ever placed the Law Officers of the Crown in any difficulty, and may I add that he has not put the smallest strain upon our friendship, which has continued for a long time, and which I hope may continue? My hon. Friend may meet me on some other occasions, and perhaps we had better defer the legal questions.
Will the right hon. Gentleman kindly explain how the proviso meets this case? In cases of a claim under Clause 2 of this Bill the first relates to ships and the second to claims in the United Kingdom.
The words of Subsection (1) of Clause 1 are before the Duke Commission. It is in respect of that, as we undertook to do, that we are going to reinforce that Commission by making a judge of the High Court President; and further than that two other judges will be appointed whose services we are glad to get, and they will be members of that Commission as well. That will be the Duke Commission reinforced by more legal talent. Upon that Commission we give a right of appeal on all questions of law to the Court of Appeal.
The third class is where there are certain legal rights which it is claimed have been overlooked before. In the case of ships and goods it is known that compensation has been paid on a certain basis over a period of five years. In the case of ships the Blue Book rates have been paid, and they were determined and settled by Committees on the invitation of Lord Mersey. Those Blue Book rates have not been considered inadequate. I do not think it would be said of the shipping community as a whole that they have not reaped a considerable reward for the valuable services they rendered during the War, which I should be very sorry to depreciate. In the case of requisitions of food and materials they have been dealt with under Regulation 2 B, and inasmuch as the market price, or the so-called market price, was enhanced by requisitions on the part of the Government, the system adopted was to pay upon the cost price plus a reasonable profit. Those two standards of compensation are maintained and validated under this Bill.
We are not endeavouring to make void a, number of cases which have reached the House of Lords. In the de Keyser Hotel case I have put down a Clause providing that the fruits of that judgment may be retained. The Newcastle Brewery case is under appeal. When I introduced this Bill I avowed that our intention was to validate the system of cost plus a reasonable profit, and not to pay enhanced or profiteering prices which have been sometimes claimed by a resort, or an attempted resort, to the Courts. The effect of the passage in the Bill which it is proposed to leave out is this. I do not know of any case which conforms to the conditions referred to by the Noble Lord the Member for Hitchin (Lord II. Cecil). We are referring to a number of petitions of right which have been presented, but are not yet tried, and what is suggested is that these cases where a petition of right has been issued should be allowed to receive a different measure of compensation from the other claims.
Have they got the fiat of the Attorney-General?
They have the fiat of the Attorney-General in the sense that advice is given that proceedings should be taken. The right hon. Gentleman knows that that does not give any assurance or imprimatur that there is a good right or a good cause of action. I have an illustration of the sort of case which I have in mind. My attention was drawn to a petition of right by a shipowner in the case of a vessel, which was not a very large one, which had been requisitioned by the Government, and had served under requisition for a period of 18 months. The owners had been paid for the requisition at Blue Book rates, but there was afterwards a petition of right containing a claim in respect of the 18 months under requisition for a sum of not less than £50,000, in addition to the Blue Book rates, which have already been paid. Now I ask the Committee would it be reasonable to say in that case, that because the petition of right had been commenced, that that particular subsidy was to be paid on a basis wholly different from a number of others when the others had not presented their petition of right or taken other steps, although their claim may be just as good as the one in which proceedings have been issued.
This Clause, about which so much has been said from the high legal point of view, is not intended to deprive the subject of compensation, nor is it intended to deprive them of going to a Court which would be presided over by a High Court Judge, and it does not deprive them of their right to go to the Court of Appeal to ascertain what are their rights. It does ensure that the same measure of compensation shall be meted out to those whose claims have not yet been decided and that those who have initiated proceedings should not, by the mere fact of having initiated proceedings, secure a higher measure of compensation than the hundreds and thousands of those who have already had their claims settled upon a recognised basis. That basis is to be continued, and we say that it ought to be continued both to those who have initiated proceedings which have gone only a short distance, and for those whose claims have not yet been brought before the Court.
I apologise to the Committee for taking up the time of the House making this explanation. Some question has been raised as to the payment of costs, but it is impossible to introduce a Clause dealing with all questions of costs on the basis of a sort of flat rate by which all persons should be entitled to receive their costs who have initiated proceedings. I recognise that the question of costs is one which ought to be dealt with, and should be carefully considered, and it will be carefully considered from the administrative point of view. Not infrequently claims are made for costs against the Treasury Solicitor, and the Attorney-General is prepared to deal with those cases, as he has often done n similar cases before, and to give an assurance that he will consider all these cases in which costs have been incurred, and he will endeavour, as far as possible, to see that right should be done. On this point I cannot promise to introduce a Clause which would be effective, and which would measure out a flat rate. In some cases the costs are enhanced or have been incurred improvidently, but where they have been rightly incurred they can be dealt with by a just system of administration.
5.0 P.M.
My right hon. and learned Friend need not apologise to the Committee for taking up our time, because if this measure is to be proceeded with we expect the Government to give the most detailed explanation for taking a course which is odious to everyone who has any regard for public liberty. We hope the Government will not adopt the course of relying on the support of hon. Members who are not present, and I hope they will not abstain from using arguments to convince those who are really the only competent judges of this case. I would remind the Solicitor-General that he has to pass this Bill not only through this House, but through the other House of Parliament, and on questions of personal liberty and legal right the other Chamber is much more independent than this House. If the right hon. Gentleman does not make out a good case I am afraid he will find himself in a difficulty when the Bill goes forward to another place. What is the argument of the Solicitor-General? It is that you ought to have at any rate a common level. He has no real regard for doing justice to the subject, and he wants a short way in order to cut off the rights of the subject according to an equal system. I cannot understand the Government saying that we are unable to have complete justice because of the various complexities of the matter and, the difficulty of the circumstances of war. Surely they should say we will see as little injustice done as possible, and we will allow certain persons who have had their rights justly tried and determined by the ordinary courts, to have their rights respected, and that we are only too ready to respect those rights. The hon. and learned Gentleman with true bureaucratic spirit prefers symmetry to justice. He would rather everybody was unjustly treated than that some should be justly and some unjustly treated. That is the proposition which he is not ashamed to make. My hon. and learned Friend says that those cases where judgment has been obtained in the Court of First Instance are very rare. If so, why is the Government afraid to accept the judgment for what it is worth and as it stands? Would not the simplest thing be to say that where judgment has been given in any Court that judgment shall be accepted for what it is worth? The Solicitor-General says he cannot even meet us in the case of costs, and that that matter will be left to the discretion of some official. For equal law he proposes to substitute the arbitrary discretion of the official. If we leave people who have proved themselves in the right and have vindicated their right before a Court of Justice to pay their own costs we shall simply be fining them.
I was referring to cases which had not come before the Courts and in which no decision of any sort or kind has been given.
Then will you except cases in which a decision has been given? If not, what is the use of interrupting?
We will deal with them administratively.
The true bureaucratic idea! The hon. and learned Gentleman will deal with them administratively just as continental statesmen are prone to deal with such matters. It is an outrage for the Government to put this sort of thing before the House. It is intolerable that the traditions of British liberty should be torn up to suit the convenience of bureaucrats without any idea of doing justice. I earnestly press the Committee to support this Amendment. If the House of Commons has any useful function it is that it should be the guardian of the liberty of the subject, and if it is to justify its reputation against many criticisms it can only do so by showing that it is determined to support the time-honoured right of the subject to appeal to Courts of Justice and not to limit those rights unless it can be shown to be unavoidable.
Nobody could approach this Bill without a profound doubt whether it is possible to find a proper solution to a very difficult problem. I venture to think the Noble Lord has infused much heat into the discussion without illuminating it. His remarks have been an almost unjustifiable criticism upon some of us. He suggests that he only is on the side of liberty and that we who do not agree with him are opposed to liberty. I do not suggest that his argument was discourteous or offensive—he is never that—but I do think it was dangerousy near it. It is not aways easy to discover on which side the liberty of the subject is. I do not know what side the Committee will say it was on in the case of those gentlemen who unexpectedly found themselves in possession of a commodity—rum—which had acquired a fabulous value owing to the absorption of other supplies of rum due to the necessities of the War. Were the owners of that rum on the side of liberty when they demanded from all other subjects of the Crown enormously inflated values for it? Were they the friends of liberty? I am not at all sure that they were. Or was liberty on the side of the Defence of the Realm Regulations, which were passed under an Act of Parliament for which the Noble Lord and other Members of the last Parliament were responsible and which laid it down that the possessors of such a commodity under such circumstances had no right to reap an extravagant price which had been created solely in consequence of the War? If every subject of the realm had pursued his remedies in the same way as these people did the financial stability of the realm would have been threatened and we could not have continued the War.
The Noble Lord took to task the Solicitor-General and said he preferred symmetry to justice. But what remedy would the Courts have given in these cases suppose there had been no Indemnity Bill and no Defence of the Realm Regulations? Is the Noble Lord sure that the law is so clear in this matter that it can be solved by a few words about symmetry and liberty? Take the de Keyser Hotel case. The judgment gave some inflated or extravagant compensation to the owners of the hotel. The jury was asked to assess the value of the occupation by the Government of the hotel. Their award may have been more or less than the Government would have given under the Defence of the Realm Regulations. You cannot solve a very difficult question by assuming that high prices are to be paid to a subject for something the Commonwealth needs. It may be justice if low prices are paid.
My hon. Friend clearly did not understand my speech and he had better not try to deal with it if he is going to do so by misrepresentation.
I said just now the Noble Lord was never discourteous——
I have no intention of being personally discourteous, but I want to avoid a misunderstanding.
I will not pursue a discussion of this sort. I venture to think that this question is not to be solved by assuming that if you pay everybody inflated war prices you do justice to them, and if you take any steps to limit their large profits you do them an injustice. I want to call the attention of the Committee to the words which it is proposed to leave out. I think we all desire to arrive at a proper solution of this question, and to see that a few favoured individuals shall not secure an advantage over the general body of citizens, nearly all of whom have been affected prejudicially in consequence of the War. With all. deference to the Noble Lord, we have to see that, as far as possible, there is equality.
If the hon. Gentleman saw a man break into a shop and steal a piece of jewellery, would he say that, as there could be no doubt about his guilt, the man should be at once sent to prison instead of being tried in the ordinary way? My Noble Friend did not argue that absurd prices should be paid for the rum—he was simply arguing that all subjects have a right to present their cases before a Court of Law.
That is just the difficulty. What is his case? It was said in a well known judgment before the Privy Council early in the War that it was very doubtful—indeed, a stronger opinion was expressed — whether a subject was entitled to compensation when the Crown requisitioned his property for the use of the Crown. It was very doubtful indeed in law as well as in abstract justice. Under these circumstances I hope the Committee will consider whether or not these words are really required at the end of Section (1). I know the marginal note suggests that the Section does not put a restriction on the taking of legal proceedings by persons acting in good faith. I admit that the Section is drawn in wider terms than that, and in consequence very large exceptions have been made under paragraphs ( b ), ( c ) and ( d ), which substantially do protect all persons in connection with litigation which they may have in contemplation or in course of prosecution. There will be nothing to prevent the prosecution of such litigation. Obviously it would be very wrong indeed if a number of officials, naval, military and civil, were to be subjected to actions merely because proceedings were instituted before a given date when otherwise, under the terms of Subsection (1), they ought to be protected. I would even go a little further in making proper provision for people who have acted in good faith. I think these words might properly be retained. On the whole it is in the interests of justice and not merely of equality that a few persons should be prevented securing an advantage over other members of the State.
The Solicitor-General's statement that he is prepared to give favourable consideration to the question of costs has, I confess, removed my main objection to the Clause. There is a question of abstract justice. As it appears to me very strongly, the Clause is in the right and the Amendment is in the: wrong. I do not think even the Noble Lord the Member for Oxford University (Lord H. Cecil) would suggest that it is possible by Act of Parliament to secure either perfect justice or perfect injustice. There must be a balance of considerations and we are reduced to the principle of the greatest justice to the greatest number. Those who have already taken proceedings before the tribunals and have agreed to settle their case with the Government form the great majority, and they will be prevented from taking proceedings in the future by the provisions of this Bill. No-doubt they are the more numerous and the more worthy of consideration, and their have the right to claim that no one shall be put in a better position than themselves.
The right?
Yes, they have a right to claim that nobody whose case is the same as theirs on the merits shall be put in a better position than themselves. It is a natural right of the subject of every State that there shall be quality and equity, that equal treatment shall be meted out to all classes, and that those who are equal on the merits shall be meted out to all classes and that those who are equal on the merits shall be dealt with equally by the State. That seems to me to need little argument. If it is fair that those whose cases are the same on the merits should be dealt with in the same way then it is unfair that one class should be differentiated by the merely accidental circumstance that the proceedings were commenced before or after a given date. It appears to me to be beyond contention that the Government and the State has an obligation towards all this enormous; class; an obligation which they are bound to carry out if they are to recommend the Bill to the favourable opinion of the country. They will not recommend it, to all those who are interested, in a favourable manner if they feel that preferential treatment has been given to. certain small classes, whose cases are no-better on the merits, merely owing to extenuating or relieving circumstances in the consideration of their case.
I must apologise to the Committee for not having been present when the Amendment standing in my name and now under discussion was moved. I do not want to say too much, because I did not hear the early part of the Debate, but there are one or two points I want to deal with. The first is that this Amendment deals with a limited aspect of the Bill. It does not deal with the general principle as to whether interference with the Courts should be allowed, or whether persons should be brought before a special tribunal, nor as to whether the legal measure of compensation is a right one, or whether something less should be given. It deals with the very limited point as to whether parties who have started to prosecute their legal rights, and in many cases have received judgment from the first Court, or even the Court of Appeal, should have the results of their labours struck out by Act of Parliament and should be deprived of their legal rights. Dealing with that one point only, I venture to say that it is an intolerable interference with the rights of the subject as known in this country. The Solicitor-General comes from a great and distinguished line of great lawyers, and the shades of his ancestors must be shuddering in their graves at the prospect of a descendant of theirs standing up in this House of Commons to argue the proposal that subjects who have prosecuted their rights to judgment in a court of law should have those rights taken away and have to pay their own costs. Why I have taken such a strong stand against the whole of the provisions of this Bill is that, in my view, the danger to the liberty of the subject today is as great as it was in the times of the Stuarts, but from different sources. It is the danger of the Departments and Ministerial officials, who want to deal with cases administratively. That is not what courts of law exist for: they exist for doing justice evenly between the Crown and the subject just as much as between subject and subject, and the whole protection of the subject today is in the power of the courts to resist the Executive. That is the reason of the large amount of opposition to this Bill. Under these words the judgment obtained last winter or in the spring from the Court of Appeal, in regard to which the six months' right of appeal to the House of Lords has not yet run out, would be struck out. Why, and on what ground? The only ground suggested by the Solicitor-General is this: that in certain cases, for reasons of patriotism, of ignorance or of imprudence, individual subjects during the War have come to the Defence of the Realm Losses Committee and have taken compensation which was ridiculous, or have accepted an award giving them no compensation, which was also ridiculous, when, as between themselves and the public as a whole, it was right that the loss should not fall upon the individual, but upon the public as a whole. The Courts would have given them compensation upon that ground. Take the case of a man who has been to the Defence of the Realm Losses Commission and who has taken less than his legal rights because he is patriotic. That man, because of his patriotism, gave up something to which he was entitled. There is no justice in giving that as an argument for depriving somebody else who may be poor and who comes to the Courts for his legal rights. Is an individual who did not take the trouble to consult his lawyers but went to the Defence of the Realm Losses Commission and took what was offered without inquiry at all, to be petted by the Government in this Bill at the expense of those who have taken advice, or is a man who did it for sheer impudence to be protected? There is no justice in that. It is not only that there is no justice in the principle of giving an equality of injustice to everybody but those people who have given up their rights have no claim to receive what is their just claim, but deprive others of their rights? The hon. Member who spoke last (Commander Hilton Young) seemed to me to say that because A, B and C gave up something to which they were legally entitled during the War, that A, B and C had a claim to prevent D, E and F from getting something to which they were entitled. The learned Solicitor-General gave an illustration of one case of shipping in which the owner was given more than the Blue Book rates, and he put it to the Committee that that case spoke for itself, and because it was a shipping owner that Committee would not give it good treatment.
indicated dissent.
It was made perfectly clear in the evidence given before the Select Committee that the shipowners are not as a whole seeking to re-open the cases as a whole. They are satisfied with the Blue Book rates; but those rates were unjust in certain cases. Lord Inchcape was the Chairman of the Committee, and in the Report of the Blue Book wrote a letter stating what the position was, saying that the shipowners had met the Government loyally and liberally in the matter. The letter was dated the 22nd October, 1914, and this sentence occurred:
"It was recognised that in some cases where whole fleets had been requisitioned and trade had been seriously upset and charters of other steamers had to be made to enable owners to maintain their services, compensation should be made by the Admiralty on terms to be mutually agreed upon between the Admiralty and the owner."
That principle has never been put in practice, because the Solicitor-General referred us to a case of that kind. It was the case that, in order to do justice to that particular firm, something more than the Blue Book rates were necessary for the very reason Lord Inchcape said. If that case went to the Courts, that particular firm would get an increase in compensation. I do not see why people should be done out of getting their legal rights. There are a number of cases which have been prosecuted in the Courts where it would have been the greatest hardship to deprive those people of their rights. The hon. and gallant Member for Bristol (Mr. Inskip) dealt with the case of rum. That does not really arise on this Clause, but the answer to the point he made is this. He said that the War had put up the market price of rum to a very high level, and that to give the owners of breweries compensation the whole of that price would be to give them a war present. If it would, then I would agree to a provision being put in regulating the matter so that the companies should not get it. But the answer to that particular case is, I am told, that, after these particular stocks were taken away from the trader, and he is given substantially less than the market price, he has to go into the market to buy additional stocks in order to go on with his business, or else he has to close his business. That is the case in which judgment was given by Mr. Justice Salter.
I only rise for the purpose of making what I think is a practical suggestion, and may help not only to abbreviate this discussion but to facilitate, if not relieve, the hostility to this Clause which the supporters of the Amendment have expressed. It is quite true that the primâ facie effect of the words which my hon. Friend has proposed to omit will be qualified considerably, both by the terms of the proviso at the end of the first Sub-section and by the fourth Sub-section. Otherwise, I confess without any hesitation that I should have supported the Motion to omit these words. I think they are dangerously wide, even as they stand. The suggestion I would make is this. The point which has remained unanswered, and which I do not think can be answered as the Clause at present stands, is not provided for by Sub-section (4). Take the case of a man who has recovered a judgment, which may have been confirmed by the Court of Appeal, and in regard to which the time for appealing to the House of Lords has not yet expired. We must presume that he has succeeded properly, because two courts have affirmed the justice of his case, and no doubt he has incurred, as is the case in matters of this kind, very considerable costs. Yet the effect of this Clause would be to deprive him of the whole fruits of those two judgments and of the costs which he has incurred. That is not justice, and the Solicitor-General does not attempt to justify it. What he asks, not only by way of answer but of what I may call a rhetorical solatium, is that the Attorney-General, and those who advise him may consider, as a matter of administrative equity and clemency, whether or not in each particular case there shall be a reimbursement. The suggestion I make to the Solicitor-General is that he should undertake to insert words—not at this stage, but perhaps at the end of the Clause or at whatever be the proper stage of the Bill—to enable, not the administrative officers of the Crown, but the courts of law, upon the principles upon which they do act, to indemnify this person for that which you are taking away from him. I am sure that nothing else will satisfy justice, nor ought to satisfy the Committee.
I was going to make the same point which has been so much better made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Paisley. I was going to press upon the Solicitor-General whether he would not consider the suggestion which was originally made by my Noble Friend the Member for Hitchin (Lord R. Cecil) some time ago, that this question of costs is really a question of injustice outside the general question of the Bill altogether. Quite apart from the Bill, where a man has, under the law of the country, started proceedings in our Courts, and this House intervenes and stops those proceedings in the national interest, that man should at any rate be entitled to the judgment of the Court as applied to the costs, if any, which he is entitled to receive for the expenses he has incurred in those proceedings. That is a perfectly plain issue. The Solicitor-General said that he could not have a flat rate, but he rather ignored the suggestion made by my Noble Friend, which Las also been made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Paisley, that the costs are outside the case. Surely that safeguard is a matter of important principle, and I hope that at any rate the Solicitor-General will go so far as to say that he will consider it and will endeavour to introduce words to that effect before the Report stage. Unless he does that, I shall feel compelled to vote for this Amendment, but I should do so with regret because of a further point which has been referred to, where I feel bound to support him. He had, I think, a very difficult task, and I do not join in attacking him for the way in which he has carried it out. I think he has improved the Bill. It was a very bad Bill when it was introduced, and even now it is not a Bill that anyone likes. I do not know whether I am right, but I understand that in the de Keyser case the question to be decided was whether the Defence of the Realm Act gave the subject a right to some ex gratia payment to which he had no right whatever, or whether it diminished the legal right which he actually had; and that the judgment decided that the latter was the case and not the former. It decided that the subject has a legal right, and that the Government has no legal right to seize his property without payment.
May I interrupt the right hon. Gentleman to correct him in one sentence? The de Keyser judgment held that the legal right which the subject had was not diminished.
I meant that it was not diminished by the Defence of the Realm Act. We are, however, now diminishing it.
It will be diminished very much if we pass this Bill.
That is the whole point, and it does seem to me to be very important. As I take it, this House passed the Defence of the Realm Act for the purpose of effecting two things. One was that the subject whose property was taken in the War should not gain an undue profit, and the other was that the subject whose property was taken in the War should not suffer an undue loss. If those two objects are carried out, I think that the desire of most of us will be fulfilled. It has been established that the subject has rights, and the House desires to limit those rights to the extent that, in the one direction there shall not be excessive profiteering, such as might have occurred through the extreme War value of goods, and in the other direction that people should not suffer because their property—houses, for example—was taken and occupied during the War without any compensation being given to them. If we can carry out that principle, and I believe that this Bill as now drafted does carry it out, I do not think we ought to quarrel with it. The main point of this Amendment, apart from the question of costs, is as to whether these proceedings should be stopped. I am bound to say that I do not see any advantage in continuing litigation when the House has laid down a principle, provided that the subject is reimbursed for any costs which he has incurred in good faith. If we could have the assurance that the decision would be made, not by an official but by the courts, I should be prepared to support the Government. If, on the other hand, we cannot have that assurance, I shall vote for the Amendment.
I think the Committee is much indebted to the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Asquith) for his contribution to the Debate. I think if a slight modification were made in Sub-section (4), to which my right hon. Friend referred, and upon which I have already given notice of an Amendment to carry out such a modification, it would very largely meet the criticisms that have been made. If a man who has taken proceedings is not to be fined by having to pay his own costs, and if the man who has actually got a judgment is to be allowed to have the benefit of that judgment, I should feel inclined to agree, having regard to the complexities and difficulties of this Bill, that the other points might fairly be conceded as a compromise. In order to do that it would be necessary to have from the Solicitor-General, first of all, an undertaking that words would be introduced to guard this question of expenses and costs that might be incurred. Further, the Solicitor-General ought to tell us now that he would accept an Amendment to Sub-section (4) of Clause 1 to leave out the last two lines of the Sub-section. The first part of the Sub-section reads:
"Nothing in this Section shall prejudice or prevent … a final judgment given before the passing of the Act by any court …"
and I think that is fair. The words which I propose should be left out are as follows:
"Where the judgment at the passing of this Act is not then the subject of a pending appeal and the time for appealing against it has expired."
We think that, if there was a judgment, that judgment ought to stand, and we think that if a man is to be deprived of the right of going on with his proceedings his costs, as fixed by the Court, ought to be reasonably provided for. It is not right that a man who has a judgment should be deprived of it, nor that a man who has expended, perhaps, thousands of pounds in trying to make good his legal rights, should be made to pay those costs in any event. If those two suggestions could be adopted, I think our time will not have been thrown away, but that we shall have achieved something towards making the provisions of this very difficult Bill a little fairer to the subject who may be damnified by the wording of the Bill as it stands.
On a point of Order. Before the Committee discusses that proposal, there are several Amendments immediately following on the same point—two or three of them in my name and several others. If you would save the Amendment standing in my name on those points I should be grateful. The Amendments standing in my name would have the effect of altering the sentence to make it read as follows:
"and if any such proceeding is instituted after the passing of this Act it shall be discharged and made void."
I want that point preserved.
The Amendment referred to by the hon. and learned Gentleman has been preserved by the way in which the Question has been put from the Chair.
I have also an Amendment which deals with the same points, and I hope that that will be saved.
I am much obliged to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Paisley, for his intervention on this matter, which obviously gives the Committee considerable difficulty. I want to explain to him and to the Committee exactly what the position is. It has been suggested that there must be a great number of cases in which large amounts, of costs have been incurred which have been thrown away. So far as my knowledge goes:—and I think that my knowledge, if not complete, is certainly adequate—the number of such cases may be reduced to one or two. The number of cases in which a judgment has been given against the Crown is exceedingly few.
If that is so, what is the need for this provision?
I am sorry the right hon. Gentleman intervened at that moment. I am dealing, as he will know, with two categories of cases. There are cases which have gone before the Courts and in which judgment has been pronounced by a Court of First Instance or by the Court of Appeal, and there is a second category, which the right hon. Gentleman will not overlook, namely, those cases in which proceedings have been merely started, and which have only gone to a limited extent—it may be to the extent of a mere petition, and so on. The right hon. Gentleman will appreciate the difference. It has been represented to the Committee that there were numerous cases in which the costs of trial and of appeal had already been incurred. To my knowledge, the number of these oases, which have resulted in costs being awarded to the subject are very few; I think one case in the Court of Appeal and one case which I have in mind, and which will be safeguarded by Sub-section (4), and really the bulk of these cases in which costs have to be dealt with are those in which proceedings have been merely instituted and have not yet gone beyond the preliminary stage, and in which costs have not yet been incurred. I think justice will be met by dealing with cases where costs have been incurred. I did not intend to be rhetorical. Indeed, I never thought even the right hon. Gentleman, with all his ability and eloquence, could be rhetorical on a question of costs.
My experience is altogether the other way.
Sometimes they are prolonged, but I do not know that rhetoric would be the right word to use. However, I am quite prepared to deal with this question of costs, and I will bring up a Clause on Report. I think in all cases the matter should be decided by the Court, but in a large number of cases we shall have to enable proceedings to be taken by a summons in order that we may have a determination as to what should be done with costs. But I must do that by a separate Clause. It is far too difficult and intricate a matter to write out a Clause immediately and put it in, or even to amend the Bill as now drawn without carefully thinking it over. Anyone who has had to consider a matter of this intricacy, which involves dealing with and possibly making an inroad upon a number of rules of Court, would hesitate to bring up a Clause or propose an Amendment unless he had abundant time for consideration. But I will bring up a Clause to meet that point upon the Report stage. I shall not be able to do it by means of an Amendment, because the matter is intricate.
Does the undertaking my hon. Friend has given include what I understand to be the suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman, not merely the question of costs, but in certain cases to safeguard the fruits of the judgment?
No, I cannot go beyond the question of costs. The only case that I know of is the Newcastle Breweries case, which is a case in which the whole principle has been challenged, and the current of legal authority in the present case is against that decision. That is the decision of Mr. Justice Salter. It has been definitely repudiated as a decision by Mr. Justice Greer, and it has been definitely differed from by Mr. Justice Darling and by Mr. Justice Bailhache, and the case stands over to the Court of Appeal, and to say that the judgment obtained before Mr. Justice Salter is to be carried to fruition would, I think, be to disregard the other decisions of other judges who have differed from the decisions given by Mr. Justice Salter. It is almost impossible to leave a judgment standing which enshrines a broad principle, and to say that that is to have no weight although the judgment is to stand. The very purpose of the Bill and the Clauses which have received a very general acceptance, not only by the Select Committee, but by the House itself, are the principles which were not accepted in the judgment: and so long as the judgment stands it will be impossible to carry out the principles which are generally accepted by both the Select Committee and, I hope, by this Committee, and which are embodied in the Bill.
Is it quite clear that this can be dealt with on Report? It seems to me a matter of some doubt, but that can be met if my hon. and learned Friend will give an undertaking that if he finds that he cannot introduce a Clause on Report because it imposes a charge on the subject, he will recommit the Bill for that purpose.
Certainly.
I think the Solicitor-General has met us very fairly in the matter. The real gravamen of the injustice which some of us see in the operation of the Clause as it stands will be removed. I hope the hon. Gentleman will not persist in the Amendment.
I shall be obliged to, because the Solicitor-General has not told us that he will let the judgment stand. If he will tell us that he is going to let it stand, we would accept it, but if he persists we cannot help him.
I hope my hon. Friend will accept the suggestion made by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Asquith) and others. After all, as the Bill is now drawn, the judgments which do not stand are judgments which are still subject to appeal and which are not final, and as they are not final, if only you do justice to the litigant in the matter of costs, they will not be in a worse position pending a decision, but they are to be as nearly as possible in the same position. I hope my hon. Friend will not divide on this, because it seems to me it is not fair to ask that they should be in a better position.
Question put," That the words proposed to be left out to the word 'has' ["has been instituted"] stand part of the Clause."
The Committee divided: Ayes, 259; Noes, 48.
Division No. 230.] AYES. 15.54 p.m. Adair, Rear-Admiral Thomas B. S. Foreman, Henry Maddocks, Henry Adkins, Sir W. Ryland D. Forestier-Walker, L. Magnus, Sir Philip Agg-Gardner, Sir James Tynte Foxcroft, Captain Charles Talbot Mallalieu, F. W. Armitage, Robert Fraser, Major Sir Keith Martin, Captain A. E. Ashley, Colonel Wilfrid W. Gange, E. Stanley Middlebrook, Sir William Asquith, Rt. Hon. Herbert Henry Gibbs, Colonel George Abraham Mills, John Edmund Astor, Viscountess Gilbert, James Daniel Molson, Major John Elsdale Baird, Sir John Lawrence Glyn, Major Ralph Mond, Rt. Hon. Sir Alfred M. Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley Goff, Sir R. Park Morison, Rt. Hon. Thomas Brash Balfour, Sir R. (Glasgow, Partick) Graham, R. (Nelson and Colne) Morrison-Bell, Major A. C. Banner, Sir John S. Harmood- Graham, W. (Edinburgh, Central) Mosley, Oswald Barnes, Rt. Hon. G. (Glas., Gorbals) Greenwood, William (Stockport) Mount, William Arthur Barnes, Major H. (Newcastle, E.) Greig, Colonel James William Murray, Lieut.-Colonel A. (Aberdeen) Barnston, Major Harry Griffiths, T. (Monmouth, Pontypool) Murray, Dr. D. (Inverness and Ross) Beckett, Hon. Gervase Grundy, T. W. Murray, John (Leeds, West) Bell, James (Lancaster, Ormskirk) Hall, Lieut.-Col. Sir F. (Dulwich) Myers, Thomas Bell, Lieut.-Col W C. H. (Devizes) Hall, F. (York, W.R., Normanton) Neal, Arthur Bellairs, Commander Carlyon W. Hancock, John George Newbould, Alfred Ernest Benn, Capt. Sir I. H., Bart. (Gr'nw'h) Hanson, Sir Charles Augustin Newman, Sir R. H. S. D. L. (Exeter) Bennett, Thomas Jewell Harmsworth, C. B. (Bedford, Luton) Nicholson, William G. (Petersfield) Bigland, Alfred Harris, Sir Henry Percy Norris, Colonel Sir Henry G. Blake, Sir Francis Douglas Hartshorn, Vernon O'Grady, Captain James Boscawen, Rt. Hon. Sir A. Griffith- Hayward, Major Evan Oman, Sir Charles William C. Bowies, Colonel H. F. Henderson, Major V. L. (Tradeston) O'Neill, Major Hon. Robert W. H. Bowyer, Captain G. E. W. Henry, Denis S. (Londonderry, S.) Palmer, Charles Frederick (Wrekin) Boyd-Carpenter, Major A. Herbert, Hon. A. (Somerset, Yeovil) Palmer, Major Godfrey Mark Brassey, Major H. L. C. Hewart, Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon Palmer, Brigadier-General G. L. Bridgeman, William Clive Hinds, John Parry, Lieut.-Colonel Thomas Henry Bromfield, William Hirst, G. H. Pearce, Sir William Brown, Captain D. C. Hoare, Lieut.-Colonel Sir S. J. G. Peel, Col. Hn. S. (Uxbridge, Mddx.) Brown, James (Ayr and Bute) Hodge, Rt. Hon. John Pennefather, De Fonblanque Buchanan, Lieut. -Colonel A. L. H. Hohler, Gerald Fitzroy Perkins, Walter Frank Buckley, Lieut.-Colonel A. Holmes, J. Stanley Pilditch, Sir Philip Bull, Rt. Hon. Sir William James Hood, Joseph Pinkham, Lieut.-Colonel Charles Burgoyne, Lieut. -Colonel A. H. Hope, Sir H. (Stirling & Cl'ckm'nn,W.) Pollock, Sir Ernest M. Butcher, Sir John George Hope, James F. (Sheffield, Central) Pownall, Lieut.-Colonel Assheton Cairns, John Hope, Lt.-Col. Sir J. A. (Midlothian) Prescott, Major W. H. Campbell, J. D. G. Hope, J. D. (Berwick & Haddington) Pretyman, Rt. Hon. Ernest G. Carr, W. Theodore Hopkins, John W. W. Purchase, H. G. Carter, W. (Nottingham, Mansfield) Hopkinson, A. (Lancaster, Mossley) Raw, Lieutenant-Colonel N. Casey, T. W. Home, Edgar (Surrey, Guildford) Rees, Capt. J. Tudor- (Barnstaple) Cautley, Henry S. Hotchkin, Captain Stafford Vere Remer, J. R. Cecil, Rt. Hon. Evelyn (Birm., Aston) Hunter, General Sir A. (Lancaster) Rendall, Athelstan Chamberlain, Rt. Hn. J. A. (Birm., W.) Hunter-Weston, Lieut. Gen. Sir A. G. Renwick, George Clay, Lieut.-Colonel H. H. Spender Hurst, Lieut.-Colonel Gerald B. Richardson, R. (Houghton-le-Spring) Clough, Robert Illingworth, Rt. Hon. A. H. Robertson, John Coates, Major Sir Edward F. Jackson, Lieut.-Colonel Hon. F. S. Robinson, S. (Brecon and Radnor) Colfox, Major Wm. Phillips Jephcott, A. R. Rodger, A. K. Colvin, Brig.-General Richard Beale Jones, Sir Evan (Pembroke) Roundel), Colonel R. F. Cope, Major Wm. Jones, Henry Haydn (Merioneth) Royce, William Stapleton Cowan, D. M. (Scottish Universities) Jones, J. T. (Carmarthen, Llanelly) Samuel, A. M. (Surrey, Farnham) Cowan, Sir H. (Aberdeen and Kinc.) Kellaway, Rt. Hon. Fredk. George Samuel, Rt. Hon. Sir H. (Norwood) Craig, Captain C. C. (Antrim, South) Kenworthy, Lieut.-Commander J. M. Sanders, Colonel Sir Robert A. Craig, Colonel Sir J. (Down, Mid) Kenyon, Barnet Scott, A. M. (Glasgow, Bridgeton) Dalziel, Sir D. (Lambeth, Brixton) King, Commander Henry Douglas Seager, Sir William Dalziel, Rt. Hon. Sir J. H. (Kirk'dy) Kinloch-Cooke, Sir Clement Seddon, J. A. Davidson, Major-General Sir J. H. Knights, Capt. H. N. (C'berwell, N.) Seely, Major-General Rt. Hon. John Davies, A. (Lancaster, Clitheroe) Lambert, Rt. Hon. George Sexton, James Davies, Thomas (Cirencester) Lane-Fox, G. R. Shaw, Thomas (Preston) Davison, J. E. (Smethwick) Law, Alfred J. (Rochdale) Shaw, William T. (Forfar) Dawes, James Arthur Law, Rt. Hon. A. B. (Glasgow, C.) Short, Alfred (Wednesbury) Dean, Lieut.-Commander P. T. Lewis, Rt. Hon. J. H. (Univ., Wales) Shortt, Rt. Hon E. (N'castle-on-T.) Denison-Pender, John C. Lewis, T. A. (Glam., Pontypridd) Sitch, Charles H. Dockrell, Sir Maurice Lloyd, George Butler Smith, Harold (Warrington) Donald, Thompson Lonsdale, James Rolston Spencer, George A. Doyle, N. Grattan Loseby, Captain C. E. Sprot, Colonel Sir Alexander Du Pre, Colonel William Baring Lowe, Sir Francis William Stanley, Major Hon. G. (Preston) Edge, Captain William M'Curdy, Rt. Hon. C. A. Stephenson, Colonel H. K. Edwards, C. (Monmouth, Bedwellty) M'Donald, Dr. Bouverie F. P. Strauss, Edward Anthony Edwards, Major J. (Aberavon) Macdonald, Rt. Hon. John Murray Sturrock, J. Leng Edwards, John H. (Glam., Neath) Mackinder, Sir H. J. (Camlachie) Surtees, Brigadier-General H. C. Eyres-Monsell, Commander B. M. McLaren, Robert (Lanark, Northern) Sutherland, Sir William Falle, Major Sir Bertram G. Maclean, Rt. Hon. Sir D. (Midlothian) Sykes, Colonel Sir A. J. (Knutsford) Farquharson, Major A. C. Macleod, J. Mackintosh Sykes, Sir Charles (Huddersfield) Fell, Sir Arthur Macmaster, Donald Talbot, G. A. (Hemel Hempstead) Finney, Samuel McNeill, Ronald (Kent, Canterbury) Taylor, J. Thomas, Sir Robert J. (Wrexham) Wallace, J. Wood, Major M. M. (Aberdeen, C.) Thomas-Stanford, Charles Walsh, Stephen (Lancaster, Ince) Worthington-Evans, Rt. Hon. Sir L. Thomson, F. C. (Aberdeen, South) Waring, Major Walter Yate, Colonel Charles Edward Thomson, T. (Middlesbrough, West) Warren, Lieut.-Col. Sir Alfred H. Yeo, Sir Alfred William Thomson, Sir W. Mitchell- (Maryhill) Wignall, James Young, Lieut.-Com. E. H. (Norwich) Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton, E.) Williams, Lt.-Com. C. (Tavistock) Young, W. (Perth & Kinross, Perth) Thorpe, Captain John Henry Wilson, Daniel M. (Down, West) Younger, Sir George Tickler, Thomas George Wilson, Colonel Leslie O. (Reading) Townley, Maximilian G. Wilson, W. Tyson (Westhoughton) TELLERS FOR THE AYES. —— Tryon, Major George Clement Winterton, Major Earl Lord E. Talbot and Mr. Dudley Ward. Turton, E. R. Wood, Hon. Edward F. L. (Ripon) Waddington, R. Wood, Sir J. (Stalybridge and Hyde)
NOES. Atkey, A. R. Ganzoni, Captain Francis John C. Parkinson, John Allen (Wigan) Banbury, Rt. Hon. Sir Frederick G. Glanville, Harold James Raeburn, Sir William H. Barnett, Major R. W. Gould, James C. Richardson, Alexander (Gravesend) Barrie, Charles Coupar Gretton, Colonel John Steel, Major S. Strang Bird, Sir A. (Wolverhampton, West) Gwynne, Rupert S. Stevens, Marshall Blair, Reginald Hailas, Eldred Stewart, Gershom Briant, Frank Herbert, Dennis (Hertford, Watford) Waterson, A. E. Burn, Col. C. R. (Devon, Torquay) Hume-Williams, Sir W. Ellis Wedgwood, Colonel J. C. Cecil, Rt. Hon. Lord H. (Ox. Univ.) Irving, Dan White, Charles F. (Derby, Western) Chadwick, Sir Robert Johnstone, Joseph White, Lieut.-Col. G. D. (Southport) Clynes, Rt. Hon. J. R. Kiley, James D. Willoughby, Lieut.-Col. Hon. Claud Coats, Sir Stuart London, John William Wilson, Capt. A. S. (Holderness) Craik, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry Lunn, William Wilson, Lieut.-Col. M. J. (Richmond) Curzon, Commander Viscount Marks, Sir George Croydon Wolmer, Viscount Davison, Sir W. H. (Kensington, S.) Mitchell, William Lane Denniss, Edmund R. B. (Oldham) Morgan, Major D. Watts TELLERS FOR THE NOES. —— FitzRoy, Captain Hon. E. A. Newman, Colonel J. R. P. (Finchley) Sir Walter Rutherford and Mr. Leslie Scott.
6.0 P.M.
In regard to the next two Amendments standing in the name of the hon. Member for Liverpool (Mr. Leslie Scott), they raise the same point as the Amendment which has been disposed of, and as there has been a general discussion on the first Amendment perhaps it will not be necessary to have another discussion on the same point.
I beg to move, in Subsection (1), to leave out the words" has been" [" proceeding has been instituted"], and to insert instead thereof the word" is".
The Clause, amended in the way which I desire this and the subsequent Amendment would read:" and if any such proceeding is instituted after the passing of this Act it shall be discharged and made void." The point of my Amendment, with the Amendments which follow immediately upon it, is that it will veto proceedings instituted after the passing of the Act, but not proceedings started before the passing of the Act. If the Government succeed ultimately in discharging all judgments obtained up to the final Court of Appeal, no doubt a good many judgments will be vacated, but some will be left, namely, the House of Lords judgments, particularly the De Keyser judgment. That judgment established that the subject had as an absolute right a claim to fair and just compensation where his property was taken or used by the Government. Having regard to the notoriety of that case and to the fact that it would govern a very large number of cases, the Attorney-General, quite properly, advised the Crown not to grant a fiat for cases raising precisely the same issue as the De Keyser case, and all these cases stood over practically by agreement in order that they might be decided by the De Keyser case. Then the Government introduced this Bill which is, practically speaking, tearing up that honourable understanding that all cases in which petitions had been lodged should be governed by the ultimate decision in the De Keyser case. The Committee should not for a moment tolerate what really is a breach of faith towards the parties concerned. The whole point of my Amendment is that under our system of law in this country decisions of the final Court of Appeal are absolutely, so to speak, authoritative on what the law is. They make the law, and all cases are governed subsequently by the decision of the House of Lords when once it has been given, and the principle of that decision applies to their cases. This Amendment will allow parties who have started proceedings before the Act becomes law to have the benefit of judgments that may have been given in the House of Lords before the Act becomes law. If, ultimately, this House or the House of Lords takes the view that no judgment can be vacated contrary to the decision of the Committee just now, this proposal of mine would inure to the benefit of parties to even a greater extent than it does today. As it stands today there are a vast number of cases absolutely identical with the De Keyser case and governed by it, which, under this Clause, will be denied the rights granted and declared by the De Keyser case. On the principle of distributive justice they should all be treated on the same footing as the De Keyser case.
My hon. and learned Friend will not be surprised to hear that I cannot accept the Amendment. We have had a discussion which has occupied about two hours and the Division decided a matter which covered the principle of this Amendment. Just as I was unable to accept the last Amendment I am unable to accept this, the truth being that as the last Amendment differentiated between persons who had instituted legal proceedings and those who had not, and the Committee decided to adhere to the words so that there should be no differentiation, this Amendment proposes to differentiate between those who commenced proceedings before the Act and those who commenced proceedings after the Act. This is really a sub-division on the lines of the division proposed in the previous Amendment. I hope my hon. Friend will not press this matter. We have had a full discussion and a decision and I have undertaken on the question of costs to bring up a Clause, which I have already explained to the Committee. It is often said that the De Keyser judgment will have been made void in the sense that some people under this Bill will be deprived of their rights. That is not so. The De Keyser case itself is safeguarded by Sub-section (4), and those persons who are asking for compensation which would be covered by or governed by the De Keyser case will now have an opportunity of going before the Commission to be set up under the Clause which has been newly inserted, and which gives compensation where legal right is relied upon. The tribunal which will assess it will be a new Commission, presided over by a judge of the High Court, and will have a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal. Under these circumstances I think my hon. and learned Friend is asking a little too much to ask me to accept this Amendment.
I am under the impression that on the previous Vote we dealt with whatever there is in the shape of real merits in this particular Amendment, and we have had a vote about five to one against it. I would ask this question, which will decide my vote if we go to a Division. Is it a fact, as commonly reported, that the learned Attorney-General or the learned Solicitor-General or the Treasury Solicitor have in a very considerable number of cases said: "Do not go on with your claim; do not put down your petition of right; do not proceed with it in cases where it has already been presented, because there is the de Keyser case at present before the Court and the same ruling will apply to your case as to it. Let us have the principle decided." It is perfectly obvious that if something of that kind has been said, and it is creditably reported so, in a considerable number of cases people have acted on the faith of the de Keyser litigation having the judgment of the House of Lords behind it, and have held back their claims and assisted the Government by not pressing litigation at an inopportune moment. Are they to be summarily swept out of their right because they obliged the Treasury or the Government or the law officers by holding back? If that is the case, we should be guilty of a monstrous injustice to these people who have taken that attitude, unless we adopt some modification of this Clause on the lines suggested in this Amendment. I certainly think that if the hon. and learned Gentleman would assure us that there is no such case, that no such evidence has been given, it would alter entirely my view of the position. At the present moment I am assured there are, and I think we ought to adopt an Amendment of this sort in order to prevent these people being treated in an unfair way.
I may as well reply at once. I know of no such case of injustice or anything of that sort that my learned Friend has suggested. May I also add that the De Keyser case is supposed to add a measure of compensation? I do not think it does. I understand that what the De Keyser case decided was that compensation should be paid, and should be ascertained under the Defence Act of 1842, that is, by jury, which is summoned on an application made to the magistrates, and the appeal in that case is by a fresh jury, summoned upon the authority of a Judge of Assize, and the appeal is from one jury to another. Under that system the claimant gets no costs at all on making the claim. From the point of view of monetary value, it is a very open question whether he will not get a larger measure of compensation by going in respect of his legal rights before a tribunal presided over by a High Court Judge than the right to go to the Court of Appeal and the same legal right of going to a jury under the Defence Act of 1842. I can well believe that those persons who now go before the Commission with the right of appeal will secure not only a decision on nigh legal authority, with the right to go to the Court of Appeal, are in a far better position than ever they would get if they proceeded under the cumbrous proceedings of the Defence Act of 1842.
As a member of the Select Committee, I would like to inform this Committee that it was the intention of the Select Committee to secure by this Bill practically all the rights that the House of Lord' have determined in the De Keyser case as in the case of the taking or requisitioning land, houses or property, I venture to suggest to this Committee that we have succeeded in that object, because if the Committee will look at the Sub-section referred to by the Solicitor-General, they will find that Clause 2, Subsection (3) provides:
"In any other case"
—that includes all the cases of the requisitioning of land premises or buildings—
"compensation shall be assessed as follows: (a) If the claimant would, apart from this Act, have had a legal right to compensation"
—these words were put in by the Select Committee for the very purpose of including this right that has been declared by the House of Lords in the De Keyser case to exist—
"the tribunal shall take that right into consideration, and in assessing the compensation shall have regard to the amount of the compensation to which, apart from this Act, the claimant would have been legally entitled to, and to the existence of a state of war:"
The Defence of the Realm Losses Commission had been prior to the introduction of this Bill acting on more liberal principles than the original principles adopted by Lord Justice Duke who was then the chairman of it. He had adopted a very narrow view, that if premises were not let at the time they were requisitioned the owner lost nothing. That had ceased to be the view of the Commission prior to the introduction of this Bill.
May I ask my hon. Friend whether this special Section gives any right to payment or compensation for indirect loss?
The proviso was meant to include losses of business and breaches of contract, and that sort of matter, nothing to do with the ownership of the land. Of course, the only direct loss you get under the de Keyser case is the loss of the use of premises. You cannot get the loss of the use of business or breach of contract connected with the business that is carried on in the premises. When the Committee proposes that this court, or, in other words, the Defence of the Realm Commission, now is to be presided over by a judge of the High Court, it is practically a court, and when it is said that in considering the measure of compensation the legal rights are to be taken into account, that in itself, in fact, means that they will be taken into account, and that the compensation will be given according to legal principles. That is the view of the Committee, and I respectfully agree wit it. I am satisfied that under the present tribunal the claimant is likely to get quite as fair and quite as ample compensation, and equal compensation, as he would by going before a jury, with all the risks under the old proceedings. My view is that legal rights have been preserved in the case of houses and property and adequately secured. I am afraid to admit that in the case of goods I am not quite certain.
There appears a tendency to go back to the main Amendment, which the Committee has discussed a long time and decided.
Do these words at the end of the Sub-section—
"If any such proceeding has been instituted, whether before or after the passing of this Act, it shall be discharged and made void"
—mean that supposing a man has proceeded to the point that he has obtained an award, and perhaps received compensation under the award, it is to be discharged and set aside? [HON. MEMBERS:" Yes!"] Or does it mean pending proceedings and has not yet reached the point of award? On that would certainly depend the vote that I should give.
I am sorry my hon. and learned Friend was not at the Debate before the Division took place. Perhaps he will be good enough to follow. This Clause says:
"No action or other legal proceeding shall be instituted in any court of law."
When, therefore, he is dealing with a question of award, that is an independent matter. This is not what is struck at by this. What is struck at is the principle of tort proceedings, a petition issued which has not yet gone before the Court and upon which no judgment has been pronounced. So far as these cases go, the Committee has already decided that the same measure of compensation shall be given to them as in the case of persons who merely get a claim and have not issued any proceedings. The question we are now discussing is whether or not you are to differentiate and to say that persons who have commenced proceedings before the passing of this Act are put into a different position from those persons who may commence proceedings after the passing of this Bill.
Is it not a fact that people who have already begun these proceedings have taken them at a time when they were sanctioned by the laws of the country?
I have already dealt with the question, and I have agreed to bring up the question of costs on Report, and I do not think the hon. Member would wish me, or the Committee would wish me, to repeat what I have already said at some length.
I am afraid this Amendment necessarily raises the identical question that has been decided. If you were to leave out the words" has been" and insert" is" and then leave out the words" whether before or", you would have nonsensical words.
We have agreed if such proceeding is instituted after the passing of this Act it shall be discharged.
I think really this. Amendment is an attempt to reverse the decision which the Committee have arrived at.
May I put it in order? I want to deal with the case which has been, so to speak, prevented from reaching the point of an official judgment. The point I want to keep open is the case where by reason of their waiting for the official judgment in a test case which was to test their rights, as well as the rights of the litigant, until the taking of the case to the House of Lords, and by the addition of a word or two I think it could be made perfectly in order." If £If any such proceeding is instituted after the passing of this Act it shall be discharged and made void unless governed by the decision of the final Court of Appeal." That is the phrase used in the Act. I can bring it up again under Report stage, if you think it more convenient than proceeding with the discussion now. It is a point really of big importance. There are a large number of cases which have been held over because some case was treated by the Crown as a test case. Where cases have been kept back in order to wait the decision of the test case they ought to have the same treatment as the test case.
May I say that that is a separate point' It would be best to bring it up on Report. I am not sure whether it is not the same point that comes later in the name of the hon. Member for Limehouse. It is clear to me that this Amendment, as put to the Committee, would leave the Clause without sense. It is my duty to withdraw it from the consideration of the Committee, subject to anything brought up in a new form. Does the Noble Lord wish to move his manuscript Amendment?
I beg to move, in Sub-section (1), after the word" void" [" discharged and made void"], to insert the words" upon such terms as to costs and otherwise as to the Court may seem just."
If my right hon. Friend thinks it would not be safe to accept that at this stage, it would be difficult to press it. I should like, however, to have an assurance that it will be left to the Court to say what the amount of costs, if any, ought to be.
I am very glad to repeat the assurance I have already given that I will deal with this question of costs by a new Clause which I will bring up on Report. My intention at the present time is that those cases which have been before the Court should be dealt with by the Court before which they have been taken, but in the larger number of cases I think the right course would be to leave the matter to be dealt with in Chambers—that is to say, by a Master or Judge not sitting in Court—in order to avoid expenses on either side. For that purpose I should have to put in the words "Court or Judge." Being interlocutory proceedings, it would not be right to go to the expense of making a Court decide them, although it would be an officer of the Court who would decide.
I was merely anxious to be sure that we really were at one, and that the question of costs was to be left to a judicial officer—somebody in the Royal Courts of Justice. I ask leave to withdraw.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move, in Sub-section (1), to leave out the words" except in cases where a claim on payment or compensation can be brought under Section 2 of this Act."
The proviso will then read a ) is not affected, because compensation is given to the subject and not to the Government and ( a ) refers to proceedings by the Government which are very carefully protected. But ( b ) would be directly affected. Turn, now to Clause 2, Sub-section (1) and look at ( a ). The Clause begins a ) reads b ). The exception I want to omit says that actions on contract which fall within Clause 2 may not be brought, and those cases are not cases which are in the least suitable for sending to the Compensation Court. The whole mercantile community is satisfied with the decisions of the Courts on those cases, and to shut it out would be monstrous—all the more so if the decision taken by the Committee this afternoon, that judgments are to be satisfied, is to be upheld on Report or in another place, because there are a large number of cases pending. These cases will all be sent to the Defence of the Realm Losses Commission, in order to decide a pure question of law. The cases I refer to ought to be kept in the Courts, and I submit that my Amendment to omit this exception on an exception is right.
I am sorry I cannot accept this Amendment, and I think I shall be able to make it clear to the Committee why. Perhaps the Committee will appreciate that the scheme of the Bill is to adhere to the existing system. Shipping has so far been dealt with by what is called the Board of Arbitration, and they have decided a great number of cases. They are an Arbitration Court, and they are bound when directed to state a case for the opinion of the Courts.
Does the hon. and learned Gentleman say that the cases to which I was referring, which have all been decided in the ordinary Courts, have been decided by the Arbitration Court? My view is that they have been decided by the Courts.
I am sorry not to answer my hon. and learned Friend at once. It is difficult to explain this matter except with a certain amount of sequence, and perhaps still more difficult for the Committee to appreciate it. The Board of Arbitration was under the Chairmanship of Lord Mersey. The second class of case relates to goods and material requisitioned under 2 ( b ), in respect of which there should be received from the War Losses Commission, now reinforced by judges, the cost plus a reasonable profit. We intended to maintain that system of compensation. Thirdly, we have provided, by the Clause to which attention has been called on page 4, Sub-clause 3, for the cases which the Member for Chelmsford had in mind. Those are the three classes of cases. Whether my hon. and learned Friend agrees with me or not, I venture to say to the Committee that the Bill does carry out the system already in practice. In order to avoid the institution of a number of proceedings in the Courts, we have excepted from the general prohibition in Clause 1 cases where there are rights under, or alleged breaches of, contract, cases where proceedings are founded on negligence, and so on. Those cases are specified in paragraphs ( b ), ( c ), and ( d ). We have very carefully, in Clause 2 ( a ) and ( b ), used precisely the words which carry out the terms of the commission under which the Board of Arbitration sat, to deal with shipping, and under which the Defence of the Realm Losses Commission sat to deal with the cases brought before it.
If we were not to adhere to the system that has hitherto prevailed, but were to allow persons to bring actions for those matters in the Courts, we might accept the Amendment of my hon. and learned Friend. But the reason why these words which he proposes to leave out are necessary is that we have decided to adhere to the system of compensation hitherto granted, and providing, also, for the third case, of which my hon. and learned Friend is thinking, because we have determined to adhere to the system, but in that also not preventing or inhibiting actions which now can be brought in respect of breaches of contract, for negligence and the like. I claim that the words, as drawn, do correctly maintain the system which has hitherto been in practice, that they withdraw nothing at all, and that, so far from trying to prevent actions being brought, the actions can still be brought for breaches of contract or founded upon negligence. But if they are claims which hitherto have been brought before the Board of Arbitration or the Losses Commission, those claims must still be brought before those tribunals. That is the system of the Bill, and to accept the Amendment of my hon. and learned Friend would really be to revert to quite a different practice, and, indeed, upset the Bill completely.
I am not sure that I understand this, and I am not quite sure that my hon. and learned Friend understands it. If he does, he has wholly failed to make it clear to me. That may be due to the density of my mind, but it may also be due to the extraordinary complicated nature of the subject. I do not take the case put by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Liverpool (Mr. L. Scott), because once you get to charter parties and re-insurance, my mind is not sufficiently active to follow the argument. But take a much simpler case arising under ( c ). Here is a case where a man has a claim for damage by negligence. He is entitled to bring his action, but he must not do it if he can by any means—that is the effect of the words we are now considering— recover under Clause 2. He receives damage owing to some action by the Government, let us say, in removing some structure they put on to his land, or whatever it may be. He sues the Crown for damage by negligence. The Crown says, "Oh, no, that is not negligence; it is quite true you are entitled to damages, but it is not negligence," and the action is dismissed, because action for negligence might have been taken under Clause 2, and, therefore, he could not proceed under Clause 1. It appears to me that this provides a fruitful source of litigation, which my hon. and learned Friend shows great sacrifice in rejecting on behalf of the learned profession which he so adorns. I cannot perceive anything more fruitful of a series of elaborate discussions as to whether you could not have brought your proceedings under Clause 2, because if you could you would be excluded from maintaining proceedings under Clause 1. I cannot see why the Solicitor-General wants to do that. I cannot conceive that it matters to him. If the subject has a right to proceed under Clause 1, why, in Heaven's name, is he to be excluded under Clause 2?
I quite agree it is a very difficult matter, and I do not in the least object to criticism, because I have not been clear.
I did not say the hon. and learned Gentleman had not been clear, but that I must have been very stupid.
If my Noble Friend will look at ( a ) in Clause 2——
I was looking at ( b ).
Will my Noble Friend first of all look at ( a ) in respect of
"cargo space or passenger accommodation in which has been requisitioned at any time during the War in exercise or purported exercise of any prerogative right of His Majesty or of any power under any enactment relating to the defence of the realm, or any regulation or order made or purporting to be made thereunder."
Paragraph ( b ) refers to loss or damage sustained by reason of the exercise of power ["under any enactment relating to the defence of the realm or any regulation or order made or purporting to be made thereunder"]. That is loss or damage in respect of powers exercised under regulations which were enacted under the Defence of the Realm Acts. It is under those Acts that we requisition food and the like. Those are makers which fall under the Defence of the Realm Acts or the Regulations made thereunder. If the Noble Lord will now turn to Par. ( c ) in Sub-section (1) of Clause 1, he will see
"the institution or prosecution of civil proceedings founded on negligence in respect of damage to person or property elsewhere than in a foreign country."
Those are what I may call common law rights, and have nothing whatever to do with the defence of the realm or any regulation made thereunder. But if the claim which arises, because property has been requisitioned under regulations made under the defence of the realm, was a claim made in respect of a ship requisitioned by reason of the regulations or powers exercised under the defence of the realm, then it will be taken before one of the Commissions which have hitherto dealt with those claims, but if they are common law rights, then they will fall under ( b ), ( c ) or ( d ), and can still be brought in an ordinary court of law.
7.0 P.M.
The hon. Member for Bristol (Mr. Inskip) in an earlier speech told us that what he feared might take place was guarded against by this proviso. I had the advantage of a conversation with the right hon. Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith). I do not think there is any harm in repeating it. He told me he should have voted in favour of the Amendment of my hon. Friend, and against the Government, if it had not been for this proviso. I asked him what he thought ( b ) and ( c ) meant, and I understood, in his opinion, they practically permitted anybody who had a claim for damage to go before an ordinary Court of Law. I admit it is very foolish and stupid of me not to have noticed the words
"except in cases where a claim for payment or compensation can be brought under Section two of this Act."
I venture to say that if the right hon. Member for Paisley had seen this, he would have shared the feelings I have now that this proviso is put in merely as a blind. It has no effect at all. It blinded me. I thought it was going to preserve the rights which the subject ought to have. My hon. and learned Friend said, "Oh, but what we want to do is to proceed on the old lines." That is exactly what we do not want to do. We feel that the Government have proceeded on the wrong lines. I think last August the Government endeavoured to introduce a Bill of this sort, and ever since they have been endeavouring to introduce Clauses of this kind in various Bills. Now they propose to introduce something to preserve, on the face of it, the right of the subject which we desire to preserve, and it turns out if the subject could obtain compensation, either by payment or in any other form not in a court of law, but by the Star Chamber, then all this proviso is mere eye-wash. He cannot go before a court of law, because at once it will be advanced by the Solicitor-General, "Allow me to draw the attention of your Lordship"—if it is argued before a Judge of the High Court—"to the words in Clause 1, which says, 'except in cases where a claim for payment or compensation can be brought under Section two of this Act.'" Now this is a case where the claimant demands that he shall have some payment for a house which has been taken by the Government. The Government has refused to make any payment, and, if he has any grievance, he must go before what I prefer to call by its proper name, the Star Chamber. I have received a letter, dated 19th July, from a solicitor, who says this:
"The Government, on the outbreak of War, very properly commandeered various properties required for the defence of the country, and amongst other properties taken over was one known as the Ravensbourne Club, Eltham Road, Lee, belonging to the late Sir Frederick L. Cook, Bart. This building was erected by Sir Frederick, at a cost of over £20,000, in 1913, as a residential club for the younger members of the staff of Messrs. Cook, Sons, and Co., of St. Paul's Churchyard, at a nominal cost to them, instead of their having to find lodgings of a more or less promiscuous character in London. Sir Frederick did not charge any rent, and provided handsomely in other ways for the support of the club. The authorities have been in possession of this building during the War, and I have asked, on behalf of the estate, that they pay for the use and occupation of these buildings a rental value on the basis of 4 per cent. of the pre-War cost. The authorities, however, in accordance with some principle which they have laid down, take up the position that, because Sir Frederick was not making a personal profit out of the transaction, he is not entitled to any compensation for the use of the buildings. The decision in the de Keyser Hotel case has swept this ground away, but the settlement is now being held up."
This is from a well-known firm of lawyers in my constituency, and I will be pleased to give the name on the letter to my right hon. and learned Friend. In fact, I will hand him down the letter. He says:
"The settlement is now being held up, pending, I believe, the intention of carrying an Indemnity Bill, in which the protection given by the de Keyser case will be nullified."
Well, this is the case. Then he says that it is obviously unfair that the interest on the money is not to be paid merely because he acted in a kindly way to the members of his staff. Very well, that is what I am afraid of. I am afraid that in that case, we will presume that this Bill becomes an Act of Parliament, when argued by those lawyers that my right hon. and learned Friend will at once get up and say, "My Lord, my learned friend is out of Court because he has not remembered the provision of Clause 1 of the Act passed by the House of Commons a short time ago." And I venture to say, in the presence of a very large number of learned Gentleman, that in nine cases out of ten the Court would propose that I was out of Court because I could go, and it is provided in this Act that I should go, to a Court specially set up to deal with these cases; and it is because we do not want to go to a Star Chamber, whether presided over by a judge or not—perhaps I ought not to make this point now, but I am going to make it later on—this judge, who is removeable at the pleasure of the Court, is not a High Court judge removeable by a Motion of both Houses of Parliament. I hope the House of Commons will see the intention of the Government all the way through. Ever since last August they have been trying to do away, by hook or by crook, with the right of the subject to go to a Court of law, and to cause him to go to a Court of law set up by themselves.
I feel very strongly that the apprehensions of the Member for Liverpool and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London are not well-founded. Under Section 1, Clause 1 of this Act, the common law rights of action for negligence or for breach of contract are expressly preserved, and the right of enforcing those rights by action in the Court of law are expressly preserved, but what the Act does do is that it limits and prevents the right of action that a subject other- wise had of going to a Court of law to assess compensation for the use of goods, ships or land that was requisitioned by the Government. If that restriction is borne in mind, I think the whole trouble of those two hon. Members and of some of the other Members of the Committee would be removed.
It is a great pity the Act did not say so.
To the best of our ability we have, by the wording which has been adopted, achieved the result that we aimed at, because except in cases where compensation has been given for the use of the requisitioned property, whether goods or land, the rights of access to the Court for breach of contract or tort or negligence are preserved.
Will my hon. Friend point out what words he relies on? He seems to me to be entirely wrong in his interpretation.
Let me point to the words
"except in cases where a claim for payment or compensation can be brought under Section 2 of this Act."
Then if the Committee will look at the top of page 2, it says
"The institution or prosecution of proceedings in respect of any rights under, or alleged breaches of, contract."
There is no limitation, therefore, on actions for breach of a contract.
Oh yes, there is.
No, unless it can be brought under Clause 2. Then as to C, the rights of action for negligence in the Law Courts and prosecutions. Under C, "the institution or prosecution of civil proceedings founded on negligence in respect of damage to personal property elsewhere than in a foreign country." And then D deals with similar rights in a foreign country. To make good the proposition that I started with in the Committee, I have to show that the claims under (2) are only for compensation for the use of the requisitioned property and not for damage, and I shall show that except for subsidiary questions of damage. Now if the Committee will look at Section 2, Sub-section ( a ) deals with the owners of ships, and the learned Solicitor-General made this point, but I am not sure that it was made quite clear, but to my mind it is clear, because Subsection ( a ) says: "being the owner of a ship requisitioned at any time during the War in exercise or purported exercise of any prerogative right of His Majesty, or of any Power under any enactment relating to the defence of the realm, shall be entitled to payment or compensation for the use of the same and for services rendered during the employment of the same in Government service, and compensation for loss or damage otherwise occasioned." Loss and damage by the use of a ship. Not loss or damage for breach of charter, or anything like that, because they are all limited by the compensation for services rendered thereby. That is the loss occasioned by the use thereby. To my mind it is perfectly clear that that is the only compensation to which they are entitled. When you look at paragraph ( b ) that deals with the requisition of goods and land.
The Solicitor-General said nothing about land. Which is it?
I will read the words. It is the requisitioning of land or goods—
"Anybody who has otherwise incurred or sustained any direct loss or damage by reason of interference with his property or business in the United Kingdom through the exercise or purported exercise, during and for the purposes of the War, of any prerogative right of His Majesty or of any power under any enactment relating to the defence of the Realm, or any regulation or Order made thereunder shall be entitled to compensation in respect of such loss or damage."
That is to say, only compensation for loss or damage due to action under the prerogative right of the Crown or any of the Defence of the Realm Regulations.
You can do all sorts of things besides requisitioning under D.O.R.A.
This is all qualified by the first words of the Sub-section "loss or damage by reason of interference." It only deals with property or business, that is, the loss sustained to his property or business. Then the measure of the damage is provided for, or the way of calculating the damage rather is provided under the last Sub-section, that is to say, Sub-section (2) on page 4. The payment of compensation shall be assessed in accordance with the principles there stated. The first deals with goods requisitioned under the Regulation 2 ( b ). Regulation 2 ( b ) is not specially referred to because there are so many other Regulations under the Defence of the Realm Act which also deals with that. If, under the Defence of the Realm Regulations or any Order made thereunder, a special principle has been provided for the payment of compensation, compensation shall be assessed in accordance with that principle. That establishes as a measure of compensation the measure laid down in Regulation 2 ( b ), which is cost price plus a reasonable profit, and when you get to Sub-section (2) of Section 2 compensation is dealt with for ships, and it provides as assessed in accordance with the principles on which the Board of Arbitration acted, that is to say, the Lord Mersey Arbitration Court. When you come to land, that includes the provisions laid down by the House of Lords in the De Keyser case. To my mind this is a correct view of these words which the Committee intended, and which I fully believe has carried out the right which the hon. and learned Member for Liverpool wished to be preserved. That is the right for breaches of contract or acts of negligence committed in the hiring of ships or common law rights of negligence are expressly preserved and the right of going to the court. The right of compensation for goods is expressly provided and the owner of the goods has to go for the price of the goods to this court which has been set up and takes the place of the Defence of the Realm Losses Commission. With common law injuries they will have their rights preserved under the Sub-section referred to. With houses, land and buildings the owner has to go to the Defence of the Realm Losses Commission where his legal rights as laid down by the House of Lords have to be carried out. That is in reference to a minor point made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London. No doubt the wear and tear while in occupation would be a measure of compensation, but for acts outside that, tort or injury done outside that, the usual court would be left.
It is evident that there is a great deal of disagreement among eminent legal authorities on this Bill. It has hardly been done justice to in the speeches to which I have listened. The whole Bill deals, first of all, with the wrong things done in one way or another under the Defence of the Realm Act. In that sphere as a whole an exception is made. These are to be left to the ordinary Courts; and then a further exception is made that the injuries done wrongly in respect of the Defence of the Realm Act to the owners of businesses are to be excepted again from the exception, which itself is an exception from the rule dealing with the Defence of the Realm Act. That seems to me to be an extraordinary complicated way of framing your Bill. Surely it would be better to set out the length to which you propose to interfere with the ordinary law, and leave the other things to the ordinary law. It would have been better to set out that which you ought to give separate treatment to, and to leave all the rest to the ordinary operations of the law. You draw a circle around a certain number of things, and then again you halve them and you draw another circle. Eminent lawyers differ as to what the Bill really does mean. It is, at any rate, plain that the Government propose in this Bill to maintain the system of two standards of right and justice. Why? The Solicitor-General solemnly says, "It has been thought best to do so." Why has it been thought best? Who has thought it best? It seems to me to be very much worse. Either the Courts do justice, or they do not. If they do, why interfere with them? If they do not, you want a much larger machinery than is proposed set up under this Bill. I am quite unable to understand the details of this Bill. Is the compensation to be greater or less? Why not abolish the whole system? If the public were to apprehend that the Government are really seeking by this Bill to sustain the machinery of the Defence of the Realm Act, their indignation would be very great indeed. The Government have told us over and over again—it is true that I do not pay much heed to their assurances—that they are anxious to get rid of the Defence of the Realm Act at the earliest possible moment. But I understand that the large part of that Act will be maintained and justified, for what purpose I cannot tell. The Solicitor-General merely says that "it has been thought best "—thought best, I suppose, by some obscure authority. I do earnestly hope that the Government, even at this stage, will drop this Bill. It can really do nothing, but will add confusion. The Solicitor-General has not explained even what would result from accepting this Amendment. Let us have the old measure of justice which existed before the War again restored. Let us trust the ordinary course of justice to do justice between the Crown and the subject, and do not let us have this extraordinary absurdity, that you are taking a case of judgment and are saying that this one essay of the ordinary course of justice is to be binding on a special tribunal. Why? Surely the whole theory of the Bill is an absurdity. You cannot have two standards of justice; you cannot ask the House of Commons in times of peace to perpetrate injustice on a great scale.
I sat on this Committee and hon. Members can quite understand the difficulty in which a plain business man was placed in sitting on that Committee when they see all these difficulties arising between legal gentlemen. When before that Committee I did my best to try and understand the Solicitor-General, and I hope he will give me credit for having done my best to understand him. But I was obliged to tell him over and over again that I could not for the life of me understand what he meant or what the Bill meant. After all, I think what the House should do is to try and recognise the real position. The Government are up against a practical difficulty. They have, under Orders issued under the Defence of the Realm Act, given all kinds of powers to the most unsuitable people to exercise. In many cases these powers have been used in the most arbitrary and unconstitutional fashion. These gentlemen did not hesitate to tell us that if the powers they had got were not sufficient to carry out their ends they could go and get other powers under D.O.R.A. and use them against us. I am bound to recognise the true position of affairs. If all the cases that could be brought against the Government in the Courts of Law are to be settled in accordance with the law of the land, then it is going to cost the country a considerable amount of money. It is just as well for the House to know the position.
That is why we are fighting it.
It is quite just that it should be fought, but we have to recognise the extraordinary position that arose during the War, and that these messes were made by the law officers of the Crown. The whole thing is simply a whitewashing business. It is nothing more nor less than an attempt to clear up these messes and to get these men out of the horrible corners they have got into. There are really two classes under this Bill, the classes who have got legal right and the classes that have got no legal right. The Losses Commission, I understand in the first place, was set up to try and deal fairly by those cases that have not got legal rights and it gradually drifted into dealing with those cases that have got legal rights. Then their decisions became so uncertain. They changed from time to time with the men who constituted the Commission. They also changed their decisions from time to time and made them more liberal or more generous. There was a strong suspicion in the country that the decisions of this Commission were not either right or fair. There was a strong feeling in the hearts and minds of many people that when they went before the Commission they were unfairly treated. It is impossible to say yet how many cases have to be dealt with by the Government. We are told there are some 800 cases to go before the Losses Commission. But surely there are a great many cases that the Losses Commission know nothing at all about, because many people have been waiting to see the result of the cases that went from one Court to another, until they were settled by the House of Lords. It is perfectly true that in many of these cases requisitioned they were dealt with under 2B—the cost price plus a reasonable profit. I tried over and over again on the Committee to pin the Solicitor-General down to that decision, but I could not. If the House can only pin the Government down to agree that no worse decision shall be given than that, I can assure the House they will have done a very great good for these men who are so unjustly suffering for deeds done under the Defence of the Realm Act. Let the Solicitor-General say plainly that all goods that have been requisitioned will not be dealt in a worse way than that. He has never clearly stated that. Let him say that should be given in all cases, and that no worse decision should be given to any claimant, and he will get this Bill through easily.
The whole question is as to the date.
What on earth has the date got to do with it? It is not the date when the goods are requisitioned, but the date when the man is paid to cost price plus a reasonable profit. If you are going to agree to the market price, you are going to give men power to get enormous profits out of the difficulties in which the country found itself through the exigencies of the War. When I spoke on the Second Reading of the Bill, acting on the advice of my old friends, I was perfectly frank with the House, and I told them I had a case against the Government which was unsettled, and that I did want to state what I knew about some of these cases, because after all those men who are interested, if they are frank with the House, can tell the House more about these cases than anybody else. I will be no party to help any man to get a profit out of the country that he would not get, for instance, if he had been in the United States or any other country before these countries went into the War.
But that is no reason why the Government should have done many things they have done. We were told that they had sometimes requisitioned goods at cost price, sometimes at market price, sometimes at controlled price, and sometimes at an artificial price; in fact, that they requisitioned them at the price which suited them best. That is the real truth of the matter. It was a very, very unfair way of doing it. They did not requisition at cost price plus a reasonable profit, and if the Solicitor-General does not know that it is high time he did. How is the Government to get out of these difficulties? It cannot get out of them by allowing every case to go to a court of law and be settled in accordance with the law of the country. It cannot do that. As I understand the Bill, and frankly, I must say I have very great difficulty in understanding parts of it, if I understand the Bill aright, those people that have legal claims and who are not satisfied with the decisions given under the reconstituted Losses Commission are to be allowed to appeal on a point of law.
Hear, hear! Quite right.
I understand they cannot appeal on any other grounds to a court of law?
Hear, hear!
I want to say to this House that no man feels stronger against the Orders issued under the Defence of the Realm Act than I do. I do not like it. I do not like the interference with the subject that all these Orders necessarily involve. But I do want to warn the Committee that as Pym and Hampden fought against the undue power claimed by the Crown, we, too, have got to be exceedingly careful against the undue power claimed by a bureaucratic Government. I am not at all sure but that the great difficulties in which Russia finds herself at present arise from that very fact. It is perfectly true that we have not got the old Stuart kings to fight against, but the same spirit.
May I remind the hon. Gentleman that we do not want a Second Reading speech over again, and that he is also discussing Clause 2?
I bow to your ruling, Mr. Whitley, but I have risen seven or eight times to-night to speak, and this has been my first opportunity. Let me say in conclusion that, taking the Bill broadly, if we get our Amendments in later, I think the House could afford to pass the Bill.
It is with some reluctance I go back to the terms of the Amendment, and I presume I will be in order in discussing that, which is that certain words should be left out of the Sub-section. The result of this will be that any man desiring to enforce his claim has first to read, or to get somebody properly remunerated to read on his behalf, paragraph ( a ) of Sub-section (1) of Clause 1, and then to read the whole of Clause 2. He has got to determine whether the claim that he is about to bring can be included in Sub-section (2) and if it can it has got to be brought under that Sub-section. It cannot be brought under Sub-section (1). Really, the Debate we have had this afternoon is an agreeable foretaste of what may be expected to happen when fixing a very difficult question which presumably is to come before a judge for determination. The happy man who is going to law would begin his action under Clause 2, claiming that his property had been injured by the negligence of Government servants. The Solicitor-General, with his accustomed ability, would appear before the court and say that this could not be brought under this Section because it was covered by Sub-section (2) of Clause 1. Thereupon the hon. and learned Gentleman, with his well-known persuasive eloquence, would point out that this must be a claim covered by Clause 2, because the words are, under Clause 2, that the man who is to come before this new tribunal had incurred damage by reason of interference in his property. He would say with great force that damage by interference must mean negligent treatment of his property, and then the other right hon. and learned Gentleman would answer with equal truth, "Not at all, this cannot come under Clause 2, this is an action which is directly included in paragraph ( c ) of Sub-section (1) of Clause 1, which provides that: b ) begins with these words: ultima thule, the House of Lords, and in the end, perhaps after many months, a decision will be obtained as to whether or not the person who is making the claim should make it in a court of law or before the new tribunal instituted under the Act.
Why not avoid all that and leave the applicant to chose which he will do? The class of action which can be brought under Clause 1 is small in number. They have respect to the contracts which are instituted within one year from the termination of the War and are not a very large class. The next Sub-section deals with negligent losses incurred. Paragraphs ( d ) and ( e ) are practically negligible paragraphs. Therefore it is a small class, while the larger class will come in the normal course under this new tribunal which the Act will institute. I can quite understand the desire of the Solicitor-General to say, "We want to sweep all these actions into this new tribunal." All I can say is that these two Sections read together do not make clear altogether what he is doing. If that is his intention it is an intention which, in my submission, is entirely wrong. I think the person who is going to bring his action, if it is founded on negligence of Government servants, negligence that has damaged his property, ought to be allowed to bring it, if he likes, into the common law courts of this Kingdom, and have it determined by the well-known and old-established rules which govern these courts. Undoubtedly, objections will be urged; and there will be an attempt to rope all the cases into the new tribunal—which we all hope will be n success—but no man should be deprived of the right of bringing his action under the ordinary law, which is apparently intended to be preserved as it is in the Act. It should be made perfectly clear that he can seek his remedy in the courts, and it is not clear. I submit if you adopt the words of this Amendment it will be.
I contend, with all respect to the hon. and learned Gentleman who has just sat down, that I prefer the interpretation of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor-General to that of any other. Will my hon. and learned Friend really get up and tell the Committee that any court or the judge of any court will construe Clause 2, Subsection (1, b ), as meaning negligence, when this damage or loss was sustained, not by negligence, but by the exercise of the prerogative right of the Crown? So long as you sustain the damage, and it is done under the prerogative right of the Crown, it is not negligence at all. At any rate, I so understand it, and I venture to suggest that the Solicitor-General was perfectly clear and right and the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for East Grinstead (Mr. Cautley) was also perfectly right. When you turn to Clause 1, Sub-section (1, c ), you will find at once the distinction clearly and appropriately drawn. You read there:
"( c ) The institution or prosecution of civil proceedings founded on negligence in respect of damage to person or property …"
You have reserved to you your right there. Supposing they burn down your house after taking it; then no doubt, they would be liable to pay compensation. There cannot be any doubt about it.
Not under this Section?
No, no! Let me state my own case. That action can be laid under Clause 2, Sub-section (1, b ). It is quite clear. Other hon. and far more learned members of my profession than I am disagree with me. I venture to think that in this matter, that of the Noble Lord (Lord R. Cecil) and others, not one of them, if they know the law, will get up and say that these words under paragraph ( d ) of Clause 1 are appropriate to negligence.
I understand my hon. and learned Friend to admit when pressed that it does cover negligence. My Noble Friend put this instance: Suppose a house in the occupation of the Crown, and by the negligence of Crown servants the house occupied is burnt down; then is it or is it not precluded by these words from bringing an action for negligence to property? That is the point!
Clearly in my opinion the person whose house is so burned down would be entitled to compensation under paragraph ( d ). Suppose I am wrong. Suppose the Law Officers succeed in satisfying the judge who is to be the head of this tribunal—I am glad to say—that that was negligence under one paragraph and that the Crown are not liable under another. Suppose the Law Officers establish that the claimant whose house has been negligently burned down is not entitled to compensation, under Clause 2, Sub-section (1, b ), what does the claimant do? He institutes his claim under Clause (1), Sub-section (1, c ). He has a right of action under that. The right hon. Member deprecates the idea of any lawyer objecting to costs. Why, it is the whole soul of litigation. I shall certainly support this Amendment.
I do not think this takes us much further, and the Committee might well come to a decision now.
Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause."
The Committee proceeded to a Division.
Lord Edmund Talbot and Mr. Dudley Ward were appointed Tellers for the Ayes, but, there being no Members prepared to act as Tellers for the Noes, the Chairman declared that the Ayes had it.
On a point of Order. I have an Amendment to Subsection (2) providing that, for the purposes of this Section, a petition of right shall be deemed to be a legal proceeding which shall be deemed to be instituted on the day on which, the petition is presented. This Bill applies to England and Scotland equally. My Amendment proposes to apply the simpler Scottish, procedure instead of the very complicated English procedure in the matter of the petition of right. I think this is an Amendment of procedure which is very badly wanted, and for the purpose of proceedings under this Bill it would be an enormous advantage to have the Scottish procedure applied in England.
But that comes in the wrong place. It is not relevant to Subsection (2). The hon. Member had better bring it up as a new Clause.
I have another Amendment, which deals with a quite separate point. It proposes to leave out from Sub-section (3) the words, "the facts stated in the certificate," and to insert instead thereof the words "such authority." Sub-section (3) proposes that the certificate by a Government Department that any act was done under the authority of a person so holding office or so employed shall be sufficient evidence of the facts stated in the certificate. The facts are, therefore, to be conclusive evidence, unless the certificate is given in bad faith. My Amendment makes the Clause read that it shall be sufficient evidence of "such authority," and that, I presume, is the object of the certificate. It is quite reasonable to have a certificate given to an individual which shall be evidence of the absence of bad faith. I think my Amendment carries out the intention of the Clause, and I rather expected the learned Solicitor-General would have accepted it.
But what does the hon. and learned Gentleman mean by "such authority"?
The Sub-section reads:
"For the purposes of this Section, a certificate by a Government Department that any act was done under the authority of a person so holding office or so employed as aforesaid shall be sufficient evidence of the facts stated in such certificate."
The point is, the Government want to be able to give a certificate that somebody appointed by them to act on behalf of a Department had authority so to act. To that I raise no objection, but that the Government should have the power by mere certificate to make the facts, whatever they may be, stated in the certificate conclusive evidence of those facts, is, I submit, a monstrous proposition.
I am doubtful whether it is in order, but I will allow the hon. and learned Member to move it.
I beg to move, in Subsection (3), to leave out the words "the facts stated in the certificate," and to insert instead thereof the words "such authority."
I think I have said sufficient to explain the object I have in view, and I will not trouble the Committee with further remarks.
I am obliged to the hon. and learned Gentleman for moving this Amendment quite shortly.
May I remind the Committee I am now on a completely different point to that on which we have been spending our time this afternoon? We are now back on the question of the protection of the persons who are given immunity under this Section. The reason why they are given immunity is this: A certain number of persons have been called upon during the course of the War to perform duties and exercise authority for which afterwards they have been found not to have been properly qualified. Let me take one of the most frequent instances on which a question of this sort may arise. A man is summoned to take part in a court martial, although he may not be of the rank which entitles him to sit. Or a person is asked to perform a duty which can be rightly performed by a person of adequate rank, and not otherwise. Such actions have been committed, and have been properly carried out. They have been carried out quite accurately. But the point is raised as to the qualification of the person performing them. It can- not be said that these things have been done in execution of duty or of authority, because the authority and the duty did not actually exist. But they purported to be done in execution of the authority or duty. My hon. and learned Friend is a little anxious about the ambit of this Section. He has some misgivings, and suggests we shall leave out certain words, "the facts stated in the certificate," and he wants it to read that, "for the purposes of this Section a certificate by a Government Department that any act, matter, or thing was done under the authority of a person so holding office or so employed as aforesaid, shall be sufficient evidence of such authority." I cannot accept these words, because they would not be adequate for the purpose for which I need this Section. First of all, after sufficient evidence of the authority, I should have to put in the words "or purported authority."
May I make an offer?
No, no! It is not very convenient at any time when one is reasoning a point like this to be suddenly asked to give way. I want to put my point before the Committee, and it is not easy to do so when one's argument is interrupted. It is quite impossible for me to accept these words as evidence of the authority. They will not do. It will have to be something like "authority or purported authority" and "duty or purported duty," and so on throughout the Clause. The words have been very carefully chosen when we say "shall be sufficient evidence of the facts stated in the certificate." My hon. and learned Friend dropped into an error which rather startled me. He used the word "conclusive." We want it to be "sufficient" evidence of the facts stated in the certificate. "Sufficient" is exactly the right word to use. I can conceive it would be possible for evidence to be given to refute it if there is a charge of bad faith. It would not then be conclusive, but it would be "sufficient" unless there is something which overrides it, such as a charge of bad faith. I come therefore to the actual Amendment that has been suggested. Protection is to be given not in a case where one is endeavouring to screen a wrong-doer, but where one is attempting to give a measure of protection to a person who, in a grave difficulty and in a period of crisis, has acted perfectly bonâ fide and with a desire to do what is right, and believing that he has authority to do that thing. That is the case in which we wish to provide a method of protection, a case where action has been carried out in perfect good faith. It is for that purpose I want to be able to place the certificate before the necessary court to show on the facts stated that the person had authority or did what he did do in the manner I have suggested to the Committee.
8.0 P.M.
If the right hon. Gentleman puts in the words suggested it will read, "is sufficient evidence of such authority and any such act, matter, or thing having been done under such authority," then he will make the point perfectly clear. As it now stands the Sub-section is open to the criticism which I make.
I hope the Committee will not discuss this subject again as a whole. The point we are dealing with is the sentence, "the facts stated in the certificate," and we should not go beyond that.
This Amendment is a very necessary one. The Solicitor-General has shown that himself, because the words, as they stand in the Subsection, go a great deal beyond the intention of the Solicitor-General. First of all let me say that I do not understand the distinction between the word "conclusive" and the word "sufficient." To all intents and purposes they are the same. Take a case where property, has been requisitioned by the competent military authority for that purpose, and a claim has been put in for user and for damages. A material question might be the length of time that the premises were in occupation of the military authority.
Under the Clause as it stands it would be open to the parties to give a certificate first of all covering the agency of the officer who acted, and setting out in the certificate the number of days the premises were occupied by the military. The length of time might be a matter of dispute, and surely it is quite wrong that a matter of that sort, which might be in dispute, and would be a very material point, should be decided by the certificate which can only be given on the information supplied by the officer concerned. Of course we put out of account altogether any deliberate attempt to mislead the court. I know cases myself where there has been a dispute as to the length of time the premises had been occupied, or the amount of damage done by the soldiers while in occupation. All these matters of fact might very well become matters of dispute and they might be conclusively determined by the certificate. That cannot be the intention of my right hon. Friend, but nevertheless it is the effect of the Clause as it stands.
Notice taken that 40 Members were not present; Committee counted; and 40 Members being found present —
I understand that the Solicitor-General is willing to accept words which will meet this point.
I am very anxious to meet the Committee on points of this sort, because we all have a common purpose. I will accept the following words if the hon. and learned Member for Liverpool (Mr. Scott) will move them:
"such authority or duty and of such act, matter, or thing having been done thereunder."
I will accept those words without the words "or duty," because that would involve assuming that there was a duty when very likely there was no duty.
That is a little disappointing because it is obvious that I had to deal with the words in the Section. If hon. Members will turn back to Sub-section (1) of Clause 1 they will find the words
"during the War before the passing of this Act, if done in good faith, and done or purported to be done in the execution of his duty or for the defence of the Realm or the public safety."
I think I must take the responsibility of moving these words myself if the hon. and learned Member (Mr. Scott) will not withdraw his Amendment. I will move the addition of these words when we have dealt with this Amendment, and I hope the Committee will feel that what I suggest carries out the purpose.
I hope the hon. Member for Liverpool will accede to the suggestion which has just been made by the Solicitor-General, because it clears up what appear to me to be most mischievous words. I think the insertion of these words will do a great deal to remove what might have been an unusual amount of oppression when the Act comes to be administered.
I ask leave to withdraw my Amendment, and I will consider the point again on the Report stage.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment made: In Sub-section (3) leave out the words "the facts stated in the certificate," and insert instead thereof the words "such authority or duty and of such act, matter, or thing having been done thereunder."—[ Sir E. Pollock. ]
I beg to move, in Sub-section (4) after the word "court" ["by any other court"], to insert the words "provided that".
Fortunately this Amendment is simple, although it is a point of importance. There are a few cases in which judgments have been obtained against the Crown in the Court of first instance, and there may be one or two cases where they have proceeded to the Court of Appeal and again obtained a judgment. The House has shown itself very ready to deal with the status of people who have taken proceedings for a petition of right, but there is a great difference in these few cases where the claimant has been actually successful before the High Courts of Justice, and has obtained judgment against the Crown with costs. It seems to me that this House should, if possible, avoid retrospective action and the making of no avail judgments in such a Court as I have indicated. I hope the Solicitor-General will be willing to meet this case, especially as he has said they were very few in number. I hope he will accept this Amendment and avoid what we desire, that we should not pass an Act of Parliament destroying the effect of judgments given against the Crown in the High Court of Justice.
I hope the Committee will not accept this Amendment. I take the same view of the position as the Mover of the Amendment, but I think the whole object of his Amendment will be carried out far better by the leaving out of Sub-section (4) of this Clause the words
"where the judgment at the passing of this Act is not then the subject of a pending appeal, and the time for appealing against it has expired."
If the Sub-section stop at the word "court" then the words might stand as they are. The whole object of the next five Amendments is to whittle down the exceptions at the end of the Clause and then to put in at the bottom that a final judgment given after the passing of the Bill shall be regarded as a final judgment given before the passing of the Bill. I think the best plan is to stop at the word "court" and insert no other words. May I also call attention to the fact that the words proposed to be left out are absolute nonsense and that is the reason for leaving them out. The words are:
"where the judgment at the passing of this Act is not then the subject of a pending appeal, and the time for appealing against it has expired."
How can it be the subject of an appeal if the time for appealing against it has expired? The whole thing is obviously ridiculous. What we want to do is to assert the fact that when a judgment has been given in one of these cases this Bill, when it passes into law, shall not upset that judgment. We want that judgment to stand. We said so in the earlier discussion on the first Amendment, and we do not want to discuss it ad nauseum. The vote that was given then was not given on that point, and therefore we are entitled to vote now upon that point, and it is this: Are we to allow the judgments of the Court to be upset by passing this Bill? I suggest we should not. If a claimant has got a judgment of a Court, surely to goodness we ought not to pass a Bill now to deprive him of the right to his judgment. If a man has won in a Court of Law, and got a judgment, it ought to stand. If the Clause is passed as we see it in the Bill, the judgment would be torn up, and all his trouble and all his expense would have gone for nothing, and he would simply be told to have his claim decided in some other way. As an illustration of that, we have already seen what difficulties there are in finding that you have to go to one Court for one purpose and to another Court for another purpose. It has already been explained that if the Government took a ship, and the amount to be paid for the use of the ship is in dispute, the owner has got to go to one Court to see how much he is entitled to, and if the captain of the ship, put in by the Government, negligently runs the ship on a sandbank, to sue for that negligence he has to go to another Court. Hitherto it has always been possible, where a man's ship was taken and there was negligence, for him to have both cases settled in the one Court. What I am pleading for is, that if for any of his claims a man has got a judgment, that judgment should stand and that we should not interfere with it.
I hope the Committee will not dwell very long upon this Amendment, because we have really discussed it in the deliberations we have had already during the afternoon, and I can only answer the point by repeating, almost in the same words, what I said in answer to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith). Perhaps I may explain to the Committee what the purpose of this Clause is. In the course of the Second Reading of the Bill I gave an undertaking that the De Keyser judgment should be allowed to stand and that no objection would be made to carrying that to fruition. The De Keyser judgment was nothing more than a declaratory judgment, and for the purpose of carrying it to fruition further proceedings are necessary. Therefore, this Clause is drawn:
"Nothing in this Section shall prejudice or prevent the institution or prosecution of proceedings for giving effect to a final judgment given before the passing of this Act by any court of final resort …."
That deals with the De Keyser judgment. Then, I think, there have been one or two other cases in which judgments akin thereto have been entered, and if judgment has been entered and no appeal has been taken from it, that judgment is to be allowed to stand; and so the Act goes on:
"or by any other court where the judgment at the passing of this Act is not then the subject of a pending appeal."
I am surprised to hear what my hon. and learned Friend (Sir Watson Ruther-ford)—if he will allow me to call him so, because he belongs to the other branch of the profession—has said, because he should know perfectly well that you may have to give notice of an appeal during a limited period, during three weeks, but that at the end of that three weeks the case has not actually been heard before the Appellate Court before whom it is to be tried. You may have many a case where the three weeks has elapsed but the case has not been heard, and those cases are aptly referred to thus:
"Where the judgment at the passing of this Act is not then the subject of a pending appeal and the time for appealing against it has expired."
Has not expired.
Has expired. The Amendment is to put in "not expired." Therefore you are in this position, that where you have left the judgment to stand without question, and the time for appealing against it has expired, so that you have got no opportunity of appealing against it, and during that time you have not entered an appeal so as to show that you are questioning it, then that judgment is to be treated in all cases as a case of a judgment of a court of final resort. I apologise to the Committee for repeating myself because these cases, which it is suggested are so very many, are, I believe, very few, but that does not affect the point for which I am bound to contend, which is that a judgment such as that referred to in the Newcastle case enshrines a particular decision on a particular principle and it is impossible to allow that principle to be maintained and confirmed. It is a principle which we conceive to be wrong, and against which an appeal has been entered, and which has now been largely differed from by a number of other judges, and there is no valid ground for saying that where a party has obtained a judgment, perhaps wrongly, from a court of first instance, he should be entitled to maintain that judgment and the fruits of it, although it is erroneous and although it is capable of being appealed against, and would be set aside. We can only go as far as the Clause indicates, and I hope the Committee will come to a decision without any great delay, because we have had a discussion which really covers the whole bearings of the question.
I wish to support the Amendment. It seems to me that the Solicitor-General is all in favour of getting rid of judgments that are against him, but if they are the other way round he regards them as something to be enshrined. I am sorry the right hon. and learned Gentleman has gone out. He was very confident about the De Keyser case, which has formed the subject of so much discussion to-day. Only two and a-half months ago, when this very Indemnity Bill was being discussed on Second Reading, he said, "It is quite true that the case has been argued in the House of Lords and I have no doubt that the decision will be reversed before long." It was not reversed, it was unanimously upheld by the House of Lords, and the hon. Baronet, the Member for the City of London, has handed in a letter to-day which refers to the De Keyser case, and suggests that many cases were held back in order to see what that final decision was going to be. A great deal of water has flowed under London Bridge since my right hon. and learned Friend used the words quoted on the 3rd of May, and said he had no doubt that as the case had been argued in the House of Lords the decision would be reversed before long. I see that my learned Friend has returned, but I do not wish to chaff him, although he has had his opinion so ruddy disturbed.
I remember saying to the House that, from the point of view of the De Keyser case, as the matter stood, I accepted for the purpose of my argument the decision of the Court of Appeal. I do not think it will be found that I expressed in any part of my speech any opinion as to the ultimate result. I treated the decision of the De Keyser case by the Court of Appeal as binding upon me.
I am afraid I must again read my right hon. and learned Friend's actual words.
We cannot pursue all the time a discussion on the same point. This matter was discussed two hours ago and we cannot have the same discussion on every Amendment.
It is a question of fact. It is in column 1760 of the OFFICIAL REPORT for the 3rd May.
I am much obliged to my hon. Friend. I see that I said:
"In the Court of Appeal their claim was allowed, and for the purpose of the Bill, and standing here to-day, I accept that decision as binding."
Nothing could be clearer than that.
Read on.
It goes on:
"It is quite true that the case has been argued in the House of Lords, and I have no doubt the decision will be reversed before long, but it is my duty, standing here, with the respect due to the Court of Appeal, to accept the decision as it stands and, for the purpose of this Bill, I accept the direction of law that there was no power to do what was done in the De Keyser case."
I feel sure that my argument was based on that view.
The right hon. Baronet the Member for the City of London (Sir F. Banbury) read a letter to my learned Friend——
The same argument cannot be used which was used on the first Amendment. That was discussed at some length. If the same argument is necessary here, it means that this Amendment is a consequential Amendment and ought not to have been put from the Chair.
I bow to your ruling. All I have to say, in supporting this Amendment, is that, if the words "where the judgment at the passing of this Act is not then the subject of a pending appeal and the time for appealing against it has expired" are not, as the hon. Member for Edge Hill (Sir W. Rutherford) said, ridiculous, they are nugatory, and the Sub-section would be better without them.
I should like to say a word in answer to what the learned Solicitor-General said. He said that this is quite a proper provision because the result would be that, where no appeal has been taken by the Government, the decision would stand, although it had not gone to a final Court; but that, if an appeal had been taken, or if the time had not elapsed after this Bill had become law, than an appeal cannot be taken, and the decision of the Court of Law would be rendered void. I want to ask how he reconciles that with his previous statement that his sole object was to give equal justice to all. Here according to his own statement two men have gone to one of the High Courts——
The right hon. Gentleman must pay some regard to what I have stated. I heard these arguments some time ago. When the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Paisley dealt with this point exactly the same arguments were used. We cannot, on subsequent Amendments, go over arguments which may have been, or could have been, used on the first Amendment. We have been several hours on this question, and it is not in order to go over again the same arguments that have been used before.
On a point of Order. The point which is now before us is whether a judgment is capable of being summarily discharged and put an end to. That is rather a different point from that which was discussed, or, rather, which ought to have been discussed, on the first Amendment. I submit that we are, at all events, entitled to divide on the question as to whether the judgment is or is not to stand.
It is usual in Committee to allow Amendments to be moved so as to enable the Committee to divide. But it is not desirable that the same arguments should be used over and over again.
I say respectfully that we all agree.
I beg respectfully to disagree. I am not repeating any argument which has been used before, except in so far as I am repeating the argument of the learned Solicitor-General. He gave, as a reason for rejecting an Amendment which was moved some time ago, a certain argument. He has now brought forward the same argument in a different sense in order to justify his rejection of another Amendment. All I was dealing with was the actual words used by the Solicitor-General during the last few moments. I venture to submit, very humbly, that I am perfectly justified in showing why the argument advanced by the Solicitor-General within the last five minutes for refusing to accept this Amendment is wrong; or, rather, in showing why that argument is contrary to an argument which he himself advanced only a short time ago. That is all I was endeavouring to do. No doubt I did not express myself as clearly as I ought, but I venture to suggest again that it is quite in order, if the Government bring forward that argument, for any hon. Member to say that is not a good argument to bring forward at the present moment, because they themselves have brought forward the same argument and used it in a contrary sense. All I desire to do is to point out to my learned Friend that he cannot have it both ways—that he cannot on one occasion refuse to accept an Amendment on the ground that he wants equal justice for all, and on another occasion refuse to accept an Amendment because he is prepared to let one man gain an advantage and not to give it to another.
Amendment negatived.
I beg to move, in Sub-section (4), to leave out the words
"where the judgment at the passing of this Act is not then the subject of a pending appeal, and the time for appealing against it has expired."
If these words be left in they are mutually destructive, and are practically nonsense. The effect of leaving them out is that the sentence becomes very much improved.
If my hon. Friend will allow me, I will carefully consider these words before the Report stage. As as I look at them in the light of the criticism which he has directed against them, I am not at the moment ready to agree that they should go out. I think they were put in for the purpose of dealing with cases in which there was not a decision by a Court of final resort, but in which a judgment may have been entered by consent. I will look into the matter again. I am much obliged to my hon. Friend for calling my attention to the words, and I hope he will accept that undertaking from me.
I am very grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman for promising to look into the matter, and I think that that is all I can reasonably ask. I think that if the word "not" were left out in the one line, and perhaps two or three "nots" were put into the other line, it might make sense of it; but perhaps we shall find that out by the Report stage.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
CLAUSE 2.—(Right to Compensation for Acts Done in Pursuance of Prerogative and Other Powers.)
(1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing Section restricting the right of taking
Provided that—
(2) The payment of compensation shall be assessed in accordance with the following principles:—
Provided that this Sub-section shall not give any right to payment or compensation for indirect loss.
(3) Where before the fifteenth day of April, nineteen hundred and twenty, any claim for compensation has been made and disposed of by award or ageement, or has been rejected, or any payment (other than a payment expressed to be made on account) has been accepted in respect thereof, and such claim is one to which paragraph (iii) of the last preceding Sub-section would have applied, no claim for compensation or further com- pensation under this Section shall be brought without the leave of the tribunal, and the tribunal shall not grant such leave except on proof of a material change of circumstances or new evidence not previously available being adduced.
(4) A certificate by the said Board of Arbitration or Commission as to the principles upon which they have hitherto acted shall be conclusive.
(5) The tribunal for assessing compensation shall, where by any of the Defence of the Realm Regulations any special tribunal is prescribed, be that tribunal, and in cases where the claim is made under paragraph ( a ) of Sub-section (1) of this Section be the said Board of Arbitration, and in any other case be the said Defence of the Realm Losses Commission.
(6) A Judge of the High Court of Justice shall preside over the Defence of the Realm Losses Commission, which Commission shall hereafter be styled and known as the War Compensation Court.
(7) A person may be compelled to attend and give evidence or produce documents in proceedings before the said Board of Arbitration or War Compensation Court in like manner as in proceedings before an arbitrator, and the Board or War Compensation Court shall have power to require any person appearing before them to give evidence on oath and to authorise any person to administer an oath for that purpose.
I beg to move, in Sub-section (1, b ), to leave out the word "direct" ["sustained any direct loss or damage "].
I confess that I intervene in this discussion with some diffidence, as I am not a lawyer. I move this Amendment for a definite purpose, in which I think all non-legal minds will agree, namely, to find out what the word "direct" means. The Solicitor-General has said fairly that this Bill is an endeavour to carry out the de Keyser judgment. The de Keyser judgment laid down that if a subject of the Crown had his property taken from him, if he suffered loss or damage, he had a right to compensation. I cannot imagine that in previous times, in the time of the Napoleonic Wars, there was any question of direct loss or damage. I imagine in those days, when the Crown took a man's property, when loss or damage was caused to a subject by the action of the Crown, the subject then got his compensation. There was no question of having to prove direct loss or damage. After all, I have not a legal mind, but I could argue the meaning of "direct" with the Solicitor-General for many hours. I will give one case. A man has his house commandeered by the Crown. He held it at the end of a long lease with fifteen years to run. The Crown takes the house and occupies it for three years and then gives it back to him. The lease is now only twelve years. He gave a substantial premium for it twenty years before, but it is a wasting asset and three more years have gone. Are those three years a direct loss or not? When he comes before the tribunal, will he have a right to say, "in addition to what you are going to give me for the damage to my wall-paper and other things, you have got to pay me for the three years of my lease which have wasted away since you took my house, and now I cannot expect to get the same premium that I could three years before." Is that direct loss or not? I could go into a hundred more cases of that sort. In the interests of the general public, words like "direct," which merely mean work for lawyers, should be taken out of the Bill altogether. Let us take it out and let us know where we are.
I understand my hon. Friend is anxious not to provide work for lawyers. Then I beg him with all the earnestness I can not to take out this word "direct." If he leaves it out and leaves the words "sustained any loss or damage" the flood of legal opinion which will arise in consequence of it will be almost unending. The truth of the matter is that unless one has been trained to the law one does not quite understand the terms of art which are used. We do not lay down the proposition at all as to damages in any short code, but we rely upon principles which are enshrined in a great number of cases. Perhaps the simplest way to answer my hon. Friend is this. The Committee in their Report refer to a letter written by Lord Mersey, and he says this in regard to the principles on which the Board has acted:
"The construction which the Board, under my direction or with my approval, has placed on the Proclamation of the 3rd August, 1914, is that it authorises payments for the use of vessels requisitioned and compensation for damage to or loss of such vessels due to such use, but does not authorise compensation for any other damage or loss which the requisition may have caused incidentally to the owners or third persons who may happen to have had contractual relations with them. As regards claims for loss or damage, the Board has refused to entertain them unless they could be brought within the terms of the Proclamation construed as above."
He goes on to say:
"The consequence to individuals must vary according to the nature of their business and affairs, and it appears to me that the only proper course is to leave each individual to bear the loss which happens to fall on him."
That, put in the simplest possible lawyers' language, is that you are dealing with direct loss. That is the proper term to use, and to leave out "direct loss" is to bring a number of possible claims, some of them more akin to actual loss and some less, but to make the words nebulous, and I hope my hon. Friend will not press the Amendment, which would really be very disastrous for the very reasons for which he is advocating them.
If my hon. and learned Friend wants to keep in "direct" why does he not keep in also the word "substantial," because we were told the Defence of the Realm Losses Commission was to inquire into losses in respect of direct and substantial loss incurred.
We were very much pressed with the cases of small persons who have suffered small losses and it was thought that if we left in the word substantial we might be leaving out a certain number of cases small in character but deserving of recognition, and for that reason we took out the word "substantial" in order to meet the point of my right hon. Friend.
I am not convinced, but I will withdraw my Amendment.
This word ought not to remain in the Clause. Judges understand very well what claims are too remote to be regarded in law as anything flowing from the particular cause of action.
If you take out the word "direct" you would leave no information as to what kind of loss or damage was to be considered.
That is not right. Subsection (2) says that if the claimant is deprived by this Act of the legal right to compensation the tribunal will take that right into consideration. So that the effect of leaving out the word "direct" would be to leave the tribunal free to give compensation for loss or damage by reason of interference with property or business according to the legal right, but having regard in addition to the existence of a state of war, and possibly adding to that paragraph an Amendment which stands in various names later in the Paper, so that the tribunal would have regard not only to the existence of a state of war but to all circumstances in the case.
If you leave out the word "direct" you make a serious modification, and it is very difficult to estimate what the result would be upon the cases they have to try. We need not spend our time in discussing what is direct and remote loss because we are familiar with it. It would be unsafe, if not unwise, to omit the word.
We have the same object in view, namely, to assist the Committee in arriving at a satisfactory-conclusion, but the Solicitor-General is not quite correct in his view of the effect of leaving out the word. There are, undoubtedly, some losses which, in the legal sense, are indirect and yet recoverable, and are of the gravest moment to individuals. The leaving out of the words would not necessarily bring those losses within the purview of the Commission, because, not only is there provision in Sub-section (2), which says what the measure of compensation is to be, but there is also provision in Sub-section (4) of Clause 2, which says that a certificate by the Board of Arbitration or Commission as to the principles upon which they have hitherto acted shall be conclusive. Therefore, in these two Subsections, (2) and (4), you have provision as to the measure of compensation. You do not want a provision as to the measure of compensation in Sub-section (1) of Clause 2, because that is simply the Section which confers the right to compensation. I submit that you ought to take out the word "direct," because it limits, and may limit unduly, the scope of the compensation which is ultimately to be given.
Amendment negatived.
I beg to move, in Sub-section (1, i ), to leave out the words "of the Arbitration Act."
This Amendment is simply for the purpose of making this Clause coincide with the principles of arbitration as known in Ireland and Scotland. There they have not an Arbitration Court known by that name.
Amendment agreed to.
Further Amendment made: In Subsection (1, i ), after the word "case'' ["of a case shall"], insert the words "in any enactment relative to arbitrations."— ( Sir E. Pollock. ]
I beg to move, in Subsection (1), to leave out paragraph (iii).
The first paragraph deals with the right of appeal on questions of law. The second paragraph is a perfectly proper provision that claims shall be put forward according to the procedure to be set up by the tribunal, to which I raise no objection. Paragraph (iii) says:
I am very glad to give an undertaking that I will consider this matter, and in doing so I may explain what is the need of this paragraph. As I pointed out from the letter of Lord Mersey, indirect loss has never been granted by the Board of Arbitration, and it is not intended that any such indirect loss should be granted. In other words, the ambit of the Board of Arbitration, as well as of the Commission, is intended to be restricted as it was in the past, and therefore these words are used in paragraph (iii). It affirms that indirect loss, in the words of Lord Mersey, should not be granted. The words "save as hereinafter provided" were put in in the Committee for the purpose of introducing Sub-section (3), which covers the small cases which my right hon. Friend (Mr. Pretyman) has in mind. Those words make Sub-sections (1) and (2) work together. However, I will undertake to look into the matter again in view of the criticisms which my hon. and learned Friend has offered.
I would like to thank the Solicitor-General for having undertaken to look into the matter. Those for whom I raised this point on the Second Reading and those who have been advising me about it were of opinion that this paragraph (iii) is really unnecessary, if Sub-section (2), which follows it, is allowed to remain complete. It is a very awkward form of legislation to say, "save as hereinafter provided," when "hereinafter provided" purports to cover the whole case. Surely it is better to cover the whole case in the Sub-section (2). There may be some legal explanation, but I do not know what it is. I understand my hon. and learned Friend will look into it.
I will give that undertaking.
My view is that it is wholly surplusage. One grave objection to the whole of this Bill is that it looks like becoming a very fruitful source of litigation. It will produce an enormous crop of lawyers, and that is the reason why I am opposing it. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
I see that my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Scott) has an Amendment down later similar to one standing in my name. I think the Amendment would be a good one, provided this paragraph (iii) was left out. If para- graph (iii) is left in I do not know how it will affect our Amendment. I understand the Solicitor-General intends to look into the question as to whether or not he will leave out the paragraph.
I have undertaken no fewer than three times to do so. I cannot say more. I will undertake to see whether paragraph (iii) is necessary.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
9.0 P.M.
I beg to move, in Subsection (2), to leave out the words
(i) Where under the Defence of the Realm Regulations or any order made or purporting to be made thereunder, any special principle for assessment of compensation or the rate thereof, is contained in the Regulation or Order, compensation shall be assessed in accordance with that principle or rate:
Provided that nothing in this provision shall prevent the tribunal in assessing compensation from taking into consideration any circumstances which, under the Regulation in question, it would have been entitled to take into consideration.
(ii) Where the payment or compensation is claimed under paragraph ( a ) of Sub-section (1) of this Section, it shall be assessed in accordance with the principles upon which the Board of Arbitration constituted under the Proclamation issued on the third day of August nineteen hundred and fourteen, has hitherto acted.
(iii) In any other case, compensation shall be assessed as follows …"
This is rather a different point from the last. In the third Paragraph the Government are proposing a certain measure of compensation for War losses. It is a general measure of compensation, having regard to the legal right, on the one hand, and to the existence of a state of war on the other, and it is a measure that I understand perfectly well as a lawyer and as a citizen. My view is that it is the sort of thing that ought to be done, but not in that manner. What is wanted is a Bill which, on the one hand, will prevent individuals making a profit out of the War and which will, on the other hand, ensure that individuals do not suffer individually undue war losses which ought to be taken by the community as a whole and repaid to the individual as compensation. That general measure is one which might have been applied by the ordinary Courts of the land just as well as by any particular tribunal. The proper way is for the House of Commons to say in reasonably plain language the sort of thing it means and to let the judges of the land apply it. To a certain extent, though it is not the judges of the land, but the Defence of the Realm Losses Tribunal, which is entrusted with that task, that object is aimed at by the third paragraph of Sub-section (2). If we then added the words which certain Members, myself included, will propose by a later Amendment should be added, namely, the words, "And to all other circumstances relevant to a just assessment of compensation," then we should get a proper measure of compensation. If you have a general measure of compensation indicated by Parliament in that way you do not want to put upon the top of it particular measures of compensation, as is done by the first and second paragraphs of this Sub-section (2). I think the true and sound principle for the House to insist upon is a measure of compensation sufficiently defined to ensure that no individual gets too much and no individual gets little little. In a sense there is less justification for the first paragraph than for the second. The first paragraph, which provides a D.O.R.A. measure of compensation, provides that whatever measure has been laid down in any regulation under D.O.R.A. during the War—a regulation which this House never had an opportunity of considering, a regulation which imposes an arbitrary measure whether hard or just—is to be applied willy nilly. Take Regulation 2B—whether it is fair to the individual to be given only the cost plus the pre-War profit, or whether it is fair to give him something more because he has to go into the market to replace the goods—that is all he is going to get. I submit that the Committee should delete paragraphs (i) and (ii.) make the general provision in paragraph (iii) fair and equitable, and leave it at that.
When we were discussing a previous Amendment, my hon. and learned Friend told us that paragraph ( b ) of Clause 2 did not apply to premises or land at all, and that what covered land was paragraph (iii). Then my hon. and learned Friend below me (Mr. Cautley) said that Sub-section (1, b ) of Clause 2 did cover land, and the word "property" is there mentioned. Will the learned Solicitor-General make it clear whether that is so or not?
I cannot accept the Amendment. The Bill has been brought in for a purpose, and that purpose is this, that we should adhere to the principle under which Blue Book rates were paid for ships, and that we should not give excessive compensation for ships that were requisitioned, and secondly, that we should pay compensation for goods and materials that were taken at cost price, plus a reasonable profit, and that in both cases the State should not be mulcted by any excessive profits obtained by reason of the very necessities of the State. My hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Leslie Scott) is quite ready, as I understand, to agree with these purposes, but he proposes to do it in a different way. He would like to have a different Bill and to draw up a different standard; in fact, although his aim is the same, his method is quite different, and if I were to accept his Amendment the result would be that I should be abolishing from the Bill the very principles which I have just mentioned. It is impossible to do that, and I do not think the Committee will ask me, after I have, I think, endeavoured to enunciate those principles at very great length, to do so. If you take out these two paragraphs you leave the principles on which the compensation is to be paid for at large, and then my hon. and learned Friend proposes to do a very dangerous thing, namely, to use some new words and to write down new principles either in another Bill or in some other place in this Bill. Anybody who has had experience of Courts knows that a very slight change of words may mean a very considerable difference in results, and few persons, if they intended to maintain the standard of eliminating excessive profits, would have the hardihood to alter the phraseology lest the alteration should have a result wholly unexpected and unwished for.
The hon. and learned Member for East Grinstead (Mr. Cautley) was much more lucid than I was, and I am indebted to him for an admirable speech, in which he cleared up matters which I had left somewhat confused. I had answered the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Pretyman) by way of a short cut, and it shows how one should not take short cuts, because, in effect, I had gone the longest way round. I said to him, shortly, that questions of land were dealt with in paragraph (iii), and that is quite right, but if he will follow the sequence of how they come to be dealt with, he will see how the hon. and learned Member for East Grinstead was perfectly right in what he said. The point is this: Clause 2 introduces two paragraphs ( a ) and ( b ), ( a ) dealing with shipping and ( b ) comprehensively dealing with the two cases, namely, the cases of owners of goods and materials which have been requisitioned and also the owners of property which has been interfered with by powers exercised under Regulations. When we come to the principles on which the compensation is to be paid, the right hon. Gentleman will find that whereas the compensation in respect of shipping and the compensation in respect of goods and materials are set out separately, so paragraph (iii) deals separately with the question of the requisitioning of property.
I understand that, but how is it that paragraph (i) which we are now discussing covers goods and not land? Paragraph (1, b ) of Clause 2, we now understand, is comprehensive and covers both goods and premises, but the Solicitor-General now says that Subsection (2, i) covers goods, Sub-section (2, ii) covers ships, and Sub-section (2, iii) covers premises. I understand that, but I cannot see how Sub-section (2, i) excludes premises, whereas Subsection (2, iii) does not.
The answer is very simple. It is that the Regulations under which they are taken did not provide a scale of compensation, and hence when you are saying whether, under Defence of the Realm Regulations or any Order made thereunder, any special principle for the assessment of compensation, and so on, is to apply, inasmuch as there was no such principle applied in respect of premises or land which was taken under the Regulations, it is abundantly plain that paragraph (i) does not cover the cases of land or property taken, and once you keep in mind the commencement of the paragraph, "Where under the Defence of the Realm Regulations," and that there is no place under the Defence of the Realm Regulations provided for the cases that my right hon. Friend has in mind, then he will at once see that there is left over a certain number of cases which fall rightly in paragraph (iii). I hope I have made the point plain, and I hope the Committee will not spend too long in discussing this Amendment, which is really to leave out the whole purpose of the Bill.
I am the last person to wish to waste time, but I must point out that this is a very important Bill, and I do not think we can be in any way blamed if we take some hours to discuss it. My hon. Friend will agree with me that this effects an enormous amount of property, and cannot be hurried through in any manner which apparently the Solicitor-General would like. The Solicitor-General apparently does not understand what is our object in putting down this Amendment. Our object is that we have got no confidence in the principles laid down under any Order made under the Defence of the Realm Regulations. This perpetuates the orders made under the Defence of the Realm Regulations, and says where in any of those Orders any provision is laid down as to what the compensation shall be, then that is to be the compensation awarded. I venture to say that any statement as to the supposed fact that very large sums of money would have to be paid by the State unless these words were put in are quite beyond the mark. Nobody wants that. All we want is to preserve to the subject the right to go to a Court of Law and ask that Court whether or not the conditions under the Defence of the Realm Regulations were not an abuse of those powers. If it is feared that a judge or a jury—because I think I am right in saying that in many cases the question of compensation would go to a jury— would give absurd compensation, then I say the proper thing to do is not to reenact the Defence of the Realm Regulation Act, but to bring in a Clause in this Bill, or better still in another Bill, abandoning this one, which would lay down that the Court should take into consideration in giving compensation that no unfair amount was to be given arising out of the necessity of the nation in the War. That seems to me a perfectly simple and proper course to pursue. What we do desire is that the arbitrary acts which have been done over and over again by various Government Departments, who have different ways and different bases of compensation, sometimes giving the market price, sometimes cost price, sometimes something less, should be stopped at once and that there should be an appeal from those arbitrary acts to the High Court which, as far as I can see at the present moment, is the only tribunal to which an unfortunate Englishman, Scotsman, or Welshman can appeal. I leave out Irishmen because they have got their own court. That is a very simple proposition. We object to the arbitrary acts which the Government have chosen to do. I object entirely, and we would never have consented to the Defence of the Realm Acts, but it was in a moment of panic. The Government—I do not mean those gentleman on the Front Bench—I mean their satelites, have been given a little brief power. They have abused, it and now under these words, under these two paragraphs, it is sought to continue and to protect them in the abuse of the powers which unfortunately have been given, and it is for these reasons that I shall support the Amendment of my hon. and learned Friend, and I sincerely hope we will go to a Division.
Again I think the hon. and learned Member for the Exchange Division is under a misapprehension. The provision of this Bill really carries out the objects that he has at heart. I can assure the Committee the Members of the Select Committee thoroughly investigated the question before them and with the universal desire to see that individual rights were preserved. We were met at once by this broad question, "If you give the market value at the time of the requisitioning, the figures, if you can arrive at the market value that the State will be called upon to pay, would be colossal, and the profits earned by the individual whose goods were requisitioned would be enormous." It ran into some hundreds of millions. You are bound to accept that contention. It is quite impossible to give what was a market value, because in the conditions of the War there was no real market value. There was not a fair test of arriving at the market value. Now what were we driven back upon? We were driven back to use the princples suggested by the hon. and learned Member for the Exchange Division to see that the individual whose goods were claimed in the interests of the State did not differ pecuniarily, but did obtain the whole costs and expenses to which he has been put together with reasonable profits, and that has been secured in practically every case as far as we have been able to secure it, and to secure it in this Bill. The main Regulation under the Defence of the Realm Act under which goods were requisitioned was 2B, and 2B provides in terms what the compensation to be paid shall be, cost price plus a reasonable profit, and I rather think that the added words, "Circumstances due to the War," might be taken into consideration. There are other Regulations dealing with the prices to be paid for the goods to be requisitioned. There is one limitation, for instance, in certain cases, that the goods are not to exceed the controlled price at the time. That may be less than the cost price plus a reasonable profit. It is not likely to be, but it may be. Is not that fair? Where A has his goods requisitioned and every vendor at the time his goods are requisitioned is subject to controlled prices, is it reasonable that the man whose goods are requisitioned should obtain more than his fellow tradesmen or commercial men who have to sell at the controlled price for the time being. This is provided under this Sub-section. There are some Regulations made, I am not sure whether they are under the Defence of the Realm Act or rules laid down by some of the Army Act or special Acts which give power to requisition goods for Army or Navy purposes and which set out the terms of compensation to be paid, and they are not less or more favourable of 2B. I see an hon. Member opposite, a member of the Committee, who will agree with me that we set out to see that the individual's rights were preserved, that we took all these cases into consideration and arrived at the conclusion put into this Bill, that we did secure in all cases subject to the exception I have mentioned of controlled prices, cost price plus a reasonable profit, and that we were doing no injury to the individual but we were doing justice to him and justice to the State. So far as concerns the next Sub-section, which my hon. and learned Friend wishes to leave out with regard to the compensation payable for ships, the evidence was overwhelming that the compensation provided by the Board of Arbitration had been accepted by shipowners in nearly every case, that the administration of requisitioning among shipowners had been extremely well done, that the body to whom the duty was entrusted had gone to all the shipowners—they are not a very large number, and are easily ascertained—and had taken from each a fair proportion of the ships he held, and, therefore, all the ships that were requisitioned were requisitioned on the same terms, and on the ships that were running free each individual shipowner could earn his fair share of profit above the Blue Book rates. We had evidence that the shipowners had accepted that position, and were satisfied with it.
I hope the Committee will support the Government in retaining the Clause in its present form. I want to join with my hon. and learned Friend opposite in the statement he has made that the Select Committee which inquired into this Bill went very carefully into the question of the right of the individual. The object of the Committee was to see that no grave injustice was done to the individual whose goods were requisitioned, and the Bill as it left that Committee, I believe, fairly safeguarded the interests of the individual. It probably does not give him as much as he would like to have, but there is really no reason why the Government should be bled white. A great many claims had been already settled that could not be re-opened, and claims coming on should be settled on the same broad principle that those claims already disposed of had been settled. We believe that the Bill in its present form secures that object, and I would like just to point to the fact that the Government has really made a very considerable concession to the individual. It has given the individual the right of appeal to the Court of Appeal on a point of law. It is a very valuable concession that whereas, under the ordinary procedure of the Losses Commission, there was no appeal, now there is an appeal to the Court of Appeal on a point of law. I think the Government has very fairly met the claims of the owner of property which has been requisitioned, and I hope they will stand by the Bill.
We have heard from several members of this Committee explanations as to the valuable efforts which they personally made to try to protect people's rights, and we have heard assurances as to what they consider the meaning of these Clauses to be. It has already been laid down by a competent authority that nothing which is said in this House in framing a Bill is to be allowed to shed any light whatever on what it means when it is once passed. That point is reserved for the judges always, and I have very little doubt that if the judges on this new tribunal which is to be set up were bound by the explanation of hon. Members as to what these Sections meant, we might have a fair amount of elemental justice for the individual. But it is no use assuring, at all events, some members of this Committee that this Bill passed in this way is going to do justice to the individual, because we are convinced it is not, and this point now before the Committee is just one where we are more than ever convinced that injustice will be done if the Clause is allowed to be incorporated in the Bill. The position is that in decision after decision obtained from the Court it has been laid down that those principles which were contained in Orders under D.O.R.A. were wrong, that they were unjust, and that they deprived the subject of certain rights.
Which cases are they?
Fortunately I am not under cross-examination.
I do not want to interrupt my hon. Friend, but he was making a very comprehensive statement. He said that in case after case it had been laid down that the principle of these regulations was wrong, and deprived the subjects of rights which they ought to have. I ask him to tell me what the cases are. I know of one.
It is a very great pity, seeing that these cases have been decided during the last few months.
Which are they?
They have been referred to in the course of the Debate. I think I should be out of order in continuing to go over that ground. You, Sir, have already held, I think, that it is improper to do so, and therefore I am sorry, under the circumstances, I cannot give what I otherwise would have great pleasure in giving. Acts of Parliament were passed through this House in ten minutes. Under those Acts a whole lot of Regulations were made. Their numbers were enormous. There was a volume published of them. In the course of those Regulations all sorts of things were laid down as to how various matters were to be dealt with. Some of those Regulations have been distinctly held, with regard to the principle of the assessment of damages, to be wrong. They have been so held by the Courts and the House of Lords. Here is a Clause which says that, in spite of that, the principle of assessment which is contained in those Regulations is to be the principle which is still to be followed. We have got an Amendment to leave that out, and I hope the Committee will see the force of agreeing to the Amendment, so far as Clause 1 is concerned. The second part of Subsection (1), which it is proposed to leave out, says:
"Nothing in this provision shall prevent the tribunal in assessing compensation from taking into consideration certain circumstances."
If there be any circumstances that are relevant to the assessment of damages, what tribunal has ever been prevented from taking them into account? Unless it was for the express purpose of endeavouring to insinuate that the principles contained in these Clauses should again be forced down the throats of the people and be the principles upon which this new Court is to deal with the matters, there is no sense in introducing such a provision. Then follows the provision with regard to ships. My own sympathy is entirely with leaving out this Clause. I cannot see that it accomplishes any good object whatever, and it certainly does accomplish one bad and evil thing in endeavouring by a side-wind to re-enact the various provisions found to be wrong and unjust and contrary to allowing the subject the rights to which he is entitled. I join in the appeal to the Committee to pass this Amendment, that these three Sub-sections be left out.
I intervene for the purpose of saying a few words, and a few words only, in reply to my hon. Friend who has just sat down. My effort to elicit from him certain information was not entirely successful. He appeared to be saying that that which is provided in the part of the Clause now sought to be left out was something which was notoriously, in case after case, in court after court, held to be wrong and contrary to the law and to sound principle, but I did not gather that the hon. Member was able, on the spur of the moment, or even after a good deal of hesitation, to name so much as one case in which that decision has been held.
Oh, De Keyser's! We had them all out before you came in.
My hon. Friend is good enough to mention Do, Keyser's Hotel. I am sure he understands that that has nothing to do with the part of the Clause which we are considering, because De Keyser's Hotel case was a case of the requisitioning of land, and the judgment of the House of Lords in the case of De Keyser's Hotel is not in the smallest degree impaired by the part of the measure we are now considering. So far as I know, there is only one case in which anything has been said by a court of law upon the subject matter of this part of the Clause, and that is the case in which a doubt was expressed as to the validity of a certain part of the Regulation, and that is a case at present under appeal. That is a case in which persons were seeking to obtain a very large profit who had already obtained a profit which most of us would regard as quite considerable.
Is that the rum case?
That is the case of the rum. My hon. Friend's recollection may be more apt than my own, but that is the only case which I can recall which is relevant to this part of the Bill. What was the other part of the hon. Member's complaint? It was, if I followed it, that it is quite idle to think that a court of law will attempt to construe an Act of Parliament by reference to statements and assurances given in Debate in this House. That is perfectly true, but if it is to have any meaning at all with refer-once to the matter we are now discussing, what it must mean is that those who are responsible for the words in this part of the Clause have failed, in the words they have employed, to give effect to the meaning they desire to convey. But in all the rest of the hon. Member's argument his complaint was that effect had been given to that meaning, and it was because he saw what that meaning was that he objected to it so much. As the hon. and learned Member for East Grinstead (Mr. Cautley) pointed out in that most concise and pertinent speech which he made a few moments ago, every case has been considered, and unless the House is going to say, at this time of day, that for the same sort of commodity and the same sort of purchase you are to have different scales of compensation, different rates, and different measures, this Clause must be passed.
The Regulations which are covered by this part of the Clause provide that where goods have been taken the person from whom they are taken shall receive compensation which will give him his cost price and a fair profit, subject to the exception which has already been referred to and on which I do not need to dwell, the question of a controlled price. What other Measure is to be given? What is that pound of flesh, exceeding this Measure, which it is desired that these persons should have? I am sure the Committee observes that that is the point. If the proposal of the hon. and learned Member for the Exchange Division (Mr. L. Scott) were now to be adopted, and if this part of the Clause were now to be omitted with a view to making some other and more lavish provision for persons to be compensated in this way, the effect would be that those who supplied those commodities during the War and received compensation at the hands of the Losses Commission would have that which they have received, while other persons, in exactly the same position, providing exactly the same kind of commodities, and subject, if they had dealt with the matter promptly, to exactly the same kind of tribunal, would now, at the hands of this House, receive another and a larger measure of compensation. I cannot imagine that the House will desire to enact anything so unjust. It is no doubt to be regretted that this Measure did not come on at a time when feelings of patriotism and unselfishness were a little more manifest in all quarters than they are at this particular moment. A time has come when those feelings have, in some quarters, and for some purposes, suffered a little abatement, but we must be fair, and I submit that it is not right that while one set of persons have received one measure of compensation we should provide that another set of persons, not to be differentiated from them in any respect, except in point of time, should receive quite a different measure of compensation.
:I think the Attorney-General has rather missed the spirit of this Debate. He appeals to the feelings of patriotism and unselfishness which dictated the action of men in the early days of the War, but what he forgets is this, that if you, under the Defence of the Realm Act, take the goods of a man, it is unfair that you should claim the Defence of the Realm Act in order to pay him an unfair price.
A fair price!
With all respect to the hon. and learned Gentleman, I am suggesting that what he calls a fair price, the cost price and a fair profit, is an unfair price to pay. You are differentiating between the man whose goods you did not commandeer and the man whose goods you did, and I say that this is, by a side wind and under the Defence of the Realm Act, extracting a War Profit Tax from the man whose goods you commandeered. Those persons whose goods you did not take got the market price at the time and, as we know, an enormously inflated profit under war conditions, and you now come down upon the man whose goods you did take and say that he shall only have compensation in the form of the cost price and a fair profit on the cost price. In many things during the night I have been with the Government, but I do not think the hon. Gentlemen who moved and supported this Amendment have made out a very good case, and I hope the Attorney-General will accommodate himself to the feeling of the Committee in some degree.
The Clause which it is now sought to be amended is a revision of what was the rule until this Bill was passed. I have seen many papers put in before the War Losses Commission which stated that they merely gave an ex gratiâ payment of the will of the Treasury. We are now going to make legal what was not legal before. The Attorney-General laid down the general principle in all cases that the cost price, pins a fair profit, was a proper and sufficient payment. I would suggest that while in many cases it is so, there are a whole series of cases where it is not so. When compensation for goods taken under the Defence of the Realm Regulations are being assessed, it is only right, reason- able, and fair to take into account the cost of replacing them. Take, for instance, the goods in many cases of the man who depends on them for the carrying on of his business. To take them at a price which would have been fair under ordinary circumstances, with an ordinary fair profit added, might be all right in an ordinary way, but now you must also take into account the cost this man would have to incur in order to replace that stock of which he was deprived, and without which his business would collapse. The right hon. and learned Gentleman also alluded to the case of controlled prices. That works very unfairly. I can put forward a whole series of cases where compensation at the old price would be very unjust and very insufficient. Take, for instance, my own case.
A quantity of my hay was taken from my farm, and the controlled price paid for it was £5 10s. per ton. It was absolutely necessary later for me to get other hay to keep my beasts alive during the winter, and on going into the open market I found I had to pay £7 15s. per ton to replace the hay which the Government had taken. Here was a loss of £2 5s. per ton on the hay taken from me at the controlled price. I suggest that a very great deal of injustice will be inflicted if full power is not given to take into consideration all the circumstances of the case. You may produce great inequalities in assessing the compensation, and you will undoubtedly inflict a very considerable lot of injury on persons whose particular length, breadth, and magnitude does not come within the compass of the Clause with which you are now dealing. A point of substance has been decided in a court of first instance, and an appeal is going forward. This is the only occasion on which an appeal can be made to the High Court. In all these matters there should be elasticity to take into consideration all the relevant facts which are necessary to meet the justice and equity of the case. The Government is striking too rigid a line. My hon. Friend who moved this Amendment is quite right in endeavouring to obtain a larger Amendment.
An extraordinary argument was used by the hon. Member for the Wrekin Division (Mr. Palmer), an argument which could be comprised in a few words. His own expression was that the people whose goods were not com- mandeered made extraordinary prices. Instead, however, of condemning the people who fleeced the country during its time of trial, what he now blandly suggested was that everybody else should be allowed to do the same thing.
Market value!
There was no market value during the War, not to patriots. Every body ought to have been doing his or her best during that time to help the country in every possible way——
Without increasing wages!
I listened with perfect attention to the hon. Member. If any arguments were now needed to influence the votes on our side for the House, those of the hon. Member for the Wrekin Division are the best that could possibly be used. In our opinion, any man whose goods were commandeered during the War, and who received the cost price and a fair profit, is honourably treated. Any man who demands more than a fair profit is not entitled to a great deal of the attention of this House. That is my submission, and that is why I shall vote for the Government.
Before this matter goes to a Division, it is only right to point out, especially as the learned Attorney-General challenged me in regard to certain cases, that there was a case, of which I have no doubt he knows something—that of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board. The Government commandeered one of their boats, which they managed in some way or another to sink. The question was whether the Board was entitled to be paid the mere cost of that boat, together with some small percentage of profit, or whether the Board were entitled to the cost of replacing the boat. If we pass these Clauses, as I understand it, we shall be fixing upon the original cost, plus what the Government call a reasonable profit. It has been decided by the Courts——
My hon. and learned Friend from some source of information —I cannot imagine what—has learned during the last few moments——
No!
That the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board——
That is not the case at all.
May I make one observation? This case has nothing whatever to do with the part of the Clause we are now upon. There is no Regulation of the Defence of the Realm Regulations that provides for compensation in such a case as that.
The insinuation that has just been made—[HON. MEMBERS: "Divide!"]—by the Attorney-General—[HON. MEMBERS: "Divide!"]— you will divide in my time! The insinution that has just been made that I became aware of a certain case, and wrongly became aware of it, is absolutely unfounded. It is a gratuitous suggestion, and had no right to be made. I have the full Report taken from the shorthand notes. I have had it for months, and the suggestion that I just acquired the informations——
On a point of Order. Is not the hon. and learned Gentleman repeating himself, or quoting cases that have been given?
This happens to be one of the cases which has not been mentioned. The right hon. and learned Gentleman keeps on saying that this has nothing to do with the point. I want to put my case very shortly, if I can do so without interruptions from hon. Members. It is this: It was considered by the Government that the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board was only entitled to the cost they paid together with a small reasonable profit. The case came before the Courts eventually upon an appeal from the arbitrator, and it was held that they were entitled to the cost of replacement, and that this method of assessing the compensation was wrong. I have seen case after case of this kind. It is wrong to ask people to take the mere cost together with a small profit, because the cost two or three years ago may be quite different from the cost to-day. There enters into every element of the cost of an article the cost of labour and raw material, and the cost of transport, and we all know how those things have altered. I take the strongest possible view, and I will not yield to anybody my right to express it, that we have no right as the House of Commons protecting the rights and interests of the subject to pass Clauses like this which are to stultify the Courts and tell them they were wrong. We are being asked again here to-night by these Clauses to ratify principles framed by jacks-in-office for the purpose of cheating subjects out of their property. You are telling these people, "Here is a new Court, we are not going to have the regular Courts of the Realm, and you must take all your claims to this new Court——"
That has been said many times over.
I apologise. I know that I feel very warmly on this subject, so warmly that if I am prevented, as I see I am going to be, from expressing what I feel, I shall take this opportunity of withdrawing.
Amendment negatived.
I beg to move, in Subsection (2, ii) to leave out the words "upon which the Board of Arbitration constituted under the proclamation issued on the third day of August, nineteen hundred and fourteen has hitherto acted," and to insert instead thereof the words "set forth in the First Schedule to this Act."
This is not a lawyers' Amendment, but one designed in the interest of the lay element. If anybody wants to discover his rights before the tribunal under this Bill he is referred to some documents, and in another Amendment he is referred to six documents and left to discover the principles on which the tribunal has acted in the past in assessing compensation. Instead of leaving the subject to discover these principles from a number of documents not drawn up with the idea of taking principles, but of making a report to this House, I propose that those principles should be put into the Bill. Hon. Members will see the two parts of the Schedule that I propose to move later. The Solicitor-General has already referred to the letter which Lord Mersey wrote laying down the principles on which the Board of Arbitration should act, and in order that there should be no doubt about it, I have taken the language of Lord Mersey's letter of the 10th September, 1919, which lays down the principles on which the Board of Arbitration has hitherto acted, and I have put those words in, merely altering words of no importance and leaving in all the words of substance, retaining the identical language of Lord Mersey's letter in the Schedule of the Bill.
10.0 P.M.
If anybody wishes to know what his rights are after my Amendment has been carried, he will be able to look at the end of the Bill and then he will know what they are. The Solicitor-General will no doubt say that he does not wish to adopt a new form of words, but what I wish to point out is that there is really no substantial change of the words, and I am merely putting into the Bill what ought to be put in, and what will have to be put in sooner or later. If hon. Members will refer to Sub-section (4) of this Clause they will see that in order to get out of the difficulty as to what the principles are on which the Board of Arbitration has acted, they will see that it is provided that mission has acted in the past. If one takes the five reports of the Commission it may be possible to discover those principles, but I defy any lawyer to do it successfully, and no layman would even attempt it. It is something approaching a scandal that we should, in an Act of Parliament, say it is subject to principles which can only be discovered by reference to documents of so vague a character.
This Amendment is designed to deal with a real blot on this Bill and I hope the Solicitor-General will see his way to accept it. By this Bill we are curtailing the rights of the subject. We are shutting him out in a number of cases from his right to go before the courts. We are setting up a new tribunal, and it is essential therefore that we should declare what substitute we are giving for those rights of claimants whom we are compelling to resort to another tribunal. It is idle to say it cannot be done, because the Bill lays it down that it is the duty of the tribunal itself to state the principles on which it acts. It is also idle to say it cannot be done, because in the five or six Blue Books they have published a return of cases that have come before them, and they have in different parts of those books set out the principles on which they purported to act. Therefore it is of no use saying it cannot be done, and, if it can be done, Parliament is the place where it should be done. We ought to insist on having these principles directly laid down in the Bill so that everybody may know what his rights are. The process, after all, is a very simple one, important though it may be. The hon. and learned Gentleman pointed out that the claimant who comes before this tribunal has to set out his case: surely he ought to know what principles are going to be applied to it. He ought not to be left in the dark. Assuming he is left in the dark, look at his position. If he is dissatisfied he does not quite know what principles have been applied to his case, as the Court may award so much and not give any reason. He may go to appeal, but he can only appeal on points of law, and then he has to take with him to the Court of Appeal the certificate of the tribunal saying on what principles they have acted. That is a most unsatisfactory condition of affairs. In an ordinary law case a man who appeals knows in substance the principle with which he is dealing. He has in fact something to go upon, but here a man may be involved in all the expense of launching his appeal and then he is faced with a certificate which may put him out of court altogether. It is a matter over which he has no control and the position is an intolerable one. I hope the Solicitor-General will realise that and will not get up and tell us it cannot be done. It has been done in the past, and I submit we are entitled to a more satisfactory answer.
One reason why applicants have been so unwilling to go before the Losses Commission has been the uncertainty as to what would be the decision of that body. There has been an unevenness about their decisions which, I think, justifies the position that these people have taken up, and the unwillingness of the Government to allow appeals to the Court is, I think, the strongest possible reason why principles should be laid down for this new Court to act upon. This Court has not to consider what the law is. It will consider in so far as it possibly can what are the principles on which the Losses Commission has acted. The hon. Member for Bristol has told us that there are six Blue Books to go through in order to find out what those decisions are. There are thousands of cases dealt with in them. Would it not be much more simple to follow on the lines laid down in the Clause mentioned by the hon. Member for Bristol? I believe the wording of this Clause is drawn almost wholly from Lord Mersey's letter, which the Solicitor General over and over again has himself endorsed. The personnel of the Losses Commission has changed considerably since it was first instituted, and it will change again. The nature of their decisions has also altered. We were told that they began to act in a most generous spirit. In any circumstances there should be confidence in this new body. The Solicitor-General may tell us that applicants who have gone before it have cheerfully acquiesced in the decisions that have been come to. How many men defeated in the Law Courts cheerfully acquiesce in the decisions which are arrived at? Half a century ago, when I was going to a grammar school, the headmaster used to go down the class with a can, asking what the sign of the future was, and if anyone said it was "might" or "should" he used to try and drive the future into them by giving them a good thrashing with the cane. Because those lads did not fetch the roof off the school with their cries, and stood the thrashing, as they thought, in a right and proper way for the honour of the school, would it be right and proper to say that they "cheerfully acquiesced" in that thrashing? There would be just as much reason to say that as to say that the people who have gone before the Losses Commission have "cheerfully acquiesced" in its decisions. I do beg the Solicitor-General to incorporate in the Bill, in some way or other, the main principles on which the decisions shall be given in this new Court which is going to be set up.
As the speech of the lion, and learned Member for Bristol has indicated, this is no new subject either to him or to me. We have discussed this proposal on many occasions, when we have had the opportunity of talking it over, and he will, therefore, know the views which I have already expressed to him about it. I hope the Committee will not suppose that I am at all impervious to the arguments which have been advanced in its favour. As long as I have been in this House I have always been anxious to try and make Acts of Parliament as plain as possible, and to do nothing by means of reference that could be avoided. I start, therefore, with every desire to try and accede to the request made to me by my hon. Friends. I am bound, however, to point out the difficulties which beset the course indicated in this Amendment. I am dealing here with the principles which are applicable to the Board of Arbitration dealing with shipping cases, and to the Commission which has dealt with cases relating to food and materials. There is a great deal to be said for putting those principles into the Schedule in an effort to codify them so far as they are applicable and, if I could be sure that in the future the results of putting this code into the Schedule would be that I should have made no variation at all, I would gladly ask the Committee to accept it.
If the hon. and learned Gentleman says that, will he agree to put in Lord Mersey's letter, upon which he has so often relied as accurately repre- senting the principles of the Board of Arbitration? That would meet both his point and mine.
I really think we should be making a confusion there. If hon. Members will turn to the letter of Lord Mersey, which I have referred to and relied upon, as my hon. Friend says, many times, and which is a very interesting letter, I think they will see that, if it were put into the Schedule, although it would be helpful—containing, as it does, sound principles on which we acted —we should not have done anything better than is proposed in the Bill, namely, to rely upon the principles which have so far guided the tribunals. From the practical point of view, if we are going to make an alteration by these new words—skilful words, but still, untried words—if we are going to do that, we are going to do the very thing that the Committee is anxious to avoid. They may, in some cases, be giving a larger measure of compensation; in some cases they may be giving a smaller measure. But what is the proposal in the Bill? It is suggested that you have got to read a number of documents before you can get to the principle. May I remind the Committee what is the position if an ordinary person goes to Court to-day and seeks for damage? He will not find the principles on which he relies codified. He will not find it in any one case alone. Any person who presents a case on his behalf will have to refer to several, and, in a difficult case, to many cases, to find the principle of the damages to which he is referring. In this case the Courts have been acting for five years. A number of cases of great similarity, following certain principles, have been decided. It is not necessary to turn to a number of reports which deal with cases wide of the mark and not germane at all to the particular case which is to be decided. It will be just as easy for any person to find a precedent which governs his particular case in those reports, just as it is possible for a person in an ordinary lawyer's library to find a precedent in one of the Courts which governs a particular case which he has got to present in the Court.
I do not myself believe that this difficulty which my learned Friends fear will prevail. After all I have to measure the pros and cons, and on the whole I have come to the conclusion that, in view of the fact that these precedents have now been accumulated during a period of five years and that they give a good illustration of the various cases and are typical of many that will come before us, it is better to proceed on the same principle rather than try to make a break at the present time and codify the principles and yield new words for the purpose of carrying out the intention of the House. But I can meet my hon. Friends, I hope, in one way, for I am very anxious to do so. They are afraid of what the effect of this Sub-clause 4 on page 5 may be, namely, "a certificate by the said court of arbitration or commission as to the principles upon which they have hitherto acted shall be conclusive." As to what the hon. and learned Member for Bristol fears I feel that a judge of the High Court who tries a case in getting it in shape for the Court of Appeal would be the last person not to give a fair chance to an applicant before him, and would give him every possible prospect of presenting his case to the Court of Appeal, whether it is decided in favour or against it. I think that is one of the benefits which the system we have now adopted of putting a judge of the High Court as President of the Court will give us. We may trust him to act impartially in all cases. It seems to me what my hon. and learned Friend has said seems well founded in that it is far better to leave that court or commission to indicate how they come to that decision without making a particular certificate. Indeed their judgment will indicate the principle on which they have acted, and it will be unnecessary and not consonant with the trust which we place in the authority presiding over the Court to ask that he should give a certificate as to his principles. I would prefer to leave the latter to his judgment in the ordinary course and to go to the Court of Appeal in the form in which it is so presented to the Court of Appeal. Therefore, I think it would be quite possible to leave out from Sub-section (4) any certificate as to the principles on which the Commission has acted. There is a little more difficulty in dealing with the question of the Board of Arbitration, because on the Board of Arbitration will be persons who are at present well qualified to deal with the matters, and it might be more doubtful whether a certificate might be required in that case, but in order to show my confidence, and to remove the misgiving which my hon. and learned Friend has presented, I am prepared to leave out Sub-section (4) altogether, subject to this, that if upon the Report stage I find I have made some mistake or dropped a stitch by doing so, I must reserve leave to myself to deal with the matter, but I would rather leave it out in this Committee stage in order to show my good faith and a determination to try to meet the views presented by my hon. and learned Friend. When I have to decide the delicate question of whether I should insert these new words in the Schedule or whether I should ask that the Court should proceed on principles hitherto adopted and enshrined in precedents already existing, with every desire and a strong bias of my own in favour of adopting the codifying principle of my hon. and learned Friend, I feel compelled, in order to secure continuity of this compensation, to advise the Committee to reject the principle of my hon. and learned Friend, to which I hope the Committee will appreciate that I have given my careful consideration, because I am prepared to leave out Sub-section (4).
I am very sorry the Solicitor-General has not seen his way to make a little more attempt to use the suggestions which have come from the critics of the Bill. I do not think my hon. and learned Friend perhaps sufficiently bears in mind, in conducting this Bill, the attitude which I believe the vast majority of the House take up towards it. I have not the least doubt that if the House really felt itself free in this matter it would throw the Bill out altogether. In principle it is absolutely hateful to everyone, and I have no doubt is equally hateful to my hon. and learned Friend. No one would pass it unless he felt compelled to do it. That, I think, is common ground, especially with regard to the action throughout the country of the Losses Commissioners. There has been a vast amount of discontent, and very justifiable discontent. We are now referring to their principles. I doubt myself whether they have any principles. There are no discernible principles in such cases as have come to my knowledge. They have acted in the most arbitrary way, and there is not a Member of the House who has not had brought to his notice numbers of cases of most justifiable complaint of their action. My hon. and learned Friend wants to pass this Bill by reference to the principles on which they have acted. First of all, that sins against the principle of legislation by reference of which in the past he has been a very strenuous critic. Why is it necessary to sin against that principle in the most flagrant way? It is bad enough in any Bill when Clauses are constructed by constant reference to existing statutes to which reference can be made and by a certain amount or research you can get at the meaning; but here you are referring to something which has no official existence whatever. You fire referring to something which is not in the common possession of anyone, and which when you examine it I doubt very much whether you would find that it has any principle at all. The Solicitor-General objects to the Amendment moved by my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Inskip) because he is having resort to untried words, but the right hon. Gentleman is going to have resort to much more untried words, because he is going to refer to decisions which really are not to be found in any true sense in any reports whatever. I do not think that my right hon. Friend could seriously draw the parallel between documents in which the decisions of this Commission are to be found, and the great body of cause law to be found in centuries of law reports. He has suggested that it was as easy to get a code of principles from these decisions as from the law reports. He knows perfectly well that the law so far as it is derived from the law reports is the result of countless decisions, very often in conflict, but eventually decided by the highest Court of Appeal; a great number of cases very near the dividing line, by means of which, after a long lapse of time, and after a great many cases have been argued, you get at principles which have been laid down by the Court. By reference to those reports you see not only the judgment but you see in the greatest detail the arguments that have been laid before the Court and that have weighed upon the judicial mind, and the reasons for the decision arrived at. That is totally different from these papers to which we are referring as embodying these principles.
I, therefore, think that this Subsection (2), to which the Amendment has been moved, has almost every vice that a proposed Clause in a Bill can have. Compensation is to be assessed in accordance with the principles upon which the Board of Arbitration, constituted under a certain proclamation, has hitherto acted. Instead of that, my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Inskip) would substitute untried words, but at all events a concise statement of the principles upon which this compensation is to be assessed. We are accustomed to that sort of thing. You never have an arbitration without terms of reference, and those terms of reference are always considered sufficient for the purpose of guiding the arbitrators as to the principles on which they are to work. What my hon. and learned Friend proposes is that this Commission should have in every case they try the precise terms of reference as to the principles upon which they are to act. My right hon. Friend is not showing enough consideration to the Committee. We are passing this Bill very much against the grain, and we are very anxious to do the right thing, and we are just as competent as my right hon. Friend to decide the point as to what is or is not a suitable word for the purpose. I do complain that, in refusing to accept so reasonable an Amendment, he is not showing sufficient consideration to those of us who are his supporters while we are critics.
I would ask the Solicitor-General to consider the position in which he is going to land himself. He recognises the force of argument of the hon. and learned Member for Bristol, and he says that Sub-section (4) is undesirable. What he is proposing to do is to leave the Bill as it stands but without Sub-section (4). If you take the case of Sub-section (2) the tribunal is to act in accordance with the principles upon which the Board of Arbitration constituted under Proclamation has hitherto acted. A claimant appeals from a decision. The Court of Appeal will at once have the problem before it of ascertaining what were the principles hitherto acted upon. It will be a matter of dispute, and evidence will have to be brought on either side before the Court can proceed to decide the merits of a. particular case. That is an impossible proceeding. Then in regard to claims under the previous Sub-section, where you have to ascertain the principles upon which the Commission has hitherto acted, the same difficulty will arise. The Court of Appeal will require to have evidence to know the contents of various blue books, and they will have to decide again the principles upon which the Commission has hitherto acted. Over and above that it has to be remembered that this Court does not give legal decisions; it does not give a formal judgment in any shape or form. There is no record of its decisions, except in the figures, and there is no reason given for its decision. It simply gives a lump sum as award. I therefore ask the Solicitor-General to think again as to the position in which his suggestion is going to land him, and to see whether he cannot accept the proposal of the Amendment. I do not ask him to tie himself down particularly to the language, but to accept the Amendment in principle and reserve liberty to himself on Report.
I wish to support the action of the Solicitor-General. I think that hon. Members who have spoken forget the existence in this House of a court which never gives any reason for its decisions. It is quite true that this is a Bill to which probably a great many of us object, but it is necessary after the War, and if it is not passed two great injustices will be done. One of them is that the taxpayer will be called upon to pay huge sums to people who are no more entitled to it than others, and the second is that those people will feel that injustice is being done to them. What is the difficulty in administering the Clause as it is in the Bill? In order to have fair justice between those who have been settled with before and those who have not been settled with up to date, you must apply to both sets the principles which have already been acted upon. What is the court in this House to which I have referred? It is a court which acts upon certain principles which can be derived by a careful perusal of its decisions, although it never gives any reason. It is the Locus Standi Court, which sits upstairs and has never yet given any reasons for its decisions. All that it says is, whether a petitioner is entitled to go before a Committee of this House, "Yes" or "No." Yet we have a whole series of reports, reading which any lawyer and anyone acquainted with the practice upstairs can find out on what principles that court has acted. The hon. Member for Bristol (Mr. Inskip) produced a series of papers and said, "This is what people will have to go through." Why, in any case which is tried in the courts of justice on questions of compensation, either of Common Law or Chancery, you will see counsel surrounded by 10, 20 or 30 books of reference, and a small number of documents such as that produced by the hon. Member would not frighten the last-joined junior at either Bar. I hope the learned Solicitor-General will stick to his guns.
I cannot see why the Solicitor-General still resists the proposal which has been made. The Amendment says nothing more than this. Let this House decide what are the fair and right principles to apply and put them in simple language. The alternative is to leave litigants to the extremely difficult process of finding principles in a body of decisions which have largely been dictated, not by any particular principle, but by the exigencies of the moment and the particular view entertained by the Commission at the time they were dealing with a particular case. My submission is that it is the duty of Parliament when altering the legal rights of the subject to say to what extent those legal rights shall be altered. There will be this further advantage flowing from our proposals, that, if they are put in the Schedule by this Committee, they can be considered between now and the Report stage, not only by the Government, but by the Members of the House. Members who have had experience of the Defence of the Realm Losses Commission or the Board of Admiralty Arbitrators can look at the statement of principles in the Schedule and say: "Are these consonant with what is right and with what has been done in the past by these two bodies?" In another place also it will be possible to criticise these provisions, and, what is more, the whole public will then know what it is that Parliament is proposing to do in regard to the alteration of the rights of the subject which this House think is necessary because of the War. I cannot see any reason why the Government should not put their cards on the table. The people and the country want to know where they are in this matter, and I ask for daylight on these principles.
The learned Solicitor-General has indicated that he is not pre- pared to depart from the Bill, and I deplore his attitude, because while we have shown our sincere desire to help him, he has met us with a non possumus on this question, without really attempting to meet the arguments which we have put forward. It would be the negation of common sense to say that, because this was difficult to put into language, therefore leave it as obscure as it is at the present moment. Nobody knows better than my hon. and learned Friend that there is all the difference in the world between the reports of cases in the Defence of the Realm Losses Commission, with their meagre statements of fact, and the reported cases in Law Reports. My hon. and learned Friend is really referring to cases which give no assistance at all as to principles, and, having got rid of Sub-section (4), the matter really becomes more difficult than before.
I am sure my hon. and learned Friends do not think I am impervious to argument, or am not doing my best to meet them. I quite recognise the assistance given by my hon. and learned Friends. The hon. and learned Member for the Exchange Division interrupted me, and it makes one despair, because he said it might be necessary to have a number of Amendments moved to the Schedule, and a number of alterations made, that criticism should be offered, and so on. If that is the vista which is opened to me, I should have to say that I am quite unable to try to meet the suggestion made by my hon. and learned Friend, because both my hon. and learned Friends know how extremely difficult it is to draw the words in the Schedule that are necessary to carry out their intention and my intention, and if, when we have ultimately put a Schedule upon the Paper, it is to be the subject of continued Debate and continued Amendments, then I would much prefer to stand where I am at the present time, and not to make any alteration at all. But it would be unfortunate to adopt that attitude, because it would not be my true attitude; it would not represent either the gratitude which I owe to my hon. and learned Friends nor my desire to try to get at some system which may be of service in the future. What I would say to my hon. and learned Friends is this: If the hon. and learned Members for Bristol (Mr. Inskip) and East Grin-stead (Mr. Cautley) will confer with me as to whether or not we can draw up a Schedule to deal with the cases, because this Schedule has, to my mind, several serious blots upon it, I will see whether it is possible to put a Schedule in the Bill in lieu of the Clause as it stands, and I will do that on the Report stage. I cannot accept that Schedule to-night because, in my opinion, it is both impracticable and leaves out certain matters that have to be dealt with. I may be wrong about that, and I will confer with my hon. and learned Friends the Members for Bristol and East Grinstead, if agreeable to the Committee, and I will see whether it is possible to put the Schedule into the Bill on the Report stage, for I recognise, just as much as they do, the importance of this matter, and I am anxious to meet my hon. Friend below the Gangway who seems to think that I am a little ungrateful for the way the Committee have assisted me this afternoon. Far be it from me either to appear ungrateful, or not to appreciate the assistance which has been given me from time to time. What I will do therefore is this: I will undertake to go into it with my two hon. and learned Friends to see whether we can get a Schedule, but when we have got a Schedule, I will have to ask the Committee to recognise that Schedule as a cast-iron Schedule. We cannot have Amendments to leave out "direct" and put in "substantial" and put in "indirect" and leave out "remote," and so on. All that is quite impossible, but if we are able to agree upon the Schedule I will endeavour to meet them upon the Report stage. Upon that undertaking, which I am sure my hon. and learned Friend will accept as indicating good-will on my part, perhaps he will withdraw the Amendment.
I do not want to appear in any way ungrateful to my right hon. Friend for what he has just said. But, at the same time, I would like to point this out to him, that, after all; the Amendment of my hon. Friend represents the wish of a great many Members of this Committee. Really, it is not a private matter of theirs; it is the wish of the Committee. The suggestion of my right hon. Friend is not quite satisfactory. He says, "if they will confer with me we will see if we can get a Schedule, but it is to be hard and fast; no one is to make any suggestions in regard to it." I do not think that is quite a satisfactory way of doing it. We object strongly and entirely to the Clause as it stands, and, while I do not think there are many of us who do not feel, if we left it to the off-chance of my two hon. Friends and the Solicitor-General being able to arrive at an agreed Schedule, yet I think my right hon. Friend—he is showing a very reasonable attitude with regard to the principle— ought to say, "Well, I am quite willing now to accept this Amendment in the place where it stands, and I will confer with my two hon. Friends, and we will try to arrange the terms of a Schedule." But it must be for the Committee itself to decide. My right hon. Friend ought not to say, "I will try to arrive at the terms of a Schedule." It is his business to put the terms in the Schedule which will be satisfactory, and I really do not think it is quite satisfactory to the rest of us that it should be left as a sort of private bargain between the Government, on the one hand, and the two hon. Members who have moved and seconded the Amendment, on the other.
If the right hon. Gentleman will do his best, with the assistance we will give him, to endeavour to frame a Schedule, I am quite prepared, upon that understanding, to ask leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move, in Sub-section (2, iii, a ) to leave out the words "and to the existence of a state of war."
I am convinced the Solicitor-General will agree to leave them out. What words he would like to insert in their place I do not know, but it is obvious that these words must be left out.
I cannot agree to leave out these words, because they have been carefully chosen and I think they serve a useful purpose. Without some such words there must be an enhancement or a depreciation of the compensation to be awarded, and I think the existence of a state of war is one of the circumstances relevant to a just assessment of compensation. I am prepared to accept the Amendment in the name of the hon. Member for the Exchange Division of Liverpool (Mr. L. Scott) to add the words
"and to all other circumstances relevant to a just assessment of compensation."
Then the Clause would stand thus:
"and to the existence of a state of war and to all other circumstances relevant to a just assessment of compensation."
If these words are kept in, what does it mean? Of course, the War is, technically, still on, but actually we know that it is not. There are cases in which houses were taken by the Government after Armistice day; in those particular cases, would the compensation be enhanced or diminished if those words were left in?
The words "existence of a state of war" are intended to deal with premises which were taken during the actual existence of hostilities, and if you add these words "and to all other circumstances relevant to a just assessment of compensation," then the state of war will be held in its true perspective, and it will enable the Court in its discretion to give a right appreciation of what ought to be paid, having regard to the fact that hostilities had ceased, although, in fact, the state of war technically continued.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment made: In Sub-section (2, iii, a ), after the word "war" ["a state of war"], insert the words "and to all other circumstances relevant to a just assessment of compensation."—[ Mr. Leslie Scott ]
It being Eleven of the Clock, the Chairman left the Chair to make his Report to the House.
Committee report Progress; to sit again To-morrow.
Public Libaries (Ireland) Bill
As amended ( in the Standing Committee ), considered.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read the Third time."
The Government have in an extraordinary fashion passed over a Bill I have in my hand and that I expected to see brought forward for decision, the Public Libraries (Scotland) Bill, which is quite harmless and meets the wishes of the Scottish Members, and now propose to keep the House at this late hour to discuss the Irish Bill, which no one is particularly interested in, though I hope some of my hon. Friends from the North-East of Ireland will say something, for that is apparently the only part of the country where the Bill will be accepted or worked. The object of this Bill is to raise the rate for public library purposes in Ireland. It is very germane to point out that at present about two thirds of the public bodies in Ireland who will have to administer the Bill are unhappily and unfortunately at loggerheads with the Central Government, and in many cases in open opposition. They are simply under another flag; not the British. They are refusing to have any communication with the local government authorities. Threats are being made by the Government—have been in this House, at the suggestion of hon. Members—that they shall receive no grants at all from State funds, while in many cases the more active members are in His Majesty's prisons. Another measure, the Criminal Injuries (Ireland) Bill, has been sent round to hon. Members. This will enable the Executive in Ireland to levy a tax on the local governing bodies if they think it just that they should pay compensation for injuries done in their area. Anyone who has the least knowledge of the present state of affairs in Ireland knows that that will mean prolonged litigation, and even passive resistance to it. That being so, to ask the House, and Ireland, to accept this Bill is very unreasonable indeed, and an affront to hon. Members for the Government appear to suppose that the majority of hon. Members are totally unacquainted with the state of affairs in Ireland. Those who know what is going on in Ireland know that this Bill will not be worked, and it is nothing but a farce. I think we ought to refuse the Third Beading and not perpetrate such a bad joke in the face of such a tragic situation.
Question "That the Bill be now read the Third time" put, and agreed to.
Bill read the Third time, and passed.
Sheriffs (Ireland) Bill
As amended ( in the Standing Committee ), considered.
Motion made, and question proposed, "That the Bill be now read the Third time."
The last Bill was, after all, very trivial, and my principal objection to it was that it is not dignified to bring forward Bills which have no chance of being worked. This measure is to raise the salaries of the sheriffs, and under its provisions the power to appoint under sheriffs is taken away from the sheriffs and is vested in the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, which means that Dublin Castle officials will be given more power to appoint people who are politically a little more attractive to them. This Bill will place a charge on the Treasury of about £3,000 a year, which is going to be paid to a set of officials who will have very little to do. Let me quote a few cases showing the exact situation. On June 16th last at Swinford Quarter Sessions only one out of 12 litigants put in an appearance, and the others went before the local Republican Courts, and the under-sheriffs do not attend those Courts. Mr. Justice Doyle said that he could not understand it. In county Cork, on 16th June, what is called the British Petty Sessions had their first case for three months. We are all aware of the state of county Cork. At Cork Sessions there was only one case in three months, and it was the case of a man with no fixed residence who was brought in by the police. At county Westmeath no single case was heard, and so I could go on. In county Tipperary and Donegal, on the 18th of June, no cases came on for hearing. The same state of things exists in county Cavan, Sligo, Mayo, and so on. In county Mayo, out of 30 cases, only nine put in an appearance, and the position is getting more serious. I saw in the papers the other day they could not get grand juries, neither will witnesses attend. Over three-quarters of Ireland the King's Courts are not operating: their places are being taken by Republican Courts, barristers are being driven to practise before them, and, as the Attorney-General has admitted, a kind of rough justice is being done. I have some instances of that. In Queen's County in June three men were tried for burglary at a Republican Court. One gave evidence and the other two were convicted and fined and ordered to restore the stolen property. In Sligo a man arrested for raiding the house of an aged woman and stealing money was fined £5 and ordered to restore the money. In county Clare the Republican Court fined men for cattle driving.
Is the hon. Member in Order in dealing with the performances of Republican Courts which are illegal?
I was not expressing an opinion on them. I was saying it was lamentable this state of things existed. It is likely to go on. The King's Courts are deserted and these irregular courts are becoming more and more firmly established. This ought to be realised.
What connection has it with this Bill?
Perhaps I am putting my case badly, but why vote money to increase the salaries of the Under-Sheriffs, who are attached to courts that are not functioning? Would it not be better to wait till things settle down and postpone this Bill till the Autumn Session?
Question, 'That the Bill be now read the Third Time," put, and agreed to.
Bill read the Third time, and passed.
Telegraph [Money]
Resolution Reported,
"That it is expedient to authorise the issue out of the Consolidated Fund of such sums not exceeding in the whole ten million pounds as are required for the further development of the telephonic system, and to authorise the Treasury to borrow money, by means of terminable annuities or by the issue of Exchequer Bonds, for the issue of such sums or the repayment thereof to the Consolidated Fund; and to provide for the payment of the terminable annuities or of the principle of and interest on any such Exchequer Bonds out of moneys provided by Parliament for Post Office services or, if those moneys are insufficient, out of the Consolidated Fund; and to amend Section four of the Telegraph (Money) Act, 1876."
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House doth agree with the Committee in the said Resolution."
I think some protest should be made against the action of the Government in taking so important a Resolution at this time of the night. We are being asked to pass a Resolution which commits us to an expenditure of £10,000,000 on undertakings about which there is a considerable division of opinion in the House. The Government is not treating the House quite fairly in this matter. A great deal of interest is taken in the telegraph and telephone undertakings and the House would desire a reasonable opportunity at a reasonable hour to discuss this Resolution quite apart from the amount of money that is being voted.
I desire to associate myself with what the hon. Member has just said. It is not desirable that a matter of such vital importance to commercial prosperity and convenience of the country should be brought on at twenty minutes past eleven without any explanation at all. I put down a question to the Postmaster-General for to-morrow, which I hoped he would answer before this Debate came on, to the effect that I wished to know whether his Department had studied the highly efficient operation of the telephone service in the United States of America, and whether before we were asked to vote another £10,000,000 to put into funds what is practically a bankrupt concern in this country, we should not have information as to what was being done by the Department in order to bring the telephone service up to date, and further, whether the Government would not consider the desirability of handing the telephones over to private business enterprise, which is the service which operated them in the United States, and which gives a highly-efficient result. I entirely associate myself with what has been said that we should have some explanation from the Government before we vote this sum of £10,000,000 to put in funds what is practically a bankrupt concern, highly inefficient. I am not prepared to vote this money until I see some prospect of the service being put on a business-like footing.
I should like to ask the representative of the Post Office whether they have decided upon any policy with regard to the extension of the telephone system in the Highlands. The scattered populations in that part of the country are suffering through the fact that they cannot provide so much work for the telephones as in the larger centres, but the necessity for the telephone in those parts is just as great as in the more populous parts of the country. I understand that the conditions laid down by the Post Office in these scattered areas are so onerous that it is very difficult for the local bodies there to meet them. I think the Post Office should regard themselves, not so much as a commercial concern as a Department of the Government functioning for the convenience of the public, even in cases where the service does not commercially pay. In the early days, at any rate, it was never regarded as an axiom that the Post Office should necessarily pay commercially. We are told that the unpaid services rendered by it to the various Government Departments do not pay, but I do not at all accept the view that it is a non-paying concern, and they should deal more generously with those parts of the country which are not in a position to pay what may be called commercial rates. I should like the Postmaster-General or his Assistant to tell the House what are the general lines of the policy they propose to adopt in extending the telephone into the areas to which I am referring, and particularly whether they are prepared to maintain the telephone systems set up during the War by the Admiralty and the military authorities. Those systems became very useful for connecting remote places. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will tell us, not in detail, but generally, what are the lines of their policy in regard to the extension of the telephone system in the Highlands of Scotland.
I should like also to enter my protest against the cavalier methods of the Postmaster-General in this matter. I think we have a right to say that, of all the Government Departments which we have criticised during the last few weeks, the Post Office is the least efficient and has brought the least satisfaction to the public. We had last night a carefully prepared speech from the right hon. Gentleman who spoke for the Post Office, but while we heard a great deal about the money that is going to be spent, we heard nothing in regard to the fees that are going to be charged to the public. The commercial community, the private individual, everyone is complaining of the inefficiency of the telephone service and its lack of coordination between the man who wants to speak and the man who wants to hear. We are told that we are to Vote £10,000,000 at this time, when we all know that every penny spent is carefully watched by the public, and we want value for our money. It is said that there is a deficit of £4,000,000 on the telephones to-day. In my opinion, if the telephones had been efficiently worked, there would have been, not a deficit, but a profit. I think it is the duty of those of us who believe in economy with efficiency to ask for a great deal more information than we have yet received as to the need for this £10,000,000 of expenditure. The whole business in regard to the Government to-day almost approaches a scandal. With a few Parliamentary words they ask us to grant the expenditure of huge sums of money and we who are taking upon ourselves the functions which used to be performed by the Exchequer, the guardians of the public purse, have the duty to see that not one penny passes this House unless we are convinced that it is right in the public service and that we are going to get good value for our money. I join with hon. Members in the protest against the perfunctory and cavalier manner in which the right hon. Gentlemen who are responsible for this Vote, after 11 o'clock, throw £10,000,000 before us and say, "Take it or leave it." I hope we shall show our feeling in the matter by dividing against the motion.
It is not out of lack of respect to the House that I have not spoken. Last night I made a long speech; in fact, I answered every question that has been raised this evening by the hon. Gentleman, also dealt with all the questions. But I shall only be too glad to give what information I can. There is more than half a column in the "Times" to-day of my speech last night dealing with this question. In reference to what the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Palmer) has said, the reason nothing has been said in reference to new charges is that a Committee, of which the hon. Gentleman the Member for Lewisham is the Chairman, which is taking evidence this very day in regard to this question, and it is impossible for us to say what the charges will be until the Committee has reported. With regard to the expenditure proposed out of telephone capital, I can give figures if the House wishes. The total amount of expenditure proposed out of telephone capital for the last year was on trunk lines £1,000,000 odd, on exchanges £2,000,000, and on sites and buildings £120,000; the total amount spent is £2,647,000. This is the amount of the expenditure proposed for the present financial year. On trunk lines £2,018,000, on exchanges, subscribers, circuits, and junction circuits connecting exchanges in each local area £4,366,000, and on sites and buildings £500,000. I gave full information last night in regard to the trunk lines. In regard to the question of the whole service, I also gave a very plain statement on the Estimates last year, and also last night, showing exactly the reasons why the telephone service had been inefficient. It is efficient in every other country in the world. I am sorry it is so. The reasons were given at great length, and I shall be very glad on a future occasion to give details again when required. It is not from any want of respect that I have not given these particulars, but because I thought it would be a pity to state again to-night what I stated last night.
Question put, and agreed to.
Bill ordered to be brought in upon the said Resolution by Mr. Baldwin, Mr. Illingworth, and Mr. Pike Pease.
TELEGRAPH [MONEY] BILL,—"to provide for raising further money for the purpose of the Telegraph Acts, 1863 to 1916, and to amend Section four of the Telegraph (Money) Act, 1876"; presented accordingly, and read the First time; to be read a Second time To-morrow; and to be printed. [Bill 178.]
The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.
It being after half-past Eleven of the Clock, Mr. Speaker adjourned the House, without question put, pursuant to Standing Order No. 3.
Adjourned at Twenty- eight Minutes before Twelve o'clock.