I beg to move "That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment."

It only does what is, I think, manifest on the face of the Bill, and the result of the insertion of these words is that it makes clear what I should say was clear in the Bill before—but it may not have been so—that no matter what is the offence, the maximum penalty shall be that set forth in the sub-section. That is the intention, and therefore the worst that can be said against the Amendment would be that it is surplus.

I beg to move, "That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment."

There is no intention whatever to alter the existing procedure in Criminal cases, and I think it is just as well that it should be made clear in the Bill.

I do not differ at all from what the Home Secretary has said; but, at the same time, I believe this is a valuable Amendment. At any rate, it will make the Bill more clear than it was when it left this House, and the two Amendments inserted in the Lords are to a very large extent a justification of the argument put forward from this side of the House in favour of more time to consider the Bill. We must acknowledge that in the House of Lords there are gentlemen who understand the law to some extent, if not to the same extent as in this House. Therefore, we welcome the Amendments inserted in the Lords.

Saved by the House of Lords!

I beg to move, in Subsection (1), to leave out the words, "and (except to the extent hereinafter mentioned) Income Tax (including Super-tax)."

The decision that the Committee came to yesterday was that Customs and Excise were to be reserved to the Imperial Parliament. The Amendment which I am now moving has a much smaller scope than the one which the Committee rejected yesterday. The Customs system of a country brings it into contact with foreign Powers, but Income Tax is entirely an internal matter. It raises no question of trade between Ireland and England. It does not touch the question of Free Trade. Therefore, all these big factors, which no doubt formed a large part of the reason why the Committee refused to give Customs to Ireland, do not apply to the gift of Income Tax. No priciple of separation is involved either, for I can imagine no service so much a matter of internal administration as the taxing of incomes. I want now to say a few words from the Irish point of view. Suposing that we leave Income Tax to be assessed and collected here, we do this: we fix the system of taxation which must compulsorily be applied to Ireland. She has no say in the system of Income Tax. I quite agree that Clause 23 gives her power to rebate Income Tax, and to rebate on any plan which her Parliaments may think right, and we were told yesterday by the President of the Board of Education that the present financial surplus would enable a rebate of 3s. in the £ to be made. I welcome that figure. Of course that is a very important power, but surely it is quite a different thing to control your own taxation and to be allowed to repay a certain amount of taxation that is imposed by somebody else. We want Ireland to have the scheme as well as the amount of Income Tax within her purview.

Secondly, I do not see why we should, for no reason that I can conceive, have the odium of tax-gathering in Ireland. It seems to me a quite gratuitous business. Some one has to collect Income Tax; some one has to go through the innumerable claims. Why should we in England do all this work? It is very unpleasant work. It brings us into conflict with Ireland at a hundred points, and we surely want some very strong arguments before we agree to do that which has got more possibility for friction than any system which you can imagine; for one cannot disregard the present position of Ireland, and it is surely plain that if we collected the Income Tax we should be called—unjustly, no doubt—a foreign country exacting tribute. Unless there are some very strong reasons, I do appeal to the Committee, as earnestly as I can, to think twice before they reserve Income Tax. The third and last reason is one that has been so often urged, that the Government who spend should have the burden of collecting the money. Unless you do that you will not get responsibility. Therefore, for every reason, for our own convenience, for the avoidance of friction in Ireland, which is a very real and serious matter, and for the purpose of giving the Irish Government a fair start, I think all the arguments will convince us into giving this tax. When we talked on the Financial Resolution last Friday, the Minister without Portfolio made rather fun of some of our propositions, and rather put himself before the House as a practical financier who was being asked by people like myself to do things that were idealistic. I wonder who is the real practical man in this matter. I have the greatest respect and admiration for my right hon. Friend, but surely it is no want of practicability to try to fit your laws to the facts; and we are, with all the limitations of private Members, trying so far as we can to make this Bill fit the facts of Ireland.

I come now to the reasons which, I think, have influenced the Government. I want to be perfectly fair with the arguments. I do not wish in the least to avoid the difficulties. I quite see the difficulties, but I think there is a way of meeting them. I believe the three reasons for retaining Income Tax are these. First of all, separatism; secondly, security for the Imperial contribution; and, thirdly, the wish to keep the collection of Income Tax at the source. So far as the first is concerned, I do submit there is no separatism involved. It is entirely a matter of internal convenience and administration, and the arguments which apply to Customs, and to a certain extent to Excise, do not apply to Income Tax. Then I come to the two important objections, and I quite recognise their importance. As to the Imperial contribution, if we collect the Income Tax we have an absolute security for a large part, at any rate, of the Imperial contribution. When the time comes, we shall suggest that the far better way of making Ireland pay what I have always said she ought to pay, a share of the War debt, is to impose a capital sum. When we talked about this last Friday the Minister in charge said it was a Utopian scheme, and that nobody would lend the Irish capital. I differ. If there were a Bill which had the least chance of acceptance, the Irish Government would get this money to-morrow. I am perfectly certain the banks in Ire land—

I must at the outset, I think, direct the Committee that we must not re-open the discussion of yesterday, or last Friday. I purposely allowed the greatest width of discussion on those two occasions, in order that we might afterwards come to the details, and, as the hon. and gallant Member quite rightly said, we are now on the smaller point where the Income Tax is a proper tax to transfer to the Irish Authority.

I really have finished on that point, and of course I bow to your ruling. Now I come to an objection of which I really see the force. We shall be told that if the Income Tax is given to Ireland, the collection at the source will be broken down. The collection at the source means that the dividends of joint stock companies have Income Tax taken off by the secretary of the company before the dividends are paid to the shareholders. It is a system of extreme convenience to the Government, and is very simple. The Government fear that if Ireland is given Income Tax, and thereby imposes a far lower tax than she has now, a large number of companies in this country will transfer their offices to Ireland and so escape the British tax. I think I have stated the main objection of the Government. London has been the home of the joint stock companies with business all over the world. They have come here for several reasons—because of the money market, and because our Company Laws are good and our conditions are stable, and they have the great advantage of our Stock Exchange, which is still the biggest stock market in the world. Therefore, I do not think at first sight a company would migrate across the Channel, leaving all those great advantages for Dublin, in the very uncertain future Dublin has got. An hon. Member asks whether they would go to Belfast. I am not so sure. Does the Committee think that a company with large financial interests would, for the sake of escaping a small amount of tax, give up all the enormous advantages that in the past have attracted companies all over the world? I cannot believe it. Would my right hon. Friend who sits beside me transfer the Great Northern Railway Head Office to Ireland? The thing is quite unlikely. Still, there is a possi- bility, and I agree that in this matter the Treasury can take no risks, and so we who support this Amendment must find some watertight scheme which still enables collection at the source to take place; otherwise the Chancellor of the Exchequer would not get the tax automatically, and he would be driven to apply to the individual shareholder here at great expense and subject to a great amount of evasion. Therefore, I admit we must find some watertight compartment.

First of all, I would point out that we shall collect more Irish revenue here than Ireland will collect of English revenue. There are all the materials for a bargain out of that. The second point is that a bargain would be to Ireland's interest. Still I agree she may be unreasonable, and do something against her own interests. We have to provide for all cases, and we have to assume, for the purposes of argument, that she is foolish and unreasonable. I suggest you can meet the thing in this way. I am very sorry to be so long but I want to make the matter quite clear. There are several company concerns that I could mention, say a great company like Vickers and Maxim, and other great businesses physically here. That being so you can do what you like because they cannot escape from control. Let me take the strongest case of which I can think. Take the San Paulo railway of Brazil. They have not got a single works here, but their head office is here. They might be induced to migrate across the Channel so that their shareholders should get their dividends with only the Irish tax taken off and not the British. We could meet that in this way. Say that they cannot do any business here at all unless they have an office here where process can be served; unless they have that, and something more that I shall show in a moment, say that they cannot even sue here.

Just think what that means. They cannot sue a shareholder for calls. They cannot sue on a stock exchange bargain. They are absolutely deprived of the benefit of our laws, and besides that I should make them keep here a register of the shareholders resident here and make their pay the dividends here, with tax deducted, and unless they did this I would exclude them altogether from the benefit of our laws. It is absolutely in- conceivable that under these circumstances they would act contrary to their own interests. If they are likely to go, why did they not go to Amsterdam or Belgium years and years ago, or to the Channel Islands?

Take one more case, a very strong case, A big company like the Bankers' Investment Trust or some similar Trust Company whose business consists of the buying and selling of securities on the London Stock Exchange. They have no real works here that you can control. Assume that they were going across to Belfast, and trusting to the expectations of my hon. Friend below me, and assume they had a private telephone to the Stock Exchange and still continued to operate here. Would they do that if they could not even sue a broker on his bargain, if they were excluded from our courts, and anybody who dealt with them knew they could repudiate the bargain, and that no liability would follow. No company would possibly run in that way, solely to escape Income Tax which would not compensate them for that very real and very serious risk.

I have tried to meet all the objections that occur to my mind. I may have missed some; if so I hope my right hon. Friend will tell me. There is perhaps a stronger point. Let me appeal to what the Prime Minister said in February, 1918, when the Irish Convention was on the point of breaking down. The distinct point involved was the Customs. In the Convention there were three parties. There was first of all Lord Middleton's party, which consisted of the Southern Unionists, the Labour representatives, and the bulk of the Nationalist party. Then there was the extreme Nationalist party of which the hon. Member for the Falls Division (Mr. Devlin) was a member, and this party would compromise on nothing except the Customs. Then there was the Ulster party. There were these three parties at a deadlock. On February 25th the Prime Minister wrote them a letter. I will only read one sentence of that letter. First of all the right hon. Gentleman said:

"The Customs cannot be given during the war."

But he did not absolutely exclude even the Customs. He also said:

"The Government consider that during the period of the war the control of all taxa- tion other than the Customs and Excise should be handed over to the Irish Parliament."

All taxation including Income Tax! No question was raised then, and nobody said that Income Tax was to be a separate department. The Prime Minister accepted then absolutely that Income Tax should be given during the War—not now in peacetime, but during the War. I want to be quite clear about that argument. I quite admit that a good deal has happened in Ireland since 25th February, 1918, that a good many things, terrible things, have happened, that murder and outrages have made a difference. I quite recognise the consideration, but remember also—if hon. Members will cast their minds back—if the Prime Minister during the blackest period of the War did not even question the advisability of giving the Income Tax over to the Irish Parliament, surely we can do it now! That is all I have to say, but I would, in conclusion, refer to what was promised in the speech of the Chief Secretary at Belfast as to an extension of the Bill. When the right hon. Gentleman made that statement I am certain he had something in his mind. We have not seen that extension yet, and I can imagine no greater concession or one that will do more good to both countries than to grant Income Tax to the Irish Parliaments.

I will put the Amendment to leave out the words "and (except to the extent hereinafter mentioned) Income Tax (including Super-tax)." The hon. and gallant Gentleman (Sir S. Hoare) will notice that I am not saving his Amendment which immediately follows, as it is unnecessary to do so.

I quite agree.

The Committee has listened to a very interesting and closely reasoned speech from my hon. and gallant Friend. Let me take up the first point which I understand was made—that there was a sort of promise that even during the War the Income Tax might be transferred. May I point out that the conditions which were then anticipated referred to a single Irish Parliament, and there was no proposal for a transfer of the Income Tax to two Irish Parliaments. I think what has been done by Clause 23 is the best administrative method of giving freedom to both Parliaments with regard to the Income Tax. I think my hon. Friend hardly did justice to the proposal in the Bill, which is that either Parliament can make rebates to any individuals or class of individuals they choose. So that, although the Income Tax is selected by a single tax by the Imperial Parliament, say, at the rate of 6s. in the £, each Irish Parliament can reduce that down to 2s, 3s., 4s., or 5s. by abatements, just as they choose. I think that is an exteremely wide power, and just as wide as if they had the original taxing rights. If it were possible to give original taxation rights without a great many difficulties, some of which my hon. and gallant Friend has referred to, we should have to come to a choice whether we give those rights or whether we adopt the plan of the Bill and give rebates. Let me deal with the difference. This is not a matter merely of separation, it is a matter of convenience. Is a single tax which preserves taxation at the source a better system, or is it better to give each separate Parliament direct taxing powers?

Let me look at some of the difficulties which have been dealt with. The difficulty of the double tax was not dealt with. We have as between the Empire and ourselves many examples of the most disastrous effects upon the individual of the heavy Income Tax in this country, and the equally heavy Income Tax imposed by our Dominions. Only last Session there was a great deal of discussion, and after examination by a Royal Commission or a Departmental Committee, a plan was devised by agreement between the Dominions and this country permitting a rebate on Income Tax, so that this country and the Dominions by mutually giving up a portion of the tax which would otherwise accrue to it, thus lighten the burden upon the individual. That has only been arrived at after the greatest difficulty, and even now it is not in full operation. What would happen if each of those Parliaments were able to levy an Income Tax?

Is it not a fact that the proposal to which the right hon. Gentleman refers, although not in full operation, has been adopted by the whole of the Dominions and our Crown Colonies?

It does not rest with us whether it comes into operation or not, but with the Dominions and us. We have made a standing offer to the Dominions and have said "If you choose to come into this plan, we will reduce our Income Tax to 3s., provided you make a reduction on your Income Tax, so that in the total the tax upon the individual will be the same." It may be said we can make the same offer to Southern and Northern Ireland, and that you can rely upon them just the same as you do on the Dominions, and arrange that you should not place a double tax on the individual taxpayer. It is not merely a question of a double tax, but it may well be a treble tax. Take either railway companies or private individuals who carry on business both in England and Northern and Southern Ireland. One of the great difficulties which has undoubtedly influenced the Government in resisting this Amendment which would arise would be that even if we did make that offer to the two Parliaments and they were accepted you would still have an individual taxpayer subjected to three different systems of income Tax.

In these matters you have to pay some attention to the taxpayer, and you must not look at it solely from the point of view of the Government or the drafting of a Bill. You have to consider what the taxpayer will be subjected to in the three different countries. He would have to make a return in the North of Ireland and in the South, and they might be different, because the Income Tax might be calculated on a different basis and the same person would also have to make a return here. I say quite frankly that my fear is that we should not be able to relieve the individual taxpayer of all the trouble that would fall upon him from possibly three different systems of income tax, and the result would be that we should lose the tax at the source. I wonder whether my hon. and gallant Friend really realises what the value of taxation at the source is to this country. I think he must have some idea of it, because he has shown, with his ingenious mind at work, various ways in which we could keep companies in this country so as to prevent them migrating and avoiding taxation at the source.

You must keep taxation at the source.

If you subject the individual taxpayer to the burden and trouble of dealing with three different systems of Income Tax the demand will be almost impossible to resist, and the taxpayer will say, "I will make a return to you and each of the other Governments, but you must only tax such of my income as arises within your jurisdiction." A company may have an office here where they have the seat of control. I know it is valuable to have an office in the City of London because it offers them facilities which they have not got in any other part of the world, but if we get into the position of only being able to tax the income arising within our jurisdicton, what about the profits in connection with the San Paulo Railway, which was mentioned by my hon. and gallant Friend. How much Income Tax should we get out of the profits of that company?

The shareholders living here are taxed to the full extent of 6s. in the £ upon their dividends. If by complicating the system of Income Tax levy and collection by having three different systems within the United Kingdom, then we should drive the Income Tax payer into revolt, and he would say, "each of these Parliaments shall only tax the income arising within their jurisdiction." In this way we should lose over £1,000,000 of tax which we now enjoy. My hon. and gallant Friend said that the Government are running no risk, and I entirely agree with him. We can run no risk. What did he offer instead of the security that we have at the present time? He offered a very ingenious system of saying to a company which was not carrying on business with physical effects in this country, such as the San Paulo railway: "If you come and register yourselves in Dublin or Belfast, we will treat you, not with any brotherly affection because you have turned yourselves into an Irish company, but more fiercely and with greater restrictions than at the present time we treat foreign companies who carry on business in the city of London." That is what my hon. and gallant Friend is driven to in order to get the security which he realises is necessary, because he recognises perfectly well that no government can afford to take the risk of breaking up the whole system of collection of Income tax at the source.

There was one other point to which my hon. and gallant Friend called attention, and that was the security which the collection of Income Tax according to the present method gives this country for the payment of an Imperial contribution. As he says, so long as we have the Income-tax in our hands it is a very substantial security indeed. It is an automatic security. It is not a security which keeps on thrusting itself into vision. It is not a security which to make good steps have to be taken. The collection of Income-tax at the source will bring in the necessary amounts to be accredited to the Imperial contribution, and, when there is a surplus, of course that will be paid over. My hon. and gallant, Friend has another method of securing the Imperial contribution by a capital sum. An amendment is going to be moved converting the Imperial contribution into a capital sum, and I shall have to deal with it then. The Committee, from my hon. and gallant Friend's own speech, will recognise the great difficulty that he has and the care that he saw was necessary to give security. He had to invent an ingenious but highly complicated procedure which would have to be applied to companies which might otherwise migrate. The Committee, I think, will come to the conclusion that the Government are right in saying that they cannot accept an amendment which could only be accepted at too great a risk.

The right hon. Gentleman has described the objections to this scheme. I want to go a little further. He has pointed out that if the concession be given to Ireland you will have complicated the Income Tax by three different systems. What is going to happen if this Home Rule Bill goes through, as we all hope that it will? Within a very short time Scotland will be demanding a Home Rule Bill and Wales also will be demanding a Home Rule Bill, and the concession which will have been granted to Ireland in respect of Income Tax will be equally demanded by Scotland and Wales. I am one of those who say that we ought to be prepared to give everything to Ireland which we asked for ourselves and nothing more. Instead, therefore, of having three systems we should have five systems, and if England got two Parliaments of her own there would be seven. With regard to the suggestion of preventing companies departing, what would happen? Ireland might offer certain advantages to a company to register there. Do you suppose Scotland would keep quiet and not offer similar concessions? The mere statement of these things shows that the suggestion of the hon. and gallant Member will not hold water.

It has to be admitted by anyone supporting this Amendment that if you accede to the proposal to set up in Ireland a new system of Income Tax, independent of that in the country, you will necessarily create a new doubtful area of double Income Tax. What are the real difficulties and disadvantages of that doubtful area? We have all felt them in recent legislation, and very largely they have been already solved. The first difficulty was to find some sensible scheme of agreement between two countries connected by the double Income Tax area. That has been found as between ourselves and the Dominions. It is, as I understand it, the identical scheme which was originally proposed for application to Ireland by the Primrose Committee. The scheme has been found. In the second place, the difficulties are largely matters of negotiation. When parties are at arm's length, it is an inducement to them to come together. In this case such difficulties can be avoided, because the parties are not yet at arm's length. The provisions can be put into this Bill and can be made part of your system. The right hon. Gentleman said, "Surely you must consider the interests and convenience of the taxpayer." It is the consideration of the interests and convenience of the taxpayer which seems to me to point in a diametrically opposite direction from that which he has taken. His objection that it will subject the taxpayer to the inconvenience of two or three systems will only apply to a limited class, namely, those who happen to have income arising from the two countries, but the system proposed by the Bill will have the disadvantage of inflicting greater inconvenience on every taxpayer in England and Ireland. That is one of the gravest disadvantages of the proposals of the Bill.

It will impose immense inconvenience upon every taxpayer in the North and South of Ireland. It will really be a system of the most extraordinary complexity. Under it every taxpayer, and not only those liable to double Income Tax, would first of all have to make a return of his income according to the system of the United Kingdom, and another according to the Irish system, and then get a rebate in North Ireland if his income be derived from the North and from Southern Ireland if his income be derived from the South. The dangers and disadvantages of a double Income Tax apply only to a small class of income taxpayer and can be avoided, but the dangers and disadvantages under the scheme of this Bill apply to all taxpayers and cannot be avoided. I venture to think that the right hon. Gentleman hardly apprehended the extent of the bearing of the arguments so lucidly advanced by my hon. and gallant Friend (Major Hills). The contention of the right hon. Gentleman, as I understand it, was that the safeguards of the collection at the source could not be extended to the income of a company, say a rubber company, which was earned in the Malay Straits and which chose to move its head offices to Dublin. There are two essential conditions for effective taxation, and I cannot put it better than in the words of the Royal Commission on Income Tax, namely,—

(a) A condition of effective taxation occurs when either

(1) a source of income arises in any State, or

(2) the owner of an income resides in any State.

In the case which has been quoted, there is just the same possibility of effective control as if the company had their factory or plantation in this country. If their shareholders reside here, if their capital was derived in this country, it is just as essential that they should have the right to sue and be sued here. They cannot get on without it, and in granting it you can impose any conditions you please upon them. In passing this Amendment we shall at any rate be simplifying the task of that unfortunate body, the Joint Exchequer Board. If we retain the system laid down in this Bill, this unfortunate body will have to fight out at arm's length the question of the due contribution of income and the yield of Income Tax and Super-tax. That is a theoretical question involving the application of practical facts the bearing and nature of which have never yet and never can be agreed. If only to preserve the possibility of harmonious relations in the Joint Exchequer Board it would be well worth while to pass this Amendment.

I rise to make a few observations on what was said by the right hon. Gentleman the Minister without Portfolio, who made great difficulties about accepting this Amendment. It seems to me the answer to him is a very simple one. Under the last Finance Act we actually proposed making an Income Tax Agreement with every one of self-governing Dominions and Colonies, and surely if we could do that with a score or more of these various Governments, we could do it with two Parliaments in Ireland. Suppose that were impossible, it still would be perfectly possible to follow the suggestion thrown out just now by my hon. and gallant Friend opposite to actually put a clause into the Bill making this agreement an integral part of the Bill. That has already been done in the case of the Death Duties, and Clause 28 in the Bill enacts that no double death duties shall be imposed. Surely the same course can be taken in the case of the Income Tax. Lastly, the right hon. Gentleman seemed in no way to meet what I think was the strongest point in my hon. and gallant Friend's contention that thi3 proposal to give Income Tax to the Irish Government was actually made in 1918 by the Prime Minister himself to the Irish Convention. Observe the time at which it was made. It was made at the moment which was the very darkest in the War, and when the resources of the country were strained to the very uttermost, yet even at that critical moment when every penny of taxation was necessary for the country, the Prime Minister made a proposal that might have broken up the principle of taxation at the source, and even at that critical moment he was prepared, in the interests of agreement in Ireland, and with a desire to make the Irish self-governing, to give Income Tax to the Irish Government. I do not think I need add anything more. After the answer we have heard from the right hon. Gentleman to-day we need have no illusions as to Income Tax concessions being given by the Government in the course of this Debate, and, that being the case, it seems to me it is hardly worth while for any Member of this Committee to make any further attempts. The Government obviously intend to make no concession, and it would be a waste of time to do anything more.

No one doubts the obvious sincerity of my hon. and gallant Friend in bringing forward this proposal, but for my part I am quite content with the answer which has been made by the Minister without Portfolio, who has shown us that the difficulties attending it are, if not insuperable, at any rate of such a grave nature as to convince him that he would be ill-advised in accepting it. There is one question, and a very material one, which I would like to ask. Which of the opponents of this Bill are likely to be conciliated if this Amendment is passed? Are the Republicans likely to be conciliated? Will it affect their minds? Will they say, "now we have the power of imposing Income Tax we will abandon our opposition to this Bill, suppress our murderous organisations and fall into line with the British Empire and with the United Kingdom in support of law and order." I see no indication of that. Will the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith) and his following, whatever it may be, be content with this proposal? Will the right hon. Gentleman, if it is granted, abandon his insane and impossible proposal to grant Dominion Home Rule to Ireland? He is not here Not one of his supporters is here to give their views on this subject. Therefore I assume that neither he nor they take any interest in it whatever. I ask further, will those who support Dominion Home Rule for Ireland—that nebulous form of Home Rule which does not include the power to raise an army, as some say, although others say it does—will those people be conciliated? I confess that I know so very little about their operations, and still less about the amount of support that they have in Ireland, that I do not know that it matters very much what they say; but they, at any rate, have not told us that they are in the slightest degree interested in this question of the Income Tax being levied by Ireland. I would ask one further question: From whom has this demand come? Has it come from the persons who, as I venture to think, ought to have, and who have, the greatest interest in this matter, namely, those in the great industrial centres of Ulster? I have heard no claim made from Ulster in support of this proposal, and I think that, if it has not been made publicly, we may assume that they have no interest in the proposal. Therefore we are driven to the conclusion that the proposal made—in all good faith, I grant—by my hon. Friends opposite, has no support, whether from rebels or from loyalists, except from themselves and, possibly, a very small minority, who certainly have not made themselves heard.

There is the Prime Minister.

That was given in totally different circumstances, and under totally different conditions.

That is raising an even wider Debate than that of yesterday. We have agreed to keep closely to the question of the Income Tax as a business proposal in the present case.

I was drawing my remarks to a conclusion when my hon. and gallant Friend interrupted me. I was going to confine myself to the pure and simple question whether, in view of the almost insuperable difficulties of this proposal, we are not entitled to say that it should be at once rejected, having regard to the fact that there is no important party inside or outside Ireland which supports the demand.

This Amendment has been argued as if the concession to the Irish Parliaments of the right to impose Income Tax would be unquestionably of benefit to Ireland, and as if, when we are considering it here, the one thing that we have to keep in view is the safeguarding of British interests. I am not really concerned about the safeguarding of British interests, because I honestly believe that the Treasury here can look after its own interests, and that it will not suffer in the slightest degree from the concession for which this Amendment asks. I should like, however, to ask those who are in favour of it how it would work in Ireland itself. I do not know whether they would propose that, when Parliaments are set up in Ireland, and they have the right to impose their own Income Tax, the Irish Parliament is to tax at the source, or to have an individual declaration of income, and impose the tax on that declaration. In either case I am cer- tain that the Irish Parliament would lose a very large portion of the revenue to which it would be justly entitled. Many of the difficulties which have been suggested in reference to the working of a proposal of this kind would be got rid of by a system which we must, I think, sooner or later adopt—a system of declaration of domicile. A good many of the arguments have rested on the assumption that what is taxed is income, and not the individual—that the tax falls on the income as possessed and owned by an individual. Undoubtedly we shall sooner or later have to adopt that system. Under the system of declaration of domicile, wherever the individual taxpayer is domiciled, his holding would be subject to the tax levied in the interests of the locality in which he is domiciled; and I think that that would get rid of all the difficulties about double income tax and most of the other difficulties that have been mentioned.

Let us assume, however, that Ireland is going to tax at the source. I do not think it matters in the least whether you adopt that assumption, or the assumption that there is to be an individual declaration of income on the part of the Irish income tax payer, and that the tax is levied on that declaration. Let us assume that one or other of these systems is adopted—I do not mind which. Then I will undertake to say that the Irish Exchequer will lose a very large amount of the income tax to which it is entitled, because it will have no means of tracing the sources or discovering the income of the individual taxpayer. Suppose, for example, that an official, let us say a Government official, in Ireland, derives income from his office, and that he has, besides, an investment in some business that is carried on, let us say, in England. If he chose, he could avoid the Income Tax on the income liable to the English tax. Under any system of separate Irish Income Tax, there would be unquestionably a very large amount of evasion, of which the Irish Exchequer would not get rid. In the United States at this moment each State has, and always has had since the States were founded, the power of imposing a separate Income Tax; and, just because of the difficulty that is arising of discovering income as the commercial and industrial life of the States has developed, and the sources of income have spread beyond the limits of the State, so the separate system of Income Tax in the United States has broken down. At this moment there is a very strong movement in the United States in favour of the separate States handing over their power of taxation to Congress, in order that the difficulties which arise under the system that has prevailed since the States were founded may be overcome. Personally, I am convinced that Ireland would lose by the right to impose a separate Income Tax. It is not on the ground of any loss to the British Exchequer that I oppose this Amendment, but on the ground that it would be inimical to the interests of Ireland itself.

I have listened to all the arguments against this Amendment, but a more important one still, which is concerned with the first principle of the Bill, has been overlooked. We are not setting up in Ireland two Dominions. The relative position of the six Ulster counties and of the remainder of Ireland in the United Kingdom appears to me to be exactly the same as that of Nova Scotia or Quebec in the Dominion of Canada. Nova Scotia and Quebec do not have a separate Income Tax; as part of the Dominion they are under the Dominion system of Income Tax. I maintain that the six counties in Ulster and the remainder of Ireland are in exactly the same position in relation to the United Kingdom as are the provinces of Nova Scotia and Quebec to the Dominion of Canada.

I beg to move, in Sub-section (1), after the word "Super-tax" ["Income Tax, including Super-tax"], to insert the words "duties on negotiable instruments."

This is really only a drafting Amendment. The Committee accepted an Amendment adding negotiable instruments to the matters which are excluded from the powers of the Irish Parliament. I think it is possible that if the duties on these instruments are left on at all the exemption might have been possibly evaded in that way It may be suggested that the exemption of negotiable instruments removes them from the power o£ taxation, but on careful consideration I think that is not so, at any rate it is not clear, because Clause 19 gives a quite definite power to make laws with respect to the imposing, and so on, of taxes within their respective jurisdictions and then follow certain exceptions. That power is quite general. Clause 4, which is the Clause containing the exemptions, begins: "Subject to the provisions of this Act," which shows that the Clause is subordinated, and furthermore Sub-section (7), which deals with trade with any place out of the part of Ireland within their jurisdiction, goes on:

"except so far as trade may be affected by the exercise of the powers of taxation given to the said Parliaments."

My submission is that those words clearly recognise the existence of a power of taxation in the Parliaments. If there were no power of taxation that exception would not be in. Therefore if what I believe to be the intention of the Committee is to be carried out, purely as a question of drafting I submit that some word ought to be added in Clause 19 so as to cover the point I have raised.

The Amendment is, in the opinion of the Government and its advisers, quite unnecessary because the reserving Clause 4 was amended to include negotiable instruments, and the words in that Clause dealing with the effect of the reservation are that the Parliaments of Southern and Northern Ireland shall not have power to make laws in respect of the following matters in particular, and then are set out in Sub-section (12)—

"Coinage, legal tender or any change in the standard of weights and measures,"

and we added "negotiable instruments."

I can only say I do not agree with the Attorney-General, but if he will not make any concessions, of course I can carry the matter no further. I can only hope that in the future the point will be cleared up.

I do not think it can be intended that there shall be a different duty on negotiable securities. I see all sorts of difficulties.

The effect of what I have said and the effect of the reservation is to guarantee that there will not be any different duty.

If the rest of the stamp duties in Ireland are within the purview of the Irish Parliament, you may have great discrepancies.

I beg to move, at the end of Sub-section (1), to insert the words

"Provided that on and after the date of Irish union the powers reserved to the Imperial Parliament under this sub-section shall be transferred to the Irish Parliament."

I recognise that, owing to the latitude the Chair allowed yesterday, we had this subject vey fully thrashed out, but I should like to ask the Government if they cannot see their way to make any concession. They have already examined the possibility of it in Clause 34, where they say that if an Address is presented by both Houses of the Parliament of Ireland the Joint Exchequer Board shall forthwith take into consideration the transfer to the Parliament of Ireland of the Customs and Excise. All we ask is that in putting in this sub-section they should make that promise a definite one, and thereby dissipate to some slight extent the tremendous atmosphere of unreality that hangs over the whole of this Bill. I simply ask for the pledge of the British Government that Customs and Excise shall be transferred at that time. I do not wish to enter into a general debate on the point. I simply move.

The Government cannot accept this Amendment. It really compels the transfer of these powers after the union. The utmost the Government can do is to allow Clause 34 to stand as it is, namely, that after Irish union, upon the Irish Parliament making acceptable proposals for the securing of an Imperial contribution, the whole question of reserved taxes shall be re-considered. My hon. and gallant Friend made no reference in his quite short speech to the feature of the security for an Imperial contribution, which would be entirely avoided if the Amendment were accepted.

I beg to move, in Sub-section (2), after the word "adjustments" ["subject to such adjustments"], to insert the words

"in the case of customs duties and of excise duties on articles manufactured and produced but not in the case of income tax (including super-tax) or of excess profits duty."

I think the object of my hon. and gallant Friend is not to press the Amendment, but to give vent to a very useful suggestion. If a schedule could be prepared which really covered the ground the Government would be interested to see it, and would endeavour to accept the suggestion which my hon. and gallant Friend makes, if it would form a basis for the guidance of the Joint Exchequer Board. I realise that the difficulties of the Joint Exchequer Board are going to be very great. If you begin to define some of the very many variants of taxable capacity you may make the task even more difficult. You may leave out some considerations which they probably ought to take into account. It is for that reason that no atempt has been made to try to put in schedule from the exact considerations which they will be bound to take into account. If we could get a really good, complete schedule agreed it would be a step in advance. I shall be very anxious to see a schedule drawn up by my hon. and gallant Friend, and I should very much like to confer with him privately upon the subject and see whether such a schedule could be added to the Bill.

My hon. Friends and I had various Amendments down on this Clause which we have not moved, because we felt that after the full discussion yesterday and the very clear intention of the Government not to accept any fundamental amendments as to finance, it would only be wasting the time of the Committee to raise these points of detail. To prevent misunderstanding of our position, I wish to say a few words on the Clause, because several hon. Members who spoke yesterday assumed that our counter proposals involved a remission, at the expense of Great Britain, of the just demands upon the Irish taxpayer. That is not my intention or that of my hon. Friends. We only wish to put forward on this question of Imperial contribution a method of obtaining payment from Ireland in a less unpopular form than that laid down in the Bill. We feel that to enact the provisions in regard to the Imperial contribution that are contained in the Bill is asking for friction. We want to avoid expense, and we want to forestall an agitation in Ireland against this taxation as a method of imposing a British tribute. We feel that there is now a very large Imperial expenditure on account of friction in Ireland, expenditure on the Army, the Navy, and various other services, which does not appear on the Irish Vote, and which in the White Paper is not attributed to Ireland. We think that it would be in the public interest to make a generous financial settlement if some of this incidental expenditure could thereby be avoided. The most important part of our suggested Amendment in regard to this Imperial contribution is contained in a new Clause, "Contribution towards National Debt," which provides that—

"The contribution of Ireland towards the public debts of the United Kingdom shall be a sum of one hundred million pounds, of which fifty-six per centum shall be apportioned to Southern Ireland and forty-four per centum to Northern Ireland, and the shares of Southern Ireland and Northern Ireland, respectively, shall be payable to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom out of moneys to be provided by the Parliaments of Southern Ireland and Northern Ireland, respectively. Interest on the said shares or on so much thereof, respectively, as shall for the time being remain unpaid shall be payable quarterly at the rate of five per centum per annum as from the fifth day of April next after the expiration of one year from the appointed day to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom, and shall be a first charge on and be paid out of the consolidated funds of Southern Ireland and Northern Ireland, respectively, or the growing produce thereof."

As I shall not have a chance of moving that new Clause when Clause 21 is accepted as part of the. Bill, I think it well to make a brief allusion to it. The principle of that Clause, which has been put down at the instance of many of the most influential business men in Dublin, is that Ireland should know what is her actual liability, and that she should in that way have a much freer hand in regulating her own finances. The principle of the Clause is that Ireland should at once, under this Bill, make a settlement for her past capital liabilities in connection with Great Britain. We suggest that she should take over a definite part of the Imperial War Debt as a capital liability. She need not pay it off at once, although my hon. and gallant Friend (Major Hills) suggested this morning that there would be no difficulty in doing so if she wished to do it. If there were no other liabilities on capital account she could probably raise it from the bank. Our Clause does not lay it down that she is to pay it off, but only gives her the option, and suggests that she might prefer to go on paying, with interest and sinking fund, for a period of years. The point is, she would then know where she stood. The question arises, what would be a fair proportion of capital liabilities to be taken over as a share by Ireland?

In view of the great prominence given by Government speakers yesterday to the prosperity of Ireland and the increase in Irish wealth, it is perhaps well to mention the evidence which was given yesterday by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that far from Irish wealth having increased in the same proportion as British wealth, it has relatively lessened. I agree that Great Britain has done an enormous amount for Ireland. She has gone in, as has so often been said, for a method of doles, but that has not brought about the economic prosperity which Irishmen of certain opinions—I do not necessarily agree with them—believe might be brought about if there were certain changes made in their fiscal system. The President of the Board of Education yesterday made out that Ireland was bulging with prosperity. The Royal Commission on Financial Relations nearly 25 years ago gave details about Income Tax as a basis for arriving at the respective wealth of the two countries, and they say, applying these figures to assessments in Great Britain and Ireland, it would appear from the evidence that Ireland's proportion of the gross assessment is 5·4 per cent., or about 1/20th of the whole. The Irish proportion of the net assessment is 4·6 per cent., or about 1/21st part. The yield from that is 4·1 per cent., or about the same as the net assessment.

I asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer yesterday for figures which would compare with these figures on which the Royal Commission based their estimate of 1/20th as the comparative taxable power of the Irish population, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer gives the figure for the net assessment, from which it appears that Ireland no longer produces 1/22nd, which was the figure in 1806, but now produces only 1/38th of the total assessment. He goes on to say

"A more reliable approximation of the true income of taxpayers liable to the tax is arrived at by taking the figures representing the original assessment."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Thursday, 28th October, 1920, Vol. 133, col. 1957.]

On this basis, which according to the Chancellor of the Exchequer is a fair one, the relative wealth of Ireland is only about one-half what it used to be 25 years ago and is only one-40th of the total wealth as shown by the Income Tax standards of the two kingdoms. On this basis my friends and I thought that £100,000,000 of national debt would be a fair sum to take over having in view the undisputed fact that, whatever may have been the case in the last 20 years, certainly for the first century after the union Irelnd was overtaxed. But we did not propose to move this Clause as a full settlement of the Irish contribution for imperial purposes. We put forward this Clause as a settlement for the past, and we leave over the matter of the annual sum, because we feel that the Irish Parliament, or a united Irish Parliament, would feel it necessary in their own interests to contribute to the British Army and Navy, because they will finally realise the advantages of having troops stationed in Ireland, and of the revenue which is enjoyed by Irish trade owing to that fact, and we believe in that way, by free negotiation, if and when this Act comes into operation, quite as big, if not even larger an Imperial contribution might be secured without the friction which would be entailed by the method proposed in this Bill. I make this explanation so that it should not be felt that in saving the time of the House by not moving our Amendment we were running away from our principles. I regret that the Government of Ireland have not seen their way to do something to meet the undoubted unpopularity of the financial proposals in Ireland but fully recognising that there had been a full and free discussion in the matter, we do not like to take up unnecessarily the time of the House.

Referring to the remarks of the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Lieut.-Colonel Guinness), it appears to me that the collective wealth of Ireland is not the basis on which taxation should be assessed. The point is whether the taxes bear to an unfair extent on the individual. If you take the individual incomes of persons in Ireland, say, £100 a year, £200 a year or larger incomes still, you would find upon the whole that the taxation paid by these individuals would be even slightly less than that which is paid by persons of the same income in this country. That being so, I can see no unfairness in graduating the taxable amount to be gathered from Ireland on the basis of the individual rather than on the collective amount of the wealth of the community. I believe that the hon. Member's amendments have been directed towards increasing the powers of the Irish Parliament with the idea that if that were done, the Act would be more effective. I believe that the extension of the powers in the direction of enabling the Irish Parliament to impose taxation would have the opposite effect, because, if they have the power to reduce taxation there would always be a controversy at elections as to which taxes would be reducted, and there would therefore be a great deal of time lost in discussing the subject when the time of the Irish Parliaments would be much better exercised in the administrative functions over which they have control under this Bill. I feel very strongly that this is a very generous Bill and a Bill which the Irish people will accept in the course of time, for when, in the North of Ireland, they have their Parlia- ment, the South of Ireland will want one also, and when this Bill gets into operation the ultimate effect will be to unite the Irish people. To enable them now to differentiate taxes in Ireland would have the effect of introducing elements subversive of the specified ideals, the consummation of which is still intended.

On a point of Order. I have an Amendment down to this Clause.

I understood that the hon. Member's Amendment was not to be moved, and therefore did not call upon him.

I had proposed to move, in Sub-section (3, c), after the word "the" ["Ireland the cost of the service"], to insert the words "reasonable and necessary.

I must apologise. It is my fault. I cannot now go back to it. Will the hon. Gentleman raise the point on the Question "That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill," and he may get a statement from the Government as to some action being taken on Report.

The Amendment I had intended to move was designed to put some limit to the cost of the services in Southern and Northern Ireland respectively. There is an absolute direction to the Exchequer Board to apportion the money in accordance with the cost of the service, whether that cost is extravagant or otherwise. There should be some check upon it. I suggest that it should be limited to "reasonable and necessary cost." I do not know whether the right hon. Gentle- man in charge of the Bill can undertake to make any concession. Under the Bill it is quite open to either the Southern or the 'Northern Parliament to carry on any service in the most extravagant way possible. I am afraid it is not an unknown thing in any part of Ireland for a man to like to find a job for a friend, and if he knows that the more relations he gets into the service the larger will be the share of the reserved taxes that will come from this country the more likely is it that the service would he carried on in an extravagant way. That might almost lead to a competition in extravagance.

The point, I thought, was already covered by the drafting of the Bill. I did not think it was possible that by reason of extravagance of one or the other Parliament it would be possible for either to get a larger share of the reserve revenue allotted to it. But after what my hon. Friend has said I will certainly look into the matter. I do not wish to be misunderstood. I cannot give an undertaking to alter the wording on Report, but I will undertake to look into it carefully, and if there is real substance in what the hon. Member says I will do my best to meet the point.

I beg to move, in Sub-section (1) to leave out the words "from all sources" and to insert instead thereof the words "arising in Southern and Northern Ireland, respectively."

Under the Clause as it stands a man domiciled in Ireland can be subject to Income Tax and Super-tax imposed by the Southern or the Northern Parliament in respect not only of property in Ireland, but in respect of the whole of his property and income from all sources. That is open to great objection. In the first place it is a double Income Tax—an Income Tax leviable in Ireland in addition to the Income Tax leviable in England. That in itself is undesirable. What I might call a full-blooded Income Tax, levied on all a man's possessions, wherever situated, ought not to be levied by a subordinate Parliament, such as these Parliaments in Northern and Southern Ireland undoubtedly are. Think of the effect. A man domiciled in Ireland with a very small amount of property there might be taxed in England for Super-tax and Income Tax up to 10s. or 12s. in the £. If the Clause stands as it is he might also be taxed by the Southern or Northern Ireland Parliament to exactly the same extent, or even more, if that be possible, and he might pay in addition to the 10s. or 12s. of United Kingdom Income Tax a further 10s. or 12s. to one of these Irish Parliaments. In other words, he might be taxed out of existence. That is an impossible suggestion. If these subordinate Parliaments are to be given any power at all of imposing Income Tax or Super-tax I suggest that it would be only reasonable to say that the tax should be levied only on the income which arises in Ireland. There might be some difficulty in working out the amount of that income, but the Joint Exchequer Board is confronted with an exactly similar problem, and I believe it would be possible for the Treasury to frame regulations. I do urge right hon. Gentlemen to make this concession. I do not think it would be reasonable to give these Parliaments power to tax a man out of existence, either in the North or the South. I am quite certain they would not do so in the North, but from other actions which have occurred in the South it is by no means improbable that the new Irish Southern Parliament might not hesitate to inflict punishment of that sort on persons with whom they disagreed. Unless my right hon. Friend can meet me to a certain extent I shall feel bound to move to leave out that Clause. If it is granted in that limited form I suggest perhaps it might be wise to leave it in as a concession or sort of sop to Southern Ireland to come in.

Some hon. Friends and myself have given notice to leave out that Clause, and we intend to put forward our views on this Amendment. I agree with what the hon. and learned Gentleman has just said as to the danger of what is in effect a double Income Tax. It seems to me that even with the insertion of this Amendment the disadvantages of the Clause would be exactly those which the right hon. Gentleman, speaking on an earlier Amendment, said would arise if you allowed Ireland to collect its own Income Tax. The Primrose Committee of 1911, which has been referred to on several occasions, referred to this matter. That was a body composed of financial experts and of men who were really acquainted with the financial position of Ireland. The report says:

"It would unfortunately be necessary to provide against the payment on one and the same income of Income Tax to both Exchequers."

That applies to this Clause. If you give power to impose this surtax a man may be paying Income Tax to both Exchequers. In the recommendations of the Primrose Committee it is stated:

"We recommend that 'double Income Tax be awarded, and that each country should bear one-half of the cost that the concession will entail.'"

The suggestion of a surtax is a most dangerous one, and I am surprised that the Government, contrary to the views expressed on a previous Amendment, should have put forward such a proposal. Many of us who proposed to give greater responsibility to the Governments of Northern and Southern Ireland are unable to support this proposal. You may have a sweeping surtax imposed on a man who will be already paying a heavy tax under the ordinary law. I submit the proposal is a dangerous one, and one which does not seem to be very necessary to the financial clauses or principles of the Bill. I ask the right hon. Gentleman to consider whether he can amend this Clause on Report. We are considering the Clause to-day in a very thin House, and I am bound to say that I feel if it were discussed in a fuller Committee it would have been found that a large number of Members in all quarters who cared for what I call financial probity and the honour of the country would not agree to a proposal which might have the effect of being used as a method of extermination of political opponents.

We have had two very interesting speeches dealing with very different subjects. I do not complain of that, as it is for the convenience of the Committee that we should get the whole thing in perspective. The hon. and learned Baronet (Sir J. Butcher) moved an Amendment which would limit the power of surtax or the grant of relief to the incomes arising in Ireland. My noble Friend (Earl Winterton) wanted to omit the Clause altogether, but failing that he would like to see it cut down in the way proposed by the Amendment. The Amendment proposes that the only income which should be subject to this tax is that which arises within the jurisdiction of the Irish Parliament which sought to place the tax upon it. I have already moved an Amendment to the Clause as printed which limits it to the power to tax those who are domiciled in that particular part of Ireland; that is to say, those who are making that their real home. Is it to be suggested that the local State Parliament, as regards those who are domiciled within their jurisdiction, should only have power to tax revenue arising from that territory? A professional man's whole income would be subject to this surtax. If he were a doctor or a barrister, or otherwise earning his living, his whole income would be subject to the surtax, but a man ten times as wealthy, deriving a relatively small income from that territory, but deriving a large income from outside, would only have perhaps a tenth of his income subject to the surtax, and that, surely, is unfair and not practicable. Remember that the question is now confined to those who are resident and domiciled within the jurisdiction of the Parliament, and surely for those people it is right that the Parliament should have power to tax any income, from whatever it might be derived. Again, would it be possible to distinguish between income which was derived partly from one source and partly from another? Take a shareholder in a bank. The bank's profits might be derived from the North or from the South of Ireland, or from both, or partly from the United Kingdom and partly from elsewhere. You could not follow to the extent at least of saying that the tax should apply to the countries from which he profits were derived. You might say, if the bank were domiciled in the North of Ireland, then all income derived from that bank should be treated as income arising from the North of Ireland, but that would be a very arbitrary division.

Does not this very difficulty arise in the case of the Joint Exchequer Board in considering contributions?

I do not want to belittle the difficulties of the Joint Exchequer Board, as I realise that they will be considerable, but that is quite a different question. You have got it chiefly in Customs and Income Tax, but I can quite conceive the Joint Exchequer Board laying down rules that this class of income should be treated as being from Ireland, and that class of income should be treated as arising from England, which would equalise over the whole field that they are to cover. I admit that it is going to be difficult, but at the same time for a long time past an endeavour has been made in that direction in connection with the Financial Relations Return, and there has already been built up a quite considerable practice which has been tested over a series of years. Without pretending that that is absolute, I do believe the Joint Exchequer Board will be able to lay down a general principle which will work out fairly over a series of years and over the broad area over which they will operate. This, however, is quite a different question. You have got first of all to make up your mind whether it is really desirable, if you give a power to surtax at all, to limit that power so that the citizen who invests money abroad shall be free of surtax, and the citizen who invests his money at home to assist his home industries shall be subject to the surtax. I really do not believe my hon. and learned Friend will think it worth while to pursue the Amendment.

My Noble Friend says this power to surtax may be made a political instrument which might be brought to bear upon political opponents oppressively. In one sense all taxation, as I think we have seen from time to time, may be directed towards certain classes of persons rather than towards others, and to that extent my Noble Friend's argument must be admitted, but not specially this surtax. After all, what the Government has done has been this; to preserve the single system of Income Tax and to give with it, subject to that, the greatest possible liberty of taxation to the State Parliament. It has been done in America, and no difficulty has been found there. There have been State Income Taxes, and there is the Federal Income Tax in America, and I see no see no reason why it should not work perfectly equitably here.

It presses very heavily on businesses in America.

Of course, Income Tax presses heavily, but I do not know that my Noble Friend can possibly say that the American surtax presses specially hardly—the State Income Tax presses specially hardly—because as a rule, I believe, it is a very light tax, and I do not anticipate that this is likely to be a very heavy tax. But after all, the State Parliament under this proposal is given the liberty without breaking up our single system of taxation. If we were not able to give this liberty under Clause 23, I frankly say that I should have had very much greater difficulty in dealing with the Amendments which propose to transfer Income Tax and Super-tax to the two Parliaments, but we can refuse that because we are giving this liberty under Clause 23 and because on balance it is better both for Great Britain and for Ireland that the single system of taxation should be maintained, provided you give a reasonable liberty. This does give a reasonable liberty, and therefore I am afraid I cannot accept the Amendment.

This point seems to me to exemplify in a very direct manner what we have been trying to say during the last few days. The right hon. Gentleman has said that they have put in these powers of surtax because they could not give the Irish Parliaments control over the other sources of taxation, and they had to give them some liberty. That seems to me to be a very curious way of treating the problem. It would have been much better to have given the full powers of taxation and to have avoided the possibility, and in my view the almost certainty, of unfair taxation being imposed under this Clause. I am inclined to think—I speak as an Englishman in ignorance of Irish conditions—that the Amendment that has just been passed at the suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman inserting "domicile" into this Clause is going to make the danger even worse, for observe what will happen. The surtax will be imposed upon the Irishman who is actually domiciled in Ireland. That means that the rich man with houses in other parts of the United Kingdom will escape, and the man who will be at the mercy of the Southern Parliament will be the man who actually lives there and has his property there. That is the man whom by this inverted process of taxation the Government pro pose to hit. He is a man who, as a rule, will have a certain amount of property, and will therefore be liable to surtax.

I am given to understand that the people of means in Ireland, no doubt possibly due to their greater understanding in political questions, are in many cases Unionists in the South and West. Political lines go hand in hand with economic lines, and the result will be that in giving this measure of liberty to the Southern Parliament you will be merely inviting them to retaliate against the scattered Unionists in that part of Ireland, and at a moment when party feeling will be very bitter. I am afraid one must face the fact that for some time at least party feeling in Southern Ireland will be very bitter. As the result of this Clause, in order to give some sort of eye-wash to the Southern Parliament in the matter of finance, we really invite discrimination and persecution against the scattered Unionists. I therefore very much hope the right hon. Gentleman will reconsider what he has said, and that between now and the Report stage will think over again what has been said by the hon. Baronet opposite, and that when we come to discuss the Bill on the Report stage this very objectionable Clause will be removed altogether.

My right hon. Friend has pointed out the difficulty in the way of my proposal, but he has not answered at all what I conceive to be the strength of my proposal, namely, the injustice which might be perpetrated on individuals if this Clause stands as drawn. The injustice I refer to is this. If a man is to be taxed first of all in the United Kingdom upon the whole of his income, from whatever source, to the extent of 10s. or 12s. in the £, and is then to be taxed in Ireland also to the extent of his whole income by another 10s. or 12s., surely my right hon. Friend will say that that is a state of things which ought not to be permitted, and the possibility of which ought not to be conceded by this Bill. He has offered no answer to that at all. He has only said there are difficulties in the way. May I suggest two ways to avoid the injustice, if he will not accept the principle involved in my Amendment? He might do one of two things. He might either limit the power of these two Parliaments in Ireland with regard to imposing Income Tax and Super-tax to a certain specified amount. For instance, if a man is paying the full rate in this country, then I think it would be reasonable to say that the Irish Parliament should not be allowed to impose full Income Tax upon him at more than a certain figure, which might be provided by the Bill. Perhaps he will consider that before the Report Stage as a means of avoiding what might be a very gross and glaring injustice upon a man resident in Ireland. There is another way in which this injustice might be got rid of. The Bill might provide that if a man pays a double Income Tax a similar method might be adopted as in the case of a man paying double Income Tax here and in the Dominions, namely, that a portion of the Income Tax might be remitted in this country or vice versâ.

Unless the right hon. Gentleman meets that case in one of two ways, I say you put into the hands of the Southern Irish Parliament the power to commit very flagrant and gross injustice upon persons who happen to be resident in the South. Let us make no secret about it. I believe Irishmen under this Bill domiciled in the North will have nothing to fear. I believe the Northern Parliament will treat them in every way fairly, but I am expressing the feeling of every Irishman who knows the country, who knows the present opinion in the South and West of Ireland, when I say there is danger as to what will happen to Loyalists in the South and West of Ireland under this Bill, and my right hon. Friend, by this Clause, is putting in to the hands of the Southern Parliament a weapon which, in the present temper of the majority of the people in the South, they may use most harshly, in a manner which will create great injustice to the loyal population of the South of Ireland. I speak here as coming from the South of Ireland. I have many dear friends there, many men who have done their duty in Ireland and elsewhere, and I say these men ought to be protected. I grant you that when you set up this Parliament in Ireland it will be impossible by legislation to prevent every individual form of hardship and injustice upon these loyal men in Ireland. But I do say it would be a very grave scandal if my right hon. Friend were to sanction a Clause in this Bill, and a Clause prepared by himself, which would put a direct weapon in the hands of the Southern Parliament to injure their opponents. I do beg of him between now and the Report stage to discover some method, either one of those I suggest or some other, for the purpose of relieving the inhabitants of the South of Ireland from what might be a very grave menace and a very grave disaster.

I trust the right hon. Gentleman will not weaken in respect of this Clause. I am certainly no lover or admirer of the Clause. I think it is a most extraordinarily cumbrous scheme, and will inflict great inconvenience on the taxpayer. I do not think it is necessary to protect the principle of collecting at the source a tax which can be collected in some other way; but the principle being so, I do value the proposals of the Clause as giving a substantial and a practical measure to the Irish Governments by which they will be able in important particulars to adapt their fiscal system to their own particular need, and that, throughout the discussion, has been the principle which has been considered most desirable to confer. As regards the argument expressed by the hon. and gallant Member for Chelsea (Sir S. Hoare), I confess I agree with him rather in his earlier and more optimistic mood, when he desired responsibility to be extended to the Governments of Ireland, than in his later attitude, when he appeals for responsibility to be reduced.

There is an old proverb which says, "Let the galled jade wince, our withers are unwrung." That may be said in respect of this question of the hon. and gallant Member. He does not happen to be resident in Ireland, and will not be called upon to pay this Super-tax, and is quite satisfied that it should be imposed upon people like myself I do not see why, having been taxed and super-taxed by Parliament, I should be super-super-taxed under this particular Clause, and I am undoubtedly speaking for every sensible loyalist in the South of Ireland. This Clause is objectionable. It is a Clause to which no Southern Irish loyalist would agree, and I cannot help thinking that the Members of the Government who are in charge of this Bill must know that very well. There are two Members, I understand, on the Front Bench at this moment in charge of this Bill—the President of the Board of Education and the Minister without Portfolio. Now I used to regard the Minister for Education as my opponent, and the Minister without Portfolio as my friend. As a matter of fact, I regard them both at the moment as my opponents, and I appeal to them as opponents on this particular Clause. What would the Minister without Portfolio have said to this Clause in 1912, supposing the then Government in the present Home Rule Act had put down a Clause similar to this? He would have fought for all he knew, and he would have fought it justly. This is bringing into the Bill of the Government a most objectionable and unfair Clause. I heard the end of the speech of the hon. Baronet below me. I suggest and urge the Government to accept some sort of suggestion put forward by him. We who are resident in the South of Ireland and who have paid our Income Tax and Super-tax up to the full amount—why should we be charged any more? I suggest that there should be a provision inserted to that effect on the Report stage.

Although there may be opportunities before the Report stage, I am afraid they will not be made available by the Government to adopt the suggestion he has just made, and in view of the discussion which took place yesterday afternoon. This must be my apology for detaining the Committee with the further consideration of the insertion of the word "domicile" and what my right hon. Friend said before, increases very much indeed the objection to this Clause. The right hon. Gentleman is no doubt familiar with the difficulties which arise when the question of domicile arises. It taxes very great lawyers to say when a man is and when a man is not domiciled. I am not going to enter into a discussion of that question; but I would remind the Committee there is all the difference in the world between residence and domicile—that you can obtain your residence without any trouble, but domicile may be a question of years and intention, which only can be discovered by references to a long course of events as to whether or not you are still domiciled. The position that will arise if these words are inserted and added to the present proposal in the Clause as now drafted, will lead to this situation: that a man who in better circumstances had a house in the South of Ireland or in the North of Ireland, and spent his holidays there and brought up his children there, and came to London or England for the conduct of his business affairs, and has now left the country in consequence of the troubled condition of it, will now be liable to a sur-tax upon the whole of his property because he is domiciled in the South or North of Ireland, and it will be unable to be proved that he is not domiciled there.

That grave objection, it seems to me, would be very much removed if the surtax be limited to his property in Ireland, because, at any rate, he would retain the liberty at any time of disposing of the property which he continued to hold in that country. Here he is at the mercy of the Parliaments for a time and a period which he cannot bring to an end. I cannot altogether suppose that the Parliaments will behave dishonestly or act with a desire to reap vengeance upon those who may be their political enemies. But I think it would be an exceedingly difficult matter for the Inland Revenue Officials to decide who is and who is not domiciled in Ireland, having regard to the fact that such a large number of persons have houses in Ireland in which they spend their holidays or a portion of their lives.

I assume, however, they will act honestly. But surely it seems rather a monstrous position, that a man brought up in Ireland, who may have the hope some day of returning there when the country becomes more happy, should be subjected to the possibility of having the whole of his property, whether derived from sources in this country or other parts of the world, liable to a sur-tax, in addition to the super-tax in this country! I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman has considered c r advised the report of a Committee as to the difficulty which may arise on this question of domicile. At any rate, when he considers these difficulties and complications, surely he will appreciate how "monstrous "—I was going to say—it is there should be so much uncertainty in a Clause of an Act of Parliament which should, of all Clauses, be certain in its incidence and clear in its construction. There will be the utmost uncertainty in the mind of a great number of people as to whether they come or do not come under this Clause because of their uncertainty of domicile, and in that state of uncertainty they will be subjected to an overwhelming tax upon their property wherever it may be. I think this Committee can hardly contemplate that state of things with equanimity. I regret the whole Clause.

It has, I think, been pointed out long ago that one of the most separating things that you could do is to give the powers of taxation in the matter of such taxes as income tax to different parts of what is intended to be one united kingdom. I voted last night for the Government upon the amendment moved by the hon. Gentleman behind me with some little doubt; I rather wish now I had voted with my hon. Friends in support of their Amendment, because I think that would have been far preferable to this cumbrous, difficult, and uncertain Clause, which has become more uncertain and more unfair, in my humble opinion, by reason of the words inserted by my right hon. Friend, and by reason of the retention of words which he is determined to retain, instead of accepting the very reasonable Amendment suggested. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will realise the difficulty of this Clause as it stands at the present time. It is not a question of unfairness. It cannot be unfair that the Irish Government should only have power to tax income that arises from property in their own country? If it is not unfair surely it is also convenient that it should be limited. If the right hon. Gentleman will consider the Clause as it is affected by the insertion of the words which he himself has proposed to put into the Clause I am sure he will appreciate that the balance of argument rests with those who support the Amendment.

In the second reading debate the Government, when they were putting in this provision as following Imperial precedents, did not think, in view of the experience of the Dominions, that it was likely to be used at all, or at all events not used in an oppressive manner. But in no country do political lines so closely follow income tax limits as in Ireland. Therefore there is no doubt amongst the scattered Unionists of the South and West that a very great anxiety is felt about this particular proposal. The case against double income tax is far stronger now than it was in 1911. In those days Income Tax and Super-tax together did not reach 2s. 6d. in the £. Now they are standing at nearly five times that amount. If, in the opinion of the Primrose Committee, it was not just that British subjects should be subjected to double Income Tax, it is far less just at the present time. I only want to say this one word further: in the earlier stages of these Debates the Government expressed much sympathy, and this especially applies to the First Lord of the Admiralty—a sympathy which I am sure he felt—in regard to the future position of the Southern Unionists. He promised to give the most favourable consideration to any safeguards which they might suggest. So far, not a single safeguard has been vouchsafed by the Government. By the alleged safeguard which has been inserted the position of the Southern Parliament is made worse. In view of these facts I hope the Government will reconsider the matter before the Report stage, and in any case I hope my hon. and learned Friend will not leave the matter where it is, but bring it up again if he dons not receive some further consideration.

I join in the appeal to the Government to reconsider this question. I was very much struck with the suggestion that it should be considered on the Report stage, but that docs not give us sufficient security. After listening to and carefully weighing the arguments on both sides on this question, I voted yesterday with the Government, although I had deep sympathy with my hon. Friends who moved their Amendment, and I did so because it seemed to me they were making a proposal which might be attended from a fiscal point of view with great danger, and would introduce dangers which I thought ought to be guarded against. The proposal we are now considering is quite different. The Minister without Portfolio thinks he has safeguarded the position, but my hon. Friend has shown that, even as regards those who are not resident in Ireland, the loss is very great, and it still leaves the injustice with those who reside in Southern Ireland, because they are liable to an arbitrary and, it may be, a hostile and inimical surtax being put upon them by those who have been their bitter political opponents.

There is another point in regard to these people. We talked yesterday as to how far you could give fiscal autonomy to Ireland within their own borders. As this Clause stands, it gives much more than fiscal autonomy, for it gives to Ireland the power of taxing property in this country. Therefore you are giving to a separate Irish Parliament the power of imposing taxation, not only in this country, but all over the Empire. Is that not an exaggeration far greater than was proposed by the Amendment of yesterday? It is for that reason that I shall use any influence I have to press upon the Government the necessity of reconsidering this matter. This is a question of fundamental justice, and you have no right to give to these two Parliaments the power of imposing hostile and inimical taxes, not levied upon property in Ireland at all, but on property in this country and all over the Empire. If this proposal goes to a Division I shall certainly support it.

I do not see why the whole of this Bill should no go through all its stages this afternoon. I have been much amused at the nervousness of certain hon. Gentlemen in connection with the establishment of a Southern Parliament for Ireland. I should like to offer them a little comfort. I think we may take it that there never will be a Southern Parliament in Ireland, and even if there should be, the Government have already provided that they must all be Loyalists. I think that fact ought to be kept in view, because all Members must take the Oath-of Allegiance. I think it would be too bad to think that a Parliament of Loyalists would inflict such injustices as have-been mentioned upon their fellow Loyalists in Ireland. The hon Member for York (Sir J. Butcher) said he had no fear as to what would be done by Parliament in the North of Ireland, and I notice two or three hon. Members opposite shake their heads. We all know the social and radical advance in the opinions of the working men of Belfast, and I agree that you are far more likely to have this sort of super-taxation imposed upon the wealthy in the North than those in the South. You will have no powers at all in regard to those in the South of Ireland in this Bill, and if you do they will all be Loyalists.

I do not think it is likely that Irishmen will be unfair in con- nection with this Clause, but I am afraid that it will introduce great complications If it can be maintained so as to limit its extent and have connection with income derived from Ireland, I think it would make the proposal more simple.

I beg to move, in Sub-section (1), to leave out the words

"each of the Exchequers of Southern and Northern Ireland a sum of one million pounds for the purpose of making provision for the establishment of the Parliaments and Governments thereof "

and to insert instead thereof the words

"the Exchequers of Southern Ireland and Northern Ireland respectively such sums as the Joint Exchequer Board may certify to be necessary for the purpose of providing buildings (including the sites thereof) and for their equipment for the accommodation of the Parliaments and public Departments in Southern and Northern Ireland respectively."

I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he is quite satisfied that the words "public departments" will cover such buildings as the Law Courts, or buildings to house the Incorporated Law Society, if such a body should be set up? It seems to me doubtful whether the words would include such bulidings, and I should be glad if the right hon. Gentleman would look into the matter, and, if, necessary, add a word or two on Report to include such buildings.

It is intended to include the Law Courts, and I will see whether the words "public departments" do include them, but the Incorporated Law Society is not in any sense a Government institution, and I cannot say that we shall provide buildings for it any more than for the local College of Surgeons or the local Veterinary Surgeons. Those are professions, and they must provide buildings for themselves.

I think I am right in saying—the Attorney-General will correct me if I am wrong—that the very fine building in Dublin in which the Incorporated Law Society is at present housed is a Government building, provided out of Government funds.

Proposed words there inserted.

Further Amendment made: Leave out Sub-section (2).—[Sir L. Worthington-Evans.]

I do not know if my right hon. Friend proposes to get through the whole of the Committee stage to-day, and I do not know that any of us who have Amendments down would raise any objection, though there are one or two important points on subsequent Amendments. I wish to raise what at any rate appears to me primâ facie strong objections to this particular Clause, Sub-section (1) of which reads:

"A candidate at an election of Members for the Parliament of Southern Ireland or Northern Ireland shall, during the time during which nominations may be received, take and prescribe before the returning officer the oath of allegiance, and if he fails to do so he shall be deemed to be withdrawn within the meaning of the provisions of the Ballot Act, 1872."

I would like the Committee to consider what the effect of this Clause is going to be. It will impose upon candidates for Parliament in Ireland a wholly novel procedure which has never been known in our constitution hitherto, and which, had it been in existence in the time of Mr. Brad-laugh, would have prevented him standing as a candidate for Northampton. Many persons who afterwards became distinguished Members of this House would have been prevented standing. It is not a question of a man being compelled to take the oath after he is elected. He is to take the oath of allegiance when he stands as a candidate, and such a condition, I believe, would have ruled out the late Sir Charles Dilke, who became a very distinguished Member of this House. It is an extremely dangerous thing to be introduced into our constitution. We have to consider public opinion all over the world. It will be said, if this is passed, that the House of Commons has introduced a wholly novel procedure never before applied to any of the Dominions that have got constitutional government. So far as I have been able to ascertain, such a condition as this is not laid down in the constitution of any one of our Dominions or in any of our colonial Parliaments. Of course, if a man is elected he has to take the oath of allegiance in the ordinary way.

3.0 P.M.

What will be the effect, if this Clause is carried, on the South of Ireland? There are those who have suspicions of the Government, among them the "Times" newspaper, and that journal suggests that the Government know perfectly well there is not a man in the South of Ireland who, if he became a candidate for the Southern Parliament, would dare to take this oath. The hon. Member for Finchley (Colonel Newman) lives in the South of Ireland. If he decided to give up his membership of this House and to stand for the Southern Parliament of Ireland I venture to think he would not dare to take the oath of allegiance. His life would not be safe for a moment. I oppose this new Clause on two grounds; first, that this thing has never been done in our constitutional history, and that in consequence it is likely to be misinterpreted not only by our enemies, but by our friends all over the world as an attempt to make, a distinction against Ireland; and, secondly, because it is not necessary, and it will prevent people standing as candidates for the Southern Parliament. No man will dare to do it. If one might venture to entertain suspicions of the attitude of the Government, as the "Times" and other newspapers, and as many associations of persons do, it might be suggested that the object of this new Clause, this very extraordinary proposal, is this. Candidates for the Northern Parliament will, of course, take the oath. But they do not live in the South of Ireland, and are not subjected to the intimidation which goes on there. In the case of the South of Ireland Parliament no one will dare to come forward, and either that Southern Parliament will never exist or, if it is elected, and this is a suggestion I have had, not from confidential quarters—I do not altogether accept it or reject it, at any rate until I have heard explanations from the Government—that the only reason for putting this Clause down is that, in the event of an election taking place for the Southern Parliament, Sinn Fein candidates will come forward and stand with the intention of being elected without eventually taking the oath of allegiance, and when 200 or 300 of them have been elected they will seize some public building in Cork, Dublin, or elsewhere, will claim to be the properly elected representatives of the people of the South of Ireland, will announce they are not going to take the oath of allegiance, and will appeal to the world for recognition as the accredited representatives of the people. I quite admit that that objection has to be got over, It is very possibly the course that would be pursued by Sinn Fein candidates, but even if that be so, I do most earnestly ask the Government, Is that a reason for differentiating the case of the Irish Parliament from that of all other Parliaments in all parts of the world? Will it not go forth to the world that we are making it impossible for people to stand for the Parliament in the South of Ireland? It is a terrible thing that circumstances should be as they are, but I earnestly beg the Government not to move this Clause, and to take time for further consideration. I would be the last to suggest negotiations outside the House, but I do think this is just one of those cases where the Government might very well discuss the question with some of their own supporters in the House and outside, and consider whether it is really necessary to press the Clause. At any rate, I hope it will not be taken this afternoon.

I have listened with great interest to my Noble Friend, and especially to the last suggestion which he made. I quite realise that we have got through the Clauses much more quickly to-day than probably any Member of the Committee anticipated, and this Clause, which has aroused a great deal of interest for some time past, both inside the House of Commons and outside, has been reached much earlier than has been expected by most hon. Members, some of whom, no doubt, would like to take part in the discussion upon it. I shall, therefore, be quite willing, on behalf of the Government, to withdraw the Motion for this new Clause today, and to bring it up on Report. It must be understood that I am not withdrawing it altogether, but I do not want to take hon. Members by surprise, and, if we were to discuss it at this moment, I am not sure that there might not be a reasonable complaint that hon. Members did not expect it to be reached so soon, and consequently are not here to discuss it. My hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Hogge) has come in breathless to take part in this discussion, and he may have other friends who wish to take part in it also. Therefore, for the convenience of the Committee, I would ask leave to withdraw the Clause.

rose—

I beg to move, "That the Clause be read a Second time."

I am very sorry to have prevented my hon. Friend (Mr. Hogge) from speaking just now but I move this Clause formally in order that he may not feel any sense of grievance, and that he may be able to make the speech that he wants to make.

I have no desire in the world to fire off a speech. All that I wanted to do was to make a suggestion with regard to the way in which the matter should be dealt with. I appreciate as much as anyone that my right hon. Friend has withdrawn the discussion of the Clause in Committee, and has suggested that it shall be discussed on Report. As a matter of fact, however, on Report no hon. Member can speak more than once. It is not that that matters, because I do not think we on this side can be accused of having made too many speeches upon this Bill; but, in any case, the disadvantage of Report is that you cannot get the explanations to which you are entitled from the Minister. If the Government have reached a stage in the Bill which they did not anticipate reaching to-day, that obviously means, having regard to the time that they have already apportioned for it next week, that the discussion on the whole Bill is quite likely to finish on Wednesday night. In view of that, I am not sure that the Government would not be doing the right thing if they reported Progress now, because the same objection obviously would arise in regard to several other of these new Clauses, which nobody anticipated would be reached to-day. A great many hon. Members who are interested in them may be absent, though, of course, that is their own fault. I do not desire to excuse them for that reason, but only to suggest that the Government having taken a certain amount of time in anticipation, and it being perfectly obvious now that they will not require all tint time, they might be serving a good purpose by reporting Progress now.

That is the worst of making any concession; one is immediately pressed to make a still further concession. I thought that my Noble Friend (Earl Winterton), in regard to this big Clause, had made out a really good case of surprise; but there are many minor Amendments—cleaning-up Amendments—which we can usefully take to-day.

Then do that.

That is what I am proposing to do. I am proposing, not to press for any of these big Clauses, but to take the others which relate to matters of detail. Accordingly I beg to ask leave to withdraw this Clause.

I beg to move "That the Clause be read a Second time.

I beg to move, "That the Clause be read a second time."

The object of this Clause is simply to enable two clerks of the Crown and Peace to exchange offices with one another. I do not think there can be any serious objection to that. It is a small matter, and does not affect more than one or two clerks of the Crown and Peace in Ireland

My hon. and gallant Friend suggests that this Clause is quite harmless, but, on the contrary, I regret to say that I cannot accept it. It proposes to empower a clerk of the Crown and Peace in Southern Ireland to exchange offices with a clerk of the Crown and Peace in Northern Ireland, and vice versa. It enables two of these clerks to negotiate a transfer and fix their own salaries and pensions quite independently of the two Governments.

It is subject to the sanction of the Lord Chancellor.

I know that it does require the sanction of the Lord Chancellor, but he is not an officer of either of the Governments, and is not responsible for providing the money. He has a freehold office. The salaries and pensions and the tenure of the existing clerks are already safeguarded, and if my hon. and gallant Friend will look at Clause 51 of the Bill he will see what the safeguards are. If this particular Clause were accepted it would lead to very remarkable results, and if we were to accept it we could not possibly refuse it in connection with other members of the Civil Service.

I should have thought my right hon. Friend, without refusing altogether to accept the Clause, might have suggested the necessary alteration to meet the point which he has raised. I do not think it was in the contemplation of those who prepared the Clause that that particular point would arise which my right hon. Friend has drawn attention to, but surely it is better in such cases as this, if it is possible that there should be such interchanges as are suggested in the Clause between officers of the North and the South, rather than that either, or both, should have to depend upon the provisions of the Clauses in the Bill, and if my right hon. Friend would intimate that he would accept the Clause subject to alterations which would safeguard the question of salary, it would, of course, be impossible that the officers should fix their own salaries, but it would be quite easy to make a verbal alteration, to meet that particular criticism, which could be made before the Report stage if he would intimate, as he has practically done, that that is the only point on which he objects to the Clause.

I forgot that we have already promised to put down an Amendment which will enable these clerks to retire on full pension after the appointed day. That will have to come on the Report stage, and I will see between now and then whether I can go any further distance to meet my hon. and gallant Friend. He, himself, will see that the Clause is impossible as it stands, but it may not be impossible to find a proper authority who can deal with the salaries, and it may be possible to give them the right to retire and offer themselves for re-engagement to the other Parliament, and it may be that that will really secure the hon. and gallant Gentleman's main object. However, I will look into it between now and Report.

Would there be any objection to such interchanges taking place at the existing salaries? That is to say a man who effects an exchange and goes from North to South would take the salary of the existing man in the South and vice versa.

On the face of it, there does not seem to be any objection, but I am not familiar with the details of their appointment, and I must reserve the question for Report.

I beg to move "That the Clause be read a Second time."

I desire to call attention to the fact that this is one of the very few Amendments on the Paper on which representatives of Southern and Northern Ireland are agreed, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will regard that as a sufficiently good reason why the Government ought to concur. The object of the Clause, I think, is so obvious on the face of it that I need not labour it, and I formally beg to move.

The Government is willing to accept this Clause with one addition. I move to insert the following words at the end—

We must get the Second Heading of the Clause first. The right hon. Gentleman may explain his Amendment, but he cannot move it.

There are two Clauses dealing with the same subject. It is the second of these Clauses which we think is the more proper of the two.

I take it the right hon. Gentleman is agreeing that the Clause should be read a Second time.

No, the next Clause.

The hon. Member (Mr. Moles) moved a new Clause. I take it that the Government is not objecting.

Yes, we object to it. We wish to have the Clause in the form in which it is introduced later on by the hon. Member (Mr. Reid).

I beg to move, "That the Clause be read a Second time."

There is an Amendment on the Paper to the Clause just negatived which I wish to move as an Amendment to this Clause. I should like to know whether I can still do that.

The question is that this Clause be read a Second time. Would it not be better that the hon. Member who is moving the Clause should explain it, and then when the Committee knows what it is I will put the Question, "That the Clause be read a Second time." Then if anyone wishes to amend it, an Amendment can be moved. That is the way in

I beg to move, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."

On a point of Order. Is that a competent Motion on the Question before the Committee?

I think I am in order in moving that the Debate be now adjourned.

It is a Motion to report Progress.

Yes, and I put it with great respect to the Committee, and with the greatest respect to you, Sir, that we are going ahead at the rate that was never contemplated when the Government said they were going to take this Bill to-day. A Count was called almost as soon as the sitting began. A number of hon. Members, who are not of my party, but who are interested in this Bill, have Amendments down which they meant to move. I daresay it is their fault that they are not here; but I do put it to the Committee that if we wish this Bill in any way to be taken seriously by any part of Ireland—and that is the important thing—we want, at any rate, the North to be temporarily peaceful as a result of this Bill—it is indecent to proceed as we are doing with the Bill to-day.

I beg to move, in Part I., under heading "Universities," to leave out:

What is this Amendment about?

This Amendment is consequential upon an Amendment which was accepted to Clause 17, preserving the representation of the Irish Universities in the United Kingdom Parliament. It formed the subject of debate in June last.

I beg to move, in Part III, to leave out paragraph 1, (a).

This Amendment stands in the name of my right hon. Friend (Sir E. Carson). I very much regret that it is through indisposition he is not here to move it. I feel, comparatively, imperfectly qualified to put forward the arguments in support of it which my right hon. Friend would have addressed to the Committee. As a matter of fact I do not think the right hon. Gentleman in charge of the Bill is under any doubt as to the views of my right hon. Friend on the matter. It is quite clear that when the two Governments are established it is of the first importance that the judiciary in both areas should be such as will, from the first, command the entire confidence of the people among whom they have to administer the law. I do not think that anyone will question that under existing conditions, without referring to individuals—I have no individual in my mind—it might be possible for a transfer to be made from one area to another of a judge who will be very far from commanding the confidence that it is necessary he should possess. Without further labouring the subject, I ask my right hon Friend to accept the Amendment as it stands or to keep an open mind on the subject at a later stage, when no doubt the right hon. Member for Duncairn would be able to give reasons in favour of it.

I cannot accept the Amendment, but I am proposing to accept the next two Amendments on the Paper which complete the scheme of the Bill. To leave out paragraph (a) would destroy the scheme of the Bill. The next two Amendments, I think, will give the protection that is desired.

What the right hon. Gentleman has said will probably be quite satisfactory to my right hon. Friend. Upon Report it will be open to him, if he should think fit to do so, to move his Amendment again. In the meantime I would ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.